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GRAHAM +{1874 was 1st edition of this translation. +1909 was the London +reprinting.} + + +NEW AND REVISED EDITION +WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY +COLONEL F.N. MAUDE C.B. (LATE R.E.) + + +EIGHTH IMPRESSION +IN THREE VOLUMES + + + + +VOLUME I + + + +INTRODUCTION + +THE Germans interpret their new national colours--black, +red, and white-by the saying, "Durch Nacht und Blut zur +licht." ("Through night and blood to light"), and no work +yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception +of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this +deep and philosophical analysis of "War" by Clausewitz. + +It reveals "War," stripped of all accessories, as the +exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, +unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and +thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political +aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally +necessary for every student of the modern conditions +of Europe. Step by step, every event since +Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the +teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, +some twenty years afterwards, by this remarkable +thinker. + +What Darwin accomplished for Biology generally +Clausewitz did for the Life-History of Nations nearly half +a century before him, for both have proved the existence +of the same law in each case, viz., "The survival of the +fittest"--the "fittest," as Huxley long since pointed out, +not being necessarily synonymous with the ethically +"best." Neither of these thinkers was concerned with +the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively, +but to both men the phase or condition presented +itself neither as moral nor immoral, any more than +are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena, but as +emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms +which can only be mastered by understanding its nature. +It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the +Nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic lessons as +Koniggr<a:>tz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the +result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and peace is +maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue +just as long as this equilibrium exists, and no longer. + +Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or +desirable thing may be open to argument. I have discussed +it at length in my "War and the World's Life"; +but I venture to suggest that to no one would a renewal +of the era of warfare be a change for the better, as far +as existing humanity is concerned. Meanwhile, however, +with every year that elapses the forces at present in +equilibrium are changing in magnitude--the pressure of +populations which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion +along the line of least resistance is, sooner or later, +inevitable. + +As I read the teaching of the recent Hague Conference, +no responsible Government on the Continent is anxious +to form in themselves that line of least resistance; they +know only too well what War would mean; and we alone, +absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant +thought of Europe, are pulling down the dam which may +at any moment let in on us the flood of invasion. + +Now no responsible man in Europe, perhaps least of +all in Germany, thanks us for this voluntary destruction +of our defences, for all who are of any importance would +very much rather end their days in peace than incur the +burden of responsibility which War would entail. But +they realise that the gradual dissemination of the principles +taught by Clausewitz has created a condition of +molecular tension in the minds of the Nations they +govern analogous to the "critical temperature of water +heated above boiling-point under pressure," which may at +any moment bring about an explosion which they will be +powerless to control. + +The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam +boiler, delivering so and so many pounds of steam to its +engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure; +but let a breach in its continuity arise--relieving the +boiling water of all restraint--and in a moment the whole +mass flashes into vapour, developing a power no work of +man can oppose. + +The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell. +The only way to avert them is to ensure victory; +and, again following out the principles of Clausewitz, +victory can only be ensured by the creation in +peace of an organisation which will bring every available +man, horse, and gun (or ship and gun, if the war be on +the sea) in the shortest possible time, and with the utmost +possible momentum, upon the decisive field of action-- +which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by +Von der Goltz in excuse for the action of the late President +Kruger in 1899: + +"The Statesman who, knowing his instrument to be +ready, and seeing War inevitable, hesitates to strike first +is guilty of a crime against his country." + +It is because this sequence of cause and effect is absolutely +unknown to our Members of Parliament, elected +by popular representation, that all our efforts to ensure a +lasting peace by securing efficiency with economy in our +National Defences have been rendered nugatory. + +This estimate of the influence of Clausewitz's sentiments +on contemporary thought in Continental Europe +may appear exaggerated to those who have not familiarised +themselves with M. Gustav de Bon's exposition of +the laws governing the formation and conduct of crowds +I do not wish for one minute to be understood as asserting +that Clausewitz has been conscientiously studied and +understood in any Army, not even in the Prussian, but +his work has been the ultimate foundation on which every +drill regulation in Europe, except our own, has been +reared. It is this ceaseless repetition of his fundamental +ideas to which one-half of the male population of every +Continental Nation has been subjected for two to three +years of their lives, which has tuned their minds to +vibrate in harmony with his precepts, and those who +know and appreciate this fact at its true value have +only to strike the necessary chords in order to evoke a +response sufficient to overpower any other ethical conception +which those who have not organised their forces +beforehand can appeal to. + +The recent set-back experienced by the Socialists in +Germany is an illustration of my position. The Socialist +leaders of that country are far behind the responsible +Governors in their knowledge of the management of +crowds. The latter had long before (in 1893, in fact) +made their arrangements to prevent the spread of Socialistic +propaganda beyond certain useful limits. As long +as the Socialists only threatened capital they were not +seriously interfered with, for the Government knew quite +well that the undisputed sway of the employer was not +for the ultimate good of the State. The standard of +comfort must not be pitched too low if men are to he +ready to die for their country. But the moment the +Socialists began to interfere seriously with the discipline +of the Army the word went round, and the Socialists +lost heavily at the polls. + +If this power of predetermined reaction to acquired +ideas can be evoked successfully in a matter of internal +interest only, in which the "obvious interest" of the +vast majority of the population is so clearly on the side +of the Socialist, it must be evident how enormously greater +it will prove when set in motion against an external +enemy, where the "obvious interest" of the people is, +from the very nature of things, as manifestly on the side +of the Government; and the Statesman who failed to +take into account the force of the "resultant thought +wave" of a crowd of some seven million men, all trained +to respond to their ruler's call, would be guilty of treachery +as grave as one who failed to strike when he knew the +Army to be ready for immediate action. + +As already pointed out, it is to the spread of Clausewitz's +ideas that the present state of more or less immediate +readiness for war of all European Armies is due, +and since the organisation of these forces is uniform this +"more or less" of readiness exists in precise proportion +to the sense of duty which animates the several Armies. +Where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice is low the +troops are unready and inefficient; where, as in Prussia, +these qualities, by the training of a whole century, have +become instinctive, troops really are ready to the last +button, and might be poured down upon any one of her +neighbours with such rapidity that the very first collision +must suffice to ensure ultimate success--a success by no +means certain if the enemy, whoever he may be, is +allowed breathing-time in which to set his house in order. + +An example will make this clearer. In 1887 Germany +was on the very verge of War with France and Russia. +At that moment her superior efficiency, the consequence +of this inborn sense of duty--surely one of the highest +qualities of humanity--was so great that it is more than +probable that less than six weeks would have sufficed to +bring the French to their knees. Indeed, after the first +fortnight it would have been possible to begin transferring +troops from the Rhine to the Niemen; and the same +case may arise again. But if France and Russia had +been allowed even ten days' warning the German plan +would have been completely defeated. France alone +might then have claimed all the efforts that Germany +could have put forth to defeat her. + +Yet there are politicians in England so grossly ignorant +of the German reading of the Napoleonic lessons that +they expect that Nation to sacrifice the enormous advantage +they have prepared by a whole century of self- +sacrifice and practical patriotism by an appeal to a +Court of Arbitration, and the further delays which must +arise by going through the medieaeval formalities of recalling +Ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums. + +Most of our present-day politicians have made their +money in business--a "form of human competition +greatly resembling War," to paraphrase Clausewitz. +Did they, when in the throes of such competition, send +formal notice to their rivals of their plans to get the better +of them in commerce? Did Mr. Carnegie, the arch- +priest of Peace at any price, when he built up the Steel +Trust, notify his competitors when and how he proposed +to strike the blows which successively made him master +of millions? Surely the Directors of a Great Nation +may consider the interests of their shareholders--i.e., the +people they govern--as sufficiently serious not to be +endangered by the deliberate sacrifice of the preponderant +position of readiness which generations of self-devotion, +patriotism and wise forethought have won for them? + +As regards the strictly military side of this work, +though the recent researches of the French General Staff +into the records and documents of the Napoleonic period +have shown conclusively that Clausewitz had never +grasped the essential point of the Great Emperor's strategic +method, yet it is admitted that he has completely fathomed +the spirit which gave life to the form; and notwithstandingthe +variations in +application which have +resulted from the progress of invention in every field of +national activity (not in the technical improvements in +armament alone), this spirit still remains the essential +factor in the whole matter. Indeed, if anything, modern +appliances have intensified its importance, for though, +with equal armaments on both sides, the form of battles +must always remain the same, the facility and certainty +of combination which better methods of communicating +orders and intelligence have conferred upon the Commanders +has rendered the control of great masses immeasurably +more certain than it was in the past. + +Men kill each other at greater distances, it is true-- +but killing is a constant factor in all battles. The difference +between "now and then" lies in this, that, thanks +to the enormous increase in range (the essential feature +in modern armaments), it is possible to concentrate by +surprise, on any chosen spot, a man-killing power fully +twentyfold greater than was conceivable in the days of +Waterloo; and whereas in Napoleon's time this concentration +of man-killing power (which in his hands took the +form of the great case-shot attack) depended almost +entirely on the shape and condition of the ground, which +might or might not be favourable, nowadays such concentration +of fire-power is almost independent of the +country altogether. + +Thus, at Waterloo, Napoleon was compelled to wait till +the ground became firm enough for his guns to gallop +over; nowadays every gun at his disposal, and five times +that number had he possessed them, might have opened +on any point in the British position he had selected, as +soon as it became light enough to see. + +Or, to take a more modern instance, viz., the battle +of St. Privat-Gravelotte, August 18, 1870, where the +Germans were able to concentrate on both wings batteries +of two hundred guns and upwards, it would have been +practically impossible, owing to the section of the slopes +of the French position, to carry out the old-fashioned +case-shot attack at all. Nowadays there would be no +difficulty in turning on the fire of two thousand guns on +any point of the position, and switching this fire up and +down the line like water from a fire-engine hose, if the +occasion demanded such concentration. + +But these alterations in method make no difference +in the truth of the picture of War which Clausewitz +presents, with which every soldier, and above all every +Leader, should be saturated. + +Death, wounds, suffering, and privation remain the +same, whatever the weapons employed, and their reaction +on the ultimate nature of man is the same now as +in the struggle a century ago. It is this reaction that +the Great Commander has to understand and prepare +himself to control; and the task becomes ever greater as, +fortunately for humanity, the opportunities for gathering +experience become more rare. + +In the end, and with every improvement in science, +the result depends more and more on the character of +the Leader and his power of resisting "the sensuous +impressions of the battlefield." Finally, for those who +would fit themselves in advance for such responsibility, +I know of no more inspiring advice than that given by +Krishna to Arjuna ages ago, when the latter trembled +before the awful responsibility of launching his Army +against the hosts of the Pandav's: + + This Life within all living things, my Prince, + Hides beyond harm. Scorn thou to suffer, then, + For that which cannot suffer. Do thy part! + Be mindful of thy name, and tremble not. + Nought better can betide a martial soul + Than lawful war. Happy the warrior + To whom comes joy of battle.... + . . . But if thou shunn'st + This honourable field--a Kshittriya-- + If, knowing thy duty and thy task, thou bidd'st + Duty and task go by--that shall be sin! + And those to come shall speak thee infamy + From age to age. But infamy is worse + For men of noble blood to bear than death! + . . . . . . + Therefore arise, thou Son of Kunti! Brace + Thine arm for conflict; nerve thy heart to meet, + As things alike to thee, pleasure or pain, + Profit or ruin, victory or defeat. + So minded, gird thee to the fight, for so + Thou shalt not sin! + COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E. + + + +CONTENTS + +BOOK I ON THE NATURE OF WAR + + I WHAT IS WAR? page 1 + II END AND MEANS IN WAR 27 + III THE GENIUS FOR WAR 46 + IV OF DANGER IN WAR 71 + V OF BODILY EXERTION IN WAR 73 + VI INFORMATION IN WAR 75 + VII FRICTION IN WAR 77 + VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 81 + + BOOK II ON THE THEORY OF WAR + I BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR 84 + II ON THE THEORY OF WAR 95 + III ART OR SCIENCE OF WAR 119 + IV METHODICISM 122V CRITICISM 130 + VI ON EXAMPLES 156 + + BOOK III OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL + I STRATEGY 165 + II ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY 175 + III MORAL FORCES 177 + IV THE CHIEF MORAL POWERS 179 + V MILITARY VIRTUE OF AN ARMY 180 + VI BOLDNESS 186 + VII PERSEVERANCE 191 + VIII SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS 192 + IX THE SURPRISE 199 + X STRATAGEM 205 + XI ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN SPACE 207 + XII ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME 208 + XIII STRATEGIC RESERVE 217 + XIV ECONOMY OF FORCES 221 + XV GEOMETRICAL ELEMENT 222 + XVI ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WAR page 224 + XVII ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR 230 + XVIII TENSION AND REST 231 + + BOOK IV THE COMBAT + I INTRODUCTORY 235 + II CHARACTER OF THE MODERN BATTLE 236 + III THE COMBAT IN GENERAL 238 + IV THE COMBAT IN GENERAL (continuation) 243 + V ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE COMBAT 253 + VI DURATION OF THE COMBAT 256 + VII DECISION OF THE COMBAT 257 + VIII MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS TO A BATTLE 266 + IX THE BATTLE 270 + X EFFECTS OF VICTORY 277 + XI THE USE OF THE BATTLE 284 + XII STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY 292 + XIII RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE 305 + XIV NIGHT FIGHTING 308 + + + +PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION + +IT will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a +female hand should accompany a work on such a subject +as the present. For my friends no explanation of the +circumstance is required; but I hope by a simple relation +of the cause to clear myself of the appearance of presumption +in the eyes also of those to whom I am not +known. + +The work to which these lines serve as a preface +occupied almost entirely the last twelve years of the life +of my inexpressibly beloved husband, who has unfortunately +been torn too soon from myself and his +country. To complete it was his most earnest desire; +but it was not his intention that it should be published +during his life; and if I tried to persuade him to alter +that intention, he often answered, half in jest, but also, +perhaps, half in a foreboding of early death: "Thou +shalt publish it." These words (which in those happy +days often drew tears from me, little as I was inclined to +attach a serious meaning to them) make it now, in the +opinion of my friends, a duty incumbent on me to introduce +the posthumous works of my beloved husband, +with a few prefatory lines from myself; and although +here may be a difference of opinion on this point, still +I am sure there will be no mistake as to the feeling which +has prompted me to overcome the timidity which makes +any such appearance, even in a subordinate part, so +difficult for a woman. + +It will be understood, as a matter of course, that I +cannot have the most remote intention of considering +myself as the real editress of a work which is far above +the scope of my capacity: I only stand at its side as an +affectionate companion on its entrance into the world. +This position I may well claim, as a similar one was +allowed me during its formation and progress. Those +who are acquainted with our happy married life, and +know how we shared everything with each other--not +only joy and sorrow, but also every occupation, every +interest of daily life--will understand that my beloved +husband could not be occupied on a work of this kind +without its being known to me. Therefore, no one can +like me bear testimony to the zeal, to the love with which +he laboured on it, to the hopes which he bound up with +it, as well as the manner and time of its elaboration. +His richly gifted mind had from his early youth longed +for light and truth, and, varied as were his talents, still +he had chiefly directed his reflections to the science of +war, to which the duties of his profession called him, and +which are of such importance for the benefit of States. +Scharnhorst was the first to lead him into the right road, +and his subsequent appointment in 1810 as Instructor +at the General War School, as well as the honour conferred +on him at the same time of giving military instruction +to H.R.H. the Crown Prince, tended further to give his +investigations and studies that direction, and to lead +him to put down in writing whatever conclusions he +arrived at. A paper with which he finished the instruction +of H.R.H. the Crown Prince contains the germ of his +subsequent works. But it was in the year 1816, at +Coblentz, that he first devoted himself again to scientific +labours, and to collecting the fruits which his rich experience +in those four eventful years had brought to +maturity. He wrote down his views, in the first place, +in short essays, only loosely connected with each other. +The following, without date, which has been found +amongst his papers, seems to belong to those early days. + +"In the principles here committed to paper, in my +opinion, the chief things which compose Strategy, as it +is called, are touched upon. I looked upon them only +as materials, and had just got to such a length towards +the moulding them into a whole. + +"These materials have been amassed without any +regularly preconceived plan. My view was at first, +without regard to system and strict connection, to put +down the results of my reflections upon the most important +points in quite brief, precise, compact propositions. +The manner in which Montesquieu has treated his subject +floated before me in idea. I thought that concise, +sententious chapters, which I proposed at first to call +grains, would attract the attention of the intelligent just +as much by that which was to be developed from them, +as by that which they contained in themselves. I had, +therefore, before me in idea, intelligent readers already +acquainted with the subject. But my nature, which +always impels me to development and systematising, at +last worked its way out also in this instance. For some +time I was able to confine myself to extracting only the +most important results from the essays, which, to attain +clearness and conviction in my own mind, I wrote upon +different subjects, to concentrating in that manner their +spirit in a small compass; but afterwards my peculiarity +gained ascendency completely--I have developed what +I could, and thus naturally have supposed a reader not +yet acquainted with the subject. + +"The more I advanced with the work, and the more +I yielded to the spirit of investigation, so much the more +I was also led to system; and thus, then, chapter after +chapter has been inserted. + +"My ultimate view has now been to go through the +whole once more, to establish by further explanation +much of the earlier treatises, and perhaps to condense +into results many analyses on the later ones, and thus to +make a moderate whole out of it, forming a small octavo +volume. But it was my wish also in this to avoid +everything common, everything that is plain of itself, +that has been said a hundred times, and is generally +accepted; for my ambition was to write a book that +would not be forgotten in two or three years, and which +any one interested in the subject would at all events +take up more than once." + +In Coblentz, where he was much occupied with duty, +he could only give occasional hours to his private studies. +It was not until 1818, after his appointment as Director +of the General Academy of War at Berlin, that he had +the leisure to expand his work, and enrich it from the +history of modern wars. This leisure also reconciled +him to his new avocation, which, in other respects, was +not satisfactory to him, as, according to the existing +organisation of the Academy, the scientific part of the +course is not under the Director, but conducted by a +Board of Studies. Free as he was from all petty vanity, +from every feeling of restless, egotistical ambition, still +he felt a desire to be really useful, and not to leave +inactive the abilities with which God had endowed him. +In active life he was not in a position in which this longing +could be satisfied, and he had little hope of attaining to +any such position: his whole energies were therefore +directed upon the domain of science, and the benefit +which he hoped to lay the foundation of by his work was +the object of his life. That, notwithstanding this, the +resolution not to let the work appear until after his +death became more confirmed is the best proof that +no vain, paltry longing for praise and distinction, no +particle of egotistical views, was mixed up with this +noble aspiration for great and lasting usefulness. + +Thus he worked diligently on, until, in the spring of +1830, he was appointed to the artillery, and his energies +were called into activity in such a different sphere, and +to such a high degree, that he was obliged, for the moment +at least, to give up all literary work. He then put his +papers in order, sealed up the separate packets, labelled +them, and took sorrowful leave of this employment which +he loved so much. He was sent to Breslau in August of +the same year, as Chief of the Second Artillery District, +but in December recalled to Berlin, and appointed Chief +of the Staff to Field-Marshal Count Gneisenau (for the +term of his command). In March 1831, he accompanied +his revered Commander to Posen. When he returned +from there to Breslau in November after the melancholy +event which had taken place, he hoped to resume his +work and perhaps complete it in the course of the winter. +The Almighty has willed it should be otherwise. On +the 7th November he returned to Breslau; on the 16th +he was no more; and the packets sealed by himself were +not opened until after his death. + +The papers thus left are those now made public in +the following volumes, exactly in the condition in which +they were found, without a word being added or erased. +Still, however, there was much to do before publication, +in the way of putting them in order and consulting about +them; and I am deeply indebted to several sincere +friends for the assistance they have afforded me, particularly +Major O'Etzel, who kindly undertook the +correction of the Press, as well as the preparation of the +maps to accompany the historical parts of the work. I +must also mention my much-loved brother, who was my +support in the hour of my misfortune, and who has also +done much for me in respect of these papers; amongst +other things, by carefully examining and putting them in +order, he found the commencement of the revision which +my dear husband wrote in the year 1827, and mentions +in the Notice hereafter annexed as a work he had in view. +This revision has been inserted in the place intended for +it in the first book (for it does not go any further). + +There are still many other friends to whom I might +offer my thanks for their advice, for the sympathy and +friendship which they have shown me; but if I do not +name them all, they will, I am sure, not have any doubts +of my sincere gratitude. It is all the greater, from my +firm conviction that all they have done was not only on +my own account, but for the friend whom God has thus +called away from them so soon. + +If I have been highly blessed as the wife of such a +man during one and twenty years, so am I still, +notwithstanding my irreparable loss, by the treasure of +my recollections and of my hopes, by the rich legacy of +sympathy and friendship which I owe the beloved +departed, by the elevating feeling which I experience +at seeing his rare worth so generally and honourably +acknowledged. + +The trust confided to me by a Royal Couple is a fresh +benefit for which I have to thank the Almighty, as it +opens to me an honourable occupation, to which Idevote myself. +May this +occupation be +blessed, and may the dear little Prince who is now +entrusted to my care, some day read this book, and +be animated by it to deeds like those of his glorious +ancestors. + + +Written at the Marble Palace, Potsdam, 30th June, 1832. + + MARIE VON CLAUSEWITZ, + Born Countess Bruhl, + Oberhofmeisterinn to H.R.H. the Princess William. + + + +NOTICE + +I LOOK upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has +now been made, as only a mass which is still in a manner +without form, and which has yet to be again revised. +In this revision the two kinds of War will be everywhere +kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will +acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and +a closer application. The two kinds of War are, first, +those in which the object is the OVERTHROW OF THE ENEMY, +whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, +or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude +peace on our terms; and next, those in which our object +is MERELY TO MAKE SOME CONQUESTS ON THE FRONTIERS OF HIS +COUNTRY, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, +or of turning them to account as matter of +exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transition from +one kind to the other must certainly continue to exist, +but the completely different nature of the tendencies of +the two must everywhere appear, and must separate +from each other things which are incompatible. + +Besides establishing this real difference in Wars, +another practically necessary point of view must at the +same time be established, which is, that WAR IS ONLY A +CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. This point of +view being adhered to everywhere, will introduce much +more unity into the consideration of the subject, and +things will be more easily disentangled from each other. +Although the chief application of this point of view does +not commence until we get to the eighth book, still it +must be completely developed in the first book, and also +lend assistance throughout the revision of the first six +books. Through such a revision the first six books will +get rid of a good deal of dross, many rents and chasms +will be closed up, and much that is of a general nature +will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms. + +The seventh book--on attack--for the different +chapters of which sketches are already made, is to be +considered as a reflection of the sixth, and must be +completed at once, according to the above-mentioned +more distinct points of view, so that it will require no +fresh revision, but rather may serve as a model in the +revision of the first six books. + +For the eighth book--on the Plan of a War, that is, +of the organisation of a whole War in general--several +chapters are designed, but they are not at all to be regarded +as real materials, they are merely a track, roughly cleared, +as it were, through the mass, in order by that means to +ascertain the points of most importance. They have +answered this object, and I propose, on finishing the seventh +book, to proceed at once to the working out of the eighth, +where the two points of view above mentioned will be +chiefly affirmed, by which everything will be simplified, +and at the same time have a spirit breathed into it. I +hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of +strategists and statesmen, and at least to show the object +of action, and the real point to be considered in War. + +Now, when I have brought my ideas clearly out by +finishing this eighth book, and have properly established +the leading features of War, it will be easier for me to +carry the spirit of these ideas in to the first six books, and +to make these same features show themselves everywhere. +Therefore I shall defer till then the revision of the first +six books. + +Should the work be interrupted by my death, then +what is found can only be called a mass of conceptions +not brought into form; but as these are open to endless +misconceptions, they will doubtless give rise to a number +of crude criticisms: for in these things, every one thinks, +when he takes up his pen, that whatever comes into his +head is worth saying and printing, and quite as incontrovertible +as that twice two make four. If such a one +would take the pains, as I have done, to think over the +subject, for years, and to compare his ideas with military +history, he would certainly be a little more guarded in +his criticism. + +Still, notwithstanding this imperfect form, I believe +that an impartial reader thirsting for truth and conviction +will rightly appreciate in the first six books the +fruits of several years' reflection and a diligent study of +War, and that, perhaps, he will find in them some +leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in the +theory of War. + + Berlin, 10th July, 1827. + + +Besides this notice, amongst the papers left the +following unfinished memorandum was found, which +appears of very recent date: + +The manuscript on the conduct of the Grande Guerre, +which will be found after my death, in its present state +can only be regarded as a collection of materials from +which it is intended to construct a theory of War. With +the greater part I am not yet satisfied; and the sixth +book is to be looked at as a mere essay: I should have +completely remodelled it, and have tried a different line. + +But the ruling principles which pervade these materials +I hold to be the right ones: they are the result of a +very varied reflection, keeping always in view the reality, +and always bearing in mind what I have learnt by experience +and by my intercourse with distinguished soldiers. + +The seventh book is to contain the attack, the +subjects of which are thrown together in a hasty manner: +the eighth, the plan for a War, in which I would have +examined War more especially in its political and human +aspects. + +The first chapter of the first book is the only one +which I consider as completed; it will at least serve to +show the manner in which I proposed to treat the subject +throughout. + +The theory of the Grande Guerre, or Strategy, as it is +called, is beset with extraordinary difficulties, and we +may affirm that very few men have clear conceptions of +the separate subjects, that is, conceptions carried up to +their full logical conclusions. In real action most men +are guided merely by the tact of judgment which hits +the object more or less accurately, according as they possess +more or less genius. + +This is the way in which all great Generals have +acted, and therein partly lay their greatness and their +genius, that they always hit upon what was right by +this tact. Thus also it will always be in action, and so +far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question, +not of acting oneself, but of convincing others in a +consultation, then all depends on clear conceptions and +demonstration of the inherent relations, and so little +progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations +are merely a contention of words, resting on no +firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own +opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations +of respect, a middle course really without any value.[*] + +[*] Herr Clausewitz evidently had before his mind the endless +consultations +at the Headquarters of the Bohemian Army in the Leipsic +Campaign 1813. + +Clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly +useless; besides, the human mind has a general tendency +to clearness, and always wants to be consistent +with the necessary order of things. + +Owing to the great difficulties attending a philosophical +construction of the Art of War, and the many +attempts at it that have failed, most people have come +to the conclusion that such a theory is impossible, because +it concerns things which no standing law can embrace. +We should also join in this opinion and give up any +attempt at a theory, were it not that a great number of +propositions make themselves evident without any +difficulty, as, for instance, that the defensive form, with +a negative object, is the stronger form, the attack, with the +positive object, the weaker--that great results carry the +little ones with them--that, therefore, strategic effects +may be referred to certain centres of gravity--that a +demonstration is a weaker application of force than a +real attack, that, therefore, there must be some special +reason for resorting to the former--that victory consists +not merely in the conquest on the field of battle, but in +the destruction of armed forces, physically and morally, +which can in general only be effected by a pursuit after +the battle is gained--that successes are always greatest +at the point where the victory has been gained, that, +therefore, the change from one line and object to another +can only be regarded as a necessary evil--that a turning +movement is only justified by a superiority of numbers +generally or by the advantage of our lines of communication +and retreat over those of the enemy--that flank +positions are only justifiable on similar grounds--that +every attack becomes weaker as it progresses. + + +THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR + +THAT the conception of the scientific does not consist +alone, or chiefly, in system, and its finished theoretical +constructions, requires nowadays no exposition. System +in this treatise is not to be found on the surface, and +instead of a finished building of theory, there are only +materials. + +The scientific form lies here in the endeavour to +explore the nature of military phenomena to show their +affinity with the nature of the things of which they are +composed. Nowhere has the philosophical argument +been evaded, but where it runs out into too thin a thread +the Author has preferred to cut it short, and fall back +upon the corresponding results of experience; for in +the same way as many plants only bear fruit when they +do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the theoretical +leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout +too far, but kept near to experience, which is their proper +soil. + +Unquestionably it would be a mistake to try to +discover from the chemical ingredients of a grain of corn +the form of the ear of corn which it bears, as we have only +to go to the field to see the ears ripe. Investigation and +observation, philosophy and experience, must neither +despise nor exclude one another; they mutually afford +each other the rights of citizenship. Consequently, +the propositions of this book, with their arch of inherent +necessity, are supported either by experience or by the +conception of War itself as external points, so that they +are not without abutments.[*] + +[*] That this is not the case in the works of many military +writers +especially of those who have aimed at treating of War itself in a +scientific manner, is shown in many instances, in which by their +reasoning, +the pro and contra swallow each other up so effectually that +there +is no vestige of the tails even which were left in the case of +the two +lions. + + +It is, perhaps, not impossible to write a systematic +theory of War full of spirit and substance, but ours. +hitherto, have been very much the reverse. To say +nothing of their unscientific spirit, in their striving after +coherence and completeness of system, they overflow +with commonplaces, truisms, and twaddle of every kind. +If we want a striking picture of them we have only to +read Lichtenberg's extract from a code of regulations +in case of fire. + +If a house takes fire, we must seek, above all things, +to protect the right side of the house standing on the left, +and, on the other hand, the left side of the house on the +right; for if we, for example, should protect the left side +of the house on the left, then the right side of the house +lies to the right of the left, and consequently as the fire +lies to the right of this side, and of the right side (for we +have assumed that the house is situated to the left of +the fire), therefore the right side is situated nearer to +the fire than the left, and the right side of the house might +catch fire if it was not protected before it came to the +left, which is protected. Consequently, something might +be burnt that is not protected, and that sooner than +something else would be burnt, even if it was not protected; +consequently we must let alone the latter and +protect the former. In order to impress the thing on +one's mind, we have only to note if the house is situated +to the right of the fire, then it is the left side, and if the +house is to the left it is the right side. + +In order not to frighten the intelligent reader by +such commonplaces, and to make the little good that +there is distasteful by pouring water upon it, the Author +has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal his +impressions and convictions, the result of many years' +reflection on War, of his intercourse with men of ability, +and of much personal experience. Thus the seemingly +weakly bound-together chapters of this book have +arisen, but it is hoped they will not be found wanting +in logical connection. Perhaps soon a greater head may +appear, and instead of these single grains, give the whole +in a casting of pure metal without dross. + + + +BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL +CLAUSEWITZ + +(BY TRANSLATOR) + +THE Author of the work here translated, General Carl +Von Clausewitz, was born at Burg, near Magdeburg, in +1780, and entered the Prussian Army as Fahnenjunker +(i.e., ensign) in 1792. He served in the campaigns of +1793-94 on the Rhine, after which he seems to have +devoted some time to the study of the scientific branches +of his profession. In 1801 he entered the Military School +at Berlin, and remained there till 1803. During his +residence there he attracted the notice of General +Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment; and +the patronage of this distinguished officer had immense +influence on his future career, and we may gather +from his writings that he ever afterwards continued +to entertain a high esteem for Scharnhorst. In the +campaign of 1806 he served as Aide-de-camp to Prince +Augustus of Prussia; and being wounded and taken +prisoner, he was sent into France until the close of that +war. On his return, he was placed on General Scharnhorst's +Staff, and employed in the work then going on +for the reorganisation of the Army. He was also at this +time selected as military instructor to the late King of +Prussia, then Crown Prince. In 1812 Clausewitz, with +several other Prussian officers, having entered the +Russian service, his first appointment was as Aide-de-camp +to General Phul. Afterwards, while serving with Wittgenstein's +army, he assisted in negotiating the famous convention +of Tauroggen with York. Of the part he took in +that affair he has left an interesting account in his work +on the "Russian Campaign." It is there stated that, +in order to bring the correspondence which had been +carried on with York to a termination in one way or +another, the Author was despatched to York's headquarters +with two letters, one was from General d'Auvray, +the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein's army, to General +Diebitsch, showing the arrangements made to cut off +York's corps from Macdonald (this was necessary in order +to give York a plausible excuse for seceding from the +French); the other was an intercepted letter from +Macdonald to the Duke of Bassano. With regard to +the former of these, the Author says, "it would not have +had weight with a man like York, but for a military +justification, if the Prussian Court should require one +as against the French, it was important." + +The second letter was calculated at the least to call +up in General York's mind all the feelings of bitterness +which perhaps for some days past bad been diminished by +the consciousness of his own behaviour towards the writer. + +As the Author entered General York's chamber, the +latter called out to him, "Keep off from me; I will have +nothing more to do with you; your d----d Cossacks +have let a letter of Macdonald's pass through them, +which brings me an order to march on Piktrepohnen, in +order there to effect our junction. All doubt is now at +an end; your troops do not come up; you are too +weak; march I must, and I must excuse myself from +further negotiation, which may cost me my head." +The Author said that be would make no opposition to +all this, but begged for a candle, as he had letters to show +the General, and, as the latter seemed still to hesitate, +the Author added, "Your Excellency will not surely +place me in the embarrassment of departing without +having executed my commission." The General ordered +candles, and called in Colonel von Roeder, the chief of his +staff, from the ante-chamber. The letters were read. +After a pause of an instant, the General said, "Clausewitz, +you are a Prussian, do you believe that the letter of +General d'Auvray is sincere, and that Wittgenstein's +troops will really be at the points he mentioned on the +31st?" The Author replied, "I pledge myself for the +sincerity of this letter upon the knowledge I have of +General d'Auvray and the other men of Wittgenstein's +headquarters; whether the dispositions he announces +can be accomplished as he lays down I certainly cannot +pledge myself; for your Excellency knows that in war +we must often fall short of the line we have drawn for +ourselves." The General was silent for a few minutes +of earnest reflection; then he held out his hand to the +Author, and said, "You have me. Tell General Diebitsch +that we must confer early to-morrow at the mill of +Poschenen, and that I am now firmly determined to +separate myself from the French and their cause." The +hour was fixed for 8 A.M. After this was settled, the +General added, "But I will not do the thing by halves, +I will get you Massenbach also." He called in an officer +who was of Massenbach's cavalry, and who had just left +them. Much like Schiller's Wallenstein, he asked, walking +up and down the room the while, "What say your +regiments?" The officer broke out with enthusiasm at +the idea of a riddance from the French alliance, and said +that every man of the troops in question felt the same. + +"You young ones may talk; but my older head is +shaking on my shoulders," replied the General.[*] + +[*] "Campaign in Russia in 1812"; translated from the German of +General Von Clausewitz (by Lord Ellesmere). + +After the close of the Russian campaign Clausewitz +remained in the service of that country, but was attached +as a Russian staff officer to Blucher's headquarters till +the Armistice in 1813. + +In 1814, he became Chief of the Staff of General +Walmoden's Russo-German Corps, which formed part +of the Army of the North under Bernadotte. His +name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that +campaign, particularly in connection with the affair +of Goehrde. + +Clausewitz re-entered the Prussian service in 1815, +and served as Chief of the Staff to Thielman's corps, +which was engaged with Grouchy at Wavre, on the 18th +of June. + +After the Peace, he was employed in a command on +the Rhine. In 1818, he became Major-General, and +Director of the Military School at which he had been +previously educated. + +In 1830, he was appointed Inspector of Artillery at +Breslau, but soon after nominated Chief of the Staff to +the Army of Observation, under Marshal Gneisenau on +the Polish frontier. + +The latest notices of his life and services are probably +to be found in the memoirs of General Brandt, who, +from being on the staff of Gneisenau's army, was brought +into daily intercourse with Clausewitz in matters of +duty, and also frequently met him at the table of Marshal +Gneisenau, at Posen. + +Amongst other anecdotes, General Brandt relates +that, upon one occasion, the conversation at the Marshal's +table turned upon a sermon preached by a priest, in +which some great absurdities were introduced, and a +discussion arose as to whether the Bishop should not be +made responsible for what the priest had said. This +led to the topic of theology in general, when General +Brandt, speaking of himself, says, "I expressed an +opinion that theology is only to be regarded as an historical +process, as a MOMENT in the gradual development of the +human race. This brought upon me an attack from all +quarters, but more especially from Clausewitz, who ought +to have been on my side, he having been an adherent +and pupil of Kiesewetter's, who had indoctrinated him +in the philosophy of Kant, certainly diluted--I +might even say in homoeopathic doses." This anecdote +is only interesting as the mention of Kiesewetter points +to a circumstance in the life of Clausewitz that may have +had an influence in forming those habits of thought +which distinguish his writings. + +"The way," says General Brandt, "in which General +Clausewitz judged of things, drew conclusions from movements +and marches, calculated the times of the marches, +and the points where decisions would take place, was extremely +interesting. Fate has unfortunately denied him +an opportunity of showing his talents in high command, +but I have a firm persuasion that as a strategist he would +have greatly distinguished himself. As a leader on the +field of battle, on the other hand, he would not have been +so much in his right place, from a manque d'habitude +du commandement, he wanted the art d'enlever les +troupes." + +After the Prussian Army of Observation was dissolved, +Clausewitz returned to Breslau, and a few days after his +arrival was seized with cholera, the seeds of which +he must have brought with him from the army on the +Polish frontier. His death took place in November +1831. + +His writings are contained in nine volumes, published +after his death, but his fame rests most upon the three +volumes forming his treatise on "War." In the present +attempt to render into English this portion of the works +of Clausewitz, the translator is sensible of many deficiencies, +but he hopes at all events to succeed in making this +celebrated treatise better known in England, believing, +as he does, that so far as the work concerns the interests +of this country, it has lost none of the importance it +possessed at the time of its first publication. + + J. J. GRAHAM (Col.) + + + +BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR + +CHAPTER I. WHAT IS WAR? + +1. INTRODUCTION. + +WE propose to consider first the single elements of our +subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the +whole, in all its relations--therefore to advance from the +simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence +with a glance at the nature of the whole, because +it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of +any of the parts their relation to the whole should be +kept constantly in view. + +2. DEFINITION. + +We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions +of War used by publicists. We shall keep to the element +of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel +on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit +the countless number of duels which make up a War, we +shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. +Each strives by physical force to compel the other to +submit to his will: each endeavours to throw his adversary, +and thus render him incapable of further resistance. + +WAR THEREFORE IS AN ACT OF VIOLENCE INTENDED TO COMPEL OUR +OPPONENT TO FULFIL OUR WILL. + +Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and +Science in order to contend against violence. Self- +imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly +worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, +accompany it without essentially impairing its power. +Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral +force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore +the MEANS; the compulsory submission of the enemy +to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain +this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and +disarmament becomes therefore the immediate OBJECT of +hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, +and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from +our calculations. + +3. UTMOST USE OF FORCE. + +Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful +method of disarming and overcoming an enemy withoutgreat +bloodshed, and that +this is the proper +tendency of the Art of War. However plausible this may +appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; +for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which +proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. +As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no +means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it +follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without +reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a +superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. +The former then dictates the law to the latter, +and both proceed to extremities to which the only +limitations are those imposed by the amount of counter- +acting force on each side. + +This is the way in which the matter must be viewed +and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own +interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real +nature of the affair because the horror of its elements +excites repugnance. + +If the Wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive +than those of savages, the difference arises from the +social condition both of States in themselves and in their +relations to each other. Out of this social condition and +its relations War arises, and by it War is subjected to +conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things +do not belong to War itself; they are only given conditions; +and to introduce into the philosophy of War itself +a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. + +Two motives lead men to War: instinctive hostility +and hostile intention. In our definition of War, we +have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these +elements, because it is the most general. It is +impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the +wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without +combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On +the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without +being accompanied by any, or at all events by any +extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views +emanating from the feelings, amongst civilised nations +those emanating from the understanding, have the +predominance; but this difference arises from attendant +circumstances, existing institutions, &c., and, therefore, +is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although +it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most +civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each +other. + +We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to +refer the War of a civilised nation entirely to an intelligent +act on the part of the Government, and to imagine it as +continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling +of passion in such a way that at last the physical masses +of combatants would no longer be required; in reality, +their mere relations would suffice--a kind of algebraic +action. + +Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until +the facts of the last War[*] taught it better. If War is an +ACT of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. +If it does not originate in the feelings, it REACTS, more or +less, upon them, and the extent of this reaction depends +not on the degree of civilisation, but upon the importance +and duration of the interests involved. + +[*] Clausewitz alludes here to the "Wars of Liberation," +1813,14,15. + + +Therefore, if we find civilised nations do not put their +prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, +this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence +on their mode of carrying on War, and has taught them +more effectual means of applying force than these rude +acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the +constant progress of improvements in the construction +of firearms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to +destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception +of War is in no way changed or modified through +the progress of civilisation. + +We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an +act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one +side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort +of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an +extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the +first extreme with which we meet (FIRST RECIPROCAL ACTION). + +4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY. + +We have already said that the aim of all action in +War is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that +this, theoretically at least, is indispensable. + +If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, +we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive +to him than the sacrifice which we demand; but the +disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a +transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the +enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect +of a change for the better. Every change in this position +which is produced by a continuation of the War should +therefore be a change for the worse. The worst condition +in which a belligerent can be placed is that of +being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is +to be reduced to submission by an act of War, he must +either be positively disarmed or placed in such a +position that he is threatened with it. From this it +follows that the disarming or overthrow of the +enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim +of Warfare. Now War is always the shock of two +hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living +power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute +state of endurance would not be making War; therefore, +what we have just said as to the aim of action in +War applies to both parties. Here, then, is another +case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not +defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no +longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me +as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, +and leads to a second extreme (SECOND RECIPROCAL ACTION). + +5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS. + +If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion +our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed +by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, +namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the +Will. The sum of the available means may be estimated +in a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon +numbers; but the strength of volition is more difficult +to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain +extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have +obtained in this way an approximation to the strength +of the power to be contended with, we can then take of our own +means, and +either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case +we have +not the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing +our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the +same; therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, +which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort +towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal +action, and a third extreme with which we meet (THIRD +RECIPROCAL ACTION). + +6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY. + +Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop +short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, +with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying +no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to +deduce from the pure conception of War an absolute point +for the aim which we shall propose and for the means +which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would +involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play +of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical +subtleties. If, adhering closely to the absolute, we try +to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist +with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must +be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted +in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be +a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real +world. + +Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an +absolute which could easily be ascertained, still we must +admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself +to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many +cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be +in opposition to other principles of statecraft; an effort +of Will would be required disproportioned to the proposed +object, which therefore it would be impossible to +realise, for the human will does not derive its impulse +from logical subtleties. + +But everything takes a different shape when we pass +from abstractions to reality. In the former, everything +must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the +one side as well as the other striving after perfection and +even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? +It will if, + +(1) War becomes a completely isolated act, which +arises suddenly, and is in no way connected with the +previous history of the combatant States. + +(2) If it is limited to a single solution, or to several +simultaneous solutions. + +(3) If it contains within itself the solution perfect and +complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation +beforehand of the political situation which will +follow from it. + +7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT. + +With regard to the first point, neither of the two +opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even +as regards that factor in the sum of resistance which +does not depend on objective things, viz., the Will. This +Will is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates +what it will be to-morrow by what it is to-day. War +does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread +to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents +can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great +measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of +judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, +should be or should do. But, now, man with his incomplete +organisation is always below the line of absolute +perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence +on both sides, become a modifying principle. + +8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS +BLOW. + + +The second point gives rise to the following +considerations:-- + +If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous +ones, then naturally all the preparations for the +same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an +omission could not in any way be repaired; the utmost, +then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide +for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as +they are known to us; all the rest would fall into the +domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up +from several successive acts, then naturally that which +precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure +for that which will follow, and in this manner the world +of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus +modifies the effort towards the extreme. + +Yet every War would necessarily resolve itself into a +single solution, or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the +means required for the struggle were raised at once, or +could be at once raised; for as one adverse result necessarily +diminishes the means, then if all the means have +been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be +supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would +belong essentially to the first, and form, in reality only +its duration. + +But we have already seen that even in the preparation +for War the real world steps into the place of mere +abstract conception--a material standard into the place +of the hypotheses of an extreme: that therefore in that +way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, +remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all +forces are not at once brought forward. + +It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application +that they cannot all be brought into activity at the +same time. These forces are THE ARMIES ACTUALLY ON FOOT, +THE COUNTRY, with its superficial extent and its population, +AND THE ALLIES. + +In point of fact, the country, with its superficial area +and the population, besides being the source of all military +force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient +quantities in War, providing either the theatre of war +or exercising a considerable influence on the same. + +Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military +forces of a country into operation at once, but not all +fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, &c.--in short, not +the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be +completely embraced by the first act of the War. Further, +the co-operation of allies does not depend on the Will of +the belligerents; and from the nature of the political +relations of states to each other, this co-operation is +frequently not afforded until after the War has commenced, +or it may be increased to restore the balance of power. + +That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot +at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much +greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, +and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously +affected by the great force of the first decision, will be +more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show +that a complete concentration of all available means in a +moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War. + +Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground for relaxing +our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result, +because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage +to which no one would purposely expose himself, and +also because the first decision, although not the only +one, still will have the more influence on subsequent +events, the greater it is in itself. + +But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men +to take refuge in that expectation, owing to the repugnance +in the human mind to making excessive efforts; and +therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are +not taken for the first decision with that energy which +would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent +omits from weakness, becomes to the other a real objective +ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again, +through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are +brought down to efforts on a limited scale. + + +9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE. + +Lastly, even the final decision of a whole War is not +always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State +often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired +in after times by means of political combinations. How +much this must modify the degree of tension, and the +vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself. + + +10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE +OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE +ABSOLUTE. + +In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from +the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If +the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no +longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine +the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, +and this can only be done on the data furnished by the +facts of the real world by the LAWS OF PROBABILITY. Once +the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but +individual States and Governments, once the War is +no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, +then the reality will furnish the data to compute the +unknown quantities which are required to be found. + +From the character, the measures, the situation of +the adversary, and the relations with which he is +surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law +of probability as to the designs of the other, and act +accordingly. + + +11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS. + +Here the question which we had laid aside forces +itself again into consideration (see No. 2), viz., the +political object of the War. The law of the extreme, the +view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has +hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end +or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political must +again come +forward. If the whole consideration +is a calculation of probability based on definite +persons and relations, then the political object, being +the original motive, must be an essential factor in the +product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our, the +smaller, it may +be expected, will be the +means of resistance which he will employ; but the +smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require +to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the +less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall +we be induced to give it up altogether. + +Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original +motive of the War, will be the standard for determining +both the aim of the military force and also the amount +of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself, but it + is so in relation to both the belligerent States, because +we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. +One and the same political object may produce totally +different effects upon different people, or even upon the +same people at different times; we can, therefore, only +admit the political object as the measure, by considering +it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, +and consequently the nature of those masses also comes +into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result +may be very different according as these masses are +animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the +action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state +of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling +political motive for War may produce an effect quite +disproportionate--in fact, a perfect explosion. + +This applies to the efforts which the political object +will call forth in the two States, and to the aim which the +military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it +may itself be that aim, as, for example, the conquest of a +province. At other times the political object itself +is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such +a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, +and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of +peace. But also, in this, due attention to the peculiar +character of the States concerned is always supposed. +There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be +much greater than the political object, in order to secure +the latter. The political object will be so much the more +the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence +in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that +any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two States +from other causes, and therefore there are cases where +the political object almost alone will be decisive. + +If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the +political object, that action will in general diminish as +the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree +the more the political object dominates. Thus it is +explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there +may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, +from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an +army of observation. This, however, leads to a question +of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and +answer. + + +12. A SUSPENSION IN THE ACTION OF WAR UNEXPLAINED +BY ANYTHING SAID AS YET. + +However insignificant the political claims mutually +advanced, however weak the means put forth, however +small the aim to which military action is directed, can +this action be suspended even for a moment? This is a +question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the +subject. + +Every transaction requires for its accomplishment a +certain time which we call its duration. This may be +longer or shorter, according as the person acting throws +more or less despatch into his movements. + +About this more or less we shall not trouble ourselves +here. Each person acts in his own fashion; but the +slow person does not protract the thing because he wishes +to spend more time about it, but because by his nature +he requires more time, and if he made more haste would +not do the thing so well. This time, therefore, depends +on subjective causes, and belongs to the length, so called, +of the action. + +If we allow now to every action in War this, its length, +then we must assume, at first sight at least, that any +expenditure of time beyond this length, that is, every +suspension of hostile action, appears an absurdity; with +respect to this it must not be forgotten that we now speak +not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents, +but of the general progress of the whole action of the +War. + + +13. THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE WHICH CAN SUSPEND +THE ACTION, AND THIS SEEMS TO BE ONLY +POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE. + +If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a +feeling of animosity must have moved them to it; as +long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to +terms of peace, this feeling must exist; and it can only +be brought to a standstill by either side by one single +motive alone, which is, THAT HE WAITS FOR A MORE FAVOURABLE +MOMENT FOR ACTION. Now, at first sight, it appears that +this motive can never exist except on one side, because +it, eo ipso, must be prejudicial to the other. If the one +has an interest in acting, then the other must have an +interest in waiting. + +A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce +a suspension of action, for during this suspension he who +has the positive object (that is, the assailant) must continue +progressing; for if we should imagine an equilibrium +in this way, that he who has the positive object, therefore +the strongest motive, can at the same time only command +the lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the +product of the motive and the power, then we must say, +if no alteration in this condition of equilibrium is to be +expected, the two parties must make peace; but if an +alteration is to be expected, then it can only be favourable +to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest +interest to act without delay. We see that the conception +of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of +arms, but that it ends in the question of the EXPECTATION +OF A MORE FAVOURABLE MOMENT. + +Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two States has +a positive object, as, for instance, the conquest of one of +the enemy's provinces--which is to be utilised in the +settlement of peace. After this conquest, his political +object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, +and for him a pause ensues. If the adversary is also +contented with this solution, he will make peace; if not, +he must act. Now, if we suppose that in four weeks he +will be in a better condition to act, then he has sufficient +grounds for putting off the time of action. + +But from that moment the logical course for the enemy +appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered +party THE DESIRED time. Of course, in this mode of reasoning +a complete insight into the state of circumstances +on both sides is supposed. + + +14. THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE +WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A CLIMAX. + +If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really +existed, the effect would be that everything would again +be driven towards the extreme; for, irrespective of the +effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings, +and infusing into the whole a greater degree of passion, +a greater elementary force, there would also follow from +this continuance of action a stricter continuity, a closer +connection between cause and effect, and thus every +single action would become of more importance, and +consequently more replete with danger. + +But we know that the course of action in War has +seldom or never this unbroken continuity, and that there +have been many Wars in which action occupied by far +the smallest portion of time employed, the whole of the +rest being consumed in inaction. It is impossible that +this should be always an anomaly; suspension of action +in War must therefore be possible, that is no contradiction +in itself. We now proceed to show how this is. + +15. HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY +IS BROUGHT INTO REQUISITION. + +As we have supposed the interests of one Commander +to be always antagonistic to those of the other, we have +assumed a true POLARITY. We reserve a fuller explanation +of this for another chapter, merely making the following +observation on it at present. + +The principle of polarity is only valid when it can be +conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive +and its opposite the negative completely destroy each +other. In a battle both sides strive to conquer; that is +true polarity, for the victory of the one side destroys +that of the other. But when we speak of two different +things which have a common relation external to themselves, +then it is not the things but their relations which +have the polarity. + + +16. ATTACK AND DEFENCE ARE THINGS DIFFERING +IN KIND AND OF UNEQUAL FORCE. POLARITY IS, +THEREFORE, NOT APPLICABLE TO THEM. + +If there was only one form of War, to wit, the attack +of the enemy, therefore no defence; or, in other words, +if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely +by the positive motive, which the one has and the other +has not, but the methods of each were precisely one and +the same: then in this sort of fight every advantage +gained on the one side would be a corresponding disadvantage +on the other, and true polarity would exist. + +But action in War is divided into two forms, attack +and defence, which, as we shall hereafter explain more +particularly, are very different and of unequal strength. +Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a +relation, in the decision, but not in the attack or defence +itself. + +If the one Commander wishes the solution put off, the +other must wish to hasten it, but only by the same +form of action. If it is A's interest not to attack +his enemy at present, but four weeks hence, then it is +B's interest to be attacked, not four weeks hence, but at +the present moment. This is the direct antagonism of +interests, but it by no means follows that it would be for +B's interest to attack A at once. That is plainly something +totally different. + + +17. THE EFFECT OF POLARITY IS OFTEN DESTROYED BY +THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DEFENCE OVER THE +ATTACK, AND THUS THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION +IN WAR IS EXPLAINED. + +If the form of defence is stronger than that of offence, +as we shall hereafter show, the question arises, Is the +advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side +as the advantage of the defensive form on the other? +If it is not, then it cannot by its counter-weight over- +balance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the +action of the War. We see, therefore, that the impulsive +force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in +the difference between the strength of the offensive and +the defensive, and thereby become ineffectual. + +If, therefore, that side for which the present is favourable, +is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage +of the defensive, he must put up with the unfavourable +prospects which the future holds out; for it may still be +better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future +than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. +Now, being convinced that the superiority of the defensive[*] +(rightly understood) is very great, and much greater +than may appear at first sight, we conceive that the +greater number of those periods of inaction which occur +in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction. +The weaker the motives to action are, the +more will those motives be absorbed and neutralised +by this difference between attack and defence, the more +frequently, therefore, will action in warfare be stopped, +as indeed experience teaches. + + +[*] It must be remembered that all this antedates by some years +the introduction of long-range weapons. + + +18 A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT +KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. + +But there is still another cause which may stop action +in War, viz., an incomplete view of the situation. Each +Commander can only fully know his own position; that +of his opponent can only be known to him by reports, +which are uncertain; he may, therefore, form a wrong +judgment with respect to it upon data of this description, +and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that +the power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary +when it lies really with himself. This want of perfect +insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely +action as untimely inaction, and hence it would in itself +no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in +War. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the +natural causes which may bring action in War to a standstill +without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect +how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate +the power of our opponents too high than too low, because +it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our +imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute +very much to delay action in War, and to modify the +application of the principles pending our conduct. + +The possibility of a standstill brings into the action +of War a new modification, inasmuch as it dilutes that +action with the element of time, checks the influence or +sense of danger in its course, and increases the means of +reinstating a lost balance of force. The greater the +tension of feelings from which the War springs, the greater +therefore the energy with which it is carried on, so much +the shorter will be the periods of inaction; on the other +hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity, the +longer will be these periods: for powerful motives increase +the force of the will, and this, as we know, is always a +factor in the product of force. + + +19. FREQUENT PERIODS OF INACTION IN WAR REMOVE +IT FURTHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE, AND MAKE IT +STILL MORE A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES. + +But the slower the action proceeds in War, the more +frequent and longer the periods of inaction, so much the +more easily can an error be repaired; therefore, so much +the bolder a General will be in his calculations, so much +the more readily will he keep them below the line of +the absolute, and build everything upon probabilities and +conjecture. Thus, according as the course of the War is +more or less slow, more or less time will be allowed for +that which the nature of a concrete case particularly +requires, calculation of probability based on given +circumstances. + + +20. THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS +WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT +ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT. + +We see from the foregoing how much the objective +nature of War makes it a calculation of probabilities; +now there is only one single element still wanting to make +it a game, and that element it certainly is not without: +it is chance. There is no human affair which stands +so constantly and so generally in close connection with +chance as War. But together with chance, the accidental, +and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in +War. + + +21. WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND +SUBJECTIVELY. + +If we now take a look at the subjective nature of War, +that is to say, at those conditions under which it is carried +on, it will appear to us still more like a game. Primarily +the element in which the operations of War are carried on +is danger; but which of all the moral qualities is the first in +danger? COURAGE. Now certainly courage is quite compatible +with prudent calculation, but still they are things +of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of +the mind; on the other hand, daring reliance on good +fortune, boldness, rashness, are only expressions of +courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for +the fortuitous (or accidental), because it is their element. + +We see, therefore, how, from the commencement, the +absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds +any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and +that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, +probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all +the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all +branches of human activity the most like a gambling game. + + +22. HOW THIS ACCORDS BEST WITH THE HUMAN MIND IN +GENERAL. + +Although our intellect always feels itself urged towards +clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself +attracted by uncertainty. Instead of threading its way +with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical +investigations and logical conclusions, in order, +almost unconscious of itself, to arrive in spaces where it +feels itself a stranger, and where it seems to part from +all well-known objects, it prefers to remain with the +imagination in the realms of chance and luck. Instead +of living yonder on poor necessity, it revels here in the +wealth of possibilities; animated thereby, courage +then takes wings to itself, and daring and danger make +the element into which it launches itself as a fearless +swimmer plunges into the stream. + +Shall theory leave it here, and move on, self-satisfied +with absolute conclusions and rules? Then it is of no +practical use. Theory must also take into account +the human element; it must accord a place to courage, +to boldness, even to rashness. The Art of War has to deal +with living and with moral forces, the consequence of +which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive. +There is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental, +and just as much in the greatest things as in the smallest. +As there is room for this accidental on the one hand, so +on the other there must be courage and self-reliance in +proportion to the room available. If these qualities are +forthcoming in a high degree, the margin left may likewise +be great. Courage and self-reliance are, therefore, +principles quite essential to War; consequently, theory +must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all +degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest +of military virtues. In daring there may still be wisdom, +and prudence as well, only they are estimated by a +different standard of value. + + +23. WAR IS ALWAYS A SERIOUS MEANS FOR A SERIOUS +OBJECT. ITS MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION. + +Such is War; such the Commander who conducts it; +such the theory which rules it. But War is no pastime; +no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work +of a free enthusiasm: it is a serious means for a serious +object. All that appearance which it wears from the +varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself +of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, +of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means. + +The War of a community--of whole Nations, and particularly +of civilised Nations--always starts from a +political condition, and is called forth by a political +motive. It is, therefore, a political act. Now if it was a +perfect, unrestrained, and absolute expression of force, as +we had to deduct it from its mere conception, then the +moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the +place of policy, and as something quite independent of it +would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a +mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into +any other direction than that which has been given to it by +preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has +really been viewed hitherto, whenever a want of harmony +between policy and the conduct of a War has led to +theoretical distinctions of the kind. But it is not so, +and the idea is radically false. War in the real world, +as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which +expends itself at one single discharge; it is the operation +of powers which do not develop themselves completely +in the same manner and in the same measure, but which +at one time expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance +opposed by inertia or friction, while at another they are +too weak to produce an effect; it is therefore, in a +certain measure, a pulsation of violent force more or less +vehement, consequently making its discharges and +exhausting its powers more or less quickly--in other words, +conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always +lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted +on it in its course, so as to give it this or that direction, +in short, to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence., +if we +reflect that War has its root in a political object, +then naturally this original motive which called it into +existence should also continue the first and highest +consideration in its conduct. Still, the political object +is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate +itself to the nature of the means, and though +changes in these means may involve modification in the +political objective, the latter always retains a prior right +to consideration. Policy, therefore, is interwoven with +the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous +influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated +by it will permit. + + +24. WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY +OTHER MEANS. + +We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political +act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation +of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by +other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar +to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means +which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy +shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of +War in general and the Commander in each particular +case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling +one. But however powerfully this may react on political +views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded +as only a modification of them; for the political view +is the object, War is the means, and the means must +always include the object in our conception. + + +25. DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS. + +The greater and the more powerful the motives of a +War, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. +The more violent the excitement which precedes the War, +by so much the nearer will the War approach to its abstract +form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction +of the enemy, so much the nearer will the military +and political ends coincide, so much the more purely +military and less political the War appears to be; but +the weaker the motives and the tensions, so much the +less will the natural direction of the military element-- +that is, force--be coincident with the direction which +the political element indicates; so much the more must, +therefore, the War become diverted from its natural +direction, the political object diverge from the aim of +an ideal War, and the War appear to become political. + +But, that the reader may not form any false conceptions, +we must here observe that by this natural tendency +of War we only mean the philosophical, the strictly +logical, and by no means the tendency of forces actually +engaged in conflict, by which would be supposed to be +included all the emotions and passions of the combatants. +No doubt in some cases these also might be excited to +such a degree as to be with difficulty restrained and +confined to the political road; but in most cases such a +contradiction will not arise, because by the existence of +such strenuous exertions a great plan in harmony therewith +would be implied. If the plan is directed only upon +a small object, then the impulses of feeling amongst +the masses will be also so weak that these masses will +require to be stimulated rather than repressed. + + +26. THEY MAY ALL BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTS. + +Returning now to the main subject, although it is true +that in one kind of War the political element seems +almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies +a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one +is as political as the other; for if we regard the State +policy as the intelligence of the personified State, then +amongst all the constellations in the political sky whose +movements it has to compute, those must be included which +arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity +of a great War. It is only if we understand by policy +not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the +conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest +craftiness, averse from violence, that the latter +kind of War may belong more to policy than the first. + + +27. INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW ON THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING +OF MILITARY HISTORY, AND ON THE +FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY. + +We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all +circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent +thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by +taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves +in opposition to all military history. This is the +only means of unlocking the great book and making it +intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars +must differ in character according to the nature of the +motives and circumstances from which they proceed. + +Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of +judgment which the Statesman and General exercises is +rightly to understand in this respect the War in which +he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to +make of it something, which by the nature of its relations +it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, +the most comprehensive, of all strategical questions. +We shall enter into this more fully in treating of the +plan of a War. + +For the present we content ourselves with having +brought the subject up to this point, and having thereby +fixed the chief point of view from which War and its theory +are to be studied. + + +28. RESULT FOR THEORY. + +War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, +because it changes its colour in some degree in each +particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the +predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful +trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, +hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind +instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which +make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate +nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely +to the reason. + +The first of these three phases concerns more the people +the second, more the General and his Army; the third, +more the Government. The passions which break forth +in War must already have a latent existence in the peoples. +The range which the display of courage and talents shall +get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on +the particular characteristics of the General and his +Army, but the political objects belong to the Government +alone. + +These three tendencies, which appear like so many +different law-givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the +subject, and at the same time variable in degree. A +theory which would leave any one of them out of account, +or set up any arbitrary relation between them, would +immediately become involved in such a contradiction +with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed +at once by that alone. + +The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself +poised in a manner between these three tendencies, as +between three points of attraction. + +The way in which alone this difficult problem can be +solved we shall examine in the book on the "Theory of +War." In every case the conception of War, as here +defined, will be the first ray of light which shows us the +true foundation of theory, and which first separates the +great masses and allows us to distinguish them from +one another. + + + +CHAPTER II. END AND MEANS IN WAR + +HAVING in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated +and variable nature of War, we shall now occupy +ourselves in examining into the influence which this +nature has upon the end and means in War. + +If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the +whole effort of War is to be directed, in order that it may +suffice for the attainment of the political object, we +shall find that it is just as variable as are the political +object and the particular circumstances of the War. + +If, in the next place, we keep once more to the pure +conception of War, then we must say that the political +object properly lies out of its province, for if War is an act +of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will, then +in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy, +that is, disarming him, and on that alone. This object, +developed from abstract conceptions, but which is also +the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality, we shall, +in the first place, examine in this reality. + +In connection with the plan of a campaign we shall +hereafter examine more closely into the meaning of disarming +a nation, but here we must at once draw a distinction +between three things, which, as three general objects, +comprise everything else within them. They are the +MILITARY POWER, THE COUNTRY, and THE WILL OF THE ENEMY. + +The military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced +to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the War. +This is the sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter, +whenever we use the expression "destruction of +the enemy's military power." + +The country must be conquered, for out of the country +a new military force may be formed. + +But even when both these things are done, still the War, +that is, the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, +cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of +the enemy is not subdued also; that is, its Government +and its Allies must be forced into signing a peace, or the +people into submission; for whilst we are in full occupation +of the country, the War may break out afresh, either in the +interior or through assistance given by Allies. No doubt, +this may also take place after a peace, but that shows +nothing more than that every War does not carry in itself +the elements for a complete decision and final settlement. + +But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion +of peace a number of sparks are always extinguished +which would have smouldered on quietly, and the excitement +of the passions abates, because all those whose +minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and +under all circumstances there is always a great number, +turn themselves away completely from the road to resistance. +Whatever may take place subsequently, we must +always look upon the object as attained, and the business +of War as ended, by a peace. + +As protection of the country is the primary object +for which the military force exists, therefore the +natural order is, that first of all this force should be +destroyed, then the country subdued; and through the +effect of these two results, as well as the position we then +hold, the enemy should be forced to make peace. Generally +the destruction of the enemy's force is done by +degrees, and in just the same measure the conquest of +the country follows immediately. The two likewise +usually react upon each other, because the loss of provinces +occasions a diminution of military force. But +this order is by no means necessary, and on that account +it also does not always take place. The enemy's Army, +before it is sensibly weakened, may retreat to the opposite +side of the country, or even quite outside of it. In +this case, therefore, the greater part or the whole of the +country is conquered. + +But this object of War in the abstract, this final means +of attaining the political object in which all others are +combined, the DISARMING THE ENEMY, is rarely attained +in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace. +Therefore it can in no wise be set up in theory as a +law. There are innumerable instances of treaties in which +peace has been settled before either party could be looked +upon as disarmed; indeed, even before the balance of +power had undergone any sensible alteration. Nay, +further, if we look at the case in the concrete, then we +must say that in a whole class of cases, the idea of a complete +defeat of the enemy would be a mere imaginative +flight, especially when the enemy is considerably superior. + +The reason why the object deduced from the conception +of War is not adapted in general to real War lies in +the difference between the two, which is discussed in the +preceding chapter. If it was as pure theory gives +it, then a War between two States of very unequal +military strength would appear an absurdity; therefore +impossible. At most, the inequality between the physical +forces might be such that it could be balanced by the +moral forces, and that would not go far with our present +social condition in Europe. Therefore, if we have seen +Wars take place between States of very unequal power, +that has been the case because there is a wide difference +between War in reality and its original conception. + +There are two considerations which as motives may +practically take the place of inability to continue the +contest. The first is the improbability, the second is +the excessive price, of success. + +According to what we have seen in the foregoing chapter, +War must always set itself free from the strict law of logical +necessity, and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities; +and as this is so much the more the case, the more +the War has a bias that way, from the circumstances +out of which it has arisen--the smaller its motives are, +and the excitement it has raised--so it is also conceivable +how out of this calculation of probabilities even motives +to peace may arise. War does not, therefore, always +require to be fought out until one party is overthrown; +and we may suppose that, when the motives and passions +are slight, a weak probability will suffice to move that +side to which it is unfavourable to give way. Now, were +the other side convinced of this beforehand, it is natural +that he would strive for this probability only, instead of +first wasting time and effort in the attempt to achieve +the total destruction of the enemy's Army. + +Still more general in its influence on the resolution to +peace is the consideration of the expenditure of force +already made, and further required. As War is no act +of blind passion, but is dominated by the political +object, therefore the value of that object determines +the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. +This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also +as regards duration. As soon, therefore, as the required +outlay becomes so great that the political object is no +longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and +peace will be the result. + +We see, therefore, that in Wars where one side cannot +completely disarm the other, the motives to peace on +both sides will rise or fall on each side according to the +probability of future success and the required outlay. +If these motives were equally strong on both sides, they +would meet in the centre of their political difference. +Where they are strong on one side, they might be weak on +the other. If their amount is only sufficient, peace will +follow, but naturally to the advantage of that side which +has the weakest motive for its conclusion. We purposely +pass over here the difference which the POSITIVE and +NEGATIVE character of the political end must necessarily +produce practically; for although that is, as we shall +hereafter show, of the highest importance, still we are +obliged to keep here to a more general point of view, +because the original political views in the course of the +War change very much, and at last may become totally +different, JUST BECAUSE THEY ARE DETERMINED BY RESULTS AND +PROBABLE EVENTS. + +Now comes the question how to influence the probability +of success. In the first place, naturally by the same +means which we use when the object is the subjugation +of the enemy, by the destruction of his military force +and the conquest of his provinces; but these two means +are not exactly of the same import here as they would be +in reference to that object. If we attack the enemy's +Army, it is a very different thing whether we intend to +follow up the first blow with a succession of others, until +the whole force is destroyed, or whether we mean to +content ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's +feeling of security, to convince him of our superiority, +and to instil into him a feeling of apprehension about +the future. If this is our object, we only go so far in the +destruction of his forces as is sufficient. In like manner, +the conquest, of the enemy's provinces is quite a different +measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's +Army. In the latter case the destruction of the Army is +the real effectual action, and the taking of the provinces +only a consequence of it; to take them before the Army +had been defeated would always be looked upon only as +a necessary evil. On the other hand, if our views are not +directed upon the complete destruction of the enemy's +force, and if we are sure that the enemy does not seek +but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking +possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage +in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance +to make the enemy apprehensive about the general +result, then it may also be regarded as a shorter road to +peace. + +But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing +the probability of the result without destroying the +enemy's Army, namely, upon the expeditions which have +a direct connection with political views. If there are any +enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the +enemy's alliances or make them inoperative, to gain +new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in +our own favour, &c. &c., then it is easy to conceive how +much these may increase the probability of success, and +become a shorter way towards our object than the routing +of the enemy's forces. + +The second question is how to act upon the enemy's +expenditure in strength, that is, to raise the price of +success. + +The enemy's outlay in strength lies in the WEAR AND +TEAR of his forces, consequently in the DESTRUCTION of them +on our part, and in the LOSS of PROVINCES, consequently +the CONQUEST of them by us. + +Here, again, on account of the various significations +of these means, so likewise it will be found that neither +of them will be identical in its signification in all cases +if the objects are different. The smallness in general +of this difference must not cause us perplexity, for in +reality the weakest motives, the finest shades of difference, +often decide in favour of this or that method of applying +force. Our only business here is to show that, certain +conditions being supposed, the possibility of attaining +our purpose in different ways is no contradiction, +absurdity, nor even error. + +Besides these two means, there are three other peculiar +ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy's +force. The first is INVASION, that is THE OCCUPATION OF THE +ENEMY'S TERRITORY, NOT WITH A VIEW TO KEEPING IT, but in order +to levy contributions upon it, or to devastate it. + +The immediate object here is neither the conquest of +the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force, but +merely to DO HIM DAMAGE IN A GENERAL WAY. The second +way is to select for the object of our enterprises those +points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing +is easier to conceive than two different directions in which +our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred +if our object is to defeat the enemy's Army, while +the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy +is out of the question. According to the usual mode of +speaking, we should say that the first is primarily military, +the other more political. But if we take our view from +the highest point, both are equally military, and neither +the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the +circumstances of the case. The third, by far the most +important, from the great number of cases which it +embraces, is the WEARING OUT of the enemy. We choose this +expression not only to explain our meaning in few words, +but because it represents the thing exactly, and is not +so figurative as may at first appear. The idea of wearing +out in a struggle amounts in practice to A GRADUAL EXHAUSTION +OF THE PHYSICAL POWERS AND OF THE WILL BY THE LONG CONTINUANCE +OF EXERTION. + +Now, if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration +of the contest, we must content ourselves with as small +objects as possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that +a great end requires a greater expenditure of force than a +small one; but the smallest object that we can propose to +ourselves is simple passive resistance, that is a combat +without any positive view. In this way, therefore, our +means attain their greatest relative value, and therefore +the result is best secured. How far now can this negative +mode of proceeding be carried? Plainly not to absolute +passivity, for mere endurance would not be fighting; +and the defensive is an activity by which so much of the +enemy's power must be destroyed that he must give up +his object. That alone is what we aim at in each single +act, and therein consists the negative nature of our +object. + +No doubt this negative object in its single act is not +so effective as the positive object in the same direction +would be, supposing it successful; but there is this +difference in its favour, that it succeeds more easily than +the positive, and therefore it holds out greater certainty +of success; what is wanting in the efficacy of its single +act must be gained through time, that is, through the +duration of the contest, and therefore this negative +intention, which constitutes the principle of the pure +defensive, is also the natural means of overcoming the +enemy by the duration of the combat, that is of wearing +him out. + +Here lies the origin of that difference of OFFENSIVE and +DEFENSIVE, the influence of which prevails throughout the +whole province of War. We cannot at present pursue this +subject further than to observe that from this negative +intention are to be deduced all the advantages and all +the stronger forms of combat which are on the side of +the Defensive, and in which that philosophical-dynamic +law which exists between the greatness and the certainty +of success is realised. We shall resume the consideration +of all this hereafter. + +If then the negative purpose, that is the concentration +of all the means into a state of pure resistance, affords a +superiority in the contest, and if this advantage is sufficient +to BALANCE whatever superiority in numbers the +adversary may have, then the mere DURATION of the contest +will suffice gradually to bring the loss of force on the part +of the adversary to a point at which the political object +can no longer be an equivalent, a point at which, therefore, +he must give up the contest. We see then that this class +of means, the wearing out of the enemy, includes the great +number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger. + +Frederick the Great, during the Seven Years' War, +was never strong enough to overthrow the Austrian +monarchy; and if he had tried to do so after the fashion +of Charles the Twelfth, he would inevitably have had to +succumb himself. But after his skilful application of the +system of husbanding his resources had shown the powers +allied against him, through a seven years' struggle, that the +actual expenditure of strength far exceeded what they +had at first anticipated, they made peace. + +We see then that there are many ways to one's object +in War; that the complete subjugation of the enemy is +not essential in every case; that the destruction of the +enemy's military force, the conquest of the enemy's provinces, +the mere occupation of them, the mere invasion of +them--enterprises which are aimed directly at political +objects--lastly, a passive expectation of the enemy's +blow, are all means which, each in itself, may be used +to force the enemy's will according as the peculiar +circumstances of the case lead us to expect more from +the one or the other. We could still add to these a +whole category of shorter methods of gaining the end, +which might be called arguments ad hominem. What +branch of human affairs is there in which these sparks +of individual spirit have not made their appearance, +surmounting all formal considerations? And least of all +can they fail to appear in War, where the personal character +of the combatants plays such an important part, both in +the cabinet and in the field. We limit ourselves to pointing +this out, as it would be pedantry to attempt to reduce +such influences into classes. Including these, we may +say that the number of possible ways of reaching the +object rises to infinity. + +To avoid under-estimating these different short roads to +one's purpose, either estimating them only as rare exceptions, +or holding the difference which they cause in the +conduct of War as insignificant, we must bear in mind the +diversity of political objects which may cause a War-- +measure at a glance the distance which there is between +a death struggle for political existence and a War which +a forced or tottering alliance makes a matter of disagreeable +duty. Between the two innumerable gradations +occur in practice. If we reject one of these gradations +in theory, we might with equal right reject the whole, +which would be tantamount to shutting the real world +completely out of sight. + +These are the circumstances in general connected with +the aim which we have to pursue in War; let us now turn +to the means. + +There is only one single means, it is the FIGHT. However +diversified this may be in form, however widely +it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity +in a hand-to-hand encounter, whatever number of things +may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting, +still it is always implied in the conception of War that all +the effects manifested have their roots in the combat. + +That this must always be so in the greatest diversity +and complication of the reality is proved in a very simple +manner. All that takes place in War takes place through +armed forces, but where the forces of War, i.e., armed +men, are applied, there the idea of fighting must of necessity +be at the foundation. + +All, therefore, that relates to forces of War--all that is +connected with their creation, maintenance, and application-- +belongs to military activity. + +Creation and maintenance are obviously only the means, +whilst application is the object. + +The contest in War is not a contest of individual against +individual, but an organised whole, consisting of manifold +parts; in this great whole we may distinguish units of two +kinds, the one determined by the subject, the other by the +object. In an Army the mass of combatants ranges itself +always into an order of new units, which again form +members of a higher order. The combat of each of these +members forms, therefore, also a more or less distinct unit. +Further, the motive of the fight; therefore its object +forms its unit. + +Now, to each of these units which we distinguish in +the contest we attach the name of combat. + +If the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every +application of armed power, then also the application +of armed force in general is nothing more than the determining +and arranging a certain number of combats. + +Every activity in War, therefore, necessarily relates to +the combat either directly or indirectly. The soldier is +levied, clothed, armed, exercised, he sleeps, eats, drinks, +and marches, all MERELY TO FIGHT AT THE RIGHT TIME AND PLACE. + +If, therefore, all the threads of military activity terminate +in the combat, we shall grasp them all when we +settle the order of the combats. Only from this order +and its execution proceed the effects, never directly +from the conditions preceding them. Now, in the combat +all the action is directed to the DESTRUCTION of the enemy, +or rather of HIS FIGHTING POWERS, for this lies in the conception +of combat. The destruction of the enemy's fighting +power is, therefore, always the means to attain the object +of the combat. + +This object may likewise be the mere destruction of +the enemy's armed force; but that is not by any means +necessary, and it may be something quite different. +Whenever, for instance, as we have shown, the defeat +of the enemy is not the only means to attain the political +object, whenever there are other objects which may be +pursued as the aim in a War, then it follows of itself that +such other objects may become the object of particular +acts of Warfare, and therefore also the object of combats. + +But even those combats which, as subordinate acts, +are in the strict sense devoted to the destruction of the +enemy's fighting force need not have that destruction +itself as their first object. + +If we think of the manifold parts of a great armed force, +of the number of circumstances which come into activity +when it is employed, then it is clear that the combat of +such a force must also require a manifold organisation, +a subordinating of parts and formation. There may +and must naturally arise for particular parts a number of +objects which are not themselves the destruction of the +enemy's armed force, and which, while they certainly +contribute to increase that destruction, do so only in an +indirect manner. If a battalion is ordered to drive the +enemy from a rising ground, or a bridge, &c., then properly +the occupation of any such locality is the real object, +the destruction of the enemy's armed force which takes +place only the means or secondary matter. If the enemy +can be driven away merely by a demonstration, the object +is attained all the same; but this hill or bridge is, in point +of fact, only required as a means of increasing the gross +amount of loss inflicted on the enemy's armed force. It +is the case on the field of battle, much more must it +be so on the whole theatre of war, where not only one +Army is opposed to another, but one State, one Nation, +one whole country to another. Here the number of +possible relations, and consequently possible combinations, +is much greater, the diversity of measures increased, and +by the gradation of objects, each subordinate to another +the first means employed is further apart from the ultimate +object. + +It is therefore for many reasons possible that the object +of a combat is not the destruction of the enemy's force, +that is, of the force immediately opposed to us, but +that this only appears as a means. But in all such +cases it is no longer a question of complete destruction, +for the combat is here nothing else but a measure of +strength--has in itself no value except only that of the +present result, that is, of its decision. + +But a measuring of strength may be effected in cases +where the opposing sides are very unequal by a mere +comparative estimate. In such cases no fighting +will take place, and the weaker will immediately give +way. + +If the object of a combat is not always the destruction +of the enemy's forces therein engaged--and if its object +can often be attained as well without the combat taking +place at all, by merely making a resolve to fight, and by +the circumstances to which this resolution gives rise-- +then that explains how a whole campaign may be +carried on with great activity without the actual combat +playing any notable part in it. + +That this may be so military history proves by a +hundred examples. How many of those cases can be +justified, that is, without involving a contradiction +and whether some of the celebrities who rose out of +them would stand criticism, we shall leave undecided, +for all we have to do with the matter is to show the +possibility of such a course of events in War. + +We have only one means in War--the battle; but this +means, by the infinite variety of paths in which it may be +applied, leads us into all the different ways which the +multiplicity of objects allows of, so that we seem to have +gained nothing; but that is not the case, for from this +unity of means proceeds a thread which assists the study +of the subject, as it runs through the whole web of military +activity and holds it together. + +But we have considered the destruction of the enemy's +force as one of the objects which maybe pursued in War, +and left undecided what relative importance should be +given to it amongst other objects. In certain cases it +will depend on circumstances, and as a general question +we have left its value undetermined. We are once more +brought back upon it, and we shall be able to get an +insight into the value which must necessarily be accorded +to it. + +The combat is the single activity in War; in the combat +the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means +to the end; it is so even when the combat does not +actually take place, because in that case there lies at +the root of the decision the supposition at all events +that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt. +It follows, therefore, that the destruction of the enemy's +military force is the foundation-stone of all action in War, +the great support of all combinations, which rest upon it +like the arch on its abutments. All action, therefore, +takes place on the supposition that if the solution by force +of arms which lies at its foundation should be realised, +it will be a favourable one. The decision by arms is, for +all operations in War, great and small, what cash payment +is in bill transactions. However remote from +each other these relations, however seldom the realisation +may take place, still it can never entirely fail to +occur. + +If the decision by arms lies at the foundation of all +combinations, then it follows that the enemy can defeat +each of them by gaining a victory on the field, not +merely in the one on which our combination directly +depends, but also in any other encounter, if it is only +important enough; for every important decision by arms +--that is, destruction of the enemy's forces--reacts upon +all preceding it, because, like a liquid element, they tend +to bring themselves to a level. + +Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force +appears, therefore, always as the superior and more +effectual means, to which all others must give way. + +It is, however, only when there is a supposed equality +in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction +of the enemy's armed force the greater efficacy. +It would, therefore, be a great mistake to draw the +conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the +victory over skill and caution. An unskilful attack would +lead to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's +force, and therefore is not what is here meant. The +superior efficacy belongs not to the MEANS but to the END, +and we are only comparing the effect of one realised +purpose with the other. + +If we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed +force, we must expressly point out that nothing obliges +us to confine this idea to the mere physical force; on +the contrary, the moral is necessarily implied as well, +because both in fact are interwoven with each other, +even in the most minute details, and therefore cannot +be separated. But it is just in connection with the +inevitable effect which has been referred to, of a great +act of destruction (a great victory) upon all other decisions +by arms, that this moral element is most fluid, if we may +use that expression, and therefore distributes itself the +most easily through all the parts. + +Against the far superior worth which the destruction +of the enemy's armed force has over all other means +stands the expense and risk of this means, and it is +only to avoid these that any other means are taken. +That these must be costly stands to reason, for +the waste of our own military forces must, ceteris +paribus, always be greater the more our aim is directed +upon the destruction of the enemy's power. + +The danger lies in this, that the greater efficacy +which we seek recoils on ourselves, and therefore has +worse consequences in case we fail of success. + +Other methods are, therefore, less costly when they +succeed, less dangerous when they fail; but in this is +necessarily lodged the condition that they are only opposed +to similar ones, that is, that the enemy acts on the same +principle; for if the enemy should choose the way of a +great decision by arms, OUR MEANS MUST ON THAT ACCOUNT +BE CHANGED AGAINST OUR WILL, IN ORDER TO CORRESPOND WITH +HIS. Then all depends on the issue of the act of destruction; +but of course it is evident that, ceteris paribus, +in this act we must be at a disadvantage in all respects +because our views and our means had been directed in +part upon other objects, which is not the case with the +enemy. Two different objects of which one is not partthe other +exclude each +other, and therefore a force +which may be applicable for the one may not serve for +the other. If, therefore, one of two belligerents is +determined to seek the great decision by arms, then he has +a high probability of success, as soon as he is certain +his opponent will not take that way, but follows a +different object; and every one who sets before himself +any such other aim only does so in a reasonable manner, +provided he acts on the supposition that his adversary +has as little intention as he has of resorting to the +great decision by arms. + +But what we have here said of another direction of +views and forces relates only to other POSITIVE OBJECTS, +which we may propose to ourselves in War, besides the +destruction of the enemy's force, not by any means +to the pure defensive, which may be adopted with a view +thereby to exhaust the enemy's forces. In the pure +defensive the positive object is wanting, and therefore, +while on the defensive, our forces cannot at the same time +be directed on other objects; they can only be employed +to defeat the intentions of the enemy. + +We have now to consider the opposite of the destruction +of the enemy's armed force, that is to say, the +preservation of our own. These two efforts always go +together, as they mutually act and react on each other; +they are integral parts of one and the same view, and +we have only to ascertain what effect is produced when +one or the other has the predominance. The endeavour +to destroy the enemy's force has a positive object, and +leads to positive results, of which the final aim is the +conquest of the enemy. The preservation of our own forces +has a negative object, leads therefore to the defeat of the +enemy's intentions, that is to pure resistance, of which +the final aim can be nothing more than to prolong the +duration of the contest, so that the enemy shall exhaust +himself in it. + +The effort with a positive object calls into existence +the act of destruction; the effort with the negative +object awaits it. + +How far this state of expectation should and may be +carried we shall enter into more particularly in the +theory of attack and defence, at the origin of which we +again find ourselves. Here we shall content ourselves +with saying that the awaiting must be no absolute +endurance, and that in the action bound up with it +the destruction of the enemy's armed force engaged in +this conflict may be the aim just as well as anything else. +It would therefore be a great error in the fundamental +idea to suppose that the consequence of the negative +course is that we are precluded from choosing the destruction +of the enemy's military force as our object, and must +prefer a bloodless solution. The advantage which the +negative effort gives may certainly lead to that, but only +at the risk of its not being the most advisable method, +as that question is dependent on totally different conditions, +resting not with ourselves but with our opponents. +This other bloodless way cannot, therefore, be looked +upon at all as the natural means of satisfying our +great anxiety to spare our forces; on the contrary, +when circumstances are not favourable, it would be +the means of completely ruining them. Very many +Generals have fallen into this error, and been ruined +by it. The only necessary effect resulting from the +superiority of the negative effort is the delay of the decision, +so that the party acting takes refuge in that way, +as it were, in the expectation of the decisive moment. +The consequence of that is generally THE POSTPONEMENT +OF THE ACTION as much as possible in time, and also in space, +in so far as space is in connection with it. If the moment +has arrived in which this can no longer be done without +ruinous disadvantage, then the advantage of the negative +must be considered as exhausted, and then comes forward +unchanged the effort for the destruction of the enemy's +force, which was kept back by a counterpoise, but never +discarded. + +We have seen, therefore, in the foregoing reflections, +that there are many ways to the aim, that is, to the +attainment of the political object; but that the only +means is the combat, and that consequently everything +is subject to a supreme law: which is the DECISION BY +ARMS; that where this is really demanded by one, it is +a redress which cannot be refused by the other; that, +therefore, a belligerent who takes any other way must +make sure that his opponent will not take this means of +redress, or his cause may be lost in that supreme court; +hence therefore the destruction of the enemy's armed +force, amongst all the objects which can be pursued in War, +appears always as the one which overrules all others. + +What may be achieved by combinations of another +kind in War we shall only learn in the sequel, and naturally +only by degrees. We content ourselves here with acknowledging +in general their possibility, as something pointing +to the difference between the reality and the conception, +and to the influence of particular circumstances. But we +could not avoid showing at once that the BLOODY SOLUTION +OF THE CRISIS, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's +force, is the firstborn son of War. If when political +objects are unimportant, motives weak, the excitement +of forces small, a cautious commander tries in all kinds +of ways, without great crises and bloody solutions, to +twist himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic +weaknesses of his enemy in the field and in the +Cabinet, we have no right to find fault with him, if the +premises on which he acts are well founded and justified +by success; still we must require him to remember that +he only travels on forbidden tracks, where the God of +War may surprise him; that he ought always to keep his +eye on the enemy, in order that he may not have to defend +himself with a dress rapier if the enemy takes up a sharp +sword. + +The consequences of the nature of War, how ends and +means act in it, how in the modifications of reality it +deviates sometimes more, sometimes less, from its strict +original conception, fluctuating backwards and forwards, +yet always remaining under that strict conception as under +a supreme law: all this we must retain before us, and +bear constantly in mind in the consideration of each of +the succeeding subjects, if we would rightly comprehend +their true relations and proper importance, and not +become involved incessantly in the most glaring contradictions +with the reality, and at last with our own selves. + + + +CHAPTER III. THE GENIUS FOR WAR + +EVERY special calling in life, if it is to be followed with +success, requires peculiar qualifications of understanding +and soul. Where these are of a high order, and manifest +themselves by extraordinary achievements, the mind +to which they belong is termed GENIUS. + +We know very well that this word is used in many +significations which are very different both in extent and +nature, and that with many of these significations it is +a very difficult task to define the essence of Genius; +but as we neither profess to be philosopher nor grammarian, +we must be allowed to keep to the meaning +usual in ordinary language, and to understand by +"genius" a very high mental capacity for certain employments. + +We wish to stop for a moment over this faculty and +dignity of the mind, in order to vindicate its title, and to +explain more fully the meaning of the conception. But +we shall not dwell on that (genius) which has obtained +its title through a very great talent, on genius properly +so called, that is a conception which has no defined limits. +What we have to do is to bring under consideration +every common tendency of the powers of the mind and +soul towards the business of War, the whole of which +common tendencies we may look upon as the ESSENCE OF +MILITARY GENIUS. We say "common," for just therein +consists military genius, that it is not one single quality +bearing upon War, as, for instance, courage, while other +qualities of mind and soul are wanting or have a direction +which is unserviceable for War, but that it is AN +HARMONIOUS ASSOCIATION OF POWERS, in which one or other +may predominate, but none must be in opposition. + +If every combatant required to be more or less endowed +with military genius, then our armies would be very weak; +for as it implies a peculiar bent of the intelligent powers, +therefore it can only rarely be found where the mental +powers of a people are called into requisition and trained +in many different ways. The fewer the employments +followed by a Nation, the more that of arms predominates, +so much the more prevalent will military genius also be +found. But this merely applies to its prevalence, by no +means to its degree, for that depends on the general state +of intellectual culture in the country. If we look at a +wild, warlike race, then we find a warlike spirit in +individuals much more common than in a civilised people; +for in the former almost every warrior possesses it, whilst +in the civilised whole, masses are only carried away by it +from necessity, never by inclination. But amongst +uncivilised people we never find a really great General, +and very seldom what we can properly call a military +genius, because that requires a development of the +intelligent powers which cannot be found in an uncivilised +state. That a civilised people may also have a warlike +tendency and development is a matter of course; and +the more this is general, the more frequently also will +military spirit be found in individuals in their armies. +Now as this coincides in such case with the higher degree +of civilisation, therefore from such nations have issued +forth the most brilliant military exploits, as the Romans +and the French have exemplified. The greatest names +in these and in all other nations that have been renowned +in War belong strictly to epochs of higher culture. + +From this we may infer how great a share the intelligent +powers have in superior military genius. We shall now +look more closely into this point. + +War is the province of danger, and therefore courage +above all things is the first quality of a warrior. + +Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or +courage in presence of danger to the person; and next, +moral courage, or courage before responsibility, whether +it be before the judgment-seat of external authority, or +of the inner power, the conscience. We only speak +here of the first. + +Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two +kinds. First, it may be indifference to danger, whether +proceeding from the organism of the individual, contempt +of death, or habit: in any of these cases it is to be regarded +as a permanent condition. + +Secondly, courage may proceed from positive motives, +such as personal pride, patriotism, enthusiasm of any +kind. In this case courage is not so much a normal +condition as an impulse. + +We may conceive that the two kinds act differently. +The first kind is more certain, because it has become a +second nature, never forsakes the man; the second +often leads him farther. In the first there is more of +firmness, in the second, of boldness. The first leaves the +judgment cooler, the second raises its power at times, +but often bewilders it. The two combined make up the +most perfect kind of courage. + +War is the province of physical exertion and suffering. +In order not to be completely overcome by them, a certain +strength of body and mind is required, which, either +natural or acquired, produces indifference to them. +With these qualifications, under the guidance of simply a +sound understanding, a man is at once a proper instrument +for War; and these are the qualifications so generally +to be met with amongst wild and half-civilised tribes. +If we go further in the demands which War makes on it, +then we find the powers of the understanding +predominating. War is the province of uncertainty: +three-fourths of those things upon which action in War +must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the clouds +of great uncertainty. Here, then, above all a fine and +penetrating mind is called for, to search out the truth by +the tact of its judgment. + +An average intellect may, at one time, perhaps hit +upon this truth by accident; an extraordinary courage, +at another, may compensate for the want of this tact; +but in the majority of cases the average result will always +bring to light the deficient understanding. + +War is the province of chance. In no sphere of human +activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder, +because none is so much in constant contact with him on +all sides. He increases the uncertainty of every circumstance, +and deranges the course of events. + +From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, +this continual interposition of chance, the actor +in War constantly finds things different from his expectations; +and this cannot fail to have an influence on his +plans, or at least on the presumptions connected with +these plans. If this influence is so great as to render +the pre-determined plan completely nugatory, then, as +a rule, a new one must be substituted in its place; but +at the moment the necessary data are often wanting for +this, because in the course of action circumstances press +for immediate decision, and allow no time to look about +for fresh data, often not enough for mature consideration. + +But it more often happens that the correction of +one premise, and the knowledge of chance events which +have arisen, are not sufficient to overthrow our plans +completely, but only suffice to produce hesitation. +Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our +uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only +increased. The reason of this is, that we do not gain all our +experience at once, but by degrees; thus our determinations +continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experi- +ence; and the mind, if we may use the expression, must +always be "under arms." + +Now, if it is to get safely through this perpetual conflict +with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: +in the first place an intellect which, even in the midst +of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces +of inner light, which lead to the truth, and then the +courage to follow this faint light. The first is figuratively +expressed by the French phrase coup d'oeil. The other is +resolution. As the battle is the feature in War to which +attention was originally chiefly directed, and as time +and space are important elements in it, more particularly +when cavalry with their rapid decisions were the +chief arm, the idea of rapid and correct decision related +in the first instance to the estimation of these two elements, +and to denote the idea an expression was adopted which +actually only points to a correct judgment by eye. Many +teachers of the Art of War then gave this limited +signification as the definition of coup d'oeil. But it is +undeniable that all able decisions formed in the moment +of action soon came to be understood by the expression, +as, for instance, the hitting upon the right point of attack, +&c. It is, therefore, not only the physical, but more +frequently the mental eye which is meant in coup d'oeil. +Naturally, the expression, like the thing, is always more +in its place in the field of tactics: still, it must not be +wanting in strategy, inasmuch as in it rapid decisions are +often necessary. If we strip this conception of that which +the expression has given it of the over-figurative and +restricted, then it amounts simply to the rapid discovery +of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not +visible at all or only becomes so after long examination +and reflection. + +Resolution is an act of courage in single instances, +and if it becomes a characteristic trait, it is a habit of +the mind. But here we do not mean courage in face of +bodily danger, but in face of responsibility, therefore, +to a certain extent against moral danger. This has +been often called courage d'esprit, on the ground that it +springs from the understanding; nevertheless, it is no +act of the understanding on that account; it is an act of +feeling. Mere intelligence is still not courage, for we +often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution. The +mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling of courage, +and then be guided and supported by it, because in +momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his +feelings than his thoughts. + +We have assigned to resolution the office of removing +the torments of doubt, and the dangers of delay, when +there are no sufficient motives for guidance. Through +the unscrupulous use of language which is prevalent, +this term is often applied to the mere propensity to daring, +to bravery, boldness, or temerity. But, when there are +SUFFICIENT MOTIVES in the man, let them be objective or +subjective, true or false, we have no right to speak of +his resolution; for, when we do so, we put ourselves in +his place, and we throw into the scale doubts which did +not exist with him. + +Here there is no question of anything but of strength +and weakness. We are not pedantic enough to dispute +with the use of language about this little misapplication, +our observation is only intended to remove wrong objections. + +This resolution now, which overcomes the state of +doubting, can only be called forth by the intellect, and, +in fact, by a peculiar tendency of the same. We maintain +that the mere union of a superior understanding +and the necessary feelings are not sufficient to make +up resolution. There are persons who possess the keenest +perception for the most difficult problems, who are also +not fearful of responsibility, and yet in cases of difficulty +cannot come to a resolution. Their courage and their +sagacity operate independently of each other, do not give +each other a hand, and on that account do not produce +resolution as a result. The forerunner of resolution is an +act of the mind making evident the necessity of venturing, +and thus influencing the will. This quite peculiar direction +of the mind, which conquers every other fear in +man by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes +up resolution in strong minds; therefore, in our opinion, +men who have little intelligence can never be resolute. +They may act without hesitation under perplexing +circumstances, but then they act without reflection. +Now, of course, when a man acts without reflection he +cannot be at variance with himself by doubts, and such +a mode of action may now and then lead to the right +point; but we say now as before, it is the average result +which indicates the existence of military genius. Should +our assertion appear extraordinary to any one, because +he knows many a resolute hussar officer who is no deep +thinker, we must remind him that the question here is +about a peculiar direction of the mind, and not about great +thinking powers. + +We believe, therefore, that resolution is indebted to a +special direction of the mind for its existence, a direction +which belongs to a strong head rather than to a brilliant +one. In corroboration of this genealogy of resolution +we may add that there have been many instances of men +who have shown the greatest resolution in an inferior +rank, and have lost it in a higher position. While, on +the one hand, they are obliged to resolve, on the other +they see the dangers of a wrong decision, and as they are +surrounded with things new to them, their understanding +loses its original force, and they become only the more +timid the more they become aware of the danger of the +irresolution into which they have fallen, and the more +they have formerly been in the habit of acting on the spur +of the moment. + + +From the coup d'oeil and resolution we are naturally to speak of +its +kindred quality, PRESENCE OF MIND, +which in a region of the unexpected like War must act a +great part, for it is indeed nothing but a great conquest +over the unexpected. As we admire presence of mind +in a pithy answer to anything said unexpectedly, so we +admire it in a ready expedient on sudden danger. Neither +the answer nor the expedient need be in themselves +extraordinary, if they only hit the point; for that which +as the result of mature reflection would be nothing +unusual, therefore insignificant in its impression on us, +may as an instantaneous act of the mind produce a +pleasing impression. The expression "presence of mind" +certainly denotes very fitly the readiness and rapidity +of the help rendered by the mind. + +Whether this noble quality of a man is to be ascribed +more to the peculiarity of his mind or to the equanimity +of his feelings, depends on the nature of the case, +although neither of the two can be entirely wanting. +A telling repartee bespeaks rather a ready wit, a ready +expedient on sudden danger implies more particularly a +well-balanced mind. + +If we take a general view of the four elements composing +the atmosphere in which War moves, of DANGER, PHYSICAL +EFFORT, UNCERTAINTY, and CHANCE, it is easy to conceive that +a great force of mind and understanding is requisite to +be able to make way with safety and success amongst +such opposing elements, a force which, according to the +different modifications arising out of circumstances, +we find termed by military writers and annalists as ENERGY, +FIRMNESS, STAUNCHNESS, STRENGTH OF MIND AND CHARACTER. +All these manifestations of the heroic nature might be +regarded as one and the same power of volition, modified +according to circumstances; but nearly related as these +things are to each other, still they are not one and the +same, and it is desirable for us to distinguish here a +little more closely at least the action of the powers of +the soul in relation to them. + +In the first place, to make the conception clear, it is +essential to observe that the weight, burden, resistance, +or whatever it may be called, by which that force of the +soul in the General is brought to light, is only in a very +small measure the enemy's activity, the enemy's resistance, +the enemy's action directly. The enemy's activity +only affects the General directly in the first place in +relation to his person, without disturbing his action as +Commander. +If the enemy, instead of two hours, resists for +four, the Commander instead of two hours is four hours +in danger; this is a quantity which plainly diminishes +the higher the rank of the Commander. What is it for +one in the post of Commander-in-Chief? It is nothing. + +Secondly, although the opposition offered by the enemy +has a direct effect on the Commander through the loss of +means arising from prolonged resistance, and the responsibility +connected with that loss, and his force of will is +first tested and called forth by these anxious considerations, +still we maintain that this is not the heaviest +burden by far which he has to bear, because he has only +himself to settle with. All the other effects of the enemy's +resistance act directly upon the combatants under his +command, and through them react upon him. + +As long as his men full of good courage fight with zeal +and spirit, it is seldom necessary for the Chief to show +great energy of purpose in the pursuit of his object. +But as soon as difficulties arise--and that must always +happen when great results are at stake--then things +no longer move on of themselves like a well-oiled machine, +the machine itself then begins to offer resistance, and to +overcome this the Commander must have a great force +of will. By this resistance we must not exactly suppose +disobedience and murmurs, although these are frequent +enough with particular individuals; it is the whole +feeling of the dissolution of all physical and moral power, +it is the heartrending sight of the bloody sacrifice which +the Commander has to contend with in himself, and then +in all others who directly or indirectly transfer to him +their impressions, feelings, anxieties, and desires. As +the forces in one individual after another become prostrated, +and can no longer be excited and supported by an +effort of his own will, the whole inertia of the mass gradually +rests its weight on the Will of the Commander: by the +spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark +of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in +others: in so far only as he is equal to this, he stands above +the masses and continues to be their master; whenever +that influence ceases, and his own spirit is no longer strong +enough to revive the spirit of all others, the masses drawing +him down with them sink into the lower region of animal +nature, which shrinks from danger and knows not shame. +These are the weights which the courage and intelligent +faculties of the military Commander have to overcome if +he is to make his name illustrious. They increase with the +masses, and therefore, if the forces in question are to +continue equal to the burden, they must rise in proportion +to the height of the station. + +Energy in action expresses the strength of the motive +through which the action is excited, let the motive have +its origin in a conviction of the understanding, or in an +impulse. But the latter can hardly ever be wanting +where great force is to show itself. + +Of all the noble feelings which fill the human heart in +the exciting tumult of battle, none, we must admit, are +so powerful and constant as the soul's thirst for honour +and renown, which the German language treats so unfairly +and tends to depreciate by the unworthy associations +in the words Ehrgeiz (greed of honour) and Ruhmsucht +(hankering after glory). No doubt it is just in War that +the abuse of these proud aspirations of the soul must +bring upon the human race the most shocking outrages, +but by their origin they are certainly to be counted +amongst the noblest feelings which belong to human +nature, and in War they are the vivifying principle which +gives the enormous body a spirit. Although other +feelings may be more general in their influence, and many +of them--such as love of country, fanaticism, revenge, +enthusiasm of every kind--may seem to stand higher, +the thirst for honour and renown still remains indispensable. +Those other feelings may rouse the great masses +in general, and excite them more powerfully, but they do +not give the Leader a desire to will more than others, which +is an essential requisite in his position if he is to make +himself distinguished in it. They do not, like a thirst +for honour, make the military act specially the property +of the Leader, which he strives to turn to the best account; +where he ploughs with toil, sows with care, that he may +reap plentifully. It is through these aspirations we have +been speaking of in Commanders, from the highest to the +lowest, this sort of energy, this spirit of emulation, these +incentives, that the action of armies is chiefly animated +and made successful. And now as to that which specially +concerns the head of all, we ask, Has there ever been +a great Commander destitute of the love of honour, or +is such a character even conceivable? + +FIRMNESS denotes the resistance of the will in relation +to the force of a single blow, STAUNCHNESS in relation to a +continuance of blows. Close as is the analogy between +the two, and often as the one is used in place of the other, +still there is a notable difference between them which +cannot be mistaken, inasmuch as firmness against a +single powerful impression may have its root in the +mere strength of a feeling, but staunchness must be +supported rather by the understanding, for the greater the +duration of an action the more systematic deliberation +is connected with it, and from this staunchness partly +derives its power. + +If we now turn to STRENGTH OF MIND OR SOUL, then the first +question is, What are we to understand thereby? + +Plainly it is not vehement expressions of feeling, nor +easily excited passions, for that would be contrary to +all the usage of language, but the power of listening to +reason in the midst of the most intense excitement, in +the storm of the most violent passions. Should this +power depend on strength of understanding alone? We +doubt it. The fact that there are men of the greatest +intellect who cannot command themselves certainly +proves nothing to the contrary, for we might say that it +perhaps requires an understanding of a powerful rather +than of a comprehensive nature; but we believe we shall +be nearer the truth if we assume that the power of submitting +oneself to the control of the understanding, +even in moments of the most violent excitement of the +feelings, that power which we call SELF-COMMAND, has its +root in the heart itself. It is, in point of fact, another +feeling, which in strong minds balances the excited +passions without destroying them; and it is only through +this equilibrium that the mastery of the understanding +is secured. This counterpoise is nothing but a sense of +the dignity of man, that noblest pride, that deeply- +seated desire of the soul always to act as a being endued +with understanding and reason. We may therefore +say that a strong mind is one which does not lose its +balance even under the most violent excitement. + +If we cast a glance at the variety to be observed in +the human character in respect to feeling, we find, first, +some people who have very little excitability, who are +called phlegmatic or indolent. + +Secondly, some very excitable, but whose feelings +still never overstep certain limits, and who are therefore +known as men full of feeling, but sober-minded. + +Thirdly, those who are very easily roused, whose feelings +blaze up quickly and violently like gunpowder, but do +not last. + +Fourthly, and lastly, those who cannot be moved by +slight causes, and who generally are not to be roused +suddenly, but only gradually; but whose feelings become +very powerful and are much more lasting. These are +men with strong passions, lying deep and latent. + +This difference of character lies probably close on +the confines of the physical powers which move the human +organism, and belongs to that amphibious organisation +which we call the nervous system, which appears to be +partly material, partly spiritual. With our weak philosophy, +we shall not proceed further in this mysterious +field. But it is important for us to spend a moment +over the effects which these different natures have on, +action in War, and to see how far a great strength of mind +is to be expected from them. + +Indolent men cannot easily be thrown out of their +equanimity, but we cannot certainly say there is strength +of mind where there is a want of all manifestation of power. + +At the same time, it is not to be denied that such men +have a certain peculiar aptitude for War, on account of +their constant equanimity. They often want the positive +motive to action, impulse, and consequently activity, +but they are not apt to throw things into disorder. + +The peculiarity of the second class is that they are +easily excited to act on trifling grounds, but in great +matters they are easily overwhelmed. Men of this kind +show great activity in helping an unfortunate individual, +but by the distress of a whole Nation they are only inclined +to despond, not roused to action. + +Such people are not deficient in either activity or +equanimity in War; but they will never accomplish +anything great unless a great intellectual force furnishes +the motive, and it is very seldom that a strong, independent +mind is combined with such a character. + +Excitable, inflammable feelings are in themselves +little suited for practical life, and therefore they are +not very fit for War. They have certainly the advantage +of strong impulses, but that cannot long sustain them. +At the same time, if the excitability in such men takes +the direction of courage, or a sense of honour, they may +often be very useful in inferior positions in War, because +the action in War over which commanders in inferior +positions have control is generally of shorter duration. +Here one courageous resolution, one effervescence of the +forces of the soul, will often suffice. A brave attack, +a soul-stirring hurrah, is the work of a few moments, +whilst a brave contest on the battle-field is the work of +a day, and a campaign the work of a year. + +Owing to the rapid movement of their feelings, it is +doubly difficult for men of this description to preserve +equilibrium of the mind; therefore they frequently +lose head, and that is the worst phase in their nature as +respects the conduct of War. But it would be contrary +to experience to maintain that very excitable spirits can +never preserve a steady equilibrium--that is to say, that +they cannot do so even under the strongest excitement. +Why should they not have the sentiment of self-respect, +for, as a rule, they are men of a noble nature? This +feeling is seldom wanting in them, but it has not time +to produce an effect. After an outburst they suffer most +from a feeling of inward humiliation. If through education, +self-observance, and experience of life, they have learned, +sooner or later, the means of being on their guard, so that +at the moment of powerful excitement they are conscious +betimes of the counteracting force within their own breasts, +then even such men may have great strength of mind. + +Lastly, those who are difficult to move, but on that +account susceptible of very deep feelings, men who stand +in the same relation to the preceding as red heat to a flame, +are the best adapted by means of their Titanic strength +to roll away the enormous masses by which we may +figuratively represent the difficulties which beset command +in War. The effect of their feelings is like the movement +of a great body, slower, but more irresistible. + +Although such men are not so likely to be suddenly +surprised by their feelings and carried away so as to be +afterwards ashamed of themselves, like the preceding, +still it would be contrary to experience to believe that +they can never lose their equanimity, or be overcome +by blind passion; on the contrary, this must always +happen whenever the noble pride of self-control is wanting, +or as often as it has not sufficient weight. We see examples +of this most frequently in men of noble minds belonging +to savage nations, where the low degree of mental cultivation +favours always the dominance of the passions. But +even amongst the most civilised classes in civilised States, +life is full of examples of this kind--of men carried away +by the violence of their passions, like the poacher of old +chained to the stag in the forest. + +We therefore say once more a strong mind is not one +that is merely susceptible of strong excitement, but one +which can maintain its serenity under the most powerful +excitement, so that, in spite of the storm in the breast, +the perception and judgment can act with perfect freedom, +like the needle of the compass in the storm-tossed ship. + +By the term STRENGTH OF CHARACTER, or simply CHARACTER, +is denoted tenacity of conviction, let it be the result of +our own or of others' views, and whether they are principles, +opinions, momentary inspirations, or any kind of emanations +of the understanding; but this kind of firmness +certainly cannot manifest itself if the views themselves +are subject to frequent change. This frequent change +need not be the consequence of external influences; +it may proceed from the continuous activity of our own +mind, in which case it indicates a characteristic unsteadiness +of mind. Evidently we should not say of a man who +changes his views every moment, however much the +motives of change may originate with himself, that he +has character. Only those men, therefore, can be said +to have this quality whose conviction is very constant, +either because it is deeply rooted and clear in itself, +little liable to alteration, or because, as in the case of +indolent men, there is a want of mental activity, and +therefore a want of motives to change; or lastly, because +an explicit act of the will, derived from an imperative +maxim of the understanding, refuses any change of +opinion up to a certain point. + +Now in War, owing to the many and powerful +impressions to which the mind is exposed, and in the +uncertainty of all knowledge and of all science, more +things occur to distract a man from the road he has +entered upon, to make him doubt himself and others, +than in any other human activity. + +The harrowing sight of danger and suffering easily +leads to the feelings gaining ascendency over the conviction +of the understanding; and in the twilight which +surrounds everything a deep clear view is so difficult +that a change of opinion is more conceivable and more +pardonable. It is, at all times, only conjecture or guesses +at truth which we have to act upon. This is why differences of +opinion are +nowhere so great as in War, and +the stream of impressions acting counter to one's own +convictions never ceases to flow. Even the greatest +impassibility of mind is hardly proof against them, +because the impressions are powerful in their nature, +and always act at the same time upon the feelings. + +When the discernment is clear and deep, none but +general principles and views of action from a high standpoint +can be the result; and on these principles the +opinion in each particular case immediately under +consideration lies, as it were, at anchor. But to keep to +these results of bygone reflection, in opposition to the +stream of opinions and phenomena which the present +brings with it, is just the difficulty. Between the particular +case and the principle there is often a wide space +which cannot always be traversed on a visible chain of +conclusions, and where a certain faith in self is necessary +and a certain amount of scepticism is serviceable. Here +often nothing else will help us but an imperative maxim +which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: +that maxim is, in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first +opinion, and not to give it up until a clear conviction +forces us to do so. We must firmly believe in the superior +authority of well-tried maxims, and under the dazzling +influence of momentary events not forget that their value +is of an inferior stamp. By this preference which in +doubtful cases we give to first convictions, by adherence +to the same our actions acquire that stability and consistency +which make up what is called character. + +It is easy to see how essential a well-balanced mind is +to strength of character; therefore men of strong minds +generally have a great deal of character. + +Force of character leads us to a spurious variety of it +--OBSTINACY. + +It is often very difficult in concrete cases to say where the +one ends and the other begins; on the other hand, it does +not seem difficult to determine the difference in idea. + +Obstinacy is no fault of the understanding; we use the +term as denoting a resistance against our better judgment, +and it would be inconsistent to charge that to the +understanding, as the understanding is the power of +judgment. Obstinacy is A FAULT OF THE FEELINGS or heart. +This inflexibility of will, this impatience of contradiction, +have their origin only in a particular kind of egotism, +which sets above every other pleasure that of governing +both self and others by its own mind alone. We should +call it a kind of vanity, were it not decidedly something +better. Vanity is satisfied with mere show, but obstinacy +rests upon the enjoyment of the thing. + +We say, therefore, force of character degenerates into +obstinacy whenever the resistance to opposing judgments +proceeds not from better convictions or a reliance upon a +trustworthy maxim, +but from a feeling of opposition. +If this definition, as we have already admitted, is of little +assistance practically, still it will prevent obstinacy +from being considered merely force of character intensified, +whilst it is something essentially different--something +which certainly lies close to it and is cognate to it, but is +at the same time so little an intensification of it that +there are very obstinate men who from want of understanding +have very little force of character. + +Having in these high attributes of a great military Commander +made ourselves acquainted with those qualities +in which heart and head co-operate, we now come to a +speciality of military activity which perhaps may be looked +upon as the most marked if it is not the most important, +and which only makes a demand on the power of the mind +without regard to the forces of feelings. It is the connection +which exists between War and country or ground. + +This connection is, in the first place, a permanent +condition of War, for it is impossible to imagine our +organised Armies effecting any operation otherwise than +in some given space; it is, secondly, of the most decisive +importance, because it modifies, at times completely +alters, the action of all forces; thirdly, while on the one +hand it often concerns the most minute features of locality, +on the other it may apply to immense tracts of country. + +In this manner a great peculiarity is given to the effect +of this connection of War with country and ground. +If we think of other occupations of man which have a +relation to these objects, on horticulture, agriculture, +on building houses and hydraulic works, on mining, +on the chase, and forestry, they are all confined within +very limited spaces which may be soon explored with +sufficient exactness. But the Commander in War must +commit the business he has in hand to a corresponding +space which his eye cannot survey, which the keenest +zeal cannot always explore, and with which, owing to the +constant changes taking place, he can also seldom become +properly acquainted. Certainly the enemy generally +is in the same situation; still, in the first place, the +difficulty, +although common to both, is not the less a difficulty, +and he who by talent and practice overcomes it will +have a great advantage on his side; secondly, this equality +of the difficulty on both sides is merely an abstract +supposition which is rarely realised in the particular case, +as one of the two opponents (the defensive) usually knows +much more of the locality than his adversary. + +This very peculiar difficulty must be overcome by a +natural mental gift of a special kind which is known by +the--too restricted--term of Orisinn sense of locality. +It is the power of quickly forming a correct geometrical +idea of any portion of country, and consequently of being +able to find one's place in it exactly at any time. This +is plainly an act of the imagination. The perception no +doubt is formed partly by means of the physical eye, +partly by the mind, which fills up what is wanting with +ideas derived from knowledge and experience, and out +of the fragments visible to the physical eye forms a whole; +but that this whole should present itself vividly to the +reason, should become a picture, a mentally drawn map, +that this picture should be fixed, that the details should +never again separate themselves--all that can only be +effected by the mental faculty which we call imagination. +If some great poet or painter should feel hurt that we +require from his goddess such an office; if he shrugs +his shoulders at the notion that a sharp gamekeeper must +necessarily excel in imagination, we readily grant that we +only speak here of imagination in a limited sense, of its +service in a really menial capacity. But, however slight +this service, still it must be the work of that natural +gift, for if that gift is wanting, it would be difficult to +imagine things plainly in all the completeness of the visible. +That a good memory is a great assistance we freely allow, +but whether memory is to be considered as an independent +faculty of the mind in this case, or whether it is just that +power of imagination which here fixes these things better +on the memory, we leave undecided, as in many respects +it seems difficult upon the whole to conceive these two +mental powers apart from each other. + +That practice and mental acuteness have much to do +with it is not to be denied. Puysegur, the celebrated +Quartermaster-General of the famous Luxemburg, used +to say that he had very little confidence in himself +in this respect at first, because if he had to fetch the +parole from a distance he always lost his way. + +It is natural that scope for the exercise of this talent +should increase along with rank. If the hussar and +rifleman in command of a patrol must know well all the +highways and byways, and if for that a few marks, a few +limited powers of observation, are sufficient, the Chief +of an Army must make himself familiar with the general +geographical features of a province and of a country; +must always have vividly before his eyes the direction +of the roads, rivers, and hills, without at the same +time being able to dispense with the narrower "sense +of locality" Orisinn. No doubt, information of +various kinds as to objects in general, maps, books, +memoirs, and for details the assistance of his Staff, +are a great help to him; but it is nevertheless certain +that if he has himself a talent for forming an ideal +picture of a country quickly and distinctly, it lends to +his action an easier and firmer step, saves him from a +certain mental helplessness, and makes him less dependent +on others. + +If this talent then is to be ascribed to imagination, it +is also almost the only service which military activity +requires from that erratic goddess, whose influence is +more hurtful than useful in other respects. + +We think we have now passed in review those +manifestations of the powers of mind and soul which military +activity requires from human nature. Everywhere +intellect appears as an essential co-operative force; +and thus we can understand how the work of War, although +so plain and simple in its effects, can never be conducted +with distinguished success by people without distinguished +powers of the understanding. + +When we have reached this view, then we need no longer +look upon such a natural idea as the turning an enemy's +position, which has been done a thousand times, and a +hundred other similar conceptions, as the result of a +great effort of genius. + +Certainly one is accustomed to regard the plain honest +soldier as the very opposite of the man of reflection, +full of inventions and ideas, or of the brilliant spirit +shining in the ornaments of refined education of every +kind. This antithesis is also by no means devoid of +truth; but it does not show that the efficiency of the +soldier consists only in his courage, and that there is no +particular energy and capacity of the brain required in +addition to make a man merely what is called a true +soldier. We must again repeat that there is nothing more +common than to hear of men losing their energy on being +raised to a higher position, to which they do not feel +themselves equal; but we must also remind our readers +that we are speaking of pre-eminent services, of such +as give renown in the branch of activity to which they +belong. Each grade of command in War therefore +forms its own stratum of requisite capacity of fame and +honour. + +An immense space lies between a General--that is, one +at the head of a whole War, or of a theatre of War--and his +Second in Command, for the simple reason that the latter +is in more immediate subordination to a superior authority +and supervision, consequently is restricted to a more +limited sphere of independent thought. This is why +common opinion sees no room for the exercise of high +talent except in high places, and looks upon an ordinary +capacity as sufficient for all beneath: this is why people +are rather inclined to look upon a subordinate General +grown grey in the service, and in whom constant discharge +of routine duties has produced a decided poverty of mind, +as a man of failing intellect, and, with all respect for his +bravery, to laugh at his simplicity. It is not our object +to gain for these brave men a better lot--that would +contribute nothing to their efficiency, and little to their +happiness; we only wish to represent things as they +are, and to expose the error of believing that a mere +bravo without intellect can make himself distinguished +in War. + +As we consider distinguished talents requisite for those +who are to attain distinction, even in inferior positions, +it naturally follows that we think highly of those who +fill with renown the place of Second in Command of an +Army; and their seeming simplicity of character as compared +with a polyhistor, with ready men of business, or +with councillors of state, must not lead us astray as to +the superior nature of their intellectual activity. It +happens sometimes that men import the fame gained +in an inferior position into a higher one, without in reality +deserving it in the new position; and then if they are +not much employed, and therefore not much exposed +to the risk of showing their weak points, the judgment +does not distinguish very exactly what degree of fame is +really due to them; and thus such men are often the +occasion of too low an estimate being formed of the +characteristics required to shine in certain situations. + +For each station, from the lowest upwards, to render +distinguished services in War, there must be a particular +genius. But the title of genius, history and the judgment +of posterity only confer, in general, on those minds which +have shone in the highest rank, that of Commanders- +in-Chief. The reason is that here, in point of fact, the +demand on the reasoning and intellectual powers generally +is much greater. + +To conduct a whole War, or its great acts, which we +call campaigns, to a successful termination, there must +be an intimate knowledge of State policy in its higher +relations. The conduct of the War and the policy of +the State here coincide, and the General becomes at +the same time the Statesman. + +We do not give Charles XII. the name of a great genius, +because he could not make the power of his sword subservient +to a higher judgment and philosophy--could not +attain by it to a glorious object. We do not give that +title to Henry IV. (of France), because he did not live long +enough to set at rest the relations of different States by his +military activity, and to occupy himself in that higher field +where noble feelings and a chivalrous disposition have less +to do in mastering the enemy than in overcoming internal +dissension. + +In order that the reader may appreciate all that must +be comprehended and judged of correctly at a glance by +a General, we refer to the first chapter. We say the General +becomes a Statesman, but he must not cease to be the +General. He takes into view all the relations of the +State on the one hand; on the other, he must know +exactly what he can do with the means at his disposal. + +As the diversity, and undefined limits, of all the circumstances +bring a great number of factors into consideration +in War, as the most of these factors can only be +estimated according to probability, therefore, if the +Chief of an Army does not bring to bear upon them a +mind with an intuitive perception of the truth, a confusion +of ideas and views must take place, in the midst of which +the judgment will become bewildered. In this sense, +Buonaparte was right when he said that many of the +questions which come before a General for decision would +make problems for a mathematical calculation not +unworthy of the powers of Newton or Euler. + +What is here required from the higher powers of the +mind is a sense of unity, and a judgment raised to such a +compass as to give the mind an extraordinary faculty of +vision which in its range allays and sets aside a thousand +dim notions which an ordinary understanding could only +bring to light with great effort, and over which it would +exhaust itself. But this higher activity of the mind, +this glance of genius, would still not become matter of +history if the qualities of temperament and character of +which we have treated did not give it their support. + +Truth alone is but a weak motive of action with men, +and hence there is always a great difference between +knowing and action, between science and art. The man +receives the strongest impulse to action through the +feelings, and the most powerful succour, if we may use +the expression, through those faculties of heart and mind +which we have considered under the terms of resolution, +firmness, perseverance, and force of character. + +If, however, this elevated condition of heart and mind +in the General did not manifest itself in the general +effects resulting from it, and could only be accepted on +trust and faith, then it would rarely become matter of +history. + +All that becomes known of the course of events in War +is usually very simple, and has a great sameness in appearance; +no one on the mere relation of such events perceives +the difficulties connected with them which had to be +overcome. It is only now and again, in the memoirs of +Generals or of those in their confidence, or by reason of +some special historical inquiry directed to a particular +circumstance, that a portion of the many threads composing +the whole web is brought to light. The reflections, +mental doubts, and conflicts which precede the execution +of great acts are purposely concealed because they affect +political interests, or the recollection of them is accidentally +lost because they have been looked upon as mere +scaffolding which had to be removed on the completion +of the building. + +If, now, in conclusion, without venturing upon a closer +definition of the higher powers of the soul, we should +admit a distinction in the intelligent faculties themselves +according to the common ideas established by language, +and ask ourselves what kind of mind comes closest to +military genius, then a look at the subject as well as at +experience will tell us that searching rather than inventive +minds, +comprehensive minds rather than such as have +a special bent, cool rather than fiery heads, are those to +which in time of War we should prefer to trust the welfare +of our women and children, the honour and the safety +of our fatherland. + + + +CHAPTER IV. OF DANGER IN WAR + +USUALLY before we have learnt what danger really is, +we form an idea of it which is rather attractive than +repulsive. In the intoxication of enthusiasm, to fall +upon the enemy at the charge--who cares then about +bullets and men falling? To throw oneself, blinded by +excitement for a moment, against cold death, uncertain +whether we or another shall escape him, and all this close +to the golden gate of victory, close to the rich fruit which +ambition thirsts for--can this be difficult? It will not be +difficult, and still less will it appear so. But such moments, +which, however, are not the work of a single pulse-beat, +as is supposed, but rather like doctors' draughts, must be +taken diluted and spoilt by mixture with time--such +moments, we say, are but few. + +Let us accompany the novice to the battle-field. As +we approach, the thunder of the cannon becoming plainer +and plainer is soon followed by the howling of shot, which +attracts the attention of the inexperienced. Balls begin +to strike the ground close to us, before and behind. We +hasten to the hill where stands the General and his +numerous Staff. Here the close striking of the cannon +balls and the bursting of shells is so frequent that the +seriousness of life makes itself visible through the youthful +picture of imagination. Suddenly some one known to us +falls--a shell strikes amongst the crowd and causes +some involuntary movements--we begin to feel that we +are no longer perfectly at ease and collected; even the +bravest is at least to some degree confused. Now, a +step farther into the battle which is raging before us like +a scene in a theatre, we get to the nearest General of +Division; here ball follows ball, and the noise of our +own guns increases the confusion. From the General of +Division to the Brigadier. He, a man of acknowledged +bravery, keeps carefully behind a rising ground, a house, +or a tree--a sure sign of increasing danger. Grape rattles +on the roofs of the houses and in the fields; cannon +balls howl over us, and plough the air in all directions, +and soon there is a frequent whistling of musket balls. +A step farther towards the troops, to that sturdy infantry +which for hours has maintained its firmness under this +heavy fire; here the air is filled with the hissing of balls +which announce their proximity by a short sharp noise +as they pass within an inch of the ear, the head, or the +breast. + +To add to all this, compassion strikes the beating heart +with pity at the sight of the maimed and fallen. The +young soldier cannot reach any of these different strata +of danger without feeling that the light of reason does not +move here in the same medium, that it is not refracted +in the same manner as in speculative contemplation. +Indeed, he must be a very extraordinary man who, +under these impressions for the first time, does not lose +the power of making any instantaneous decisions. It +is true that habit soon blunts such impressions; in half +in hour we begin to be more or less indifferent to all +that is going on around us: but an ordinary character +never attains to complete coolness and the natural +elasticity of mind; and so we perceive that here again +ordinary qualities will not suffice--a thing which gains +truth, the wider the sphere of activity which is to be filled. +Enthusiastic, stoical, natural bravery, great ambition, +or also long familiarity with danger--much of all this +there must be if all the effects produced in this resistant +medium are not to fall far short of that which in the student's +chamber may appear only the ordinary standard. + +Danger in War belongs to its friction; a correct idea +of its influence is necessary for truth of perception, and +therefore it is brought under notice here. + + + +CHAPTER V. OF BODILY EXERTION IN WAR + +IF no one were allowed to pass an opinion on the events +of War, except at a moment when he is benumbed by frost, +sinking from heat and thirst, or dying with hunger and +fatigue, we should certainly have fewer judgments correct +*objectively; but they would be so, SUBJECTIVELY, at least; +that is, they would contain in themselves the exact relation +between the person giving the judgment and the +object. We can perceive this by observing how modestly +subdued, even spiritless and desponding, is the opinion +passed upon the results of untoward events by those +who have been eye-witnesses, but especially if they have +been parties concerned. This is, according to our view, +a criterion of the influence which bodily fatigue exercises, +and of the allowance to be made for it in matters of +opinion. + +Amongst the many things in War for which no tariff +can be fixed, bodily effort may be specially reckoned. +Provided there is no waste, it is a coefficient of all the +forces, and no one can tell exactly to what extent it may +be carried. But what is remarkable is, that just as only +a strong arm enables the archer to stretch the bowstring +to the utmost extent, so also in War it is only by means +of a great directing spirit that we can expect the full power +latent in the troops to be developed. For it is one thing if +an Army, in consequence of great misfortunes, surrounded +with danger, falls all to pieces like a wall that has been +thrown down, and can only find safety in the utmost +exertion of its bodily strength; it is another thing +entirely when a victorious Army, drawn on by proud +feelings only, is conducted at the will of its Chief. The +same effort which in the one case might at most excite +our pity must in the other call forth our admiration, +because it is much more difficult to sustain. + +By this comes to light for the inexperienced eye one +of those things which put fetters in the dark, as it were, +on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the +powers of the soul. + +Although here the question is strictly only respecting +the extreme effort required by a Commander from his +Army, by a leader from his followers, therefore of the +spirit to demand it and of the art of getting it, still the +personal physical exertion of Generals and of the Chief +Commander must not be overlooked. Having brought +the analysis of War conscientiously up to this point, +we could not but take account also of the weight of this +small remaining residue. + +We have spoken here of bodily effort, chiefly because, +like danger, it belongs to the fundamental causes of friction, +and because its indefinite quantity makes it like an +elastic body, the friction of which is well known to be +difficult to calculate. + +To check the abuse of these considerations, of such a +survey of things which aggravate the difficulties of War, +nature has given our judgment a guide in our sensibilities. +just as an individual cannot with advantage refer to his +personal deficiencies if he is insulted and ill-treated, +but may well do so if he has successfully repelled the +affront, or has fully revenged it, so no Commander or +Army will lessen the impression of a disgraceful defeat by +depicting the danger, the distress, the exertions, things +which would immensely enhance the glory of a victory. +Thus our feeling, which after all is only a higher kind +of judgment, forbids us to do what seems an act of justice +to which our judgment would be inclined. + + + +CHAPTER VI. INFORMATION IN WAR + +By the word "information" we denote all the knowledge +which we have of the enemy and his country; therefore, +in fact, the foundation of all our ideas and actions. Let +us just consider the nature of this foundation, its want +of trustworthiness, its changefulness, and we shall soon +feel what a dangerous edifice War is, how easily it may +fall to pieces and bury us in its ruins. For although it +is a maxim in all books that we should trust only certain +information, that we must be always suspicious, that is +only a miserable book comfort, belonging to that description +of knowledge in which writers of systems and compendiums +take refuge for want of anything better to say. + +Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, +a still greater part is false, and by far the +greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required +of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which +only knowledge of men and things and good judgment +can give. The law of probability must be his guide. +This is not a trifling difficulty even in respect of the first +plans, which can be formed in the chamber outside the +real sphere of War, but it is enormously increased when +in the thick of War itself one report follows hard upon the +heels of another; it is then fortunate if these reports +in contradicting each other show a certain balance of +probability, and thus themselves call forth a scrutiny. +It is much worse for the inexperienced when accident +does not render him this service, but one report supports +another, confirms it, magnifies it, finishes off the picture +with fresh touches of colour, until necessity in urgent +haste forces from us a resolution which will soon be discovered +to be folly, all those reports having been lies, +exaggerations, errors, &c. &c. In a few words, most +reports are false, and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier +of lies and untruths. As a general rule, every one is +more inclined to lend credence to the bad than the good. +Every one is inclined to magnify the bad in some measure, +and although the alarms which are thus propagated +like the waves of the sea subside into themselves, still, +like them, without any apparent cause they rise again. +Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the Chief +must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its +fury in vain. The role is not easy; he who is not by +nature of a buoyant disposition, or trained by experience +in War, and matured in judgment, may let it be his rule +to do violence to his own natural conviction by inclining +from the side of fear to that of hope; only by that means +will he be able to preserve his balance. This difficulty +of seeing things correctly, which is one of the greatest +sources of friction in War, makes things appear quite +different from what was expected. The impression of the +senses is stronger than the force of the ideas resulting from +methodical reflection, and this goes so far that no important +undertaking was ever yet carried out without the +Commander having to subdue new doubts in himself +at the time of commencing the execution of his work. +Ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others +become, therefore, generally undecided on the spot; +they think that they have found circumstances different +from what they had expected, and this view gains strength +by their again yielding to the suggestions of others. +But even the man who has made his own plans, when he +comes to see things with his own eyes will often think +he has done wrong. Firm reliance on self must make +him proof against the seeming pressure of the moment; +his first conviction will in the end prove true, when the +foreground scenery which fate has pushed on to the +stage of War, with its accompaniments of terrific objects, +is drawn aside and the horizon extended. This is one +of the great chasms which separate CONCEPTION from +EXECUTION. + + + +CHAPTER VII. FRICTION IN WAR + +As long as we have no personal knowledge of War, we +cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which +so much is said, and what that genius and those extraordinary +mental powers required in a General have really +to do. All appears so simple, all the requisite branches of +knowledge appear so plain, all the combinations so unimportant, +that in comparison with them the easiest problem +in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain +scientific dignity. But if we have seen War, all becomes +intelligible; and still, after all, it is extremely difficult +to describe what it is which brings about this change, +to specify this invisible and completely efficient factor. + +Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest +thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce +a friction which no man can imagine exactly who +has not seen War, Suppose now a traveller, who towards +evening expects to accomplish the two stages at the end +of his day's journey, four or five leagues, with post-horses, +on the high road--it is nothing. He arrives now at the +last station but one, finds no horses, or very bad ones; +then a hilly country, bad roads; it is a dark night, and he +is glad when, after a great deal of trouble, he reaches +the next station, and finds there some miserable accommodation. +So in War, through the influence of an infinity +of petty circumstances, which cannot properly be described +on paper, things disappoint us, and we fall short of the +mark. A powerful iron will overcomes this friction; +it crushes the obstacles, but certainly the machine along +with them. We shall often meet with this result. Like +an obelisk towards which the principal streets of a town +converge, the strong will of a proud spirit stands prominent +and commanding in the middle of the Art of +War. + +Friction is the only conception which in a general way +corresponds to that which distinguishes real War from +War on paper. The military machine, the Army and all +belonging to it, is in fact simple, and appears on this +account easy to manage. But let us reflect that no part +of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of +individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all +directions. Theoretically all sounds very well: the commander +of a battalion is responsible for the execution of +the order given; and as the battalion by its discipline +is glued together into one piece, and the chief must be a +man of acknowledged zeal, the beam turns on an iron +pin with little friction. But it is not so in reality, and all +that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests +itself at once in War. The battalion always remains +composed of a number of men, of whom, if chance so wills, +the most insignificant is able to occasion delay and even +irregularity. The danger which War brings with it, +the bodily exertions which it requires, augment this evil +so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes +of it. + +This enormous friction, which is not concentrated, as +in mechanics, at a few points, is therefore everywhere +brought into contact with chance, and thus incidents take +place upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief +origin being chance. As an instance of one such chancethe +weather. Here the +fog prevents the enemy +from being discovered in time, a battery from firing at +the right moment, a report from reaching the General; +there the rain prevents a battalion from arriving +at the right time, because instead of for three it +had to march perhaps eight hours; the cavalry from +charging effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy +ground. + +These are only a few incidents of detail by way of +elucidation, that the reader may be able to follow the +author, for whole volumes might be written on these +difficulties. To avoid this, and still to give a clear conception +of the host of small difficulties to be contended with +in War, we might go on heaping up illustrations, if we were +not afraid of being tiresome. But those who have already +comprehended us will permit us to add a few more. + +Activity in War is movement in a resistant medium. +Just as a man immersed in water is unable to perform with +ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, +that of walking, so in War, with ordinary powers, +one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity. This is the +reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master, +who teaches on dry land movements which are required +in the water, which must appear grotesque and ludicrous +to those who forget about the water. This is also why +theorists, who have never plunged in themselves, or who +cannot deduce any generalities from their experience, +are unpractical and even absurd, because they only teach +what every one knows--how to walk. + +Further, every War is rich in particular facts, while +at the same time each is an unexplored sea, full of rocks +which the General may have a suspicion of, but which he +has never seen with his eye, and round which, moreover, +he must steer in the night. If a contrary wind also +springs up, that is, if any great accidental event declares +itself adverse to him, then the most consummate skill, +presence of mind, and energy are required, whilst to +those who only look on from a distance all seems to +proceed with the utmost ease. The knowledge of this +friction is a chief part of that so often talked of, experience +in War, which is required in a good General. Certainly +he is not the best General in whose mind it assumes the +greatest dimensions, who is the most over-awed by it +(this includes that class of over-anxious Generals, of +whom there are so many amongst the experienced); +but a General must be aware of it that he may overcome +it, where that is possible, and that he may not expect +a degree of precision in results which is impossible on +account of this very friction. Besides, it can never be +learnt theoretically; and if it could, there would still +be wanting that experience of judgment which is called +tact, and which is always more necessary in a field full +of innumerable small and diversified objects than in +great and decisive cases, when one's own judgment may +be aided by consultation with others. Just as the man +of the world, through tact of judgment which has become +habit, speaks, acts, and moves only as suits the occasion, +so the officer experienced in War will always, in great and +small matters, at every pulsation of War as we may say, +decide and determine suitably to the occasion. Through +this experience and practice the idea comes to his mind +of itself that so and so will not suit. And thus he will +not easily place himself in a position by which he is +compromised, +which, if it often occurs in War, shakes all the +foundations of confidence and becomes extremely dangerous. + +It is therefore this friction, or what is so termed here, +which makes that which appears easy in War difficult in +reality. As we proceed, we shall often meet with this +subject again, and it will hereafter become plain that +besides experience and a strong will, there are still +many other rare qualities of the mind required to +make a man a consummate General. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS, BOOK I + +THOSE things which as elements meet together in the +atmosphere of War and make it a resistant medium for +every activity we have designated under the terms +danger, bodily effort (exertion), information, and friction. +In their impedient effects they may therefore be comprehended +again in the collective notion of a general friction. +Now is there, then, no kind of oil which is capable of +diminishing this friction? Only one, and that one is not +always available at the will of the Commander or his +Army. It is the habituation of an Army to War. + +Habit gives strength to the body in great exertion, to +the mind in great danger, to the judgment against first +impressions. By it a valuable circumspection is generally +gained throughout every rank, from the hussar and rifleman +up to the General of Division, which facilitates the +work of the Chief Commander. + +As the human eye in a dark room dilates its pupil, +draws in the little light that there is, partially distinguishes +objects by degrees, and at last knows them quite well, +so it is in War with the experienced soldier, whilst the +novice is only met by pitch dark night. + +Habituation to War no General can give his Army at +once, and the camps of manoeuvre (peace exercises) +furnish but a weak substitute for it, weak in comparison +with real experience in War, but not weak in relation +to other Armies in which the training is limited to mere +mechanical exercises of routine. So to regulate the exercises +in peace time as to include some of these causes of +friction, that the judgment, circumspection, even resolution +of the separate leaders may be brought into exercise, +is of much greater consequence than those believe who +do not know the thing by experience. It is of immense +importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever rank +he has, should not have to encounter in War those +things which, when seen for the first time, set him +in astonishment and perplexity; if he has only met +with them one single time before, even by that he is half +acquainted with them. This relates even to bodily +fatigues. They should be practised less to accustom the +body to them than the mind. In War the young soldier +is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the consequence +of faults, mistakes, and embarrassment in the conduct +of the whole, and to become distressed and despondent +as a consequence. This would not happen if he had +been prepared for this beforehand by exercises in peace. + +Another less comprehensive but still very important +means of gaining habituation to War in time of peace is +to invite into the service officers of foreign armies who +have had experience in War. Peace seldom reigns over +all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world. A +State which has been long at peace should, therefore, +always seek to procure some officers who have done good +service at the different scenes of Warfare, or to send +there some of its own, that they may get a lesson in +War. + +However small the number of officers of this description +may appear in proportion to the mass, still their +influence is very sensibly felt.[*] Their experience, the bent +of their genius, the stamp of their character, influence +their subordinates and comrades; and besides that, if +they cannot be placed in positions of superior command, +they may always be regarded as men acquainted with +the country, who may be questioned on many special +occasions. + +[*] The War of 1870 furnishes a marked illustration. Von Moltke +and +von Goeben, not to mention many others, had both seen service in +this manner, the former in Turkey and Syria, the latter in +Spain-- +EDITOR. + + + +BOOK II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR + +CHAPTER I. BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR + +WAR in its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone +is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which +in a wide sense is called War. But fighting is a trial of +strength of the moral and physical forces by means of +the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is evident +of itself, for the condition of the mind has always the +most decisive influence on the forces employed in War. + +The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special +inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favour: +in consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone +great alterations; but in whatever way it is conducted +its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is +that which constitutes War. + +The inventions have been from the first weapons and +equipments for the individual combatants. These have +to be provided and the use of them learnt before the War +begins. They are made suitable to the nature of the +fighting, consequently are ruled by it; but plainly +the activity engaged in these appliances is a different +thing from the fight itself; it is only the preparation for +the combat, not the conduct of the same. That arming +and equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting +is plain, because mere wrestling is also fighting. + +Fighting has determined everything appertaining to +arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of +fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action +between the two. + +Nevertheless, the fight itself remains still an entirely +special activity, more particularly because it moves in an +entirely special element, namely, in the element of danger. + +If, then, there is anywhere a necessity for drawing a +line between two different activities, it is here; and in +order to see clearly the importance of this idea, we need +only just to call to mind how often eminent personal +fitness in one field has turned out nothing but the most +useless pedantry in the other. + +It is also in no way difficult to separate in idea the one +activity from the other, if we look at the combatant +forces fully armed and equipped as a given means, the +profitable use of which requires nothing more than a +knowledge of their general results. + +The Art of War is therefore, in its proper sense, the art +of making use of the given means in fighting, and we +cannot give it a better name than the "Conduct of War." +On the other hand, in a wider sense all activities which +have their existence on account of War, therefore the +whole creation of troops, that is levying them, arming, +equipping, and exercising them, belong to the Art of War. + +To make a sound theory it is most essential to separate +these two activities, for it is easy to see that if every act +of War is to begin with the preparation of military forces, +and to presuppose forces so organised as a primary condition +for conducting War, that theory will only be applicable +in the few cases to which the force available happens +to be exactly suited. If, on the other hand, we wish to +have a theory which shall suit most cases, and will not be +wholly useless in any case, it must be founded on those +means which are in most general use, and in respect to +these only on the actual results springing from them. + +The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation and +conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act, +there would be no necessity for any further subdivision, +but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of +single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats, +as we have shown in the first chapter of the first book, and +which form new units. From this arises the totally +different activities, that of the FORMATION and CONDUCT of +these single combats in themselves, and the COMBINATION +of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object +of the War. The first is called TACTICS, the other STRATEGY. + +This division into tactics and strategy is now in almost +general use, and every one knows tolerably well under +which head to place any single fact, without knowing +very distinctly the grounds on which the classification +is founded. But when such divisions are blindly adhered +to in practice, they must have some deep root. We have +searched for this root, and we might say that it is just the +usage of the majority which has brought us to it. On the +other hand, we look upon the arbitrary, unnatural definitions +of these conceptions sought to be established +by some writers as not in accordance with the general +usage of the terms. + +According to our classification, therefore, tactics IS THE +THEORY OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN COMBAT. Strategy +IS THE THEORY OF THE USE OF COMBATS FOR THE OBJECT OF THE WAR. + +The way in which the conception of a single, or independent +combat, is more closely determined, the conditions +to which this unit is attached, we shall only be able to +explain clearly when we consider the combat; we must +content ourselves for the present with saying that in +relation to space, therefore in combats taking place at +the same time, the unit reaches just as far as PERSONAL +COMMAND reaches; but in regard to time, and therefore +in relation to combats which follow each other in close +succession, it reaches to the moment when the crisis which +takes place in every combat is entirely passed. + +That doubtful cases may occur, cases, for instance, +in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also +as a single one, will not overthrow the ground of distinction +we have adopted, for the same is the case with all +grounds of distinction of real things which are differentiated +by a gradually diminishing scale. There may, +therefore, certainly be acts of activity in War which, +without any alteration in the point of view, may just +as well be counted strategic as tactical; for example, +very extended positions resembling a chain of posts, the +preparations for the passage of a river at several points, &c. + +Our classification reaches and covers only the USE OF +THE MILITARY FORCE. But now there are in War a number +of activities which are subservient to it, and still are quite +different from it; sometimes closely allied, sometimes +less near in their affinity. All these activities relate to +the MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY FORCE. In the same way +as its creation and training precede its use, so its maintenance +is always a necessary condition. But, strictly +viewed, all activities thus connected with it are always +to be regarded only as preparations for fighting; they are +certainly nothing more than activities which are very +close to the action, so that they run through the hostile +act alternate in importance with the use of the forces. We +have therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other +preparatory activities from the Art of War in its restricted +sense, from the conduct of War properly so called; and +we are obliged to do so if we would comply with the first +principle of all theory, the elimination of all heterogeneous +elements. Who would include in the real "conduct +of War" the whole litany of subsistence and administration, +because it is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal +action with the use of the troops, but is something essentially +different from it? + +We have said, in the third chapter of our first book, that +as the fight or combat is the only directly effective activity, +therefore the threads of all others, as they end in it, are +included in it. By this we meant to say that to all +others an object was thereby appointed which, in accordance +with the laws peculiar to themselves, they must seek +to attain. Here we must go a little closer into this +subject. + +The subjects which constitute the activities outside of +the combat are of various kinds. + +The one part belongs, in one respect, to the combat +itself, is identical with it, whilst it serves in another +respect for the maintenance of the military force. The +other part belongs purely to the subsistence, and has only, +in consequence of the reciprocal action, a limited influence +on the combats by its results. The subjects which in one +respect belong to the fighting itself are MARCHES, CAMPS, +and CANTONMENTS, for they suppose so many different situations +of troops, and where troops are supposed there the +idea of the combat must always be present. + +The other subjects, which only belong to the maintenance, +are SUBSISTENCE, CARE OF THE SICK, the SUPPLY AND +REPAIR OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. + +Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. +The act of marching in the combat, generally called +manoeuvring, certainly does not necessarily include the +use of weapons, but it is so completely and necessarily combined +with it that it forms an integral part of that which +we call a combat. But the march outside the combat +is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By +the strategic plan is settled WHEN, WHERE, and WITH WHAT +FORCES a battle is to be delivered--and to carry that into +execution the march is the only means. + +The march outside of the combat is therefore an +instrument of strategy, but not on that account exclusively +a subject of strategy, for as the armed force which +executes it may be involved in a possible combat at any +moment, therefore its execution stands also under tactical +as well as strategic rules. If we prescribe to a column +its route on a particular side of a river or of a branch of a +mountain, then that is a strategic measure, for it contains +the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill +or river in preference to the other, in case a combat +should be necessary during the march. + +But if a column, instead of following the road through a +valley, marches along the parallel ridge of heights, or +for the convenience of marching divides itself into several +columns, then these are tactical arrangements, for they +relate to the manner in which we shall use the troops in +the anticipated combat. + +The particular order of march is in constant relation +with readiness for combat, is therefore tactical in its +nature, for it is nothing more than the first or preliminary +disposition for the battle which may possibly take +place. + +As the march is the instrument by which strategy +apportions its active elements, the combats, but these +last often only appear by their results and not in the details +of their real course, it could not fail to happen that in +theory the instrument has often been substituted for the +efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive skilful +march, allusion being thereby made to those combat- +combinations to which these marches led. This substitution +of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression +too desirable to call for alteration, but still it is only a +condensed chain of ideas in regard to which we must +never omit to bear in mind the full meaning, if we would +avoid falling into error. + +We fall into an error of this description if we attribute +to strategical combinations a power independent of tactical +results. We read of marches and manoeuvres combined, +the object attained, and at the same time not a word about +combat, from which the conclusion is drawn that there +are means in War of conquering an enemy without fighting. +The prolific nature of this error we cannot show until +hereafter. + +But although a march can be regarded absolutely as an +integral part of the combat, still there are in it certain +relations which do not belong to the combat, and therefore +are neither tactical nor strategic. To these belong +all arrangements which concern only the accommodation +of the troops, the construction of bridges, roads, &c. +These are only conditions; under many circumstances +they are in very close connection, and may almost identify +themselves with the troops, as in building a bridge in +presence of the enemy; but in themselves they are always +activities, the +theory of which does not form +part of the theory of the conduct of War. + +Camps, by which we mean every disposition of troops +in concentrated, therefore in battle order, in +contradistinction to cantonments or quarters, are a state of +rest, therefore of restoration; but they are at the same +time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the spot, +chosen; and by the manner in which they are taken up +they contain the fundamental lines of the battle, a +condition from which every defensive battle starts; +they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and +tactics. + +Cantonments take the place of camps for the better +refreshment of the troops. They are therefore, like +camps, strategic subjects as regards position and extent; +tactical subjects as regards internal organisation, with a +view to readiness to fight. + +The occupation of camps and cantonments no doubt +usually combines with the recuperation of the troops +another object also, for example, the covering a district +of country, the holding a position; but it can very well +be only the first. We remind our readers that strategy +may follow a great diversity of objects, for everything +which appears an advantage may be the object of a combat, +and the preservation of the instrument with which +War is made must necessarily very often become the +object of its partial combinations. + +If, therefore, in such a case strategy ministers only to +the maintenance of the troops, we are not on that account +out of the field of strategy, for we are still engaged +with the use of the military force, because every disposition +of that force upon any point Whatever of the +theatre of War is such a use. + +But if the maintenance of the troops in camp or +quarters calls forth activities which are no employment +of the armed force, such as the construction of huts, +pitching of tents, subsistence and sanitary services in +camps or quarters, then such belong neither to strategy +nor tactics. + +Even entrenchments, the site and preparation of which +are plainly part of the order of battle, therefore tactical +subjects, do not belong to the theory of the conduct of +War so far as respects the execution of their construction +the knowledge and skill required for such work being, in +point of fact, qualities inherent in the nature of an +organised Army; the theory of the combat takes them +for granted. + +Amongst the subjects which belong to the mere keeping +up of an armed force, because none of the parts are +identified with the combat, the victualling of the troops +themselves comes first, as it must be done almost daily +and for each individual. Thus it is that it completely +permeates military action in the parts constituting +strategy--we say parts constituting strategy, because +during a battle the subsistence of troops will rarely have +any influence in modifying the plan, although the thing +is conceivable enough. The care for the subsistence of +the troops comes therefore into reciprocal action chiefly +with strategy, and there is nothing more common than +for the leading strategic features of a campaign and War +to be traced out in connection with a view to this supply. +But however frequent and however important these +views of supply may be, the subsistence of the troops +always remains a completely different activity from the +use of the troops, and the former has only an influence on +the latter by its results. + +The other branches of administrative activity which +we have mentioned stand much farther apart from the +use of the troops. The care of sick and wounded, highly +important as it is for the good of an Army, directly affects +it only in a small portion of the individuals composing it, +and therefore has only a weak and indirect influence +upon the use of the rest. The completing and replacing +articles of arms and equipment, except so far as by the +organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous activity +inherent in them--takes place only periodically, and +therefore seldom affects strategic plans. + +We must, however, here guard ourselves against a +mistake. In certain cases these subjects may be really +of decisive importance. The distance of hospitals and +depo^ts of munitions may very easily be imagined as the +sole cause of very important strategic decisions. We do +not wish either to contest that point or to throw it into +the shade. But we are at present occupied not with the +particular facts of a concrete case, but with abstract +theory; and our assertion therefore is that such an +influence is too rare to give the theory of sanitary measures +and the supply of munitions and arms an importance intheory of +the conduct +of War such as to make it worth +while to include in the theory of the conduct of War the +consideration of the different ways and systems which +the above theories may furnish, in the same way as is +certainly necessary in regard to victualling troops. + +If we have clearly understood the results of our reflections, +then the activities belonging to War divide themselves +into two principal classes, into such as are only +"preparations for War" and into the "War itself." +This division must therefore also be made in theory. + +The knowledge and applications of skill in the preparations +for War are engaged in the creation, discipline, and +maintenance of all the military forces; what general +names should be given to them we do not enter into, but +we see that artillery, fortification, elementary tactics, as +they are called, the whole organisation and administration +of the various armed forces, and all such things are +included. But the theory of War itself occupies itself +with the use of these prepared means for the object of +the war. It needs of the first only the results, that is, the +knowledge of the principal properties of the means taken +in hand for use. This we call "The Art of War" in a +limited sense, or "Theory of the Conduct of War," or +"Theory of the Employment of Armed Forces," all of +them denoting for us the same thing. + +The present theory will therefore treat the combat as +the real contest, marches, camps, and cantonments as +circumstances which are more or less identical with it. +The subsistence of the troops will only come into consideration +like OTHER GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES in respect of its +results, not as an activity belonging to the combat. + +The Art of War thus viewed in its limited sense divides +itself again into tactics and strategy. The former occupies +itself with the form of the separate combat, the latter +with its use. Both connect themselves with the circumstances +of marches, camps, cantonments only through +the combat, and these circumstances are tactical or +strategic according as they relate to the form or to the +signification of the battle. + +No doubt there will be many readers who will consider +superfluous this careful separation of two things lying so +close together as tactics and strategy, because it has no +direct effect on the conduct itself of War. We admit, +certainly that it would be pedantry to look for direct +effects on the field of battle from a theoretical distinction. + +But the first business of every theory is to clear up +conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together, +and, we may say, entangled and confused; and only when +a right understanding is established, as to names and +conceptions, can we hope to progress with clearness and +facility, and be certain that author and reader will always +see things from the same point of view. Tactics and +strategy are two activities mutually permeating each +other in time and space, at the same time essentially +different activities, the inner laws and mutual relations +of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until +a clear conception of the nature of each activity is +established. + +He to whom all this is nothing, must either repudiate +all theoretical consideration, OR HIS UNDERSTANDING HAS +NOT AS YET BEEN PAINED by the confused and perplexing +ideas resting on no fixed point of view, leading to no +satisfactory result, sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic, +sometimes floating in vague generalities, which we are +often obliged to hear and read on the conduct of War, +owing to the spirit of scientific investigation having +hitherto been little directed to these subjects. + + + +CHAPTER II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR + +1. THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THE "ART OF WAR" WAS +MERELY THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES. + +FORMERLY by the term "Art of War," or "Science of +War," nothing was understood but the totality of those +branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill +occupied with material things. The pattern and preparation +and the mode of using arms, the construction of +fortifications and entrenchments, the organism of an army +and the mechanism of its movements, were the subjectthese +branches of +knowledge and skill above referred +to, and the end and aim of them all was the establishment +of an armed force fit for use in War. All this concerned +merely things belonging to the material world and a one- +sided activity only, and it was in fact nothing but an +activity advancing by gradations from the lower occupations +to a finer kind of mechanical art. The relation of +all this to War itself was very much the same as the relation +of the art of the sword cutler to the art of using the +sword. The employment in the moment of danger and +in a state of constant reciprocal action of the particular +energies of mind and spirit in the direction proposed to +them was not yet even mooted. + + +2. TRUE WAR FIRST APPEARS IN THE ART OF SIEGES. + +In the art of sieges we first perceive a certain degree of +guidance of the combat, something of the action of the +intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under +their control, but generally only so far that it very soon +embodied itself again in new material forms, such as +approaches, trenches, counter-approaches, batteries, &c., +and every step which this action of the higher faculties +took was marked by some such result; it was only the +thread that was required on which to string these material +inventions in order. As the intellect can hardly manifest +itself in this kind of War, except in such things, so therefore +nearly all that was necessary was done in that way. + + +3. THEN TACTICS TRIED TO FIND ITS WAY IN +THE SAME DIRECTION. + +Afterwards tactics attempted to give to the mechanism +of its joints the character of a general disposition, built +upon the peculiar properties of the instrument, which +character leads indeed to the battle-field, but instead of +leading to the free activity of mind, leads to an Army made +like an automaton by its rigid formations and orders of +battle, which, movable only by the word of command, +is intended to unwind its activities like a piece of clockwork. + + +4. THE REAL CONDUCT OF WAR ONLY MADE ITS +APPEARANCE INCIDENTALLY AND INCOGNITO. + +The conduct of War properly so called, that is, a use of +the prepared means adapted to the most special requirements, +was not considered as any suitable subject for +theory, but one which should be left to natural talents +alone. By degrees, as War passed from the hand-to-hand +encounters of the middle ages into a more regular and +systematic form, stray reflections on this point also forced +themselves into men's minds, but they mostly appeared +only incidentally in memoirs and narratives, and in a +certain measure incognito. + + +5. REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY EVENTS BROUGHT +ABOUT THE WANT OF A THEORY. + +As contemplation on War continually increased, and its +history every day assumed more of a critical character, +the urgent want appeared of the support of fixed maxims +and rules, in order that in the controversies naturally +arising about military events the war of opinions might +be brought to some one point. This whirl of opinions, +which neither revolved on any central pivot nor according +to any appreciable laws, could not but be very distasteful +to people's minds. + + +6. ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE THEORY. + +There arose, therefore, an endeavour to establish +maxims, rules, and even systems for the conduct of War. +By this the attainment of a positive object was proposed, +without taking into view the endless difficulties which +the conduct of War presents in that respect. The conduct +of War, as we have shown, has no definite limits in +any direction, while every system has the circumscribing +nature of a synthesis, from which results an irreconcileable +opposition between such a theory and practice. + + +7. LIMITATION TO MATERIAL OBJECTS. + +Writers on theory felt the difficulty of the subject soon +enough, and thought themselves entitled to get rid of it +by directing their maxims and systems only upon material +things and a one-sided activity. Their aim was to reach +results, as in the science for the preparation for War, +entirely certain and positive, and therefore only to take +into consideration that which could be made matter of +calculation. + + +8. SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS. + +The superiority in numbers being a material condition, +it was chosen from amongst all the factors required to +produce victory, because it could be brought under +mathematical laws through combinations of time and +space. It was thought possible to leave out of sight all +other circumstances, by supposing them to be equal on +each side, and therefore to neutralise one another. This +would have been very well if it had been done to gain a +preliminary knowledge of this one factor, according to +its relations, but to make it a rule for ever to consider +superiority of numbers as the sole law; to see the whole +secret of the Art of War in the formula, IN A CERTAIN TIME, +AT A CERTAIN POINT, TO BRING UP SUPERIOR MASSES--was a +restriction overruled by the force of realities. + + +9. VICTUALLING OF TROOPS. + +By one theoretical school an attempt was made to +systematise another material element also, by making the +subsistence of troops, according to a previously established +organism of the Army, the supreme legislator in the higher +conduct of War. In this way certainly they arrived at +definite figures, but at figures which rested on a number +of arbitrary calculations, and which therefore could not +stand the test of practical application. + + +10. BASE. + +An ingenious author tried to concentrate in a single +conception, that of a BASE, a whole host of objects +amongst which sundry relations even with immaterial +forces found their way in as well. The list comprised the +subsistence of the troops, the keeping them complete in +numbers and equipment, the security of communications +with the home country, lastly, the security of retreat in +case it became necessary; and, first of all, he proposed to +substitute this conception of a base for all these things; +then for the base itself to substitute its own length +(extent); and, last of all, to substitute the angle +formed by the army with this base: all this was done to obtain a +pure +geometrical result utterly useless. +This last is, in fact, unavoidable, if we reflect that none +of these substitutions could be made without violating +truth and leaving out some of the things contained in the +original conception. The idea of a base is a real necessity +for strategy, and to have conceived it is meritorious; +but to make such a use of it as we have depicted is +completely inadmissible, and could not but lead to partial +conclusions which have forced these theorists into a direction +opposed to common sense, namely, to a belief in the +decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack. + + +11. INTERIOR LINES. + +As a reaction against this false direction, another +geometrical principle, that of the so-called interior lines, +was then elevated to the throne. Although this principle +rests on a sound foundation, on the truth that the combat +is the only effectual means in War, still it is, just on +account of its purely geometrical nature, nothing but +another case of one-sided theory which can never gain +ascendency in the real world. + + +12. ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OPEN TO OBJECTION. + +All these attempts at theory are only to be considered +in their analytical part as progress in the province of truth, +but in their synthetical part, in their precepts and rules, +they are quite unserviceable. + +They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in War +all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to +be made with varying quantities. + +They direct the attention only upon material forces, +while the whole military action is penetrated throughout +by intelligent forces and their effects. + +They only pay regard to activity on one side, whilst +War is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of +which are mutual. + +13. AS A RULE THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS. + +All that was not attainable by such miserable philosophy, +the offspring of partial views, lay outside the +precincts of science--and was the field of genius, which +RAISES ITSELF ABOVE RULES. + +Pity the warrior who is contented to crawl about in +this beggardom of rules, which are too bad for genius, +over which it can set itself superior, over which it can +perchance make merry! What genius does must be +the best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to +show how and why it is so. + +Pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the +mind! It cannot repair this contradiction by any +humility, and the humbler it is so much the sooner will +ridicule and contempt drive it out of real life. + + +14. THE DIFFICULTY OF THEORY AS SOON AS MORAL +QUANTITIES COME INTO CONSIDERATION. + +Every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the +moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities. +Architecture and painting know quite well what +they are about as long as they have only to do with matter; +there is no dispute about mechanical or optical construction. +But as soon as the moral activities begin their +work, as soon as moral impressions and feelings are produced, +the whole set of rules dissolves into vague ideas. + +The science of medicine is chiefly engaged with bodily +phenomena only; its business is with the animal organism, +which, liable to perpetual change, is never exactly the +same for two moments. This makes its practice very +difficult, and places the judgment of the physician above +his science; but how much more difficult is the case if a +moral effect is added, and how much higher must we place +the physician of the mind? + +15. THE MORAL QUANTITIES MUST NOT BE +EXCLUDED IN WAR. + +But now the activity in War is never directed solely +against matter; it is always at the same time directed +against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter, +and to separate the two from each other is impossible. + +But the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner +eye, and this is different in each person, and often different +in the same person at different times. + +As danger is the general element in which everything +moves in War, it is also chiefly by courage, the feeling of +one's own power, that the judgment is differently influenced. +It is to a certain extent the crystalline lens +through which all appearances pass before reaching the +understanding. + +And yet we cannot doubt that these things acquire a +certain objective value simply through experience. + +Every one knows the moral effect of a surprise, of an +attack in flank or rear. Every one thinks less of the +enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back, and ventures +much more in pursuit than when pursued. Every +one judges of the enemy's General by his reputed talents, +by his age and experience, and shapes his course accordingly. +Every one casts a scrutinising glance at the spirit +and feeling of his own and the enemy's troops. All these +and similar effects in the province of the moral nature +of man have established themselves by experience, are +perpetually recurring, and therefore warrant our reckoning +them as real quantities of their kind. What +could we do with any theory which should leave them +out of consideration? + +Certainly experience is an indispensable title for these +truths. With psychological and philosophical sophistries +no theory, no General, should meddle. + +16. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY OF A THEORY FOR THE +CONDUCT OF WAR. + +In order to comprehend clearly the difficulty of the +proposition which is contained in a theory for the conduct +of War, and thence to deduce the necessary characteristics +of such a theory, we must take a closer view of the chief +particulars which make up the nature of activity in War. + + +17. FIRST SPECIALITY.--MORAL FORCES AND THEIR +EFFECTS. +(HOSTILE FEELING.) + +The first of these specialities consists in the moral +forces and effects. + +The combat is, in its origin, the expression of HOSTILE +FEELING, but in our great combats, which we call Wars, +the hostile feeling frequently resolves itself into merely +a hostile VIEW, and there is usually no innate hostile +feeling residing in individual against individual. Nevertheless, +the combat never passes off without such feelings +being brought into activity. National hatred, which is +seldom wanting in our Wars, is a substitute for personal +hostility in the breast of individual opposed to individual. +But where this also is wanting, and at first no animosity +of feeling subsists, a hostile feeling is kindled by the +combat itself; for an act of violence which any one +commits upon us by order of his superior, will excite in +us a desire to retaliate and be revenged on him, sooner +than on the superior power at whose command the act +was done. This is human, or animal if we will; still it +is so. We are very apt to regard the combat in theory +as an abstract trial of strength, without any participation +on the part of the feelings, and that is one of the thousand +errors which theorists deliberately commit, because they +do not see its consequences. + +Besides that excitation of feelings naturally arising +from the combat itself, there are others also which do not +essentially belong to it, but which, on account of their +relationship, easily unite with it--ambition, love of power, +enthusiasm of every kind, &c. &c. + + +18. THE IMPRESSIONS OF DANGER. +(COURAGE.) + +Finally, the combat begets the element of danger, in +which all the activities of War must live and move, like +the bird in the air or the fish in the water. But the +influences of danger all pass into the feelings, either +directly--that is, instinctively--or through the medium +of the understanding. The effect in the first case would +be a desire to escape from the danger, and, if that cannot +be done, fright and anxiety. If this effect does not take +place, then it is COURAGE, which is a counterpoise to that +instinct. Courage is, however, by no means an act of +the understanding, but likewise a feeling, like fear; the +latter looks to the physical preservation, courage to the +moral preservation. Courage, then, is a nobler instinct. +But because it is so, it will not allow itself to be used as +a lifeless instrument, which produces its effects exactly +according to prescribed measure. Courage is therefore +no mere counterpoise to danger in order to neutralise +the latter in its effects, but a peculiar power in itself. + + +19. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF DANGER. + +But to estimate exactly the influence of danger upon +the principal actors in War, we must not limit its sphere +to the physical danger of the moment. It dominates +over the actor, not only by threatening him, but also +by threatening all entrusted to him, not only at the +moment in which it is actually present, but also through +the imagination at all other moments, which have a +connection with the present; lastly, not only directly by +itself, but also indirectly by the responsibility which +makes it bear with tenfold weight on the mind of the chief +actor. Who could advise, or resolve upon a great battle, +without feeling his mind more or less wrought up, or perplexed +by, the danger and responsibility which such a +great act of decision carries in itself? We may say that +action in War, in so far as it is real action, not a mere +condition, is never out of the sphere of danger. + + +20. OTHER POWERS OF FEELING. + +If we look upon these affections which are excited +by hostility and danger as peculiarly belonging to War, +we do not, therefore, exclude from it all others +accompanying man in his life's journey. They will also find +room here frequently enough. Certainly we may say +that many a petty action of the passions is silenced in +this serious business of life; but that holds good only +in respect to those acting in a lower sphere, who, hurried +on from one state of danger and exertion to another, +lose sight of the rest of the things of life, BECOME UNUSED +TO DECEIT, because it is of no avail with death, and so +attain to that soldierly simplicity of character which +has always been the best representative of the military +profession. In higher regions it is otherwise, for the +higher a man's rank, the more he must look around him; +then arise interests on every side, and a manifold activity +of the passions of good and bad. Envy and generosity, +pride and humility, fierceness and tenderness, all may +appear as active powers in this great drama. + + +21. PECULIARITY OF MIND. + +The peculiar characteristics of mind in the chief actor +have, as well as those of the feelings, a high importance. +From an imaginative, flighty, inexperienced head, and +from a calm, sagacious understanding, different things +are to be expected. + + +22. FROM THE DIVERSITY IN MENTAL INDIVIDUALITIES +ARISES THE DIVERSITY OF WAYS LEADING TO THE +END. + +It is this great diversity in mental individuality, the +influence of which is to be supposed as chiefly felt in the +higher ranks, because it increases as we progress upwards, +which chiefly produces the diversity of ways leading to the +end noticed by us in the first book, and which gives, to the +play of probabilities and chance, such an unequal share in +determining the course of events. + + +23. SECOND PECULIARITY.--LIVING REACTION. + +The second peculiarity in War is the living reaction, +and the reciprocal action resulting therefrom. We do +not here speak of the difficulty of estimating that reaction, +for that is included in the difficulty before mentioned, +of treating the moral powers as quantities; but of this, +that reciprocal action, by its nature, opposes anything +like a regular plan. The effect which any measure produces +upon the enemy is the most distinct of all the data +which action affords; but every theory must keep to +classes (or groups) of phenomena, and can never take up +the really individual case in itself: that must everywhere +be left to judgment and talent. It is therefore natural +that in a business such as War, which in its plan--built +upon general circumstances--is so often thwarted by +unexpected and singular accidents, more must generally +be left to talent; and less use can be made of a THEORETICAL +GUIDE than in any other. + + +24. THIRD PECULIARITY.--UNCERTAINTY OF ALL DATA. + +Lastly, the great uncertainty of all data in War is a +peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain +extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition +not unfrequently--like the effect of a fog or moonshine-- +gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural +appearance. + +What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight +talent must discover, or must be left to chance. It is +therefore again talent, or the favour of fortune, on which +reliance must be placed, for want of objective knowledge. + + +25. POSITIVE THEORY IS IMPOSSIBLE. + +With materials of this kind we can only say to ourselves +that it is a sheer impossibility to construct for the Art of +War a theory which, like a scaffolding, shall ensure to +the chief actor an external support on all sides. In all +those cases in which he is thrown upon his talent he would +find himself away from this scaffolding of theory and in +opposition to it, and, however many-sided it might be +framed, the same result would ensue of which we spoke +when we said that talent and genius act beyond the law, +and theory is in opposition to reality. + + +26. MEANS LEFT BY WHICH A THEORY IS POSSIBLE +(THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT EVERYWHERE EQUALLY +GREAT). + +Two means present themselves of getting out of this +difficulty. In the first place, what we have said of the +nature of military action in general does not apply in +the same manner to the action of every one, whatever +may be his standing. In the lower ranks the spirit of +self-sacrifice is called more into request, but the difficulties +which the understanding and judgment meet with are +infinitely less. The field of occurrences is more confined. +Ends and means are fewer in number. Data more +distinct; mostly also contained in the actually visible. +But the higher we ascend the more the difficulties increase, +until in the Commander-in-Chief they reach their climax, +so that with him almost everything must be left to genius. + +Further, according to a division of the subject in AGREEMENT +WITH ITS NATURE, the difficulties are not everywhere +the same, but diminish the more results manifest themselves +in the material world, and increase the more they +pass into the moral, and become motives which influence +the will. Therefore it is easier to determine, by theoretical +rules, the order and conduct of a battle, than the use to +be made of the battle itself. Yonder physical weapons +clash with each other, and although mind is not wanting +therein, matter must have its rights. But in the effects +to be produced by battles when the material results +become motives, we have only to do with the moral +nature. In a word, it is easier to make a theory for +TACTICS than for STRATEGY. + + +27. THEORY MUST BE OF THE NATURE OF OBSERVATIONS +NOT OF DOCTRINE. + +The second opening for the possibility of a theory lies +in the point of view that it does not necessarily require +to be a DIRECTION for action. As a general rule, whenever +an ACTIVITY is for the most part occupied with the same +objects over and over again, with the same ends and +means, although there may be trifling alterations and a +corresponding number of varieties of combination, such +things are capable of becoming a subject of study for the +reasoning faculties. But such study is just the most +essential part of every THEORY, and has a peculiar title to +that name. It is an analytical investigation of the subject +that leads to an exact knowledge; and if brought +to bear on the results of experience, which in our case +would be military history, to a thorough familiarity with +it. The nearer theory attains the latter object, so much +the more it passes over from the objective form of knowledge into +the +subjective one of skill in action; and so +much the more, therefore, it will prove itself effective +when circumstances allow of no other decision but that +of personal talents; it will show its effects in that talent +itself. If theory investigates the subjects which constitute +War; if it separates more distinctly that which +at first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the +properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; +if it makes evident the nature of objects; if it brings to +bear all over the field of War the light of essentially +critical investigation--then it has fulfilled the chief +duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him +who wishes to make himself acquainted with War from +books; it lights up the whole road for him, facilitates his +progress, educates his judgment, and shields him from +error. + +If a man of expertness spends half his life in the endeavour +to clear up an obscure subject thoroughly, he will +probably know more about it than a person who seeks +to master it in a short time. Theory is instituted that +each person in succession may not have to go through +the same labour of clearing the ground and toiling through +his subject, but may find the thing in order, and light +admitted on it. It should educate the mind of the future +leader in War, or rather guide him in his self-instruction, +but not accompany him to the field of battle; just as a +sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a +youth without, therefore, keeping him in leading strings +all through his life. + +If maxims and rules result of themselves from the considerations +which theory institutes, if the truth accretes +itself into that form of crystal, then theory will not oppose +this natural law of the mind; it will rather, if the arch +ends in such a keystone, bring it prominently out; but +so does this, only in order to satisfy the philosophical +law of reason, in order to show distinctly the point to +which the lines all converge, not in order to form out of +it an algebraical formula for use upon the battle-field; +for even these maxims and rules serve more to determine +in the reflecting mind the leading outline of its habitual +movements than as landmarks indicating to it the way +in the act of execution. + + +28. BY THIS POINT OF VIEW THEORY BECOMES POSSIBLE, +AND CEASES TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO PRACTICE. + +Taking this point of view, there is a possibility afforded +of a satisfactory, that is, of a useful, theory of the conduct +of War, never coming into opposition with the reality, +and it will only depend on rational treatment to bring it +so far into harmony with action that between theory +and practice there shall no longer be that absurd difference +which an unreasonable theory, in defiance of common +sense, has often produced, but which, just as often, +narrow-mindedness and ignorance have used as a pretext +for giving way to their natural incapacity. + + +29. THEORY THEREFORE CONSIDERS THE NATURE OF +ENDS AND MEANS--ENDS AND MEANS IN TACTICS. + +Theory has therefore to consider the nature of the +means and ends. + +In tactics the means are the disciplined armed forces +which are to carry on the contest. The object is victory. +The precise definition of this conception can be better +explained hereafter in the consideration of the combat. +Here we content ourselves by denoting the retirement of +the enemy from the field of battle as the sign of victory. +By means of this victory strategy gains the object for +which it appointed the combat, and which constitutes +its special signification. This signification has certainly +some influence on the nature of the victory. A victory +which is intended to weaken the enemy's armed forces +is a different thing from one which is designed only to put +us in possession of a position. The signification of a +combat may therefore have a sensible influence on the +preparation and conduct of it, consequently will be also +a subject of consideration in tactics. + + +30. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND THE +APPLICATION OF THE MEANS. + +As there are certain circumstances which attend the +combat throughout, and have more or less influence upon +its result, therefore these must be taken into consideration +in the application of the armed forces. + +These circumstances are the locality of the combat +(ground), the time of day, and the weather. + + +31. LOCALITY. + +The locality, which we prefer leaving for solution, +under the head of "Country and Ground," might, strictly +speaking, be without any influence at all if the combat +took place on a completely level and uncultivated plain. + +In a country of steppes such a case may occur, but in +the cultivated countries of Europe it is almost an imaginary +idea. Therefore a combat between civilised nations, in +which country and ground have no influence, is hardly +conceivable. + + +32. TIME OF DAY. + +The time of day influences the combat by the difference +between day and night; but the influence naturally +extends further than merely to the limits of these divisions, +as every combat has a certain duration, and great battles +last for several hours. In the preparations for a great +battle, it makes an essential difference whether it begins +in the morning or the evening. At the same time, certainly many +battles may +be fought in which the question of the time of day is quite +immaterial, and +in the generality of cases its influence is only trifling. + + +33. WEATHER. + +Still more rarely has the weather any decisive influence, +and it is mostly only by fogs that it plays a part. + + +34. END AND MEANS IN STRATEGY. + +Strategy has in the first instance only the victory, +that is, the tactical result, as a means to its object, and +ultimately those things which lead directly to peace. +The application of its means to this object is at the same +time attended by circumstances which have an influence +thereon more or less. + +35. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ATTEND THE APPLICATION +OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGY. + +These circumstances are country and ground, the +former including the territory and inhabitants of the whole +theatre of war; next the time of the day, and the time of +the year as well; lastly, the weather, particularly any +unusual state of the same, severe frost, &c. + + +36. THESE FORM NEW MEANS. + +By bringing these things into combination with the +results of a combat, strategy gives this result--and therefore +the combat--a special signification, places before it +a particular object. But when this object is not that +which leads directly to peace, therefore a subordinate +one, it is only to be looked upon as a means; and therefore +in strategy we may look upon the results of combats +or victories, in all their different significations, as means. +The conquest of a position is such a result of a combat +applied to ground. But not only are the different +combats with special objects to be considered as means, +but also every higher aim which we may have in view +in the combination of battles directed on a common +object is to be regarded as a means. A winter campaign +is a combination of this kind applied to the season. + +There remain, therefore, as objects, only those things +which may be supposed as leading DIRECTLY to peace, +Theory investigates all these ends and means according +to the nature of their effects and their mutual relations. + + +37. STRATEGY DEDUCES ONLY FROM EXPERIENCE THE +ENDS AND MEANS TO BE EXAMINED. + +The first question is, How does strategy arrive at a +complete list of these things? If there is to be a philosophical +inquiry leading to an absolute result, it would +become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical +necessity of the conduct of War and its theory exclude. +It therefore turns to experience, and directs its attention +on those combinations which military history can furnish. +In this manner, no doubt, nothing more than a limited +theory can be obtained, which only suits circumstances +such as are presented in history. But this incompleteness +is unavoidable, because in any case theory must either +have deduced from, or have compared with, history +what it advances with respect to things. Besides, this +incompleteness in every case is more theoretical than real. + +One great advantage of this method is that theory +cannot lose itself in abstruse disquisitions, subtleties, +and chimeras, but must always remain practical. + + +38. HOW FAR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS SHOULD +BE CARRIED. + +Another question is, How far should theory go in its +analysis of the means? Evidently only so far as the +elements in a separate form present themselves for consideration +in +practice. The range and effect of different +weapons is very important to tactics; their construction, +although these effects result from it, is a matter of +indifference; for the conduct of War is not making powder +and cannon out of a given quantity of charcoal, sulphur, +and saltpetre, of copper and tin: the given quantities +for the conduct of War are arms in a finished state and +their effects. Strategy makes use of maps without +troubling itself about triangulations; it does not inquire +how the country is subdivided into departments and +provinces, and how the people are educated and governed, +in order to attain the best military results; but it takes +things as it finds them in the community of European +States, and observes where very different conditions have +a notable influence on War. + + +39. GREAT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE +REQUIRED. + +That in this manner the number of subjects for theory +is much simplified, and the knowledge requisite for the +conduct of War much reduced, is easy to perceive. The +very great mass of knowledge and appliances of skill +which minister to the action of War in general, and which +are necessary before an army fully equipped can take +the field, unite in a few great results before they are able +to reach, in actual War, the final goal of their activity; +just as the streams of a country unite themselves in +rivers before they fall into the sea. Only those activities +emptying themselves directly into the sea of War have +to be studied by him who is to conduct its operations. + + +40. THIS EXPLAINS THE RAPID GROWTH OF GREAT +GENERALS, AND WHY A GENERAL IS NOT A MAN +OF LEARNING. + +This result of our considerations is in fact so necessary,any +other would +have made us distrustful of their +accuracy. Only thus is explained how so often men +have made their appearance with great success in War, +and indeed in the higher ranks even in supreme Command, +whose pursuits had been previously of a totally different +nature; indeed how, as a rule, the most distinguished +Generals have never risen from the very learned or really +erudite class of officers, but have been mostly men who, +from the circumstances of their position, could not have +attained to any great amount of knowledge. On that +account those who have considered it necessary or even +beneficial to commence the education of a future General +by instruction in all details have always been ridiculed +as absurd pedants. It would be easy to show the injurious +tendency of such a course, because the human mind is +trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction +given to its ideas. Only what is great can make it +great; the little can only make it little, if the mind itself +does not reject it as something repugnant. + + +41. FORMER CONTRADICTIONS. + +Because this simplicity of knowledge requisite in War +was not attended to, but that knowledge was always +jumbled up with the whole impedimenta of subordinate +sciences and arts, therefore the palpable opposition to +the events of real life which resulted could not be solved +otherwise than by ascribing it all to genius, which requires +no theory and for which no theory could be prescribed. + + +42. ON THIS ACCOUNT ALL USE OF KNOWLEDGE WAS +DENIED, AND EVERYTHING ASCRIBED TO NATURAL +TALENTS. + +People with whom common sense had the upper hand +felt sensible of the immense distance remaining to be filled +up between a genius of the highest order and a learned +pedant; and they became in a manner free-thinkers, +rejected all belief in theory, and affirmed the conduct of +War to be a natural function of man, which he performs +more or less well according as he has brought with him +into the world more or less talent in that direction. It +cannot be denied that these were nearer to the truth than +those who placed a value on false knowledge: at the same +time it may easily be seen that such a view is itself but +an exaggeration. No activity of the human understanding +is possible without a certain stock of ideas; +but these are, for the greater part at least, not innate but +acquired, and constitute his knowledge. The only question +therefore is, of what kind should these ideas be; and +we think we have answered it if we say that they should be +directed on those things which man has directly to deal +with in War. + + +43. THE KNOWLEDGE MUST BE MADE SUITABLE TO THE +POSITION. + +Inside this field itself of military activity, the knowledge +required must be different according to the station of +the Commander. It will be directed on smaller and more +circumscribed objects if he holds an inferior, upon greater +and more comprehensive ones if he holds a higher situation. +There are Field Marshals who would not have +shone at the head of a cavalry regiment, and vice versa. + + +44. THE KNOWLEDGE IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE, BUT NOT, +AT THE SAME TIME, VERY EASY. + +But although the knowledge in War is simple, that +is to say directed to so few subjects, and taking up +those only in their final results, the art of execution +is not, on that account, easy. Of the difficulties to +which activity in War is subject generally, we have +already spoken in the first book; we here omit those +things which can only be overcome by courage, and +maintain also that the activity of mind, is only simple, +and easy in inferior stations, but increases in difficulty +with increase of rank, and in the highest position, in that +of Commander-in-Chief, is to be reckoned among the +most difficult which there is for the human mind. + + +45. OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE. + +The Commander of an Army neither requires to be a +learned explorer of history nor a publicist, but he must be +well versed in the higher affairs of State; he must know, +and be able to judge correctly of traditional tendencies, +interests at stake, the immediate questions at issue, and +the characters of leading persons; he need not be a close +observer of men, a sharp dissector of human character, +but he must know the character, the feelings, the habits, +the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is +to command. He need not understand anything about +the make of a carriage, or the harness of a battery horse, +but he must know how to calculate exactly the march of +a column, under different circumstances, according to +the time it requires. These are matters the knowledge +of which cannot be forced out by an apparatus of scientific +formula and machinery: they are only to be gained by +the exercise of an accurate judgment in the observation +of things and of men, aided by a special talent for the +apprehension of both. + +The necessary knowledge for a high position in military. +action is therefore distinguished by this, that by observation, +therefore by study and reflection, it is only to be +attained through a special talent which as an intellectual +instinct understands how to extract from the phenomena +of life only the essence or spirit, as bees do the honey +from the flowers; and that it is also to be gained by +experience of life as well as by study and reflection. Life +will never bring forth a Newton or an Euler by its rich +teachings, but it may bring forth great calculators in War, +such as Conde' or Frederick. + +It is therefore not necessary that, in order to vindicate +the intellectual dignity of military activity, we should +resort to untruth and silly pedantry. There never has +been a great and distinguished Commander of contracted +mind, but very numerous are the instances of men who, +after serving with the greatest distinction in inferior +positions, remained below mediocrity in the highest, from +insufficiency of intellectual capacity. That even amongst +those holding the post of Commander-in-Chief there may +be a difference according to the degree of their plenitude +of power is a matter of course. + + +46. SCIENCE MUST BECOME ART. + +Now we have yet to consider one condition which is +more necessary for the knowledge of the conduct of War +than for any other, which is, that it must pass completely +into the mind and almost completely cease to be something +objective. In almost all other arts and occupations +of life the active agent can make use of truths which he +has only learnt once, and in the spirit and sense of which +he no longer lives, and which he extracts from dusty +books. Even truths which he has in hand and uses daily +may continue something external to himself, If the +architect takes up a pen to settle the strength of a pier +by a complicated calculation, the truth found as a result +is no emanation from his own mind. He had first to +find the data with labour, and then to submit these to an +operation of the mind, the rule for which he did not +discover, the necessity of which he is perhaps at the +moment only partly conscious of, but which he applies, +for the most part, as if by mechanical dexterity. But +it is never so in War. The moral reaction, the ever- +changeful form of things, makes it necessary for the chief +actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus +of his knowledge, that anywhere and at every pulse-beat +he may be capable of giving the requisite decision from +himself. Knowledge must, by this complete assimilation +with his own mind and life, be converted into real power. +This is the reason why everything seems so easy with +men distinguished in War, and why everything is ascribed +to natural talent. We say natural talent, in order thereby +to distinguish it from that which is formed and matured +by observation and study. + +We think that by these reflections we have explained +the problem of a theory of the conduct of War; and pointed +out the way to its solution. + +Of the two fields into which we have divided the conduct +of War, tactics and strategy, the theory of the latter +contains unquestionably, as before observed, the greatest +difficulties, because the first is almost limited to a +circumscribed +field of objects, but the latter, in the direction of +objects leading directly to peace, opens to itself an +unlimited field of possibilities. Since for the most part +the Commander-in-Chief has only to keep these objects +steadily in view, therefore the part of strategy in which +he moves is also that which is particularly subject to this +difficulty. + +Theory, therefore, especially where it comprehends +the highest services, will stop much sooner in strategy +than in tactics at the simple consideration of things, and +content itself to assist the Commander to that insight +into things which, blended with his whole thought, +makes his course easier and surer, never forces him into +opposition with himself in order to obey an objective +truth. + + + +CHAPTER III. ART OR SCIENCE OF WAR + +1.--USAGE STILL UNSETTLED + +(POWER AND KNOWLEDGE. SCIENCE WHEN MERE KNOWING; +ART, WHEN DOING, IS THE OBJECT.) + +THE choice between these terms seems to be still unsettled, +and no one seems to know rightly on what grounds +it should be decided, and yet the thing is simple. We +have already said elsewhere that "knowing" is something +different from "doing." The two are so different that they +should not easily be mistaken the one for the other. The +"doing" cannot properly stand in any book, and therefore +also Art should never be the title of a book. But because +we have once accustomed ourselves to combine in conception, +under the name of theory of Art, or simply Art, +the branches of knowledge (which may be separately +pure sciences) necessary for the practice of an Art, +therefore it is consistent to continue this ground of +distinction, and to call everything Art when the object +is to carry out the "doing" (being able), as for example, +Art of building; Science, when merely knowledge is the +object; as Science of mathematics, of astronomy. That +in every Art certain complete sciences may be included is +intelligible of itself, and should not perplex us. But still +it is worth observing that there is also no science without +a mixture of Art. In mathematics, for instance, the use +of figures and of algebra is an Art, but that is only one +amongst many instances. The reason is, that however +plain and palpable the difference is between knowledge +and power in the composite results of human knowledge, +yet it is difficult to trace out their line of separation in +man himself. + +2. DIFFICULTY OF SEPARATING PERCEPTION FROM JUDGMENT. + +(ART OF WAR.) + +All thinking is indeed Art. Where the logician draws +the line, where the premises stop which are the result +of cognition--where judgment begins, there Art begins. +But more than this even the perception of the mind is +judgment again, and consequently Art; and at last, +even the perception by the senses as well. In a word, +if it is impossible to imagine a human being possessing +merely the faculty of cognition, devoid of judgment or +the reverse, so also Art and Science can never be +completely separated from each other. The more these +subtle elements of light embody themselves in the outward +forms of the world, so much the more separate +appear their domains; and now once more, where the +object is creation and production, there is the province +of Art; where the object is investigation and knowledge +Science holds sway.--After all this it results of itself that +it is more fitting to say Art of War than Science of War. + +So much for this, because we cannot do without these +conceptions. But now we come forward with the assertion +that War is neither an Art nor a Science in the real +signification, and that it is just the setting out from that +starting-point of ideas which has led to a wrong direction +being taken, which has caused War to be put on a par +with other arts and sciences, and has led to a number of +erroneous analogies. + +This has indeed been felt before now, and on that it was +maintained that +War is a handicraft; but there was more lost than gained by that, +for a +handicraft is only an inferior art, and as such is also subject +to definite and rigid laws. In reality the Art of War did +go on for some time in the spirit of a handicraft--we +allude to the times of the Condottieri--but then it received +that direction, not from intrinsic but from external +causes; and military history shows how little it was at +that time in accordance with the nature of the thing. + + +3. WAR IS PART OF THE INTERCOURSE OF THE HUMAN +RACE. + +We say therefore War belongs not to the province of +Arts and Sciences, but to the province of social life. It +is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, +and only in that is it different from others. It +would be better, instead of comparing it with any Art, to +liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of +human interests and activities; and it is still more like +State policy, which again, on its part, may be looked upon +as a kind of business competition on a great scale. Besides, +State policy is the womb in which War is developed, in +which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like +the qualities of living creatures in their germs.[*] + +[*] The analogy has become much closer since Clausewitz's time. +Now +that the first business of the State is regarded as the +development of +facilities for trade, War between great nations is only a +question of +time. No Hague Conferences can avert it--EDITOR. + + + +4. DIFFERENCE. + +The essential difference consists in this, that War is no +activity of the will, which exerts itself upon inanimate +matter like the mechanical Arts; or upon a living but +still passive and yielding subject, like the human mind +and the human feelings in the ideal Arts, but against a +living and reacting force. How little the categories +of Arts and Sciences are applicable to such an activity +strikes us at once; and we can understand at the same +time how that constant seeking and striving after laws +like those which may be developed out of the dead +material world could not but lead to constant errors. +And yet it is just the mechanical Arts that some people +would imitate in the Art of War. The imitation of the +ideal Arts was quite out of the question, because these +themselves dispense too much with laws and rules, and +those hitherto tried, always acknowledged as insufficient +and one-sided, are perpetually undermined and washed +away by the current of opinions, feelings, and customs. + +Whether such a conflict of the living, as takes place +and is settled in War, is subject to general laws, and +whether these are capable of indicating a useful line of +action, will be partly investigated in this book; but so +much is evident in itself, that this, like every other +subject which does not surpass our powers of understanding, +may be lighted up, and be made more or less +plain in its inner relations by an inquiring mind, and +that alone is sufficient to realise the idea of a THEORY. + + + +CHAPTER IV. METHODICISM + +IN order to explain ourselves clearly as to the conception +of method, and method of action, which play such an important +part in War, we must be allowed to cast a hasty +glance at the logical hierarchy through which, as through +regularly constituted official functionaries, the world +of action is governed. + +LAW, in the widest sense strictly applying to perception +as well as action, has plainly something subjective and +arbitrary in its literal meaning, and expresses just +that on which we and those things external to us are +dependent. As a subject of cognition, LAW is the relation +of things and their effects to one another; as a subject +of the will, it is a motive of action, and is then equivalent +to COMMAND or PROHIBITION. + +PRINCIPLE is likewise such a law for action, except that +it has not the formal definite meaning, but is only the +spirit and sense of law in order to leave the judgment +more freedom of application when the diversity of the +real world cannot be laid hold of under the definite form +of a law. As the judgment must of itself suggest the +cases in which the principle is not applicable, the latter +therefore becomes in that way a real aid or guiding star +for the person acting. + +Principle is OBJECTIVE when it is the result of objective +truth, and consequently of equal value for all men; +it is SUBJECTIVE, and then generally called MAXIM if there +are subjective relations in it, and if it therefore has a +certain value only for the person himself who makes it. + +RULE is frequently taken in the sense of LAW, and then +means the same as Principle, for we say "no rule without +exceptions," but we do not say "no law without exceptions," +a sign that with RULE we retain to ourselves +more freedom of application. + +In another meaning RULE is the means used of discerning +a recondite truth in a particular sign lying close at hand, +in order to attach to this particular sign the law of action +directed upon the whole truth. Of this kind are all the +rules of games of play, all abridged processes in mathematics, +&c. + +DIRECTIONS and INSTRUCTIONS are determinations of action +which have an influence upon a number of minor circumstances +too numerous and unimportant for general +laws. + +Lastly, METHOD, MODE OF ACTING, is an always recurring +proceeding selected out of several possible ones; and +METHODICISM (METHODISMUS) is that which is determined +by methods instead of by general principles or particular +prescriptions. By this the cases which are placed under +such methods must necessarily be supposed alike in their +essential parts. As they cannot all be this, then the +point is that at least as many as possible should be; in +other words, that Method should be calculated on the most +probable cases. Methodicism is therefore not founded +on determined particular premises, but on the average +probability of cases one with another; and its ultimate +tendency is to set up an average truth, the constant and +uniform, application of which soon acquires something +of the nature of a mechanical appliance, which in the end +does that which is right almost unwittingly. + +The conception of law in relation to perception is +not necessary for the conduct of War, because the complex +phenomena of War are not so regular, and the regular are +not so complex, that we should gain anything more by +this conception than by the simple truth. And where +a simple conception and language is sufficient, to resort +to the complex becomes affected and pedantic. The +conception of law in relation to action cannot be used in +the theory of the conduct of War, because owing to the +variableness and diversity of the phenomena there is +in it no determination of such a general nature as to +deserve the name of law. + +But principles, rules, prescriptions, and methods are +conceptions indispensable to a theory of the conduct of +War, in so far as that theory leads to positive doctrines, +because in doctrines the truth can only crystallise itself +in such forms. + +As tactics is the branch of the conduct of War in which +theory can attain the nearest to positive doctrine, therefore +these conceptions will appear in it most frequently. + +Not to use cavalry against unbroken infantry except +in some case of special emergency, only to use firearms +within effective range in the combat, to spare the forces +as much as possible for the final struggle--these are +tactical principles. None of them can be applied absolutely in +every case, +but they must always be present to +the mind of the Chief, in order that the benefit of the truth +contained in them may not be lost in cases where that +truth can be of advantage. + +If from the unusual cooking by an enemy's camp his +movement is inferred, if the intentional exposure of troops +in a combat indicates a false attack, then this way of +discerning the truth is called rule, because from a single +visible circumstance that conclusion is drawn which +corresponds with the same. + +If it is a rule to attack the enemy with renewed vigour, +as soon as he begins to limber up his artillery in the combat, +then on this particular fact depends a course of action +which is aimed at the general situation of the enemy as +inferred from the above fact, namely, that he is about +to give up the fight, that he is commencing to draw off +his troops, and is neither capable of making a serious +stand while thus drawing off nor of making his retreat +gradually in good order. + +REGULATIONS and METHODS bring preparatory theories +into the conduct of War, in so far as disciplined troops +are inoculated with them as active principles. The whole +body of instructions for formations, drill, and field +service are regulations and methods: in the drill +instructions the first predominate, in the field service +instructions the latter. To these things the real conduct +of War attaches itself; it takes them over, therefore, as +given modes of proceeding, and as such they must appear +in the theory of the conduct of War. + +But for those activities retaining freedom in the employment +of these forces there cannot be regulations, that is, +definite instructions, because they would do away with +freedom of action. Methods, on the other hand, as a +general way of executing duties as they arise, calculated, +as we have said, on an average of probability, or as a +dominating influence of principles and rules carried through +to application, may certainly appear in the theory of +the conduct of War, provided only they are not represented +as something different from what they are, +not as the absolute and necessary modes of action +(systems), but as the best of general forms which may +be used as shorter ways in place of a particular disposition +for the occasion, at discretion. + +But the frequent application of methods will be seen +to be most essential and unavoidable in the conduct of +War, if we reflect how much action proceeds on mere +conjecture, or in complete uncertainty, because one side +is prevented from learning all the circumstances which +influence the dispositions of the other, or because, even +if these circumstances which influence the decisions of +the one were really known, there is not, owing to their +extent and the dispositions they would entail, sufficient +time for the other to carry out all necessary counteracting +measures--that therefore measures in War must always +be calculated on a certain number of possibilities; if we +reflect how numberless are the trifling things belonging +to any single event, and which therefore should be taken +into account along with it, and that therefore there is no +other means to suppose the one counteracted by the other, +and to base our arrangements only upon what is of a +general nature and probable; if we reflect lastly that, +owing to the increasing number of officers as we descend +the scale of rank, less must be left to the true discernment +and ripe judgment of individuals the lower the sphere of +action, and that when we reach those ranks where we +can look for no other notions but those which the regulations +of the service and experience afford, we must help +them with the methodic forms bordering on those regulations. +This will serve both as a support to their judgment +and a barrier against those extravagant and erroneous +views which are so especially to be dreaded in a sphere +where experience is so costly. + +Besides this absolute need of method in action, we must +also acknowledge that it has a positive advantage, which +is that, through the constant repetition of a formal exercise, +a readiness, precision, and firmness is attained in +the movement of troops which diminishes the natural +friction, and makes the machine move easier. + +Method will therefore be the more generally used, +become the more indispensable, the farther down the scale +of rank the position of the active agent; and on the other +hand, its use will diminish upwards, until in the highest +position it quite disappears. For this reason it is more +in its place in tactics than in strategy. + +War in its highest aspects consists not of an infinite +number of little events, the diversities in which compensate +each other, and which therefore by a better or worse +method are better or worse governed, but of separate +great decisive events which must be dealt with separately. +It is not like a field of stalks, which, without any regard to +the particular form of each stalk, will be mowed better or +worse, according as the mowing instrument is good or +bad, but rather as a group of large trees, to which the axe +must be laid with judgment, according to the particular +form and inclination of each separate trunk. + +How high up in military activity the admissibility of +method in action reaches naturally determines itself, not +according to actual rank, but according to things; and +it affects the highest positions in a less degree, only +because these positions have the most comprehensive +subjects of activity. A constant order of battle, a +constant formation of advance guards and outposts, +are methods by which a General ties not only his +subordinates' hands, but also his own in certain cases. +Certainly they may have been devised by himself, and +may be applied by him according to circumstances, but +they may also be a subject of theory, in so far as they +are based on the general properties of troops and weapons. +On the other hand, any method by which definite plans +for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made +as if from a machine are absolutely worthless. + +As long as there exists no theory which can be sustained, +that is, no enlightened treatise on the conduct of War, +method in action cannot but encroach beyond its proper +limits in high places, for men employed in these spheres +of activity have not always had the opportunity of +educating themselves, through study and through contact +with the higher interests. In the impracticable and +inconsistent disquisitions of theorists and critics they +cannot find their way, their sound common sense rejects +them, and as they bring with them no knowledge but +that derived from experience, therefore in those cases +which admit of, and require, a free individual treatment +they readily make use of the means which experience +gives them--that is, an imitation of the particular methods +practised by great Generals, by which a method of +action then arises of itself. If we see Frederick the +Great's Generals always making their appearance in the +so-called oblique order of battle, the Generals of the French +Revolution always using turning movements with a long, +extended line of battle, and Buonaparte's lieutenants +rushing to the attack with the bloody energy of concentrated +masses, then we recognise in the recurrence of the +mode of proceeding evidently an adopted method, and +see therefore that method of action can reach up to regions +bordering on the highest. Should an improved theory +facilitate the study of the conduct of War, form the mind +and judgment of men who are rising to the highest commands, +then also method in action will no longer reach +so far, and so much of it as is to be considered indispensable +will then at +least be formed from theory itself, +and not take place out of mere imitation. However +pre-eminently a great Commander does things, there is +always something subjective in the way he does them; +and if he has a certain manner, a large share of his +individuality is contained in it which does not always accord +with the individuality of the person who copies his manner. + +At the same time, it would neither be possible nor right +to banish subjective methodicism or manner completely +from the conduct of War: it is rather to be regarded as a +manifestation of that influence which the general character +of a War has upon its separate events, and to which +satisfaction can only be done in that way if theory is not +able to foresee this general character and include it in +its considerations. What is more natural than that the +War of the French Revolution had its own way of doing +things? and what theory could ever have included that +peculiar method? The evil is only that such a manner +originating in a special case easily outlives itself, +becausecontinues +whilst circumstances imperceptibly change. +This is what theory should prevent by lucid and rational +criticism. When in the year 1806 the Prussian Generals, +Prince Louis at Saalfeld, Tauentzien on the Dornberg near +Jena, Grawert before and Ruechel behind Kappellendorf, +all threw themselves into the open jaws of destruction +in the oblique order of Frederick the Great, and +managed to ruin Hohenlohe's Army in a way that no +Army was ever ruined, even on the field of battle, all +this was done through a manner which had outlived its +day, together with the most downright stupidity to which +methodicism ever led. + + + +CHAPTER V. CRITICISM + +THE influence of theoretical principles upon real life is +produced more through criticism than through doctrine, +for as criticism is an application of abstract truth to real +events, therefore it not only brings truth of this description +nearer to life, but also accustoms the understanding +more to such truths by the constant repetition of their +application. We therefore think it necessary to fix the +point of view for criticism next to that for theory. + +From the simple narration of an historical occurrence +which places events in chronological order, or at most +only touches on their more immediate causes, we separate +the CRITICAL. + +In this CRITICAL three different operations of the mind +may be observed. + +First, the historical investigation and determining of +doubtful facts. This is properly historical research, and +has nothing in common with theory. + +Secondly, the tracing of effects to causes. This is the +REAL CRITICAL INQUIRY; it is indispensable to theory, for +everything which in theory is to be established, supported, +or even merely explained, by experience can only be settled +in this way. + +Thirdly, the testing of the means employed. This is +criticism, properly speaking, in which praise and censure +is contained. This is where theory helps history, or +rather, the teaching to be derived from it. + +In these two last strictly critical parts of historical +study, all depends on tracing things to their primary +elements, that is to say, up to undoubted truths, and not, +as is so often done, resting half-way, that is, on some +arbitrary assumption or supposition. + +As respects the tracing of effect to cause, that is often +attended with the insuperable difficulty that the real +causes are not known. In none of the relations of life +does this so frequently happen as in War, where events +are seldom fully known, and still less motives, as the latter +have been, perhaps purposely, concealed by the chief +actor, or have been of such a transient and accidental +character that they have been lost for history. For this +reason critical narration must generally proceed hand in +hand with historical investigation, and still such a want +of connection between cause and effect will often present +itself, that it does not seem justifiable to consider effects +as the necessary results of known causes. Here, therefore,must +occur, that +is, historical results which cannot be made use of for teaching. +All that +theory can demand is that the investigation should be rigidly +conducted +up to that point, and there leave off without +drawing conclusions. A real evil springs up only if the +known is made perforce to suffice as an explanation of +effects, and thus a false importance is ascribed to it. + +Besides this difficulty, critical inquiry also meets with +another great and intrinsic one, which is that the progress +of events in War seldom proceeds from one simple cause, +but from several in common, and that it therefore is not +sufficient to follow up a series of events to their origin +in a candid and impartial spirit, but that it is then also +necessary to apportion to each contributing cause its +due weight. This leads, therefore, to a closer investigation +of their nature, and thus a critical investigation +may lead into what is the proper field of theory. + +The critical CONSIDERATION, that is, the testing of the +means, leads to the question, Which are the effects +peculiar to the means applied, and whether these effects +were comprehended in the plans of the person directing? + +The effects peculiar to the means lead to the investigation of +their nature, +and thus again into the field of theory. + +We have already seen that in criticism all depends +upon attaining to positive truth; therefore, that we must +not stop at arbitrary propositions which are not allowed +by others, and to which other perhaps equally arbitrary +assertions may again be opposed, so that there is no end +to pros and cons; the whole is without result, and +therefore without instruction. + +We have seen that both the search for causes and the +examination of means lead into the field of theory; +that is, into the field of universal truth, which does not +proceed solely from the case immediately under examination. +If there is a theory which can be used, then the +critical consideration will appeal to the proofs there +afforded, and the examination may there stop. But +where no such theoretical truth is to be found, the inquiry +must be pushed up to the original elements. If this +necessity occurs often, it must lead the historian (according +to a common expression) into a labyrinth of details. +He then has his hands full, and it is impossible for him to +stop to give the requisite attention everywhere; the consequence +is, that in order to set bounds to his investigation, +he adopts some arbitrary assumptions which, if +they do not appear so to him, do so to others, as they are +not evident in themselves or capable of proof. + +A sound theory is therefore an essential foundation +for criticism, and it is impossible for it, without the +assistance of a sensible theory, to attain to that point at +which it commences chiefly to be instructive, that is, +where it becomes demonstration, both convincing and +sans re'plique. + +But it would be a visionary hope to believe in the possibility +of a theory applicable to every abstract truth, +leaving nothing for criticism to do but to place the case +under its appropriate law: it would be ridiculous pedantry +to lay down as a rule for criticism that it must always +halt and turn round on reaching the boundaries of sacred +theory. The same spirit of analytical inquiry which +is the origin of theory must also guide the critic in his +work; and it can and must therefore happen that he +strays beyond the boundaries of the province of theory +and elucidates those points with which he is more particularly +concerned. It is more likely, on the contrary, +that criticism would completely fail in its object if it +degenerated into a mechanical application of theory. +All positive results of theoretical inquiry, all principles, +rules, and methods, are the more wanting in generality +and positive truth the more they become positive doctrine. +They exist to offer themselves for use as required, and +it must always be left for judgment to decide whether +they are suitable or not. Such results of theory must +never be used in criticism as rules or norms for a standard, +but in the same way as the person acting should use them, +that is, merely as aids to judgment. If it is an acknowledged +principle in tactics that in the usual order of battle +cavalry should be placed behind infantry, not in line with +it, still it would be folly on this account to condemn +every deviation from this principle. Criticism must +investigate the grounds of the deviation, and it is only in +case these are insufficient that it has a right to appeal to +principles laid down in theory. If it is further established +in theory that a divided attack diminishes the probability +of success, still it would be just as unreasonable, whenever +there is a divided attack and an unsuccessful issue, +to regard the latter as the result of the former, without +further investigation into the connection between the +two, as where a divided attack is successful to infer from +it the fallacy of that theoretical principle. The spirit +of investigation which belongs to criticism cannot allow +either. Criticism therefore supports itself chiefly on +the results of the analytical investigation of theory; +what has been made out and determined by theory does +not require to be demonstrated over again by criticism, +and it is so determined by theory that criticism may find +it ready demonstrated. + +This office of criticism, of examining the effect produced +by certain causes, and whether a means applied has +answered its object, will be easy enough if cause and +effect, means and end, are all near together. + +If an Army is surprised, and therefore cannot make a +regular and intelligent use of its powers and resources, then +the effect of the surprise is not doubtful.--If theory +has determined that in a battle the convergent form of +attack is calculated to produce greater but less certain +results, then the question is whether he who employs +that convergent form had in view chiefly that greatness +of result as his object; if so, the proper means were chosen. +But if by this form he intended to make the result more +certain, and that expectation was founded not on some +exceptional circumstances (in this case), but on the general +nature of the convergent form, as has happened a hundred +times, then he mistook the nature of the means and +committed an error. + +Here the work of military investigation and criticism +is easy, and it will always be so when confined to the +immediate effects and objects. This can be done quite +at option, if we abstract the connection of the parts +with the whole, and only look at things in that relation. + +But in War, as generally in the world, there is a connection +between everything which belongs to a whole; and +therefore, however small a cause may be in itself, its +effects reach to the end of the act of warfare, and modify +or influence the final result in some degree, let that degree +be ever so small. In the same manner every means +must be felt up to the ultimate object. + +We can therefore trace the effects of a cause as long +as events are worth noticing, and in the same way we +must not stop at the testing of a means for the immediate +object, but test also this object as a means to a higher +one, and thus ascend the series of facts in succession, +until we come to one so absolutely necessary in its nature +as to require no examination or proof. In many cases, +particularly in what concerns great and decisive measures, +the investigation must be carried to the final aim, to that +which leads immediately to peace. + +It is evident that in thus ascending, at every new station +which we reach a new point of view for the judgment +is attained, so that the same means which appeared +advisable at one station, when looked at from the next +above it may have to be rejected. + +The search for the causes of events and the comparison +of means with ends must always go hand in hand in the +critical review of an act, for the investigation of causes +leads us first to the discovery of those things which are +worth examining. + +This following of the clue up and down is attended +with considerable difficulty, for the farther from an event +the cause lies which we are looking for, the greater must +be the number of other causes which must at the same +time be kept in view and allowed for in reference to the +share which they have in the course of events, and then +eliminated, because the higher the importance of a fact +the greater will be the number of separate forces and +circumstances by which it is conditioned. If we have +unravelled the causes of a battle being lost, we have +certainly also ascertained a part of the causes of the +consequences which this defeat has upon the whole War, +but only a part, because the effects of other causes, more +or less according to circumstances, will flow into the final +result. + +The same multiplicity of circumstances is presented +also in the examination of the means the higher our point +of view, for the higher the object is situated, the greater +must be the number of means employed to reach it. +The ultimate object of the War is the object aimed at +by all the Armies simultaneously, and it is therefore +necessary that the consideration should embrace all that +each has done or could have done. + +It is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide +field of inquiry, in which it is easy to wander and lose +the way, and in which this difficulty prevails--that a +number of assumptions or suppositions must be made +about a variety of things which do not actually appear, +but which in all probability did take place, and therefore +cannot possibly be left out of consideration. + +When Buonaparte, in 1797,[*] at the head of the Army +of Italy, advanced from the Tagliamento against the +Archduke Charles, he did so with a view to force that +General to a decisive action before the reinforcements +expected from the Rhine had reached him. If we look, +only at the immediate object, the means were well chosen +and justified by the result, for the Archduke was so inferior +in numbers that he only made a show of resistance on the +Tagliamento, and when he saw his adversary so strong +and resolute, yielded ground, and left open the passages, +of the Norican Alps. Now to what use could Buonaparte +turn this fortunate event? To penetrate into the heart +of the Austrian empire itself, to facilitate the advance of +the Rhine Armies under Moreau and Hoche, and open +communication with them? This was the view taken +by Buonaparte, and from this point of view he was right. +But now, if criticism places itself at a higher point of +view--namely, that of the French Directory, which body +could see and know that the Armies on the Rhine could +not commence the campaign for six weeks, then the +advance of Buonaparte over the Norican Alps can only +be regarded as an extremely hazardous measure; for if +the Austrians had drawn largely on their Rhine Armies +to reinforce their Army in Styria, so as to enable the +Archduke to fall upon the Army of Italy, not only would +that Army have been routed, but the whole campaign +lost. This consideration, which attracted the serious +attention of Buonaparte at Villach, no doubt induced him +to sign the armistice of Leoben with so much readiness. + +[*] Compare Hinterlassene Werke, 2nd edition, vol. iv. p. 276 et +seq. + + +If criticism takes a still higher position, and if it knows +that the Austrians had no reserves between the Army +of the Archduke Charles and Vienna, then we see that +Vienna became threatened by the advance of the Army +of Italy. + +Supposing that Buonaparte knew that the capital was +thus uncovered, and knew that he still retained the same +superiority in numbers over the Archduke as he had in +Styria, then his advance against the heart of the Austrian +States was no longer without purpose, and its value +depended on the value which the Austrians might place +on preserving their capital. If that was so great that, +rather than lose it, they would accept the conditions of +peace which Buonaparte was ready to offer them, it +became an object of the first importance to threaten +Vienna. If Buonaparte had any reason to know this, +then criticism may stop there, but if this point was only +problematical, then criticism must take a still higher +position, and ask what would have followed if the Austrians +had resolved to abandon Vienna and retire farther +into the vast dominions still left to them. But it is easy +to see that this question cannot be answered without +bringing into the consideration the probable movements +of the Rhine Armies on both sides. Through the decided +superiority of numbers on the side of the French-- +130,000 to 80,000--there could be little doubt of the +result; but then next arises the question, What use would +the Directory make of a victory; whether they would +follow up their success to the opposite frontiers of the +Austrian monarchy, therefore to the complete breaking +up or overthrow of that power, or whether they would be +satisfied with the conquest of a considerable portion to +serve as a security for peace? The probable result in +each case must be estimated, in order to come to a conclusion +as to the probable determination of the Directory. +Supposing the result of these considerations to be that the +French forces were much too weak for the complete +subjugation of the Austrian monarchy, so that the +attempt might completely reverse the respective positions +of the contending Armies, and that even the conquest +and occupation of a considerable district of country +would place the French Army in strategic relations to which +they were not equal, then that result must naturally +influence the estimate of the position of the Army of +Italy, and compel it to lower its expectations. And this, +it was no doubt which influenced Buonaparte, although +fully aware of the helpless condition of the Archduke, +still to sign the peace of Campo Formio, which imposed +no greater sacrifices on the Austrians than the loss of +provinces which, even if the campaign took the most +favourable turn for them, they could not have reconquered. +But the French could not have reckoned on +even the moderate treaty of Campo Formio, and therefore +it could not have been their object in making their bold +advance if two considerations had not presented themselves +to their view, the first of which consisted in the question, +what degree of value the Austrians would attach to +each of the above-mentioned results; whether, notwithstanding the +probability of a satisfactory result in either +of these cases, would it be worth while to make the +sacrifices inseparable from a continuance of the War, +when they could be spared those sacrifices by a peace +on terms not too humiliating? The second consideration +is the question whether the Austrian Government, instead +of seriously weighing the possible results of a resistance +pushed to extremities, would not prove completely disheartened +by the impression of their present reverses. + +The consideration which forms the subject of the first +is no idle piece of subtle argument, but a consideration of +such decidedly practical importance that it comes up +whenever the plan of pushing War to the utmost extremity +is mooted, and by its weight in most cases restrains the +execution of such plans. + +The second consideration is of equal importance, for +we do not make War with an abstraction but with a +reality, which we must always keep in view, and we may +be sure that it was not overlooked by the bold Buonaparte +--that is, that he was keenly alive to the terror +which the appearance of his sword inspired. It was +reliance on that which led him to Moscow. There it +led him into a scrape. The terror of him had been +weakened by the gigantic struggles in which he had been +engaged; in the year 1797 it was still fresh, and the +secret of a resistance pushed to extremities had not been +discovered; nevertheless even in 1797 his boldness +might have led to a negative result if, as already said, +he had not with a sort of presentiment avoided it by +signing the moderate peace of Campo Formio. + +We must now bring these considerations to a close-- +they will suffice to show the wide sphere, the diversity +and embarrassing nature of the subjects embraced in a +critical examination carried to the fullest extent, that is, +to those measures of a great and decisive class which +must necessarily be included. It follows from them that +besides a theoretical acquaintance with the subject, +natural talent must also have a great influence on the +value of critical examinations, for it rests chiefly with the +latter to throw the requisite light on the interrelations +of things, and to distinguish from amongst the endless +connections of events those which are really essential. + +But talent is also called into requisition in another +way. Critical examination is not merely the appreciation +of those means which have been actually employed, +but also of all possible means, which therefore must be +suggested in the first place--that is, must be discovered; +and the use of any particular means is not fairly open to +censure until a better is pointed out. Now, however +small the number of possible combinations may be in +most cases, still it must be admitted that to point out +those which have not been used is not a mere analysis +of actual things, but a spontaneous creation which +cannot be prescribed, and depends on the fertility of +genius. + +We are far from seeing a field for great genius in a case +which admits only of the application of a few simple +combinations, and we think it exceedingly ridiculous +to hold up, as is often done, the turning of a position as +an invention showing the highest genius; still nevertheless +this creative self-activity on the part of the critic is +necessary, and it is one of the points which essentially +determine the value of critical examination. + +When Buonaparte on 30th July, 1796,[*] determined +to raise the siege of Mantua, in order to march with his +whole force against the enemy, advancing in separate +columns to the relief of the place, and to beat them in +detail, this appeared the surest way to the attainment +of brilliant victories. These victories actually followed, +and were afterwards again repeated on a still more brilliant +scale on the attempt to relieve the fortress being again +renewed. We hear only one opinion on these achievements, +that of unmixed admiration. + +[*] Compare Hinterlassene Werke, 2nd edition, vol. iv. p. 107 et +seq. + + +At the same time, Buonaparte could not have adopted +this course on the 30th July without quite giving up +the idea of the siege of Mantua, because it was impossible +to save the siege train, and it could not be replaced by +another in this campaign. In fact, the siege was converted +into a blockade, and the town, which if the siege +had continued must have very shortly fallen, held out +for six months in spite of Buonaparte's victories in the +open field. + +Criticism has generally regarded this as an evil that +was unavoidable, because critics have not been able to +suggest any better course. Resistance to a relieving +Army within lines of circumvallation had fallen into +such disrepute and contempt that it appears to have +entirely escaped consideration as a means. And yet in +the reign of Louis XIV. that measure was so often used +with success that we can only attribute to the force of +fashion the fact that a hundred years later it never +occurred to any one even to propose such a measure. +If the practicability of such a plan had ever been entertained +for a moment, a closer consideration of circumstances +would have shown that 40,000 of the best infantry +in the world under Buonaparte, behind strong lines of +circumvallation round Mantua, had so little to fear from +the 50,000 men coming to the relief under Wurmser, that +it was very unlikely that any attempt even would be +made upon their lines. We shall not seek here to establish +this point, but we believe enough has been said to show +that this means was one which had a right to a share of +consideration. Whether Buonaparte himself ever thought +of such a plan we leave undecided; neither in his memoirs +nor in other sources is there any trace to be found of his +having done so; in no critical works has it been touched +upon, the measure being one which the mind had lost +sight of. The merit of resuscitating the idea of this +means is not great, for it suggests itself at once to any +one who breaks loose from the trammels of fashion. +Still it is necessary that it should suggest itself for us to +bring it into consideration and compare it with the means +which Buonaparte employed. Whatever may be the +result of the comparison, it is one which should not be +omitted by criticism. + +When Buonaparte, in February, 1814,[*] after gaining +the battles at Etoges, Champ-Aubert, and Montmirail, +left Bluecher's Army, and turning upon Schwartzenberg, +beat his troops at Montereau and Mormant, every one +was filled with admiration, because Buonaparte, by thus +throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent, +then upon another, made a brilliant use of the mistakes +which his adversaries had committed in dividing their +forces. If these brilliant strokes in different directions +failed to save him, it was generally considered to be no +fault of his, at least. No one has yet asked the question, +What would have been the result if, instead of turning +from Bluecher upon Schwartzenberg, he had tried another +blow at Bluecher, and pursued him to the Rhine? We +are convinced that it would have completely changed the +course of the campaign, and that the Army of the Allies, +instead of marching to Paris, would have retired behind +the Rhine. We do not ask others to share our conviction, +but no one who understands the thing will doubt, at the +mere mention of this alternative course, that it is one +which should not be overlooked in criticism. + +[*] Compare Hinterlassene Werks, 2nd edition. vol. vii. p. 193 et +seq. + + +In this case the means of comparison lie much more +on the surface than in the foregoing, but they have +been equally overlooked, because one-sided views have +prevailed, and there has been no freedom of judgment. + +From the necessity of pointing out a better means which +might have been used in place of those which are condemned +has arisen the form of criticism almost exclusively +in use, which contents itself with pointing out the +better means without demonstrating in what the superiority +consists. The consequence is that some are not +convinced, that others start up and do the same thing, +and that thus discussion arises which is without any fixed +basis for the argument. Military literature abounds +with matter of this sort. + +The demonstration we require is always necessary +when the superiority of the means propounded is not so +evident as to leave no room for doubt, and it consists +in the examination of each of the means on its own +merits, and then of its comparison with the object desired. +When once the thing is traced back to a simple truth, +controversy must cease, or at all events a new result +is obtained, whilst by the other plan the pros and cons +go on for ever consuming each other. + +Should we, for example, not rest content with assertion +in the case before mentioned, and wish to prove that the +persistent pursuit of Bluecher would have been more +advantageous than the turning on Schwartzenberg, we +should support the arguments on the following simple +truths: + +1. In general it is more advantageous to continue our +blows in one and the same direction, because there is a +loss of time in striking in different directions; and at a +point where the moral power is already shaken by considerable +losses there is the more reason to expect fresh +successes, therefore in that way no part of the preponderance +already gained is left idle. + +2. Because Bluecher, although weaker than Schwartzenberg, +was, on account of his enterprising spirit, the more +important adversary; in him, therefore, lay the centre +of attraction which drew the others along in the same +direction. + +3. Because the losses which Bluecher had sustained +almost amounted to a defeat, which gave Buonaparte +such a preponderance over him as to make his retreat +to the Rhine almost certain, and at the same time no +reserves of any consequence awaited him there. + +4. Because there was no other result which would be +so terrific in its aspects, would appear to the imagination +in such gigantic proportions, an immense advantage in +dealing with a Staff so weak and irresolute as that of +Schwartzenberg notoriously was at this time. What +had happened to the Crown Prince of Wartemberg at +Montereau, and to Count Wittgenstein at Mormant, +Prince Schwartzenberg must have known well enough; +but all the untoward events on Bluecher's distant and +separate line from the Marne to the Rhine would only +reach him by the avalanche of rumour. The desperate +movements which Buonaparte made upon Vitry at the +end of March, to see what the Allies would do if he +threatened to turn them strategically, were evidently +done on the principle of working on their fears; but it +was done under far different circumstances, in consequence +of his defeat at Laon and Arcis, and because +Bluecher, with 100,000 men, was then in communication +with Schwartzenberg. + +There are people, no doubt, who will not be convinced +on these arguments, but at all events they cannot +retort by saying, that "whilst Buonaparte threatened +Schwartzenberg's base by advancing to the Rhine, +Schwartzenberg at the same time threatened Buonaparte's +communications with Paris," because we have shown +by the reasons above given that Schwartzenberg would +never have thought of marching on Paris. + +With respect to the example quoted by us from the +campaign of 1796, we should say: Buonaparte looked +upon the plan he adopted as the surest means of beating +the Austrians; but admitting that it was so, still the +object to be attained was only an empty victory, which +could have hardly any sensible influence on the fall of +Mantua. The way which we should have chosen would, +in our opinion, have been much more certain to prevent +the relief of Mantua; but even if we place ourselves in +the position of the French General and assume that it +was not so, and look upon the certainty of success to +have been less, the question then amounts to a choice +between a more certain but less useful, and therefore less +important, victory on the one hand, and a somewhat less +probable but far more decisive and important victory, +on the other hand. Presented in this form, boldness +must have declared for the second solution, which is the +reverse of what took place, when the thing was only superficially +viewed. Buonaparte certainly was anything but +deficient in boldness, and we may be sure that he did +not see the whole case and its consequences as fully and +clearly as we can at the present time. + +Naturally the critic, in treating of the means, must +often appeal to military history, as experience is of more +value in the Art of War than all philosophical truth. But +this exemplification from history is subject to certain +conditions, of which we shall treat in a special chapter and +unfortunately these conditions are so seldom regarded +that reference to history generally only serves to increase +the confusion of ideas. + +We have still a most important subject to consider, +which is, How far criticism in passing judgments on +particular events is permitted, or in duty bound, to make +use of its wider view of things, and therefore also of that +which is shown by results; or when and where it should +leave out of sight these things in order to place itself, +as far as possible, in the exact position of the chief actor? + +If criticism dispenses praise or censure, it should seek +to place itself as nearly as possible at the same point of +view as the person acting, that is to say, to collect all he +knew and all the motives on which he acted, and, on the +other hand, to leave out of the consideration all that the +person acting could not or did not know, and above all, +the result. But this is only an object to aim at, which +can never be reached because the state of circumstances +from which an event proceeded can never be placed before +the eye of the critic exactly as it lay before the eye of the +person acting. A number of inferior circumstances, +which must have influenced the result, are completely +lost to sight, and many a subjective motive has never +come to light. + +The latter can only be learnt from the memoirs of the +chief actor, or from his intimate friends; and in such things of +this kind +are often treated of in a very +desultory manner, or purpusely misrepresented. Criticism +must, therefore, always forego much which was +present in the minds of those whose acts are criticised. + +On the other hand, it is much more difficult to leave out +of sight that which criticism knows in excess. This is +only easy as regards accidental circumstances, that is, +circumstances which have been mixed up, but are in no +way necessarily related. But it is very difficult, and, in +fact, can never be completely done with regard to things +really essential. + +Let us take first, the result. If it has not proceeded +from accidental circumstances, it is almost impossible +that the knowledge of it should not have an effect on the +judgment passed on events which have preceded it, for +we see these things in the light of this result, and it is to +a certain extent by it that we first become acquainted +with them and appreciate them. Military history, with +all its events, is a source of instruction for criticism +itself, and it is only natural that criticism should throw +that light on things which it has itself obtained from the +consideration of the whole. If therefore it might wish +in some cases to leave the result out of the consideration, +it would be impossible to do so completely. + +But it is not only in relation to the result, that is, with +what takes place at the last, that this embarrassment +arises; the same occurs in relation to preceding events, +therefore with the data which furnished the motives to +action. Criticism has before it, in most cases, more +information on this point than the principal in the transaction. +Now it may seem easy to dismiss from the consideration +everything of this nature, but it is not so easy +as we may think. The knowledge of preceding and +concurrent events is founded not only on certain information, +but on a number of conjectures and suppositions; +indeed, there is hardly any of the information respecting +things not purely accidental which has not been preceded +by suppositions or conjectures destined to take the place +of certain information in case such should never be +supplied. Now is it conceivable that criticism in after +times, which has before it as facts all the preceding and +concurrent circumstances, should not allow itself to be +thereby influenced when it asks itself the question, +What portion of the circumstances, which at the moment +of action were unknown, would it have held to be probable? +We maintain that in this case, as in the case of +the results, and for the same reason, it is impossible to +disregard all these things completely. + +If therefore the critic wishes to bestow praise or blame +upon any single act, he can only succeed to a certain +degree in placing himself in the position of the person +whose act he has under review. In many cases he can +do so sufficiently near for any practical purpose, but in +many instances it is the very reverse, and this fact should +never be overlooked. + +But it is neither necessary nor desirable that criticism +should completely identify itself with the person acting. +In War, as in all matters of skill, there is a certain natural +aptitude required which is called talent. This may be +great or small. In the first case it may easily be superior +to that of the critic, for what critic can pretend to the +skill of a Frederick or a Buonaparte? Therefore, if +criticism is not to abstain altogether from offering an +opinion where eminent talent is concerned, it must be +allowed to make use of the advantage which its enlarged +horizon affords. Criticism must not, therefore, treat +the solution of a problem by a great General like a sum +in arithmetic; it is only through the results and through +the exact coincidences of events that it can recognise +with admiration how much is due to the exercise of genius, +and that it first learns the essential combination which +the glance of that genius devised. + +But for every, even the smallest, act of genius it is +necessary that criticism should take a higher point of +view, so that, having at command many objective grounds +of decision, it may be as little subjective as possible, +and that the critic may not take the limited scope of his +own mind as a standard. + +This elevated position of criticism, its praise and blame +pronounced with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, +has in itself nothing which hurts our feelings; it only +does so if the critic pushes himself forward, and speaks +in a tone as if all the wisdom which he has obtained by +an exhaustive examination of the event under consideration +were really his own talent. Palpable as is this +deception, it is one which people may easily fall into +through vanity, and one which is naturally distasteful to +others. It very often happens that although the critic +has no such arrogant pretensions, they are imputed to +him by the reader because he has not expressly disclaimed +them, and then follows immediately a charge of a want of +the power of critical judgment. + +If therefore a critic points out an error made by a +Frederick or a Buonaparte, that does not mean that he +who makes the criticism would not have committed the +same error; he may even be ready to grant that had +he been in the place of these great Generals he might +have made much greater mistakes; he merely sees this +error from the chain of events, and he thinks that it +should not have escaped the sagacity of the General. + +This is, therefore, an opinion formed through the connection +of events, and therefore through the RESULT. But +there is another quite different effect of the result itself +upon the judgment, that is if it is used quite alone as an +example for or against the soundness of a measure. This +may be called JUDGMENT ACCORDING TO THE RESULT. Such a +judgment appears at first sight inadmissible, and yet it +is not. + +When Buonaparte marched to Moscow in 1812, all +depended upon whether the taking of the capital, and the +events which preceded the capture, would force the +Emperor Alexander to make peace, as he had been compelled +to do after the battle of Friedland in 1807, and +the Emperor Francis in 1805 and 1809 after Austerlitz +and Wagram; for if Buonaparte did not obtain a peace +at Moscow, there was no alternative but to return--that +is, there was nothing for him but a strategic defeat. +We shall leave out of the question what he did to get to +Moscow, and whether in his advance he did not miss many +opportunities of bringing the Emperor Alexander to peace; +we shall also exclude all consideration of the disastrous +circumstances which attended his retreat, and which +perhaps had their origin in the general conduct of the +campaign. Still the question remains the same, for +however much more brilliant the course of the campaign +up to Moscow might have been, still there was always +an uncertainty whether the Emperor Alexander would be +intimidated into making peace; and then, even if a retreat +did not contain in itself the seeds of such disasters as did +in fact occur, still it could never be anything else than a +great strategic defeat. If the Emperor Alexander agreed +to a peace which was disadvantageous to him, the campaign +of 1812 would have ranked with those of Austerlitz, +Friedland, and Wagram. But these campaigns also, if +they had not led to peace, would in all probability have +ended in similar catastrophes. Whatever, therefore, of +genius, skill, and energy the Conqueror of the World +applied to the task, this last question addressed to fate[*] +remained always the same. Shall we then discard the +campaigns of 1805, 1807, 1809, and say on account of the +campaign of 1812 that they were acts of imprudence; +that the results were against the nature of things, and that +in 1812 strategic justice at last found vent for itself +in opposition to blind chance? That would be an +unwarrantable conclusion, a most arbitrary judgment, +a case only half proved, because no human, eye can trace +the thread of the necessary connection of events up to +the determination of the conquered Princes. + +[*] "Frage an der Schicksal,"a familiar quotation from +Schiller.--TR. + + +Still less can we say the campaign of 1812 merited the +same success as the others, and that the reason why it +turned out otherwise lies in something unnatural, for +we cannot regard the firmness of Alexander as something +unpredictable. + +What can be more natural than to say that in the +years 1805, 1807, 1809, Buonaparte judged his opponents +correctly, and that in 1812 he erred in that point? On +the former occasions, therefore, he was right, in the +latter wrong, and in both cases we judge by the RESULT. + +All action in War, as we have already said, is directed +on probable, not on certain, results. Whatever is wanting +in certainty must always be left to fate, or chance, call +it which you will. We may demand that what is so left +should be as little as possible, but only in relation to +the particular case--that is, as little as is possible in this +one case, but not that the case in which the least is left +to chance is always to be preferred. That would be an +enormous error, as follows from all our theoretical views. +There are cases in which the greatest daring is the greatest +wisdom. + +Now in everything which is left to chance by the chief +actor, his personal merit, and therefore his responsibility +as well, seems to be completely set aside; nevertheless +we cannot suppress an inward feeling of satisfaction +whenever expectation realises itself, and if it disappoints +us our mind is dissatisfied; and more than this of right +and wrong should not be meant by the judgment which +we form from the mere result, or rather that we find there. + +Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the satisfaction +which our mind experiences at success, the pain caused +by failure, proceed from a sort of mysterious feeling; +we suppose between that success ascribed to good fortune +and the genius of the chief a fine connecting thread, +invisible to the mind's eye, and the supposition gives +pleasure. What tends to confirm this idea is that our +sympathy increases, becomes more decided, if the successes +and defeats of the principal actor are often repeated. +Thus it becomes intelligible how good luck in War assumes +a much nobler nature than good luck at play. In general, +when a fortunate warrior does not otherwise lessen our +interest in his behalf, we have a pleasure in accompanying +him in his career. + +Criticism, therefore, after having weighed all that comes +within the sphere of human reason and conviction, will +let the result speak for that part where the deep mysterious +relations are not disclosed in any visible form, +and will protect this silent sentence of a higher authority +from the noise of crude opinions on the one hand, while +on the other it prevents the gross abuse which might +be made of this last tribunal. + +This verdict of the result must therefore always bring +forth that which human sagacity cannot discover; and +it will be chiefly as regards the intellectual powers and +operations that it will be called into requisition, partly +because they can be estimated with the least certainty, +partly because their close connection with the will is +favourable to their exercising over it an important +influence. When fear or bravery precipitates the decision, +there is nothing objective intervening between them +for our consideration, and consequently nothing by which +sagacity and calculation might have met the probable +result. + +We must now be allowed to make a few observations +on the instrument of criticism, that is, the language +which it uses, because that is to a certain extent connected +with the action in War; for the critical examination is +nothing more than the deliberation which should precede +action in War. We therefore think it very essential +that the language used in criticism should have the same +character as that which deliberation in War must have, +for otherwise it would cease to be practical, and criticism +could gain no admittance in actual life. + +We have said in our observations on the theory of the +conduct of War that it should educate the mind of the +Commander for War, or that its teaching should guide his +education; also that it is not intended to furnish him +with positive doctrines and systems which he can use +like mental appliances. But if the construction of +scientific formulae is never required, or even allowable, +in War to aid the decision on the case presented, if truth +does not appear there in a systematic shape, if it is not +found in an indirect way, but directly by the natural +perception of the mind, then it must be the same also in +a critical review. + +It is true as we have seen that, wherever complete +demonstration of the nature of things would be too tedious, +criticism must support itself on those truths which theory +has established on the point. But, just as in War the +actor obeys these theoretical truths rather because his +mind is imbued with them than because he regards them +as objective inflexible laws, so criticism must also make +use of them, not as an external law or an algebraic formula, +of which fresh proof is not required each time they are +applied, but it must always throw a light on this proof +itself, leaving only to theory the more minute and circumstantial +proof. Thus it avoids a mysterious, unintelligible +phraseology, and makes its progress in plain language, +that is, with a clear and always visible chain of ideas. + +Certainly this cannot always be completely attained, +but it must always be the aim in critical expositions. +Such expositions must use complicated forms of science +as sparingly as possible, and never resort to the construction +of scientific aids as of a truth apparatus of its own, +but always be guided by the natural and unbiassed +impressions of the mind. + +But this pious endeavour, if we may use the expression, +has unfortunately seldom hitherto presided over critical +examinations: the most of them have rather been +emanations of a species of vanity--a wish to make a +display of ideas. + +The first evil which we constantly stumble upon is a +lame, totally inadmissible application of certain one- +sided systems as of a formal code of laws. But it is +never difficult to show the one-sidedness of such systems, +and this only requires to be done once to throw discredit +for ever on critical judgments which are based on them. +We have here to deal with a definite subject, and as the +number of possible systems after all can be but small, +therefore also they are themselves the lesser evil. + +Much greater is the evil which lies in the pompous +retinue of technical terms--scientific expressions and +metaphors, which these systems carry in their train, and +which like a rabble-like the baggage of an Army broken +away from its Chief--hang about in all directions. Any +critic who has not adopted a system, either because he has +not found one to please him, or because he has not yet +been able to make himself master of one, will at least +occasionally make use of a piece of one, as one would +use a ruler, to show the blunders committed by a General. +The most of them are incapable of reasoning without +using as a help here and there some shreds of scientific +military theory. The smallest of these fragments, +consisting in mere scientific words and metaphors, are +often nothing more than ornamental flourishes of critical +narration. Now it is in the nature of things that all +technical and scientific expressions which belong to a +system lose their propriety, if they ever had any, as soon +as they are distorted, and used as general axioms, or as +small crystalline talismans, which have more power of +demonstration than simple speech. + +Thus it has come to pass that our theoretical and +critical books, instead of being straightforward, intelligible +dissertations, in which the author always knows at least +what he says and the reader what he reads, are brimful +of these technical terms, which form dark points of interference +where +author and reader part company. But +frequently they are something worse, being nothing but +hollow shells without any kernel. The author himself +has no clear perception of what he means, contents himself +with vague ideas, which if expressed in plain language +would be unsatisfactory even to himself. + +A third fault in criticism is the MISUSE of HISTORICAL +EXAMPLES, and a display of great reading or learning. +What the history of the Art of War is we have already +said, and we shall further explain our views on examples +and on military history in general in special chapters. +One fact merely touched upon in a very cursory manner +may be used to support the most opposite views, and +three or four such facts of the most heterogeneous description, +brought together out of the most distant lands and +remote times and heaped up, generally distract and +bewilder the judgment and understanding without +demonstrating anything; for when exposed to the light +they turn out to be only trumpery rubbish, made use +of to show off the author's learning. + +But what can be gained for practical life by such +obscure, partly false, confused arbitrary conceptions? +So little is gained that theory on account of them has +always been a true antithesis of practice, and frequently +a subject of ridicule to those whose soldierly qualities +in the field are above question. + +But it is impossible that this could have been the case, +if theory in simple language, and by natural treatment +of those things which constitute the Art of making War, +had merely sought to establish just so much as admits of +being established; if, avoiding all false pretensions and +irrelevant display of scientific forms and historical +parallels, it had kept close to the subject, and gone hand +in hand with those who must conduct affairs in the field +by their own natural genius. + + + +CHAPTER VI. ON EXAMPLES + +EXAMPLES from history make everything clear, and +furnish the best description of proof in the empirical +sciences. This applies with more force to the Art of War +than to any other. General Scharnhorst, whose handbook +is the best ever written on actual War, pronounces +historical examples to be of the first importance, and +makes an admirable use of them himself. Had he survived +the War in which he fell,[*] the fourth part of his +revised treatise on artillery would have given a still +greater proof of the observing and enlightened spirit +in which he sifted matters of experience. + +But such use of historical examples is rarely made by +theoretical writers; the way in which they more commonly +make use of them is rather calculated to leave +the mind unsatisfied, as well as to offend the understanding. +We therefore think it important to bring specially +into view the use and abuse of historical examples. + +[*] General Scharnhorst died in 1813, of a wound received in the +battle of Bautzen or Grosz Gorchen--EDITOR. + + +Unquestionably the branches of knowledge which lie +at the foundation of the Art of War come under the +denomination of empirical sciences; for although they +are derived in a great measure from the nature of things, +still we can only learn this very nature itself for the most +part from experience; and besides that, the practical +application is modified by so many circumstances that +the effects can never be completely learnt from the mere +nature of the means. + +The effects of gunpowder, that great agent in our +military activity, were only learnt by experience, and up +to this hour experiments are continually in progress in +order to investigate them more fully. That an iron ball +to which powder has given a velocity of 1000 feet in a +second, smashes every living thing which it touches in +its course is intelligible in itself; experience is not +required to tell us that; but in producing this effect how +many hundred circumstances are concerned, some of +which can only be learnt by experience! And the +physical is not the only effect which we have to study, +it is the moral which we are in search of, and that can only +be ascertained by experience; and there is no other way +of learning and appreciating it but by experience. In +the middle ages, when firearms were first invented, +their effect, owing to their rude make, was materially +but trifling compared to what it now is, but their effect +morally was much greater. One must have witnessed +the firmness of one of those masses taught and led by +Buonaparte, under the heaviest and most unintermittent +cannonade, in order to understand what troops, hardened +by long practice in the field of danger, can do, when by +a career of victory they have reached the noble principle +of demanding from themselves their utmost efforts. In +pure conception no one would believe it. On the other +hand, it is well known that there are troops in the service +of European Powers at the present moment who would +easily be dispersed by a few cannon shots. + +But no empirical science, consequently also no theory +of the Art of War, can always corroborate its truths by +historical proof; it would also be, in some measure, +difficult to support experience by single facts. If any +means is once found efficacious in War, it is repeated; +one nation copies another, the thing becomes the fashion, +and in this manner it comes into use, supported by experience, +and takes its place in theory, which contents itself +with appealing to experience in general in order to +show its origin, but not as a verification of its truth. + +But it is quite otherwise if experience is to be used +in order to overthrow some means in use, to confirm +what is doubtful, or introduce something new; then +particular examples from history must be quoted as +proofs. + +Now, if we consider closely the use of historical proofs, +four points of view readily present themselves for the +purpose. + +First, they may be used merely as an EXPLANATION of an +idea. In every abstract consideration it is very easy to +be misunderstood, or not to be intelligible at all: when +an author is afraid of this, an exemplification from history +serves to throw the light which is wanted on his idea, and +to ensure his being intelligible to his reader. + +Secondly, it may serve as an APPLICATION of an idea, +because by means of an example there is an opportunity +of showing the action of those minor circumstances +which cannot all be comprehended and explained in any +general expression of an idea; for in that consists, indeed, +the difference between theory and experience. Both +these cases belong to examples properly speaking, the +two following belong to historical proofs. + +Thirdly, a historical fact may be referred to particularly, +in order to support what one has advanced. This is in +all cases sufficient, if we have ONLY to prove the POSSIBILITY +of a fact or effect. + +Lastly, in the fourth place, from the circumstantial +detail of a historical event, and by collecting together +several of them, we may deduce some theory, which +therefore has its true PROOF in this testimony itself. + +For the first of these purposes all that is generally +required is a cursory notice of the case, as it is only used +partially. Historical correctness is a secondary consideration; +a case invented might also serve the purpose as +well, only historical ones are always to be preferred, +because they bring the idea which they illustrate nearer +to practical life. + +The second use supposes a more circumstantial relation +of events, but historical authenticity is again of secondary +importance, and in respect to this point the same is to be +said as in the first case. + +For the third purpose the mere quotation of an undoubted +fact is generally sufficient. If it is asserted +that fortified positions may fulfil their object under +certain conditions, it is only necessary to mention the +position of Bunzelwitz[*] in support of the assertion. + +[*] Frederick the Great's celebrated entrenched camp in 1761. + + +But if, through the narrative of a case in history, an +abstract truth is to be demonstrated, then everything +in the case bearing on the demonstration must be analysed +in the most searching and complete manner; it must, +to a certain extent, develop itself carefully before the +eyes of the reader. The less effectually this is done the +weaker will be the proof, and the more necessary it will +be to supply the demonstrative proof which is wanting +in the single case by a number of cases, because we have +a right to suppose that the more minute details which +we are unable to give neutralise each other in their +effects in a certain number of cases. + +If we want to show by example derived from experience +that cavalry are better placed behind than in a line with +infantry; that it is very hazardous without a decided +preponderance of numbers to attempt an enveloping +movement, with widely separated columns, either on a +field of battle or in the theatre of war--that is, either +tactically or strategically--then in the first of these cases +it would not be sufficient to specify some lost battles in +which the cavalry was on the flanks and some gained in +which the cavalry was in rear of the infantry; and in the +tatter of these cases it is not sufficient to refer to the +battles of Rivoli and Wagram, to the attack of the +Austrians on the theatre of war in Italy, in 1796, or of +the French upon the German theatre of war in the same +year. The way in which these orders of battle or plans +of attack essentially contributed to disastrous issues +in those particular cases must be shown by closely tracing +out circumstances and occurrences. Then it will appear +how far such forms or measures are to be condemned, +a point which it is very necessary to show, for a total +condemnation would be inconsistent with truth. + +It has been already said that when a circumstantial +detail of facts is impossible, the demonstrative power +which is deficient may to a certain extent be supplied by +the number of cases quoted; but this is a very dangerous +method of getting out of the difficulty, and one which +has been much abused. Instead of one well-explained +example, three or four are just touched upon, and thus +a show is made of strong evidence. But there are matters +where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would +prove nothing, if, for instance, they are facts of frequent +occurrence, and therefore a dozen other cases with an +opposite result might just as easily be brought forward. +If any one will instance a dozen lost battles in which +the side beaten attacked in separate converging columns, +we can instance a dozen that have been gained in which +the same order was adopted. It is evident that in this +way no result is to be obtained. + +Upon carefully considering these different points, it will +be seen how easily examples may be misapplied. + +An occurrence which, instead of being carefully analysed +in all its parts, is superficially noticed, is like an object +seen at a great distance, presenting the same appearance +on each side, and in which the details of its parts cannot +be distinguished. Such examples have, in reality, served +to support the most contradictory opinions. To some +Daun's campaigns are models of prudence and skill. To +others, they are nothing but examples of timidity and +want of resolution. Buonaparte's passage across the +Noric Alps in 1797 may be made to appear the noblest +resolution, but also as an act of sheer temerity. His +strategic defeat in 1812 may be represented as the consequence +either of an excess, or of a deficiency, of energy. +All these opinions have been broached, and it is easy to +see that they might very well arise, because each person +takes a different view of the connection of events. At the +same time these antagonistic opinions cannot be reconciled +with each other, and therefore one of the two must +be wrong. + +Much as we are obliged to the worthy Feuquieres for the +numerous examples introduced in his memoirs--partly +because a number of historical incidents have thus been +preserved which might otherwise have been lost, and +partly because he was one of the first to bring theoretical, +that is, abstract, ideas into connection with the practical +in war, in so far that the cases brought forward may be +regarded as intended to exemplify and confirm what is +theoretically asserted--yet, in the opinion of an impartial +reader, he will hardly be allowed to have attained the +object he proposed to himself, that of proving theoretical +principles by historical examples. For although he sometimes +relates occurrences with great minuteness, still he +falls short very often of showing that the deductions +drawn necessarily proceed from the inner relations of +these events. + +Another evil which comes from the superficial notice of +historical events, is that some readers are either wholly +ignorant +of the events, or cannot call them to remembrance +sufficiently to be able to grasp the author's meaning, +so that there is no alternative between either accepting +blindly what is said, or remaining unconvinced. + +It is extremely difficult to put together or unfold historical +events before the eyes of a reader in such a way +as is necessary, in order to be able to use them as proofs; +for the writer very often wants the means, and can neither +afford the time nor the requisite space; but we maintain +that, when the object is to establish a new or doubtful +opinion, one single example, thoroughly analysed, is far +more instructive than ten which are superficially treated. +The great mischief of these superficial representations is +not that the writer puts his story forward as a proof +when it has only a false title, but that he has not made +himself properly acquainted with the subject, and that +from this sort of slovenly, shallow treatment of history, +a hundred false views and attempts at the construction of +theories arise, which would never have made their appearance +if the writer had looked upon it as his duty to +deduce from the strict connection of events everything +new which he brought to market, and sought to prove +from history. + +When we are convinced of these difficulties in the use of +historical examples, and at the same time of the necessity +(of making use of such examples), then we shall also come +to the conclusion that the latest military history is +naturally the best field from which to draw them, inasmuch +as it alone is sufficiently authentic and detailed. + +In ancient times, circumstances connected with War, +as well as the method of carrying it on, were different; +therefore its events are of less use to us either theoretically +or practically; in addition to which, military history, like +every other, naturally loses in the course of time a number +of small traits and lineaments originally to be seen, loses in +colour and life, like a worn-out or darkened picture; so +that perhaps at last only the large masses and leading +features remain, which thus acquire undue proportions. + +If we look at the present state of warfare, we should +say that the Wars since that of the Austrian succession are +almost the only ones which, at least as far as armament, +have still a considerable similarity to the present, and +which, notwithstanding the many important changes which +have taken place both great and small, are still capable +of affording much instruction. It is quite otherwise with +the War of the Spanish succession, as the use of fire-arms +had not then so far advanced towards perfection, and +cavalry still continued the most important arm. The +farther we go back, the less useful becomes military history, +as it gets so much the more meagre and barren of detail. +The most useless of all is that of the old world. + +But this uselessness is not altogether absolute, it relates +only to those subjects which depend on a knowledge +of minute details, or on those things in which the method +of conducting war has changed. Although we know very +little about the tactics in the battles between the Swiss +and the Austrians, the Burgundians and French, still we +find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the +first in which the superiority of a good infantry over the +best cavalry was, displayed. A general glance at the time +of the Condottieri teaches us how the whole method of +conducting War is dependent on the instrument used; +for at no period have the forces used in War had so much +the characteristics of a special instrument, and been a +class so totally distinct from the rest of the national +community. The memorable way in which the Romans in the +second Punic War attacked the Carthaginan possessions +in Spain and Africa, while Hannibal still maintained himself +in Italy, is a most instructive subject to study, as the +general relations of the States and Armies concerned in +this indirect act of defence are sufficiently well known. + +But the more things descend into particulars and deviate +in character from the most general relations, the less +we can look for examples and lessons of experience from +very remote periods, for we have neither the means of +judging properly of corresponding events, nor can we +apply them to our completely different method of War. + +Unfortunately, however, it has always been the +fashion with historical writers to talk about ancient times. +We shall not say how far vanity and charlatanism may +have had a share in this, but in general we fail to discover +any honest intention and earnest endeavour to instruct +and convince, and we can therefore only look upon such +quotations and references as embellishments to fill up +gaps and hide defects. + +It would be an immense service to teach the Art of War +entirely by historical examples, as Feuquieres proposed +to do; but it would be full work for the whole life of a +man, if we reflect that he who undertakes it must first +qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience +in actual War. + +Whoever, stirred by ambition, undertakes such a task, +let him prepare himself for his pious undertaking as for a +long pilgrimage; let him give up his time, spare no +sacrifice, fear no temporal rank or power, and rise above +all feelings of personal vanity, of false shame, in order, +according to the French code, to speak THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE +TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH. + + + +BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL + +CHAPTER I. STRATEGY + +IN the second chapter of the second book, Strategy has +been defined as "the employment of the battle as the means +towards the attainment of the object of the War." Properly +speaking it has to do with nothing but the battle, but +its theory must include in this consideration the instrument +of this real activity--the armed force--in itself and +in its principal relations, for the battle is fought by it, +and shows its effects upon it in turn. It must be well +acquainted with the battle itself as far as relates to its +possible results, and those mental and moral powers +which are the most important in the use of the same. + +Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the +end of the War; it must therefore give an aim to the whole +military action, which must be in accordance with the +object of the War; in other words, Strategy forms the +plan of the War, and to this end it links together the +series of acts which are to lead to the final decision, that, +is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns +and regulates the combats to be fought in each. As these +are all things which to a great extent can only be determined +on conjectures some of which turn out incorrect, +while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details +cannot be made at all beforehand, it follows, as a matter +of course, that Strategy must go with the Army to the field +in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to make +the modifications in the general plan, which incessantly +become necessary in War. Strategy can therefore never +take its hand from the work for a moment. + +That this, however, has not always been the view taken +is evident from the former custom of keeping Strategy +in the cabinet and not with the Army, a thing only allowable +if the cabinet is so near to the Army that it can be +taken for the chief head-quarters of the Army. + +Theory will therefore attend on Strategy in the determination +of its plans, or, as we may more properly say, +it will throw a light on things in themselves, and on their +relations to each other, and bring out prominently the +little that there is of principle or rule. + +If we recall to mind from the first chapter how many +things of the highest importance War touches upon, we +may conceive that a consideration of all requires a rare +grasp of mind. + +A Prince or General who knows exactly how to organise +his War according to his object and means, who does neither +too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof +of his genius. But the effects of this talent are exhibited +not so much by the invention of new modes of action, +which might strike the eye immediately, as in the successful +final result of the whole. It is the exact fulfilment +of silent suppositions, it is the noiseless harmony of the +whole action which we should admire, and which only +makes itself known in the total result. +inquirer who, tracing back from the final result, +does not perceive the signs of that harmony is one who +is apt to seek for genius where it is not, and where it +cannot be found. + +The means and forms which Strategy uses are in fact +so extremely simple, so well known by their constant +repetition, that it only appears ridiculous to sound +common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking +of them with high-flown emphasis. Turning a flank, +which has been done a thousand times, is regarded here +as a proof of the most brilliant genius, there as a +proof of the most profound penetration, indeed even of +the most comprehensive knowledge. Can there be in the +book--world more absurd productions?[*] + +[*] This paragraph refers to the works of Lloyd, Buelow, indeed +to all +the eighteenth-century writers, from whose influence we in +England are +not even yet free.--ED. + + +It is still more ridiculous if, in addition to this, we +reflect that the same critic, in accordance with prevalent +opinion, excludes all moral forces from theory, and will +not allow it to be concerned with anything but the material +forces, so that all must be confined to a few mathematical +relations of equilibrium and preponderance, of time and +space, and a few lines and angles. If it were nothing +more than this, then out of such a miserable business there +would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy. + +But let us admit: there is no question here about +scientific formulas and problems; the relations of material +things are all very simple; the right comprehension of +the moral forces which come into play is more difficult. +Still, even in respect to them, it is only in the highest +branches of Strategy that moral complications and a great +diversity of quantities and relations are to be looked for, +only at that point where Strategy borders on political +science, or rather where the two become one, and there, +as we have before observed, they have more influence on +the "how much" and "how little" is to be done than on +the form of execution. Where the latter is the principal +question, as in the single acts both great and small in War, +the moral quantities are already reduced to a very small +number. + +Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but +not on that account very easy. Once it is determined +from the relations of the State what should and may be +done by War, then the way to it is easy to find; but to +follow that way straightforward, to carry out the plan +without being obliged to deviate from it a thousand times +by a thousand varying influences, requires, besides great +strength of character, great clearness and steadiness of +mind, and out of a thousand men who are remarkable, +some for mind, others for penetration, others again for +boldness or strength of will, perhaps not one will combine +in himself all those qualities which are required to raise a +man above mediocrity in the career of a general. + +It may sound strange, but for all who know War in this +respect it is a fact beyond doubt, that much more strength +of will is required to make an important decision in +Strategy than in tactics. In the latter we are hurried on +with the moment; a Commander feels himself borne along +in a strong current, against which he durst not contend +without the most destructive consequences, he suppresses +the rising fears, and boldly ventures further. In Strategy, +where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more room +allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others, +for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for +unseasonable regrets; and as we do not see things in +Strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with +the living eye, but everything must be conjectured and +assumed, the convictions produced are less powerful. +The consequence is that most Generals, when they should +act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts. + +Now let us cast a glance at history--upon Frederick +the Great's campaign of 1760, celebrated for its fine +marches and manoeuvres: a perfect masterpiece of +Strategic skill as critics tell us. Is there really anything +to drive us out of our wits with admiration in the King's +first trying to turn Daun's right flank, then his left, then +again his right, &c. ? Are we to see profound wisdom in +this? No, that we cannot, if we are to decide naturally +and without affectation. What we rather admire above +all is the sagacity of the King in this respect, that while +pursuing a great object with very limited means, he undertook +nothing beyond his powers, and JUST ENOUGH to gain +his object. This sagacity of the General is visible not +only in this campaign, but throughout all the three Wars +of the Great King! + +To bring Silesia into the safe harbour of a well- +guaranteed peace was his object. + +At the head of a small State, which was like other +States in most things, and only ahead of them in some +branches of administration; he could not be an Alexander, +and, as Charles XII, he would only, like him, have broken +his head. We find, therefore, in the whole of his conduct +of War, a controlled power, always well balanced, and +never wanting in energy, which in the most critical +moments rises to astonishing deeds, and the next moment +oscillates quietly on again in subordination to the play +of the most subtil political influences. Neither vanity, +thirst for glory, nor vengeance could make him deviate +from his course, and this course alone it is which brought +him to a fortunate termination of the contest. + +These few words do but scant justice to this phase of +the genius of the great General; the eyes must be fixed +carefully on the extraordinary issue of the struggle, and +the causes which brought about that issue must be traced +out, in order thoroughly to understand that nothing but +the King's penetrating eye brought him safely out of all +his dangers. + +This is one feature in this great Commander which we +admire in the campaign of 1760--and in all others, but +in this especially--because in none did he keep the +balance even against such a superior hostile force, with +such a small sacrifice. + +Another feature relates to the difficulty of execution. +Marches to turn a flank, right or left, are easily combined; +the idea of keeping a small force always well concentrated +to be able to meet the enemy on equal terms at any point, +to multiply a force by rapid movement, is as easily conceived +as expressed; the mere contrivance in these points, +therefore, cannot excite our admiration, and with respect +to such simple things, there is nothing further than to +admit that they are simple. + +But let a General try to do these things like Frederick +the Great. Long afterwards authors, who were eyewitnesses, +have spoken of the danger, indeed of the +imprudence, of the King's camps, and doubtless, at the +time he pitched them, the danger appeared three times +as great as afterwards. + +It was the same with his marches, under the eyes, nay, +often under the cannon of the enemy's Army; these camps +were taken up, these marches made, not from want of +prudence, but because in Daun's system, in his mode of +drawing up his Army, in the responsibility which pressed +upon him, and in his character, Frederick found that +security which justified his camps and marches. But +it required the King's boldness, determination, and +strength of will to see things in this light, and not to be +led astray and intimidated by the danger of which thirty +years after people still wrote and spoke. Few Generals in +this situation would have believed these simple strategic +means to be practicable. + +Again, another difficulty in execution lay in this, that +the King's Army in this campaign was constantly in +motion. Twice it marched by wretched cross-roads, +from the Elbe into Silesia, in rear of Daun and pursued +by Lascy (beginning of July, beginning of August). It +required to be always ready for battle, and its marches +had to be organised with a degree of skill which necessarily +called forth a proportionate amount of exertion. +Although attended and delayed by thousands of waggons, +still its subsistence was extremely difficult. In Silesia, +for eight days before the battle of Leignitz, it had constantly +to march, defiling alternately right and left in +front of the enemy:--this costs great fatigue, and entails +great privations. + +Is it to be supposed that all this could have been done +without producing great friction in the machine? Can +the mind of a Commander elaborate such movements with +the same ease as the hand of a land surveyor uses the +astrolabe? Does not the sight of the sufferings of their +hungry, thirsty comrades pierce the hearts of the Commander +and his Generals a thousand times? Must not +the murmurs and doubts which these cause reach his ear? +Has an ordinary man the courage to demand such sacrifices, +and would not such efforts most certainly demoralise +the Army, break up the bands of discipline, and, in short, +undermine its military virtue, if firm reliance on the greatness +and infallibility of the Commander did not compensate +for all? Here, therefore, it is that we should pay respect; +it is these miracles of execution which we should admire. +But it is impossible to realise all this in its full force +without +a foretaste of it by experience. He who only knows +War from books or the drill-ground cannot realise the +whole effect of this counterpoise in action; WE BEG HIM, +THEREFORE, TO ACCEPT FROM US ON FAITH AND TRUST ALL THAT HE IS +UNABLE TO SUPPLY FROM ANY PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF HIS OWN. + +This illustration is intended to give more clearness to +the course of our ideas, and in closing this chapter we will +only briefly observe that in our exposition of Strategy +we shall describe those separate subjects which appear to +us the most important, whether of a moral or material +nature; then proceed from the simple to the complex, +and conclude with the inner connection of the whole +act of War, in other words, with the plan for a War or +campaign. + + +OBSERVATION. + +In an earlier manuscript of the second book are the +following passages endorsed by the author himself +to be used for the first Chapter of the second Book: the +projected revision of that chapter not having been made, +the passages referred to are introduced here in full. + + +By the mere assemblage of armed forces at a particular +point, a battle there becomes possible, but does not always +take place. Is that possibility now to be regarded as a +reality and therefore an effective thing? Certainly, it is +so by its results, and these effects, whatever they may +be, can never fail. + + +1. POSSIBLE COMBATS ARE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR +RESULTS TO BE LOOKED UPON AS REAL ONES. + +If a detachment is sent away to cut off the retreat of a +flying enemy, and the enemy surrenders in consequence +without further resistance, still it is through the combat +which is offered to him by this detachment sent after him +that he is brought to his decision. + +If a part of our Army occupies an enemy's province +which was undefended, and thus deprives the enemy of +very considerable means of keeping up the strength of +his Army, it is entirely through the battle which our +detached body gives the enemy to expect, in case he seeks +to recover the lost province, that we remain in possession +of the same. + +In both cases, therefore, the mere possibility of a battle +has produced results, and is therefore to be classed +amongst actual events. Suppose that in these cases the +enemy has opposed our troops with others superior in +force, and thus forced ours to give up their object without +a combat, then certainly our plan has failed, but the +battle which we offered at (either of) those points has +not on that account been without effect, for it attracted +the enemy's forces to that point. And in case our whole +undertaking has done us harm, it cannot be said that these +positions, these possible battles, have been attended +with no results; their effects, then, are similar to those +of a lost battle. + +In this manner we see that the destruction of the +enemy's military forces, the overthrow of the enemy's +power, is only to be done through the effect of a battle, +whether it be that it actually takes place, or that it is +merely offered, and not accepted. + + +2. TWOFOLD OBJECT OF THE COMBAT. + +But these effects are of two kinds, direct and indirect +they are of the latter, if other things intrude themselves +and become the object of the combat--things which cannot +be regarded as the destruction of enemy's force, but +only leading up to it, certainly by a circuitous road, but +with so much the greater effect. The possession of provinces, +towns, fortresses, roads, bridges, magazines, &c., +may be the IMMEDIATE object of a battle, but never the +ultimate one. Things of this description can never be, +looked upon otherwise than as means of gaining greater +superiority, so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in +such a way that it will be impossible for him to accept it. +Therefore all these things must only be regarded as intermediate +links, steps, as it were, leading up to the effectual +principle, but never as that principle itself. + +3. EXAMPLE. + +In 1814, by the capture of Buonaparte's capital the object +of the War was attained. The political divisions which +had their roots in Paris came into active operation, and +an enormous split left the power of the Emperor to collapse +of itself. Nevertheless the point of view from which we +must look at all this is, that through these causes the +forces and defensive means of Buonaparte were suddenly +very much diminished, the superiority of the Allies, +therefore, just in the same measure increased, and any +further resistance then became IMPOSSIBLE. It was this +impossibility which produced the peace with France. +If we suppose the forces of the Allies at that moment +diminished to a like extent through external causes;-- +if the superiority vanishes, then at the same time vanishes +also all the effect and importance of the taking of Paris. + +We have gone through this chain of argument in order +to show that this is the natural and only true view of +the thing from which it derives its importance. It leads +always back to the question, What at any given moment +of the War or campaign will be the probable result of the +great or small combats which the two sides might offer to +each other? In the consideration of a plan for a campaign, +this question only is decisive as to the measures which are +to be taken all through from the very commencement. + + +4. WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE +VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER THINGS. + +If we do not accustom ourselves to look upon War, and +the single campaigns in a War, as a chain which is all +composed of battles strung together, one of which always +brings on another; if we adopt the idea that the taking +of a certain geographical point, the occupation of an +undefended province, is in itself anything; then we are +very likely to regard it as an acquisition which we may +retain; and if we look at it so, and not as a term in the +whole series of events, we do not ask ourselves whether +this possession may not lead to greater disadvantages +hereafter. How often we find this mistake recurring in +military history. + +We might say that, just as in commerce the merchant +cannot set apart and place in security gains from one +single transaction by itself, so in War a single advantage +cannot be separated from the result of the whole. Just +as the former must always operate with the whole bulk +of his means, just so in War, only the sum total will decide +on the advantage or disadvantage of each item. + +If the mind's eye is always directed upon the series of +combats, so far as they can be seen beforehand, then it is +always looking in the right direction, and thereby the +motion of the force acquires that rapidity, that is to say, +willing and doing acquire that energy which is suitable +to the matter, and which is not to be thwarted or turned +aside by extraneous influences.[*] + +[*] The whole of this chapter is directed against the theories of +the Austrian Staff in 1814. It may be taken as the foundation of +the +modern teaching of the Prussian General Staff. See especially von +Kammer.--ED. + + + +CHAPTER II. ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY + +THE causes which condition the use of the combat in +Strategy may be easily divided into elements of different +kinds, such as the moral, physical, mathematical, +geographical and statistical elements. + +The first class includes all that can be called forth by +moral qualities and effects; to the second belong the +whole mass of the military force, its organisation, the +proportion of the three arms, &c. &c.; to the third, +the angle of the lines of operation, the concentric and +eccentric movements in as far as their geometrical nature +has any value in the calculation; to the fourth, the +influences of country, such as commanding points, hills, +rivers, woods, roads, &c. &c.; lastly, to the fifth, all the +means of supply. The separation of these things once +for all in the mind does good in giving clearness and +helping us to estimate at once, at a higher or lower value, +the different classes as we pass onwards. For, in considering +them separately, many lose of themselves their +borrowed importance; one feels, for instance, quite +plainly that the value of a base of operations, even if +we look at nothing in it but its relative position to the +line of operations, depends much less in that simple form +on the geometrical element of the angle which they form +with one another, than on the nature of the roads and the +country through which they pass. + +But to treat upon Strategy according to these elements +would be the most unfortunate idea that could be conceived, +for these elements are generally manifold, and +intimately connected with each other in every single +operation of War. We should lose ourselves in the most +soulless analysis, and as if in a horrid dream, we should +be for ever trying in vain to build up an arch to connect +this base of abstractions with facts belonging to the real +world. Heaven preserve every theorist from such an +undertaking! We shall keep to the world of things in +their totality, and not pursue our analysis further than +is necessary from time to time to give distinctness to +the idea which we wish to impart, and which has come +to us, not by a speculative investigation, but through +the impression made by the realities of War in their +entirety. + + +CHAPTER III. MORAL FORCES + +WE must return again to this subject, which is touched +upon in the third chapter of the second book, +because the moral forces are amongst the most important +subjects in War. They form the spirit which permeates +the whole being of War. These forces fasten themselves +soonest and with the greatest affinity on to the Will which +puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers, +uniting with it as it were in one stream, because this is a +moral force itself. Unfortunately they will escape from all +book-analysis, for they will neither be brought into numbers +nor into classes, and require to be both seen and felt. + +The spirit and other moral qualities which animate +an Army, a General, or Governments, public opinion in +provinces in which a War is raging, the moral effect of +a victory or of a defeat, are things which in themselves +vary very much in their nature, and which also, according +as they stand with regard to our object and our relations, +may have an influence in different ways. + +Although little or nothing can be said about these things +in books, still they belong to the theory of the Art of War, +as much as everything else which constitutes War. For +I must here once more repeat that it is a miserable philosophy +if, according to the old plan, we establish rules and +principles wholly regardless of all moral forces, and then, +as soon as these forces make their appearance, we begin +to count exceptions which we thereby establish as it were +theoretically, that is, make into rules; or if we resort +to an appeal to genius, which is above all rules, thus +giving out by implication, not only that rules were only +made for fools, but also that they themselves are no +better than folly. + +Even if the theory of the Art of War does no more in +reality than recall these things to remembrance, showing +the necessity of allowing to the moral forces their full +value, and of always taking them into consideration, +by so doing it extends its borders over the region of +immaterial forces, and by establishing that point of view, +condemns beforehand every one who would endeavour +to justify himself before its judgment seat by the mere +physical relations of forces. + +Further out of regard to all other so-called rules, theory +cannot banish the moral forces beyond its frontier, because +the effects of the physical forces and the moral are completely +fused, and are not to be decomposed like a metal +alloy by a chemical process. In every rule relating +to the physical forces, theory must present to the mind +at the same time the share which the moral powers will +have in it, if it would not be led to categorical propositions, +at one time too timid and contracted, at another +too dogmatical and wide. Even the most matter-of-fact +theories have, without knowing it, strayed over into this +moral kingdom; for, as an example, the effects of a +victory cannot in any way be explained without taking +into consideration the moral impressions. And therefore +the most of the subjects which we shall go through in +this book are composed half of physical, half of moral +causes and effects, and we might say the physical are +almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral +are the noble metal, the real bright-polished weapon. + +The value of the moral powers, and their frequently +incredible influence, are best exemplified by history, and +this is the most generous and the purest nourishment +which the mind of the General can extract from it.--At +the same time it is to be observed, that it is less +demonstrations, +critical examinations, and learned treatises, than +sentiments, general impressions, and single flashing +sparks of truth, which yield the seeds of knowledge that +are to fertilise the mind. + +We might go through the most important moral phenomena +in War, and with all the care of a diligent professor +try what we could impart about each, either good or bad. +But as in such a method one slides too much into the +commonplace and trite, whilst real mind quickly makes its +escape in analysis, the end is that one gets imperceptibly +to the relation of things which everybody knows. We +prefer, therefore, to remain here more than usually incomplete +and rhapsodical, content to have drawn attention +to the importance of the subject in a general way, and to +have pointed out the spirit in which the views given in +this book have been conceived. + + + +CHAPTER IV. THE CHIEF MORAL POWERS + +THESE are The Talents of the Commander; The Military +Virtue of the Army; Its National feeling. Which of +these is the most important no one can tell in a general +way, for it is very difficult to say anything in general +of their strength, and still more difficult to compare the +strength of one with that of another. The best plan is +not to undervalue any of them, a fault which human +judgment is prone to, sometimes on one side, sometimes +on another, in its whimsical oscillations. It is better +to satisfy ourselves of the undeniable efficacy of these +three things by sufficient evidence from history. + +It is true, however, that in modern times the Armies of +European states have arrived very much at a par as +regards discipline and fitness for service, and that the +conduct of War has--as philosophers would say--naturally +developed itself, thereby become a method, common as +it were to all Armies, so that even from Commanders there +is nothing further to be expected in the way of application +of special means of Art, in the limited sense (such as +Frederick the Second's oblique order). Hence it cannot be +denied that, as matters now stand, greater scope is afforded +for the influence of National spirit and habituation of an +army to War. A long peace may again alter all this.[*] + +[*] Written shortly after the Great Napoleonic campaigns. + + +The national spirit of an Army (enthusiasm, fanatical +zeal, faith, opinion) displays itself most in mountain +warfare, where every one down to the common soldier is +left to himself. On this account, a mountainous country +is the best campaigning ground for popular levies. + +Expertness of an Army through training, and that +well-tempered courage which holds the ranks together +as if they had been cast in a mould, show their superiority +in an open country. + +The talent of a General has most room to display itself +in a closely intersected, undulating country. In mountains +he has too little command over the separate parts, +and the direction of all is beyond his powers; in open +plains it is simple and does not exceed those powers. + +According to these undeniable elective affinities, plans +should be regulated. + + +CHAPTER V. MILITARY VIRTUE OF AN ARMY + +THIS is distinguished from mere bravery, and still more +from enthusiasm for the business of War. The first is +certainly a necessary constituent part of it, but in the +same way as bravery, which is a natural gift in some men, +may arise in a soldier as a part of an Army from habit +and custom, so with him it must also have a different +direction from that which it has with others. It must +lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of +force which is its characteristic in the individual, and +submit itself to demands of a higher kind, to obedience, +order, rule, and method. Enthusiasm for the profession +gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an Army, +but does not necessarily constitute a part of it. + +War is a special business, and however general its relations +may be, and even if all the male population of a +country, capable of bearing arms, exercise this calling, +still it always continues to be different and separate from +the other pursuits which occupy the life of man.--To be +imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this +business, to make use of, to rouse, to assimilate into the +system the powers which should be active in it, to penetrate +completely into the nature of the business with the +understanding, through exercise to gain confidence and +expertness in it, to be completely given up to it, to pass +out of the man into the part which it is assigned to us to +play in War, that is the military virtue of an Army in +the individual. + +However much pains may be taken to combine the +soldier and the citizen in one and the same individual, +whatever may be done to nationalise Wars, and however +much we may imagine times have changed since the days +of the old Condottieri, never will it be possible to do away +with the individuality of the business; and if that cannot +be done, then those who belong to it, as long as they +belong to it, will always look upon themselves as a kind +of guild, in the regulations, laws and customs in which +the "Spirit of War" by preference finds its expression. +And so it is in fact. Even with the most decided inclination +to look at War from the highest point of view, it +would be very wrong to look down upon this corporate +spirit (e'sprit de corps) which may and should exist more +or less in every Army. This corporate spirit forms the +bond of union between the natural forces which are active +in that which we have called military virtue. The +crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity for the +spirit of a corporate body than for anything else. + +An Army which preserves its usual formations under the +heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and +in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch, +which, proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its +sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its +leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat; an +Army with all its physical powers, inured to privations and +fatigue by exercise, like the muscles of an athlete; an Army +which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory, not +as a curse which hovers over its standards, and which is +always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short +catechism of one idea, namely the HONOUR OF ITS ARMS;-- +Such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit. + +Soldiers may fight bravely like the Vende'ans, and do +great things like the Swiss, the Americans, or Spaniards, +without displaying this military virtue. A Commander +may also be successful at the head of standing Armies, +like Eugene and Marlborough, without enjoying the +benefit of its assistance; we must not, therefore, say that +a successful War without it cannot be imagined; and we +draw especial attention to that point, in order the more +to individualise the conception which is here brought +forward, that the idea may not dissolve into a generalisation +and that it may not be thought that military virtue +is in the end everything. It is not so. Military virtue +in an Army is a definite moral power which may be supposed +wanting, and the influence of which may therefore +be estimated--like any instrument the power of which +may be calculated. + +Having thus characterised it, we proceed to consider +what can be predicated of its influence, and what are the +means of gaining its assistance. + +Military virtue is for the parts, what the genius of the +Commander is for the whole. The General can only guide +the whole, not each separate part, and where he cannot +guide the part, there military virtue must be its leader. +A General is chosen by the reputation of his superior +talents, the chief leaders of large masses after careful +probation; but this probation diminishes as we descend +the scale of rank, and in just the same measure we may +reckon less and less upon individual talents; but what is +wanting in this respect military virtue should supply. +The natural qualities of a warlike people play just this +part: BRAVERY, APTITUDE, POWERS OF ENDURANCE and ENTHUSIASM. + +These properties may therefore supply the place of +military virtue, and vice versa, from which the following +may be deduced: + +1. Military virtue is a quality of standing Armies only, +but they require it the most. In national risings its +place is supplied by natural qualities, which develop +themselves there more rapidly. + +2. Standing Armies opposed to standing Armies, can +more easily dispense with it, than a standing Army +opposed to a national insurrection, for in that case, the +troops are more scattered, and the divisions left more to +themselves. But where an Army can be kept concentrated, +the genius of the General takes a greater place, +and supplies what is wanting in the spirit of the Army. +Therefore generally military virtue becomes more necessary +the more the theatre of operations and other circumstances +make the War complicated, and cause the forces +to be scattered. + +From these truths the only lesson to be derived is this, +that if an Army is deficient in this quality, every endeavour +should be made to simplify the operations of the War +as much as possible, or to introduce double efficiency +in the organisation of the Army in some other respect, +and not to expect from the mere name of a standing +Army, that which only the veritable thing itself can give. + +The military virtue of an Army is, therefore, one of the +most important moral powers in War, and where it is +wanting, we either see its place supplied by one of the +others, such as the great superiority of generalship or +popular enthusiasm, or we find the results not commensurate +with the exertions made.--How much that is great, +this spirit, this sterling worth of an army, this refining +of ore into the polished metal, has already done, we see +in the history of the Macedonians under Alexander, +the Roman legions under Cesar, the Spanish infantry +under Alexander Farnese, the Swedes under Gustavus +Adolphus and Charles XII, the Prussians under Frederick +the Great, and the French under Buonaparte. We must +purposely shut our eyes against all historical proof, if +we do not admit, that the astonishing successes of these +Generals and their greatness in situations of extreme +difficulty, were only possible with Armies possessing this +virtue. + +This spirit can only be generated from two sources, and +only by these two conjointly; the first is a succession of +campaigns and great victories; the other is, an activity of +the Army carried sometimes to the highest pitch. Only +by these, does the soldier learn to know his powers. +The more a General is in the habit of demanding from his +troops, the surer he will be that his demands will be +answered. The soldier is as proud of overcoming toil, +as he is of surmounting danger. Therefore it is only in +the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ +will thrive, but also only in the sunshine of victory. +Once it becomes a STRONG TREE, it will stand against the +fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat, and even against +the indolent inactivity of peace, at least for a time. +It can therefore only be created in War, and under great +Generals, but no doubt it may last at least for several +generations, even under Generals of moderate capacity, +and through considerable periods of peace. + +With this generous and noble spirit of union in a line +of veteran troops, covered with scars and thoroughly +inured to War, we must not compare the self-esteem and +vanity of a standing Army,[*] held together merely by the +glue of service-regulations and a drill book; a certain +plodding earnestness and strict discipline may keep up +military virtue for a long time, but can never create +it; these things therefore have a certain value, but must +not be over-rated. Order, smartness, good will, also a +certain degree of pride and high feeling, are qualities of +an Army formed in time of peace which are to be prized, +but cannot stand alone. The whole retains the whole, +and as with glass too quickly cooled, a single crack +breaks the whole mass. Above all, the highest spirit in +the world changes only too easily at the first check into +depression, and one might say into a kind of rhodomontade +of alarm, the French sauve que peut.--Such an Army can +only achieve something through its leader, never by +itself. It must be led with double caution, until by +degrees, in victory and hardships, the strength grows +into the full armour. Beware then of confusing the +SPIRIT of an Army with its temper. + +[*] Clausewitz is, of course, thinking of the long-service +standing armies +of his own youth. Not of the short-service standing armies of +to-day +(EDITOR). + + + +CHAPTER VI. BOLDNESS + +THE place and part which boldness takes in the dynamic +system of powers, where it stands opposed to Foresight +and prudence, has been stated in the chapter on the certainty +of the result in order thereby to show, that theory +has no right to restrict it by virtue of its legislative +power. + +But this noble impulse, with which the human soul +raises itself above the most formidable dangers, is to be +regarded as an active principle peculiarly belonging to +War. In fact, in what branch of human activity should +boldness have a right of citizenship if not in War? + +From the transport-driver and the drummer up to the +General, it is the noblest of virtues, the true steel which +gives the weapon its edge and brilliancy. + +Let us admit in fact it has in War even its own prerogatives. +Over and above the result of the calculation of +space, time, and quantity, we must allow a certain percentage +which boldness derives from the weakness of +others, whenever it gains the mastery. It is therefore, +virtually, a creative power. This is not difficult to +demonstrate philosophically. As often as boldness +encounters hesitation, the probability of the result is +of necessity in its favour, because the very state of hesitation +implies a loss of equilibrium already. It is only +when it encounters cautious foresight--which we may say +is just as bold, at all events just as strong and powerful +as itself--that it is at a disadvantage; such cases, +however, rarely occur. Out of the whole multitude of +prudent men in the world, the great majority are so +from timidity. + +Amongst large masses, boldness is a force, the special +cultivation of which can never be to the detriment of +other forces, because the great mass is bound to a higher +will by the frame-work and joints of the order of battle +and of the service, and therefore is guided by an intelligent +power which is extraneous. Boldness is therefore here +only like a spring held down until its action is required. + +The higher the rank the more necessary it is that boldness +should be accompanied by a reflective mind, that it +may not be a mere blind outburst of passion to no purpose; +for with increase of rank it becomes always less a matter +of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation +of others, and the good of the whole. Where regulations +of the service, as a kind of second nature, prescribe for +the masses, reflection must be the guide of the General, +and in his case individual boldness in action may easily +become a fault. Still, at the same time, it is a fine failing, +and must not be looked at in the same light as any other. +Happy the Army in which an untimely boldness frequently +manifests itself; it is an exuberant growth which shows +a rich soil. Even foolhardiness, that is boldness without +an object, is not to be despised; in point of fact it is the +same energy of feeling, only exercised as a kind of passion +without any co-operation of the intelligent faculties. It +is only when it strikes at the root of obedience, when it +treats with contempt the orders of superior authority, +that it must be repressed as a dangerous evil, not on its +own account but on account of the act of disobedience, +for there is nothing in War which is of GREATER IMPORTANCE +THAN OBEDIENCE. + +The reader will readily agree with us that, supposing +an equal degree of discernment to be forthcoming in a +certain number of cases, a thousand times as many of +them will end in disaster through over-anxiety as through +boldness. + +One would suppose it natural that the interposition +of a reasonable object should stimulate boldness, and +therefore lessen its intrinsic merit, and yet the reverse is +the case in reality. + +The intervention of lucid thought or the general supremacy +of mind deprives the emotional forces of a great +part of their power. On that account BOLDNESS BECOMES +OF RARER OCCURRENCE THE HIGHER WE ASCEND THE SCALE OF RANK, +for whether the discernment and the understanding do +or do not increase with these ranks still the Commanders, +in their several stations as they rise, are pressed upon +more and more severely by objective things, by relations +and claims from without, so that they become the more +perplexed the lower the degree of their individual intelligence. +This so far as regards War is the chief foundation +of the truth of the French proverb:-- + +"Tel brille au second qui s' e'clipse an premier." + + +Almost all the Generals who are represented in history +as merely having attained to mediocrity, and as wanting +in decision when in supreme command, are men celebrated +in their antecedent career for their boldness and decision.[*] + +[*] Beaulieu, Benedek, Bazaine, Buller, Melas, Mack. &c. &c. + + +In those motives to bold action which arise from the +pressure of necessity we must make a distinction. Necessity +has its degrees of intensity. If it lies near at hand, +if the person acting is in the pursuit of his object driven +into great dangers in order to escape others equally great, +then we can only admire his resolution, which still has +also its value. If a young man to show his skill in horsemanship +leaps across a deep cleft, then he is bold; if he +makes the same leap pursued by a troop of head-chopping +Janissaries he is only resolute. But the farther off the +necessity from the point of action, the greater the number +of relations intervening which the mind has to traverse; +in order to realise them, by so much the less does necessity +take from boldness in action. If Frederick the Great, +in the year 1756, saw that War was inevitable, and that +he could only escape destruction by being beforehand +with his enemies, it became necessary for him to commence +the War himself, but at the same time it was certainly +very bold: for few men in his position would have made +up their minds to do so. + +Although Strategy is only the province of Generals-in- +Chief or Commanders in the higher positions, still boldness +in all the other branches of an Army is as little a matter of +indifference to it as their other military virtues. With an +Army belonging to a bold race, and in which the spirit +of boldness has been always nourished, very different +things may be undertaken than with one in which this +virtue, is unknown; for that reason we have considered +it in connection with an Army. But our subject is specially +the boldness of the General, and yet we have not much +to say about it after having described this military +virtue in a general way to the best of our ability. + +The higher we rise in a position of command, the more +of the mind, understanding, and penetration predominate +in activity, the more therefore is boldness, which is a property +of the feelings, kept in subjection, and for that +reason we find it so rarely in the highest positions, but +then, so much the more should it be admired. Boldness, +directed by an overruling intelligence, is the stamp of +the hero: this boldness does not consist in venturing +directly against the nature of things, in a downright +contempt of the laws of probability, but, if a choice is +once made, in the rigorous adherence to that higher +calculation which genius, the tact of judgment, has gone +over with the speed of lightning. The more boldness +lends wings to the mind and the discernment, so much the +farther they will reach in their flight, so much the more +comprehensive will be the view, the more exact the result, +but certainly always only in the sense that with greater +objects greater dangers are connected. The ordinary man, +not to speak of the weak and irresolute, arrives at an exact +result so far as such is possible without ocular demonstration, +at most after diligent reflection in his chamber, +at a distance from danger and responsibility. Let danger +and responsibility draw close round him in every direction, +then he loses the power of comprehensive vision, and if +he retains this in any measure by the influence of others, +still he will lose his power of DECISION, because in that point +no one can help him. + +We think then that it is impossible to imagine a distinguished +General without boldness, that is to say, that +no man can become one who is not born with this power +of the soul, and we therefore look upon it as the first +requisite for such a career. How much of this inborn +power, developed and moderated through education and +the circumstances of life, is left when the man has attained +a high position, is the second question. The greater +this power still is, the stronger will genius be on the wing, +the higher will be its flight. The risks become always +greater, but the purpose grows with them. Whether +its lines proceed out of and get their direction from a +distant necessity, or whether they converge to the keystone +of a building which ambition has planned, whether +Frederick or Alexander acts, is much the same as regards +the critical view. If the one excites the imagination more +because it is bolder, the other pleases the understanding +most, because it has in it more absolute necessity. + +We have still to advert to one very important circumstance. + +The spirit of boldness can exist in an Army, either +because it is in the people, or because it has been generated +in a successful War conducted by able Generals. +In the latter case it must of course be dispensed with at +the commencement. + +Now in our days there is hardly any other means of +educating the spirit of a people in this respect, except by +War, and that too under bold Generals. By it alone can +that effeminacy of feeling be counteracted, that propensity +to seek for the enjoyment of comfort, which cause +degeneracy in a people rising in prosperity and immersed +in an extremely busy commerce. + +A Nation can hope to have a strong position in the +political world only if its character and practice in actual +War mutually support each other in constant reciprocal +action. + + + +CHAPTER VII. PERSEVERANCE + +THE reader expects to hear of angles and lines, and finds, +instead of these citizens of the scientific world, only +people out of common life, such as he meets with every +day in the street. And yet the author cannot make up +his mind to become a hair's breadth more mathematical +than the subject seems to him to require, and he is not +alarmed at the surprise which the reader may show. + +In War more than anywhere else in the world things +happen differently to what we had expected, and look +differently when near, to what they did at a distance. +With what serenity the architect can watch his work +gradually rising and growing into his plan. The doctor +although much more at the mercy of mysterious agencies +and chances than the architect, still knows enough of +the forms and effects of his means. In War, on the other +hand, the Commander of an immense whole finds himself +in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of +mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, +through precipitation, of contraventions of his authority, +either from mistaken or correct motives, from ill will, +true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of +accidents which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, +he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, of +which the most have an intimidating, the fewest an +encouraging tendency. By long experience in War, the +tact is acquired of readily appreciating the value of these +incidents; high courage and stability of character stand +proof against them, as the rock resists the beating of the +waves. He who would yield to these impressions would +never carry out an undertaking, and on that account +PERSEVERANCE in the proposed object, as long as there is no +decided reason against it, is a most necessary counterpoise. +Further, there is hardly any celebrated enterprise +in War which was not achieved by endless exertion, pains, +and privations; and as here the weakness of the physical +and moral man is ever disposed to yield, only an immense +force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance +admired by present and future generations, can conduct to our +goal. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS + +THIS is in tactics, as well as in Strategy, the most general +principle of victory, and shall be examined by us first +in its generality, for which we may be permitted the +following exposition: + +Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the +numerical force with which the battle is to be fought. +By this triple determination it has therefore a very essential +influence on the issue of the combat. If tactics has +fought the battle, if the result is over, let it be victory or +defeat, Strategy makes such use of it as can be made in +accordance with the great object of the War. This object +is naturally often a very distant one, seldom does it lie +quite close at hand. A series of other objects subordinate +themselves to it as means. These objects, which are at +the same time means to a higher purpose, may be practically +of various kinds; even the ultimate aim of the +whole War may be a different one in every case. We shall +make ourselves acquainted with these things according as +we come to know the separate objects which they come, +in contact with; and it is not our intention here to +embrace the whole subject by a complete enumeration +of them, even if that were possible. We therefore let +the employment of the battle stand over for the present. + +Even those things through which Strategy has an influence +on the issue of the combat, inasmuch as it establishes +the same, to a certain extent decrees them, are not +so simple that they can be embraced in one single view. +For as Strategy appoints time, place and force, it can do +so in practice in many ways, each of which influences in +a different manner the result of the combat as well as its +consequences. Therefore we shall only get acquainted +with this also by degrees, that is, through the subjects +which more closely determine the application. + +If we strip the combat of all modifications which it +may undergo according to its immediate purpose and the +circumstances from which it proceeds, lastly if we set +aside the valour of the troops, because that is a given +quantity, then there remains only the bare conception +of the combat, that is a combat without form, in which +we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants. + +This number will therefore determine victory. Now +from the number of things above deducted to get to this +point, it is shown that the superiority in numbers in a +battle is only one of the factors employed to produce +victory that therefore so far from having with the +superiority in number obtained all, or even only the +principal thing, we have perhaps got very little by it, +according as the other circumstances which co-operate +happen to vary. + +But this superiority has degrees, it may be imagined +as twofold, threefold or fourfold, and every one sees, +that by increasing in this way, it must (at last) overpower +everything else. + +In such an aspect we grant, that the superiority in +numbers is the most important factor in the result of a +combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise +to all the other co-operating circumstances. The +direct result of this is, that the greatest possible number +of troops should be brought into action at the decisive +point. + +Whether the troops thus brought are sufficient or not, +we have then done in this respect all that our means +allowed. This is the first principle in Strategy, therefore +in general as now stated, it is just as well suited for Greeks +and Persians, or for Englishmen and Mahrattas, as for +French and Germans. But we shall take a glance at our +relations in Europe, as respects War, in order to arrive +at some more definite idea on this subject. + +Here we find Armies much more alike in equipment, +organisation, and practical skill of every kind. There +only remains a difference in the military virtue of Armies, +and in the talent of Generals which may fluctuate with +time from side to side. If we go through the military +history of modern Europe, we find no example of a +Marathon. + +Frederick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians at Leuthen +with about 30,000 men, and at Rosbach with 25,000 some +50,000 allies; these are however the only instances of +victories gained against an enemy double, or more than +double in numbers. Charles XII, in the battle of Narva, +we cannot well quote, for the Russians were at that time +hardly to be regarded as Europeans, also the principal +circumstances, even of the battle, are too little known. +Buonaparte had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000, +therefore not the double. At Kollin, Frederick the Great +did not succeed, with 30,000 against 50,000 Austrians, +neither did Buonaparte in the desperate battle of Leipsic, +where he was 160,000 strong, against 280,000. + +From this we may infer, that it is very difficult in the +present state of Europe, for the most talented General +to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. +Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the +scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that +in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an +important superiority of numbers, but which need not +be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, +however disadvantageous other circumstances may be. +Certainly, we may imagine a defile which even tenfold +would not suffice to force, but in such a case it can be +no question of a battle at all. + +We think, therefore, that under our conditions, as well +as in all similar ones, the superiority at the decisive point +is a matter of capital importance, and that this subject, in +the generality of cases, is decidedly the most important +of all. The strength at the decisive point depends on +the absolute strength of the Army, and on skill in making +use of it. + +The first rule is therefore to enter the field with an Army +as strong as possible. This sounds very like a commonplace, +but still it is really not so. + +In order to show that for a long time the strength of +forces was by no means regarded as a chief point, we need +only observe, that in most, and even in the most detailed +histories of the Wars in the eighteenth century, the +strength of the Armies is either not given at all, or only +incidentally, and in no case is any special value laid upon +it. Tempelhof in his history of the Seven Years' War is +the earliest writer who gives it regularly, but at the same +time he does it only very superficially. + +Even Massenbach, in his manifold critical observations +on the Prussian campaigns of 1793-94 in the Vosges, +talks a great deal about hills and valleys, roads and footpaths, +but does not say a syllable about mutual strength. + +Another proof lies in a wonderful notion which haunted +the heads of many critical historians, according to which +there was a certain size of an Army which was the best, +a normal strength, beyond which the forces in excess were +burdensome rather than serviceable.[*] + +[*] Tempelhof and Montalembert are the first we recollect as +examples +--the first in a passage of his first part, page 148; the other +in his +correspondence relative to the plan of operations of the Russians +in 1759. + + +Lastly, there are a number of instances to be found, +in which all the available forces were not really brought +into the battle,[*] or into the War, because the superiority +of numbers was not considered to have that importance +which in the nature of things belongs to it. + +[*] The Prussians at Jena, 1806. Wellington at Waterloo. + + +If we are thoroughly penetrated with the conviction +that with a considerable superiority of numbers everything +possible is to be effected, then it cannot fail that +this clear conviction reacts on the preparations for the +War, so as to make us appear in the field with as many +troops as possible, and either to give us ourselves the +superiority, or at least to guard against the enemy +obtaining it. So much for what concerns the absolute +force with which the War is to be conducted. + +The measure of this absolute force is determined by +the Government; and although with this determination +the real action of War commences, and it forms an essential +part of the Strategy of the War, still in most cases +the General who is to command these forces in the War +must regard their absolute strength as a given quantity, +whether it be that he has had no voice in fixing it, or that +circumstances prevented a sufficient expansion being +given to it. + +There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute +superiority is not attainable, but to produce a relative +one at the decisive point, by making skilful use of what +we have. + +The calculation of space and time appears as the most +essential thing to this end--and this has caused that +subject to be regarded as one which embraces nearly the +whole art of using military forces. Indeed, some have +gone so far as to ascribe to great strategists and tacticians +a mental organ peculiarly adapted to this point. + +But the calculation of time and space, although it lies +universally at the foundation of Strategy, and is to a +certain extent its daily bread, is still neither the most +difficult, nor the most decisive one. + +If we take an unprejudiced glance at military history, +we shall find that the instances in which mistakes in such +a calculation have proved the cause of serious losses are +very rare, at least in Strategy. But if the conception of +a skilful combination of time and space is fully to account +for every instance of a resolute and active Commander +beating several separate opponents with one and the same +army (Frederick the Great, Buonaparte), then we perplex +ourselves unnecessarily with conventional language. +For the sake of clearness and the profitable use of conceptions, +it is necessary that things should always be called +by their right names. + +The right appreciation of their opponents (Daun, +Schwartzenberg), the audacity to leave for a short space +of time a small force only before them, energy in forced +marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the intensified +activity which great souls acquire in the moment of +danger, these are the grounds of such victories; and what +have these to do with the ability to make an exact calculation +of two such simple things as time and space? + +But even this ricochetting play of forces, "when the +victories at Rosbach and Montmirail give the impulse +to victories at Leuthen and Montereau," to which great +Generals on the defensive have often trusted, is still, if we +would be clear and exact, only a rare occurrence in history. + +Much more frequently the relative superiority--that +is, the skilful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive +point--has its foundation in the right appreciation of +those points, in the judicious direction which by that means +has been given to the forces from the very first, and in +the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to +the advantage of the important--that is, to keep the +forces concentrated in an overpowering mass. In this, +Frederick the Great and Buonaparte are particularly +characteristic. + +We think we have now allotted to the superiority +in numbers the importance which belongs to it; it is to +be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed +at before all and as far as possible. + +But to regard it on this account as a necessary condition +of victory would be a complete misconception of our +exposition; in the conclusion to be drawn from it there +lies nothing more than the value which should attach +to numerical strength in the combat. If that strength +is made as great as possible, then the maxim is +satisfied; a review of the total relations must then decide +whether or not the combat is to be avoided for want of +sufficient force.[*] + +[*] Owing to our freedom from invasion, and to the condition +which +arise in our Colonial Wars, we have not yet, in England, arrived +at a +correct appreciation of the value of superior numbers in War, and +still +adhere to the idea of an Army just "big enough," which Clausewitz +has so unsparingly ridiculed. (EDITOR.) + + + +CHAPTER IX. THE SURPRISE + +FROM the subject of the foregoing chapter, the general +endeavour to attain a relative superiority, there follows +another endeavour which must consequently be just as +general in its nature: this is the SURPRISE of the enemy. +It lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings, +for without it the preponderance at the decisive point +is not properly conceivable. + +The surprise is, therefore, not only the means to +the attainment of numerical superiority; but it is also +to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself, on +account of its moral effect. When it is successful in a +high degree, confusion and broken courage in the enemy's +ranks are the consequences; and of the degree to which +these multiply a success, there are examples enough, +great and small. We are not now speaking of the +particular surprise which belongs to the attack, but of +the endeavour by measures generally, and especially +by the distribution of forces, to surprise the enemy, which +can be imagined just as well in the defensive, and which +in the tactical defence particularly is a chief point. + +We say, surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings +without exception, only in very different degrees +according to the nature of the undertaking and other +circumstances. + +This difference, indeed, originates in the properties or +peculiarities of the Army and its Commander, in those +even of the Government. + +Secrecy and rapidity are the two factors in this product +and these suppose in the Government and the Commander- +in-Chief great energy, and on the part of the Army a high +sense of military duty. With effeminacy and loose +principles it is in vain to calculate upon a surprise. But +so general, indeed so indispensable, as is this endeavour, +and true as it is that it is never wholly unproductive of +effect, still it is not the less true that it seldom succeeds +to a REMARKABLE degree, and this follows from the nature of +the idea itself. We should form an erroneous conception +if we believed that by this means chiefly there is much to +be attained in War. In idea it promises a great deal; +in the execution it generally sticks fast by the friction of +the whole machine. + +In tactics the surprise is much more at home, for the +very natural reason that all times and spaces are on a +smaller scale. It will, therefore, in Strategy be the more +feasible in proportion as the measures lie nearer to the +province of tactics, and more difficult the higher up they +lie towards the province of policy. + +The preparations for a War usually occupy several +months; the assembly of an Army at its principal positions +requires generally the formation of depo^ts and +magazines, and long marches, the object of which can be +guessed soon enough. + +It therefore rarely happens that one State surprises +another by a War, or by the direction which it gives the +mass of its forces. In the seventeenth and eighteenth +centuries, when War turned very much upon sieges, +it was a frequent aim, and quite a peculiar and important +chapter in the Art of War, to invest a strong place unexpectedly, +but even that only rarely succeeded.[*] + +[*] Railways, steamships, and telegraphs have, however, +enormously +modified the relative importance and practicability of surprise. +(EDITOR.) + + +On the other hand, with things which can be done in a +day or two, a surprise is much more conceivable, and, +therefore, also it is often not difficult thus to gain a march +upon the enemy, and thereby a position, a point of country, +a road, &c. But it is evident that what surprise gains +in this way in easy execution, it loses in the efficacy, as +the greater the efficacy the greater always the difficulty +of execution. Whoever thinks that with such surprises +on a small scale, he may connect great results--as, for +example, the gain of a battle, the capture of an important +magazine--believes in something which it is certainly +very possible to imagine, but for which there is no warrant +in history; for there are upon the whole very few instances +where anything great has resulted from such surprises; +from which we may justly conclude that inherent difficulties +lie in the way of their success. + +Certainly, whoever would consult history on such points +must not depend on sundry battle steeds of historical +critics, on their wise dicta and self-complacent terminology, +but look at facts with his own eyes. There is, for instance, +a certain day in the campaign in Silesia, 1761, which, in +this respect, has attained a kind of notoriety. It is the +22nd July, on which Frederick the Great gained on +Laudon the march to Nossen, near Neisse, by which, as +is said, the junction of the Austrian and Russian armies +in Upper Silesia became impossible, and, therefore, a +period of four weeks was gained by the King. Whoever +reads over this occurrence carefully in the principal +histories,[*] and considers it impartially, will, in the march +of the 22nd July, never find this importance; and +generally in the whole of the fashionable logic on this +subject, he will see nothing but contradictions; but in +the proceedings of Laudon, in this renowned period of +manoeuvres, much that is unaccountable. How could +one, with a thirst for truth, and clear conviction, accept +such historical evidence? + +[*] Tempelhof, The Veteran, Frederick the Great. Compare also +(Clausewitz) "Hinterlassene Werke," vol. x., p. 158. + + +When we promise ourselves great effects in a campaign +from the principle of surprising, we think upon great +activity, rapid resolutions, and forced marches, as the +means of producing them; but that these things, even +when forthcoming in a very high degree, will not always +produce the desired effect, we see in examples given byGenerals, +who may be +allowed to have had the greatest +talent in the use of these means, Frederick the Great and +Buonaparte. The first when he left Dresden so suddenly +in July 1760, and falling upon Lascy, then turned against +Dresden, gained nothing by the whole of that intermezzo, +but rather placed his affairs in a condition notably worse, +as the fortress Glatz fell in the meantime. + +In 1813, Buonaparte turned suddenly from Dresden +twice against Bluecher, to say nothing of his incursion into +Bohemia from Upper Lusatia, and both times without +in the least attaining his object. They were blows in the +air which only cost him time and force, and might have +placed him in a dangerous position in Dresden. + +Therefore, even in this field, a surprise does not necessarily +meet with great success through the mere activity, +energy, and resolution of the Commander; it must be +favoured by other circumstances. But we by no means +deny that there can be success; we only connect with it +a necessity of favourable circumstances, which, certainly +do not occur very frequently, and which the Commander +can seldom bring about himself. + +Just those two Generals afford each a striking illustration +of this. We take first Buonaparte in his famous +enterprise against Bluecher's Army in February 1814, +when it was separated from the Grand Army, and descending +the Marne. It would not be easy to find a two days' +march to surprise the enemy productive of greater results +than this; Bluecher's Army, extended over a distance of +three days' march, was beaten in detail, and suffered a +loss nearly equal to that of defeat in a great battle. This +was completely the effect of a surprise, for if Bluecher +had thought of such a near possibility of an attack from +Buonaparte[*] he would have organised his march quite +differently. To this mistake of Bluecher's the result is +to be attributed. Buonaparte did not know all these +circumstances, and so there was a piece of good fortune +that mixed itself up in his favour. + +[*] Bluecher believed his march to be covered by Pahlen's +Cossacks, +but these had been withdrawn without warning to him by the Grand +Army Headquarters under Schwartzenberg. + + +It is the same with the battle of Liegnitz, 1760. Frederick +the Great gained this fine victory through altering +during the night a position which he had just before taken +up. Laudon was through this completely surprised, and +lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men. Although +Frederick the Great had at this time adopted the principle +of moving backwards and forwards in order to make a +battle impossible, or at least to disconcert the enemy's +plans, still the alteration of position on the night of the +14-15 was not made exactly with that intention, but as +the King himself says, because the position of the 14th did +not please him. Here, therefore, also chance was hard at +work; without this happy conjunction of the attack and +the change of position in the night, and the difficult +nature of the country, the result would not have been +the same. + +Also in the higher and highest province of Strategy +there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results. +We shall only cite the brilliant marches of the Great +Elector against the Swedes from Franconia to Pomerania +and from the Mark (Brandenburg) to the Pregel in 1757, +and the celebrated passage of the Alps by Buonaparte, +1800. In the latter case an Army gave up its whole +theatre of war by a capitulation, and in 1757 another +Army was very near giving up its theatre of war and itself +as well. Lastly, as an instance of a War wholly unexpected, +we may bring forward the invasion of Silesia +by Frederick the Great. Great and powerful are here the +results everywhere, but such events are not common in +history if we do not confuse with them cases in which +a State, for want of activity and energy (Saxony 1756, +and Russia, 1812), has not completed its preparations +in time. + +Now there still remains an observation which concerns +the essence of the thing. A surprise can only be effected +by that party which gives the law to the other; and he +who is in the right gives the law. If we surprise the +adversary by a wrong measure, then instead of reaping +good results, we may have to bear a sound blow in return; +in any case the adversary need not trouble himself much +about our surprise, he has in our mistake the means of +turning off the evil. As the offensive includes in itself +much more positive action than the defensive, so the +surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant, +but by no means invariably, as we shall hereafter see. +Mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may +therefore meet, and then that one will have the advantage +who has hit the nail on the head the best. + +So should it be, but practical life does not keep to this +line so exactly, and that for a very simple reason. The +moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the +worst case into a good one for the side they favour, and +do not allow the other to make any regular determination. +We have here in view more than anywhere else not only +the chief Commander, but each single one, because a surprise +has the effect in particular of greatly loosening +unity, so that the individuality of each separate leader +easily comes to light. + +Much depends here on the general relation in which +the two parties stand to each other. If the one side +through a general moral superiority can intimidate and +outdo the other, then he can make use of the surprise +with more success, and even reap good fruit where +properly he should come to ruin. + + + +CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM + +STRATAGEM implies a concealed intention, and therefore +is opposed to straightforward dealing, in the same way +as wit is the opposite of direct proof. It has therefore +nothing in common with means of persuasion, of self- +interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit, +because that likewise conceals its object. It is itself +a deceit as well when it is done, but still it differs from +what is commonly called deceit, in this respect that there +is no direct breach of word. The deceiver by stratagem +leaves it to the person himself whom he is deceiving to +commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing +into ONE result, suddenly change the nature of things in +his eyes. We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of +hand with ideas and conceptions, so stratagem is a sleight +of hand with actions. + +At first sight it appears as if Strategy had not improperly +derived its name from stratagem; and that, with all the +real and apparent changes which the whole character of +War has undergone since the time of the Greeks, this +term still points to its real nature. + +If we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow, +the battle itself, and look upon Strategy as the art of +using this means with skill, then besides the forces of +the character, such as burning ambition which always +presses like a spring, a strong will which hardly bends +&c. &c., there seems no subjective quality so suited to +guide and inspire strategic activity as stratagem. The +general tendency to surprise, treated of in the foregoing +chapter, points to this conclusion, for there is a degree of +stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation +of every attempt to surprise. + +But however much we feel a desire to see the actors +in War outdo each other in hidden activity, readiness, +and stratagem, still we must admit that these qualities +show themselves but little in history, and have rarely +been able to work their way to the surface from amongst +the mass of relations and circumstances. + +The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost +identical with the subject matter of the preceding +chapter. + +Strategy knows no other activity than the regulating +of combat with the measures which relate to it. It has +no concern, like ordinary life, with transactions which +consist merely of words--that is, in expressions, declarations, +&c. But these, which are very inexpensive, are +chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in those +he practises upon. + +That which there is like it in War, plans and orders +given merely as make-believers, false reports sent on +purpose to the enemy--is usually of so little effect in the +strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular +cases which offer of themselves, therefore cannot be +regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from the +leader. + +But such measures as carrying out the arrangements +for a battle, so far as to impose upon the enemy, require +a considerable expenditure of time and power; of course, +the greater the impression to be made, the greater the +expenditure in these respects. And as this is usually +not given for the purpose, very few demonstrations, +so-called, in Strategy, effect the object for which they are +designed. In fact, it is dangerous to detach large forces +for any length of time merely for a trick, because there is +always the risk of its being done in vain, and then these +forces are wanted at the decisive point. + +The chief actor in War is always thoroughly sensible +of this sober truth, and therefore he has no desire to play +at tricks of agility. The bitter earnestness of necessity +presses so fully into direct action that there is no room +for that game. In a word, the pieces on the strategical +chess-board want that mobility which is the element of +stratagem and subtility. + +The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and +penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful +quality for a General than craftiness, although that also +does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of necessary +qualities of the heart, which is only too often the case. + +But the weaker the forces become which are under +the command of Strategy, so much the more they become +adapted for stratagem, so that to the quite feeble and +little, for whom no prudence, no sagacity is any longer +sufficient at the point where all art seems to forsake him, +stratagem offers itself as a last resource. The more +helpless his situation, the more everything presses towards +one single, desperate blow, the more readily stratagem +comes to the aid of his boldness. Let loose from all +further calculations, freed from all concern for the future, +boldness and stratagem intensify each other, and thus +collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope +into a single ray, which may likewise serve to kindle +a flame. + + + +CHAPTER XI. ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN SPACE + +THE best Strategy is ALWAYS TO BE VERY STRONG, first generally +then at the decisive point. Therefore, apart from the +energy which creates the Army, a work which is not +always done by the General, there is no more imperative +and no simpler law for Strategy than to KEEP THE FORCES +CONCENTRATED.--No portion is to be separated from the main +body unless called away by some urgent necessity. On +this maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a guide +to be depended upon. What are the reasonable grounds +on which a detachment of forces may be made we shall +learn by degrees. Then we shall also see that this principle +cannot have the same general effects in every War, +but that these are different according to the means and +end. + +It seems incredible, and yet it has happened a hundred +times, that troops have been divided and separated +merely through a mysterious feeling of conventional +manner, without any clear perception of the reason. + +If the concentration of the whole force is acknowledged +as the norm, and every division and separation as an +exception which must be justified, then not only will +that folly be completely avoided, but also many an +erroneous ground for separating troops will be barred +admission. + + + +CHAPTER XII. ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME + +WE have here to deal with a conception which in real +life diffuses many kinds of illusory light. A clear definition +and development of the idea is therefore necessary, +and we hope to be allowed a short analysis. + +War is the shock of two opposing forces in collision +with each other, from which it follows as a matter of +course that the stronger not only destroys the other, +but carries it forward with it in its movement. This +fundamentally admits of no successive action of powers, +but makes the simultaneous application of all forces +intended for the shock appear as a primordial law of War. + +So it is in reality, but only so far as the struggle resembles +also in practice a mechanical shock, but when +it consists in a lasting, mutual action of destructive +forces, then we can certainly imagine a successive action +of forces. This is the case in tactics, principally because +firearms form the basis of all tactics, but also for other +reasons as well. If in a fire combat 1000 men are opposed +to 500, then the gross loss is calculated from the amount +of the enemy's force and our own; 1000 men fire twice as +many shots as 500, but more shots will take effect on the +1000 than on the 500 because it is assumed that they stand +in closer order than the other. If we were to suppose the +number of hits to be double, then the losses on each side +would be equal. From the 500 there would be for example +200 disabled, and out of the body of 1000 likewise the +same; now if the 500 had kept another body of equal +number quite out of fire, then both sides would have 800 +effective men; but of these, on the one side there would +be 500 men quite fresh, fully supplied with ammunition, +and in their full vigour; on the other side only 800 all +alike shaken in their order, in want of sufficient ammunition +and weakened in physical force. The assumption +that the 1000 men merely on account of their greater +number would lose twice as many as 500 would have lost +in their place, is certainly not correct; therefore the +greater loss which the side suffers that has placed the +half of its force in reserve, must be regarded as a disadvantage +in that original formation; further it must be +admitted, that in the generality of cases the 1000 men +would have the advantage at the first commencement of +being able to drive their opponent out of his position and +force him to a retrograde movement; now, whether these +two advantages are a counterpoise to the disadvantage +of finding ourselves with 800 men to a certain extent +disorganised by the combat, opposed to an enemy who is +not materially weaker in numbers and who has 500 quite +fresh troops, is one that cannot be decided by pursuing +an analysis further, we must here rely upon experience, +and there will scarcely be an officer experienced in War +who will not in the generality of cases assign the advantage +to that side which has the fresh troops. + +In this way it becomes evident how the employment +of too many forces in combat may be disadvantageous; +for whatever advantages the superiority may give in the +first moment, we may have to pay dearly for in the next. + +But this danger only endures as long as the disorder, +the state of confusion and weakness lasts, in a word, up +to the crisis which every combat brings with it even for +the conqueror. Within the duration of this relaxed state +of exhaustion, the appearance of a proportionate number +of fresh troops is decisive. + +But when this disordering effect of victory stops, and +therefore only the moral superiority remains which every +victory gives, then it is no longer possible for fresh troops +to restore the combat, they would only be carried along +in the general movement; a beaten Army cannot be +brought back to victory a day after by means of a strong +reserve. Here we find ourselves at the source of a highly +material difference between tactics and strategy. + +The tactical results, the results within the four corners +of the battle, and before its close, lie for the most part +within the limits of that period of disorder and weakness. +But the strategic result, that is to say, the result of the +total combat, of the victories realised, let them be small +or great, lies completely (beyond) outside of that period. +It is only when the results of partial combats have bound +themselves together into an independent whole, that the +strategic result appears, but then, the state of crisis is +over, the forces have resumed their original form, and +are now only weakened to the extent of those actually +destroyed (placed hors de combat). + +The consequence of this difference is, that tactics can +make a continued use of forces, Strategy only a simultaneous +one.[*] + +[*] See chaps. xiii., and xiv., Book III and chap. xxix. Book +V.--TR. + + +If I cannot, in tactics, decide all by the first success, if +I have to fear the next moment, it follows of itself that I +employ only so much of my force for the success of the +first moment as appears sufficient for that object, and keep +the rest beyond the reach of fire or conflict of any kind, +in order to be able to oppose fresh troops to fresh, or +with such to overcome those that are exhausted. But +it is not so in Strategy. Partly, as we have just shown, +it has not so much reason to fear a reaction after a success +realised, because with that success the crisis stops; partly +all the forces strategically employed are not necessarily +weakened. Only so much of them as have been tactically +in conflict with the enemy's force, that is, engaged in +partial combat, are weakened by it; consequently, only so +much as was unavoidably necessary, but by no means +all which was strategically in conflict with the enemy, +unless tactics has expended them unnecessarily. Corps +which, on account of the general superiority in numbers, +have either been little or not at all engaged, whose presence +alone has assisted in the result, are after the decision +the same as they were before, and for new enterprises as +efficient as if they had been entirely inactive. How +greatly such corps which thus constitute our excess may +contribute to the total success is evident in itself; indeed, +it is not difficult to see how they may even diminish +considerably the loss of the forces engaged in tactical, +conflict on our side. + +If, therefore, in Strategy the loss does not increase with +the number of the troops employed, but is often diminished +by it, and if, as a natural consequence, the decision in our +favor is, by that +means, the more certain, then it follows naturally that in +Strategy we can +never employ too many forces, and consequently also that they +must +be applied simultaneously to the immediate purpose. + +But we must vindicate this proposition upon another +ground. We have hitherto only spoken of the combat +itself; it is the real activity in War, but men, time, and +space, which appear as the elements of this activity, +must, at the same time, be kept in view, and the results +of their influence brought into consideration also. + +Fatigue, exertion, and privation constitute in War a +special principle of destruction, not essentially belonging +to contest, but more or less inseparably bound up with it, +and certainly one which especially belongs to Strategy. +They no doubt exist in tactics as well, and perhaps there +in the highest degree; but as the duration of the tactical +acts is shorter, therefore the small effects of exertion and +privation on them can come but little into consideration. +But in Strategy on the other hand, where time and space, +are on a larger scale, their influence is not only always +very considerable, but often quite decisive. It is not at +all uncommon for a victorious Army to lose many more +by sickness than on the field of battle. + +If, therefore, we look at this sphere of destruction in +Strategy in the same manner as we have considered that +of fire and close combat in tactics, then we may well +imagine that everything which comes within its vortex +will, at the end of the campaign or of any other strategic +period, be reduced to a state of weakness, which makes +the arrival of a fresh force decisive. We might therefore +conclude that there is a motive in the one case as well +as the other to strive for the first success with as few forces +as possible, in order to keep up this fresh force for the +last. + +In order to estimate exactly this conclusion, which, +in many cases in practice, will have a great appearancetruth, we +must direct +our attention to the separate +ideas which it contains. In the first place, we must not +confuse the notion of reinforcement with that of fresh +unused troops. There are few campaigns at the end of +which an increase of force is not earnestly desired by +the conqueror as well as the conquered, and indeed +should appear decisive; but that is not the point here, +for that increase of force could not be necessary if the force +had been so much larger at the first. But it would be +contrary to all experience to suppose that an Army coming +fresh into the field is to be esteemed higher in point of +moral value than an Army already in the field, just as a +tactical reserve is more to be esteemed than a body of +troops which has been already severely handled in the +fight. Just as much as an unfortunate campaign lowers +the courage and moral powers of an Army, a successful +one raises these elements in their value. In the generality +of cases, therefore, these influences are compensated, +and then there remains over and above as clear gain the +habituation to War. We should besides look more here +to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns, because +when the greater probability of the latter may be seen +beforehand, without doubt forces are wanted, and, +therefore, the reserving a portion for future use is out of +the question. + +This point being settled, then the question is, Do the +losses which a force sustains through fatigues and privations +increase in proportion to the size of the force, as +is the case in a combat? And to that we answer "No." + +The fatigues of War result in a great measure from the +dangers with which every moment of the act of War is +more or less impregnated. To encounter these dangers +at all points, to proceed onwards with security in the +execution of one's plans, gives employment to a multitude +of agencies which make up the tactical and +strategic service of the Army. This service is more difficult +the weaker an Army is, and easier as its numerical +superiority over that of the enemy increases. Who can +doubt this? A campaign against a much weaker enemy +will therefore cost smaller efforts than against one just +as strong or stronger. + +So much for the fatigues. It is somewhat different +with the privations; they consist chiefly of two things, +the want of food, and the want of shelter for the troops, +either in quarters or in suitable camps. Both these +wants will no doubt be greater in proportion as the number +of men on one spot is greater. But does not the superiority +in force afford also the best means of spreading +out and finding more room, and therefore more means of +subsistence and shelter? + +If Buonaparte, in his invasion of Russia in 1812, +concentrated his Army in great masses upon one single road +in a manner never heard of before, and thus caused +privations equally unparalleled, we must ascribe it to his +maxim THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE TOO STRONG AT THE DECISIVE +POINT. Whether in this instance he did not strain the +principle too far is a question which would be out of place +here; but it is certain that, if he had made a point of +avoiding the distress which was by that means brought +about, he had only to advance on a greater breadth of +front. Room was not wanted for the purpose in Russia, +and in very few cases can it be wanted. Therefore, from +this no ground can be deduced to prove that the simultaneous +employment of very superior forces must produce +greater weakening. But now, supposing that in spite +of the general relief afforded by setting apart a portion +of the Army, wind and weather and the toils of War had +produced a diminution even on the part which as a spare +force had been reserved for later use, still we must take +a comprehensive general view of the whole, and therefore +ask, Will this diminution of force suffice to counterbalance +the gain in forces, which we, through our superiority +in numbers, may be able to make in more ways +than one? + +But there still remains a most important point to be +noticed. In a partial combat, the force required to obtain +a great result can be approximately estimated without +much difficulty, and, consequently, we can form an idea +of what is superfluous. In Strategy this may be said to +be impossible, because the strategic result has no such +well-defined object and no such circumscribed limits as +the tactical. Thus what can be looked upon in tactics +as an excess of power, must be regarded in Strategy as a +means to give expansion to success, if opportunity offers +for it; with the magnitude of the success the gain in force +increases at the same time, and in this way the superiority +of numbers may soon reach a point which the most +careful economy of forces could never have attained. + +By means of his enormous numerical superiority, +Buonaparte was enabled to reach Moscow in 1812, and +to take that central capital. Had he by means of this +superiority succeeded in completely defeating the Russian +Army, he would, in all probability, have concluded a +peace in Moscow which in any other way was much less +attainable. This example is used to explain the idea, +not to prove it, which would require a circumstantial +demonstration, for which this is not the place.[*] + +[*] Compare Book VII., second edition, p. 56. + + +All these reflections bear merely upon the idea of a +successive employment of forces, and not upon the conception +of a reserve properly so called, which they, no doubt, +come in contact with throughout, but which, as we shall +see in the following chapter, is connected with some other +considerations. + +What we desire to establish here is, that if in tactics +the military force through the mere duration of actual +employment suffers a diminution of power, if time, +therefore, appears as a factor in the result, this is not the +case in Strategy in a material degree. The destructive +effects which are also produced upon the forces in Strategy +by time, are partly diminished through their mass, +partly made good in other ways, and, therefore, in +Strategy it cannot be an object to make time an ally on +its own account by bringing troops successively into +action. + +We say on "its own account," for the influence which +time, on account of other circumstances which it brings +about but which are different from itself can have, indeed +must necessarily have, for one of the two parties, is quite +another thing, is anything but indifferent or unimportant, +and will be the subject of consideration hereafter. + +The rule which we have been seeking to set forth is, +therefore, that all forces which are available and destined +for a strategic object should be SIMULTANEOUSLY applied to +it; and this application will be so much the more complete +the more everything is compressed into one act and into +one movement. + +But still there is in Strategy a renewal of effort and a +persistent action which, as a chief means towards the +ultimate success, is more particularly not to be overlooked, +it is the CONTINUAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FORCES. This +is also the subject of another chapter, and we only refer +to it here in order to prevent the reader from having +something in view of which we have not been speaking. + +We now turn to a subject very closely connected with +our present considerations, which must be settled before +full light can be thrown on the whole, we mean the +STRATEGIC RESERVE. + + + +CHAPTER XIII. STRATEGIC RESERVE + +A RESERVE has two objects which are very distinct from +each other, namely, first, the prolongation and renewal +of the combat, and secondly, for use in case of unforeseen +events. The first object implies the utility of a successive +application of forces, and on that account cannot +occur in Strategy. Cases in which a corps is sent to +succour a point which is supposed to be about to fall are +plainly to be placed in the category of the second object, +as the resistance which has to be offered here could not +have been sufficiently foreseen. But a corps which is +destined expressly to prolong the combat, and with that +object in view is placed in rear, would be only a corps +placed out of reach of fire, but under the command and +at the disposition of the General Commanding in the +action, and accordingly would be a tactical and not a +strategic reserve. + +But the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen +events may also take place in Strategy, and consequently +there may also be a strategic reserve, but only where +unforeseen events are imaginable. In tactics, where the +enemy's measures are generally first ascertained by direct +sight, and where they may be concealed by every wood, +every fold of undulating ground, we must naturally +always be alive, more or less, to the possibility of unforeseen +events, in order to strengthen, subsequently, those +points which appear too weak, and, in fact, to modify +generally the disposition of our troops, so as to make it +correspond better to that of the enemy. + +Such cases must also happen in Strategy, because the +strategic act is directly linked to the tactical. In Strategy +also many a measure is first adopted in consequence of +what is actually seen, or in consequence of uncertain +reports arriving from day to day, or even from hour to +hour, and lastly, from the actual results of the combats +it is, therefore, an essential condition of strategic command +that, according to the degree of uncertainty, +forces must be kept in reserve against future contingencies. + +In the defensive generally, but particularly in the +defence of certain obstacles of ground, like rivers, hills, +&c., such contingencies, as is well known, happen constantly. + +But this uncertainty diminishes in proportion as the +strategic activity has less of the tactical character, and +ceases almost altogether in those regions where it borders +on politics. + +The direction in which the enemy leads his columns to +the combat can be perceived by actual sight only; where +he intends to pass a river is learnt from a few preparations +which are made shortly before; the line by which he +proposes to invade our country is usually announced by +all the newspapers before a pistol shot has been fired. +The greater the nature of the measure the less it will +take the enemy by surprise. Time and space are so +considerable, the circumstances out of which the action +proceeds so public and little susceptible of alteration, +that the coming event is either made known in good time, +or can be discovered with reasonable certainty. + +On the other hand the use of a reserve in this province +of Strategy, even if one were available, will always be +less efficacious the more the measure has a tendency +towards being one of a general nature. + +We have seen that the decision of a partial combat is +nothing in itself, but that all partial combats only find +their complete solution in the decision of the total +combat. + +But even this decision of the total combat has only a +relative meaning of many different gradations, according +as the force over which the victory has been gained +forms a more or less great and important part of the whole. +The lost battle of a corps may be repaired by the victory +of the Army. Even the lost battle of an Army may not +only be counterbalanced by the gain of a more important +one, but converted into a fortunate event (the two days +of Kulm, August 29 and 30, 1813[*]). No one can doubt +this; but it is just as clear that the weight of each victory +(the successful issue of each total combat) is so much the +more substantial the more important the part conquered, +and that therefore the possibility of repairing the loss +by subsequent events diminishes in the same proportion. +In another place we shall have to examine this more in +detail; it suffices for the present to have drawn attention +to the indubitable existence of this progression. + +[*] Refers to the destruction of Vandamme's column, which had +been +sent unsupported to intercept the retreat of the Austrians and +Prussians +from Dresden--but was forgotten by Napoleon.--EDITOR. + + +If we now add lastly to these two considerations the +third, which is, that if the persistent use of forces in tactics +always shifts the great result to the end of the whole act,law of +the +simultaneous use of the forces in Strategy, +on the contrary, lets the principal result (which need not +be the final one) take place almost always at the commencement +of the great (or whole) act, then in these three +results we have grounds sufficient to find strategic reserves +always more superfluous, always more useless, always +more dangerous, the more general their destination. + +The point where the idea of a strategic reserve begins +to become inconsistent is not difficult to determine: it +lies in the SUPREME DECISION. Employment must be given +to all the forces within the space of the supreme decision, +and every reserve (active force available) which is only +intended for use after that decision is opposed to common +sense. + +If, therefore, tactics has in its reserves the means of +not only meeting unforeseen dispositions on the part of +the enemy, but also of repairing that which never can be +foreseen, the result of the combat, should that be unfortunate; +Strategy on the other hand must, at least as far +as relates to the capital result, renounce the use of these +means. As A rule, it can only repair the losses sustained at +one point by advantages gained at another, in a few cases +by moving troops from one point to another; the idea +of preparing for such reverses by placing forces in reserve +beforehand, can never be entertained in Strategy. + +We have pointed out as an absurdity the idea of a +strategic reserve which is not to co-operate in the capital +result, and as it is so beyond a doubt, we should not have +been led into such an analysis as we have made in these +two chapters, were it not that, in the disguise of other +ideas, it looks like something better, and frequently makes +its appearance. One person sees in it the acme of strategic +sagacity and foresight; another rejects it, and with it +the idea of any reserve, consequently even of a tactical +one. This confusion of ideas is transferred to real life, +and if we would see a memorable instance of it we have +only to call to mind that Prussia in 1806 left a reserve of +20,000 men cantoned in the Mark, under Prince Eugene +of Wurtemberg, which could not possibly reach the Saale +in time to be of any use, and that another force Of 25,000 +men belonging to this power remained in East and South +Prussia, destined only to be put on a war-footing afterwards +as a reserve. + +After these examples we cannot be accused of having +been fighting with windmills. + + + +CHAPTER XIV. ECONOMY OF FORCES + +THE road of reason, as we have said, seldom allows itself +to be reduced to a mathematical line by principles and +opinions. There remains always a certain margin. +But it is the same in all the practical arts of life. For the +lines of beauty there are no abscissae and ordinates; +circles and ellipses are not described by means of their +algebraical formulae. The actor in War therefore soon +finds he must trust himself to the delicate tact of judgment +which, founded on natural quickness of perception, and +educated by reflection, almost unconsciously seizes upon +the right; he soon finds that at one time he must +simplify the law (by reducing it) to some prominent +characteristic points which form his rules; that at another +the adopted method must become the staff on which he +leans. + +As one of these simplified characteristic points as a +mental appliance, we look upon the principle of watching +continually over the co-operation of all forces, or in other +words, of keeping constantly in view that no part of them +should ever be idle. Whoever has forces where the enemy +does not give them sufficient employment, whoever has +part of his forces on the march--that is, allows them to +lie dead--while the enemy's are fighting, he is a bad +manager of his forces. In this sense there is a waste of +forces, which is even worse than their employment to no +purpose. If there must be action, then the first point is +that all parts act, because the most purposeless activity +still keeps employed and destroys a portion of the enemy's +force, whilst troops completely inactive are for the +moment quite neutralised. Unmistakably this idea is +bound up with the principles contained in the last three +chapters, it is the same truth, but seen from a somewhat +more comprehensive point of view and condensed into a +single conception. + + + +CHAPTER XV. GEOMETRICAL ELEMENT + +THE length to which the geometrical element or form in +the disposition of military force in War can become a +predominant principle, we see in the art of fortification, +where geometry looks after the great and the little. Also +in tactics it plays a great part. It is the basis of elementary +tactics, or of the theory of moving troops; but in +field fortification, as well as in the theory of positions, +and of their attack, its angles and lines rule like law +givers who have to decide the contest. Many things +here were at one time misapplied, and others were mere +fribbles; still, however, in the tactics of the present day, +in which in every combat the aim is to surround the +enemy, the geometrical element has attained anew a +great importance in a very simple, but constantly recurring +application. Nevertheless, in tactics, where all is +more movable, where the moral forces, individual traits, +and chance are more influential than in a war of sieges, +the geometrical element can never attain to the same +degree of supremacy as in the latter. But less still is its +influence in Strategy; certainly here, also, form in the +disposition of troops, the shape of countries and states +is of great importance; but the geometrical element is +not decisive, as in fortification, and not nearly so important +as in tactics.--The manner in which this influence +exhibits itself, can only be shown by degrees at those +places where it makes its appearance, and deserves notice. +Here we wish more to direct attention to the difference +which there is between tactics and Strategy in relation +to it. + +In tactics time and space quickly dwindle to their +absolute minimum. If a body of troops is attacked in +flank and rear by the enemy, it soon gets to a point where +retreat no longer remains; such a position is very close +to an absolute impossibility of continuing the fight; it +must therefore extricate itself from it, or avoid getting +into it. This gives to all combinations aiming at this +from the first commencement a great efficiency, which +chiefly consists in the disquietude which it causes the +enemy as to consequences. This is why the geometrical +disposition of the forces is such an important factor in +the tactical product. + +In Strategy this is only faintly reflected, on account of +the greater space and time. We do not fire from one +theatre of war upon another; and often weeks and months +must pass before a strategic movement designed to +surround the enemy can be executed. Further, the +distances are so great that the probability of hitting +the right point at last, even with the best arrangements, +is but small. + +In Strategy therefore the scope for such combinations, +that is for those resting on the geometrical element, is +much smaller, and for the same reason the effect of an +advantage once actually gained at any point is much +greater. Such advantage has time to bring all its effects +to maturity before it is disturbed, or quite neutralised +therein, by any counteracting apprehensions. We therefore +do not hesitate to regard as an established truth, +that in Strategy more depends on the number and the magnitude of +the victorious +combats, than on the form of the great lines by which they are +connected. + +A view just the reverse has been a favourite theme +of modern theory, because a greater importance was supposed +to be thus given to Strategy, and, as the higher +functions of the mind were seen in Strategy, it was +thought by that means to ennoble War, and, as it was +said--through a new substitution of ideas--to make it +more scientific. We hold it to be one of the principal +uses of a complete theory openly to expose such vagaries, +and as the geometrical element is the fundamental idea +from which theory usually proceeds, therefore we have +expressly brought out this point in strong relief. + + + +CHAPTER XVI. ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WARFARE + +IF one considers War as an act of mutual destruction, we +must of necessity imagine both parties as making some +progress; but at the same time, as regards the existing +moment, we must almost as necessarily suppose the one +party in a state of expectation, and only the other actually +advancing, for circumstances can never be actually the +same on both sides, or continue so. In time a change must +ensue, from which it follows that the present moment is +more favourable to one side than the other. Now if we +suppose that both commanders have a full knowledge of +this circumstance, then the one has a motive for action, +which at the same time is a motive for the other to wait; +therefore, according to this it cannot be for the interest +of both at the same time to advance, nor can waiting be +for the interest of both at the same time. This opposition +of interest as regards the object is not deduced here +from the principle of general polarity, and therefore is not +in opposition to the argument in the fifth chapter of the +second book; it depends on the fact that here in reality +the same thing is at once an incentive or motive to both +commanders, namely the probability of improving or +impairing their position by future action. + +But even if we suppose the possibility of a perfect +equality of circumstances in this respect, or if we take +into account that through imperfect knowledge of their +mutual position such an equality may appear to the two +Commanders to subsist, still the difference of political +objects does away with this possibility of suspension. +One of the parties must of necessity be assumed politically +to be the aggressor, because no War could take place from +defensive intentions on both sides. But the aggressor +has the positive object, the defender merely a negative +one. To the first then belongs the positive action, for +it is only by that means that he can attain the positive +object; therefore, in cases where both parties are in +precisely similar circumstances, the aggressor is called +upon to act by virtue of his positive object. + +Therefore, from this point of view, a suspension in the +act of Warfare, strictly speaking, is in contradiction with +the nature of the thing; because two Armies, being two +incompatible elements, should destroy one another +unremittingly, just as fire and water can never put themselves +in equilibrium, but act and react upon one another, +until one quite disappears. What would be said of two +wrestlers who remained clasped round each other for +hours without making a movement. Action in War, +therefore, like that of a clock which is wound up, should +go on running down in regular motion.--But wild as is +the nature of War it still wears the chains of human +weakness, and the contradiction we see here, viz., that +man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the +same time will astonish no one. + +If we cast a glance at military history in general, we +find so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards +the aim, that STANDING STILL and DOING NOTHING is quite +plainly the NORMAL CONDITION of an Army in the midst of +War, ACTING, the EXCEPTION. This must almost raise a +doubt as to the correctness of our conception. But if +military history leads to this conclusion when viewed +in the mass the latest series of campaigns redeems our +position. The War of the French Revolution shows too +plainly its reality, and only proves too clearly its necessity. +In these operations, and especially in the campaigns of +Buonaparte, the conduct of War attained to that unlimited +degree of energy which we have represented as the +natural law of the element. This degree is therefore +possible, and if it is possible then it is necessary. + +How could any one in fact justify in the eyes of reason +the expenditure of forces in War, if acting was not the +object? The baker only heats his oven if he has bread +to put into it; the horse is only yoked to the carriage if +we mean to drive; why then make the enormous effort +of a War if we look for nothing else by it but like efforts +on the part of the enemy? + +So much in justification of the general principle; now +as to its modifications, as far as they lie in the nature of +the thing and are independent of special cases. + +There are three causes to be noticed here, which appear +as innate counterpoises and prevent the over-rapid or +uncontrollable movement of the wheel-work. + +The first, which produces a constant tendency to delay, +and is thereby a retarding principle, is the natural timidity +and want of resolution in the human mind, a kind of +inertia in the moral world, but which is produced not by +attractive, but by repellent forces, that is to say, by dread +of danger and responsibility. + +In the burning element of War, ordinary natures appear +to become heavier; the impulsion given must therefore +be stronger and more frequently repeated if the motion is +to be a continuous one. The mere idea of the object for +which arms have been taken up is seldom sufficient to +overcome this resistant force, and if a warlike enterprising +spirit is not at the head, who feels himself in War in his +natural element, as much as a fish in the ocean, or if +there is not the pressure from above of some great +responsibility, then standing still will be the order of +the day, and progress will be the exception. + +The second cause is the imperfection of human perception +and judgment, which is greater in War than anywhere, +because a person hardly knows exactly his own position +from one moment to another, and can only conjecture on +slight grounds that of the enemy, which is purposely +concealed; this often gives rise to the case of both parties +looking upon one and the same object as advantageous +for them, while in reality the interest of one must +preponderate; thus then each may think he acts wisely +by waiting another moment, as we have already said in +the fifth chapter of the second book. + +The third cause which catches hold, like a ratchet wheel +in machinery, from time to time producing a complete +standstill, is the greater strength of the defensive form. +A may feel too weak to attack B, from which it does not +follow that B is strong enough for an attack on A. The +addition of strength, which the defensive gives is not +merely lost by assuming the offensive, but also passes to +the enemy just as, figuratively expressed, the difference +of a + b and a - b is equal to 2b. Therefore it may so +happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not +only feel themselves too weak to attack, but also are so +in reality. + +Thus even in the midst of the act of War itself, anxious +sagacity and the apprehension of too great danger find +vantage ground, by means of which they can exert their +power, and tame the elementary impetuosity of War. + +However, at the same time these causes without an +exaggeration of their effect, would hardly explain the long +states of inactivity which took place in military operations, +in former times, in Wars undertaken about interests of +no great importance, and in which inactivity consumed +nine-tenths of the time that the troops remained under +arms. This feature in these Wars, is to be traced +principally to the influence which the demands of the +one party, and the condition, and feeling of the other, +exercised over the conduct of the operations, as has +been already observed in the chapter on the essence +and object of War. + +These things may obtain such a preponderating influence +as to make of War a half-and-half affair. A War +is often nothing more than an armed neutrality, or a +menacing attitude to support negotiations or an attempt +to gain some small advantage by small exertions, and +then to wait the tide of circumstances, or a disagreeable +treaty obligation, which is fulfilled in the most niggardly +way possible. + +In all these cases in which the impulse given by interest +is slight, and the principle of hostility feeble, in which +there is no desire to do much, and also not much to dread +from the enemy; in short, where no powerful motives +press and drive, cabinets will not risk much in the game; +hence this tame mode of carrying on War, in which the +hostile spirit of real War is laid in irons. + +The more War becomes in this manner devitalised +so much the more its theory becomes destitute of the +necessary firm pivots and buttresses for its reasoning; +the necessary is constantly diminishing, the accidental +constantly increasing. + +Nevertheless in this kind of Warfare, there is also a +certain shrewdness, indeed, its action is perhaps more +diversified, and more extensive than in the other. Hazard +played with realeaux of gold seems changed into a game +of commerce with groschen. And on this field, where the +conduct of War spins out the time with a number of small +flourishes, with skirmishes at outposts, half in earnest +half in jest, with long dispositions which end in nothing +with positions and marches, which afterwards are designated +as skilful only because their infinitesimally small +causes are lost, and common sense can make nothing of +them, here on this very field many theorists find the real +Art of War at home: in these feints, parades, half and +quarter thrusts of former Wars, they find the aim of all +theory, the supremacy of mind over matter, and modern +Wars appear to them mere savage fisticuffs, from which +nothing is to be learnt, and which must be regarded as mere +retrograde steps towards barbarism. This opinion is as +frivolous as the objects to which it relates. Where great +forces and great passions are wanting, it is certainly easier +for a practised dexterity to show its game; but is then +the command of great forces, not in itself a higher exercise +of the intelligent faculties? Is then that kind of conventional +sword-exercise not comprised in and belonging to +the other mode of conducting War? Does it not bear the +same relation to it as the motions upon a ship to the motion +of the ship itself? Truly it can take place only under the +tacit condition that the adversary does no better. And +can we tell, how long he may choose to respect those +conditions? Has not then the French Revolution fallen +upon us in the midst of the fancied security of our old +system of War, and driven us from Chalons to Moscow? +And did not Frederick the Great in like manner surprise +the Austrians reposing in their ancient habits of War, +and make their monarchy tremble? Woe to the cabinet +which, with a shilly-shally policy, and a routine-ridden +military system, meets with an adversary who, like the +rude element, knows no other law than that of his intrinsic +force. Every deficiency in energy and exertion is then a +weight in the scales in favour of the enemy; it is not so +easy then to change from the fencing posture into that +of an athlete, and a slight blow is often sufficient to +knock down the whole. + +The result of all the causes now adduced is, that the +hostile action of a campaign does not progress by a +continuous, but by an intermittent movement, and that, +therefore, between the separate bloody acts, there is a +period of watching, during which both parties fall into +the defensive, and also that usually a higher object causes +the principle of aggression to predominate on one side, +and thus leaves it in general in an advancing position, +by which then its proceedings become modified in some +degree. + + + +CHAPTER XVII. ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR + +THE attention which must be paid to the character of War +as it is now made, has a great influence upon all plans, +especially on strategic ones. + +Since all methods formerly usual were upset by Buonaparte's +luck and boldness, and first-rate Powers almost +wiped out at a blow; since the Spaniards by their stubborn +resistance have shown what the general arming of a nation +and insurgent measures on a great scale can effect, in +spite of weakness and porousness of individual parts; +since Russia, by the campaign of 1812 has taught us, first, +that an Empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered +(which might have been easily known before), secondly, +that the probability of final success does not in all cases +diminish in the same measure as battles, capitals, and +provinces are lost (which was formerly an incontrovertible +principle with all diplomatists, and therefore made them +always ready to enter at once into some bad temporary +peace), but that a nation is often strongest in the heart of +its country, if the enemy's offensive power has exhausted +itself, and with what enormous force the defensive then +springs over to the offensive; further, since Prussia +(1813) has shown that sudden efforts may add to an Army +sixfold by means of the militia, and that this militia is +just as fit for service abroad as in its own country;-- +since all these events have shown what an enormous +factor the heart and sentiments of a Nation may be in the +product of its political and military strength, in fine, +since governments have found out all these additional +aids, it is not to be expected that they will let them lie +idle in future Wars, whether it be that danger threatens +their own existence, or that restless ambition drives +them on. + +That a War which is waged with the whole weight +of the national power on each side must be organised +differently in principle to those where everything is +calculated according to the relations of standing Armies +to each other, it is easy to perceive. Standing Armies +once resembled fleets, the land force the sea force in their +relations to the remainder of the State, and from that the +Art of War on shore had in it something of naval tactics, +which it has now quite lost. + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. TENSION AND REST + +The Dynamic Law of War + +WE have seen in the sixteenth chapter of this book, how, in most +campaigns, +much more time used to be spent in standing still and inaction +than in +activity. + +Now, although, as observed in the preceding chapter +we see quite a different character in the present form of +War, still it is certain that real action will always be +interrupted more or less by long pauses; and this leads +to the necessity of our examining more closely the nature +of these two phases of War. + +If there is a suspension of action in War, that is, if +neither party wills something positive, there is rest, and +consequently equilibrium, but certainly an equilibrium +in the largest signification, in which not only the moral +and physical war-forces, but all relations and interests, +come into calculation. As soon as ever one of the two +parties proposes to himself a new positive object, and +commences active steps towards it, even if it is only by +preparations, and as soon as the adversary opposes this, +there is a tension of powers; this lasts until the decision +takes place--that is, until one party either gives up his +object or the other has conceded it to him. + +This decision--the foundation of which lies always in +the combat--combinations which are made on each side-- +is followed by a movement in one or other direction. + +When this movement has exhausted itself, either in +the difficulties which had to be mastered, in overcoming +its own internal friction, or through new resistant forces +prepared by the acts of the enemy, then either a state +of rest takes place or a new tension with a decision, and +then a new movement, in most cases in the opposite +direction. + +This speculative distinction between equilibrium, tension, +and motion is more essential for practical action +than may at first sight appear. + +In a state of rest and of equilibrium a varied kind +of activity may prevail on one side that results from +opportunity, and does not aim at a great alteration. Such +an activity may contain important combats--even pitched +battles--but yet it is still of quite a different nature, and +on that account generally different in its effects. + +If a state of tension exists, the effects of the decision +are always greater partly because a greater force of will +and a greater pressure of circumstances manifest themselves +therein; partly because everything has been +prepared and arranged for a great movement. The decision +in such cases resembles the effect of a mine well +closed and tamped, whilst an event in itself perhaps just +as great, in a state of rest, is more or less like a mass of +powder puffed away in the open air. + +At the same time, as a matter of course, the state of +tension must be imagined in different degrees of intensity, +and it may therefore approach gradually by many steps +towards the state of rest, so that at the last there is a +very slight difference between them. + +Now the real use which we derive from these reflections +is the conclusion that every measure which is taken during +a state of tension is more important and more prolific +in results than the same measure could be in a state of +equilibrium, and that this importance increases immensely +in the highest degrees of tension. + +The cannonade of Valmy, September 20, 1792, decided +more than the battle of Hochkirch, October 14, 1758. + +In a tract of country which the enemy abandons to us +because he cannot defend it, we can settle ourselves +differently from what we should do if the retreat of the +enemy was only made with the view to a decision under +more favourable circumstances. Again, a strategic attack +in course of execution, a faulty position, a single false +march, may be decisive in its consequence; whilst in a +state of equilibrium such errors must be of a very glaring +kind, even to excite the activity of the enemy in a general +way. + +Most bygone Wars, as we have already said, consisted, +so far as regards the greater part of the time, in this state +of equilibrium, or at least in such short tensions with +long intervals between them, and weak in their effects, +that the events to which they gave rise were seldom +great successes, often they were theatrical exhibitions, +got up in honour of a royal birthday (Hochkirch), often +a mere satisfying of the honour of the arms (Kunersdorf), +or the personal vanity of the commander (Freiberg). + +That a Commander should thoroughly understand these +states, that he should have the tact to act in the spirit of +them, we hold to be a great requisite, and we have had +experience in the campaign of 1806 how far it is sometimes +wanting. In that tremendous tension, when everything +pressed on towards a supreme decision, and that alone +with all its consequences should have occupied the whole +soul of the Commander, measures were proposed and even +partly carried out (such as the reconnaissance towards +Franconia), which at the most might have given a kind +of gentle play of oscillation within a state of equilibrium. +Over these blundering schemes and views, absorbing +the activity of the Army, the really necessary means, +which could alone save, were lost sight of. + +But this speculative distinction which we have made +is also necessary for our further progress in the construction +of our theory, because all that we have to say on the +relation of attack and defence, and on the completion of +this double-sided act, concerns the state of the crisis in +which the forces are placed during the tension and motion, +and because all the activity which can take place during +the condition of equilibrium can only be regarded and +treated as a corollary; for that crisis is the real War +and this state of equilibrium only its reflection. + + + +BOOK IV THE COMBAT + +CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY + +HAVING in the foregoing book examined the subjects +which may be regarded as the efficient elements of War, +we shall now turn our attention to the combat as the +real activity in Warfare, which, by its physical and moral +effects, embraces sometimes more simply, sometimes in a +more complex manner, the object of the whole campaign. +In this activity and in its effects these elements must +therefore, reappear. + +The formation of the combat is tactical in its nature; +we only glance at it here in a general way in order to get +acquainted with it in its aspect as a whole. In practice +the minor or more immediate objects give every combat +a characteristic form; these minor objects we shall not +discuss until hereafter. But these peculiarities are in +comparison to the general characteristics of a combat +mostly only insignificant, so that most combats are very +like one another, and, therefore, in order to avoid repeating +that which is general at every stage, we are compelled +to look into it here, before taking up the subject of its +more special application. + +In the first place, therefore, we shall give in the next +chapter, in a few words, the characteristics of the modern +battle in its tactical course, because that lies at the +foundation +of our conceptions of what the battle really is. + + + +CHAPTER II. CHARACTER OF THE MODERN BATTLE + +ACCORDING to the notion we have formed of tactics and +strategy, it follows, as a matter of course, that if the nature +of the former is changed, that change must have an influence +on the latter. If tactical facts in one case are +entirely different from those in another, then the strategic, +must be so also, if they are to continue consistent and +reasonable. It is therefore important to characterise +a general action in its modern form before we advance +with the study of its employment in strategy. + +What do we do now usually in a great battle? We +place ourselves quietly in great masses arranged +contiguous to and behind one another. We deploy relatively +only a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself +out in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours, only +interrupted now and again, and removed hither and thither +by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet +and cavalry attacks. When this line has gradually +exhausted part of its warlike ardour in this manner +and there remains nothing more than the cinders, it is +withdrawn[*] and replaced by another. + +[*] The relief of the fighting line played a great part in the +battles of +the Smooth-Bore era; it was necessitated by the fouling of the +muskets, +physical fatigue of the men and consumption of ammunition, and +was +recognised as both necessary and advisable by Napoleon +himself.--EDITOR. + + +In this manner the battle on a modified principle burns +slowly away like wet powder, and if the veil of night commands +it to stop, because neither party can any longer +see, and neither chooses to run the risk of blind chance, +then an account is taken by each side respectively of the +masses remaining, which can be called still effective, that +is, which have not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes; +account is taken of the ground gained or lost, +and of how stands the security of the rear; these results +with the special impressions as to bravery and cowardice, +ability and stupidity, which are thought to have been +observed in ourselves and in the enemy are collected into +one single total impression, out of which there springs the +resolution to quit the field or to renew the combat on the +morrow. + +This description, which is not intended as a finished +picture of a modern battle, but only to give its general +tone, suits for the offensive and defensive, and the special +traits which are given, by the object proposed, the country, +&c. &c., may be introduced into it, without materially +altering the conception. + +But modern battles are not so by accident; they are +so because the parties find themselves nearly on a level +as regards military organisation and the knowledge of +the Art of War, and because the warlike element inflamed +by great national interests has broken through artificial +limits and now flows in its natural channel. Under these +two conditions, battles will always preserve this character. + +This general idea of the modern battle will be useful +to us in the sequel in more places than one, if we want +to estimate the value of the particular co-efficients of +strength, country, &c. &c. It is only for general, great, +and decisive combats, and such as come near to them that +this description stands good; inferior ones have changed +their character also in the same direction but less than +great ones. The proof of this belongs to tactics; we shall, +however, have an opportunity hereafter of making this +subject plainer by giving a few particulars. + + + +CHAPTER III. THE COMBAT IN GENERAL + +THE Combat is the real warlike activity, everything else +is only its auxiliary; let us therefore take an attentive +look at its nature. + +Combat means fighting, and in this the destruction or +conquest of the enemy is the object, and the enemy, in +the particular combat, is the armed force which stands +opposed to us. + +This is the simple idea; we shall return to it, but +before we can do that we must insert a series of others. + +If we suppose the State and its military force as a unit, +then the most natural idea is to imagine the War also as +one great combat, and in the simple relations of savage +nations it is also not much otherwise. But our Wars +are made up of a number of great and small simultaneous +or consecutive combats, and this severance of the activity +into so many separate actions is owing to the great +multiplicity of the relations out of which War arises +with us. + +In point of fact, the ultimate object of our Wars the, +political one, is not always quite a simple one; and even +were it so, still the action is bound up with such a number +of conditions and considerations to be taken into account, +that the object can no longer be attained by one single +great act but only through a number of greater or smaller +acts which are bound up into a whole; each of these +separate acts is therefore a part of a whole, and has +consequently a special object by which it is bound to this +whole. + +We have already said that every strategic act can be +referred to the idea of a combat, because it is an employment +of the military force, and at the root of that there +always lies the idea of fighting. We may therefore +reduce every military activity in the province of Strategy +to the unit of single combats, and occupy ourselves with +the object of these only; we shall get acquainted with +these special objects by degrees as we come to speak of +the causes which produce them; here we content ourselves +with saying that every combat, great or small, has its +own peculiar object in subordination to the main object. +If this is the case then, the destruction and conquest of +the enemy is only to be regarded as the means of gaining +this object; as it unquestionably is. + +But this result is true only in its form, and important +only on account of the connection which the ideas have +between themselves, and we have only sought it out to +get rid of it at once. + +What is overcoming the enemy? Invariably the +destruction of his military force, whether it be by death, +or wounds, or any means; whether it be completely +or only to such a degree that he can no longer continue +the contest; therefore as long as we set aside all special +objects of combats, we may look upon the complete or +partial destruction of the enemy as the only object of +all combats. + +Now we maintain that in the majority of cases, and +especially in great battles, the special object by which +the battle is individualised and bound up with the great +whole is only a weak modification of that general object, +or an ancillary object bound up with it, important enough +to individualise the battle, but always insignificant in +comparison with that general object; so that if that +ancillary object alone should be obtained, only an unimportant +part of the purpose of the combat is fulfilled. +If this assertion is correct, then we see that the idea, +according to which the destruction of the enemy's force +is only the means, and something else always the object, +can only be true in form, but, that it would lead to false +conclusions if we did not recollect that this destruction +of the enemy's force is comprised in that object, and that +this object is only a weak modification of it. +Forgetfulness of this led to completely false views before +the Wars of the last period, and created tendencies as well +as fragments of systems, in which theory thought it raised +itself so much the more above handicraft, the less it +supposed itself to stand in need of the use of the real +instrument, that is the destruction of the enemy's force. + +Certainly such a system could not have arisen unless +supported by other false suppositions, and unless in place +of the destruction of the enemy, other things had been +substituted to which an efficacy was ascribed which did +not rightly belong to them. We shall attack these falsehoods +whenever occasion requires, but we could not treat +of the combat without claiming for it the real importance +and value which belong to it, and giving warning against +the errors to which merely formal truth might lead. + +But now how shall we manage to show that in most +cases, and in those of most importance, the destruction +of the enemy's Army is the chief thing? How shall we +manage to combat that extremely subtle idea, which +supposes it possible, through the use of a special artificial +form, to effect by a small direct destruction of the enemy's +forces a much greater destruction indirectly, or by means +of small but extremely well-directed blows to produce +such paralysation of the enemy's forces, such a command +over the enemy's will, that this mode of proceeding is to +be viewed as a great shortening of the road? Undoubtedly +a victory at one point may be of more value than at +another. Undoubtedly there is a scientific arrangement +of battles amongst themselves, even in Strategy, which is +in fact nothing but the Art of thus arranging them. +To deny that is not our intention, but we assert that +the direct destruction of the enemy's forces is everywhere +predominant; we contend here for the overruling +importance of this destructive principle and +nothing else. + +We must, however, call to mind that we are now engaged +with Strategy, not with tactics, therefore we do not speak +of the means which the former may have of destroying +at a small expense a large body of the enemy's forces, but under +direct +destruction we understand the tactical +results, and that, therefore, our assertion is that only +great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones, or, +as we have already once before more distinctly expressed +it, THE TACTICAL SUCCESSES are of paramount importance +in the conduct of War. + +The proof of this assertion seems to us simple enough, +it lies in the time which every complicated (artificial) +combination requires. The question whether a simple +attack, or one more carefully prepared, i.e., more artificial, +will produce greater effects, may undoubtedly be decided +in favour of the latter as long as the enemy is assumed +to remain quite passive. But every carefully combined +attack requires time for its preparation, and if a counter- +stroke by the enemy intervenes, our whole design may be +upset. Now if the enemy should decide upon some simple +attack, which can be executed in a shorter time, then he +gains the initiative, and destroys the effect of the great +plan. Therefore, together with the expediency of a complicated +attack we must consider all the dangers which we +run during its preparation, and should only adopt it if +there is no reason to fear that the enemy will disconcert +our scheme. Whenever this is the case we must ourselves +choose the simpler, i.e., quicker way, and lower our views +in this sense as far as the character, the relations of the +enemy, and other circumstances may render necessary. +If we quit the weak impressions of abstract ideas and +descend to the region of practical life, then it is evident +that a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us +have time for wide-reaching skilful combinations, and it +is just against such a one we should require skill the most. +By this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and +direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively +shown. + +Our opinion is not on that account that the simple blow +is the best, but that we must not lift the arm too far for +the time given to strike, and that this condition will always +lead more to direct conflict the more warlike our opponent +is. Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon +the enemy by complicated plans, we must rather seek to +be beforehand with him by greater simplicity in our +designs. + +If we seek for the lowest foundation-stones of these +converse propositions we find that in the one it is ability, +in the other, courage. Now, there is something very +attractive in the notion that a moderate degree of courage +joined to great ability will produce greater effects than +moderate ability with great courage. But unless we +suppose these elements in a disproportionate relation, +not logical, we have no right to assign to ability this +advantage over courage in a field which is called danger, +and which must be regarded as the true domain of +courage. + +After this abstract view we shall only add that experience, +very far from leading to a different conclusion, is +rather the sole cause which has impelled us in this +direction, and given rise to such reflections. + +Whoever reads history with a mind free from prejudice +cannot fail to arrive at a conviction that of all military +virtues, energy in the conduct of operations has always +contributed the most to the glory and success of arms. + +How we make good our principle of regarding the +destruction of the enemy's force as the principal object, +not only in the War as a whole but also in each separate +combat, and how that principle suits all the forms and +conditions necessarily demanded by the relations out of +which War springs, the sequel will show. For the present +all that we desire is to uphold its general importance, +and with this result we return again to the combat. + + + +CHAPTER IV. THE COMBAT IN GENERAL (CONTINUATION) + +IN the last chapter we showed the destruction of the enemy +as the true object of the combat, and we have sought +to prove by a special consideration of the point, that this +is true in the majority of cases, and in respect to the most +important battles, because the destruction of the enemy's +Army is always the preponderating object in War. The +other objects which may be mixed up with this destruction +of the enemy's force, and may have more or less influence, +we shall describe generally in the next chapter, and +become better acquainted with by degrees afterwards; +here we divest the combat of them entirely, and look +upon the destruction of the enemy as the complete and +sufficient object of any combat. + +What are we now to understand by destruction of the +enemy's Army? A diminution of it relatively greater +than that on our own side. If we have a great superiority +in numbers over the enemy, then naturally the same absolute +amount of loss on both sides is for us a smaller one +than for him, and consequently may be regarded in itself +as an advantage. As we are here considering the combat +as divested of all (other) objects, we must also exclude +from our consideration the case in which the combat is +used only indirectly for a greater destruction of the +enemy's force; consequently also, only that direct gain +which has been made in the mutual process of destruction, +is to be regarded as the object, for this is an absolute gain, +which runs through the whole campaign, and at the end +of it will always appear as pure profit. But every other +kind of victory over our opponent will either have its +motive in other objects, which we have completely +excluded here, or it will only yield a temporary relative +advantage. An example will make this plain. + +If by a skilful disposition we have reduced our opponent +to such a dilemma, that he cannot continue the combat +without danger, and after some resistance he retires, then +we may say, that we have conquered him at that point; +but if in this victory we have expended just as many +forces as the enemy, then in closing the account of the +campaign, there is no gain remaining from this victory, +if such a result can be called a victory. Therefore the +overcoming the enemy, that is, placing him in such a +position that he must give up the fight, counts for nothing +in itself, and for that reason cannot come under the +definition of object. There remains, therefore, as we have +said, nothing over except the direct gain which we have +made in the process of destruction; but to this belong +not only the losses which have taken place in the course +of the combat, but also those which, after the withdrawal +of the conquered part, take place as direct consequences +of the same. + +Now it is known by experience, that the losses in physical +forces in the course of a battle seldom present a great +difference between victor and vanquished respectively, +often none at all, sometimes even one bearing an inverse +relation to the result, and that the most decisive losses +on the side of the vanquished only commence with the +retreat, that is, those which the conqueror does not share +with him. The weak remains of battalions already +in disorder are cut down by cavalry, exhausted men +strew the ground, disabled guns and broken caissons are +abandoned, others in the bad state of the roads cannot be +removed quickly enough, and are captured by the enemy's +troops, during the night numbers lose their way, and fall +defenceless into the enemy's hands, and thus the victory +mostly gains bodily substance after it is already decided. +Here would be a paradox, if it did not solve itself in the +following manner. + +The loss in physical force is not the only one which the +two sides suffer in the course of the combat; the moral +forces also are shaken, broken, and go to ruin. It is not +only the loss in men, horses and guns, but in order, courage, +confidence, cohesion and plan, which come into consideration +when it is a question whether the fight can be still +continued or not. It is principally the moral forces which +decide here, and in all cases in which the conqueror has +lost as heavily as the conquered, it is these alone. + +The comparative relation of the physical losses is difficult +to estimate in a battle, but not so the relation of the +moral ones. Two things principally make it known. +The one is the loss of the ground on which the fight has +taken place, the other the superiority of the enemy's. The more +our reserves +have diminished as compared +with those of the enemy, the more force we have +used to maintain the equilibrium; in this at once, an +evident proof of the moral superiority of the enemy is +given which seldom fails to stir up in the soul of the +Commander a certain bitterness of feeling, and a sort of +contempt for his own troops. But the principal thing is, +that men who have been engaged for a long continuance +of time are more or less like burnt-out cinders; their +ammunition is consumed; they have melted away to a +certain extent; physical and moral energies are exhausted, +perhaps their courage is broken as well. Such a force, +irrespective of the diminution in its number, if viewed as +an organic whole, is very different from what it was +before the combat; and thus it is that the loss of moral +force may be measured by the reserves that have been +used as if it were on a foot-rule. + +Lost ground and want of fresh reserves, are, therefore, +usually the principal causes which determine a retreat; +but at the same time we by no means exclude or desire +to throw in the shade other reasons, which may lie in the +interdependence of parts of the Army, in the general +plan, &c. + +Every combat is therefore the bloody and destructive +measuring of the strength of forces, physical and moral; +whoever at the close has the greatest amount of both left +is the conqueror. + +In the combat the loss of moral force is the chief cause +of the decision; after that is given, this loss continues +to increase until it reaches its culminating-point at the +close of the whole act. This then is the opportunity the +victor should seize to reap his harvest by the utmost +possible restrictions of his enemy's forces, the real object +of engaging in the combat. On the beaten side, the loss +of all order and control often makes the prolongation +of resistance by individual units, by the further punishment +they are certain to suffer, more injurious than useful +to the whole. The spirit of the mass is broken; the +original excitement about losing or winning, through +which danger was forgotten, is spent, and to the majority +danger now appears no longer an appeal to their courage, +but rather the endurance of a cruel punishment. Thus +the instrument in the first moment of the enemy's victory +is weakened and blunted, and therefore no longer fit to +repay danger by danger. + +This period, however, passes; the moral forces of the +conquered will recover by degrees, order will be restored, +courage will revive, and in the majority of cases there +remains only a small part of the superiority obtained, +often none at all. In some cases, even, although rarely, +the spirit of revenge and intensified hostility may bring +about an opposite result. On the other hand, whatever +is gained in killed, wounded, prisoners, and guns captured +can never disappear from the account. + +The losses in a battle consist more in killed and +wounded; those after the battle, more in artillery taken +and prisoners. The first the conqueror shares with the +conquered, more or less, but the second not; and for that +reason they usually only take place on one side of the +conflict, at least, they are considerably in excess on one side. + +Artillery and prisoners are therefore at all times regarded +as the true trophies of victory, as well as its measure, +because through these things its extent is declared beyond +a doubt. Even the degree of moral superiority may be +better judged of by them than by any other relation, +especially if the number of killed and wounded is compared +therewith; and here arises a new power increasing +the moral effects. + +We have said that the moral forces, beaten to the +ground in the battle and in the immediately succeeding +movements, recover themselves gradually, and often bear +no traces of injury; this is the case with small divisions +of the whole, less frequently with large divisions; it +may, however, also be the case with the main Army, but +seldom or never in the State or Government to which the +Army belongs. These estimate the situation more impartially, +and from a more elevated point of view, and +recognise in the number of trophies taken by the enemy, +and their relation to the number of killed and wounded, +only too easily and well, the measure of their own weakness +and inefficiency. + +In point of fact, the lost balance of moral power must +not be treated lightly because it has no absolute value, +and because it does not of necessity appear in all cases in +the amount of the results at the final close; it may +become of such excessive weight as to bring down everything +with an irresistible force. On that account it may +often become a great aim of the operations of which we +shall speak elsewhere. Here we have still to examine +some of its fundamental relations. + +The moral effect of a victory increases, not merely +in proportion to the extent of the forces engaged, but in a +progressive ratio--that is to say, not only in extent, but +also in its intensity. In a beaten detachment order is easily +restored. As a single frozen limb is easily revived by the +rest of the body, so the courage of a defeated detachment +is easily raised again by the courage of the rest of the Army +as soon as it rejoins it. If, therefore, the effects of a small +victory are not completely done away with, still they are +partly lost to the enemy. This is not the case if the Army +itself sustains a great defeat; then one with the other +fall together. A great fire attains quite a different heat +from several small ones. + +Another relation which determines the moral value of +a victory is the numerical relation of the forces which +have been in conflict with each other. To beat many +with few is not only a double success, but shows also a +greater, especially a more general superiority, which the +conquered must always be fearful of encountering again. +At the same time this influence is in reality hardly observable +in such a case. In the moment of real action, the +notions of the actual strength of the enemy are generally +so uncertain, the estimate of our own commonly so +incorrect, that the party superior in numbers either does +not admit the disproportion, or is very far from admitting +the full truth, owing to which, he evades almost entirely +the moral disadvantages which would spring from it. +It is only hereafter in history that the truth, long suppressed +through ignorance, vanity, or a wise discretion, +makes its appearance, and then it certainly casts a +lustre on the Army and its Leader, but it can then do +nothing more by its moral influence for events long +past. + +If prisoners and captured guns are those things by +which the victory principally gains substance, its true +crystallisations, then the plan of the battle should have +those things specially in view; the destruction of the +enemy by death and wounds appears here merely as a +means to an end. + +How far this may influence the dispositions in the battle +is not an affair of Strategy, but the decision to fight the +battle is in intimate connection with it, as is shown by +the direction given to our forces, and their general grouping, +whether we threaten the enemy's flank or rear, or he +threatens ours. On this point, the number of prisoners +and captured guns depends very much, and it is a point +which, in many cases, tactics alone cannot satisfy, particularly +if the strategic relations are too much in opposition +to it. + +The risk of having to fight on two sides, and the still +more dangerous position of having no line of retreat left +open, paralyse the movements and the power of resistance; +further, in case of defeat, they increase the loss, +often raising it to its extreme point, that is, to destruction. +Therefore, the rear being endangered makes +defeat more probable, and, at the same time, more +decisive. + +From this arises, in the whole conduct of the War,especially in +great and +small combats, a perfect instinct to secure our own line of +retreat and to +seize that of the enemy; this follows from the conception of +victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond mere +slaughter. + +In this effort we see, therefore, the first immediate +purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. +No combat is imaginable in which this effort, either in +its double or single form, does not go hand in hand with +the plain and simple stroke of force. Even the smallest +troop will not throw itself upon its enemy without thinking +of its line of retreat, and, in most cases, it will have +an eye upon that of the enemy also. + +We should have to digress to show how often this +instinct is prevented from going the direct road, how +often it must yield to the difficulties arising from more +important considerations: we shall, therefore, rest contented +with affirming it to be a general natural law of +the combat. + +It is, therefore, active; presses everywhere with its +natural weight, and so becomes the pivot on which +almost all tactical and strategic manoeuvres turn. + +If we now take a look at the conception of victory as +a whole, we find in it three elements:-- + +1. The greater loss of the enemy in physical power. + +2. In moral power. + +3. His open avowal of this by the relinquishment of +his intentions. + +The returns made up on each side of losses in killed +and wounded, are never exact, seldom truthful, and in +most cases, full of intentional misrepresentations. Even +the statement of the number of trophies is seldom to be +quite depended on; consequently, when it is not considerable +it may also cast a doubt even on the reality of +the victory. Of the loss in moral forces there is no +reliable measure, except in the trophies: therefore, in +many cases, the giving up the contest is the only real +evidence of the victory. It is, therefore, to be regarded +as a confession of inferiority--as the lowering of the flag, +by which, in this particular instance, right and superiority +are conceded to the enemy, and this degree of humiliation +and disgrace, which, however, must be distinguished +from all the other moral consequences of the loss of equilibrium, +is an essential part of the victory. It is this part +alone which acts upon the public opinion outside the +Army, upon the people and the Government in both +belligerent States, and upon all others in any way concerned. + +But renouncement of the general object is not quite +identical with quitting the field of battle, even when the +battle has been very obstinate and long kept up; no one +says of advanced posts, when they retire after an obstinate +combat, that they have given up their object; even in +combats aimed at the destruction of the enemy's Army, +the retreat from the battlefield is not always to be +regarded as a relinquishment of this aim, as for instance, +in retreats planned beforehand, in which the ground is +disputed foot by foot; all this belongs to that part of our +subject where we shall speak of the separate object of the +combat; here we only wish to draw attention to the fact +that in most cases the giving up of the object is very +difficult to distinguish from the retirement from the +battlefield, +and that the impression produced by the latter, +both in and out of the Army, is not to be treated lightly. + +For Generals and Armies whose reputation is not made, +this is in itself one of the difficulties in many operations, +justified by circumstances when a succession of combats, +each ending in retreat, may appear as a succession of +defeats, without being so in reality, and when that appearance +may exercise a very depressing influence. It is +impossible for the retreating General by making known his +real intentions to prevent the moral effect spreading to +the public and his troops, for to do that with effect he +must disclose his plans completely, which of course would +run counter to his principal interests to too great a degree. + +In order to draw attention to the special importance of +this conception of victory we shall only refer to the battle +of Soor,[*] the trophies from which were not important (a +few thousand prisoners and twenty guns), and where +Frederick proclaimed his victory by remaining for five +days after on the field of battle, although his retreat into +Silesia had been previously determined on, and was a +measure natural to his whole situation. According to +his own account, he thought he would hasten a peace by +the moral effect of his victory. Now although a couple of +other successes were likewise required, namely, the battle +at Katholisch Hennersdorf, in Lusatia, and the battle of +Kesseldorf, before this peace took place, still we cannot +say that the moral effect of the battle of Soor was nil. + +[*] Soor, or Sohr, Sept. 30, 1745; Hennersdorf, Nov. 23, 1745; +Kealteldorf, Dec. 15, 1745, all in the Second Silesian War. + + +If it is chiefly the moral force which is shaken by defeat, +and if the number of trophies reaped by the enemy mounts +up to an unusual height, then the lost combat becomes a +rout, but this is not the necessary consequence of every +victory. A rout only sets in when the moral force of the +defeated is very severely shaken then there often ensues +a complete incapability of further resistance, and the +whole action consists of giving way, that is of flight. + +Jena and Belle Alliance were routs, but not so Borodino. + +Although without pedantry we can here give no single +line of separation, because the difference between the +things is one of degrees, yet still the retention of the +conception +is essential as a central point to give clearness to +our theoretical ideas and it is a want in our terminology +that for a victory over the enemy tantamount to a rout, +and a conquest of the enemy only tantamount to a simple +victory, there is only one and the same word to use. + + + +CHAPTER V. ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE COMBAT + +HAVING in the preceding chapter examined the combat +in its absolute form, as the miniature picture of the whole +War, we now turn to the relations which it bears to the +other parts of the great whole. First we inquire what is +more precisely the signification of a combat. + +As War is nothing else but a mutual process of destruction, +then the most natural answer in conception, and +perhaps also in reality, appears to be that all the powers +of each party unite in one great volume and all results +in one great shock of these masses. There is certainly +much truth in this idea, and it seems to be very advisable +that we should adhere to it and should on that account +look upon small combats at first only as necessary loss, +like the shavings from a carpenter's plane. Still, however, +the thing cannot be settled so easily. + +That a multiplication of combats should arise from a +fractioning of forces is a matter of course, and the more +immediate objects of separate combats will therefore +come before us in the subject of a fractioning of forces; +but these objects, and together with them, the whole mass +of combats may in a general way be brought under certain +classes, and the knowledge of these classes will contribute +to make our observations more intelligible. + +Destruction of the enemy's military forces is in reality +the object of all combats; but other objects may be joined +thereto, and these other objects may be at the same time +predominant; we must therefore draw a distinction +between those in which the destruction of the enemy's +forces is the principal object, and those in which it is more +the means. The destruction of the enemy's force, the +possession of a place or the possession of some object may +be the general motive for a combat, and it may be either +one of these alone or several together, in which case +however usually one is the principal motive. Now the +two principal forms of War, the offensive and defensive, +of which we shall shortly speak, do not modify the first +of these motives, but they certainly do modify the other +two, and therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they +would appear thus:-- + + OFFENSIVE. DEFENSIVE. + 1. Destruction of enemy's 1. Destruction of enemy's + force. force. + 2. Conquest of a place. 2. Defence of a place. + 3. Conquest of some object. 3. Defence of some object. + + These motives, however, do not seem to embrace completely +the whole of the subject, if we recollect that there +are reconnaissances and demonstrations, in which plainly +none of these three points is the object of the combat. +In reality we must, therefore, on this account be allowed +a fourth class. Strictly speaking, in reconnaissances in +which we wish the enemy to show himself, in alarms by +which we wish to wear him out, in demonstrations by +which we wish to prevent his leaving some point or to +draw him off to another, the objects are all such as can +only be attained indirectly and UNDER THE PRETEXT OF ONE +OF THE THREE OBJECTS SPECIFIED IN THE TABLE, usually of the +second; +for the enemy whose aim is to reconnoitre must draw up +his force as if he really intended to attack and defeat us, +or drive us off, &c. &c. But this pretended object is not +the real one, and our present question is only as to the +latter; therefore, we must to the above three objects of +the offensive further add a fourth, which is to lead the +enemy to make a false conclusion. That offensive means are +conceivable in +connection with this object, lies in the nature of the thing. + +On the other hand we must observe that the defence of +a place may be of two kinds, either absolute, if as a general +question the point is not to be given up, or relative if it +is only required for a certain time. The latter happens +perpetually in the combats of advanced posts and rear +guards. + +That the nature of these different intentions of a combat +must have an essential influence on the dispositions which +are its preliminaries, is a thing clear in itself. We act +differently if our object is merely to drive an enemy's post +out of its place from what we should if our object was to +beat him completely; differently, if we mean to defend +a place to the last extremity from what we should do if +our design is only to detain the enemy for a certain time. +In the first case we trouble ourselves little about the line +of retreat, in the latter it is the principal point, &c. + +But these reflections belong properly to tactics, and are +only introduced here by way of example for the sake +of greater clearness. What Strategy has to say on the +different objects of the combat will appear in the chapters +which touch upon these objects. Here we have only a +few general observations to make, first, that the importance +of the object decreases nearly in the order as they +stand above, therefore, that the first of these objects must +always predominate in the great battle; lastly, that the +two last in a defensive battle are in reality such as yield +no fruit, they are, that is to say, purely negative, and can, +therefore, only be serviceable, indirectly, by facilitating +something else which is positive. IT IS, THEREFORE, A BAD +SIGN OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IF BATTLES OF THIS KIND BECOME +TOO +FREQUENT. + + + +CHAPTER VI. DURATION OF THE COMBAT + +IF we consider the combat no longer in itself but in relation +to the other forces of War, then its duration acquires +a special importance. + +This duration is to be regarded to a certain extent as a +second subordinate success. For the conqueror the combat +can never be finished too quickly, for the vanquished +it can never last too long. A speedy victory indicates a +higher power of victory, a tardy decision is, on the side of +the defeated, some compensation for the loss. + +This is in general true, but it acquires a practical +importance in its application to those combats, the object +of which is a relative defence. + +Here the whole success often lies in the mere duration. +This is the reason why we have included it amongst the +strategic elements. + +The duration of a combat is necessarily bound up with +its essential relations. These relations are, absolute +magnitude of force, relation of force and of the different +arms mutually, and nature of the country. Twenty +thousand men do not wear themselves out upon one +another as quickly as two thousand: we cannot resist an +enemy double or three times our strength as long as one of +the same strength; a cavalry combat is decided sooner than +an infantry combat; and a combat between infantry +only, quicker than if there is artillery[*] as well; in hills +and forests we cannot advance as quickly as on a level +country; all this is clear enough. + +[*] The increase in the relative range of artillery and the +introduction of shrapnel has altogether modified this conclusion. + + +From this it follows, therefore, that strength, relation +of the three arms, and position, must be considered if the +combat is to fulfil an object by its duration; but to set +up this rule was of less importance to us in our present +considerations than to connect with it at once the chief +results which experience gives us on the subject. + +Even the resistance of an ordinary Division of 8000 to +10,000 men of all arms even opposed to an enemy considerably +superior in numbers, will last several hours, if +the advantages of country are not too preponderating, and +if the enemy is only a little, or not at all, superior in +numbers, the combat will last half a day. A Corps of +three or four Divisions will prolong it to double the time; +an Army of 80,000 or 100,000 to three or four times. +Therefore the masses may be left to themselves for that +length of time, and no separate combat takes place if +within that time other forces can be brought up, whose +co-operation mingles then at once into one stream with +the results of the combat which has taken place. + +These calculations are the result of experience; but +it is important to us at the same time to characterise more +particularly the moment of the decision, and consequently +the termination. + + + +CHAPTER VII. DECISION OF THE COMBAT + +No battle is decided in a single moment, although in every +battle there arise moments of crisis, on which the result +depends. The loss of a battle is, therefore, a gradual falling +of the scale. But there is in every combat a point of time + +[*] Under the then existing conditions of armament understood. +This point is of supreme importance, as practically the whole +conduct +of a great battle depends on a correct solution of this +question--viz., +How long can a given command prolong its resistance? If this is +incorrectly answered in practice--the whole manoeuvre depending +on +it may collapse--e.g., Kouroupatkin at Liao-Yang, September 1904. + + +when it may be regarded as decided, in such a way that +the renewal of the fight would be a new battle, not a +continuation of the old one. To have a clear notion on this +point of time, is very important, in order to be able to +decide whether, with the prompt assistance of reinforcements, +the combat can again be resumed with advantage. + +Often in combats which are beyond restoration new +forces are sacrificed in vain; often through neglect the +decision has not been seized when it might easily have +been secured. Here are two examples, which could not +be more to the point: + +When the Prince of Hohenlohe, in 1806, at Jena,[*] with +35,000 men opposed to from 60,000 to 70,000, under +Buonaparte, had accepted battle, and lost it--but lost +it in such a way that the 35,000 might be regarded as +dissolved--General Ruchel undertook to renew the +fight with about 12,000; the consequence was that in a +moment his force was scattered in like manner. + +[*] October 14, 1806. + + +On the other hand, on the same day at Auerstadt, +the Prussians maintained a combat with 25,000, against +Davoust, who had 28,000, until mid-day, without success, +it is true, but still without the force being reduced to a +state of dissolution without even greater loss than the +enemy, who was very deficient in cavalry;--but they +neglected to use the reserve of 18,000, under General +Kalkreuth, to restore the battle which, under these +circumstances, +it would have been impossible to lose. + +Each combat is a whole in which the partial combats +combine themselves into one total result. In this total +result lies the decision of the combat. This success need +not be exactly a victory such as we have denoted in the +sixth chapter, for often the preparations for that have not +been made, often there is no opportunity if the enemy +gives way too soon, and in most cases the decision, even +when the resistance has been obstinate, takes place before +such a degree of success is attained as would completely +satisfy the idea of a victory. + +We therefore ask, Which is commonly the moment of +the decision, that is to say, that moment when a fresh, +effective, of course not disproportionate, force, can no +longer turn a disadvantageous battle? + +If we pass over false attacks, which in accordance with +their nature are properly without decision, then + +1. If the possession of a movable object was the object +of the combat, the loss of the same is always the decision. + +2. If the possession of ground was the object of the combat, +then the decision generally lies in its loss. Still not +always, only if this ground is of peculiar strength, ground +which is easy to pass over, however important it may be +in other respects, can be re-taken without much danger. + +3. But in all other cases, when these two circumstances +have not already decided the combat, therefore, particularly +in case the destruction of the enemy's force is the +principal object, the decision is reached at that moment +when the conqueror ceases to feel himself in a state of +disintegration, that is, of unserviceableness to a certain +extent, when therefore, there is no further advantage +in using the successive efforts spoken of in the twelfth +chapter of the third book. On this ground we have given +the strategic unity of the battle its place here. + +A battle, therefore, in which the assailant has not lost +his condition of order and perfect efficiency at all, or, at +least, only in a small part of his force, whilst the opposing +forces are, more or less, disorganised throughout, is also +not to be retrieved; and just as little if the enemy has +recovered his efficiency. + +The smaller, therefore, that part of a force is which +has really been engaged, the greater that portion which as +reserve has contributed to the result only by its presence. +so much the less will any new force of the enemy wrest +again the victory from our hands, and that Commander +who carries out to the furthest with his Army the principle +of conducting the combat with the greatest economy of +forces, and making the most of the moral effect of strong +reserves, goes the surest way to victory. We must allow +that the French, in modern times, especially when led by +Buonaparte, have shown a thorough mastery in this. + +Further, the moment when the crisis-stage of the combat +ceases with the conqueror, and his original state of +order is restored, takes place sooner the smaller the unit +he controls. A picket of cavalry pursuing an enemy at +full gallop will in a few minutes resume its proper order, +and the crisis ceases. A whole regiment of cavalry requires +a longer time. It lasts still longer with infantry, +if extended in single lines of skirmishers, and longer again +with Divisions of all arms, when it happens by chance that +one part has taken one direction and another part another +direction, and the combat has therefore caused a loss of +the order of formation, which usually becomes still worse +from no part knowing exactly where the other is. Thus, +therefore, the point of time when the conqueror has collected +the instruments he has been using, and which are +mixed up and partly out of order, the moment when he +has in some measure rearranged them and put them in +their proper places, and thus brought the battle-workshop +into a little order, this moment, we say, is always later, +the greater the total force. + +Again, this moment comes later if night overtakes the +conqueror in the crisis, and, lastly, it comes later still if the +country is broken and thickly wooded. But with regard +to these two points, we must observe that night is also +a great means of protection, and it is only seldom that +circumstances favour the expectation of a successful +result from a night attack, as on March 10, 1814, at +Laon,[*] where York against Marmont gives us an example +completely in place here. In the same way a wooded +and broken country will afford protection against a reaction +to those who are engaged in the long crisis of victory. +Both, therefore, the night as well as the wooded and +broken country are obstacles which make the renewal +of the same battle more difficult instead of facilitating it. + +[*] The celebrated charge at night upon Marmont's Corps. + + +Hitherto, we have considered assistance arriving for the +losing side as a mere increase of force, therefore, as a +reinforcement coming up directly from the rear, which is +the most usual case. But the case is quite different if +these fresh forces come upon the enemy in flank or rear. + +On the effect of flank or rear attacks so far as they belong +to Strategy, we shall speak in another place: such a one +as we have here in view, intended for the restoration of the +combat, belongs chiefly to tactics, and is only mentioned +because we are here speaking of tactical results, our ideas, +therefore, must trench upon the province of tactics. + +By directing a force against the enemy's flank and rear +its efficacy may be much intensified; but this is so far +from being a necessary result always that the efficacy +may, on the other hand, be just as much weakened. The +circumstances under which the combat has taken place +decide upon this part of the plan as well as upon every +other, without our being able to enter thereupon here. +But, at the same time, there are in it two things of importance +for our subject: first, FLANK AND REAR ATTACKS HAVE, AS +A RULE, A MORE FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE +DECISION THAN UPON THE DECISION ITSELF. Now as concerns +the retrieving a battle, the first thing to be arrived at +above all is a favourable decision and not magnitude of +success. In this view one would therefore think that a +force which comes to re-establish our combat is of less +assistance if it falls upon the enemy in flank and rear, +therefore separated from us, than if it joins itself to us +directly; certainly, cases are not wanting where it is so, +but we must say that the majority are on the other side, +and they are so on account of the second point which is +here important to us. + +This second point IS THE MORAL EFFECT OF THE SURPRISE, WHICH, +AS A RULE, A REINFORCEMENT COMING UP TO RE-ESTABLISH A COMBAT +HAS GENERALLY IN ITS FAVOUR. Now the effect of a surprise +is always heightened if it takes place in the flank or rear, +and an enemy completely engaged in the crisis of victory +in his extended and scattered order, is less in a state to +counteract it. Who does not feel that an attack in flank +or rear, which at the commencement of the battle, when +the forces are concentrated and prepared for such an event +would be of little importance, gains quite another weight +in the last moment of the combat. + +We must, therefore, at once admit that in most cases a +reinforcement coming up on the flank or rear of the enemy +will be more efficacious, will be like the same weight at +the end of a longer lever, and therefore that under these +circumstances, we may undertake to restore the battle +with the same force which employed in a direct attack +would be quite insufficient. Here results almost defy +calculation, because the moral forces gain completely +the ascendency. This is therefore the right field for +boldness and daring. + +The eye must, therefore, be directed on all these objects, +all these moments of co-operating forces must be taken +into consideration, when we have to decide in doubtful +cases whether or not it is still possible to restore a combat +which has taken an unfavourable turn. + +If the combat is to be regarded as not yet ended, then +the new contest which is opened by the arrival of assistance +fuses into the former; therefore they flow together into +one common result, and the first disadvantage vanishes +completely out of the calculation. But this is not the +case if the combat was already decided; then there are +two results separate from each other. Now if the assistance +which arrives is only of a relative strength, that is, +if it is not in itself alone a match for the enemy, then +a favourable result is hardly to be expected from this +second combat: but if it is so strong that it can undertake +the second combat without regard to the first, then it may +be able by a favourable issue to compensate or even overbalance +the first combat, but never to make it disappear +altogether from the account. + +At the battle of Kunersdorf,[*] Frederick the Great at the +first onset carried the left of the Russian position, and took +seventy pieces of artillery; at the end of the battle both +were lost again, and the whole result of the first combat +was wiped out of the account. Had it been possible to stop +at the first success, and to put off the second part of the +battle to the coming day, then, even if the King had lost +it, the advantages of the first would always have been a +set off to the second. + +[*] August 12, 1759. + + +But when a battle proceeding disadvantageously is +arrested and turned before its conclusion, its minus result +on our side not only disappears from the account, but also +becomes the foundation of a greater victory. If, for +instance, we picture to ourselves exactly the tactical +course of the battle, we may easily see that until it is +finally concluded all successes in partial combats are only +decisions in suspense, which by the capital decision may +not only be destroyed, but changed into the opposite. +The more our forces have suffered, the more the enemy +will have expended on his side; the greater, therefore, +will be the crisis for the enemy, and the more the superiority +of our fresh troops will tell. If now the total +result turns in our favour, if we wrest from the enemy the +field of battle and recover all the trophies again, then +all the forces which he has sacrificed in obtaining them +become sheer gain for us, and our former defeat becomes +a stepping-stone to a greater triumph. The most brilliant +feats which with victory the enemy would have so highly +prized that the loss of forces which they cost would have +been disregarded, leave nothing now behind but regret +at the sacrifice entailed. Such is the alteration which the +magic of victory and the curse of defeat produces in the +specific weight of the same elements. + +Therefore, even if we are decidedly superior in strength, +and are able to repay the enemy his victory by a greater +still, it is always better to forestall the conclusion of a +disadvantageous combat, if it is of proportionate importance, +so as to turn its course rather than to deliver +a second battle. + +Field-Marshal Daun attempted in the year 1760 to +come to the assistance of General Laudon at Leignitz, +whilst the battle lasted; but when he failed, he did not +attack the King next day, although he did not want for +means to do so. + +For these reasons serious combats of advance guards +which precede a battle are to be looked upon only as necessary +evils, and when not necessary they are to be avoided.[*] + +[*] This, however, was not Napoleon's view. A vigorous attack of +his +advance guard he held to be necessary always, to fix the enemy's +attention +and "paralyse his independent will-power." It was the failure to +make this point which, in August 1870, led von Moltke repeatedly +into the +very jaws of defeat, from which only the lethargy of Bazaine on +the one +hand and the initiative of his subordinates, notably of von +Alvensleben, +rescued him. This is the essence of the new Strategic Doctrine of +the +French General Staff. See the works of Bonnal, Foch, &C.--EDITOR + + +We have still another conclusion to examine. + +If on a regular pitched battle, the decision has gone +against one, this does not constitute a motive for +determining on a new one. The determination for this new +one must proceed from other relations. This conclusion, +however, is opposed by a moral force, which we must take +into account: it is the feeling of rage and revenge. From +the oldest Field-Marshal to the youngest drummer-boy +this feeling is general, and, therefore, troops are never +in better spirits for fighting than when they have to wipe +out a stain. This is, however, only on the supposition +that the beaten portion is not too great in proportion to +the whole, because otherwise the above feeling is lost in +that of powerlessness. + +There is therefore a very natural tendency to use this +moral force to repair the disaster on the spot, and on that +account chiefly to seek another battle if other circumstances +permit. It then lies in the nature of the case that +this second battle must be an offensive one. + +In the catalogue of battles of second-rate importance +there are many examples to be found of such retaliatory +battles; but great battles have generally too many other +determining causes to be brought on by this weaker motive. + +Such a feeling must undoubtedly have led the noble +Bluecher with his third Corps to the field of battle on +February 14, 1814, when the other two had been beaten +three days before at Montmirail. Had he known that he +would have come upon Buonaparte in person, then, +naturally, preponderating reasons would have determined +him to put off his revenge to another day: but he +hoped to revenge himself on Marmont, and instead of +gaining the reward of his desire for honourable satisfaction, +he suffered the penalty of his erroneous calculation. + +On the duration of the combat and the moment of its +decision depend the distances from each other at which +those masses should be placed which are intended to fight +IN CONJUNCTION WITH each other. This disposition would be +a tactical arrangement in so far as it relates to one and the +same battle; it can, however, only be regarded as such, +provided the position of the troops is so compact that +two separate combats cannot be imagined, and consequently +that the space which the whole occupies can be +regarded strategically as a mere point. But in War, +cases frequently occur where even those forces intended +to fight IN UNISON must be so far separated from each +other that while their union for one common combat +certainly remains the principal object, still the occurrence +of separate combats remains possible. Such a disposition +is therefore strategic. + +Dispositions of this kind are: marches in separate +masses and columns, the formation of advance guards, +and flanking columns, also the grouping of reserves +intended to serve as supports for more than one strategic +point; the concentration of several Corps from widely +extended cantonments, &c. &c. We can see that the +necessity for these arrangements may constantly arise, +and may consider them something like the small change +in the strategic economy, whilst the capital battles, and +all that rank with them are the gold and silver pieces. + + + +CHAPTER VIII. MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS TO A BATTLE + +NO battle can take place unless by mutual consent; and +in this idea, which constitutes the whole basis of a duel, is +the root of a certain phraseology used by historical writers, +which leads to many indefinite and false conceptions. + +According to the view of the writers to whom we +refer, it has frequently happened that one Commander +has offered battle to the other, and the latter has not +accepted it. + +But the battle is a very modified duel, and its foundation +is not merely in the mutual wish to fight, that is in +consent, but in the objects which are bound up with the +battle: these belong always to a greater whole, and that +so much the more, as even the whole war considered as +a "combat-unit" has political objects and conditions +which belong to a higher standpoint. The mere desire +to conquer each other therefore falls into quite a subordinate +relation, or rather it ceases completely to be anything +of itself, and only becomes the nerve which conveys the +impulse of action from the higher will. + +Amongst the ancients, and then again during the early +period of standing Armies, the expression that we had +offered battle to the enemy in vain, had more sense in it +than it has now. By the ancients everything was constituted +with a view to measuring each other's strength +in the open field free from anything in the nature of a +hindrance,[*] and the whole Art of War consisted in the +organisation, and formation of the Army, that is in the +order of battle. + +[*] Note the custom of sending formal challenges, fix time and +place +for action, and "enhazelug" the battlefield in Anglo-Saxon +times.--ED, + + +Now as their Armies regularly entrenched themselves in +their camps, therefore the position in a camp was regarded +as something unassailable, and a battle did not become +possible until the enemy left his camp, and placed himself +in a practicable country, as it were entered the lists. + +If therefore we hear about Hannibal having offered +battle to Fabius in vain, that tells us nothing more as +regards the latter than that a battle was not part of his +plan, and in itself neither proves the physical nor moral +superiority of Hannibal; but with respect to him the +expression is still correct enough in the sense that Hannibal +really wished a battle. + +In the early period of modern Armies, the relations were +similar in great combats and battles. That is to say, +great masses were brought into action, and managed +throughout it by means of an order of battle, which like +a great helpless whole required a more or less level plain +and was neither suited to attack, nor yet to defence in a +broken, close or even mountainous country. The defender +therefore had here also to some extent the means of +avoiding battle. These relations although gradually becoming +modified, continued until the first Silesian War, +and it was not until the Seven Years' War that attacksan enemy +posted in a +difficult country gradually +became feasible, and of ordinary occurrence: ground did +not certainly cease to be a principle of strength to those +making use of its aid, but it was no longer a charmed +circle, which shut out the natural forces of War. + +During the past thirty years War has perfected itself +much more in this respect, and there is no longer anything +which stands in the way of a General who is in earnest +about a decision by means of battle; he can seek out his +enemy, and attack him: if he does not do so he cannot +take credit for having wished to fight, and the expression +he offered a battle which his opponent did not accept, +therefore now means nothing more than that he did not +find circumstances advantageous enough for a battle, an +admission which the above expression does not suit, but +which it only strives to throw a veil over. + +It is true the defensive side can no longer refuse a +battle, yet he may still avoid it by giving up his position, +and the role with which that position was connected: +this is however half a victory for the offensive side, and +an acknowledgment of his superiority for the present. + +This idea in connection with the cartel of defiance can +therefore no longer be made use of in order by such +rhodomontade to qualify the inaction of him whose part +it is to advance, that is, the offensive. The defender who +as long as he does not give way, must have the credit of +willing the battle, may certainly say, he has offered +it if he is not attacked, if that is not understood of +itself. + +But on the other hand, he who now wishes to, and can +retreat cannot easily be forced to give battle. Now as the +advantages to the aggressor from this retreat are often +not sufficient, and a substantial victory is a matter of +urgent necessity for him, in that way the few means which +there are to compel such an opponent also to give battle are +often sought for and applied with particular skill. + +The principal means for this are--first SURROUNDING the +enemy so as to make his retreat impossible, or at least so +difficult that it is better for him to accept battle; and, +secondly, SURPRISING him. This last way, for which there +was a motive formerly in the extreme difficulty of all +movements, has become in modern times very inefficacious. + +From the pliability and manoeuvring capabilities +of troops in the present day, one does not hesitate to +commence a retreat even in sight of the enemy, and only +some special obstacles in the nature of the country can +cause serious difficulties in the operation. + +As an example of this kind the battle of Neresheim +may be given, fought by the Archduke Charles with +Moreau in the Rauhe Alp, August 11, 1796, merely with a +view to facilitate his retreat, although we freely confess +we have never been able quite to understand the argument +of the renowned general and author himself in this case. + +The battle of Rosbach[*] is another example, if we suppose +the commander of the allied army had not really the +intention of attacking Frederick the Great. + +[*] November 5, 1757. + + +Of the battle of Soor,[*] the King himself says that it was +only fought because a retreat in the presence of the enemy +appeared to him a critical operation; at the same time +the King has also given other reasons for the battle. + +[*] Or Sohr, September 30, 1745. + + +On the whole, regular night surprises excepted, such +cases will always be of rare occurrence, and those in which +an enemy is compelled to fight by being practically surrounded, +will happen mostly to single corps only, like +Mortier's at Durrenstein 1809, and Vandamme at Kulm, +1813. + + + +CHAPTER IX. THE BATTLE[*] + +[*] Clausewitz still uses the word "die Hauptschlacht" but modern +usage employs only the word "die Schlacht" to designate the +decisive +act of a whole campaign--encounters arising from the collision or +troops marching towards the strategic culmination of each portion +or +the campaign are spoken of either as "Treffen," i.e., +"engagements" +or "Gefecht," i.e., "combat" or "action." Thus technically, +Gravelotte +was a "Schlacht," i.e., "battle," but Spicheren, Woerth, Borny, +even Vionville were only "Treffen." + + +ITS DECISION + +WHAT is a battle? A conflict of the main body, but not +an unimportant one about a secondary object, not a mere +attempt which is given up when we see betimes that +our object is hardly within our reach: it is a conflict waged +with all our forces for the attainment of a decisive victory. + +Minor objects may also be mixed up with the principal +object, and it will take many different tones of colour from +the circumstances out of which it originates, for a battle +belongs also to a greater whole of which it is only a part, +but because the essence of War is conflict, and the battle +is the conflict of the main Armies, it is always to be +regarded as the real centre of gravity of the War, and +therefore its distinguishing character is, that unlike all +other encounters, it is arranged for, and undertaken +with the sole purpose of obtaining a decisive victory. + +This has an influence on the MANNER OF ITS DECISION, on +the EFFECT OF THE VICTORY CONTAINED IN IT, and determines THE +VALUE WHICH THEORY IS TO ASSIGN TO IT AS A MEANS TO AN END. + +On that account we make it the subject of our special +consideration, and at this stage before we enter upon the +special ends which may be bound up with it, but which +do not essentially alter its character if it really deserves +to be termed a battle. + +If a battle takes place principally on its own account, +the elements of its decision must be contained in itself; +in other words, victory must be striven for as long as a +possibility or hope remains. It must not, therefore, be +given up on account of secondary circumstances, but only +and alone in the event of the forces appearing completely +insufficient. + +Now how is that precise moment to be described? + +If a certain artificial formation and cohesion of an Army +is the principal condition under which the bravery of the +troops can gain a victory, as was the case during a great +part of the period of the modern Art of War, THEN THE +BREAKING UP OF THIS FORMATION is the decision. A beaten +wing which is put out of joint decides the fate of all that +was connected with it. If as was the case at another time +the essence of the defence consists in an intimate alliance +of the Army with the ground on which it fights and its +obstacles, so that Army and position are only one, then +the CONQUEST of AN ESSENTIAL POINT in this position is +the decision. It is said the key of the position is lost, +it cannot therefore be defended any further; the battle +cannot be continued. In both cases the beaten Armies +are very much like the broken strings of an instrument +which cannot do their work. + +That geometrical as well as this geographical principle +which had a tendency to place an Army in a state of +crystallising tension which did not allow of the available +powers being made use of up to the last man, have at least +so far lost their influence that they no longer predominate. +Armies are still led into battle in a certain order, but that +order is no longer of decisive importance; obstacles of +ground are also still turned to account to strengthen a +position, but they are no longer the only support. + +We attempted in the second chapter of this book to take +a general view of the nature of the modern battle. According +to our conception of it, the order of battle is only +a disposition of the forces suitable to the convenient use +of them, and the course of the battle a mutual slow +wearing away of these forces upon one another, to see +which will have soonest exhausted his adversary. + +The resolution therefore to give up the fight arises, in +a battle more than in any other combat, from the relation +of the fresh reserves remaining available; for only these +still retain all their moral vigour, and the cinders of the +battered, knocked-about battalions, already burnt out in +the destroying element, must not be placed on a level +with them; also lost ground as we have elsewhere said, +is a standard of lost moral force; it therefore comes also +into account, but more as a sign of loss suffered than for +the loss itself, and the number of fresh reserves is always +the chief point to be looked at by both Commanders. + +In general, an action inclines in one direction from the +very commencement, but in a manner little observable. +This direction is also frequently given in a very decided +manner by the arrangements which have been made +previously, and then it shows a want of discernment in +that General who commences battle under these unfavourable +circumstances without being aware of them. Even +when this does not occur it lies in the nature of things that +the course of a battle resembles rather a slow disturbance +of equilibrium which commences soon, but as we have said +almost imperceptibly at first, and then with each moment +of time becomes stronger and more visible, than an +oscillating to and fro, as those who are misled by mendacious +descriptions usually suppose. + +But whether it happens that the balance is for a long +time little disturbed, or that even after it has been lost on +one side it rights itself again, and is then lost on the other +side, it is certain at all events that in most instances the +defeated General foresees his fate long before he retreats, +and that cases in which some critical event acts with unexpected +force upon the course of the whole have their +existence mostly in the colouring with which every one +depicts his lost battle. + +We can only here appeal to the decision of unprejudiced +men of experience, who will, we are sure, assent to what +we have said, and answer for us to such of our readers as +do not know War from their own experience. To develop +the necessity of this course from the nature of the thing +would lead us too far into the province of tactics, to which +this branch of the subject belongs; we are here only +concerned with its results. + +If we say that the defeated General foresees the unfavourable +result usually some time before he makes up his mind +to give up the battle, we admit that there are also instances +to the contrary, because otherwise we should maintain a +proposition contradictory in itself. If at the moment of +each decisive tendency of a battle it should be considered +as lost, then also no further forces should be used to give +it a turn, and consequently this decisive tendency could +not precede the retreat by any length of time. Certainly +there are instances of battles which after having taken a +decided turn to one side have still ended in favour of the +other; but they are rare, not usual; these exceptional +cases, however, are reckoned upon by every General against +whom fortune declares itself, and he must reckon upon +them as long as there remains a possibility of a turn of +fortune. He hopes by stronger efforts, by raising the +remaining moral forces, by surpassing himself, or also by +some fortunate chance that the next moment will bring a +change, and pursues this as far as his courage and his judgment +can agree. We shall have something more to say +on this subject, but before that we must show what are +the signs of the scales turning. + +The result of the whole combat consists in the sum total +of the results of all partial combats; but these results of +separate combats are settled by different considerations. + +First by the pure moral power in the mind of the leading +officers. If a General of Division has seen his battalions +forced to succumb, it will have an influence on his demeanour +and his reports, and these again will have an influence +on the measures of the Commander-in-Chief; therefore +even those unsuccessful partial combats which to all +appearance are retrieved, are not lost in their results, +and the impressions from them sum themselves up in the +mind of the Commander without much trouble, and even +against his will. + +Secondly, by the quicker melting away of our troops, +which can be easily estimated in the slow and relatively[*] +little tumultuary course of our battles. + +[*] Relatively, that is say to the shock of former days. + + +Thirdly, by lost ground. + +All these things serve for the eye of the General as a +compass to tell the course of the battle in which he is +embarked. If whole batteries have been lost and none of +the enemy's taken; if battalions have been overthrown by +the enemy's cavalry, whilst those of the enemy everywhere +present impenetrable masses; if the line of fire +from his order of battle wavers involuntarily from one +point to another; if fruitless efforts have been made to +gain certain points, and the assaulting battalions each, +time been scattered by well-directed volleys of grape and +case;--if our artillery begins to reply feebly to that of the +enemy--if the battalions under fire diminish unusually, +fast, because with the wounded crowds of unwounded men +go to the rear;--if single Divisions have been cut off and +made prisoners through the disruption of the plan of the +battle;--if the line of retreat begins to be endangered: +the Commander may tell very well in which direction he +is going with his battle. The longer this direction +continues, the more decided it becomes, so much the more +difficult will be the turning, so much the nearer the moment +when he must give up the battle. We shall now make +some observations on this moment. + +We have already said more than once that the final +decision is ruled mostly by the relative number of the +fresh reserves remaining at the last; that Commander +who sees his adversary is decidedly superior to him in +this respect makes up his mind to retreat. It is the +characteristic +of modern battles that all mischances and losses +which take place in the course of the same can be retrieved +by fresh forces, because the arrangement of the modern +order of battle, and the way in which troops are brought +into action, allow of their use almost generally, and in +each position. So long, therefore, as that Commander +against whom the issue seems to declare itself still retains +a superiority in reserve force, he will not give up the day. +But from the moment that his reserves begin to become +weaker than his enemy's, the decision may be regarded as +settled, and what he now does depends partly on special +circumstances, partly on the degree of courage and perseverance +which he personally possesses, and which may +degenerate into foolish obstinacy. How a Commander +can attain to the power of estimating correctly the still +remaining reserves on both sides is an affair of skilful +practical genius, which does not in any way belong to this +place; we keep ourselves to the result as it forms itself +in his mind. But this conclusion is still not the moment +of decision properly, for a motive which only arises gradually +does not answer to that, but is only a general motive +towards resolution, and the resolution itself requires still +some special immediate causes. Of these there are two +chief ones which constantly recur, that is, the danger of +retreat, and the arrival of night. + +If the retreat with every new step which the battle +takes in its course becomes constantly in greater danger, +and if the reserves are so much diminished that they are +no longer adequate to get breathing room, then there is +nothing left but to submit to fate, and by a well-conducted +retreat to save what, by a longer delay ending in flight +and disaster, would be lost. + +But night as a rule puts an end to all battles, because a +night combat holds out no hope of advantage except under +particular circumstances; and as night is better suited for +a retreat than the day, so, therefore, the Commander +who must look at the retreat as a thing inevitable, or as +most probable, will prefer to make use of the night for his +purpose. + +That there are, besides the above two usual and chief +causes, yet many others also, which are less or more +individual and not to be overlooked, is a matter of course; +for the more a battle tends towards a complete upset of +equilibrium the more sensible is the influence of each +partial result in hastening the turn. Thus the loss of a +battery, a successful charge of a couple of regiments of +cavalry, may call into life the resolution to retreat already +ripening. + +As a conclusion to this subject, we must dwell for a +moment on the point at which the courage of the Commander +engages in a sort of conflict with his reason. + +If, on the one hand the overbearing pride of a victorious +conqueror, if the inflexible will of a naturally obstinate +spirit, if the strenuous resistance of noble feelings will +not yield the battlefield, where they must leave their +honour, yet on the other hand, reason counsels not to +give up everything, not to risk the last upon the game, +but to retain as much over as is necessary for an orderly +retreat. However highly we must esteem courage and +firmness in War, and however little prospect there is of +victory to him who cannot resolve to seek it by the exertion +of all his power, still there is a point beyond which +perseverance +can only be termed desperate folly, and therefore +can meet with no approbation from any critic. In +the most celebrated of all battles, that of Belle-Alliance, +Buonaparte used his last reserve in an effort to retrieve a +battle which was past being retrieved. He spent his last +farthing, and then, as a beggar, abandoned both the +battle-field and his crown. + + + +CHAPTER X. EFFECTS OF VICTORY (continuation) + +ACCORDING to the point from which our view is taken, we +may feel as much astonished at the extraordinary results +of some great battles as at the want of results in others. +We shall dwell for a moment on the nature of the effect +of a great victory. + +Three things may easily be distinguished here: the +effect upon the instrument itself, that is, upon the +Generals and their Armies; the effect upon the States +interested in the War; and the particular result of these +effects as manifested in the subsequent course of the +campaign. + +If we only think of the trifling difference which there +usually is between victor and vanquished in killed, +wounded, prisoners, and artillery lost on the field of battle +itself, the consequences which are developed out of this +insignificant point seem often quite incomprehensible, and +yet, usually, everything only happens quite naturally. + +We have already said in the seventh chapter that the +magnitude of a victory increases not merely in the same +measure as the vanquished forces increase in number, +but in a higher ratio. The moral effects resulting from the +issue of a great battle are greater on the side of the conquered +than on that of the conqueror: they lead to greater +losses in physical force, which then in turn react on the +moral element, and so they go on mutually supporting +and intensifying each other. On this moral effect we +must therefore lay special weight. It takes an opposite +direction on the one side from that on the other; as it +undermines the energies of the conquered so it elevates +the powers and energy of the conqueror. But its chief +effect is upon the vanquished, because here it is the direct +cause of fresh losses, and besides it is homogeneous in +nature with danger, with the fatigues, the hardships, and +generally with all those embarrassing circumstances by +which War is surrounded, therefore enters into league with +them and increases by their help, whilst with the conqueror +all these things are like weights which give a higher swing +to his courage. It is therefore found, that the vanquished +sinks much further below the original line of equilibrium +than the conqueror raises himself above it; on this +account, if we speak of the effects of victory we allude more +particularly to those which manifest themselves in the +army. If this effect is more powerful in an +important combat than in a smaller one, so again it is +much more powerful in a great battle than in a minor one. +The great battle takes place for the sake of itself, for the +sake of the victory which it is to give, and which is sought +for with the utmost effort. Here on this spot, in this very +hour, to conquer the enemy is the purpose in which the +plan of the War with all its threads converges, in which +all distant hopes, all dim glimmerings of the future meet, +fate steps in before us to give an answer to the bold +question.--This is the +state of mental tension not only of the +Commander but of his whole Army down to the lowest +waggon-driver, no doubt in decreasing strength but also +in decreasing importance. + +According to the nature of the thing, a great battle has +never at any time been an unprepared, unexpected, blind +routine service, but a grand act, which, partly of itself +and partly from the aim of the Commander, stands out +from amongst the mass of ordinary efforts, sufficiently to +raise the tension of all minds to a higher degree. But the +higher this tension with respect to the issue, the more +powerful must be the effect of that issue. + +Again, the moral effect of victory in our battles is +greater than it was in the earlier ones of modern military +history. If the former are as we have depicted them, a +real struggle of forces to the utmost, then the sum total +of all these forces, of the physical as well as the moral, +must decide more than certain special dispositions or +mere chance. + +A single fault committed may be repaired next time; +from good fortune and chance we can hope for more favour +on another occasion; but the sum total of moral and +physical powers cannot be so quickly altered, and, therefore, +what the award of a victory has decided appears +of much greater importance for all futurity. Very probably, +of all concerned in battles, whether in or out of +the Army, very few have given a thought to this difference, +but the course of the battle itself impresses on the +minds of all present in it such a conviction, and the +relation of this course in public documents, however +much it may be coloured by twisting particular circumstances, +shows also, more or less, to the world at large +that the causes were more of a general than of a particular +nature. + +He who has not been present at the loss of a great +battle will have difficulty in forming for himself a living +or quite true idea of it, and the abstract notions of this or +that small untoward affair will never come up to the perfect +conception of a lost battle. Let us stop a moment +at the picture. + +The first thing which overpowers the imagination--and +we may indeed say, also the understanding--is the +diminution of the masses; then the loss of ground, which +takes place always, more or less, and, therefore, on the +side of the assailant also, if he is not fortunate; then the +rupture of the original formation, the jumbling together +of troops, the risks of retreat, which, with few exceptions +may always be seen sometimes in a less sometimes in a +greater degree; next the retreat, the most part of which +commences at night, or, at least, goes on throughout the +night. On this first march we must at once leave behind, +a number of men completely worn out and scattered about, +often just the bravest, who have been foremost in the fight +who held out the longest: the feeling of being conquered, +which only seized the superior officers on the battlefield, +now spreads through all ranks, even down to the common +soldiers, aggravated by the horrible idea of being obliged +to leave in the enemy's hands so many brave comrades, +who but a moment since were of such value to us in the +battle, and aggravated by a rising distrust of the chief, to +whom, more or +less, every subordinate attributes as a fault the fruitless +efforts he has +made; and this feeling of being conquered is no ideal picture +over +which one might become master; it is an evident truth +that the enemy is superior to us; a truth of which the +causes might have been so latent before that they were +not to be discovered, but which, in the issue, comes out +clear and palpable, or which was also, perhaps, before +suspected, but which in the want of any certainty, we +had to oppose by the hope of chance, reliance on good +fortune, Providence or a bold attitude. Now, all this has +proved insufficient, and the bitter truth meets us harsh +and imperious. + +All these feelings are widely different from a panic, +which in an army fortified by military virtue never, and +in any other, only exceptionally, follows the loss of a +battle. They must arise even in the best of Armies, and +although long habituation to War and victory together +with great confidence in a Commander may modify them +a little here and there, they are never entirely wanting +in the first moment. They are not the pure consequences +of lost trophies; these are usually lost at a later period, +and the loss of them does not become generally known so +quickly; they will therefore not fail to appear even when +the scale turns in the slowest and most gradual manner, +and they constitute that effect of a victory upon which +we can always count in every case. + +We have already said that the number of trophies +intensifies this effect. + +It is evident that an Army in this condition, looked at as +an instrument, is weakened! How can we expect that +when reduced to such a degree that, as we said before, it +finds new enemies in all the ordinary difficulties of making +War, it will be able to recover by fresh efforts what has +been lost! Before the battle there was a real or assumed +equilibrium between the two sides; this is lost, and, +therefore, some external assistance is requisite to restore +it; every new effort without such external support can +only lead to fresh losses. + +Thus, therefore, the most moderate victory of the chief +Army must tend to cause a constant sinking of the scale +on the opponent's side, until new external circumstances +bring about a change. If these are not near, if the conqueror +is an eager opponent, who, thirsting for glory, +pursues great aims, then a first-rate Commander, and in +the beaten Army a true military spirit, hardened by many +campaigns are required, in order to stop the swollen +stream of prosperity from bursting all bounds, and to +moderate its course by small but reiterated acts of +resistance, until the force of victory has spent itself at +the goal of its career. + +And now as to the effect of defeat beyond the Army, +upon the Nation and Government! It is the sudden +collapse of hopes stretched to the utmost, the downfall +of all self-reliance. In place of these extinct forces, fear, +with its destructive properties of expansion, rushes into +the vacuum left, and completes the prostration. It is +a real shock upon the nerves, which one of the two athletes +receives from the electric spark of victory. And that +effect, however different in its degrees, is never completely +wanting. Instead of every one hastening with a spirit +of determination to aid in repairing the disaster, every one +fears that his efforts will only be in vain, and stops, +hesitating with himself, when he should rush forward; +or in despondency he lets his arm drop, leaving everything +to fate. + +The consequence which this effect of victory brings forth +in the course of the War itself depend in part on the +character and talent of the victorious General, but more +on the circumstances from which the victory proceeds, +and to which it leads. Without boldness and an enterprising +spirit on the part of the leader, the most brilliant +victory will lead to no great success, and its force exhausts +itself all the sooner on circumstances, if these offer a +strong and stubborn opposition to it. How very differently +from Daun, Frederick the Great would have used the victory +at Kollin; and what different consequences France, +in place of Prussia, might have given a battle of Leuthen! + +The conditions which allow us to expect great results +from a great victory we shall learn when we come to the +subjects with which they are connected; then it will +be possible to explain the disproportion which appears at +first sight between the magnitude of a victory and its +results, and which is only too readily attributed to a want +of energy on the part of the conqueror. Here, where we +have to do with the great battle in itself, we shall merely +say that the effects now depicted never fail to attend a +victory, that they mount up with the intensive strength +of the victory--mount up more the more the whole +strength of the Army has been concentrated in it, the +more the whole military power of the Nation is contained +in that Army, and the State in that military power. + +But then the question may be asked, Can theory accept +this effect of victory as absolutely necessary?--must it +not rather endeavour to find out counteracting means +capable of neutralising these effects? It seems quite +natural to answer this question in the affirmative; but +heaven defend us from taking that wrong course of most +theories, out of which is begotten a mutually devouring +Pro et Contra. + +Certainly that effect is perfectly necessary, for it has +its foundation in the nature of things, and it exists, even +if we find means to struggle against it; just as the motion +of a cannon ball is always in the direction of the terrestrial, +although when fired from east to west part of the general +velocity is destroyed by this opposite motion. + +All War supposes human weakness, and against that +it is directed. + +Therefore, if hereafter in another place we examine +what is to be done after the loss of a great battle, if we +bring under review the resources which still remain, even +in the most desperate cases, if we should express a belief +in the possibility of retrieving all, even in such a case; +it must not be supposed we mean thereby that the effects +of such a defeat can by degrees be completely wiped out, +for the forces and means used to repair the disaster might +have been applied to the realisation of some positive +object; and this applies both to the moral and physical +forces. + +Another question is, whether, through the loss of a great +battle, forces are not perhaps roused into existence, which +otherwise would never have come to life. This case is +certainly conceivable, and it is what has actually occurred +with many Nations. But to produce this intensified +reaction is beyond the province of military art, which +can only take account of it where it might be assumed as +a possibility. + +If there are cases in which the fruits of a victory appear +rather of a destructive nature in consequence of the reaction +of the forces which it had the effect of rousing into +activity--cases which certainly are very exceptional-- +then it must the more surely be granted, that there is a +difference in the effects which one and the same victory +may produce according to the character of the people or +state, which has been conquered. + + + +CHAPTER XI. THE USE OF THE BATTLE (continued) + +WHATEVER form the conduct of War may take in particular +cases, and whatever we may have to admit in the +sequel as necessary respecting it: we have only to refer +to the conception of War to be convinced of what follows: + +1. The destruction of the enemy's military force, is +the leading principle of War, and for the whole chapter of +positive action the direct way to the object. + +2. This destruction of the enemy's force, must be principally +effected by means of battle. + +3. Only great and general battles can produce great +results. + +4. The results will be greatest when combats unite themselves +in one great battle. + +5. It is only in a great battle that the General-in-Chief +commands in person, and it is in the nature of things, +that he should place more confidence in himself than in +his subordinates. + +From these truths a double law follows, the parts of +which mutually support each other; namely, that the +destruction of the enemy's military force is to be sought +for principally by great battles, and their results; and +that the chief object of great battles must be the destruction +of the enemy's military force. + +No doubt the annihilation-principle is to be found more +or less in other means--granted there are instances in which +through favourable circumstances in a minor combat, the +destruction of the enemy's forces has been disproportionately +great (Maxen), and on the other hand in a battle, +the taking or holding a single post may be predominant +in importance as an object--but as a general rule it remains +a paramount truth, that battles are only fought +with a view to the destruction of the enemy's Army, and +that this destruction can only be effected by their +means. + +The battle may therefore be regarded as War concentrated, +as the centre of effort of the whole War or +campaign. As the sun's rays unite in the focus of the +concave mirror in a perfect image, and in the fulness +of their heat; to the forces and circumstances of War, +unite in a focus in the great battle for one concentrated +utmost effort. + +The very assemblage of forces in one great whole, which +takes place more or less in all Wars, indicates an intention +to strike a decisive blow with this whole, either voluntarily +as assailant, or constrained by the opposite party as +defender. When this great blow does not follow, then +some modifying, and retarding motives have attached +themselves to the original motive of hostility, and have +weakened, altered or completely checked the movement. +But also, even in this condition of mutual inaction which +has been the key-note in so many Wars, the idea of a +possible battle serves always for both parties as a point +of direction, a distant focus in the construction of their +plans. The more War is War in earnest, the more it is a +venting of animosity and hostility, a mutual struggle to +overpower, so much the more will all activities join +deadly contest, and also the more prominent in importance +becomes the battle. + +In general, when the object aimed at is of a great and positive +nature, one therefore in which the interests of the enemy +are deeply concerned, the battle offers itself as the most +natural means; it is, therefore, also the best as we shall show +more plainly hereafter: and, as a rule, when it is evaded +from aversion to the great decision, punishment follows. + +The positive object belong to the offensive, and therefore +the battle is also more particularly his means. But +without examining the conception of offensive and defensive +more minutely here, we must still observe that, even +for the defender in most cases, there is no other effectual +means with which to meet the exigencies of his situation, +to solve the problem presented to him. + +The battle is the bloodiest way of solution. True, it is +not merely reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is more a +killing of the enemy's courage than of the enemy's soldiers, +as we shall see more plainly in the next chapter--but +still blood is always its price, and slaughter its character +as well as name;[*] from this the humanity in the General's +mind recoils with horror. + +[*] "Schlacht", from schlachten = to slaughter. + + +But the soul of the man trembles still more at the +thought of the decision to be given with one single blow. +IN ONE POINT of space and time all action is here pressed +together, and at such a moment there is stirred up within +us a dim feeling as if in this narrow space all our forces +could not develop themselves and come into activity, as if +we had already gained much by mere time, although this +time owes us nothing at all. This is all mere illusion, but +even as illusion it is something, and the same weakness +which seizes upon the man in every, other momentous +decision may well be felt more powerfully by the General, +when he must stake interests of such enormous weight +upon one venture. + +Thus, then, Statesmen and Generals have at all times +endeavoured to avoid the decisive battle, seeking either +to attain their aim without it, or dropping that aim +unperceived. Writers on history and theory have then +busied themselves to discover in some other feature in +these campaigns not only an equivalent for the decision +by battle which has been avoided, but even a higher +art. In this way, in the present age, it came very near to +this, that a battle in the economy of War was looked upon +as an evil, rendered necessary through some error committed,a +morbid +paroxysm to which a regular prudent +system of War would never lead: only those Generals +were to deserve laurels who knew how to carry on War +without spilling blood, and the theory of War--a real +business for Brahmins--was to be specially directed to +teaching this. + +Contemporary history has destroyed this illusion,[*] but +no one can guarantee that it will not sooner or later +reproduce itself, and lead those at the head of affairs to +perversities which please man's weakness, and therefore +have the greater affinity for his nature. Perhaps, by-and- +by, Buonaparte's campaigns and battles will be looked +upon as mere acts of barbarism and stupidity, and we shall +once more turn with satisfaction and confidence to the +dress-sword of obsolete and musty institutions and forms. +If theory gives a caution against this, then it renders a +real service to those who listen to its warning voice. MAY +WE SUCCEED IN LENDING A HAND TO THOSE WHO IN OUR DEAR NATIVE +LAND ARE CALLED UPON TO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY ON THESE MATTERS, +THAT WE MAY BE THEIR GUIDE INTO THIS FIELD OF INQUIRY, +AND EXCITE THEM TO MAKE A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THE +SUBJECT.[**] + +[*] On the Continent only, it still preserves full vitality in +the minds +of British politicians and pressmen.--EDITOR. + +[**] This prayer was abundantly granted--vide the German +victories +of 1870.--EDITOR. + + +Not only the conception of War but experience also +leads us to look for a great decision only in a great battle. +From time immemorial, only great victories have led to +great successes on the offensive side in the absolute form, +on the defensive side in a manner more or less satisfactory. +Even Buonaparte would not have seen the day of Ulm, +unique in its kind, if he had shrunk from shedding blood; +it is rather to be regarded as only a second crop from the +victorious events in his preceding campaigns. It is not +only bold, rash, and presumptuous Generals who have +sought to complete their work by the great venture of a +decisive battle, but also fortunate ones as well; and we +may rest satisfied with the answer which they have thus +given to this vast question. + +Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. +If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that +is a ground for paying more respect to War, but not +for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by +degrees from feelings of humanity, until some one steps +in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our +body. + +We look upon a great battle as a principal decision, but +certainly not as the only one necessary for a War or a +campaign. Instances of a great battle deciding a whole +campaign, have been frequent only in modern times, +those which have decided a whole War, belong to the class +of rare exceptions. + +A decision which is brought about by a great battle +depends naturally not on the battle itself, that is on the +mass of combatants engaged in it, and on the intensity of +the victory, but also on a number of other relations +between the military forces opposed to each other, and +between the States to which these forces belong. But +at the same time that the principal mass of the force available +is brought to the great duel, a great decision is also +brought on, the extent of which may perhaps be foreseen +in many respects, though not in all, and which although +not the only one, still is the FIRST decision, and as such, +has an influence on those which succeed. Therefore a +deliberately planned great battle, according to its relations, +is more or less, but always in some degree, to be regarded +as the leading means and central point of the whole +system. The more a General takes the field in the true +spirit of War as well as of every contest, with the feeling +and the idea, that is the conviction, that he must and +will conquer, the more he will strive to throw every +weight into the scale in the first battle, hope and strive +to win everything by it. Buonaparte hardly ever entered +upon a War without thinking of conquering his enemy +at once in the first battle,[*] and Frederick the Great, +although in a more limited sphere, and with interests +of less magnitude at stake, thought the same when, +at the head of a small Army, he sought to disengage +his rear from the Russians or the Federal Imperial +Army. + +[*] This was Moltke's essential idea in his preparations for the +War +of 1870. See his secret memorandum issued to G.O.C.s on May 7. +1870, pointing to a battle on the Upper Saar as his primary +purpose.-- +EDITOR. + + +The decision which is given by the great battle, depends, +we have said, partly on the battle itself, that is on the +number of troops engaged, and partly on the magnitude +of the success. + +How the General may increase its importance in respect +to the first point is evident in itself and we shall merely +observe that according to the importance of the great +battle, the number of cases which are decided along with +it increases, and that therefore Generals who, confident +in themselves have been lovers of great decisions, have +always managed to make use of the greater part of their +troops in it without neglecting on that account essential +points elsewhere. + +As regards the consequences or speaking more correctly +the effectiveness of a victory, that depends chiefly on +four points: + +1. On the tactical form adopted as the order of battle. + +2. On the nature of the country. + +3. On the relative proportions of the three arms. + +4. On the relative strength of the two Armies. + +A battle with parallel fronts and without any action +against a flank will seldom yield as great success as one in +which the defeated Army has been turned, or compelled +to change front more or less. In a broken or hilly country +the successes are likewise smaller, because the power +of the blow is everywhere less. + +If the cavalry of the vanquished is equal or superior to +that of the victor, then the effects of the pursuit are +diminished, and by that great part of the results of victory +are lost. + +Finally it is easy to understand that if superior numbers +are on the side of the conqueror, and he uses his advantage +in that respect to turn the flank of his adversary, or compel +him to change front, greater results will follow than if the +conqueror had been weaker in numbers than the vanquished. +The battle of Leuthen may certainly be quoted +as a practical refutation of this principle, but we beg +permission for once to say what we otherwise do not like, +NO RULE WITHOUT AN EXCEPTION. + +In all these ways, therefore, the Commander has the +means of giving his battle a decisive character; certainly +he thus exposes himself to an increased amount of danger, +but his whole line of action is subject to that dynamic +law of the moral world. + +There is then nothing in War which can be put in comparison +with the great battle in point of importance, AND THE ACME OF +STRATEGIC +ABILITY IS DISPLAYED IN THE PROVISION OF MEANS FOR THIS GREAT +EVENT, IN THE +SKILFUL DETERMINATION OF PLACE AND TIME, AND DIRECTION OF TROOPS, +AND ITS +THE GOOD USE MADE OF SUCCESS. + +But it does not follow from the importance of these +things that they must be of a very complicated and +recondite nature; all is here rather simple, the art of +combination by no means great; but there is great need of +quickness in judging of circumstances, need of energy, +steady resolution, a youthful spirit of enterprise--heroic +qualities, to which we shall often have to refer. There is, +therefore, but little wanted here of that which can be +taught by books and there is much that, if it can be taught +at all, must come to the General through some other +medium than printer's type. + +The impulse towards a great battle, the voluntary, +sure progress to it, must proceed from a feeling of innate +power and a clear sense of the necessity; in other words, +it must proceed from inborn courage and from perceptions +sharpened by contact with the higher interests of +life. + +Great examples are the best teachers, but it is certainly +a misfortune if a cloud of theoretical prejudices comes +between, for even the sunbeam is refracted and tinted by +the clouds. To destroy such prejudices, which many a +time rise and spread themselves like a miasma, is an +imperative duty of theory, for the misbegotten offspring +of human reason can also be in turn destroyed by pure +reason. + + + +CHAPTER XII. STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY + +THE more difficult part, viz., that of perfectly preparing +the victory, is a silent service of which the merit belongs +to Strategy and yet for which it is hardly sufficiently +commended. It appears brilliant and full of renown by +turning to good account a victory gained. + +What may be the special object of a battle, how it is +connected with the whole system of a War, whither the +career of victory may lead according to the nature of +circumstances, where its culminating-point lies--all these +are things which we shall not enter upon until hereafter. +But under any conceivable circumstances the fact holds +good, that without a pursuit no victory can have a great +effect, and that, however short the career of victory may +be, it must always lead beyond the first steps in pursuit; +and in order to avoid the frequent repetition of this, we +shall now dwell for a moment on this necessary supplement +of victory in general. + +The pursuit of a beaten Army commences at the moment +that Army, giving up the combat, leaves its position; +all previous movements in one direction and another +belong not to that but to the progress of the battle itself. +Usually victory at the moment here described, even if it +is certain, is still as yet small and weak in its proportions, +and would not rank as an event of any great positive +advantage if not completed by a pursuit on the first +day. Then it is mostly, as we have before said, that the +trophies which give substance to the victory begin to +be gathered up. Of this pursuit we shall speak in the +next place. + +Usually both sides come into action with their physical +powers considerably deteriorated, for the movements +immediately preceding have generally the character of +very urgent circumstances. The efforts which the forging +out of a great combat costs, complete the exhaustion; +from this it follows that the victorious party is very little +less disorganised and out of his original formation than +the vanquished, and therefore requires time to reform, +to collect stragglers, and issue fresh ammunition to those +who are without. All these things place the conqueror +himself in the state of crisis of which we have already +spoken. If now the defeated force is only a detached +portion of the enemy's Army, or if it has otherwise to +expect a considerable reinforcement, then the conqueror +may easily run into the obvious danger of having to pay +dear for his victory, and this consideration, in such a case, +very soon puts an end to pursuit, or at least restricts it +materially. Even when a strong accession of force by +the enemy is not to be feared, the conqueror finds in the +above circumstances a powerful check to the vivacity of +his pursuit. There is no reason to fear that the victory +will be snatched away, but adverse combats are still +possible, and may diminish the advantages which up to +the present have been gained. Moreover, at this moment +the whole weight of all that is sensuous in an Army, its +wants and weaknesses, are dependent on the will of the +Commander. All the thousands under his command +require rest and refreshment, and long to see a stop put +to toil and danger for the present; only a few, forming +an exception, can see and feel beyond the present moment, +it is only amongst this little number that there is sufficient +mental vigour to think, after what is absolutely necessary +at the moment has been done, upon those results which at +such a moment only appear to the rest as mere embellishments +of victory--as a luxury of triumph. But all these +thousands have a voice in the council of the General, +for through the various steps of the military hierarchy +these interests of the sensuous creature have their sure +conductor into the heart of the Commander. He himself, +through mental and bodily fatigue, is more or less +weakened in his natural activity, and thus it happens +then that, mostly from these causes, purely incidental to +human nature, less is done than might have been done, +and that generally what is done is to be ascribed entirely +to the THIRST FOR GLORY, the energy, indeed also the HARD- +HEARTEDNESS of the General-in-Chief. It is only thus we +can explain the hesitating manner in which many Generals +follow up a victory which superior numbers have given +them. The first pursuit of the enemy we limit in general +to the extent of the first day, including the night following +the victory. At the end of that period the necessity of +rest ourselves prescribes a halt in any case. + +This first pursuit has different natural degrees. + +The first is, if cavalry alone are employed; in that case +it amounts usually more to alarming and watching than +to pressing the enemy in reality, because the smallest +obstacle of ground is generally sufficient to check the +pursuit. Useful as cavalry may be against single bodies +of broken demoralised troops, still when opposed to the +bulk of the beaten Army it becomes again only the auxiliary +arm, because the troops in retreat can employ fresh +reserves to cover the movement, and, therefore, at the next +trifling obstacle of ground, by combining all arms they can +make a stand with success. The only exception to this +is in the case of an army in actual flight in a complete +state of dissolution. + +The second degree is, if the pursuit is made by a strong +advance-guard composed of all arms, the greater part +consisting naturally of cavalry. Such a pursuit generally +drives the enemy as far as the nearest strong position for +his rear-guard, or the next position affording space for his +Army. Neither can usually be found at once, and, therefore, +the pursuit can be carried further; generally, however, +it does not extend beyond the distance of one or at +most a couple of leagues, because otherwise the advance- +guard would not feel itself sufficiently supported. +The third and most vigorous degree is when the +victorious Army itself continues to advance as far as its +physical powers can endure. In this case the beaten Army +will generally quit such ordinary positions as a country +usually offers on the mere show of an attack, or of an +intention to turn its flank; and the rear-guard will be +still less likely to engage in an obstinate resistance. + +In all three cases the night, if it sets in before the conclusion +of the whole act, usually puts an end to it, and the +few instances in which this has not taken place, and the +pursuit has been continued throughout the night, must be +regarded as pursuits in an exceptionally vigorous form. + +If we reflect that in fighting by night everything must be, more +or less, +abandoned to chance, and that at the +conclusion of a battle the regular cohesion and order of +things in an army must inevitably be disturbed, we may +easily conceive the reluctance of both Generals to carrying +on their business under such disadvantageous conditions. +If a complete dissolution of the vanquished Army, or a +rare superiority of the victorious Army in military virtue +does not ensure success, everything would in a manner be +given up to fate, which can never be for the interest of +any one, even of the most fool-hardy General. As a rule, +therefore, night puts an end to pursuit, even when the +battle has only been decided shortly before darkness sets +in. This allows the conquered either time for rest and to +rally immediately, or, if he retreats during the night it gives +him a march in advance. After this break the conquered +is decidedly in a better condition; much of that which +had been thrown into confusion has been brought again +into order, ammunition has been renewed, the whole has +been put into a fresh formation. Whatever further encounter +now takes place with the enemy is a new battle +not a continuation of the old, and although it may be far +from promising absolute success, still it is a fresh combat, +and not merely a gathering up of the debris by the victor. + +When, therefore, the conqueror can continue the pursuit +itself throughout the night, if only with a strong advance- +guard composed of all arms of the service, the effect of +the victory is immensely increased, of this the battles of +Leuthen and La Belle Alliance[*] are examples. + +[*] Waterloo. + + +The whole action of this pursuit is mainly tactical, +and we only dwell upon it here in order to make plain the +difference which through it may be produced in the +effect of a victory. + +This first pursuit, as far as the nearest stopping-point, +belongs as a right to every conqueror, and is hardly in any +way connected with his further plans and combinations. +These may considerably diminish the positive results of a +victory gained with the main body of the Army, but they +cannot make this first use of it impossible; at least cases +of that kind, if conceivable at all, must be so uncommon +that they should have no appreciable influence on theory. +And here certainly we must say that the example afforded +by modern Wars opens up quite a new field for energy. +In preceding Wars, resting on a narrower basis, and altogether +more circumscribed in their scope, there were many +unnecessary conventional restrictions in various ways, +but particularly in this point. THE CONCEPTION, HONOUR OF +VICTORY seemed to Generals so much by far the chief thing +that they thought the less of the complete destruction of +the enemy's military force, as in point of fact that destruction +of force appeared to them only as one of the many +means in War, not by any means as the principal, much +less as the only means; so that they the more readily put +the sword in its sheath the moment the enemy had +lowered his. Nothing seemed more natural to them than +to stop the combat as soon as the decision was obtained, +and to regard all further carnage as unnecessary cruelty. +Even if this false philosophy did not determine their +resolutions entirely, still it was a point of view by which +representations of the exhaustion of all powers, and physical +impossibility of continuing the struggle, obtained +readier evidence and greater weight. Certainly the +sparing one's own instrument of victory is a vital question +if we only possess this one, and foresee that soon the time +may arrive when it will not be sufficient for all that remains +to be done, for every continuation of the offensive must +lead ultimately to complete exhaustion. But this calculation +was still so far false, as the further loss of forces by a +continuance of the pursuit could bear no proportion to +that which the enemy must suffer. That view, therefore, +again could only exist because the military forces were not +considered the vital factor. And so we find that in former +Wars real heroes only--such as Charles XII., Marlborough, +Eugene, Frederick the Great--added a vigorous pursuit +to their victories when they were decisive enough, and +that other Generals usually contented themselves with the +possession of the field of battle. In modern times the +greater energy infused into the conduct of Wars through +the greater importance of the circumstances from which +they have proceeded has thrown down these conventional +barriers; the pursuit has become an all-important business +for the conqueror; trophies have on that account +multiplied in extent, and if there are cases also in modern +Warfare in which this has not been the case, still they +belong to the list of exceptions, and are to be accounted +for by peculiar circumstances. + +At Gorschen[*] and Bautzen nothing but the superiority +of the allied cavalry prevented a complete rout, at Gross +Beeren and Dennewitz the ill-will of Bernadotte, the +Crown Prince of Sweden; at Laon the enfeebled personal +condition of Bluecher, who was then seventy years old and at the +moment +confined to a dark room owing to an injury to his eyes. + +[*] Gorschen or Lutzen, May 2, 1813; Gross Beeren and Dennewitz, +August 22, 1813; Bautzen. May 22, 1913; Laon, March 10 1813. + + +But Borodino is also an illustration to the point here, +and we cannot resist saying a few more words about it, +partly because we do not consider the circumstances are +explained simply by attaching blame to Buonaparte, +partly because it might appear as if this, and with it a +great number of similar cases, belonged to that class which +we have designated as so extremely rare, cases in which the +general relations seize and fetter the General at the very +beginning of the battle. French authors in particular, +and great admirers of Buonaparte (Vaudancourt, Chambray, +Se'gur), have blamed him decidedly because he did +not drive the Russian Army completely off the field, +and use his last reserves to scatter it, because then what +was only a lost battle would have been a complete rout. +We should be obliged to diverge too far to describe +circumstantially +the mutual situation of the two Armies; but +this much is evident, that when Buonaparte passed the +Niemen with his Army the same corps which afterwards +fought at Borodino numbered 300,000 men, of whom now +only 120,000 remained, he might therefore well be apprehensive +that he would +not have enough left to march +upon Moscow, the point on which everything seemed to +depend. The victory which he had just gained gave him +nearly a certainty of taking that capital, for that the +Russians would be in a condition to fight a second battle +within eight days seemed in the highest degree improbable; +and in Moscow he hoped to find peace. No doubt +the complete dispersion of the Russian Army would have +made this peace much more certain; but still the first +consideration was to get to Moscow, that is, to get there +with a force with which he should appear dictator over +the capital, and through that over the Empire and the +Government. The force which he brought with him to +Moscow was no longer sufficient for that, as shown in the +sequel, but it would have been still less so if, in scattering +the Russian Army, he had scattered his own at the same +time. Buonaparte was thoroughly alive to all this, and +in our eyes he stands completely justified. But on that +account this case is still not to be reckoned amongst those +in which, through the general relations, the General is +interdicted from following up his victory, for there never +was in his case any question of mere pursuit. The victory +was decided at four o'clock in the afternoon, but the +Russians still occupied the greater part of the field of +battle; they were not yet disposed to give up the ground, +and if the attack had been renewed, they would still have +offered a most determined resistance, which would have +undoubtedly ended in their complete defeat, but would +have cost the conqueror much further bloodshed. We +must therefore reckon the Battle of Borodino as amongst +battles, like Bautzen, left unfinished. At Bautzen the +vanquished preferred to quit the field sooner; at Borodino +the conqueror preferred to content himself with a +half victory, not because the decision appeared doubtful, +but because he was not rich enough to pay for the whole. + +Returning now to our subject, the deduction from our +reflections in relation to the first stage of pursuit is, that +the energy thrown into it chiefly determines the value of +the victory; that this pursuit is a second act of the +victory, in many cases more important also than the first, +and that strategy, whilst here approaching tactics to receive +from it the harvest of success, exercises the first act of +her authority by demanding this completion of the victory. + +But further, the effects of victory are very seldom +found to stop with this first pursuit; now first begins the +real career to which victory lent velocity. This course is +conditioned as we have already said, by other relations of +which it is not yet time to speak. But we must here mention, +what there is of a general character in the pursuit in +order to avoid repetition when the subject occurs again. + +In the further stages of pursuit, again, we can distinguish +three degrees: the simple pursuit, a hard pursuit, +and a parallel march to intercept. + +The simple FOLLOWING or PURSUING causes the enemy to +continue his retreat, until he thinks he can risk another +battle. It will therefore in its effect suffice to exhaust +the advantages gained, and besides that, all that the enemy +cannot carry with him, sick, wounded, and disabled from +fatigue, quantities of baggage, and carriages of all kinds, +will fall into our hands, but this mere following does not +tend to heighten the disorder in the enemy's Army, an +effect which is produced by the two following causes. + +If, for instance, instead of contenting ourselves with +taking up every day the camp the enemy has just vacated, +occupying just as much of the country as he chooses to +abandon, we make our arrangements so as every day to +encroach further, and accordingly with our advance- +guard organised for the purpose, attack his rear-guard +every time it attempts to halt, then such a course will +hasten his retreat, and consequently tend to increase his +disorganisation.--This it will principally effect by the +character of continuous flight, which his retreat will thus +assume. Nothing has such a depressing influence on the +soldier, as the sound of the enemy's cannon afresh at the +moment when, after a forced march he seeks some rest; +if this excitement is continued from day to day for some +time, it may lead to a complete rout. There lies in it a +constant admission of being obliged to obey the law of +the enemy, and of being unfit for any resistance, and the +consciousness of this cannot do otherwise than weaken the +moral of an Army in a high degree. The effect of pressing +the enemy in this way attains a maximum when it drives +the enemy to make night marches. If the conqueror +scares away the discomfited opponent at sunset from a +camp which has just been taken up either for the main +body of the Army, or for the rear-guard, the conquered +must either make a night march, or alter his position in +the night, retiring further away, which is much the same +thing; the victorious party can on the other hand pass +the night in quiet. + +The arrangement of marches, and the choice of positions +depend in this case also upon so many other things, +especially on the supply of the Army, on strong natural +obstacles in the country, on large towns, &c. &c., that it +would be ridiculous pedantry to attempt to show by a +geometrical analysis how the pursuer, being able to +impose his laws on the retreating enemy, can compel him +to march at night while he takes his rest. But nevertheless +it is true and practicable that marches in pursuit may +be so planned as to have this tendency, and that the efficacy +of the pursuit is very much enchanced thereby. If +this is seldom attended to in the execution, it is because +such a procedure is more difficult for the pursuing Army, +than a regular adherence to ordinary marches in the daytime. +To start in good time in the morning, to encamp +at mid-day, to occupy the rest of the day in providing +for the ordinary wants of the Army, and to use the night +for repose, is a much more convenient method than to +regulate one's movements exactly according to those of +the enemy, therefore to determine nothing till the last +moment, to start on the march, sometimes in the morning, +sometimes in the evening, to be always for several hours +in the presence of the enemy, and exchanging cannon shots +with him, and keeping up skirmishing fire, to plan manoeuvres +to turn him, in short, to make the whole outlay of +tactical means which such a course renders necessary. +All that naturally bears with a heavy weight on the pursuing +Army, and in War, where there are so many burdens +to be borne, men are always inclined to strip off those +which do not seem absolutely necessary. These observations +are true, whether applied to a whole Army or as in +the more usual case, to a strong advance-guard. For the +reasons just mentioned, this second method of pursuit, +this continued pressing of the enemy pursued is rather a +rare occurrence; even Buonaparte in his Russian campaign, +1812, practised it but little, for the reasons here +apparent, that the difficulties and hardships of this campaign, +already threatened his Army with destruction before +it could reach its object; on the other hand, the French +in their other campaigns have distinguished themselves +by their energy in this point also. + +Lastly, the third and most effectual form of pursuit is, +the parallel march to the immediate object of the retreat. + +Every defeated Army will naturally have behind it, at +a greater or less distance, some point, the attainment of +which is the first purpose in view, whether it be that +failing in this its further retreat might be compromised, +as in the case of a defile, or that it is important for the +point itself to reach it before the enemy, as in the case of +a great city, magazines, &c., or, lastly, that the Army +at this point will gain new powers of defence, such as +a strong position, or junction with other corps. + +Now if the conqueror directs his march on this point by +a lateral road, it is evident how that may quicken the +retreat of the beaten Army in a destructive manner, +convert it into hurry, perhaps into flight.[*] The +conquered has only three ways to counteract this: the first +is to throw himself in front of the enemy, in order by an +unexpected attack to gain that probability of success which +is lost to him in general from his position; this plainly +supposes an enterprising bold General, and an excellent +Army, beaten but not utterly defeated; therefore, it can +only be employed by a beaten Army in very few cases. + +[*] This point is exceptionally well treated by von Bernhardi in +his "Cavalry in Future Wars." London: Murray, 1906. + + +The second way is hastening the retreat; but this is +just what the conqueror wants, and it easily leads to +immoderate efforts on the part of the troops, by which +enormous losses are sustained, in stragglers, broken guns, +and carriages of all kinds. + +The third way is to make a detour, and get round the +nearest point of interception, to march with more ease at +a greater distance from the enemy, and thus to render the +haste required less damaging. This last way is the worst +of all, it generally turns out like a new debt contracted +by an insolvent debtor, and leads to greater embarrassment. +There are cases in which this course is advisable; +others where there is nothing else left; also instances in +which it has been successful; but upon the whole it is +certainly true that its adoption is usually influenced +less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest way of +attaining the aim than by another inadmissible motive-- +this motive is the dread of encountering the enemy. +Woe to the Commander who gives in to this! However +much the moral of his Army may have deteriorated, and +however well founded may be his apprehensions of being +at a disadvantage in any conflict with the enemy, the evil +will only be made worse by too anxiously avoiding every +possible risk of collision. Buonaparte in 1813 would never +have brought over the Rhine with him the 30,000 or 40,000 +men who remained after the battle of Hanau,[*] if he had +avoided that battle and tried to pass the Rhine at Mannheim +or Coblenz. It is just by means of small combats +carefully prepared and executed, and in which the defeated +army being on the defensive, has always the assistance of +the ground--it is just by these that the moral strength of +the Army can first be resuscitated. + +[*] At Hanau (October 30, 1813), the Bavarians some 50,000 strong +threw themselves across the line of Napoleon's retreat from +Leipsic. +By a masterly use of its artillery the French tore the Bavarians +asunder +and marched on over their bodies.--EDITOR. + + +The beneficial effect of the smallest successes is +incredible; but with most Generals the adoption of this +plan implies great self-command. The other way, that +of evading all encounter, appears at first so much easier, +that there is a natural preference for its adoption. It is +therefore usually just this system of evasion which best, +promotes the view of the pursuer, and often ends with +the complete downfall of the pursued; we must, however, +recollect here that we are speaking of a whole Army, not +of a single Division, which, having been cut off, is seeking +to join the main Army by making a de'tour; in such a +case circumstances are different, and success is not uncommon. +But there is one condition requisite to the +success of this race of two Corps for an object, which is that +a Division of the pursuing army should follow by the same +road which the pursued has taken, in order to pick up +stragglers, and keep up the impression which the presence +of the enemy never fails to make. Bluecher neglected this +in his, in other respects unexceptionable, pursuit after +La Belle Alliance. + +Such marches tell upon the pursuer as well as the pursued, +and they are not advisable if the enemy's Army +rallies itself upon another considerable one; if it has a +distinguished General at its head, and if its destruction is +not already well prepared. But when this means can be +adopted, it acts also like a great mechanical power. +The losses of the beaten Army from sickness and fatigue +are on such a disproportionate scale, the spirit of the Army +is so weakened and lowered by the constant solicitude +about impending ruin, that at last anything like a well +organised stand is out of the question; every day thousands +of prisoners fall into the enemy's hands without +striking a blow. In such a season of complete good +fortune, the conqueror need not hesitate about dividing +his forces in order to draw into the vortex of destruction +everything within reach of his Army, to cut off detachments, +to take fortresses unprepared for defence, to occupy +large towns, &c. &c. He may do anything until a new +state of things arises, and the more he ventures in this +way the longer will it be before that change will take +place. +is no want of examples of brilliant results from +grand decisive victories, and of great and vigorous +pursuits in the wars of Buonaparte. We need only quote +Jena 1806, Ratisbonne 1809, Leipsic 1813, and Belle- +Alliance 1815. + + + +CHAPTER XIII. RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE + +IN a lost battle the power of an Army is broken, the moral +to a greater degree than the physical. A second battle +unless fresh favourable circumstances come into play, +would lead to a complete defeat, perhaps, to destruction. +This is a military axiom. According to the usual course +the retreat is continued up to that point where the +equilibrium of forces is restored, either by reinforcements, +or by the protection of strong fortresses, or by great defensive +positions afforded by the country, or by a separation +of the enemy's force. The magnitude of the losses +sustained, the extent of the defeat, but still more the +character of the enemy, will bring nearer or put off the instant +of this equilibrium. How many instances may be found +of a beaten Army rallied again at a short distance, without +its circumstances having altered in any way since the +battle. The cause of this may be traced to the moral +weakness of the adversary, or to the preponderance +gained in the battle not having been sufficient to make +lasting impression. + +To profit by this weakness or mistake of the enemy, not +to yield one inch breadth more than the pressure of circumstances +demands, but above all things, in order to keep up +the moral forces to as advantageous a point as possible, +a slow retreat, offering incessant resistance, and bold +courageous counterstrokes, whenever the enemy seeks to +gain any excessive advantages, are absolutely necessary. +Retreats of great Generals and of Armies inured to War +have always resembled the retreat of a wounded lion, +such is, undoubtedly, also the best theory. + +It is true that at the moment of quitting a dangerous +position we have often seen trifling formalities observed +which caused a waste of time, and were, therefore, attended +with danger, whilst in such cases everything depends on +getting out of the place speedily. Practised Generals +reckon this maxim a very important one. But such cases +must not be confounded with a general retreat after a +lost battle. Whoever then thinks by a few rapid marches +to gain a start, and more easily to recover a firm standing, +commits a great error. The first movements should be +as small as possible, and it is a maxim in general not to +suffer ourselves to be dictated to by the enemy. This +maxim cannot be followed without bloody fighting with +the enemy at our heels, but the gain is worth the sacrifice; +without it we get into an accelerated pace which soon +turns into a headlong rush, and costs merely in stragglers +more men than rear-guard combats, and besides that +extinguishes the last remnants of the spirit of resistance. + +A strong rear-guard composed of picked troops, commanded +by the bravest General, and supported by the whole +Army at critical moments, a careful utilisation of ground, +strong ambuscades wherever the boldness of the enemy's +advance-guard, and the ground, afford opportunity; in +short, the preparation and the system of regular small +battles,--these are the means of following this principle. + +The difficulties of a retreat are naturally greater or +less according as the battle has been fought under more +or less favourable circumstances, and according as it has +been more or less obstinately contested. The battle of +Jena and La Belle-Alliance show how impossible anything +like a regular retreat may become, if the last man is used +up against a powerful enemy. + +Now and again it has been suggested[*] to divide +for the purpose of retreating, therefore to retreat in +separate divisions or even eccentrically. Such a separation +as is made merely for convenience, and along with +which concentrated action continues possible and is kept +in view, is not what we now refer to; any other kind is +extremely dangerous, contrary to the nature of the thing, +and therefore a great error. Every lost battle is a principle +of weakness and disorganisation; and the first and +immediate desideratum is to concentrate, and in concentration +to recover order, courage, and confidence. The +idea of harassing the enemy by separate corps on both +flanks at the moment when he is following up his victory, +is a perfect anomaly; a faint-hearted pedant might be +overawed by his enemy in that manner, and for such a +case it may answer; but where we are not sure of this +failing in our opponent it is better let alone. If the +strategic relations after a battle require that we should +cover ourselves right and left by detachments, so much +must be done, as from circumstances is unavoidable, but +this fractioning must always be regarded as an evil, and +we are seldom in a state to commence it the day after +the battle itself. + +[*] Allusion is here made to the works of Lloyd Bullow and +others. + + +If Frederick the Great after the battle of Kollin,[*] and +the raising of the siege of Prague retreated in three columns +that was done not out of choice, but because the position +of his forces, and the necessity of covering Saxony, left +him no alternative, Buonaparte after the battle of +Brienne,[**] sent Marmont back to the Aube, whilst he +himself passed the Seine, and turned towards Troyes; +but that this did not end in disaster, was solely owing to +the circumstance that the Allies, instead of pursuing +divided their forces in like manner, turning with the one +part (Bluecher) towards the Marne, while with the other +(Schwartzenberg), from fear of being too weak, they +advanced with exaggerated caution. + +[*] June 19, 1757. + +[**] January 30, 1814. + + + +CHAPTER XIV. NIGHT FIGHTING + +THE manner of conducting a combat at night, and what +concerns the details of its course, is a tactical subject; +we only examine it here so far as in its totality it appears +as a special strategic means. + +Fundamentally every night attack is only a more vehement +form of surprise. Now at the first look of the thing +such an attack appears quite pre-eminently advantageous, +for we suppose the enemy to be taken by surprise, the +assailant naturally to be prepared for everything which +can happen. What an inequality! Imagination paints +to itself a picture of the most complete confusion on the +one side, and on the other side the assailant only occupied +in reaping the fruits of his advantage. Hence the constant +creation of schemes for night attacks by those who +have not to lead them, and have no responsibility, whilst +these attacks seldom take place in reality. + +These ideal schemes are all based on the hypothesis that +the assailant knows the arrangements of the defender +because they have been made and announced beforehand, +and could not escape notice in his reconnaissances, and +inquiries; that on the other hand, the measures of the +assailant, being only taken at the moment of execution, +cannot be known to the enemy. But the last of these is +not always quite the case, and still less is the first. If we +are not so near the enemy as to have him completely under +our eye, as the Austrians had Frederick the Great before +the battle of Hochkirch (1758), then all that we know of +his position must always be imperfect, as it is obtained by +reconnaissances, patrols, information from prisoners, and +spies, sources on which no firm reliance can be placed +because intelligence thus obtained is always more or +less of an old date, and the position of the enemy may +have been altered in the meantime. Moreover, with the +tactics and mode of encampment of former times it was +much easier than it is now to examine the position of the +enemy. A line of tents is much easier to distinguish than +a line of huts or a bivouac; and an encampment on a line +of front, fully and regularly drawn out, also easier than +one of Divisions formed in columns, the mode often used +at present. We may have the ground on which a Division +bivouacs in that manner completely under our eye, and +yet not be able to arrive at any accurate idea. + +But the position again is not all that we want to know +the measures which the defender may take in the course +of the combat are just as important, and do not by any +means consist in mere random shots. These measures +also make night attacks more difficult in modern Wars +than formerly, because they have in these campaigns an +advantage over those already taken. In our combats +the position of the defender is more temporary than definitive, +and on that account the defender is better able to +surprise his adversary with unexpected blows, than he +could formerly.[*] + +[*] All these difficulties obviously become increased as the +power of +the weapons in use tends to keep the combatants further +apart.--EDITOR. + + +Therefore what the assailant knows of the defensive +previous to a night attack, is seldom or never sufficient +to supply the want of direct observation. + +But the defender has on his side another small advantage +as well, which is that he is more at home than the +assailant, on the ground which forms his position, and +therefore, like the inhabitant of a room, will find his way +about it in the dark with more ease than a stranger. He +knows better where to find each part of his force, and +therefore can more readily get at it than is the case with +his adversary. + +From this it follows, that the assailant in a combat at +night feels the want of his eyes just as much as the +defender, and that therefore, only particular reasons can +make a night attack advisable. + +Now these reasons arise mostly in connection with +subordinate parts of an Army, rarely with the Army itself; +it follows that a night attack also as a rule can only take +place with secondary combats, and seldom with great battles. + +We may attack a portion of the enemy's Army with a +very superior force, consequently enveloping it with a +view either to take the whole, or to inflict very severe loss +on it by an unequal combat, provided that other circumstances +are in our favour. But such a scheme can never +succeed except by a great surprise, because no fractional +part of the enemy's Army would engage in such an unequal +combat, but would retire instead. But a surprise on an +important scale except in rare instances in a very close +country, can only be effected at night. If therefore we +wish to gain such an advantage as this from the faulty +disposition of a portion of the enemy's Army, then we must +make use of the night, at all events, to finish the preliminary +part even if the combat itself should not open till +towards daybreak. This is therefore what takes place +in all the little enterprises by night against outposts, and +other small bodies, the main point being invariably through +superior numbers, and getting round his position, to entangle +him unexpectedly in such a disadvantageous combat, +that he cannot disengage himself without great loss. + +The larger the body attacked the more difficult the +undertaking, because a strong force has greater resources +within itself to maintain the fight long enough for help +to arrive. + +On that account the whole of the enemy's Army can +never in ordinary cases be the object of such an attack for +although it has no assistance to expect from any quarter +outside itself, still, it contains within itself sufficient +means of repelling attacks from several sides particularly +in our day, when every one from the commencement is +prepared for this very usual form of attack. Whether the enemy +can attack us +on several sides with success depends generally on conditions +quite different +from that of its being done unexpectedly; without entering here +into +the nature of these conditions, we confine ourselves to +observing, that with turning an enemy, great results, +as well as great dangers are connected; that therefore, +if we set aside special circumstances, nothing justifies it +but a great superiority, just such as we should use against +a fractional part of the enemy's Army. + +But the turning and surrounding a small fraction of the +enemy, and particularly in the darkness of night, is also +more practicable for this reason, that whatever we stake +upon it, and however superior the force used may be, still +probably it constitutes only a limited portion of our Army, +and we can sooner stake that than the whole on the risk +of a great venture. Besides, the greater part or perhaps +the whole serves as a support and rallying-point for the +portion risked, which again very much diminishes the +danger of the enterprise. + +Not only the risk, but the difficulty of execution as well +confines night enterprises to small bodies. As surprise +is the real essence of them so also stealthy approach is +the chief condition of execution: but this is more easily +done with small bodies than with large, and for the columns +of a whole Army is seldom practicable. For this reason +such enterprises are in general only directed against single +outposts, and can only be feasible against greater bodies +if they are without sufficient outposts, like Frederick the +Great at Hochkirch.[*] This will happen seldomer in future +to Armies themselves than to minor divisions. + +[*] October 14, 1758. + + +In recent times, when War has been carried on with so +much more rapidity and vigour, it has in consequence +often happened that Armies have encamped very close to +each other, without having a very strong system of +outposts, because those circumstances have generally +occurred just at the crisis which precedes a great decision. + +But then at such times the readiness for battle on both +sides is also more perfect; on the other hand, in former +Wars it was a frequent practice for armies to take up camps +in sight of each other, when they had no other object but +that of mutually holding each other in check, consequently +for a longer period. How often Frederick the Great stood +for weeks so near to the Austrians, that the two might +have exchanged cannon shots with each other. + +But these practices, certainly more favourable to night +attacks, have been discontinued in later days; and armies +being now no longer in regard to subsistence and requirements +for encampment, such independent bodies complete +in themselves, find it necessary to keep usually a day's +march between themselves and the enemy. If we now +keep in view especially the night attack of an army, it +follows that sufficient motives for it can seldom occur, +and that they fall under one or other of the following +classes. + +1. An unusual degree of carelessness or audacity which +very rarely occurs, and when it does is compensated for by +a great superiority in moral force. + +2. A panic in the enemy's army, or generally such a +degree of superiority in moral force on our side, that this +is sufficient to supply the place of guidance in action. + +3. Cutting through an enemy's army of superior force, +which keeps us enveloped, because in this all depends +on surprise. and the object of merely making a passage +by force, allows a much greater concentration of forces. + +4. Finally, in desperate cases, when our forces have +such a disproportion to the enemy's, that we see no +possibility of success, except through extraordinary +daring. + +But in all these cases there is still the condition that +the enemy's army is under our eyes, and protected by no +advance-guard. + +As for the rest, most night combats are so conducted +as to end with daylight, so that only the approach and +the first attack are made under cover of darkness, because +the assailant in that manner can better profit by the +consequences of the state of confusion into which he +throws his adversary; and combats of this description +which do not commence until daybreak, in which the night +therefore is only made use of to approach, are not to be +counted as night combats, + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg etext On War, Volume 1. + |