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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, by Karl
+Nordlund
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis
+       A History with Documents
+
+
+Author: Karl Nordlund
+
+
+
+Release Date: April 29, 2007  [eBook #21253]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION
+CRISIS***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Louise Pryor and the Project Gutenberg Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+   There are many typographical and orthographical errors in
+   the original. They are listed at the end of this etext. No
+   corrections have been made.
+
+   In the second part of the book lines of dashes are used to
+   represent omissions in excerpts. There are represented
+   in this etext by [-- -- --] or [-- --].
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS
+
+A History With Documents
+
+by
+
+K. NORDLUND
+PH D.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Upsala & Stockholm
+Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd
+Printed by Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd, Upsala 1905
+
+
+
+
+Author's Introductory Remarks.
+
+
+The following work is intended to give an insight into the
+Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author's endeavour to attain
+this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few
+years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents
+referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to
+the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the
+discussions on the most disputed points are given.
+
+In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen's brochure the author
+does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only
+tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts
+have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number
+of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following
+representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must
+be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not
+disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case.
+
+Upsala. August 1905.
+
+  _The Author._
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+  A. History.
+                                                                   Sid.
+    I. Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden's
+       and Norway's different reform programmes                     1-8
+
+   II. Contents of the charge of 1885 in § 11 of Sweden's
+       Constitution. First development of Consular Question.
+       Union Committee 1895-98                                     8-19
+
+  III. Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of
+       Communiqué                                                 19-28
+
+   IV. Treaties on the identical laws                             29-38
+
+    V. Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular
+       Negatiations                                               38-46
+
+   VI. Development of Crisis this year until the time of the
+       Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag                  46-64
+
+  VII. Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution           64-67
+
+
+  B. Acts.
+
+   1. Acts from Norway's »Grundlov»                                  71
+
+   2. Acts from »Riksakten». (Special laws relating to Union)        72
+
+   3. Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish
+      and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communiqué)          73
+
+   4. Extract from Norwegian Government's proposal referring to
+      identical laws                                                 75
+
+   5. Extract from Boström's reasons for identical laws              76
+
+   6. Extract from Hagerup's Answer                                  77
+
+   7. Extract from Swedish Government's proposal regarding identical
+      laws                                                           78
+
+   8. Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council's Memorandum on account
+      of this proposal                                               79
+
+   9. Extract from Swedish Cabinet's answer                          82
+
+  10. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February
+      1905                                                           83
+
+  11. Crown Prince-Regent's address to Special Committee of
+      Storthing                                                      85
+
+  12. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April
+      1905                                                           86
+
+  13. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Upper Chamber    87
+
+  14. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Lower Chamber    88
+
+  15. Norwegian Government's »proposal» of 17th April 1905           89
+
+  16. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April
+      1905                                                           92
+
+  17. Swedish Riksdag's Statement on Union Question                  93
+
+  18. Norwegian Minister's Notice of resignation                     94
+
+  19. Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th
+      May 1905                                                       94
+
+  20. King's telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government's
+      Statement                                                      97
+
+  21. Norwegian Ministers' announcement to King of resignation       97
+
+  22. King's telegraphic protest                                     98
+
+  23. Storthing's President's proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905  99
+
+  24. Storthing's address to King Oscar                              99
+
+  25. King's telegraphic protest                                    101
+
+  26. Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June
+      1905                                                          101
+
+  27. King's letter to Storthing 10th June 1905                     102
+
+  28. Storthing's reply                                             106
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The object of the Union dispute._]
+
+Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented
+itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in
+reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.
+
+[Sidenote: _The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union._]
+
+The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden,
+from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the
+responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political
+affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians
+on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time
+shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the
+same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of
+detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden,
+that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims
+of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of
+State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial
+Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839
+the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two
+later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side
+complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this
+Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have
+been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844
+concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were
+refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the
+administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more
+general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--,
+NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as »90 years' labour to
+procure a supremacy for Sweden»,--ought to appear in its true
+colours[2:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to
+gain the supremacy._]
+
+The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy
+have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly
+the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union,
+partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.
+
+Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents
+of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union
+itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the
+unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character
+of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or
+less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that
+Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has
+especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from
+the first, placed in Sweden's hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has
+also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian
+writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side
+have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed
+on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right,
+for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under
+this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her
+conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting
+»designs of supremacy».
+
+Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do
+with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most
+extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans--to
+mention one, the late professor OSCAR ALIN--have on different occasions
+maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality
+within the Union, and it must be asserted that _no Swedish political
+party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway_[3:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming
+the Union._]
+
+That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the
+reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable
+oppositions in opinions concerning _the manner_ and _the aim_ for a
+reform.
+
+Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the _entire_ reorganization, Norway the
+_partial_--the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the
+so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden
+has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the
+interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by
+concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not
+gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was
+complete[4:1].
+
+Sweden has furthermore insisted on _negotiations_ and _agreements_, as
+the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself
+to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.
+
+Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the _aim_ of
+the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a
+Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a
+safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing
+overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a
+purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as
+the main object in view.
+
+The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in
+Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian
+programme, especially since 1885.
+
+Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were
+forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to
+the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in
+need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that
+the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State
+for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian
+people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a
+mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the
+political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife.
+The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the
+utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJÖRNSON and
+other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden
+increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJÖRNSON as the only
+enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their
+(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the
+»Norwegians of the Future» buried themselves deeper and deeper in the
+study of »Ancient Glorious Norway». Imagination was fed on Norwegian
+heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of
+Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place
+for renewed worship[5:2].
+
+This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and
+all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and
+the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less
+importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian
+Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the
+Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years
+played a dominating rôle in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the
+more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the
+cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in
+Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were
+scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political
+responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in
+need, of BJÖRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this.
+It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long
+time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the
+King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the
+fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds
+has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at
+the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost
+entirely vanished from the »national junction.»
+
+[Sidenote: _Sweden's later Union policy._]
+
+During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians
+have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
+opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
+accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
+grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
+the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
+might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
+Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
+saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
+the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
+become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
+bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
+into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
+the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
+present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.
+
+But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint
+administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
+possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
+in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
+both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they
+like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
+sort of »_confusion_»; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
+the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
+into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
+extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
+subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
+policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
+insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
+that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
+interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
+disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
+appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents
+of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
+possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
+shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
+the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union
+Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish
+majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented
+itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against
+the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining
+the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the
+present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the
+principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and
+Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by
+Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter
+of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its
+claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on
+account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union,
+but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the
+enticing reward--harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting
+Norway honestly to meet her half way--has been sufficiently uncertain,
+in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a
+remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[2:1] NANSEN (English edition). The same author writes (page 62):
+»Finally in 1903(!) the Swedish Government declared openly that the
+present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway's just demands for
+equality in the Union.» How such a statement can be made is simply
+incomprehensible.
+
+[2:2] How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large numbers of
+lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all.
+
+[2:3] On this account, it has especially been vindicated that the Act of
+Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is scarcely
+possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same Act of
+Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as the head
+of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the »Eidswold
+Constitution», at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph referring
+to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored. This last
+inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory of State
+Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the
+administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his
+turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the
+Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. NANSEN (page 49 and following.) The
+artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is
+exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can
+commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has confered a
+position of importance on the King Himself.
+
+[3:1] The Norwegian Right Side (Conservative) has not either emphatically
+disputed the Swedish conception.
+
+[3:2] Illustrative of the Norwegian way of confusing the Swedish _legal
+conception_ and the Swedish _amendment programme_ in the Union question
+is an expression of NANSEN (page 61). According to him »the Swedish
+government as late as 1891 appeared, as already mentioned, inclined to
+deny Norway every right of taking part in the administration of foreign
+affairs», while in 1893 the Swedish Government offered a joint Minister
+for Foreign Affairs for the Union. The state of the case was, that the
+Swedish Government in 1891 offered Norway _increase_ of influence in
+Foreign affairs, but in motioning this offer the Swedish legal point of
+view was maintained, that the administration of Foreign (diplomatic)
+affairs for the Union by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs was
+founded on legal right. Reflections arise of themselves.
+
+[4:1] Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of Norway's
+fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence. According to
+this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops, that cannot be
+reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed outside the
+boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the more
+pernicous, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have
+illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces,
+by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the
+annual classes of recruits.
+
+[5:1] Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the
+Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be regarded by the
+Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections campaigns.
+
+[5:2] We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the ultra modern
+»glorious» revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was decreed, that
+the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient Kings of Norway.
+In a festival number of a »Vordens Gang» in honour of the revolution we
+find printed a »Psalm on Olaf's Day» written by BJÖRNSON.
+
+[6:1] That Norway in carrying out the law (1899) respecting the flag,
+broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in
+conformity with everything else.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The Consul question._]
+
+The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the
+Union struggles during the last fourteen years--
+
+[Sidenote: _The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885._]
+
+The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the
+Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always
+allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1].
+
+What was it then that happened in 1885?
+
+[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._]
+
+By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also
+in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council
+instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object
+being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully
+represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as
+previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime
+Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when
+foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway
+by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a
+somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately
+offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs,
+which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway
+on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the
+majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason
+for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council
+in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in
+the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's
+leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal
+right[9:1].
+
+But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not
+discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which,
+being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we
+Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to
+be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to
+the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be
+more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could
+receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885
+the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish
+Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more
+dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have
+become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the
+state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary
+responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the
+Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now--
+responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in
+Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885
+was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters
+concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the
+paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with
+greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign
+affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected
+that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's
+foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he
+held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this
+constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters
+concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the
+preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under
+observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions
+taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the
+King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the
+Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a
+manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.
+
+Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary
+control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just
+intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be
+exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But
+the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it
+preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was
+necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their
+hands._]
+
+The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in
+1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran
+leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated
+»to take matters into our own hands». The system was founded on the
+Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs,
+its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved
+with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union
+between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and
+boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having
+granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian
+Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay
+in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway
+were fixed by the Separatists[10:1].
+
+It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able,
+of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and
+dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union
+itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the
+Union. A _Union_ policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely
+revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union.
+Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations
+of fidelity to the Union--the last speech of this sort was heard a
+short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away
+to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of
+duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain.
+
+There was a cautious beginning with »their own Consuls»; it was too
+venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their
+own Minister for Foreign Affairs.
+
+[Sidenote: _The real innecessity of having separate Consuls._]
+
+On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests
+of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is
+an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no
+essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of
+having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter
+in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners--were in opposition for a
+long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the
+Consular Committee's deliberations on the subject before the mercantile
+authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the
+matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that
+»the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of
+benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so
+weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent
+agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested,
+or amongst the masses of the people». There are principally two reasons
+for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different
+Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and
+Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the
+different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and
+not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the
+fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their
+business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give
+reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is
+also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been
+expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the
+Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears,
+that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office,
+partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact _that
+for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls'
+duties have, on Norway's side, been performed by one of the Norwegian
+Government Departements_, proves how vain those fears were.
+
+[Sidenote: _The real object of raising the consular question._]
+
+Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a
+moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides
+the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian
+Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture
+of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth
+striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular
+Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic
+representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. »Directly
+they have got the wedge fixed into the small end», wrote in 1892
+President HANS FORSSELL, »they will try to persuade us that there will be
+no danger in letting them drive it in a bit». Above all they considered
+that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the
+administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the
+dominating rôle interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our
+day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.
+
+[Sidenote: _Want of Union motives for Consular reform._]
+
+The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any
+motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism
+has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and
+its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the
+Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any
+time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have
+usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union
+demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national
+sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right.
+That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees
+become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand
+a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points
+touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway.
+
+[Sidenote: _Misinterpretation of the King's opposition._]
+
+When therefore the King, in the interests of _the Union_, at first
+opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it
+out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only
+the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish
+veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has
+gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this,
+that has brought about the rupture of the Union.
+
+[Sidenote: _The raising of the Consular question in 1891._]
+
+Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which
+at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual
+diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in
+the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision
+by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was
+established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter,
+which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State
+alone; on the other hand the _winding up_ of the joint Consular Service
+would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal
+Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called
+Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which
+according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions »concerning
+the two Kingdoms[14:1].» And this one-sided right of decision was
+maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes--the last in 1886
+--having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact
+that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that
+Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian
+Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might
+certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the
+winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a
+separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it
+would be Norway's prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up;
+Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign
+affairs from the joint Foreign administration.
+
+Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the
+Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed,
+and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the
+Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of
+a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the
+sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there
+began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events
+of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already
+here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the
+revolution, which has now broken out.
+
+[Sidenote: _»The King and the Ministry» according to the Norwegian
+Constitution._]
+
+When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but
+little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council
+and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of
+the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly
+stated in the division of the Constitution. The King's veto over legal
+questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless
+tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly
+responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the
+King's Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of
+his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own
+judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of
+Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for
+instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly
+refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring
+that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the
+King's Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but
+this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement
+of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers
+on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National
+Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize
+something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were
+not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the
+Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment
+a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical
+Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the
+Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this
+means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way
+into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the
+responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must
+naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation
+of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of
+refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the
+old only possible forms.
+
+[Sidenote: _The development of the Consular question._]
+
+Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the
+Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire.
+Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the
+consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently
+set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the
+King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters
+becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the
+initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr
+MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and
+the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian
+masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the
+dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence.
+
+The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on
+having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests
+to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute
+on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences
+»that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present
+constitution». This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on
+behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed
+a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary
+Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced
+intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King's
+opposition, Sweden's and the King's of Sweden, not the King's of the
+United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union.
+It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a
+question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the
+disloyalty of the Radicals to the _Union_ was entirely ignored. The
+Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the
+country.
+
+[Sidenote: _The position in 1895._]
+
+In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete
+standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted
+on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish
+Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to
+an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a
+matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had
+the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of
+her defence which of late years she has neglected.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Union Committee 1895-1908._]
+
+The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing
+in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to
+obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected
+a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The
+Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the
+Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their
+party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish
+Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the
+Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and
+Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the
+opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign
+affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance,
+the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the
+possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the
+Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller
+portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1].
+In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members
+were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both
+Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a
+joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly
+emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be
+personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls
+and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with
+evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate
+the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded,
+that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might
+have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _Norway prepares again to the Consular Question._]
+
+The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for
+another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared
+to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time,
+they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on
+the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of
+State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of
+having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing
+Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for
+Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the
+consequences of which brought about the present crisis.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[8:1] Compare NANSEN (page 48 and following).
+
+[9:1] The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden's
+maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal;
+this has been Norway's right alone.
+
+[9:2] Compare NANSEN (page 54). »The change in the Swedish Constitution
+in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty
+years' strife in the union.»
+
+[10:1] On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885
+adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by
+themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must,
+however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own
+right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and
+Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy.
+This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was
+passed in the _Swedish_ Cabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State
+to the Ministeral Council. The Norwegian claim to participate in the
+revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as
+Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860
+maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or
+changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.
+
+[11:1] Compare NANSEN (page 68 and following).
+
+[12:1] It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it
+has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a
+general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of »the land
+of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.
+
+[14:1] The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint
+Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the
+thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr HAGERUP,
+there has been quite a »sickly» fear of having matters settled there. On
+the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those
+matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being
+distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has
+been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive
+account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether
+it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends
+entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. _This latter
+conception has been adopted of old._
+
+[15:1] Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31.
+
+[18:1] The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of
+Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed
+minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.
+
+[18:2] NANSEN says (page 71) »Divisions arose partly over the resistance
+from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates
+for a separate Consular Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an
+extremely modified version of the truth.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim's Proposal._]
+
+His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM'S proposal implied an attempt to settle the
+Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign
+Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this,
+he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised
+afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work
+of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent
+the old attempts on Norway's side »to take matters into her own hands»,
+to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way
+could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from
+distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to
+have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they
+would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a
+definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the
+grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt.
+The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it
+concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even
+Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the
+Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom
+and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their
+courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals
+prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable
+compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been
+acceptable.
+
+But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable
+difficulties through which to pilot its way.
+
+[Sidenote: _The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the
+Consular Question._]
+
+In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway
+without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a
+wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians
+took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet
+in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be
+discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign
+administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since
+deviated in any way.
+
+In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish
+government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the
+negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the
+Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to
+which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.
+
+But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these
+guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the
+Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as
+deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for
+the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in
+carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid
+inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against
+the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the
+Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from
+a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally
+with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination
+to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day.
+»As to one's rights, no one negotiates». This has become well nigh the
+axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to
+one and all of her demands.--
+
+[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._]
+
+In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to
+convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two
+Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to
+how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United
+Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present
+joint diplomatic representatives.
+
+The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It
+declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to
+give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the
+arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the
+same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in
+order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to
+describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain
+circumstances and nothing more.
+
+The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own
+consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would
+be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these
+alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look
+at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit
+of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under
+authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be
+an »anomaly». The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it,
+nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the
+advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by
+continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration
+of the Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very
+imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for
+instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving
+instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first
+to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom
+rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of
+Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary
+when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with
+Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts
+on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an
+extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the
+total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the
+Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian
+Consular Service would »duly value the importance of a loyal
+co-operation.»
+
+It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be
+considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the
+more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any
+reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the
+Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of
+a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's
+conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish
+side for the solution of the question[22:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian
+delegates._]
+
+Mr. BOSTRÖM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the
+autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced
+between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The
+conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined
+and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in
+Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the
+matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual
+agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off
+on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the
+Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well
+known so-called Communiqué[23:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _The Communiqué._]
+
+This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the
+preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though
+it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments
+themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the
+Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.
+
+Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the
+Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of
+Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general
+agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign
+affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the
+Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe
+for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in
+January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were
+evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a
+Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare
+that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in
+itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent
+in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be
+»not impossible» that under certain circumstances a system with different
+Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the
+most important advantage of the political agreement between the two
+countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the
+question on the following basis:
+
+1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
+
+2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities of both Kingdoms.
+
+It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the
+position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should
+remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the
+establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to
+regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.
+The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do
+not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time
+secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and
+the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].
+
+When the Communiqué was issued, it was received with very great diversity
+of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions
+which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the
+agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held,
+contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially
+concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and
+as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great
+importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give
+some enlightenment on the point.
+
+In the first part of the Communiqué, which decribes the offer of the
+Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of
+the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic
+representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be
+_altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of
+both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws »which
+cannot be altered by one of the parties», the word 'abolish' does not
+occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission
+had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTRÖM, in the
+Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the
+Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended
+on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania
+under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have
+given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full
+contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions
+in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must
+necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was
+afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should
+be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been
+significant only through the connection which may be found to exist
+between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the
+extent to which the laws were to be changeable.
+
+The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by
+the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have
+her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to
+appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were
+based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign
+affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the
+Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of
+Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the
+suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would
+become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in
+the matter.
+
+In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqué to force Norway to
+a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through
+negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to
+continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?
+
+In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
+too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
+be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he
+might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws
+will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
+matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
+the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that
+they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
+out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
+the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
+could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
+whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP,
+and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
+negotiations.
+
+Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqué? It is
+evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
+importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
+Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
+the Communiqué must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
+authority.
+
+On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
+been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
+assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
+among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
+foreign administration »into her own hands_.» The great fear of such a
+contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
+this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
+informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
+confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
+by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqué by
+the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
+vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
+Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
+Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
+Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
+Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
+loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
+question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
+from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
+to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2],
+without an agreement with Sweden.
+
+How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
+could interpret the Communiqué as it did?
+
+As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
+is impossible to make any definite assertions.
+
+The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
+Communiqué did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
+right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could
+scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the
+Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of
+that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
+protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
+remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to
+the wording of the Communiqué on that point, and the Norwegian
+governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
+especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
+Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
+idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
+scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the
+Communiqué_.
+
+Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact
+remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect
+by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqué_. This must be kept strictly
+in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to
+be obtained.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have
+especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJÖRNSON.
+
+[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN,
+who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the
+Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador
+BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AMÉEN in Barcelona,
+and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp.
+
+[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that
+they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.
+
+[22:1] NANSEN evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64):
+»No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore,
+follows that even the _Swedish Commissioners_ did not think it
+incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate
+Consuls». And, of course, he mentions, »the _unanimous conclusion_ of the
+committee of experts from _both_ countries» (p. 72).
+
+[23:1] N:o 3.
+
+[23:2] The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTRÖM, the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian
+members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries
+KNUDSEN and IBSEN
+
+[24:1] N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communiqué, which are
+conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish
+government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN.
+
+[25:1] The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have
+been proposed at more recent dates.
+
+[26:1] It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of
+identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained,
+especially the Radicals, of that »Massive instrument.»
+
+[27:1] In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER
+said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing
+respecting; the Communiqué before its publication was made known to the
+Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on,
+had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply
+replied, that »Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the
+Norwegian government on the subject of the Communiqué.»
+
+[27:2] Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the
+Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr
+BOSTRÖM'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in
+the Communiqué it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be
+valid only »so long as the present system of foreign administration
+existed.» When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition,
+it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be
+valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in
+the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all
+intents unacceptable.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communiqué in Sweden and Norway._]
+
+Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was
+supposed to characterise the Communiqué, its general contents roused no
+unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate,
+serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the
+Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister
+Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home)
+was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless
+referred to the resolution of 1893.
+
+Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known
+there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the
+cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.
+Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqué, the Norwegian Radicals
+immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again
+solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.
+
+However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was
+started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards
+negotiating, and even BJÖRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause
+of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical
+Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was
+suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for
+negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though
+not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the
+Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable,
+impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old
+Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the
+elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then
+became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as
+Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the
+leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a
+powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in
+no favourable direction.
+
+[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communiqué._]
+
+In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms
+were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the
+basis of the Communiqué. They were carried on slowly during the Spring
+1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the
+proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government
+the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.
+
+[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign
+affairs to the Consular service._]
+
+It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real
+authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the
+Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest
+of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a
+purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was
+responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should
+be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way
+connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to
+hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development,
+from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration
+within the Union.
+
+The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign
+Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in
+Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong
+efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union
+Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the
+direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all
+matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same
+conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve
+the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile
+part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained
+intact[30:1].
+
+But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one
+it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had
+postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a
+deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest
+the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and
+mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now
+arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would
+be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the
+Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most
+remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian
+opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an »anomaly»,
+in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made
+it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part
+of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State
+Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.
+
+From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the
+right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere
+forms. The evasive talk of the »spirit» of constitutional law, and the
+administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in
+public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very
+great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold
+in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of
+Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must
+presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its
+branches_.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]
+
+The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the
+Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this
+proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should
+regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders
+issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.
+
+Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic
+character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the
+report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter,
+under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.
+Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no
+account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.
+
+This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection
+between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration
+was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever
+that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come
+into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a
+deficiency so much the more serious as the Act § 1--c allowed the
+Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less
+diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to
+Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.
+
+Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the
+Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to
+secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not
+compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause
+for declaring from the Swedish side, »that the proposition includes
+scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the
+Communiqué, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their
+office», and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the
+acknowledged principles of the Communiqué_.
+
+[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]
+
+From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet
+there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not
+accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must
+have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil
+would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the
+question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno,
+till the autumn.
+
+During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of
+opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation
+was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In
+November His Excellency Mr BOSTRÖM went to Christiania and presented his
+conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if
+the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions
+stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the
+Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the
+Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to
+disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers,
+the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King,
+recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases,
+should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].
+
+After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP
+made a written statement of his objections.
+
+[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]
+
+In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the
+Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical
+manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance,
+though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee,
+emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the
+Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest
+acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the
+results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a
+single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be
+acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy
+the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions
+would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to
+international and common law principles, and declared that from a
+national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the
+present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets
+that Mr BOSTRÖM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not
+touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil
+Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic
+Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTRÖM, would very
+seldom occur.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]
+
+It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTRÖM'S demand, that the
+King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to
+dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian
+susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to
+the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's
+Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to
+Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers,
+as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for
+identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.
+
+The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict
+with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it
+naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the
+Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further,
+the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions,
+suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not
+necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors,
+though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of
+view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On
+the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great
+consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United
+Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before
+the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the
+King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs
+of that State.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]
+
+What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently
+perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]
+
+It declares that it »stands to reason» that the Norwegian Consular Office
+would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to
+presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish
+proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have
+been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who
+is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more
+important points the unsuitability of a »hierarchal» relation between
+Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of
+the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the
+Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian
+government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that
+the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to
+refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest
+in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of
+course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of
+the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqué. Finally the
+Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions
+unacceptable, and adds, that »if they should be adhered to further
+discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless»[36:1]. Really a
+formal ultimatum!
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]
+
+Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's
+Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the
+subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the
+liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try,
+if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of
+the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af
+decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet
+firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially
+emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the
+power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the
+limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly
+indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend
+operations into departments that had previously been considered as
+belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian
+Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian
+Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was
+met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for
+Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls
+instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of
+affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of
+Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the
+unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the
+guarantees presupposed by the Communiqué that the Consuls shall not
+exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on
+Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by
+the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of
+that kind was not intended in the Communiqué, as it had nothing to do
+with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian
+Consular Office.
+
+On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to
+modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions
+of the Communiqué. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making
+on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions,
+but their essential items must »be adhered to». The Cabinet does not
+consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally
+to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]
+
+To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the
+reply, »that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further
+communication on the matter.»
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in
+the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: »Our own Norwegian
+Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the
+relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is
+hereby declared established».
+
+[31:1] N:o 4.
+
+[33:1] N:o 5.
+
+[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTRÖM'S Memorandum were rejected by the
+Norwegian side. They ran as follows:
+
+1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the
+Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think
+necessary.
+
+2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and
+Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as
+these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the
+King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers.
+
+3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by
+Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign conntry had not
+been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions.
+--Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because
+the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTRÖM were not,
+according to his own account, so very insurmountable.
+
+[34:1] N:o 6.
+
+[34:2] N:o 7.
+
+[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.
+
+[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations
+(page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It
+can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the
+subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply
+the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish
+Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.
+
+[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations
+would have remained unwritten!
+
+[36:1] N:o 8.
+
+[36:2] N:o 9
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]
+
+The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway,
+and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.
+
+Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it
+made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.
+Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe--
+thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the
+European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish
+government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness
+etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then
+already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.
+
+Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?
+
+[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]
+
+The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the
+Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this
+it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its
+demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally,
+therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible
+party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum,
+did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely
+inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition
+in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the
+Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further
+negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side,
+that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the
+form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of
+points of minor importance.
+
+The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may
+now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting
+only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of
+negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains
+to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their
+lawful rights.
+
+The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish
+government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the
+breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that
+result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish
+final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may
+assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part
+of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter
+on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the
+government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting
+concessions.
+
+It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could
+not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations
+it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian
+political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a
+defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish
+government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the
+proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the
+Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure
+position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in
+the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish
+government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on
+the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old
+standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction
+with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to
+the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that
+it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of
+the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical
+laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular
+office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be
+provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This
+question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling
+to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian
+Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the
+Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its
+original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign
+affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTRÖM'S demands ought
+undoubtedly to be seen.
+
+It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian
+government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish
+government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish
+Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the
+Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an
+expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its
+own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from
+the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old
+Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by
+the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were
+dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the
+negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the
+negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the
+Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old
+lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of
+taking matters into their own hands.
+
+[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken
+the covenant of the Communiqué._]
+
+But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators'
+(especially Mr BOSTRÖM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the
+negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was
+loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word,
+had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden
+became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically
+pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation
+contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest
+by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of
+plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent,
+but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the
+responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its
+true light.
+
+The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on
+the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communiqué
+to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the
+same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian
+demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This
+supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communiqué naturally
+implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be
+satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however,
+typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way
+by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing
+negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very
+amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of
+the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communiqué.
+»Norwegians», he said, »are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with
+them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken
+great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their
+demands».
+
+Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had
+violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the
+Communiqué[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the
+negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations,
+and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he
+announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The
+Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and
+offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded
+the terms of the Communiqué. But the Norwegian government failed to
+produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.
+
+What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the
+Communiqué that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority
+of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned
+shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish
+government's evident plans to arrange a »hierarchal» relationship between
+the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself,
+undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an
+honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the
+light of their relation to the whole matter.
+
+Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communiqué confirms among
+other things that they shall »give guarantee that the Consuls do not
+exceed the proper limits of their occupation.» What guarantee? The
+Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision
+in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best
+guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian
+Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object:
+»that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communiqué, as this
+had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian
+consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the
+Communiqué mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised
+by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls».
+
+If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult
+to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the
+Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not
+exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs
+were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal
+relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive
+for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish
+government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this
+interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct
+orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a
+hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian
+Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a
+concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communiqué. It had already been
+made before the Communiqué was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be
+included in the frame of the Communiqué. The so much-disputed claims of
+Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional
+conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within
+the frame of the Communiqué.
+
+In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for
+breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the
+Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the
+agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and
+Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the
+preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been
+made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets,
+before the Communiqué existed.
+
+It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the
+negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct
+opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the
+breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the
+references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the
+Norwegian Storthing.
+
+The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the
+Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared
+that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the
+28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be
+accepted by the Swedish Cabinet »it would find no support from
+admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates.» Now, there
+were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the
+contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite
+Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian
+Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the
+origin of the Communiqué, to the feigned conclusions of which the
+Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was
+the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the
+proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the
+contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired
+into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a
+»preliminary», as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that
+the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish
+Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the
+origin of the Communiqué, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.
+The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred,
+seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly
+adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister
+to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined
+themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their
+agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet
+with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian
+Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not
+even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to
+them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally
+understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his
+Excellency BOSTRÖM brought forward casually several of the questions
+which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the
+right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made
+objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular
+Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and
+during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended
+laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two
+Cabinets[45:1].
+
+Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained
+in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting
+the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, »must be subjected to
+further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature».
+
+According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the
+Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also
+add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build
+the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTRÖM
+of breach of agreement[45:2].
+
+With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the
+Communiqué and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the
+Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the
+Communiqué to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different
+quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in
+unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communiqué it was not
+intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during
+these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as
+the general decisions of the Communiqué, sensibly interpreted, were
+observed.
+
+To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if
+it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before
+the existence of the Communiqué, it was on account of the binding nature
+of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has
+endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view,
+that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the
+Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the
+laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose
+that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual
+termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of
+the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be
+granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status
+quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the
+interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communiqué,
+these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it
+may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact
+too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the
+prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.
+
+Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of
+the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian
+revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are
+unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which
+was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin
+air.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[41:1] NANSEN (page 76): »The Swedish draft contained a number of demands
+quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and
+object of the negotiations.»
+
+[45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this
+way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed
+Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as »quite preliminary».
+
+[45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet
+were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these
+preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C.
+BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard
+both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a
+quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular
+negotiations._]
+
+The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian
+politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close
+connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in
+Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in
+comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as
+extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in
+critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's
+part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the
+Consular question would rouse their passions
+
+It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the
+situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful
+and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating
+that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their
+fruit_.
+
+In these days much is said of »necessity» in the development of events.
+»Necessity», it is said, »has been stronger than the wishes of
+individuals». To those who in any degree believe in personal influence
+and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of
+history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to
+the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LÖVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to
+the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any
+leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_
+public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard
+to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to
+do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The
+Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.
+
+The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and
+designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid
+how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering
+of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been
+discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it
+be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been
+set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken
+off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in
+Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening
+danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance
+of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid
+to rest.
+
+That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place
+became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the
+systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of
+Swedish hatred and »national persecution», which in Christiania were held
+in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a
+Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the
+government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of
+breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.
+A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that
+the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as
+an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but
+their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned.
+In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian
+opinion a tone of unreasonableness.
+
+Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation
+shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very
+tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the
+negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to
+express his hearty wishes, »that the two Kingdoms which could soon
+celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences
+of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the
+independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its
+two peoples». To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken
+the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making
+this speech[48:2].
+
+A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now
+dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous
+on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins,
+that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to
+actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not
+choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the
+peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's
+breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of
+personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which
+Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case,
+artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and
+the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.
+
+[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._]
+
+In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister
+for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause
+of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign
+policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming
+negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign
+affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side
+all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first
+stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the
+break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of
+the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of
+Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from
+the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr
+HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under
+the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered
+that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led
+to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to
+continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain
+»more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations», in
+other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said
+he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union
+Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he
+announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed
+it when he resigned in March.
+
+A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and
+even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would
+not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the
+possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more
+independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was
+responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the
+matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms
+presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further
+consideration[50:1].
+
+But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be
+favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the
+termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called
+Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of
+this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and
+therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHÖNING at the end
+of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his
+resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.
+
+The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the
+negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity
+of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading
+politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the
+matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee
+appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction
+that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the
+preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was
+not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two
+peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the
+Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be
+entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.
+
+The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect,
+but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by
+informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was
+of no »Constitutional importance», and shrewdly trying to prove that the
+Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that
+manner[51:1].
+
+Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans
+before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the
+negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to
+consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the
+man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet
+consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers,
+however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LÖVLAND, were rank radicals. In the
+beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were
+able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a
+novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to
+take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into
+»their own hands».
+
+In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here
+twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to
+decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown
+Prince Regent on the matter.
+
+On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the
+joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open
+negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the
+Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign
+affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared
+himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the
+matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to
+remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the
+continuance of the Union[52:1].
+
+On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime
+Minister BOSTRÖM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially
+been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the
+hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was
+immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both
+Chambers of the Diet[52:2].
+
+_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway,
+for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in
+terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years
+back_[52:3].
+
+But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal
+was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of
+the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are
+typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of
+which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of
+Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian
+demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially
+»given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of
+similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the
+good relations existent between the two peoples». The Norwegian
+government knows what means to employ to produce »these good relations»,
+namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated
+in the past. This accomplished, »that confidence, which is the mainspring
+of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate
+relations in a Union, will have revived». Norway is thus always the
+injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might
+have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union
+Policy[53:1].
+
+In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned
+statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible,
+for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated
+imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the
+object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but
+they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply
+deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.
+
+In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the
+above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they
+had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored
+the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible
+that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead
+eventually to more favourable results.
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._]
+
+While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made
+to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being
+carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the
+side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was
+not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were
+heard hesitations.
+
+Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and
+unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a
+most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's
+side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an
+opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English
+newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home,
+that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that.
+
+[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._]
+
+When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the
+Storthing presented their proposals.
+
+This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the
+first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added
+were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not
+have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the
+beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that
+is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a
+separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile
+shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be
+exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was
+adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be
+presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being
+that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before
+the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But
+there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of
+the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill
+three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered
+resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his
+assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had
+of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as
+1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the
+Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime
+Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of
+Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence
+to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto
+was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be
+brought to a climax.
+
+The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to
+the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
+Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
+imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
+declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
+many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
+intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
+Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
+with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
+previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first
+be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
+agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
+take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
+if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
+proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs.
+
+[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]
+
+The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being
+revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
+resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards
+the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
+consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
+Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
+unreasonable.
+
+To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a
+revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
+Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far
+more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
+background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
+shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
+interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he
+should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
+the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
+King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
+'No', »it cannot», Mr NANSEN says, »be the result of Norwegian influence,
+_but on account of Swedish pressure_»[56:1]. Here we are met by the
+dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
+the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining
+the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards
+the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of
+Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling
+motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King
+has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more
+faithfully than King OSCAR II.
+
+_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the
+Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by
+this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they
+cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the
+basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness
+of this is sufficiently evident.
+
+[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._]
+
+The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was
+fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National
+revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania,
+especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be
+no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway,
+and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand
+persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on
+a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway
+in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!
+
+These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the
+Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any
+debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to
+protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest.
+
+With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP
+pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the
+decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently
+found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as
+to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to
+these eventualities--which might exceed both the Constitution and the
+Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the
+Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a
+change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few
+in the minority made known their different views, and among them the
+Shipowner JÖRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons
+for dissolving the joint Consular Service.
+
+But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment
+was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed
+unanimously.
+
+[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._]
+
+Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters
+as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of
+the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted
+with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's
+reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of
+NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said,
+»would really refuse Norway her right» seemed rather unnatural.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_]
+
+On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in
+Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the
+Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint
+Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of
+the Union § 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty
+with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet
+raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's
+loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a
+violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would
+undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon,
+sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to
+allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then
+ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King
+maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his
+veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the
+Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on
+their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the
+fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing
+countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances,
+only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full
+consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].
+
+[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._]
+
+Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the
+extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional
+law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was
+furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his
+decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from
+constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules
+of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation
+of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King,
+meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--»now»--
+form a new Ministry.
+
+This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign,
+undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the
+beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_
+--had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals
+to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also
+without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their
+post till the King released them. For, according to the general
+constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who
+releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.
+
+It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all
+the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law
+was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed
+the King that they resigned office_[59:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._]
+
+Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their
+inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their
+opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and
+declared themselves to be 'free men' entitled to the right to resign
+office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this
+proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the
+Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played
+out.
+
+On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their
+resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little
+word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared
+himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion
+that the Constitutional Royal Power was »no longer effectual», on which
+the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government,
+which, according to Constitutional law, was the King's prerogative alone.
+The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.
+King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration
+followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all
+communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to
+deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied
+that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary
+Storthing[60:6].
+
+It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.
+They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!
+
+The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the
+Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the
+principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first
+paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.
+
+The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden,
+or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the
+Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this
+last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription
+that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of
+State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the
+freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of
+the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].
+
+As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of
+laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that
+country.
+
+[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._]
+
+On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.
+In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to
+meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly
+emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply
+violated Sweden's rights.
+
+The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address
+to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King
+maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to
+the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the
+capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had
+considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As
+Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition
+to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the
+Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden »if
+Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_
+dissolution».
+
+[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._]
+
+The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the
+Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality
+to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people
+entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and
+appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on
+both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by
+their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.
+
+The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have
+received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming
+mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a
+good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had
+formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of
+the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different
+in all respects.
+
+The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since,
+step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and
+therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish
+government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume
+negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in
+case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on
+this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on
+Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had
+already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?
+
+In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations
+are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled.
+Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the
+situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his
+veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to
+the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an
+eventual negotiation. It should be carried on »_on an entirely free basis
+with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any
+reservation or restriction whatever_», and among other matters, it was
+stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should
+be able to decide, of its own accord, »the future form of its national
+existence.» Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the
+Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the
+contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would
+break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this
+_method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature
+threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime
+Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on
+the Norwegian side »as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.»
+The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that
+the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account
+that he refused to negotiate.
+
+But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af
+the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility
+for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of
+which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden,
+this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the
+majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this
+was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April,
+when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the
+Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto;
+the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time
+beforehand.--
+
+On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost
+entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions
+refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a
+Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.
+
+[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the
+members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.
+
+[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ
+HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to
+notice.
+
+[48:2] N:o 10.
+
+[49:1] N:o 10.
+
+[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward
+in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14.
+
+[50:2] N:o 11.
+
+[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the document in his book.
+
+[51:2] N:o 12.
+
+[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a
+compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a
+Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union
+policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign
+affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.
+The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at
+the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical
+representatives.
+
+[52:2] N:o 13 and 14.
+
+[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against
+this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after
+the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by
+Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as
+it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must
+nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_
+guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet,
+partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to
+carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the
+Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that »the last
+Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a
+decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of
+the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this
+Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than
+the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee.
+Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
+
+[53:1] N:o 15.
+
+[53:2] N:o 16.
+
+[54:1] N:o 17.
+
+[55:1] Page 14.
+
+[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93).
+
+[58:1] NANSEN page 93.
+
+[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete
+report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of
+the Cabinet.
+
+Compare with N:o 19.
+
+[58:3] N:o 18.
+
+[58:4] Compare N:o 27.
+
+[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21.
+
+[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for
+having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry.
+The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not
+having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in
+fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to
+the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after
+being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from
+that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King
+might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached
+for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened
+with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How
+truly Norwegian!
+
+[60:1] N:o 21.
+
+[60:2] N:o 22.
+
+[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same
+as in the address to the King.
+
+[60:4] N:o 23.
+
+[60:5] N:o 24.
+
+[60:6] N:o 25.
+
+[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated
+Norwegian logic. (page 94).
+
+[61:1] Compare N:o 1 § 112 and N:o 2 § 12.
+
+[61:2] »The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and
+inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»
+
+[61:3] N:o 26.
+
+[62:1] N:o 27.
+
+[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the
+legality of his action.
+
+[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The question of the Justification of the Norwegian
+Revolution._]
+
+Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History--even
+the history of Sweden--records many revolutions, which are said to have
+been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on
+the grounds of its having been _the extreme means of protecting most
+important interests_.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish »oppression»._]
+
+In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway's
+breaking out of the Union, and Sweden's struggle for freedom from Denmark
+in the middle ages. Sweden's way of using its power has been stamped as
+an intolerable _oppression_. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more
+powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to
+the fact that Norway's »struggle for freedom» has had for its object the
+enormously important cause--their own consuls!
+
+[Sidenote: _Sweden's loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the
+Union._]
+
+The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply
+in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; _in everything
+else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality
+with that of Sweden_. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted
+the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious
+to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the
+hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that
+in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they
+can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the
+Union--the well known Bodö affair in 1819-1821--an episode concerning
+which _Norwegian_ investigations of recent date, have served to place
+Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian
+tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish
+administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years'
+uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity
+of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and
+spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure
+interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian
+assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the
+organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that
+Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign
+affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long
+time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be
+added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection
+with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself
+Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State--
+the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs--a Norwegian has
+lately been in office. the posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even
+the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of
+those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians.
+Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration
+of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests
+of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give
+Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers,
+which even if they did not accede to all Norway's demands, would, if
+realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously
+held.
+
+[Sidenote: _Has Norway been denied its prerogative._]
+
+But it has been said on the Norwegian side--and this has been brought
+forward as the main point--Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a
+»free and independent Kingdom». If by that, they mean that Norway has
+been denied equality in the Union, it is _not true_.
+
+Sweden's only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her
+prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be
+subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden
+on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be
+maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary
+obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief
+impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the
+Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else.
+Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of
+responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be
+_declared_, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can
+never be politically _defended_. Norway must already have made the
+discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever,
+_to political action under a strict sense of responsibility_.
+
+[Sidenote: _Faults on Sweden's side._]
+
+By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to
+a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking
+back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be
+noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness
+and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been
+mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the
+so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden's policy was
+undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the
+Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to
+make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be
+unanimous because Sweden has been _too conciliatory_ towards Norways'
+demands.
+
+[Sidenote: _Swedish opinion._]
+
+It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian
+countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the
+Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The
+observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least,
+true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by
+kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to
+smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of
+the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the
+prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of
+Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account
+that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more
+intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are
+shown in their true light, such as they are and--have been. The
+revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the
+past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of
+Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which
+Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.
+
+In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest
+periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the
+indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen
+terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ACTS TOUCHING THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN CRISIS.
+
+
+
+
+1.
+
+Extracts from the Constitution of Norway.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and
+inalinenable realm united with Sweden under one King.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 5. The King's person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused. The
+responsibility is incumbent on His Council.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§15. [-- --] The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible
+for the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions
+adopted.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded.
+Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his
+opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for
+the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment.
+
+If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings' resolution
+incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the
+country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make
+strenuous remonstrance and to have his opinon recorded. He who has not
+issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King
+and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the
+Odelsthing can proeced against him before the Court of impeachment.
+
+§ 31. All orders (ezcepting matters of military command) issued by the
+King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its own
+members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. [-- --]
+
+§ 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of by
+the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if
+present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of
+obtaining the sanction of the King.
+
+§ 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His
+signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve
+of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that
+He does not find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case
+the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing
+then assembled.
+
+§ 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three
+ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general
+Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate
+ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and
+the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been
+passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the
+request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution
+regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it
+passes into law, even if the King's sanction should not be obtained
+before the break-up of the Storthing.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of
+the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made
+at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be
+issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary
+Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the
+amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however,
+must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should
+only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the
+spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by
+two thirds of the Storthing.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+2.
+
+Extracts from the Act of Union.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war
+and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and
+receive ambassadors. [-- --]
+
+§ 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministers
+accompaning the King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet
+Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted.
+In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be
+consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not
+allow of it.
+
+When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries
+are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there
+have a seat and vote.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 7[72:1]. [-- --] Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in
+consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any
+special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+are despatched to each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden
+by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime
+Minister.
+
+Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol[73:1]. [-- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are
+copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions
+to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the
+Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same
+authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered
+but in the way indicated in § 112 of that same Constitution.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[72:1] This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional
+Government.
+
+
+
+
+3.
+
+Preliminary settlement of the Consular question between members of the
+Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on March 24, 1903. (The
+so-called Communiqué).
+
+
+The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of
+October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question,
+have been continued in Christiania during February and March.
+
+During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United
+Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not
+convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect,
+would convey any important practical advantages to either of the
+Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this
+arrangement should lead to inconveniences.
+
+Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and
+whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest
+Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned
+out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system
+with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to
+satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal
+apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to
+attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two
+Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the
+following terms:
+
+1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
+
+2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of th seame
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities, of both Kingdoms.
+
+The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and
+acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union
+that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability
+of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at
+present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have,
+however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a
+desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and
+the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as
+can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister
+for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister's
+constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both
+Kingdoms.
+
+To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally
+concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the
+administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway's justified
+claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more
+evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted
+that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time,
+however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a
+satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might
+soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms.
+
+When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the
+supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state
+of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to
+the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of
+things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an
+agreement could not be expected.
+
+We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to
+bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leave
+_status quo_ undisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for
+Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation
+between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which
+both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their
+authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary
+co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular
+Services of both Kingdoms.
+
+In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not
+be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of
+arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of
+negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both
+countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[73:1] These enactsments show plainly that the Act of Union only
+recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the
+Foreign Policy of the Union.
+
+
+
+
+4.
+
+Extracts from the Norwegian Government's draft of laws of the same
+wording in order to regulate the relations between the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs and the legations on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular services of the two countries on the other hand. Dated May 28,
+1904.
+
+
+I.
+
+The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the
+Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign
+affairs of:
+
+a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of
+Consular Services, the appointement or employment of Consuls, their power
+of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge:
+
+b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the
+Consular Service;
+
+c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e.
+g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or
+proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power
+against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation
+and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters
+simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+III.
+
+Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic
+or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the
+Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement.
+This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement
+of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities
+to the Consul's discharge of his official duties; of troubles for
+warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of
+arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from
+outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to
+diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional
+information.
+
+In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a
+negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable
+inconveniences, the Minister for Foreign affairs can make direct
+inquires of, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the
+diplomatic or political side of the matter.
+
+The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction
+addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding
+the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above.
+
+
+IV.
+
+When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked
+after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give
+orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual
+law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the
+Home authority.
+
+With regard to a Consul's duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above,
+the last passage of § 3 should be applied.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+5.
+
+Extracts from the outlines for laws of the same wording drawn up by His
+Excellency Boström, in November 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and
+the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to
+their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information
+about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them
+to know it should be directed:
+
+that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for
+Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its
+establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers;
+
+that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have
+an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the
+persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment;
+
+that, for obtaining a Foreign Power's recognition of a Consul, the
+Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign
+Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the
+province of the Consular administration the question arises about
+applying to the Government of a Foreign Power;
+
+and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration,
+the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the
+Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting
+with such an instruction.
+
+As to the Foreign Minister's relation to the Consuls and _vice versâ_,
+the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for
+Foreign affairs in such a way:
+
+that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request
+information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions;
+
+and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly
+what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by
+him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to
+affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a
+report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further
+development.
+
+Besides it should be instituted:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing
+effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the
+Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to
+execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the
+Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble
+request to the King about the Consul's revocation, whereupon the Consular
+administration concerned should be informed of the resolution.
+
+In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls
+concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of
+mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law:
+
+that the legation is bound to guard the Consul's rights and to lend him
+necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the
+legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him
+instructions;
+
+that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the
+Minister for Foreign affairs;
+
+and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or
+in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to
+have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an
+action affecting his civil repute should he brought against him, the
+legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further
+notice.
+
+
+
+
+6.
+
+Extract from the answer given by His Excellency Hagerup to the preceeding
+draft, on November 26, 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement
+that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with
+measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely
+adhere to the Communiqué and the Protocols of December that, as a basis
+of agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular
+service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case »the Consuls of each
+Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which
+the latter shall have to determine.» This arrangement does not however
+preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain
+possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the
+consuls.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+With particular regard to the demand expressed in the »outlines» that the
+Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right--this is the,
+intention according to your Excellency's verbal declaration--to
+discharge in ministerial--consequently in Swedish--Cabinet Council a
+consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that
+this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that
+an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a
+resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to
+the general principles of political and international law, impress upon
+Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a
+national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared
+with the present arrangement of the Consular service.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+7.
+
+Extracts from the draft of laws of the same wording made by the Swedish
+Government in December 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 8.
+
+If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the
+Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a
+measure as is alluded to in § 9, it is for the Consular administration to
+observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the consul
+concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this matter
+given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular
+administration.
+
+§ 9.
+
+The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his
+province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country
+concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in
+such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound to fullfill what is thus
+requested of him.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 11.
+
+If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employé
+has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of
+the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in
+political demonstrations, or secretely, or openly encouraged or supported
+attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may
+have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United
+Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to
+give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council
+whereupon the matter is submitted to the King's consideration in the
+Cabinet Council of the country concerned.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+§ 16.
+
+If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect
+alluded to in § 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime
+affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by
+circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter
+should immedately be reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and to the Consular administration concerned.
+
+A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office
+until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has
+resolved upon it.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+8.
+
+Extracts from notes made, in consequence of the Swedish Government's
+draft of laws of the same wording by the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on
+January 11, 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To § 8. It is stated here that, when. in a matter being dealt with by the
+Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an
+order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its
+side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is
+difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without
+a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any
+similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from
+reference to § 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the
+Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with
+by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to
+instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department
+can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposed to have been
+the following:--to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a
+diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a
+diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from
+arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It
+stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to
+reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is
+calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an
+interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of
+judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very
+appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to
+the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To § 11. [-- --] We should not however dwell upon these formal
+considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared
+with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint
+treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consuls
+wheteher to the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign
+authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the
+report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both
+countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): »Furthermore the
+Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister
+(and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign
+Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the
+actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although
+dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic
+and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment,
+the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the
+matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international
+conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions
+necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be
+debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the
+Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable
+to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to
+the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to
+the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the
+Norwegian department.» We concur in the opinion expressed here and the
+demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning
+measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the
+cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question
+regards the consul's relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations.
+In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of
+the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is
+evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating
+to the Consul's disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor
+was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place
+before the appearance of the Communiqué. Such a joint treatment that
+should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, can only imply one
+of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to
+delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be
+a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get
+influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will
+signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should
+be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it
+is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be
+supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not
+being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for
+a Consul's revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the
+matter the object of a humble report.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To § 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to
+suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in § 11, or
+prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection
+it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute,
+the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations,
+but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has
+to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future
+Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to
+other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised
+by the King (see the Constitution, § 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuværende
+statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations
+would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to
+consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the
+present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior
+consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the
+legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular
+Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp.
+24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to
+Norwegian authonity and ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish
+minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic
+relations: [-- -- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a
+Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly
+because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the
+claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms of
+independecy, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is
+intended by the whole negotiation, viz--to use the words of the Swedish
+negotiators--to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and
+for Norway The Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority
+that each country decides for itself. (see the Communiqué of March 24,
+1903).
+
+On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the
+paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further
+discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile.
+
+
+
+
+9.
+
+Extracts from the answer of the Swedish Cabinet Council to the memorandum
+made by the Norwegian Cabinet Council on January 11, 1905. Dated January
+30, 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that §
+8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard
+to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the
+Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the
+draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a
+certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to
+be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between
+the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter
+subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the
+origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to
+interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him.
+When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities,
+that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a
+conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between
+the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged,
+are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency
+to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as
+exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be
+incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert
+regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be
+entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of
+their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can
+hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign
+Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must
+be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint
+countries should be preferred.
+
+The precepts of §§ 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant to
+guarrantee that the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their
+province. Such a guarrantee cannot be dispensed with in the opinion of
+the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign
+country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good
+relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms.
+To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their
+relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the
+legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under
+such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council,
+hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might,
+with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be
+escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedish draft alike contain regulations
+enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign
+Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his
+duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position
+held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the
+possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a
+form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul's conduct, of his
+remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the
+Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul.
+
+In support of his standpoint that »a joint treatment of matters
+concerning the Consul's relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the
+legations or the Foreign Authorities» must not occur, the Norwegian
+Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular
+Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words.
+»But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the
+disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the
+internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the
+Norwegian department.» To this the objection should be made that the
+opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish
+Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has
+itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign
+Minister and the legations, the right to address »injunctions» that the
+Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of
+the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls
+shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish
+Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the
+welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded
+in the Norwegian memorandum, the abovementioned paragraphs of its draft.
+This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and
+modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is
+important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible
+modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued
+negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into
+particulars.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+10.
+
+Record of Foreign Office affair, made before H. M. the King in the
+presence of H. R. H. the Crown Prince in Joint Cabinet Council at
+Stockholm Palace, on February 7, 1905.
+
+
+His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an
+account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway.
+In answer to the Foreign Minister's recommendation in Joint Swedish and
+Norwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made
+by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been
+appended to this Protocol.
+
+After having given an account of the contents of the report of the
+Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say:
+
+»The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration
+of the recommendation[84:1] previously made by me. I venture however, to
+draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to
+terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be
+sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the
+relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this
+arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within
+the Union, has long been admitted.
+
+In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of
+March 24, 1903, I want therfore, to emphasize the desirability that the
+question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign
+affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two
+countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to
+taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously
+advocated».
+
+What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the
+other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council.
+
+The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian
+Government's humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that
+in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way
+expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24,
+1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating
+Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally
+agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the
+positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24,
+1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging
+on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be
+taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of
+the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said
+document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case,
+partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the
+chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the
+above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded.
+
+_His Majesty the King_ was hereupon pleased to dictate:
+
+»In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other
+resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My
+peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a
+century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger
+the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the
+independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula
+and her two peoples».
+
+Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in
+all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this
+dictate.
+
+In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Council, _His Majesty the King_ was pleased to resolve
+that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet
+Council in persuance of the King's resolution of December 21, 1903, shall
+not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of
+the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published!
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[84:1] In Joint Cabinet Council of February 6 the Foreign Minister had
+recommended that the task of negotiation, entrusted by the King to the
+Cabinet Councils of the two countries, should not lead to any further
+steps.
+
+
+
+
+11.
+
+The note of the Crown-Prince-Regent to the special committee of the
+Storthing. Dated February 28, 1905.
+
+
+It is my wish to make the following declaration to the Committee. In
+these fatal days I feel it a necessity to open My heart to you and I do
+so now only in the capacity of Norway's Regent.
+
+I fully understand the sentiments the Norwegian people, in these days,
+are animated with and that you as the loyal sons of the Fatherland in
+passing your resolutions will solely have in view the welfare of Norway.
+But what is Norway's welfare, nay, I say with the same emphasis, what is
+the welfare of both countries? I do not hesitate a moment to answer this
+question with the one word: Union.
+
+It is therefore my sincerest hope and my strongest exhortation to you not
+to enter upon a way that leads to a rupture between the two peoples. It
+has so often been said that the dynasty tries to look after its own
+interests, but this is not true. The Union is not of paramount interest
+to the _dynasty_, but it should be so to the two _peoples_, for it is a
+vital condition for their happiness and future.
+
+The Royal power has never tried to prevent Norway from obtaining her own
+Consular service. The only condition for the fulfilment of this desire
+is, and must be, that the relation to the joint administration of Foreign
+affairs should be arranged in a way securing the Union and that this
+matter regarding both countries cannot be definitively settled until
+after being treated in accordance with § 5 of the Act of Union. From My
+standpoint as the Regent of the United Kingdoms I can never act otherwise
+than as I consider useful to the existing Union to which I hold Myself
+bound to adhere.
+
+An attempt has now been made on the way to partial reform, which I am
+sorry to say has been unsuccessful. But one should not therefore give up
+everything and enter into a way that, at any rate, cannot lead to the
+obobject preserved. But the logical consequence of this is to enter into
+new negotiations with Sweden on a larger basis. And to such negotiations
+on the basis of complete equality between the countries I declare Myself
+fully prepared to lend my assistance.
+
+I consider it my imperative duty openly to hold forth to you the great
+dangers and the fatal consequences for each people to follow their own
+course. United, we have at any rate a certain power and importance in the
+European system of states but separated--how much the less the word of
+Norway or of Sweden would _then_ weigh! Therefore, may these peoples
+assigned by nature itself to hold together, also do so for the future!
+
+When I see all this stand out clearly to My inward eye, you, too will
+understand with what sincere and intense, and heart-felt sorrow I
+consider thesituation we are in and the threatening turn matters now seem
+to take.
+
+In conclusion I want only to add this: when you go to your task, do so
+with entirely open eyes and consider carefully _all_ consequences of your
+actions. Each one may act according to his best convictions! God leads
+the destinies of the peoples. May He give you and us all prudence so as
+to enter into the way that leads to the true welfare of the Fatherland
+and of the North.
+
+I want this my address to be published.
+
+  GUSTAF
+
+
+
+
+12.
+
+Record of Justice-Department affair held at Stockholm Palace, on
+Wednesday the 5th of April 1905 before His Royal Highness the
+Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent declared:
+
+»I have to-day summond you to Joint Cabinet Council in order to make the
+following address to you:
+
+I herewith exhort the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, on both
+sides without an one-sided adherence to standpoints formerly held, to
+immediately enter into free and friendly negotiations concerning a new
+arrangement of all matters affecting the Union, upon the fundamental
+principle that full equality between the countries should be tried to be
+established.
+
+The way which, in My opinion, ought to be chosen and in which, as far as
+I know, with a little good intention on both sides a solution of the
+difficulties satisfactory to all parties can be attained is this: Foreign
+Minister in common, be he a Swede or a Norwegian, responsible to both
+countries or to a joint institution; separate Consular service for each
+country arranged however, in such a way that the Consuls, in everything
+regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, should be under the Foreign
+Minister's direction and control.
+
+If, in the course of the negotiations, another form could be found for
+arranging the affairs affecting the Union, always however with the
+preservation of the community in the management and charge of Foreign
+affairs, which is an indispensable condition to the existence of the
+Union, I herewith declare myself, prepared to take also this form into
+earnest consideration.»
+
+Mr. Berger, Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department, made the following
+statement:
+
+»In connection with what your Royal Highness has been pleased to declare
+and while emphasizing the desirability of opening further negotiations as
+to arranging the Union affairs, I recommend in all humility to request in
+persuance of § 5 of the Act of Union, a report from the Norwegian
+Government as to the proposition of opening such negotiations.»
+
+What the president of the Justice-Department had thus stated and
+recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.
+
+The Norwegian section of the Cabinet Council stated that, at present, it
+did not find any reason to give its opinion on the reality of the matter,
+but, with reference to § 15 of the Norwegian Constitution and to § 5 of
+the Act of Union, it confined itself in recommending the request of a
+report from the Norwegian Government.
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was graciously pleased to
+decree that the Norwegian Government's report of the matter should be
+requested.
+
+
+
+
+13.
+
+Motion on the Union question in the First Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag.
+
+
+According to notification made in the »Post-och Inrikes Tidningar» of
+April 6, this year, the Crown-Prince Regent has on the 5th of the same
+month in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council made the following
+declaration:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Whereas, through the exhortation thus addressed by the Crown-Prince
+Regent to the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, a suggestion of
+new negotiations has been made, which ought to be able to lead to such a
+solution of the Union affairs as may be approved of by both peoples, and
+whereas the present state of things seems to occasion the Riksdag to give
+already its opinion on the matter, we move,
+
+     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+     Governments concerning, a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+Stockholm, April 12, 1905.
+
+  _Gustaf Ax. Berg._     _Gottfrid Billing._     _Gustaf Björlin._
+  _Hj. Palmstierna._    _Fredrik Pettersson._    _Gust. Tamm._
+          _R. Törnebladh._                 _Wilh. Walldén._
+
+
+
+
+14.
+
+Motion on the Union question in the Second Chamber of the Swedish
+Riksdag.
+
+
+The declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Cabinet Council
+of the 5th inst. and published the day after in the »Post-och Inrikes
+Tidningar», has given great satisfaction to us and certainly also to
+other friends of the Union, to whom the relation arisen between the
+sister countries after the failure of the consular negotiations, has
+caused a great deal of anxiety. That new negotiations if brought about,
+will have a decisive influence on the future of the Union, is obvious.
+The worth of the Union, as well as the prospect of maintaining it for a
+considerable time to come, depend upon the two peoples voluntary
+adherence to it in the conviction that the Union involves advantages well
+worth of those restrictions in each peoples absolute right of self
+determination as are necessarily conditioned by it. Again, the failure of
+the negotiations would evidently produce among the two peoples a general
+and settled opinion that an arrangement satisfactory to both cannot be
+found within the Union, and such a conviction is sure to undermine its
+existence.
+
+Because of this, it proves to be of importance for the Riksdag not to
+pass in silence the suggestion of negotiations given in the
+above-mentioned declaration, but to second it, if found satisfactory.
+
+It seems to us that the Riksdag should not hesitate to take the latter
+alternative, since the declaration, while holding in wiew the necessary
+communion in the management of Foreign affairs and in the two peoples'
+control of it, at the same time in consideration of its latter portion,
+has the bearing that it should not preclude the possibility to attain a
+solution satisfactory to both peoples.
+
+On that account we beg leave to move:
+
+     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+     Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+  Stockholm, April 12, 1905.
+
+     _Carl Persson._     _Hans Andersson._     _Sixten von Friesen._
+  _Ernst Lindblad._  _D. Persson i Tällberg._  _K. H. Gez. von Schéele._
+                         _T. Zetterstrand._
+
+
+
+
+15.
+
+The Norwegian Governments' report of April 17th 1905.
+
+
+His Excellency Michelsen, Prime Minister, and Chief of the
+Justice-Department, has in all humility made the following statement:
+
+In making this matter the subject of a humble report the Department
+desires to state: As is well known the Norwegian people have made a
+unanimous demand for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service and have with equal unanimity asserted that the decision of this
+matter, as lying outside the community established between the countries
+through the Act of Union, should be reserved to the Norwegian
+constitutional authorities. For the treatement of this matter the
+Norwegian Storthing has appointed a special Committee and in the
+immediate future, this committee will prepare a motion that, in the
+present sitting of the Storthing, a bill be to passed with regard to the
+establishment of a separate Consular service.
+
+Inasmuch as the scheme propounded in Joint Cabinet Council should be
+based on the supposition that the further advancement of the Consular
+question should, for the present, be deferred Norway's approval of such a
+supposition would, in the opinion of the Department be equivalent to
+giving up of the Norwegian people's unanimous desire to now see a just
+right carried through which is due to Norway in her capacity of a
+Sovereign realm and is secured in her Constitution, and for a reform
+requested with cumulative force by the development and the conditions of
+industry, instead of entering into negotiations between the countries,
+which, after renewed experience, may unfortunately be apprehended to
+prove fruitless or at best, to delay the realisation of the matter.
+
+For there is no denying the fact that the scheme for negotiations now
+propounded is nothing new, but that similar schemes in the earlier
+history of the Union have repeatedly been tried in vain. The three
+Committees affecting the Union and made up of Norwegian and Swedish men,
+that in the past century, after previous treatment in 1844, in 1867, and
+in 1898 propounded schemes for new regulations concerning the mutual
+relations of the countries did not lead to any positive result. The
+report of the first Committee was in 1847 subject to a treatment on the
+part of the Norwegian Government, but was afterwards not favoured by the
+Swedish Government; the report of the second Committee, which did not
+give expression to Norway's equality in the Union was rejected by the
+vast majority of the Storthing in 1871 and in the third Committee no
+proposal of a future arrangement could obtain plurality among the
+Norwegian and the Swedish members.
+
+With regard to the last-mentioned Committee we beg leave to draw
+particular attention to the fact, that all the Swedish members of the
+Committee certainly agreed upon founding the Union on the principle of
+parity and equality, inasmuch as they proposed that the Foreign affairs
+should be entrusted to the charge of a joint Foreign minister of
+Norwegian or Swedish nationality. But at the same time the two fractions
+wherein the Swedish members of the Committee were divided, proposed such
+an arrangement of the constitutional responsibility not only for those
+members of the separate Cabinet Councils of the countries, who at the
+side of the Foreign Minister take part in the treatment of diplomatic
+affairs, but also for the Foreign Minister himself, so that no member of
+the Norwegian Committee could in this respect support any of the Swedish
+schemes. In addition to the establishment of a joint Foreign Minister
+office, all the Swedish members recommended an extension of the
+constitutional community between the countries which no member of the
+Norwegian Committee could second and lastly, the scheme for a separate
+Foreign Office for each country which already was the expression of the
+opinion prevailing among the Norwegian people, could not gain any support
+from the Swedish side.
+
+In this connection it should also be remembered that equally fruitless
+proved the negotiations about the arrangement of the ministerial Cabinet
+Council, carried on between the two Governments in 1885-86 and in
+1890-91.
+
+If thus the results of the above-mentioned efforts have been but little
+encouraging, this can, in a still higher degree, be said to have been the
+case with the negotiations just now terminated concerning questions
+connected with the establishment of a separate Consular service for each
+country. After these negotiations, brought about on Swedens initiative,
+had led to a preliminary agreement presupposing a separate Consular
+service for each country, subject to the home authority which each
+country decided for itself, and after this agreement had been approved of
+by the King and the Governments of the two countries in Joint Cabinet
+Council on December 21, 1903, the matter, as is well known, fell through
+owing to the so called bills of the same wording that were meant to
+regulate the relations between the separate Consular services on the one
+hand, and the Foreign Minister and the legations on the other hand. This
+negative result was attributed to the circumstance that from the Swedish
+side a number of demands were finally made and adhered to, which are
+partly considered as incongruous with the Constitution of Norway and
+with our rights as a Sovereign realm, partly would exclude what had been
+presupposed in the preliminary agreements viz. that the Consuls of each
+country should be subject to that home authority which each country
+decided for itself. Through this, a deep disappointment has arisen in
+Norway which, if strengthened by new unsuccessful schemes, will imply the
+greatest danger to the good relations between the two peoples which in a
+far higher degree than agreements laid down in treatises or juridical
+forms are the basis of the concord and the strength of both peoples.
+
+Under these circumstances the Department finds it necessary to dissuade
+from entering into new negotiations on the Union affairs ere a separate
+Norwegian Consular service has been established. Not until this has been
+done, will the confidence return which is the condition of any friendly
+and successful consideration of embarrassing and delicate Union affairs,
+and the Department will then be able to recommend the opening of
+negotiations for arranging the management of Foreign affairs and of the
+diplomacy and about the present Union based on the Act of Union, and
+questions connected with this matter. But, if so, these negotiations must
+be carried on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the
+Sovereignity of each country without any reservation or restriction
+whatever and consequently also--in conformity with what occurred in
+1898--embrace the arrangement proposed by the Norwegian side as to the
+establishment of a separate Norwegian and a separate Swedish Foreign
+Office administration in such forms as each country will consider
+necessary for its objects and interests. In harmony with this it should,
+besides, be agreed upon that, if also new negotiations should prove
+fruitless one must not return to _status quo_ so as to adhere to the
+present untenable state of Union affairs. There should be a binding
+presumption that the present state of things must not prevent either
+country from exercising its right of self-determination, but that instead
+each country can freely decide upon the future forms of its national
+existence. For not a coercive union but only the mutual confidence and
+feeling of solidarity of the free and independent nations can safeguard
+the future and the happiness of both peoples and the independence and
+integrity of their countries.
+
+With reference to the above-mentioned statement endorsed in substance by
+the other members of the Cabinet Council, it is recommended in all
+humility:
+
+     that a copy of the present humble report made in Joint Cabinet
+     Council on April 5th this year, concerning new negotiations
+     affecting the Union may graciously be ordered to be delivered over
+     to the Swedish Iustice-Department.
+
+
+
+
+16.
+
+Record of Justice-Departement affair held at Stockholm Palace on Tuesday
+the 25th of April, 1905 before His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Mr Berger, Cabinet Minister and Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department
+gave, in all humility, a notice of the Norwegian Government's humble
+report in consequence of the question raised in Joint Cabinet Council on
+the 5th inst. vith regard to opening new negotiations concerning the
+arrangement of the Union question; this report is appended to this
+Protocol.
+
+After the chief of Department had given an account of the contents of the
+report, His Excellency Ramstedt, Prime Minister made the following
+statement:
+
+»What in the Norwegian Governments report has been said about the reason
+why the latest negotiations, regarding the Union did not lead to any
+result, does not, in my opinion, now require a reply, but in this
+respect, I only refer to the Swedish Cabinet Council's declaration of
+January 30, 1905, appended to the Protocol made in Joint Cabinet Council
+on the 6th of February last.
+
+In the declaration made by your Royal Highness on the 5th inst. and put
+on record, the Swedish Cabinet Council expected to find a method of
+settling the differences of opinion as to the Union affairs. Therefore
+the Swedish Cabinet Council gave its support to your Royal Highness's
+declaration.
+
+The condition of the new negotiations, however, was, according to the
+same declaration, that the negotiations should embrace all matters
+affecting the Union and consequently also the Consular question.
+
+Whereas now from the Norwegian side the thought of further negotiations
+is rejected, ere a separate Norwegian Consular service has been
+established and whereas besides, for eventual new negotiations, such a
+condition is made from the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union
+and the Act of Union, it is obvious that negotiations on the basis
+indicated by your Royal Highness cannot now be opened with any chance of
+success».
+
+This statement was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.
+
+The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated:
+
+»The section of the Cabinet Council refers to the report of the Norwegian
+Government from which it appears that on the Norwegian side there is
+willingness to bring about negotiations between the countries on the
+conditions put forward in the report. It is also obvious from the report
+that from the Norwegian side the intention is not to try to dissolve the
+present Union. On the other hand, one finds it necessary to demand that
+such a dissolution should be within the bounds of possibility and that
+negotiations presupposing this eventuality with the consent of the
+Constitution authorities of both countries, should be compatible with the
+Act of Union.
+
+Under these circumstances, however, the section of the Cabinet Council
+that negotiations concerning the Union affairs cannot, agree for the
+present, opened with any chance of success.»
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was hereupon pleased he to
+declare:
+
+»Whereas the Norwegian Government has unfortunately been unwilling to
+accept my proposition of new negotiations concerning all the affairs
+affecting the Union, I must, while sincerely regretting it, let the
+matter abide by the declarations made by the Cabinet Councils.»
+
+
+
+
+17.
+
+The Riksdags address to the King on the Union question, on May 15, 1905.
+
+
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+
+In both Chambers of the Riksdag resolutions have been submitted with the
+object of expressing, in an address, to your Majesty the Riksdag's
+support of the declaration published in the »Post-och Inrikes Tidningar»
+and made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian
+Cabinet Council on the 5th of April last.
+
+This declaration is to the following effect:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+The Riksdag realizes to the full the importance of this declaration of
+the Crown-Prince Regent, as involving a possibility of bringing about a
+new satisfactory arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+It is therefore with an expression of regret that the Riksdag has learned
+from the publishment of the Protocol drawn up in Joint Swedish and
+Norwegian Cabinet Council on the 25th of April last, that negotiations
+founded on the basis indicated in the above-mentioned declaration of the
+Crown-Prince Regent cannot now be opened with any chance of success.
+
+Although thus the question of such negotiations seems to have been
+dropped for the present, the Riksdag, however, considers itself bound to
+express its opinion on a question of such a far-reaching importance as
+the present one, and consequently the Riksdag has resolved to announce
+herewith its support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year,
+and recommending the opening of negotiations between the Swedish and
+Norwegian Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+Stockholm, May 13, 1905.
+
+  With all loyal veneration.
+
+
+
+
+18.
+
+The resignation of the Norwegian Government. Dated Christiania, May 26,
+1905.
+
+
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+
+In case Your Majesty should find yourself unable to acquiesce in the
+Norwegian Government's recommendation to sanction the Storthing's
+resolution for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service, we venture, in all humility, to apply for permission to
+immediately resign our posts as members of Your Majesty's Cabinet, since
+none of us well be able to countersign a resolution considered by us as
+noxious to the country. A rejection of this unanimous recommendation of
+the Government concerning a Norwegian law unanimously adopted by the
+Storthing and issued by the whole Norwegian people to be carried through
+cannot, in our opinion, be grounded on regards paid to the interests of
+Norway, but would involve an abnegation of the Sovereignity of the
+country, and would be a manifestation of a personal Royal power in
+opposition to the Constitution and to constitutional practice.
+
+Christiania, May 26, 1905.
+
+
+
+
+19.
+
+Report of the Cabinet Council held in Stockholm May 30th 1905, given by
+the Norwegian Section of the Council.
+
+
+  To the President of the Norwegian Government.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council herewith presents the following
+report.
+
+In the Cabinet Council held by the King at the Royal Palace in Stockholm
+on May 27th the Norwegian Government presented their proposal respecting
+the sanction of the Storthing to the Norwegian Consular law. After which
+the members of the Section expressed their unanimity respecting the
+proposals, and urgently appealed to the King to sanction them. They
+emphasized the reform in question for the development of the country in a
+national and economical respect, which was unanimously approved of both
+by the National Assembly and also the whole of the people of Norway.
+There might be many differences of opinion and divergencies on various
+public affairs, but in this case, there was complete unanimity among all
+parties and communities. The Storthing, in conjunction with the
+government, had omitted from the law such questions as might have
+reference to the points that touched upon the Foreign and Diplomatic
+administration and dealt with the Consular question alone.
+
+Therefore it was thought that all cause of opposition would, on this
+side, be removed. It was therefore the nation's sincere hope, that His
+Majesty would graciously incline to their appeal.
+
+  The King
+
+thereupon read the following reply.
+
+»The Crown-Prince as Regent in a joint Cabinet Council on the 5th April
+has already pointed out the only way, in which this important matter can
+be presented, and all difficulties thereby be removed, that is, by
+negotiation. I give this decision my entire approval, and do not find the
+present moment suitable for sanctioning the law, which implies a change
+in the existing partnership in the Consular Service, which cannot be
+dissolved except by mutual agreement. The present regulation is
+established in consequence of a resolution in a Joint Cabinet Council,
+and therefore a separate Consular Service cannot be established either
+for Sweden or for Norway before the matter has been dealt with in the
+same Constitutional forms prescribed by the Act of Union § 5. In refusing
+now to give My sanction to this law, I am supported by §§ 30 and 78 in
+the Constitutional law, which give the King this right. The equal love I
+bear to my two peoples, makes it my duty to exercise this right.»
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council resolved first to institute further
+negotiations in the Cabinet Council in Christiania, in order that His
+Majesty might deal with this important matter, which might lead to a
+serious crisis in the government then in office.
+
+  The King
+
+declared Himself unwilling to assent to this appeal and pointed out that
+the Norwegian government's proposal was received and dealt with.
+
+Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest
+representations in reference to His Majesty's decision, which would rouse
+complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal
+efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have
+led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the
+Kingdom. In this case Norway's interests in the Union were equal with
+those of Sweden. For that Norway's rights were respected, was a necessary
+condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His
+Majesty's decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and
+after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have
+incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it
+was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent
+decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and
+Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the
+present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it
+constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of
+resignation.
+
+  His Majesty the King
+
+then read the following reply:
+
+»As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I
+cannot consent to he resignation of the Ministers.»
+
+Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution § 30, and affirmed
+that the Ministers had now dutifully »expressed their opinions with
+boldness», and »made strong representations» against His decision;
+therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph
+reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, »according to His
+own judgment.» He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law,
+to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the
+Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the
+negotiations and agreements on the matter.
+
+The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the
+Constitutional law § 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive
+for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned,
+it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the
+negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal
+decree.
+
+Countersignature implied responsibility for the King's decisions, but in
+this case the government could not take that responsibility. It was
+prescribed in the Constitution § 31 for all commands issued by the King
+(except affairs relating to military orders). But this conclusion was not
+a regular rule for the members of the Cabinet; it was a prescription for
+the forms to be observed in order to give a command legal validity.
+Occasions might therefore occur when it was not only right, but also a
+duty to refuse countersignature. The Section of the Cabinet Council had
+appealed to the Justice-Departement for enlightenment on the subject, and
+they knew that there had been several occasions when the Norwegian side
+had maintained the same opinions as those now presented.
+
+The Departement now comes to the same conclusion as in 1847 when it
+discussed the question in another agreement namely in a Resolution on the
+intended proposal for a new Act of Union; in this there is a reference to
+the Norwegian conception that there is nothing to prevent a member of the
+Council from refusing countersignature and resigning his office. This
+Resolution is accepted by the Government then in office: Lovenskiold,
+Krog, Sibbern, Schmidt, Pettersen, Herm. Foss and Fr. Stang and by the
+members then forming the Section of the Cabinet Council, Due, J. H. Vogt
+and Fleischer.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council finally decided that as a refusal to
+sanction would manifestly not be only injurious to the Kingdom, but also
+a denial of its Self-dependence, it had become a necessity to refuse
+countersignature, in order to avoid being a party in the matter. The
+Norwegian who did countersign would from that moment lose all national
+rights.
+
+After which the letters of resignation from the Norwegian Government, and
+from the Section of the Cabinet Council were delivered and read in the
+presence of the King. Respecting this matter, the customary protocol has
+been drawn up.
+
+Kristiania 30:th May 1905.
+
+  _J. Lovland._    _E. Hagerup Bull._    _Harald Bothner._
+
+
+
+
+20.
+
+The King's telegraphic protest against the declarations of the Norwegian
+Government. Dated Stockholm, May 29, 1905.
+
+
+Stockholm, May 29. On account of what the Norwegian Government has
+declared--not only in writing in their resignations, but also verbally
+in the Cabinet Council of May 27 after my rejection of the Consular
+service law--I must declare that I, most decidedly, protest against the
+comments made there on Me and my method of action. I adhere to everything
+I have stated to the assembled Cabinet Council as to my constitutional
+right. I beg the Premie minister to give publicity to this as soon as
+possible.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+21.
+
+The Norwegian Cabinet Minister's notification to the King that they
+resigned their posts. Dated Christiania, Juni 6, 1905.
+
+
+In response to our humble resignations, Your Majesty has in Cabinet
+Council at the Palace of Stockholm on May 27th, decreed: »As it is clear
+to me that no other Cabinet can at present be formed, I decline to accept
+the resignations tendered by the Cabinet Ministers.»
+
+According to Norway's Constitution it is incumbent on the King to procure
+a constitutional Government for the country. In the same moment as the
+Kings policy is an obstacle to the formation of a responsible Council the
+Norwegian Royal power has become in-operative.
+
+By your Majesty's resolution therefore, the constitutional relation
+between Your Majesty and the responsible Ministers of the Crown has
+assumed such an aspect as cannot be maintained. No Government and none of
+its members individually can, in a constitutional country, be forced
+against their wishes to remain in office with a Ministers responsibility,
+when their responsible advice in great questions decisive to the
+Fatherland is not followed by the King who, in persuace of the
+constitution, is exempt from responsibility whereas under these
+circumstances it is the undoubted right of each member individually as a
+free man to resign his post, this will also, as a rule, be a duty towards
+the Fatherland in order to maintain its constitutional rights.
+
+Your Majesty has declared that no Government can, at present, be formed.
+Your Majesty has found this so clear that Norway's King in these fatal
+days has remained at the Palace of Stockholm without making an attempt at
+bringing the country back to constitutional conditions.
+
+The policy manifested in Your Majesty's attitude towards the question of
+sanctioning the Consular service law is, in our opinion, incompatible
+with the Norwegian Constitution. But no more than a new Government is
+able to take upon itself the responsibility of this policy, no more are
+we able in office to render us participant of it by remaining in office.
+It is therefore our duty to resign our posts and to immediately give the
+Storthing the necessary communication of it.
+
+This shall now be done. Deep and discordant political divergencies have
+thus burst the frame of the constitutional Norwegian Monarchy.
+Circumstances have been stranger than the desire of the individual. But
+the final settlement on the dissolution of the Union, that through Your
+Majesty's resolution--no doubt passed with a heavy heart, but also with
+full knowledge of its consequences--has now been started, will however,
+--this is our hope--turn out before long to have been the introduction
+to better and happier days for the two peoples, whose happiness and
+welfare have always been dear to Your Majesty's heart.
+
+In conclusion we venture to tender Your Majesty our humblest thanks for
+the personal kindness and amiability shown to us during the time we have
+had the honour of being members of Your Majesty's Council.
+
+We beg Your Majesty to accept the assurance of our full recognition of
+Your Majesty's difficult position and of our invaried esteem. But
+paramount are our duties towards the Fatherland.
+
+Christiania, June 6, 1905.
+
+   _Chr. Michelsen._  _J. Lövland._  _Sofus Arctander._  _Gunnar Knudsen._
+   _W. Olssön._   _E. Hagerup Bull._   _Chr. Knudsen._   _Harald Bothner._
+                       _A. Vinje._      _Kr. Lehmkuhl._
+
+
+
+
+22.
+
+The King's telegraphic protests against the abdication of the Norwegian
+Government.
+
+
+  To _the Prime Minister_.
+
+I have received the communication of the Cabinet Ministers and I record a
+most decided protest against the method of action of the Government.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+  To _the President of Storthing_.
+
+Having this morning received from the Government the communication of the
+Cabinet Minister's resolution to resign their posts and to inform the
+Storthing of it I want herewith to make known that, in a telegram to M.
+Michelsen, Prime minister, I have recorded a most decided protest against
+their method of action.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+23.
+
+The Reasons for the decision proposed by the President, in the Storting,
+on the 7th June 1905.
+
+
+Having on behalf of the Storthing received open information from the head
+of the Government that the several members of the Cabinet council have
+one and all resigned hereby declare: We were all prepared for the
+situation in which we now find ourselves. In meetings of the
+representatives, the question has therefore been discussed as to what
+measures would be taken by the Storthing to meet the necessities of such
+a situation. Every representative has had an opportunity for making known
+his personal opinions at these meetings respecting the situation and its
+demands. On this day the Storthing must make known its decisive
+resolutions. I must also permit myself to express the wish, that these
+resolutions may be unanimously accepted, and without debate.
+
+In respect to the communication given by the head of the Government I
+propose that the Storthing shall make the following resolutions:
+
+The different members of the Council having resigned office,
+
+His Majesty the King having declared Himself unable to form a new
+government, and the Constitutional Sovereign having resigned his powers,
+
+the Storthing authorizes the members of the Council who resigned this
+day, to assume until further notice, as the Norwegian government, the
+authority granted the King in accordance with the Constitution of the
+Norwegian Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become
+necessary through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is
+dissolved as a consequence of the King having ceased to act as King of
+Norway.
+
+
+
+
+24.
+
+The address of the Storthing to King Oscar, dated Christiania, June 7,
+1905.
+
+
+  Your Majesty,
+
+Whereas all the members of the Cabinet have to-day, in the Storthing,
+resigned their posts, and whereas Your Majesty in the Protocol of May 27
+officially declared that Your Majesty did not see your way clear to
+create a new Government for the country, the Constitutional Regal power
+in Norway has thereby become inoperative.
+
+It has therefore been the duty of the Storthing, as the representative
+of the Norwegian people, without delay to empower the members of the
+resigning Cabinet to exercise until further notice as the Norwegian
+Government the power appertaining to the King in accordance with the
+Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway and the existing laws with the
+changes which are necessitated by the fact that the union with Sweden,
+which provides that there shall be a common King, is dissolved in
+consequence of the fact that the King has ceased to act as King of
+Norway.
+
+The course of developments, which proved more powerful than the desire
+and will of the individual, has led to this result.
+
+The union entered into in 1814 has from its first hour been differently
+interpreted by the two nations both as regards its spirit and letter.
+Efforts have been made on the Swedish side to extend the Union, and on
+the Norwegian side to confine it within the limits laid down in the Act
+of Union, and otherwise to assert the independent power of both States in
+all matters which are not defined in that Act as coming under the Union.
+The difference of principle in the interpretation of the character of the
+Union has provoked much misunderstanding between the two peoples, and has
+caused much friction. In the interpretation which, during the last
+negotiations between the two countries, has been laid down by the Swedish
+Government as against Norway, the Norwegian people were bound to perceive
+an injury to their constitutional right, their independence, and their
+national honour.
+
+The Union was justified as long as it could contribute to promoting the
+welfare and happiness of both peoples, while maintaining their
+independence as Sovereign States. But above the Union their stands for us
+Norwegians our Norwegian Fatherland, and for the Swedes their Swedish
+Fatherland. And more valuable than a political union are the feelings of
+solidarity and voluntary cohesion of both peoples. The union has become a
+danger to this feeling of solidarity between the Norwegian and Swedish
+people which should secure the happiness of both nations and constitute
+their strength abroad.
+
+When the union is now severed, the Norwegian people have no loftier wish
+than to live in peace and good harmony with all, not least with the
+people of Sweden and the dynasty under the direction of which our
+country, despite many and bitter disputes affecting the union, has
+attained such important intellectual and material development.
+
+As evidence of the fact that the work and the struggle of the Norwegian
+people for the full independence of the Fatherland have not been formed
+on any ill-feeling towards the Royal House or the Swedish people, and
+have not left behind any bitterness towards any of these, the Storthing
+respectfully solicits your Majesty's co-operation to the end that a
+Prince of your Majesty's house may be permitted, while relinquishing his
+right of succession to the Throne of Sweden, to accept election as King
+of Norway.
+
+The day upon which the Norwegian people elect their own King to ascend
+the ancient throne of Norway will open up an era of tranquil conditions
+of industry for Norway, of good and cordial relations to the Swedish
+people, and of peace and concord and loyal co-operation in the north for
+the protection of the civilization of the people and of their freedom and
+independence.
+
+In full assurance of this, the Storthing ventures to express the sincere
+hope, that the present events, will turn out to be for the good of all,
+also for their Majesties, for whom personally the Norwegian people will
+preserve their respect and affection.
+
+
+
+
+25.
+
+The King's telegraphic protest against the resolution of the Storthing.
+Despatched June 8th 1905.
+
+
+As We hereby declare that We do not approve of the revolutionary measures
+which have been deplorably taken by the Storthing in violation of the
+Constitution and Act of Union, and in revolt against their King, We
+refuse to receive the deputation proposed by the Storthing.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+26.
+
+Extract of the protocol of Civil business held in Council before His
+Majesty in the presence of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the
+Royal Palace Stocholm June 9th 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+His Excellency Mr. Ramstedt, Prime Minister, stated:
+
+»According to information received from Norway the Norwegian Storthing
+has, on the 7th inst. passed the following resolutions:
+
+'The members of the Cabinet having resigned their office and the King
+having declared himself unable to form a new government; and the
+Constitutional Sovereign thereby having resigned His powers, the
+Storthing authorises the members of the Council who resigned this day, to
+assume until further notice, as the Norwegian Government, the authority
+granted to the King according to the Constitution of the Norwegian
+Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become neccessary
+through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is dissolved,
+in consequence of the King having ceased to Act as King of Norway.'
+
+Through this revolutionary measure, the Storthing has not only without
+the King's assistance, but also without referring to Sweden arbitrarily
+passed a resolution respecting the dissolution of a Union which has
+existed on the grounds of legal mutual agreements between the two
+countries and cannot without mutual consent be broken.
+
+The Storthing, having thus by this resolution, violated Sweden's
+prerogative it becomes undeniably necessary that an extra session of the
+Diet be immediately summoned in order to debate as to what measures
+should be taken on Sweden's side, with reference to what has thus
+occurred. Herewith I appeal that Your Majesty will resolve on the
+summoning of the Diet, at the same time Your Majesty intimates
+disacknowledgement of the government, proclaimed by the Storthing».
+
+In this address the rest of the members proclaimed themselves unanimous;
+
+And His Majesty the King consented to this, and in accordance with the
+Prime Minister's recommendation was graciously pleased to decree, by open
+letter and edict, the import of which are contained in the appendage to
+this protocol, that the members of both Chambers of the Diet be summoned
+to an extra session in Stockholm on Tuesday June 20th.
+
+
+
+
+27.
+
+Address from the King to the President of the Storthing.
+
+
+  To the President of the Storthing!
+
+To you, and through you to the Storthing and the entire population of
+Norway, I address the following words, in answer to the address and
+decision both of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Storthing:
+
+The oath that the King of Norway takes according to the Constitution § 9
+on his accession to the throne, »that he will rule the Kingdom of Norway
+in accordance with its constitution and law», makes it a kingly duty for
+Me not to pay any attention to the statement of the Norwegian Cabinet in
+reference to my decree on May 27th ult., in which I declared, that, for
+the present, I did not find it suitable to sanction the Storthing's
+proposal respecting the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+Service. The Cabinet thereby declared that this decree, being in conflict
+with the unanimous recommendation of the Norwegian Cabinet would imply a
+depreciation of a right in accordance with the Norwegian fundamental law,
+independently to settle the matter in question, and also implied a
+violation of Norway's freedom, independence and Sovereignty, and at the
+same time the Cabinet declared that no member of the Ministry then
+sitting would be willing to countersign My Decree, and thereby, according
+to the opinion of the Cabinet, give it legislative validity.
+
+The Norwegian King's prerogative, when he thinks the welfare of the
+kingdom demands it, to refuse His sanction to a proposal presented in due
+form by the Storthing is unconditional. From this rule, there is no
+exception even though the Storthing were to present the same resolution
+ever so many times in precisely the same terms. Meanwhile according to
+the fundamental law (Constitution § 79) the decision of the Storthing
+becomes the law of Norway without the sanction of the King, but in order
+to accomplish this, are required unaltered resolutions from three
+Storthings drawn up after three consecutive elections, which resolution
+must be laid before the King, »with an appeal, that His Majesty will not
+refuse to sanction the resolution, which the Storthing after the most
+careful considerations, believes to be advantageous. In the case now in
+hand, there was no question of any such resolution from the Storthing,
+and therefore the regulation in the fundamental law § 78: could be
+suitably applied: »If the King sanctions the resolution, He signs it with
+His superscription, on which it becomes the law. If He does not sanction
+it, He returns it to the Odelsthing (Lower House) with the declaration
+that for the present He finds it unsuitable to sanction.» And the
+paragraph continues: »The resolution may not again on that occasion be
+laid before the King by the members of the Storthing then assembled.» By
+this last mentioned prescription the Constitution has evidently meant to
+protect the Norwegian King's liberty in the exercise of the legislative
+powers which are his indisputable right.
+
+My resolve, not to sanction a law providing for a separate Norwegian
+Consular Service, can consequently not be considered to imply any
+transgression whatever of the legislative power, which according to the
+fundamental law is the King's right, not even, if the matter in question
+happened to be an affair which concerned Norway alone. But on the grounds
+of the valid Union agreement between Norway and Sweden, it was not only
+My right, but also My duty as King of Norway to refuse My sanction, for
+the dissolution of the existing identical Consular Office could only be
+effected through Norway's consent to free and friendly negotiations
+concerning agreements for altering the Union on the basis of full
+equality between the United Kingdoms, to which not only the _Powers
+Royal_, but also the Diet of Sweden had unanimously themselves agreed.
+That such a respect to the demands of the existing Union should imply an
+attack on Norway's independence and sovereignty, is so much the more
+unfounded, as the fundamental law explicitly connects Norway's
+independence with its Union with Sweden. Norway's King must ever hold in
+sight the 1:st paragraph of its Constitution:
+
+»The Kingdom of Norway is a free, self-dependant, integral and
+independent Kingdom, united with Sweden under one King.»
+
+The statement made by the Council that My resolve, not to sanction the
+Consular law, proposed by the Storthing, would have no legal validity, as
+none of the members of the Cabinet had found themselves able to
+countersign the Royal Decree supplies a supposition which I must declare
+is in conflict with fundamental law. The question of the significance of
+contrasignature according to Norwegian State law, is not a new question
+brought up to day, but is older than the present Norwegian Constitution.
+It was already solved at the Convention of Eidsvold. A proposal was then
+made that Countersignature was requisite in order that the King's
+commands should become valid, but was opposed on the grounds that it was
+against the general principles of the Constitution for the division of
+supreme power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of
+the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional
+Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the
+Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The
+change, which § 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives
+increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister's
+Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the
+King has made a Decree of certain import.
+
+And that § 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the
+authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is
+acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the
+Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian
+government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under
+consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in
+a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations § 38, was
+intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King
+included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could
+not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law
+respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the
+contrary emphatically prescribes in § 30: »But to the King it is reserved
+the right to form his decision according to His own judgment», and in §
+31: »All Commands issued by the King himself (Military Orders excepted)
+shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before 1873 the Norwegian
+Prime Minister).
+
+That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect
+for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is
+a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution
+grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best
+of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved
+to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict
+with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which,
+according to the explicit prescriptions in § 112 may not be done, even by
+an alteration of the fundamental law.
+
+One of the chief principles of the Constitution--the most important of
+all, in point of fact--is that Norway shall be a Constitutional
+Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a
+helpless tool in the hands of His Ministers. If, meanwhile, the members
+of the Council should have the power, by refusing countersignature, to
+hinder every future Royal Decree, the Norwegian King would be deprived of
+participating in the government. This position would be as lowering to
+the Monarch as injurious to Norway herself.
+
+To the circumstances that can thus be adduced against the validity,
+according to fundamental law, of the Prime Minister's refusal of
+Countersignature, and against the efficacy of the dogma that the King's
+Decree in order to be valid, must bear the responsibility of some member
+of the Cabinet, can be added, in questions touching the Union situation,
+two more reasons, which have their foundation in the fact that the King
+of Norway is also King of the Union.
+
+However opinions may have varied, respecting the conception of the unity
+which the Union agreements have created for the binding together of the
+two Kingdoms, one fact remains clear, that Royal power is also an
+institution of the Union. This position of the King's as being not only
+King of Norway or of Sweden, but also as Monarch of the United Kingdoms,
+makes it the King's duty, not to form decisions in conflict with the Act
+of Union § 5, respecting the settlement of matters in one country, which
+would also affect the other. The King's duty in the aforesaid respect is
+incompatible with the opinion that the one Kingdom, by the refusal of
+Countersignature by its Prime Minister or otherwise, could undo a Royal
+Decree, by which he refused to make a resolution prejudicial to the other
+Kingdom or injurious to the Union. In Norway, when they endeavoured to
+adhere to an opposite opinion, when the Norwegian people claimed the
+right to force the King to form his decision in conflict with what he
+considers his right as King of the Union to concede, there was no other
+way of attaining this object than making the Union, and also the King of
+Sweden, in his actions, totally dependent on the will of the Norwegian
+people, its Storthing and its Cabinet.
+
+A Sovereign power of this kind I must characterize as being in strife
+with the Union between the Kingdoms as confirmed by the Act of Union
+
+It has been My constant endeavour to give Norway that position within the
+Union to which it has a just claim. My Royal duty has forced Me, even in
+conflict with general opinion in Norway, to try to maintain the legal
+principles of the Union.
+
+My coronation oath and the good of the United Kingdoms prompted My Decree
+concerning the settlement of the Consular question, but in this I have
+been met, not only by the Norwegian Cabinet's refusal of
+Countersignature, but also the resignation of its members. When I
+declared, »As it is clear to Me, that no other government can now be
+formed therefore I cannot consent to the resignation of the Cabinet», the
+Cabinet answered by the threat that the Norwegian who assented to My
+Decree would in the same moment lose all national rights. I was therefore
+placed in such a situation that I must either break the oaths I took
+under the Act of Union, or expose Myself to being without Ministers. I
+had no choice. After having in conflict with the fundamental law, tried
+to undo the King's lawfully made resolution, the Council, by resigning
+their office at the Storthing, have left the King without advisers. The
+Storthing has approved of this breaking of the law, and by a
+Revolutionary proceeding declared that the lawful King of Norway has
+ceased to reign, and hat the Union between the Kingdoms is dissolved.
+
+It now becomes the bounden duty of Sweden and Myself as King of the
+Union to decide whether Norway's attack on the existing Union shall lead
+to the legal dissolution of the same.
+
+May the opinions of our contemporaries and also those of posterity judge
+between Me and the People of Norway!
+
+
+
+
+28.
+
+The Norwegian Storthings documentary address to the King. Dated
+Christiania June 19th 1905.
+
+
+  To the King's Most Excellent Majesty!
+
+Norway's Storthing appeals, in all humility, to Your Majesty and through
+the Your Majesty to the Diet and the People of Sweden to be allowed to
+express the following:
+
+That which has now happened in Norway is the necessary results of the
+late events in Union politics, and cannot be undone. And as it is certain
+that the nation does not wish to return to the old conditions of the
+Union, the Storthing considers it impossible to resume negotiations on
+the different constitutional and state-law questions, which in Your
+Majesty's address to the President of the Storthing are referred to, in
+connection with the settled decisions, and on which the Storthing and
+Government have previously fully expressed themselves. The Storthing
+fully understands the difficult position of Your Majesty, and has not for
+a moment doubted that Your Majesty's decree is made with the full
+conviction that Your Majesty has considered it to be the right and duty
+of Your Majesty.
+
+But it is the desire of the Storthing to address an appeal to Your
+Majesty, to the Swedish Diet and Nation, to assist in a peaceful
+arrangement for the dissolution of the Union, in order to secure
+relations of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of the
+Peninsula. From statements made in Sweden, the Storthing finds that the
+resolution the Storthing considered it its duty towards the fatherland to
+adopt, by declaring the Union between the United Kingdoms to be
+dissolved, has, in its form and the manner of carrying it out, been
+looked upon as an insult to Sweden. This has never been our intention.
+What has now happened and must happen in Norway, was simply done in order
+to maintain Norway's constitutional rights. The nation of Norway never
+intended an insult to the honour of Sweden.
+
+Your Majesty having on the 27th May declared it impossible to sanction
+the unanimous decision of the Storthing to establish a separate Norwegian
+Consulate, and as no Norwegian Government could be formed by Your
+Majesty, the constitutional situation became out of joint, so dislocated
+that the Union could no longer be upheld. The Norwegian Storthing
+therefore found the position untenable and was forced to get a new
+government for the country. Every other resource was excluded, so much
+the more so as the Swedish government of Majesty had already in April
+23:rd emphatically refused fresh negotiations, he alternative of which
+was the dissolution of the Union, if new regulations for the continuance
+of the Union could not be arranged.
+
+The Storthing has already, before hand, stated that the Norwegian people
+do not entertain any feelings of bitterness or ill-will towards Your
+Majesty and the people of Sweden. Expressions to the contrary which may
+possibly on different occasions have been heard, have alone been caused
+on the grounds of the displeasure of Norway at her position in the Union.
+When the cause of this bitterness and ill-will on account of the
+dissolution of the Union has been removed, its effects will also
+disappear. A ninety years' cooperation in material and spiritual culture
+has inspired in the Norwegian people a sincere feeling of friendship and
+sympathy for the Swedish people. The consequences will be, that when
+Norway no longer stands in a position so insulting to its national sense
+of independence, a friendship will be established that will serve to
+confirm and increase the mutual understanding between the two peoples.
+
+With the confidence that the Swedish people will also share these
+opinions, the Storthing appeals to the authorities of State in Sweden, in
+acknowledging the new situation in Norway, and its rights as a Sovereign
+State, to consent to the negotiations which are necessary for the final
+agreements in connection with the now dissolved Union. The Storthing is
+ready, on its part, to accede to any fair and reasonable wish, that, in
+this respect, may contribute to the guarantee of self dependence and
+integrity of the two Kingdoms.
+
+In a legislative sense the two peoples are hereafter separated. But the
+Storthing has a certain conviction that happy and confidential relations
+will arise to the benefit of the interests of both. If the above
+statement can find support, without prejudice and without bitterness, the
+Storthing is firmly convinced that what has now happened will be to the
+lasting happiness of Europe. On behalf of the welfare of the countries of
+the North, the Storthing addresses this appeal to the people who, by
+their magnanimity and chivalry, have won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's notes
+
+There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original.
+They are listed below. No corrections have been made.
+
+Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting; the use of apostrophes for
+possessives is inconsistent; and a number of words are inconsistently
+hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent neologisms are noted
+explicitly.
+
+  Title page
+    Ph D.
+
+  Table of Contents
+    Consular Negatiations
+
+  Footnote 2-3
+    that it has confered
+
+  Page 4
+    which outworldly represents
+
+  Footnote 4-1
+    the more pernicous
+
+  Page 5
+    political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords
+
+  Page 7
+    They may have complain
+    in the Committe of 1898
+
+  Page 8
+    represented in they the in administration
+
+  Footnote 10-1
+    Ministeral Council
+
+  Page 11
+    policy of whech
+
+  Page 12
+    Government Departements
+
+  Page 16
+    by which the Ministery
+
+  Footnote 18-1
+    wherevy it became incumbent
+
+  Page 21
+    January 21et 1902
+    an disciplinary
+
+  Footnote 23-2 is missing a full stop at the end.
+
+  Page 25
+    which decribes
+
+  Page 27
+    Buth it may nevertheless
+
+  Page 30
+    Norwegian gouvernment
+
+  Page 31
+    Swedish governement
+
+  Page 32, side note
+    Mr Bostrom's
+
+  Page 33, "Coun" omitted before "cil" at the start of the page
+
+  Footnote 33-2
+    Foreign conntry
+
+  Page 34
+    remedy the deficiences
+
+  Page 36
+    tone is one af decision
+
+  Footnote 36-2 is missing a full stop at the end.
+
+  Page 38, side note
+    accusations aganist
+
+  Page 38
+    illwill against Sweden
+    Formally, therfore,
+
+  Page 40
+    the breaking op
+    was prowed by
+
+  Page 43
+    an disciplinary sense
+
+  Footnote 45-2
+    frame this laws
+
+  Page 46
+    are unnessary
+
+  Page 47
+    There is a missing a full stop after "rouse their passions"
+
+  Footnote 47-1
+    as questions refering
+
+  Page 48
+    One symtom of this
+    the tumultuons confusion
+
+  Page 50
+    disssolution of the Union
+    a document adressed
+    There is a missing full stop after "appointed by the Storthing"
+
+  Page 51
+    Therfore the way
+    und Mr LÖVLAND
+
+  Page 52
+    for the establisment
+
+  Page 53
+    cause for displeausure
+
+  Page 55
+    whole of the procedings
+
+  Page 58 side note
+    There is a missing full stop after "27th May 1905"
+
+  Page 59 side note
+    27nd May
+
+  Footnote 60-7
+    One reeds, for exemple
+    There is an extra full stop after "logic"
+
+  Page 61
+    on Extraordinary session
+
+  Footnote 62-1
+    The marker for this footnote is on page 61
+
+  Page 63
+    the contents af
+
+  Page 64
+    An Norway cannot complain
+
+  Page 65
+    been in office. the posts
+
+  Page 66
+    absolutly their own
+
+  Page 67
+    such as they are and--have been
+
+  Document 1, § 1
+    inalinenable realm
+
+  Document 1, § 30
+    his opinon recorded
+    proeced against him
+
+  Document 1, § 31
+    ezcepting matters of military command
+
+  Document 2, § 5
+    accompaning the King
+
+  Footnote 73-1
+    These enactsments
+
+  Document 3
+    th seame wording
+
+  Document 4, I
+    the appointement or employment
+
+  Document 4, III
+    make direct inquires
+
+  Document 5
+    should he brought against him
+
+  Document 6
+    the preceeding draft
+
+  Document 6, 2
+    this is the, intention
+
+  Document 7, § 9
+    bound to fullfill
+
+  Document 7, § 11
+    or secretely
+
+  Document 7, § 16
+    immedately be reported
+
+  Document 8, to § 8
+    when. in a matter
+
+  Document 8, to § 11
+    wheteher to the
+
+  Document 8, to § 16
+    Norwegian authonity
+
+  Document 8
+    forms of independecy
+    There is a missing full stop after "viz"
+    There is a missing full stop after "Sweden and for Norway"
+    (see the Communiqué  (should have upper case S)
+
+  Document 9
+    to guarrantee that the Consuls
+    Such a guarrantee cannot
+    the abovementioned paragraphs
+
+  Document 10
+    I want therfore
+    in persuance of
+
+  Document 11
+    lead to the obobject
+    thesituation we are in
+
+  Document 12
+    I have to-day summond you
+    an one-sided adherence
+    request in persuance of
+
+  Document 14
+    while holding in wiew
+
+  Document 15
+    For the treatement
+    the Sovereignity of each country
+    Swedish Iustice-Department
+
+  Document 16
+    Justice-Departement
+    vith regard to
+
+  Document 18
+    well be able to
+    Sovereignity of the country
+
+  Document 19
+    May 30th 1905 (should read May 27th)
+    I cannot consent to he resignation
+    J. Lovland (spelled Lövland elsewhere)
+
+  Document 20
+    the Premie minister
+
+  Document 21
+    Juni 6, 1905.
+    in persuace of the constitution
+    been stranger than
+
+  Document 26
+    Royal Palace Stocholm
+    become neccessary
+
+  Document 27
+    There is a missing full stop after "as confirmed by the Act of Union"
+    and hat the Union
+    The quotation marks opened with "»with an appeal," are not closed
+    The quotation marks opened with "»All Commands issued by the King" are
+      not closed
+
+  Document 28
+    he alternative of which
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS***
+
+
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+<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, by Karl
+Nordlund</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis</p>
+<p>       A History with Documents</p>
+<p>Author: Karl Nordlund</p>
+<p>Release Date: April 29, 2007  [eBook #21253]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3>E-text prepared by Louise Pryor and the<br />
+    Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br />
+    (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<div class="transnote">
+<h3>Transcriber&rsquo;s note:</h3>
+
+<p>There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original.
+They are indicated <span class="tn" title="sic" >like this</span>. No
+corrections have been made. Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting;
+the use of apostrophes for possessives is inconsistent; and a number
+of words are inconsistently hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent
+neologisms are noted explicitly.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+
+<h1>
+  <span class="little">THE</span><br />
+  SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN<br />
+  UNION CRISIS
+</h1>
+
+  <p class="center gap big">A HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS</p>
+
+  <p class="center gap big"><span class="little">BY</span><br />
+  K. NORDLUND<br />
+  <span class="little tn" title="sic">PH D.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p class="center gap">
+  UPSALA &amp; STOCKHOLM<br />
+<span class="little">
+  ALMQVIST &amp; WIKSELL LTD</span>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="little biggap center">PRINTED BY ALMQVIST &amp; WIKSELL LTD, UPSALA 1905</p>
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="Authors_Introductory_Remarks" id="Authors_Introductory_Remarks"></a>Author&rsquo;s Introductory Remarks.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The following work is intended to give an insight into the
+Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author&rsquo;s endeavour to attain
+this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few
+years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents
+referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to
+the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the
+discussions on the most disputed points are given.</p>
+
+<p>In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen&rsquo;s brochure the author
+does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only
+tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts
+have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number
+of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following
+representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must
+be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not
+disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case.</p>
+
+<p>Upsala. August 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  <i>The Author.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+  <h3>A. History.</h3>
+<div class="center">
+<table summary="Table of contents for first part">
+  <tr><td>&nbsp;</td><td>&nbsp;</td><td class="toright">Sid.</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"> <a href="#I">I.</a> </td>
+    <td>Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden&rsquo;s
+      and Norway&rsquo;s different reform programmes </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_1">1</a>-<a href="#Page_8">8</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+    <tr>
+    <td class="toright"> <a href="#II">II.</a> </td>
+    <td>Contents of the charge of 1885 in &sect; 11 of Sweden&rsquo;s
+       Constitution. First development of Consular Question.
+       Union Committee 1895-98 </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_8">8</a>-<a href="#Page_19">19</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"> <a href="#III">III.</a> </td>
+    <td>Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of
+       Communiqu&eacute; </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_19">19</a>-<a href="#Page_28">28</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+    <tr>
+    <td class="toright"> <a href="#IV">IV.</a> </td>
+    <td>Treaties on the identical laws </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_29">29</a>-<a href="#Page_38">38</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+    <tr>
+    <td class="toright"> <a href="#V">V.</a> </td>
+    <td>Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular
+       <span class="tn" title="sic">Negatiations</span> </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_46">46</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#VI">VI.</a> </td>
+    <td>Development of Crisis this year until the time of the
+       Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_46">46</a>-<a href="#Page_64">64</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#VII">VII.</a> </td>
+    <td>Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_64">64</a>-<a href="#Page_67">67</a></td>
+    </tr>
+    </table>
+</div>
+
+  <h3>B. Acts.</h3>
+
+    <div class="center">
+    <table summary="Table of contents for the excerpted documents">
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc1">1.</a> </td>
+    <td>Acts from Norway&rsquo;s &raquo;Grundlov&raquo; </td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc2">2.</a> </td>
+    <td>Acts from &raquo;Riksakten&raquo;. (Special laws relating to Union)</td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc3">3.</a> </td>
+    <td>Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish
+      and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communiqu&eacute;)</td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc4">4.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Norwegian Government&rsquo;s proposal referring to
+      identical laws</td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc5">5.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s reasons for identical laws</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_76">76</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc6">6.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Hagerup&rsquo;s Answer</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_77">77</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc7">7.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Swedish Government&rsquo;s proposal regarding identical
+      laws</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_78">78</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc8">8.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council&rsquo;s Memorandum on account
+      of this proposal</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_79">79</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+   <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc9">9.</a> </td>
+    <td>Extract from Swedish Cabinet&rsquo;s answer</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_82">82</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc10">10.</a> </td>
+    <td>Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February
+      1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_83">83</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc11">11.</a> </td>
+    <td>Crown Prince-Regent&rsquo;s address to Special Committee of
+      Storthing</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_85">85</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc12">12.</a> </td>
+    <td>Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April
+      1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_86">86</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc13">13.</a> </td>
+    <td>Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag&rsquo;s Upper Chamber</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_86">87</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc14">14.</a> </td>
+    <td>Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag&rsquo;s Lower Chamber</td>
+      <td class="toright"><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc15">15.</a> </td>
+    <td>Norwegian Government&rsquo;s &raquo;proposal&raquo; of 17th April 1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_89">89</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc16">16.</a> </td>
+    <td>Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April
+      1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_92">92</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc17">17.</a> </td>
+    <td>Swedish Riksdag&rsquo;s Statement on Union Question</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_93">93</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc18">18.</a> </td>
+    <td>Norwegian Minister&rsquo;s Notice of resignation</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_94">94</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc19">19.</a> </td>
+    <td>Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th
+      May 1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_94">94</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc20">20.</a> </td>
+    <td>King&rsquo;s telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government&rsquo;s
+      Statement</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_97">97</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc21">21.</a> </td>
+    <td>Norwegian Ministers&rsquo; announcement to King of resignation</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_97">97</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc22">22.</a> </td>
+    <td>King&rsquo;s telegraphic protest</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_98">98</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc23">23.</a> </td>
+    <td>Storthing&rsquo;s President&rsquo;s proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_99">99</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc24">24.</a> </td>
+    <td>Storthing&rsquo;s address to King Oscar</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_99">99</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc25">25</a>. </td>
+    <td>King&rsquo;s telegraphic protest</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_101">101</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc26">26.</a> </td>
+    <td>Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June
+      1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_101">101</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc27">27.</a> </td>
+    <td>King&rsquo;s letter to Storthing 10th June 1905</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_102">102</a></td>
+    </tr>
+
+  <tr>
+    <td class="toright"><a href="#doc28">28.</a> </td>
+    <td>Storthing&rsquo;s reply</td>
+      <td class="toright"> <a href="#Page_106">106</a></td>
+    </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagebreak" title="1">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a>
+
+<a name="I" id="I"></a>I.</h2>
+
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The object of the Union dispute.</span>
+
+Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented
+itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in
+reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union.</span>
+
+The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden,
+from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the
+responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political
+affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians
+on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time
+shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the
+same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of
+detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden,
+that Norway&rsquo;s position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims
+of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of
+State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial
+Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839
+the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two
+later &mdash; the last 1895-98 &mdash; Norway was offered from the Swedish side
+complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this
+Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have
+been accepted by Norway &mdash; as for instance the law passed in 1844
+concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc. &mdash; others again were
+refused &mdash; as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the
+administration of Foreign affairs. If offers
+<span class="pagebreak" title="2">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a>
+of equality worded in more
+general terms are added &mdash; as in 1893 and during the present year &mdash;,
+<span class="smcap">Nansen&rsquo;s</span> characterising Sweden&rsquo;s Union policy as &raquo;90 years&rsquo; labour to
+procure a supremacy for Sweden&raquo;, &mdash; ought to appear in its true
+colours<a name="fnm_2_1" id="fnm_2_1"></a><a href="#fn_2_1" class="fnnum">2:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to
+gain the supremacy.</span>
+
+The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy
+have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly
+the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union,
+partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents
+of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union
+itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the
+unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character
+of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or
+less ignored<a name="fnm_2_2" id="fnm_2_2"></a><a href="#fn_2_2" class="fnnum">2:2</a>. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that
+Sweden&rsquo;s supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has
+especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from
+the first, placed in Sweden&rsquo;s hands<a name="fnm_2_3" id="fnm_2_3"></a><a href="#fn_2_3" class="fnnum">2:3</a>, and this Swedish standpoint has
+also
+<span class="pagebreak" title="3">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>
+been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian
+writers on State law<a name="fnm_3_1" id="fnm_3_1"></a><a href="#fn_3_1" class="fnnum">3:1</a>. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side
+have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed
+on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right,
+for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under
+this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden&rsquo;s defence of her
+conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting
+&raquo;designs of supremacy&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do
+with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most
+extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans &mdash; to
+mention one, the late professor <span class="smcap">Oscar Alin</span> &mdash; have on different occasions
+maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality
+within the Union, and it must be asserted that <i>no Swedish political
+party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway</i><a name="fnm_3_2" id="fnm_3_2"></a><a href="#fn_3_2" class="fnnum">3:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming
+the Union.</span>
+
+That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the
+reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable
+oppositions in opinions concerning <i>the manner</i> and <i>the aim</i> for a
+reform.</p>
+
+<p>Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the <i>entire</i> reorganization,
+<span class="pagebreak" title="4">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a>
+Norway the
+<i>partial</i> &mdash; the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the
+so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden
+has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the
+interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by
+concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not
+gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was
+complete<a name="fnm_4_1" id="fnm_4_1"></a><a href="#fn_4_1" class="fnnum">4:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Sweden has furthermore insisted on <i>negotiations</i> and <i>agreements</i>, as
+the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself
+to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.</p>
+
+<p>Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the <i>aim</i> of
+the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a
+Union, which <span class="tn" title="sic">outworldly</span> represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a
+safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing
+overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a
+purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as
+the main object in view.</p>
+
+<p>The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in
+Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian
+programme, especially since 1885.</p>
+
+<p>Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were
+forced &mdash; practically if not legally &mdash; to capitulate in essentials to
+the orthodox parliamentarism, the Nor
+<span class="pagebreak" title="5">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a>
+wegian party champions became in
+need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that
+the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State
+for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian
+people<a name="fnm_5_1" id="fnm_5_1"></a><a href="#fn_5_1" class="fnnum">5:1</a>, who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a
+mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the
+political ascendency chauvinistic <span class="tn" title="sic">strongwords</span> became more and more rife.
+The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the
+utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of <span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span> and
+other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden
+increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by <span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span> as the only
+enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their
+(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the
+&raquo;Norwegians of the Future&raquo; buried themselves deeper and deeper in the
+study of &raquo;Ancient Glorious Norway&raquo;. Imagination was fed on Norwegian
+heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of
+Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place
+for renewed worship<a name="fnm_5_2" id="fnm_5_2"></a><a href="#fn_5_2" class="fnnum">5:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and
+all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and
+the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less
+importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian
+Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the
+Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years
+played a dominating r&ocirc;le in Norwegian party
+<span class="pagebreak" title="6">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a>
+politics<a name="fnm_6_1" id="fnm_6_1"></a><a href="#fn_6_1" class="fnnum">6:1</a>. It became the
+more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the
+cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in
+Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were
+scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political
+responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in
+need, of <span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span> and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this.
+It is true, that one party &mdash; the Norwegian Right Side &mdash;, for a long
+time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the
+King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the
+fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds
+has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at
+the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost
+entirely vanished from the &raquo;national junction.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Sweden&rsquo;s later Union policy.</span>
+
+During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians
+have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
+opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
+accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
+grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
+the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
+might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
+Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
+saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
+the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
+become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
+bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
+into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
+the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
+present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.</p>
+
+<p>But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding
+<span class="pagebreak" title="7">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>
+a joint
+administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
+possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
+in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
+both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have <span class="tn" title="sic">complain</span> as much as they
+like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
+sort of &raquo;<i>confusion</i>&raquo;; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
+the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
+into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
+extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
+subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
+policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
+insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
+that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
+interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
+disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
+appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula&rsquo;s unity to Europe. The currents
+of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
+possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
+shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
+the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union
+Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish
+majority in the <span class="tn" title="sic">Committe</span> of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented
+itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against
+the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining
+the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the
+present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the
+principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and
+Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by
+Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter
+of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its
+claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on
+
+<span class="pagebreak" title="8">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a>
+account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union,
+but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the
+enticing reward &mdash; harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting
+Norway honestly to meet her half way &mdash; has been sufficiently uncertain,
+in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a
+remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_2_1" id="fn_2_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_2_1">2:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (English edition). The same author writes (page
+62): &raquo;Finally in 1903(!) the Swedish Government declared openly that the
+present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway&rsquo;s just demands for
+equality in the Union.&raquo; How such a statement can be made is simply
+incomprehensible.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_2_2" id="fn_2_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_2_2">2:2</a></span> How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large
+numbers of lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_2_3" id="fn_2_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_2_3">2:3</a></span> On this account, it has especially been vindicated that
+the Act of Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is
+scarcely possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same
+Act of Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as
+the head of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the
+&raquo;Eidswold Constitution&raquo;, at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph
+referring to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored.
+This last inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory
+of State Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the
+administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his
+turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the
+Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 49 and following.) The
+artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is
+exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can
+commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has <span
+class="tn" title="sic">confered</span> a
+position of importance on the King Himself.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_3_1" id="fn_3_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_3_1">3:1</a></span> The Norwegian Right Side (Conservative) has not either
+emphatically disputed the Swedish conception.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_3_2" id="fn_3_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_3_2">3:2</a></span> Illustrative of the Norwegian way of confusing the Swedish
+<i>legal conception</i> and the Swedish <i>amendment programme</i> in the Union
+question is an expression of <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 61). According to him &raquo;the
+Swedish government as late as 1891 appeared, as already mentioned,
+inclined to deny Norway every right of taking part in the administration
+of foreign affairs&raquo;, while in 1893 the Swedish Government offered a joint
+Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Union. The state of the case was,
+that the Swedish Government in 1891 offered Norway <i>increase</i> of
+influence in Foreign affairs, but in motioning this offer the Swedish
+legal point of view was maintained, that the administration of Foreign
+(diplomatic) affairs for the Union by the Swedish Minister for Foreign
+Affairs was founded on legal right. Reflections arise of themselves.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_4_1" id="fn_4_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_4_1">4:1</a></span> Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of
+Norway&rsquo;s fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence.
+According to this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops,
+that cannot be reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed
+outside the boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the
+more <span class="tn" title="sic">pernicous</span>, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have
+illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces,
+by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the
+annual classes of recruits.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_5_1" id="fn_5_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_5_1">5:1</a></span> Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904
+that the Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be
+regarded by the Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections
+campaigns.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_5_2" id="fn_5_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_5_2">5:2</a></span> We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the
+ultra modern &raquo;glorious&raquo; revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was
+decreed, that the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient
+Kings of Norway. In a festival number of a &raquo;Vordens Gang&raquo; in honour of
+the revolution we find printed a &raquo;Psalm on Olaf&rsquo;s Day&raquo; written by
+<span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_6_1" id="fn_6_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_6_1">6:1</a></span> That Norway in carrying out the law (1899) respecting the
+flag, broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in
+conformity with everything else.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="II" id="II"></a>II.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">The Consul question.</span>
+
+The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the
+Union struggles during the last fourteen years&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885.</span>
+
+The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the
+Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always
+allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885<a name="fnm_8_1" id="fnm_8_1"></a><a href="#fn_8_1" class="fnnum">8:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>What was it then that happened in 1885?</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Norway&rsquo;s attitude to the same.</span>
+
+By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also
+in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council
+instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object
+being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully
+represented in <span class="tn" title="sic">they the in</span> administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as
+previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime
+Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when
+foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway
+by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a
+somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately
+offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs,
+which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway
+on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the
+majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason
+for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council
+in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="9">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>
+Act of Union (not in
+the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden&rsquo;s
+leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal
+right<a name="fnm_9_1" id="fnm_9_1"></a><a href="#fn_9_1" class="fnnum">9:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not
+discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which,
+being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we
+Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to
+be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to
+the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be
+more impartially treated, so that even Norway&rsquo;s lawful interests could
+receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885
+the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish
+Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more
+dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have
+become the source of the last twenty year&rsquo;s Union struggle<a name="fnm_9_2" id="fnm_9_2"></a><a href="#fn_9_2" class="fnnum">9:2</a>. Now the
+state of the case is this, <i>the Foreign Minister&rsquo;s parliamentary
+responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the
+Constitution in 1885</i>. Formerly he was &mdash; just as he is now &mdash;
+responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all <i>resolutions</i> in
+Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885
+was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also <i>prepare</i> matters
+concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the
+paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with
+greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign
+affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected
+that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden&rsquo;s
+foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he
+held in all cases for Sweden&rsquo;s Foreign policy.
+<span class="pagebreak" title="10">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a>
+It may be added that this
+constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters
+concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the
+preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under
+observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions
+taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the
+King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the
+Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a
+manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.</p>
+
+<p>Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary
+control over foreign affairs, <i>but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just
+intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be
+exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet</i>. But
+the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it
+preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was
+necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Norwegian radicals&rsquo; method of taking matters into their
+hands.</span>
+
+The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in
+1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran
+leader of the Left Side (separatists) <span class="smcap">Johan Sverdrup</span>; it was indicated
+&raquo;to take matters into our own hands&raquo;. The system was founded on the
+Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs,
+its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved
+with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union
+between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and
+boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having
+granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian
+Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay
+in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway
+were fixed by the Separatists<a name="fnm_10_1" id="fnm_10_1"></a><a href="#fn_10_1" class="fnnum">10:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="11">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a>
+It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able,
+of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and
+dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union
+itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the
+Union. A <i>Union</i> policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely
+revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union.
+Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations
+of fidelity to the Union &mdash; the last speech of this sort was heard a
+short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away
+to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of
+duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of <span class="tn" title="sic">whech</span> Sweden has had to complain.</p>
+
+<p>There was a cautious beginning with &raquo;their own Consuls&raquo;; it was too
+venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their
+own Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The real innecessity of having separate Consuls.</span>
+
+On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests
+of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own<a name="fnm_11_1" id="fnm_11_1"></a><a href="#fn_11_1" class="fnnum">11:1</a>. In reality, it is
+an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no
+essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of
+having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter
+in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners &mdash; were in opposition for a
+long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the
+Consular Committee&rsquo;s deliberations
+<span class="pagebreak" title="12">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a>
+on the subject before the mercantile
+authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the
+matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that
+&raquo;the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of
+benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so
+weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent
+agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested,
+or amongst the masses of the people&raquo;. There are principally two reasons
+for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different
+Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and
+Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the
+different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and
+not for the exports<a name="fnm_12_1" id="fnm_12_1"></a><a href="#fn_12_1" class="fnnum">12:1</a>; the second reason loses its chief point by the
+fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their
+business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give
+reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is
+also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been
+expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the
+Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears,
+that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office,
+partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact <i>that
+for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls&rsquo;
+duties have, on Norway&rsquo;s side, been performed by one of the Norwegian
+Government <span class="tn" title="sic">Departements</span></i>, proves how vain those fears were.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The real object of raising the consular question.</span>
+
+Norwegian separatists, among others <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span> himself, long ago, in a
+moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides
+the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian
+Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture
+of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth
+striving
+<span class="pagebreak" title="13">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>
+for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular
+Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic
+representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. &raquo;Directly
+they have got the wedge fixed into the small end&raquo;, wrote in 1892
+President <span class="smcap">Hans Forssell</span>, &raquo;they will try to persuade us that there will be
+no danger in letting them drive it in a bit&raquo;. Above all they considered
+that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the
+administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the
+dominating r&ocirc;le interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our
+day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Want of Union motives for Consular reform.</span>
+
+The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any
+motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism
+has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and
+its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the
+Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any
+time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have
+usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union
+demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national
+sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway&rsquo;s right.
+That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees
+become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand
+a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points
+touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and &mdash; of Norway.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Misinterpretation of the King&rsquo;s opposition.</span>
+
+When therefore the King, in the interests of <i>the Union</i>, at first
+opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it
+out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only
+the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish
+veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has
+gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this,
+that has brought about the rupture of the Union.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="14">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">The raising of the Consular question in 1891.</span>
+
+Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which
+at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual
+diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in
+the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision
+by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was
+established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter,
+which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State
+alone; on the other hand the <i>winding up</i> of the joint Consular Service
+would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal
+Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called
+Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which
+according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions &raquo;concerning
+the two Kingdoms<a name="fnm_14_1" id="fnm_14_1"></a><a href="#fn_14_1" class="fnnum">14:1</a>.&raquo; And this one-sided right of decision was
+maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes &mdash; the last in 1886
+&mdash; having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact
+that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that
+Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian
+Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might
+certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the
+winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a
+separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it
+would be Norway&rsquo;s prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up;
+Norway might
+<span class="pagebreak" title="15">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>
+without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign
+affairs from the joint Foreign administration.</p>
+
+<p>Through its leader, <span class="smcap">Emil Stang</span>, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the
+Union King&rsquo;s view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed,
+and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the
+Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of
+a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the
+sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there
+began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events
+of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already
+here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the
+revolution, which has now broken out.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">&raquo;The King and the Ministry&raquo; according to the Norwegian
+Constitution.</span>
+
+When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but
+little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council
+and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of
+the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly
+stated in the division of the Constitution. The King&rsquo;s veto over legal
+questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless
+tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly
+responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the
+King&rsquo;s Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of
+his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own
+judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of
+Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for
+instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly
+refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring
+that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the
+King&rsquo;s Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but
+this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement
+of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers
+on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National
+Law<a name="fnm_15_1" id="fnm_15_1"></a><a href="#fn_15_1" class="fnnum">15:1</a>. Furthermore the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="16">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>
+Constitution originally did not recognize
+something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were
+not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the
+Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment
+a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical
+Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the
+<span class="tn" title="sic">Ministery</span> were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this
+means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way
+into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the
+responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must
+naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation
+of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of
+refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the
+old only possible forms.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The development of the Consular question.</span>
+
+Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet <span class="smcap">Steen</span> did not venture to carry the
+Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire.
+Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the
+consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently
+set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the
+King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters
+becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the
+initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr
+<span class="smcap">Michelsen</span>. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and
+the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian
+masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the
+dissolution of the Union &mdash; and Norway was not yet armed for defence.</p>
+
+<p>The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on
+having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests
+to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute
+on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences
+&raquo;that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present
+constitution&raquo;. This time the Conservatives stepped into
+<span class="pagebreak" title="17">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a>
+the breach on
+behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet <span class="smcap">Stang</span> opposed
+a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary
+Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced
+intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King&rsquo;s
+opposition, Sweden&rsquo;s and the King&rsquo;s of Sweden, not the King&rsquo;s of the
+United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union.
+It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a
+question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the
+disloyalty of the Radicals to the <i>Union</i> was entirely ignored. The
+Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the
+country.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The position in 1895.</span>
+
+In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete
+standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted
+on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish
+Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to
+an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a
+matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had
+the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of
+her defence which of late years she has neglected.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Union Committee 1895-1908.</span>
+
+The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing
+in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to
+obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected
+a couple of year&rsquo;s truce; any real results were not to be expected. The
+Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the
+Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their
+party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish
+Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the
+Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and
+Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the
+opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint
+<span class="pagebreak" title="18">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a>
+Minister for Foreign
+affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance,
+the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the
+possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the
+Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller
+portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union<a name="fnm_18_1" id="fnm_18_1"></a><a href="#fn_18_1" class="fnnum">18:1</a>.
+In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members
+were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both
+Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a
+joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly
+emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be
+personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls
+and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with
+evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate
+the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded,
+that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might
+have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service<a name="fnm_18_2" id="fnm_18_2"></a><a href="#fn_18_2" class="fnnum">18:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Norway prepares again to the Consular Question.</span>
+
+The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for
+another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared
+to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time,
+they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on
+the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of
+State, Dr. <span class="smcap">Sigurd Ibsen</span>, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of
+having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing
+Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for
+
+<span class="pagebreak" title="19">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>
+Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. <span class="smcap">Lagerheim</span>, made a proposal, the
+consequences of which brought about the present crisis.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_8_1" id="fn_8_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_8_1">8:1</a></span> Compare <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 48 and following).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_9_1" id="fn_9_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_9_1">9:1</a></span> The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon
+Sweden&rsquo;s maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very
+criminal; this has been Norway&rsquo;s right alone.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_9_2" id="fn_9_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_9_2">9:2</a></span> Compare <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 54). &raquo;The change in the Swedish
+Constitution in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last
+twenty years&rsquo; strife in the union.&raquo;</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_10_1" id="fn_10_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_10_1">10:1</a></span> On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in
+1885 adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution
+by themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must,
+however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own
+right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and
+Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy.
+This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was
+passed in the <i>Swedish</i> Cabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State
+to the <span class="tn" title="sic">Ministeral</span> Council. The Norwegian claim to participate in the
+revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as
+Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860
+maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or
+changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_11_1" id="fn_11_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_11_1">11:1</a></span> Compare <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 68 and following).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_12_1" id="fn_12_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_12_1">12:1</a></span> It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days,
+when it has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry
+out a general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of &raquo;the
+land of Free Trade&raquo; Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_14_1" id="fn_14_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_14_1">14:1</a></span> The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a
+Joint Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks
+in the thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr
+<span class="smcap">Hagerup</span>, there has been quite a &raquo;sickly&raquo; fear of having matters settled
+there. On the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that
+only those matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union,
+as being distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden
+it has been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an
+exhaustive account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do
+not. Whether it can be considered a matter which concerns both the
+Kingdoms depends entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. <i>This
+latter conception has been adopted of old.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_15_1" id="fn_15_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_15_1">15:1</a></span> Compare No. I &sect;&sect; 5, 15, 30, 31.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_18_1" id="fn_18_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_18_1">18:1</a></span> The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the
+Act of Union, <span class="tn" title="sic">wherevy</span> it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a
+fixed minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_18_2" id="fn_18_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_18_2">18:2</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> says (page 71) &raquo;Divisions arose partly over the
+resistance from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian
+delegates for a separate Consular Service.&raquo; This is, as plainly apparent,
+an extremely modified version of the truth.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="III" id="III"></a>III.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim&rsquo;s Proposal.</span>
+
+His Excellency Mr. <span class="smcap">Lagerheim&rsquo;s</span> proposal implied an attempt to settle the
+Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign
+Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this,
+he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised
+afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work
+of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent
+the old attempts on Norway&rsquo;s side &raquo;to take matters into her own hands&raquo;,
+to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way
+could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from
+distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to
+have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they
+would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a
+definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the
+grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.</p>
+
+<p>In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt.
+The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it
+concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even
+Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the
+Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom
+and independence<a name="fnm_19_1" id="fnm_19_1"></a><a href="#fn_19_1" class="fnnum">19:1</a>. It was certainly on that account that their
+courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals
+prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable
+compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been
+acceptable.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="20">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>
+But Mr <span class="smcap">Lagerheim&rsquo;s</span> experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable
+difficulties through which to pilot its way.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the
+Consular Question.</span>
+
+In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway
+without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a
+wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians
+took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet
+in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be
+discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign
+administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since
+deviated in any way.</p>
+
+<p>In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish
+government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the
+negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the
+Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to
+which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.</p>
+
+<p>But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these
+guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the
+Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as
+deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for
+the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in
+carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r <span class="smcap">Ibsen&rsquo;s</span> aforesaid
+inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against
+the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the
+Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from
+a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally
+with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination
+to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day.
+&raquo;As to one&rsquo;s rights, no one negotiates&raquo;. This has become well nigh the
+axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to
+one and all of her demands. &mdash;</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="21">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">The Consular Committee of 1902.</span>
+
+In a joint Cabinet Council held on January <span class="tn" title="sic">21et</span> 1902, it was resolved to
+convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two
+Norwegian authorities,<a name="fnm_21_1" id="fnm_21_1"></a><a href="#fn_21_1" class="fnnum">21:1</a> who were to institute an examination as to
+how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United
+Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present
+joint diplomatic representatives.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It
+declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to
+give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability<a name="fnm_21_2" id="fnm_21_2"></a><a href="#fn_21_2" class="fnnum">21:2</a> of the
+arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the
+same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in
+order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to
+describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain
+circumstances and nothing more.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own
+consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would
+be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these
+alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look
+at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit
+of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under
+authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be
+an &raquo;anomaly&raquo;. The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it,
+nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the
+advantages to be obtained, from <span class="tn" title="sic">an disciplinary</span> point of view, by
+continuing to allow the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="22">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a>
+separate consuls to act under the administration
+of the Minister for Foreign affairs.</p>
+
+<p>The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very
+imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for
+instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving
+instructions directly to the different consuls; his &rsquo;wishes&rsquo; were first
+to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom
+rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of
+Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary
+when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with
+Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts
+on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an
+extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the
+total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the
+Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian
+Consular Service would &raquo;duly value the importance of a loyal
+co-operation.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be
+considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the
+more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any
+reference to them be made on Norway&rsquo;s part without further notice, the
+Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of
+a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee&rsquo;s
+conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish
+side for the solution of the question<a name="fnm_22_1" id="fnm_22_1"></a><a href="#fn_22_1" class="fnnum">22:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="23">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian
+delegates.</span>
+
+Mr. <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span> became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the
+autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced
+between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The
+conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined
+and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in
+Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the
+matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual
+agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off
+on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the
+Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well
+known so-called Communiqu&eacute;<a name="fnm_23_1" id="fnm_23_1"></a><a href="#fn_23_1" class="fnnum">23:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Communiqu&eacute;.</span>
+
+This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the
+preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though
+it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments
+themselves<a name="fnm_23_2" id="fnm_23_2"></a><a href="#fn_23_2" class="fnnum">23:2</a>, but only by different members in each, and that the
+Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.</p>
+
+<p>Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the
+Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of
+Foreign administration, in other words, <i>they plainly offered a general
+agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign
+affairs</i>, but that the Norwegian negotiators <i>refused</i> this offer. On the
+Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe
+for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in
+January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were
+evidently determined not to give up their claim &mdash; so unreasonable from a
+Union point of view &mdash; to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.</p>
+
+<p>With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare
+that a dissolution of the joint Consular Of
+<span class="pagebreak" title="24">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>
+fice, appears to them, in
+itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent
+in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be
+&raquo;not impossible&raquo; that under certain circumstances a system with different
+Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the
+most important advantage of the political agreement between the two
+countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the
+question on the following basis:</p>
+
+<p>1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.</p>
+
+<p>2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities of both Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the
+position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should
+remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the
+establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to
+regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.
+The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do
+not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time
+secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and
+the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms<a name="fnm_24_1" id="fnm_24_1"></a><a href="#fn_24_1" class="fnnum">24:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>When the Communiqu&eacute; was issued, it was received with very great diversity
+of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions
+which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the
+agreement, on which
+<span class="pagebreak" title="25">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>
+considerable divergence of opinion was held,
+contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially
+concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and
+as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great
+importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give
+some enlightenment on the point.</p>
+
+<p>In the first part of the Communiqu&eacute;, which <span class="tn" title="sic">decribes</span> the offer of the
+Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of
+the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic
+representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be
+<i>altered</i> or <i>abolished</i> without the consent of the Government powers of
+both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws &raquo;which
+cannot be altered by one of the parties&raquo;, the word &rsquo;abolish&rsquo; does not
+occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission
+had any important significance. It was observed that Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span>, in the
+Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr <span class="smcap">Blehr</span> in the
+Norwegian Diet of the second.<a name="fnm_25_1" id="fnm_25_1"></a><a href="#fn_25_1" class="fnnum">25:1</a> In reality, the difference depended
+on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania
+under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have
+given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full
+contents were grasped. Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> acknowledged later that the expressions
+in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word &rsquo;alter&rsquo;, must
+necessarily include the conception of the word &rsquo;abolish&rsquo;. It was
+afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should
+be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been
+significant only through the connection which may be found to exist
+between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the
+extent to which the laws were to be changeable.</p>
+
+<p>The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by
+the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have
+her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to
+appoint one with
+<span class="pagebreak" title="26">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a>
+out agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were
+based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign
+affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the
+Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of
+Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the
+suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would
+become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in
+the matter.</p>
+
+<p>In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqu&eacute; to force Norway to
+a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through
+negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to
+continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?</p>
+
+<p>In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
+too binding, &mdash; Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
+be bound in any way &mdash;His Excellency <span class="smcap">Blehr</span> meanwhile imagined that he
+might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that <i>the laws
+will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
+matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
+the regulation of foreign administration</i>; or be reckoned as a proof that
+they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
+out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
+the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
+could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
+whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span>,
+and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
+negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqu&eacute;? It is
+evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
+importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
+Sweden<a name="fnm_26_1" id="fnm_26_1"></a><a href="#fn_26_1" class="fnnum">26:1</a>, touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
+
+<span class="pagebreak" title="27">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>
+the Communiqu&eacute; must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
+authority.</p>
+
+<p>On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
+been published. <span class="tn" title="sic">Buth</span> it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
+assumed <i>that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
+among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
+foreign administration &raquo;into her own hands</i>.&raquo; The great fear of such a
+contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
+this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
+informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
+confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
+by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqu&eacute; by
+the Swedish government differed from its own<a name="fnm_27_1" id="fnm_27_1"></a><a href="#fn_27_1" class="fnnum">27:1</a>. This supposition is
+vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
+Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
+Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
+Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
+Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
+loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
+question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
+from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
+to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration<a name="fnm_27_2" id="fnm_27_2"></a><a href="#fn_27_2" class="fnnum">27:2</a>,
+without an agreement with Sweden.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="28">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>
+How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
+could interpret the Communiqu&eacute; as it did?</p>
+
+<p>As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
+is impossible to make any definite assertions.</p>
+
+<p>The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
+Communiqu&eacute; did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
+right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs &mdash; that demand could
+scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden &mdash; and passed over the
+Swedish delegates&rsquo; plain intention to bind Norway to the <i>execution</i> of
+that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
+protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
+remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates&rsquo; intentions with regard to
+the wording of the Communiqu&eacute; on that point, and the Norwegian
+governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
+especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
+Minister <span class="smcap">Stang&rsquo;s</span> open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
+idea of the matter, <i>the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
+scarcely in accordance with Mr <span class="smcap">Blehr&rsquo;s</span> interpretation of the
+Communiqu&eacute;</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact
+remains clear, <i>that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect
+by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqu&eacute;</i>. This must be kept strictly
+in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to
+be obtained.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_19_1" id="fn_19_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_19_1">19:1</a></span> It is undoubtedly Russia&rsquo;s proceedings in Finland which
+have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of
+<span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_21_1" id="fn_21_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_21_1">21:1</a></span> The most effective power in the Committee was D:r <span class="smcap">Sigurd
+Ibsen</span>, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of
+the Committee&rsquo;s debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish
+Ambassador <span class="smcap">Bildt</span> at the Court of St James, the Consul General <span class="smcap">Am&eacute;en</span> in
+Barcelona, and the Consul General <span class="smcap">Christophersen</span> in Antwerp.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_21_2" id="fn_21_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_21_2">21:2</a></span> The Swedish members of the Committee indicate,
+incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_22_1" id="fn_22_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_22_1">22:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> evidently looks upon the matter in this light
+(page 64): &raquo;No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it
+therefore, follows that even the <i>Swedish Commissioners</i> did not think it
+incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate
+Consuls&raquo;. And, of course, he mentions, &raquo;the <i>unanimous conclusion</i> of the
+committee of experts from <i>both</i> countries&raquo; (p. 72).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_23_1" id="fn_23_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_23_1">23:1</a></span> <a href="#doc3">N:o 3</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_23_2" id="fn_23_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_23_2">23:2</a></span> The Swedish members were, the Premier, <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span>, the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. <span class="smcap">Lagerheim</span>, and State Secretary <span class="smcap">Husberg</span>.
+The Norwegian members were, Prime Ministers <span class="smcap">Blehr</span> and <span class="smcap">Qvam</span>, and State
+Secretaries <span class="smcap">Knudsen</span> and
+<span class="smcap tn" title="Full stop missing">Ibsen</span></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_24_1" id="fn_24_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_24_1">24:1</a></span> <a href="#doc3">N:o 3</a> These latter decisions in the Communiqu&eacute;, which are
+conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish
+government, are, of course, omitted by <span class="smcap">Nansen</span>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_25_1" id="fn_25_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_25_1">25:1</a></span> The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws
+which have been proposed at more recent dates.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_26_1" id="fn_26_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_26_1">26:1</a></span> It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the
+idea of identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained,
+especially the Radicals, of that &raquo;Massive instrument.&raquo;</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_27_1" id="fn_27_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_27_1">27:1</a></span> In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr
+<span class="smcap">Carl Berner</span> said he had heard that Mr <span class="smcap">Blehr&rsquo;s</span> explanation in the
+Storthing respecting; the Communiqu&eacute; before its publication was made
+known to the Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor
+later on, had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary
+<span class="smcap">Michelsen</span> sharply replied, that &raquo;Mr <span class="smcap">Blehr&rsquo;s</span> explanation was only the
+explanation of the Norwegian government on the subject of the
+Communiqu&eacute;.&raquo;</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_27_2" id="fn_27_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_27_2">27:2</a></span> Further affirmation is given by Mr <span class="smcap">Ibsen&rsquo;s</span> declaration in
+the Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr
+<span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span> opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in
+the Communiqu&eacute; it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be
+valid only &raquo;so long as the present system of foreign administration
+existed.&raquo; When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition,
+it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be
+valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in
+the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all
+intents unacceptable.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<h2>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="29">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>
+<a name="IV" id="IV"></a>IV.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">The reception of the Communiqu&eacute; in Sweden and Norway.</span>
+
+Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was
+supposed to characterise the Communiqu&eacute;, its general contents roused no
+unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate,
+serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the
+Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister
+Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home)
+was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless
+referred to the resolution of 1893.</p>
+
+<p>Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known
+there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the
+cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.
+Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqu&eacute;, the Norwegian Radicals
+immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again
+solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.</p>
+
+<p>However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was
+started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards
+negotiating, and even <span class="smcap">Bj&ouml;rnson</span>, among others, warmly advocated the cause
+of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical
+Minister <span class="smcap">Blehr</span>, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was
+suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for
+negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though
+not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the
+Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable,
+impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old
+Radical government. Mr <span class="smcap">Blehr</span> resigned in the autumn 1903, after the
+elections. Professor <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span>, the leader of the Conservatives, then
+became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r <span class="smcap">Ibsen</span> as
+Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the
+leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious
+<span class="pagebreak" title="30">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a>
+attitude, a
+powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in
+no favourable direction.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Negotiations on the basis of the Communiqu&eacute;.</span>
+
+In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms
+were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the
+basis of the Communiqu&eacute;. They were carried on slowly during the Spring
+1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the
+proceedings was made by Mr. <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> presenting to the Swedish government
+the Norwegian <span class="tn" title="sic">gouvernment</span> proposal for identical laws.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign
+affairs to the Consular service.</span>
+
+It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real
+authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the
+Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest
+of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a
+purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was
+responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should
+be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way
+connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to
+hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development,
+from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration
+within the Union.</p>
+
+<p>The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign
+Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in
+Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong
+efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union
+Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the
+direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all
+matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same
+conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve
+the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile
+part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained
+intact<a name="fnm_30_1" id="fnm_30_1"></a><a href="#fn_30_1" class="fnnum">30:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="31">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>
+But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one
+it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had
+postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a
+deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest
+the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and
+mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now
+arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would
+be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the
+Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most
+remarkable way. In the Consular Committee&rsquo;s deliberations, Norwegian
+opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an &raquo;anomaly&raquo;,
+in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made
+it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part
+of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State
+Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.</p>
+
+<p>From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the
+right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere
+forms. The evasive talk of the &raquo;spirit&raquo; of constitutional law, and the
+administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in
+public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very
+great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold
+in view, was this, <i>that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of
+Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must
+presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its
+branches</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Norwegian proposal. May 1904.</span>
+
+The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the
+Swedish <span class="tn" title="sic">governement</span> could not entirely be ignored. According to this
+proposal<a name="fnm_31_1" id="fnm_31_1"></a><a href="#fn_31_1" class="fnnum">31:1</a> the Consular administration
+<span class="pagebreak" title="32">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>
+in Christiania should
+regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders
+issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic
+character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the
+report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter,
+under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.
+Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no
+account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.</p>
+
+<p>This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection
+between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration
+was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever
+that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come
+into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a
+deficiency so much the more serious as the Act &sect; 1&mdash;c allowed the
+Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less
+diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to
+Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the
+Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to
+secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not
+compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause
+for declaring from the Swedish side, &raquo;that the proposition includes
+scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the
+Communiqu&eacute;, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their
+office&raquo;, and <i>was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the
+acknowledged principles of the Communiqu&eacute;</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Mr <span class="tn" title="sic">Bostrom&rsquo;s</span> Conditions.</span>
+
+From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet
+there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not
+accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must
+have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet
+<span class="pagebreak" title="33">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>
+<span class="tn" title="&ldquo;Coun&rdquo; omitted at the start of the
+page">cil</span>
+would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the
+question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno,
+till the autumn.</p>
+
+<p>During the autumn Mr <span class="smcap">Lagerheim</span> resigned on the grounds of difference of
+opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation
+was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In
+November His Excellency Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span> went to Christiania and presented his
+conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if
+the Norwegian government would approve of them<a name="fnm_33_1" id="fnm_33_1"></a><a href="#fn_33_1" class="fnnum">33:1</a>. These conditions
+stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the
+Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the
+Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to
+disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers,
+the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King,
+recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases,
+should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office<a name="fnm_33_2" id="fnm_33_2"></a><a href="#fn_33_2" class="fnnum">33:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span>
+made a written statement of his objections.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Mr Hagerups Reply.</span>
+
+In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the
+Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical
+manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance,
+though the Norwegian majority
+<span class="pagebreak" title="34">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>
+itself, in the last Union Committee,
+emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the
+Diplomatic administration, Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> does not make the slightest
+acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the
+results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a
+single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be
+acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy
+the <span class="tn" title="sic">deficiences</span>. On the contrary, Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> mentions that such decisions
+would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to
+international and common law principles, and declared that from a
+national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the
+present arrangement of the Consular Service<a name="fnm_34_1" id="fnm_34_1"></a><a href="#fn_34_1" class="fnnum">34:1</a>. In this, he forgets
+that Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span> conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not
+touch the Norwegian Consul&rsquo;s normal position as being a Norwegian civil
+Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic
+Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span>, would very
+seldom occur.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Swedish Government&rsquo;s proposal.</span>
+
+It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span> demand, that the
+King, on the Swedish Minister&rsquo;s representations, should be empowered to
+dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian
+susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to
+the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway&rsquo;s
+Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> went to
+Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers,
+as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal<a name="fnm_34_2" id="fnm_34_2"></a><a href="#fn_34_2" class="fnnum">34:2</a> for
+identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.</p>
+
+<p>The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict
+with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it
+naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the
+Minister could not give
+<span class="pagebreak" title="35">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a>
+orders directly to the Consular Office. Further,
+the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions,
+suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not
+necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors,
+though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of
+view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union<a name="fnm_35_1" id="fnm_35_1"></a><a href="#fn_35_1" class="fnnum">35:1</a>. On
+the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great
+consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United
+Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before
+the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the
+King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs
+of that State.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Norwegian government&rsquo;s Ultimatum.</span>
+
+What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently
+perfectly fair and moderate demands?<a name="fnm_35_2" id="fnm_35_2"></a><a href="#fn_35_2" class="fnnum">35:2</a></p>
+
+<p>It declares that it &raquo;stands to reason&raquo; that the Norwegian Consular Office
+would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to
+presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office<a name="fnm_35_3" id="fnm_35_3"></a><a href="#fn_35_3" class="fnnum">35:3</a>. If the Swedish
+proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have
+been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who
+is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more
+important points the unsuitability of a &raquo;hierarchal&raquo; relation between
+Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of
+the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the
+Norwegian
+<span class="pagebreak" title="36">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a>
+government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian
+government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that
+the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to
+refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest
+in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of
+course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of
+the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqu&eacute;. Finally the
+Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions
+unacceptable, and adds, that &raquo;if they should be adhered to further
+discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless&raquo;<a name="fnm_36_1" id="fnm_36_1"></a><a href="#fn_36_1" class="fnnum">36:1</a>. Really a
+formal ultimatum!</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Swedish government&rsquo;s reply.</span>
+
+Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government&rsquo;s
+Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the
+subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the
+liberal party&rsquo;s side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try,
+if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of
+the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905<a name="fnm_36_2" id="fnm_36_2"></a><a href="#fn_36_2" class="fnnum">36:2</a>. Its tone is one <span class="tn" title="sic">af</span>
+decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet
+firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially
+emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the
+power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the
+limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly
+indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend
+operations into departments that had previously been considered as
+belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian
+Cabinet, to the Consular Committee&rsquo;s resolution that the Norwegian
+Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was
+met by the Norwegian Cabinet&rsquo;s own admissions, that the Minister for
+Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls
+instructions, and, herewith the claim
+<span class="pagebreak" title="37">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>
+that, in the Diplomatic branch of
+affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of
+Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the
+unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the
+guarantees presupposed by the Communiqu&eacute; that the Consuls shall not
+exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on
+Norway&rsquo;s side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by
+the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of
+that kind was not intended in the Communiqu&eacute;, as it had nothing to do
+with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian
+Consular Office.</p>
+
+<p>On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to
+modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions
+of the Communiqu&eacute;. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making
+on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions,
+but their essential items must &raquo;be adhered to&raquo;. The Cabinet does not
+consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally
+to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations.</span>
+
+To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the
+reply, &raquo;that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further
+communication on the matter.&raquo;</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_30_1" id="fn_30_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_30_1">30:1</a></span> Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was
+worded in the Norwegian Moderate party&rsquo;s programme as follows: &raquo;Our own
+Norwegian Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected
+with the relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic
+administration is hereby declared established&raquo;.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_31_1" id="fn_31_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_31_1">31:1</a></span> <a href="#doc4">N:o 4</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_33_1" id="fn_33_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_33_1">33:1</a></span> <a href="#doc5">N:o 5</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_33_2" id="fn_33_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_33_2">33:2</a></span> Some other points in Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span> Memorandum were
+rejected by the Norwegian side. They ran as follows:
+</p><p>
+1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the
+Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think
+necessary.
+</p><p>
+2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and
+Norway &mdash; not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway &mdash; as
+these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the
+King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers.
+</p><p>
+3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by
+Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign <span class="tn" title="sic">conntry</span> had not
+been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions.
+&mdash; Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> did not refer to these points in his reply partly because
+the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span> were not,
+according to his own account, so very insurmountable.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_34_1" id="fn_34_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_34_1">34:1</a></span> <a href="#doc6">N:o 6</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_34_2" id="fn_34_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_34_2">34:2</a></span> <a href="#doc7">N:o 7</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_35_1" id="fn_35_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_35_1">35:1</a></span> They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_35_2" id="fn_35_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_35_2">35:2</a></span> It is characteristic that <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> in his review of the
+negotiations (page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish
+demands. It can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on
+the subject, as to whether its decisions, as <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 77) insists,
+imply the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish
+Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_35_3" id="fn_35_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_35_3">35:3</a></span> In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and
+regulations would have remained unwritten!</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_36_1" id="fn_36_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_36_1">36:1</a></span> <a href="#doc8">N:o 8</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_36_2" id="fn_36_2"></a><span
+class="label"><a href="#fnm_36_2">36:2</a></span> <a href="#doc9">N:o <span class="tn"
+title="Missing full stop">9</span></a></p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<h2>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="38">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>
+<a name="V" id="V"></a>V.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">Norwegian accusations <span class="tn" title="sic">aganist</span> the Swedish government.</span>
+
+The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway,
+and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.</p>
+
+<p>Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it
+made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.
+Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe &mdash;
+thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the
+European Press &mdash; resounded with accusations against the Swedish
+government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness
+etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then
+already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.</p>
+
+<p>Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations.</span>
+
+The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the
+Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this
+it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its
+demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally,
+<span class="tn" title="sic">therfore</span>, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible
+party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum,
+did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely
+inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition
+in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the
+Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further
+negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side,
+that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the
+form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of
+points of minor importance.</p>
+
+<p>The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may
+now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting
+only on the grounds that it
+<span class="pagebreak" title="39">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>
+illustrates the Norwegian method of
+negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains
+to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their
+lawful rights.</p>
+
+<p>The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish
+government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the
+breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that
+result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish
+final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may
+assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part
+of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter
+on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the
+government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting
+concessions.</p>
+
+<p>It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could
+not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations
+it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian
+political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a
+defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish
+government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the
+proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the
+Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure
+position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in
+the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish
+government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on
+the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old
+standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction
+with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to
+the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that
+it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of
+the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical
+laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="40">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>
+independent Consular
+office would not disloyally &mdash; when the time was ripe for it &mdash; be
+provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This
+question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling
+to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian
+Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the
+Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its
+original goal &mdash; the breaking <span class="tn" title="sic">op</span> of the joint administration for Foreign
+affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span> demands ought
+undoubtedly to be seen.</p>
+
+<p>It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian
+government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish
+government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish
+Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the
+Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an
+expression for a suspicion of Norway&rsquo;s implicit loyalty in conducting its
+own Consular affairs, <i>it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from
+the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it</i>. And that the old
+Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was <span class="tn" title="sic">prowed</span> by
+the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were
+dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the
+negotiations. That even Mr <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span>, one of the parties to the
+negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the
+Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old
+lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of
+taking matters into their own hands.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken
+the covenant of the Communiqu&eacute;.</span>
+
+But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators&rsquo;
+(especially Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m&rsquo;s</span>) bringing about the breaking off of the
+negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was
+loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word,
+had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden
+became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically
+pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc.
+<span class="pagebreak" title="41">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>
+The amount of moral indignation
+contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest
+by late events. Their object &mdash; to throw on Sweden the responsibility of
+plans that were designed to be executed in Norway &mdash; was too transparent,
+but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the
+responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its
+true light.</p>
+
+<p>The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on
+the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communiqu&eacute;
+to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the
+same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian
+demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This
+supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communiqu&eacute; naturally
+implying only a promise <i>to try</i> to come to a conclusion that would be
+satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however,
+typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way
+by the Norwegian government&rsquo;s peculiar way of practically commencing
+negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very
+amusing manner, by professor <span class="smcap">Trygger</span> in a debate in the First Chamber of
+the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communiqu&eacute;.
+&raquo;Norwegians&raquo;, he said, &raquo;are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with
+them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken
+great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their
+demands&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had
+violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the
+Communiqu&eacute;<a name="fnm_41_1" id="fnm_41_1"></a><a href="#fn_41_1" class="fnnum">41:1</a>. It has evidently been privately expressed by the
+negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations,
+and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> when he
+
+<span class="pagebreak" title="42">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a>
+announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The
+Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and
+offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded
+the terms of the Communiqu&eacute;. But the Norwegian government failed to
+produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the
+Communiqu&eacute; that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority
+of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned
+shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish
+government&rsquo;s evident plans to arrange a &raquo;hierarchal&raquo; relationship between
+the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself,
+undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an
+honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the
+light of their relation to the whole matter.</p>
+
+<p>Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communiqu&eacute; confirms among
+other things that they shall &raquo;give guarantee that the Consuls do not
+exceed the proper limits of their occupation.&raquo; What guarantee? The
+Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision
+in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best
+guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian
+Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object:
+&raquo;that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communiqu&eacute;, as this
+had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian
+consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the
+Communiqu&eacute; mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised
+by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct &mdash; and it is difficult
+to find any other &mdash; it is plain that the presupposition cited by the
+Norwegians only referred to <i>normal</i> conditions and that it did not
+exclude in exceptional cases &mdash; as for instance, when Consular affairs
+were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office &mdash; a hierarchal
+
+<span class="pagebreak" title="43">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a>
+relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive
+for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish
+government, <i>is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this
+interpretation</i> by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct
+orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a
+hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian
+Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a
+concession <i>beyond</i> the demands of the Communiqu&eacute;. It had already been
+made before the Communiqu&eacute; was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be
+included in the frame of the Communiqu&eacute;. The so much-disputed claims of
+Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional
+conditions, especially in <span class="tn" title="sic">an</span> disciplinary sense, and are therefore within
+the frame of the Communiqu&eacute;.</p>
+
+<p>In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for
+breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the
+Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the
+agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and
+Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the
+preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been
+made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets,
+before the Communiqu&eacute; existed.</p>
+
+<p>It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the
+negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct
+opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the
+breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the
+references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the
+Norwegian Storthing.</p>
+
+<p>The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the
+Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared
+that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the
+28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be
+accepted by the Swedish Cabinet &raquo;it would find no support from
+admissions
+<span class="pagebreak" title="44">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>
+either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates.&raquo; Now, there
+were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the
+contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite
+Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian
+Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the
+origin of the Communiqu&eacute;, to the feigned conclusions of which the
+Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was
+the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the
+proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the
+contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired
+into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a
+&raquo;preliminary&raquo;, as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that
+the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish
+Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the
+origin of the Communiqu&eacute;, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.
+The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred,
+seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly
+adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister
+to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined
+themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their
+agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet
+with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian
+Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not
+even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to
+them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally
+understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his
+Excellency <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span> brought forward casually several of the questions
+which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the
+right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made
+objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular
+Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and
+during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended
+laws
+<span class="pagebreak" title="45">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>
+were discussed only by special delegates from the two
+Cabinets<a name="fnm_45_1" id="fnm_45_1"></a><a href="#fn_45_1" class="fnnum">45:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Mr <span class="smcap">Lagerheim</span> was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained
+in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting
+the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, &raquo;must be subjected to
+further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the
+Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also
+add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build
+the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span>
+of breach of agreement<a name="fnm_45_2" id="fnm_45_2"></a><a href="#fn_45_2" class="fnnum">45:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the
+Communiqu&eacute; and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the
+Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the
+Communiqu&eacute; to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different
+quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in
+unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communiqu&eacute; it was not
+intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during
+these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as
+the general decisions of the Communiqu&eacute;, sensibly interpreted, were
+observed.</p>
+
+<p>To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if
+it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before
+the existence of the Communiqu&eacute;, it was on account of the binding nature
+of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government
+<span class="pagebreak" title="46">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>
+has
+endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view,
+that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the
+Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the
+laws, were <i>succeeded</i> by this, and there is strong reason to suppose
+that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual
+termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of
+the laws, <i>under the express supposition</i> that safe guarantee would be
+granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status
+quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the
+interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communiqu&eacute;,
+these &mdash; to Sweden &mdash; very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it
+may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact
+too much from the Swedish delegate&rsquo;s possible optimism respecting the
+prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.</p>
+
+<p>Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of
+the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian
+revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are
+<span class="tn" title="sic">unnessary</span>. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which
+was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin
+air.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_41_1" id="fn_41_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_41_1">41:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 76): &raquo;The Swedish draft contained a number
+of demands quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very
+basis and object of the negotiations.&raquo;</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_45_1" id="fn_45_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_45_1">45:1</a></span> Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed
+in this way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well
+informed Norwegian politician Mr C. <span class="smcap">Berner</span> as &raquo;quite preliminary&raquo;.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_45_2" id="fn_45_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_45_2">45:2</a></span> In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian
+Cabinet were evidently not under the impression that the most important
+of these preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion.
+C. <span class="smcap">Berner</span> says &mdash; in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904 &mdash; he had heard
+both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame <span class="tn" title="sic">this laws</span> in a
+quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2><a name="VI" id="VI"></a>VI.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular
+negotiations.</span>
+
+The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian
+politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close
+connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in
+Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in
+comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as
+extremely
+<span class="pagebreak" title="47">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>
+abnormal<a name="fnm_47_1" id="fnm_47_1"></a><a href="#fn_47_1" class="fnnum">47:1</a>. With the lack of consideration which in
+critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people&rsquo;s
+part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the
+Consular question would rouse their
+<span class="tn" title="Missing full stop">passions</span></p>
+
+<p>It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the
+situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful
+and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating
+that <i>the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their
+fruit</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In these days much is said of &raquo;necessity&raquo; in the development of events.
+&raquo;Necessity&raquo;, it is said, &raquo;has been stronger than the wishes of
+individuals&raquo;. To those who in any degree believe in personal influence
+and personal responsibility, and not only the <i>needs</i> in the progress of
+history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to
+the front in Norway &mdash; <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span>, <span class="smcap">L&ouml;vland</span>, <span class="smcap">Berner</span>, <span class="smcap">Arctander</span> &mdash; belong to
+the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any
+leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of <i>creating</i>
+public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard
+to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to
+do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The
+Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.</p>
+
+<p>The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and
+designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid
+how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering
+of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been
+discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it
+be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been
+set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken
+off<a name="fnm_47_2" id="fnm_47_2"></a><a href="#fn_47_2" class="fnnum">47:2</a>. And it is
+<span class="pagebreak" title="48">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>
+an indisputable fact that those men of action in
+Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening
+danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance
+of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid
+to rest.</p>
+
+<p>That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place
+became manifest in innumerable ways. One <span class="tn" title="sic">symtom</span> of this, was the
+systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of
+Swedish hatred and &raquo;national persecution&raquo;, which in Christiania were held
+in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a
+Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the
+government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of
+breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.
+A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that
+the Swedish government&rsquo;s claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as
+an insult to Norway, made themselves heard<a name="fnm_48_1" id="fnm_48_1"></a><a href="#fn_48_1" class="fnnum">48:1</a> in the beginning, but
+their voices were soon silenced in the <span class="tn" title="sic">tumultuons</span> confusion that reigned.
+In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian
+opinion a tone of unreasonableness.</p>
+
+<p>Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation
+shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very
+tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the
+negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to
+express his hearty wishes, &raquo;that the two Kingdoms which could soon
+celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences
+of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the
+independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its
+two peoples&raquo;. To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken
+the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making
+this speech<a name="fnm_48_2" id="fnm_48_2"></a><a href="#fn_48_2" class="fnnum">48:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="49">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>
+A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now
+dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous
+on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins,
+that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to
+actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not
+choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the
+peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway&rsquo;s
+breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of
+personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which
+Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case,
+artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents &mdash; Sweden and
+the Union King &mdash; in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The question of resuming negotiations.</span>
+
+In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905<a name="fnm_49_1" id="fnm_49_1"></a><a href="#fn_49_1" class="fnnum">49:1</a> the Swedish Minister
+for Foreign affairs, Count <span class="smcap">Gyldenstolpe</span>, pointed out that the chief cause
+of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign
+policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming
+negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign
+affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side
+all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first
+stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the
+break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of
+the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of
+Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from
+the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr
+<span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under
+the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> considered
+that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led
+to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to
+continue, but by
+<span class="pagebreak" title="50">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a>
+voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain
+&raquo;more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations&raquo;, in
+other words, prepare for the <span class="tn" title="sic">disssolution</span> of the Union. In this way, said
+he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union
+Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he
+announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed
+it when he resigned in March.</p>
+
+<p>A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and
+even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would
+not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the
+possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more
+independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was
+responsible for the Union, could never take the <i>initiative</i> in the
+matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms
+presented by Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span> had certainly not been refused without further
+consideration<a name="fnm_50_1" id="fnm_50_1"></a><a href="#fn_50_1" class="fnnum">50:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>But it soon appeared that Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup&rsquo;s</span> programme was not likely to be
+favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the
+termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called
+Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of
+this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and
+therefore, when the State Secretaries <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span> and <span class="smcap">Sch&ouml;ning</span> at the end
+of February protested against Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup&rsquo;s</span> proceeding, in sending in his
+resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.</p>
+
+<p>The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the
+negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity
+of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading
+politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the
+matter in a document <span class="tn" title="sic">adressed</span> to the President of the Special Committee
+appointed by the <span class="tn" title="Full stop missing">Storthing</span><a name="fnm_50_2" id="fnm_50_2"></a><a href="#fn_50_2" class="fnnum">50:2</a> He earnestly
+<span class="pagebreak" title="51">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>
+expresses his conviction
+that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the
+preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was
+not the chief object for the <i>dynasty</i>, but it ought to be so to <i>the two
+peoples</i> concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the
+Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be
+entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.</p>
+
+<p>The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect,
+but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by
+informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was
+of no &raquo;Constitutional importance&raquo;, and shrewdly trying to prove that the
+Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that
+manner<a name="fnm_51_1" id="fnm_51_1"></a><a href="#fn_51_1" class="fnnum">51:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans
+before the worked up excitement cooled down. <span class="tn" title="sic">Therfore</span> the way of the
+negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to
+consent to a change of Ministry. Mr <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span>, who was pointed out as the
+man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet
+consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers,
+however, Mr <span class="smcap">Michelsen</span> <span class="tn" title="sic">und</span> Mr <span class="smcap">L&ouml;vland</span>, were rank radicals. In the
+beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were
+able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a
+novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to
+take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into
+&raquo;their own hands&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here
+twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to
+decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown
+Prince Regent on the matter.</p>
+
+<p>On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the
+joint Cabinet<a name="fnm_51_2" id="fnm_51_2"></a><a href="#fn_51_2" class="fnnum">51:2</a> that the two governments
+<span class="pagebreak" title="52">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>
+should immediately open
+negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the
+Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign
+affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared
+himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the
+matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to
+remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the
+continuance of the Union<a name="fnm_52_1" id="fnm_52_1"></a><a href="#fn_52_1" class="fnnum">52:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent&rsquo;s proposal, the Prime
+Minister <span class="smcap">Bostr&ouml;m</span>, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially
+been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the
+hands of State Secretary <span class="smcap">Ramstedt</span>. The Crown Prince&rsquo;s proposal was
+immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both
+Chambers of the Diet<a name="fnm_52_2" id="fnm_52_2"></a><a href="#fn_52_2" class="fnnum">52:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p><i>In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway,
+for the <span class="tn" title="sic">establisment</span> of full equality within the Union, and that too in
+terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years
+back</i><a name="fnm_52_3" id="fnm_52_3"></a><a href="#fn_52_3" class="fnnum">52:3</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="53">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>
+But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal
+was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of
+the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are
+typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of
+which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of
+Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian
+demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially
+&raquo;given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of
+similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the
+good relations existent between the two peoples&raquo;. The Norwegian
+government knows what means to employ to produce &raquo;these good relations&raquo;,
+namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated
+in the past. This accomplished, &raquo;that confidence, which is the mainspring
+of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate
+relations in a Union, will have revived&raquo;. Norway is thus always the
+injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might
+have or possibly <i>could find</i> cause for <span class="tn" title="sic">displeausure</span> over Norwegian Union
+Policy<a name="fnm_53_1" id="fnm_53_1"></a><a href="#fn_53_1" class="fnnum">53:1</a>.</p>
+
+<p>In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned
+statements were carried<a name="fnm_53_2" id="fnm_53_2"></a><a href="#fn_53_2" class="fnnum">53:2</a>. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible,
+for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated
+imperatively &mdash; to those who would believe it &mdash; that it is not the
+object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but
+they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply
+deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.</p>
+
+<p>In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the
+above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they
+had given the Crown Prince&rsquo;s
+<span class="pagebreak" title="54">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>
+resolution<a name="fnm_54_1" id="fnm_54_1"></a><a href="#fn_54_1" class="fnnum">54:1</a>. The Diet deeply deplored
+the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible
+that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince&rsquo;s programme would lead
+eventually to more favourable results.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Norwegian agitation.</span>
+
+While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made
+to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being
+carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the
+side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was
+not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were
+heard hesitations.</p>
+
+<p>Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and
+unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a
+most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway&rsquo;s
+side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an
+opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English
+newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home,
+that Norway&rsquo;s cause was a righteous one, &mdash; all Europe saw that.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing.</span>
+
+When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the
+Storthing presented their proposals.</p>
+
+<p>This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the
+first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added
+were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not
+have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the
+beginning of the 90&rsquo;s the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that
+is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a
+separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile
+shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be
+exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was
+adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be
+presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being
+that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before
+the King
+<span class="pagebreak" title="55">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a>
+immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But
+there was an obstacle to this: the King&rsquo;s right of veto! On the ground of
+the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill
+three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered
+resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his
+assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had
+of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as
+1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the
+Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime
+Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of
+Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence
+to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto
+was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be
+brought to a climax.</p>
+
+<p>The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to
+the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
+Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
+imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
+declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
+many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
+intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
+Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
+with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
+previously mentioned<a name="fnm_55_1" id="fnm_55_1"></a><a href="#fn_55_1" class="fnnum">55:1</a>, by fixing the date when the laws would first
+be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
+agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
+take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
+if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
+proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The revolutionary basis of the proposal.</span>
+
+The tactics in the whole of the <span class="tn" title="sic">procedings</span> are characterised as being
+revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
+resolutions to dissolve the joint
+<span class="pagebreak" title="56">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>
+Foreign Administration. And as regards
+the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
+consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
+Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
+unreasonable.</p>
+
+<p>To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, <i>to take a
+revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
+Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union</i>, far
+more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
+background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
+shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
+interests of Norway, and had denied Norway&rsquo;s Sovereign rights; then he
+should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
+the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
+King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
+&rsquo;No&rsquo;, &raquo;it cannot&raquo;, Mr <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> says, &raquo;be the result of Norwegian influence,
+<i>but on account of Swedish pressure</i>&raquo;<a name="fnm_56_1" id="fnm_56_1"></a><a href="#fn_56_1" class="fnnum">56:1</a>. Here we are met by the
+dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
+the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining
+the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive &mdash; piety towards
+the Union &mdash; when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of
+Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling
+motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King
+has kept in view the Union, and <i>all it implied on all sides</i>, more
+faithfully than King <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> II.</p>
+
+<p><i>They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the
+Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by
+this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto &mdash; and then they
+cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden.</i> This is the
+basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness
+of this is sufficiently evident.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="57">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">The decision in the Storthing.</span>
+
+The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was
+fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National
+revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania,
+especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be
+no doubt as to what was in the wind. <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> used big words about Norway,
+and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand
+persons, a memorial wreath was laid &mdash; as on several previous years &mdash; on
+a Colonel <span class="smcap">Krebs</span>&rsquo; grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway
+in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!</p>
+
+<p>These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the
+Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any
+debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to
+protest in words &mdash; in actions no one dared to protest.</p>
+
+<p>With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup</span>
+pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the
+decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently
+found most acceptable, and in Norway&rsquo;s real interest, he warned them as
+to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to
+these eventualities &mdash; which might exceed both the Constitution and the
+Act of Union &mdash; should be deferred till after the new elections, as the
+Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a
+change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few
+in the minority made known their different views, and among them the
+Shipowner <span class="smcap">J&ouml;rgen Knudsen</span> openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons
+for dissolving the joint Consular Service.</p>
+
+<p>But the issue was plain. After Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup&rsquo;s</span> proposal for an adjournment
+was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed
+unanimously.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">King Oscar&rsquo;s position in regard to the Consular law.</span>
+
+Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters
+as to how king <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> would express himself, simply implied ignorance of
+the political situation in
+<span class="pagebreak" title="58">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>
+an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted
+with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King&rsquo;s
+reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of
+<span class="smcap">Nansen</span><a name="fnm_58_1" id="fnm_58_1"></a><a href="#fn_58_1" class="fnnum">58:1</a> and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said,
+&raquo;would really refuse Norway her right&raquo; seemed rather unnatural.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Cabinet meeting. 27th May <span
+class="tn" title="Full stop missing">1905</span></span>
+
+On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in
+Stockholm<a name="fnm_58_2" id="fnm_58_2"></a><a href="#fn_58_2" class="fnnum">58:2</a>. To the Norwegian Cabinet&rsquo;s appeal for sanction to the
+Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint
+Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of
+the Union &sect; 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty
+with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet
+raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway&rsquo;s
+loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King&rsquo;s decree implied a
+violation of Norway&rsquo;s independence and Sovereign right, and would
+undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon,
+sent in their resignations<a name="fnm_58_3" id="fnm_58_3"></a><a href="#fn_58_3" class="fnnum">58:3</a>, which the King, meanwhile, refused to
+allow, as he had <i>at present</i> no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then
+ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King
+maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his
+veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the
+Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on
+their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the
+fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing
+countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances,
+only quote the not altogether applicable opinion &mdash; after full
+consideration &mdash; of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847<a name="fnm_58_4" id="fnm_58_4"></a><a href="#fn_58_4" class="fnnum">58:4</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="59">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">The situation after the <span class="tn" title="sic">27nd</span> May.</span>
+
+Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the
+extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional
+law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was
+furthermore the Prime Minister&rsquo;s undoubted duty to countersign his
+decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from
+constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules
+of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation
+of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King,
+meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not <i>for the present</i> &mdash; &raquo;now&raquo; &mdash;
+form a new Ministry.</p>
+
+<p>This word &rsquo;now&rsquo; in the King&rsquo;s refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign,
+undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the
+beginning of 1890, when the Ministry &mdash; on one or two occasions <i>Radical</i>
+&mdash; had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals
+to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also
+without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their
+post till the King released them. For, according to the general
+constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who
+releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.</p>
+
+<p>It is not Norway&rsquo;s <i>King</i> who has transgressed the law, in spite of all
+the accusations to that effect from Norway&rsquo;s government<a name="fnm_59_1" id="fnm_59_1"></a><a href="#fn_59_1" class="fnnum">59:1</a>. <i>The law
+was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed
+the King that they resigned office</i><a name="fnm_59_2" id="fnm_59_2"></a><a href="#fn_59_2" class="fnnum">59:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="60">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a>
+<span class="sidenote">The Norwegian Revolution.</span>
+
+Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their
+inability to be a party to the King&rsquo;s policy, which according to their
+opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and
+declared themselves to be &rsquo;free men&rsquo; entitled to the right to resign
+office<a name="fnm_60_1" id="fnm_60_1"></a><a href="#fn_60_1" class="fnnum">60:1</a>. King <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> immediately sent protestations against this
+proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the
+Premier<a name="fnm_60_2" id="fnm_60_2"></a><a href="#fn_60_2" class="fnnum">60:2</a>. But before these came to hand, the next act was played
+out.</p>
+
+<p>On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their
+resignation<a name="fnm_60_3" id="fnm_60_3"></a><a href="#fn_60_3" class="fnnum">60:3</a>. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little
+word <i>now</i> categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared
+himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion
+that the Constitutional Royal Power was &raquo;no longer effectual&raquo;, on which
+the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government,
+which, according to Constitutional law, was the King&rsquo;s prerogative alone.
+The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.
+King <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> having ceased to act as Norway&rsquo;s King, the declaration
+followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved<a name="fnm_60_4" id="fnm_60_4"></a><a href="#fn_60_4" class="fnnum">60:4</a>. This was all
+communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to
+deliver to King <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> by a deputation<a name="fnm_60_5" id="fnm_60_5"></a><a href="#fn_60_5" class="fnnum">60:5</a>. The King of course replied
+that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary
+Storthing<a name="fnm_60_6" id="fnm_60_6"></a><a href="#fn_60_6" class="fnnum">60:6</a>.</p>
+
+<p>It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.
+They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal<a name="fnm_60_7" id="fnm_60_7"></a><a href="#fn_60_7" class="fnnum">60:7</a>!</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="61">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a>
+The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the
+Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the
+principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first
+paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.</p>
+
+<p>The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden,
+or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the
+Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out<a name="fnm_61_1" id="fnm_61_1"></a><a href="#fn_61_1" class="fnnum">61:1</a>. And this
+last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription
+that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of
+State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the
+freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of
+the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union<a name="fnm_61_2" id="fnm_61_2"></a><a href="#fn_61_2" class="fnnum">61:2</a>.</p>
+
+<p>As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of
+laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that
+country.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Protestations of Sweden and the Union King.</span>
+
+On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.
+In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to
+meet in <span class="tn" title="sic">on</span> Extraordinary session<a name="fnm_61_3" id="fnm_61_3"></a><a href="#fn_61_3" class="fnnum">61:3</a>, the Prime Minister strongly
+emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing&rsquo;s proceedings had deeply
+violated Sweden&rsquo;s rights.</p>
+
+<p>The following day, June 10th, King <span class="smcap">Oscar</span> issued his protest in an address
+to the Norwegian Storthing<a name="fnm_62_1" id="fnm_62_1"></a><a href="#fn_62_1" class="fnnum">62:1</a>. In clear and convincing terms the King
+maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to
+the Cabinet&rsquo;s opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the
+capacity of the chief representative of the <i>Union</i> that he had
+considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As
+Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition
+to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the
+Union, and he
+<span class="pagebreak" title="62">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>
+finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden &raquo;if
+Norway&rsquo;s attack on the existing Union should lead to its <i>legal</i>
+dissolution&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905.</span>
+
+The reply to this address of the King was an address<a name="fnm_62_2" id="fnm_62_2"></a><a href="#fn_62_2" class="fnnum">62:2</a> from the
+Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality
+to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people
+entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and
+appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on
+both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by
+their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.</p>
+
+<p>The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have
+received this compliment <i>a little sooner</i>, instead of the overwhelming
+mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a
+good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had
+formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of
+the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different
+in all respects.</p>
+
+<p>The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since,
+step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and
+therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish
+government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume
+negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in
+case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on
+this account, from Norway&rsquo;s side they have tried to cast the blame on
+Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had
+already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?</p>
+
+<p>In the Norwegian Government&rsquo;s proposal of the 17:th April negotiations
+are firmly <i>refused</i>, before the Consular question has been settled.
+Therefore Norway has never proposed
+<span class="pagebreak" title="63">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>
+negotiations respecting the
+situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his
+veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to
+the Norwegian government&rsquo;s wording of the <i>presuppositions</i> for an
+eventual negotiation. It should be carried on &raquo;<i>on an entirely free basis
+with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any
+reservation or restriction whatever</i>&raquo;, and among other matters, it was
+stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should
+be able to decide, of its own accord, &raquo;the future form of its national
+existence.&raquo; Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the
+Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the
+contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would
+break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this
+<i>method</i> of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature
+threat to rupture the Union on Norway&rsquo;s side, that the Swedish Prime
+Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on
+the Norwegian side &raquo;as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.&raquo;
+The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that
+the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account
+that he refused to negotiate.</p>
+
+<p>But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents <span class="tn" title="sic">af</span>
+the Prime Minister&rsquo;s speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility
+for dissolving the Union<a name="fnm_63_1" id="fnm_63_1"></a><a href="#fn_63_1" class="fnnum">63:1</a>. Of all the cunning devices, the object of
+which has been, on Norway&rsquo;s side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden,
+this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the
+majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr <span class="smcap">Hagerup&rsquo;s</span> proposal, and this
+was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April,
+when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the
+Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto;
+the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time
+beforehand. &mdash;</p>
+
+<p>On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_47_1" id="fn_47_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_47_1">47:1</a></span> It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an
+almost entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as
+questions <span class="tn" title="sic">refering</span> to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet,
+and a Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of
+affairs.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_47_2" id="fn_47_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_47_2">47:2</a></span> It does not follow, however, that at least the majority
+of the members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an
+agreement.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_48_1" id="fn_48_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_48_1">48:1</a></span> A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr
+<span class="smcap">Fritz Hansen</span>, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be
+brought to notice.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_48_2" id="fn_48_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_48_2">48:2</a></span> <a href="#doc10">N:o 10</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_49_1" id="fn_49_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_49_1">49:1</a></span> <a href="#doc10">N:o 10</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_50_1" id="fn_50_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_50_1">50:1</a></span> This is proved by the motion on the Union question
+brought forward in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See <a href="#doc14">N:o
+14</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_50_2" id="fn_50_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_50_2">50:2</a></span> <a href="#doc11">N:o 11</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_51_1" id="fn_51_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_51_1">51:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> does not even mention the document in his book.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_51_2" id="fn_51_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_51_2">51:2</a></span> <a href="#doc12">N:o 12</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_52_1" id="fn_52_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_52_1">52:1</a></span> This last alternative was considered to imply proposals
+for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a
+Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union
+policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign
+affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.
+The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at
+the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical
+representatives.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_52_2" id="fn_52_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_52_2">52:2</a></span> <a href="#doc13">N:o 13</a> and <a href="#doc14">14</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_52_3" id="fn_52_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_52_3">52:3</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way
+against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made
+immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course,
+was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and
+especially as it did not include &raquo;the same guarantees we had before&raquo;. It
+must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far <i>greater</i>
+guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet,
+partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince&rsquo;s programme was far easier to
+carry out than the programme of the Communiqu&eacute;, which implied that the
+Consular question would solve itself. <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> also mentions that &raquo;the last
+Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a
+decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of
+the Norwegian Commissioners&raquo;. To this it must be observed that this
+Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than
+the Norwegian majority&rsquo;s proposal had been in the last Union Committee.
+Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_53_1" id="fn_53_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_53_1">53:1</a></span> <a href="#doc15">N:o 15</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_53_2" id="fn_53_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_53_2">53:2</a></span> <a href="#doc16">N:o 16</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_54_1" id="fn_54_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_54_1">54:1</a></span> <a href="#doc17">N:o 17</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_55_1" id="fn_55_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_55_1">55:1</a></span> <a href="#Page_14">Page 14</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_56_1" id="fn_56_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_56_1">56:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> (pag. 93).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_58_1" id="fn_58_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_58_1">58:1</a></span> <span class="smcap">Nansen</span> page 93.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_58_2" id="fn_58_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_58_2">58:2</a></span> There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a
+complete report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the
+delegates of the Cabinet.
+</p><p>
+Compare with <a href="#doc19">N:o 19</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_58_3" id="fn_58_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_58_3">58:3</a></span> <a href="#doc18">N:o 18</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_58_4" id="fn_58_4"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_58_4">58:4</a></span> Compare <a href="#doc27">N:o 27</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_59_1" id="fn_59_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_59_1">59:1</a></span> N:os <a href="#doc18">18</a>, <a href="#doc19">19</a> and <a href="#doc21">21</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_59_2" id="fn_59_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_59_2">59:2</a></span> On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to
+themselves for having given the King a few day&rsquo;s grace in order to form a
+new Ministry. The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with <a href="#doc21">N:o
+21</a>) for not having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that
+the King in fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by
+alluding to the Cabinets open threats (Compare with <a href="#doc19">N:o 19</a>) that the man
+who, after being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as
+adviser, from that moment lost his national rights; in other words,
+however the King might act, the Revolution would come. The King is
+therefore reproached for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after
+he had been threatened with the revolution if the attempt had shown any
+sign of success. How truly Norwegian!</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_1" id="fn_60_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_1">60:1</a></span> <a href="#doc21">N:o 21</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_2" id="fn_60_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_2">60:2</a></span> <a href="#doc22">N:o 22</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_3" id="fn_60_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_3">60:3</a></span> The terms of this communication are almost word for word
+the same as in the address to the King.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_4" id="fn_60_4"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_4">60:4</a></span> <a href="#doc23">N:o 23</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_5" id="fn_60_5"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_5">60:5</a></span> <a href="#doc24">N:o 24</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_6" id="fn_60_6"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_6">60:6</a></span> <a href="#doc25">N:o 25</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_60_7" id="fn_60_7"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_60_7">60:7</a></span> One <span class="tn" title="sic">reeds, for exemple</span>, <span class="smcap">Nansens</span> arguments in real
+exaggerated Norwegian <span class="tn" title="Superfluous full stop">logic.</span> (page 94).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_61_1" id="fn_61_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_61_1">61:1</a></span> Compare <a href="#doc1_s112">N:o 1 &sect; 112</a> and <a href="#doc2_s12">N:o 2 &sect; 12</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_61_2" id="fn_61_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_61_2">61:2</a></span> &raquo;The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent,
+indivisible and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.&raquo;</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_61_3" id="fn_61_3"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_61_3">61:3</a></span> <a href="#doc26">N:o 26</a>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_62_1" id="fn_62_1"></a><span
+class="label"><a href="#fnm_62_1">62:1</a></span> <span class="tn"
+title="Although this footnote appeared on page 62, the marker was on page 61">N:o <a href="#doc27">27</a>.</span></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_62_2" id="fn_62_2"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_62_2">62:2</a></span> <a href="#doc28">N:o 28</a>. They are careful not to confute the King&rsquo;s
+defence of the legality of his action.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_63_1" id="fn_63_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_63_1">63:1</a></span> Compare, with N:os <a href="#doc15">15</a> and <a href="#doc16">16</a>.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<h2>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="64">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a>
+<a name="VII" id="VII"></a>VII.</h2>
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="sidenote">The question of the Justification of the Norwegian
+Revolution.</span>
+
+Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History &mdash; even
+the history of Sweden &mdash; records many revolutions, which are said to have
+been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on
+the grounds of its having been <i>the extreme means of protecting most
+important interests</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">The Swedish &raquo;oppression&raquo;.</span>
+
+In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway&rsquo;s
+breaking out of the Union, and Sweden&rsquo;s struggle for freedom from Denmark
+in the middle ages. Sweden&rsquo;s way of using its power has been stamped as
+an intolerable <i>oppression</i>. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more
+powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to
+the fact that Norway&rsquo;s &raquo;struggle for freedom&raquo; has had for its object the
+enormously important cause &mdash; their own consuls!</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Sweden&rsquo;s loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the
+Union.</span>
+
+The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply
+in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; <i>in everything
+else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality
+with that of Sweden</i>. <span class="tn" title="sic">An</span> Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted
+the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious
+to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the
+hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that
+in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they
+can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the
+Union &mdash; the well known Bod&ouml; affair in 1819-1821 &mdash; an episode concerning
+which <i>Norwegian</i> investigations of recent date, have served to place
+Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian
+tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish
+administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years&rsquo;
+uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity
+of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of
+<span class="pagebreak" title="65">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>
+material and
+spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure
+interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian
+assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the
+organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that
+Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign
+affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long
+time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be
+added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection
+with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself
+Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State &mdash;
+the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs &mdash; a Norwegian has
+lately been in office. <span class="tn" title="sic">the</span> posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even
+the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of
+those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians.
+Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration
+of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests
+of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give
+Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers,
+which even if they did not accede to all Norway&rsquo;s demands, would, if
+realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously
+held.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Has Norway been denied its prerogative.</span>
+
+But it has been said on the Norwegian side &mdash; and this has been brought
+forward as the main point &mdash; Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a
+&raquo;free and independent Kingdom&raquo;. If by that, they mean that Norway has
+been denied equality in the Union, it is <i>not true</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Sweden&rsquo;s only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her
+prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be
+subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden
+on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be
+maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary
+obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief
+impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire
+<span class="pagebreak" title="66">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a>
+on the part of the
+Norwegians to be <span class="tn" title="sic">absolutly</span> their own masters, that and nothing else.
+Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of
+responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be
+<i>declared</i>, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can
+never be politically <i>defended</i>. Norway must already have made the
+discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever,
+<i>to political action under a strict sense of responsibility</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Faults on Sweden&rsquo;s side.</span>
+
+By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to
+a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking
+back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be
+noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness
+and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been
+mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the
+so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden&rsquo;s policy was
+undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the
+Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to
+make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be
+unanimous because Sweden has been <i>too conciliatory</i> towards Norways&rsquo;
+demands.</p>
+
+<p><span class="sidenote">Swedish opinion.</span>
+
+It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian
+countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the
+Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The
+observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least,
+true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by
+kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to
+smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of
+the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the
+prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of
+Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account
+that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more
+intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are
+shown in their
+<span class="pagebreak" title="67">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a>
+true light, such as they are <span class="tn" title="sic">and &mdash; have</span> been. The
+revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the
+past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of
+Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which
+Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.</p>
+
+<p>In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest
+periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the
+indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen
+terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.
+<span class="pagebreak" title="68">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="69">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>
+</p>
+<h2><span class="pagebreak" title="70">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>
+
+<a name="ACTS_TOUCHING_THE_SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN_CRISIS" id="ACTS_TOUCHING_THE_SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN_CRISIS"></a>ACTS TOUCHING THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN CRISIS.</h2>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="71">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a>
+
+<a name="doc1" id="doc1"></a>1.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the Constitution of Norway.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and
+<span class="tn" title="sic">inalinenable</span> realm united with Sweden under one King.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 5. The King&rsquo;s person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused. The
+responsibility is incumbent on His Council.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<p>&sect;15. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;  The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible for
+the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions adopted.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded.
+Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his
+opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for
+the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment.</p>
+
+<p>If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings&rsquo; resolution
+incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the
+country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make
+strenuous remonstrance and to have his <span class="tn" title="sic">opinon</span> recorded. He who has not
+issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King
+and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the
+Odelsthing can <span class="tn" title="sic">proeced</span> against him before the Court of impeachment.</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 31. All orders (<span class="tn" title="sic">ezcepting</span> matters of military command) issued by the
+King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its own
+members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash; </p>
+
+<p>&sect; 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of by
+the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if
+present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of
+obtaining the sanction of the King.</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His
+signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve
+of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that
+He does
+<span class="pagebreak" title="72">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a>
+ not find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case
+the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing
+then assembled.</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three
+ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general
+Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate
+ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and
+the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been
+passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the
+request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution
+regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it
+passes into law, even if the King&rsquo;s sanction should not be obtained
+before the break-up of the Storthing.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><a name="doc1_s112" id="doc1_s112"></a>&sect; 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of
+the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made
+at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be
+issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary
+Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the
+amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however,
+must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should
+only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the
+spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by
+two thirds of the Storthing.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc2" id="doc2"></a>2.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the Act of Union.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war
+and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and
+receive ambassadors. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash; </p>
+
+<p>&sect; 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministers
+<span class="tn" title="sic">accompaning</span> the King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet
+Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted.
+In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be
+consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not
+allow of it.</p>
+
+<p>When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries
+are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there
+have a seat and vote.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&sect; 7<a name="fnm_72_1" id="fnm_72_1"></a><a href="#fn_72_1" class="fnnum">72:1</a>. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;  Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in
+consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any
+special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+are despatched
+<span class="pagebreak" title="73">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>
+to each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden
+by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime
+Minister.</p>
+
+<p>Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol<a name="fnm_73_1" id="fnm_73_1"></a><a href="#fn_73_1" class="fnnum">73:1</a>. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash; </p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p><a name="doc2_s12" id="doc2_s12"></a>&sect; 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are
+copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions
+to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the
+Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same
+authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered
+but in the way indicated in &sect; 112 of that same Constitution.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_72_1" id="fn_72_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_72_1">72:1</a></span> This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional
+Government.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc3" id="doc3"></a>3.<br /><br />
+Preliminary settlement of the Consular question between members of the
+Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on March 24, 1903. (The
+so-called Communiqu&eacute;).</h2>
+
+
+<p>The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of
+October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question,
+have been continued in Christiania during February and March.</p>
+
+<p>During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United
+Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not
+convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect,
+would convey any important practical advantages to either of the
+Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this
+arrangement should lead to inconveniences.</p>
+
+<p>Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and
+whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest
+Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned
+out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system
+with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to
+satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal
+apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to
+attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two
+Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the
+following terms:</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="74">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a>
+1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.</p>
+
+<p>2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of <span class="tn" title="sic">th seame</span>
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities, of both Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and
+acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union
+that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability
+of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at
+present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have,
+however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a
+desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and
+the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as
+can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister
+for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister&rsquo;s
+constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both
+Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally
+concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the
+administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway&rsquo;s justified
+claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more
+evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted
+that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time,
+however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a
+satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might
+soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the
+supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state
+of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to
+the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of
+things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an
+agreement could not be expected.</p>
+
+<p>We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to
+bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leave
+<i>status quo</i> undisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for
+Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation
+between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which
+both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their
+authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary
+co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular
+Services of both Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="75">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>
+In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not
+be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of
+arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of
+negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both
+countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_73_1" id="fn_73_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_73_1">73:1</a></span> These <span class="tn" title="sic">enactsments</span> show plainly that the Act of Union only
+recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the
+Foreign Policy of the Union.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc4" id="doc4"></a>4.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the Norwegian Government&rsquo;s draft of laws of the same
+wording in order to regulate the relations between the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs and the legations on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular services of the two countries on the other hand. Dated May 28,
+1904.</h2>
+
+
+<h3 class="appendix">I.</h3>
+
+<p>The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the
+Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign
+affairs of:</p>
+
+<p>a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of
+Consular Services, the <span class="tn" title="sic">appointement</span> or employment of Consuls, their power
+of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge:</p>
+
+<p>b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the
+Consular Service;</p>
+
+<p>c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e.
+g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or
+proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power
+against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation
+and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters
+simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<h3 class="appendix">III.</h3>
+
+<p>Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic
+or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the
+Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement.
+This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement
+of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities
+to the Consul&rsquo;s discharge of his official duties; of troubles for
+warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of
+arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from
+outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to
+diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional
+information.</p>
+
+<p>In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a
+negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable
+inconveniences,
+<span class="pagebreak" title="76">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a>
+ the Minister for Foreign affairs can make direct
+<span class="tn" title="sic">inquires</span> of, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the
+diplomatic or political side of the matter.</p>
+
+<p>The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction
+addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding
+the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above.</p>
+
+
+<h3 class="appendix">IV.</h3>
+
+<p>When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked
+after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give
+orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual
+law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the
+Home authority.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to a Consul&rsquo;s duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above,
+the last passage of &sect; 3 should be applied.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc5" id="doc5"></a>5.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the outlines for laws of the same wording drawn up by His
+Excellency Bostr&ouml;m, in November 1904.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and
+the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to
+their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information
+about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them
+to know it should be directed:</p>
+
+<p>that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for
+Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its
+establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers;</p>
+
+<p>that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have
+an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the
+persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment;</p>
+
+<p>that, for obtaining a Foreign Power&rsquo;s recognition of a Consul, the
+Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign
+Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the
+province of the Consular administration the question arises about
+applying to the Government of a Foreign Power;</p>
+
+<p>and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration,
+the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the
+Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting
+with such an instruction.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="77">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>
+As to the Foreign Minister&rsquo;s relation to the Consuls and <i>vice vers&acirc;</i>,
+the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for
+Foreign affairs in such a way:</p>
+
+<p>that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request
+information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions;</p>
+
+<p>and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly
+what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by
+him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to
+affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a
+report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further
+development.</p>
+
+<p>Besides it should be instituted:</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing
+effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the
+Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to
+execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the
+Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble
+request to the King about the Consul&rsquo;s revocation, whereupon the Consular
+administration concerned should be informed of the resolution.</p>
+
+<p>In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls
+concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of
+mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law:</p>
+
+<p>that the legation is bound to guard the Consul&rsquo;s rights and to lend him
+necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the
+legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him
+instructions;</p>
+
+<p>that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the
+Minister for Foreign affairs;</p>
+
+<p>and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or
+in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to
+have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an
+action affecting his civil repute should <span class="tn" title="sic">he</span> brought against him, the
+legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further
+notice.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc6" id="doc6"></a>6.<br /><br />
+Extract from the answer given by His Excellency Hagerup to the <span class="tn" title="sic">preceeding</span>
+draft, on November 26, 1904.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement
+that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with
+measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely
+adhere to the Communiqu&eacute; and the Protocols of December that, as a basis
+<span class="pagebreak" title="78">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a>
+
+of agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular
+service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case &raquo;the Consuls of each
+Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which
+the latter shall have to determine.&raquo; This arrangement does not however
+preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain
+possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the
+consuls.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>With particular regard to the demand expressed in the &raquo;outlines&raquo; that the
+Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right &mdash; this is <span class="tn" title="superfluous comma">the,</span>
+intention according to your Excellency&rsquo;s verbal declaration &mdash; to
+discharge in ministerial &mdash; consequently in Swedish &mdash; Cabinet Council a
+consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that
+this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that
+an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a
+resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to
+the general principles of political and international law, impress upon
+Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a
+national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared
+with the present arrangement of the Consular service.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc7" id="doc7"></a>7.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the draft of laws of the same wording made by the Swedish
+Government in December 1904.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="center">&sect; 8.</p>
+
+<p>If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the
+Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a
+measure as is alluded to in &sect; 9, it is for the Consular administration to
+observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the consul
+concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this matter
+given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular
+administration.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&sect; 9.</p>
+
+<p>The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his
+province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country
+concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in
+such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound to <span class="tn" title="sic">fullfill</span> what is thus
+requested of him.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="79">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>
+&sect; 11.</p>
+
+<p>If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employ&eacute;
+has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of
+the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in
+political demonstrations, or <span class="tn" title="sic">secretely</span>, or openly encouraged or supported
+attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may
+have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United
+Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to
+give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council
+whereupon the matter is submitted to the King&rsquo;s consideration in the
+Cabinet Council of the country concerned.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="center">&sect; 16.</p>
+
+<p>If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect
+alluded to in &sect; 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime
+affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by
+circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter
+should <span class="tn" title="sic">immedately</span> be reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and to the Consular administration concerned.</p>
+
+<p>A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office
+until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has
+resolved upon it.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc8" id="doc8"></a>8.<br /><br />
+Extracts from notes made, in consequence of the Swedish Government&rsquo;s
+draft of laws of the same wording by the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on
+January 11, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>To &sect; 8. It is stated here that, <span class="tn" title="superfluous full stop">when.</span> in a matter being dealt with by the
+Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an
+order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its
+side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is
+difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without
+a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any
+similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from
+reference to &sect; 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the
+Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with
+by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to
+instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department
+can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposed
+<span class="pagebreak" title="80">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>
+ to have been
+the following: &mdash; to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a
+diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a
+diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from
+arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It
+stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to
+reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is
+calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an
+interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of
+judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very
+appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to
+the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>To &sect; 11. &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;  We should not however dwell upon these formal
+considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared
+with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint
+treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consuls
+<span class="tn" title="sic">wheteher</span> to the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign
+authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the
+report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both
+countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): &raquo;Furthermore the
+Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister
+(and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign
+Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the
+actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although
+dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic
+and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment,
+the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the
+matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international
+conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions
+necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be
+debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the
+Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable
+to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to
+the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to
+the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the
+Norwegian department.&raquo; We concur in the opinion expressed here and the
+demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning
+measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the
+cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question
+regards the consul&rsquo;s relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations.
+In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of
+the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is
+evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating
+to the Consul&rsquo;s disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor
+was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place
+before the appearance of the Communiqu&eacute;. Such a joint treatment that
+should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, can
+<span class="pagebreak" title="81">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a>
+ only imply one
+of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to
+delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be
+a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get
+influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will
+signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should
+be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it
+is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be
+supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not
+being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for
+a Consul&rsquo;s revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the
+matter the object of a humble report.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>To &sect; 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to
+suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in &sect; 11, or
+prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection
+it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute,
+the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations,
+but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has
+to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future
+Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to
+other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised
+by the King (see the Constitution, &sect; 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuv&aelig;rende
+statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations
+would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to
+consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the
+present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior
+consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the
+legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular
+Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp.
+24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to
+Norwegian <span class="tn" title="sic">authonity</span> and ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish
+minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic
+relations: &mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash; </p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a
+Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly
+because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the
+claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms of
+<span class="tn" title="sic">independecy</span>, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is
+intended by the whole negotiation, <span class="tn" title="missing full stop">viz</span> &mdash; to use the words of the Swedish
+negotiators &mdash; to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and
+for <span class="tn" title="missing full stop">Norway</span> The Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority
+that each country decides for itself. (see the <a href="#doc3">Communiqu&eacute;</a> of March 24,
+1903).</p>
+
+<p>On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the
+paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further
+discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile.</p>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="82">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>
+
+<a name="doc9" id="doc9"></a>9.<br /><br />
+Extracts from the answer of the Swedish Cabinet Council to the memorandum
+made by the Norwegian Cabinet Council on January 11, 1905. Dated January
+30, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that &sect;
+8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard
+to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the
+Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the
+draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a
+certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to
+be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between
+the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter
+subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the
+origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to
+interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him.
+When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities,
+that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a
+conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between
+the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged,
+are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency
+to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as
+exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be
+incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert
+regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be
+entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of
+their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can
+hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign
+Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must
+be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint
+countries should be preferred.</p>
+
+<p>The precepts of &sect;&sect; 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant to
+<span class="tn" title="sic">guarrantee</span> that the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their
+province. Such a <span class="tn" title="sic">guarrantee</span> cannot be dispensed with in the opinion of
+the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign
+country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good
+relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms.
+To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their
+relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the
+legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under
+such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council,
+hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might,
+with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be
+escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedish
+<span class="pagebreak" title="83">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a>
+draft alike contain regulations
+enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign
+Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his
+duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position
+held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the
+possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a
+form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul&rsquo;s conduct, of his
+remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the
+Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul.</p>
+
+<p>In support of his standpoint that &raquo;a joint treatment of matters
+concerning the Consul&rsquo;s relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the
+legations or the Foreign Authorities&raquo; must not occur, the Norwegian
+Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular
+Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words.
+&raquo;But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the
+disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the
+internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the
+Norwegian department.&raquo; To this the objection should be made that the
+opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish
+Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has
+itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign
+Minister and the legations, the right to address &raquo;injunctions&raquo; that the
+Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of
+the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls
+shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish
+Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the
+welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded
+in the Norwegian memorandum, the <span class="tn" title="sic">abovementioned</span> paragraphs of its draft.
+This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and
+modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is
+important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible
+modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued
+negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into
+particulars.</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc10" id="doc10"></a>10.<br /><br />
+Record of Foreign Office affair, made before H.&nbsp;M. the King in the
+presence of H.&nbsp;R.&nbsp;H. the Crown Prince in Joint Cabinet Council at
+Stockholm Palace, on February 7, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an
+account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway.
+In answer to the Foreign Minister&rsquo;s recommendation in Joint Swedish and
+<span class="pagebreak" title="84">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>
+
+Norwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made
+by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been
+appended to this Protocol.</p>
+
+<p>After having given an account of the contents of the report of the
+Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration
+of the recommendation<a name="fnm_84_1" id="fnm_84_1"></a><a href="#fn_84_1" class="fnnum">84:1</a> previously made by me. I venture however, to
+draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to
+terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be
+sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the
+relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this
+arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within
+the Union, has long been admitted.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of
+March 24, 1903, I want <span class="tn" title="sic">therfore</span>, to emphasize the desirability that the
+question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign
+affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two
+countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to
+taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously
+advocated&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the
+other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council.</p>
+
+<p>The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian
+Government&rsquo;s humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that
+in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way
+expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24,
+1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating
+Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally
+agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the
+positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24,
+1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging
+on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be
+taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of
+the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said
+document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case,
+partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the
+chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the
+above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded.</p>
+
+<p><i>His Majesty the King</i> was hereupon pleased to dictate:</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="85">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>
+&raquo;In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other
+resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My
+peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a
+century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger
+the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the
+independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula
+and her two peoples&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in
+all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this
+dictate.</p>
+
+<p>In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Council, <i>His Majesty the King</i> was pleased to resolve
+that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet
+Council in <span class="tn" title="sic">persuance</span> of the King&rsquo;s resolution of December 21, 1903, shall
+not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of
+the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published!</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="fn_84_1" id="fn_84_1"></a><span class="label"><a href="#fnm_84_1">84:1</a></span> In Joint Cabinet Council of February 6 the Foreign
+Minister had recommended that the task of negotiation, entrusted by the
+King to the Cabinet Councils of the two countries, should not lead to any
+further steps.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc11" id="doc11"></a>11.<br /><br />
+The note of the Crown-Prince-Regent to the special committee of the
+Storthing. Dated February 28, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>It is my wish to make the following declaration to the Committee. In
+these fatal days I feel it a necessity to open My heart to you and I do
+so now only in the capacity of Norway&rsquo;s Regent.</p>
+
+<p>I fully understand the sentiments the Norwegian people, in these days,
+are animated with and that you as the loyal sons of the Fatherland in
+passing your resolutions will solely have in view the welfare of Norway.
+But what is Norway&rsquo;s welfare, nay, I say with the same emphasis, what is
+the welfare of both countries? I do not hesitate a moment to answer this
+question with the one word: Union.</p>
+
+<p>It is therefore my sincerest hope and my strongest exhortation to you not
+to enter upon a way that leads to a rupture between the two peoples. It
+has so often been said that the dynasty tries to look after its own
+interests, but this is not true. The Union is not of paramount interest
+to the <i>dynasty</i>, but it should be so to the two <i>peoples</i>, for it is a
+vital condition for their happiness and future.</p>
+
+<p>The Royal power has never tried to prevent Norway from obtaining her own
+Consular service. The only condition for the fulfilment of this desire
+is, and must be, that the relation to the joint administration of Foreign
+affairs should be arranged in a way securing the Union and that this
+matter regarding both countries cannot be definitively settled until
+after being treated in accordance with &sect; 5 of the Act of Union. From My
+standpoint as the Regent of the United Kingdoms I can never act otherwise
+than as I consider useful to the existing Union to which I hold Myself
+bound to adhere.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="86">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a>
+An attempt has now been made on the way to partial reform, which I am
+sorry to say has been unsuccessful. But one should not therefore give up
+everything and enter into a way that, at any rate, cannot lead to the
+<span class="tn" title="sic">obobject</span> preserved. But the logical consequence of this is to enter into
+new negotiations with Sweden on a larger basis. And to such negotiations
+on the basis of complete equality between the countries I declare Myself
+fully prepared to lend my assistance.</p>
+
+<p>I consider it my imperative duty openly to hold forth to you the great
+dangers and the fatal consequences for each people to follow their own
+course. United, we have at any rate a certain power and importance in the
+European system of states but separated &mdash; how much the less the word of
+Norway or of Sweden would <i>then</i> weigh! Therefore, may these peoples
+assigned by nature itself to hold together, also do so for the future!</p>
+
+<p>When I see all this stand out clearly to My inward eye, you, too will
+understand with what sincere and intense, and heart-felt sorrow I
+consider <span class="tn" title="sic">thesituation</span> we are in and the threatening turn matters now seem
+to take.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion I want only to add this: when you go to your task, do so
+with entirely open eyes and consider carefully <i>all</i> consequences of your
+actions. Each one may act according to his best convictions! God leads
+the destinies of the peoples. May He give you and us all prudence so as
+to enter into the way that leads to the true welfare of the Fatherland
+and of the North.</p>
+
+<p>I want this my address to be published.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  GUSTAF
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc12" id="doc12"></a>12.<br /><br />
+Record of Justice-Department affair held at Stockholm Palace, on
+Wednesday the 5th of April 1905 before His Royal Highness the
+Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent declared:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;I have to-day <span class="tn" title="sic">summond</span> you to Joint Cabinet Council in order to make the
+following address to you:</p>
+
+<p>I herewith exhort the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, on both
+sides without <span class="tn" title="sic">an</span> one-sided adherence to standpoints formerly held, to
+immediately enter into free and friendly negotiations concerning a new
+arrangement of all matters affecting the Union, upon the fundamental
+principle that full equality between the countries should be tried to be
+established.</p>
+
+<p>The way which, in My opinion, ought to be chosen and in which, as far as
+I know, with a little good intention on both sides a solution of the
+difficulties satisfactory to all parties can be attained is this: Foreign
+Minister
+<span class="pagebreak" title="87">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a>
+ in common, be he a Swede or a Norwegian, responsible to both
+countries or to a joint institution; separate Consular service for each
+country arranged however, in such a way that the Consuls, in everything
+regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, should be under the Foreign
+Minister&rsquo;s direction and control.</p>
+
+<p>If, in the course of the negotiations, another form could be found for
+arranging the affairs affecting the Union, always however with the
+preservation of the community in the management and charge of Foreign
+affairs, which is an indispensable condition to the existence of the
+Union, I herewith declare myself, prepared to take also this form into
+earnest consideration.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Berger, Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department, made the following
+statement:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;In connection with what your Royal Highness has been pleased to declare
+and while emphasizing the desirability of opening further negotiations as
+to arranging the Union affairs, I recommend in all humility to request in
+<span class="tn" title="sic">persuance</span> of &sect; 5 of the Act of Union, a report from the Norwegian
+Government as to the proposition of opening such negotiations.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>What the president of the Justice-Department had thus stated and
+recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.</p>
+
+<p>The Norwegian section of the Cabinet Council stated that, at present, it
+did not find any reason to give its opinion on the reality of the matter,
+but, with reference to &sect; 15 of the Norwegian Constitution and to &sect; 5 of
+the Act of Union, it confined itself in recommending the request of a
+report from the Norwegian Government.</p>
+
+<p>His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was graciously pleased to
+decree that the Norwegian Government&rsquo;s report of the matter should be
+requested.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc13" id="doc13"></a>13.<br /><br />
+Motion on the Union question in the First Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag.</h2>
+
+
+<p>According to notification made in the &raquo;Post- och Inrikes Tidningar&raquo; of
+April 6, this year, the Crown-Prince Regent has on the 5th of the same
+month in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council made the following
+declaration:</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>Whereas, through the exhortation thus addressed by the Crown-Prince
+Regent to the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, a suggestion of
+new negotiations has been made, which ought to be able to lead to such a
+solution of the Union affairs as may be approved of by both peoples, and
+whereas the present state of things seems to occasion the Riksdag to give
+already its opinion on the matter, we move,</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="88">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a>
+that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+Governments concerning, a new arrangement of the Union affairs.</p></div>
+
+<p>Stockholm, April 12, 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  <i>Gustaf Ax. Berg.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Gottfrid Billing.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Gustaf Bj&ouml;rlin.</i><br />
+
+  <i>Hj. Palmstierna.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Fredrik Pettersson.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Gust. Tamm.</i><br />
+
+          <i>R. T&ouml;rnebladh.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Wilh. Walld&eacute;n.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc14" id="doc14"></a>14.<br /><br />
+Motion on the Union question in the Second Chamber of the Swedish
+Riksdag.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Cabinet Council
+of the 5th inst. and published the day after in the &raquo;Post- och Inrikes
+Tidningar&raquo;, has given great satisfaction to us and certainly also to
+other friends of the Union, to whom the relation arisen between the
+sister countries after the failure of the consular negotiations, has
+caused a great deal of anxiety. That new negotiations if brought about,
+will have a decisive influence on the future of the Union, is obvious.
+The worth of the Union, as well as the prospect of maintaining it for a
+considerable time to come, depend upon the two peoples voluntary
+adherence to it in the conviction that the Union involves advantages well
+worth of those restrictions in each peoples absolute right of self
+determination as are necessarily conditioned by it. Again, the failure of
+the negotiations would evidently produce among the two peoples a general
+and settled opinion that an arrangement satisfactory to both cannot be
+found within the Union, and such a conviction is sure to undermine its
+existence.</p>
+
+<p>Because of this, it proves to be of importance for the Riksdag not to
+pass in silence the suggestion of negotiations given in the
+above-mentioned declaration, but to second it, if found satisfactory.</p>
+
+<p>It seems to us that the Riksdag should not hesitate to take the latter
+alternative, since the declaration, while holding in <span class="tn" title="sic">wiew</span> the necessary
+communion in the management of Foreign affairs and in the two peoples&rsquo;
+control of it, at the same time in consideration of its latter portion,
+has the bearing that it should not preclude the possibility to attain a
+solution satisfactory to both peoples.</p>
+
+<p>On that account we beg leave to move:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="89">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a>
+that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.</p></div>
+
+<p>
+  Stockholm, April 12, 1905.
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  <i>Carl Persson.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Hans Andersson.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Sixten von Friesen.</i><br />
+
+  <i>Ernst Lindblad.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>D. Persson i T&auml;llberg.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>K.&nbsp;H. Gez. von Sch&eacute;ele.</i><br />
+
+                          <i>T. Zetterstrand.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc15" id="doc15"></a>15.<br /><br />
+The Norwegian Governments&rsquo; report of April 17th 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>His Excellency Michelsen, Prime Minister, and Chief of the
+Justice-Department, has in all humility made the following statement:</p>
+
+<p>In making this matter the subject of a humble report the Department
+desires to state: As is well known the Norwegian people have made a
+unanimous demand for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service and have with equal unanimity asserted that the decision of this
+matter, as lying outside the community established between the countries
+through the Act of Union, should be reserved to the Norwegian
+constitutional authorities. For the <span class="tn" title="sic">treatement</span> of this matter the
+Norwegian Storthing has appointed a special Committee and in the
+immediate future, this committee will prepare a motion that, in the
+present sitting of the Storthing, a bill be to passed with regard to the
+establishment of a separate Consular service.</p>
+
+<p>Inasmuch as the scheme propounded in Joint Cabinet Council should be
+based on the supposition that the further advancement of the Consular
+question should, for the present, be deferred Norway&rsquo;s approval of such a
+supposition would, in the opinion of the Department be equivalent to
+giving up of the Norwegian people&rsquo;s unanimous desire to now see a just
+right carried through which is due to Norway in her capacity of a
+Sovereign realm and is secured in her Constitution, and for a reform
+requested with cumulative force by the development and the conditions of
+industry, instead of entering into negotiations between the countries,
+which, after renewed experience, may unfortunately be apprehended to
+prove fruitless or at best, to delay the realisation of the matter.</p>
+
+<p>For there is no denying the fact that the scheme for negotiations now
+propounded is nothing new, but that similar schemes in the earlier
+history of the Union have repeatedly been tried in vain. The three
+Committees affecting the Union and made up of Norwegian and Swedish men,
+that in the past century, after previous treatment in 1844, in 1867, and
+in 1898 propounded
+<span class="pagebreak" title="90">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>
+schemes for new regulations concerning the mutual
+relations of the countries did not lead to any positive result. The
+report of the first Committee was in 1847 subject to a treatment on the
+part of the Norwegian Government, but was afterwards not favoured by the
+Swedish Government; the report of the second Committee, which did not
+give expression to Norway&rsquo;s equality in the Union was rejected by the
+vast majority of the Storthing in 1871 and in the third Committee no
+proposal of a future arrangement could obtain plurality among the
+Norwegian and the Swedish members.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the last-mentioned Committee we beg leave to draw
+particular attention to the fact, that all the Swedish members of the
+Committee certainly agreed upon founding the Union on the principle of
+parity and equality, inasmuch as they proposed that the Foreign affairs
+should be entrusted to the charge of a joint Foreign minister of
+Norwegian or Swedish nationality. But at the same time the two fractions
+wherein the Swedish members of the Committee were divided, proposed such
+an arrangement of the constitutional responsibility not only for those
+members of the separate Cabinet Councils of the countries, who at the
+side of the Foreign Minister take part in the treatment of diplomatic
+affairs, but also for the Foreign Minister himself, so that no member of
+the Norwegian Committee could in this respect support any of the Swedish
+schemes. In addition to the establishment of a joint Foreign Minister
+office, all the Swedish members recommended an extension of the
+constitutional community between the countries which no member of the
+Norwegian Committee could second and lastly, the scheme for a separate
+Foreign Office for each country which already was the expression of the
+opinion prevailing among the Norwegian people, could not gain any support
+from the Swedish side.</p>
+
+<p>In this connection it should also be remembered that equally fruitless
+proved the negotiations about the arrangement of the ministerial Cabinet
+Council, carried on between the two Governments in 1885-86 and in
+1890-91.</p>
+
+<p>If thus the results of the above-mentioned efforts have been but little
+encouraging, this can, in a still higher degree, be said to have been the
+case with the negotiations just now terminated concerning questions
+connected with the establishment of a separate Consular service for each
+country. After these negotiations, brought about on Swedens initiative,
+had led to a preliminary agreement presupposing a separate Consular
+service for each country, subject to the home authority which each
+country decided for itself, and after this agreement had been approved of
+by the King and the Governments of the two countries in Joint Cabinet
+Council on December 21, 1903, the matter, as is well known, fell through
+owing to the so called bills of the same wording that were meant to
+regulate the relations between the separate Consular services on the one
+hand, and the Foreign Minister and the legations on the other hand. This
+negative result was attributed to the circumstance that from the Swedish
+side a number of demands were finally made and adhered to, which are
+partly considered as incongruous with the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="91">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>
+ Constitution of Norway and
+with our rights as a Sovereign realm, partly would exclude what had been
+presupposed in the preliminary agreements viz. that the Consuls of each
+country should be subject to that home authority which each country
+decided for itself. Through this, a deep disappointment has arisen in
+Norway which, if strengthened by new unsuccessful schemes, will imply the
+greatest danger to the good relations between the two peoples which in a
+far higher degree than agreements laid down in treatises or juridical
+forms are the basis of the concord and the strength of both peoples.</p>
+
+<p>Under these circumstances the Department finds it necessary to dissuade
+from entering into new negotiations on the Union affairs ere a separate
+Norwegian Consular service has been established. Not until this has been
+done, will the confidence return which is the condition of any friendly
+and successful consideration of embarrassing and delicate Union affairs,
+and the Department will then be able to recommend the opening of
+negotiations for arranging the management of Foreign affairs and of the
+diplomacy and about the present Union based on the Act of Union, and
+questions connected with this matter. But, if so, these negotiations must
+be carried on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the
+<span class="tn" title="sic">Sovereignity</span> of each country without any reservation or restriction
+whatever and consequently also &mdash; in conformity with what occurred in
+1898 &mdash; embrace the arrangement proposed by the Norwegian side as to the
+establishment of a separate Norwegian and a separate Swedish Foreign
+Office administration in such forms as each country will consider
+necessary for its objects and interests. In harmony with this it should,
+besides, be agreed upon that, if also new negotiations should prove
+fruitless one must not return to <i>status quo</i> so as to adhere to the
+present untenable state of Union affairs. There should be a binding
+presumption that the present state of things must not prevent either
+country from exercising its right of self-determination, but that instead
+each country can freely decide upon the future forms of its national
+existence. For not a coercive union but only the mutual confidence and
+feeling of solidarity of the free and independent nations can safeguard
+the future and the happiness of both peoples and the independence and
+integrity of their countries.</p>
+
+<p>With reference to the above-mentioned statement endorsed in substance by
+the other members of the Cabinet Council, it is recommended in all
+humility:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>that a copy of the present humble report made in Joint Cabinet
+Council on April 5th this year, concerning new negotiations
+affecting the Union may graciously be ordered to be delivered over
+to the Swedish <span class="tn" title="sic">Iustice</span>-Department.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="92">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>
+<a name="doc16" id="doc16"></a>16.<br /><br />
+Record of Justice-<span class="tn" title="sic">Departement</span> affair held at Stockholm Palace on Tuesday
+the 25th of April, 1905 before His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>Mr Berger, Cabinet Minister and Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department
+gave, in all humility, a notice of the Norwegian Government&rsquo;s humble
+report in consequence of the question raised in Joint Cabinet Council on
+the 5th inst. <span class="tn" title="sic">vith</span> regard to opening new negotiations concerning the
+arrangement of the Union question; this report is appended to this
+Protocol.</p>
+
+<p>After the chief of Department had given an account of the contents of the
+report, His Excellency Ramstedt, Prime Minister made the following
+statement:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;What in the Norwegian Governments report has been said about the reason
+why the latest negotiations, regarding the Union did not lead to any
+result, does not, in my opinion, now require a reply, but in this
+respect, I only refer to the Swedish Cabinet Council&rsquo;s declaration of
+January 30, 1905, appended to the Protocol made in Joint Cabinet Council
+on the 6th of February last.</p>
+
+<p>In the declaration made by your Royal Highness on the 5th inst. and put
+on record, the Swedish Cabinet Council expected to find a method of
+settling the differences of opinion as to the Union affairs. Therefore
+the Swedish Cabinet Council gave its support to your Royal Highness&rsquo;s
+declaration.</p>
+
+<p>The condition of the new negotiations, however, was, according to the
+same declaration, that the negotiations should embrace all matters
+affecting the Union and consequently also the Consular question.</p>
+
+<p>Whereas now from the Norwegian side the thought of further negotiations
+is rejected, ere a separate Norwegian Consular service has been
+established and whereas besides, for eventual new negotiations, such a
+condition is made from the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union
+and the Act of Union, it is obvious that negotiations on the basis
+indicated by your Royal Highness cannot now be opened with any chance of
+success&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>This statement was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.</p>
+
+<p>The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;The section of the Cabinet Council refers to the report of the Norwegian
+Government from which it appears that on the Norwegian side there is
+willingness to bring about negotiations between the countries on the
+conditions put forward in the report. It is also obvious from the report
+that from the Norwegian side the intention is not to try to dissolve the
+present Union. On the other hand, one finds it necessary to demand that
+such a
+<span class="pagebreak" title="93">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a>
+ dissolution should be within the bounds of possibility and that
+negotiations presupposing this eventuality with the consent of the
+Constitution authorities of both countries, should be compatible with the
+Act of Union.</p>
+
+<p>Under these circumstances, however, the section of the Cabinet Council
+that negotiations concerning the Union affairs cannot, agree for the
+present, opened with any chance of success.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was hereupon pleased he to
+declare:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;Whereas the Norwegian Government has unfortunately been unwilling to
+accept my proposition of new negotiations concerning all the affairs
+affecting the Union, I must, while sincerely regretting it, let the
+matter abide by the declarations made by the Cabinet Councils.&raquo;</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc17" id="doc17"></a>17.<br /><br />
+The Riksdags address to the King on the Union question, on May 15, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+</p>
+
+<p>In both Chambers of the Riksdag resolutions have been submitted with the
+object of expressing, in an address, to your Majesty the Riksdag&rsquo;s
+support of the declaration published in the &raquo;Post- och Inrikes Tidningar&raquo;
+and made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian
+Cabinet Council on the 5th of April last.</p>
+
+<p>This declaration is to the following effect:</p>
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>The Riksdag realizes to the full the importance of this declaration of
+the Crown-Prince Regent, as involving a possibility of bringing about a
+new satisfactory arrangement of the Union affairs.</p>
+
+<p>It is therefore with an expression of regret that the Riksdag has learned
+from the publishment of the Protocol drawn up in Joint Swedish and
+Norwegian Cabinet Council on the 25th of April last, that negotiations
+founded on the basis indicated in the above-mentioned declaration of the
+Crown-Prince Regent cannot now be opened with any chance of success.</p>
+
+<p>Although thus the question of such negotiations seems to have been
+dropped for the present, the Riksdag, however, considers itself bound to
+express its opinion on a question of such a far-reaching importance as
+the present one, and consequently the Riksdag has resolved to announce
+herewith its support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year,
+and recommending the opening of negotiations between the Swedish and
+Norwegian Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.</p>
+
+<p>Stockholm, May 13, 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  With all loyal veneration.
+</p>
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="94">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>
+<a name="doc18" id="doc18"></a>18.<br /><br />
+The resignation of the Norwegian Government. Dated Christiania, May 26,
+1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+</p>
+
+<p>In case Your Majesty should find yourself unable to acquiesce in the
+Norwegian Government&rsquo;s recommendation to sanction the Storthing&rsquo;s
+resolution for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service, we venture, in all humility, to apply for permission to
+immediately resign our posts as members of Your Majesty&rsquo;s Cabinet, since
+none of us <span class="tn" title="sic">well</span> be able to countersign a resolution considered by us as
+noxious to the country. A rejection of this unanimous recommendation of
+the Government concerning a Norwegian law unanimously adopted by the
+Storthing and issued by the whole Norwegian people to be carried through
+cannot, in our opinion, be grounded on regards paid to the interests of
+Norway, but would involve an abnegation of the <span class="tn" title="sic">Sovereignity</span> of the
+country, and would be a manifestation of a personal Royal power in
+opposition to the Constitution and to constitutional practice.</p>
+
+<p>Christiania, May 26, 1905.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc19" id="doc19"></a>19.<br /><br />
+Report of the Cabinet Council held in Stockholm May <span class="tn" title="should read &ldquo;27th&rdquo;">30th</span> 1905, given by
+the Norwegian Section of the Council.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  To the President of the Norwegian Government.
+</p>
+
+<p>The Section of the Cabinet Council herewith presents the following
+report.</p>
+
+<p>In the Cabinet Council held by the King at the Royal Palace in Stockholm
+on May 27th the Norwegian Government presented their proposal respecting
+the sanction of the Storthing to the Norwegian Consular law. After which
+the members of the Section expressed their unanimity respecting the
+proposals, and urgently appealed to the King to sanction them. They
+emphasized the reform in question for the development of the country in a
+national and economical respect, which was unanimously approved of both
+by the National Assembly and also the whole of the people of Norway.
+There might be many differences of opinion and divergencies on various
+public affairs, but in this case, there was complete unanimity among all
+parties and communities. The Storthing, in conjunction with the
+government, had omitted from the law such questions as might have
+reference to the points that touched upon the Foreign and Diplomatic
+administration and dealt with the Consular question alone.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="95">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>
+Therefore it was thought that all cause of opposition would, on this
+side, be removed. It was therefore the nation&rsquo;s sincere hope, that His
+Majesty would graciously incline to their appeal.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  The King
+</p>
+
+<p>thereupon read the following reply.</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;The Crown-Prince as Regent in a joint Cabinet Council on the 5th April
+has already pointed out the only way, in which this important matter can
+be presented, and all difficulties thereby be removed, that is, by
+negotiation. I give this decision my entire approval, and do not find the
+present moment suitable for sanctioning the law, which implies a change
+in the existing partnership in the Consular Service, which cannot be
+dissolved except by mutual agreement. The present regulation is
+established in consequence of a resolution in a Joint Cabinet Council,
+and therefore a separate Consular Service cannot be established either
+for Sweden or for Norway before the matter has been dealt with in the
+same Constitutional forms prescribed by the Act of Union &sect; 5. In refusing
+now to give My sanction to this law, I am supported by &sect;&sect; 30 and 78 in
+the Constitutional law, which give the King this right. The equal love I
+bear to my two peoples, makes it my duty to exercise this right.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>The Section of the Cabinet Council resolved first to institute further
+negotiations in the Cabinet Council in Christiania, in order that His
+Majesty might deal with this important matter, which might lead to a
+serious crisis in the government then in office.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  The King
+</p>
+
+<p>declared Himself unwilling to assent to this appeal and pointed out that
+the Norwegian government&rsquo;s proposal was received and dealt with.</p>
+
+<p>Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest
+representations in reference to His Majesty&rsquo;s decision, which would rouse
+complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal
+efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have
+led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the
+Kingdom. In this case Norway&rsquo;s interests in the Union were equal with
+those of Sweden. For that Norway&rsquo;s rights were respected, was a necessary
+condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His
+Majesty&rsquo;s decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and
+after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have
+incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it
+was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent
+decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and
+Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union.</p>
+
+<p>The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the
+present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it
+constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of
+resignation.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="pagebreak" title="96">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a>
+His Majesty the King
+</p>
+
+<p>then read the following reply:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I
+cannot consent to <span class="tn" title="sic">he</span> resignation of the Ministers.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution &sect; 30, and affirmed
+that the Ministers had now dutifully &raquo;expressed their opinions with
+boldness&raquo;, and &raquo;made strong representations&raquo; against His decision;
+therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph
+reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, &raquo;according to His
+own judgment.&raquo; He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law,
+to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the
+Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the
+negotiations and agreements on the matter.</p>
+
+<p>The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the
+Constitutional law &sect; 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive
+for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned,
+it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the
+negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal
+decree.</p>
+
+<p>Countersignature implied responsibility for the King&rsquo;s decisions, but in
+this case the government could not take that responsibility. It was
+prescribed in the Constitution &sect; 31 for all commands issued by the King
+(except affairs relating to military orders). But this conclusion was not
+a regular rule for the members of the Cabinet; it was a prescription for
+the forms to be observed in order to give a command legal validity.
+Occasions might therefore occur when it was not only right, but also a
+duty to refuse countersignature. The Section of the Cabinet Council had
+appealed to the Justice-Departement for enlightenment on the subject, and
+they knew that there had been several occasions when the Norwegian side
+had maintained the same opinions as those now presented.</p>
+
+<p>The Departement now comes to the same conclusion as in 1847 when it
+discussed the question in another agreement namely in a Resolution on the
+intended proposal for a new Act of Union; in this there is a reference to
+the Norwegian conception that there is nothing to prevent a member of the
+Council from refusing countersignature and resigning his office. This
+Resolution is accepted by the Government then in office: Lovenskiold,
+Krog, Sibbern, Schmidt, Pettersen, Herm. Foss and Fr. Stang and by the
+members then forming the Section of the Cabinet Council, Due, J.&nbsp;H. Vogt
+and Fleischer.</p>
+
+<p>The Section of the Cabinet Council finally decided that as a refusal to
+sanction would manifestly not be only injurious to the Kingdom, but also
+a denial of its Self-dependence, it had become a necessity to refuse
+countersignature, in order to avoid being a party in the matter. The
+Norwegian who did countersign would from that moment lose all national
+rights.</p>
+
+<p>After which the letters of resignation from the Norwegian Government, and
+from the Section of the Cabinet Council were delivered and read in the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="97">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a>
+
+presence of the King. Respecting this matter, the customary protocol has
+been drawn up.</p>
+
+<p>Kristiania 30:th May 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  <i>J. <span class="tn" title="spelled L&ouml;vland elsewhere">Lovland</span>.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>E. Hagerup Bull.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Harald Bothner.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc20" id="doc20"></a>20.<br /><br />
+The King&rsquo;s telegraphic protest against the declarations of the Norwegian
+Government. Dated Stockholm, May 29, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Stockholm, May 29. On account of what the Norwegian Government has
+declared &mdash; not only in writing in their resignations, but also verbally
+in the Cabinet Council of May 27 after my rejection of the Consular
+service law &mdash; I must declare that I, most decidedly, protest against the
+comments made there on Me and my method of action. I adhere to everything
+I have stated to the assembled Cabinet Council as to my constitutional
+right. I beg the <span class="tn" title="sic">Premie</span> minister to give publicity to this as soon as
+possible.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  <i>Oscar.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc21" id="doc21"></a>21.<br /><br />
+The Norwegian Cabinet Minister&rsquo;s notification to the King that they
+resigned their posts. Dated Christiania, <span class="tn" title="sic">Juni</span> 6, 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>In response to our humble resignations, Your Majesty has in Cabinet
+Council at the Palace of Stockholm on May 27th, decreed: &raquo;As it is clear
+to me that no other Cabinet can at present be formed, I decline to accept
+the resignations tendered by the Cabinet Ministers.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>According to Norway&rsquo;s Constitution it is incumbent on the King to procure
+a constitutional Government for the country. In the same moment as the
+Kings policy is an obstacle to the formation of a responsible Council the
+Norwegian Royal power has become in-operative.</p>
+
+<p>By your Majesty&rsquo;s resolution therefore, the constitutional relation
+between Your Majesty and the responsible Ministers of the Crown has
+assumed such an aspect as cannot be maintained. No Government and none of
+its members individually can, in a constitutional country, be forced
+against their wishes to remain in office with a Ministers responsibility,
+when their responsible advice in great questions decisive to the
+Fatherland is not followed by the King who, in <span class="tn" title="sic">persuace</span> of the
+constitution, is exempt from responsibility whereas under these
+circumstances it is the undoubted right of each member individually as a
+free man to resign his post, this will also, as a rule, be a duty towards
+the Fatherland in order to maintain its constitutional rights.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="98">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a>
+Your Majesty has declared that no Government can, at present, be formed.
+Your Majesty has found this so clear that Norway&rsquo;s King in these fatal
+days has remained at the Palace of Stockholm without making an attempt at
+bringing the country back to constitutional conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The policy manifested in Your Majesty&rsquo;s attitude towards the question of
+sanctioning the Consular service law is, in our opinion, incompatible
+with the Norwegian Constitution. But no more than a new Government is
+able to take upon itself the responsibility of this policy, no more are
+we able in office to render us participant of it by remaining in office.
+It is therefore our duty to resign our posts and to immediately give the
+Storthing the necessary communication of it.</p>
+
+<p>This shall now be done. Deep and discordant political divergencies have
+thus burst the frame of the constitutional Norwegian Monarchy.
+Circumstances have been <span class="tn" title="sic">stranger</span> than the desire of the individual. But
+the final settlement on the dissolution of the Union, that through Your
+Majesty&rsquo;s resolution &mdash; no doubt passed with a heavy heart, but also with
+full knowledge of its consequences &mdash; has now been started, will however,
+&mdash; this is our hope &mdash; turn out before long to have been the introduction
+to better and happier days for the two peoples, whose happiness and
+welfare have always been dear to Your Majesty&rsquo;s heart.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion we venture to tender Your Majesty our humblest thanks for
+the personal kindness and amiability shown to us during the time we have
+had the honour of being members of Your Majesty&rsquo;s Council.</p>
+
+<p>We beg Your Majesty to accept the assurance of our full recognition of
+Your Majesty&rsquo;s difficult position and of our invaried esteem. But
+paramount are our duties towards the Fatherland.</p>
+
+<p>Christiania, June 6, 1905.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+  <i>Chr. Michelsen.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>J. L&ouml;vland.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Sofus Arctander.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Gunnar Knudsen.</i><br />
+
+  <i>W. Olss&ouml;n.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>E. Hagerup Bull.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Chr. Knudsen.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Harald Bothner.</i><br />
+
+                       <i>A. Vinje.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>Kr. Lehmkuhl.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc22" id="doc22"></a>22.<br /><br />
+The King&rsquo;s telegraphic protests against the abdication of the Norwegian
+Government.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  To <i>the Prime Minister</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p>I have received the communication of the Cabinet Ministers and I record a
+most decided protest against the method of action of the Government.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  <i>Oscar.</i>
+</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  To <i>the President of Storthing</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p>Having this morning received from the Government the communication of the
+Cabinet Minister&rsquo;s resolution to resign their posts and to inform
+<span class="pagebreak" title="99">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a>
+ the
+Storthing of it I want herewith to make known that, in a telegram to M.
+Michelsen, Prime minister, I have recorded a most decided protest against
+their method of action.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  <i>Oscar.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc23" id="doc23"></a>23.<br /><br />
+The Reasons for the decision proposed by the President, in the Storting,
+on the 7th June 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Having on behalf of the Storthing received open information from the head
+of the Government that the several members of the Cabinet council have
+one and all resigned hereby declare: We were all prepared for the
+situation in which we now find ourselves. In meetings of the
+representatives, the question has therefore been discussed as to what
+measures would be taken by the Storthing to meet the necessities of such
+a situation. Every representative has had an opportunity for making known
+his personal opinions at these meetings respecting the situation and its
+demands. On this day the Storthing must make known its decisive
+resolutions. I must also permit myself to express the wish, that these
+resolutions may be unanimously accepted, and without debate.</p>
+
+<p>In respect to the communication given by the head of the Government I
+propose that the Storthing shall make the following resolutions:</p>
+
+<p>The different members of the Council having resigned office,</p>
+
+<p>His Majesty the King having declared Himself unable to form a new
+government, and the Constitutional Sovereign having resigned his powers,</p>
+
+<p>the Storthing authorizes the members of the Council who resigned this
+day, to assume until further notice, as the Norwegian government, the
+authority granted the King in accordance with the Constitution of the
+Norwegian Kingdom and its valid law &mdash; with the changes that become
+necessary through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is
+dissolved as a consequence of the King having ceased to act as King of
+Norway.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc24" id="doc24"></a>24.<br /><br />
+The address of the Storthing to King Oscar, dated Christiania, June 7,
+1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  Your Majesty,
+</p>
+
+<p>Whereas all the members of the Cabinet have to-day, in the Storthing,
+resigned their posts, and whereas Your Majesty in the Protocol of May 27
+officially declared that Your Majesty did not see your way clear to
+create a new Government for the country, the Constitutional Regal power
+in Norway has thereby become inoperative.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span class="pagebreak" title="100">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a>
+It has therefore been the duty of the Storthing, as the representative
+of the Norwegian people, without delay to empower the members of the
+resigning Cabinet to exercise until further notice as the Norwegian
+Government the power appertaining to the King in accordance with the
+Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway and the existing laws with the
+changes which are necessitated by the fact that the union with Sweden,
+which provides that there shall be a common King, is dissolved in
+consequence of the fact that the King has ceased to act as King of
+Norway.</p>
+
+<p>The course of developments, which proved more powerful than the desire
+and will of the individual, has led to this result.</p>
+
+<p>The union entered into in 1814 has from its first hour been differently
+interpreted by the two nations both as regards its spirit and letter.
+Efforts have been made on the Swedish side to extend the Union, and on
+the Norwegian side to confine it within the limits laid down in the Act
+of Union, and otherwise to assert the independent power of both States in
+all matters which are not defined in that Act as coming under the Union.
+The difference of principle in the interpretation of the character of the
+Union has provoked much misunderstanding between the two peoples, and has
+caused much friction. In the interpretation which, during the last
+negotiations between the two countries, has been laid down by the Swedish
+Government as against Norway, the Norwegian people were bound to perceive
+an injury to their constitutional right, their independence, and their
+national honour.</p>
+
+<p>The Union was justified as long as it could contribute to promoting the
+welfare and happiness of both peoples, while maintaining their
+independence as Sovereign States. But above the Union their stands for us
+Norwegians our Norwegian Fatherland, and for the Swedes their Swedish
+Fatherland. And more valuable than a political union are the feelings of
+solidarity and voluntary cohesion of both peoples. The union has become a
+danger to this feeling of solidarity between the Norwegian and Swedish
+people which should secure the happiness of both nations and constitute
+their strength abroad.</p>
+
+<p>When the union is now severed, the Norwegian people have no loftier wish
+than to live in peace and good harmony with all, not least with the
+people of Sweden and the dynasty under the direction of which our
+country, despite many and bitter disputes affecting the union, has
+attained such important intellectual and material development.</p>
+
+<p>As evidence of the fact that the work and the struggle of the Norwegian
+people for the full independence of the Fatherland have not been formed
+on any ill-feeling towards the Royal House or the Swedish people, and
+have not left behind any bitterness towards any of these, the Storthing
+respectfully solicits your Majesty&rsquo;s co-operation to the end that a
+Prince of your Majesty&rsquo;s house may be permitted, while relinquishing his
+right of succession to the Throne of Sweden, to accept election as King
+of Norway.</p>
+
+<p>The day upon which the Norwegian people elect their own King to ascend
+the ancient throne of Norway will open up an era of tranquil conditions
+<span class="pagebreak" title="101">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a>
+
+of industry for Norway, of good and cordial relations to the Swedish
+people, and of peace and concord and loyal co-operation in the north for
+the protection of the civilization of the people and of their freedom and
+independence.</p>
+
+<p>In full assurance of this, the Storthing ventures to express the sincere
+hope, that the present events, will turn out to be for the good of all,
+also for their Majesties, for whom personally the Norwegian people will
+preserve their respect and affection.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc25" id="doc25"></a>25.<br /><br />
+The King&rsquo;s telegraphic protest against the resolution of the Storthing.
+Despatched June 8th 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p>As We hereby declare that We do not approve of the revolutionary measures
+which have been deplorably taken by the Storthing in violation of the
+Constitution and Act of Union, and in revolt against their King, We
+refuse to receive the deputation proposed by the Storthing.</p>
+
+<p class="signature">
+  <i>Oscar.</i>
+</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc26" id="doc26"></a>26.<br /><br />
+Extract of the protocol of Civil business held in Council before His
+Majesty in the presence of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the
+Royal Palace <span class="tn" title="sic">Stocholm</span> June 9th 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="center">&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>His Excellency Mr. Ramstedt, Prime Minister, stated:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;According to information received from Norway the Norwegian Storthing
+has, on the 7th inst. passed the following resolutions:</p>
+
+<p>&rsquo;The members of the Cabinet having resigned their office and the King
+having declared himself unable to form a new government; and the
+Constitutional Sovereign thereby having resigned His powers, the
+Storthing authorises the members of the Council who resigned this day, to
+assume until further notice, as the Norwegian Government, the authority
+granted to the King according to the Constitution of the Norwegian
+Kingdom and its valid law &mdash; with the changes that become <span class="tn" title="sic">neccessary</span>
+through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is dissolved,
+in consequence of the King having ceased to Act as King of Norway.&rsquo;</p>
+
+<p>Through this revolutionary measure, the Storthing has not only without
+the King&rsquo;s assistance, but also without referring to Sweden arbitrarily
+passed a resolution respecting the dissolution of a Union which has
+existed
+<span class="pagebreak" title="102">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a>
+ on the grounds of legal mutual agreements between the two
+countries and cannot without mutual consent be broken.</p>
+
+<p>The Storthing, having thus by this resolution, violated Sweden&rsquo;s
+prerogative it becomes undeniably necessary that an extra session of the
+Diet be immediately summoned in order to debate as to what measures
+should be taken on Sweden&rsquo;s side, with reference to what has thus
+occurred. Herewith I appeal that Your Majesty will resolve on the
+summoning of the Diet, at the same time Your Majesty intimates
+disacknowledgement of the government, proclaimed by the Storthing&raquo;.</p>
+
+<p>In this address the rest of the members proclaimed themselves unanimous;</p>
+
+<p>And His Majesty the King consented to this, and in accordance with the
+Prime Minister&rsquo;s recommendation was graciously pleased to decree, by open
+letter and edict, the import of which are contained in the appendage to
+this protocol, that the members of both Chambers of the Diet be summoned
+to an extra session in Stockholm on Tuesday June 20th.</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc27" id="doc27"></a>27.<br /><br />
+Address from the King to the President of the Storthing.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  To the President of the Storthing!
+</p>
+
+<p>To you, and through you to the Storthing and the entire population of
+Norway, I address the following words, in answer to the address and
+decision both of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Storthing:</p>
+
+<p>The oath that the King of Norway takes according to the Constitution &sect; 9
+on his accession to the throne, &raquo;that he will rule the Kingdom of Norway
+in accordance with its constitution and law&raquo;, makes it a kingly duty for
+Me not to pay any attention to the statement of the Norwegian Cabinet in
+reference to my decree on May 27th ult., in which I declared, that, for
+the present, I did not find it suitable to sanction the Storthing&rsquo;s
+proposal respecting the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+Service. The Cabinet thereby declared that this decree, being in conflict
+with the unanimous recommendation of the Norwegian Cabinet would imply a
+depreciation of a right in accordance with the Norwegian fundamental law,
+independently to settle the matter in question, and also implied a
+violation of Norway&rsquo;s freedom, independence and Sovereignty, and at the
+same time the Cabinet declared that no member of the Ministry then
+sitting would be willing to countersign My Decree, and thereby, according
+to the opinion of the Cabinet, give it legislative validity.</p>
+
+<p>The Norwegian King&rsquo;s prerogative, when he thinks the welfare of the
+kingdom demands it, to refuse His sanction to a proposal presented in due
+form by the Storthing is unconditional. From this rule, there is no
+exception even though the Storthing were to present the same resolution
+ever so many times
+<span class="pagebreak" title="103">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a>
+ in precisely the same terms. Meanwhile according to
+the fundamental law (Constitution &sect; 79) the decision of the Storthing
+becomes the law of Norway without the sanction of the King, but in order
+to accomplish this, are required unaltered resolutions from three
+Storthings drawn up after three consecutive elections, which resolution
+must be laid before the King, <span class="tn" title="these quotation marks are not closed">&raquo;with</span> an appeal, that His Majesty will not
+refuse to sanction the resolution, which the Storthing after the most
+careful considerations, believes to be advantageous. In the case now in
+hand, there was no question of any such resolution from the Storthing,
+and therefore the regulation in the fundamental law &sect; 78: could be
+suitably applied: &raquo;If the King sanctions the resolution, He signs it with
+His superscription, on which it becomes the law. If He does not sanction
+it, He returns it to the Odelsthing (Lower House) with the declaration
+that for the present He finds it unsuitable to sanction.&raquo; And the
+paragraph continues: &raquo;The resolution may not again on that occasion be
+laid before the King by the members of the Storthing then assembled.&raquo; By
+this last mentioned prescription the Constitution has evidently meant to
+protect the Norwegian King&rsquo;s liberty in the exercise of the legislative
+powers which are his indisputable right.</p>
+
+<p>My resolve, not to sanction a law providing for a separate Norwegian
+Consular Service, can consequently not be considered to imply any
+transgression whatever of the legislative power, which according to the
+fundamental law is the King&rsquo;s right, not even, if the matter in question
+happened to be an affair which concerned Norway alone. But on the grounds
+of the valid Union agreement between Norway and Sweden, it was not only
+My right, but also My duty as King of Norway to refuse My sanction, for
+the dissolution of the existing identical Consular Office could only be
+effected through Norway&rsquo;s consent to free and friendly negotiations
+concerning agreements for altering the Union on the basis of full
+equality between the United Kingdoms, to which not only the <i>Powers
+Royal</i>, but also the Diet of Sweden had unanimously themselves agreed.
+That such a respect to the demands of the existing Union should imply an
+attack on Norway&rsquo;s independence and sovereignty, is so much the more
+unfounded, as the fundamental law explicitly connects Norway&rsquo;s
+independence with its Union with Sweden. Norway&rsquo;s King must ever hold in
+sight the 1:st paragraph of its Constitution:</p>
+
+<p>&raquo;The Kingdom of Norway is a free, self-dependant, integral and
+independent Kingdom, united with Sweden under one King.&raquo;</p>
+
+<p>The statement made by the Council that My resolve, not to sanction the
+Consular law, proposed by the Storthing, would have no legal validity, as
+none of the members of the Cabinet had found themselves able to
+countersign the Royal Decree supplies a supposition which I must declare
+is in conflict with fundamental law. The question of the significance of
+contrasignature according to Norwegian State law, is not a new question
+brought up to day, but is older than the present Norwegian Constitution.
+It was already solved at the Convention of Eidsvold. A proposal was then
+made that Countersignature was requisite in order that the King&rsquo;s
+commands
+<span class="pagebreak" title="104">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a>
+ should become valid, but was opposed on the grounds that it was
+against the general principles of the Constitution for the division of
+supreme power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of
+the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional
+Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the
+Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The
+change, which &sect; 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives
+increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister&rsquo;s
+Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the
+King has made a Decree of certain import.</p>
+
+<p>And that &sect; 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the
+authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is
+acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the
+Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian
+government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under
+consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in
+a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations &sect; 38, was
+intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King
+included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could
+not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law
+respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the
+contrary emphatically prescribes in &sect; 30: &raquo;But to the King it is reserved
+the right to form his decision according to His own judgment&raquo;, and in &sect;
+31: <span class="tn" title="these quotation marks are not closed">&raquo;All</span> Commands issued by the King himself (Military Orders excepted)
+shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before 1873 the Norwegian
+Prime Minister).</p>
+
+<p>That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect
+for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is
+a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution
+grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best
+of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved
+to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict
+with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which,
+according to the explicit prescriptions in &sect; 112 may not be done, even by
+an alteration of the fundamental law.</p>
+
+<p>One of the chief principles of the Constitution &mdash; the most important of
+all, in point of fact &mdash; is that Norway shall be a Constitutional
+Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a
+helpless tool in the hands of His Ministers. If, meanwhile, the members
+of the Council should have the power, by refusing countersignature, to
+hinder every future Royal Decree, the Norwegian King would be deprived of
+participating in the government. This position would be as lowering to
+the Monarch as injurious to Norway herself.</p>
+
+<p>To the circumstances that can thus be adduced against the validity,
+according to fundamental law, of the Prime Minister&rsquo;s refusal of
+Countersignature, and against the efficacy of the dogma that the King&rsquo;s
+Decree in order to be valid, must bear the responsibility of some member
+of the Cabinet,
+<span class="pagebreak" title="105">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a>
+can be added, in questions touching the Union situation,
+two more reasons, which have their foundation in the fact that the King
+of Norway is also King of the Union.</p>
+
+<p>However opinions may have varied, respecting the conception of the unity
+which the Union agreements have created for the binding together of the
+two Kingdoms, one fact remains clear, that Royal power is also an
+institution of the Union. This position of the King&rsquo;s as being not only
+King of Norway or of Sweden, but also as Monarch of the United Kingdoms,
+makes it the King&rsquo;s duty, not to form decisions in conflict with the Act
+of Union &sect; 5, respecting the settlement of matters in one country, which
+would also affect the other. The King&rsquo;s duty in the aforesaid respect is
+incompatible with the opinion that the one Kingdom, by the refusal of
+Countersignature by its Prime Minister or otherwise, could undo a Royal
+Decree, by which he refused to make a resolution prejudicial to the other
+Kingdom or injurious to the Union. In Norway, when they endeavoured to
+adhere to an opposite opinion, when the Norwegian people claimed the
+right to force the King to form his decision in conflict with what he
+considers his right as King of the Union to concede, there was no other
+way of attaining this object than making the Union, and also the King of
+Sweden, in his actions, totally dependent on the will of the Norwegian
+people, its Storthing and its Cabinet.</p>
+
+<p>A Sovereign power of this kind I must characterize as being in strife
+with the Union between the Kingdoms as confirmed by the Act of <span class="tn" title="missing full stop">Union</span></p>
+
+<p>It has been My constant endeavour to give Norway that position within the
+Union to which it has a just claim. My Royal duty has forced Me, even in
+conflict with general opinion in Norway, to try to maintain the legal
+principles of the Union.</p>
+
+<p>My coronation oath and the good of the United Kingdoms prompted My Decree
+concerning the settlement of the Consular question, but in this I have
+been met, not only by the Norwegian Cabinet&rsquo;s refusal of
+Countersignature, but also the resignation of its members. When I
+declared, &raquo;As it is clear to Me, that no other government can now be
+formed therefore I cannot consent to the resignation of the Cabinet&raquo;, the
+Cabinet answered by the threat that the Norwegian who assented to My
+Decree would in the same moment lose all national rights. I was therefore
+placed in such a situation that I must either break the oaths I took
+under the Act of Union, or expose Myself to being without Ministers. I
+had no choice. After having in conflict with the fundamental law, tried
+to undo the King&rsquo;s lawfully made resolution, the Council, by resigning
+their office at the Storthing, have left the King without advisers. The
+Storthing has approved of this breaking of the law, and by a
+Revolutionary proceeding declared that the lawful King of Norway has
+ceased to reign, and <span class="tn" title="sic">hat</span> the Union between the Kingdoms is dissolved.</p>
+
+<p>It now becomes the bounden duty of Sweden and Myself as King of
+<span class="pagebreak" title="106">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a>
+ the
+Union to decide whether Norway&rsquo;s attack on the existing Union shall lead
+to the legal dissolution of the same.</p>
+
+<p>May the opinions of our contemporaries and also those of posterity judge
+between Me and the People of Norway!</p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="appendix"><a name="doc28" id="doc28"></a>28.<br /><br />
+The Norwegian Storthings documentary address to the King. Dated
+Christiania June 19th 1905.</h2>
+
+
+<p class="indent5">
+  To the King&rsquo;s Most Excellent Majesty!
+</p>
+
+<p>Norway&rsquo;s Storthing appeals, in all humility, to Your Majesty and through
+the Your Majesty to the Diet and the People of Sweden to be allowed to
+express the following:</p>
+
+<p>That which has now happened in Norway is the necessary results of the
+late events in Union politics, and cannot be undone. And as it is certain
+that the nation does not wish to return to the old conditions of the
+Union, the Storthing considers it impossible to resume negotiations on
+the different constitutional and state-law questions, which in Your
+Majesty&rsquo;s address to the President of the Storthing are referred to, in
+connection with the settled decisions, and on which the Storthing and
+Government have previously fully expressed themselves. The Storthing
+fully understands the difficult position of Your Majesty, and has not for
+a moment doubted that Your Majesty&rsquo;s decree is made with the full
+conviction that Your Majesty has considered it to be the right and duty
+of Your Majesty.</p>
+
+<p>But it is the desire of the Storthing to address an appeal to Your
+Majesty, to the Swedish Diet and Nation, to assist in a peaceful
+arrangement for the dissolution of the Union, in order to secure
+relations of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of the
+Peninsula. From statements made in Sweden, the Storthing finds that the
+resolution the Storthing considered it its duty towards the fatherland to
+adopt, by declaring the Union between the United Kingdoms to be
+dissolved, has, in its form and the manner of carrying it out, been
+looked upon as an insult to Sweden. This has never been our intention.
+What has now happened and must happen in Norway, was simply done in order
+to maintain Norway&rsquo;s constitutional rights. The nation of Norway never
+intended an insult to the honour of Sweden.</p>
+
+<p>Your Majesty having on the 27th May declared it impossible to sanction
+the unanimous decision of the Storthing to establish a separate Norwegian
+Consulate, and as no Norwegian Government could be formed by Your
+Majesty, the constitutional situation became out of joint, so dislocated
+that the Union could no longer be upheld. The Norwegian Storthing
+therefore found the position untenable and was forced to get a new
+government for the country. Every other resource was excluded, so much
+the
+<span class="pagebreak" title="107">&nbsp;</span><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a>
+ more so as the Swedish government of Majesty had already in April
+23:rd emphatically refused fresh negotiations, <span class="tn" title="sic">he</span> alternative of which
+was the dissolution of the Union, if new regulations for the continuance
+of the Union could not be arranged.</p>
+
+<p>The Storthing has already, before hand, stated that the Norwegian people
+do not entertain any feelings of bitterness or ill-will towards Your
+Majesty and the people of Sweden. Expressions to the contrary which may
+possibly on different occasions have been heard, have alone been caused
+on the grounds of the displeasure of Norway at her position in the Union.
+When the cause of this bitterness and ill-will on account of the
+dissolution of the Union has been removed, its effects will also
+disappear. A ninety years&rsquo; cooperation in material and spiritual culture
+has inspired in the Norwegian people a sincere feeling of friendship and
+sympathy for the Swedish people. The consequences will be, that when
+Norway no longer stands in a position so insulting to its national sense
+of independence, a friendship will be established that will serve to
+confirm and increase the mutual understanding between the two peoples.</p>
+
+<p>With the confidence that the Swedish people will also share these
+opinions, the Storthing appeals to the authorities of State in Sweden, in
+acknowledging the new situation in Norway, and its rights as a Sovereign
+State, to consent to the negotiations which are necessary for the final
+agreements in connection with the now dissolved Union. The Storthing is
+ready, on its part, to accede to any fair and reasonable wish, that, in
+this respect, may contribute to the guarantee of self dependence and
+integrity of the two Kingdoms.</p>
+
+<p>In a legislative sense the two peoples are hereafter separated. But the
+Storthing has a certain conviction that happy and confidential relations
+will arise to the benefit of the interests of both. If the above
+statement can find support, without prejudice and without bitterness, the
+Storthing is firmly convinced that what has now happened will be to the
+lasting happiness of Europe. On behalf of the welfare of the countries of
+the North, the Storthing addresses this appeal to the people who, by
+their magnanimity and chivalry, have won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.</p>
+
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS***</p>
+<p>******* This file should be named 21253-h.txt or 21253-h.zip *******</p>
+<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br />
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, by Karl
+Nordlund
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis
+       A History with Documents
+
+
+Author: Karl Nordlund
+
+
+
+Release Date: April 29, 2007  [eBook #21253]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION
+CRISIS***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Louise Pryor and the Project Gutenberg Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+   There are many typographical and orthographical errors in
+   the original. They are listed at the end of this etext. No
+   corrections have been made.
+
+   In the second part of the book lines of dashes are used to
+   represent omissions in excerpts. There are represented
+   in this etext by [-- -- --] or [-- --].
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS
+
+A History With Documents
+
+by
+
+K. NORDLUND
+PH D.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Upsala & Stockholm
+Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd
+Printed by Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd, Upsala 1905
+
+
+
+
+Author's Introductory Remarks.
+
+
+The following work is intended to give an insight into the
+Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author's endeavour to attain
+this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few
+years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents
+referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to
+the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the
+discussions on the most disputed points are given.
+
+In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen's brochure the author
+does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only
+tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts
+have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number
+of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following
+representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must
+be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not
+disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case.
+
+Upsala. August 1905.
+
+  _The Author._
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+  A. History.
+                                                                   Sid.
+    I. Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden's
+       and Norway's different reform programmes                     1-8
+
+   II. Contents of the charge of 1885 in Sec. 11 of Sweden's
+       Constitution. First development of Consular Question.
+       Union Committee 1895-98                                     8-19
+
+  III. Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of
+       Communique                                                 19-28
+
+   IV. Treaties on the identical laws                             29-38
+
+    V. Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular
+       Negatiations                                               38-46
+
+   VI. Development of Crisis this year until the time of the
+       Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag                  46-64
+
+  VII. Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution           64-67
+
+
+  B. Acts.
+
+   1. Acts from Norway's "Grundlov"                                  71
+
+   2. Acts from "Riksakten". (Special laws relating to Union)        72
+
+   3. Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish
+      and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communique)          73
+
+   4. Extract from Norwegian Government's proposal referring to
+      identical laws                                                 75
+
+   5. Extract from Bostroem's reasons for identical laws              76
+
+   6. Extract from Hagerup's Answer                                  77
+
+   7. Extract from Swedish Government's proposal regarding identical
+      laws                                                           78
+
+   8. Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council's Memorandum on account
+      of this proposal                                               79
+
+   9. Extract from Swedish Cabinet's answer                          82
+
+  10. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February
+      1905                                                           83
+
+  11. Crown Prince-Regent's address to Special Committee of
+      Storthing                                                      85
+
+  12. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April
+      1905                                                           86
+
+  13. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Upper Chamber    87
+
+  14. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Lower Chamber    88
+
+  15. Norwegian Government's "proposal" of 17th April 1905           89
+
+  16. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April
+      1905                                                           92
+
+  17. Swedish Riksdag's Statement on Union Question                  93
+
+  18. Norwegian Minister's Notice of resignation                     94
+
+  19. Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th
+      May 1905                                                       94
+
+  20. King's telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government's
+      Statement                                                      97
+
+  21. Norwegian Ministers' announcement to King of resignation       97
+
+  22. King's telegraphic protest                                     98
+
+  23. Storthing's President's proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905  99
+
+  24. Storthing's address to King Oscar                              99
+
+  25. King's telegraphic protest                                    101
+
+  26. Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June
+      1905                                                          101
+
+  27. King's letter to Storthing 10th June 1905                     102
+
+  28. Storthing's reply                                             106
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The object of the Union dispute._]
+
+Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented
+itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in
+reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.
+
+[Sidenote: _The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union._]
+
+The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden,
+from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the
+responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political
+affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians
+on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time
+shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the
+same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of
+detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden,
+that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims
+of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of
+State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial
+Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839
+the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two
+later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side
+complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this
+Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have
+been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844
+concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were
+refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the
+administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more
+general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--,
+NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as "90 years' labour to
+procure a supremacy for Sweden",--ought to appear in its true
+colours[2:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to
+gain the supremacy._]
+
+The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy
+have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly
+the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union,
+partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.
+
+Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents
+of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union
+itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the
+unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character
+of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or
+less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that
+Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has
+especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from
+the first, placed in Sweden's hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has
+also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian
+writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side
+have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed
+on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right,
+for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under
+this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her
+conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting
+"designs of supremacy".
+
+Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do
+with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most
+extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans--to
+mention one, the late professor OSCAR ALIN--have on different occasions
+maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality
+within the Union, and it must be asserted that _no Swedish political
+party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway_[3:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming
+the Union._]
+
+That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the
+reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable
+oppositions in opinions concerning _the manner_ and _the aim_ for a
+reform.
+
+Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the _entire_ reorganization, Norway the
+_partial_--the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the
+so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden
+has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the
+interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by
+concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not
+gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was
+complete[4:1].
+
+Sweden has furthermore insisted on _negotiations_ and _agreements_, as
+the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself
+to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.
+
+Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the _aim_ of
+the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a
+Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a
+safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing
+overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a
+purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as
+the main object in view.
+
+The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in
+Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian
+programme, especially since 1885.
+
+Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were
+forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to
+the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in
+need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that
+the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State
+for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian
+people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a
+mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the
+political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife.
+The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the
+utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJOeRNSON and
+other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden
+increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJOeRNSON as the only
+enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their
+(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the
+"Norwegians of the Future" buried themselves deeper and deeper in the
+study of "Ancient Glorious Norway". Imagination was fed on Norwegian
+heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of
+Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place
+for renewed worship[5:2].
+
+This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and
+all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and
+the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less
+importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian
+Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the
+Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years
+played a dominating role in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the
+more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the
+cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in
+Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were
+scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political
+responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in
+need, of BJOeRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this.
+It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long
+time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the
+King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the
+fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds
+has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at
+the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost
+entirely vanished from the "national junction."
+
+[Sidenote: _Sweden's later Union policy._]
+
+During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians
+have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
+opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
+accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
+grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
+the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
+might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
+Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
+saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
+the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
+become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
+bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
+into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
+the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
+present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.
+
+But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint
+administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
+possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
+in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
+both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they
+like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
+sort of "_confusion_"; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
+the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
+into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
+extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
+subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
+policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
+insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
+that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
+interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
+disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
+appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents
+of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
+possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
+shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
+the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union
+Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish
+majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented
+itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against
+the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining
+the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the
+present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the
+principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and
+Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by
+Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter
+of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its
+claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on
+account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union,
+but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the
+enticing reward--harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting
+Norway honestly to meet her half way--has been sufficiently uncertain,
+in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a
+remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[2:1] NANSEN (English edition). The same author writes (page 62):
+"Finally in 1903(!) the Swedish Government declared openly that the
+present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway's just demands for
+equality in the Union." How such a statement can be made is simply
+incomprehensible.
+
+[2:2] How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large numbers of
+lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all.
+
+[2:3] On this account, it has especially been vindicated that the Act of
+Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is scarcely
+possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same Act of
+Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as the head
+of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the "Eidswold
+Constitution", at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph referring
+to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored. This last
+inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory of State
+Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the
+administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his
+turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the
+Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. NANSEN (page 49 and following.) The
+artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is
+exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can
+commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has confered a
+position of importance on the King Himself.
+
+[3:1] The Norwegian Right Side (Conservative) has not either emphatically
+disputed the Swedish conception.
+
+[3:2] Illustrative of the Norwegian way of confusing the Swedish _legal
+conception_ and the Swedish _amendment programme_ in the Union question
+is an expression of NANSEN (page 61). According to him "the Swedish
+government as late as 1891 appeared, as already mentioned, inclined to
+deny Norway every right of taking part in the administration of foreign
+affairs", while in 1893 the Swedish Government offered a joint Minister
+for Foreign Affairs for the Union. The state of the case was, that the
+Swedish Government in 1891 offered Norway _increase_ of influence in
+Foreign affairs, but in motioning this offer the Swedish legal point of
+view was maintained, that the administration of Foreign (diplomatic)
+affairs for the Union by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs was
+founded on legal right. Reflections arise of themselves.
+
+[4:1] Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of Norway's
+fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence. According to
+this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops, that cannot be
+reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed outside the
+boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the more
+pernicous, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have
+illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces,
+by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the
+annual classes of recruits.
+
+[5:1] Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the
+Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be regarded by the
+Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections campaigns.
+
+[5:2] We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the ultra modern
+"glorious" revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was decreed, that
+the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient Kings of Norway.
+In a festival number of a "Vordens Gang" in honour of the revolution we
+find printed a "Psalm on Olaf's Day" written by BJOeRNSON.
+
+[6:1] That Norway in carrying out the law (1899) respecting the flag,
+broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in
+conformity with everything else.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The Consul question._]
+
+The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the
+Union struggles during the last fourteen years--
+
+[Sidenote: _The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885._]
+
+The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the
+Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always
+allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1].
+
+What was it then that happened in 1885?
+
+[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._]
+
+By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also
+in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council
+instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object
+being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully
+represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as
+previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime
+Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when
+foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway
+by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a
+somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately
+offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs,
+which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway
+on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the
+majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason
+for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council
+in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in
+the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's
+leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal
+right[9:1].
+
+But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not
+discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which,
+being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we
+Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to
+be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to
+the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be
+more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could
+receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885
+the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish
+Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more
+dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have
+become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the
+state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary
+responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the
+Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now--
+responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in
+Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885
+was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters
+concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the
+paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with
+greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign
+affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected
+that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's
+foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he
+held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this
+constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters
+concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the
+preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under
+observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions
+taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the
+King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the
+Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a
+manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.
+
+Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary
+control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just
+intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be
+exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But
+the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it
+preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was
+necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their
+hands._]
+
+The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in
+1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran
+leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated
+"to take matters into our own hands". The system was founded on the
+Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs,
+its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved
+with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union
+between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a
+Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and
+boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having
+granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian
+Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay
+in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway
+were fixed by the Separatists[10:1].
+
+It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able,
+of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and
+dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union
+itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the
+Union. A _Union_ policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely
+revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union.
+Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations
+of fidelity to the Union--the last speech of this sort was heard a
+short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away
+to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of
+duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain.
+
+There was a cautious beginning with "their own Consuls"; it was too
+venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their
+own Minister for Foreign Affairs.
+
+[Sidenote: _The real innecessity of having separate Consuls._]
+
+On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests
+of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is
+an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no
+essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of
+having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter
+in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners--were in opposition for a
+long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the
+Consular Committee's deliberations on the subject before the mercantile
+authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the
+matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that
+"the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of
+benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so
+weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent
+agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested,
+or amongst the masses of the people". There are principally two reasons
+for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different
+Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and
+Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the
+different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and
+not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the
+fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their
+business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give
+reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is
+also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been
+expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the
+Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears,
+that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office,
+partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact _that
+for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls'
+duties have, on Norway's side, been performed by one of the Norwegian
+Government Departements_, proves how vain those fears were.
+
+[Sidenote: _The real object of raising the consular question._]
+
+Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a
+moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides
+the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian
+Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture
+of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth
+striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular
+Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic
+representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Directly
+they have got the wedge fixed into the small end", wrote in 1892
+President HANS FORSSELL, "they will try to persuade us that there will be
+no danger in letting them drive it in a bit". Above all they considered
+that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the
+administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the
+dominating role interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our
+day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.
+
+[Sidenote: _Want of Union motives for Consular reform._]
+
+The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any
+motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism
+has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and
+its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the
+Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any
+time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have
+usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union
+demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national
+sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right.
+That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees
+become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand
+a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points
+touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway.
+
+[Sidenote: _Misinterpretation of the King's opposition._]
+
+When therefore the King, in the interests of _the Union_, at first
+opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it
+out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only
+the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish
+veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has
+gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this,
+that has brought about the rupture of the Union.
+
+[Sidenote: _The raising of the Consular question in 1891._]
+
+Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which
+at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual
+diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in
+the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision
+by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was
+established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter,
+which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State
+alone; on the other hand the _winding up_ of the joint Consular Service
+would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal
+Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called
+Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which
+according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions "concerning
+the two Kingdoms[14:1]." And this one-sided right of decision was
+maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes--the last in 1886
+--having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact
+that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that
+Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian
+Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might
+certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the
+winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a
+separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it
+would be Norway's prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up;
+Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign
+affairs from the joint Foreign administration.
+
+Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the
+Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed,
+and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the
+Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of
+a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the
+sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there
+began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events
+of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already
+here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the
+revolution, which has now broken out.
+
+[Sidenote: _"The King and the Ministry" according to the Norwegian
+Constitution._]
+
+When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but
+little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council
+and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of
+the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly
+stated in the division of the Constitution. The King's veto over legal
+questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless
+tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly
+responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the
+King's Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of
+his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own
+judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of
+Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for
+instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly
+refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring
+that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the
+King's Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but
+this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement
+of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers
+on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National
+Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize
+something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were
+not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the
+Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment
+a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical
+Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the
+Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this
+means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way
+into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the
+responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must
+naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation
+of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of
+refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the
+old only possible forms.
+
+[Sidenote: _The development of the Consular question._]
+
+Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the
+Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire.
+Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the
+consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently
+set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the
+King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters
+becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the
+initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr
+MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and
+the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian
+masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the
+dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence.
+
+The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on
+having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests
+to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute
+on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences
+"that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present
+constitution". This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on
+behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed
+a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary
+Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced
+intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King's
+opposition, Sweden's and the King's of Sweden, not the King's of the
+United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union.
+It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a
+question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the
+disloyalty of the Radicals to the _Union_ was entirely ignored. The
+Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the
+country.
+
+[Sidenote: _The position in 1895._]
+
+In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete
+standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted
+on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish
+Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to
+an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a
+matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had
+the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of
+her defence which of late years she has neglected.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Union Committee 1895-1908._]
+
+The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing
+in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to
+obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected
+a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The
+Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the
+Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their
+party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish
+Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the
+Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and
+Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the
+opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign
+affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance,
+the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the
+possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the
+Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller
+portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1].
+In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members
+were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both
+Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a
+joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly
+emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be
+personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls
+and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with
+evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate
+the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded,
+that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might
+have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _Norway prepares again to the Consular Question._]
+
+The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for
+another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared
+to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time,
+they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on
+the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of
+State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of
+having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing
+Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for
+Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the
+consequences of which brought about the present crisis.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[8:1] Compare NANSEN (page 48 and following).
+
+[9:1] The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden's
+maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal;
+this has been Norway's right alone.
+
+[9:2] Compare NANSEN (page 54). "The change in the Swedish Constitution
+in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty
+years' strife in the union."
+
+[10:1] On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885
+adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by
+themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must,
+however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own
+right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and
+Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy.
+This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was
+passed in the _Swedish_ Cabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State
+to the Ministeral Council. The Norwegian claim to participate in the
+revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as
+Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860
+maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or
+changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.
+
+[11:1] Compare NANSEN (page 68 and following).
+
+[12:1] It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it
+has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a
+general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of "the land
+of Free Trade" Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.
+
+[14:1] The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint
+Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the
+thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr HAGERUP,
+there has been quite a "sickly" fear of having matters settled there. On
+the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those
+matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being
+distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has
+been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive
+account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether
+it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends
+entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. _This latter
+conception has been adopted of old._
+
+[15:1] Compare No. I Secs. 5, 15, 30, 31.
+
+[18:1] The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of
+Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed
+minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.
+
+[18:2] NANSEN says (page 71) "Divisions arose partly over the resistance
+from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates
+for a separate Consular Service." This is, as plainly apparent, an
+extremely modified version of the truth.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim's Proposal._]
+
+His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM'S proposal implied an attempt to settle the
+Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign
+Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this,
+he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised
+afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work
+of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent
+the old attempts on Norway's side "to take matters into her own hands",
+to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way
+could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from
+distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to
+have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they
+would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a
+definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the
+grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt.
+The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it
+concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even
+Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the
+Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom
+and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their
+courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals
+prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable
+compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been
+acceptable.
+
+But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable
+difficulties through which to pilot its way.
+
+[Sidenote: _The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the
+Consular Question._]
+
+In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway
+without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a
+wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians
+took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet
+in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be
+discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign
+administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since
+deviated in any way.
+
+In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish
+government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the
+negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the
+Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to
+which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.
+
+But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these
+guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the
+Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as
+deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for
+the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in
+carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid
+inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against
+the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the
+Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from
+a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally
+with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination
+to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day.
+"As to one's rights, no one negotiates". This has become well nigh the
+axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to
+one and all of her demands.--
+
+[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._]
+
+In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to
+convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two
+Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to
+how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United
+Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present
+joint diplomatic representatives.
+
+The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It
+declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to
+give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the
+arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the
+same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in
+order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to
+describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain
+circumstances and nothing more.
+
+The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own
+consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would
+be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these
+alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look
+at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit
+of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under
+authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be
+an "anomaly". The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it,
+nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the
+advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by
+continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration
+of the Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very
+imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for
+instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving
+instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first
+to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom
+rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of
+Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign
+affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary
+when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with
+Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts
+on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an
+extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the
+total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the
+Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian
+Consular Service would "duly value the importance of a loyal
+co-operation."
+
+It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be
+considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the
+more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any
+reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the
+Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of
+a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's
+conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish
+side for the solution of the question[22:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian
+delegates._]
+
+Mr. BOSTROeM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the
+autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced
+between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The
+conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined
+and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in
+Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the
+matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual
+agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off
+on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the
+Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well
+known so-called Communique[23:1].
+
+[Sidenote: _The Communique._]
+
+This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the
+preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though
+it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments
+themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the
+Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.
+
+Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the
+Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of
+Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general
+agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign
+affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the
+Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe
+for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in
+January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were
+evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a
+Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.
+
+With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare
+that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in
+itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent
+in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be
+"not impossible" that under certain circumstances a system with different
+Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the
+most important advantage of the political agreement between the two
+countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the
+question on the following basis:
+
+1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
+
+2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities of both Kingdoms.
+
+It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the
+position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should
+remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the
+establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to
+regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.
+The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do
+not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time
+secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and
+the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].
+
+When the Communique was issued, it was received with very great diversity
+of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions
+which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the
+agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held,
+contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially
+concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and
+as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great
+importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give
+some enlightenment on the point.
+
+In the first part of the Communique, which decribes the offer of the
+Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of
+the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic
+representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be
+_altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of
+both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws "which
+cannot be altered by one of the parties", the word 'abolish' does not
+occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission
+had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTROeM, in the
+Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the
+Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended
+on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania
+under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have
+given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full
+contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions
+in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must
+necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was
+afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should
+be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been
+significant only through the connection which may be found to exist
+between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the
+extent to which the laws were to be changeable.
+
+The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by
+the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have
+her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to
+appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were
+based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign
+affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the
+Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of
+Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the
+suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would
+become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in
+the matter.
+
+In other words, was it the intention of the Communique to force Norway to
+a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through
+negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to
+continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?
+
+In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
+too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
+be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he
+might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws
+will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
+matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
+the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that
+they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
+out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
+the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
+could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
+whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP,
+and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
+negotiations.
+
+Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communique? It is
+evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
+importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
+Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
+the Communique must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
+authority.
+
+On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
+been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
+assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
+among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
+foreign administration "into her own hands_." The great fear of such a
+contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
+this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
+informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
+confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
+by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by
+the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
+vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
+Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
+Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
+Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
+Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
+loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
+question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
+from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
+to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2],
+without an agreement with Sweden.
+
+How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
+could interpret the Communique as it did?
+
+As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
+is impossible to make any definite assertions.
+
+The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
+Communique did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
+right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could
+scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the
+Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of
+that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
+protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
+remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to
+the wording of the Communique on that point, and the Norwegian
+governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
+especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
+Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
+idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
+scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the
+Communique_.
+
+Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact
+remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect
+by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the
+Norwegian interpretation of the Communique_. This must be kept strictly
+in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to
+be obtained.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have
+especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJOeRNSON.
+
+[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN,
+who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the
+Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador
+BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AMEEN in Barcelona,
+and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp.
+
+[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that
+they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.
+
+[22:1] NANSEN evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64):
+"No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore,
+follows that even the _Swedish Commissioners_ did not think it
+incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate
+Consuls". And, of course, he mentions, "the _unanimous conclusion_ of the
+committee of experts from _both_ countries" (p. 72).
+
+[23:1] N:o 3.
+
+[23:2] The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTROeM, the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian
+members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries
+KNUDSEN and IBSEN
+
+[24:1] N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communique, which are
+conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish
+government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN.
+
+[25:1] The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have
+been proposed at more recent dates.
+
+[26:1] It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of
+identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained,
+especially the Radicals, of that "Massive instrument."
+
+[27:1] In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER
+said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing
+respecting; the Communique before its publication was made known to the
+Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on,
+had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply
+replied, that "Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the
+Norwegian government on the subject of the Communique."
+
+[27:2] Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the
+Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr
+BOSTROeM'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in
+the Communique it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be
+valid only "so long as the present system of foreign administration
+existed." When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition,
+it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be
+valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in
+the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all
+intents unacceptable.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communique in Sweden and Norway._]
+
+Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was
+supposed to characterise the Communique, its general contents roused no
+unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate,
+serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the
+Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister
+Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home)
+was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless
+referred to the resolution of 1893.
+
+Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known
+there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the
+cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.
+Meanwhile after the publication of the Communique, the Norwegian Radicals
+immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again
+solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.
+
+However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was
+started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards
+negotiating, and even BJOeRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause
+of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical
+Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was
+suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for
+negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though
+not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the
+Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable,
+impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old
+Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the
+elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then
+became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as
+Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the
+leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a
+powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in
+no favourable direction.
+
+[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communique._]
+
+In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms
+were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the
+basis of the Communique. They were carried on slowly during the Spring
+1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the
+proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government
+the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.
+
+[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign
+affairs to the Consular service._]
+
+It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real
+authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the
+Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest
+of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a
+purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was
+responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should
+be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way
+connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to
+hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development,
+from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration
+within the Union.
+
+The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign
+Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in
+Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong
+efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union
+Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the
+direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all
+matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same
+conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve
+the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile
+part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained
+intact[30:1].
+
+But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one
+it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had
+postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a
+deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest
+the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and
+mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now
+arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would
+be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the
+Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most
+remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian
+opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an "anomaly",
+in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made
+it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part
+of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State
+Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.
+
+From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the
+right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere
+forms. The evasive talk of the "spirit" of constitutional law, and the
+administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in
+public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very
+great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold
+in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of
+Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must
+presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its
+branches_.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]
+
+The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the
+Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this
+proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should
+regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders
+issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.
+
+Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic
+character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the
+report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter,
+under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.
+Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no
+account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.
+
+This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection
+between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration
+was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever
+that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come
+into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a
+deficiency so much the more serious as the Act Sec. 1--c allowed the
+Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less
+diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to
+Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.
+
+Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the
+Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to
+secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not
+compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause
+for declaring from the Swedish side, "that the proposition includes
+scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the
+Communique, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their
+office", and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the
+acknowledged principles of the Communique_.
+
+[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]
+
+From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet
+there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not
+accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must
+have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil
+would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the
+question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno,
+till the autumn.
+
+During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of
+opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation
+was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In
+November His Excellency Mr BOSTROeM went to Christiania and presented his
+conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if
+the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions
+stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the
+Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the
+Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to
+disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers,
+the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King,
+recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases,
+should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].
+
+After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP
+made a written statement of his objections.
+
+[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]
+
+In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the
+Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical
+manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance,
+though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee,
+emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the
+Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest
+acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the
+results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a
+single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be
+acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy
+the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions
+would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to
+international and common law principles, and declared that from a
+national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the
+present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets
+that Mr BOSTROeM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not
+touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil
+Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic
+Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTROeM, would very
+seldom occur.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]
+
+It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTROeM'S demand, that the
+King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to
+dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian
+susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to
+the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's
+Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to
+Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers,
+as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for
+identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.
+
+The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict
+with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it
+naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the
+Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further,
+the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions,
+suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not
+necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors,
+though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of
+view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On
+the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great
+consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United
+Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before
+the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the
+King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs
+of that State.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]
+
+What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently
+perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]
+
+It declares that it "stands to reason" that the Norwegian Consular Office
+would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to
+presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish
+proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have
+been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who
+is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more
+important points the unsuitability of a "hierarchal" relation between
+Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of
+the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the
+Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian
+government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the
+Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that
+the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to
+refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest
+in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of
+course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of
+the legislative binding nature intended by the Communique. Finally the
+Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions
+unacceptable, and adds, that "if they should be adhered to further
+discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless"[36:1]. Really a
+formal ultimatum!
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]
+
+Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's
+Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the
+subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the
+liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try,
+if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of
+the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af
+decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet
+firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially
+emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the
+power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the
+limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly
+indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend
+operations into departments that had previously been considered as
+belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian
+Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian
+Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was
+met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for
+Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls
+instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of
+affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of
+Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the
+unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the
+guarantees presupposed by the Communique that the Consuls shall not
+exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on
+Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by
+the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of
+that kind was not intended in the Communique, as it had nothing to do
+with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian
+Consular Office.
+
+On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to
+modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions
+of the Communique. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making
+on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions,
+but their essential items must "be adhered to". The Cabinet does not
+consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally
+to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]
+
+To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the
+reply, "that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further
+communication on the matter."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in
+the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: "Our own Norwegian
+Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the
+relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is
+hereby declared established".
+
+[31:1] N:o 4.
+
+[33:1] N:o 5.
+
+[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTROeM'S Memorandum were rejected by the
+Norwegian side. They ran as follows:
+
+1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the
+Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think
+necessary.
+
+2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and
+Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as
+these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the
+King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers.
+
+3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by
+Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign conntry had not
+been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions.
+--Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because
+the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTROeM were not,
+according to his own account, so very insurmountable.
+
+[34:1] N:o 6.
+
+[34:2] N:o 7.
+
+[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.
+
+[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations
+(page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It
+can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the
+subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply
+the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish
+Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.
+
+[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations
+would have remained unwritten!
+
+[36:1] N:o 8.
+
+[36:2] N:o 9
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]
+
+The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway,
+and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.
+
+Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it
+made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.
+Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe--
+thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the
+European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish
+government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness
+etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then
+already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.
+
+Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?
+
+[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]
+
+The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the
+Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this
+it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its
+demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally,
+therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible
+party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum,
+did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely
+inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition
+in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the
+Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further
+negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side,
+that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the
+form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of
+points of minor importance.
+
+The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may
+now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting
+only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of
+negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains
+to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their
+lawful rights.
+
+The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish
+government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the
+breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that
+result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish
+final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may
+assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part
+of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter
+on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the
+government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting
+concessions.
+
+It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could
+not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations
+it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian
+political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a
+defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish
+government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the
+proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the
+Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure
+position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in
+the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish
+government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on
+the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old
+standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction
+with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to
+the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that
+it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of
+the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical
+laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular
+office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be
+provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This
+question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling
+to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian
+Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the
+Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its
+original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign
+affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTROeM'S demands ought
+undoubtedly to be seen.
+
+It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian
+government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish
+government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish
+Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the
+Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an
+expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its
+own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from
+the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old
+Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by
+the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were
+dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the
+negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the
+negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the
+Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old
+lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of
+taking matters into their own hands.
+
+[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken
+the covenant of the Communique._]
+
+But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators'
+(especially Mr BOSTROeM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the
+negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was
+loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word,
+had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden
+became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically
+pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation
+contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest
+by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of
+plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent,
+but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the
+responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its
+true light.
+
+The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on
+the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communique
+to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the
+same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian
+demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This
+supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communique naturally
+implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be
+satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however,
+typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way
+by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing
+negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very
+amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of
+the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communique.
+"Norwegians", he said, "are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with
+them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken
+great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their
+demands".
+
+Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had
+violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the
+Communique[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the
+negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations,
+and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he
+announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The
+Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and
+offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded
+the terms of the Communique. But the Norwegian government failed to
+produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.
+
+What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the
+Communique that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority
+of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned
+shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish
+government's evident plans to arrange a "hierarchal" relationship between
+the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself,
+undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an
+honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the
+light of their relation to the whole matter.
+
+Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communique confirms among
+other things that they shall "give guarantee that the Consuls do not
+exceed the proper limits of their occupation." What guarantee? The
+Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision
+in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best
+guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian
+Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object:
+"that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communique, as this
+had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian
+consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the
+Communique mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised
+by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls".
+
+If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult
+to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the
+Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not
+exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs
+were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal
+relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive
+for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish
+government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this
+interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct
+orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a
+hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian
+Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a
+concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communique. It had already been
+made before the Communique was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be
+included in the frame of the Communique. The so much-disputed claims of
+Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional
+conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within
+the frame of the Communique.
+
+In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for
+breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the
+Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the
+agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and
+Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the
+preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been
+made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets,
+before the Communique existed.
+
+It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the
+negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct
+opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the
+breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the
+references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the
+Norwegian Storthing.
+
+The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the
+Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared
+that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the
+28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be
+accepted by the Swedish Cabinet "it would find no support from
+admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates." Now, there
+were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the
+contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite
+Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian
+Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the
+origin of the Communique, to the feigned conclusions of which the
+Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was
+the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the
+proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the
+contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired
+into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a
+"preliminary", as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that
+the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish
+Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the
+origin of the Communique, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.
+The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred,
+seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly
+adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister
+to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined
+themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their
+agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet
+with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian
+Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not
+even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to
+them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally
+understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his
+Excellency BOSTROeM brought forward casually several of the questions
+which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the
+right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made
+objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular
+Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and
+during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended
+laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two
+Cabinets[45:1].
+
+Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained
+in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting
+the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, "must be subjected to
+further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature".
+
+According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the
+Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also
+add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build
+the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTROeM
+of breach of agreement[45:2].
+
+With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the
+Communique and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the
+Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the
+Communique to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different
+quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in
+unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communique it was not
+intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during
+these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as
+the general decisions of the Communique, sensibly interpreted, were
+observed.
+
+To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if
+it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before
+the existence of the Communique, it was on account of the binding nature
+of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has
+endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view,
+that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the
+Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the
+laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose
+that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual
+termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of
+the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be
+granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status
+quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the
+interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communique,
+these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it
+may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact
+too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the
+prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.
+
+Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of
+the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian
+revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are
+unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which
+was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin
+air.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[41:1] NANSEN (page 76): "The Swedish draft contained a number of demands
+quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and
+object of the negotiations."
+
+[45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this
+way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed
+Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as "quite preliminary".
+
+[45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet
+were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these
+preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C.
+BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard
+both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a
+quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular
+negotiations._]
+
+The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian
+politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close
+connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in
+Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in
+comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as
+extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in
+critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's
+part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the
+Consular question would rouse their passions
+
+It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the
+situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful
+and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating
+that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their
+fruit_.
+
+In these days much is said of "necessity" in the development of events.
+"Necessity", it is said, "has been stronger than the wishes of
+individuals". To those who in any degree believe in personal influence
+and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of
+history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to
+the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LOeVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to
+the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any
+leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_
+public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard
+to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to
+do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The
+Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.
+
+The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and
+designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid
+how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering
+of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been
+discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it
+be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been
+set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken
+off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in
+Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening
+danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance
+of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid
+to rest.
+
+That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place
+became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the
+systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of
+Swedish hatred and "national persecution", which in Christiania were held
+in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a
+Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the
+government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of
+breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.
+A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that
+the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as
+an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but
+their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned.
+In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian
+opinion a tone of unreasonableness.
+
+Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation
+shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very
+tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the
+negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to
+express his hearty wishes, "that the two Kingdoms which could soon
+celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences
+of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the
+independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its
+two peoples". To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken
+the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making
+this speech[48:2].
+
+A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now
+dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous
+on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins,
+that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to
+actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not
+choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the
+peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's
+breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of
+personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which
+Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case,
+artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and
+the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.
+
+[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._]
+
+In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister
+for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause
+of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for
+Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign
+policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming
+negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign
+affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side
+all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first
+stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the
+break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of
+the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of
+Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from
+the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr
+HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under
+the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered
+that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led
+to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to
+continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain
+"more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations", in
+other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said
+he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union
+Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he
+announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed
+it when he resigned in March.
+
+A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and
+even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would
+not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the
+possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more
+independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was
+responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the
+matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms
+presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further
+consideration[50:1].
+
+But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be
+favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the
+termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called
+Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of
+this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and
+therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHOeNING at the end
+of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his
+resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.
+
+The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the
+negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity
+of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading
+politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the
+matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee
+appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction
+that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the
+preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was
+not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two
+peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the
+Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be
+entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.
+
+The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect,
+but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by
+informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was
+of no "Constitutional importance", and shrewdly trying to prove that the
+Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that
+manner[51:1].
+
+Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans
+before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the
+negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to
+consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the
+man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet
+consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers,
+however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LOeVLAND, were rank radicals. In the
+beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were
+able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a
+novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to
+take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into
+"their own hands".
+
+In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here
+twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to
+decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown
+Prince Regent on the matter.
+
+On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the
+joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open
+negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the
+Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign
+affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared
+himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the
+matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to
+remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the
+continuance of the Union[52:1].
+
+On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime
+Minister BOSTROeM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially
+been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the
+hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was
+immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both
+Chambers of the Diet[52:2].
+
+_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway,
+for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in
+terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years
+back_[52:3].
+
+But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal
+was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of
+the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are
+typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of
+which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of
+Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian
+demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially
+"given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of
+similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the
+good relations existent between the two peoples". The Norwegian
+government knows what means to employ to produce "these good relations",
+namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated
+in the past. This accomplished, "that confidence, which is the mainspring
+of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate
+relations in a Union, will have revived". Norway is thus always the
+injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might
+have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union
+Policy[53:1].
+
+In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned
+statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible,
+for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated
+imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the
+object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but
+they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply
+deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.
+
+In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the
+above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they
+had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored
+the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible
+that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead
+eventually to more favourable results.
+
+[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._]
+
+While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made
+to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being
+carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the
+side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was
+not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were
+heard hesitations.
+
+Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and
+unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a
+most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's
+side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an
+opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English
+newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home,
+that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that.
+
+[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._]
+
+When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the
+Storthing presented their proposals.
+
+This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the
+first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added
+were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not
+have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the
+beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that
+is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a
+separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile
+shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be
+exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was
+adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be
+presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being
+that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before
+the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But
+there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of
+the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill
+three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered
+resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his
+assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had
+of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as
+1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the
+Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime
+Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of
+Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence
+to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto
+was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be
+brought to a climax.
+
+The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to
+the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
+Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
+imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
+declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
+many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
+intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
+Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
+with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
+previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first
+be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
+agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
+take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
+if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
+proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
+affairs.
+
+[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]
+
+The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being
+revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
+resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards
+the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
+consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
+Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
+unreasonable.
+
+To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a
+revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
+Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far
+more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
+background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
+shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
+interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he
+should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
+the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
+King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
+'No', "it cannot", Mr NANSEN says, "be the result of Norwegian influence,
+_but on account of Swedish pressure_"[56:1]. Here we are met by the
+dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
+the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining
+the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards
+the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of
+Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling
+motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King
+has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more
+faithfully than King OSCAR II.
+
+_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the
+Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by
+this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they
+cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the
+basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness
+of this is sufficiently evident.
+
+[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._]
+
+The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was
+fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National
+revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania,
+especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be
+no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway,
+and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand
+persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on
+a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway
+in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!
+
+These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the
+Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any
+debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to
+protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest.
+
+With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP
+pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the
+decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently
+found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as
+to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to
+these eventualities--which might exceed both the Constitution and the
+Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the
+Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a
+change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few
+in the minority made known their different views, and among them the
+Shipowner JOeRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons
+for dissolving the joint Consular Service.
+
+But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment
+was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed
+unanimously.
+
+[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._]
+
+Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters
+as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of
+the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted
+with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's
+reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of
+NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said,
+"would really refuse Norway her right" seemed rather unnatural.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_]
+
+On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in
+Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the
+Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint
+Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of
+the Union Sec. 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by
+treaty with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The
+Cabinet raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's
+loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a
+violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would
+undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon,
+sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to
+allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then
+ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King
+maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his
+veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the
+Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on
+their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the
+fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing
+countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances,
+only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full
+consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].
+
+[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._]
+
+Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the
+extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional
+law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was
+furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his
+decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from
+constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules
+of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation
+of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King,
+meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--"now"--
+form a new Ministry.
+
+This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign,
+undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the
+beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_
+--had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals
+to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also
+without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their
+post till the King released them. For, according to the general
+constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who
+releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.
+
+It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all
+the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law
+was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed
+the King that they resigned office_[59:2].
+
+[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._]
+
+Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their
+inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their
+opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and
+declared themselves to be 'free men' entitled to the right to resign
+office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this
+proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the
+Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played
+out.
+
+On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their
+resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little
+word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared
+himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion
+that the Constitutional Royal Power was "no longer effectual", on which
+the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government,
+which, according to Constitutional law, was the King's prerogative alone.
+The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.
+King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration
+followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all
+communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to
+deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied
+that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary
+Storthing[60:6].
+
+It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.
+They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!
+
+The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the
+Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the
+principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first
+paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.
+
+The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden,
+or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the
+Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this
+last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription
+that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of
+State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the
+freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of
+the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].
+
+As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of
+laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that
+country.
+
+[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._]
+
+On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.
+In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to
+meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly
+emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply
+violated Sweden's rights.
+
+The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address
+to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King
+maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to
+the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the
+capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had
+considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As
+Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition
+to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the
+Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden "if
+Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_
+dissolution".
+
+[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._]
+
+The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the
+Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality
+to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people
+entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and
+appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on
+both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by
+their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.
+
+The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have
+received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming
+mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a
+good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had
+formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of
+the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different
+in all respects.
+
+The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since,
+step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and
+therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish
+government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume
+negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in
+case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on
+this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on
+Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had
+already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?
+
+In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations
+are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled.
+Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the
+situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his
+veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to
+the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an
+eventual negotiation. It should be carried on "_on an entirely free basis
+with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any
+reservation or restriction whatever_", and among other matters, it was
+stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should
+be able to decide, of its own accord, "the future form of its national
+existence." Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the
+Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the
+contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would
+break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this
+_method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature
+threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime
+Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on
+the Norwegian side "as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union."
+The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that
+the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account
+that he refused to negotiate.
+
+But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af
+the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility
+for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of
+which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden,
+this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the
+majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this
+was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April,
+when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the
+Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto;
+the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time
+beforehand.--
+
+On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost
+entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions
+refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a
+Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.
+
+[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the
+members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.
+
+[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ
+HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to
+notice.
+
+[48:2] N:o 10.
+
+[49:1] N:o 10.
+
+[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward
+in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14.
+
+[50:2] N:o 11.
+
+[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the document in his book.
+
+[51:2] N:o 12.
+
+[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a
+compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a
+Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union
+policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign
+affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.
+The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at
+the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical
+representatives.
+
+[52:2] N:o 13 and 14.
+
+[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against
+this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after
+the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by
+Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as
+it did not include "the same guarantees we had before". It must
+nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_
+guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet,
+partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to
+carry out than the programme of the Communique, which implied that the
+Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that "the last
+Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a
+decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of
+the Norwegian Commissioners". To this it must be observed that this
+Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than
+the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee.
+Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
+
+[53:1] N:o 15.
+
+[53:2] N:o 16.
+
+[54:1] N:o 17.
+
+[55:1] Page 14.
+
+[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93).
+
+[58:1] NANSEN page 93.
+
+[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete
+report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of
+the Cabinet.
+
+Compare with N:o 19.
+
+[58:3] N:o 18.
+
+[58:4] Compare N:o 27.
+
+[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21.
+
+[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for
+having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry.
+The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not
+having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in
+fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to
+the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after
+being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from
+that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King
+might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached
+for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened
+with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How
+truly Norwegian!
+
+[60:1] N:o 21.
+
+[60:2] N:o 22.
+
+[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same
+as in the address to the King.
+
+[60:4] N:o 23.
+
+[60:5] N:o 24.
+
+[60:6] N:o 25.
+
+[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated
+Norwegian logic. (page 94).
+
+[61:1] Compare N:o 1 Sec. 112 and N:o 2 Sec. 12.
+
+[61:2] "The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and
+inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King."
+
+[61:3] N:o 26.
+
+[62:1] N:o 27.
+
+[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the
+legality of his action.
+
+[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+
+[Sidenote: _The question of the Justification of the Norwegian
+Revolution._]
+
+Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History--even
+the history of Sweden--records many revolutions, which are said to have
+been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on
+the grounds of its having been _the extreme means of protecting most
+important interests_.
+
+[Sidenote: _The Swedish "oppression"._]
+
+In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway's
+breaking out of the Union, and Sweden's struggle for freedom from Denmark
+in the middle ages. Sweden's way of using its power has been stamped as
+an intolerable _oppression_. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more
+powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to
+the fact that Norway's "struggle for freedom" has had for its object the
+enormously important cause--their own consuls!
+
+[Sidenote: _Sweden's loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the
+Union._]
+
+The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply
+in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; _in everything
+else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality
+with that of Sweden_. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted
+the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious
+to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the
+hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that
+in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they
+can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the
+Union--the well known Bodoe affair in 1819-1821--an episode concerning
+which _Norwegian_ investigations of recent date, have served to place
+Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian
+tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish
+administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years'
+uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity
+of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and
+spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure
+interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian
+assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the
+organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that
+Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign
+affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long
+time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be
+added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection
+with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself
+Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State--
+the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs--a Norwegian has
+lately been in office. the posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even
+the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of
+those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians.
+Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration
+of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests
+of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give
+Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers,
+which even if they did not accede to all Norway's demands, would, if
+realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously
+held.
+
+[Sidenote: _Has Norway been denied its prerogative._]
+
+But it has been said on the Norwegian side--and this has been brought
+forward as the main point--Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a
+"free and independent Kingdom". If by that, they mean that Norway has
+been denied equality in the Union, it is _not true_.
+
+Sweden's only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her
+prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be
+subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden
+on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be
+maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary
+obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief
+impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the
+Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else.
+Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of
+responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be
+_declared_, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can
+never be politically _defended_. Norway must already have made the
+discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever,
+_to political action under a strict sense of responsibility_.
+
+[Sidenote: _Faults on Sweden's side._]
+
+By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to
+a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking
+back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be
+noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness
+and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been
+mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the
+so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden's policy was
+undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the
+Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to
+make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be
+unanimous because Sweden has been _too conciliatory_ towards Norways'
+demands.
+
+[Sidenote: _Swedish opinion._]
+
+It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian
+countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the
+Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The
+observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least,
+true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by
+kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to
+smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of
+the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the
+prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of
+Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account
+that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more
+intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are
+shown in their true light, such as they are and--have been. The
+revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the
+past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of
+Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which
+Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.
+
+In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest
+periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the
+indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen
+terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ACTS TOUCHING THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN CRISIS.
+
+
+
+
+1.
+
+Extracts from the Constitution of Norway.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and
+inalinenable realm united with Sweden under one King.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 5. The King's person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused.
+The responsibility is incumbent on His Council.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec.15. [-- --] The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible
+for the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions
+adopted.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded.
+Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his
+opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for
+the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment.
+
+If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings' resolution
+incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the
+country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make
+strenuous remonstrance and to have his opinon recorded. He who has not
+issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King
+and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the
+Odelsthing can proeced against him before the Court of impeachment.
+
+Sec. 31. All orders (ezcepting matters of military command) issued by the
+King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its
+own members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. [-- --]
+
+Sec. 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of
+by the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if
+present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of
+obtaining the sanction of the King.
+
+Sec. 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His
+signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve
+of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that
+He does not find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case
+the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing
+then assembled.
+
+Sec. 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three
+ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general
+Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate
+ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and
+the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been
+passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the
+request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution
+regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it
+passes into law, even if the King's sanction should not be obtained
+before the break-up of the Storthing.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of
+the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made
+at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be
+issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary
+Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the
+amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however,
+must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should
+only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the
+spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by
+two thirds of the Storthing.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+2.
+
+Extracts from the Act of Union.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war
+and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and
+receive ambassadors. [-- --]
+
+Sec. 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministers
+accompaning the King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet
+Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted.
+In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be
+consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not
+allow of it.
+
+When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries
+are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there
+have a seat and vote.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 7[72:1]. [-- --] Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in
+consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any
+special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
+are despatched to each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden
+by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime
+Minister.
+
+Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign
+affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol[73:1]. [-- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are
+copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions
+to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the
+Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same
+authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered
+but in the way indicated in Sec. 112 of that same Constitution.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[72:1] This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional
+Government.
+
+
+
+
+3.
+
+Preliminary settlement of the Consular question between members of the
+Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on March 24, 1903. (The
+so-called Communique).
+
+
+The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of
+October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question,
+have been continued in Christiania during February and March.
+
+During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United
+Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not
+convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect,
+would convey any important practical advantages to either of the
+Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this
+arrangement should lead to inconveniences.
+
+Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and
+whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest
+Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned
+out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system
+with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to
+satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal
+apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to
+attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two
+Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the
+following terms:
+
+1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
+established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the
+authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
+
+2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of th seame
+wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
+authorities, of both Kingdoms.
+
+The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and
+acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union
+that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability
+of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at
+present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have,
+however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a
+desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and
+the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as
+can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister
+for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister's
+constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both
+Kingdoms.
+
+To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally
+concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the
+administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway's justified
+claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more
+evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted
+that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time,
+however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a
+satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might
+soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms.
+
+When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the
+supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state
+of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to
+the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of
+things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an
+agreement could not be expected.
+
+We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to
+bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leave
+_status quo_ undisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for
+Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation
+between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same
+wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which
+both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their
+authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary
+co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular
+Services of both Kingdoms.
+
+In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not
+be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of
+arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of
+negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both
+countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[73:1] These enactsments show plainly that the Act of Union only
+recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the
+Foreign Policy of the Union.
+
+
+
+
+4.
+
+Extracts from the Norwegian Government's draft of laws of the same
+wording in order to regulate the relations between the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs and the legations on the one hand, and the separate
+Consular services of the two countries on the other hand. Dated May 28,
+1904.
+
+
+I.
+
+The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the
+Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign
+affairs of:
+
+a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of
+Consular Services, the appointement or employment of Consuls, their power
+of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge:
+
+b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the
+Consular Service;
+
+c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e.
+g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or
+proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power
+against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation
+and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters
+simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+III.
+
+Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic
+or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the
+Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement.
+This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement
+of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities
+to the Consul's discharge of his official duties; of troubles for
+warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of
+arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from
+outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to
+diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional
+information.
+
+In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a
+negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable
+inconveniences, the Minister for Foreign affairs can make direct
+inquires of, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the
+diplomatic or political side of the matter.
+
+The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction
+addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding
+the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above.
+
+
+IV.
+
+When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked
+after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give
+orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual
+law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the
+Home authority.
+
+With regard to a Consul's duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above,
+the last passage of Sec. 3 should be applied.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+5.
+
+Extracts from the outlines for laws of the same wording drawn up by His
+Excellency Bostroem, in November 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and
+the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to
+their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information
+about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them
+to know it should be directed:
+
+that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for
+Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its
+establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers;
+
+that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have
+an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the
+persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment;
+
+that, for obtaining a Foreign Power's recognition of a Consul, the
+Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign
+Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the
+province of the Consular administration the question arises about
+applying to the Government of a Foreign Power;
+
+and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration,
+the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the
+Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting
+with such an instruction.
+
+As to the Foreign Minister's relation to the Consuls and _vice versa_,
+the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for
+Foreign affairs in such a way:
+
+that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request
+information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions;
+
+and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly
+what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by
+him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to
+affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a
+report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further
+development.
+
+Besides it should be instituted:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing
+effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the
+Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to
+execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the
+Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble
+request to the King about the Consul's revocation, whereupon the Consular
+administration concerned should be informed of the resolution.
+
+In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls
+concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of
+mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law:
+
+that the legation is bound to guard the Consul's rights and to lend him
+necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the
+legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him
+instructions;
+
+that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the
+Minister for Foreign affairs;
+
+and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or
+in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to
+have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an
+action affecting his civil repute should he brought against him, the
+legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further
+notice.
+
+
+
+
+6.
+
+Extract from the answer given by His Excellency Hagerup to the preceeding
+draft, on November 26, 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement
+that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with
+measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely
+adhere to the Communique and the Protocols of December that, as a basis
+of agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular
+service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case "the Consuls of each
+Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which
+the latter shall have to determine." This arrangement does not however
+preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain
+possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the
+consuls.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+With particular regard to the demand expressed in the "outlines" that the
+Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right--this is the,
+intention according to your Excellency's verbal declaration--to
+discharge in ministerial--consequently in Swedish--Cabinet Council a
+consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that
+this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that
+an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a
+resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to
+the general principles of political and international law, impress upon
+Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a
+national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared
+with the present arrangement of the Consular service.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+7.
+
+Extracts from the draft of laws of the same wording made by the Swedish
+Government in December 1904.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 8.
+
+If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the
+Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a
+measure as is alluded to in Sec. 9, it is for the Consular administration
+to observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the
+consul concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this
+matter given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular
+administration.
+
+Sec. 9.
+
+The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his
+province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country
+concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in
+such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound to fullfill what is thus
+requested of him.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 11.
+
+If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employe
+has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of
+the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in
+political demonstrations, or secretely, or openly encouraged or supported
+attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may
+have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United
+Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to
+give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council
+whereupon the matter is submitted to the King's consideration in the
+Cabinet Council of the country concerned.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Sec. 16.
+
+If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect
+alluded to in Sec. 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime
+affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by
+circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter
+should immedately be reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs
+and to the Consular administration concerned.
+
+A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office
+until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has
+resolved upon it.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+8.
+
+Extracts from notes made, in consequence of the Swedish Government's
+draft of laws of the same wording by the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on
+January 11, 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To Sec. 8. It is stated here that, when. in a matter being dealt with by the
+Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an
+order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its
+side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is
+difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without
+a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any
+similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from
+reference to Sec. 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the
+Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with
+by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to
+instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department
+can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposed to have been
+the following:--to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a
+diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a
+diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from
+arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It
+stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to
+reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is
+calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an
+interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of
+judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very
+appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to
+the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To Sec. 11. [-- --] We should not however dwell upon these formal
+considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared
+with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint
+treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consuls
+wheteher to the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign
+authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the
+report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both
+countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): "Furthermore the
+Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister
+(and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign
+Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the
+actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although
+dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic
+and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment,
+the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the
+matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international
+conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions
+necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be
+debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the
+Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable
+to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to
+the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to
+the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the
+Norwegian department." We concur in the opinion expressed here and the
+demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning
+measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the
+cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question
+regards the consul's relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations.
+In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of
+the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is
+evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating
+to the Consul's disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor
+was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place
+before the appearance of the Communique. Such a joint treatment that
+should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, can only imply one
+of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to
+delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be
+a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get
+influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will
+signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should
+be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it
+is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be
+supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not
+being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for
+a Consul's revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the
+matter the object of a humble report.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+To Sec. 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to
+suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in Sec. 11, or
+prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection
+it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute,
+the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations,
+but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has
+to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future
+Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to
+other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised
+by the King (see the Constitution, Sec. 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuvaerende
+statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations
+would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to
+consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the
+present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior
+consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the
+legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular
+Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp.
+24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to
+Norwegian authonity and ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish
+minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic
+relations: [-- -- --]
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a
+Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly
+because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the
+claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms of
+independecy, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is
+intended by the whole negotiation, viz--to use the words of the Swedish
+negotiators--to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and
+for Norway The Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority
+that each country decides for itself. (see the Communique of March 24,
+1903).
+
+On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the
+paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further
+discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile.
+
+
+
+
+9.
+
+Extracts from the answer of the Swedish Cabinet Council to the memorandum
+made by the Norwegian Cabinet Council on January 11, 1905. Dated January
+30, 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that Sec.
+8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard
+to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the
+Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to
+assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the
+draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a
+certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to
+be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between
+the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter
+subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the
+origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to
+interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him.
+When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities,
+that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a
+conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between
+the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged,
+are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency
+to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as
+exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be
+incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert
+regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be
+entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of
+their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can
+hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign
+Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must
+be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint
+countries should be preferred.
+
+The precepts of Secs. 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant
+to guarrantee that the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their
+province. Such a guarrantee cannot be dispensed with in the opinion of
+the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign
+country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good
+relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms.
+To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their
+relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the
+legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under
+such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council,
+hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might,
+with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be
+escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedish draft alike contain regulations
+enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign
+Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his
+duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position
+held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the
+possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a
+form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul's conduct, of his
+remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the
+Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul.
+
+In support of his standpoint that "a joint treatment of matters
+concerning the Consul's relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the
+legations or the Foreign Authorities" must not occur, the Norwegian
+Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular
+Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words.
+"But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the
+disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the
+internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the
+Norwegian department." To this the objection should be made that the
+opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish
+Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has
+itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign
+Minister and the legations, the right to address "injunctions" that the
+Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of
+the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls
+shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish
+Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the
+welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded
+in the Norwegian memorandum, the abovementioned paragraphs of its draft.
+This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and
+modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is
+important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible
+modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued
+negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into
+particulars.
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+
+
+
+10.
+
+Record of Foreign Office affair, made before H. M. the King in the
+presence of H. R. H. the Crown Prince in Joint Cabinet Council at
+Stockholm Palace, on February 7, 1905.
+
+
+His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an
+account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the
+establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway.
+In answer to the Foreign Minister's recommendation in Joint Swedish and
+Norwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made
+by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been
+appended to this Protocol.
+
+After having given an account of the contents of the report of the
+Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say:
+
+"The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration
+of the recommendation[84:1] previously made by me. I venture however, to
+draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to
+terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be
+sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the
+relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this
+arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within
+the Union, has long been admitted.
+
+In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of
+March 24, 1903, I want therfore, to emphasize the desirability that the
+question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign
+affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two
+countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to
+taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously
+advocated".
+
+What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the
+other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council.
+
+The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian
+Government's humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that
+in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way
+expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24,
+1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating
+Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally
+agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the
+positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24,
+1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging
+on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be
+taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of
+the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said
+document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case,
+partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the
+chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the
+above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded.
+
+_His Majesty the King_ was hereupon pleased to dictate:
+
+"In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other
+resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the
+Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My
+peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a
+century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger
+the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the
+independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula
+and her two peoples".
+
+Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in
+all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this
+dictate.
+
+In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the
+Norwegian Cabinet Council, _His Majesty the King_ was pleased to resolve
+that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet
+Council in persuance of the King's resolution of December 21, 1903, shall
+not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of
+the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published!
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[84:1] In Joint Cabinet Council of February 6 the Foreign Minister had
+recommended that the task of negotiation, entrusted by the King to the
+Cabinet Councils of the two countries, should not lead to any further
+steps.
+
+
+
+
+11.
+
+The note of the Crown-Prince-Regent to the special committee of the
+Storthing. Dated February 28, 1905.
+
+
+It is my wish to make the following declaration to the Committee. In
+these fatal days I feel it a necessity to open My heart to you and I do
+so now only in the capacity of Norway's Regent.
+
+I fully understand the sentiments the Norwegian people, in these days,
+are animated with and that you as the loyal sons of the Fatherland in
+passing your resolutions will solely have in view the welfare of Norway.
+But what is Norway's welfare, nay, I say with the same emphasis, what is
+the welfare of both countries? I do not hesitate a moment to answer this
+question with the one word: Union.
+
+It is therefore my sincerest hope and my strongest exhortation to you not
+to enter upon a way that leads to a rupture between the two peoples. It
+has so often been said that the dynasty tries to look after its own
+interests, but this is not true. The Union is not of paramount interest
+to the _dynasty_, but it should be so to the two _peoples_, for it is a
+vital condition for their happiness and future.
+
+The Royal power has never tried to prevent Norway from obtaining her own
+Consular service. The only condition for the fulfilment of this desire
+is, and must be, that the relation to the joint administration of Foreign
+affairs should be arranged in a way securing the Union and that this
+matter regarding both countries cannot be definitively settled until
+after being treated in accordance with Sec. 5 of the Act of Union. From My
+standpoint as the Regent of the United Kingdoms I can never act otherwise
+than as I consider useful to the existing Union to which I hold Myself
+bound to adhere.
+
+An attempt has now been made on the way to partial reform, which I am
+sorry to say has been unsuccessful. But one should not therefore give up
+everything and enter into a way that, at any rate, cannot lead to the
+obobject preserved. But the logical consequence of this is to enter into
+new negotiations with Sweden on a larger basis. And to such negotiations
+on the basis of complete equality between the countries I declare Myself
+fully prepared to lend my assistance.
+
+I consider it my imperative duty openly to hold forth to you the great
+dangers and the fatal consequences for each people to follow their own
+course. United, we have at any rate a certain power and importance in the
+European system of states but separated--how much the less the word of
+Norway or of Sweden would _then_ weigh! Therefore, may these peoples
+assigned by nature itself to hold together, also do so for the future!
+
+When I see all this stand out clearly to My inward eye, you, too will
+understand with what sincere and intense, and heart-felt sorrow I
+consider thesituation we are in and the threatening turn matters now seem
+to take.
+
+In conclusion I want only to add this: when you go to your task, do so
+with entirely open eyes and consider carefully _all_ consequences of your
+actions. Each one may act according to his best convictions! God leads
+the destinies of the peoples. May He give you and us all prudence so as
+to enter into the way that leads to the true welfare of the Fatherland
+and of the North.
+
+I want this my address to be published.
+
+  GUSTAF
+
+
+
+
+12.
+
+Record of Justice-Department affair held at Stockholm Palace, on
+Wednesday the 5th of April 1905 before His Royal Highness the
+Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent declared:
+
+"I have to-day summond you to Joint Cabinet Council in order to make the
+following address to you:
+
+I herewith exhort the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, on both
+sides without an one-sided adherence to standpoints formerly held, to
+immediately enter into free and friendly negotiations concerning a new
+arrangement of all matters affecting the Union, upon the fundamental
+principle that full equality between the countries should be tried to be
+established.
+
+The way which, in My opinion, ought to be chosen and in which, as far as
+I know, with a little good intention on both sides a solution of the
+difficulties satisfactory to all parties can be attained is this: Foreign
+Minister in common, be he a Swede or a Norwegian, responsible to both
+countries or to a joint institution; separate Consular service for each
+country arranged however, in such a way that the Consuls, in everything
+regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, should be under the Foreign
+Minister's direction and control.
+
+If, in the course of the negotiations, another form could be found for
+arranging the affairs affecting the Union, always however with the
+preservation of the community in the management and charge of Foreign
+affairs, which is an indispensable condition to the existence of the
+Union, I herewith declare myself, prepared to take also this form into
+earnest consideration."
+
+Mr. Berger, Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department, made the following
+statement:
+
+"In connection with what your Royal Highness has been pleased to declare
+and while emphasizing the desirability of opening further negotiations as
+to arranging the Union affairs, I recommend in all humility to request in
+persuance of Sec. 5 of the Act of Union, a report from the Norwegian
+Government as to the proposition of opening such negotiations."
+
+What the president of the Justice-Department had thus stated and
+recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.
+
+The Norwegian section of the Cabinet Council stated that, at present, it
+did not find any reason to give its opinion on the reality of the matter,
+but, with reference to Sec. 15 of the Norwegian Constitution and to Sec. 5
+of the Act of Union, it confined itself in recommending the request of a
+report from the Norwegian Government.
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was graciously pleased to
+decree that the Norwegian Government's report of the matter should be
+requested.
+
+
+
+
+13.
+
+Motion on the Union question in the First Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag.
+
+
+According to notification made in the "Post-och Inrikes Tidningar" of
+April 6, this year, the Crown-Prince Regent has on the 5th of the same
+month in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council made the following
+declaration:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Whereas, through the exhortation thus addressed by the Crown-Prince
+Regent to the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, a suggestion of
+new negotiations has been made, which ought to be able to lead to such a
+solution of the Union affairs as may be approved of by both peoples, and
+whereas the present state of things seems to occasion the Riksdag to give
+already its opinion on the matter, we move,
+
+     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+     Governments concerning, a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+Stockholm, April 12, 1905.
+
+  _Gustaf Ax. Berg._     _Gottfrid Billing._     _Gustaf Bjoerlin._
+  _Hj. Palmstierna._    _Fredrik Pettersson._    _Gust. Tamm._
+          _R. Toernebladh._                 _Wilh. Wallden._
+
+
+
+
+14.
+
+Motion on the Union question in the Second Chamber of the Swedish
+Riksdag.
+
+
+The declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Cabinet Council
+of the 5th inst. and published the day after in the "Post-och Inrikes
+Tidningar", has given great satisfaction to us and certainly also to
+other friends of the Union, to whom the relation arisen between the
+sister countries after the failure of the consular negotiations, has
+caused a great deal of anxiety. That new negotiations if brought about,
+will have a decisive influence on the future of the Union, is obvious.
+The worth of the Union, as well as the prospect of maintaining it for a
+considerable time to come, depend upon the two peoples voluntary
+adherence to it in the conviction that the Union involves advantages well
+worth of those restrictions in each peoples absolute right of self
+determination as are necessarily conditioned by it. Again, the failure of
+the negotiations would evidently produce among the two peoples a general
+and settled opinion that an arrangement satisfactory to both cannot be
+found within the Union, and such a conviction is sure to undermine its
+existence.
+
+Because of this, it proves to be of importance for the Riksdag not to
+pass in silence the suggestion of negotiations given in the
+above-mentioned declaration, but to second it, if found satisfactory.
+
+It seems to us that the Riksdag should not hesitate to take the latter
+alternative, since the declaration, while holding in wiew the necessary
+communion in the management of Foreign affairs and in the two peoples'
+control of it, at the same time in consideration of its latter portion,
+has the bearing that it should not preclude the possibility to attain a
+solution satisfactory to both peoples.
+
+On that account we beg leave to move:
+
+     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
+     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
+     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
+     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
+     Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+  Stockholm, April 12, 1905.
+
+     _Carl Persson._     _Hans Andersson._     _Sixten von Friesen._
+  _Ernst Lindblad._  _D. Persson i Taellberg._  _K. H. Gez. von Scheele._
+                         _T. Zetterstrand._
+
+
+
+
+15.
+
+The Norwegian Governments' report of April 17th 1905.
+
+
+His Excellency Michelsen, Prime Minister, and Chief of the
+Justice-Department, has in all humility made the following statement:
+
+In making this matter the subject of a humble report the Department
+desires to state: As is well known the Norwegian people have made a
+unanimous demand for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service and have with equal unanimity asserted that the decision of this
+matter, as lying outside the community established between the countries
+through the Act of Union, should be reserved to the Norwegian
+constitutional authorities. For the treatement of this matter the
+Norwegian Storthing has appointed a special Committee and in the
+immediate future, this committee will prepare a motion that, in the
+present sitting of the Storthing, a bill be to passed with regard to the
+establishment of a separate Consular service.
+
+Inasmuch as the scheme propounded in Joint Cabinet Council should be
+based on the supposition that the further advancement of the Consular
+question should, for the present, be deferred Norway's approval of such a
+supposition would, in the opinion of the Department be equivalent to
+giving up of the Norwegian people's unanimous desire to now see a just
+right carried through which is due to Norway in her capacity of a
+Sovereign realm and is secured in her Constitution, and for a reform
+requested with cumulative force by the development and the conditions of
+industry, instead of entering into negotiations between the countries,
+which, after renewed experience, may unfortunately be apprehended to
+prove fruitless or at best, to delay the realisation of the matter.
+
+For there is no denying the fact that the scheme for negotiations now
+propounded is nothing new, but that similar schemes in the earlier
+history of the Union have repeatedly been tried in vain. The three
+Committees affecting the Union and made up of Norwegian and Swedish men,
+that in the past century, after previous treatment in 1844, in 1867, and
+in 1898 propounded schemes for new regulations concerning the mutual
+relations of the countries did not lead to any positive result. The
+report of the first Committee was in 1847 subject to a treatment on the
+part of the Norwegian Government, but was afterwards not favoured by the
+Swedish Government; the report of the second Committee, which did not
+give expression to Norway's equality in the Union was rejected by the
+vast majority of the Storthing in 1871 and in the third Committee no
+proposal of a future arrangement could obtain plurality among the
+Norwegian and the Swedish members.
+
+With regard to the last-mentioned Committee we beg leave to draw
+particular attention to the fact, that all the Swedish members of the
+Committee certainly agreed upon founding the Union on the principle of
+parity and equality, inasmuch as they proposed that the Foreign affairs
+should be entrusted to the charge of a joint Foreign minister of
+Norwegian or Swedish nationality. But at the same time the two fractions
+wherein the Swedish members of the Committee were divided, proposed such
+an arrangement of the constitutional responsibility not only for those
+members of the separate Cabinet Councils of the countries, who at the
+side of the Foreign Minister take part in the treatment of diplomatic
+affairs, but also for the Foreign Minister himself, so that no member of
+the Norwegian Committee could in this respect support any of the Swedish
+schemes. In addition to the establishment of a joint Foreign Minister
+office, all the Swedish members recommended an extension of the
+constitutional community between the countries which no member of the
+Norwegian Committee could second and lastly, the scheme for a separate
+Foreign Office for each country which already was the expression of the
+opinion prevailing among the Norwegian people, could not gain any support
+from the Swedish side.
+
+In this connection it should also be remembered that equally fruitless
+proved the negotiations about the arrangement of the ministerial Cabinet
+Council, carried on between the two Governments in 1885-86 and in
+1890-91.
+
+If thus the results of the above-mentioned efforts have been but little
+encouraging, this can, in a still higher degree, be said to have been the
+case with the negotiations just now terminated concerning questions
+connected with the establishment of a separate Consular service for each
+country. After these negotiations, brought about on Swedens initiative,
+had led to a preliminary agreement presupposing a separate Consular
+service for each country, subject to the home authority which each
+country decided for itself, and after this agreement had been approved of
+by the King and the Governments of the two countries in Joint Cabinet
+Council on December 21, 1903, the matter, as is well known, fell through
+owing to the so called bills of the same wording that were meant to
+regulate the relations between the separate Consular services on the one
+hand, and the Foreign Minister and the legations on the other hand. This
+negative result was attributed to the circumstance that from the Swedish
+side a number of demands were finally made and adhered to, which are
+partly considered as incongruous with the Constitution of Norway and
+with our rights as a Sovereign realm, partly would exclude what had been
+presupposed in the preliminary agreements viz. that the Consuls of each
+country should be subject to that home authority which each country
+decided for itself. Through this, a deep disappointment has arisen in
+Norway which, if strengthened by new unsuccessful schemes, will imply the
+greatest danger to the good relations between the two peoples which in a
+far higher degree than agreements laid down in treatises or juridical
+forms are the basis of the concord and the strength of both peoples.
+
+Under these circumstances the Department finds it necessary to dissuade
+from entering into new negotiations on the Union affairs ere a separate
+Norwegian Consular service has been established. Not until this has been
+done, will the confidence return which is the condition of any friendly
+and successful consideration of embarrassing and delicate Union affairs,
+and the Department will then be able to recommend the opening of
+negotiations for arranging the management of Foreign affairs and of the
+diplomacy and about the present Union based on the Act of Union, and
+questions connected with this matter. But, if so, these negotiations must
+be carried on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the
+Sovereignity of each country without any reservation or restriction
+whatever and consequently also--in conformity with what occurred in
+1898--embrace the arrangement proposed by the Norwegian side as to the
+establishment of a separate Norwegian and a separate Swedish Foreign
+Office administration in such forms as each country will consider
+necessary for its objects and interests. In harmony with this it should,
+besides, be agreed upon that, if also new negotiations should prove
+fruitless one must not return to _status quo_ so as to adhere to the
+present untenable state of Union affairs. There should be a binding
+presumption that the present state of things must not prevent either
+country from exercising its right of self-determination, but that instead
+each country can freely decide upon the future forms of its national
+existence. For not a coercive union but only the mutual confidence and
+feeling of solidarity of the free and independent nations can safeguard
+the future and the happiness of both peoples and the independence and
+integrity of their countries.
+
+With reference to the above-mentioned statement endorsed in substance by
+the other members of the Cabinet Council, it is recommended in all
+humility:
+
+     that a copy of the present humble report made in Joint Cabinet
+     Council on April 5th this year, concerning new negotiations
+     affecting the Union may graciously be ordered to be delivered over
+     to the Swedish Iustice-Department.
+
+
+
+
+16.
+
+Record of Justice-Departement affair held at Stockholm Palace on Tuesday
+the 25th of April, 1905 before His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+Mr Berger, Cabinet Minister and Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department
+gave, in all humility, a notice of the Norwegian Government's humble
+report in consequence of the question raised in Joint Cabinet Council on
+the 5th inst. vith regard to opening new negotiations concerning the
+arrangement of the Union question; this report is appended to this
+Protocol.
+
+After the chief of Department had given an account of the contents of the
+report, His Excellency Ramstedt, Prime Minister made the following
+statement:
+
+"What in the Norwegian Governments report has been said about the reason
+why the latest negotiations, regarding the Union did not lead to any
+result, does not, in my opinion, now require a reply, but in this
+respect, I only refer to the Swedish Cabinet Council's declaration of
+January 30, 1905, appended to the Protocol made in Joint Cabinet Council
+on the 6th of February last.
+
+In the declaration made by your Royal Highness on the 5th inst. and put
+on record, the Swedish Cabinet Council expected to find a method of
+settling the differences of opinion as to the Union affairs. Therefore
+the Swedish Cabinet Council gave its support to your Royal Highness's
+declaration.
+
+The condition of the new negotiations, however, was, according to the
+same declaration, that the negotiations should embrace all matters
+affecting the Union and consequently also the Consular question.
+
+Whereas now from the Norwegian side the thought of further negotiations
+is rejected, ere a separate Norwegian Consular service has been
+established and whereas besides, for eventual new negotiations, such a
+condition is made from the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union
+and the Act of Union, it is obvious that negotiations on the basis
+indicated by your Royal Highness cannot now be opened with any chance of
+success".
+
+This statement was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
+Council.
+
+The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated:
+
+"The section of the Cabinet Council refers to the report of the Norwegian
+Government from which it appears that on the Norwegian side there is
+willingness to bring about negotiations between the countries on the
+conditions put forward in the report. It is also obvious from the report
+that from the Norwegian side the intention is not to try to dissolve the
+present Union. On the other hand, one finds it necessary to demand that
+such a dissolution should be within the bounds of possibility and that
+negotiations presupposing this eventuality with the consent of the
+Constitution authorities of both countries, should be compatible with the
+Act of Union.
+
+Under these circumstances, however, the section of the Cabinet Council
+that negotiations concerning the Union affairs cannot, agree for the
+present, opened with any chance of success."
+
+His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was hereupon pleased he to
+declare:
+
+"Whereas the Norwegian Government has unfortunately been unwilling to
+accept my proposition of new negotiations concerning all the affairs
+affecting the Union, I must, while sincerely regretting it, let the
+matter abide by the declarations made by the Cabinet Councils."
+
+
+
+
+17.
+
+The Riksdags address to the King on the Union question, on May 15, 1905.
+
+
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+
+In both Chambers of the Riksdag resolutions have been submitted with the
+object of expressing, in an address, to your Majesty the Riksdag's
+support of the declaration published in the "Post-och Inrikes Tidningar"
+and made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian
+Cabinet Council on the 5th of April last.
+
+This declaration is to the following effect:
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+The Riksdag realizes to the full the importance of this declaration of
+the Crown-Prince Regent, as involving a possibility of bringing about a
+new satisfactory arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+It is therefore with an expression of regret that the Riksdag has learned
+from the publishment of the Protocol drawn up in Joint Swedish and
+Norwegian Cabinet Council on the 25th of April last, that negotiations
+founded on the basis indicated in the above-mentioned declaration of the
+Crown-Prince Regent cannot now be opened with any chance of success.
+
+Although thus the question of such negotiations seems to have been
+dropped for the present, the Riksdag, however, considers itself bound to
+express its opinion on a question of such a far-reaching importance as
+the present one, and consequently the Riksdag has resolved to announce
+herewith its support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent
+in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year,
+and recommending the opening of negotiations between the Swedish and
+Norwegian Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.
+
+Stockholm, May 13, 1905.
+
+  With all loyal veneration.
+
+
+
+
+18.
+
+The resignation of the Norwegian Government. Dated Christiania, May 26,
+1905.
+
+
+  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.
+
+In case Your Majesty should find yourself unable to acquiesce in the
+Norwegian Government's recommendation to sanction the Storthing's
+resolution for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+service, we venture, in all humility, to apply for permission to
+immediately resign our posts as members of Your Majesty's Cabinet, since
+none of us well be able to countersign a resolution considered by us as
+noxious to the country. A rejection of this unanimous recommendation of
+the Government concerning a Norwegian law unanimously adopted by the
+Storthing and issued by the whole Norwegian people to be carried through
+cannot, in our opinion, be grounded on regards paid to the interests of
+Norway, but would involve an abnegation of the Sovereignity of the
+country, and would be a manifestation of a personal Royal power in
+opposition to the Constitution and to constitutional practice.
+
+Christiania, May 26, 1905.
+
+
+
+
+19.
+
+Report of the Cabinet Council held in Stockholm May 30th 1905, given by
+the Norwegian Section of the Council.
+
+
+  To the President of the Norwegian Government.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council herewith presents the following
+report.
+
+In the Cabinet Council held by the King at the Royal Palace in Stockholm
+on May 27th the Norwegian Government presented their proposal respecting
+the sanction of the Storthing to the Norwegian Consular law. After which
+the members of the Section expressed their unanimity respecting the
+proposals, and urgently appealed to the King to sanction them. They
+emphasized the reform in question for the development of the country in a
+national and economical respect, which was unanimously approved of both
+by the National Assembly and also the whole of the people of Norway.
+There might be many differences of opinion and divergencies on various
+public affairs, but in this case, there was complete unanimity among all
+parties and communities. The Storthing, in conjunction with the
+government, had omitted from the law such questions as might have
+reference to the points that touched upon the Foreign and Diplomatic
+administration and dealt with the Consular question alone.
+
+Therefore it was thought that all cause of opposition would, on this
+side, be removed. It was therefore the nation's sincere hope, that His
+Majesty would graciously incline to their appeal.
+
+  The King
+
+thereupon read the following reply.
+
+"The Crown-Prince as Regent in a joint Cabinet Council on the 5th April
+has already pointed out the only way, in which this important matter can
+be presented, and all difficulties thereby be removed, that is, by
+negotiation. I give this decision my entire approval, and do not find the
+present moment suitable for sanctioning the law, which implies a change
+in the existing partnership in the Consular Service, which cannot be
+dissolved except by mutual agreement. The present regulation is
+established in consequence of a resolution in a Joint Cabinet Council,
+and therefore a separate Consular Service cannot be established either
+for Sweden or for Norway before the matter has been dealt with in the
+same Constitutional forms prescribed by the Act of Union Sec. 5. In
+refusing now to give My sanction to this law, I am supported by Secs. 30
+and 78 in the Constitutional law, which give the King this right. The
+equal love I bear to my two peoples, makes it my duty to exercise this
+right."
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council resolved first to institute further
+negotiations in the Cabinet Council in Christiania, in order that His
+Majesty might deal with this important matter, which might lead to a
+serious crisis in the government then in office.
+
+  The King
+
+declared Himself unwilling to assent to this appeal and pointed out that
+the Norwegian government's proposal was received and dealt with.
+
+Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest
+representations in reference to His Majesty's decision, which would rouse
+complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal
+efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have
+led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the
+Kingdom. In this case Norway's interests in the Union were equal with
+those of Sweden. For that Norway's rights were respected, was a necessary
+condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His
+Majesty's decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and
+after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have
+incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it
+was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent
+decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and
+Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the
+present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it
+constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of
+resignation.
+
+  His Majesty the King
+
+then read the following reply:
+
+"As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I
+cannot consent to he resignation of the Ministers."
+
+Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution Sec. 30, and affirmed
+that the Ministers had now dutifully "expressed their opinions with
+boldness", and "made strong representations" against His decision;
+therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph
+reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, "according to His
+own judgment." He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law,
+to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the
+Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the
+negotiations and agreements on the matter.
+
+The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the
+Constitutional law Sec. 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive
+for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned,
+it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the
+negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal
+decree.
+
+Countersignature implied responsibility for the King's decisions, but in
+this case the government could not take that responsibility. It was
+prescribed in the Constitution Sec. 31 for all commands issued by the King
+(except affairs relating to military orders). But this conclusion was not
+a regular rule for the members of the Cabinet; it was a prescription for
+the forms to be observed in order to give a command legal validity.
+Occasions might therefore occur when it was not only right, but also a
+duty to refuse countersignature. The Section of the Cabinet Council had
+appealed to the Justice-Departement for enlightenment on the subject, and
+they knew that there had been several occasions when the Norwegian side
+had maintained the same opinions as those now presented.
+
+The Departement now comes to the same conclusion as in 1847 when it
+discussed the question in another agreement namely in a Resolution on the
+intended proposal for a new Act of Union; in this there is a reference to
+the Norwegian conception that there is nothing to prevent a member of the
+Council from refusing countersignature and resigning his office. This
+Resolution is accepted by the Government then in office: Lovenskiold,
+Krog, Sibbern, Schmidt, Pettersen, Herm. Foss and Fr. Stang and by the
+members then forming the Section of the Cabinet Council, Due, J. H. Vogt
+and Fleischer.
+
+The Section of the Cabinet Council finally decided that as a refusal to
+sanction would manifestly not be only injurious to the Kingdom, but also
+a denial of its Self-dependence, it had become a necessity to refuse
+countersignature, in order to avoid being a party in the matter. The
+Norwegian who did countersign would from that moment lose all national
+rights.
+
+After which the letters of resignation from the Norwegian Government, and
+from the Section of the Cabinet Council were delivered and read in the
+presence of the King. Respecting this matter, the customary protocol has
+been drawn up.
+
+Kristiania 30:th May 1905.
+
+  _J. Lovland._    _E. Hagerup Bull._    _Harald Bothner._
+
+
+
+
+20.
+
+The King's telegraphic protest against the declarations of the Norwegian
+Government. Dated Stockholm, May 29, 1905.
+
+
+Stockholm, May 29. On account of what the Norwegian Government has
+declared--not only in writing in their resignations, but also verbally
+in the Cabinet Council of May 27 after my rejection of the Consular
+service law--I must declare that I, most decidedly, protest against the
+comments made there on Me and my method of action. I adhere to everything
+I have stated to the assembled Cabinet Council as to my constitutional
+right. I beg the Premie minister to give publicity to this as soon as
+possible.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+21.
+
+The Norwegian Cabinet Minister's notification to the King that they
+resigned their posts. Dated Christiania, Juni 6, 1905.
+
+
+In response to our humble resignations, Your Majesty has in Cabinet
+Council at the Palace of Stockholm on May 27th, decreed: "As it is clear
+to me that no other Cabinet can at present be formed, I decline to accept
+the resignations tendered by the Cabinet Ministers."
+
+According to Norway's Constitution it is incumbent on the King to procure
+a constitutional Government for the country. In the same moment as the
+Kings policy is an obstacle to the formation of a responsible Council the
+Norwegian Royal power has become in-operative.
+
+By your Majesty's resolution therefore, the constitutional relation
+between Your Majesty and the responsible Ministers of the Crown has
+assumed such an aspect as cannot be maintained. No Government and none of
+its members individually can, in a constitutional country, be forced
+against their wishes to remain in office with a Ministers responsibility,
+when their responsible advice in great questions decisive to the
+Fatherland is not followed by the King who, in persuace of the
+constitution, is exempt from responsibility whereas under these
+circumstances it is the undoubted right of each member individually as a
+free man to resign his post, this will also, as a rule, be a duty towards
+the Fatherland in order to maintain its constitutional rights.
+
+Your Majesty has declared that no Government can, at present, be formed.
+Your Majesty has found this so clear that Norway's King in these fatal
+days has remained at the Palace of Stockholm without making an attempt at
+bringing the country back to constitutional conditions.
+
+The policy manifested in Your Majesty's attitude towards the question of
+sanctioning the Consular service law is, in our opinion, incompatible
+with the Norwegian Constitution. But no more than a new Government is
+able to take upon itself the responsibility of this policy, no more are
+we able in office to render us participant of it by remaining in office.
+It is therefore our duty to resign our posts and to immediately give the
+Storthing the necessary communication of it.
+
+This shall now be done. Deep and discordant political divergencies have
+thus burst the frame of the constitutional Norwegian Monarchy.
+Circumstances have been stranger than the desire of the individual. But
+the final settlement on the dissolution of the Union, that through Your
+Majesty's resolution--no doubt passed with a heavy heart, but also with
+full knowledge of its consequences--has now been started, will however,
+--this is our hope--turn out before long to have been the introduction
+to better and happier days for the two peoples, whose happiness and
+welfare have always been dear to Your Majesty's heart.
+
+In conclusion we venture to tender Your Majesty our humblest thanks for
+the personal kindness and amiability shown to us during the time we have
+had the honour of being members of Your Majesty's Council.
+
+We beg Your Majesty to accept the assurance of our full recognition of
+Your Majesty's difficult position and of our invaried esteem. But
+paramount are our duties towards the Fatherland.
+
+Christiania, June 6, 1905.
+
+   _Chr. Michelsen._  _J. Loevland._  _Sofus Arctander._  _Gunnar Knudsen._
+   _W. Olssoen._   _E. Hagerup Bull._   _Chr. Knudsen._   _Harald Bothner._
+                       _A. Vinje._      _Kr. Lehmkuhl._
+
+
+
+
+22.
+
+The King's telegraphic protests against the abdication of the Norwegian
+Government.
+
+
+  To _the Prime Minister_.
+
+I have received the communication of the Cabinet Ministers and I record a
+most decided protest against the method of action of the Government.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+  To _the President of Storthing_.
+
+Having this morning received from the Government the communication of the
+Cabinet Minister's resolution to resign their posts and to inform the
+Storthing of it I want herewith to make known that, in a telegram to M.
+Michelsen, Prime minister, I have recorded a most decided protest against
+their method of action.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+23.
+
+The Reasons for the decision proposed by the President, in the Storting,
+on the 7th June 1905.
+
+
+Having on behalf of the Storthing received open information from the head
+of the Government that the several members of the Cabinet council have
+one and all resigned hereby declare: We were all prepared for the
+situation in which we now find ourselves. In meetings of the
+representatives, the question has therefore been discussed as to what
+measures would be taken by the Storthing to meet the necessities of such
+a situation. Every representative has had an opportunity for making known
+his personal opinions at these meetings respecting the situation and its
+demands. On this day the Storthing must make known its decisive
+resolutions. I must also permit myself to express the wish, that these
+resolutions may be unanimously accepted, and without debate.
+
+In respect to the communication given by the head of the Government I
+propose that the Storthing shall make the following resolutions:
+
+The different members of the Council having resigned office,
+
+His Majesty the King having declared Himself unable to form a new
+government, and the Constitutional Sovereign having resigned his powers,
+
+the Storthing authorizes the members of the Council who resigned this
+day, to assume until further notice, as the Norwegian government, the
+authority granted the King in accordance with the Constitution of the
+Norwegian Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become
+necessary through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is
+dissolved as a consequence of the King having ceased to act as King of
+Norway.
+
+
+
+
+24.
+
+The address of the Storthing to King Oscar, dated Christiania, June 7,
+1905.
+
+
+  Your Majesty,
+
+Whereas all the members of the Cabinet have to-day, in the Storthing,
+resigned their posts, and whereas Your Majesty in the Protocol of May 27
+officially declared that Your Majesty did not see your way clear to
+create a new Government for the country, the Constitutional Regal power
+in Norway has thereby become inoperative.
+
+It has therefore been the duty of the Storthing, as the representative
+of the Norwegian people, without delay to empower the members of the
+resigning Cabinet to exercise until further notice as the Norwegian
+Government the power appertaining to the King in accordance with the
+Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway and the existing laws with the
+changes which are necessitated by the fact that the union with Sweden,
+which provides that there shall be a common King, is dissolved in
+consequence of the fact that the King has ceased to act as King of
+Norway.
+
+The course of developments, which proved more powerful than the desire
+and will of the individual, has led to this result.
+
+The union entered into in 1814 has from its first hour been differently
+interpreted by the two nations both as regards its spirit and letter.
+Efforts have been made on the Swedish side to extend the Union, and on
+the Norwegian side to confine it within the limits laid down in the Act
+of Union, and otherwise to assert the independent power of both States in
+all matters which are not defined in that Act as coming under the Union.
+The difference of principle in the interpretation of the character of the
+Union has provoked much misunderstanding between the two peoples, and has
+caused much friction. In the interpretation which, during the last
+negotiations between the two countries, has been laid down by the Swedish
+Government as against Norway, the Norwegian people were bound to perceive
+an injury to their constitutional right, their independence, and their
+national honour.
+
+The Union was justified as long as it could contribute to promoting the
+welfare and happiness of both peoples, while maintaining their
+independence as Sovereign States. But above the Union their stands for us
+Norwegians our Norwegian Fatherland, and for the Swedes their Swedish
+Fatherland. And more valuable than a political union are the feelings of
+solidarity and voluntary cohesion of both peoples. The union has become a
+danger to this feeling of solidarity between the Norwegian and Swedish
+people which should secure the happiness of both nations and constitute
+their strength abroad.
+
+When the union is now severed, the Norwegian people have no loftier wish
+than to live in peace and good harmony with all, not least with the
+people of Sweden and the dynasty under the direction of which our
+country, despite many and bitter disputes affecting the union, has
+attained such important intellectual and material development.
+
+As evidence of the fact that the work and the struggle of the Norwegian
+people for the full independence of the Fatherland have not been formed
+on any ill-feeling towards the Royal House or the Swedish people, and
+have not left behind any bitterness towards any of these, the Storthing
+respectfully solicits your Majesty's co-operation to the end that a
+Prince of your Majesty's house may be permitted, while relinquishing his
+right of succession to the Throne of Sweden, to accept election as King
+of Norway.
+
+The day upon which the Norwegian people elect their own King to ascend
+the ancient throne of Norway will open up an era of tranquil conditions
+of industry for Norway, of good and cordial relations to the Swedish
+people, and of peace and concord and loyal co-operation in the north for
+the protection of the civilization of the people and of their freedom and
+independence.
+
+In full assurance of this, the Storthing ventures to express the sincere
+hope, that the present events, will turn out to be for the good of all,
+also for their Majesties, for whom personally the Norwegian people will
+preserve their respect and affection.
+
+
+
+
+25.
+
+The King's telegraphic protest against the resolution of the Storthing.
+Despatched June 8th 1905.
+
+
+As We hereby declare that We do not approve of the revolutionary measures
+which have been deplorably taken by the Storthing in violation of the
+Constitution and Act of Union, and in revolt against their King, We
+refuse to receive the deputation proposed by the Storthing.
+
+  _Oscar._
+
+
+
+
+26.
+
+Extract of the protocol of Civil business held in Council before His
+Majesty in the presence of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the
+Royal Palace Stocholm June 9th 1905.
+
+
+[-- -- --]
+
+His Excellency Mr. Ramstedt, Prime Minister, stated:
+
+"According to information received from Norway the Norwegian Storthing
+has, on the 7th inst. passed the following resolutions:
+
+'The members of the Cabinet having resigned their office and the King
+having declared himself unable to form a new government; and the
+Constitutional Sovereign thereby having resigned His powers, the
+Storthing authorises the members of the Council who resigned this day, to
+assume until further notice, as the Norwegian Government, the authority
+granted to the King according to the Constitution of the Norwegian
+Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become neccessary
+through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is dissolved,
+in consequence of the King having ceased to Act as King of Norway.'
+
+Through this revolutionary measure, the Storthing has not only without
+the King's assistance, but also without referring to Sweden arbitrarily
+passed a resolution respecting the dissolution of a Union which has
+existed on the grounds of legal mutual agreements between the two
+countries and cannot without mutual consent be broken.
+
+The Storthing, having thus by this resolution, violated Sweden's
+prerogative it becomes undeniably necessary that an extra session of the
+Diet be immediately summoned in order to debate as to what measures
+should be taken on Sweden's side, with reference to what has thus
+occurred. Herewith I appeal that Your Majesty will resolve on the
+summoning of the Diet, at the same time Your Majesty intimates
+disacknowledgement of the government, proclaimed by the Storthing".
+
+In this address the rest of the members proclaimed themselves unanimous;
+
+And His Majesty the King consented to this, and in accordance with the
+Prime Minister's recommendation was graciously pleased to decree, by open
+letter and edict, the import of which are contained in the appendage to
+this protocol, that the members of both Chambers of the Diet be summoned
+to an extra session in Stockholm on Tuesday June 20th.
+
+
+
+
+27.
+
+Address from the King to the President of the Storthing.
+
+
+  To the President of the Storthing!
+
+To you, and through you to the Storthing and the entire population of
+Norway, I address the following words, in answer to the address and
+decision both of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Storthing:
+
+The oath that the King of Norway takes according to the Constitution Sec. 9
+on his accession to the throne, "that he will rule the Kingdom of Norway
+in accordance with its constitution and law", makes it a kingly duty for
+Me not to pay any attention to the statement of the Norwegian Cabinet in
+reference to my decree on May 27th ult., in which I declared, that, for
+the present, I did not find it suitable to sanction the Storthing's
+proposal respecting the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
+Service. The Cabinet thereby declared that this decree, being in conflict
+with the unanimous recommendation of the Norwegian Cabinet would imply a
+depreciation of a right in accordance with the Norwegian fundamental law,
+independently to settle the matter in question, and also implied a
+violation of Norway's freedom, independence and Sovereignty, and at the
+same time the Cabinet declared that no member of the Ministry then
+sitting would be willing to countersign My Decree, and thereby, according
+to the opinion of the Cabinet, give it legislative validity.
+
+The Norwegian King's prerogative, when he thinks the welfare of the
+kingdom demands it, to refuse His sanction to a proposal presented in due
+form by the Storthing is unconditional. From this rule, there is no
+exception even though the Storthing were to present the same resolution
+ever so many times in precisely the same terms. Meanwhile according to
+the fundamental law (Constitution Sec. 79) the decision of the Storthing
+becomes the law of Norway without the sanction of the King, but in order
+to accomplish this, are required unaltered resolutions from three
+Storthings drawn up after three consecutive elections, which resolution
+must be laid before the King, "with an appeal, that His Majesty will not
+refuse to sanction the resolution, which the Storthing after the most
+careful considerations, believes to be advantageous. In the case now in
+hand, there was no question of any such resolution from the Storthing,
+and therefore the regulation in the fundamental law Sec. 78: could be
+suitably applied: "If the King sanctions the resolution, He signs it with
+His superscription, on which it becomes the law. If He does not sanction
+it, He returns it to the Odelsthing (Lower House) with the declaration
+that for the present He finds it unsuitable to sanction." And the
+paragraph continues: "The resolution may not again on that occasion be
+laid before the King by the members of the Storthing then assembled." By
+this last mentioned prescription the Constitution has evidently meant to
+protect the Norwegian King's liberty in the exercise of the legislative
+powers which are his indisputable right.
+
+My resolve, not to sanction a law providing for a separate Norwegian
+Consular Service, can consequently not be considered to imply any
+transgression whatever of the legislative power, which according to the
+fundamental law is the King's right, not even, if the matter in question
+happened to be an affair which concerned Norway alone. But on the grounds
+of the valid Union agreement between Norway and Sweden, it was not only
+My right, but also My duty as King of Norway to refuse My sanction, for
+the dissolution of the existing identical Consular Office could only be
+effected through Norway's consent to free and friendly negotiations
+concerning agreements for altering the Union on the basis of full
+equality between the United Kingdoms, to which not only the _Powers
+Royal_, but also the Diet of Sweden had unanimously themselves agreed.
+That such a respect to the demands of the existing Union should imply an
+attack on Norway's independence and sovereignty, is so much the more
+unfounded, as the fundamental law explicitly connects Norway's
+independence with its Union with Sweden. Norway's King must ever hold in
+sight the 1:st paragraph of its Constitution:
+
+"The Kingdom of Norway is a free, self-dependant, integral and
+independent Kingdom, united with Sweden under one King."
+
+The statement made by the Council that My resolve, not to sanction the
+Consular law, proposed by the Storthing, would have no legal validity, as
+none of the members of the Cabinet had found themselves able to
+countersign the Royal Decree supplies a supposition which I must declare
+is in conflict with fundamental law. The question of the significance of
+contrasignature according to Norwegian State law, is not a new question
+brought up to day, but is older than the present Norwegian Constitution.
+It was already solved at the Convention of Eidsvold. A proposal was then
+made that Countersignature was requisite in order that the King's
+commands should become valid, but was opposed on the grounds that it was
+against the general principles of the Constitution for the division of
+supreme power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of
+the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional
+Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the
+Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The
+change, which Sec. 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives
+increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister's
+Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the
+King has made a Decree of certain import.
+
+And that Sec. 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the
+authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is
+acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the
+Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian
+government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under
+consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in
+a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations Sec. 38, was
+intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King
+included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could
+not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law
+respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the
+contrary emphatically prescribes in Sec. 30: "But to the King it is
+reserved the right to form his decision according to His own judgment",
+and in Sec. 31: "All Commands issued by the King himself (Military
+Orders excepted) shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before
+1873 the Norwegian Prime Minister).
+
+That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect
+for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is
+a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution
+grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best
+of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved
+to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict
+with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which,
+according to the explicit prescriptions in Sec. 112 may not be done, even
+by an alteration of the fundamental law.
+
+One of the chief principles of the Constitution--the most important of
+all, in point of fact--is that Norway shall be a Constitutional
+Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a
+helpless tool in the hands of His Ministers. If, meanwhile, the members
+of the Council should have the power, by refusing countersignature, to
+hinder every future Royal Decree, the Norwegian King would be deprived of
+participating in the government. This position would be as lowering to
+the Monarch as injurious to Norway herself.
+
+To the circumstances that can thus be adduced against the validity,
+according to fundamental law, of the Prime Minister's refusal of
+Countersignature, and against the efficacy of the dogma that the King's
+Decree in order to be valid, must bear the responsibility of some member
+of the Cabinet, can be added, in questions touching the Union situation,
+two more reasons, which have their foundation in the fact that the King
+of Norway is also King of the Union.
+
+However opinions may have varied, respecting the conception of the unity
+which the Union agreements have created for the binding together of the
+two Kingdoms, one fact remains clear, that Royal power is also an
+institution of the Union. This position of the King's as being not only
+King of Norway or of Sweden, but also as Monarch of the United Kingdoms,
+makes it the King's duty, not to form decisions in conflict with the Act
+of Union Sec. 5, respecting the settlement of matters in one country, which
+would also affect the other. The King's duty in the aforesaid respect is
+incompatible with the opinion that the one Kingdom, by the refusal of
+Countersignature by its Prime Minister or otherwise, could undo a Royal
+Decree, by which he refused to make a resolution prejudicial to the other
+Kingdom or injurious to the Union. In Norway, when they endeavoured to
+adhere to an opposite opinion, when the Norwegian people claimed the
+right to force the King to form his decision in conflict with what he
+considers his right as King of the Union to concede, there was no other
+way of attaining this object than making the Union, and also the King of
+Sweden, in his actions, totally dependent on the will of the Norwegian
+people, its Storthing and its Cabinet.
+
+A Sovereign power of this kind I must characterize as being in strife
+with the Union between the Kingdoms as confirmed by the Act of Union
+
+It has been My constant endeavour to give Norway that position within the
+Union to which it has a just claim. My Royal duty has forced Me, even in
+conflict with general opinion in Norway, to try to maintain the legal
+principles of the Union.
+
+My coronation oath and the good of the United Kingdoms prompted My Decree
+concerning the settlement of the Consular question, but in this I have
+been met, not only by the Norwegian Cabinet's refusal of
+Countersignature, but also the resignation of its members. When I
+declared, "As it is clear to Me, that no other government can now be
+formed therefore I cannot consent to the resignation of the Cabinet", the
+Cabinet answered by the threat that the Norwegian who assented to My
+Decree would in the same moment lose all national rights. I was therefore
+placed in such a situation that I must either break the oaths I took
+under the Act of Union, or expose Myself to being without Ministers. I
+had no choice. After having in conflict with the fundamental law, tried
+to undo the King's lawfully made resolution, the Council, by resigning
+their office at the Storthing, have left the King without advisers. The
+Storthing has approved of this breaking of the law, and by a
+Revolutionary proceeding declared that the lawful King of Norway has
+ceased to reign, and hat the Union between the Kingdoms is dissolved.
+
+It now becomes the bounden duty of Sweden and Myself as King of the
+Union to decide whether Norway's attack on the existing Union shall lead
+to the legal dissolution of the same.
+
+May the opinions of our contemporaries and also those of posterity judge
+between Me and the People of Norway!
+
+
+
+
+28.
+
+The Norwegian Storthings documentary address to the King. Dated
+Christiania June 19th 1905.
+
+
+  To the King's Most Excellent Majesty!
+
+Norway's Storthing appeals, in all humility, to Your Majesty and through
+the Your Majesty to the Diet and the People of Sweden to be allowed to
+express the following:
+
+That which has now happened in Norway is the necessary results of the
+late events in Union politics, and cannot be undone. And as it is certain
+that the nation does not wish to return to the old conditions of the
+Union, the Storthing considers it impossible to resume negotiations on
+the different constitutional and state-law questions, which in Your
+Majesty's address to the President of the Storthing are referred to, in
+connection with the settled decisions, and on which the Storthing and
+Government have previously fully expressed themselves. The Storthing
+fully understands the difficult position of Your Majesty, and has not for
+a moment doubted that Your Majesty's decree is made with the full
+conviction that Your Majesty has considered it to be the right and duty
+of Your Majesty.
+
+But it is the desire of the Storthing to address an appeal to Your
+Majesty, to the Swedish Diet and Nation, to assist in a peaceful
+arrangement for the dissolution of the Union, in order to secure
+relations of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of the
+Peninsula. From statements made in Sweden, the Storthing finds that the
+resolution the Storthing considered it its duty towards the fatherland to
+adopt, by declaring the Union between the United Kingdoms to be
+dissolved, has, in its form and the manner of carrying it out, been
+looked upon as an insult to Sweden. This has never been our intention.
+What has now happened and must happen in Norway, was simply done in order
+to maintain Norway's constitutional rights. The nation of Norway never
+intended an insult to the honour of Sweden.
+
+Your Majesty having on the 27th May declared it impossible to sanction
+the unanimous decision of the Storthing to establish a separate Norwegian
+Consulate, and as no Norwegian Government could be formed by Your
+Majesty, the constitutional situation became out of joint, so dislocated
+that the Union could no longer be upheld. The Norwegian Storthing
+therefore found the position untenable and was forced to get a new
+government for the country. Every other resource was excluded, so much
+the more so as the Swedish government of Majesty had already in April
+23:rd emphatically refused fresh negotiations, he alternative of which
+was the dissolution of the Union, if new regulations for the continuance
+of the Union could not be arranged.
+
+The Storthing has already, before hand, stated that the Norwegian people
+do not entertain any feelings of bitterness or ill-will towards Your
+Majesty and the people of Sweden. Expressions to the contrary which may
+possibly on different occasions have been heard, have alone been caused
+on the grounds of the displeasure of Norway at her position in the Union.
+When the cause of this bitterness and ill-will on account of the
+dissolution of the Union has been removed, its effects will also
+disappear. A ninety years' cooperation in material and spiritual culture
+has inspired in the Norwegian people a sincere feeling of friendship and
+sympathy for the Swedish people. The consequences will be, that when
+Norway no longer stands in a position so insulting to its national sense
+of independence, a friendship will be established that will serve to
+confirm and increase the mutual understanding between the two peoples.
+
+With the confidence that the Swedish people will also share these
+opinions, the Storthing appeals to the authorities of State in Sweden, in
+acknowledging the new situation in Norway, and its rights as a Sovereign
+State, to consent to the negotiations which are necessary for the final
+agreements in connection with the now dissolved Union. The Storthing is
+ready, on its part, to accede to any fair and reasonable wish, that, in
+this respect, may contribute to the guarantee of self dependence and
+integrity of the two Kingdoms.
+
+In a legislative sense the two peoples are hereafter separated. But the
+Storthing has a certain conviction that happy and confidential relations
+will arise to the benefit of the interests of both. If the above
+statement can find support, without prejudice and without bitterness, the
+Storthing is firmly convinced that what has now happened will be to the
+lasting happiness of Europe. On behalf of the welfare of the countries of
+the North, the Storthing addresses this appeal to the people who, by
+their magnanimity and chivalry, have won such a prominent place in the
+ranks of Nations.
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's notes
+
+There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original.
+They are listed below. No corrections have been made.
+
+Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting; the use of apostrophes for
+possessives is inconsistent; and a number of words are inconsistently
+hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent neologisms are noted
+explicitly.
+
+  Title page
+    Ph D.
+
+  Table of Contents
+    Consular Negatiations
+
+  Footnote 2-3
+    that it has confered
+
+  Page 4
+    which outworldly represents
+
+  Footnote 4-1
+    the more pernicous
+
+  Page 5
+    political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords
+
+  Page 7
+    They may have complain
+    in the Committe of 1898
+
+  Page 8
+    represented in they the in administration
+
+  Footnote 10-1
+    Ministeral Council
+
+  Page 11
+    policy of whech
+
+  Page 12
+    Government Departements
+
+  Page 16
+    by which the Ministery
+
+  Footnote 18-1
+    wherevy it became incumbent
+
+  Page 21
+    January 21et 1902
+    an disciplinary
+
+  Footnote 23-2 is missing a full stop at the end.
+
+  Page 25
+    which decribes
+
+  Page 27
+    Buth it may nevertheless
+
+  Page 30
+    Norwegian gouvernment
+
+  Page 31
+    Swedish governement
+
+  Page 32, side note
+    Mr Bostrom's
+
+  Page 33, "Coun" omitted before "cil" at the start of the page
+
+  Footnote 33-2
+    Foreign conntry
+
+  Page 34
+    remedy the deficiences
+
+  Page 36
+    tone is one af decision
+
+  Footnote 36-2 is missing a full stop at the end.
+
+  Page 38, side note
+    accusations aganist
+
+  Page 38
+    illwill against Sweden
+    Formally, therfore,
+
+  Page 40
+    the breaking op
+    was prowed by
+
+  Page 43
+    an disciplinary sense
+
+  Footnote 45-2
+    frame this laws
+
+  Page 46
+    are unnessary
+
+  Page 47
+    There is a missing a full stop after "rouse their passions"
+
+  Footnote 47-1
+    as questions refering
+
+  Page 48
+    One symtom of this
+    the tumultuons confusion
+
+  Page 50
+    disssolution of the Union
+    a document adressed
+    There is a missing full stop after "appointed by the Storthing"
+
+  Page 51
+    Therfore the way
+    und Mr LOeVLAND
+
+  Page 52
+    for the establisment
+
+  Page 53
+    cause for displeausure
+
+  Page 55
+    whole of the procedings
+
+  Page 58 side note
+    There is a missing full stop after "27th May 1905"
+
+  Page 59 side note
+    27nd May
+
+  Footnote 60-7
+    One reeds, for exemple
+    There is an extra full stop after "logic"
+
+  Page 61
+    on Extraordinary session
+
+  Footnote 62-1
+    The marker for this footnote is on page 61
+
+  Page 63
+    the contents af
+
+  Page 64
+    An Norway cannot complain
+
+  Page 65
+    been in office. the posts
+
+  Page 66
+    absolutly their own
+
+  Page 67
+    such as they are and--have been
+
+  Document 1, Sec. 1
+    inalinenable realm
+
+  Document 1, Sec. 30
+    his opinon recorded
+    proeced against him
+
+  Document 1, Sec. 31
+    ezcepting matters of military command
+
+  Document 2, Sec. 5
+    accompaning the King
+
+  Footnote 73-1
+    These enactsments
+
+  Document 3
+    th seame wording
+
+  Document 4, I
+    the appointement or employment
+
+  Document 4, III
+    make direct inquires
+
+  Document 5
+    should he brought against him
+
+  Document 6
+    the preceeding draft
+
+  Document 6, 2
+    this is the, intention
+
+  Document 7, Sec. 9
+    bound to fullfill
+
+  Document 7, Sec. 11
+    or secretely
+
+  Document 7, Sec. 16
+    immedately be reported
+
+  Document 8, to Sec. 8
+    when. in a matter
+
+  Document 8, to Sec. 11
+    wheteher to the
+
+  Document 8, to Sec. 16
+    Norwegian authonity
+
+  Document 8
+    forms of independecy
+    There is a missing full stop after "viz"
+    There is a missing full stop after "Sweden and for Norway"
+    (see the Communique  (should have upper case S)
+
+  Document 9
+    to guarrantee that the Consuls
+    Such a guarrantee cannot
+    the abovementioned paragraphs
+
+  Document 10
+    I want therfore
+    in persuance of
+
+  Document 11
+    lead to the obobject
+    thesituation we are in
+
+  Document 12
+    I have to-day summond you
+    an one-sided adherence
+    request in persuance of
+
+  Document 14
+    while holding in wiew
+
+  Document 15
+    For the treatement
+    the Sovereignity of each country
+    Swedish Iustice-Department
+
+  Document 16
+    Justice-Departement
+    vith regard to
+
+  Document 18
+    well be able to
+    Sovereignity of the country
+
+  Document 19
+    May 30th 1905 (should read May 27th)
+    I cannot consent to he resignation
+    J. Lovland (spelled Loevland elsewhere)
+
+  Document 20
+    the Premie minister
+
+  Document 21
+    Juni 6, 1905.
+    in persuace of the constitution
+    been stranger than
+
+  Document 26
+    Royal Palace Stocholm
+    become neccessary
+
+  Document 27
+    There is a missing full stop after "as confirmed by the Act of Union"
+    and hat the Union
+    The quotation marks opened with ""with an appeal," are not closed
+    The quotation marks opened with ""All Commands issued by the King" are
+      not closed
+
+  Document 28
+    he alternative of which
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS***
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