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diff --git a/21253.txt b/21253.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c95660e --- /dev/null +++ b/21253.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5425 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, by Karl +Nordlund + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis + A History with Documents + + +Author: Karl Nordlund + + + +Release Date: April 29, 2007 [eBook #21253] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION +CRISIS*** + + +E-text prepared by Louise Pryor and the Project Gutenberg Online +Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) + + + +Transcriber's note: + + There are many typographical and orthographical errors in + the original. They are listed at the end of this etext. No + corrections have been made. + + In the second part of the book lines of dashes are used to + represent omissions in excerpts. There are represented + in this etext by [-- -- --] or [-- --]. + + + + + +THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS + +A History With Documents + +by + +K. NORDLUND +PH D. + + + + + + + +Upsala & Stockholm +Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd +Printed by Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd, Upsala 1905 + + + + +Author's Introductory Remarks. + + +The following work is intended to give an insight into the +Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author's endeavour to attain +this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few +years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents +referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to +the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the +discussions on the most disputed points are given. + +In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen's brochure the author +does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only +tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts +have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number +of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following +representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must +be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not +disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case. + +Upsala. August 1905. + + _The Author._ + + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + A. History. + Sid. + I. Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden's + and Norway's different reform programmes 1-8 + + II. Contents of the charge of 1885 in Sec. 11 of Sweden's + Constitution. First development of Consular Question. + Union Committee 1895-98 8-19 + + III. Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of + Communique 19-28 + + IV. Treaties on the identical laws 29-38 + + V. Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular + Negatiations 38-46 + + VI. Development of Crisis this year until the time of the + Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag 46-64 + + VII. Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution 64-67 + + + B. Acts. + + 1. Acts from Norway's "Grundlov" 71 + + 2. Acts from "Riksakten". (Special laws relating to Union) 72 + + 3. Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish + and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communique) 73 + + 4. Extract from Norwegian Government's proposal referring to + identical laws 75 + + 5. Extract from Bostroem's reasons for identical laws 76 + + 6. Extract from Hagerup's Answer 77 + + 7. Extract from Swedish Government's proposal regarding identical + laws 78 + + 8. Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council's Memorandum on account + of this proposal 79 + + 9. Extract from Swedish Cabinet's answer 82 + + 10. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February + 1905 83 + + 11. Crown Prince-Regent's address to Special Committee of + Storthing 85 + + 12. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April + 1905 86 + + 13. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Upper Chamber 87 + + 14. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Lower Chamber 88 + + 15. Norwegian Government's "proposal" of 17th April 1905 89 + + 16. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April + 1905 92 + + 17. Swedish Riksdag's Statement on Union Question 93 + + 18. Norwegian Minister's Notice of resignation 94 + + 19. Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th + May 1905 94 + + 20. King's telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government's + Statement 97 + + 21. Norwegian Ministers' announcement to King of resignation 97 + + 22. King's telegraphic protest 98 + + 23. Storthing's President's proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905 99 + + 24. Storthing's address to King Oscar 99 + + 25. King's telegraphic protest 101 + + 26. Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June + 1905 101 + + 27. King's letter to Storthing 10th June 1905 102 + + 28. Storthing's reply 106 + + + + +I. + + +[Sidenote: _The object of the Union dispute._] + +Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented +itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in +reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself. + +[Sidenote: _The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union._] + +The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden, +from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the +responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political +affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians +on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time +shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the +same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of +detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden, +that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims +of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of +State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial +Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839 +the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two +later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side +complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this +Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have +been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844 +concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were +refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the +administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more +general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--, +NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as "90 years' labour to +procure a supremacy for Sweden",--ought to appear in its true +colours[2:1]. + +[Sidenote: _Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to +gain the supremacy._] + +The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy +have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly +the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union, +partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union. + +Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents +of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union +itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the +unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character +of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or +less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that +Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has +especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from +the first, placed in Sweden's hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has +also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian +writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side +have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed +on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right, +for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under +this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her +conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting +"designs of supremacy". + +Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do +with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most +extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans--to +mention one, the late professor OSCAR ALIN--have on different occasions +maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality +within the Union, and it must be asserted that _no Swedish political +party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway_[3:2]. + +[Sidenote: _The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming +the Union._] + +That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the +reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable +oppositions in opinions concerning _the manner_ and _the aim_ for a +reform. + +Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the _entire_ reorganization, Norway the +_partial_--the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the +so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden +has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the +interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by +concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not +gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was +complete[4:1]. + +Sweden has furthermore insisted on _negotiations_ and _agreements_, as +the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself +to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained. + +Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the _aim_ of +the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a +Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a +safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing +overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a +purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as +the main object in view. + +The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in +Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian +programme, especially since 1885. + +Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were +forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to +the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in +need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that +the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State +for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian +people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a +mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the +political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife. +The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the +utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJOeRNSON and +other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden +increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJOeRNSON as the only +enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their +(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the +"Norwegians of the Future" buried themselves deeper and deeper in the +study of "Ancient Glorious Norway". Imagination was fed on Norwegian +heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of +Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place +for renewed worship[5:2]. + +This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and +all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and +the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less +importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian +Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the +Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years +played a dominating role in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the +more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the +cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in +Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were +scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political +responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in +need, of BJOeRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this. +It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long +time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the +King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the +fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds +has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at +the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost +entirely vanished from the "national junction." + +[Sidenote: _Sweden's later Union policy._] + +During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians +have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point +opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to +accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two +grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of +the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union +might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the +Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest +saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of +the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby +become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential +bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting +into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when +the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the +present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt. + +But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint +administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of +possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions +in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed +both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they +like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any +sort of "_confusion_"; their inability to comprehend the requirements of +the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take +into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain +extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the +subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish +policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to +insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious +that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real +interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially +disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the +appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents +of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two +possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we +shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In +the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union +Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish +majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented +itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against +the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining +the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the +present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the +principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and +Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by +Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter +of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its +claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on +account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union, +but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the +enticing reward--harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting +Norway honestly to meet her half way--has been sufficiently uncertain, +in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a +remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2:1] NANSEN (English edition). The same author writes (page 62): +"Finally in 1903(!) the Swedish Government declared openly that the +present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway's just demands for +equality in the Union." How such a statement can be made is simply +incomprehensible. + +[2:2] How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large numbers of +lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all. + +[2:3] On this account, it has especially been vindicated that the Act of +Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is scarcely +possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same Act of +Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as the head +of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the "Eidswold +Constitution", at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph referring +to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored. This last +inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory of State +Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the +administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his +turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the +Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. NANSEN (page 49 and following.) The +artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is +exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can +commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has confered a +position of importance on the King Himself. + +[3:1] The Norwegian Right Side (Conservative) has not either emphatically +disputed the Swedish conception. + +[3:2] Illustrative of the Norwegian way of confusing the Swedish _legal +conception_ and the Swedish _amendment programme_ in the Union question +is an expression of NANSEN (page 61). According to him "the Swedish +government as late as 1891 appeared, as already mentioned, inclined to +deny Norway every right of taking part in the administration of foreign +affairs", while in 1893 the Swedish Government offered a joint Minister +for Foreign Affairs for the Union. The state of the case was, that the +Swedish Government in 1891 offered Norway _increase_ of influence in +Foreign affairs, but in motioning this offer the Swedish legal point of +view was maintained, that the administration of Foreign (diplomatic) +affairs for the Union by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs was +founded on legal right. Reflections arise of themselves. + +[4:1] Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of Norway's +fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence. According to +this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops, that cannot be +reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed outside the +boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the more +pernicous, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have +illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces, +by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the +annual classes of recruits. + +[5:1] Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the +Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be regarded by the +Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections campaigns. + +[5:2] We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the ultra modern +"glorious" revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was decreed, that +the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient Kings of Norway. +In a festival number of a "Vordens Gang" in honour of the revolution we +find printed a "Psalm on Olaf's Day" written by BJOeRNSON. + +[6:1] That Norway in carrying out the law (1899) respecting the flag, +broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in +conformity with everything else. + + + + +II. + + +[Sidenote: _The Consul question._] + +The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the +Union struggles during the last fourteen years-- + +[Sidenote: _The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885._] + +The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the +Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always +allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1]. + +What was it then that happened in 1885? + +[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._] + +By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also +in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council +instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object +being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully +represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as +previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime +Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when +foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway +by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a +somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately +offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs, +which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway +on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the +majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason +for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council +in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in +the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's +leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal +right[9:1]. + +But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not +discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which, +being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we +Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to +be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister +for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to +the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be +more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could +receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885 +the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish +Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for +Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more +dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have +become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the +state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary +responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the +Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now-- +responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in +Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885 +was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters +concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the +paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with +greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign +affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected +that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's +foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he +held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this +constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister +for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters +concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the +preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under +observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions +taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the +King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the +Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a +manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever. + +Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary +control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just +intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be +exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But +the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it +preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was +necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression. + +[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their +hands._] + +The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in +1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran +leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated +"to take matters into our own hands". The system was founded on the +Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a +Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs, +its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved +with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union +between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a +Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and +boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having +granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian +Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay +in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway +were fixed by the Separatists[10:1]. + +It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able, +of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and +dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union +itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the +Union. A _Union_ policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely +revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union. +Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations +of fidelity to the Union--the last speech of this sort was heard a +short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away +to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of +duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain. + +There was a cautious beginning with "their own Consuls"; it was too +venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their +own Minister for Foreign Affairs. + +[Sidenote: _The real innecessity of having separate Consuls._] + +On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests +of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is +an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no +essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of +having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter +in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners--were in opposition for a +long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the +Consular Committee's deliberations on the subject before the mercantile +authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the +matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that +"the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of +benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so +weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent +agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested, +or amongst the masses of the people". There are principally two reasons +for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different +Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and +Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the +different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and +not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the +fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their +business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give +reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is +also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been +expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the +Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears, +that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office, +partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact _that +for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls' +duties have, on Norway's side, been performed by one of the Norwegian +Government Departements_, proves how vain those fears were. + +[Sidenote: _The real object of raising the consular question._] + +Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a +moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides +the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian +Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture +of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth +striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular +Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic +representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Directly +they have got the wedge fixed into the small end", wrote in 1892 +President HANS FORSSELL, "they will try to persuade us that there will be +no danger in letting them drive it in a bit". Above all they considered +that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the +administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the +dominating role interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our +day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office. + +[Sidenote: _Want of Union motives for Consular reform._] + +The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any +motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism +has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and +its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the +Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any +time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have +usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union +demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national +sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right. +That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees +become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand +a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points +touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway. + +[Sidenote: _Misinterpretation of the King's opposition._] + +When therefore the King, in the interests of _the Union_, at first +opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it +out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only +the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish +veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has +gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this, +that has brought about the rupture of the Union. + +[Sidenote: _The raising of the Consular question in 1891._] + +Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which +at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual +diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in +the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision +by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was +established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter, +which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State +alone; on the other hand the _winding up_ of the joint Consular Service +would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal +Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called +Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which +according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions "concerning +the two Kingdoms[14:1]." And this one-sided right of decision was +maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes--the last in 1886 +--having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact +that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that +Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian +Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and +diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might +certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the +winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a +separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it +would be Norway's prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up; +Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign +affairs from the joint Foreign administration. + +Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the +Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed, +and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the +Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of +a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the +sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there +began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events +of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already +here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the +revolution, which has now broken out. + +[Sidenote: _"The King and the Ministry" according to the Norwegian +Constitution._] + +When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but +little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council +and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of +the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly +stated in the division of the Constitution. The King's veto over legal +questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless +tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly +responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the +King's Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of +his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own +judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of +Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for +instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly +refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring +that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the +King's Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but +this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement +of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers +on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National +Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize +something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were +not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the +Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment +a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical +Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the +Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this +means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way +into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the +responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must +naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation +of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of +refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the +old only possible forms. + +[Sidenote: _The development of the Consular question._] + +Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the +Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire. +Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the +consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently +set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the +King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters +becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the +initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr +MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and +the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian +masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the +dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence. + +The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on +having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests +to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute +on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences +"that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present +constitution". This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on +behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed +a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary +Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced +intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King's +opposition, Sweden's and the King's of Sweden, not the King's of the +United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union. +It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a +question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the +disloyalty of the Radicals to the _Union_ was entirely ignored. The +Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the +country. + +[Sidenote: _The position in 1895._] + +In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete +standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted +on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish +Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to +an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a +matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had +the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of +her defence which of late years she has neglected. + +[Sidenote: _The Union Committee 1895-1908._] + +The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing +in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to +obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected +a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The +Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the +Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their +party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign +affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish +Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the +Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and +Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the +opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign +affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance, +the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the +possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the +Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller +portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1]. +In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members +were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both +Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a +joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly +emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be +personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign +affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls +and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with +evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate +the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded, +that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might +have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2]. + +[Sidenote: _Norway prepares again to the Consular Question._] + +The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for +another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared +to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time, +they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on +the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of +State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of +having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing +Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for +Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the +consequences of which brought about the present crisis. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8:1] Compare NANSEN (page 48 and following). + +[9:1] The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden's +maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal; +this has been Norway's right alone. + +[9:2] Compare NANSEN (page 54). "The change in the Swedish Constitution +in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty +years' strife in the union." + +[10:1] On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885 +adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by +themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must, +however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own +right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and +Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy. +This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was +passed in the _Swedish_ Cabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State +to the Ministeral Council. The Norwegian claim to participate in the +revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as +Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860 +maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or +changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution. + +[11:1] Compare NANSEN (page 68 and following). + +[12:1] It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it +has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a +general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of "the land +of Free Trade" Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all. + +[14:1] The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint +Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the +thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr HAGERUP, +there has been quite a "sickly" fear of having matters settled there. On +the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those +matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being +distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has +been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive +account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether +it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends +entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. _This latter +conception has been adopted of old._ + +[15:1] Compare No. I Secs. 5, 15, 30, 31. + +[18:1] The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of +Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed +minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union. + +[18:2] NANSEN says (page 71) "Divisions arose partly over the resistance +from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates +for a separate Consular Service." This is, as plainly apparent, an +extremely modified version of the truth. + + + + +III. + + +[Sidenote: _His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim's Proposal._] + +His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM'S proposal implied an attempt to settle the +Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign +Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this, +he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised +afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work +of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent +the old attempts on Norway's side "to take matters into her own hands", +to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way +could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from +distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to +have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they +would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a +definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the +grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs. + +In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. +The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it +concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even +Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the +Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom +and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their +courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals +prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable +compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been +acceptable. + +But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable +difficulties through which to pilot its way. + +[Sidenote: _The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the +Consular Question._] + +In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway +without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a +wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians +took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet +in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be +discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign +administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since +deviated in any way. + +In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish +government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the +negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the +Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to +which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union. + +But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these +guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the +Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as +deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for +the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in +carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid +inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against +the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the +Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from +a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally +with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination +to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day. +"As to one's rights, no one negotiates". This has become well nigh the +axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to +one and all of her demands.-- + +[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._] + +In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to +convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two +Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to +how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United +Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present +joint diplomatic representatives. + +The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It +declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to +give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the +arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the +same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in +order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to +describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain +circumstances and nothing more. + +The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own +consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign +affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would +be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these +alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look +at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit +of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under +authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be +an "anomaly". The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the +Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it, +nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the +advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by +continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration +of the Minister for Foreign affairs. + +The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very +imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for +instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving +instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first +to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom +rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of +Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign +affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary +when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with +Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts +on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an +extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs +and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the +total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the +Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian +Consular Service would "duly value the importance of a loyal +co-operation." + +It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be +considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the +more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any +reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the +Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of +a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's +conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish +side for the solution of the question[22:1]. + +[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian +delegates._] + +Mr. BOSTROeM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the +autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced +between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The +conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined +and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in +Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the +matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual +agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off +on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the +Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well +known so-called Communique[23:1]. + +[Sidenote: _The Communique._] + +This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the +preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though +it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments +themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the +Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter. + +Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the +Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of +Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general +agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign +affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the +Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe +for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in +January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were +evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a +Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs. + +With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare +that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in +itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent +in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be +"not impossible" that under certain circumstances a system with different +Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the +most important advantage of the political agreement between the two +countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the +question on the following basis: + +1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be +established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the +authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine. + +2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign +Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same +wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the +authorities of both Kingdoms. + +It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the +position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should +remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the +establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to +regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the +Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other. +The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do +not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time +secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and +the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1]. + +When the Communique was issued, it was received with very great diversity +of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions +which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the +agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held, +contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially +concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and +as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great +importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give +some enlightenment on the point. + +In the first part of the Communique, which decribes the offer of the +Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of +the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic +representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be +_altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of +both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws "which +cannot be altered by one of the parties", the word 'abolish' does not +occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission +had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTROeM, in the +Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the +Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended +on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania +under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have +given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full +contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions +in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must +necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was +afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should +be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been +significant only through the connection which may be found to exist +between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the +extent to which the laws were to be changeable. + +The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by +the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have +her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to +appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were +based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign +affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the +Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of +Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the +suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would +become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in +the matter. + +In other words, was it the intention of the Communique to force Norway to +a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through +negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to +continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands? + +In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove +too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to +be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he +might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws +will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the +matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to +the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that +they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them +out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in +the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws +could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way +whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP, +and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all +negotiations. + +Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communique? It is +evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial +importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by +Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of +the Communique must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of +authority. + +On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet +been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be +assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really, +among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of +foreign administration "into her own hands_." The great fear of such a +contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of +this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well +informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more +confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made +by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by +the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is +vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the +Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the +Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a +Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign +Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit +loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister +question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact +from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek +to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2], +without an agreement with Sweden. + +How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing +could interpret the Communique as it did? + +As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it +is impossible to make any definite assertions. + +The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the +Communique did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal +right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could +scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the +Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of +that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of +protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have +remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to +the wording of the Communique on that point, and the Norwegian +governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange, +especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War +Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his +idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were +scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the +Communique_. + +Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact +remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect +by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the +Norwegian interpretation of the Communique_. This must be kept strictly +in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to +be obtained. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have +especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJOeRNSON. + +[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN, +who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the +Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador +BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AMEEN in Barcelona, +and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp. + +[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that +they do not consider it to be altogether desirable. + +[22:1] NANSEN evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64): +"No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore, +follows that even the _Swedish Commissioners_ did not think it +incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate +Consuls". And, of course, he mentions, "the _unanimous conclusion_ of the +committee of experts from _both_ countries" (p. 72). + +[23:1] N:o 3. + +[23:2] The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTROeM, the Minister for +Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian +members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries +KNUDSEN and IBSEN + +[24:1] N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communique, which are +conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish +government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN. + +[25:1] The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have +been proposed at more recent dates. + +[26:1] It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of +identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained, +especially the Radicals, of that "Massive instrument." + +[27:1] In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER +said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing +respecting; the Communique before its publication was made known to the +Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on, +had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply +replied, that "Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the +Norwegian government on the subject of the Communique." + +[27:2] Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the +Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr +BOSTROeM'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in +the Communique it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be +valid only "so long as the present system of foreign administration +existed." When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition, +it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be +valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in +the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all +intents unacceptable. + + + + +IV. + + +[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communique in Sweden and Norway._] + +Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was +supposed to characterise the Communique, its general contents roused no +unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate, +serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the +Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister +Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home) +was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless +referred to the resolution of 1893. + +Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known +there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the +cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs. +Meanwhile after the publication of the Communique, the Norwegian Radicals +immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again +solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme. + +However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was +started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards +negotiating, and even BJOeRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause +of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical +Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was +suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for +negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though +not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the +Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable, +impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old +Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the +elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then +became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as +Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the +leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a +powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in +no favourable direction. + +[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communique._] + +In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms +were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the +basis of the Communique. They were carried on slowly during the Spring +1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the +proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government +the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws. + +[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign +affairs to the Consular service._] + +It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real +authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the +Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest +of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a +purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was +responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should +be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way +connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to +hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, +from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration +within the Union. + +The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign +Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in +Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong +efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union +Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the +direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all +matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same +conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve +the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile +part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained +intact[30:1]. + +But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one +it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had +postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a +deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest +the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and +mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now +arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would +be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the +Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most +remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian +opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an "anomaly", +in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made +it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part +of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State +Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled. + +From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the +right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere +forms. The evasive talk of the "spirit" of constitutional law, and the +administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in +public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very +great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold +in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of +Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must +presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its +branches_. + +[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._] + +The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the +Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this +proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should +regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders +issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know. + +Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic +character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the +report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, +under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul. +Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no +account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities. + +This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection +between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration +was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever +that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come +into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a +deficiency so much the more serious as the Act Sec. 1--c allowed the +Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less +diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to +Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law. + +Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the +Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to +secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not +compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause +for declaring from the Swedish side, "that the proposition includes +scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the +Communique, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their +office", and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the +acknowledged principles of the Communique_. + +[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._] + +From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet +there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not +accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must +have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil +would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the +question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, +till the autumn. + +During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of +opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation +was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In +November His Excellency Mr BOSTROeM went to Christiania and presented his +conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if +the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions +stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the +Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the +Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to +disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, +the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, +recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases, +should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2]. + +After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP +made a written statement of his objections. + +[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._] + +In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the +Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical +manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, +though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee, +emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the +Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest +acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the +results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a +single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be +acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy +the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions +would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to +international and common law principles, and declared that from a +national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the +present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets +that Mr BOSTROeM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not +touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil +Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic +Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTROeM, would very +seldom occur. + +[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._] + +It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTROeM'S demand, that the +King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to +dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian +susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to +the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's +Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to +Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, +as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for +identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point. + +The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict +with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it +naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the +Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further, +the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions, +suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not +necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors, +though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign +affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of +view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On +the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign +affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great +consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United +Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before +the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the +King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs +of that State. + +[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._] + +What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently +perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2] + +It declares that it "stands to reason" that the Norwegian Consular Office +would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign +affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to +presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish +proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have +been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who +is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more +important points the unsuitability of a "hierarchal" relation between +Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of +the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the +Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian +government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the +Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that +the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to +refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest +in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of +course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of +the legislative binding nature intended by the Communique. Finally the +Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions +unacceptable, and adds, that "if they should be adhered to further +discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless"[36:1]. Really a +formal ultimatum! + +[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._] + +Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's +Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the +subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the +liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, +if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of +the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af +decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet +firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially +emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the +power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the +limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly +indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend +operations into departments that had previously been considered as +belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian +Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian +Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was +met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for +Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls +instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of +affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of +Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the +unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the +guarantees presupposed by the Communique that the Consuls shall not +exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on +Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by +the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of +that kind was not intended in the Communique, as it had nothing to do +with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian +Consular Office. + +On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to +modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions +of the Communique. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making +on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, +but their essential items must "be adhered to". The Cabinet does not +consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally +to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet. + +[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._] + +To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the +reply, "that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further +communication on the matter." + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in +the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: "Our own Norwegian +Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the +relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is +hereby declared established". + +[31:1] N:o 4. + +[33:1] N:o 5. + +[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTROeM'S Memorandum were rejected by the +Norwegian side. They ran as follows: + +1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the +Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think +necessary. + +2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and +Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as +these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the +King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers. + +3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by +Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign conntry had not +been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions. +--Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because +the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTROeM were not, +according to his own account, so very insurmountable. + +[34:1] N:o 6. + +[34:2] N:o 7. + +[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union. + +[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations +(page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It +can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the +subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply +the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish +Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale. + +[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations +would have remained unwritten! + +[36:1] N:o 8. + +[36:2] N:o 9 + + + + +V. + + +[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._] + +The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway, +and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored. + +Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it +made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden. +Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe-- +thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the +European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish +government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness +etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then +already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago. + +Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie? + +[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._] + +The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the +Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this +it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its +demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally, +therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible +party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum, +did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely +inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition +in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the +Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further +negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side, +that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the +form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of +points of minor importance. + +The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may +now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting +only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of +negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains +to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their +lawful rights. + +The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish +government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the +breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that +result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish +final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may +assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part +of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter +on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the +government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting +concessions. + +It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could +not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations +it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian +political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a +defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish +government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the +proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the +Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure +position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in +the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish +government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on +the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old +standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction +with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to +the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that +it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of +the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical +laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular +office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be +provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This +question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling +to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian +Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the +Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its +original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign +affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTROeM'S demands ought +undoubtedly to be seen. + +It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian +government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish +government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish +Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the +Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an +expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its +own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from +the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old +Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by +the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were +dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the +negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the +negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the +Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old +lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of +taking matters into their own hands. + +[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken +the covenant of the Communique._] + +But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators' +(especially Mr BOSTROeM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the +negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was +loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word, +had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden +became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically +pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation +contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest +by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of +plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent, +but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the +responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its +true light. + +The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on +the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communique +to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the +same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian +demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This +supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communique naturally +implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be +satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however, +typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way +by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing +negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very +amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of +the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communique. +"Norwegians", he said, "are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with +them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken +great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their +demands". + +Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had +violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the +Communique[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the +negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations, +and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he +announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The +Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and +offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded +the terms of the Communique. But the Norwegian government failed to +produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations. + +What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the +Communique that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority +of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned +shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish +government's evident plans to arrange a "hierarchal" relationship between +the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself, +undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an +honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the +light of their relation to the whole matter. + +Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communique confirms among +other things that they shall "give guarantee that the Consuls do not +exceed the proper limits of their occupation." What guarantee? The +Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision +in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best +guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian +Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object: +"that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communique, as this +had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian +consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the +Communique mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised +by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls". + +If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult +to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the +Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not +exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs +were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal +relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive +for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish +government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this +interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct +orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a +hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian +Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a +concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communique. It had already been +made before the Communique was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be +included in the frame of the Communique. The so much-disputed claims of +Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional +conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within +the frame of the Communique. + +In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for +breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the +Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the +agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and +Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the +preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been +made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets, +before the Communique existed. + +It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the +negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct +opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the +breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the +references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the +Norwegian Storthing. + +The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the +Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared +that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the +28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be +accepted by the Swedish Cabinet "it would find no support from +admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates." Now, there +were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the +contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite +Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian +Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the +origin of the Communique, to the feigned conclusions of which the +Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was +the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the +proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the +contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired +into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a +"preliminary", as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that +the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish +Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the +origin of the Communique, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain. +The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred, +seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly +adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister +to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined +themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their +agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet +with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian +Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not +even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to +them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally +understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his +Excellency BOSTROeM brought forward casually several of the questions +which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the +right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made +objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular +Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and +during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended +laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two +Cabinets[45:1]. + +Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained +in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting +the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, "must be subjected to +further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature". + +According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the +Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also +add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build +the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTROeM +of breach of agreement[45:2]. + +With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the +Communique and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the +Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the +Communique to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different +quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in +unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communique it was not +intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during +these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as +the general decisions of the Communique, sensibly interpreted, were +observed. + +To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if +it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before +the existence of the Communique, it was on account of the binding nature +of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has +endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view, +that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the +Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the +laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose +that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual +termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of +the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be +granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status +quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the +interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communique, +these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it +may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact +too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the +prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points. + +Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of +the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian +revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are +unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which +was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin +air. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[41:1] NANSEN (page 76): "The Swedish draft contained a number of demands +quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and +object of the negotiations." + +[45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this +way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed +Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as "quite preliminary". + +[45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet +were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these +preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C. +BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard +both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a +quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing. + + + + +VI. + + +[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular +negotiations._] + +The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian +politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close +connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in +Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in +comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as +extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in +critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's +part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the +Consular question would rouse their passions + +It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the +situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful +and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating +that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their +fruit_. + +In these days much is said of "necessity" in the development of events. +"Necessity", it is said, "has been stronger than the wishes of +individuals". To those who in any degree believe in personal influence +and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of +history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to +the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LOeVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to +the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any +leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_ +public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard +to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to +do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The +Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax. + +The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and +designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid +how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering +of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been +discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it +be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been +set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken +off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in +Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening +danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance +of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid +to rest. + +That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place +became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the +systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of +Swedish hatred and "national persecution", which in Christiania were held +in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a +Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the +government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of +breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania. +A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that +the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as +an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but +their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned. +In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian +opinion a tone of unreasonableness. + +Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation +shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very +tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the +negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to +express his hearty wishes, "that the two Kingdoms which could soon +celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences +of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the +independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its +two peoples". To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken +the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making +this speech[48:2]. + +A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now +dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous +on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins, +that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to +actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not +choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the +peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's +breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of +personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which +Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case, +artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and +the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them. + +[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._] + +In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister +for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause +of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for +Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign +policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming +negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign +affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side +all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first +stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the +break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of +the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of +Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from +the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr +HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under +the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered +that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led +to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to +continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain +"more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations", in +other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said +he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union +Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he +announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed +it when he resigned in March. + +A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and +even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would +not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the +possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more +independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was +responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the +matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms +presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further +consideration[50:1]. + +But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be +favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the +termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called +Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of +this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and +therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHOeNING at the end +of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his +resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached. + +The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the +negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity +of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading +politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the +matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee +appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction +that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the +preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was +not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two +peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the +Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be +entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union. + +The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect, +but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by +informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was +of no "Constitutional importance", and shrewdly trying to prove that the +Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that +manner[51:1]. + +Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans +before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the +negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to +consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the +man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet +consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers, +however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LOeVLAND, were rank radicals. In the +beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were +able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a +novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to +take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into +"their own hands". + +In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here +twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to +decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown +Prince Regent on the matter. + +On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the +joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open +negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the +Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign +affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared +himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the +matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to +remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the +continuance of the Union[52:1]. + +On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime +Minister BOSTROeM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially +been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the +hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was +immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both +Chambers of the Diet[52:2]. + +_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway, +for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in +terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years +back_[52:3]. + +But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal +was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of +the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are +typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of +which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of +Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian +demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially +"given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of +similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the +good relations existent between the two peoples". The Norwegian +government knows what means to employ to produce "these good relations", +namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated +in the past. This accomplished, "that confidence, which is the mainspring +of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate +relations in a Union, will have revived". Norway is thus always the +injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might +have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union +Policy[53:1]. + +In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned +statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible, +for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated +imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the +object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but +they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply +deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final. + +In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the +above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they +had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored +the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible +that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead +eventually to more favourable results. + +[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._] + +While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made +to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being +carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the +side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was +not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were +heard hesitations. + +Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and +unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a +most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's +side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an +opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English +newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home, +that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that. + +[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._] + +When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the +Storthing presented their proposals. + +This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the +first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added +were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not +have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the +beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that +is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a +separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile +shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be +exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was +adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be +presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being +that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before +the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But +there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of +the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill +three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered +resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his +assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had +of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as +1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the +Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime +Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of +Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence +to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto +was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be +brought to a climax. + +The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to +the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a +Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to +imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically +declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too +many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was +intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the +Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty +with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as +previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first +be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible +agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would +take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that +if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then +proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign +affairs. + +[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._] + +The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being +revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian +resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards +the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without +consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of +Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly +unreasonable. + +To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a +revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the +Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far +more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the +background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be +shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the +interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he +should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of +the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The +King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said +'No', "it cannot", Mr NANSEN says, "be the result of Norwegian influence, +_but on account of Swedish pressure_"[56:1]. Here we are met by the +dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which +the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining +the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards +the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of +Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling +motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King +has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more +faithfully than King OSCAR II. + +_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the +Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by +this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they +cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the +basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness +of this is sufficiently evident. + +[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._] + +The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was +fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National +revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania, +especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be +no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway, +and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand +persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on +a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway +in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment! + +These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the +Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any +debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to +protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest. + +With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP +pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the +decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently +found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as +to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to +these eventualities--which might exceed both the Constitution and the +Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the +Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a +change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few +in the minority made known their different views, and among them the +Shipowner JOeRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons +for dissolving the joint Consular Service. + +But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment +was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed +unanimously. + +[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._] + +Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters +as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of +the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted +with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's +reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of +NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said, +"would really refuse Norway her right" seemed rather unnatural. + +[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_] + +On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in +Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the +Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint +Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of +the Union Sec. 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by +treaty with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The +Cabinet raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's +loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a +violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would +undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon, +sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to +allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then +ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King +maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his +veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the +Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on +their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the +fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing +countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances, +only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full +consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4]. + +[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._] + +Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the +extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional +law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was +furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his +decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from +constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules +of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation +of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King, +meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--"now"-- +form a new Ministry. + +This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign, +undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the +beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_ +--had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals +to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also +without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their +post till the King released them. For, according to the general +constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who +releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves. + +It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all +the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law +was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed +the King that they resigned office_[59:2]. + +[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._] + +Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their +inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their +opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and +declared themselves to be 'free men' entitled to the right to resign +office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this +proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the +Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played +out. + +On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their +resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little +word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared +himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion +that the Constitutional Royal Power was "no longer effectual", on which +the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government, +which, according to Constitutional law, was the King's prerogative alone. +The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further. +King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration +followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all +communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to +deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied +that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary +Storthing[60:6]. + +It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway. +They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]! + +The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the +Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the +principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first +paragraph of her Constitution, is bound. + +The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden, +or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the +Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this +last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription +that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of +State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the +freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of +the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2]. + +As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of +laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that +country. + +[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._] + +On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution. +In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to +meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly +emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply +violated Sweden's rights. + +The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address +to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King +maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to +the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the +capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had +considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As +Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition +to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the +Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden "if +Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_ +dissolution". + +[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._] + +The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the +Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality +to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people +entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and +appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on +both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by +their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the +ranks of Nations. + +The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have +received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming +mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a +good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had +formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of +the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different +in all respects. + +The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since, +step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and +therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish +government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume +negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in +case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on +this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on +Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had +already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions? + +In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations +are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled. +Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the +situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his +veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to +the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an +eventual negotiation. It should be carried on "_on an entirely free basis +with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any +reservation or restriction whatever_", and among other matters, it was +stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should +be able to decide, of its own accord, "the future form of its national +existence." Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the +Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the +contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would +break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this +_method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature +threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime +Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on +the Norwegian side "as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union." +The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that +the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account +that he refused to negotiate. + +But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af +the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility +for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of +which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden, +this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the +majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this +was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April, +when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the +Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto; +the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time +beforehand.-- + +On the 20:th June the Diet assembled. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost +entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions +refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a +Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs. + +[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the +members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement. + +[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ +HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to +notice. + +[48:2] N:o 10. + +[49:1] N:o 10. + +[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward +in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14. + +[50:2] N:o 11. + +[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the document in his book. + +[51:2] N:o 12. + +[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a +compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a +Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union +policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign +affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction. +The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at +the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical +representatives. + +[52:2] N:o 13 and 14. + +[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against +this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after +the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by +Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as +it did not include "the same guarantees we had before". It must +nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_ +guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, +partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to +carry out than the programme of the Communique, which implied that the +Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that "the last +Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a +decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of +the Norwegian Commissioners". To this it must be observed that this +Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than +the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee. +Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians? + +[53:1] N:o 15. + +[53:2] N:o 16. + +[54:1] N:o 17. + +[55:1] Page 14. + +[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93). + +[58:1] NANSEN page 93. + +[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete +report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of +the Cabinet. + +Compare with N:o 19. + +[58:3] N:o 18. + +[58:4] Compare N:o 27. + +[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21. + +[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for +having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry. +The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not +having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in +fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to +the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after +being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from +that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King +might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached +for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened +with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How +truly Norwegian! + +[60:1] N:o 21. + +[60:2] N:o 22. + +[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same +as in the address to the King. + +[60:4] N:o 23. + +[60:5] N:o 24. + +[60:6] N:o 25. + +[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated +Norwegian logic. (page 94). + +[61:1] Compare N:o 1 Sec. 112 and N:o 2 Sec. 12. + +[61:2] "The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and +inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King." + +[61:3] N:o 26. + +[62:1] N:o 27. + +[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the +legality of his action. + +[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16. + + + + +VII. + + +[Sidenote: _The question of the Justification of the Norwegian +Revolution._] + +Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History--even +the history of Sweden--records many revolutions, which are said to have +been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on +the grounds of its having been _the extreme means of protecting most +important interests_. + +[Sidenote: _The Swedish "oppression"._] + +In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway's +breaking out of the Union, and Sweden's struggle for freedom from Denmark +in the middle ages. Sweden's way of using its power has been stamped as +an intolerable _oppression_. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more +powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to +the fact that Norway's "struggle for freedom" has had for its object the +enormously important cause--their own consuls! + +[Sidenote: _Sweden's loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the +Union._] + +The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply +in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; _in everything +else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality +with that of Sweden_. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted +the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious +to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the +hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that +in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they +can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the +Union--the well known Bodoe affair in 1819-1821--an episode concerning +which _Norwegian_ investigations of recent date, have served to place +Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian +tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish +administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years' +uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity +of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and +spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure +interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian +assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the +organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that +Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign +affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long +time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be +added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection +with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself +Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State-- +the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs--a Norwegian has +lately been in office. the posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even +the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of +those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians. +Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration +of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests +of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give +Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers, +which even if they did not accede to all Norway's demands, would, if +realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously +held. + +[Sidenote: _Has Norway been denied its prerogative._] + +But it has been said on the Norwegian side--and this has been brought +forward as the main point--Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a +"free and independent Kingdom". If by that, they mean that Norway has +been denied equality in the Union, it is _not true_. + +Sweden's only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her +prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be +subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden +on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be +maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary +obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief +impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the +Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else. +Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of +responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be +_declared_, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can +never be politically _defended_. Norway must already have made the +discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever, +_to political action under a strict sense of responsibility_. + +[Sidenote: _Faults on Sweden's side._] + +By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to +a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking +back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be +noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness +and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been +mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the +so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden's policy was +undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the +Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to +make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be +unanimous because Sweden has been _too conciliatory_ towards Norways' +demands. + +[Sidenote: _Swedish opinion._] + +It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian +countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the +Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The +observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least, +true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by +kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to +smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of +the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the +prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of +Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account +that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more +intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are +shown in their true light, such as they are and--have been. The +revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the +past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of +Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which +Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials. + +In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest +periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the +indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen +terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain. + + + + + + +ACTS TOUCHING THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN CRISIS. + + + + +1. + +Extracts from the Constitution of Norway. + + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and +inalinenable realm united with Sweden under one King. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 5. The King's person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused. +The responsibility is incumbent on His Council. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec.15. [-- --] The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible +for the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions +adopted. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded. +Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his +opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for +the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment. + +If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings' resolution +incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the +country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make +strenuous remonstrance and to have his opinon recorded. He who has not +issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King +and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the +Odelsthing can proeced against him before the Court of impeachment. + +Sec. 31. All orders (ezcepting matters of military command) issued by the +King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its +own members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. [-- --] + +Sec. 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of +by the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if +present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of +obtaining the sanction of the King. + +Sec. 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His +signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve +of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that +He does not find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case +the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing +then assembled. + +Sec. 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three +ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general +Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate +ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and +the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been +passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the +request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution +regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it +passes into law, even if the King's sanction should not be obtained +before the break-up of the Storthing. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of +the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made +at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be +issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary +Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the +amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however, +must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should +only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the +spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by +two thirds of the Storthing. + +[-- -- --] + + + + +2. + +Extracts from the Act of Union. + + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war +and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and +receive ambassadors. [-- --] + +Sec. 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministers +accompaning the King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet +Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted. +In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be +consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not +allow of it. + +When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries +are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there +have a seat and vote. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 7[72:1]. [-- --] Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in +consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any +special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and +are despatched to each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden +by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime +Minister. + +Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign +affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol[73:1]. [-- --] + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are +copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions +to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the +Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same +authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered +but in the way indicated in Sec. 112 of that same Constitution. + +[-- -- --] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[72:1] This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional +Government. + + + + +3. + +Preliminary settlement of the Consular question between members of the +Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on March 24, 1903. (The +so-called Communique). + + +The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of +October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the +Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question, +have been continued in Christiania during February and March. + +During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the +establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United +Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not +convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect, +would convey any important practical advantages to either of the +Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this +arrangement should lead to inconveniences. + +Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and +whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest +Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned +out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system +with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to +satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal +apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to +attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two +Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the +following terms: + +1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be +established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the +authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine. + +2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign +Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of th seame +wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the +authorities, of both Kingdoms. + +The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and +acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for +Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union +that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability +of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at +present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have, +however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a +desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and +the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as +can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister +for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister's +constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both +Kingdoms. + +To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally +concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the +administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway's justified +claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more +evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted +that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time, +however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a +satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might +soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms. + +When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the +supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state +of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to +the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of +things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an +agreement could not be expected. + +We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to +bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leave +_status quo_ undisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for +Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation +between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate +Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same +wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which +both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their +authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary +co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular +Services of both Kingdoms. + +In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not +be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of +arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of +negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both +countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[73:1] These enactsments show plainly that the Act of Union only +recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the +Foreign Policy of the Union. + + + + +4. + +Extracts from the Norwegian Government's draft of laws of the same +wording in order to regulate the relations between the Minister for +Foreign Affairs and the legations on the one hand, and the separate +Consular services of the two countries on the other hand. Dated May 28, +1904. + + +I. + +The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the +Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign +affairs of: + +a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of +Consular Services, the appointement or employment of Consuls, their power +of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge: + +b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the +Consular Service; + +c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e. +g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or +proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power +against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation +and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters +simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment. + +[-- -- --] + + +III. + +Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic +or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the +Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement. +This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement +of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities +to the Consul's discharge of his official duties; of troubles for +warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of +arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from +outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to +diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional +information. + +In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a +negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable +inconveniences, the Minister for Foreign affairs can make direct +inquires of, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the +diplomatic or political side of the matter. + +The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction +addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding +the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above. + + +IV. + +When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked +after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give +orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual +law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the +Home authority. + +With regard to a Consul's duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above, +the last passage of Sec. 3 should be applied. + +[-- -- --] + + + + +5. + +Extracts from the outlines for laws of the same wording drawn up by His +Excellency Bostroem, in November 1904. + + +[-- -- --] + +[-- -- --] + +With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and +the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to +their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information +about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them +to know it should be directed: + +that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for +Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its +establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers; + +that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have +an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the +persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment; + +that, for obtaining a Foreign Power's recognition of a Consul, the +Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign +Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the +province of the Consular administration the question arises about +applying to the Government of a Foreign Power; + +and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration, +the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the +Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting +with such an instruction. + +As to the Foreign Minister's relation to the Consuls and _vice versa_, +the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for +Foreign affairs in such a way: + +that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request +information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions; + +and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly +what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by +him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to +affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a +report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further +development. + +Besides it should be instituted: + +[-- -- --] + +that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing +effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the +Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to +execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the +Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble +request to the King about the Consul's revocation, whereupon the Consular +administration concerned should be informed of the resolution. + +In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls +concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of +mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law: + +that the legation is bound to guard the Consul's rights and to lend him +necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the +legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him +instructions; + +that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the +Minister for Foreign affairs; + +and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or +in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to +have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an +action affecting his civil repute should he brought against him, the +legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further +notice. + + + + +6. + +Extract from the answer given by His Excellency Hagerup to the preceeding +draft, on November 26, 1904. + + +[-- -- --] + +2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement +that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with +measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely +adhere to the Communique and the Protocols of December that, as a basis +of agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular +service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case "the Consuls of each +Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which +the latter shall have to determine." This arrangement does not however +preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain +possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the +consuls. + +[-- -- --] + +With particular regard to the demand expressed in the "outlines" that the +Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right--this is the, +intention according to your Excellency's verbal declaration--to +discharge in ministerial--consequently in Swedish--Cabinet Council a +consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that +this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that +an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a +resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to +the general principles of political and international law, impress upon +Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a +national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared +with the present arrangement of the Consular service. + +[-- -- --] + + + + +7. + +Extracts from the draft of laws of the same wording made by the Swedish +Government in December 1904. + + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 8. + +If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the +Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a +measure as is alluded to in Sec. 9, it is for the Consular administration +to observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the +consul concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this +matter given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular +administration. + +Sec. 9. + +The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his +province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country +concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in +such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound to fullfill what is thus +requested of him. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 11. + +If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employe +has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of +the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in +political demonstrations, or secretely, or openly encouraged or supported +attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may +have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United +Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to +give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council +whereupon the matter is submitted to the King's consideration in the +Cabinet Council of the country concerned. + +[-- -- --] + +Sec. 16. + +If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect +alluded to in Sec. 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime +affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by +circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter +should immedately be reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs +and to the Consular administration concerned. + +A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office +until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has +resolved upon it. + +[-- -- --] + + + + +8. + +Extracts from notes made, in consequence of the Swedish Government's +draft of laws of the same wording by the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on +January 11, 1905. + + +[-- -- --] + +To Sec. 8. It is stated here that, when. in a matter being dealt with by the +Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an +order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its +side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is +difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without +a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any +similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from +reference to Sec. 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the +Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with +by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to +assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to +instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department +can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposed to have been +the following:--to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a +diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a +diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from +arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It +stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to +reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is +calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an +interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of +judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very +appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to +the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned. + +[-- -- --] + +To Sec. 11. [-- --] We should not however dwell upon these formal +considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared +with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint +treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consuls +wheteher to the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign +authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the +report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both +countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): "Furthermore the +Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister +(and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign +Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the +actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although +dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic +and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment, +the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the +matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international +conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions +necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be +debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the +Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable +to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to +the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to +the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the +Norwegian department." We concur in the opinion expressed here and the +demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning +measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the +cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question +regards the consul's relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations. +In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of +the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is +evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating +to the Consul's disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor +was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place +before the appearance of the Communique. Such a joint treatment that +should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, can only imply one +of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to +delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be +a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get +influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will +signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should +be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it +is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be +supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not +being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for +a Consul's revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the +matter the object of a humble report. + +[-- -- --] + +To Sec. 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to +suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in Sec. 11, or +prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection +it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute, +the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations, +but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has +to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future +Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to +other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised +by the King (see the Constitution, Sec. 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuvaerende +statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations +would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to +consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the +present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior +consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the +legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular +Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp. +24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to +Norwegian authonity and ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish +minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic +relations: [-- -- --] + +[-- -- --] + +After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a +Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly +because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the +claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms of +independecy, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is +intended by the whole negotiation, viz--to use the words of the Swedish +negotiators--to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and +for Norway The Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority +that each country decides for itself. (see the Communique of March 24, +1903). + +On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the +paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further +discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile. + + + + +9. + +Extracts from the answer of the Swedish Cabinet Council to the memorandum +made by the Norwegian Cabinet Council on January 11, 1905. Dated January +30, 1905. + + +[-- -- --] + +In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that Sec. +8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard +to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the +Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to +assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the +draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a +certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to +be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between +the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter +subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the +origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to +interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him. +When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities, +that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a +conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between +the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged, +are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency +to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as +exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be +incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert +regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be +entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of +their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can +hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign +Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must +be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint +countries should be preferred. + +The precepts of Secs. 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant +to guarrantee that the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their +province. Such a guarrantee cannot be dispensed with in the opinion of +the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign +country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good +relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms. +To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their +relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the +legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under +such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council, +hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might, +with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be +escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedish draft alike contain regulations +enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign +Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his +duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position +held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the +possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a +form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul's conduct, of his +remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the +Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul. + +In support of his standpoint that "a joint treatment of matters +concerning the Consul's relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the +legations or the Foreign Authorities" must not occur, the Norwegian +Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular +Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words. +"But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the +disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the +internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the +Norwegian department." To this the objection should be made that the +opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish +Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has +itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign +Minister and the legations, the right to address "injunctions" that the +Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of +the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls +shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities. + +[-- -- --] + +From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish +Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the +welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded +in the Norwegian memorandum, the abovementioned paragraphs of its draft. +This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and +modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is +important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible +modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued +negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into +particulars. + +[-- -- --] + + + + +10. + +Record of Foreign Office affair, made before H. M. the King in the +presence of H. R. H. the Crown Prince in Joint Cabinet Council at +Stockholm Palace, on February 7, 1905. + + +His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an +account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the +establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway. +In answer to the Foreign Minister's recommendation in Joint Swedish and +Norwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made +by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been +appended to this Protocol. + +After having given an account of the contents of the report of the +Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say: + +"The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration +of the recommendation[84:1] previously made by me. I venture however, to +draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to +terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be +sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the +relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this +arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within +the Union, has long been admitted. + +In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the +Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of +March 24, 1903, I want therfore, to emphasize the desirability that the +question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign +affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two +countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to +taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously +advocated". + +What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the +other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council. + +The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian +Government's humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that +in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way +expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24, +1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating +Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally +agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the +positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the +Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24, +1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging +on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be +taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of +the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said +document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case, +partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the +chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the +above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded. + +_His Majesty the King_ was hereupon pleased to dictate: + +"In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other +resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the +Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My +peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a +century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger +the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the +independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula +and her two peoples". + +Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in +all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this +dictate. + +In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the +Norwegian Cabinet Council, _His Majesty the King_ was pleased to resolve +that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet +Council in persuance of the King's resolution of December 21, 1903, shall +not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of +the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published! + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[84:1] In Joint Cabinet Council of February 6 the Foreign Minister had +recommended that the task of negotiation, entrusted by the King to the +Cabinet Councils of the two countries, should not lead to any further +steps. + + + + +11. + +The note of the Crown-Prince-Regent to the special committee of the +Storthing. Dated February 28, 1905. + + +It is my wish to make the following declaration to the Committee. In +these fatal days I feel it a necessity to open My heart to you and I do +so now only in the capacity of Norway's Regent. + +I fully understand the sentiments the Norwegian people, in these days, +are animated with and that you as the loyal sons of the Fatherland in +passing your resolutions will solely have in view the welfare of Norway. +But what is Norway's welfare, nay, I say with the same emphasis, what is +the welfare of both countries? I do not hesitate a moment to answer this +question with the one word: Union. + +It is therefore my sincerest hope and my strongest exhortation to you not +to enter upon a way that leads to a rupture between the two peoples. It +has so often been said that the dynasty tries to look after its own +interests, but this is not true. The Union is not of paramount interest +to the _dynasty_, but it should be so to the two _peoples_, for it is a +vital condition for their happiness and future. + +The Royal power has never tried to prevent Norway from obtaining her own +Consular service. The only condition for the fulfilment of this desire +is, and must be, that the relation to the joint administration of Foreign +affairs should be arranged in a way securing the Union and that this +matter regarding both countries cannot be definitively settled until +after being treated in accordance with Sec. 5 of the Act of Union. From My +standpoint as the Regent of the United Kingdoms I can never act otherwise +than as I consider useful to the existing Union to which I hold Myself +bound to adhere. + +An attempt has now been made on the way to partial reform, which I am +sorry to say has been unsuccessful. But one should not therefore give up +everything and enter into a way that, at any rate, cannot lead to the +obobject preserved. But the logical consequence of this is to enter into +new negotiations with Sweden on a larger basis. And to such negotiations +on the basis of complete equality between the countries I declare Myself +fully prepared to lend my assistance. + +I consider it my imperative duty openly to hold forth to you the great +dangers and the fatal consequences for each people to follow their own +course. United, we have at any rate a certain power and importance in the +European system of states but separated--how much the less the word of +Norway or of Sweden would _then_ weigh! Therefore, may these peoples +assigned by nature itself to hold together, also do so for the future! + +When I see all this stand out clearly to My inward eye, you, too will +understand with what sincere and intense, and heart-felt sorrow I +consider thesituation we are in and the threatening turn matters now seem +to take. + +In conclusion I want only to add this: when you go to your task, do so +with entirely open eyes and consider carefully _all_ consequences of your +actions. Each one may act according to his best convictions! God leads +the destinies of the peoples. May He give you and us all prudence so as +to enter into the way that leads to the true welfare of the Fatherland +and of the North. + +I want this my address to be published. + + GUSTAF + + + + +12. + +Record of Justice-Department affair held at Stockholm Palace, on +Wednesday the 5th of April 1905 before His Royal Highness the +Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council. + + +[-- -- --] + +His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent declared: + +"I have to-day summond you to Joint Cabinet Council in order to make the +following address to you: + +I herewith exhort the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, on both +sides without an one-sided adherence to standpoints formerly held, to +immediately enter into free and friendly negotiations concerning a new +arrangement of all matters affecting the Union, upon the fundamental +principle that full equality between the countries should be tried to be +established. + +The way which, in My opinion, ought to be chosen and in which, as far as +I know, with a little good intention on both sides a solution of the +difficulties satisfactory to all parties can be attained is this: Foreign +Minister in common, be he a Swede or a Norwegian, responsible to both +countries or to a joint institution; separate Consular service for each +country arranged however, in such a way that the Consuls, in everything +regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, should be under the Foreign +Minister's direction and control. + +If, in the course of the negotiations, another form could be found for +arranging the affairs affecting the Union, always however with the +preservation of the community in the management and charge of Foreign +affairs, which is an indispensable condition to the existence of the +Union, I herewith declare myself, prepared to take also this form into +earnest consideration." + +Mr. Berger, Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department, made the following +statement: + +"In connection with what your Royal Highness has been pleased to declare +and while emphasizing the desirability of opening further negotiations as +to arranging the Union affairs, I recommend in all humility to request in +persuance of Sec. 5 of the Act of Union, a report from the Norwegian +Government as to the proposition of opening such negotiations." + +What the president of the Justice-Department had thus stated and +recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet +Council. + +The Norwegian section of the Cabinet Council stated that, at present, it +did not find any reason to give its opinion on the reality of the matter, +but, with reference to Sec. 15 of the Norwegian Constitution and to Sec. 5 +of the Act of Union, it confined itself in recommending the request of a +report from the Norwegian Government. + +His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was graciously pleased to +decree that the Norwegian Government's report of the matter should be +requested. + + + + +13. + +Motion on the Union question in the First Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag. + + +According to notification made in the "Post-och Inrikes Tidningar" of +April 6, this year, the Crown-Prince Regent has on the 5th of the same +month in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council made the following +declaration: + +[-- -- --] + +Whereas, through the exhortation thus addressed by the Crown-Prince +Regent to the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, a suggestion of +new negotiations has been made, which ought to be able to lead to such a +solution of the Union affairs as may be approved of by both peoples, and +whereas the present state of things seems to occasion the Riksdag to give +already its opinion on the matter, we move, + + that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its + support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint + Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a + view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian + Governments concerning, a new arrangement of the Union affairs. + +Stockholm, April 12, 1905. + + _Gustaf Ax. Berg._ _Gottfrid Billing._ _Gustaf Bjoerlin._ + _Hj. Palmstierna._ _Fredrik Pettersson._ _Gust. Tamm._ + _R. Toernebladh._ _Wilh. Wallden._ + + + + +14. + +Motion on the Union question in the Second Chamber of the Swedish +Riksdag. + + +The declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Cabinet Council +of the 5th inst. and published the day after in the "Post-och Inrikes +Tidningar", has given great satisfaction to us and certainly also to +other friends of the Union, to whom the relation arisen between the +sister countries after the failure of the consular negotiations, has +caused a great deal of anxiety. That new negotiations if brought about, +will have a decisive influence on the future of the Union, is obvious. +The worth of the Union, as well as the prospect of maintaining it for a +considerable time to come, depend upon the two peoples voluntary +adherence to it in the conviction that the Union involves advantages well +worth of those restrictions in each peoples absolute right of self +determination as are necessarily conditioned by it. Again, the failure of +the negotiations would evidently produce among the two peoples a general +and settled opinion that an arrangement satisfactory to both cannot be +found within the Union, and such a conviction is sure to undermine its +existence. + +Because of this, it proves to be of importance for the Riksdag not to +pass in silence the suggestion of negotiations given in the +above-mentioned declaration, but to second it, if found satisfactory. + +It seems to us that the Riksdag should not hesitate to take the latter +alternative, since the declaration, while holding in wiew the necessary +communion in the management of Foreign affairs and in the two peoples' +control of it, at the same time in consideration of its latter portion, +has the bearing that it should not preclude the possibility to attain a +solution satisfactory to both peoples. + +On that account we beg leave to move: + + that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its + support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint + Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a + view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian + Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs. + + Stockholm, April 12, 1905. + + _Carl Persson._ _Hans Andersson._ _Sixten von Friesen._ + _Ernst Lindblad._ _D. Persson i Taellberg._ _K. H. Gez. von Scheele._ + _T. Zetterstrand._ + + + + +15. + +The Norwegian Governments' report of April 17th 1905. + + +His Excellency Michelsen, Prime Minister, and Chief of the +Justice-Department, has in all humility made the following statement: + +In making this matter the subject of a humble report the Department +desires to state: As is well known the Norwegian people have made a +unanimous demand for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular +service and have with equal unanimity asserted that the decision of this +matter, as lying outside the community established between the countries +through the Act of Union, should be reserved to the Norwegian +constitutional authorities. For the treatement of this matter the +Norwegian Storthing has appointed a special Committee and in the +immediate future, this committee will prepare a motion that, in the +present sitting of the Storthing, a bill be to passed with regard to the +establishment of a separate Consular service. + +Inasmuch as the scheme propounded in Joint Cabinet Council should be +based on the supposition that the further advancement of the Consular +question should, for the present, be deferred Norway's approval of such a +supposition would, in the opinion of the Department be equivalent to +giving up of the Norwegian people's unanimous desire to now see a just +right carried through which is due to Norway in her capacity of a +Sovereign realm and is secured in her Constitution, and for a reform +requested with cumulative force by the development and the conditions of +industry, instead of entering into negotiations between the countries, +which, after renewed experience, may unfortunately be apprehended to +prove fruitless or at best, to delay the realisation of the matter. + +For there is no denying the fact that the scheme for negotiations now +propounded is nothing new, but that similar schemes in the earlier +history of the Union have repeatedly been tried in vain. The three +Committees affecting the Union and made up of Norwegian and Swedish men, +that in the past century, after previous treatment in 1844, in 1867, and +in 1898 propounded schemes for new regulations concerning the mutual +relations of the countries did not lead to any positive result. The +report of the first Committee was in 1847 subject to a treatment on the +part of the Norwegian Government, but was afterwards not favoured by the +Swedish Government; the report of the second Committee, which did not +give expression to Norway's equality in the Union was rejected by the +vast majority of the Storthing in 1871 and in the third Committee no +proposal of a future arrangement could obtain plurality among the +Norwegian and the Swedish members. + +With regard to the last-mentioned Committee we beg leave to draw +particular attention to the fact, that all the Swedish members of the +Committee certainly agreed upon founding the Union on the principle of +parity and equality, inasmuch as they proposed that the Foreign affairs +should be entrusted to the charge of a joint Foreign minister of +Norwegian or Swedish nationality. But at the same time the two fractions +wherein the Swedish members of the Committee were divided, proposed such +an arrangement of the constitutional responsibility not only for those +members of the separate Cabinet Councils of the countries, who at the +side of the Foreign Minister take part in the treatment of diplomatic +affairs, but also for the Foreign Minister himself, so that no member of +the Norwegian Committee could in this respect support any of the Swedish +schemes. In addition to the establishment of a joint Foreign Minister +office, all the Swedish members recommended an extension of the +constitutional community between the countries which no member of the +Norwegian Committee could second and lastly, the scheme for a separate +Foreign Office for each country which already was the expression of the +opinion prevailing among the Norwegian people, could not gain any support +from the Swedish side. + +In this connection it should also be remembered that equally fruitless +proved the negotiations about the arrangement of the ministerial Cabinet +Council, carried on between the two Governments in 1885-86 and in +1890-91. + +If thus the results of the above-mentioned efforts have been but little +encouraging, this can, in a still higher degree, be said to have been the +case with the negotiations just now terminated concerning questions +connected with the establishment of a separate Consular service for each +country. After these negotiations, brought about on Swedens initiative, +had led to a preliminary agreement presupposing a separate Consular +service for each country, subject to the home authority which each +country decided for itself, and after this agreement had been approved of +by the King and the Governments of the two countries in Joint Cabinet +Council on December 21, 1903, the matter, as is well known, fell through +owing to the so called bills of the same wording that were meant to +regulate the relations between the separate Consular services on the one +hand, and the Foreign Minister and the legations on the other hand. This +negative result was attributed to the circumstance that from the Swedish +side a number of demands were finally made and adhered to, which are +partly considered as incongruous with the Constitution of Norway and +with our rights as a Sovereign realm, partly would exclude what had been +presupposed in the preliminary agreements viz. that the Consuls of each +country should be subject to that home authority which each country +decided for itself. Through this, a deep disappointment has arisen in +Norway which, if strengthened by new unsuccessful schemes, will imply the +greatest danger to the good relations between the two peoples which in a +far higher degree than agreements laid down in treatises or juridical +forms are the basis of the concord and the strength of both peoples. + +Under these circumstances the Department finds it necessary to dissuade +from entering into new negotiations on the Union affairs ere a separate +Norwegian Consular service has been established. Not until this has been +done, will the confidence return which is the condition of any friendly +and successful consideration of embarrassing and delicate Union affairs, +and the Department will then be able to recommend the opening of +negotiations for arranging the management of Foreign affairs and of the +diplomacy and about the present Union based on the Act of Union, and +questions connected with this matter. But, if so, these negotiations must +be carried on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the +Sovereignity of each country without any reservation or restriction +whatever and consequently also--in conformity with what occurred in +1898--embrace the arrangement proposed by the Norwegian side as to the +establishment of a separate Norwegian and a separate Swedish Foreign +Office administration in such forms as each country will consider +necessary for its objects and interests. In harmony with this it should, +besides, be agreed upon that, if also new negotiations should prove +fruitless one must not return to _status quo_ so as to adhere to the +present untenable state of Union affairs. There should be a binding +presumption that the present state of things must not prevent either +country from exercising its right of self-determination, but that instead +each country can freely decide upon the future forms of its national +existence. For not a coercive union but only the mutual confidence and +feeling of solidarity of the free and independent nations can safeguard +the future and the happiness of both peoples and the independence and +integrity of their countries. + +With reference to the above-mentioned statement endorsed in substance by +the other members of the Cabinet Council, it is recommended in all +humility: + + that a copy of the present humble report made in Joint Cabinet + Council on April 5th this year, concerning new negotiations + affecting the Union may graciously be ordered to be delivered over + to the Swedish Iustice-Department. + + + + +16. + +Record of Justice-Departement affair held at Stockholm Palace on Tuesday +the 25th of April, 1905 before His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent +in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council. + + +[-- -- --] + +Mr Berger, Cabinet Minister and Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department +gave, in all humility, a notice of the Norwegian Government's humble +report in consequence of the question raised in Joint Cabinet Council on +the 5th inst. vith regard to opening new negotiations concerning the +arrangement of the Union question; this report is appended to this +Protocol. + +After the chief of Department had given an account of the contents of the +report, His Excellency Ramstedt, Prime Minister made the following +statement: + +"What in the Norwegian Governments report has been said about the reason +why the latest negotiations, regarding the Union did not lead to any +result, does not, in my opinion, now require a reply, but in this +respect, I only refer to the Swedish Cabinet Council's declaration of +January 30, 1905, appended to the Protocol made in Joint Cabinet Council +on the 6th of February last. + +In the declaration made by your Royal Highness on the 5th inst. and put +on record, the Swedish Cabinet Council expected to find a method of +settling the differences of opinion as to the Union affairs. Therefore +the Swedish Cabinet Council gave its support to your Royal Highness's +declaration. + +The condition of the new negotiations, however, was, according to the +same declaration, that the negotiations should embrace all matters +affecting the Union and consequently also the Consular question. + +Whereas now from the Norwegian side the thought of further negotiations +is rejected, ere a separate Norwegian Consular service has been +established and whereas besides, for eventual new negotiations, such a +condition is made from the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union +and the Act of Union, it is obvious that negotiations on the basis +indicated by your Royal Highness cannot now be opened with any chance of +success". + +This statement was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet +Council. + +The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated: + +"The section of the Cabinet Council refers to the report of the Norwegian +Government from which it appears that on the Norwegian side there is +willingness to bring about negotiations between the countries on the +conditions put forward in the report. It is also obvious from the report +that from the Norwegian side the intention is not to try to dissolve the +present Union. On the other hand, one finds it necessary to demand that +such a dissolution should be within the bounds of possibility and that +negotiations presupposing this eventuality with the consent of the +Constitution authorities of both countries, should be compatible with the +Act of Union. + +Under these circumstances, however, the section of the Cabinet Council +that negotiations concerning the Union affairs cannot, agree for the +present, opened with any chance of success." + +His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was hereupon pleased he to +declare: + +"Whereas the Norwegian Government has unfortunately been unwilling to +accept my proposition of new negotiations concerning all the affairs +affecting the Union, I must, while sincerely regretting it, let the +matter abide by the declarations made by the Cabinet Councils." + + + + +17. + +The Riksdags address to the King on the Union question, on May 15, 1905. + + + TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING. + +In both Chambers of the Riksdag resolutions have been submitted with the +object of expressing, in an address, to your Majesty the Riksdag's +support of the declaration published in the "Post-och Inrikes Tidningar" +and made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian +Cabinet Council on the 5th of April last. + +This declaration is to the following effect: + +[-- -- --] + +The Riksdag realizes to the full the importance of this declaration of +the Crown-Prince Regent, as involving a possibility of bringing about a +new satisfactory arrangement of the Union affairs. + +It is therefore with an expression of regret that the Riksdag has learned +from the publishment of the Protocol drawn up in Joint Swedish and +Norwegian Cabinet Council on the 25th of April last, that negotiations +founded on the basis indicated in the above-mentioned declaration of the +Crown-Prince Regent cannot now be opened with any chance of success. + +Although thus the question of such negotiations seems to have been +dropped for the present, the Riksdag, however, considers itself bound to +express its opinion on a question of such a far-reaching importance as +the present one, and consequently the Riksdag has resolved to announce +herewith its support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent +in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year, +and recommending the opening of negotiations between the Swedish and +Norwegian Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs. + +Stockholm, May 13, 1905. + + With all loyal veneration. + + + + +18. + +The resignation of the Norwegian Government. Dated Christiania, May 26, +1905. + + + TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING. + +In case Your Majesty should find yourself unable to acquiesce in the +Norwegian Government's recommendation to sanction the Storthing's +resolution for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular +service, we venture, in all humility, to apply for permission to +immediately resign our posts as members of Your Majesty's Cabinet, since +none of us well be able to countersign a resolution considered by us as +noxious to the country. A rejection of this unanimous recommendation of +the Government concerning a Norwegian law unanimously adopted by the +Storthing and issued by the whole Norwegian people to be carried through +cannot, in our opinion, be grounded on regards paid to the interests of +Norway, but would involve an abnegation of the Sovereignity of the +country, and would be a manifestation of a personal Royal power in +opposition to the Constitution and to constitutional practice. + +Christiania, May 26, 1905. + + + + +19. + +Report of the Cabinet Council held in Stockholm May 30th 1905, given by +the Norwegian Section of the Council. + + + To the President of the Norwegian Government. + +The Section of the Cabinet Council herewith presents the following +report. + +In the Cabinet Council held by the King at the Royal Palace in Stockholm +on May 27th the Norwegian Government presented their proposal respecting +the sanction of the Storthing to the Norwegian Consular law. After which +the members of the Section expressed their unanimity respecting the +proposals, and urgently appealed to the King to sanction them. They +emphasized the reform in question for the development of the country in a +national and economical respect, which was unanimously approved of both +by the National Assembly and also the whole of the people of Norway. +There might be many differences of opinion and divergencies on various +public affairs, but in this case, there was complete unanimity among all +parties and communities. The Storthing, in conjunction with the +government, had omitted from the law such questions as might have +reference to the points that touched upon the Foreign and Diplomatic +administration and dealt with the Consular question alone. + +Therefore it was thought that all cause of opposition would, on this +side, be removed. It was therefore the nation's sincere hope, that His +Majesty would graciously incline to their appeal. + + The King + +thereupon read the following reply. + +"The Crown-Prince as Regent in a joint Cabinet Council on the 5th April +has already pointed out the only way, in which this important matter can +be presented, and all difficulties thereby be removed, that is, by +negotiation. I give this decision my entire approval, and do not find the +present moment suitable for sanctioning the law, which implies a change +in the existing partnership in the Consular Service, which cannot be +dissolved except by mutual agreement. The present regulation is +established in consequence of a resolution in a Joint Cabinet Council, +and therefore a separate Consular Service cannot be established either +for Sweden or for Norway before the matter has been dealt with in the +same Constitutional forms prescribed by the Act of Union Sec. 5. In +refusing now to give My sanction to this law, I am supported by Secs. 30 +and 78 in the Constitutional law, which give the King this right. The +equal love I bear to my two peoples, makes it my duty to exercise this +right." + +The Section of the Cabinet Council resolved first to institute further +negotiations in the Cabinet Council in Christiania, in order that His +Majesty might deal with this important matter, which might lead to a +serious crisis in the government then in office. + + The King + +declared Himself unwilling to assent to this appeal and pointed out that +the Norwegian government's proposal was received and dealt with. + +Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest +representations in reference to His Majesty's decision, which would rouse +complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal +efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have +led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the +Kingdom. In this case Norway's interests in the Union were equal with +those of Sweden. For that Norway's rights were respected, was a necessary +condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His +Majesty's decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and +after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have +incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it +was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent +decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and +Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union. + +The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the +present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it +constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of +resignation. + + His Majesty the King + +then read the following reply: + +"As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I +cannot consent to he resignation of the Ministers." + +Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution Sec. 30, and affirmed +that the Ministers had now dutifully "expressed their opinions with +boldness", and "made strong representations" against His decision; +therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph +reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, "according to His +own judgment." He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law, +to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the +Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the +negotiations and agreements on the matter. + +The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the +Constitutional law Sec. 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive +for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned, +it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the +negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal +decree. + +Countersignature implied responsibility for the King's decisions, but in +this case the government could not take that responsibility. It was +prescribed in the Constitution Sec. 31 for all commands issued by the King +(except affairs relating to military orders). But this conclusion was not +a regular rule for the members of the Cabinet; it was a prescription for +the forms to be observed in order to give a command legal validity. +Occasions might therefore occur when it was not only right, but also a +duty to refuse countersignature. The Section of the Cabinet Council had +appealed to the Justice-Departement for enlightenment on the subject, and +they knew that there had been several occasions when the Norwegian side +had maintained the same opinions as those now presented. + +The Departement now comes to the same conclusion as in 1847 when it +discussed the question in another agreement namely in a Resolution on the +intended proposal for a new Act of Union; in this there is a reference to +the Norwegian conception that there is nothing to prevent a member of the +Council from refusing countersignature and resigning his office. This +Resolution is accepted by the Government then in office: Lovenskiold, +Krog, Sibbern, Schmidt, Pettersen, Herm. Foss and Fr. Stang and by the +members then forming the Section of the Cabinet Council, Due, J. H. Vogt +and Fleischer. + +The Section of the Cabinet Council finally decided that as a refusal to +sanction would manifestly not be only injurious to the Kingdom, but also +a denial of its Self-dependence, it had become a necessity to refuse +countersignature, in order to avoid being a party in the matter. The +Norwegian who did countersign would from that moment lose all national +rights. + +After which the letters of resignation from the Norwegian Government, and +from the Section of the Cabinet Council were delivered and read in the +presence of the King. Respecting this matter, the customary protocol has +been drawn up. + +Kristiania 30:th May 1905. + + _J. Lovland._ _E. Hagerup Bull._ _Harald Bothner._ + + + + +20. + +The King's telegraphic protest against the declarations of the Norwegian +Government. Dated Stockholm, May 29, 1905. + + +Stockholm, May 29. On account of what the Norwegian Government has +declared--not only in writing in their resignations, but also verbally +in the Cabinet Council of May 27 after my rejection of the Consular +service law--I must declare that I, most decidedly, protest against the +comments made there on Me and my method of action. I adhere to everything +I have stated to the assembled Cabinet Council as to my constitutional +right. I beg the Premie minister to give publicity to this as soon as +possible. + + _Oscar._ + + + + +21. + +The Norwegian Cabinet Minister's notification to the King that they +resigned their posts. Dated Christiania, Juni 6, 1905. + + +In response to our humble resignations, Your Majesty has in Cabinet +Council at the Palace of Stockholm on May 27th, decreed: "As it is clear +to me that no other Cabinet can at present be formed, I decline to accept +the resignations tendered by the Cabinet Ministers." + +According to Norway's Constitution it is incumbent on the King to procure +a constitutional Government for the country. In the same moment as the +Kings policy is an obstacle to the formation of a responsible Council the +Norwegian Royal power has become in-operative. + +By your Majesty's resolution therefore, the constitutional relation +between Your Majesty and the responsible Ministers of the Crown has +assumed such an aspect as cannot be maintained. No Government and none of +its members individually can, in a constitutional country, be forced +against their wishes to remain in office with a Ministers responsibility, +when their responsible advice in great questions decisive to the +Fatherland is not followed by the King who, in persuace of the +constitution, is exempt from responsibility whereas under these +circumstances it is the undoubted right of each member individually as a +free man to resign his post, this will also, as a rule, be a duty towards +the Fatherland in order to maintain its constitutional rights. + +Your Majesty has declared that no Government can, at present, be formed. +Your Majesty has found this so clear that Norway's King in these fatal +days has remained at the Palace of Stockholm without making an attempt at +bringing the country back to constitutional conditions. + +The policy manifested in Your Majesty's attitude towards the question of +sanctioning the Consular service law is, in our opinion, incompatible +with the Norwegian Constitution. But no more than a new Government is +able to take upon itself the responsibility of this policy, no more are +we able in office to render us participant of it by remaining in office. +It is therefore our duty to resign our posts and to immediately give the +Storthing the necessary communication of it. + +This shall now be done. Deep and discordant political divergencies have +thus burst the frame of the constitutional Norwegian Monarchy. +Circumstances have been stranger than the desire of the individual. But +the final settlement on the dissolution of the Union, that through Your +Majesty's resolution--no doubt passed with a heavy heart, but also with +full knowledge of its consequences--has now been started, will however, +--this is our hope--turn out before long to have been the introduction +to better and happier days for the two peoples, whose happiness and +welfare have always been dear to Your Majesty's heart. + +In conclusion we venture to tender Your Majesty our humblest thanks for +the personal kindness and amiability shown to us during the time we have +had the honour of being members of Your Majesty's Council. + +We beg Your Majesty to accept the assurance of our full recognition of +Your Majesty's difficult position and of our invaried esteem. But +paramount are our duties towards the Fatherland. + +Christiania, June 6, 1905. + + _Chr. Michelsen._ _J. Loevland._ _Sofus Arctander._ _Gunnar Knudsen._ + _W. Olssoen._ _E. Hagerup Bull._ _Chr. Knudsen._ _Harald Bothner._ + _A. Vinje._ _Kr. Lehmkuhl._ + + + + +22. + +The King's telegraphic protests against the abdication of the Norwegian +Government. + + + To _the Prime Minister_. + +I have received the communication of the Cabinet Ministers and I record a +most decided protest against the method of action of the Government. + + _Oscar._ + + * * * * * + + To _the President of Storthing_. + +Having this morning received from the Government the communication of the +Cabinet Minister's resolution to resign their posts and to inform the +Storthing of it I want herewith to make known that, in a telegram to M. +Michelsen, Prime minister, I have recorded a most decided protest against +their method of action. + + _Oscar._ + + + + +23. + +The Reasons for the decision proposed by the President, in the Storting, +on the 7th June 1905. + + +Having on behalf of the Storthing received open information from the head +of the Government that the several members of the Cabinet council have +one and all resigned hereby declare: We were all prepared for the +situation in which we now find ourselves. In meetings of the +representatives, the question has therefore been discussed as to what +measures would be taken by the Storthing to meet the necessities of such +a situation. Every representative has had an opportunity for making known +his personal opinions at these meetings respecting the situation and its +demands. On this day the Storthing must make known its decisive +resolutions. I must also permit myself to express the wish, that these +resolutions may be unanimously accepted, and without debate. + +In respect to the communication given by the head of the Government I +propose that the Storthing shall make the following resolutions: + +The different members of the Council having resigned office, + +His Majesty the King having declared Himself unable to form a new +government, and the Constitutional Sovereign having resigned his powers, + +the Storthing authorizes the members of the Council who resigned this +day, to assume until further notice, as the Norwegian government, the +authority granted the King in accordance with the Constitution of the +Norwegian Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become +necessary through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is +dissolved as a consequence of the King having ceased to act as King of +Norway. + + + + +24. + +The address of the Storthing to King Oscar, dated Christiania, June 7, +1905. + + + Your Majesty, + +Whereas all the members of the Cabinet have to-day, in the Storthing, +resigned their posts, and whereas Your Majesty in the Protocol of May 27 +officially declared that Your Majesty did not see your way clear to +create a new Government for the country, the Constitutional Regal power +in Norway has thereby become inoperative. + +It has therefore been the duty of the Storthing, as the representative +of the Norwegian people, without delay to empower the members of the +resigning Cabinet to exercise until further notice as the Norwegian +Government the power appertaining to the King in accordance with the +Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway and the existing laws with the +changes which are necessitated by the fact that the union with Sweden, +which provides that there shall be a common King, is dissolved in +consequence of the fact that the King has ceased to act as King of +Norway. + +The course of developments, which proved more powerful than the desire +and will of the individual, has led to this result. + +The union entered into in 1814 has from its first hour been differently +interpreted by the two nations both as regards its spirit and letter. +Efforts have been made on the Swedish side to extend the Union, and on +the Norwegian side to confine it within the limits laid down in the Act +of Union, and otherwise to assert the independent power of both States in +all matters which are not defined in that Act as coming under the Union. +The difference of principle in the interpretation of the character of the +Union has provoked much misunderstanding between the two peoples, and has +caused much friction. In the interpretation which, during the last +negotiations between the two countries, has been laid down by the Swedish +Government as against Norway, the Norwegian people were bound to perceive +an injury to their constitutional right, their independence, and their +national honour. + +The Union was justified as long as it could contribute to promoting the +welfare and happiness of both peoples, while maintaining their +independence as Sovereign States. But above the Union their stands for us +Norwegians our Norwegian Fatherland, and for the Swedes their Swedish +Fatherland. And more valuable than a political union are the feelings of +solidarity and voluntary cohesion of both peoples. The union has become a +danger to this feeling of solidarity between the Norwegian and Swedish +people which should secure the happiness of both nations and constitute +their strength abroad. + +When the union is now severed, the Norwegian people have no loftier wish +than to live in peace and good harmony with all, not least with the +people of Sweden and the dynasty under the direction of which our +country, despite many and bitter disputes affecting the union, has +attained such important intellectual and material development. + +As evidence of the fact that the work and the struggle of the Norwegian +people for the full independence of the Fatherland have not been formed +on any ill-feeling towards the Royal House or the Swedish people, and +have not left behind any bitterness towards any of these, the Storthing +respectfully solicits your Majesty's co-operation to the end that a +Prince of your Majesty's house may be permitted, while relinquishing his +right of succession to the Throne of Sweden, to accept election as King +of Norway. + +The day upon which the Norwegian people elect their own King to ascend +the ancient throne of Norway will open up an era of tranquil conditions +of industry for Norway, of good and cordial relations to the Swedish +people, and of peace and concord and loyal co-operation in the north for +the protection of the civilization of the people and of their freedom and +independence. + +In full assurance of this, the Storthing ventures to express the sincere +hope, that the present events, will turn out to be for the good of all, +also for their Majesties, for whom personally the Norwegian people will +preserve their respect and affection. + + + + +25. + +The King's telegraphic protest against the resolution of the Storthing. +Despatched June 8th 1905. + + +As We hereby declare that We do not approve of the revolutionary measures +which have been deplorably taken by the Storthing in violation of the +Constitution and Act of Union, and in revolt against their King, We +refuse to receive the deputation proposed by the Storthing. + + _Oscar._ + + + + +26. + +Extract of the protocol of Civil business held in Council before His +Majesty in the presence of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the +Royal Palace Stocholm June 9th 1905. + + +[-- -- --] + +His Excellency Mr. Ramstedt, Prime Minister, stated: + +"According to information received from Norway the Norwegian Storthing +has, on the 7th inst. passed the following resolutions: + +'The members of the Cabinet having resigned their office and the King +having declared himself unable to form a new government; and the +Constitutional Sovereign thereby having resigned His powers, the +Storthing authorises the members of the Council who resigned this day, to +assume until further notice, as the Norwegian Government, the authority +granted to the King according to the Constitution of the Norwegian +Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become neccessary +through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is dissolved, +in consequence of the King having ceased to Act as King of Norway.' + +Through this revolutionary measure, the Storthing has not only without +the King's assistance, but also without referring to Sweden arbitrarily +passed a resolution respecting the dissolution of a Union which has +existed on the grounds of legal mutual agreements between the two +countries and cannot without mutual consent be broken. + +The Storthing, having thus by this resolution, violated Sweden's +prerogative it becomes undeniably necessary that an extra session of the +Diet be immediately summoned in order to debate as to what measures +should be taken on Sweden's side, with reference to what has thus +occurred. Herewith I appeal that Your Majesty will resolve on the +summoning of the Diet, at the same time Your Majesty intimates +disacknowledgement of the government, proclaimed by the Storthing". + +In this address the rest of the members proclaimed themselves unanimous; + +And His Majesty the King consented to this, and in accordance with the +Prime Minister's recommendation was graciously pleased to decree, by open +letter and edict, the import of which are contained in the appendage to +this protocol, that the members of both Chambers of the Diet be summoned +to an extra session in Stockholm on Tuesday June 20th. + + + + +27. + +Address from the King to the President of the Storthing. + + + To the President of the Storthing! + +To you, and through you to the Storthing and the entire population of +Norway, I address the following words, in answer to the address and +decision both of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Storthing: + +The oath that the King of Norway takes according to the Constitution Sec. 9 +on his accession to the throne, "that he will rule the Kingdom of Norway +in accordance with its constitution and law", makes it a kingly duty for +Me not to pay any attention to the statement of the Norwegian Cabinet in +reference to my decree on May 27th ult., in which I declared, that, for +the present, I did not find it suitable to sanction the Storthing's +proposal respecting the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular +Service. The Cabinet thereby declared that this decree, being in conflict +with the unanimous recommendation of the Norwegian Cabinet would imply a +depreciation of a right in accordance with the Norwegian fundamental law, +independently to settle the matter in question, and also implied a +violation of Norway's freedom, independence and Sovereignty, and at the +same time the Cabinet declared that no member of the Ministry then +sitting would be willing to countersign My Decree, and thereby, according +to the opinion of the Cabinet, give it legislative validity. + +The Norwegian King's prerogative, when he thinks the welfare of the +kingdom demands it, to refuse His sanction to a proposal presented in due +form by the Storthing is unconditional. From this rule, there is no +exception even though the Storthing were to present the same resolution +ever so many times in precisely the same terms. Meanwhile according to +the fundamental law (Constitution Sec. 79) the decision of the Storthing +becomes the law of Norway without the sanction of the King, but in order +to accomplish this, are required unaltered resolutions from three +Storthings drawn up after three consecutive elections, which resolution +must be laid before the King, "with an appeal, that His Majesty will not +refuse to sanction the resolution, which the Storthing after the most +careful considerations, believes to be advantageous. In the case now in +hand, there was no question of any such resolution from the Storthing, +and therefore the regulation in the fundamental law Sec. 78: could be +suitably applied: "If the King sanctions the resolution, He signs it with +His superscription, on which it becomes the law. If He does not sanction +it, He returns it to the Odelsthing (Lower House) with the declaration +that for the present He finds it unsuitable to sanction." And the +paragraph continues: "The resolution may not again on that occasion be +laid before the King by the members of the Storthing then assembled." By +this last mentioned prescription the Constitution has evidently meant to +protect the Norwegian King's liberty in the exercise of the legislative +powers which are his indisputable right. + +My resolve, not to sanction a law providing for a separate Norwegian +Consular Service, can consequently not be considered to imply any +transgression whatever of the legislative power, which according to the +fundamental law is the King's right, not even, if the matter in question +happened to be an affair which concerned Norway alone. But on the grounds +of the valid Union agreement between Norway and Sweden, it was not only +My right, but also My duty as King of Norway to refuse My sanction, for +the dissolution of the existing identical Consular Office could only be +effected through Norway's consent to free and friendly negotiations +concerning agreements for altering the Union on the basis of full +equality between the United Kingdoms, to which not only the _Powers +Royal_, but also the Diet of Sweden had unanimously themselves agreed. +That such a respect to the demands of the existing Union should imply an +attack on Norway's independence and sovereignty, is so much the more +unfounded, as the fundamental law explicitly connects Norway's +independence with its Union with Sweden. Norway's King must ever hold in +sight the 1:st paragraph of its Constitution: + +"The Kingdom of Norway is a free, self-dependant, integral and +independent Kingdom, united with Sweden under one King." + +The statement made by the Council that My resolve, not to sanction the +Consular law, proposed by the Storthing, would have no legal validity, as +none of the members of the Cabinet had found themselves able to +countersign the Royal Decree supplies a supposition which I must declare +is in conflict with fundamental law. The question of the significance of +contrasignature according to Norwegian State law, is not a new question +brought up to day, but is older than the present Norwegian Constitution. +It was already solved at the Convention of Eidsvold. A proposal was then +made that Countersignature was requisite in order that the King's +commands should become valid, but was opposed on the grounds that it was +against the general principles of the Constitution for the division of +supreme power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of +the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional +Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the +Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The +change, which Sec. 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives +increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister's +Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the +King has made a Decree of certain import. + +And that Sec. 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the +authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is +acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the +Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian +government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under +consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in +a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations Sec. 38, was +intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King +included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could +not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law +respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the +contrary emphatically prescribes in Sec. 30: "But to the King it is +reserved the right to form his decision according to His own judgment", +and in Sec. 31: "All Commands issued by the King himself (Military +Orders excepted) shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before +1873 the Norwegian Prime Minister). + +That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect +for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is +a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution +grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best +of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved +to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict +with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which, +according to the explicit prescriptions in Sec. 112 may not be done, even +by an alteration of the fundamental law. + +One of the chief principles of the Constitution--the most important of +all, in point of fact--is that Norway shall be a Constitutional +Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a +helpless tool in the hands of His Ministers. If, meanwhile, the members +of the Council should have the power, by refusing countersignature, to +hinder every future Royal Decree, the Norwegian King would be deprived of +participating in the government. This position would be as lowering to +the Monarch as injurious to Norway herself. + +To the circumstances that can thus be adduced against the validity, +according to fundamental law, of the Prime Minister's refusal of +Countersignature, and against the efficacy of the dogma that the King's +Decree in order to be valid, must bear the responsibility of some member +of the Cabinet, can be added, in questions touching the Union situation, +two more reasons, which have their foundation in the fact that the King +of Norway is also King of the Union. + +However opinions may have varied, respecting the conception of the unity +which the Union agreements have created for the binding together of the +two Kingdoms, one fact remains clear, that Royal power is also an +institution of the Union. This position of the King's as being not only +King of Norway or of Sweden, but also as Monarch of the United Kingdoms, +makes it the King's duty, not to form decisions in conflict with the Act +of Union Sec. 5, respecting the settlement of matters in one country, which +would also affect the other. The King's duty in the aforesaid respect is +incompatible with the opinion that the one Kingdom, by the refusal of +Countersignature by its Prime Minister or otherwise, could undo a Royal +Decree, by which he refused to make a resolution prejudicial to the other +Kingdom or injurious to the Union. In Norway, when they endeavoured to +adhere to an opposite opinion, when the Norwegian people claimed the +right to force the King to form his decision in conflict with what he +considers his right as King of the Union to concede, there was no other +way of attaining this object than making the Union, and also the King of +Sweden, in his actions, totally dependent on the will of the Norwegian +people, its Storthing and its Cabinet. + +A Sovereign power of this kind I must characterize as being in strife +with the Union between the Kingdoms as confirmed by the Act of Union + +It has been My constant endeavour to give Norway that position within the +Union to which it has a just claim. My Royal duty has forced Me, even in +conflict with general opinion in Norway, to try to maintain the legal +principles of the Union. + +My coronation oath and the good of the United Kingdoms prompted My Decree +concerning the settlement of the Consular question, but in this I have +been met, not only by the Norwegian Cabinet's refusal of +Countersignature, but also the resignation of its members. When I +declared, "As it is clear to Me, that no other government can now be +formed therefore I cannot consent to the resignation of the Cabinet", the +Cabinet answered by the threat that the Norwegian who assented to My +Decree would in the same moment lose all national rights. I was therefore +placed in such a situation that I must either break the oaths I took +under the Act of Union, or expose Myself to being without Ministers. I +had no choice. After having in conflict with the fundamental law, tried +to undo the King's lawfully made resolution, the Council, by resigning +their office at the Storthing, have left the King without advisers. The +Storthing has approved of this breaking of the law, and by a +Revolutionary proceeding declared that the lawful King of Norway has +ceased to reign, and hat the Union between the Kingdoms is dissolved. + +It now becomes the bounden duty of Sweden and Myself as King of the +Union to decide whether Norway's attack on the existing Union shall lead +to the legal dissolution of the same. + +May the opinions of our contemporaries and also those of posterity judge +between Me and the People of Norway! + + + + +28. + +The Norwegian Storthings documentary address to the King. Dated +Christiania June 19th 1905. + + + To the King's Most Excellent Majesty! + +Norway's Storthing appeals, in all humility, to Your Majesty and through +the Your Majesty to the Diet and the People of Sweden to be allowed to +express the following: + +That which has now happened in Norway is the necessary results of the +late events in Union politics, and cannot be undone. And as it is certain +that the nation does not wish to return to the old conditions of the +Union, the Storthing considers it impossible to resume negotiations on +the different constitutional and state-law questions, which in Your +Majesty's address to the President of the Storthing are referred to, in +connection with the settled decisions, and on which the Storthing and +Government have previously fully expressed themselves. The Storthing +fully understands the difficult position of Your Majesty, and has not for +a moment doubted that Your Majesty's decree is made with the full +conviction that Your Majesty has considered it to be the right and duty +of Your Majesty. + +But it is the desire of the Storthing to address an appeal to Your +Majesty, to the Swedish Diet and Nation, to assist in a peaceful +arrangement for the dissolution of the Union, in order to secure +relations of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of the +Peninsula. From statements made in Sweden, the Storthing finds that the +resolution the Storthing considered it its duty towards the fatherland to +adopt, by declaring the Union between the United Kingdoms to be +dissolved, has, in its form and the manner of carrying it out, been +looked upon as an insult to Sweden. This has never been our intention. +What has now happened and must happen in Norway, was simply done in order +to maintain Norway's constitutional rights. The nation of Norway never +intended an insult to the honour of Sweden. + +Your Majesty having on the 27th May declared it impossible to sanction +the unanimous decision of the Storthing to establish a separate Norwegian +Consulate, and as no Norwegian Government could be formed by Your +Majesty, the constitutional situation became out of joint, so dislocated +that the Union could no longer be upheld. The Norwegian Storthing +therefore found the position untenable and was forced to get a new +government for the country. Every other resource was excluded, so much +the more so as the Swedish government of Majesty had already in April +23:rd emphatically refused fresh negotiations, he alternative of which +was the dissolution of the Union, if new regulations for the continuance +of the Union could not be arranged. + +The Storthing has already, before hand, stated that the Norwegian people +do not entertain any feelings of bitterness or ill-will towards Your +Majesty and the people of Sweden. Expressions to the contrary which may +possibly on different occasions have been heard, have alone been caused +on the grounds of the displeasure of Norway at her position in the Union. +When the cause of this bitterness and ill-will on account of the +dissolution of the Union has been removed, its effects will also +disappear. A ninety years' cooperation in material and spiritual culture +has inspired in the Norwegian people a sincere feeling of friendship and +sympathy for the Swedish people. The consequences will be, that when +Norway no longer stands in a position so insulting to its national sense +of independence, a friendship will be established that will serve to +confirm and increase the mutual understanding between the two peoples. + +With the confidence that the Swedish people will also share these +opinions, the Storthing appeals to the authorities of State in Sweden, in +acknowledging the new situation in Norway, and its rights as a Sovereign +State, to consent to the negotiations which are necessary for the final +agreements in connection with the now dissolved Union. The Storthing is +ready, on its part, to accede to any fair and reasonable wish, that, in +this respect, may contribute to the guarantee of self dependence and +integrity of the two Kingdoms. + +In a legislative sense the two peoples are hereafter separated. But the +Storthing has a certain conviction that happy and confidential relations +will arise to the benefit of the interests of both. If the above +statement can find support, without prejudice and without bitterness, the +Storthing is firmly convinced that what has now happened will be to the +lasting happiness of Europe. On behalf of the welfare of the countries of +the North, the Storthing addresses this appeal to the people who, by +their magnanimity and chivalry, have won such a prominent place in the +ranks of Nations. + + + + + * * * * * + + + + +Transcriber's notes + +There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original. +They are listed below. No corrections have been made. + +Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting; the use of apostrophes for +possessives is inconsistent; and a number of words are inconsistently +hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent neologisms are noted +explicitly. + + Title page + Ph D. + + Table of Contents + Consular Negatiations + + Footnote 2-3 + that it has confered + + Page 4 + which outworldly represents + + Footnote 4-1 + the more pernicous + + Page 5 + political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords + + Page 7 + They may have complain + in the Committe of 1898 + + Page 8 + represented in they the in administration + + Footnote 10-1 + Ministeral Council + + Page 11 + policy of whech + + Page 12 + Government Departements + + Page 16 + by which the Ministery + + Footnote 18-1 + wherevy it became incumbent + + Page 21 + January 21et 1902 + an disciplinary + + Footnote 23-2 is missing a full stop at the end. + + Page 25 + which decribes + + Page 27 + Buth it may nevertheless + + Page 30 + Norwegian gouvernment + + Page 31 + Swedish governement + + Page 32, side note + Mr Bostrom's + + Page 33, "Coun" omitted before "cil" at the start of the page + + Footnote 33-2 + Foreign conntry + + Page 34 + remedy the deficiences + + Page 36 + tone is one af decision + + Footnote 36-2 is missing a full stop at the end. + + Page 38, side note + accusations aganist + + Page 38 + illwill against Sweden + Formally, therfore, + + Page 40 + the breaking op + was prowed by + + Page 43 + an disciplinary sense + + Footnote 45-2 + frame this laws + + Page 46 + are unnessary + + Page 47 + There is a missing a full stop after "rouse their passions" + + Footnote 47-1 + as questions refering + + Page 48 + One symtom of this + the tumultuons confusion + + Page 50 + disssolution of the Union + a document adressed + There is a missing full stop after "appointed by the Storthing" + + Page 51 + Therfore the way + und Mr LOeVLAND + + Page 52 + for the establisment + + Page 53 + cause for displeausure + + Page 55 + whole of the procedings + + Page 58 side note + There is a missing full stop after "27th May 1905" + + Page 59 side note + 27nd May + + Footnote 60-7 + One reeds, for exemple + There is an extra full stop after "logic" + + Page 61 + on Extraordinary session + + Footnote 62-1 + The marker for this footnote is on page 61 + + Page 63 + the contents af + + Page 64 + An Norway cannot complain + + Page 65 + been in office. the posts + + Page 66 + absolutly their own + + Page 67 + such as they are and--have been + + Document 1, Sec. 1 + inalinenable realm + + Document 1, Sec. 30 + his opinon recorded + proeced against him + + Document 1, Sec. 31 + ezcepting matters of military command + + Document 2, Sec. 5 + accompaning the King + + Footnote 73-1 + These enactsments + + Document 3 + th seame wording + + Document 4, I + the appointement or employment + + Document 4, III + make direct inquires + + Document 5 + should he brought against him + + Document 6 + the preceeding draft + + Document 6, 2 + this is the, intention + + Document 7, Sec. 9 + bound to fullfill + + Document 7, Sec. 11 + or secretely + + Document 7, Sec. 16 + immedately be reported + + Document 8, to Sec. 8 + when. in a matter + + Document 8, to Sec. 11 + wheteher to the + + Document 8, to Sec. 16 + Norwegian authonity + + Document 8 + forms of independecy + There is a missing full stop after "viz" + There is a missing full stop after "Sweden and for Norway" + (see the Communique (should have upper case S) + + Document 9 + to guarrantee that the Consuls + Such a guarrantee cannot + the abovementioned paragraphs + + Document 10 + I want therfore + in persuance of + + Document 11 + lead to the obobject + thesituation we are in + + Document 12 + I have to-day summond you + an one-sided adherence + request in persuance of + + Document 14 + while holding in wiew + + Document 15 + For the treatement + the Sovereignity of each country + Swedish Iustice-Department + + Document 16 + Justice-Departement + vith regard to + + Document 18 + well be able to + Sovereignity of the country + + Document 19 + May 30th 1905 (should read May 27th) + I cannot consent to he resignation + J. Lovland (spelled Loevland elsewhere) + + Document 20 + the Premie minister + + Document 21 + Juni 6, 1905. + in persuace of the constitution + been stranger than + + Document 26 + Royal Palace Stocholm + become neccessary + + Document 27 + There is a missing full stop after "as confirmed by the Act of Union" + and hat the Union + The quotation marks opened with ""with an appeal," are not closed + The quotation marks opened with ""All Commands issued by the King" are + not closed + + Document 28 + he alternative of which + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS*** + + +******* This file should be named 21253.txt or 21253.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/1/2/5/21253 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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