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diff --git a/21833-h/21833-h.htm b/21833-h/21833-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8de0876 --- /dev/null +++ b/21833-h/21833-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,12075 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> + +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Experiences Of A Dug-out 1914-1918 - Author: Sir Stanley Maude</title> + + +<style type="text/css"> +<!-- + +body {font-size: 1em; text-align: justify; margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%;} + +h1 {font-size: 140%; text-align: center; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h2 {font-size: 130%; text-align: center; margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; text-align: center; margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h5 {font-size: 120%; text-align: center; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +.p4 {margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 1em;} + +.pagenum {visibility: hidden; position: absolute; right:0; + font-size: 13px; text-align: right; + color: #C0C0C0; background-color: inherit;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps; font-size: 95%;} + +.resume {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} +.quote {margin-left: 05%; font-size: 90%;} +.poem {margin-left: 10%; font-size: 90%;} + +.add2em {margin-left: 2em;} +.add6em {margin-left: 6em;} + +.figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center; margin-top: 2em;} +.center {text-align: center;} + +.td-right {text-align: right;} + +--> +</style> + +</head> + +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918, by +Charles Edward Callwell + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918 + +Author: Charles Edward Callwell + +Release Date: June 14, 2007 [EBook #21833] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EXPERIENCES OF A DUG-OUT *** + + + + +Produced by David Clarke, Christine P. Travers and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<p>[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all +other inconsistencies are as in the original. Author's spelling has +been maintained.]</p> + + +<h1>EXPERIENCES<br> +OF A DUG-OUT<br> +1914-1918</h1> + + +<p class="center"><i>BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</i></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">the life of lieutenant-general</span><br> +SIR STANLEY MAUDE<br> +<span class="smcap">K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</span><br> +Illustrations and Maps.</p> + +<p class="center">THE DARDANELLES<br> +Maps.</p> + +<p class="center">TIRAH 1897<br> +Maps.</p> + +<p class="p2 resume">The last two of these volumes belong to Constable's "Campaigns and +their Lessons" Series, of which Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell is +Editor.</p> + +<div class="figcenter"> +<img src="images/img001.jpg" width="600" height="473" alt="At The "Crow's Nest" (Page 273)" title="At The "Crow's Nest" (Page 273)"> +</div> + + +<h1>EXPERIENCES<br> +OF A DUG-OUT<br> +1914-1918</h1> + +<h2>BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR<br> +C. E. CALLWELL, K.C.B.</h2> + + +<p class="p2 center">WITH A<br> +FRONTISPIECE</p> + +<p class="p4 center">LONDON: CONSTABLE<br> +& COMPANY LIMITED 1920</p> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagev" name="pagev"></a>(p. v)</span> NOTE</h2> + +<p>Some passages in this Volume have already appeared in <i>Blackwood's +Magazine</i>. The Author has to express his acknowledgements to the +Editor for permission to reproduce them.</p> + +<p>Had Lord Fisher's death occurred before the proofs were finally passed +for press, certain references to that great servant of the State would +have been somewhat modified.</p> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevii" name="pagevii"></a>(p. vii)</span> CONTENTS</h2> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER I<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page001">The Outbreak of War</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Unfair disparagement of the War Office during the + war — Difficulties under which it suffered owing to pre-war + misconduct of the Government — The army prepared, the Government + and the country unprepared — My visit to German districts on the + Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers in June 1914 — The German railway + preparations — The plan of the Great General Staff indicated by + these — The Aldershot Command at exercise — I am summoned to London + by General H. Wilson — Informed of contemplated appointment to be + D.M.O. — The unsatisfactory organization of the Military + Operations Directorate — An illustration of this from pre-war + days — G.H.Q. rather a nuisance till they proceeded to France — The + scare about a hostile maritime descent — Conference at the + Admiralty — The depletion of my Directorate to build up + G.H.Q. — Inconvenience of this in the case of the section dealing + with special Intelligence services — An example of the trouble + that arose at the very start — This points to a misunderstanding + of the relative importance of the War Office and of G.H.Q. — Sir + J. French's responsibility for this, Sir C. Douglas not really + responsible — Colonel Dallas enumerates the great numerical + resources of Germany — Lord Kitchener's immediate recognition of + the realities of the situation — Sir J. French's suggestion that + Lord Kitchener should be commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary + Force indicated misconception of the position of affairs.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER II<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page018">Early Days at the War Office</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Plan of issuing <span lang="fr"><i>communiqués</i></span> given up owing to the disposition + to conceal reverses that manifested itself — Direct telephonic + communication with the battlefield in <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageviii" name="pageviii"></a>(p. viii)</span> Belgium — A + strange attempt to withhold news as to the fall of + Brussels — Anxiety during the retreat from Mons — The work of the + Topographical Section at that time — Arrival of refugee officers + and other ranks at the War Office — One of the Royal Irish affords + valuable information — Candidates for the appointment of + "Intelligence Officer" — How one dealt with recommendations in + regard to jobs — Linguists — The discoverer of interpreters, fifty + produced as if by magic — The Boy Scouts in the War Office — An + Admirable Crichton — The scouts' effective method of handling + troublesome visitors — Army chaplains in embryo — A famous + cricketer doing his bit — A beauty competition outside my + door — The Eminent K.C. — An impressive personality — How he + benefits the community — The Self-Appointed Spy-Catcher — Gun + platforms concealed everywhere — The hidden dangers in disused + coal mines in Kent — Procuring officers for the New Armies — "Bill" + Elliot's unorthodox methods — The Military Secretary's branch + meets with a set-back — Visits from Lord Roberts — His suggestion + as to the commander-in-chiefship in China — His last visit — The + Antwerp business — The strategical situation with regard to the + Belgian field army — The project of our Government — The despatch + of the Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division to Belgian + Flanders — Organization of base and line of communications + overlooked — A couple of transports "on their own" come to a halt + on the Goodwins — Difficulty of the strategical situation — Death + of Sir C. Douglas.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER III<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page042">Lord Kitchener's Start</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">A first meeting with Lord Kitchener — Sent up to see him in + Pretoria by his brother under unpromising conditions — The + interview — The Chief's pleasant reception — A story of Lord K. + from the Sudan — An unpleasant interview with him in August + 1914 — Rare meetings with him during the first two or three + months — His ignorance of War Office organization — His lack of + acquaintance with many matters in connection with the existing + organization of the army — His indisposition to listen to advice + on such subjects — Lord K. shy of strangers — His treatment of the + Territorial Forces — Their weak point at the outset of + hostilities, not having the necessary strength to mobilize at war + establishment — Effect of this on the general plans — The way the + Territorials dwindled after taking the field — Lord K. inclined at + first to pile up divisions without providing them with the + requisite reservoirs of reserves — His feat in organizing five + regular divisions in addition to those in the Expeditionary + Force — His immediate recognition <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageix" name="pageix"></a>(p. ix)</span> of the magnitude of the + contest — He makes things hum in the War Office — His differences + of opinion with G.H.Q. — The inability of G.H.Q. to realize that a + vast expansion of the military forces was the matter of primary + importance — Lord K.'s relations with Sir J. French — The despatch + of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to command the Second Corps — Sir J. + French not well treated at the time of the Antwerp affair — The + relegation of the General Staff at the War Office to the + background in the early days — Question whether this was entirely + due to its having suffered in efficiency by the withdrawals which + took place on mobilization — The General Staff only eliminated in + respect to operations.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER IV<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page060">Lord Kitchener's Later Record</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The munitions question and the Dardanelles to be dealt with + later — The Alexandretta project of the winter of 1914-15 — Such an + operation presented little difficulty then — H.M.S. <i>Doris'</i> + doings — The scheme abandoned — I am sent to Paris about the + Italian conventions just after the Dardanelles landings — Concern + at the situation after the troops had got ashore at Helles and + Anzac — A talk with Lord K. and Sir E. Grey — Its + consequences — Lord K. seemed to have lost some of his confidence + in his own judgement with regard to operations questions — The + question of the withdrawal of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> from the + Aegean — The discussion about it at the Admiralty — Lord K.'s + inability to take some of his colleagues at their own + valuation — Does not know some of their names — Another officer of + distinction gets them mixed up in his mind — Lord K.'s + disappointment at the early failures of the New Army + divisions — His impatience when he wanted anything in a hurry — My + own experiences — Typists' idiosyncrasies aggravate the + trouble — Lord K. in an unreasonable mood — His knowledge of + French — His skilful handling of a Portuguese mission — His + readiness to see foreign officers when asked to do so — How he + handled them — The Serbian Military Attaché asks for approval of + an attack by his country upon Bulgaria at the time of Bulgarian + mobilization — A dramatic interview with Lord K. — Confidence + placed in him with regard to munitions by the Russians — His + speeches in the House of Lords — The heat of his room — His + preoccupation about the safety of Egypt — He disapproves of the + General Staff plan with regard to its defence — His attitude with + regard to national service — His difficulties in this matter — His + anxiety to have a reserve in hand for delivering the decisive + blow in the war — My last meeting with him — His pleasure in going + to Russia — His failure to accomplish <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagex" name="pagex"></a>(p. x)</span> his mission, a great + disaster to the Entente cause — A final word about him — He did + more than any man on the side of the Allies to win the war — Fitz.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER V<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page086">The Dardanelles</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The Tabah incident — The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 — Special + steps taken with regard to it by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman — Mr. + Churchill first raises the question — My conference with him in + October 1914 — The naval project against the Straits — Its + fundamental errors — Would never have been carried into effect had + there been a conference between the Naval War Staff and the + General Staff — The bad start — The causes of the final failure on + the 18th of March — Lord K.'s instructions to Sir I. Hamilton — The + question of the packing of the transports — Sir I. Hamilton's + complaint as to there being no plan prepared — The 1906 + memorandum — Sir Ian's complaint about insufficient + information — How the 1906 memorandum affected this + question — Misunderstanding as to the difficulty of obtaining + information — The information not in reality so defective — My + anxiety at the time of the first landing — The plan, a failure by + early in May — Impossibility of sending reinforcements + then — Question whether the delay in sending out reinforcements + greatly affected the result in August 1915 — The Dardanelles + Committee — Its anxiety — Sir E. Carson and Mr. Churchill, + allies — The question of clearing out — My disinclination to accept + the principle before September — Sir C. Monro sent out — The delay + of the Government in deciding — Lord K. proceeds to the Aegean — My + own experiences — A trip to Paris with a special message to the + French Government — Sent on a fool's errand, thanks to the + Cabinet — A notable State paper on the subject — Mr. Lloyd George + and the "sanhedrin" — Decision to evacuate only Anzac and + Suvla — Sir W. Robertson arrives and orders sent to evacuate + Helles — I give up the appointment of D.M.O.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER VI<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page107">Some Experiences in the War Office</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">A reversion to earlier dates — The statisticians in the winter of + 1914-15 — The efforts to prove that German man-power would shortly + give out — Lack of the necessary premises upon which to found such + calculations — Views on the maritime blockade — The projects for + operations against <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexi" name="pagexi"></a>(p. xi)</span> the Belgian coast district in the + winter of 1914-15 — Nature of my staff — The "dug-outs" — The + services of one of them, "Z" — His care of me in foreign + parts — His activities in other Departments of State — An alarming + discovery — How "Z" grappled with a threatening situation — He + hears about the Admiralty working on the Tanks — The + cold-shouldering of Colonel Swinton when he raised this question + at the War Office in January 1915 — Lord Fisher proposes to + construct large numbers of motor-lighters, and I am told off to + go into the matter with him — The Baltic project — The way it was + approached — Meetings with Lord Fisher — The "beetles" — Visits from + the First Sea Lord — The question of secrecy in connection with + war operations — A parable — The land service behind the sea + service in this matter — Interviews with Mr. Asquith — His ways on + such occasions.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER VII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page127">Further Experiences in the War Office</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Varied nature of my responsibilities — Inconvenience caused by a + Heath-Caldwell being a brother-Director on the General Staff — An + interview with Lord Methuen — The Man of Business — His methods + when in charge of a Government Department — War Office branches + under Men of Business — The art of advertisement — This not + understood by War Office officials — The paltry staff and + accommodation at the disposal of the Director of Supplies and + Transport, and what was accomplished — Good work of the Committee + of Imperial Defence in providing certain organizations for + special purposes before the war — The contre-espionage branch — The + Government's singular conduct on the occasion of the first enemy + spy being executed at the Tower — The cable censorship — The post + office censorship — A visit from Admiral Bacon — His plan of + landing troops by night at Ostend — Some observations on the + subject — Sir J. Wolfe-Murray leaves the War Office — An + appreciation of his work — The Dardanelles papers to be presented + to Parliament referred to me — My action in the matter and the + appointment of the Dardanelles Committee in consequence — Mr. + Lloyd George, Secretary of State for War — His activities — I act + as D.C.I.G.S. for a month — Sound organization introduced by Sir + W. Robertson — Normal trench-warfare casualties and battle + casualties — I learn the facts about the strengths of the + different armies in the field — Troubles with the Cabinet over + man-power — Question of resignation of the Army Council — The Tank + Corps and Tanks — The War Office helps in the reorganization of + the Admiralty — Some of the War Cabinet want to divert troops to + the Isonzo — The folly of such a plan — Objections <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexii" name="pagexii"></a>(p. xii)</span> to it + indicated — Arrival of General Pershing in London — I form one of + the party that proceeds to Devonport to meet Colonel House and + the United States Commissioners — Its adventures — Admirals + adrift — Mr. Balfour meets the Commissioners at Paddington.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER VIII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page152">The Near East</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The first talk about Salonika — The railway and the port — The + question of operations based on Macedonia at the end of + 1914 — Failure of "easterners" to realize that the Western Front + was Germany's weakest front — Question whether it might not have + been better to go to Salonika than to the Dardanelles — Objections + to this plan — The problem of Bulgaria — Consequences of the + Russian <span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span> — Difficulty of the Near Eastern problem in the + early summer — An example of how the Dardanelles Committee + approached it — Awkwardness of the problem after the failure of + Sir I. Hamilton's August offensive — The Bulgarian + attitude — Entente's objection to Serbia attacking Bulgaria — I am + ordered to Salonika, but order countermanded — The disaster to + Serbia — Hard to say what ought to have been done — Real mistake, + the failure to abandon the Dardanelles enterprise in May — The + French attitude about Salonika — General Sarrail — French General + Staff impressed with War Office information concerning + Macedonia — Unsatisfactory situation at the end of 1915 — The + Salonika business a blunder all through — Eventual success does + not alter this.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER IX<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page170">Other Side-Shows</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Three categories of side-shows — The Jackson Committee — The + Admiralty's attitude — The Pacific, Duala, Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam, + Oceania, the Wireless Stations — Kiao Chao — The + Shatt-el-Arab — Egypt — Question whether the Australasian forces + ought to have been kept for the East — The East African + operations — Our lack of preparation for a campaign in this + quarter — Something wrong — My own visit to Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam + in 1908 — The bad start of the campaign — Question of utilizing + South African troops to restore the situation — How this was + managed — Reasons why this was a justifiable + side-show — Mesopotamia — The War Office ought to have + interfered — The question of an advance on Baghdad by General + Townshend suddenly <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiii" name="pagexiii"></a>(p. xiii)</span> referred to the General Staff — Our + mistake — The question of Egyptian defence in the latter part of + 1915 — The Alexandretta project — A later Alexandretta project + propounded by the War Cabinet in 1917 — Its absurdity — The amateur + strategist on the war-path — The Palestine campaign of 1918 + carried out almost entirely by troops not required on the Western + Front, and therefore a legitimate side-show — The same principle + to some extent holds good with regard to the conquest of + Mesopotamia — The Downing Street project to substitute Sir W. + Robertson for Sir C. Monro, a miss-fire.</p> + + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER X<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page190">The Munitions Question</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech — The mischief that it did — The + time that must elapse before any great expansion in output of + munitions can begin to materialize — The situation analogous to + that of a building — The Ministry of Munitions was given and took + the credit for the expansion in output for the year subsequent to + its creation, which was in reality the work of the War + Office — The Northcliffe Press stunt about shell shortage — Its + misleading character — Sir H. Dalziel's attack upon General von + Donop in the House — Mr. Lloyd George's reply — A discreditable + episode — Misapprehension on the subject of the army's + preparedness for war in respect to material — Misunderstanding as + to the machine-gun position — Lord French's attack upon the War + Office with regard to Munitions — His responsibility for the lack + of heavy artillery — The matter taken up at the War Office before + he ever raised it from G.H.Q. — His responsibility for the absence + of high-explosive shell for our field artillery — A misconception + as to the rôle of the General Staff — The serious difficulty that + arose with regard to this ammunition owing to prematures — The + misstatements in "<i>1914</i>" as to the amount of artillery + ammunition which was sent across France to the + Dardanelles — Exaggerated estimates by factories as to what they + would be able to turn out — Their estimates discounted as a result + of later experiences — The Munitions Ministry not confined to its + proper job — The incident of 400 Tanks — Conclusion.</p> + + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XI<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page208">Councils, Committees, and Cabinets</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The responsibilities of experts at War Councils — The Rt. Hon. A. + Fisher's views — Discussion as to whether these meet the + case — Under the War Cabinet system, the <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiv" name="pagexiv"></a>(p. xiv)</span> question does + not arise — The Committee of Imperial Defence merged in the War + Council early in the conflict — The Dardanelles Committee — Finding + a formula — Mr. Churchill backs up Sir I. Hamilton — The spirit of + compromise — The Cabinet carrying on <i>pari passu</i> with the + Dardanelles Committee — Personal experiences with the Cabinet — The + War Council which succeeded the Dardanelles Committee — An + illustration of the value of the War Cabinet system — Some of its + inconveniences — Ministers — Mr. Henderson — Sir E. Carson — Mr. + Bonar Law — The question of resignation of individuals — Lord + Curzon — Mr. Churchill — Mr. Lloyd George.</p> + + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page222">Some Inter-Allies Conferences</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The Conference with the Italians in Paris in April-May 1915 — Its + constitution — Italians anxious that Allies should deliver big + offensive simultaneously with advance of Italian + army — Impossibility of giving a guarantee — Difficulties over the + naval proposals — Banquet given by M. Millerand at the War + Office — A visit to the front — Impressions — Mr. Churchill turns up + unexpectedly — A conference with General Joffre at Chantilly on + Salonika — Its unsatisfactory character — Admiral Gamble races + <span lang="fr">"Grandpère"</span> and suffers discomfiture — A distinguished party + proceed to Paris — A formal conference with the French + Government — Messrs. Asquith, Grey and Lloyd George as + linguists — The French attitude over Salonika — Sir W. Robertson + gives his views — The decision — Dinner at the Élysée — Return to + London — Mr. Lloyd George and the soldiers on the Boulogne + jetty — Points of the destroyer as a yacht — Mr. Balfour and Sir W. + Robertson afloat — A chatty dinner on our side of the + Channel — Difficulty over Russian munitions owing to a Chantilly + conference — A conference at the War Office — Mr. Lloyd George as + chairman — M. Mantoux.</p> + + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XIII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page237">A First Mission to Russia</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Reasons for Mission — An effectual staff officer — Our + distinguished representatives in Scandinavia — The + journey — Stockholm — Lapps — Crossing the frontier at + Haparanda — Arrival at Petrograd — Sir G. Buchanan — Interviews + <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexv" name="pagexv"></a>(p. xv)</span> with General Polivanoff, Admiral Grigorovitch and M. + Sazonoff — Imperial vehicles — Petrograd — We proceed to the + Stavka — Improper use of the title "Tsar" — The Imperial + headquarters — Meeting with the Emperor — Two disconcerting + incidents — Nicholas II. — His charm — His admiration for Lord + Kitchener's work — Conference with General + Alexeieff — Mohileff — Service in the church in honour of the Grand + Duchess Tatiana's birthday — Return to Petrograd — A rencontre with + an archbishop — The nuisance of swords — Return home.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XIV<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page253">A Second Mission to Russia</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Object of this second mission — The general military + situation — Verdun and Kut — Baron Meyendorff — We partially adopt + Russian uniform — Stay in Petrograd — Sir Mark Sykes — Presentation + of decorations at the Admiralty — Mohileff — Conference with + General Alexeieff — He raises the question of an expedition to + Alexandretta — Asks for heavy artillery — The Emperor — A + conversation with him — The dismissal of Polivanoff — Disquieting + political conditions in Russia — Nicholas II.'s attitude — The + journey to Tiflis — We emerge from the snow near the Sea of + Azov — Caucasia — Tiflis — General Yanushkhevitch — Conference with + the Grand Duke Nicholas — Proposes that we should smash + Turkey — Constantinople? — Major Marsh — The Grand Duke — Presenting + the G.C.M.G. to General Yudenitch — Our stay at Tiflis — Proceed to + Batoum — A day at Batoum — Visit to the hospital ship + <i>Portugal</i> — Proceed by destroyer to Off — Sinking of the + <i>Portugal</i> — Off — General Liakoff — A ride to the scene of a very + recent fight — A fine view — The field force dependent upon + maritime communications — Landing difficulties — Return to + Tiflis — A gala dinner at the palace — Journey to + Sarikamish — Russian pronunciation of names — Kars — Greeting the + troops — One of the forts — Welcome at Sarikamish — General + Savitzky — Russian hospitality — The myth about Russians being good + linguists — A drive in a blizzard — Colonel Maslianikoff describes + his victory over the Turks in December 1914, on the site of his + command post — Our visit to this part of the world much + appreciated — A final interview with the Grand Duke — Proceed to + Moscow — The Kremlin — View of Moscow from the Sparrow Hills — Visit + to a hospital — Observations on such visits — A talk with our + acting Consul-General — Back to Petrograd — Conclusions drawn from + this journey through Russia — Visit to Lady Sybil Grey's + hospital — A youthful swashbuckler — Return home — We encounter a + battle-cruiser squadron on the move.</p> + +<p class="p2"><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvi" name="pagexvi"></a>(p. xvi)</span> CHAPTER XV<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page280">The Russian Bungle</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The Russian Revolution the worst disaster which befell the + Entente during the Great War — The political situation in Russia + before that event much less difficult to deal with than had been + the political situation in the Near East in 1915 — The Allies' + over-estimate of Russian strength in the early months of the + war — We hear about the ammunition shortage first from + Japan — Presumable cause of the breakdown — The Grand Duke + Nicholas' difficulties in the early months — Great improvement + effected in respect to munitions subsequent to the summer of + 1915 — Figures — Satisfactory outlook for the campaign of + 1917 — Political situation goes from bad to worse — Russian mission + to London; no steps taken by our Government — Our representatives + in Russia — Situation at the end of 1916 — A private letter to Mr. + Lloyd George — The Milner Mission to Russia — Its failure to + interpret the portents — Had Lord Kitchener got out it might have + made all the difference — Some excuse for our blundering + subsequent to the Revolution — The delay in respect to action in + Siberia and at Vladivostok.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XVI<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page293">Catering for the Allies</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The appointment of Colonel Ellershaw to look after Russian + munition supplies — His remarkable success — I take over his branch + after his death — Gradual alteration of its functions — The + Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement — Its efficiency — The + despatch of goods to Russia — Russian technical abilities in + advance of their organizing power — The flame projector and the + Stokes mortar — Drawings and specifications of Tanks — An early + contretemps in dealing with a Russian military + delegate — Misadventure in connection with a 9.2-inch + howitzer — Difficulties at the northern Russian ports — The + American contracts — The Russian Revolution — This transforms the + whole position as to supplies — Roumania — Statesmen in + conflict — Dealings with the Allies' delegates in + general — Occasional difficulties — Helpfulness of the United + States representatives — The Greek muddle — Getting it + disentangled — Great delays in this country and in France in + fitting out the Greeks, and their consequences — Serbian + supplies — The command in Macedonia ought on administrative + grounds to have been in British hands.</p> + +<p class="p2"><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvii" name="pagexvii"></a>(p. xvii)</span> CHAPTER XVII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page310">The Press</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">The constant newspaper attacks upon the War Office — Often arise + from misunderstandings or sheer ignorance — The mistake made with + regard to war correspondents at the start — The pre-war intentions + of the General Staff — How they were set on one + side — Inconvenience of this from the War Office point of view — A + breach of faith — The mischievous optimism of newspapers in the + early days — Tendency of the military authorities to conceal bad + news — Experts at fault in the Press — Tendency to take the Press + too seriously in this country — Some of its blunders during the + war — A proposal to put German officer prisoners on board + transports as a protection — A silly mistake over the promotion of + general-officers — Why were Tanks not adopted before the war! — A + paean about Sukhomlinoff — A gross misstatement — Temporary + officers and high positions in the field — A suggestion that the + Press should censor itself in time of war; its absurdity — The + Press Bureau — Some of its mistakes — Information allowed to appear + which should have been censored — Difficulties of the censors — The + case of the shell shortage — Difficulty of laying down rules for + the guidance of censors — The Press and air-raids — A newspaper + proprietor placed at the head of the Air Service — The result — The + question of announcing the names of units that have distinguished + themselves — Conclusion.</p> + +<p class="p2">CHAPTER XVIII<br> + <span class="add2em smcap"><a href="#page328">Some Criticisms, Suggestions, and Generalities</a></span></p> + +<p class="resume">Post-war extravagance — The Office of Works lavish all + through — The Treasury — Its unpopularity in the spending + departments — The Finance Branch of the War + Office — Suggestions — The change with regard to saluting — Red tabs + and red cap-bands — A Staff dandy in the West — The age of + general-officers — Position of the General Staff in the War + Office — The project of a Defence Ministry — No excuse for it + except with regard to the air services, and that not a sufficient + excuse — Confusion between the question of a Defence Ministry and + that of the Imperial General Staff — The time which must elapse + before newly constituted units can be fully depended upon, one of + the most important lessons for the public to realize — This proved + to be the case in almost every theatre and in the military forces + of almost every belligerent — Misapprehensions about South + Africa — Improvised units could not have done what the "Old + Contemptibles" did — Conclusion.</p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page001" name="page001"></a>(p. 001)</span> CHAPTER I</h3> + +<h5>THE OUTBREAK OF WAR</h5> + +<p class="resume">Unfair disparagement of the War Office during the + war — Difficulties under which it suffered owing to pre-war + misconduct of the Government — The army prepared, the Government + and the country unprepared — My visit to German districts on the + Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers in June 1914 — The German railway + preparations — The plan of the Great General Staff indicated by + these — The Aldershot Command at exercise — I am summoned to London + by General H. Wilson — Informed of contemplated appointment to be + D.M.O. — The unsatisfactory organization of the Military + Operations Directorate — An illustration of this from pre-war + days — G.H.Q. rather a nuisance until they proceeded to + France — The scare about a hostile maritime descent — Conference at + the Admiralty — The depletion of my Directorate to build up + G.H.Q. — Inconvenience of this in the case of the section dealing + with special Intelligence services — An example of the trouble + that arose at the very start — This points to a misunderstanding + of the relative importance of the War Office and of G.H.Q. — Sir + J. French's responsibility for this, Sir C. Douglas not really + responsible — Colonel Dallas enumerates the great numerical + resources of Germany — Lord Kitchener's immediate recognition of + the realities of the situation — Sir J. French's suggestion that + Lord Kitchener should be Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary + Force indicated misconception of the position of affairs.</p> + +<p class="p2">In a record of experiences during the Great War that were for the most +part undergone within the War Office itself, it is impossible to +overcome the temptation to draw attention at the start to the +unreasonably disparaging attitude towards that institution which has +been adopted so generally throughout the country. Nobody will contend +that hideous blunders were not committed by some departments of the +central administration of the Army in Whitehall during the progress of +the struggle. It has to be admitted that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page002" name="page002"></a>(p. 002)</span> considerable sums +of money were from time to time wasted—it could hardly be otherwise +in such strenuous times. A regrettable lack of foresight was +undoubtedly displayed in some particulars. But tremendous +difficulties, difficulties for the existence of which the military +authorities were nowise to blame, had on the other hand to be +overcome—and they were overcome. Nor can the War Office be robbed of +its claim to have borne the chief share in performing what was the +greatest miracle of all the miracles performed during the course of +the contest. Within the space of less than two years the United +Kingdom was, mainly by the exertions of the War Office, transformed +into a Great Military Power. That achievement covers up many +transgressions.</p> + +<p>It has to be remembered that in this matter the detractors had it all +their own way during the struggle. Anybody harbouring a grievance, +real or imaginary, was at liberty to air his wrongs, whereas the +mouths of soldiers in a position to reply had perforce to remain +closed and have to a great extent still to remain closed. The +disgruntled had the field pretty well to themselves. Ridiculous +stories for which there was not one atom of foundation have gained +currency, either because those who knew the truth were precluded by +their official status from revealing the facts or because no one took +the trouble to contradict the absurdities. Some of these yarns saw the +light in the newspapers, and the credulity of the public in accepting +everything that happens to appear in the Press is one of the +curiosities of the age. Not, however, that many of the criticisms of +which the War Office was the subject during the protracted broil were +not fully warranted. Some of them were indeed most helpful. But others +were based on a positively grovelling ignorance of the circumstances +governing the subject at issue. Surely it is an odd thing that, +whereas your layman will shy at committing himself in regard to legal +problems, will not dream of debating medical questions, will shrink +from expressing opinions on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page003" name="page003"></a>(p. 003)</span> matters involving acquaintance +with technical science, will even be somewhat guarded in his +utterances concerning the organization and handling of fleets, +everybody is eager to lay the law down respecting the conduct of war +on land.</p> + +<p>A reference has been made above to the extraordinary difficulties +under which the War Office laboured during the war. The greatest of +these, at all events during the early days, was the total +misconception of the international situation of which H.M. Government +had been guilty—or had apparently been guilty—during the years +immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. No intelligible and +satisfactory explanation of this has ever been put forward. Their +conduct in this connection had been the conduct of fools, or of +knaves, or of liars. They had been acting as fools if they had failed +to interpret auguries which presented no difficulty whatever to people +of ordinary intelligence who took the trouble to watch events. They +had been acting as knaves if they had been drawing their salaries and +had not earned them by making themselves acquainted with facts which +it was their bounden duty to know. They had been acting as liars if, +when fully aware of the German preparations for aggressive war and of +what these portended, they had deliberately deceived and hoodwinked +the countrymen who trusted them. (Personally, I should be disposed to +acquit them of having been fools or knaves—but I may be wrong.) +Several Ministers had indeed deliberately stated in their places in +Parliament that the nation's military arrangements were not framed to +meet anything beyond the despatch to an oversea theatre of war of four +out of the six divisions of our Expeditionary Force! One of the gang +had even been unable "to conceive circumstances in which continental +operations by our troops would not be a crime against the people of +this country."</p> + +<p>Much has been said and written since 1914 concerning the +unpreparedness of the army for war. But the truth <span class="pagenum"><a id="page004" name="page004"></a>(p. 004)</span> is that +the army was not unprepared for that limited-liability, +pill-to-stop-an-earthquake theory of making war which represented the +programme of Mr. Asquith and his colleagues before the blow fell. Take +it all round, the Expeditionary Force was as efficient as any allied +or hostile army which took the field. It was almost as well prepared +for the supreme test in respect to equipment as it was in respect to +leadership and training. The country and the Government, not the army, +were unprepared. There was little wrong with the military forces +except that they represented merely a drop in the ocean, that they +constituted no more than an advanced guard to legions which did not +exist. Still one must acknowledge that (as will be pointed out further +on) even some of our highest military authorities did not realize what +an insignificant asset our splendid little Expeditionary Force would +stand for in a great European war, nor to have grasped when the crash +came that the matter of paramount importance in connection with the +conduct of the struggle on land was the creation of a host of fighting +men reaching such dimensions as to render it competent to play a +really vital rôle in achieving victory for the Entente.</p> + +<p>As it happened, I had proceeded as a private individual in the month +of June 1914 to inspect the German railway developments directed +towards the frontiers of Belgium and of Luxemburg. This was an +illuminating, indeed an ominous, experience. Entering the Kaiser's +dominions by the route from the town of Luxemburg to Trèves, one came +of a sudden upon a colossal detraining station that was not quite +completed, fulfilling no conceivable peaceful object and dumped down +on the very frontier—anything more barefaced it would be difficult to +conceive. Trèves itself, three or four miles on, constituted a vast +railway centre, and three miles or so yet farther along there was its +counterpart in another great railway centre where there was no town at +all. You got Euston, Liverpool Street, and Waterloo—only the lines +and sidings, of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page005" name="page005"></a>(p. 005)</span> course—grown up like mushrooms in a +non-populous and non-industrial region, and at the very gates of a +little State of which Germany had guaranteed the neutrality.</p> + +<p>Traversing the region to the north of the Moselle along the western +German border-line, this proved to be a somewhat barren, partly +woodland, partly moorland, tract, sparsely inhabited as Radnor and +Strathspey; and yet this unproductive district had become a network of +railway communications. Elaborate detraining stations were passed +every few miles. One constantly came upon those costly overhead +cross-over places, where one set of lines is carried right over the +top of another set at a junction, so that continuous traffic going one +way shall not be checked by traffic coming in from the side and +proceeding in the opposite direction—a plan seldom adopted at our +most important railway centres. On one stretch of perhaps half-a-dozen +miles connecting two insignificant townships were to be seen eight +lines running parallel to each other. Twopenny-halfpenny little trains +doddered along, occasionally taking up or putting down a single +passenger at some halting-place that was large enough to serve a +Coventry or a Croydon. The slopes of the cuttings and sidings were +destitute of herbage; the bricks of the culverts and bridges showed +them by the colour to be brand-new; all this construction had taken +place within the previous half-dozen years. Everything seemed to be +absolutely ready except that one place on the Luxemburg frontier +mentioned above, and that obviously could be completed in a few hours +of smart work, if required.</p> + +<p>One had heard a good deal about the Belgians having filled in a gap on +their side of the frontier so as to join up Malmedy with their +internal railway system, and thus to establish a fresh +through-connection between the Rhineland and the Meuse, so I travelled +along this on my way back. But it was unimpressive. The drop from the +rolling uplands about the camp of Elsenborn down to Malmedy gave rise +to very steep gradients on the German <span class="pagenum"><a id="page006" name="page006"></a>(p. 006)</span> side, and the single +line of rail was so dilapidated and was so badly laid that, as we ran +down with steam off, it hardly seemed safe for a short train of about +half-a-dozen coaches. That the Great General Staff had no intention of +making this a main line of advance appeared to be pretty clear. They +meant the hosts that they would dispose of when the moment came, to +sweep round by communications lying farther to the north, starting +from about Aix-la-Chapelle and heading for the gap south of the Dutch +enclave about Maestricht. The impression acquired during this flying +visit was that for all practical purposes the Germans had everything +ready for an immediate invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg when the +crisis arrived, that they were simply awaiting the fall of the flag, +that when war came they meant to make their main advance through +Belgium, going wide, and that <i>pickelhaubes</i> would be as the sands of +the sea for number well beyond Liège within a very few days of the +outbreak of hostilities. On getting home I compared notes with the +Intelligence Section of the General Staff which was especially +interested in these territories, but found little to tell them that +they did not know already except with regard to a few very recently +completed railway constructions. The General Staff hugged no +illusions. They were not so silly as to suppose that the Teuton +proposed to respect treaties in the event of the upheaval that was +sure to come ere long.</p> + +<p>Having a house at Fleet that summer, I cycled over to beyond Camberley +one day, just at the stage when coming events were beginning to cast +their shadows before after the Serajevo assassinations, to watch the +Aldershot Command at work, and talked long with many members of the +Command and with some of the Staff College personnel who had turned +out to see the show. Some of them—<i>e.g.</i> Lieut.-Colonels W. Thwaites +and J. T. Burnett-Stuart and Major (or was it Captain?) W. E. +Ironside—were to go far within the next five years. But there were +also others whom I met that day for the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page007" name="page007"></a>(p. 007)</span> last +time—Brigadier-General Neil Findlay, commanding the artillery, who +had been in the same room with me at the "Shop," and Lieut.-Colonel +Adrian Grant-Duff of the Black Watch, excusing his presence in the +firing-line on the plea that he "really <i>must</i> see how his lads worked +through the woodlands"; both had made the supreme sacrifice in France +before the leaves were off the trees. How many are alive and unmaimed +to-day of those fighting men of all ranks who buzzed about so cheerily +amid the heather and the pine trees that afternoon, and who melted +away so silently out of Aldershot a very few days later?</p> + +<p>The clouds thereafter gathered thicker from day to day, and on Friday +morning, the 31st of July, I received a letter from General Henry +Wilson, sent on from my town address, asking me to come and breakfast +with him on the following day. I was going down to Winchester to see +the Home Counties (Territorial) Division complete a long march from +the east on their way to Salisbury Plain, and it happened to be +inconvenient to go up to town that night, so I wired to Wilson to say +I would call at his house on the Sunday. On getting back, late, to +Fleet I however found a peremptory summons from him saying I must come +and see him next day, and I went up in the morning. One could not +foresee that that breakfast in Draycott Place to which I had been +bidden was to take rank as a historic meal. Mr. Maxse has told the +story of it in the pages of the <i>National Review</i>, and of how the +movement was there started by which the Unionist leaders were got +together from various quarters to bring pressure on the Government not +to leave France in the lurch, a movement which culminated in Mr. Bonar +Law's famous letter to Mr. Asquith.</p> + +<p>On meeting General Wilson at the War Office about noon he told me that +I was to take his place as Director of Military Operations in case of +mobilization, and he asked me to join as soon as possible. He further +made me acquainted with the political situation, with the very +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page008" name="page008"></a>(p. 008)</span> unsatisfactory attitude which a proportion of the Cabinet +were disposed to take up, and with the steps which Messrs. George +Lloyd, Amery, Maxse, and others were taking to mobilize the Opposition +leaders and to compel the Government to play the game. In the last +conversation that I ever had with Lord Roberts, two or three days +before the great Field-Marshal paid the visit to the Front which was +so tragically cut short, he spoke enthusiastically of the services of +Lloyd (now Sir George) on this occasion. In consequence of what I had +learnt I joined at the War Office for duty on the Monday, although the +arrangement was irregular and purely provisional for the moment, +seeing that it had not yet been decided whether mobilization was to be +ordained or not. But I found Wilson in much more buoyant mood after +the week-end of anxiety, for he believed that Mr. Bonar Law's letter +had proved the decisive factor. By this time we moreover knew that +Germany had already violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and was +threatening Belgium openly.</p> + +<p>I ought to mention here that this appointment to the post of Director +of Military Operations came as a complete surprise—my not having been +warned well in advance had been due to an oversight; up to within a +few months earlier, when I had ceased to belong to the Reserve of +Officers, having passed the age-limit for colonels, my fate in the +event of general mobilization was to have been something high up on +the staff of the Home Defence Army. One could entertain no illusions. +Heavy responsibilities were involved in taking up such an appointment +on the eve of war. After five years of civil life it was a large order +to find myself suddenly thrust into such a job and to be called upon +to take up charge of a War Office Directorate which I knew was +overloaded. Ever since 1904, ever since the date when this Directorate +had been set up by the Esher Committee as one item in the +reconstitution of the office as a whole and when my section of the old +Intelligence Division had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page009" name="page009"></a>(p. 009)</span> been absorbed into it, I had +insisted that this composite branch was an overburdened and improperly +constituted one.</p> + +<p>For the Esher triumvirate had amalgamated "operations" and +"intelligence," while they had deposited "home defence" in the +Military Training Directorate. It was an absurd arrangement in +peace-time, and one that was wholly unadapted to the conditions of a +great war. Lord Esher and his colleagues would seem, however, to have +been actuated by a fear lest the importance of home defence should +overshadow that of preparation for oversea warfare if the two sets of +duties were in one hand, and, inasmuch as they were making a start +with the General Staff at Headquarters and bearing in mind former +tendencies, they may have been right. They, moreover, hardly realized +perhaps that intelligence must always be the handmaid of operations, +and that it is in the interest of both that they should be kept quite +distinct. It was natural that the first Chief of the General Staff to +be appointed, Sir N. Lyttelton, should have hesitated to overset an +organization which had been so recently laid down and which had been +accepted by the Government as it stood, even if he recognized its +unsuitability; but I have never been able to understand how his +successors, Sir W. Nicholson and Sir J. French, failed to effect the +rearrangement of duties which a sound system of administration +imperatively called for. That my predecessors, Generals "Jimmy" +Grierson, Spencer Ewart, and Henry Wilson, made no move in the matter +is rendered the more intelligible to me by the fact that I took no +steps in the matter myself, even when the need for a reorganization +was driven home by the conditions brought about in the War Office +during the early months of the Great War. Somehow one feels no +irresistible impulse to abridge one's functions and to depreciate +one's importance by one's own act, to lop off one's own members, so to +speak. But when Sir W. Robertson turned up at the end of 1915 to +become <span class="pagenum"><a id="page010" name="page010"></a>(p. 010)</span> C.I.G.S. he straightway split my Directorate in two, +and he thus put things at last on a proper footing.</p> + +<p>The incongruity of the Esher organization had, it may be mentioned, +been well illustrated by an episode that occurred very shortly after +the reconstitution of the War Office had been carried into effect in +the spring of 1904. Under the distribution of duties then laid down, +my section of the Operations Directorate dealt <span lang="la"><i>inter alia</i></span>, with +questions of coast defence in connection with our stations abroad, +while a section of the Military Training Directorate dealt <span lang="la"><i>inter +alia</i></span> with questions of coast defence in connection with our stations +at home. It came about that the two sections issued instructions +simultaneously about the same thing, and the instructions issued by +the two sections were absolutely antagonistic. The consequence was +that coast defence people at Malta came to be doing the thing one way, +while those at Portsmouth came to be doing it exactly the opposite +way, and that the War Office managed to give itself away and to expose +itself to troublesome questionings. The blunder no doubt could be put +down to lack of co-ordination; but the primary cause was the existence +of a faulty organization under which two different branches at +Headquarters were dealing with the one subject.</p> + +<p>The earliest experiences in the War Office in August 1914 amounted, it +must be confessed, almost to a nightmare. There were huge maps working +on rollers in my spacious office, and in particular there was one of +vast dimensions portraying what even then was coming to be called the +Western Front. During the week or so that elapsed before G.H.Q. of the +Expeditionary Force proceeded to the theatre of war, its cream thought +fit to spend the hours of suspense in creeping on tiptoe in and out of +my apartment, clambering on and off a table which fronted this +portentous map, discussing strategical problems in blood-curdling +whispers, and every now and then expressing an earnest hope that this +sort of thing was not a nuisance. It was a most intolerable nuisance, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page011" name="page011"></a>(p. 011)</span> but they were persons of light and leading who could not be +addressed in appropriate terms. As hour to hour passed, and H.M. +Government could not make up its mind to give the word "go" to the +Expeditionary Force, G.H.Q.'s language grew stronger and stronger +until the walls resounded with expletives. It was not easy to +concentrate one's attention upon questions arising in the performance +of novel duties in a time of grave emergency under such conditions, +and it was a genuine relief when the party took itself off to France.</p> + +<p>One was too busy to keep notes of what went on in those days and I am +not sure of exact dates, but I think that it was on the 6th of August +that a wire, which seemed on the face of it to be trustworthy, came to +hand from a German port, to the effect that transports and troops were +being collected there to convey a military force somewhither. This +message caused the Government considerable concern and very nearly +delayed the despatch of the Expeditionary Force across the Channel. +One was too new to the business to take the proper steps to trace the +source of that message, which, as far as I remember, purported to +emanate from one of our consuls; but I have a strong suspicion that +the message was faked—was really sent off by the Germans. Lord +Kitchener had taken up the appointment of Secretary of State that +morning, and in the afternoon he walked across Whitehall, accompanied +by my immediate chief, Sir C. Douglas the C.I.G.S., General Kiggell, +and myself, to discuss the position with Mr. Churchill and the chiefs +of the Admiralty in the First Lord's room. Whitehall was rendered +almost impassable by a mass of excited citizens, and Lord Kitchener on +being recognized was wildly cheered. Nothing could have been clearer +and more reassuring than Mr. Churchill's exposition of the naval +arrangements to meet any attempt at a landing on our shores, and any +one of the War Office quartette who may have been troubled with +qualms—I had felt none myself—must have had his anxiety allayed.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page012" name="page012"></a>(p. 012)</span> It will not be out of place to refer here to one aspect of +the virtual emasculation of the General Staff at the War Office on +mobilization that has not perhaps quite received the attention that it +deserves. That, in spite of his being Director of Military Operations +in Whitehall, General Wilson very properly accompanied the +Expeditionary Force will hardly be disputed. He had established close +and cordial relations with the French higher military authorities, he +could talk French like a Parisian, he had worked out the details of +the concentration of our troops on the farther side of the Channel +months before, and he probably knew more about the theatre where our +contingent was expected to operate than any man in the army. But he +was not the only member of the Military Operations Directorate staff +who disappeared; he took his right-hand man and his left-hand man in +respect to actual operations with him. Nevertheless, as I was pretty +familiar with the working of the War Office, and as the planting down +of the Expeditionary Force beyond Le Cateau was effected, practically +automatically, by the Movements branch under the +Quartermaster-General, operations question in respect to the war in +the West gave no great trouble until my Directorate had had time to +settle down after a fashion in its new conditions.</p> + +<p>But the Intelligence side of General Wilson's Directorate included a +branch which dealt with a number of matters with which no Director +brought in from outside was likely to be well acquainted, and about +which I knew nothing at all. Very few officers in the regular army are +conversant with international law. Nor used they, in the days before +1914, to interest themselves in the status of aliens when the country +is engaged in hostilities, nor with problems of censorship of the post +and telegraph services, nor with the relations between the military +and the Press, nor yet with the organization, the maintenance, and the +duties of a secret service. Before mobilization, all this was in the +hands of a section under the D.M.O. which was in charge of Colonel +(now Lieut.-General Sir G.) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page013" name="page013"></a>(p. 013)</span> Macdonogh, who had made a +special study of these matters, and who had devised a machinery for +performing a number of duties in this country which on the outbreak of +war necessarily assumed a cardinal importance and called for efficient +administration at the hands of a large personnel, only to be got +together when the emergency arose. But Colonel Macdonogh on +mobilization took up an important appointment with the Expeditionary +Force, and went off to France, carrying off his assistants with him. +As far as personnel was concerned, this cupboard was left as bare as a +fashionable lady's back when <span lang="fr"><i>en grande tenue</i></span> in "Victory Year." +Charge of it was assumed by an extremely capable and energetic +substitute brought in from outside (Colonel D. L. MacEwen), who, +however, suffered under the disability of knowing practically nothing +about the peculiar class of work which he was suddenly called upon to +take up.</p> + +<p>As an example of the extreme inconvenience which this caused, the +following somewhat comical incident may be related. Three or four days +after the declaration of war a brace of very distinguished civil +servants, one representing the Foreign Office and the other the Home +Office, came across Whitehall by appointment and with long faces, and +the four of us sat solemnly round a table—they, Colonel MacEwen, and +I. It appeared that we had been guilty of terrifying violations of +international law. We had seized numbers of German reservists and +German males of military age on board ships in British ports, and had +consigned some of them to quarters designed for the accommodation of +malefactors. This sort of thing would never do. Such steps had not +been taken by belligerents in 1870, nor at the time of the American +War of Secession, and I am not sure that Messrs. Mason and Slidell +were not trotted out. The Foreign and Home Secretaries, the very +distinguished civil servants declared, would not unlikely be agitated +when they heard of the shocking affair. Soldiers, no doubt, were by +nature abrupt and unconventional in their actions, and the Foreign and +Home <span class="pagenum"><a id="page014" name="page014"></a>(p. 014)</span> Offices would make every allowance, realizing that we +had acted in good faith. But, hang it all—and they gazed at us in +compassionate displeasure.</p> + +<p>Will it be believed? My assistant and I knew so little about our +business that we did not fall upon that pair of pantaloons and rend +them. We took them and their protestation quite seriously. We accepted +their courteous, but uncompromising, rebuke like small boys caught +stealing apples, whose better feelings have been appealed to. For the +space of two or three hours, and until we had pulled ourselves +together, we remained content, on the strength of doctrines enunciated +by a couple of officials fossilized by having dwelt in a groove for +years, to accept it as a principle that this tremendous conflict into +which the Empire had been plunged at a moment's notice was to be a +kid-glove transaction. Within three weeks the Foreign Office and the +Home Office were, however, praying us in the War Office for goodness' +sake to take all questions in connection with the internment and so +forth of aliens entirely off their hands because they could make +nothing of the business.</p> + +<p>The above reference to my having been virtually left in the lurch with +regard to these, to me, occult matters is not made by way of +complaint. It is made because it illustrates with signal force how +completely the relative importance of the Expeditionary Force as +compared to the task which the War Office had to face had been +misunderstood when framing plans in advance for the anticipated +emergency. Colonel Macdonogh became head of Sir J. French's +Intelligence Department in the field. That was a very important +appointment and one for which he was admirably fitted, but it was one +which many other experienced officers in the army could have +effectually filled. The appointment at the War Office which he gave up +was one which no officer in the army was so well qualified—nor nearly +so well qualified—to hold as he was, and it was at the outbreak of +war incomparably the more important appointment of the two. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page015" name="page015"></a>(p. 015)</span> +The arrangement arrived at in respect to this matter indicated, in +fact, a strange lack of sense of proportion. It argued a fundamental +misconception of the military problem with which the country was +confronted.</p> + +<p>In his book, "<i>1914</i>," in which he finds so much to say in +disparagement of Lord Kitchener, Lord French has very frankly admitted +his inability to foresee certain tactical developments in connection +with heavy artillery and so forth, which actual experience in the +field brought home to him within a few weeks of the opening of +hostilities. Most of the superior French and German military +authorities who held sway in the early days of the struggle would +probably similarly plead guilty, for nobody in high places anticipated +these developments. The Field-Marshal, on the other hand, makes no +reference to any failure on his part to realize in advance the +relatively insignificant part which our original Expeditionary Force +would be able to play in the great contest. He makes no admission as +to a misconception with regard to the paramount problem which faced +the British military authorities as a whole after mobilization was +decreed. He would not seem to have been aware, when a conflict of +first-rate magnitude came upon us, that the creation of a great +national army was of far greater consequence than the operations of +the small body of troops which he took with him into the field. The +action taken in connection with the personnel of the General Staff in +Whitehall is significant evidence of the extent to which the whole +situation had been misinterpreted.</p> + +<p>It may be urged that Sir J. French (as he then was) was not +responsible. He had—under circumstances which will not have been +forgotten—ceased to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff some four +months before war broke out. But Sir Charles Douglas, who had then +taken his place, although a resolute, experienced soldier, equipped +with an almost unique knowledge of the army, was a deliberate, +cautious Scot; he was the very last man to shirk responsibility and to +shelter himself behind <span class="pagenum"><a id="page016" name="page016"></a>(p. 016)</span> somebody else, but, on the other +hand, he was not an impatient thruster who would be panting to be—in +gunner's parlance—"re-teaming the battery before the old major was +out of the gate." He accepted, and he was indeed bound to accept, the +ideas of a predecessor of the highest standing in the Service, who had +made a special study of campaigning possibilities under the conditions +which actually arose in August 1914, and under whose aegis definite +plans and administrative arrangements to meet the case had been +elaborated beforehand with meticulous care. Enjoying all the +advantages arising from having made a close study of the subject and +from having an Intelligence Department brimming over with detailed +information at his beck and call, Sir J. French entirely failed to +grasp the extent and nature of the war in its early days. Lord +Kitchener did. Suddenly summoned to take supreme military charge, a +stranger to the War Office and enjoying none of Sir J. French's +advantages, the new Secretary of State mastered the realities of the +position at once by some sort of instinct, perceived what a stupendous +effort would have to be made, took the long view from the start, and +foretold that the struggle would last some years.</p> + +<p>It must have been about the 11th of August, three days before G.H.Q. +crossed the Channel, that I went in with Sir John to see Colonel +Dallas, the head of my Intelligence section dealing with Germany. One +had been too busy during the previous few days to bother much about +the German army, and at the time I knew little more about that +formidable fighting machine than what was told in books of reference +like the <i>Statesman's Year-book</i>, which gave full particulars about +First Line Troops, but said uncommonly little about Reserve +Formations. Information with regard to these could only be obtained +from secret sources. What we were told by Dallas was a revelation to +me. There seemed to be no end to the enemy's fighting resources. He +kept on producing fresh batches of Reserve Divisions and Extra-Reserve +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page017" name="page017"></a>(p. 017)</span> Divisions, like a conjurer who produces huge glass bowls +full of goldfish out of his waistcoat pocket. He seemed to be doing it +on purpose—one felt quite angry with the man. But it was made plain +to me that we were up against a tougher proposition than I had +imagined. The Field-Marshal must have been, or at all events ought to +have been, perfectly well aware of all this, seeing that he had been +C.I.G.S. up till very recently, and had devoted special attention to +the problems involved in a war with Germany.</p> + +<p>In a foot-note near the end of "<i>1914</i>," Lord French mentions having, +on some occasion during the few days when war was still trembling in +the balance, suggested to Lord Kitchener that they should repair +together to the Prime Minister and propose that Lord Kitchener should +be commander-in-chief of the field army, with him (French) as Chief of +Staff. That was a self-sacrificing suggestion; but it surely indicates +an absence of what Lord Haldane calls "clear thinking." Sir J. French +had been organizing and training the Expeditionary Force for some +years previously, knew all about it, was acquainted with its generals +and staffs, was up-to-date in connection with progress in tactical +details, and had studied the strategical situation in Belgium and +France. Lord Kitchener had, on the other hand, been in civil +employment and out of touch with most military questions for some +considerable time previously. Lord Kitchener would have been thrown +away commanding the Expeditionary Force. He was needed for the much +more important position which he actually took up.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page018" name="page018"></a>(p. 018)</span> CHAPTER II</h3> + +<h5>EARLY DAYS AT THE WAR OFFICE</h5> + +<p class="resume">Plan of issuing <span lang="fr"><i>communiqués</i></span> given up owing to the disposition + to conceal reverses that manifested itself — Direct telephonic + communication with the battlefield in Belgium — A strange attempt + to withhold news as to the fall of Brussels — Anxiety during the + retreat from Mons — The work of the Topographical Section at that + time — Arrival of refugee officers and other ranks at the War + Office — One of the Royal Irish affords valuable + information — Candidates for the appointment of "Intelligence + Officer" — How one dealt with recommendations in regard to + jobs — Linguists — The discoverer of interpreters, fifty produced + as if by magic — The Boy Scouts in the War Office — An Admirable + Crichton — The scouts' effective method of handling troublesome + visitors — Army chaplains in embryo — A famous cricketer doing his + bit — A beauty competition outside my door — The Eminent K.C. — An + impressive personality — How he benefits the community — The + Self-Appointed Spy-Catcher — Gun platforms concealed + everywhere — The hidden dangers in disused coal mines in + Kent — Procuring officers for the New Armies — "Bill" Elliot's + unorthodox methods — The Military Secretary's branch meets with a + set-back — Visits from Lord Roberts — His suggestion as to the + commander-in-chiefship in China — His last visit — The Antwerp + business — The strategical situation with regard to the Belgian + field army — The project of our Government — The despatch of the + Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division to Belgian + Flanders — Organization of base and line of communications + overlooked — A couple of transports "on their own" come to a halt + on the Goodwins — Difficulty of the strategical situation — Death + of Sir C. Douglas.</p> + +<p class="p2">It will be remembered that although our troops were not engaged during +the first fortnight of the war, and were indeed never likely to be +engaged so early, events moved quickly on the Western Front, and that +the set-back encountered by the Germans when they tried to smother +Liège without bringing up heavy artillery aroused a certain enthusiasm +in this country. On taking stock of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page019" name="page019"></a>(p. 019)</span> my duties, it had +appeared to me that one of these would be the issue of reasoned +<span lang="fr"><i>communiqués</i></span> to the Press from time to time, and I actually drafted +one, designed to convey a warning as to excessive jubilation over +incidents such as the momentary success of the defending side in the +struggle for the stronghold on the Meuse, which appeared in all the +newspapers. The following passage occurred in it: "The exaggeration +into important triumphs of minor episodes in which the Allies are +alleged to have gained the upper hand is misleading." But it speedily +became apparent that the powers that be did not mean to be expansive +in connection with incidents where our side was getting the worst of +it, so the plan of issuing <span lang="fr"><i>communiqués</i></span> was abandoned almost at once.</p> + +<p>One soon learnt that Belgian resistance was being brushed aside by the +enemy with comparative ease, and that such delay as the invaders had +suffered before Liège did not very appreciably interfere with the +plans of the German Great General Staff. Going one afternoon into the +room occupied by the head of my Intelligence section which was charged +with French and Belgian affairs, I found him on his telephone and +holding up his hand to enjoin silence. He was speaking with the late +General "Sandy" Du Cane, our representative with King Albert's forces +in the field, who was at the moment actually on the battlefield and +under fire. While I was in the room, Du Cane wound up the conversation +with; "They're giving way all along the line. I'm off." A day or two +after this the Boches were in Brussels, and one realized that our +Expeditionary Force must very soon be in the thick of it.</p> + +<p>For some reason or other those in the highest places at the War Office +hesitated to allow the news that Brussels had fallen to leak out to +the public—an attitude at which the newspaper editors were not +unnaturally incensed—and Mr. F. E. Smith, now Lord Birkenhead, who +was head of the Press Bureau, came to see me that evening, and was +outspoken as to the absurdity of this sort of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page020" name="page020"></a>(p. 020)</span> thing. The +matter did not, however, rest in my hands. The secretiveness in +connection with reverses and contretemps which prevailed at that time, +and which continued to prevail during the first year and a half of the +war—during the very period when I had certain responsibilities in +connection with such matters myself—seemed to me then, and seems to +me now, to have been a mistake. It did our cause considerable harm, it +delayed the putting forth of the full fighting strength of the British +nation, it created irritation in the country when it came to be +detected, and it even at times caused official reports which were +perfectly in accordance with the facts to be regarded with suspicion. +The point will be touched upon again in later chapters.</p> + +<p>Then came those grey days when we knew that the Entente plan of +campaign had broken down, that the forces on our side were not +satisfactorily disposed for staying the hostile rush, that the French +were unable to hold their ground, and that our little army were sore +beset and in full retreat before superior hosts. King's Messengers, +the Duke of Marlborough and Major Hankey, came to see me, and told me +of the atmosphere of grave anxiety prevalent at G.H.Q. A message from +General Henry Wilson, written in pencil late at night on a leaf of a +notebook, reached me, of so ominous a character (seeing that he +assuredly was not one to quail) that I never showed it to anybody—not +even to my chief, Sir C. Douglas. And yet, one felt somehow that we +should pull through in spite of all, and even though the demands +coming to hand for maps of regions in the very heart of France +certainly conveyed no encouragement. One regretted that the country +was being kept so much in the dark—the best is never got out of the +Anglo-Saxon race until it is in a tight place. A special edition of +the <i>Times</i>, issued on Sunday morning the 30th of August, which +contained a somewhat lurid account of the retreat by some hysterical +journalist, and which, it turned out, had been doctored by the head of +the Press Bureau, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page021" name="page021"></a>(p. 021)</span> caused great anger in some quarters. But +for my part I rather welcomed it. Anything that would help to bring +home to the public what they were up against was to the good. Whoever +first made use of that pestilent phrase "business as usual," whether +it was a Cabinet Minister, or a Fleet Street scribe, or some +gag-merchant on the music-hall stage, had much to answer for.</p> + +<p>The Topographical Section under Colonel Hedley did fine work during +those troubled days before the Battle of the Marne. It was in the +highest degree gratifying to find a branch, for which one found +oneself suddenly after a fashion responsible, to be capable of so +promptly and effectually meeting emergencies. The Expeditionary Force +had taken with it generous supplies of maps portraying the regions +adjacent to the Franco-Belgian frontier, where it proposed to operate; +a somewhat hasty retreat to a point right away back, south-east of +Paris, had formed no part of its programme. A day or two after the +first clash of arms near Mons, a wire arrived demanding the instant +despatch of maps of the country as far to the rear as the Seine and +the Marne. Now, as all units had to be supplied on a liberal scale, +this meant hundreds of copies of each of a considerable number of +different large-scale sheets, besides hundreds of copies of two or +three more general small-scale sheets; nevertheless, the consignment +was on its way before midnight. A day or two later G.H.Q. wired for +maps as far back as Orleans, a day or two later, again, for maps as +far as the mouth of the Loire, and yet a day or two later, for maps +down to Bordeaux—this last request representing thousands of sheets. +But on each occasion the demand was met within a few hours and without +the slightest hitch. It was a remarkable achievement—an achievement +attributable in part to military foresight dating back to the days +when Messrs. Asquith, Lloyd George, Churchill and Co., either +deliberately or else as a result of sheer ignorance and ineptitude, +were deceiving their countrymen as to the gravity of the German +menace, an achievement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page022" name="page022"></a>(p. 022)</span> attributable also in part to military +administrative efficiency of a high order in a time of crisis. The +Topographical Section, it should be added, was able to afford highly +appreciated assistance to our French and Belgian allies in the matter +of supplying them with maps of their own countries.</p> + +<p>During the first two or three weeks after fighting started, waifs and +strays who had been run over by the Boches, but who had picked +themselves up somehow and had fetched up at the coast, used to turn up +at the War Office and to find their way to my department. For some +reason or other they always presented themselves after dinner—like +the coffee. The first arrival was a young cavalry officer, knocked +off his horse in the preliminary encounters by what had evidently +been the detonation of a well-pitched-up high-explosive, and who was +still suffering from a touch of what we now know as shell-shock. He +proved to be the very embodiment of effective military training, +because, although he was to the last degree vague as to how he had got +back across the Channel and only seemed to know that he had had a bath +at the Cavalry Club, he was able to give most useful and detailed +information as to what he had noted after recovering consciousness +while making his way athwart the German trains and troops in reserve +as they poured along behind Von Kluck's troops in front line. One +observed the same thing in the case of another cavalry officer who +arrived some days later, after a prolonged succession of tramps by +night from the Sambre to Ostend. "You'll sleep well to-night," I +remarked when thanking him for the valuable information that he had +been able to impart—and of a sudden he looked ten years older. "I +couldn't sleep a wink last night at Ostend," he muttered in a +bewildered sort of way, "and I don't feel as if I'd ever sleep again."</p> + +<p>We did not wear uniform in the War Office for the first month or so, +and one night about this time, on meeting a disreputable and +suspicious-looking character on the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page023" name="page023"></a>(p. 023)</span> stairs, garbed in the +vesture affected by the foreign mechanic, I was debating whether to +demand of the interloper what he was doing within the sacred +precincts, when he abruptly accosted me with: "I say, d'you happen to +know where in this infernal rabbit-warren a blighter called the +Something of Military Operations hangs out?" His address indicated him +to be a refugee officer looking for my department.</p> + +<p>These prodigals had such interesting experiences to recount that, in a +weak moment, I gave instructions for them to be brought direct to me, +and about 10 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> one night, when there happened to be a lot of +unfinished stuff to be disposed of before repairing homewards, a +tarnished-looking but otherwise smart and well-set-up private soldier +was let loose on me. A colloquy somewhat as follows ensued:</p> + +<p>"What regiment?"</p> + +<p>"The Rile Irish, sorr." (He said this as if there was no other +regiment—they always do.)</p> + +<p>"Ah! Well, and how have you got along back here?"</p> + +<p>"Sorr, it's the truth I'm tellin' ye, sorra ilse. Sure wasn't I +marchin' and fightin' and hidin' and craalin' for wakes and wakes" +(the Royal Irish could only have detrained at Le Cateau about ten days +before) "before I gits to that place as they calls Boulong—a gran' +place, sorr, wid quays and thruck like it was the North Waal—an' a +fellah takes me to the Commandant, sorr, where I seen a major-man wid +red tabs an' an eye like Polly-famous. 'Sorr,' sez I to him, sez I; +sez I, 'it's gittin' back to the rigimint I'd be afther,' sez I. +'Ye'll not,' sez he, 'divil a stir,' sez he; 'ye'll go to Lunnon,' sez +he. 'Will I?' sez I. 'Ye will,' sez he; 'take him down to the boat at +wanst, sergeant,' sez he, and the sergeant right turns me and marches +me out. 'Sergeant dear,' sez I, 'sure why can't I be gittin' back to +the rigimint?' sez I. 'Agh, t'hell out o' that,' sez he; 'sure didn't +ye hear what the major bin and said?' sez he, an' he gin me over to a +carpral—one on thim ogly Jocks, sorr—an' down we <span class="pagenum"><a id="page024" name="page024"></a>(p. 024)</span> goes by +the quays to the boat—a gran' boat, sorr, wid ladies an' childer an' +Frinch an' Bilgians, an' all sorts, as minded me on the ould +<i>Innisfallen</i>. D'y' iver know the ould <i>Innisfallen</i>, sorr, as sails +from Carrk to some place as I misremember the name on, sorr?"</p> + +<p>"Crossed over on her once from Cork to Milford."</p> + +<p>"Ye did, yer honour—sorr, I mane? Glory be to God—to think o' that! +Well, sorr, I'd a sup of tay at one on thim shtahls, sorr, an' the +Jock gives me me papers an' puts me aboard, sorr. It's mostly onaisy +in me inside I am, sorr, on the say, but it was beautiful calm +an'——"</p> + +<p>"Yes, yes; but look here—Where was it you left your regiment?"</p> + +<p>"Is it me, sorr? Me lave me rigimint, sorr? Me wid three years' sarvis +an' sorra intry in my shate at all, only two, wan time I was dthronk +wid a cowld in me nose, sorr. Me lave me rigimint? It was the rigimint +lift me, sorr. As I tell ye just now, we'd bin marchin' an' fightin' +for wakes and wakes, an' it was tired I was, sorr, bate I was, an' we +was havin' a halt, sorr; an' I sez to Mick Shehan from Mallow, as is +in my platoon, 'Mick,' sez I. 'Tim,' sez he, wid his mouth full of +shkoff. 'Mick,' sez I, 'it's gwan to have a shlape, I am,' sez I, 'an' +ye'll wake me, Mick darlint, when the fall-in goes.' 'Begob an' why +wouldn't I, Tim,' sez he, 'so I ain't shlapin' mysilf?' sez he. 'Ye'll +no forgit, Mick,' sez I. 'Agh, shut yer mouth, why would I be the wan +to forgit?' sez he. But whin I wuk up, the divil a rigimint was there +at all, at all, only me, sorr; an' there was a lot of quare-lookin' +chaps as I sinsed by the look on thim was Jarmins. I was concealed by +a ditch,<a id="footnotetag1" name="footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1">[1]</a> an' settin' down by a bit o' whin, I was, sorr, or they +seen me for sure. 'Phwat'll I do at all?' sez I to mysilf, sez I, +an'—"</p> + +<p>"Just stop a minute; where was all this?"</p> + +<p>"Where was it? Why, in Fraance, sorr, where ilse would it be? Well, +sorr, as I was just startin' to tell ye, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page025" name="page025"></a>(p. 025)</span> there was a lot of +quare-lookin' chaps as I sinsed by the look of thim was Jarmins, +an'——"</p> + +<p>"Yes, but good Lord, man, what was the name of the place in France +where all this happened?"</p> + +<p>"Place is it, sorr? Sure it wasn't any place at all, but one of thim +kind of places as the name on has shlipped me mimry, a bog, +sorr—leastways it wasn't a bog as ye'd rightly call a bog in +Oireland, sorr—no turf nor there wasn't no wather. I mind now, sorr! +It was what the chaps at the 'Shott calls a 'hathe,' sorr. There was +trees contagious, an' whins; sure wasn't I tellin' ye just now as I +was settin' down by a bit of whin, sorr——"</p> + +<p>But it had been borne in on me that this had become a young man's job, +so I succeeded, not without some difficulty, in consigning the gallant +Royal Irishman—still pouring forth priceless intelligence +material—into the hands of a messenger to be taken to the officer on +duty. Manuals of instruction that deal with the subject of eliciting +military information in time of war impress upon you that the Oriental +always wants to tell you what he thinks you want him to tell you. But +the Irishman tells you what he wants to tell you himself, and it isn't +the least use trying to stop him.</p> + +<p>The Intelligence Department being—directly at home and indirectly +abroad—under my control, I was much sought after in the early days, +was almost snowed under, indeed, with applications and recommendations +for the post of "Intelligence Officer." Bigwigs within the War Office +itself, when they were bothered on paper about people, simply passed +the note along as it stood with "D.M.O., can you do anything for this +creature?" or something of that sort, scribbled in blue pencil at the +top. One was treated as if one was a sort of unemployment bureau. +Qualifications for this particular class of post turned out to be of +the most varied kind. One young gentleman, who was declared to be a +veritable jewel, was described as a pianist, fitted out with +"technique almost equal to a professional." The leading characteristic +of another <span class="pagenum"><a id="page026" name="page026"></a>(p. 026)</span> candidate appeared to be his liability to fits. +Algy, "a dear boy and <i>so</i> good-looking," had spent a couple of months +in Paris after leaving Eton a year or two back. This sounds terribly +like petticoat influence; but resisting petticoat influence is, I can +assure you, child's play compared to resisting Parliamentary +influence. For good, straightforward, unblushing, +shan't-take-no-for-an-answer jobbery, give me the M.P. They are +sublime in their hardihood.</p> + +<p>My experience in these Whitehall purlieus during the war perhaps +provides some explanation of the theory, so sedulously hugged by the +community, that interest and influence are all-powerful inside the War +Office portals. To be invited to take a hand in obtaining jobs for +people about whom one knew nothing and cared less, in services with +which one had no connection, was a daily event. The procedure that was +followed in such cases was automatic and appropriate. A reply would be +dictated intimating that one would do what one could—a mere form of +words, needless to say, as one had not the slightest intention of +doing anything. And yet, as often as not, there would be a +disconcerting sequel. Profuse outpourings of gratitude in letter form +would come to hand, two or three weeks later: Jimmy had got his job, +entirely owing to one's efforts in his behalf: the memory of one's +services in this sacred cause would be carried to the grave: might +Jimmy call and express his feeling of obligation in person? One had +not the faintest recollection of what all the bother was about; but it +was easy to dictate another letter expressing one's gratification at +the recognition of Jimmy's merits and one's heartfelt regret that +owing to stress of work one would be unable to grant him an audience. +To hint that the appointment had presumably been made by the +responsible official, on the strength of an application received from +Jimmy in proper form, that there had been no wheels within wheels, and +that backstairs had never got beyond the first landing, would have +been disobliging.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page027" name="page027"></a>(p. 027)</span> Some applicants for "intelligence work" possessed, or gave +out that they possessed, the gift of tongues, and the provision of +interpreters was one of the many duties which had to be performed by +the huge agglomeration of branches over which I exercised—or was +supposed to exercise—sway. The subordinate charged with the provision +had been retrieved from the Reserve of Officers and business pursuits, +but retained the instincts of the soldier—a man with all his wits +about him, but who sometimes positively frightened one by his +unconventional procedure. One hardly likes to say such a thing of a +man behind his back, but I really would not have been surprised to +hear that, because he had been unable to concur in the views set out +on it by other branches, he had put one of those bloated War Office +files, on which one more or less automatically expresses dissent with +the last minute without reading the remainder, into the fire. He made +up his mind in a moment, which was irregular; and he generally made it +up right, which was unprecedented. Experts in many outlandish +vernaculars had to be found from the start, and he always managed to +produce the article required at the shortest notice. As a matter of +fact, he had laid hands upon a tame professor, whom he kept immured in +a fastness somewhere in the attics, and who was always prepared to +vouch for the proficiency of anybody in any language when required to +do so.</p> + +<p>The first Divisions of the "Old Contemptibles" to proceed to the +Continent were fitted out with interpreters by the French. But, for +some reason or other, a Division going out to the front some few weeks +later had not been prepared for, and so we suddenly found that we had +to furnish it with its linguists at this end. But the chief of the +subsection responsible for finding them proved fully equal to the +occasion. "How many d'you want, sir?" he demanded. I intimated that +the authorized establishment was about seventy, but that if we could +find fifty under the circumstances we should have done very well. +"I'll have them ready early to-morrow, sir," <span class="pagenum"><a id="page028" name="page028"></a>(p. 028)</span> he remarked, as +if it was the most ordinary thing in the world—and he did. For, next +morning the passages in the immediate vicinity of the room which he +graced with his presence were congested with swarms of individuals, +arrayed in the newest of new uniforms and resplendent in the lightest +of light brown belts and gaiters, who were bundled off unceremoniously +to regiments and batteries and staffs on the eve of departure for the +seat of war. It is quite true that some generals and colonels in this +Division wrote from France to complain that their interpreters did not +know French, or if they did know French, did not know English. Still, +nobody takes that sort of croaking seriously. In a grumbling match the +British officer can keep his end up against the British soldier any +day.</p> + +<p>An excellent innovation at the War Office synchronizing with +mobilization was the introduction of a large number of boy scouts +within its gates. They proved most reliable and useful, and did the +utmost credit to the fine institution for which we have to thank Sir +Robert Baden-Powell. A day or two after joining I wanted to make the +acquaintance of a colonel, who I found was under me in charge of a +branch—a new hand like myself, but whose apartment nobody in the +place could indicate. A War Office messenger despatched to find him +came back empty-handed. Another War Office messenger sent on the same +errand on the morrow proved no more successful. On the third day I +summoned a boy scout into my presence—a very small one—and commanded +him to find that colonel and not to come back without him. In about +ten minutes' time the door of my room was flung open, and in walked +the scout, followed by one of the biggest sort of colonels. "I did not +know what I had done or where I was being taken," remarked the +colonel, "but the boy made it quite clear that he wasn't going to have +any nonsense; so I thought it best to come quietly."</p> + +<p>At a much later stage, one of these youngsters was especially told off +to a branch which I then controlled—an <span class="pagenum"><a id="page029" name="page029"></a>(p. 029)</span> extraordinary boy, +who impressed one all the more owing to his looking considerably +younger than he really was. I seldom found anything that he did not +know, and never found anything that he could not do. This Admirable +Crichton was spangled all over well-earned badges, indicating his +accomplishments. We really might have gone off, the whole lot of us, +masterful staff officer, dainty registration clerks, highly efficient +stenographer, etc., and had a good time; he would have run the show +perfectly well without us—a Hirst, a Jimmy Wilde, a "Tetrarch," as he +was amongst scouts.</p> + +<p>The plan that the lads adopted for making things uncomfortable for +troublesome people paid eloquent testimony to that fertility of +resource which it is one of the objects of the scout movement to +develop in its members. One of the greatest worries to which War +Office officials were exposed during these anxious times was a bent on +the part of individuals, whom they had not the slightest wish to see, +for demanding—and obtaining—interviews. The scouts tumbled to this +(if one may use so vulgar an expression) almost from the first day, +and they acted with rare judgement and determination. They chose +<span lang="it"><i>lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch' entrate</i></span> for their motto, and adopted +the method of herding the intruders into an unattractive apartment on +the ground floor, as tube attendants herd subterranean travellers into +the lifts, and of keeping the intruders there until they verged on a +condition of mutiny. They then enlarged them in big parties, each of +which was taken control of by a scout, who led his charges round and +round and in and out along the corridors, and up and down between +floors, carefully avoiding the elevators, until the victims were in a +state of physical and mental collapse. If one of the party quitted the +ranks while on the trek, to read the name marked up on some door that +he was passing, the scout called a halt and withered the culprit with +a scowl—it would never have done to permit that sort of thing, +because the visitor might conceivably have noticed the name <span class="pagenum"><a id="page030" name="page030"></a>(p. 030)</span> +of the very official whom he had come to see. Anybody who came again +after undergoing this experience once, probably had just cause for +demanding an interview; but one bout of it satisfied most people. It +may be suggested that the scouts were acting under instructions from +Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary and Grand Master of the Ceremonies, in +this matter. But, if asked, he will own up and admit that in the +pressure of his duties he overlooked the point, and that the entire +credit belongs to the boys.</p> + +<p>Still, perambulation of those furlongs of corridor in the big building +in Whitehall might have offered points of interest to a visitor not +too exhausted to take notice. By one window was usually to be seen a +posse of parsons, of furtive aspect, each nervously twiddling a lissom +hat, a love-your-neighbour-as-yourself look frozen on their +countenances, and not by any means conveying for the time being an +impression of the church militant: they were candidates for the post +of army chaplain, and were about to be inspected by the genial prelate +who presided over the department responsible for the spiritual welfare +of the troops. A day or two later might be seen in the same place some +of these very candidates, decked out in khaki raiment, hung about with +contrivances into which combatant comrades introduce implements for +slaying their fellow-men, erect, martial, terrifying, the very +embodiment of the church triumphant, having been accepted for the job +and awaiting orders—and no men have done finer service in the Great +Adventure.</p> + +<p>At another point one encountered a very well-known cricketer, who was +doling out commissions. How he did it one had no time to ask. But one +strongly suspected that, if one of the young gentlemen whom he took in +hand had been in a school eleven or even house eleven (or said he +had), crooked ways somehow became straight.</p> + +<p>Just outside my own door an attractive-looking civilian had devised a +sort of wigwam within which he took cover—one of those arrangements +with screens which second lieutenants prepare when there is a +regimental <span class="pagenum"><a id="page031" name="page031"></a>(p. 031)</span> dance, and which they designate, until called to +order, as "hugging booths." There he was to be seen at any hour of the +day in close communion with a fascinating lady, heads close together, +murmuring confidences, an idyll in a vestibule—or rather a succession +of idylls, because there was a succession of ladies, all of them +different except in that all of them were charming. After two or three +months he disappeared, and only then did it occur to me to ask what +these intimate transactions were on which he had been engaged. It +transpired that he was acting vicariously on my behalf, that he was +selecting a staff for censorship duties or some such dull occupation, +in my place. If good looks were a qualification for such employment, +that civilian must have been troubled with an <span lang="fr"><i>embarras de richesses</i></span>.</p> + +<p>Amongst the many privileges and responsibilities which my position in +the early months of the war thrust upon me was that of finding myself +in more or less official relations with the Eminent K.C. and with the +Self-Appointed Spy-Catcher. One may have had the good fortune in +pre-war times to meet the former, when disguised as a mere human +being—on the links, say, or at the dinner table. The latter, one came +into contact with for the first time.</p> + +<p>The average soldier seldom finds himself associated with the Eminent +K.C. on parade, so to speak, in the piping times of peace. When +performing, and on the war-path as you might say, this successful limb +of the law is a portentous personage. Persuasive, masterful, +clean-shaven, he fixes you with his eye as the boa-constrictor +fascinates the rabbit. Pontifically, compassionately, almost +affectionately indeed, he makes it plain to you what an ass you in +reality are, and he looks so wise the while that you are hardly able +to bear it. He handles his arguments with such petrifying precision, +he marshals his facts so mercilessly, he becomes so elusive when you +approach the real point, and he grows so bewildering if he detects the +slightest symptoms of your having discovered <span class="pagenum"><a id="page032" name="page032"></a>(p. 032)</span> what he is +driving at, that he will transform an elementary military question, +which you in your folly have presumed to think that you understand, +into a problem which a very Moltke would ignominiously fail to +elucidate.</p> + +<p>Contact with the Eminent K.C. under such conditions makes you realize +to the full what an inestimable boon lawyers confer upon their +fellow-citizens when they sink all personal ambition and flock into +the House of Commons for their country's good. It makes you rejoice in +that time-honoured arrangement under which the Lord Chancellorship is +the reward and recognition, not of mastery of the principles and +practice of jurisprudence, but of parliamentary services to a +political faction. It convinces you that the importance of judges and +barristers having holidays of a length to make the public-school-boy's +mouth water, immeasurably exceeds the importance of litigation being +conducted with reasonable despatch. It accounts for the dexterity +invariably displayed by Parliament when new enactments are placed on +the Statute-Book, for the simplicity of the language in which they are +couched, and for that minimum of employment to the legal profession to +which these specimens of masterly legislation subsequently give rise. +The Eminent K.C. is, by the way, reputed to be a somewhat expensive +luxury when you avail yourself of his services in your civil capacity, +but he must be well worth it. A man who can be so mystifying when he +proposes to be lucid must prove a priceless asset to his client when +he undertakes the task of bamboozling a dozen unhappy countrymen +penned in a box. It is hard to picture to yourself this impressive +figure giggling sycophantically at the pleasantries of a humorous +judge. But he must have conformed to convention in this matter in the +past, for how otherwise could he now be an Eminent K.C.?</p> + +<p>During many months of acute national emergency, while the war was +settling into its groove, there was no more zealous, no more +persevering, and no more ineffectual <span class="pagenum"><a id="page033" name="page033"></a>(p. 033)</span> subject of the King +than the Self-Appointed Spy-Catcher. You never know what ferocity +means until you have been approached by a titled lady who has +persuaded herself that she is on the track of a German spy. We Britons +are given to boasting of our grit in adversity and of our inability to +realize when we are beaten. In no class of the community were these +national traits more conspicuous in the early days of the war than in +the ranks of the amateur spy-catching fraternity and sisterhood—for +the amateur spy-catcher never caught a spy. Only after months of +disappointment and failure did these self-appointed protectors of +their country begin to abandon a task which they had taken up with +enthusiastic fervour, and which they had prosecuted with unfaltering +resolution. Although it was at the hands of the despised professional +that enemy agents were again and again brought to face the firing +party in the Tower ditch, the amateurs entertained, and perhaps still +entertain, a profound contempt for the official method. One fair +member of the body, indeed, so far forgot herself as to write in a fit +of exasperation to say that we must—the whole boiling of us—be in +league with the enemy, and that we ought to be "intered."</p> + +<p>They were in their element when, after the fall of Maubeuge, it +transpired that the Germans had gun-platforms in certain factories +situated within range of the forts, that they had established ready +prepared for action should they be required. Anybody with an asphalt +lawn-tennis court then became suspect. A very bad case was reported +from the Chilterns, just the very sort of locality where Boches +contemplating invasion of the United Kingdom would naturally propose +to set up guns of big calibre. A building with a concrete base—many +buildings do have concrete bases nowadays—near Hampstead was the +cause of much excitement. When the unemotional official, sent to view +the place, suggested that the extremely solid structure overhead would +be rather in the way supposing that one proposed to emplace <span class="pagenum"><a id="page034" name="page034"></a>(p. 034)</span> +a gun, or guns, on the concrete base, it was urged that there was a +flat roof and that ordnance mounted on it would dominate the +metropolis. There was a flat roof all right, but it turned out to be +of glass.</p> + +<p>A number of most worthy people were much concerned over the subject of +certain disused coal-mines in Kent, where, they had persuaded +themselves, the enemy had stored quantities of war material. What +precisely was the nature of the war material they did not +know—aircraft as like as not, the aviator finds the bottom of a +mine-shaft an ideal place to keep his machine. These catacombs were +duly inspected by an expert, but he could find nothing. The worthy +people thereupon declared that the penetralia had not been properly +examined and desired permission to carry out a searching inspection +themselves. They were, if I remember aright, told they might go down +the mines or might go to the devil (or words to that effect) for all +we cared. Had one not been so busy one could have got a good deal of +fun out of the Self-Appointed Spy-Catcher.</p> + +<p>The Military Operations Directorate had nothing to do with the +formation and organization of the New Armies, but one heard a good +deal about their birth and infancy. Apart from the question of their +personal equipment, in regard to which the Quartermaster-General's +Department (with Lord Kitchener at its back and urging it forward) +performed such wonders, the most troublesome question in connection +with their creation in the early stages was the provision of officers; +the men were procured almost too fast. This became the business of the +Military Secretary's Department. The M.S. Department holds tenaciously +to the dogma that maladministration is the child of precipitancy and +that deliberation stamps official procedure with the hall-mark of +respectability. In later stages of the war one never was gazetted to +an appointment until after one had passed on to the next one. But a +gunner "dug-out," Colonel "Bill" Elliot, had been roped into the +Department on mobilization, having been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page035" name="page035"></a>(p. 035)</span> similarly roped in +during the South African War, and by good luck the question of +officers for the New Armies was turned over to him.</p> + +<p>A believer in the theory that the King's service has to be carried on +even in spite of regulations, he worked on lines of his own, and he +altered those lines when the occasion called for it. He was a +"mandarin," of course—everybody in a Government office is. He was to +some extent enmeshed in "red tape"—every step taken in a Government +office, from sending a note in acknowledgement of a written +communication, to losing a State paper at a moment when the safety of +the country depends upon its being available for reference, comes +within the category of "red tape." But he did get things done somehow, +thanks to some extent to his pronounced and never-failing sense of +humour. When one felt worried, weary, worn out, one only had to sit +opposite to him at lunch at the club and to listen to some of his +tales of manufacturing New Army officers, to be oneself again; it was +like a trip to Margate. Fortunately he either was given, or gave +himself, a free hand, and his quota was not the least considerable of +the many quotas from various quarters that contributed towards winning +the war.</p> + +<p>As keeper of the Secretary of State's conscience when he has one, the +Military Secretary is bound to take himself very seriously indeed. +There is always something dignified and impressive about slow motion, +and his branch during the Great War was compelled to take up a firm +attitude in exacting the respect that was its due; "Bill," with his +eminently successful, but none the less abnormal and even lawless, +methods at times hardly seemed in the picture. It may be mentioned +that in spite of precautions the branch on at least one occasion met +with a deplorable affront. An officer, who had been secured by +tumultuary process during the early efforts to expand the land forces, +proved to be a disappointment and had to be invited to convert his +sword into a ploughshare. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page036" name="page036"></a>(p. 036)</span> His reply is understood to have +read somewhat as follows:</p> + +<p class="quote"><span class="smcap">Sir</span>—I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of —— + directing me to resign my commission. I will see you damned + first.—Yours,<span class="add6em">——.</span></p> + +<p>New Army officers were so unconventional.</p> + +<p>Lord Roberts often came to see me in those anxious early days at the +War Office, ever sympathetic, ever encouraging, ever confident. It had +not been my privilege while on the active list to be brought into +contact with him, except once, many years ago, when a young subaltern +at Kabul. But one day, it must have been in 1911, he sent me a message +asking me to call and see him at the Athenaeum. On my presenting +myself, and on our repairing to the little room by the door where +members of that exclusive establishment interviewed outsiders, he made +a somewhat unexpected proposal. A gentleman of progressive views +hailing from the Far East, called Sun Yat-sen,—one had seen his name +in the newspapers and had got the impression that he was a +revolutionary, out for trouble—was in England in search of arms, and +he required a commander-in-chief for the forces which he proposed to +raise for the purpose of bringing the Celestial Empire up to date.<a id="footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2">[2]</a> +The Field-Marshal wanted me to take on the job. But the project +somehow did not appeal to me—people do say that the Chinese have +old-fashioned ways when they come to deal with persons whose conduct +they are unable to approve—and I no doubt cut but a poor figure when +manifesting no disposition to jump at the chance. "If I were only +forty years younger," exclaimed Lord Roberts, "I would go myself! Why, +you might be Emperor of China before you knew where you were!" But +even the prospect of a seat on the Peacock Throne failed to charm, +although I had an interview with Sun Yat-sen (who looked as if butter +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page037" name="page037"></a>(p. 037)</span> would not melt in his mouth) at the Savoy Hotel; benefactors +of the human race coming from foreign parts always put up at that +hostelry, comfortable quarters are understood to be procurable. One +could not, however, but be impressed with the amazing vitality of the +aged Field-Marshal then, as also a year or two later when he used to +come to make enquiries concerning the progress of events in France.</p> + +<p>He followed the movements of the contending armies closely, and he +always carried the details of the map and of the British order of +battle in his head, just as if he were a smart young staff-captain. At +critical junctures he used to call me up, between 9 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> and 10 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span>, +from his house at Ascot on the telephone, eager for news. The last +time that I saw him was when he came to ask me to tell off some one +from my staff to accompany him to the front on the occasion of the +visit which in some respects ended so tragically, but which enabled +the great soldier to go to his rest within sound of the guns and +surrounded by the troops whom he had loved so well.</p> + +<p>It was mentioned in the preceding chapter that the Military Operations +Directorate found little to do in connection with "operations" +question concerning the Western Front just at first, because the +concentration of the Expeditionary Force in the war zone was carried +out automatically and in accordance with plans worked out in advance. +Indeed almost the first time that such a question arose in at all +aggravated form was when the Antwerp affair got going. That was a +queer business altogether, and it seems necessary briefly to deal with +what most military men regard as an unfortunate transaction.</p> + +<p>In so far as the Belgian forces as part of the Entente hosts in this +theatre of war were concerned, the strategical situation after the +great retreat appeared to demand imperatively that these must above +all things avoid, firstly, any risk of becoming cut off from their +French and British allies, and, secondly, the danger of finding +themselves <span class="pagenum"><a id="page038" name="page038"></a>(p. 038)</span> trapped in the entrenched camp of Antwerp or of +being hustled up against the Dutch frontier on their way out of the +entrenched camp. The Belgian military authorities, as far as one could +make out at the time, appreciated the situation quite correctly—they +wished to abandon Antwerp, at all events with their field troops. +Problems such as those responsible on the Entente side were at this +time faced with, undoubtedly admit of difference of opinion; but most +soldiers will surely agree that the Belgian leaders deserve great +credit for not allowing themselves to be hypnotized by that huge place +of arms which General Brialmont had designed some forty years before, +and upon which vast sums of money had been laid out then and since. It +has to be remembered in this connection that the famous engineer had +always contemplated the retirement of his country's armies into the +stronghold, more or less as a matter of course, in case of invasion, +and that this had virtually been the military policy of Belgium up +till quite recently. Lord French has referred in "<i>1914</i>" to the +"terrible temptation" which Maubeuge offered to him at the time of the +retreat from Mons. If Maubeuge suggested itself as an asylum for the +hard-pressed Expeditionary Force, Antwerp would assuredly suggest +itself still more strongly as an asylum for King Albert's field army, +confronted as it was by an overwhelming hostile array and not in +direct contact with the troops under Joffre and Sir J. French.</p> + +<p>It was then that those who were directing the British operations as a +whole suddenly intervened and induced the Belgians to alter their +plan. The very recently improvised Naval Division was set in motion +for Antwerp. Mr. Churchill, a bolt from the blue, appeared in the +city. And, instead of King Albert's forces getting clear in good time +and moving off, practically unmolested, to join the Anglo-French host +in Western Flanders, they only escaped by the skin of their teeth +after being roughly handled, and the all-important junction was +delayed so long that a most critical situation arose. Moreover, the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page039" name="page039"></a>(p. 039)</span> Seventh Division and a Cavalry Division were packed off in a +hurry from this country to help the Belgians out of a mess which they +would not have got into had they been left alone, instead of being +sent to join the Expeditionary Force where they were badly wanted. +That is how I read the proceedings at the time, and how I read them +still.</p> + +<p>War Office procedure did not at that stage conform to the methods +which had held good previous to mobilization, and which had been +devised to hold good in time of war; something further will be said on +the subject in a later chapter. The Director of Military Operations +did not on this particular occasion hear about the Seventh Division +and the cavalry being diverted to the Belgian coast until after +instructions for the move had been issued and the troops were +preparing to proceed to the port of embarkation. How far my chief, Sir +C. Douglas, concurred in this disposition of our limited available +fighting forces, how far he was consulted and what part he performed +in giving the orders, I do not know. I have no recollection of ever +discussing the matter with him. But there was a circumstance in +connection with the transaction which does suggest that the C.I.G.S. +did not play a very prominent rôle in the business.</p> + +<p>Some time after I had learnt what was going forward—it was next day, +I think—the idea occurred to me to find out what steps had been, or +were being, taken to provide the necessary organization for a base and +line of communications for this force which was about to be projected +suddenly across the narrow seas. Enquiries elicited the startling +information that nothing whatever had been done in the matter; some of +those most concerned in such questions in Whitehall had not even heard +that the force was preparing to start. The problem, such as it was, +was promptly solved as soon as it was grappled with. The Directors +dealing with such subjects met in my room, and in a few minutes the +requisite staff had been selected, arrangements had been decided upon, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page040" name="page040"></a>(p. 040)</span> and orders had been despatched—it was as easy as falling +downstairs once machinery had been set in motion. But how came it that +this had not been thought of before? Now, I can quite understand Sir +C. Douglas holding that this particular phase of the Antwerp project, +sending Generals Capper and Byng with their divisions to sustain the +Belgians and the Naval Division by a landing at Zeebrugge, was a sound +one from the strategical point of view—such questions are necessarily +questions of opinion. But I cannot understand a master of military +administration such as he was, a soldier equipped with exceptional +knowledge of organization and with wide experience of the requirements +of a British army in the field, sending a considerable body of troops +off oversea to a theatre of operations, where fighting might be +expected almost as soon as they landed, without making provision for +their base and communications.</p> + +<p>Actually, what turned out to be a tragic episode was not without some +little comic relief. There was consternation in Whitehall one evening, +just before the dinner-hour, when tidings arrived that a couple of the +transports conveying this force to its destination had passed the +rendezvous where the convoy was mustering, and were at large, heading +without escort or orders for a water-area known to be mined by both +sides, and where enemy destroyers and similar pests were apt to make +their appearance unexpectedly. Fortunately the panic was of short +duration. On returning to the office after dinner one learnt that the +straying vessels had both fetched up on the Goodwins—luckily about +low water—and were under control again.</p> + +<p>In any criticism of H.M. Government's action in connection with the +Antwerp affair (as regards the prosecution of the war in the field, +H.M. Government for all practical purposes then meant Mr. Asquith, +Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill) it must be allowed that the +situation at the time was a most complicated and perplexing one. Lord +French in his book makes it clear that, while he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page041" name="page041"></a>(p. 041)</span> objected +strongly to the Seventh Division and the Third Cavalry Division being +sent to the Belgian coast under the independent command of Sir H. +Rawlinson instead of their being sent to Boulogne and placed under his +own orders, he did not wish Antwerp to be abandoned. Lord Kitchener +had, as a matter of fact, seized upon Antwerp as a means of inducing +reluctant colleagues to assent to the United Kingdom being denuded of +these regular troops and their being hurried to the theatre of war. +Knowing what we know now, it seems almost certain that, no matter +where the fresh troops from England turned up or whose orders they +were under, the Belgian army and the Naval Division would have been +lost for good and all had they not cleared out of the fortress when +they did. The verdict of history will probably be that both H.M. +Government and the commander of the British Expeditionary Force +misread the situation, that H.M. Government's misreading was very much +the graver of the two, that there was excuse for such misreadings when +the inevitable fog of war is taken into consideration, and that the +Germans threw away their chances and bungled the business worst of +all.</p> + +<p>A few days after Antwerp had fallen, and a week or so before that +tremendous conflict which has come to be known as the First Battle of +Ypres was fairly launched, Sir C. Douglas, who for a long time past +had not been in the best of health and upon whom the strain had been +telling severely during the previous two and a half months, did not +make his appearance at the office one morning. He had struggled on +with splendid grit and determination almost to the very end, for he +died within a few days, a victim of devotion to duty and of overwork. +His place was taken by Sir J. Wolfe-Murray.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page042" name="page042"></a>(p. 042)</span> CHAPTER III</h3> + +<h5>LORD KITCHENER'S START</h5> + +<p class="resume">A first meeting with Lord Kitchener — Sent up to see him in + Pretoria by his brother under unpromising conditions — The + interview — The Chief's pleasant reception — A story of Lord K. + from the Sudan — An unpleasant interview with him in August + 1914 — Rare meetings with him during the first two or three + months — His ignorance of War Office organization — His lack of + acquaintance with many matters in connection with the existing + organization of the army — His indisposition to listen to advice + on such subjects — Lord K. shy of strangers — His treatment of the + Territorial Forces — Their weak point at the outset of + hostilities, not having the necessary strength to mobilize at war + establishment — Effect of this on the general plans — The way the + Territorials dwindled after taking the field — Lord K. inclined at + first to pile up divisions without providing them with the + requisite reservoirs of reserves — His feat in organizing four + regular divisions in addition to those in the Expeditionary + Force — His immediate recognition of the magnitude of the + contest — He makes things hum in the War Office — His differences + of opinion with G.H.Q. — The inability of G.H.Q. to realize that a + vast expansion of the military forces was the matter of primary + importance — Lord K.'s relations with Sir J. French — The despatch + of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to command the Second Corps — Sir J. + French not well treated at the time of the Antwerp affair — The + relegation of the General Staff at the War Office to the + background in the early days — Question whether this was entirely + due to its having suffered in efficiency by the withdrawals which + took place on mobilization — The General Staff only eliminated in + respect to operations.</p> + +<p class="p2">My first meeting with Lord Kitchener had taken place under conditions +that augured no agreeable experience. It was in March or April 1901. +At that time I had charge of a heterogeneous collection of guns in a +body of troops operating in the Eastern Transvaal and commanded by +General Walter Kitchener, the Chief's brother, and was also used by +him as a sort of second-in-command to take <span class="pagenum"><a id="page043" name="page043"></a>(p. 043)</span> charge of +portions of the force when detached from time to time. Our commando +had trekked out from Belfast and had camped in a likely spot, and on +the morrow he took out part of the force in one direction and sent me +off with part of the force in another direction, while the remainder +stayed in camp guarding the impedimenta. I tumbled across a few +snipers, and we enjoyed a harmless scrap; but Walter butted into a +whole lot of truculent burghers. These were being reinforced and were +full of fight, so he decided to retire, and also to retire the camp; +but the message directing me to conform unfortunately went astray. The +result was that before long I found myself covering the retirement of +the whole gang, and being rather harried to boot—one of those +<span lang="fr"><i>reculer pour mieux sauter</i></span> sort of movements where it is all +<span lang="fr"><i>reculer</i></span> and no <span lang="fr"><i>sauter</i></span>. The casualties were, however, small, and we +lost nothing worth bothering about; but Walter took his big brother +very seriously indeed, was much concerned as to how the Chief might +regard an operation which we could not possibly represent as a +success, and, after much cogitation, packed me off to Pretoria to +report in person.</p> + +<p>He gave me elaborate directions as to how best to approach the subject +when in the presence. "No, don't put it that way, tell it him like +this"—"He'll damn me and you, but whatever you do, don't make +excuses," and so forth. One had read Steevens' appreciation of the +then Sirdar in his <i>With Kitchener to Khartum</i>, and had gathered from +newspapers (the worst possible source of information about the +character and the idiosyncrasies of persons of note) that this +commander-in-chief of ours was a cold, exacting, unsympathetic figure, +much more given to jumping down your throat than to patting you on the +back. The consequence was that when, having fetched up in Pretoria +after some adventures, I was wending my way to Lord K.'s headquarters +I felt very much as one does when repairing to the dentist. It was +worse, indeed, than going to the dentist, because when I got there +Colonel Hubert Hamilton, the Military Secretary <span class="pagenum"><a id="page044" name="page044"></a>(p. 044)</span> (who was +killed when in command of the Third Division soon after it reached the +Lys from the Aisne in October 1914), greeted me with "Very sorry, but +the Chief's awfully busy to-day. Roll up about this time to-morrow, +will you, like a good chap?" It was the same story again on the next +day—the Chief up to the neck in correspondence. But on presenting +myself on the third day, Hamilton promptly ushered me into the great +man's study, where he was sitting at his desk.</p> + +<p>"What d'you want?" demanded Lord K. I began explaining about our +little affair near Belfast; but he cut me short with "Oh, I don't want +to hear about all that. Had any trouble getting here?" Yes, the train +in front of mine had been blown up, and——"They'll bag you on the way +back," interrupted the Chief cheerily, "so I'd better get what I can +out of you now; my brother writes that you've been about a good deal +on the east side, and I'm going to take that in hand very shortly. +Come along over here." We went across to where there was a huge great +map of the Eastern Transvaal, with the positions of the posts and +columns, etc., marked on it, and for twenty minutes or so I found +myself enjoying the pleasantest interview with a much senior officer +than I had ever had in my life. He listened to my exposition of how it +seemed best to round up the enemy commandos, where sedentary forces +ought to be dumped down to act as stops, and what lines the mobile +columns ought to operate along. Lord K. occasionally interjected a +question or criticism as to some particular point, but seemed not in +the least displeased when I stuck to my own view. When he dismissed me +he spoke in a particularly friendly way, and my experience of him on +this occasion was nothing short of a revelation.</p> + +<p>"Had a satisfactory talk?" asked Hamilton when I came out, and, on my +saying how nice the Chief had been, he remarked, "He's in one of his +good moods to-day, but you mightn't always find him quite so tame. +He's been down to the Old Colony and back these last two days, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page045" name="page045"></a>(p. 045)</span> and found things moving—that's why he could not see you +before. But he always keeps his movements very close, so you mustn't +let it go any further."</p> + +<p>Walter Kitchener, not unnaturally, entertained unbounded admiration +for, and belief in, his brother, and he often told me tales from +Egyptian days of things that the Sirdar then did and of the resource +he would display in unexpected emergencies. One of these yarns about +the great War Minister at a stage of his career when he was still +mounting the ladder of success deserves to be repeated here.<a id="footnotetag3" name="footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3">[3]</a> It +happened one day, during the operations for the recovery of the Sudan +from the Mahdi-ists, that "K." was riding forward with his staff, +there being no troops nor transport actually on the move, he mounted +on his camel, the rest on horses and ponies. By the wayside they came +upon a heap of rolls of telegraph-wire lying near the track, which +some unit had apparently abandoned as lumber or else had been unable +to carry. "We can't leave that stuff behind," said the Sirdar to the +staff; "bring it along." Two or three of them dismounted to see what +could be done, but there was no gear available for lashing and the +rolls were heavy. A little party of the small donkeys of the country +was, however, being driven along by a native lad and came on the scene +just at this juncture. "Hurry up. Put the wire on those donkeys. I +don't want to sit here all day," commanded the Sirdar impatiently. The +donkeys had no saddles nor equipment of any kind except rope halters +of sorts, and the officers sampled various devices, without success, +for placing the goods on the donkeys' backs and keeping them there. +They experimented with balancing a roll on the back of one, but it +promptly fell off again. They tied two rolls together and slung them +across the back of another, pannier fashion; but the little beast gave +a kick and a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page046" name="page046"></a>(p. 046)</span> wriggle and deposited the load on the ground. +Various dodges were tried, perspiration poured off the faces of the +officers, they were covered with dust, their language grew stronger +and stronger, and at last, feeling themselves entirely nonplussed, one +of them, looking up at their chief as he sat on his camel with a +sardonic smile on his face, observed deprecatingly, "I'm afraid we +really can't manage it, sir."</p> + +<p>"Can't manage it, can't you!" ejaculated the Sirdar; "here, let me +come." He made his camel kneel, and dismounted, stalked over to one of +the donkeys, gripped the animal by the nose, backed it till its hind +feet were inside one of the rolls, turned the roll up over the +donkey's back from behind, gave the beast a smack on the rump, and +after one or two wriggles and kicks, the creature was trotting along, +adorned with a loosely fitting girdle of telegraph-wire round its +waist which it could not get rid of. The same plan was promptly +adopted with the other donkeys. And in a few minutes the party were +riding along again, with the donkeys, carrying the whole of the +abandoned wire, in close attendance.</p> + +<p>That Lord Kitchener would cut up rough at times when things went +wrong, as Hubert Hamilton had hinted at Pretoria, was brought home to +me convincingly on the occasion of my first interview with him at the +War Office after that visit to the Admiralty which is mentioned in +Chapter I. General Hanbury Williams had been earmarked in advance for +British Military Commissioner at Russian Headquarters, and he dashed +off in a great hurry to take up the appointment on mobilization. I +believe that he looked in to see me before starting, but I was not in +my room at the moment; I am not sure, indeed, that I knew that he was +going until after he had started. A few days later the Chief, when +wanting to wire to his representative with the Tsar's armies, +discovered that he had gone off without a cipher. It was possible, of +course, to communicate through the Foreign Office and our embassy at +St. Petersburg (as the capital <span class="pagenum"><a id="page047" name="page047"></a>(p. 047)</span> was still called); but Lord +K. naturally desired means of direct communication. He was extremely +angry about it, and he gave me a most disagreeable five minutes.</p> + +<p>Although all this cipher business was under charge of one of my +branches, the contretemps was due to no neglect on my own part. Nor +was it the fault of the subordinate who actually handled the ciphers, +because he did not even know that Hanbury Williams had gone until the +row occurred. The mishap had resulted from our Military Commissioner +making his exit at the very moment when new hands were taking up their +duties and had not yet got the hang of these. But one guessed that +explanations would not be received sympathetically by the Secretary of +State, and that it would be wisest to take the rebuke "lying down"; he +expected things to be done right, and that was all about it. Still, it +was not an altogether encouraging start. Indeed I scarcely ever saw +Lord K. during the first two or three months, and when I did, it was +generally because some little matter had gone wrong in connection with +the Secret Service or the Press, or owing to one of the Amateur +Spy-Catchers starting some preposterous hare, or because he needed +information as to some point of little importance. The fact is +that—to put the matter quite bluntly—when he took up his burden the +Chief did not know what the duties of his subordinates were supposed +to be, and he took little trouble to find out. One day he sent for me +and directed me to carry out a certain measure in connection with a +subject that was not my business at all, and I was so ill-advised as +to say, "It's a matter for the Adjutant-General's Department, sir, but +I'll let them know about it." "I told you to do it yourself," snapped +the Chief in a very peremptory tone. Under the circumstances, one +could only go to the man concerned in the A.G. Department, explain +matters, and beg him for goodness sake to wrestle with the problem and +carry out what was wanted.</p> + +<p>What, however, was still more unfortunate than Lord K.'s lack of +acquaintance with the distribution of work <span class="pagenum"><a id="page048" name="page048"></a>(p. 048)</span> within the Office +was that he was by no means familiar with many very essential details +of our existing military organization. That is not an unusual state of +affairs when a new Secretary of State is let loose in the War Office. +But a new Secretary of State as a rule has the time, and is willing, +to study questions of organization and policy closely before embarking +on fresh projects. Lord Kitchener, however, arrived with certain +preconceived ideas and cramped by defective knowledge of the army +system. He had scarcely served at home since he had left Chatham as a +young subaltern of the Royal Engineers. In Egypt, in India, even to a +great extent in South Africa, the troops coming from the United +Kingdom with which he had been brought into contact had been regulars. +He had never had anything to say to the provision of British military +personnel at its source. For the three years previous to the outbreak +of the Great War he had been holding a civil appointment afar off, and +had necessarily been out of touch with contemporary military thought. +There must have been many matters in connection with the organization +of His Majesty's land forces, thoroughly known to pretty well every +staff-officer in the War Office, of which the incoming Secretary of +State was entirely unaware. The British division of all arms of 1914 +represented a far larger force than the British divisions of all arms +had represented with which he had had to do in the days of Paardeberg +and Diamond Hill. The expressions "Special Reserve" and "Territorial +Forces" did not, I believe, when he arrived, convey any very clear +meaning to him. He was not, in fact, in all respects fully equipped +for his task.</p> + +<p>With many, indeed with most, men similarly placed this might not have +greatly mattered. There were plenty of officers of wide experience in +Whitehall who could have posted him up fully in regard to points not +within his knowledge. But Lord Kitchener had for many years previously +always been absolute master in his own house, with neither the need +nor the desire to lean upon others. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page049" name="page049"></a>(p. 049)</span> Like many men of strong +will and commanding ability, he was a centralizer by instinct and in +practice. He took over the position of War Minister with very clearly +defined conceptions of what must be done to expand the exiguous +fighting forces of his country in face of the tremendous emergency +with which it stood suddenly confronted. He was little disposed to +modify the plans which he had formed for compassing that end, when +subordinates pointed out that these clashed with arrangements that +were already in full working order, or that they ignored the existence +of formations which only stood in need of nursing and of consolidation +to render them really valuable assets within a short space of time for +the purpose of prosecuting war. The masterful personality and +self-confidence to which the phenomenal success that attended his +creation of the wonderful New Armies was so largely due, was in some +respects a handicap to him in the early days of his stewardship.</p> + +<p>My impression of him—an impression unduly influenced perhaps by +personal experiences—was that he was shy of strangers or comparative +strangers. He did not give his confidence readily to subordinates with +whom he found himself associated for the first time. He would not +brook remonstrance, still less contradiction, from a man whom he did +not know. It was largely due to this, as it seemed to me, that he was +rather out of hand, so to speak, during the critical opening months. +It was during those opening months that he performed the greatest +services to the people of this land, that he introduced the measures +which won us the war. But it was also during those opening months, +when he was disinclined to listen to advice, that he made his worst +mistakes.</p> + +<p>I do not believe that there was one single military authority of any +standing within the War Office, except himself, who would not have +preferred that the cream of the personnel, men who had served in the +regulars, who flocked into the ranks in response to his trumpet call +to the nation, should have been devoted in the first instance +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page050" name="page050"></a>(p. 050)</span> to filling the yawning gaps that existed in the Territorial +Forces, and to providing those forces with trained reservists to fill +war wastage. Such a disposition of this very valuable material seemed +preferable to absorbing it at the outset in brand-new formations, +which in any case would be unable to take the field for many months to +come. Parliament would have readily consented to any alteration in the +statutes governing the Territorial Forces which might have been +necessary. Lord K.'s actions in this question to some extent +antagonized the military side of the War Office just at first: we were +thinking of the early future: he, as was his wont, was looking far +ahead. My work was nowise concerned with the provision of troops in +any form, and in later days, when I was often with the Chief, I never +remember discussing the Territorials with him. But it is conceivable +that he became somewhat prejudiced against this category of the land +forces at the start on finding that they were unable to perform the +very duty for which they were supposed to exist—that of home defence. +Something may, therefore, perhaps be said here on this point.</p> + +<p>Mobilization means producing the force concerned, at its full war +establishment and composed of officers and men who at least have some +pretence to military training. It is, moreover, supposed to be +completed at very short notice. Owing to their being territorial and +to officers and other ranks living in their territorial districts, the +Territorial Forces ought to have been mobilized more rapidly by some +hours than the Expeditionary Force, and I believe that, in so far as +collecting what personnel there was available is concerned, the +Territorial Forces beat the Expeditionary Force. But the ranks of the +Territorials had never filled in pre-war days, and there were +practically no organized reserves. The war establishment was roughly +315,000 of all ranks; but at the beginning of August the strength was +only about 270,000, and this, be it remembered, included a proportion +of totally untrained individuals, as well as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page051" name="page051"></a>(p. 051)</span> sick, +absentees, and so forth. To have mobilized these troops properly, the +number of officers and men on the books at the start and before the +order came ought to have amounted to at least 350,000.</p> + +<p>The consequence of this shortage was that, at the very moment when the +Government and the country were on the first occasion for a century +confronted by a really grave and complex military situation, at the +very moment when there was a scare as to German projects of an +immediate invasion, that category of our land forces which was +especially earmarked for the defence of the British Isles was not in a +position to perform its functions. The Sixth Division, properly +forming part of the Expeditionary Force, had to be fetched over from +Ireland to East Anglia to bolster up the Territorials, and Sir J. +French was deprived of its use for six weeks at a very critical time. +The ranks of the Territorial Forces filled up very rapidly <i>after</i> +mobilization, but from the home defence point of view that was too +late. We required our home defence army to be ready at once, so that +the overseas army could be despatched complete to the Continent +without <span lang="fr"><i>arrière pensée</i></span>. Its failure at the critical moment may have +somewhat influenced Lord Kitchener in the estimates that he formed of +it thenceforward. Instead of framing his plans with a view to +reinforcing the Expeditionary Force as soon as possible with the +existing fourteen Territorial divisions which were in some measure +going concerns, by affording these special support, he preferred +simply to expand the Territorial Forces as a whole. Four divisions +were sent out of the country on garrison duty before the end of 1914, +but although a number of individual battalions had preceded it, the +first division to be sent to the front (the North Midland) did not +sail from the United Kingdom till the end of February, more than six +months after the outbreak of hostilities, while the two last to take +the field did not leave till early in 1916. The policy may in the long +run have proved the right one; but <span class="pagenum"><a id="page052" name="page052"></a>(p. 052)</span> at the time it did seem a +pity not to have accelerated the preparation of these existing troops +for the ordeal of the field. None of us in Whitehall, however, wished +the New Armies to be set up under the auspices of the Territorial +Associations; that was a different question altogether.</p> + +<p>Moreover, whatever was the cause of it, the Territorial divisions +after they took the field seemed to be treated as veritable +Cinderellas for a long time. They generally set out short of +establishment, and they were apt to dwindle away painfully for want of +reserves after they had spent a few weeks on the war-path. The Returns +show this to have been the case. More than one of the divisional +Generals concerned spoke to me, or wrote to me, on the subject in the +later months of 1915. This discouraging shrinkage was not manifesting +itself to at all the same extent at that stage in such New Army +divisions as were at the front.</p> + +<p>A good many of us at the War Office also did not, I think, see quite +eye to eye with Lord K. in connection with his piling up of New Army +divisions without providing them with reserves. The tremendous drain +which modern war creates in respect to personnel came as a surprise to +all the belligerents; but the surprise came fairly early in the +proceedings, and the Adjutant-General's department had fully grasped +what this meant, and had realized the scale of the provision necessary +to meet it, by the end of 1914. If I remember aright, one whole "New +Army" (the Fourth, I think it was) had to be broken up in the summer +of 1915, and transformed into a reservoir of reserves, because the +First, Second, and Third New Armies practically had none. It had been +manifest long before these armies were gradually drawn into the fight +that they would suffer heavy wastage, and that they would speedily +become mere skeletons unless they had ample backing from home. Had the +branches of the War Office which were supposed to deal with these +questions been allowed their own way in regard to them, I imagine +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page053" name="page053"></a>(p. 053)</span> that greater foresight would have been displayed and that +some confusion might have been avoided.</p> + +<p>The preceding paragraphs read perhaps rather like a deliberate attempt +to belittle the achievements of the greatest of our War Ministers. But +they only touch upon one side, the dark side so to speak, of Lord +Kitchener's work as an organizer and administrator during the Great +War. Little has been said hitherto as to the other and much more +important side, the bright side, of that work.</p> + +<p>The marvels that he accomplished in respect to multiplying the land +forces of the nation by creating improvised armies as it were by +magic, have put in the shade a feat for which Lord Kitchener has never +been given sufficient credit. Prior to August 1914, no organization +existed for placing any portions of our regular army in the field in a +Continental theatre of war, other than the Expeditionary Force and one +additional division. The additional division was to be constituted if +possible on the outbreak of war out of infantry to be withdrawn from +certain foreign garrisons, and spare artillery, engineer and +departmental units that existed in the United Kingdom. That additional +division, the Seventh, was despatched to the Western Front within two +months of mobilization. But Lord Kitchener also organized four further +regular divisions, the Eighth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth and +Twenty-ninth, of which the first three were in the field within five +months of mobilization, joining Sir J. French respectively in +November, December and January, and the remaining one was nearly ready +to take the field by the end of the six months. The Secretary of State +prepared for this immediately on taking up office, by recalling +practically the whole of the regulars on foreign service, with the +exception of the British troops included in four mixed Indian +divisions. Would any War Minister other than Lord Kitchener have had +the courage to denude India of British regular troops, artillery as +well as infantry, to the extent that he did? Supposing any other War +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page054" name="page054"></a>(p. 054)</span> Minister to have proposed such a thing, would the Government +have backed him up? It was the handiwork of a very big man.</p> + +<p>Still, this was after all a quite minor detail in the constructive +labours undertaken by one of the most illustrious public servants of +our time. His paramount claim to the gratitude of his countrymen rests +upon his nimble perception of the nature of the task which he had been +suddenly called upon to perform, and upon the speed with which he set +every channel in motion to accomplish his purpose. He realized, as it +seemed by instinct, that this contest was going to be a very big +business indeed, an incomparably bigger business than these topmost +military authorities who had been in the confidence of the Government +before the blow fell had any idea of. It is no exaggeration to say +that in this matter he was a giant amongst the pigmies. He grasped the +truth at once that this world war was to be a protracted struggle, a +struggle in which the Entente would not gain the upper hand unless a +tremendous effort was to be put forward by the British Empire. He saw +almost at a glance that our military system such as it was, and as +previously devised with a view to war conditions, provided what +represented numerically no more than an insignificant fraction of the +host which would ultimately be needed to give us victory. He +furthermore—and it is well to insist upon this thus early, in view of +fabrications which have been put about on the subject of +munitions—clearly discerned the need for a huge expansion in the +country's powers of output in respect to war material; so that under +his impulse existing factories and establishments were developed on +generous lines, and arrangements were instantly set on foot for +creating entirely new factories and establishments. The result was +that, after a lean and discouraging period for the troops in the +field, the needs of an army which was ten times as strong as the army +which soldiers of light and leading had been contemplating before war +broke out, were being <span class="pagenum"><a id="page055" name="page055"></a>(p. 055)</span> adequately met within fifteen months +of the British ultimatum to Germany.</p> + +<p>Within the War Office itself he certainly made things hum. In pre-war, +plain-clothes days, those messengers of distinguished +presence—dignity personified in their faultlessly-fitting official +frock-coats and red waistcoats—had lent a tone of respectability to +the precincts, compensating for the unfortunate impression conveyed by +Adjutant-Generals and such like who perambulated the corridors in +grimy, abandoned-looking "office jackets." (No scarecrow on duty +afield in the remotest of rural districts would have been seen in the +garment which my predecessor, now F.M., Bart., and G.C.B., left +hanging up as a legacy in the apartment which he vacated in my +favour.) But—although old hands will hardly credit it and may think I +am romancing—I have seen those messengers tearing along the passages +with coat-tails flying as though mad monkeys were at their heels, when +Lord K. wanted somebody in his sanctum and had invited one of them to +take the requisite steps. If the Chief happened to desire the presence +of oneself, one did not run. Appearances had to be preserved. But one +walked rather fast.</p> + +<p>An earlier paragraph has hinted that, owing to military authorities in +Whitehall not seeing quite eye to eye with the new Secretary of State +when he took up his appointment, he was to some small extent working +in an atmosphere of latent hostility to his measures. This state of +affairs was, however, of very short duration, and certainly did not +hamper his operations in the slightest degree; he would indeed have +made uncommonly short work of anybody whom he found to be actively +opposing him, or even to be hanging back. But the situation in the +case of G.H.Q. of the Expeditionary Force was different. It is a +matter of common knowledge—anybody who was unaware of it before the +appearance of Lord French's "<i>1914</i>" will have learnt it from that +volume—that the relations between Lord Kitchener and some of those up +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page056" name="page056"></a>(p. 056)</span> at the top in connection with our troops on the Western +Front were, practically from the outset, not quite satisfactory in +character.</p> + +<p>The attitude taken up by G.H.Q. over a comparatively small matter +during the first few days is an example of this. The Secretary of +State had laid his hands upon one officer and one or two +non-commissioned officers of each battalion of the Expeditionary +Force, and had diverted these to act as drill-instructors, and so +forth, for the new formations which he proposed to create. That his +action in this should have been objected to within the bereft units +was natural enough; their officers could hardly be expected to take +the long view on the question at such a juncture. But that the higher +authorities of our little army proceeding to the front should have +taken the measure so amiss was unfortunate. And it was, moreover, +instructive, indicating as it did in somewhat striking fashion the +lack of sense of proportion prevalent amongst some of those included +in G.H.Q. This chapter deals only with early days; but it may perhaps +be mentioned here that there was a disposition to deride and decry the +New Army at St. Omer almost up to the date, May 1915, when the first +three of its divisions, the Ninth, Twelfth and Fourteenth, made their +appearance in the war zone.</p> + +<p>Watching the progress of events from behind the scenes, one could not +but think that in respect to the occasional <span lang="fr"><i>tracasseries</i></span> between the +War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in +France and Flanders, there were faults on both sides. The wording of +some of the telegraphic messages passing between Lord K. and Sir J. +French did not strike one as altogether felicitous, and, if messages +from G.H.Q. were provocative, the replies were not always calculated +to pour oil on troubled waters. The truth is, that when a pair of +people both of whom require "handling" become associated under +conditions of anxiety and stress that are bound to be trying to the +temper and jarring on the nerves, it's a horse to a hen they won't +make much of a fist of handling each other. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page057" name="page057"></a>(p. 057)</span> The Secretary of +State's action in sending Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to command the Second +Corps at the very outset of the campaign after General Grierson's +tragic death, struck me at the time as a mistake. Sir J. French had +asked for General Plumer who was available, and his wishes might well +have been acceded to. Owing to circumstances of a quite special +character the selection was not in any case an altogether happy one, +as the relations between the new commander of the Second Corps and the +chief of the B.E.F. had not always been too cordial in the past. +Having been away from home so much, Lord K. may not have been aware of +this; but I imagine that if he had consulted the Military Members of +the Army Council they would have mentioned it, as it was almost a +matter of common knowledge in the Service.</p> + +<p>On that unpleasant controversy with regard to the rights and the +wrongs of what occurred when the War Minister paid his sudden visit to +Paris during the retreat from Mons, of which so much has been heard, I +can throw no light whatever. At a later date "Fitz" (Colonel O. +Fitzgerald, Lord K.'s constant companion) and I were in pretty close +touch, and he used to keep me informed of what his chief had in his +mind; but I hardly knew him to speak to during the early weeks. In +respect to the Antwerp business, it certainly did seem to me that our +principal commander on the Western Front (for the moment there were +two) was not being very well treated. From a perusal of some of the +communications that were flying about at a juncture when Sir J. French +was confronted by a complex problem, and was virtually embarking on an +entirely new set of operations, one gathered that he was hardly being +kept so well informed of what was in progress and of what was +contemplated as he had a right to expect, and as was indeed demanded +by the situation. Still, this was no doubt due to what one might call +bad Staff work, and not to any wish to keep Sir John in the dark as to +Sir H. Rawlinson's orders, nor as to the position of this new British +force that was being <span class="pagenum"><a id="page058" name="page058"></a>(p. 058)</span> planted down in the war zone. It may +well have been the direct result of Lord K.'s system of keeping all +telegraphic work in connection with operations in his own hands, +instead of this being carried out by the General Staff as under the +existing regulations it was supposed to be.</p> + +<p>Much has been written and has been said in public about the pushing of +the General Staff into the background at the War Office during the +early months of the war. An idea exists that this subversion was +mainly, if not indeed entirely, consequential on the weakening of its +personnel as a body owing to a number of its most prominent and +experienced members having gone off to the wars. While readily +admitting that its efficiency suffered as a result of these +withdrawals, I am by no means sure that it would have managed to keep +in the foreground even if the whole of its more shining lights had on +mobilization remained where they were in Whitehall. Lord Kitchener had +never been closely associated with Generals Robertson and Henry +Wilson, its two principal members to leave for the front, and it by no +means follows that if they had remained they would, during the first +few critical weeks, have been much more successful than were Sir C. +Douglas and Sir J. Wolfe-Murray in keeping a hand on the helm. The +Secretary of State would no doubt have learnt to value their counsel +before long, but he would no more have tolerated the slightest attempt +at dictation in respect to the general conduct of the war until he +knew his men, than he would have put up with dictation as to how the +personnel which he was attracting into the ranks at the rate of tens +of thousands per week were to be disposed of. The story of how the +General Staff gradually recovered much of its lost ground will, +however, be touched upon in the next chapter, and on that point no +more need be said at present.</p> + +<p>It may, however, be remarked here that the comparative elimination of +the General Staff was virtually <span class="pagenum"><a id="page059" name="page059"></a>(p. 059)</span> confined to its elimination +in respect to what admittedly is its most important function in times +of national emergency—advising the Government of the country on the +subject of the general conduct of the war—and in respect to the +administrative task of actually issuing instructions as to operations +to those in supreme command in the theatres of conflict. The duties of +the General Staff cover many other matters besides these. They include +collection of information, secret service, questions of international +law, military education, training of troops, etc. It fulfilled its +mission in connection with such subjects just as had always been +intended, nor, in so far as they were concerned, was it thrust on one +side in any sense. Lord Kitchener's system of centralization only +directly affected a small proportion of the very numerous +directorates, branches, and sections into which the War Office was +divided up.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page060" name="page060"></a>(p. 060)</span> CHAPTER IV</h3> + +<h5>LORD KITCHENER'S LATER RECORD</h5> + +<p class="resume">The munitions question and the Dardanelles, to be dealt with + later — The Alexandretta project of the winter of 1914-15 — Such an + operation presented little difficulty then — H.M.S. <i>Doris'</i> + doings — The scheme abandoned — I am sent to Paris about the + Italian conventions just after the Dardanelles landings — Concern + at the situation after the troops had got ashore at Helles and + Anzac — A talk with Lord K. and Sir E. Grey — Its + consequences — Lord K. seemed to have lost some of his confidence + in his own judgement with regard to operations questions — The + question of the withdrawal of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> from the + Aegean — The discussion about it at the Admiralty — Lord K.'s + inability to take some of his colleagues at their own + valuation — Does not know some of their names — Another officer of + distinction gets them mixed up in his mind — Lord K.'s + disappointment at the early failures of the New Army + divisions — His impatience when he wanted anything in a hurry — My + own experiences — Typists' idiosyncrasies aggravate the + trouble — Lord K. in an unreasonable mood — His knowledge of + French — His skilful handling of a Portuguese mission — His + readiness to see foreign officers when asked to do so — How he + handled them — The Serbian Military Attaché asks for approval of + an attack by his country upon Bulgaria at the time of Bulgarian + mobilization — A dramatic interview with Lord K. — Confidence + placed in him with regard to munitions by the Russians — His + speeches in the House of Lords — The heat of his room — His + preoccupation about the safety of Egypt — He disapproves of the + General Staff plan with regard to its defence — His attitude with + regard to national service — His difficulties in this matter — His + anxiety to have a reserve in hand for delivering the decisive + blow in the war — My last meeting with him — His pleasure in going + to Russia — His failure to accomplish his mission, a great + disaster to the Entente cause — A final word about him — He did + more than any man on the side of the Allies to win the war — Fitz.</p> + +<p class="p2">Lord Kitchener's actions and attitude in connection with two +particular matters evoked a good deal of criticism in various quarters +at the time, and much has been said and written about them. One of +those matters was the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page061" name="page061"></a>(p. 061)</span> munitions question, the other was the +Dardanelles undertaking; both of those subjects are, however, +discussed in special later chapters, and no reference will therefore +be made to them in this one, except incidentally. I have, moreover, no +recollection of ever having been brought into contact with the +Secretary of State in connection with those projects for combined +naval and military operations on the Flanders coast which received +considerable attention in the winter of 1914-15, although, as will be +mentioned in Chapter VI., aware of what was under review.</p> + +<p>That Flanders coast scheme constituted, it may be observed, a question +of the general strategical conduct of the war; it was, in fact, a +question of "operations." The first time that I went into any problem +coming properly under that heading with the Secretary of State was +when a plan of landing troops at or near Alexandretta was on the tapis +in December 1914. There was a good deal to be said for such an +enterprise at that particular juncture. Military opinion invariably +favours active in preference to passive defence, so long as active +defence can be regarded as reasonably feasible and the troops needed +for the purpose are available. The Turks were mustering for an attack +upon Egypt across the Isthmus of Sinai at that time. It was an axiom +in our military policy that the Nile delta must be rendered secure +against such efforts. There was something decidedly attractive about +employing the troops—or a portion of them—who must in any case be +charged with the protection of Egypt, actively against the enemy's +line of communications instead of their hanging about, a stationary +force, on the Suez Canal awaiting the onset of the Osmanli. Right +through the war, the region about the Gulf of Iskanderun was one of +prime strategical importance, seeing that Entente forces planted down +in those parts automatically threatened, if they did not actually +sever, the Ottoman communications between Anatolia and the theatres of +war in Palestine and in Mesopotamia. But at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page062" name="page062"></a>(p. 062)</span> dates subsequent +to the winter of 1914-15 the enemy had fully realized that this was +the case, was in a position to provide against the eventuality, and +had taken steps accordingly.</p> + +<p>At the time I speak of, the Turks were not, however, in strong force +at or near Alexandretta. Nor were they in a position to assemble +formidable bodies of troops in that neighbourhood at short notice. For +railway communications running westward towards Smyrna and the Golden +Horn remained interrupted by the great Taurus range of mountains, the +tunnels through which were making slow progress, and the tunnels +through the Amanus hills which sever Aleppo from the Cilician Plain +were likewise incomplete. One of our light cruisers (H.M.S. <i>Doris</i>, +if my memory is not at fault) was stationed in the Gulf of Iskanderun, +and was having a high old time. She dodged up and down the coast, +appeared unexpectedly at unwelcome moments, and carried terror into +the hearts of the local representatives of the Sublime Porte. She +landed boats' crews from time to time just to show that she was +top-dog, without their even being fired upon. Somebody ashore having +done something that she disapproved of, she ordered the Ottoman +officials to blow up certain of the bridges on their own railway, and +when these harassed individuals, anxious to oblige, proffered the +excuse that they lacked the wherewithal to carry her instructions out, +she lent them explosives and saw to it that they were properly used. +Her activities made it plain to us that there was absolutely no fight +in the enemy at the moment in this quarter.</p> + +<p>The whole subject of an expedition to Alexandretta was carefully gone +into, in consultation with Sir J. Maxwell who was commanding the +forces in Egypt, and we came to the conclusion that a comparatively +small force could quite easily effect a landing and gain sufficient +ground to make itself comfortable on enemy soil, even if the Turks +managed gradually to assemble reinforcements. One realized that +securing a considerable sector of ground <span class="pagenum"><a id="page063" name="page063"></a>(p. 063)</span> at once was +essential in an amphibious operation of this kind, the very thing that +was never accomplished on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Lord K. was much +interested in the project for a time; he believed that it would help +the Russians, who were in some straits in Armenia, and he was +satisfied that if it was successfully carried into effect, hostile +designs against the Suez Canal line would automatically be brought to +nought. A job of this sort would have served as a capital exercise for +some of the Australasian troops then in Egypt, who from the training +point of view were still a raw soldiery; such a task would have +represented a very different class of trial from that which they were +actually to undergo three months later when getting ashore at Anzac +Cove. But Mr. Churchill's naval project against the Dardanelles began +to take shape early in January, and it put an end to any thoughts +about Alexandretta. The matter is, indeed, only mentioned here because +its consideration marked about the first occasion on which Lord +Kitchener made any use of the General Staff within the War Office in +connection with any operations question outside the United Kingdom.</p> + +<p>It was not until another four months had elapsed, however, that I +personally had much say in regard to those very questions which a +Director of Military Operations would, from his title, seem +necessarily to be closely concerned with. The change that then took +place I attribute very largely to an incident which on that account +deserves recording. It happened that, on the very day after welcome +tidings came to hand by cable from Sir I. Hamilton to the effect that +he had successfully landed 29,000 troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula on +the 25th of April, I was sent off to Paris to represent the British +Army at a secret conference with French and Russian commissioners and +with representatives of the Italians (who were coming into the war), +at which naval and military conventions with our fresh ally were to be +drawn up. Further reference to this conference will be made in a later +chapter. The consequence was that for <span class="pagenum"><a id="page064" name="page064"></a>(p. 064)</span> several days I heard +no more about Sir Ian's operations beyond what appeared in the +newspapers, and it was only when Mr. Churchill turned up somewhat +unexpectedly and told me what had occurred, that it was borne in on me +that our Dardanelles expeditionary force was completely held up in +cramped positions and without elbow-room on an uncomfortable sort of +shore. An examination of the telegrams and a discussion with my +assistants after getting back from Paris convinced me that the +situation was in the highest degree unsatisfactory, and I gathered, +furthermore, that H.M. Government did not seem to be aware how +unsatisfactory the situation was.</p> + +<p>A day or two later, Lord K. summoned me to his room to ask some +question, when I found Sir E. Grey closeted with him. Here was an +opportunity that was not to be missed. While the Chief was making a +note at his desk of the point that he wanted to know, I spoke to Sir +Edward, and told him in effect that we had not a dog's chance of +getting through the Dardanelles unless he secured the aid of the +Bulgars, or of the Greeks, or of both of them—purposely putting the +matter more strongly than I actually felt about it, in the hopes of +making an impression by a jeremiad. Lord K. stopped writing and looked +up. We had a short conversation, and after a few minutes I left the +room. The Foreign Minister may not have been impressed, but Lord K. +was; for he sent for me again later in the day, and we had a long +discussion about Sir I. Hamilton's prospects. The incident, moreover, +had a result which I had not anticipated. From that time forward the +Chief often talked to me about the position in the Dardanelles and in +the Near East generally. He used to take me with him to the +Dardanelles Committee which was formed soon afterwards; and when he +was away I ordinarily represented him at the deliberations of that +body, deliberations which, as a matter of fact, covered a good deal of +ground besides the Gallipoli Peninsula.</p> + +<p>It struck me at the time that Lord Kitchener's <span class="pagenum"><a id="page065" name="page065"></a>(p. 065)</span> confidence in +himself and his own judgement, in connection with what may be called +operations subjects, had been somewhat shaken, and that from this +stage onwards he rather welcomed the opinion of others when such +points arose. The Antwerp adventure had proved a fiasco. The endeavour +to force the Dardanelles by naval power, unaided by troops, had +conspicuously failed. Coming on the top of those discouraging +experiences, our army thrown ashore on the Gallipoli Peninsula had, +after suffering very heavy losses, straightway been brought to a +standstill. As regards the Fleet's efforts against the Straits, I +gathered at the time (from Fitzgerald, I think) that in taking an +optimistic view of the project when it was under discussion by the War +Council, Lord K. had been a good deal influenced by recollections of +the bombardment of Alexandria, at which he had been present. The Chief +always claimed to have been led astray by Mr. Churchill concerning the +potentialities of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, and had, I should say, come +to the conclusion that the judgement of the then First Lord, with whom +he had been so closely associated for nine months, was not quite +infallible. He cannot but have been aware that his Cabinet colleagues +no longer reposed the implicit trust in his own judgement that they +had accorded him at the outset. All through the summer of 1915 he grew +more and more disposed to listen to the views of the General Staff as +regards questions affecting the general conduct of the war, and, after +Sir A. Murray became C.I.G.S. in October, that institution was almost +occupying its proper position in the consultative sense. It did not +recover its proper position in the executive sense, however, until +Lord K. arranged that Sir W. Robertson should take up charge at the +end of the year.</p> + +<p>The question of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> cropped up in somewhat acute +form two or three weeks after my conversation with Sir E. Grey which +has been mentioned above. Lord Fisher had, as I knew from himself, +been getting decidedly jumpy about the enemy U-boats, which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page066" name="page066"></a>(p. 066)</span> +were known to be approaching the Aegean, and about the middle of May +he raised the question of fetching away the "<i>Lizzie</i>," as Sir I. +Hamilton's troops used to call her, lest evil should befall this, the +most powerful ship in commission at the time. Lord Fisher has referred +to this matter in his book <i>Memories</i>. He speaks of great tension +between Lord K. and himself over the business, and he mentions an +interview at the Admiralty at which, according to him, Lord K. got up +from the table and left when he (Lord Fisher) announced that he would +resign unless the battleship was ordered out of that forthwith. Now +there may have been more than one interview at the Admiralty, but I +was present at the conference when the matter was settled, and my +recollection of what occurred does not agree with Lord Fisher's +account.</p> + +<p>Lord Kitchener sent for me early one morning, and on my presenting +myself, told me that Lord Fisher was insisting upon recalling the +<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> owing to enemy submarines, that Mr. Churchill was in +two minds but leant towards keeping her where she was, that he (Lord +K.) objected to her removal, and that I was to accompany him to a +meeting at the Admiralty a little later in connection with the affair. +"They've rammed that ship down my throat," said he in effect. +"Churchill told me in the first place that she would knock all the +Dardanelles batteries into smithereens, firing from goodness knows +where. He afterwards told me that she would make everything all right +for the troops as they landed, and after they landed. And now, without +'with your leave or by your leave,' old Fisher says he won't let her +stop out there." He seemed to be quite as much concerned about the way +he had been treated in the matter, as influenced by any great alarm at +the prospect of the ship leaving the vicinity of the Dardanelles. +Finally, he asked me what I thought myself.</p> + +<p>Now, there could be no question as to the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> being a +most powerful ship of war; but the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page067" name="page067"></a>(p. 067)</span> fact was that she had +been a regular nuisance. Mr. Churchill had somehow persuaded himself, +and what was worse, he had managed to persuade Lord Kitchener as well +as Mr. Asquith and others, that she would just about settle the +Dardanelles business off her own bat. I had, as it happened (and as +will be mentioned in the next chapter), expressed doubts to him six +months earlier when the idea of operations in this quarter was first +mooted, as to the efficacy of gun-fire from warships in assisting +troops on shore or when trying to get ashore. Nothing which had +happened since had furnished any reason for altering that view. No +battleship depending upon flat trajectory guns could ever play a rôle +of paramount importance during fighting ashore, except in quite +abnormal circumstances. The whole thing was a delusion. Ships of war, +and particularly such a vessel as the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, did +undoubtedly provide moral support to an army operating on land close +to the coast, and their aid was by no means to be despised; but their +potentialities under such conditions were apt to be greatly +overestimated, and had, in fact, been greatly overestimated by the War +Council. My reply to the Chief, therefore, was to the effect that it +was of secondary importance from the soldier's point of view whether +this particular battleship stopped or cleared out, and that, seeing +the risks which she obviously was running, it seemed to me a mistake +to contest the point. We discussed the matter briefly, and Lord K. +gave me to understand that, although he must put up some sort of fight +as he had already raised objections, he would make no real stand about +it at the coming pow-wow.</p> + +<p>When we went across the road we found Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher +waiting in the First Lord's room. After some remarks by Mr. Churchill +giving the <i>pros</i> and <i>cons</i>, Lord Fisher burst out that, unless +orders were dispatched to the battleship without delay to "come out of +that," he would resign. The First Lord thereupon, somewhat reluctantly +as it seemed to me, intimated that in view of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page068" name="page068"></a>(p. 068)</span> the position +taken up by his principal expert adviser, he had no option but to +recall the vessel. Lord Kitchener demurred, but he demurred very +mildly. There was no jumping up and going off in a huff. Some +perfectly amicable discussion as to one or two other points of mutual +interest ensued, and when we took our departure the Chief was in the +very best of humours and asked me if he had made as much fuss as was +expedient under the circumstances.</p> + +<p>Lord K. seemed quite incapable of taking his Cabinet colleagues so +seriously as people of that sort take themselves. Indeed, but for the +more prominent ones, he never could remember what their jobs were, nor +even recollect their names. It put one in a cold perspiration to hear +him remark, when recounting what had occurred at a Cabinet séance or +at the meeting of some committee bristling with Privy Councillors, "A +fellow—I don't know his name but he's got curly hair—said..." Other +soldiers besides Lord K. have, however, been known on occasion to get +these super-men mixed up in their minds. There were three Ministers, +for instance, whom for convenience we will call Messrs. Abraham, Isaac +and Jacob. Mr. Jacob was on one occasion taking part in a conference +at the War Office about something or other, a whole lot of the +brightest and best sitting round a table trying to look intelligent; +and in the course of the proceedings he felt constrained to give his +opinion on a matter that had cropped up. A soldier of high degree, who +was holding a most respectable position in the War Office and was +sitting on the opposite side of the table, thereupon lifted up his +voice. "I quite see Mr. Abraham's point," he began argumentatively, +"but I——." He was thrown into pitiable confusion, was routed, lost +his guns, his baggage, everything, forgot what he was about to say, on +being brought up short by a snarl from across the table, "My name is +Jacob, not Abraham."</p> + +<p>One day in the summer of 1915 when Lord K. had summoned me to ask some +question, he appeared to be in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page069" name="page069"></a>(p. 069)</span> particularly low spirits, and +presently he showed me a communication (a telegram, I think it was) +from Sir J. French, intimating that one of the New Army divisions +which had recently proceeded across the water had not borne itself +altogether satisfactorily when assailed in the trenches. The troops +had apparently been in a measure caught napping, although they had +fought it out gallantly after being taken at a disadvantage owing to +keeping careless guard. That these divisions, in which he naturally +enough took such exceptional personal interest, needed a great deal of +breaking-in to conditions in presence of the enemy before they could +be employed with complete confidence, had been a bitter disappointment +to him. On this subject he was perhaps misled to some extent by the +opinions of officers who were particularly well qualified to judge. +The New Army troops had shown magnificent grit and zeal while +preparing themselves in this country for the ordeal of the field, +under most discouraging conditions, and they had come on very fast in +consequence. Their very experienced divisional commanders, many of +whom had come conspicuously to the front in the early months of the +war and had learnt in the best of schools what fighting meant under +existing conditions, were therefore rather disposed to form unduly +favourable estimates of what their divisions would be capable of as +soon as they entered upon their great task in the war zone. I remember +receiving a letter from that very gallant and popular gunner, General +F. Wing (who was afterwards killed at Loos), written very shortly +before his division proceeded to France, in which he expressed himself +enthusiastically with regard to the potentialities of his troops. His +earnest hope was to find himself pitting them against the Boche as +soon as the division took the field.</p> + +<p>In one respect we most of us, I think, found Lord K. a little +difficult at times. He was apt to be impatient if, when he was at all +in a hurry, he required information from, or wanted something carried +out by, a subordinate. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page070" name="page070"></a>(p. 070)</span> This impatience indeed rather +disposed him to rush his fences at times. Your book or your orator +always extols the man of lightning decision, and in time of war +soldiers do often have to make up their minds for better or for worse +on the spur of the moment. But there is a good deal to be said for +very carefully examining all the factors bearing upon the question at +issue before coming to a conclusion, if there be leisure for +consideration. Certain of the Secretary of State's colleagues were +perpetually starting some new hare or other overnight, and the result +would often be that the Chief would send for me at about 9.30 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span>, +would give me some brand-new document or would tell me of some fresh +project that was afoot, and would direct me to let him have a note on +the subject not later than 11 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span>, so that he should be fully posted +up in the matter by 11.30 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span>, when the War Council, or the Cabinet, +or the Dardanelles Committee, as the case might be, would be wanting +to chat about it.</p> + +<p>One would thereupon proceed to investigate the project, or whatever +the thing was, would muster one's data, would probably consult some +subordinate and get him to lend a hand, and by, say, 10.15 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> one +had hurriedly drafted out a memorandum, and had handed it to one's +typists with injunctions that the draft must be reproduced at all +hazards within twenty minutes. About 10.30 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> a War Office +messenger, wearing a hunted look on his face, would appear at one's +door. "His Lordship wants to know, sir, if you have that paper ready +that he asked you for." "Tell him that he shall have it directly," and +one got on to the telephone to the clerks' room and enjoined despatch. +In another ten minutes, Lord K.'s Private Secretary, and one of the +best, Creedy, would turn up panting but trying not to look heated. "I +say, can't you let the S. of S. have that confounded paper he is +worrying about? Do be quick so that we may have some peace." Fresh +urgings through the telephone, accompanied by reminders that the +twenty minutes had more than elapsed. Five minutes later <span class="pagenum"><a id="page071" name="page071"></a>(p. 071)</span> +Fitzgerald would arrive. "Look here! K.'s kicking up the devil's own +fuss because you won't let him have some paper or other. Typists? But +it's always those typists of yours, General. Why don't you have the +lot up against the wall out in the courtyard, and have them shot? It's +the only thing to do in these cases." When one had almost given up +hope, the typist would hurry in with a beautifully prepared document, +and one would rush off to the Chief. "Oh! Here you are at last. What a +time you've been. Now, let me see what you say.... Well, that seems +all right. But stop. Show me on the map where this place B—— that +you mention is. One of them may ask." They were just a little +exhausting, those occasions.</p> + +<p>What exactly the tomfoolery is that expert typists engage on after +they have typed a document, I have never been able to discover. As +long as they are at play on their machines these whirr like the +propeller of a Handley-Page. They get down millions of words a minute. +But when they have got the job apparently done, they simmer away to +nothing. They perform mysterious rites with ink-eraser. They scratch +feebly with knives. They hold up to the light, they tittivate, they +muse and they adorn. It is not the slightest use intimating that you +do not care twopence whether there are typographic errors or not—the +expert typist treats you with the scorn that the expert always does +treat the layman with. At such junctures it is an advantage if the +typist happens to be a he, because you can tell him what you think of +him. If the typist happens to be a she, and you tell her what you +think of her, the odds are she will take cover under a flood of tears, +and goodness only knows what one is supposed to do then. Not that my +typists were not highly meritorious—I would not have exchanged them +with anybody. They merely played their game according to the rules.</p> + +<p>Lord K. could no doubt be really unreasonable on occasion; but I can +only recall one instance of it in my own experience. It all arose over +our Military Attaché at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page072" name="page072"></a>(p. 072)</span> our Paris embassy, Colonel H. +Yarde-Buller, having taken up his abode from an early date at +Chantilly so as to be in close touch with General Joffre's +headquarters. Not being on the spot at the Embassy, his work in the +meantime was being done, and very well done, by our Naval Attaché, +Captain M. H. Hodges. I do not know why it was, but one afternoon the +Chief sent for me to say that a Military Attaché was required at once +in Paris, and that I was to proffer names for him to choose from +forthwith. After consultation with my French experts, I produced a +list of desirable candidates for the post, all, to a man, equipped +with incontestable qualifications. But Lord K. would have none of my +nominees, although he probably knew uncommonly little about any of +them. I tried one or two more casts, but the Chief was really for the +moment in an impossible mood. Even Fitzgerald was in despair. At last +the name of Colonel Le Roy Lewis occurred to me, whom I somehow had +not thought of before; but on repairing to the Chief's anteroom, where +Fitz always was, a restful air was noticeable in the apartment, and +Fitz acquainted me in a tone of relief that the boss had gone off +home. He moreover counselled me to keep Le Roy Lewis up my sleeve and +to lie low, as the whole thing might have blown over by next day, and +that is exactly what happened. One heard no more about it; but several +weeks later I began myself to find that the military work in Paris was +getting so heavy that we ought to have an attaché of our own, instead +of depending upon the Admiralty's man, Hodges. So I went to Lord K., +proposed the appointment of a second Military Attaché, and suggested +Le Roy Lewis for the job. "Certainly," said Lord K.; "fix the business +up with the Foreign Office, or whatever's necessary." The fuss there +had been a few weeks before had apparently been forgotten.</p> + +<p>His intimate acquaintance with the French language stood him in rare +stead, and this undoubtedly represented an asset to the country during +the period that he was War Minister. His actual phraseology and his +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page073" name="page073"></a>(p. 073)</span> accent might peradventure not have been accounted quite +faultless on the boulevards; but he was wonderfully fluent, he never +by any chance paused for a word, and he always appeared to be +perfectly familiar with those happy little turns of speech to which +the Gallic tongue so particularly lends itself. The ease with which he +took charge of, and dominated, the whole proceedings on the occasion +of one or two of the earlier conferences on the farther side of the +Channel between our Ministers and the French astonished our +representatives, as some of them have told me. He thoroughly enjoyed +discussions with foreign officers who had been sent over officially to +consult with the War Office about matters connected with the war, and +he always, as far as one could judge, deeply impressed such visitors. +I do not think that the warmth with which some of them spoke about him +after such pow-wows when I ushered them out, was a mere manifestation +of politeness. He was gifted with a special bent for diplomacy, and he +prided himself with justice on the skill and tact with which he +handled such questions.</p> + +<p>Quite early in the war—it must have been about November 1914—a small +Portuguese military mission turned up, bearers of a proposal that our +ancient ally should furnish a division to fight under Sir J. French's +orders on the Western Front. Our Government, as it happened, were not +anxious, on political grounds which need not be gone into here, for +open and active co-operation on the part of Portugal at this time. +Regarding the question from the purely military point of view, one +doubted whether the introduction into the Flanders war zone of +Portuguese troops, who would require certain material which we could +then ill spare before they took the field, would not be premature at +this early juncture. When tactfully interrogating concerning the +martial spirit, the training efficiency, and so forth, of the rank and +file, one was touched rather than exhilarated by the head of the +mission's expression of faith "<span lang="fr">ils savent mourir</span>." The officers +composing the mission were, however, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page074" name="page074"></a>(p. 074)</span> enthusiasts for their +project, and they were on that account somewhat difficult to keep, as +it were, at arm's length. But Lord K.'s management of the problem was +masterly.</p> + +<p>In the course of a protracted conference in his room, he contrived to +persuade our friends from Lisbon that the despatch of the division at +this moment would be a mistake from their, and from everybody else's, +point of view, and he extracted promises out of them to let us have +many thousands of their excellent Mauser rifles, together with a +goodly number of their Schneider-Canet field guns. The small arms (of +which we were horribly short at the time) proved invaluable in South +Africa and Egypt, while the guns served to re-equip the Belgian army +to some extent with field artillery. He managed to convince the +mission that this was by far the most effective form of assistance +which Portugal could then afford to the Entente—as was indeed the +case—and he sent them off, just a little bewildered perhaps, but +perfectly satisfied and even gratified. One felt a little bewildered +oneself, the whole business had been conducted with such nicety and +discretion.</p> + +<p>His name counted for much in the armies of the Allies, as I myself +found later wherever I went in Russia. Foreign officers coming on +official errands to London, attached an enormous importance to +obtaining an interview with him, and he was very good about this. "Oh, +I can't be bothered with seeing the man," he would say; "you've told +him the thing's out of the question. What's the good of his coming to +me, taking up my time?" "But you see, sir," one would urge; "he's a +little rubbed up the wrong way at not getting what he wants, and will +not put the thing pleasantly to his own people when he fetches up at +their end. You can smooth him down as nobody else could, and then +he'll go away off out of this like a lamb and be quite good." "Oh +well, bring him along. But, look here. You must have him away again +sharp out of my room, or he'll keep on giving tongue here all the rest +of the day." What actually <span class="pagenum"><a id="page075" name="page075"></a>(p. 075)</span> happened as a rule on such +occasions was that Lord K. would not let the missionary get a word in +edgeways, smothered him with cordiality, chattered away in French as +if he were wound up, and the difficulty was, not to carry the man off +but to find an opportunity for jumping up and thereby conveying a hint +to our friend that it was time to clear out. "<span lang="fr">Comme il est charmant, +M. le Maréchal,</span>" the gratified foreign officer would say after one had +grabbed him somehow and conducted him out of the presence; "<span lang="fr">je +n'oublierai de ma vie que je lui ai serré la main</span>." And he would go +off back to where he had come from, as pleased as Punch, having +completely failed in his embassy.</p> + +<p>But Lord K. could if the occasion called for it, adopt quite a +different tone when dealing with an Allied representative, and I have +a vivid remembrance of one such interview to which there seems to be +no harm in referring now. Some aspects of the tangled political web of +1915, in the Near East, will be dealt with at greater length in +Chapter VII. Suffice it to say here that, at the juncture under +reference, Serbia, with formidable German and Austro-Hungarian hosts +pouring into her territory from the north and aware that her +traditional foe, Bulgaria, was mobilizing, desired to attack Tsar +Ferdinand's realm before it was ready. That, from the purely military +point of view, was unquestionably the sound procedure to adopt. +"Thrice is he armed who has his quarrel just, but four times he who +gets his blow in fust." We know now that it would have been the sound +procedure to adopt, even allowing for arguments against such a course +that could be put forward from the political point of view. But our +Government's attitude was that, in view of engagements entered into by +Greece, the Serbs must not act aggressively against the still neutral +Bulgars. Nor do I think that, seeing how contradictory and +inconclusive the information was upon which they were relying, they +were to blame for maintaining an attitude which in the event had +untoward consequences.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page076" name="page076"></a>(p. 076)</span> One afternoon the Serbian Military Attaché came to see me. He +called in to beg us soldiers to do our utmost to induce H.M. +Government to acquiesce in an immediate offensive on the part of King +Peter's troops against the forces of the neighbouring State, which +were mobilizing and were evidently bent on mischief. I presented our +Government's case as well as I could, although my sympathies were in +fact on military grounds entirely on the side of my visitor. He +thereupon besought me to take him to Lord Kitchener, and I did so. The +Chief talked the question over in the friendliest and most sympathetic +manner, he gave utterance to warm appreciation of the vigorous, heroic +stand which the sore-beset little Allied nation had made, and was +making, in face of dangers that were gathering ever thicker, he +expressed deep regret at our inability to give effective assistance, +and he admitted that from the soldier's point of view there was much +to be said for the contention that an immediate blow should be struck +at Serbia's eastern neighbour. But he stated our Government's attitude +in the matter clearly and uncompromisingly, and he would not budge an +inch on the subject of our sanctioning or approving an attack upon +Bulgaria so long as Bulgaria remained neutral.</p> + +<p>The Attaché protested eagerly, volubly, stubbornly, pathetically, but +all to no purpose. Then, when at last we rose to our feet, Lord K., +finding his visitor wholly unconvinced, drew himself up to his full +height. He seemed to tower over the Attaché, who was himself a tall +man, and—well, it is hard to set down in words the happenings of a +tense situation. The scene was one that I never shall forget, as, by +his demeanour rather than by any words of his, Lord K. virtually +issued a command that no Serb soldier was to cross the Bulgar border +unless the Bulgars embarked on hostilities. The Attaché stood still a +moment; then he put his kepi on, saluted gravely, turned round and +went out without a word. I followed him out on to the landing. "<span lang="fr">Mon +Dieu!</span>" he said; <span class="pagenum"><a id="page077" name="page077"></a>(p. 077)</span> "<span lang="fr">mon Dieu</span>!" And then he went slowly down the +great marble staircase, looking a broken man. But for that interview +the Serbs might perhaps have given their treacherous neighbours an +uncommonly nasty jar before these got going, and this might have +rendered their own military situation decidedly less tragic than it +came to be within a very few days. But I do not see that Lord +Kitchener could have done otherwise than support the attitude of the +Government of which he was a member.</p> + +<p>Striking testimony to the confidence which his name inspired amongst +our Allies is afforded by the action of the Russians in the summer of +1915, in entrusting the question of their being furnished with +munitions from the United States into his hands. They came to him as a +child comes to its mother. This, be it noted, was at a time when our +own army fighting in many fields was notoriously none too well fitted +out with weapons nor with ammunition for them, at a time when the most +powerful group of newspapers in this country had recently been making +a pointed attack upon him in connection with this very matter, at a +time when an idea undoubtedly existed in many quarters in the United +Kingdom that the provision of vital war material had been neglected +and botched under his control. That there was no justification +whatever for that idea does not alter the fact that the idea +prevailed. As I assumed special responsibilities in connection with +Russian supplies at a later date, a date subsequent to the <i>Hampshire</i> +catastrophe, and as the subject of munitions will be dealt with in a +later chapter, no more need be said on the subject here. But the point +seemed to deserve mention at this stage.</p> + +<p>We came rather to dread the occasions when the Chief was going to +deliver one of his periodical orations in the House of Lords. +Singularly enough, he used to take these speeches of his, in which he +took good care never to tell his auditors anything that they did not +know before, quite seriously—a good deal more seriously than we did. +He prepared them laboriously, absorbing a good deal of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page078" name="page078"></a>(p. 078)</span> his +own time, and some of the time of certain of those under him, and then +he would read out his rough draft to one, asking for approval and +grateful for hints. He was always delighted to have some felicitous +turn of expression proffered him, and he would discuss its merits at +some length as compared with his own wording, ending by inserting it +in the draft or rejecting it, as the case might be. I remember on one +occasion, when he was going to fire off one of these addresses, just +about the time when the great Boche thrust of 1915 into the heart of +Russia came to an end, his making use of the idiom that the German +"bolt was about shot." I objected. "Don't you like the phrase?" +demanded Lord K. I admitted that it was an excellent phrase in itself, +but urged that it was not altogether applicable, that the enemy seemed +to have come to a standstill, not because he could get no farther but +because he did not want to go farther, meaning to divert force in some +new direction, and that the words somehow represented our principal +foe as in worse case than was correct. Lord K. seemed disappointed. He +said that he would consider the matter, and he made a note on his +draft. But he stuck to his guns as it turned out; he used the phrase +in the Upper House a day or two later, and it was somewhat criticised +in the newspapers at the time. He was, I believe, so much captivated +by his little figure of speech that he simply could not bear to part +with it.</p> + +<p>He was a regular salamander. The heat of his room, owing to the huge +fire that he always maintained if it was in the least cold outside and +to the double windows designed to keep out the noise of Whitehall, was +at times almost unbearable. One's head would be in a buzz after being +in it for some time. His long sojourn in southern lands no doubt +rendered him very susceptible to low temperatures. On one occasion, +when General Joffre had sent over a couple of superior staff officers +to discuss some questions with him, the four of us sat at his table +for an hour and a half, and the two visitors and I were almost +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page079" name="page079"></a>(p. 079)</span> in a state of collapse at the end. "<span lang="fr">Mais la chaleur! Pouf! +C'était assommant!</span>" I heard one say to the other as they left the +room, not noticing that I was immediately behind.</p> + +<p>Lord Kitchener's judgement in respect to general military policy in +the Near East and the Levant, during the time that he was War Minister +was, I think, to some small extent warped at times by excessive +preoccupation with regard to Egypt and the Sudan. His hesitation to +concur in the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula until he had +convinced himself of the urgent necessity of the step by personal +observation, was, I am sure, prompted by his fears as to the evil +moral effect which such a confession of failure would exert in the +Nile Delta, and up the valley of the great river. Soon after Sir +Archie Murray had become C.I.G.S., and when the War Council had taken +to asking for the considered views of the General Staff upon problems +of the kind, a paper had to be prepared on the subject of how best to +secure Egypt. This document I drafted in the rough in the first +instance. Sir Archie and we Directors of the General Staff then went +carefully through it and modified it in some respects. Its purport +when presented was that the proper course to pursue with regard to +Egypt would be to depend upon holding the line of the Suez Canal, and +some minor areas in front of it, as a comparatively small force would +suffice for the purpose.</p> + +<p>Lord K. was much disappointed. He sent for me, expressed himself as +strongly opposed to our view, and he seemed rather hurt at the +attitude we had taken up. He favoured the despatch of a body of troops +to the Gulf of Alexandretta with the idea of carrying on a very active +defence; he wished to keep the enemy as far away from Egypt as +possible for fear of internal disturbances, and this opinion was, I +know, concurred in by Sir R. Wingate and Sir J. Maxwell. We should, no +doubt, have concurred in that view likewise, had there been unlimited +numbers of divisions to dispose of, and had there been no U-boats +about. But an army merely sufficient to hold the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page080" name="page080"></a>(p. 080)</span> Egyptian +frontier would have been entirely inadequate to start a campaign based +on the sea in northern Syria, and experiences in the Dardanelles +theatre of war hardly offered encouragement for embarking on ventures +on the shores of the Levant. Lord K. called Sir D. Haig, who happened +to be over on short leave at the time, into counsel; Sir Douglas +supported the contention that a comparatively small force distributed +about the Canal would render things secure. The Chief then despatched +General Home (who in those days was known rather as an expert gunner +than as commander of aggregates of army corps) to Egypt to report; I +had ceased to be D.M.O. before the report came to hand, but I believe +that it favoured our plan, the plan which actually was adopted and +which served its purpose for many months.</p> + +<p>A good many of us in the War Office were a little inclined to cavil at +our Chief's deliberation in the matter of demanding a system of +national service, when the country had arrived at the stage where +expansion of the fighting forces was no longer hopelessly retarded by +lack of war material. But, looking back upon the events of the first +year of the war, one realizes now that if he made a mistake over this +subject it was in not establishing the principle by statute at the +very beginning, in the days when he was occupying a position in the +eyes of his countrymen such as no British citizen had enjoyed for +generations. He could have done what he liked at the start. The nation +was solid behind him. Not Great Britain alone, but also Ireland, would +have swallowed conscription with gusto in September 1914, after the +retreat from Mons. Our man-power could in that case have been tapped +gradually, by methods that were at once scientific and equitable, so +as to cause the least possible disturbance to the country's productive +capacity.</p> + +<p>Twelve months later, he had ceased to present quite so commanding a +figure to the proletariat as he had presented when first he was called +in to save the situation. Of this he was probably quite aware himself, +and it is a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page081" name="page081"></a>(p. 081)</span> great mistake to suppose that he was indifferent +to public opinion or even to the opinion of the Press. By that time, +moreover, he was probably a good deal hampered by some of his +colleagues and their pestilent pre-war pledges. A good many +politicians nowadays find it convenient to forget that during those +very days when the secret information reaching them must surely have +made them aware of Germany's determination to make war on a suitable +opportunity presenting itself, they were making the question of +compulsory service virtually a party matter, and were binding +themselves to oppose it tooth and nail. The statemonger always assumes +that the public take his pledges (which he never boggles over breaking +for some purely factious object) seriously. The public may be silly, +but they are not quite so silly as that.</p> + +<p>Having missed the tide when it was at the flood, Lord K. was wise in +acting with circumspection, and in rather shrinking from insisting +upon compulsion so long as it had not become manifestly and +imperatively necessary. When, in the early autumn of 1915, he told me +off as a kind of bear-leader to a Cabinet Committee presided over by +Lord Crewe, which was to go into the general question of man-power and +of the future development of the forces—a Committee which was +intended, as far as I could make out, to advise as to whether +compulsory service was to be adopted or not—I found him a little +unapproachable and disinclined to commit himself. I was, of course, +only supposed to assist in respect to information and as regards +technical military points; but it would have been a help to know +exactly what one's Chief desired and thought. Fitzgerald was a great +standby on such occasions. I gathered from him that the Secretary of +State was not anxious to precipitate bringing the question to a head, +with the conception ever at the back of his mind of conserving +sufficient fighting resources under his hand to deal the decisive blow +in the war when the psychological moment should come, months ahead. He +was not, in 1915, looking to 1916; he was looking to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page082" name="page082"></a>(p. 082)</span> 1917, +having made up his mind from the outset that this was to be a +prolonged war of attrition. He, no more than all others, could foresee +that the Russian revolution was to occur and was to delay the final +triumph of the Entente for full twelve months.</p> + +<p>The last time that I saw the greatest of our War Ministers was a day +or two before he started on his fatal expedition to Russia. I had +recently come back from that country, and had been able to give him +and Fitzgerald some useful hints as to minor points—kit, having all +available decorations handy to put on for special occasions, taking +large-sized photographs to dole out as presents, and so forth. He was +very anxious to get back speedily, and had been somewhat disturbed to +hear that things moved slowly in the Tsar's dominions, and that the +trip would inevitably take considerably longer than he had counted on. +I had urged him not to be in too great haste—to visit several groups +of armies, and to show himself in Moscow and Kieff, feeling absolutely +convinced that if the most was made of his progress through Russian +territory it would do an immense amount of good. But he was in just as +great a hurry to get journeys over in 1916 as he had been in South +African days, when he used to risk a smash by requiring the trains in +which he roamed the theatre of war to travel at a speed beyond that +which was safe on such tortuous tracks; and it is easy to understand +how hard-set, with so impetuous a passenger, the Admiralissimo of the +Grand Fleet would have been to delay the departure of the <i>Hampshire</i> +merely on the grounds of rough weather on the day on which she put to +sea.</p> + +<p>On that last occasion when I saw him the Field-Marshal was in rare +spirits, looking forward eagerly to his time in Russia, merry as a +schoolboy starting for his holidays, only anxious to be off. With that +incomparable gift of his for interpreting the essentials of a +situation, he fully realized how far-reaching might be the +consequences of the undertaking to which he stood committed. The +public of this country perhaps hardly realize that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page083" name="page083"></a>(p. 083)</span> most +unfortunate feature of his death at that time, from the national point +of view, was that it prevented his Russian trip. Had it not been for +the disaster of the 5th of June 1916 off the Orkneys, that convulsion +of March 1917 in the territories of our great eastern Ally might never +have occurred, or it might at least have been deferred until after the +war had been brought to a happy termination. Apart from this, Lord +Kitchener's work was almost done. Thanks to him, the United Kingdom +had, alike in respect to men and to material, been transformed into a +great military Power, and yet further developments had been assured. +The employing of the instrument which he had created could be left to +other hands.</p> + +<p>Many appreciations of him appeared at the time of his lamented +passing, and have appeared since. His character and his qualifications +as man of action and elaborator had not always been appraised quite +correctly during his lifetime, and they are a subject of differences +of opinion still. Often was he spoken of as a great organizer and +administrator. But his claim to possess such qualifications rested +rather upon the results that he obtained than upon the methods by +which he obtained them. Of detail he possessed no special mastery, and +yet he would concern himself with questions of detail which might well +have been left to subordinates to deal with. He won the confidence of +those under him not so much through trusting them in the sense of +leaving them responsibility, as through compelling them to trust him +by the force of his personality and by the wide compass of his outlook +upon the numberless questions that were ever at issue. He had been +described as harsh, taciturn, and unbending. He was on the contrary a +delightful chief to serve once one understood his ways, although he +would stand no nonsense and, like most people, was occasionally out of +humour and exacting.</p> + +<p>A more cunning hand than mine is needed to depict adequately the great +soldier-statesman. But this I <span class="pagenum"><a id="page084" name="page084"></a>(p. 084)</span> would say. There has been much +foolish talk as to this individual and to that having won the war. +That any one person could have won the war is on the face of it an +absurdity. The greatest factor in achieving the result was the British +Navy; but who would claim that any one of the chieftains in our fleets +or pulling the naval strings ashore decided the issue of the struggle? +Next, however, to what our sailors achieved afloat, the most important +influence in giving victory to the side of the Entente was the +development, to an extent previously undreamt of, of the British +fighting resources ashore. That was primarily the handiwork of Lord +Kitchener. His country can fairly claim that he accomplished more than +did any other individual—French, American, Italian, Russian, +British—to bring German militarism to the ground.</p> + +<p>No reference to the famous Field-Marshal's career during the Great War +would be complete without one word as to "Fitz." Fitzgerald was, after +a fashion, the complement of his Chief. We in Whitehall would have +been lost without him. A comparatively junior officer, he was looked +upon with some suspicion by those high up in the War Office just at +first, in consequence of the exceptional influence that he enjoyed +with the War Minister, and of his always knowing more about what was +going on than anybody else but the War Minister himself. But all hands +speedily came to appreciate the rare qualities of this seeming +interloper, to realize what useful services he was able and ever ready +to perform, and to turn his presence at his Chief's elbow to the best +account. Sometimes he would be acting as a buffer; at other times he +assumed the rôle of coupling-chain. Lord Kitchener frequently employed +him to convey instructions verbally, and on such occasions the +emissary always knew exactly what was in the War Minister's mind. If +after an interview with the Chief one felt any doubts as to what was +required of one, a hint to Fitz would be sure to secure the +information of which one stood in need. Lord K. reposed implicit +confidence in the judgement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page085" name="page085"></a>(p. 085)</span> of this Personal Military +Secretary of his, and with good reason. Often when the solution of +some problem under discussion appeared to be open to question, he +would say, "Let's have in Fitz and see what he thinks."</p> + +<p>The relations between them were like father and son. Each swore by the +other, and Lord K. indeed never seemed better pleased than when one +showed a liking for the Bengal Lancer whom he had chosen when in India +and attached to himself. "I'll go and talk it over with Fitz, sir," +was sure to be rewarded with a pleasant smile and a "Yes, do." +Possessing a charming personality, a keen intellect, a fund of humour +and a considerable knowledge of the world, Fitz was an extremely +attractive figure quite apart from the exceptional qualifications +which he possessed for a post which he filled with so much credit to +himself, and with such advantage to others. Of the thousands who went +down in the great struggle, few were probably more sincerely mourned +by hosts of friends than the gallant soldier whose body, washed ashore +on the iron-bound coast of the Orkneys, we laid to rest one showery +June afternoon in the hillside cemetery overlooking Eastbourne.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page086" name="page086"></a>(p. 086)</span> CHAPTER V</h3> + +<h5>THE DARDANELLES</h5> + +<p class="resume">The Tabah incident — The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 — Special + steps taken with regard to it by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman — Mr. + Churchill first raises the question — My conference with him in + October 1914 — The naval project against the Straits — Its + fundamental errors — Would never have been carried into effect had + there been a conference between the Naval War Staff and the + General Staff — The bad start — The causes of the final failure on + the 18th of March — Lord K.'s instructions to Sir I. Hamilton — The + question of the packing of the transports — Sir I. Hamilton's + complaint as to there being no plan prepared — The 1906 + memorandum — Sir Ian's complaint about insufficient + information — How the 1906 memorandum affected this + question — Misunderstanding as to the difficulty of obtaining + information — The information not in reality so defective — My + anxiety at the time of the first landing — The plan, a failure by + early in May — Impossibility of sending out reinforcements + then — Question whether the delay in sending out reinforcements + greatly affected the result in August 1915 — The Dardanelles + Committee — Its anxiety — Sir E. Carson and Mr. Churchill, + allies — The question of clearing out — My disinclination to accept + the principle before September — Sir C. Monro sent out — The delay + of the Government in deciding — Lord K. proceeds to the Aegean — My + own experiences — A trip to Paris with a special message to the + French Government — Sent on a fool's errand, thanks to the + Cabinet — A notable state paper on the subject — Mr. Lloyd George + and the "sanhedrin" — Decision to evacuate only Anzac and + Suvla — Sir W. Robertson arrives and orders are sent to evacuate + Helles — I give up the appointment of D.M.O.</p> + +<p class="p2">No sooner did disquieting intelligence come to hand to the effect that +the Ottoman authorities had given the <i>Goeben</i> and the <i>Breslau</i> a +suspicious welcome in Turkish waters during the opening weeks of the +great struggle, than it became apparent that war with a fresh +antagonist was at least on the cards. It was, moreover, obvious that +if there were to be a rupture between the Entente <span class="pagenum"><a id="page087" name="page087"></a>(p. 087)</span> and the +Sublime Porte, the Bosphorus was certain to be closed as a line of +communication between the Western Powers and Russia. Such an +eventuality was bound to exercise a far-reaching influence over the +course of the war as a whole. One therefore naturally gave some +attention to the possibilities involved in an undertaking against +Constantinople and the Straits—a subject with which by chance I +happened to be probably as familiar as anybody in the army.</p> + +<p>Some eight years before, in the early part of 1906, H.M. Government +had found itself at variance with the Sublime Porte in connection with +a spot called Tabah at the head of the Gulf of Akaba, which we +regarded as within the dominions of the Khedive but which Osmanli +troops had truculently taken possession of. The Sultan's advisers had +been rather troublesome about the business, and Downing Street and the +Foreign Office had been obliged to take up a firm attitude before the +Ottoman Government unwillingly climbed down. I had been in charge of +the strategical section of the Military Operations Directorate at that +time, and, in considering what we might be able to do in the military +line supposing that things came to a head, had investigated the +problems involved in gaining possession of the Dardanelles. Some years +earlier, moreover, I had passed through the Straits and had spent a +night at Chanak in the Narrows, taking careful note of the lie of the +land, of the batteries as then existing, and so forth.</p> + +<p>After an accommodation had been arrived at with Johnny Turk in 1906, +the Committee of Imperial Defence had followed up this question of +operations against the Hellespont, more or less as an academic +question; and I had drafted a paper on the subject, which was gone +through line by line by General Spencer Ewart who was then D.M.O., in +consultation with myself, was modified in some minor respects by him, +was initialed by General Lyttelton, the Chief of the General Staff, +and was accepted in principle by the C.I.D., Sir J. Fisher (as he then +was) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page088" name="page088"></a>(p. 088)</span> having as First Sea Lord expressed his full concurrence +with the views therein expressed. These in effect "turned" the project +"down." When about the end of August I searched for the 1906 +memorandum in the files of the Committee of Imperial Defence papers +which were in my safe, I found a note in the file concerned to say +that by order of the Prime Minister the memorandum had been withdrawn. +The reason for this I discovered at a later date. Sir H. +Campbell-Bannerman had fully realized the importance of this +Dardanelles transaction of 1906. He had perceived that it was a matter +of quite exceptional secrecy. He had dreaded the disastrous results +which might well arise were news by any mischance to leak out and to +reach the Sublime Porte that the naval and military authorities in +this country had expressed the opinion that successful attack upon the +Dardanelles was virtually impracticable, and that H.M. Government had +endorsed this view. Tell the Turk that, and our trump card was gone. +We could then no longer bluff the Ottoman Government in the event of +war with feints of operations against the Straits—the very course +which I believe would have been adopted in 1914-1915, had the +Admiralty War Staff and the General Staff considered the question +together without Cabinet interference and submitted a joint report for +the information of the War Council. That 1906 memorandum and the +Committee of Imperial Defence transactions in connection with it were +treated differently from any C.I.D. documents of analogous kind then +or, as far as I know, subsequently. I never saw the memorandum from +1906 till one day in May 1915, when Mr. Asquith pushed a copy across +the table to me at a meeting of the War Council in Downing Street, and +I recognized it at once as in great measure my own production. It +would not seem to have been brought to the notice of the Dardanelles +Commission that the memorandum (to which several references are made +in their Reports) was practically accepted by the Committee of +Imperial Defence as governing the military policy of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page089" name="page089"></a>(p. 089)</span> the +country with respect to attack on the Straits in the event of war.</p> + +<p>The consequence of my having made myself familiar with the question in +the past was that, when at the beginning of September 1914 Mr. +Churchill raised the question of a conjunct Greek and British +enterprise against the Straits, it was a simple matter for me to +prepare a short memorandum on the subject, a memorandum of a decidedly +discouraging nature. As a matter of fact, what was perhaps the +strongest argument against the undertaking at that time was by +oversight omitted from the document—the Greeks had no howitzers or +mobile heavy artillery worth mentioning, and any ordnance of that +class that we disposed of in the Mediterranean was of the prehistoric +kind. The slip was of no great importance, however, because there +never was the remotest chance of King Constantine, who was no mean +judge of warlike problems, letting his country in for so dubious an +enterprise.</p> + +<p>We were not actually at war with the Ottoman Empire for another two +months. But hostilities had virtually become certain during the month +of October, and one morning in the latter part of that month the First +Lord sent a message across asking me to come over to his room and +discuss possibilities in connection with the Dardanelles. I found the +First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of Battenberg) and the Fourth Sea Lord +(Commodore C. F. Lambert) waiting, as well as Mr. Churchill, and we +sat round a table with all the maps and charts that were necessary for +our purpose spread out on it. The problem of mastering the Straits was +examined entirely from the point of view of a military operation based +upon, and supported by, naval power. If the question of a fleet attack +upon the defences within the defile was mentioned at all, it was only +referred to quite incidentally.</p> + +<p>From my own observation on the spot, and as a result of later +examination of maps, charts, confidential reports, and so forth, I had +come to the conclusion that the key <span class="pagenum"><a id="page090" name="page090"></a>(p. 090)</span> to the Dardanelles lay +in the Kilid Bahr plateau, which dominates the channel at its very +narrowest point from the European (Gallipoli Peninsula) side. By far +the best plan of gaining possession of this high ground would, I +considered, be to land, by surprise if possible, the biggest military +force that could be very rapidly put ashore on that long stretch of +coast-line practicable for troops to disembark from boats in fine +weather, which was situated about the locality that has since become +immortalized as Anzac Cove. A project on these lines is what we +actually discussed that morning in the First Lord's room. I pointed +out the difficulties and the dangers involved, <i>i.e.</i> the virtual +impossibility of effecting a real surprise, the perils inseparable +from a disembarkation in face of opposition, the certainty that the +enemy was even now improving the land defences of the Gallipoli +Peninsula, and the fact that, at the moment, we had no troops to carry +such a scheme out and that we were most unlikely to have any to spare +for such an object for months to come. One somewhat controversial +tactical point I gave particular attention to—the efficacy of the +fire of warships when covering a military landing and when +endeavouring to silence field-guns on shore; my own view was that the +potentialities of a fleet under such conditions were apt to be greatly +overestimated. My exposition was intended to be dissuasive, and I +think that Mr. Churchill was disappointed.</p> + +<p>We had a most pleasant discussion, the First Lord having a good +working knowledge of military questions owing to his early career and +training, and being therefore able to appreciate professional points +which might puzzle the majority of civilians. At the end of it he +seemed to clearly realize what a very serious operation of war a +military undertaking against the Straits was likely to be, but he +dwelt forcibly, and indeed enthusiastically, upon the results that +would be gained by the Entente in the event of such an undertaking +being successfully carried out—on that subject we were all quite at +one. The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page091" name="page091"></a>(p. 091)</span> story of this informal pow-wow has been recorded +thus at length, because it was really the only occasion on which the +General Staff were afforded anything like a proper opportunity of +expressing an opinion as to operations against the Dardanelles, until +after the country had been engulfed up to the neck in the morass and +was irretrievably committed to an amphibious campaign on a great scale +in the Gallipoli Peninsula. Prince Louis resigned his position as +First Sea Lord a few days later; Commodore Lambert often mentioned the +pow-wow in conversation with me in later days, after the mischief (for +which the professional side of the Admiralty was only very partially +to blame) had been done.</p> + +<p>As one gradually became acquainted in the following January with the +nature of the naval scheme for dealing with the Straits, it was +difficult not to feel apprehension. While, as Brigade-Major R.A. in +the Western Command and later as commanding a company of R.G.A. at +Malta, concerned with coast defence principles, the tactical rather +than the technical scientific side of such problems had always +interested me. When musing, during those interminable waits which take +place in the course of a day's gun practice from a coast-defence +battery, as to what would be likely to happen in the event of the work +actually engaging a hostile armament, one could picture oneself driven +from the guns under the hail of flying fragments of rock, concrete, +and metal thrown up by the ships' huge projectiles. But one did not +picture the battery as destroyed and rendered of no effect. Anybody +who has tried both is aware how infinitely easier gun practice is at +even a moving target on the water than it is at a target on land. One +foresaw that the enemy's warships would plaster the vicinity of the +work with projectiles, and would create conditions disastrous to human +life if the gun-detachments did not go to ground, but that they would +not often, if ever, actually hit the mark and demolish guns and +mountings.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty's creeping form of attack, chosen on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page092" name="page092"></a>(p. 092)</span> Admiral +Carden's initiative, ignored this aspect of the question altogether. +The whole scheme hinged upon <i>destroying</i> the Ottoman coast batteries, +the very thing that ships find it hardest to do. They can silence +batteries; but what is the good of that if they then clear out and +allow the defenders to come back and clean up? The creeping plan, +moreover, obviously played into the hands of Turkish mobile guns, +which would turn up in new positions on successive days, and which, as +I had told Mr. Churchill three months before, our ships would find +most difficult to deal with; these guns would probably give the +mine-sweepers much more trouble than the heavy ordnance in the enemy's +fixed defences. Then, again, one could not but be aware that the +Sister Service was none too well equipped for dealing with the enigma +of mines in any form—that had become obvious to those behind the +scenes during the first six months of the war—and one's information +pointed to the Turkish mine-defence of the Dardanelles being more up +to date than was their gun-defence. Finally, and much the most +important of all, this deliberate procedure was the worst possible +method to adopt from the army's point of view, supposing the plan to +fail and the army then to be called in to pull the chestnuts out of +the fire. The enemy would have been given full warning, and would +deliberately have been allowed what the Turk always stands in need of +when on the war-path—time to prepare.</p> + +<p>The "First Report" of the Dardanelles Commission, as well as +sidelights thrown upon the affair from other quarters, have +established that of the three eminent naval experts who dealt with the +project and who were more or less responsible for its being put into +execution, two, Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir Henry Jackson, were by no +means enthusiastic about it, while the third, Lord Fisher, was opposed +to it but allowed himself to be overruled by the War Council. Had +those three admirals met three representatives of the General Staff, +Sir J. Wolfe-Murray, General Kiggell and myself, let us say, sitting +round a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page093" name="page093"></a>(p. 093)</span> table with no Cabinet Ministers present, I am +certain that the report that we should have drawn up would have been +dead against the whole thing. The objections raised from the military +side would have been quite sufficient to dispel any doubts that the +sailors had left on the subject. As for that naïve theory that we +might draw back in the middle of the naval operations supposing that +the business went awry, of which I do not remember hearing at the +time—— Pooh! We could hardly, left to ourselves, have been such +flats as to take that seriously.</p> + +<p>The cable message from Tenedos which announced the result of the first +effort against the conspicuous and comparatively feeble works that +defended the mouth of the Straits, was the reverse of heartening. The +bombarding squadron enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in armament +from every point of view—range, weight of metal, and accuracy. The +conditions were almost ideal for the attacking side, as there was +plenty of sea-room and no worry about mines. If the warships could not +finally dispose of Turkish works such as this, and with everything +favourable, by long-range fire, then long-range fire was "off." Once +inside the Straits, the fleet, manœuvring without elbow-room, would +have to get pretty near its work, mines or no mines, if it was going +to do any good. The idea of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> pitching her stuff +over the top of the Gallipoli Peninsula left one cold. Several days +before Admiral de Robeck delivered his determined attack upon the +defences of the Narrows of the 18th of March, one had pretty well made +up one's mind that the thing was going to be a failure, and that the +army was going to be let in for an extremely uncomfortable business.</p> + +<p>Accounts emanating from the Turkish side have suggested that the naval +operations were within an ace of succeeding, and that they only had to +be pressed a little further to achieve their object. An examination of +the books by Mr. Morgenthau and others does not bear this out. The +Turks imagined that our fleet had been beaten <span class="pagenum"><a id="page094" name="page094"></a>(p. 094)</span> off by +gun-fire on the 18th, and they appear to have got nervous because the +ammunition for certain of their heaviest guns was running short. Their +heavy guns, and the ammunition for them, was a matter of quite +secondary importance. The fleet was beaten off owing to the effect of +the drifting mines. The Turks thought that the damage done to the +ships was due to their batteries, when it was in reality caused by +their mines. They did not appreciate the situation correctly, for they +do not appear to have been short of mines. The Russian plan of letting +these engines of destruction loose at the Black Sea end of the +Bosphorus to drift down with the current indeed provided the Osmanlis +with a constant supply of excellent ones; they were picked up, shipped +down to the Dardanelles, and used against the Allies' fleet. These +weapons, drifting and fixed, together with the mobile artillery which +so seriously interfered with mine-sweeping, proved to be the trump +cards in the hands of Johnny Turk and his Boche assistants.</p> + +<p>I was present when Lord Kitchener met Sir I. Hamilton and his chief +staff-officer, General Braithwaite, and gave Sir Ian his instructions. +At that time Lord K. still hoped that, in so far as forcing the +Dardanelles was concerned, the fleet would effect its purpose, +practically if not wholly unaided by the troops. These were designed +rather for operations subsequent to the fall of what was after all but +the first line of Ottoman defence. It was only after Sir Ian arrived +on the spot that the naval attack actually failed and that military +operations on an ambitious scale against the Gallipoli Peninsula took +the stage. The fact that when the transports arrived at Mudros they +were found not to be packed suitably for effecting an immediate +disembarkation on hostile soil, has been a good deal criticized. +Although it was not a matter within my responsibility, I was sharply +heckled over the point by Captain Stephen Gwynne when before the +Dardanelles Commission. But the troops left before there was any +question of attempting a landing in force in face of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page095" name="page095"></a>(p. 095)</span> +enemy in the immediate vicinity of the Straits. At the date when they +sailed it remained quite an open question as to what exactly their +task was to be. The transports could not have been appropriately +packed even after military operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula had +been decided upon, without knowing exactly what was Sir Ian's plan.</p> + +<p>Sir Ian complained to the Dardanelles Commission that no preliminary +scheme of operations had been drawn up by the War Office; and he +certainly got little assistance in that direction, although it might +not have been of much use to him if he had.<a id="footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href="#footnote4">[4]</a> He also complained that +there was a great want of staff preparation, no arrangements for +water, for instance, having been made. This was in effect the +consequence of the General Staff at this time not exercising its +proper functions or being invested with the powers to which it was +entitled. There never was a meeting of the various directors in the +War Office concerned, under the aegis of the General Staff, to go into +these matters in detail. The troops would certainly be called upon to +land somewhere, sooner or later, whether the fleet forced the +Dardanelles or not, and all the arrangements as regards supplies, +transport, water, hospitals, material for piers, etc., required to be +worked out by those responsible after getting a lead from the General +Staff. If the commodities of all kinds involved could not be procured +locally or in Egypt, then it was up to the War <span class="pagenum"><a id="page096" name="page096"></a>(p. 096)</span> Office to see +that they should be sent out from home, and be sent out, moreover, +practically at the same time as the troops left so that they should be +on the spot when needed.</p> + +<p>Sir Ian also mentioned that he had not been shown the 1906 memorandum +before going to the Near East. As it turned out, the mystery made +about this document (although there was excellent reason for the +special steps that were taken in connection with it at the time of its +coming before the Committee of Imperial Defence) proved inconvenient +in 1914-15. One wonders, indeed, whether it was ever seen by the +Admiralty experts at the time when they had Admiral Carden's plan of a +creeping naval attack upon the Dardanelles under consideration, +because the memorandum expressed considerable doubts as to the +efficacy of gun-fire from on board ship against the land, and the +event proved that these doubts were fully justified. Had I had a copy +in my possession I should certainly have shown it to Sir Ian, or else +to Braithwaite, with whom, as he had been a brother-Director on the +General Staff at the War Office for some months previously, I was in +close touch.</p> + +<p>Sir Ian, the Report says, "dwelt strongly on the total absence of +information furnished him by the War Office staff," and he complained +very justly that the map, or maps, given him had proved inaccurate and +inadequate. Now, that reflected upon Generals Ewart and H. Wilson, who +had been holding the appointment of D.M.O. between 1906 and 1914, and +it reflected upon Sir N. Lyttelton, the late Lord Nicholson (actually +a member of the Commission) and Sir J. French, who had successively +been Chiefs of the General Staff during the same period. Topographical +information cannot be procured after hostilities have broken out; it +has to be obtained in advance. On noting what was said about this in +the "First Report" of the Dardanelles Commission, I asked to be +allowed to give evidence again, and the Commission were good enough to +recall me in due course. The object was, not to contest Sir I. +Hamilton's assertions but to point out <span class="pagenum"><a id="page097" name="page097"></a>(p. 097)</span> that under the +circumstances of the case no blame was fairly attributable to those +who were responsible for information of some sort being available.</p> + +<p>To have obtained full information as to the Gallipoli Peninsula and +the region around the Dardanelles, but especially as to the peninsula, +was a matter of money—and plenty of it. In no country in the world in +pre-war days was spying on fortified areas of strategical importance +without money a more unprofitable game than in the Ottoman dominions. +There were, on the other hand, few countries where money, if you had +enough of it, was more sure to procure you the information that you +required. Ever since the late General Brackenbury was at the head of +the Intelligence Department of the War Office in the eighties secret +funds have been at its disposal, but they have not been large, and +there have always been plenty of desirable objects to devote those +funds to. Had the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906 taken the line +that, even admitting an attack upon the Straits to be a difficult +business, its effect if successful was nevertheless likely to be so +great that the matter was one to be followed up, a pretty substantial +share of the secret funds coming to hand in the Intelligence +Department between 1906 and 1914 would surely have been devoted to +this region. All kinds of topographical details concerning the +immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles would thereby have been got +together, ready for use; it would somehow have been discovered in the +environs of Stamboul that the Gallipoli Peninsula had been surveyed +and that good large-scale maps of that region actually existed, and +copies of those large-scale maps would have found their way into the +War Office, where they would speedily have been reproduced.</p> + +<p>It was made plain to me when giving evidence before the Commission +that the Rt. Hon. A. Fisher and Sir T. Mackenzie, its members +representing the Antipodes, considered that there had been great +neglect on the part of the War Office in obtaining information with +regard <span class="pagenum"><a id="page098" name="page098"></a>(p. 098)</span> to the environs of the Dardanelles in advance. But, +quite apart from the peculiar situation created by the decision of the +Committee of Imperial Defence, there must have been serious +difficulties in obtaining such information about the Gallipoli +Peninsula—only those who have had experience in such matters know how +great the difficulties are. Intelligence service in peace time is a +subject of which the average civilian does not understand the meaning +nor realize the dangers. The Commission, which included experts in +such matters in the shape of Admiral Sir W. May and Lord Nicholson, +made no comment on this point in its final Report, evidently taking +the broad view that the lack of information was, under all the +circumstances of the case, excusable. In his special Report, Sir T. +Mackenzie on the other hand blames the Imperial General Staff for +being "unprepared for operations against the Dardanelles and +Bosphorus," obviously having the question of information in his mind, +as he must be perfectly well aware that the planning of actual +operations was just as much a matter for the Admiralty as for the +General Staff, the whole problem being manifestly an amphibious one.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, considering the kind of place that the Gallipoli +Peninsula was, and taking into consideration the extreme jealousy with +which the Turks, quite properly from their point of view, had always +regarded the appearance of strangers in that well-watched region, the +information contained in the secret official publications which the +Mediterranean Expeditionary Force took out with it was by no means to +be despised. All but one of the landing places actually utilized on +the famous 25th of April were, I think, designated in these booklets, +and that one was unsuitable for landing anything but infantry. A great +deal of the information proved to be perfectly correct, and a good +deal more of it might have proved to be correct had the Expeditionary +Force ever penetrated far enough into the interior of the Peninsula to +test it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page099" name="page099"></a>(p. 099)</span> There had been many occasions giving grounds for disquietude +since the days of Mons, but I never felt greater anxiety at any time +during the war than when awaiting tidings as to the landing on the +Aegean shore. We knew that this was about to take place, but I was not +aware of the details of Sir I. Hamilton's plan. Soldiers who had +examined carefully into the factors likely to govern a disembarkation +in force in face of an enemy who was fully prepared, were unanimous in +viewing such an operation as a somewhat desperate enterprise. There +was no modern precedent for an undertaking of the kind. One dreaded +some grave disaster, feared that the troops might entirely fail to +gain a footing on shore, and pictured them as driven off after +suffering overwhelming losses. The message announcing that a large +part of the army was safely disembarked came as an immense relief. +Although disappointed at learning that only a portion of the troops +had been put ashore at Anzac on the outside of the Peninsula, which, I +had presumed, would be the point selected for the main attack, I felt +decidedly optimistic for the moment. What had appeared to be the +greatest obstacle to success had been overcome, for a landing had been +effected in spite of all that the enemy could do to hinder it. As +mentioned in the previous chapter, I left London immediately +afterwards, and it was a bitter disappointment to hear the truth a few +days later, to realize that my first appreciation had been incorrect, +and to learn that gaining a footing on shore did not connote an +immediate advance into the interior. It provides a good example of how +difficult it is to forecast results in war.</p> + +<p>By fairly early in May, there already seemed to be little prospect of +the Expeditionary Force achieving its object unless very strong +reinforcements in men and munitions were sent out to the Aegean. But +there was shortage of both men and munitions, and men and munitions +alike were needed elsewhere. The second Battle of Ypres, coupled with +the miscarriage of the Franco-British offensive about La Bassée, +indicated that the enemy was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page100" name="page100"></a>(p. 100)</span> formidable on the Western +Front. Although there was every prospect of an improvement before long +in respect to munitions output, the shell shortage was at the moment +almost at its worst. We knew at the War Office that the Russians were +in grave straits in respect to weapons and ammunition, and one could +not tell whether the German Great General Staff, probably quite as +well aware of this as we were, would assume the offensive in the +Eastern theatre of war, or would transfer great bodies of troops from +East to West to make some determined effort against the French and +ourselves. The change of Government which introduced Mr. Asquith's +Coalition Cabinet, moreover, came about at this time, and political +palaver seriously delayed decisions.</p> + +<p>It was, no doubt, unfortunate, from the point of view of the +Dardanelles campaign, that there was so much hesitation about sending +out the very substantial reinforcements which only actually reached +Sir I. Hamilton at the end of July and during the early days of +August. But it by no means necessarily follows that if they had +reached their destination, say, six weeks sooner, the Straits would +have been won. Much stress has always been laid upon the torpor that +descended upon Suvla during the very critical hours which followed the +successful disembarkation of the new force in that region; but those +inexperienced troops and their leaders must have acted with +extraordinary resolution and energy to have appreciably changed the +fortunes of General Birdwood's great offensive against Sari Bair. +Information from the Turkish side does not suggest that Liman von +Sanders gained any great accessions of strength during July and early +August. It was the ample warning which the enemy received of what was +impending before ever a soldier was landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula +that, far more than anything which occurred subsequently, rendered the +Dardanelles operations abortive.</p> + +<p>The Dardanelles Committee came into being in June. This body included +most of the more prominent figures <span class="pagenum"><a id="page101" name="page101"></a>(p. 101)</span> in the Coalition Cabinet. +Attending its deliberations from time to time one acquired the +impression that an undue amount of attention was being given in +Government circles to the Aegean theatre of war, an attention out of +all proportion either to its importance or to our prospects of +success; for the talk ranged over the whole wide world at times and +the Committee dealt with a good deal besides the Dardanelles. Its +members always took the utmost interest in the events in the Gallipoli +Peninsula, and, up to the date when the August offensive in that +region definitely failed, they were mostly in sanguine mood. One or +two optimistic statements made in public at that time were indeed +quite inappropriate and had much better been left unspoken. The +amateur strategist, that inexhaustible source of original and +unprofitable proposals, was by no means inarticulate at these +confabulations in 10 Downing Street. He would pick up Sir I. +Hamilton's Army and would deposit it in some new locality, just as one +might pick up one's pen-wiper and shift it from one side of the +blotting-pad to the other. That is how some people who are simply +bursting with intelligence, people who will produce whole newspaper +columns of what to the uninformed reads like sensible matter, love to +make war. In a way, the U-boats in the Aegean served as a blessing in +disguise; they helped to squash many hare-brained schemes inchoated +around Whitehall, and to consign them to oblivion before they became +really dangerous.</p> + +<p>After the failure of the August offensive in the Gallipoli Peninsula, +the members of the Dardanelles Committee became extremely anxious, and +with good reason. They would come round to my room and discuss the +situation individually, and I am afraid they seldom found me in +optimistic vein. I had run over to Ulster in April 1914 on the +occasion of certain stirring events taking place, which brought +General Hubert Gough and his cavalry brigade into some public +prominence, and which robbed the War Office of the services of Colonel +Seely, Sir J. French and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page102" name="page102"></a>(p. 102)</span> Sir Spencer Ewart. I had been +allowed behind the scenes in the north of Ireland as a sympathiser, +had visited Omagh, Enniskillen, historic Derry and other places, had +noted the grim determination of the loyalists, and had been deeply +impressed by the efficiency and the foresight of the inner +organization. Necessity makes strange bedfellows. It was almost +startling to find within fifteen months of that experience Sir E. +Carson arriving in my apartment together with Mr. Churchill, their +relations verging on the mutually affectionate, eager to discuss as +colleagues the very unpromising position of affairs on the shores of +the Thracian Chersonese.</p> + +<p>From a very early stage in the Dardanelles venture there had been a +feeling in some quarters within the War Office that we ought to cut +our losses and clear out of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and that sending +out reinforcements to the Aegean which could ill be spared from other +scenes of warlike activity looked uncommonly like throwing good money +after bad. My friends at G.H.Q., from whom I used to hear frequently, +and who would look in when over on duty or on short leave, were +strongly of this opinion; but they naturally were somewhat biassed. +One took a long time to reconcile oneself to this idea, even when no +hope of real success remained. It was not until September indeed, and +after the decision had been come to to send out no more fresh troops +to Sir I. Hamilton, that I personally came to the conclusion that no +other course was open than to have done with the business and to come +away out of that with the least possible delay. Sir Ian had sent home +a trusted staff-officer, Major (now Major-General) the Hon. Guy +Dawnay, to report and to try to secure help. Dawnay fought his corner +resolutely and was loyalty itself to his chief, but the information +that he had to give and his appreciation of the situation as it stood +were the reverse of encouraging. By the middle of October, when the +Salonika affair had begun to create fresh demands on our limited +resources and when Sir C. Monro was sent out to take up command of the +Mediterranean <span class="pagenum"><a id="page103" name="page103"></a>(p. 103)</span> Expeditionary Force, any doubts which remained +on the subject had been dispelled, and I was glad to gather from the +new chief's attitude when he left that, in so far as he understood the +situation before satisfying himself of the various factors on the +spot, he leant towards complete and prompt evacuation.</p> + +<p>If a withdrawal was to be effected, it was manifest that this ought to +be carried out as soon as possible in view of the virtual certainty of +bad weather during the winter months. But the War Council, which had +superseded the Dardanelles Committee, unfortunately appeared to halt +helplessly between two opinions. Even Sir C. Monro's uncompromising +recommendation failed to decide its members. Lord Kitchener was loth +to agree to the step, as he feared the effect which a British retreat +might exert in Egypt and elsewhere in the East. As will be remembered +he proceeded to the Aegean himself at the beginning of November to +take stock, but he soon decided for evacuation after examining the +conditions on the spot. The whole question remained in abeyance for +some three weeks.</p> + +<p>My own experiences of what followed were so singular that a careful +note of dates and details was made at the time, because one realized +even then that incidents of the kind require to be made known. They +may serve as a warning. On the 23rd of November my chief, Sir A. +Murray, summoned me, after a meeting of the War Council, to say that +that body wished me to repair straightway to Paris and to make General +Gallieni, the War Minister, acquainted with a decision which they had +just arrived at—viz., that the Gallipoli Peninsula was to be +abandoned without further ado. The full Cabinet would meet on the +morrow (the 24th) to endorse the decision. That afternoon Mr. Asquith, +who was acting as Secretary of State for War in the absence of Lord +Kitchener, sent for me and repeated these instructions.</p> + +<p>I left by the morning boat-train next day, having wired to our +Military Attaché to arrange, if possible, an interview <span class="pagenum"><a id="page104" name="page104"></a>(p. 104)</span> with +General Gallieni that evening; and he met me at the Gare du Nord, +bearer of an invitation to dinner from the War Minister, and of a +telegram from General Murray intimating that the Cabinet, having met +as arranged, had been unable to come to a decision but were going to +have another try on the morrow. Here was a contingency that was not +covered by instructions and for which one was not prepared, but I +decided to tell General Gallieni exactly how matters stood. (Adroitly +drawn out for my benefit by his personal staff during dinner, the +great soldier told us that stirring tale of how, as Governor of Paris, +he despatched its garrison in buses and taxis and any vehicles that he +could lay hands upon, to buttress the army which, under Maunoury's +stalwart leadership, was to fall upon Von Kluck's flank, and was to +usher in the victory of the Marne.)</p> + +<p>A fresh wire came to hand from the War Office on the following +afternoon, announcing that the Cabinet had again been unable to clinch +the business, but contemplated a further séance two days later, the +27th. On the afternoon of the 27th, however, a message arrived from +General Murray, to say that our rulers had yet again failed to make up +their minds, and that the best thing I could do under the +circumstances was to return to the War Office. General Gallieni, when +the position of affairs was explained to him, was most sympathetic, +quoted somebody's dictum that "<span lang="fr">la politique n'a pas d'entrailles,</span>" and +hinted that he did not always find it quite plain sailing with his own +gang. Still, there it was. The Twenty-Three had thrown the War Council +over (it was then composed of Messrs. Asquith, Bonar Law, Lloyd +George, and Balfour, and Sir E. Grey, assisted by the First Sea Lord +and the C.I.G.S.) and they were leaving our army marooned on the +Gallipoli Peninsula, with the winter approaching apace, in a position +growing more and more precarious owing to Serbia's collapse and to +Bulgaria's accession to the enemy ranks having freed the great artery +of communications connecting Germany with the Golden Horn.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page105" name="page105"></a>(p. 105)</span> Life in the War Office during the Great War, even during +those early anxious days of 1914 and 1915, had its lighter side. The +astonishing cheeriness of the British soldier under the most trying +circumstances has become proverbial; but his officer shares this +priceless characteristic with him and displays it even amid the +deadening surroundings of the big building in Whitehall. The best +laugh that we enjoyed during that strenuous period was on the morning +when news came that Anzac and Suvla had been evacuated at the cost of +only some half-dozen casualties and of the abandonment of a very few +worn-out guns. Then it was that an official, who was very much behind +the scenes, extracted a document on the familiar grey-green paper from +his safe and read it out with appropriate "business" to a joyous +party.</p> + +<p>This State paper, a model of incisive diction and of moving prose, +conceived in the best Oxford manner, drew a terrible picture of what +might occur in withdrawing troops from a foreshore in presence of a +ferocious foe. Its polished periods portrayed a scene of horror and +despair, of a bullet-swept beach, of drowning soldiers and of +shattered boats. It quoted the case of some similar military +operation, where warriors who had gained a footing on a hostile +coast-line had been obliged to remove themselves in haste and had had +the very father and mother of a time during the process—it was +Marathon or Syracuse or some such contemporary martial event, if I +remember aright. This masterly production, there is reason to believe, +had not been without its influence when the question of abandoning the +Gallipoli Peninsula was under consideration of those responsible. Well +did Mr. Lloyd George say in the House of Commons many months later in +the course of his first speech after becoming Prime Minister: "You +cannot run a war with a Sanhedrin."</p> + +<p>When the War Council, or the Cabinet, or whatever set of men in +authority it was who at last got something settled, made up their +minds that a withdrawal of sorts was really to take place, they in a +measure reversed the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page106" name="page106"></a>(p. 106)</span> decision which I had been charged to +convey to the French Government a fortnight before. The orders sent +out to Sir C. Monro only directed an evacuation of Anzac and Suvla to +take place. This, it may be observed, seems to some extent to have +been the fault of the sailor-men. They butted in, wanting to hang on +to Helles on watching-the-Straits grounds; they were apparently ready +to impose upon our naval forces in the Aegean the very grave +responsibility of mothering a small army, which was blockaded and +dominated on the land side, as it clung to the inhospitable, +storm-driven toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula in midwinter.</p> + +<p>Sir W. Robertson arrived a few days later to take up the appointment +of C.I.G.S., which, I knew, meant the splitting up of my Directorate. +Being aware of his views beforehand as we had often talked it over, I +had a paper ready drafted for his approval urging an immediate total +evacuation of Turkish soil in this region. This he at once submitted +to the War Council, and within two or three days orders were +telegraphed out to the Aegean to the effect that Helles was to be +abandoned. After remaining a few days longer at the War Office as +Director of Military Intelligence, I was sent by the C.I.G.S. on a +special mission to Russia, and my direct connection with the General +Staff came to an end but for a short period in the summer of 1917. It +is a satisfaction to remember that the last question of importance in +which I was concerned before leaving Whitehall for the East was in +lending a hand towards getting our troops out of the impossible +position they were in at the mouth of the Dardanelles.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page107" name="page107"></a>(p. 107)</span> CHAPTER VI</h3> + +<h5>SOME EXPERIENCES IN THE WAR OFFICE</h5> + +<p class="resume">A reversion to earlier dates — The statisticians in the winter of + 1914-15 — The efforts to prove that German man-power would shortly + give out — Lack of the necessary premises upon which to found such + calculations — Views on the maritime blockade — The projects for + operations against the Belgian coast district in the winter of + 1914-15 — Nature of my staff — The "dug-outs" — The services of one + of them, "Z" — His care of me in foreign parts — His activities in + other Departments of State — An alarming discovery — How "Z" + grappled with a threatening situation — He hears about the + Admiralty working on the Tanks — The cold-shouldering of Colonel + Swinton when he raised this question at the War Office in January + 1915 — Lord Fisher proposes to construct large numbers of + motor-lighters, and I am told off to go into the matter with + him — The Baltic project — The way it was approached — Meetings with + Lord Fisher — The "beetles" — Visits from the First Sea Lord — The + question of secrecy in connection with war operations — A + parable — The land service behind the sea service in this + matter — Interviews with Mr. Asquith — His ways on such occasions.</p> + +<p class="p2">These random jottings scarcely lend themselves to the scrupulous +preservation of a chronological continuity. Many other matters +meriting some mention as affecting the War Office had claimed one's +attention before the Dardanelles campaign finally fizzled out early in +January 1916. The General Staff had to some extent been concerned in +the solutions arrived at by the Entente during the year 1915 of those +acutely complex problems which kept arising in the Balkans. Then, +again, quite a number of "side-shows" had been embarked on at various +dates since the outbreak of the conflict, of which some had been +carried through to a successful conclusion to the advantage of the +cause, while the course of others had been of a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page108" name="page108"></a>(p. 108)</span> decidedly +chequered character. The munitions question, furthermore, which had +for a time caused most serious difficulty but which had been disposed +of in great measure by the end of 1915 owing to the foresight and the +labours of Lord Kitchener and of the Master-General of the Ordnance's +Department, was necessarily one in which the Military Operations +Directorate was deeply interested. These and a number of other matters +will be dealt with in special chapters, but some more or less personal +experiences in and around Whitehall may appropriately be placed on +record here.</p> + +<p>Already, early in the winter of 1914-15, the statisticians were busily +at work. They had found a bone and they were gnawing at it to their +heart's content. Individuals of indisputable capacity and of infinite +application set themselves to work to calculate how soon Boche +man-power would be exhausted. Lord Haldane hurled himself into the +breach with a zest that could hardly have been exceeded had he been +contriving a totally new Territorial Army organization. Professor Oman +abandoned Wellington somewhere amidst the declivities of the sierras +without one qualm, and immersed himself in computations warranted to +make the plain man's hair stand on end. The enthusiasts who +voluntarily undertook this onerous task arrived at results of the most +encouraging kind, for one learnt that the Hun as a warrior would +within quite a short space of time be a phantom of the past, that +adult males within the Kaiser's dominions would speedily comprise only +the very aged, the mentally afflicted or the maimed wreckage from the +battlefields of France and Poland, and that if this attractive +Sovereign proposed to continue hostilities he must ere long, as +Lincoln said of Jefferson Davis, "rob the cradle and the grave." Even +Lord Kitchener displayed some interest in these mathematical +exercises, and was not wholly unimpressed when figures established the +gratifying fact that the German legions were a vanishing proposition. +I was always in this matter graded in the "doubting Thomas" class.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page109" name="page109"></a>(p. 109)</span> The question seemed to base itself upon what premises you +thought fit to start from. You could no doubt calculate with some +certainty upon the total number of Teuton males of fighting age being +somewhere about fifteen millions in August 1914, upon 700,000, or so, +youths annually reaching the age of eighteen, and upon Germany being +obliged to have under arms continually some five million soldiers. +After that you were handling rather indeterminate factors. You might +put down indispensables in civil life at half a million or at four +millions just as you liked; but it made the difference of three and a +half millions in your pool to start with, according to which estimate +you preferred. After that you had to cut out the unfit—another +problematical figure. Finally came the question of casualties based on +suspicious enemy statistics, and the perplexities involved in the +number of wounded who would, and who would not, be able to return to +the ranks. The only conclusion that one seemed to be justified in +arriving at was that the wastage was in excess of the intake of +youngsters, that the outflow was greater than the inflow, and that if +the war went on long enough German man-power would give out. When that +happy consummation would be arrived at, it was in the winter of +1914-15 impossible to say and fruitless to take a shot at.</p> + +<p>The Director of Military Operations received copies of most Foreign +Office telegrams as a matter of course, and during the early months of +the war many of these documents as they came to hand were found to be +concerned with that very ticklish question, the maritime blockade. The +attitude taken up by those responsible in this country regarding this +matter has been severely criticized in many quarters, certain organs +of the Press were loud in their condemnation of our kid-glove methods +in those days, and the Sister Service seemed to be in discontented +mood. But there was a good deal to be said on the other side. Lack of +familiarity with international law, with precedents, and with the +tenour and result of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page110" name="page110"></a>(p. 110)</span> the discussions which had at various +times taken place with foreign countries over the manners and customs +of naval blockade, made any conclusions which I might arrive at over +so complex a problem of little profit. But it always did seem to me +that the policy actually adopted was in the main the right one, and +that to have bowed before advocates of more drastic measures might +well have landed us in a most horrible mess. You can play tricks with +neutrals whose fighting potentialities are restricted, which you had +better not try on with non-belligerents who may be able to make things +hot for you. The progress of the war in the early months was not so +wholly reassuring as to justify hazarding fresh complications.</p> + +<p>In his book, "<i>1914</i>," Lord French has dealt at some length with an +operations question which was much in debate during the winter of +1914-15. He and Mr. Churchill were at this time bent on joint naval +and military undertakings designed to recover possession of part, or +of the whole, of the Belgian coast-line—in itself a most desirable +objective. Although I did not see most of the communications which +passed between the French Government and ours on the subject, nor +those which passed between Lord Kitchener and the Commander-in-Chief +of the B.E.F., I gathered the nature of what was afoot from Sir J. +Wolfe Murray and Fitzgerald, as also from G.H.Q. in France, and +examined the problem which was involved with the aid of large-scale +maps and charts and such other information as was available. The +experts of St. Omer did not appear to accept the scheme with +absolutely whole-hearted concurrence. By some of them—it may have +been a mistaken impression on my part—the visits of the First Lord of +the Admiralty to their Chief hardly seemed to be welcomed with the +enthusiasm that might have been expected. Whisperings from across the +Channel perhaps made one more critical than one ought to have been, +but, be that as it may, the project hardly struck one as an especially +inviting method of employing force at that particular juncture. We +were <span class="pagenum"><a id="page111" name="page111"></a>(p. 111)</span> deplorably short of heavy howitzers, and we were +already feeling the lack of artillery ammunition of all sorts. +Although some reinforcements—the Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth +Divisions—were pretty well ready to take the field, no really +substantial augmentation of our fighting forces on the Western Front +was to be anticipated for some months. The end was attractive enough, +but the means appeared to be lacking.</p> + +<p>In long-range—or, for the matter of that, short-range—bombardments +of the Flanders littoral by warships I placed no trust. Mr. +Churchill's "we could give you 100 or 200 guns from the sea in +absolutely devastating support" of the 22nd of November to Sir J. +French would not have excited me in the very least. In his book, the +Field-Marshal ascribes the final decision of our Government to refuse +sanction to a plan of operations which they had approved of at the +first blush, partly to French objections and partly to the sudden +fancy taken by the War Council for offensive endeavour in far-distant +fields. That may be the correct explanation; but it is also possible +that after careful consideration of the subject Lord Kitchener +perceived the tactical and strategical weakness of the plan in itself.</p> + +<p>My staff was from the outset a fairly substantial one—much the +largest of that in any War Office Directorate—and, although I am no +great believer in a multitudinous personnel swarming in a public +office, it somehow grew. It was composed partly of officers and others +whom I found on arrival, partly of new hands brought in automatically +on mobilization like myself to fill the places of picked men who had +been spirited away with the Expeditionary Force, and partly of +individuals acquired later on as other regular occupants were received +up into the framework of the growing fighting forces of the country. A +proportion of the new-comers were dug-outs, and it may not be out of +place to say a word concerning this particular class of officer as +introduced into the War Office, of whom I formed one myself. +Instigated thereunto <span class="pagenum"><a id="page112" name="page112"></a>(p. 112)</span> by that gushing fountain of +unimpeachable information, the Press, the public were during the early +part of the war disposed to attribute all high crimes and +misdemeanours, of which the central administration of the nation's +military forces was pronounced to have been guilty, to the "dug-out." +That the personnel of the War Office was always set out in detail at +the beginning of the <i>Monthly Army List</i>, the omniscient Fourth Estate +was naturally aware; but the management of a newspaper could hardly be +expected to purchase a copy (it was not made confidential for a year). +Nor could a journalistic staff condescend to study this work of +reference at some library or club. Under the circumstances, and having +heard that such people as "dug-outs" actually existed, the Press as a +matter of course assumed that within the portals in Whitehall Lord +Kitchener was struggling in vain against the ineptitude and +reactionary tendencies of a set of prehistoric creatures who +constituted the whole of his staff. The fact, however, was that all +the higher appointments (with scarcely an exception other than that of +myself) were occupied by soldiers who had been on the active list at +the time of mobilization, and the great majority of whom simply +remained at their posts after war was declared.</p> + +<p>Nor were "dug-outs," whether inside or outside of the War Office, by +necessity and in obedience to some inviolable rule individuals +languishing in the last stage of mental and bodily decay. Some of them +were held to be not too effete to bear their burden even amid the +stress and turmoil of the battlefield. One, after serving with +conspicuous distinction in several theatres of war, finished up as +Chief of the General Staff and right-hand man to Sir Douglas Haig in +1918. Those members of the band who were at my beck and call within +the War Office generally contrived to grapple effectually with +whatever they undertook, and amongst them certainly not the least +competent and interesting was a Rip Van Winkle, whom we will call +"Z"—for short.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page113" name="page113"></a>(p. 113)</span> A subaltern at the start, "Z" was fitted out with all the +virtues of the typical subaltern, but was furnished in addition with +certain virtues that the typical subaltern does not necessarily +possess. It could not be said of him that</p> + +<p class="poem"><span class="add2em">deep on his brow engraven</span><br> + Deliberation sat and sovereign care,</p> + +<p>but he treated Cabinet Ministers with an engaging blend of firmness +and familiarity, and he could, when occasion called for it, keep +Royalty in its place. Once when he thought fit to pay a visit on duty +to Paris and the front, he took me with him, explaining that unless he +had a general officer in his train there might be difficulties as to +his being accompanied by his soldier servant. Generals and colonels +and people of that kind doing duty at the War Office did not then have +soldier servants—but "Z" did. It is, however, bare justice to him to +acknowledge that, after I had served his purpose and when he came to +send me back to England from Boulogne before he resumed his inspection +of troops and trenches, he was grandmotherly in his solicitude that I +should meet with no misadventure. "Have you got your yellow form all +right, sir? You'd better look. No, no; that's not it, that's another +thing altogether. Surely you haven't lost it already! Ah, that's it. +Now, do put it in your right-hand breast pocket, where you won't get +it messed up with your pocket-handkerchief, sir, and remember where it +is." It reminded one of being sent off as a small boy to school.</p> + +<p>It was his practice to make a round of the different Public +Departments of a forenoon, and to draw the attention of those +concerned in each of them to any matters that appeared to him to call +for comment. The Admiralty and the Foreign Office naturally engaged +his attention more than others, but he was a familiar figure in them +all. His activities were so varied indeed that they almost might have +been summed up as universal, which being the case, it is not perhaps +altogether to be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page114" name="page114"></a>(p. 114)</span> wondered at that he did occasionally make a +mistake. For instance:</p> + +<p>He burst tumultuously into my room one morning flourishing a paper. +"Have you seen this, sir?" As a matter of fact I had seen it; but as +the document had conveyed no meaning to my mind, dissembled. Its +purport was that 580 tons of a substance of which I had never heard +before, and of which I have forgotten the name, had been landed +somewhere or other in Scandinavia. "But do you know what it is, sir? +It's the most appalling poison! It's the concoction that the South Sea +Islanders smear their bows and arrows with—cyanide and prussic acid +are soothing-syrup compared to it. Of course it's for those filthy +Boches. Five hundred and eighty tons of it! There won't be a bullet or +a zeppelin or a shell or a bayonet or a dart or a strand of +barbed-wire that won't be reeking with the stuff." I was aghast. +"Shall I go and see the Director-General, A.M.S., about it, sir?"</p> + +<p>"Yes, do, by all means. The very thing."</p> + +<p>He came back presently. "I've seen the D.-G., sir, and he's +frightfully excited. He's got hold of all his deputies and hangers-on, +and the whole gang of them are talking as if they were wound up. One +of them says he thinks he has heard of an antidote, but of course he +knows nothing whatever about it really, and is only talking through +his hat, I tell you what, sir, we ought to lend them a hand in this +business. I know Professor Stingo; he's miles and away the biggest man +on smells and that sort of thing in London, if not in Europe. So, if +you'll let me, I'll charter a taxi and be off and hunt him up, and get +him to work. If the thing can be done, sir, he's the lad for the job. +May I go, sir?"</p> + +<p>"Very well, do as you propose, and let me know the result."</p> + +<p>He turned up again in the afternoon. "I've seen old man Stingo, sir, +and he's for it all right. He's going to collect a lot more sportsmen +of the same kidney, and they're going to have the time of their lives, +and to make <span class="pagenum"><a id="page115" name="page115"></a>(p. 115)</span> a regular night of it. You see, sir, I pointed +out to him that this was a matter of the utmost urgency—not merely a +question of finding an antidote, but also of distributing it +methodically and broadcast. After it's been invented or made or +procured, or whatever's got to be done, some comedian in the +Quartermaster-General's show will insist on the result being packed up +in receptacles warranted rot-proof against everything that the mind of +man can conceive till the Day of Judgment—you know the absurd way +those sort of people go on, sir—and all that will take ages, æons." +He really thought of everything. "And there'll have to be books of +instructions and classes, and the Lord knows what besides! After that +the stuff'll have to be carted off to France and the Dardanelles, and +maybe to Archangel and Mesopotamia; so Stingo and Co. are going to be +up all night, and mean to arrive at some result or to perish in the +attempt. And now, sir, what have you done about it at the Foreign +Office?"</p> + +<p>This was disconcerting, seeing that I had done nothing.</p> + +<p>"Oh, but, sir," sounding that note of submissive expostulation which +the tactful staff-officer contrives to introduce when he feels himself +obliged reluctantly to express disapproval of superior military +authority, "oughtn't we to do something? How would it be if I were to +go down and see Grey, or one of them, and to talk to him like a +father?"</p> + +<p>"Well, perhaps it might be advisable to make a guarded suggestion to +them on the subject. Give my compliments to ——" But he was gone.</p> + +<p>He returned in about half an hour. "I've been down to the Foreign +Office, sir, and as you might have expected, they haven't done a +blooming thing. What those 'dips' think they're paid for always beats +me! However, I've got them to promise to cable out to their +ambassadors and consuls and bottle-washers in Scandinavia to keep +their wits about them. I offered to draft the wires for them; but they +seemed to think that they could do it themselves, and I daresay +they'll manage all right now <span class="pagenum"><a id="page116" name="page116"></a>(p. 116)</span> that I've told them exactly +what they are to say. I really do not know that we can do anything +more about it this evening," he added doubtfully, and with a worried, +far-away look on his face. Good heavens, he was never going to think +of something else! He took himself off, however, still evidently +dissatisfied and communing with himself.</p> + +<p>Next forenoon "Z" came into my room in a hurry. "I've been hearing +about the caterpillars, sir," he exclaimed joyously.</p> + +<p>"The caterpillars?"</p> + +<p>"Oh, not crawly things like one finds in one's salad, sir. The ones +the Admiralty are making<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href="#footnote5">[5]</a>—armoured motor contrivances, with great +big feet that will go across country and jump canals, and go bang +through Boche trenches and barbed wire as if they weren't there. +They'll be perfectly splendid—full of platoons and bombs and machine +guns, and all the rest of it. I <i>will</i> say this for Winston and those +mariners across Whitehall, when they get an idea they carry it out and +do not bother whether the thing'll be any use or can be made at +all—care no more for the Treasury than if it was so much dirt, and +quite right too! Just what it is. But when they've got their +caterpillars made, they won't know what to do with them any more than +the Babes in the Wood. Then we'll collar them; but in the meantime I +might be able to give them some hints, so, if you'll let me, I'll go +across and——"</p> + +<p>"Yes, yes; but just one moment. How about the poison?"</p> + +<p>"The poison, sir? What poi—oh, that stuff. Didn't I tell you, sir? It +isn't poison at all. You see, sir, it's this way. There are two forms +of it. There's the white form, and that <i>is</i> poison, shocking poison; +it's what the Fijians use when they want to pacify a busybody like +Captain Cook who comes butting in where he isn't wanted. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page117" name="page117"></a>(p. 117)</span> As +a matter of fact there's uncommon little of it—they don't get a +hundredweight in a generation. Then there's the red form, and that's +what Johnnies have been dumping down 580 tons of at What's-its-name. +It's quite innocuous, and is used for commercial purposes—tanning +leather, or making spills, or something of that kind. Now may I go to +the Ad——"</p> + +<p>"But have you told all this to the Director-General?"</p> + +<p>"Oh yes, sir. I told him first thing this morning."</p> + +<p>"Did he pass no remarks as to your having started him off after this +absurd hare of yours?"</p> + +<p>"Well, you see, sir, he's an uncommonly busy man, and I didn't feel +justified in wasting his time. So, after relieving his mind, I cleared +out at once."</p> + +<p>"And your professors?"</p> + +<p>"Oh, those professor-men—it would never do to tell them, sir. They'd +be perfectly miserable if they were deprived of the excitement of +muddling about with their crucibles and blow-pipes and retorts and +things. It would be cruelty to animals to enlighten them—it would +indeed, sir; and I know that you would not wish me to do anything to +discourage scientific investigation. Now, sir, may I go over to the +Admiralty?" And off he went, with instructions to find out all that he +could about these contrivances that he had heard about, and to do what +he could to promote their production. A treasure: unconventional, +resourceful, exceptionally well informed, determined; the man to get a +thing done that one wanted done—even if he did at times get a thing +done that one didn't particularly want done—and in some respects +quite the best intelligence officer I have come across in a fairly +wide experience. To-day "Z" commands the applause of listening senates +in the purlieus of St. Stephen's and has given up to party what was +meant for mankind; but although he is not Prime Minister yet, nor even +a Secretary of State, that will come in due course.</p> + +<p>It was in May 1915 that "Z" told me that the Admiralty were at work on +some sort of land-ship, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page118" name="page118"></a>(p. 118)</span> set about finding out what was +being done; he had previously been in communication with Colonel E. D. +Swinton over at the front. Only in the latter part of 1919, when the +question of claims in connection with the invention and the +development of Tanks had been investigated by a Royal Commission, did +I learn to my astonishment that this matter had been brought by +Swinton before the War Office so early as the beginning of January +1915, and that his projects had then been "turned down" by a technical +branch to which he had, unfortunately, referred them. It does not seem +possible that the technical branch can have brought the question to +the notice of the General Staff, or I must have heard of it. The value +of some contrivance such as he was confident could be constructed was +from the tactical point of view incontestable, and had been +incontestable ever since trench warfare became the order of the day on +the Western Front in the late autumn of 1914. But the idea of the +land-ship appeared to be an idle dream, and there was perhaps some +excuse for the General Staff in its not of its own accord pressing +upon the technical people that something of the sort must be produced +somehow. Knowledge that a thoroughly practical man possessed of +engineering knowledge and distinguished for his prescience like +Swinton was convinced that the thing was feasible, was just what was +required to set the General Staff in motion.</p> + +<p>Thanks to Swinton, and also to "Z," the General Staff did get into +touch with the Admiralty in May, and then found that a good deal had +already been done, owing to Mr. Churchill's imagination and foresight +and to the energy and ingenuity with which the land-ship idea had been +taken up at his instigation. But the War Office came badly out of the +business, and the severe criticisms to which it has been exposed in +connection with the subject are better deserved than a good many of +the criticisms of which it has been the victim. The blunder was not +perhaps so much the fault of individuals as of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page119" name="page119"></a>(p. 119)</span> system. +The technical branches had not been put in their place before the war, +they did not understand their position and did not realize that on +broad questions of policy they were subject to the General Staff. It +is worthy of note, incidentally, that Swinton never seems to have got +much satisfaction with G.H.Q. in France until he brought his ideas +direct before the General Staff out there on the 1st of June by +submitting a memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief. It is to be hoped +that the subserviency of all other branches to the General Staff in +connection with matters of principle has been established once for all +by this time; it was, I think, pretty well established by Sir W. +Robertson when he became C.I.G.S. Should there ever be any doubt about +the matter—well, remember the start of the Tanks!</p> + +<p>One morning in January or February 1915, Lord K. sent for me to his +room. It appeared that Lord Fisher had in mind a project of +constructing a flotilla of lighters of special type, to be driven by +motor power and designed for the express purpose of landing large +bodies of troops rapidly on an enemy's coast. The First Sea Lord was +anxious to discuss details with somebody from our side of Whitehall, +and the Chief wished me to take the thing up, the whole business being +of a most secret character. Lord Fisher, I gathered, contemplated +descents upon German shores; Lord K. did not appear to take these very +seriously, but he did foresee that a flotilla of the nature proposed +might prove extremely useful in connection with possible future +operations on the Flanders littoral. In any case, seeing that the +Admiralty were prepared to undertake a construction job of this kind +more or less in the interests of us soldiers, we ought to give the +plan every encouragement.</p> + +<p>Vague suggestions had reached me from across the road shortly +before—I do not recollect exactly how they came to hand—to the +effect that one ought to examine into the possibilities offered by +military operations based on the German Baltic coast and against the +Frisian <span class="pagenum"><a id="page120" name="page120"></a>(p. 120)</span> Islands. Attacks upon these islands presented +concrete problems; the question in their case had been already gone +into carefully by other hands before the war, and schemes of this +particular kind had not been found to offer much attraction when their +details came to be considered. As for the Baltic coast, one was given +nothing whatever to go upon—was groping in the dark. You wondered how +it was proposed to obtain command of these protected waters, bearing +in mind the nature of the approaches through defiles which happened to +be in the main in neutral hands, but you realized that this was a +naval question and therefore somebody else's job. Still, even given +this command, what then? Investigations of the subject, based upon +uncertain premises, did not lead to the conclusion that, beyond +"containing" hostile forces which otherwise might be available for +warfare in some other quarter, a landing in large force on these +shores was likely to prove an effective operation of war; and it was +bound to be an extremely hazardous one.</p> + +<p>It has since transpired from Lord Fisher's volcanic <i>Memories</i> that +the First Sea Lord had, with his "own hands alone to preserve secret +all arrangements," prepared plans for depositing three "great armies" +at different places in the Baltic, "two of them being feints that +could be turned into reality." How the First Sea Lord could draw up +plans of this kind that were capable of being put into effective +execution without some military assistance I do not pretend to +understand. A venture such as this does not begin and end with dumping +down any sort of army you like at a spot on the enemy's shores where +it happens to be practicable to disembark troops rapidly. Once landed, +the army still has to go ahead and do its business, whatever this is, +as a military undertaking, and it stands in need of some definite and +practicable objective. The numbers of which it is to consist and its +detailed organization have to be worked out in advance, with a clear +idea of what service it is intended to perform and of the strength of +the enemy <span class="pagenum"><a id="page121" name="page121"></a>(p. 121)</span> forces which it is likely to encounter while +carrying out its purpose. It has to be fed and has to be supplied with +war material after it has been deposited on <span lang="la"><i>terra firma</i></span>. Is it to +take its transport with it, or will it pick this up on arrival? Even +the constitution of the armada which is to convey it to its point of +disembarkation by no means represents a purely naval problem. Until +the sailors know what the composition of the military force in respect +to men, animals, vehicles, etc., is to be, they cannot calculate what +tonnage will be required, or decide how that tonnage is to be allotted +for transporting the troops oversea. For a project of this kind to be +worked out solely by naval experts would be no less ridiculous than +for it to be worked out solely by military experts. Secrecy in a +situation of this kind is no doubt imperative, but you must trust +somebody or you will head straight for catastrophe.</p> + +<p>When I went over by appointment to see Lord Fisher, he got to work at +once in that inimitable way of his. He explained that what he had in +view was to place sufficient motor-lighters at Lord Kitchener's +disposal, each carrying about 500 men, to land 50,000 troops on a +beach at one time. He insisted upon the most absolute secrecy. What he +wanted me to do was to discuss the construction of the lighters in +detail with the admiral who had the job in charge, so as to ensure +that their design would fall in with purely military requirements. I +had, some sixteen years before when Lord Fisher had been +Commander-in-Chief on the Mediterranean station, enjoyed a +confidential discussion with him in Malta concerning certain +strategical questions in that part of the world, and had been amazed +at the alertness of his brain, his originality of thought, his +intoxicating enthusiasm, and his relentless driving power. Now, in +1915, he seemed to be even younger than he had seemed then. He covered +the ground at such a pace that I was speedily toiling breathless and +dishevelled far in rear. It is all very well to carry off <i>Memories</i> +into a quiet corner and to try to assimilate limited portions of that +work at a time, deliberately and in solitude. But to have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page122" name="page122"></a>(p. 122)</span> a +hotch-potch of Shakespeare, internal combustion engines, chemical +devices for smoke screens, principles of the utilization of sea power +in war, Holy Writ, and details of ship construction dolloped out on +one's plate, and to have to bolt it then and there, imposes a strain +on the interior economy that is greater than this will stand. After an +interview with the First Sea Lord you suffered from that giddy, +bewildered, exhausted sort of feeling that no doubt has you in thrall +when you have been run over by a motor bus without suffering actual +physical injury.</p> + +<p>The main point that I insisted upon when in due course discussing the +construction details of the motor-lighters with the admiral who was +supervising the work, was that they should be so designed as to let +the troops aboard of them rush out quickly as soon as the prow should +touch the shore. The vessels were put together rapidly, and one or two +of those first completed were experimented with in the Solent towards +the end of April, when they were found quite satisfactory. Although +they were never turned to account for the purpose which Lord Fisher +had had in mind when the decision was taken to build them, a number of +these mobile barges proved extremely useful to our troops in the later +stages of the Dardanelles campaign, notably on the occasion of the +landing at Suvla and while the final evacuations were being carried +out. Indeed, but for the "beetles" (as the soldiers christened these +new-fangled craft), our army would never have got away from the +Gallipoli Peninsula with such small loss of stores and impedimenta as +it did, and the last troops told off to leave Helles on the stormy +night of the 8th-9th of January 1916 might have been unable to embark +and might have met with a deplorable disaster.</p> + +<p>After that first meeting with him at the Admiralty, I frequently saw +Lord Fisher, and he kept me acquainted with his views on many points, +notably on what was involved in the threat of the U-boats after Sir I. +Hamilton had landed his troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula. On more +than one occasion he honoured me with a surprise visit in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page123" name="page123"></a>(p. 123)</span> my +office. These interviews in my sanctum were of quite a dramatic, +Harrison-Ainsworth, Gunpowder-Treason, Man-in-the-Iron-Mask character. +He gave me no warning, scorning the normal procedure of induction by a +messenger. He would appear of a sudden peeping in at the door to see +if I was at home, would then thrust the door to and lock it on the +inside with a deft turn of the wrist, would screw up the lean-to +ventilator above the door in frantic haste, and would have darted over +and be sitting down beside me, talking earnestly and <span lang="fr"><i>ventre-à-terre</i></span> +of matters of grave moment, almost before I could rise to my feet and +conform to those deferential observances that are customary when a +junior officer has to deal with one of much higher standing. Some +subjects treated of on these occasions were of an extremely +confidential nature, and in view of the laxity of many eminent +officials and—if the truth be told—of military officers as a body, +the precautions taken by the First Sea Lord within my apartment were +perhaps not without justification.</p> + +<p>War is too serious a business to warrant the proclamation of +prospective naval and military operations from the housetops. +Reasonable precautions must be taken. One thing one did learn during +those early months of the war, and that was that the fewer the +individuals are—no matter who they may be—who are made acquainted +with secrets the better. But this is not of such vital importance when +the secret concerns some matter of limited interest to the ordinary +person as it is when the secret happens to relate to what is +calculated to attract public attention.</p> + +<p>Of course it was most reprehensible on the part of that expansive +youth, Geoffrey, to have acquainted Gladys—strictly between +themselves of course—that his company had been "dished out with a +brand-new, slap-up, experimental automatic rifle, that'll make Mr. +Boche sit up when we get across." Still it did no harm, because Gladys +doesn't care twopence about rifles of any kind, and had forgotten all +about it before she had swallowed the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page124" name="page124"></a>(p. 124)</span> chocolate that was in +her mouth. But when Geoffrey informed Gladys a fortnight later—again +strictly between themselves—that the regiment was booked for a stunt +at Cuxhaven, it did a great deal of harm. Because, although Gladys did +not know where Cuxhaven was, she looked it up in the atlas when she +got home, and she thereupon realized, with a wriggle of gratification, +that she was "in the know," and under the circumstances she could +hardly have been expected not to tell Agatha—under pledge, needless +to say, of inviolable secrecy. Nor would you have been well advised to +have bet that Agatha would not—in confidence—mention the matter to +Genevieve, because you would have lost your money if you had. Then, it +was only to be expected that Genevieve should let the cat out of the +bag that afternoon at the meeting of Lady Blabit's Committee for the +Development of Discretion in Damsels, observing that in <i>such</i> company +a secret was bound to be absolutely safe. However, that was how the +whole story came to be known, and Geoffrey might just as well have +done the thing handsomely, and have placarded what was contemplated in +Trafalgar Square alongside Mr. Bonar Law's frenzied incitements to buy +war bonds.</p> + +<p>Speaking seriously, there is rather too much of the sieve about the +soldier officer when information comes to his knowledge which it is +his duty to keep to himself. He has much to learn in this respect from +his sailor brother. You won't get much to windward of the naval cadet +or the midshipman if you try to extract out of him details concerning +the vessel which has him on her books in time of war—what she is, +where she is, or how she occupies her time. These youngsters cannot +have absorbed this reticence simply automatically and as one of the +traditions of that great Silent Service, to which, more than to any +other factor, we and our Allies owe our common triumph in the Great +War. It must have been dinned into them at Osborne and Dartmouth, and +it must have been impressed upon them—forcibly as is the way +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page125" name="page125"></a>(p. 125)</span> amongst those whose dwelling is in the Great Waters—day by +day by their superiors afloat. The subject used not to be mentioned at +the Woolwich Academy in the seventies. Nor was secretiveness +inculcated amongst battery subalterns a few years subsequently. One +does not recollect hearing anything about it during the Staff College +course, nor call to mind having preached the virtues of discretion in +this matter to one's juniors oneself at a later date. Here is a matter +which has been grossly neglected and which the General Staff must see +to.</p> + +<p>When Lord Kitchener was going to be away from town for two or three +days in the summer of 1915, he sometimes instructed me to be at Mr. +Asquith's beck and call during his absence in case some important +question should suddenly arise, and once or twice I was summoned to 10 +Downing Street of a morning in consequence, and was ushered into the +precincts. On these occasions the Prime Minister was to be found in a +big room upstairs; and he was always walking up and down, like +Aristotle only that he had his hands in his pockets. His demeanour +would be a blend of boredom with the benign. "Whatch-think of this?" +he would demand, snatching up some paper from his desk, cramming it +into my hand, and continuing his promenade. Such observations on my +part in response to the invitation as seemed to meet the case would be +acknowledged with a grunt—dissent, concurrence, incredulity, or a +desire for further information being communicated by modulations in +the grunt. Once, when the document under survey elaborated one of Mr. +Churchill's virgin plans of revolutionizing the conduct of the war as +a whole, the Right Honourable Gentleman in an access of exuberance +became garrulous to the extent of muttering, "'Tslike a hen laying +eggs."</p> + +<p>But, all the same, when instructions came to be given at the end of +such an interview, they invariably were lucid, concise, and very much +to the point. You knew exactly where you were. For condensing what was +needed in a case like this into a convincing form of words, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page126" name="page126"></a>(p. 126)</span> +for epitomizing in a single sentence the conclusions arrived at +(supposing conclusions by any chance to have been arrived at) after +prolonged discussions by a War Council, or at a gathering of the +Dardanelles Committee, I have never come across anybody in the same +street with Mr. Asquith.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page127" name="page127"></a>(p. 127)</span> CHAPTER VII</h3> + +<h5>FURTHER EXPERIENCES IN THE WAR OFFICE</h5> + +<p class="resume">Varied nature of my responsibilities — Inconvenience caused by a + Heath-Caldwell being a brother-Director on the General Staff — An + interview with Lord Methuen — The Man of Business — His methods + when in charge of a Government Department — War Office branches + under Men of Business — The art of advertisement — This not + understood by War Office officials — The paltry staff and + accommodation at the disposal of the Director of Supplies and + Transport, and what was accomplished — Good work of the Committee + of Imperial Defence in providing certain organizations for + special purposes before the war — The contre-espionage branch — The + Government's singular conduct on the occasion of the first enemy + spy being executed at the Tower — The cable censorship — The post + office censorship — A visit from Admiral Bacon — His plan of + landing troops by night at Ostend — Some observations on the + subject — Sir J. Wolfe Murray leaves the War Office — An + appreciation of his work — The Dardanelles papers to be presented + to Parliament referred to me — My action in the matter and the + appointment of the Dardanelles Committee in consequence — Mr. + Lloyd George, Secretary of State for War — His activities — I act + as D.C.I.G.S. for a month — Sound organization introduced by Sir + W. Robertson — Normal trench-warfare casualties and battle + casualties — I learn the facts about the strengths of the + different armies in the field — Troubles with the Cabinet over + man-power — Question of resignation of the Army Council — The Tank + Corps and Tanks — The War Office helps in the reorganization of + the Admiralty — Some of the War Cabinet want to divert troops to + the Isonzo — The folly of such a plan — Objections to it + indicated — Arrival of General Pershing in London — I form one of + the party that proceeds to Devonport to meet Colonel House and + the United States Commissioners — Its adventures — Admirals + adrift — Mr. Balfour meets the Commissioners at Paddington.</p> + +<p class="p2">During those months as Director of Military Operations my +responsibilities were in reality of a most varied nature. They covered +pretty well the whole field of endeavour, from drafting documents +bearing upon operations—subjects for the edification of the very +elect—down to returning <span class="pagenum"><a id="page128" name="page128"></a>(p. 128)</span> to him by King's Messenger the +teeth which a well-known staff-officer had inadvertently left behind +him at his club when returning to the front from short leave. One was +for various reasons brought into contact with numbers of public men +who were quite outside of Government circles and official +institutions, and whose acquaintance it was agreeable to make. +Moreover, officers of high standing, over from the front or holding +commands at home, would look in to pass the time of day and keep one +posted with what was going on afield. Soldiers appointed to some new +billet overseas had constantly to be fitted out with instructions, or +to be provided with books, maps, and cipher. The last that I was to +see of that brilliant leader, General Maude, was when I went down to +Victoria to see him and my old contemporary of "Shop" days, General E. +A. Fanshawe, off on their hurried journey to the Dardanelles in August +1915.</p> + +<p>A certain amount of minor inconvenience in connection with telephones, +correspondence, visits, and so on, arose owing to General +Heath-Caldwell taking up the appointment of Director of Military +Training about six months after mobilization. That two out of the four +Directors on the General Staff within the War Office should have +practically the same name, was something of a coincidence. Lord +Methuen, who was then holding a very important appointment in +connection with the home army (with which I had nothing to do), was +ushered into my room one day. He had scarcely sat down when he began, +"Now I know how tremendously busy all you people are, and I won't keep +you one moment, but ...," and he embarked on some question in +connection with the training of the troops in the United Kingdom. I +tried to interrupt; but he checked me with a gesture, and took +complete command of the situation. "No, no. Just let me finish what I +want to say ..." and off he was again in full cry, entirely out of +control. After one or two other attempts to stop him, I had to give it +up. You can't coerce a Field-Marshal: it isn't done. At last, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page129" name="page129"></a>(p. 129)</span> after about five minutes of rapid and eager exposition of +what he had come to the War Office to discuss, he wound up with "Well, +what d'you think of that. I haven't kept you long, have I?" It was +then up to me to explain that he had attacked the wrong man, that the +question he was interested in did not concern me, and that the best +thing I could do was to conduct him forthwith to Heath-Caldwell's +lair.</p> + +<p>One saw something of the Man of Business in those days, as also later. +Next to the "Skilled Workman," the "Man of Business" is the greatest +impostor amongst the many impostors at present preying on the +community. Just as there are plenty of genuine Skilled Workmen, so +also are there numbers of Men of Business who, thanks to their +capacity and to the advantage that they have taken of experience, +constitute real assets to the nation. Latter-day events have, however, +taught us that the majority of the individuals who pose as Skilled +Workmen are in reality engaged on operations which anybody in full +power of his faculties and of the most ordinary capacity can learn to +carry on within a very few hours, if not within a very few minutes. +What occurred in Government departments during the war proved that a +very large percentage of the Men of Business, who somehow found their +way into public employ, were no great catch even if they did manage to +spend a good deal of the taxpayer's money. To draw a sharp +dividing-line between the nation's good bargains and the nation's bad +bargains in this respect would be out of the question. To try to +separate the sheep from the goats would be as invidious as it would be +vain—there were a lot of hybrids. But it was not military men within +the War Office alone who suffered considerable disillusionment on +being brought into contact with the Man of Business in the aggregate; +that was also the experience of the Civil Service in general.</p> + +<p>The successful Man of Business has owed his triumphs to aptitude in +capturing the business of other people. Therefore when he blossoms out +as a Government official <span class="pagenum"><a id="page130" name="page130"></a>(p. 130)</span> in charge of a department, he +devotes his principal energies to trying to absorb rival departments. +It was a case of fat kine endeavouring to swallow lean kine, but +finding at times that the lean kine were not so badly nourished after +all—and took a deal of swallowing. And yet successful Men of +Business, when introduced into Government departments, do have their +points. One wonders how much the income-tax payer would be saved +during the next decade or two had some really great knight of +industry, content to do his own work and not covetous of that of other +people (assuming such a combination of the paragon and the freak to +exist), been placed in charge of the Ministry of Munitions as soon as +Mr. Lloyd George had, with his defiance of Treasury convention, with +his wealth of imagination, and with his irrepressible and buoyant +courage, set the thing up on the vast foundations already laid by the +War Office. Unsuccessful Men of Business, when introduced into +Government departments, have their points too, but they are mostly bad +points.</p> + +<p>The Man of Business' procedure, when he is placed at the head of a +Government department, or of some branch of a Government department, +in time of war is well known. He makes himself master of some gigantic +building or some set of buildings. He then sets to work to people the +premises with creatures of his own. He then, with the assistance of +the superior grades amongst the creatures, becomes wrapped up in +devising employment for the multitudinous personnel that has been got +together. He then finds that he has not got sufficient accommodation +to house his legions—and so it goes on. He talks in moments of +relaxation of "introducing business methods into Whitehall." But that +is absurd. You could not introduce business methods into Whitehall, +because there is not room enough; you would have to commandeer the +whole of the West End, and then you would be cramped. While the big +men at the top are wrestling with housing problems, the staff are +engaged in writing minutes to each other—a process which, when +indulged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page131" name="page131"></a>(p. 131)</span> in, in out-of-date institutions of the War Office, +Admiralty, Colonial Office type, is called "red tape," but which, when +put in force in a department watched over by Men of Business, is +called "push and go." Engulfed in one of the mushroom branches that +were introduced into the War Office in the later stages of the war, I +could not but be impressed by what I saw. The women were splendid: the +way in which they kept the lifts in exercise, each lady spending her +time going up and down, burdened with a tea-cup or a towel and +sometimes with both, was beyond all praise.</p> + +<p>One is prejudiced perhaps, and may not on that account do full justice +to the achievements of some of those civilian branches which were +evolved within the War Office and which elbowed out military branches +altogether or else absorbed them. But they enjoyed great advantages, +and on that account much could fairly be expected of them. Your +civilian, introduced into the place with full powers, a blank cheque +and the uniform of a general officer, stood on a very different +footing from the soldier ever hampered by a control that was not +always beneficently administered—financial experts on the War Office +staff are apt to deliver their onsets upon the Treasury to the +battle-cry of <span lang="ge"><i>Kamerad</i></span>. Still, should the civilian elect to maintain +on its military lines the branch that he had taken over, he sometimes +turned out to be an asset. When the new broom adopted the plan of +picking out the best men on the existing staff, of giving those +preferred a couple of steps in rank, of providing them with large +numbers of assistants, and of housing the result in some spacious +edifice or group of edifices especially devised for the purpose, he +sometimes contrived to develop what had been an efficient organization +before into a still more efficient one. In that case the spirit of the +branch remained, it carried on as a military institution but with a +free hand and with extended liberty of action—and the public service +benefited although the cost was considerably greater. But that was not +always the procedure decided upon.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page132" name="page132"></a>(p. 132)</span> Whatever procedure was decided upon, every care was taken to +advertise. Advertisement is an art that the Man of Business thoroughly +understands, and as to which he has little to learn even from the +politician with a Press syndicate at his back. Soldiers are deplorably +apathetic in this respect. It will hardly be believed that during the +war the military department charged with works and construction often +left the immediate supervision of the creation of some set of +buildings in the hands of a single foreman of works, acting under an +officer of Royal Engineers who only paid a visit daily as he would +have several other duties of the same nature to perform. But if that +set of buildings under construction came to be transferred to a +civilian department or branch—the Ministry of Munitions, let us +say—a large staff of supervisors of all kinds was at once introduced. +Offices for them to carry on their supervisory duties in were erected. +The thing was done in style, employment was given to a number of +worthy people at the public expense, and it is quite possible that the +supervisory duties were carried on no less efficiently than they had +previously been by the foreman of works, visited daily by the officer +of Royal Engineers.</p> + +<p>From the outbreak of war and for nearly two years afterwards, the +headquarters administration of the supply branch of our armies in all +theatres except Mesopotamia and East Africa was carried out at the War +Office by one director, five military assistants and some thirty +clerks, together with one "permanent official" civilian aided by +half-a-dozen assistants and about thirty clerks. It administered and +controlled and supervised the obtaining and distribution of all +requirements in food and forage, as also of fuel, petrol, +disinfectants, and special hospital comforts, not only for the armies +in the field but also for the troops in the United Kingdom. This meant +an expenditure which by the end of the two years had increased to +about half a million sterling per diem. Affiliated to this branch, as +being under the same director, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page133" name="page133"></a>(p. 133)</span> was the headquarters +administration of the military-transport service, consisting of some +fifteen military assistants and fifty or sixty clerks. The military +transport service included a personnel of fully 300,000 officers and +men, and the branch was charged with the obtaining of tens of +thousands of motor vehicles of all kinds and of the masses of spare +parts needed to keep them in working order, together with many other +forms of transport material. The whole of these two affiliated +military branches of the War Office could have been accommodated +comfortably on one single floor of the Hotel Metropole! Well has it +been said that soldiers have no imagination.</p> + +<p>There were four especial branches under me to which some reference +ought to be made. Of two of them little was, in the nature of things, +heard during the war; these two were secret service branches, the one +obtaining information with regard to the enemy, the other preventing +the enemy from receiving information with regard to us. Of the other +two, one dealt with the cable censorship and the other with the postal +censorship. The Committee of Imperial Defence has been taken to task +in some ill-informed quarters because of that crying lack of +sufficient land forces and of munitions of certain kinds which made +itself apparent when the crisis came upon us. It was, however, merely +a consultative and not an executive body. It had no hold over the +purse-strings. Shortcomings in these respects were the fault not of +the Committee of Imperial Defence but of the Government of the day. On +the other hand, the Committee did splendid work in getting expert +sub-committees to compile regulations that were to be brought into +force in each Government department on the outbreak of war—compiling +regulations cost practically nothing. Moreover, thanks to its +representations and to its action, organizations were created in +peace-time for prosecuting espionage in time of war and for ensuring +an effective system of contre-espionage; these were under the control +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page134" name="page134"></a>(p. 134)</span> of the Director of Military Operations, and were the two +secret branches referred to above.</p> + +<p>About the former nothing can appropriately be disclosed. So much +interesting information about the latter has appeared in <i>German Spies +at Bay</i> that little need be said about it, except to repeat what has +already appeared in that volume—the branch had already achieved a +notable triumph more than a fortnight before our Expeditionary Force +fired a shot and some hours before the Royal Navy brought off their +first success. For the whole enemy spy system within the United +Kingdom was virtually laid by the heels within twenty-four hours of +the declaration of war. Every effort to set it up afresh subsequently +was nipped in the bud before it could do mischief.</p> + +<p>One point, however, deserves to be placed on record. The +disinclination of H.M. Government to announce the execution of the +first enemy agent to meet his fate, Lodi, was one of the most +extraordinary incidents that came to my knowledge in connection with +enemy spies. Lodi was an officer, or ex-officer, and a brave man who +in the service of his country had gambled with his life as the +stake—and had lost. He had fully acknowledged the justice of his +conviction. All who were acquainted with the facts felt sympathy for +him, although there could, of course, be no question of not carrying +out the inevitable sentence of the court-martial. And yet our +Government wanted to hush the whole thing up. They did not seem to +realize that the shooting of a spy does not, when the spy is an enemy, +mean punishment for a crime, that it represents a penalty which has to +be inflicted as a deterrent, and which if it is to fulfil its purpose +must be made known. Those of us who knew the facts were greatly +incensed at the most improper, and indeed fatuous, attitude which the +Executive for a time took up. What made them change their minds I do +not know.</p> + +<p>Then there was the cable censorship, an organization <span class="pagenum"><a id="page135" name="page135"></a>(p. 135)</span> which +did admirable work and got little thanks for it. The personnel +consisted largely of retired officers, and many of them broke down +under the prolonged strain. The potentialities of the cable censorship +had not been fully foreseen when it was automatically established on +mobilization, and of what it accomplished the general public know +practically nothing at all. The conception of this institution had at +the outset merely been that of setting up a barrier intended to +prevent naval and military information that was calculated to be of +service to the enemy from passing over the wires, whether in cipher or +in clear. But an enterprising, prescient, and masterful staff +perceived ere long that their powers could be developed and turned to +account in other directions with advantage to the State, notably in +that of stifling the commercial activities of the Central Powers in +the Western Hemisphere. The consequence was that within a very few +months the cable censorship had transformed itself to a great extent +out of an effective shield for defence into a potent weapon of attack. +The measure of its services to the country will never be known, as +some of its procedure cannot perhaps advantageously be disclosed. Its +labours were unadvertised, and its praises remained unsung. But those +who were behind the scenes are well aware of what it accomplished, +creeping along unseen tracks, to bring about the downfall of the Hun.</p> + +<p>The postal censorship started as a branch of comparatively modest +dimensions; but it gradually developed into a huge department, +employing a personnel which necessarily included large numbers of +efficient linguists. The remarkable success achieved by the +contre-espionage service in preventing the re-establishment of the +enemy spy system after it had been smashed at the start was in no +small degree due to the work of the censorship. That the requisite +number of individuals well acquainted with some of the outlandish +lingoes which had to be grappled with proved to be forthcoming, is a +matter of surprise and a subject for congratulation. This was not +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page136" name="page136"></a>(p. 136)</span> a case merely of French, German, Italian, and languages more +or less familiar to our educated and travelled classes. Much of the +work was in Scandinavian and in occult Slav tongues, a good deal of it +not even written in the Roman character. The staff was largely +composed, it should be mentioned, of ladies, some of them quite young; +but young or old—no, that won't do, for ladies are never old—quite +young or only moderately young, they took to the work like ducks to +the water and did yeoman service. As in the case of the cable +censorship, employment in the postal censorship was a thankless job; +but the labourers of both sexes in the branch had at least the +satisfaction of knowing that they had done their bit—some of them a +good deal more than their bit—for their country in its hour of trial.</p> + +<p>Reference was made in the last chapter to certain discussions which +took place in the winter of 1914-15 on the subject of suggested +conjunct naval and military operations on the Flanders coast. The +possibility of such undertakings was never entirely lost sight of +during 1915, although the diversion of considerable British forces to +far-off theatres of war necessarily enhanced the difficulties that +stood in the way of a form of project which had much to recommend it +from the strategical point of view. Our hosts on the Western Front +were absolutely dependent upon the security of the Narrow Seas, and +that security was being menaced owing to the enemy having laid his +grip upon Ostend and Zeebrugge. One afternoon in the autumn of 1915 +Admiral Bacon of the Dover Patrol, who believed in an extremely active +defence, came to see me and we had a long and interesting +conversation. He was full of a scheme for running some ship-loads of +troops right into Ostend harbour at night and landing the men by +surprise about the mole and the docks. His plans were not, however, at +this time worked out so elaborately, nor had such effective +preparations been taken in hand with regard to them, as was the case +at a later date after Sir D. Haig had taken up command of the B.E.F. +The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page137" name="page137"></a>(p. 137)</span> Admiral describes these preparations and his developed +plans in <i>The Dover Patrol</i>.</p> + +<p>On the occasion of this talk in the War Office, Admiral Bacon was, if +I recollect aright, contemplating landing the troops straight off the +ordinary type of vessel, not off craft especially designed and +constructed for the particular purpose, as was intended in his +improved project. Nor was it, I think, proposed to use "beetles" +(these may perhaps all have gone to the Mediterranean). My impression +at the time was that the scheme had very much to recommend it in +principle, but that its execution as it stood must represent an +extremely hazardous operation of war. Nor was this a moment when one +felt much leaning towards new-fangled tactical and strategical +devices, for we had a large force locked up under most depressing +conditions in the Gallipoli Peninsula, we were apparently going to be +let in for trouble in Macedonia, and, although the United Kingdom and +the Dominions had by this time very large forces under arms, a +considerable proportion of the troops could hardly be looked upon as +efficient owing to lack of training.</p> + +<p>Looking at this question of the Flanders littoral from what, in a +naval and military sense, may be called the academical point of view, +it is certainly a great pity that neither the project worked out by +Admiral Bacon in the winter of 1915-16 in agreement with G.H.Q., nor +yet the later plan for conjunct operations to take place in this coast +region had the Passchendael offensive of 1917 not been so disastrously +delayed, was put into execution. Had either of them actually been +carried out this must, whatever the result was, have provided one of +the most dramatic and remarkable incidents in the course of the Great +War.</p> + +<p>Passing reference has already been made to Sir Archie Murray's +assumption of the position of C.I.G.S. in October 1915, when he +replaced the late Sir James Wolfe-Murray. Shrewd, indefatigable, of +very varied experience, an excellent administrator and a man of such +charming <span class="pagenum"><a id="page138" name="page138"></a>(p. 138)</span> personality that he could always get the very best +out of his subordinates, Sir James would have admirably filled any +high, non-technical appointment within the War Office during the early +part of the contest, other than that which he was suddenly called upon +to take up on the death of Sir C. Douglas. Absolutely disinterested, +his energies wholly devoted to the service of the State, compelling +the respect, indeed the affection, of all of us who were under him in +those troublous times, a more considerate chief, nor one whose opinion +when you put a point to him you could accept with more implicit +confidence, it would have been impossible to find. But for occupying +the headship of the General Staff under the existing circumstances he +lacked certain desirable qualifications. Although well acquainted with +the principles that should govern the general conduct of war and no +mean judge of such questions, he was not disposed by instinct to +interest himself in the broader aspects of strategy and of military +policy. His bent was rather to concern himself with the details. +Somewhat cautious, nay diffident, by nature, he moreover shrank from +pressing his views, worthy of all respect as they were, on others, and +he was always guarded in expressing them even when invited to do so.</p> + +<p>Dealing with a Secretary of State of Lord Kitchener's temperament, +reticence of this kind did not work. Lord K. liked you to say what you +thought without hesitation, and, once he knew you, he never resented +your giving an opinion even uninvited if you did so tactfully. As for +the personnel who constitute War Councils and their like, it is not +the habit of the politician to hide his light under a bushel, nor to +recoil from laying down the law about any matter with which he has a +bowing acquaintance. That an expert should sit mute when his own +subject is in debate, surprises your statesman profoundly. That the +expert should not be brimming over with a didactic and confident flow +of words when he has been invited to promulgate his views, confounds +your statesman altogether. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page139" name="page139"></a>(p. 139)</span> General Wolfe-Murray never seemed +to succeed in getting on quite the proper terms either with his +immediate superior, the War Minister, or yet with the members of the +Government included in the War Council and the Dardanelles Committee; +and it was cruel luck that, with so fine a record in almost all parts +of the world to look back upon, this most meritorious public servant +should towards the close of his career have found himself unwillingly +thrust into a position for which, as he foresaw himself when he +assumed it, he was not altogether well suited.</p> + +<p>Subsequent to returning from Russia, and very shortly after the loss +of the <i>Hampshire</i> with Lord Kitchener and his party, I came to be for +some weeks unemployed, afterwards taking up a fresh appointment—one +in connection with Russian supplies, which later developed into one +covering supplies for all the Allies and to which reference will be +made in a special chapter. But the result was that, as a retired +officer, I ceased for the time being to be on the active list and +became a gentleman at large. Thereby hangs a tale; because it was just +at this juncture that I was asked by the Army Council to go into the +question of papers which were to be presented to the House of Commons +in connection with the Dardanelles Campaign. Badgered by inquisitive +members of that assembly, Mr. Asquith had committed himself to the +production of papers; and Mr. Churchill had got together a dossier +dealing with his share in the affair, which was sent to me to +consider, together with all the telegrams, and so forth, that bore on +the operations and their prologue.</p> + +<p>On examining all this stuff, it soon became manifest that the +publication of any papers at all during the war, in connection with +this controversial subject, was to be deprecated. Still, one +recognized that the Prime Minister's promise had to be fulfilled +somehow; so the great object to be kept in view seemed to be to keep +publication within the narrowest possible limits compatible <span class="pagenum"><a id="page140" name="page140"></a>(p. 140)</span> +with satisfying the curiosity of the people in Parliament. As a matter +of fact, there were passages in some of the documents which Mr. +Churchill proposed for production that must obviously be expunged, in +view of Allies' susceptibilities and of their conveying information +which might still be of value to the enemy. There could be no question +that, no matter how drastic might be the cutting-down process, the +Admiralty, the War Office and the Government would come badly out of +the business. Furthermore, any publication of papers must make known +to the world that Lord Kitchener's judgement in connection with this +particular phase of the war had been somewhat at fault.</p> + +<p>When asking me to take the matter up, the Army Council had probably +overlooked my civilian status or forgotten what a strong position this +placed me in. An ex-soldier does not often get an opportunity of +enjoying an official heart-to-heart talk, on paper, with the +powers-that-be in the War Office. My report was to the effect that it +was undesirable to produce any papers at all during the war, but that, +as some had to be produced, they ought to be cut down to a minimum, +that everybody official concerned in the business at home would be +more or less shown up, that this was particularly unfortunate just at +this time in view of Lord Kitchener's lamented death, that the papers +must be limited to those bearing upon the period antecedent to the +actual landing of the army in the Gallipoli Peninsula, that if this +last proviso was accepted I would go fully into the question and +report in detail, and that if the proviso was not accepted I declined +to act and they might all go to the—well, one did not quite put it in +those words, but they would take it that way. The result was not quite +what one had either expected or desired. The production-of-papers +project was dropped, and the Dardanelles Commission was appointed +instead.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lloyd George had become Secretary of State for War by this time. +He was full of zeal and of original <span class="pagenum"><a id="page141" name="page141"></a>(p. 141)</span> ideas, nor had he any +intention of being merely a "passenger." He had, after the manner of +new War Ministers, introduced a fresh personal entourage into the +place, and a momentary panic, caused by the news that telephonic +communications into and out of the place were passing in an unknown +guttural language not wholly unlike German, was only allayed on its +being ascertained that certain of his hangers-on conversed over the +wires in Welsh. Besides being full of original ideas, the new +Secretary of State was in a somewhat restless mood. He took so keen an +interest in some wonderful scheme in connection with Russian railways +(about which I was freely consulted) that he evidently was hankering +after going on a mission to that part of the world himself. He no +doubt believed that a visit from him would be an equivalent for the +visit by Lord Kitchener which had been interrupted so tragically. To +anybody who had recently been to Russia, such an idea was +preposterous. Few who counted in the Tsar's dominions had ever heard +of the Right Honourable Gentleman at this time; Lord Kitchener's name, +on the other hand, had been known, and his personality had counted as +an asset (as I knew from my own experience), from Tornea on the +Lappland borders to the highlands of Erzerum. The project did not +strike one as deserving encouragement, and I did what I could to damp +it down unobtrusively.</p> + +<p>It was nearly a year later than this, in the summer of 1917, that, +owing to the horse of General Whigham, the Deputy C.I.G.S., slipping +up with him near the Marble Arch and giving him a nasty fall, he +became incapacitated for a month. Sir W. Robertson thereupon called me +in to act as <span lang="la"><i>locum tenens</i></span>. From many points of view this proved to +be a particularly edifying and instructive experience. One could not +fail to be impressed with the smoothness with which the military side +of the War Office was working under the system which Sir William had +introduced, and one furthermore found oneself behind the scenes in +respect to the progress of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page142" name="page142"></a>(p. 142)</span> the war and to numbers of matters +only known to the very few.</p> + +<p>The plan under which nearly all routine work in connection with the +General Staff, work that the C.I.G.S. would otherwise be obliged to +concern himself with personally to a large extent, was delegated to a +Deputy who was a Member of the Army Council was an admirable +arrangement. It worked almost to perfection as far as I could see. It +allowed Sir W. Robertson, in consultation with his Directors of +Military Operations and of Intelligence, Generals Maurice and +Macdonogh, to devote his attention to major questions embracing the +conduct of the war on land as a whole. The Deputy in the meantime +wrestled with the details, with the correspondence about points of +secondary importance, in fact with the red tape if you like to call it +that, while keeping in close and constant touch with the +administrative departments and branches. Everybody advocates +de-centralization in theory; Sir William actually carried it out in +practice, reminding me of that Prince of military administrators, the +late Sir H. Brackenbury. The Deputy's room opened off that of the +C.I.G.S.; but on many days I never even saw him except when he looked +in for a minute to ask if I had anything for him, or when I happened +to walk home some part of the way to York House with him after the +trouble was over for the day.</p> + +<p>It was intensely interesting to have the daily reports of casualties +at the Western Front passing through one's hands, and to note the +extent to which these mounted up on what might be called non-fighting +days as compared to days of attack. As this was during the opening +stages of the Flanders offensive subsequent to General Plumer's +victory at Messines, these statistics were extremely instructive. I do +not know whether the details have ever been worked out for the years +1915-17, but it looked to me at that time as if the losses in three +weeks of ordinary trench-warfare came on the average to about the same +total as did the losses in a regular formal assault of some <span class="pagenum"><a id="page143" name="page143"></a>(p. 143)</span> +section of the enemy's lines. Or, putting the thing in another form +and supposing the above calculation to be correct, you would in three +weeks of continuous attack in a given zone only lose the same number +of men as you would lose in that same zone in a year of stagnant, +unprofitable trench-warfare. Some of our offensives on the Western +Front have been condemned on the grounds of their costliness in human +life; but it has not been sufficiently realized in the country how +heavy the losses were during periods of quiescence.</p> + +<p>As acting D.C.I.G.S. one, moreover, enjoyed opportunities of examining +the various compiled statements showing the numbers of our forces in +the various theatres, with full information as to the strength of our +Allies' armies in all quarters, as well as the carefully prepared +estimates of the enemy's fighting resources as these were arrived at +by our Intelligence organizations in consultation with those of the +French, Italians, Belgians, and others. One learnt the full details of +our "order of battle" for the time being, exactly where the different +divisions, army corps, etc., were located, and who commanded them. It +transpired that the Entente host on the Salonika Front at this time +comprised no fewer than 655,000 of all ranks, without counting in the +Serbs who would have brought the total up to about 800,000, while the +enemy forces opposed to them were calculated to muster only about +450,000; the situation was, in fact, much worse than one had imagined. +One discovered that, while slightly over 17 per cent of the male +population of Great Britain had been enrolled as soldiers, only 5 per +cent of the Irish male population had come forward, and that but for +north-east Ulster the figure would not have reached 3 per cent. One +became aware, moreover, that the Army Council, or at least its +Military Members, were at loggerheads with the War Cabinet over the +problem of man-power, and that this question was from the military +point of view giving grounds for grave anxiety.</p> + +<p>In one of my drawers there was the first draft of a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page144" name="page144"></a>(p. 144)</span> secret +paper on this subject, which expressed the views of the Military +Members of the Council in blunt terms, and which amounted in reality +to a crushing indictment of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. I have +a copy of the draft in my possession, but as it was a secret document +it would be improper to give details of its contents; it, moreover, +was somewhat modified and mellowed in certain particulars before the +paper was actually sent to Downing Street. The final discussion took +place at a full meeting of the Army Council while I was acting as +D.C.I.G.S., but which I did not attend as not being a statutory member +of that body. Parliament ought to call for this paper; it was +presented in July 1917; it practically foreshadowed what actually +occurred in March 1918. The Military Members of the Council nearly +resigned in a body over this business; but they were not unanimous on +the question of resignation, although perfectly unanimous as regards +the seriousness of the position. It may be mentioned that at a +considerably later date the Army Council did, including its civilian +members, threaten resignation as a body when Sir N. Macready gave up +the position of Adjutant-General to become Commissioner of the +Metropolitan Police, owing to an attempt made from Downing Street to +civilianize the Adjutant-General's department. The Army Council beat +Downing Street, hands down.</p> + +<p>The disquieting conditions in respect to man-power were, incidentally, +hampering the development of two important combatant branches at this +time, the Machine-Gun Corps and the Tank Corps. The heavy demands of +these two branches, coupled with the fact that infantry wastage was +practically exceeding the intake of recruits, threatened a gradual +disappearance of the principal arm of the Service. We had by this time +got long past the stage with which, when D.M.O., I had been familiar, +where lack of material and munitions was checking the growth of our +armies in the field. We had arrived at the stage where material and +munitions were ample, but where <span class="pagenum"><a id="page145" name="page145"></a>(p. 145)</span> it was becoming very +difficult to maintain our armies in the field from lack of +personnel—a state of things directly attributable to the Government's +opportunist, hand-to-mouth policy in the matter, and to their +disinclination to insist upon practically the whole of the younger +categories of male adults joining the colours. The organization of the +Tank Corps was finally decided actually while I was acting as +D.C.I.G.S. In so far as the general control of Tank design and the +numbers of these engines of war to be turned out was concerned, it +seemed to me to be a case of "pull devil, pull baker" between the +military and the civilians as to how far these matters were to be left +entirely to the technicalist; but the technicalist was not perhaps +getting quite so much to say in the matter as was reasonable. The +personal factor maybe entered into the question.</p> + +<p>When the War Office had been reconstituted by the Esher Committee in +1904, the Admiralty organization had been to a great extent taken as a +model for the Army Council arrangement which the triumvirate then +introduced. Thirteen years later the Admiralty was reorganized, and on +this occasion the War Office system of 1904, as modified and developed +in the light of experience in peace and in war, was taken as the model +for the rival institution. Whigham had played a part in the carrying +out of this important reform, lending his advice to the sailors and +explaining the distribution of duties amongst the higher professional +authorities on our side of Whitehall, especially in connection with +the General Staff. The most urgently needed alteration to be sought +after was the relieving of the First Sea Lord of a multitude of duties +which were quite incompatible with his giving full attention to really +vital questions in connection with employing the Royal Navy. For years +past he had been a sort of Pooh Bah, holding a position in some +respects analogous to that occupied by Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts +when they had been nominally "Commander-in-chief" of the army. Under +the arrangements made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page146" name="page146"></a>(p. 146)</span> with the assistance of the War Office +in 1917, a post somewhat analogous to that of D.C.I.G.S. was set up at +the Admiralty, and the First Sea Lord was thenceforward enabled to see +to the things that really mattered as he never had been before. +Although the amount of current work to be got through daily when +acting as Deputy C.I.G.S. proved heavy enough during the month when I +was <span lang="la"><i>locum tenens</i></span>, it was not so heavy as to preclude my looking +through the instructive documents dealing with this matter amongst +Whigham's papers.</p> + +<p>The glorious uncertainty of cricket is acknowledged to be one of the +main attractions of our national game. But the glorious uncertainty of +cricket is as nothing compared to the glorious uncertainty which +obtains in time of war as to what silly thing H.M. Government—or some +of its shining lights—will be wanting to do next. At this time the +War Cabinet, or perhaps one ought rather to say certain members of +that body, had got it into their heads that to send round a lot of Sir +Douglas Haig's troops (who were pretty well occupied as it was) to the +Isonzo Front would be a capital plan, the idea being to catch the +Central Powers no end of a "biff" in this particular quarter. That +fairly banged Banagher. For sheer fatuity it was the absolute limit.</p> + +<p>Ever since the era of Hannibal, if not indeed since even earlier +epochs, trampling, hope-bestirred armies have from generation to +generation been bursting forth like a pent-up torrent from that broad +zone of tumbled Alpine peaks which overshadows Piedmont, Lombardy and +Venetia, to flood their smiling plains with hosts of fighting men. Who +ever heard of an army bursting in the opposite direction? Napoleon +tried it, and rugged, thrusting Suvorof; but they did not get much +change out of it. The mountain region has invariably either been in +possession of the conquerors at the start, or else it has been +acquired by deliberate, protracted process during the course of a +lengthy struggle, before the dramatic coup has been delivered by which +the levels have been won. The wide <span class="pagenum"><a id="page147" name="page147"></a>(p. 147)</span> belt of highlands +extending from Switzerland to Croatia remained in the enemy's hands up +to the time of the final collapse of the Dual Monarchy subsequent to +the rout of the Emperor Francis' legions on the Piave. The Italians +had in the summer of 1917 for two years been striving to force their +way into these mountain fastnesses, and they had progressed but a very +few miles. They had not only been fighting the soldiery of the Central +Powers, but had also been fighting Nature. Nature often proves a yet +more formidable foe than do swarms of warriors, even supposing these +to be furnished with all modern requirements for prosecuting +operations in the field.</p> + +<p>Roads are inevitably few and far between in a mountainous region. In +such terrain, roads and railways can be destroyed particularly easily +and particularly effectively by a retiring host. In this kind of +theatre, troops can only quit the main lines of communications with +difficulty, and localities abound where a very inferior force will for +a long time stay the advance of much more imposing columns. You can no +more cram above a given number of men on to a certain stretch of road +when on the move, than you can get a quart into a pint pot. Even if +your enemy simply falls back without fighting, destroying all +viaducts, tunnels, embankments, culverts, and so forth, your army will +take a long time to traverse the highlands—unless it be an uncommonly +small one. Armies in these days are inevitably of somewhat bloated +dimensions if they are to do any good. Theatrical strategy of the +flags-on-the-map order is consequently rather at a discount in an +arena such as the War Cabinet, or some members of that body, proposed +to exploit. Even had there been no other obvious objections to a +diversion of force such as they contemplated, the project ignored +certain elementary aspects of the conduct of warlike operations which +might be summed up in the simple expression "common-sense."</p> + +<p>But there were other obvious objections. To switch any force worth +bothering about from northern France <span class="pagenum"><a id="page148" name="page148"></a>(p. 148)</span> to the Friuli flats was +bound to be a protracted process, because only two railways led over +the Alps from Dauphiné and Provence into the basin of the Po; and +those lines were distinguished for their severe gradients. It was, as +a matter of fact, incomparably easier for the enemy to mass +reinforcements in the Julian Alps than it was for the two Western +Powers to mass reinforcements in the low ground facing that great area +of rugged hills. The question of a transfer of six divisions from the +Western Front to Venetia had, however, been gone into very thoroughly +by the General Staff in view of conceivable eventualities. An +elaborate scheme had been drawn up by experienced officers, who had +examined the question in consultation with the Italian military +authorities, and had traversed the communications that would have to +be brought into play were such a move to be carried out. What time the +transfer would take was a matter of calculation based on close +examination of the details. The final report came to hand while I was +acting as Deputy C.I.G.S., although its general purport had already +been communicated several weeks before. Two or three months later, +when it suddenly became necessary to rush British and French troops +round from northern France to the eastern portions of the Po basin +after the singular <span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span> of Caporetto, actual experience proved +the forecasts made in this report to have been quite correct. There +was not much "rushing" about the move. It took weeks to complete.</p> + +<p>General Pershing and his staff arrived in England just at this time, +and I enjoyed the pleasure of meeting them and discussing many +matters. The attitude of these distinguished soldiers, one and all, +impressed us most agreeably. One had heard something about "Yankee +bounce" in the past, which exists no doubt amongst some of the +citizens of the great Republic across the water. But here we found a +body of officers who, while manifestly knowing uncommonly well what +they were about, were bent on learning from us everything that +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page149" name="page149"></a>(p. 149)</span> they possibly could, and who from the outset proved +themselves singularly ready to fall in with our methods of doing +business even where those methods differed widely from what they had +been accustomed to.</p> + +<p>Some weeks later (in the capacity of War Office representative) I +accompanied Lord Jellicoe and Admiral Sims, together with Sir I. +Malcolm and Sir W. Wiseman of the Foreign Office, to Devonport to meet +a large party of high officials from the United States who were coming +over to Europe to take general charge of things in connection with the +American share in the war. It was headed by Colonel House, and +included the Chiefs of the Naval and Military Staffs with their +assistants, as well as financial and other delegates. We arrived some +time before the two cruisers conveying the party were due, so we +proceeded to Admiralty House. While waiting there, one was afforded a +most welcome opportunity of learning something about how the strings +were being pulled over the great water-area which was under special +charge of the local commander-in-chief. The whole thing was set out on +a huge fixed map covering, I think, the billiard-table. On it were +shown where the various convoys were at the moment, the minefields, +the positions where German U-boats had recently been located, and +numberless other important details. To a landsman it was absorbingly +interesting to have all this explained, just as it had been +interesting, a few days before, to visit General Ashmore's office at +the Horse Guards and to learn on the map how the London anti-aircraft +defences were controlled during an attack.</p> + +<p>Just about dusk the two cruisers were descried coming in past the +breakwater, so it became a question of getting to the Keyham dockyard +where they were to fetch up. Ever keen for exercise in any form, Lord +Jellicoe decided to walk, and the commander-in-chief went with him. +Knowing the distance and the somewhat unattractive approaches leading +to the Keyham naval establishments, and as it, moreover, looked and +felt uncommonly like <span class="pagenum"><a id="page150" name="page150"></a>(p. 150)</span> rain, I preferred to wait and to +proceed in due course by car, as did all the rest of our party. The +flag-lieutenant and the naval officer who had come down with Lord +Jellicoe from the Admiralty likewise thought that a motor was good +enough for them. By the time that the automobile party reached the +dockyard it was pitch dark and pouring rain, and the cruisers were +already reported as practically alongside; but to our consternation +there was no sign of the two flag-officers. Now, a dog who has lost +his master is an unperturbed, torpid, contented creature compared with +a flag-lieutenant who has lost his admiral, and there was a terrible +to-do. All the telephones were buzzing and ringing, the dockyard +police were eagerly interrogated, and there was already talk of +despatching search-parties, when the two distinguished truants +suddenly turned up, exceedingly hot, decidedly wet, and, if the truth +must be told, looking a little muddy and bedraggled. However, there +was no time to be lost, and we all rushed off into the night heading +for where the vessels were to berth. How we did not break our necks +tumbling into a dry-dock or find a watery grave tumbling into a wet +one, I do not know. We certainly most of us barked our shins against +anchors, chains, bollards, and every sort of pernicious litter such as +the sister service loves to fondle, and the language would have been +atrocious had we not been out of breath—the Foreign Office indeed +contrived to be explosive even as it was. However, we managed to reach +the jetty after all just as the two big warships had been warped +alongside, winning by a nose. So all was well.</p> + +<p>Colonel House and his party had not been fortunate in their weather +during the crossing, and they had come to the conclusion that a +fighting ship represented an overrated form of ocean liner. More than +one of the soldiers and civilians confided to me that if there was no +other way of getting across the herring-pond on the way back than by +cruiser, they would stop this side. They were all quite pleased to +find themselves on dry land, and during <span class="pagenum"><a id="page151" name="page151"></a>(p. 151)</span> the journey up to +town by special there was plenty of time to make acquaintance and to +discuss general questions. One point was made plain. Mr. Balfour's +recently concluded mission to the United States had been a tremendous +success. Junior officers who had not met him spoke of him almost with +bated breath, and a hint that he might be at the terminus to greet the +party caused unbounded satisfaction. When we steamed into Paddington +about 1 o'clock <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> and his tall figure was descried on the platform, +the whole crowd burst out of the train in a disorderly swarm, jostling +each other in trying to get near him and have a chance of shaking his +hand; it was quite a business getting them sorted and under control +again so as to start them off in the waiting cars to Claridge's. We do +not always send the right man as envoy to foreign parts, but we had +managed it that time.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page152" name="page152"></a>(p. 152)</span> CHAPTER VIII</h3> + +<h5>THE NEAR EAST</h5> + +<p class="resume">The first talk about Salonika — The railway and the port — The + question of operations based on Macedonia at the end of + 1914 — Failure of "easterners" to realize that the Western Front + was Germany's weakest front — Question whether it might not have + been better to go to Salonika than to go to the + Dardanelles — Objections to such a plan — The problem of + Bulgaria — Consequences of the Russian <span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span> — Difficulty of + the Near Eastern problem in the early summer — An example of how + the Dardanelles Committee approached it — Awkwardness of the + problem after the failure of Sir I. Hamilton's August + offensive — The Bulgarian attitude — Entente's objection to Serbia + attacking Bulgaria — I am ordered to Salonika, but order + countermanded — The disaster to Serbia — Hard to say what ought to + have been done — Real mistake, the failure to abandon the + Dardanelles enterprise in May — The French attitude about + Salonika — General Sarrail — French General Staff impressed with + War Office information concerning Macedonia — Unsatisfactory + situation at the end of 1915 — The Salonika business a blunder all + through — Eventual success does not alter this.</p> + +<p class="p2">"If you've 'eard the East a-callin', you won't never 'eed nought +else," Rudyard Kipling's old soldier sings, mindful of spacious days +along the road to Mandalay. The worst of the East, however, is that +people hear it calling who have never been there in their lives. That +there were individuals in high places who were subject to this +mysterious influence, became apparent at a comparatively early stage +of the World War.</p> + +<p>The first occasion on which, apart from a few outpost affairs over the +Dardanelles with Mr. Churchill to which reference has already been +made, "easternism" (as it came to be called later) raised its head to +my knowledge to any alarming extent, was when Colonel Hankey asked me, +one day early in December 1914, to go across to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page153" name="page153"></a>(p. 153)</span> Treasury +Buildings to meet Sir E. Grey and Mr. Lloyd George. There is not a +more depressing structure in existence than Treasury Buildings. The +arrangement of the interior is a miracle of inconvenience, on the most +cloudless of days its apartments are wrapped in gloom, and no +decorator has been permitted to pass its portals since it was declared +fit for occupation in some forgotten age. But Mr. Lloyd George, who +was Chancellor of the Exchequer at this time, is ever like a ray of +sunshine illumining otherwise dark places, and on this occasion he was +at his very brightest. He had made a discovery. He had found on a map +that there was quite a big place—it was shown in block +capitals—called Salonika, tucked away in a corner of the Balkans +right down by the sea. The map furthermore indicated by means of an +interminable centipede that a railway led from this place Salonika +right away up into Serbia, and on from thence towards the very heart +of the Dual Monarchy. Here was a chance of starting an absolutely new +hare. The Chancellor, <span lang="it"><i>allegro con fuoco</i></span>, was in a buoyant mood, as +was indeed only to be expected under such circumstances, and he was +geniality itself when I appeared in the apartment where Sir E. Grey +and Hankey were awaiting me together with himself. We should be able +to deal the enemy a blow from an entirely unexpected direction, the +days of stalemate in the half-frozen morasses of Flanders would be at +an end, we would carry the Balkans with us, it would be absolutely +top-hole. Although obviously interested—it could hardly be otherwise +when the words "Near East" were mentioned—the Foreign Secretary was +careful not to give himself away. You have to make a practice of that +when you are Foreign Secretary.</p> + +<p>Now, it so happened that I had been at Salonika more than once, and +also that I had travelled along this very railway more than once and +had carefully noted matters in connection with it so long as daylight +served. Much more important than that, there were in the archives of +my branch at the War Office very elaborate reports on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page154" name="page154"></a>(p. 154)</span> the +railway, and there was moreover full information as to the +capabilities and the incapabilities of the port of Salonika for the +discharge of what was animate and what was inanimate. It was a case of +an extensive haven that provided shelter in all weathers for +ocean-going ships, but possessing most indifferent facilities for +landing merchandise, or animals, or persons, considering the +importance of the site. And it was, moreover, a case of one single +line of railway meandering up a trough-like valley which at some +points narrowed into a defile, a railway of severe gradients with few +passing stations, a railway which assuredly would be very short of +rolling stock—although this latter disability could no doubt be +overcome easily enough. One somehow did not quite picture to oneself +an army of many divisions comfortably advancing from Belgrade on +Vienna based on Salonika, and depending upon the Salonika-Belgrade +railway for its food, for its munitions, and for its own means of +transit from the Mediterranean to its launching place. Besides, there +were no reserves of troops ready to hand for projecting into the +Balkans at this juncture. Only a very few weeks had passed since those +days of peril when Sir J. French and the "Old Contemptibles" had, +thanks to resolute leadership and to a splendid heroism on the part of +regimental officers and rank-and-file, just managed to bring the +German multitudes up short as these were surging towards the Channel +Ports. Fancy stunts seemed to be at a discount at the moment, and I +found it hard to be encouraging.</p> + +<p>Some statesmen are ever, unconsciously perhaps but none the less +instinctively, gravitating towards the line of least resistance, or +towards what they imagine to be the line of least resistance. This, +peradventure, accounts to some extent for the singular attraction +which operations in the Near East, or Palestine, or anywhere other +than on the Western Front, always seemed to present to certain highly +placed men of affairs. The idea that the actual strategical position +in those somewhat remote regions was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page155" name="page155"></a>(p. 155)</span> such as to constitute +any one of them the line of least resistance from the Entente point of +view, was based on a complete misreading of the military situation. +That theory was founded on the fallacy that the Western Front +represented the enemy's strongest point. It was, on the contrary, the +enemy's weakest point, because this front was from its geographical +position the one where British and French troops could most easily be +assembled, and it was the one on which a serious defeat to the enemy +necessarily threatened that enemy with a grave, if not an +irretrievable, disaster. It is true that for the comparatively short +period during which Russia really counted, that is to say during the +early months before Russian munitions gave out, the Eastern Front—the +Poland Front—was a weak point for the Germans. But the Russian bubble +had been pricked in the eyes of those behind the scenes long before +the great advance of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies over the +Vistula and into the heart of the Tsar's dominions began in the early +summer of 1915.</p> + +<p>Scarcely had the Salonika venture been mooted than the Dardanelles +venture cropped up and was actually embarked on; so that for the nonce +the advocates of an advance through Serbia—I am not sure that there +was more than one at the time—abandoned that project. But although +the Serbs had succeeded early in the winter of 1914-15 in driving the +Austro-Hungarian invading columns ignominiously back over the Save and +the Danube, the position of this isolated Ally of ours was giving +grounds for anxiety from an early period in 1915, and it always +presented a serious problem for the Entente. Colonel Basil Buckley, my +right-hand man with regard to the Near East, had it constantly in +mind.</p> + +<p>It is always easy to be wise after the event; what in the world would +become of the noble army of critics if it were not so? Still, looking +back in the light of the sequel upon the political and strategical +situation that existed in the Near East early in 1915, it does look as +if <span class="pagenum"><a id="page156" name="page156"></a>(p. 156)</span> the right course for the Western Powers to have adopted +then (so soon as there were troops available for another theatre +without hopelessly queering the Entente pitch on the Western Front) +would have been to use those troops for lending Serbia a hand instead +of despatching them to the Dardanelles. Even a weaker force than that +with which Sir I. Hamilton embarked on the Gallipoli venture +(nominally five Anglo-Australasian and two French divisions) would +have proved an invaluable moral, and an effective actual, support to +the Serbs; and its arrival on the Morava and the Save could hardly +have failed to influence to some extent the attitude of Bulgaria and +Roumania, and assuredly would have caused the Austro-Hungarian +monarchy some heart-burnings. It has been said that M. Briand (who did +not assume the premiership in France until a somewhat later date) +advocated the despatch of Entente troops to Serbia in the spring of +1915, and that the question was discussed between the British and +French Governments; but I know nothing of this, only having come to be +behind the scenes of the Near Eastern drama at a somewhat later date.</p> + +<p>Objections to such a course undoubtedly existed, even leaving out of +account the fact that our Government was, with the approval of that of +Paris, committing itself at the time more and more definitely to the +Hellespont-Bosphorus-Black Sea project. In the first place, Salonika +happened to be in the hands of neutral Greece, although that +difficulty would probably have been got over readily enough then. In +the second place, the despatch of a Franco-British force to Serbia in +the spring would have been playing the enemy's game to the extent of +virtually tying up that force and of condemning it to inactivity for +the time being, so as to provide against a danger—hostile attack on +Serbia—which might never materialize, and which actually did not +materialize until the autumn. In the third place, there was always, +with amateur strategists about, the grave risk that a measure taken +with the object of safeguarding Serbia as far as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page157" name="page157"></a>(p. 157)</span> possible, +might translate itself into a great offensive operation against the +Central Powers from the south, absorbing huge Anglo-French forces, +conducted under great difficulties in respect to communications with +the sea, and playing into the hands of the German Great General Staff +by enabling that wide-awake body to make the very fullest use of its +strategical assets in respect to "interior lines." Finally, we could +not depend upon Bulgaria siding with the Entente, nor even Roumania; +and although Italy would certainly not take up arms against us she had +not yet declared herself an Ally.</p> + +<p>The above reference to Bulgaria introduces a question which added +greatly to the perplexities of the Near Eastern problem then and +afterwards, perplexities that were aggravated by the well-founded +suspicion with which Bulgaria's monarch was on all hands regarded. The +Bulgars coveted Macedonia. But the greater part of Macedonia happened +as a result of the Balkan upheavals of 1912 and 1913 to belong to +Serbia, and the rest of it belonged to Greece. Into the ethnographical +aspect of the Macedonian problem it is not necessary to enter here. +The cardinal fact remained that Bulgaria wanted, and practically +demanded, this region. While we might have been ready enough to give +away Greek territory which did not belong to us, we really could not +give away Serbian territory which did not belong to us seeing that +Serbia was an Ally actually embattled on our side and with a +victorious campaign already to her credit. Macedonia at a later date +upset the applecart.</p> + +<p>Things were already from our point of view in something of a tangle in +the Balkans by the vernal equinox of 1915; but they had got into much +more of a tangle by the time that spring was merging into summer. At +that stage, the failure of our naval effort against the Dardanelles +had been followed by our military effort coming to a disconcerting +standstill, and the Bulgarian and Greek Governments in common with +their military authorities made up their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page158" name="page158"></a>(p. 158)</span> minds that the +operation against the Straits was doomed. That was bad enough in all +conscience, but worse was to follow. Because then the Russian bubble +was suddenly, dramatically, and publicly pricked, the Tsar's stubborn +soldiery, without ammunition and almost without weapons, could not +even maintain themselves against the Austro-Hungarian forces, much +less against the formidable German hosts that were suddenly turned +loose upon them, and within the space of a very few weeks the +situation on the Eastern Front, which at least in appearance had been +favourable enough during the winter and the early spring, suddenly +became transformed into one of profoundest gloom from the Entente +point of view. Even a much less unpromising diplomatic situation than +that which had existed in the Balkans between December and May was +bound to become an untoward one under such conditions. Our side had +come to be looked upon as the losing side. No amount of skill on the +part of our Foreign Office nor of the Quai d'Orsay could compensate +for the logic of disastrous facts. The performances of H.M. Government +in connection with Bulgaria and Greece at this time have been the +subject of much acid criticism. But in time of war it is the +victorious battalions that count, not the wiles of a Talleyrand nor of +a Great Elchi. The failure in the Dardanelles and the Russian collapse +settled our hash in the Near East for the time being, and no amount of +diplomatic juggling could have effectually repaired the mischief.</p> + +<p>Exactly what line the General Staff would have taken up had they been +called upon, say at the beginning of July, to give a considered +opinion in the form of a carefully prepared memorandum as to the +course that ought to be followed in connection with the Dardanelles +and Serbia, it is hard to say. That there was considerable risk of +Serbia being assailed in force by the Central Powers before long was +manifest. On the other hand, there we were, up to the neck in the +Dardanelles venture, and strong reinforcements were at this time +belatedly on their way out <span class="pagenum"><a id="page159" name="page159"></a>(p. 159)</span> to Sir I. Hamilton from home. The +position was a decidedly awkward one. To despatch further contingents +to this part of the world, over and above those already on the way or +under orders, was virtually out of the question, unless the Near East +was to be accepted as the Entente's main theatre of war—which way +madness lay. To divert the Dardanelles reinforcements to Salonika +destroyed such hopes as remained of the Gallipoli campaign proving a +success after all. Human nature being what it is, there would have +been a sore temptation to adopt the attitude of "wait and see" which +might perhaps have commended itself to Mr. Asquith, to let things take +their course, to be governed by how Sir I. Hamilton's contemplated +offensive panned out, and to trust to a decision in that quarter +taking place before isolated Serbia should actually be imperilled. But +in those days the General Staff never was asked to give a considered +opinion. At the Dardanelles Committee which had all these matters in +hand, one seldom, if ever, was given an opportunity of expressing +views on the broader aspects of any question. The methods in vogue on +the part of that body are indeed well illustrated by the following +incident.</p> + +<p>One evening in August, about 7 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span>, just when I was getting to the +end of my work for the day, Colonel Swinton, who for many months past +had been acting as "Eye-Witness" with Sir J. French's forces, turned +up unexpectedly in my room. My pleasure at meeting an old friend, +recently from the hub of things in France and whom I had not seen for +a long time, gave place to resentment when he explained what he had +come for. It appeared that he had a short time previously arrived in +the United Kingdom to act temporarily as Secretary of the Committee of +Imperial Defence (which practically meant the Dardanelles Committee at +the moment), and he had been called upon, right off the reel, to +prepare a memorandum on the Dardanelles situation, which was to be +ready next morning. Knowing comparatively little about the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page160" name="page160"></a>(p. 160)</span> +Dardanelles, he had come to consult me. In the first instance I +absolutely declined to oblige. I had no authority from Lord K. or the +C.I.G.S. to express views on this subject on paper for the benefit of +the Committee. Furthermore—and perhaps this weighed more heavily in +the scale than did official considerations—I was "fed up." One +generally was by 7 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> at the War Office. The very idea of starting +at this hour upon a memorandum about anything, let alone the +Dardanelles, was infuriating.</p> + +<p>Swinton, however, eventually prevailed upon me to lend a hand on the +distinct understanding, pressed for by me, that it remained a hidden +hand. After all, this intrusion of his did provide some sort of +opportunity for putting the situation plainly before the Committee, +and for expressing a vertebrate opinion. We proceeded to the club and +dined together, and thereafter, refreshed and my equanimity restored +by a rest and hearing the news from across the water, we grappled with +the subject in the C.I.D. office. "Ole Luke Oie" could be trusted to +put a thing tersely and with vigour once he knew what to say, and the +document did not take long to draft. We took the line that in the +Gallipoli Peninsula it was a case of getting on or of getting out. The +core of this memorandum is quoted in the "Final Report" of the +Dardanelles Commission, where it is pointed out that no mention is +made of a middle course. That was intentional. A middle course was +regarded by us as wholly unjustifiable, although it was the one which +the Dardanelles Committee adopted; for that body did not take our +advice—it neither got on nor got out.</p> + +<p>The situation in the Near East as a whole became a more anxious one +than ever after the failure of Sir I. Hamilton's August offensive, +because by this time Russia's collapse was complete, and the legions +of the Central Powers which had been flooding Poland, Grodno and +Volhynia, impeded by sparsity of communications rather than by the +resistance of the Grand Duke Nicholas's ammunitionless army, had +become available for operations <span class="pagenum"><a id="page161" name="page161"></a>(p. 161)</span> in a new direction. The +portents all pointed to an attack upon Serbia. If Serbia was to +receive effective aid at the hands of the Western Powers, that aid +must be well in motion before the enemy hosts should gather on the +northern and western frontiers of our threatened Ally, otherwise the +aid would assuredly be late owing to the difficulty of moving troops +rapidly from board ship in Salonika roads, up to the theatre of +operations. Hopes still existed, on the other hand, at least in the +minds of some of the members of the Dardanelles Committee, that by +sending additional reinforcements to Sir I. Hamilton a success might +be obtained even yet in that quarter. The French for a week or two +contemplated despatching four divisions which were to operate on the +Asiatic side of the Hellespont; but the situation on the Western Front +put an end to this design. There were two stools, the Dardanelles and +Salonika, and among us we contrived to sit down between them. For +while all this was in debate the danger to Serbia grew apace, and +intelligence sources of information now made it certain that the +German Great General Staff had not only planned, but had already made +nearly all the preparations for, a great stroke in the direction of +the western Balkans.</p> + +<p>In this distressing state of affairs Bulgaria was always the uncertain +factor. Her attitude could not be gauged with certainty, but it was +extremely suspicious throughout. A pro-Bulgar element had for some +months been listened to by our Foreign Office with greater respect +than it deserved, although nobody, pro-Bulgar or anti-Bulgar, +entertained any trust in Tsar Ferdinand's integrity. Had Serbia even +at this late hour been willing to relinquish Macedonia, it is +conceivable that Bulgaria might have remained neutral, and that +Ferdinand might have broken such engagements as he had secretly +entered into with the Central Powers. But utter distrust and bitter +hatred of Bulgaria prevailed in Serbia. Our Ally perhaps hardly +sufficiently realized that national aspirations ought rather <span class="pagenum"><a id="page162" name="page162"></a>(p. 162)</span> +to direct themselves towards the Adriatic and the regions inhabited by +Serb stock under Austro-Hungarian rule, than towards districts peopled +by mixed races on the shores of the Aegean. Be that as it may, the +idea of delivering up Macedonia to the traditional Eastern enemy was +scouted at Belgrade. We hoped that at the worst Greece would, in +accordance with treaty obligations, take sides with Serbia should +Bulgaria throw in her lot with the Central Powers against the Serbs. +Then came the attack of the German and Austro-Hungarian forces, +synchronizing with the mobilization of the Bulgarian army.</p> + +<p>The Nish Government—Belgrade had been quitted by this +time—entertained no illusions whatever regarding Bulgarian +intentions, and wished to assume the offensive promptly eastwards +while this very suspicious mobilization was still in progress. Our +Government—I am not sure what attitude the French, Russian, and +Italian Governments took up—realized that Serbia's seizing the +initiative put an end to all hopes of Greece lending a hand, and they +virtually vetoed the project, as has already been mentioned in Chapter +IV. That, as it turned out, was an unfortunate decision, because it +fatally injured the Serbian prospects of preventing their territory +being overrun before the French and we could intervene effectively, +while it did not secure Greek adhesion. We virtually staked on King +Constantine, and we found too late that our King was a Knave.</p> + +<p>Just at this awkward juncture Lord Kitchener instructed me to be +prepared to proceed to Salonika, and all the necessary steps for +starting on the journey were promptly taken; but it was not clear what +capacity I was going in. It seemed a mistake, although one was +naturally heartened at the prospect of activities in a new sphere, +even if these were only to be of a temporary character. But, as it +turned out, the Dardanelles Committee (or the War Council, I am not +sure of the exact date when the Dardanelles Committee deceased) +intervened, wishing me to remain at my post. In view of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page163" name="page163"></a>(p. 163)</span> what +followed, one was well out of intimate contact with the Macedonian +imbroglio on the spot, because, as everybody knows now, the +Franco-British forces arrived too late to save Serbia from reverses +which amounted to an almost overwhelming disaster at the hands of the +great hosts which the Central Powers and Bulgaria threw into the +scale.</p> + +<p>We and the French had, judged by results, made a hideous mess of +things between us. The Allies were late at a critical juncture—and in +war that is the unpardonable sin. Sir E. Carson, who had for a brief +period proved himself a tower of strength on the Dardanelles +Committee, resigned from the Cabinet in disgust. Lord Milner, +independent man of affairs at the time, spoke out strongly on the +subject in the House of Lords. But although the opinion of either of +them is well worth having on most questions, and although both know +their own minds, I doubt whether they, either of them, had any clear +idea then as to what ought to have been done to avert the catastrophe, +and I doubt whether they, either of them, have a clear idea now. +Subsequent to May we were confronted with a horribly complex military +and political situation in the Near East (and by that time military +forces were already committed to the Dardanelles venture); because it +was only then that the position of affairs on the Eastern Front and in +the Near East became transformed owing to the Russian <span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span>—a +<span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span> which turned out to be considerably greater than the +available information as to our Ally's munition difficulties had led +us to anticipate.</p> + +<p>It is easy to say now, after the event, that we ought to have come +away from the Dardanelles in June, and to have transferred the force +there, or part of it, to Serbia, which was obviously placed in peril +by Russia's collapse. But in June reinforcements were already +earmarked for the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Sir I. Hamilton was +confident of achieving a substantial success after they should arrive. +It is easy to say now, after the event, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page164" name="page164"></a>(p. 164)</span> that, immediately +the offensive from Anzac and Suvla in August miscarried, we ought to +have come out of the Gallipoli Peninsula and to have transferred the +force there, or some of it, to Serbia. But in the latter part of +August the French were disposed to send a substantial contingent to +the Asiatic side of the Straits, we were supposed to have troops to +spare for that part of the world, and it was not until early September +that all this was dropped in view of events on the Western Front. It +is easy to say now, after the event, that the Entente ought to have +foreseen that King Constantine would throw Serbia over in any case, +and that therefore we ought not to have prevented the Serbs from +attacking Bulgaria while she was still mobilizing. But we trusted a +King's word, and we knew that M. Venizelos was heart and soul on our +side. It is easy to say now that we ought to have insisted on Serbia +buying off Bulgar hostility by handing over Macedonia. But Serbia +might have refused despite our insisting, and, when all is said and +done, Serbia has succeeded in keeping Macedonia after all. Ought we to +have come out of the Dardanelles in September, as soon as it was +decided that neither the French nor British would send reinforcements +thither, and to have transferred the troops to Salonika? Assuredly we +ought then to have come away from the Gallipoli Peninsula. But the +evacuation must have been a ticklish business, and to have aggravated +its difficulties by despatching its war-worn garrison simultaneously +to Salonika and Serbia, just when great enemy contingents were +gathering on the Danube and the Save, would have thrown a tremendous +strain upon staff, upon troops, and upon the shipping resources of all +kinds actually on the spot.</p> + +<p>No. Leaving out of consideration the blunder of having drifted into +the Dardanelles enterprise at all, the real mistake lay in not +abandoning that enterprise when it became apparent that the troops +originally detailed could not accomplish their purpose, when it became +apparent that gaining a footing on the Gallipoli Peninsula meant +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page165" name="page165"></a>(p. 165)</span> gaining a footing and no more and that no aid was to be +expected from Bulgaria or from Greece. It was just at that juncture +that Russia began to give out and that the tide turned in favour of +the Central Powers on the eastern side of Europe. The matter was +primarily one for H.M. Government, because the French were not deeply +committed to the effort against the Straits; but H.M. Government at +that moment happened to be in a state of flux. The staff at G.H.Q., +St. Omer, were no doubt not absolutely unprejudiced judges; but I was +hearing constantly from General H. Wilson between August 1914 and the +end of 1915, and he always wrote in the same strain about the +Dardanelles from April onwards: "Cut your losses and come out."</p> + +<p>Some mention has already been made of M. Briand's inclination for +Entente efforts based on Salonika. In the autumn of 1915 that eminent +French statesman was head of the Government in Paris, and his Cabinet +took up a very strong line indeed over this question. We all agreed +that neither the city, linked as it was by railway with Central +Europe, nor yet its spacious land-locked haven must fall into enemy +hands. Our naval authorities were in full agreement with the French +naval authorities on that point. But when it came to projects for +planting down large military forces in this area, with the idea of +ultimate offensive operations northward ever in the background, we of +the General Staff at the War Office demurred, and we were, at all +events in principle, supported by the majority of the War Council. +Lord Kitchener left for the Aegean at this time; but both before going +and after his return he always, as far as I know, deprecated locking +up fighting resources in Macedonia. Our Allies across the Channel +were, however, somewhat insistent. Two conferences took place: one, a +military one at Chantilly at the very end of October, and a more +authoritative one a few days later in Paris, both of which I attended. +More will be said about these <span lang="fr"><i>réunions</i></span> in Chapter XII. General +Joffre, with some of his staff, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page166" name="page166"></a>(p. 166)</span> also paid a visit to London +in connection with the matter. The upshot was that the French +practically forced us into the policy of maintaining a large force +about Salonika. But H.M. Government were placed in a difficult +position in the matter, seeing that their pet project (or at all +events the pet project of the pre-Coalition Government), that of +attacking the Dardanelles, had so completely failed.</p> + +<p>One could not altogether escape from the impression at the time that, +in the determined attitude which our friends over the water adopted on +this point, they were at least to some small extent actuated by +anxiety to maroon General Sarrail, who had been sent off in command of +the French troops already despatched, and also to keep him quiet by +investing him with the supreme command in this new theatre of war—as +was later arranged. Why the strong political support enjoyed in +certain French quarters by this prominent, and in the opening days of +the war highly successful, soldier should have been taken so +seriously, it was hard for anybody on our side of the Straits of Dover +to understand. One wonders whether M. Clemenceau might not have been +somewhat less discomposed on the subject had he been at the head of +affairs. But the attitude adopted on the point became extremely +inconvenient at a later date when, after an offensive on a large scale +undertaken on the Salonika front had miscarried completely, owing +largely, if not entirely, to a lamentable lack of co-ordination +between the various contingents engaged, a change in the chief command +did not instantly follow. Unsatisfactory as was the policy of +interning large bodies of British and French troops that were badly +wanted at the decisive point, in a sort of cul-de-sac in the Near +East, it was made all the more unsatisfactory by the way the military +situation was dealt with locally for more than a year and a half.</p> + +<p>In view of certain criticisms of the General Staff to which the lack +of information concerning the Gallipoli Peninsula when it was needed +in 1915 has given rise, it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page167" name="page167"></a>(p. 167)</span> is worth mentioning that at my +suggestion General Joffre sent one of his trusted staff-officers over +from Chantilly in November 1915 to put up with us for a few days, +particularly in connection with Macedonian problems. This +representative of the French General Staff was astonished to find that +we possessed numbers of detailed military reports concerning that part +of the world, with full information as to railways and communications, +and he was most complimentary on the subject. "Your England is an +island, my general," he remarked to me; "you have not had the eastern +frontier always to think of like France. How could we devote attention +to Macedonia?" It was not here a question of reconnaissance work or of +costly backstairs methods in a carefully watched fortified area of +prime strategical significance like the environs of the Hellespont. +Getting information about Macedonia had merely been a matter of +sending out experienced military observers to look about them and to +report.</p> + +<p>When I left the General Staff at the War Office at the end of the +year, the position of affairs at Salonika was a thoroughly +unsatisfactory one, although the General Staff could fairly claim that +for this it was not responsible. A great Allied army was collected in +this quarter, inert and virtually out of the game. Our antagonists had +very wisely abandoned all idea of attacking, and of thereby justifying +the existence of, that great Allied army. The Bulgars had, with some +assistance from German and Austro-Hungarian troops, secured possession +of the mountainous region of the Balkans; and the Central Powers had +thus acquired just that same advantageous strategical and tactical +position on the Macedonian Front as they had for a year and a half +been enjoying on the Italian borders—the advantageous position of +having roped in Nature as a complaisant ally. The Entente had had an +uncommonly difficult hand to play in the Near East, but, as things +turned out, the Governments concerned had played it about as badly as +was feasible.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page168" name="page168"></a>(p. 168)</span> Except in the matter of equipping the Greek forces at a very +much later date, I was not directly concerned in what followed for +weary months on the Salonika Front. During the few weeks when I was +acting temporarily as Deputy C.I.G.S. in 1917, things happened to be +pretty well at a standstill in Macedonia, except that just at that +time one British division was transferred from that theatre to +Palestine, where there was some prospect of doing something. I +remained in touch with the General Staff, however, until the end of +the war, and throughout was to a great extent behind the scenes.</p> + +<p>Only one valid military excuse can be put forward for imprisoning a +great field army for three years in the Salonika area, a plan to which +the General Staff was consistently opposed from the outset. It enabled +our side to employ some 150,000 Serbian and Greek troops, whom it +might have been difficult to turn to good account elsewhere; at the +very end the Greek contingents were, moreover, being substantially +increased. In what was to a great extent a war of attrition this was a +point of some importance. But that great field army was for all +practical purposes immobilized for the whole of the three years. It +was immobilized partly by inferior bodies of troops—mainly Bulgarian, +whom the German Great General Staff would have found it hard to +utilize in other theatres. It was immobilized partly by having before +it a wide zone of rugged uplands which were in occupation of the +enemy, and which forbade the employment of masses of men. That great +field army never at any time pulled its weight, and its presence in +Macedonia threw a severe and unwarranted strain upon our naval +resources owing to the difficulty of safeguarding its communications +against submarines in a water area exceptionally favourable for the +operations of such craft.</p> + +<p>At the end of the three years that great field army did carry out a +remarkably successful offensive, in which the Serbs played a gallant +and prominent part. But, without wishing to disparage the fine work +performed by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page169" name="page169"></a>(p. 169)</span> the various contingents in that offensive of +September 1918—British, French, Italian, Serb and Greek—the fact +remains that the Bulgars were defeated not in Macedonia but in Picardy +and Artois. Exhausted by years of hostilities—they had been at it +since 1912—they knew that the game was up before the offensive ever +started, knew that their side had lost the war, knew that there was no +hope of succour from Germany. Considering the hopelessness of the +situation from the point of view of the Central Powers, it is +surprising that the Sofia Executive did not throw up the sponge at a +somewhat earner date.</p> + +<p>The Macedonian side-show is a typical example of the kind of side-show +which cannot be justified from the broad point of view of military +policy. In the next chapter a number of other side-shows which had +their place in the Great War will be touched upon. In it the fact will +be pointed out that side-shows are sometimes unavoidable, and it will +be suggested that most of those on which the British Government +embarked between 1914 and the end of the war were justifiable, even +when they were not absolutely unavoidable.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page170" name="page170"></a>(p. 170)</span> CHAPTER IX</h3> + +<h5>OTHER SIDE-SHOWS</h5> + +<p class="resume">Three categories of side-shows — The Jackson Committee — The + Admiralty's attitude — The Pacific, Duala, Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam, + Oceania, the Wireless Stations — Kiao Chao — The + Shatt-el-Arab — Egypt — Question whether the Australasian forces + ought to have been kept for the East — The East African + operations — Our lack of preparation for a campaign in this + quarter — Something wrong — My own visit to Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam + in 1908 — The bad start of the campaign — Question of utilizing + South African troops to restore the situation — How this was + managed — Reasons why this was a justifiable + side-show — Mesopotamia — The War Office ought to have + interfered — The question of an advance on Baghdad by General + Townshend suddenly referred to the General Staff — Our + mistake — The question of Egyptian defence in the latter part of + 1915 — The Alexandretta project — A later Alexandretta project + propounded by the War Cabinet in 1917 — Its absurdity — The amateur + strategist on the war-path — The Palestine campaign of 1918 + carried out almost entirely by troops not required on the Western + Front, and therefore a legitimate side-show — The same principle + to some extent holds good with regard to the conquest of + Mesopotamia — The Downing Street project to substitute Sir W. + Robertson for Sir C. Monro, a miss-fire.</p> + +<p class="p2">"There must have been a baker's dozen of them," writes Lord Fisher in +his <i>Memories</i> in reference to what he calls the "wild-cat +expeditions" on which troops were engaged while he was First Sea Lord +in 1914-15. There were a baker's dozen of them, and more, if the +occupation by Australasian contingents of certain islands in the +Indian Archipelago and the Pacific are included. But a correct +appreciation of the merits and of the demerits of our numerous +side-shows of those and later days is not covered by ejaculatory +generalizations. Some of the very greatest of soldiers—Marlborough, +Frederick the Great, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page171" name="page171"></a>(p. 171)</span> Napoleon, and Wellington—all +countenanced side-shows that were kept within limits.</p> + +<p>The truth about side-shows is that they may be divided up roughly into +three categories: (1) The necessary, (2) the excusable, (3) the +unjustifiable and mischievous. But there is no sharp dividing-line +between the three categories. Of those for which we made ourselves +responsible in the Great War, the majority undoubtedly come within the +first category. Most of the remainder may, upon the whole, be classed +as excusable. Unfortunately the small number which come under the +third heading were just those which absorbed the greatest military +effort, and which were the only ones that really reckoned as vital +factors in influencing the course of the conflict as a whole. Amongst +the necessary and unavoidable side-shows were those which were +undertaken, at all events in the first instance, in the interests of +sea power. Amongst the side-shows which may be regarded as +justifiable, although not unavoidable, may be mentioned the +continuation of the Cameroons operations after the taking of Duala, +the continuation of the operations in "German East" after the capture +of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam, and the continuation of the operations in +"German South-West" after the great wireless station had been dealt +with; in each of these cases the forces and resources of various kinds +absorbed were, for various reasons, of no great relative importance, +and the conquest of the Boche territories involved was desirable. Two +unjustifiable side-shows have already been discussed, the Dardanelles +and Salonika; another that comes within this third category was +Mesopotamia subsequent to the securing of the Shatt-el-Arab and the +Karun oil-fields, and yet another is represented by the excessive +resources which were devoted to Palestine operations during certain +periods of the war.</p> + +<p>A special interdepartmental committee, an offshoot of the Committee of +Imperial Defence, was set up on the outbreak of the war, virtually as +an expansion of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page172" name="page172"></a>(p. 172)</span> already existing Colonial Defence +Committee. By a stroke of good fortune, its chairman was Admiral Sir +Henry Jackson, who was attached to the Admiralty for special service +at the time; the Colonial Office and the India Office, as well as the +Admiralty were represented on it, and I was the War Office delegate. +It was on the recommendations of this body that the operations against +Togoland, the Cameroons, and "German East" were initiated, that every +encouragement was given to the projects set on foot by the +Australasian Governments for the conquest of German New Guinea, the +Bismarck Archipelago, Samoa, and other localities in Oceania, and that +similar encouragement was given to the Union Government of South +Africa in respect to its plans for wresting "German South-West" out of +the hands of its possessors and oppressors. The Admiralty attached +extreme importance to Duala, and considerable importance to +Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, as also to some of the ports in Oceania owing +to the presence of Von Spee's squadron of swift cruisers in the +Pacific. They likewise were anxious that the German wireless stations +of great range and power in Togoland, the Cameroons, "German +South-West," and "German East" should be brought to nought.</p> + +<p>Then there was also Kiao Chao. The capture of that enemy naval +stronghold in the Far East was regarded as eminently desirable, and +although the Japanese were ready and willing to take the thing on +alone it seemed expedient that we should contribute a small contingent +to assist, very much on the same principle as the French and Italians +liked to have small contingents fighting under the orders of General +Allenby during his triumphant operations in Palestine and Syria. Our +military garrisons at Tientsin and Hong-Kong could easily find a +couple of battalions, and from our British point of view this +contribution may be set down as coming within the category of an +excusable, if not an unavoidable, side-show. Apart from East Africa, +none of these minor sets of operations absorbed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page173" name="page173"></a>(p. 173)</span> more than +insignificant military forces, which in most cases were composed +largely of Colonial coloured troops who were hardly fitted for +fighting on the Western Front at that stage. In almost all of them, +except "German East" and Kiao Chao, the object had been achieved +within a few weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, and even the +bitterest foes of the side-show in the abstract will admit that the +end justified the means.</p> + +<p>The question of an expedition to the Shatt-el-Arab was first raised by +the India Office. Such an undertaking could indeed hardly suggest +itself during the first few weeks of the war, seeing that the Ottoman +Empire did not become involved until some weeks had elapsed. The +object of this Mesopotamia side-show, which ultimately developed into +one of the greatest campaigns ever undertaken by a European Power in a +region beyond the seas, was, to start with, simply the seizure of the +water-way for the length that this is navigable by ocean-going ships +together with the port of Basrah, and to secure the safety of the +oil-fields of the Karun. The operation incidentally could hardly fail +to exercise considerable political effect around the Persian Gulf, +which was all to the good, and the project did not call for the +employment of a large force to effect the purpose that was in view at +the start. Most military authorities would surely class this as a +thoroughly justifiable, if perhaps not an absolutely necessary, +side-show.</p> + +<p>Then, thrusting itself into prominence about the same time as the +Shatt-el-Arab affair developed, came the question of Egypt. The Turks +would assuredly contrive a stroke at the Khedive's dominions from the +side of the Isthmus of Suez sooner or later, the attitude of the +tribes in the vast regions to the west of the Nile valley could not +but give grounds for some anxiety, and there was a fair chance of +effervescence within the Nile Delta itself. Maintaining the security +of Egypt was hardly more a side-show than was the provision of +garrisons for India; but the defence of Egypt at a later stage more or +less merged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page174" name="page174"></a>(p. 174)</span> into offensive operations directed against +Palestine. The question of giving that defence a somewhat active form +by undertaking expeditionary enterprises in the direction of the Gulf +of Alexandretta came to be considered quite early in the war, as has +already been mentioned in Chapter III. But during the first six months +or so Egypt only in reality absorbed military resources which for +various reasons could not appropriately have been utilized elsewhere. +The British regulars were withdrawn from Cairo and Khartum and helped +to form divisions for the Western Front, considerable bodies of Native +Indian troops were transported to Suez from Bombay and Kurrachee, the +East Lancashire Territorial Division was sent out from home, and the +newly constituted contingents from the Antipodes secured a temporary +resting-place in a region which climatically was particularly well +suited for their purpose. Anxiety as to Egypt was as a matter of fact +in great measure allayed in January 1915, owing to the Osmanlis +pressing forward to the Suez Canal, sustaining a severe rebuff near +its banks at the hands of the defending force, and disappearing +eastwards as a beaten and disorganized rabble.</p> + +<p>The Palestine operations will be touched upon later; but there is a +subject in connection with the contingents from the Antipodes, +referred to above, which, although it has nothing to do with the +principle of side-shows in the abstract, may perhaps not +inappropriately be discussed here. Was it right ever to have employed +those contingents on the Western Front, as they were employed from an +early date in 1916 onwards to the end of the struggle? The result of +their being so disposed of was that, covering a space of nearly three +years, troops from the United Kingdom were perpetually passing +eastwards through the Mediterranean while Australasian troops were +perpetually passing westwards through the Mediterranean. Military +forces belonging to the one belligerent Empire were, in fact, crossing +each other at sea. This involved an avoidable absorption of +ship-tonnage, it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page175" name="page175"></a>(p. 175)</span> threw an avoidable strain upon the naval +forces of the Entente, and it imposed an avoidable period of inaction +upon the troops concerned. Look upon the Anzacs simply as counters and +upon the Great War as a <span lang="ge"><i>Kriegspiel</i></span>, and such procedure becomes +ridiculous. Whatever there is to be said for and against the +Dardanelles, Salonika, Palestine, and Mesopotamia side-shows, they did +undoubtedly absorb military forces in excess of those which Australia +and New Zealand placed in the field, and they provided active work in +eastern regions far nearer to the Antipodes than was the Western +Front.</p> + +<p>This, however, entirely ignores sentiment, and sentiment can never +justly nor safely be ignored in military matters. The Anzacs would +have bitterly resented being relegated to theatres, of secondary +importance so to speak. Their Governments would have protested had +such a thing been even hinted at, and they would have protested in +very forcible terms. No other course than that actually followed was +in reality practicable nor, as far as I know, ever suggested. As a +matter of fact, however, none of the Australasian mounted troops, +apart from some quite minor exceptions, ever did proceed west of the +Aegean. After performing brilliant service in the Gallipoli Peninsula +acting as foot soldiers, the Anzac Horse spent the last three years of +the war in Egypt, where they seized and made the most of opportunities +for gaining distinction under General Allenby such as would never have +been presented to them in France.</p> + +<p>I was a good deal concerned in the operations in East Africa during +the first year and a half of the war, a period of scanty progress and +of regrettable misadventures. We enjoyed the advantage, when this +question came before Admiral Jackson's committee, of having +Lieut.-Colonel (now Major-General Sir A. R.) Hoskins present, who at +the time was Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles and was +consequently well acquainted <span class="pagenum"><a id="page176" name="page176"></a>(p. 176)</span> with our own territories in +that part of the world. From the outset, Hoskins was disinclined to +regard operations in this quarter as a sort of picnic, and the event +proved that he was right. It was, however, settled that the whole +business should be handed over in the main to India to carry out, and +that the commander and staff for the contemplated offensive, as well +as the reinforcements needed for the purpose, should come across the +Indian Ocean from Bombay.</p> + +<p>At a very early stage it became apparent that our information +concerning the enemy districts nearest to the frontier between German +territory and British East Africa was defective, while information as +to the districts on our own side was not all that might be wished, and +I gathered from Hoskins at the time (and also later on from Colonel G. +Thesiger, Hoskins' predecessor, who brought home his battalion of the +Rifle Brigade from India during the winter of 1914-15 and who was +killed when commanding a division at Loos in the autumn of 1915) that +the prosecution of active intelligence work had received little +encouragement from home during their terms of office. That is the +worst of a corps like the King's African Rifles being under the +Colonial Office instead of under the War Office, although there are +adequate reasons for that arrangement; but I cannot help thinking that +if the General Staff had pressed the matter, not much difficulty would +have been encountered in altering the Colonial Office's point of view, +and that both no doubt were to blame. It may also be remarked +incidentally that the Colonial Office probably has no secret service +funds at its disposal. Still, be that as it may, there was something +amiss.</p> + +<p>Here we were, with British soil actually in contact with an extensive +province in the hands of a potential enemy and known to be garrisoned +by a considerable body of native troops. Everything pointed to the +need for extensive reconnaissance work in the borderland districts +with a view to possible eventualities. Numbers of active, intelligent, +and adventurous young British <span class="pagenum"><a id="page177" name="page177"></a>(p. 177)</span> officers, admirably fitted for +acquiring military information, were stationed on our side of the +frontier. And yet when the storm broke we were unprepared to meet it. +We had plans worked out in the utmost detail for depositing the +Expeditionary Force at its concentration points in French territory. +Our naval policy was to all intents and purposes framed with a German +war as its ultimate goal. The probability of a conflict with the +Boches had for some years past virtually governed our military policy. +But in East Africa we were in a measure caught napping.</p> + +<p>There had been lack of foresight. I had been guilty of this myself, so +that I have the less hesitation in referring to it; for I had been at +both Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam early in 1908. At the first-named port +our ship only spent a few hours, so that any kind of reconnaissance +work would have been out of the question. But we lay for four days on +end in Dar-es-Salaam harbour, and yet it never occurred to me to +examine the place and its immediate surroundings from the point of +view of possible attack upon it in the future—this, moreover, after +having just given over charge of the strategical section in the War +Office. Even allowing for the fact that war with Germany was not +looming ahead to the same extent in 1908 as it was from 1909 onwards, +there was surely something wrong on that occasion.</p> + +<p>The start that was made in East Africa in 1914 can only be described +as deplorable. Following a custom which to my mind is more honoured in +the breach than in the observance, the mortifying results of the +attempted maritime descent upon Tanga which ushered in the +hostilities, were for a long time kept concealed from the public. That +reverse constituted a grave set-back—a set-back on a small scale +perhaps, but as decided a one as we met with during the war. Our +troops not only lost heavily in casualties, but they also suffered +appreciably in <i>moral</i>. For months subsequent to that untoward event +we were virtually on the defensive in this theatre of war, although we +unquestionably enjoyed the advantage <span class="pagenum"><a id="page178" name="page178"></a>(p. 178)</span> in actual numbers, and +although the maritime communications were open to our side and closed +to that of the enemy. The enemy enjoyed such initiative as there was. +Bodies of hostile troops used to cross the border from time to time +and inflict unpleasant pin-pricks upon us. The situation was an +eminently unsatisfactory one, but what was to be done?</p> + +<p>That "German East" was just the very place to utilize South African +troops in, became apparent at a comparatively early stage of the +proceedings. Even before General Botha and his men had completed his +conquest of "German South-West," one had already begun to dream dreams +of these same forces, or their equivalent, coming to the rescue on the +farther side of the Dark Continent, and of their getting our Indian +and native African contingents, with their small nucleus of British +regulars, out of the scrape that they were in. Being in constant +communication with General C. W. Thomson, who was in command of the +exiguous body of British soldiers left at the Cape, I was able to +gauge the local feeling out there fairly correctly, and became +convinced that we should be able to rely on securing a really +high-class contingent of improvised units for "German East" out of +South Africa, of units composed of tough, self-reliant, experienced +fighting men who might not be disposed to undertake service on the +Western Front. The special character of the theatre of war in East +Africa, the nature of the fighting which its topography imposed on the +contending sides, its climate, its prospects for the settler, and its +geographical position, were all such as to appeal to the dwellers on +the veldt. But when the subject was broached once or twice to Lord K. +during the summer of 1915 he would have nothing to do with it. Once +bitten twice shy. The War Minister looked on side-shows with no kindly +eye. Nor could he be persuaded that this was one which would only be +absorbing resources that could hardly be made applicable to other +quarters.</p> + +<p>Mr. Bonar Law, who was then Colonial Minister, was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page179" name="page179"></a>(p. 179)</span> very +anxious to have the military situation in this part of the world +cleared up, and I rather took advantage of Lord K.'s absence in the +Near East in November to bring the whole thing to a head. Sir A. +Murray quite agreed that South Africa ought to be invited to step in +and help. So it came about that the business was practically settled +by the time that the Chief came back from the Dardanelles, and +although he was by no means enthusiastic, he accepted the situation +and he chose Sir H. Smith-Dorrien for the command. Whether this was, +or was not, a justifiable side-show is no doubt a matter of opinion. +But a very large proportion of the troops who eventually conquered +"German East" under Generals Smuts, Hoskins and Van Deventer would +scarcely have been available for effective operations in any other +theatre, and the demands in respect to artillery, aircraft, and so +forth were almost negligible as compared to the resources that were in +being even so early as the winter of 1915-16. Perhaps the most +powerful arguments that could be brought forward against the offensive +campaign that was initiated by General Smuts in German East Africa +were its cost and the amount of ship-tonnage that it absorbed. The +primary object for which operations in this region were undertaken, +the capture of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam so as to deprive the enemy of +their use for naval purposes, had rather dropped out of consideration +owing to the seas having been cleared of enemy non-diving craft in the +meantime.</p> + +<p>The Mesopotamian operations during the first year and a half were +conducted entirely by the India Office and India, and, up till after +Sir W. Robertson had become C.I.G.S., we had no direct responsibility +in connection with them in the War Office. I had a subsection that +dealt entirely with Indian matters; this kept watch, noted the +telegrams, reports, and so forth, dealing with what was going on on +the Shatt-el-Arab and beyond, and it could at any moment supply me +with general information as to the situation. From time to time I used +to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page180" name="page180"></a>(p. 180)</span> ask how the operations were progressing, and, without +ever going carefully into the matter, was disposed to look somewhat +askance at the procedure that was being adopted of continually +pressing forward from place to place—like the hill-climber who on +reaching one crest ever feels himself drawn on to gain the next—far +beyond the zone which had in the first instance been regarded as the +objective of the Expeditionary Force. The meteor of conquest appeared +to be alluring "D" Force too far. Without examining the position of +affairs closely, it was obvious that the farther our troops proceeded +up the Tigris the longer became their line of communications, the +shorter became that of the Turks, and the greater must inevitably +become the contingents put in the field by our side. What had started +as a limited-liability and warrantable side-show was somehow +imperceptibly developing into a really serious campaign in a remote +region.</p> + +<p>Looking back upon those months in the light of later experience, the +attitude which one felt disposed to assume, the attitude that as this +was an India Office business with which the War Office had nothing to +do it was their funeral, was a mistaken one. The War Office could not, +of course, butt in unceremoniously. But Lord Kitchener was a member of +the Government in an exceptionally powerful position in all things +connected with the war, and had one represented one's doubts to him, +he would certainly have gone into the question and might have taken up +a strong line. I, however, have no recollection of ever speaking to +him on the subject of Mesopotamia during the period when "D" Force was +working right up into Irak, moving first to Amarah, then to El Gharbi, +and then on to Kut, thus involving the Empire in a regular offensive +campaign on an ambitious scale in the cradle of the world.</p> + +<p>Then came that farther advance of General Townshend's from Kut to +Azizieh, the project for an advance right up to Baghdad assumed shape +at Army Headquarters on the Tigris, in Simla, and at the India Office, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page181" name="page181"></a>(p. 181)</span> and it was then that the General Staff, now with Sir A. +Murray in charge, was suddenly called upon to give a considered +opinion concerning this ambitious scheme for the information of the +War Council. Now it is an interesting fact that just at that very same +time we were called upon to give a considered opinion on the subject +of the best plan of rendering Egypt secure, and that this necessarily +raised the question whether the plan should favour an active form of +defence involving an expedition to Alexandretta or thereabouts, or +whether it should take a more passive form of holding positions away +back near the Suez Canal. The two Memoranda were as a matter of fact +printed in the one secret document.</p> + +<p>As regards Alexandretta we had no doubts whatever, although, as +already mentioned on <a href="#page079">p. 79</a>, Lord K. and the experts in connection with +Egypt favoured operations in that direction. We made up our minds +without the slightest difficulty, and pronounced dead against a +forward policy of that kind at such a time. But in reference to +Baghdad we all of us, I think, felt undecided and in a quandary. +Unacquainted with General Townshend's views, assuming that the river +transport upon which military operations up-Tigris necessarily hinged +was in a reasonably efficient condition, ignorant of the obstacles +which forbade a prompt start from Azizieh, we pictured to ourselves a +bound forward at a very early date. Actually the advance did not +materialize for more than a month, and in the meantime the Turks were +gathering reinforcements apace. The city might have been occupied had +General Townshend been able to push forward at once; for an army +(favoured, it is true, by incomparably more effectual administrative +arrangements) did sixteen months later reach the place within seven +days of quitting Azizieh, although strongly opposed. But so exiguous +an expeditionary force could not have maintained itself in that +isolated situation in face of swelling hostile numbers. In falling +back to his advanced base its leader would have been faced with +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page182" name="page182"></a>(p. 182)</span> nearly double the distance to cover that he compassed so +successfully in his retreat from Ctesiphon. The little army would +almost certainly have been cornered and compelled for lack of supplies +to surrender in some advanced position in Irak five months earlier +than, as it turned out, Kut hauled down the flag.</p> + +<p>But, be that as it may, we made ourselves to some extent responsible +for the disaster which occurred to General Townshend's force, owing to +our not taking a decided line on the subject and not obeying the +elementary principle that resources must not in war be wasted upon +unnecessary subsidiary enterprises. Whether it was or was not feasible +to get to Baghdad at the time was a matter of some uncertainty. But +that the whole business of all this pouring of troops into Mesopotamia +was fundamentally unsound scarcely admitted of dispute. That ought to +have determined our attitude on the minor Baghdad point.</p> + +<p>Egypt gave rise to little anxiety during the spring and summer of 1915 +in consequence of the signal discomfiture which the Turks had suffered +on the Canal early in the year; the arid tract known as the Sinai +desert indeed provided a satisfactory defence in itself during the dry +months. But as autumn approached, the prospect of Ottoman efforts +against the Nile Delta had to be taken into serious consideration, the +more so that neither the Dardanelles Committee nor the War Council +which took its place could disguise from themselves that the +abandonment of the Dardanelles enterprise was at least on the cards, +and that this would liberate Osmanli forces for efforts in other +directions. There had been a school of thought in Egypt all along that +the best defence of that region against Turkish invasion was by +undertaking operations on the Syrian or Palestine coast, based on the +Gulf of Iskanderun for preference, but possibly based on Beirut or +Haifa. As the situation in the Near East grew rapidly worse during +September, the War Council began to dream of diversions in new +directions, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page183" name="page183"></a>(p. 183)</span> quite apart from the Gallipoli Peninsula and +Salonika, and some of them pitched upon the shores of the Gulf of +Iskanderun, the strategical importance of which was unquestionable. A +force landed in that quarter would give the enemy something to think +about, would afford excellent protection to Egypt, and would +indirectly assist our troops, which had been gradually penetrating +along the Tigris right up into Mesopotamia.</p> + +<p>On this project the General Staff was called upon to report, as +already mentioned in Chapter IV, and as stated above, and the General +Staff rejected the project without hesitation. This was a very +different scheme from that which had been regarded with approval in +the winter of 1914-15. Then the enemy resources in these environs had +been insignificant, the Turkish communications leading thither had +still been interrupted by the Taurus Mountains, and there had been no +U-boats in the Mediterranean. Now the enemy was fully prepared in this +quarter and would be on the look-out for our troops, the tunnels +through the Taurus had been completed, and warships and transports +could not possibly have lain moored in the roadstead of Alexandretta +for fear of submarines. The landing would have had to take place in +the inner portion of the Gulf of Iskanderun, Ayas Bay, where there +were no facilities, where the surroundings were unhealthy, and where +it would be particularly easy for the Turks to put up a stolid +resistance. Our view was that for any operation of this kind to be +initiated with reasonable safety, a very large body of troops would be +necessary, that as far as Egypt was concerned the Nile Delta could be +rendered absolutely secure with a much smaller expenditure of force, +and that the inevitable result of embarking on a campaign in this new +region would be to withdraw yet more of the Entente fighting resources +from the main theatre of war in France. It would have been a side-show +for which very little could be said and the objections to which seemed +to us manifest and overwhelming. The War Council took our advice +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page184" name="page184"></a>(p. 184)</span> and dropped the scheme, although Lord Kitchener, who was out +in the Aegean, favoured it. Any anxiety that prevailed as to Egypt +settled itself shortly afterwards owing to the Gallipoli troops, so +skilfully withdrawn from Anzac, Suvla and Helles, all assembling in +the Nile Delta, where they were refitted and obtained some rest after +their terribly arduous campaign in the Thracian Chersonese. This +practically synchronized with the time of my leaving the War Office +for the time being and proceeding to Russia.</p> + +<p>As will be mentioned in Chapter XIV., one heard more about +Alexandretta while out in that country. I, moreover, became indirectly +concerned in that same old question again at a considerably later +date. For, early in October 1917, the War Cabinet hit upon a great +notion. On the close of the Flanders operations a portion of Sir D. +Haig's forces were to be switched thither to succour Generals Allenby +and Marshall in their respective campaigns, and were to be switched +back again so as to be on hand for the opening of active work on the +Western Front at the beginning of March 1918—a three months' +excursion. This scheme seems to have been evolved quite <span lang="fr"><i>au grand +sérieux</i></span> and not as a joke. At all events, a conference (which I was +called in to attend as knowing more about the Dardanelles business +from the War Office end than anybody else) assembled in the Chief of +the Imperial General Staff's room one Sunday morning—the First Sea +Lord and the Deputy First Sea Lord with subordinates, together with +General Horne who happened to be over on leave from his First Army, +and prominent members of the General Staff—and we gravely debated the +idiotic project.</p> + +<p>Nobody but a lunatic would, after Gallipoli experiences, undertake +serious land operations in the Alexandretta region with less than six +divisions. To ship six divisions absorbs a million tons. There were +United States troops at this time unable to cross the Atlantic for +want of tonnage, and, allowing for disembarkation difficulties +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page185" name="page185"></a>(p. 185)</span> on the Syrian coast, two soldiers or animals or vehicles +could be transported from America to French or English ports for every +one soldier or animal or vehicle that could be shifted from Marseilles +or Toulon to the War Cabinet's fresh theatre of operations, given the +same amount of shipping. Our Italian allies were in sore straits over +coal for munitions and transportation purposes, simply because +sufficient tonnage could not be placed at their disposal. Our own food +supplies were causing anxiety, and the maintenance of the forces at +Salonika afforded constant proof of the insecurity of the +Mediterranean as a sea route. But fatuous diversion of shipping +represented quite a minor objection to this opera-bouffe proposal. +For, allowing for railing troops from the Western Front to the Côte +Azure and embarking them, and for the inevitable delays in landing a +force of all arms on a beach with improvised piers, the troops at the +head of the hunt would already have to be re-embarking in Ayas Bay by +the time that those at the tail of the hunt came to be emptied out on +the shores of the Gulf of Iskanderun; otherwise the wanderers would +miss the venue on the Western Front.</p> + +<p>Had this been suggested by a brand-new Ministry—a Labour Cabinet, +say, reviewing the military situation at its very first +meeting—nobody could reasonably have complained. People quite new to +the game naturally enough overlook practical questions connected with +moving troops by land and sea, and do not realize that those questions +govern the whole business. Any third-form boy, given a map of +Turkey-in-Asia and told of campaigns in Palestine, and Mesopotamia, +and Armenia, and of the bulk of enemy resources being found about +Constantinople and in Anatolia, who did not instantly perceive how +nice it would be to dump an army down at Alexandretta, would, it is +earnestly to be hoped, be sent up to have his dormant intelligence +awakened by outward applications according to plan. Quite +knowledgeable and well-educated people call this sort of thing +"strategy," <span class="pagenum"><a id="page186" name="page186"></a>(p. 186)</span> and so in a sense it is—it is strategy in the +same sense as the multiplication table is mathematics. If you don't +know that two added to two makes four, and divided by two makes one, +the integral calculus and functional equations will defeat you; if it +has never occurred to you that by throwing your army, or part of it, +across the route that your opponent gets his food and his ammunition +and his reinforcements by you will cause him inconvenience, then your +name is not likely to be handed down to posterity with those of the +Great Captains. But the War Cabinet of October 1917 contained +personages of light and leading who had been immersed up to the neck +in the conduct of hostilities ever since early in 1915.</p> + +<p>The Royal Navy could always be trusted to play the game on these +occasions. When you cannot get your own way in the army, you beslaver +the local martial Esculapius with soft words and prevail upon him to +back you up. "Oh, if the medical authorities pronounce it necessary," +thereupon declare the Solons up top who have been sticking their toes +in, "it's of course got to be done." Similarly, when the amateur +strategist gets out of hand, you appeal to the sailors to save the +situation. "Just look at what these owls are after now," you say; +"they'll upset the coach before they've done with it. <i>You</i> won't be +able to do your share in the business, and we——" "Not do our share +in the business? Why not? Of course we——" "Yes, yes, I know that; +but you really must help us. One of those unintelligible masterpieces +of yours all about prostitution of sea-power, and periscopes and that +sort of poppy-cock with which you always know how to bluff the +lubbers." "Well, we'll see what we can do"—and the extinguisher is +dexterously and effectually applied. Co-operation between the two +great fighting services is the master-key opening every impeditive +doorway on the path to victory.</p> + +<p>The operations which brought about the occupation of Palestine and +Syria constituted a side-show on a very <span class="pagenum"><a id="page187" name="page187"></a>(p. 187)</span> important scale +indeed, and they at one period swallowed up contingents of British +troops that were somewhat badly needed on the Western Front, just as +the Salonika business did. Troops of that character, troops fit to +throw against the Hindenburg Line, however, represented quite an +insignificant proportion of the forces with which General Allenby +achieved his startling triumphs in the year 1918. The urgent need of +increasing our strength in France and Flanders during the winter of +1917-18 was fully realized by the General Staff at the War Office, and +efforts were made to induce the War Cabinet to consent to withdraw +some of the British troops from Palestine. But nothing was done in the +matter until after the successful German offensive of March, when the +enemy almost drove a wedge through the Allies' front near Amiens. +After that the bulk of General Allenby's British infantry were taken +from him and rushed off to France, native troops from India which had +been created by Sir C. Monro since he had taken up the chief command +there in 1916, together with some veteran Indian companies from +Mesopotamia, being sent in their place. The brilliant offensive which +carried our flag to Damascus and on to Aleppo after utterly defeating +the Turks was executed with a soldiery of whom the greater part could +be spared from the decisive theatre. The conquering army was composed +almost entirely of mounted men for whom there was little scope in +France, or of Indian troops. Even had the results been infinitely less +satisfactory to the Entente in themselves than they actually were, a +side-show run on such lines was a perfectly legitimate undertaking.</p> + +<p>The same principle to some extent holds good in respect to the +conquest of Mesopotamia by Sir S. Maude and Sir W. Marshall. The +troops which won such striking successes in that theatre of war +included a considerable proportion of units which would not have been +employed on the Western Front in any case. The army was to a large +extent a native Indian one, and latterly it included <span class="pagenum"><a id="page188" name="page188"></a>(p. 188)</span> its +quota of the freshly organized units which General Monro had created. +The fact remains, however, that from April 1916 (when Kut fell) until +the end of the war, a considerable force of British white troops was +continuously locked up in this remote region, engaged upon what can +hardly be called a necessary side-show.</p> + +<p>In connection with the remarkably successful efforts made by the +Commander-in-Chief in India to expand the local forces during the last +two years of the conflict, there is a matter which may be mentioned +here. That the victorious campaigns in Palestine and in Mesopotamia in +1917 and 1918 were in no small degree attributable, indirectly, to +what General Monro had accomplished by energy and administrative +capacity, is well known to all who were behind the scenes, and has +been cordially acknowledged by Lord Allenby and Sir W. Marshall. +Especially was this the case in Palestine in 1918, when brand-new +native Indian regiments took the place of British troops belatedly +summoned to the Western Front after our line had been broken at St. +Quentin. Nevertheless, a Downing Street intrigue was set on foot about +the end of April 1918 to substitute Sir W. Robertson for the commander +of the forces in India who had accomplished so much since taking over +charge.</p> + +<p>Not that there was any desire to remove Sir C. Monro. The object of +the shuffle was simply to get Sir W. Robertson out of the country, in +view of the manner in which his warnings in connection with +strengthening our forces in France had been disregarded and of his +having proved to be right. Sir William would no doubt have made an +excellent Commander-in-Chief in India; but if ever there was an +example of ill-contrived swapping of horses while crossing a stream, +this precious plot would have provided the example had it been carried +into execution. There would have been a three months' interregnum +while the new chief was on his way out and was picking up the strings +after getting out—this in the middle of the final year of the war! +The best-laid plans of politicians, however, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page189" name="page189"></a>(p. 189)</span> gang aft +a-gley. Sir C. Monro had stipulated, when reluctantly agreeing to give +up command of his army on the Western Front in the autumn of 1916 and +to proceed to Bombay, that this Indian appointment was to be a +permanent one, and not a temporary one such as all other appointments +came to be during the war. He did not feel disposed to fall in with +the Downing Street project when this was broached. Is it to be +wondered at that military men regard some of the personnel that is +found in Government circles with profound suspicion?</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page190" name="page190"></a>(p. 190)</span> CHAPTER X</h3> + +<h5>THE MUNITIONS QUESTION</h5> + +<p class="resume">Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech — The mischief that it did — The + time that must elapse before any great expansion in output of + munitions can begin to materialize — The situation analogous to + that of a building — The Ministry of Munitions took, and was + given, the credit for the expansion in output for the year + subsequent to its creation, which was in reality the work of the + War Office — The Northcliffe Press stunt about shell shortage — Its + misleading character — Sir H. Dalziel's attack upon General von + Donop in the House — Mr. Lloyd George's reply — A discreditable + episode — Misapprehension on the subject of the army's + preparedness for war in respect to material — Misunderstanding as + to the machine-gun position — Lord French's attack upon the War + Office with regard to munitions — His responsibility for the lack + of heavy artillery — The matter taken up at the War Office before + he ever raised it from G.H.Q. — His responsibility for the absence + of high-explosive shell for our field artillery — A misconception, + as to the rôle of the General Staff — The serious difficulty that + arose with regard to this ammunition owing to prematures — The + misstatements in "<i>1914</i>" as to the amount of artillery + ammunition which was sent across France to the + Dardanelles — Exaggerated estimates by factories as to what they + would be able to turn out — Their estimates discounted as a result + of later experiences — The Munitions Ministry not confined to its + proper job — The incident of 400 Tanks — Conclusion.</p> + +<p class="p2">Who reads the platform addresses of political personages, even the +most eminent and the most plausible? Some people evidently do, or such +utterances would not fill the columns of our newspapers. If one had +ever felt tempted to peruse the reports of these harangues in the +piping times of peace, one assuredly had neither the inclination nor +yet the leisure to indulge in such practices during the early days of +the Great War. To skim off the cream of the morning's news while at +breakfast was about as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page191" name="page191"></a>(p. 191)</span> much as a War Office mandarin could +manage in the way of reading the daily papers during that +super-strenuous time. One morning, however—it must have been the +morning of the 22nd of April 1915—I met an assistant with a journal +in his hand, as I was making my way along the corridor to my room in +the War Office. "Seen this what Squiff says about the shell, general?" +he asked, handing me the paper with his finger on the passage in the +Prime Minister's Newcastle speech, denying that there was an +ammunition shortage.</p> + +<p>The report of that discourse took one flat aback. For weeks past +letters from G.H.Q., as also the fervent representations made by +visitors over on duty or on leave from the front, had been harping +upon this question. Lord Kitchener had informed the House of Lords on +the 15th day of March that the supply of war material was "causing him +considerable anxiety." There was not the slightest doubt, even +allowing for the tendency of men exposed to nerve-racking experiences +or placed in positions of anxious responsibility to find fault, that +our army in France and Flanders was at a terrible disadvantage as +compared to that opposed to it in the matter of artillery ammunition. +The state of affairs was perfectly well known, not merely to the +personnel of batteries constantly restricted in respect to +expenditure, but also to the infantry and to other branches of the +service deprived of adequate gun support. Into the controversies and +recriminations which have taken place over the subject of how this +extraordinary statement came to be made at Newcastle, it is not +proposed to enter here. There is at all events no controversy as to +whether the statement was true or not, in substance and in fact. It is +common knowledge now, and it was indeed fairly common knowledge at the +time, that the statement was in the highest degree misleading. It did +a great deal of mischief amongst the troops in the war zone, and it +caused serious injury to those who were responsible for the provision +of munitions in this country.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page192" name="page192"></a>(p. 192)</span> A pronouncement of that kind, published as it was in all the +newspapers, was bound to arouse comment not merely at home, but also +amongst officers and men confronting the enemy between Dixmude and the +La Bassée Canal. These latter, who were only too well aware of the +realities of the case, resented such a misstatement of facts, and they +were also inclined to jump to the conclusion, not altogether +unnaturally, that the serious ammunition shortage, the crying need for +additional heavy ordnance, and so forth, were being deliberately +ignored by those responsible for supply at home. The inferiority of +our side in the field in respect to certain forms of munitions as +compared to the enemy, came to be attributed to indifference and to +mismanagement on the part of the Master-General of the Ordnance's +department and of Lord Kitchener. Even the majority of artillery +officers had not the slightest conception of what an expansion of +output of munitions on a huge scale involved. Still less were staff +officers in general and officers of other branches of the service in a +position to interpret the situation correctly. They did not realize +that before you can bring about any substantial increase of production +in respect to shell, or fuses, or rifles, or machine-guns, or +howitzers, you have to provide the machinery with which the particular +form of war material is to be manufactured, and that you probably have +to fashion some extensive structure to house that machinery in. It +takes months before any tangible result can be obtained, the number of +months to elapse varying according to the nature of the goods.</p> + +<p>Dwellers in great cities will often note what happens when some +ancient building has been demolished by the house-breaker. The site is +concealed by an opaque hoarding. For months, even sometimes for years, +nothing seems to follow. The passer-by who happens to get an +opportunity of peeping in when some gate is opened to let out a cart +full of debris, only sees a vast crater at the bottom of which men, +like ants, are scurrying about with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page193" name="page193"></a>(p. 193)</span> barrows or are delving +in the earth. All the time that the ground is being cleared and that +the foundations are being laid, those out in the street know nothing +of what is going on, and they wonder why some effort is not made to +utilize the vacant space for building purposes. Then one day, quite +unexpectedly, scaffolding begins to rear its head. A few weeks later +bricklayers and their work begin to show above the hoarding; and from +that moment things at last are obviously on the move. The edifice +grows from day to day. Within quite a short space of time workmen are +already putting on the roof. Then down comes the scaffolding, windows +are put in, final touches are given to the interior, and, within what +seems to be no time at all from the day when the scaffolding first was +seen, the building is ready for occupation. So it is with the +manufacture of munitions—experience in the United States in +connection with output for us and also in connection with output for +Russia, was exactly the same as in the United Kingdom in this respect. +An interminable time seems to elapse before the output begins; but +once it has fairly started it grows by leaps and bounds.</p> + +<p>At the time of the Newcastle oration, and for some months +subsequently, the work of expansion on a colossal scale which the +Master-General of the Ordnance had undertaken was still, speaking +generally, rather on the footing of the building of which the +foundations are only beginning to be laid even if the excavations have +been completed and the debris has been cleared away. There was as yet +comparatively little to show. The results did not begin to make +themselves apparent until a date when the Ministry of Munitions had +already come into being some time. That Department of State gained the +benefit. Its Chief took the credit for work in connection with which +it had for all practical purposes no responsibility beyond that of +issuing what predecessors had arranged for. The full product of the +contracts which the Master-General of the Ordnance had placed, of the +development he had given to existing Government establishments, and of +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page194" name="page194"></a>(p. 194)</span> setting up of entirely new ones by him, with Lord +Kitchener ever using his driving power and his fertility of resource +in support, only materialized in the winter of 1915-16, at a stage +when the Ministry of Munitions had been already full six months in +existence.</p> + +<p>If the army in general failed to understand the position, it is hardly +to be wondered at that Parliament and the less well-informed section +of the Press should not understand the position, and that the public +should have been deceived. Very shortly after the Newcastle speech, +and no doubt largely in consequence of it, the Northcliffe Press stunt +of May 1915 on the subject of shell shortage was initiated. Up to a +certain point that stunt was not only fully justified, but was +actually advantageous to the country. It made the nation acquainted +with the fact that our troops were suffering severely from +insufficiency of munitions. It stirred the community up, and that in +itself was an excellent thing. But it succeeded somehow at the same +time in conveying the impression that this condition of affairs was +due to neglect, and in consequence it misled public opinion and did +grave injustice. We must assume that, owing to fundamental ignorance +of the problems involved, to a neglect to keep touch with industrial +conditions, and to lack of acquaintance with the technicalities of +munitions manufacture, these newspapers (which usually contrive to be +extremely well informed, thanks to the great financial resources at +their back) were totally unaware that a sudden expansion of output on +a great scale was an impossibility; to suggest that this aspect of the +problem was deliberately suppressed would be highly improper. The +Northcliffe Press had also maybe failed to become acquainted with the +great increase that had taken place in the forces at the front, as +compared to the strength of the original Expeditionary Force which had +provided the basis of calculation for munitions in pre-war days, an +increase for which there was no counterpart in the armies of our +Allies or of our enemies. Or the effect that this must have in +accentuating <span class="pagenum"><a id="page195" name="page195"></a>(p. 195)</span> munitions shortage may have been overlooked, +obvious as it was. Be that as it may, the country readily accepted the +story as it stood, and was in consequence grievously misinformed as to +the merits of the question. The real truth has only leaked out since +the cessation of hostilities, and it is not generally known now.<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href="#footnote6">[6]</a></p> + +<p>After the Government had decided to create a Munitions Ministry with +Mr. Lloyd George at its head, one of the first incidents that occurred +was an unsavoury one. In the course of the discussions in the House of +Commons over the Bill setting up this new Department of State, Sir H. +Dalziel, a newspaper proprietor and a politician of long standing, +delivered on the 1st of July a violent diatribe directed against Sir +S. von Donop, the Master-General of the Ordnance. The honourable +member no doubt quite honestly believed that the lack of munitions was +due to neglect on the part of the War Office since the beginning of +the war. It is clear that he was totally unqualified to express an +opinion on the subject, and that he was ignorant of the manufacturing +aspects of the problem. He had heard stories of mistakes made here and +there, such as was inevitable at a time of tremendous stress. He +probably had not the slightest conception that the primary cause of +the shell shortage was the neglect of the Government of pre-war days +(which had recognized his party services by conferring on him the +dignity of a Privy-Councillorship) to give support to the +establishments for manufacturing armaments that existed in the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page196" name="page196"></a>(p. 196)</span> country. It is not with his performance on this occasion +that one feels a disposition to quarrel, but with that of the newly +created Minister of Munitions.</p> + +<p>Mr. Lloyd George could not plead ignorance of the facts. He had been +installed for a month or so. He must have known that it had been +totally impossible to produce, within ten months of the outbreak of +the war, the munitions that were required for an army in the field +three or four times greater than had ever been thought of prior to +mobilization.<a id="footnotetag7" name="footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7">[7]</a> He had actually given some pertinent information with +regard to manufacturing difficulties when he was introducing the bill, +which clearly demonstrated that he had grasped the general principles +governing the problem of munitions output. But what was his attitude? +Instead of following the honourable and chivalrous course, the course +sanctioned by long-established precedent and practice on the part of +Ministers of the Crown, of protecting, or trying to protect, the +public servant who had been assailed, he contented himself with +pointing out that the public servant ought to be given an opportunity +of stating his side of the question—which was manifestly impossible +in time of war—and that the onslaught was unexpected! There is not a +man in the United Kingdom better able to protect himself, or anybody +else, in speech and in argument in face of sudden attack than Mr. +Lloyd George. Had he been willing to do so he could have disposed of +Sir H. Dalziel, who in reality had no case, with the utmost ease.</p> + +<p>But that line apparently did not suit the book of the Minister of +Munitions. He must have been well aware that a great improvement in +output was already beginning to take place, and that, thanks entirely +to the labours of the Ordnance Department of the War Office and of +Lord Kitchener, the output would within a few months reach huge +figures. If it were represented to the House, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page197" name="page197"></a>(p. 197)</span> through +the House to the country, that this question of munitions had been +grossly neglected up to the time that he took charge, and if it became +apparent subsequently that from the hour of his becoming Munitions +Minister a rapid improvement set in, then the thanks of the nation +would go out to him and he would be canonized. This is the only +explanation that I can find for a most discreditable incident. For he +made no attempt to meet the attack, and he contrived to convey the +impression by his remarks that the attack was fully justified. I have, +moreover, good reason for believing that on that day there was present +on the Treasury bench a representative of the War Office, not a +Cabinet Minister, who was ready and willing to defend the +Master-General of the Ordnance and who was acquainted with the facts, +but that the Minister of Munitions, being in charge of the House, +refused to sanction his speaking. Happily such occurrences are rare in +the public life of this country.</p> + +<p>That reply of Mr. Lloyd George's on the 1st of July 1915—anybody can +look it up in Hansard—left an uncommonly nasty taste in the mouth. +The taste was made none the less nasty by his unblushing assumption on +later occasions of the credit for the improvement in munitions output +that took place from the summer of 1915 onwards. In my own case, +although I was nowise concerned with munitions output then, neither +pleasant association with Mr. Lloyd George at later dates in +connection with various war problems, nor yet the admiration for the +grit and courage displayed by him during the last three years of the +great contest which is felt by us all, could wholly remove that nasty +taste.</p> + +<p>Much misapprehension—a misapprehension fostered by reckless and +ignorant assertions made on the subject in Parliament and in the +Press—exists in regard to the state of preparedness of our army for +war in the matter of armament. Rightly or wrongly—most people +probably now think wrongly—H.M. Government of pre-war days merely +contemplated placing in the field for offensive <span class="pagenum"><a id="page198" name="page198"></a>(p. 198)</span> purposes a +force of six, or at the outside, seven divisions, with their +complement of mounted troops. Leaving the Germans out of +consideration, our Expeditionary Force of six divisions was upon the +whole as well equipped in respect to armament (apart from ammunition +reserves) as any one of the armies that were placed in the field in +August 1914. It only failed in respect to two items, heavy ordnance +and high-explosive shell for the field-guns, and in respect to +field-howitzers and heavy field-guns (the 60-pounders) it was better +off than any, including the German forces.</p> + +<p>It will perhaps be urged that we were deplorably badly-off for +machine-guns, and so in a sense we were. But what were the facts? The +Expeditionary Force was better fitted out with this class of weapon +than any one of the embattled armies at the outset of the war, with +the exception of the German. Ex-Kaiser William's hosts enjoyed a +tremendous advantage in respect to machine-guns, but they enjoyed that +advantage to an even greater extent over the French and Russian +legions than over ours. No action on the part of the German Great +General Staff before the conflict reflects greater credit upon their +prescience, than does their recognition in the time of peace of the +great part that the mitrailleuse was capable of playing in +contemporary warfare. The quantities of these weapons with which our +principal antagonist took the field was a complete surprise to all; +these were far in excess of the "establishment" that had been +acknowledged and which was the same as our own. As a matter of fact we +were better off for them, relatively, than the French, or +Austro-Hungarians, or Russians. To say that the question of +machine-guns had been neglected by us before the war either from the +point of view of tactics or of supply, is almost as unfair as it would +be to allege that the question of Tanks had been neglected by the +Germans before the Battle of the Somme. In the course of the debate in +the House over the Munitions Bill in the early summer of 1915, Sir F. +Cawley stated that we were short <span class="pagenum"><a id="page199" name="page199"></a>(p. 199)</span> of machine-guns at the +beginning of the war, and that none had been provided; the first +charge was made under a misapprehension, and the second charge was +contrary to the fact because a number of entirely new units had been +fitted out with the weapons. Mr. Lloyd George's statement, made a week +before, that it takes eight or nine months to turn out a machine-gun +from the time that the requisite new machinery is ordered, was +ignored.</p> + +<p>This brings us to the question of heavy ordnance and of high-explosive +ammunition for field-guns, and in this connection it is necessary to +refer to the violent attacks made upon the War Office in respect to +the supply of munitions, which find place in Lord French's "<i>1914</i>." +The Field-Marshal has not minced matters in his references to this +subject. He says of Mr. Lloyd George's work that it "was done in the +face of a dead weight of senseless but powerful opposition, all of +which he had to undermine and overcome." He speaks of the "apathy of a +Government which had brought the Empire to the brink of disaster," +although his attitude towards the head of that Government hardly +betrays this. He devotes his last chapter to "making known some of the +efforts" that he "made to awaken both the Government and the public +from the apathy which meant certain defeat." His book appeared in the +summer of 1919, three and a half years after he had returned from +France, three and a half years which had given him ample time to +examine at home into the justice of views which he had formed during +critical months when confronting the enemy. His attitude relieves one +of many scruples that might have otherwise been entertained when +discussing the statement which he has made.</p> + +<p>"<i>1914</i>," possibly unintentionally, leaves it to be inferred in +respect to heavy howitzers and similar ordnance, that the question of +supplying artillery of that type was first raised by Lord French +himself during the Battle of the Aisne. For the absence of any such +pieces from the Expeditionary Force when it started, no one, in my +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page200" name="page200"></a>(p. 200)</span> opinion, was more responsible than the Field-Marshal. Plenty +of gunner officers were advocates of the employment of such ordnance +in the field, although none probably fully realized the importance of +the matter; but what evidence is there of encouragement from the +Inspector-General of the Forces of 1907-12 and C.I.G.S. of 1912-14, +who had been controlling the manœvres of the regular army for the +half-dozen years preceding August 1914? The question was taken up +within the War Office three or four weeks before the commencement of +the Battle of the Aisne—as soon, in fact, as the effect of the German +heavy howitzers against Liège and Namur came to be realized. I spoke +to Sir C. Douglas on the subject myself—I believe before the retreat +from Mons began. A Committee was set up, to which I contributed a +member from amongst the gunners in my branch. The immediate +construction of a very large—although not nearly large enough—number +of 8-inch, 9.2-inch and 12-inch howitzers was recommended by this +body. Lord Kitchener approved its recommendations on the spot, and the +Master-General of the Ordnance started work. All this, I believe, took +place before Sir J. French raised the question at all. But past +neglect could not be overcome at a moment's notice. Experiments had to +be carried out, and designs had to be approved. To construct a big +howitzer with its mounting takes time even after you have the +machinery available, and in 1914 the machinery had to be got together +in the first instance. How the ex-First Member of the Army Council +comes to be unaware of the extent to which the factor of time enters +into the construction of armament, I do not pretend to understand.</p> + +<p>To a retired officer of artillery who had kept himself acquainted with +military progress, it did seem strange that after the Balkan War of +1912-13, which had clearly demonstrated the value of high-explosive +ammunition with field-guns, the War Office should continue to depend +entirely upon shrapnel for our 18-pounders, instead of following the +example of all other European countries <span class="pagenum"><a id="page201" name="page201"></a>(p. 201)</span> that spent any +considerable sums on their armies. No very intimate acquaintance with +technical details was needed to realize that there were difficulties +in the way, and that high-explosive is awkward stuff to deal with—a +gun of my own 5-inch battery in South Africa was, shortly after I had +left the unit to take up other work, blown to pieces by a lyddite +shell detonating in the bore, with dire results to the detachment. To +secure detonation is more difficult in a small, than in a big shell; +but other countries had managed to solve the problem in the case of +their field-guns somehow.</p> + +<p>On joining at the War Office on mobilization, and before any fighting +had taken place, I asked about the matter, but was not wholly +convinced that there was adequate excuse for our taking the field +without what our antagonists and our Allies alike regarded as a +requisite. Ever since I joined the Army in 1878—and before—there had +been a vein of conservatism running through the upper ranks of the +Royal Artillery. (When my battery proceeded from India to Natal to +take part in the first Boer War in 1881, we actually had to change our +Armstrong breech-loading field-guns for muzzle-loaders on the way, +because breech-loaders had been abandoned at home and there was no +ammunition for them.) Of late years a progressive school had come into +being—technically described as "Young Turks"—who had tried hard to +secure the introduction of four-gun batteries and other up-to-date +reforms, but without having it all their own way by any means. Whether +the Young Turks favoured high-explosive or not, I do not know; but its +absence somehow did rather smack of the reactionary, and, with the +exception of one of its members, the personnel of the Expeditionary +Force appeared to have some grounds for complaint at its +field-batteries having none of this form of ammunition. The one +exception was, in my opinion, its commander-in-chief.</p> + +<p>Lord French's account of his achievements in this matter is artless to +a degree. He informs his readers that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page202" name="page202"></a>(p. 202)</span> he was always an +advocate for the supply of high-explosive shell to our horse and field +artillery, but that he got very little support; that such support as +he got was lukewarm in the extreme, and, finally, we are told that the +"Ordnance Board was not in favour of it." Here we have the Chief of +the Imperial General Staff and First Military Member of the Army +Council advocating the adoption in our army of what practically all +other armies had already adopted or were adopting, the adoption of a +form of munitions the value of which had been conclusively +demonstrated in encounters of which the General Staff must have had +full cognizance, and he is turned down by the "Ordnance Board"! If +this represents the Field-Marshal's conception of the position and the +duties of the General Staff and its head, then it is not surprising +that, under another chief, Tanks were dismissed with ignominy by a +technical branch of the War Office in January 1915 without the General +Staff ever having been consulted. The pre-war C.I.G.S. was in a +dominating position amongst the Military Members of the Army Council +in virtue of his high rank and his distinguished antecedents. He was +very much more than a <span lang="la"><i>primus inter pares</i></span>. He was a field-marshal +while the Master-General of the Ordnance was a colonel with temporary +rank of major-general. Surely, if he had pressed this matter before +the Army Council, he would have received support? I feel equally sure +that, supposing the Army Council had refused to listen to his urgings, +he would have received satisfaction on representing the matter to the +Committee of Imperial Defence.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, it was only after more than one representation +made by General von Donop that G.H.Q. agreed to take some +high-explosive ammunition, and so it was introduced—in small +quantities—very soon after fighting began, and when the urgent need +of it had become apparent. But the output was necessarily very +restricted for a long time, and no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page203" name="page203"></a>(p. 203)</span> amount of talk and of +bounce, such as the Minister of Munitions was wont to indulge in from +the summer of 1915 onwards for several months, would have increased +it. Here was a case of an entirely new article, for the provision of +which no steps had been taken before the war. There happened to be +special technical difficulties in the way of producing the article, +<i>e.g.</i> the hardness of the steel necessary for this type of shell, and +devising a safe and effective fuse. There is, moreover, one matter in +connection with this question of high-explosive for our 18-pounders +which should be mentioned, but to which no reference finds a place in +"<i>1914</i>."</p> + +<p>Some months after this ammunition first came to be used in the field +it began to give serious trouble. Something was wrong. The shell took +to bursting in the bore of the gun and to bulging, or wholly +destroying, the piece, although these disasters fortunately did not +generally involve loss of life. Between August and October 1915, no +less than sixty-four of our 18-pounders were thus rendered +unserviceable—very nearly double the number lost during the retreat +from Mons, and considerably more than the complement of one of our +divisions. We could not comfortably afford this drain upon our supply +of field-guns at a time when New Army divisions were still in some +cases gun-less, and when the Territorial division were still armed +with the virtually obsolete 15-pounder. Accidents of this character, +moreover, have a bad effect upon the personnel of batteries, for the +soldier does not like his weapon, be it a rifle, or a hand-grenade, or +a sabre that crumples up, to play tricks on him. The difficulty was +not got over until elaborate experiments, immediately set on foot by +the War Office (which still dealt with design and investigation, +although actual manufacture was by this time in the hands of the +Ministry of Munitions), had been carried out. But before the end of +the year it had been established that the failures were due to faults +in manufacture, and from that time forward these <span lang="fr"><i>contretemps</i></span> became +extremely rare in the case of the 18-pounder. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page204" name="page204"></a>(p. 204)</span> The question +caused acute anxiety at G.H.Q. and in the War Office for some weeks; +the French had had a very similar experience, but on an even worse +scale. The difficulty arose just after the Ministry of Munitions +became responsible for manufacture, and I do not suggest that the +destruction of the guns was the fault of that department, for the +ammunition used in the field during that period and for many months +later was ammunition ordered by the Master-General of the Ordnance. +But similar trouble arose later in the case of the field howitzer; +there were no less than 25 of these damaged between April and June +1916, nearly a year after the Munitions Ministry had been set up.</p> + +<p>It should be mentioned that some other statements regarding munitions +which appear in "<i>1914</i>" are inaccurate. In discussing Lord +Kitchener's memorandum written at the beginning of January 1915, which +intimated that H.M. Government vetoed the Belgian coast project, Lord +French declares that two or three months later, viz. in March and +April, "large train-loads of ammunition—heavy, medium, and +light—passed by the rear of the army in France <span lang="fr"><i>en route</i></span> for +Marseilles for shipment to the Dardanelles." The Admiralty may +possibly have sent some ammunition by that route at that time, but it +is extremely unlikely. As for munitions for Sir I. Hamilton's troops, +the Dardanelles force did not land till the end of April, and its war +material was sent by long sea from the United Kingdom; very little +would have been gained, even in time, by adopting the route across +France. No great quantities of ammunition were sent from the United +Kingdom across country at any juncture to the Gallipoli Peninsula, but +G.H.Q. in France was once called upon to sacrifice some of its +reserve, and Lord French makes especial reference to this incident.</p> + +<p>He says that on the 9th of May—the date on which he launched his +political intrigue—he was directed by the Secretary of State for War +to despatch 20 per cent of his reserve supply of ammunition to the +Dardanelles. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page205" name="page205"></a>(p. 205)</span> Now, what are the facts? Sir I. Hamilton had +urgently demanded ammunition for a contemplated offensive. A vessel +that was loading up at Marseilles would reach the Aegean in time. To +pass the consignment through from the United Kingdom (where a large +supply had just come to hand from America) would mean missing the +ship. G.H.Q. were therefore instructed to forward 20,000 field-gun +rounds and 2000 field-howitzer rounds to the Mediterranean port, and +were at the same time assured that the rounds would straightway, over +and above the normal nightly allowance sent across the Channel, be +made good from home. Sent off by G.H.Q. under protest, the field-gun +rounds were replaced <i>within twenty-four hours</i> and the others within +four days, but of the engagement entered into, and kept, by the War +Office, "<i>1914</i>" says not one word. Lord French was evidently +completely misinformed on this matter.</p> + +<p>It should be added that the amount of heavy artillery included in the +Dardanelles Expeditionary Force was negligible, and that the amount of +medium artillery was relatively very small. Large train-loads of +ammunition for such pieces were never required, nor sent. Inaccurate +statements of this kind tend to discredit much of Lord French's severe +criticism of Lord Kitchener and the department of the Master-General +of the Ordnance, for which there is small justification in any case.</p> + +<p>One point made in the "Ammunition" chapter in "<i>1914</i>" deserves a word +of comment. Lord French mentions that the supply of shell received at +the front in May proved to be less than half of the War Office +estimate. That kind of thing went on after supply had been transferred +from the War Office to the Ministry of Munitions. I had something to +say to munitions at a subsequent period of the war, as will be touched +upon later, and used to see the returns and estimates. The Munitions +Ministry was invariably behind its estimates (although seldom, if +ever, to the extent of over 50 per cent) right up to the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page206" name="page206"></a>(p. 206)</span> +end. There you have our old friend, the Man of Business, with his +intolerable swank. Some old-established private factories, as well as +some new factories set up during the war, were in the habit of +promising more than they could possibly perform. Certain of them were, +indeed, ready to promise almost anything. Their behaviour, I happen to +know, caused some of our Allies who placed contracts with them and +were let in, extreme annoyance. The names of one or two of them +possibly stink in the nostrils of certain foreign countries to this +day, although that sort of thing may also be common abroad. Those in +authority came to realize in the later stages of the war how little +reliance could be placed on promises, and they became sceptical. The +Ministry of Munitions, one can well imagine, discounted the estimates +that they got from their manufacturing establishments. The War Office +certainly discounted the estimates that it got from the Ministry of +Munitions. Commanders-in-chief in the field consequently no longer +miscalculated what they might expect, to the same extent as Sir J. +French did in May 1915.</p> + +<p>I only became directly associated with armament questions in the +summer of 1916, and then came for the first time into contact with the +Ministry of Munitions. Such questions are matters of opinion, but it +always seemed to me that this Department of State would have done +better had it stuck to its proper job—that of providing what the Army +and the Air Service required. The capture of design and inspection by +the Ministry may have been unavoidable, seeing that this new +organization was improvised actually during the course of a great war +and under conditions of emergency; but the principle is radically +wrong. It is for the department which wants a thing to say what it +wants and to see that it gets it. As a matter of fact, the Munitions +Ministry occasionally went even farther, and actually allocated goods +required by the Army to other purposes. When a well-known and popular +politician, after spending some <span class="pagenum"><a id="page207" name="page207"></a>(p. 207)</span> three years or so at the +front with credit to himself, took up a dignified appointment in +Armament Buildings, the first thing that he did was to promise a +trifle of 400 tanks to the French without any reference to the +military authorities at all. Still, who would blame him? His action, +when all is said and done, was merely typical of that "every man for +himself, and the devil take the hindmost" attitude assumed by +latter-day neoteric Government institutions. But even the most +phlegmatic member of the community will feel upset when the trousers +which he has ordered are consigned by his tailor to somebody else, and +on this occasion the War Office did gird up its loins and remonstrate +in forcible terms.</p> + +<p>With regard to the War Office and munitions, it only remains to be +said again in conclusion that the country was never told the truth +about this subject until some months after the armistice, when the +nation had ceased to care. Never was it told till then, nor were the +forces which had been fighting in the field told, that the great +increase in the output of guns, howitzers, machine-guns, and +ammunition, which took place from the autumn of 1915 onwards up to +just before the Battle of the Somme, was the achievement, not of the +Ministry of Munitions but of the War Office. The Munitions Ministry in +due course did splendid work. Chancellor of the Exchequer become +lord-paramount of a great spending Department of State, its chief was +on velvet. "Copper" turned footpad, he knew the ropes, he could flout +the Treasury—and he did. But it is a pity that unwarrantable claims +should have been put forward on behalf of the department in not +irresponsible quarters at a time when they could not be denied, claims +which have tended to bring the department as a whole into undeserved +disrepute amongst those who know the facts.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page208" name="page208"></a>(p. 208)</span> CHAPTER XI</h3> + +<h5>COUNCILS, COMMITTEES, AND CABINETS</h5> + +<p class="resume">The responsibilities of experts at War Councils — The Rt. Hon. A. + Fisher's views — Discussion as to whether these meet the + case — Under the War Cabinet system, the question does not + arise — The Committee of Imperial Defence merged in the War + Council early in the conflict — The Dardanelles Committee — Finding + a formula — Mr. Churchill backs up Sir I. Hamilton — The spirit of + compromise — The Cabinet carrying on <i>pari passu</i> with the + Dardanelles Committee — Personal experiences with the Cabinet — The + War Council which succeeded the Dardanelles Committee — An + illustration of the value of the War Cabinet system — Some of its + inconveniences — Ministers — Mr. Henderson — Sir E. Carson — Mr. + Bonar Law — The question of resignation of individuals — Lord + Curzon — Mr. Churchill — Mr. Lloyd George.</p> + +<p class="p2">Before proceeding to refer to a few personal experiences in connection +with the Ministerial pow-wows at which the conduct of the war was +decided, there is one matter of some public importance to which a +reference will not be out of place. That matter is the question of +responsibility imposed upon experts at gatherings of this kind. Are +they to wait until they are spoken to, no matter what folly is on the +tapis, or are they to intervene without invitation when things become +serious? My own experience is that on these occasions Ministers have +such a lot to say that the expert is likely to be overlooked in the +babel unless he flings himself into the fray.</p> + +<p>The point is suggested by the "Conclusions" in the "First Report" of +the Dardanelles Commission. The Commissioners gave it as their opinion +that at the time of the initiation of the venture against the Straits, +"the Naval Advisers should have expressed their views in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page209" name="page209"></a>(p. 209)</span> +Council, whether asked or not, if they considered that the project +which the Council was about to adopt was impracticable from a naval +point of view." The Commissioners also gave the decision on this point +in other words, but to the same effect, in another paragraph. Mr. +Fisher, who represented the Commonwealth of Australia on the +Commission, while subscribing to the Report in general, emphatically +demurred to the view taken by his brother Commissioners on this point, +and Sir T. Mackenzie, who represented New Zealand, agreed with Mr. +Fisher although he did not express himself quite so forcibly on the +subject. Mr. Fisher wrote: "I dissent in the strongest terms from any +suggestion that the departmental advisers of a Minister in his company +at a Council meeting should express any views at all other than to the +Minister and through him, unless specifically invited to do so. I am +of opinion it would seal the fate of responsible government if +servants of the State were to share the responsibility of Ministers to +Parliament, and to the people on matters of public policy." Which view +is the right one, that of the seven Commissioners representing the +United Kingdom, or that of the two Commissioners representing the +young nations afar off?</p> + +<p>The answer to the question can perhaps best be put in the form of +another. Does the country exist for the Government, or does the +Government exist for the country? Now, if the country merely exists +for the Government, then Mr. Fisher's contention is unanswerable. +Whether it receives the opinion of the expert or not, the Government +is responsible. For a Minister to have an expert, within his own +Department of State and therefore his subordinate, blurting out views +contrary to his own is likely to be a sore trial to that Minister's +dignity, and this is not altered by the fact that the expert is likely +to be infinitely better qualified to express opinions on the subject +than he is. Supposing that the War Council, or the Cabinet, or +whatever the body happens to be, ignores <span class="pagenum"><a id="page210" name="page210"></a>(p. 210)</span> or is unaware of +the opinion of the experts, and that it lands the country in some +hideous mess in consequence, it can always be called to account for +the lapse. The doctrine of responsibility which is regarded as of such +paramount importance will be fully upheld—and what more do you want? +Gibbets can be erected, the Ministers who have got the country into +the mess can be hanged in a row, and a fat lot of good that will do +towards getting the country out of the mess.</p> + +<p>But if, on the contrary, the Government merely exists for the country, +then in times of emergency it is the bounden duty of everybody, and +particularly is it the duty of those who are really competent to do +so, to help the Government and to keep it out of trouble if they can. +One feels cold inside conjuring up the spectacle of a pack of experts +who have been called in to be present at a meeting of the War Council +or the Cabinet, sitting there mute and inarticulate like cataleptics +while the members of the Government taking part in the colloquy embark +on some course that is fraught with danger to the State. <span lang="la"><i>Salus populi +suprema lex</i></span>. Surely the security of the commonwealth is of infinitely +greater moment than any doctrine of responsibility of Ministers, +mortals who are here to-day and gone to-morrow. Indeed—one says it +with all respect for a distinguished representative of one of the +great British dominions overseas—it looks as though Mr. Fisher did +not quite realize the position of the expert, and assumed that if the +expert gave his advice when asked it made him responsible to the +country. The expert is present, not in an executive, but in a +consultative capacity. He decides nothing. The Ministers present +decide, following his advice, ignoring his advice, failing to ask for +his advice, or mistakenly imagining that the expert concurs with them +as he keeps silence, according to the circumstances of the case. +Naturally, the expert should try to induce the head of his department +to listen to his views on the subject before the subject ever comes +before the Cabinet or the War Council. But if the Minister <span class="pagenum"><a id="page211" name="page211"></a>(p. 211)</span> +takes a contrary view, if the matter is one of importance and if the +Minister at the meeting fails to acquaint his colleagues that he is at +variance with the expert, or again if the question crops up +unexpectedly and the expert has had no opportunity of expressing an +opinion, then the duty of the expert to the country comes first and he +should say his say. It may be suggested that he ought to resign. +Perhaps he ought to—afterwards. But the matter of vital importance is +not whether he resigns, but whether he warns the Government of the +danger. The country is the first consideration, not the Government nor +yet the expert.</p> + +<p>One great advantage of the War Cabinet system introduced by Mr. Lloyd +George was that there was none of this sort of flapdoodle. At a War +Cabinet meeting the expert never hesitated to express his opinion, +whether he was asked for it or not. The work that I was doing in the +later stages of the war did not involve me in problems of major +importance, but when summoned to a War Cabinet meeting I never boggled +over giving my views as to what concerned my own job. I have heard Sir +W. Robertson, when he thought it necessary to do so, giving his +opinion similarly concerning questions of great moment, and nobody +dreamt of objecting to the intervention.</p> + +<p>The Director of Military Intelligence was, more or less <span lang="la"><i>ex officio</i></span>, +a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence in pre-war days, and +consequently I attended one meeting of this body shortly after +mobilization. There was a huge gathering—the thing was a regular +duma—and a prolonged discussion, which as far as I could make out led +nowhere and which in any case dealt with matters that nowise concerned +me, took place. Those were busy times, and, seeing that Lord Kitchener +and Sir C. Douglas attended these meetings as a matter of course, I +asked to be excused thenceforward. The Committee of Imperial Defence +was obviously not a suitable assemblage to treat of the conduct of the +war, seeing that it was only invested <span class="pagenum"><a id="page212" name="page212"></a>(p. 212)</span> with consultative and +not with executive functions, and that it bore on its books +individuals such as Mr. Balfour and Lord Esher, who were not members +of the Government, nor yet officials. It therefore at a comparatively +early date gave place to the War Council, which captured its +secretariat (a priceless asset), and which later on became transformed +into the Dardanelles Committee. The Government did not, however, +wholly lose the benefit of Mr. Balfour's experience and counsel. One +day—it must have been in December—there was an informal discussion +at the War Office in Lord Kitchener's room, he being away in France at +the time, in which General Wolfe-Murray and I took part, and besides +Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill and Sir E. Grey—I do not think that +Mr. Asquith was there—Mr. Balfour was present.</p> + +<p>Up till the early days of May, I attended no War Councils. Very soon +after that, the Coalition Government was formed, and thereupon the War +Council, which had been quite big enough goodness knows, developed +into the Dardanelles Committee of twelve members, of whom, excluding +Lord Kitchener, six were members of the former Liberal Government, and +five were Unionists. Sir E. Carson only came in in August, making the +number of representatives from the two factions equal and raising the +total to the lucky number of thirteen. What object was supposed to be +fulfilled by making the War Council such a bloated institution it is +hard to say. Almost the only members of the Cabinet who counted and +who were not included on its roll were Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Long. +Be that as it may, the result was virtually to constitute the +Dardanelles Committee the Cabinet for general purposes of the war, and +to lead to its dealing with many matters quite distinct from the +prosecution of the campaign for the Straits. I have a vivid +recollection of one meeting, which probably took place late in June +(Lord Kitchener was not present), and at which the attitude to be +assumed by us with reference to Bulgaria and Greece, particularly +Bulgaria, was discussed. Sir <span class="pagenum"><a id="page213" name="page213"></a>(p. 213)</span> E. Grey wanted a "formula" +devised to indicate to the Sofia Government what that attitude was; as +neither he nor anybody else knew what the attitude was, it was not +easy to devise the formula. Formula is an odious word in any case, +recalling, as it does, algebraical horrors of a forgotten past; but +everybody present wrote out formulae, and dialecticians had the time +of their lives. Mr. Balfour's version was eventually chosen as the +most felicitous. But the worst of it was that this masterpiece of +appropriate phrase-mongering did not bring in the Bulgars on our side. +The triumphant campaign of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front +somehow proved a more potent factor in deciding Tsar Ferdinand as to +what course to pursue, than a whole libraryful of formulae could ever +have effected.</p> + +<p>At another meeting, at which Lord Kitchener likewise was not present, +a marked and disagreeable tendency to criticize Sir I. Hamilton for +his ill-success made itself apparent. I was the only representative of +the army present, and it was manifestly impossible for an officer +miles junior to Sir Ian to butt into a discussion of that kind. But +Mr. Churchill spoke up manfully and with excellent effect. The gist of +his observations amounted to this: If you commit a military commander +to the undertaking of an awkward enterprise and then refuse him the +support that he requires, you have no business to abuse him behind his +back if he fails. That seemed to me to fit the situation like a glove; +it did not leave much more to be said on the point, and no more was +said, thanks to the First Lord's timely remonstrance.</p> + +<p>There was any amount of chatter at these musters; but on the other +hand one seldom seemed to find oneself much forrarder. That is the +worst of getting together a swarm of thinkers who are furnished with +the gift of the gab and are brimming over with brains. Nothing +happens. If a decision was by any chance arrived at, it was of a +non-committal nature. The spirit of compromise asserted itself and the +Committee adopted a middle course, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page214" name="page214"></a>(p. 214)</span> a course which no doubt +fits in well with many of the problems with which governments in +ordinary times have to wrestle, but which does not constitute a good +way of conducting war.</p> + +<p>The full Cabinet of twenty-three was carrying on <i>pari passu</i> with the +Dardanelles Committee. It did undoubtedly take some sort of hand in +the prosecution of the war from time to time, because one day I was +summoned to stand by at 10 Downing Street when it was sitting, soon +after the Coalition Government was formed and when Lord Kitchener +happened to be away, on the chance of my being wanted. They were +hardly likely to require my services in connection with matters other +than military. After an interminable wait—during the luncheon hour, +too—Mr. Arthur Henderson, who was a very recent acquisition, emerged +stealthily from the council chamber after the manner of the +conspirator in an Adelphi drama, and intimated that they thought that +they would be able to get on without me. In obedience to an unwritten +law, the last-joined member was always expected to do odd jobs of this +kind, just as at some schools the bottom boy of the form is called +upon by the form-master to perform certain menial offices <span lang="la"><i>pro bono +publico</i></span>.</p> + +<p>The mystery observed in connection with these Cabinet meetings was not +unimpressive. But the accepted procedure—without a secretary present +to keep record of what was done and with apparently no proper minutes +kept by anybody—was the very negation of sound administration and of +good government. Such practice would have been out of date in the days +of the Heptarchy. Furthermore it did not fulfil its purpose in respect +to concealment, because whenever the gathering by any accident made up +its mind about anything that was in the least interesting, everybody +outside knew all about it within twenty-four hours. And in spite of +all the weird precautions, I actually was present once for a very +brief space of time at one of these momentous <span class="pagenum"><a id="page215" name="page215"></a>(p. 215)</span> sittings. It +came about after this wise. On the rising of a Dardanelles Committee +meeting, one of the Ministers who had attended drew me into a corner +to enquire concerning a point that had arisen. There was movement +going on in the room, people coming and going, but we were intent on +our confabulation and took no notice. Suddenly there was an +awe-inspiring silence and then Mr. Asquith was heard to lift up his +voice. "Good Lord!" ejaculated my Minister (just like that—they are +quite human when taken off their guard), "the Cabinet's sitting!" and +until back, safe within the War Office portals, I almost seemed to +feel a heavy hand on my shoulder haling me off to some oubliette, +never more to be heard of in the outer world.</p> + +<p>A less teeming War Council than the Dardanelles Committee was +substituted for that assemblage about October 1915, and I only +attended one or two of its meetings. Sir A. Murray was by that time +installed as C.I.G.S., and things were on a more promising footing +within the War Office. It was this new form of War Council which was +thrown over by the Cabinet with reference to the evacuation of the +Gallipoli Peninsula, as related on <a href="#page103">pp. 103</a>, 104. As far as one could +judge, when more or less of an outsider in connection with the general +conduct of operations but none the less a good deal behind the scenes, +this type of War Council, constituted out of the Ministers who were +directly connected with the operations, besides the Prime Minister, +Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the First Sea +Lord and C.I.G.S. always in attendance, worked very well during the +greater part of 1916. But Mr. Lloyd George's plan of a War Cabinet, in +spite of certain inevitable drawbacks to such an arrangement, was +undoubtedly the right one for times of grave national emergency. Its +accessibility and its readiness to deal with problems in a practical +spirit are illustrated by the following incident within my own +experience.</p> + +<p>We had got ourselves into a condition of chaos in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page216" name="page216"></a>(p. 216)</span> connection +with the problem of Greek supplies at the beginning of 1918. There was +an extremely vague agreement with the French, an unsigned agreement +entered into in haste by representatives on our side of little +authority, under which we were supposed to provide all sorts of things +for the Hellenes. But the whole business was extremely irregular and +it was in a state of hopeless confusion—it will be referred to again +in a later chapter. In the War Office alone, several departments and +branches were concerned, including my own up to a certain point. The +Ministries of Munitions and Shipping were in the affair as well, +together with the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office, and last but not +least, the Treasury. But what was everybody's business was nobody's +business. Each department involved declared that some other one must +take the matter up and get things unravelled, and at last in a fit of +exasperation, although my branch was only a 100 to 3 outsider in the +matter, I took the bull by the horns and wrote privately to Sir M. +Hankey, asking him to put the subject of Greek Supplies on the Agenda +for the War Cabinet on some early date and to summon me to be on hand, +which he did. When the matter came up, Mr. Lloyd George enquired of me +what the trouble was. I told him that we were in a regular muddle, +that we could not get on, that several Departments of State were in +the thing, but that it hardly seemed a matter for the War Cabinet to +trouble itself with. Could not one of its members take charge, get us +together, and give us the authority we required for dealing with the +problem? Mr. Lloyd George at once asked Lord Milner to take the +question up, not more than five minutes of the War Cabinet's time was +wasted, and within a very few hours Lord Milner had got the business +on a proper footing and we all knew where we were.</p> + +<p>Now, supposing that instead of the War Cabinet it had been a case of +that solemn, time-honoured, ineffectual council composed of all the +principal Ministers of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page217" name="page217"></a>(p. 217)</span> Crown, gathered together in +Downing Street to discuss matters which the majority of those present +never know any more about than the man in the moon, what would have +happened? We of the War Office might among us, with decent luck, have +managed to prime our own private Secretary of State, and might have +sent him off to the Cabinet meeting with a knowledge of his brief. +But, unless the Ministers at the heads of the other Departments of +State concerned had been got hold of beforehand and told what to do +and to say, they would among the lot of them have made confusion worse +confounded. If by any chance a decision had then been arrived at, it +would almost inevitably have been a perfectly preposterous one, +totally inapplicable to the question that was actually at issue.</p> + +<p>A summons to attend a War Cabinet meeting was not, however, an unmixed +joy. There was always an agenda paper; but it was apt to turn out a +delusion and a snare. The Secretariat did their very best to calculate +when the different subjects down for discussion on the paper would +come up, and they would warn one accordingly. But they often were out +in their estimate, and they had always to be on the safe side. Some +quite simple and apparently straightforward subject would take a +perfectly unconscionable time to dispose of, while, on the other hand, +an apparently extremely knotty problem might be solved within a few +minutes and so throw the time-table out of gear. The result was that +in the course of months one spent a good many hours, off and on, +lurking in the antechamber in 10 Downing Street.</p> + +<p>Still, there was always a good fire in winter time, and one found +oneself hobnobbing, while waiting, with all sorts and conditions of +men. There would be Ministers holding high office but not included in +the Big Five (or was it Six?), emissaries just back from some centre +of disturbance and excitement abroad, people who dealt with wheat +production and distribution, knights of industry called in over some +special problem, and persons <span class="pagenum"><a id="page218" name="page218"></a>(p. 218)</span> purporting to be masters of +finance—which nobody understands, least of all the experts. Who could +possibly, under any circumstances, be angry with Mr. Balfour? But he +was occasionally something of a trial when one was patiently awaiting +one's turn. Although the Agenda paper might make it plain that no +subject was coming up with which the Foreign Office could possibly be +in the remotest degree connected, he would be descried sloping past +and going straight into the Council Chamber, as if he had bought the +place. Then out would come one of the Secretary gang. The Foreign +Minister had turned up, and was setting them an entirely unexpected +conundrum inside; the best thing one could do was to clear out of +that, as the point which one had been summoned to give one's views +about had not now the slightest chance of coming before the Cabinet +that day.</p> + +<p>At the various forms of War Council at which the prosecution of the +war was debated, one was necessarily brought into contact with a +number of politicians and statesmen, and was enabled to note their +peculiarities and to watch their methods. I never to my knowledge saw +Lord Beaconsfield; but in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties Mr. +Gladstone was sometimes to be met in the streets, and, even if one +thought that he ought to be boiled, one none the less felt mildly +excited at the spectacle. That aphorism, "familiarity breeds +contempt," does put the point a little crudely; but the fact remains +that when you are brought into contact with people of this kind, about +whom there is such a lot of talk in the newspapers, they turn out to +be very much like everybody else. Needless to say, they will give +tongue to any extent, but, apart from that, they may even be something +of a disappointment to those who anticipate great things of them. +Still, it is only right to acknowledge that the majority of Ministers +met with during the Great War were sensible enough in respect to +military matters. The amateur strategist was fortunately the exception +in these circles, and not the rule. Most of them picked up <span class="pagenum"><a id="page219" name="page219"></a>(p. 219)</span> +the fundamental facts in connection with any situation that presented +itself quite readily; they grasped elementary principles when these +were explained to them and they were able to keep those principles in +mind. But there were goats as well as sheep. You might just as well +have started dancing jigs to a milestone as have tried to get into the +heads of one or two of them the elementary fact that the conduct of +war cannot be decided on small-scale maps but is a matter of stolid +and unemotional calculation, that imagination is a deadly peril when +unaccompanied by knowledge, and that army corps and divisions cannot +be switched about ashore or afloat as though they were taxi-cabs or +hydroplanes.</p> + +<p>Mr. Henderson shaped well when military matters were in debate; he +looked portentous and he held his tongue. Then there was Sir E. Carson +who, during the few weeks that he figured on the Dardanelles +Committee, was an undeniable asset. His interjections of "Mr. Asquith, +we really must make up our minds," uttered with an accent not +unfamiliar to one who had passed youthful days in the vicinity of +Dublin, and accompanied by a moody stare such as his victim in the +witness-box must find rather disconcerting when under +cross-examination at the hands of the famous K.C., had no great effect +perhaps. But the motive was unexceptionable. He and Mr. Bonar Law used +to sit together and to press for decisions, and it was unfortunate +that Sir Edward resigned when he did. Mr. Bonar Law was within an ace +of resigning likewise very shortly afterwards. He invited me to go +over to the Colonial Office to see him and to talk over matters, and I +expressed an earnest hope that he would stick to the ship. An artist +in letter-writing (as was shown in his momentous epistle written on +behalf of the Unionist leaders when Mr. Asquith's Cabinet were in two +minds at the beginning of August 1914), his memorandum which is quoted +in the "Final Report" of the Dardanelles Commission, and in which he +insisted upon the advice of the military authorities with reference +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page220" name="page220"></a>(p. 220)</span> to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula being followed, +indicates how fortunate it was that he remained at his post.</p> + +<p>The truth is that resignations of the individual Minister seldom do +any good from the point of view of the public interest, except when +the individual Minister concerned happens to be unfit for his +position—and then he generally seems immune from that "unwanted +doggie" sort of feeling from which less illustrious persons are apt to +suffer when they are <span lang="fr"><i>de trop</i></span>. The cases mentioned on <a href="#page144">p. 144</a> in +connection with the Army Council stood on an entirely different +footing. When a body of officials resign, or threaten to resign, their +action cannot be ignored; in the second case mentioned the mere threat +sufficed. Lord Fisher paid me one of his meteoric visits on the +morning that he submitted his resignation to Mr. Asquith, and he +confided his reasons to me; the reasons were good, but it seemed +doubtful whether they were quite good enough to justify the taking of +so drastic a step.</p> + +<p>There was no more edifying and compelling personality amongst the +party who were in the habit of taking the floor in 10 Downing Street +in 1915 than Lord Curzon. He, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Lloyd George +might almost have been called rivals for the rôle of <span lang="it"><i>prima ballerina +assoluta</i></span>. The remarks that fell from his lips, signalized as they +ever were by a faultless phraseology and delivered with a prunes, +prisms and potatoes diction, seldom failed to lift the discussion on +to a higher plane, to waft his hearers on to the serene hill-tops of +thought, to awaken sublime sensations in all present such as the +spectacle of some noble mountain panorama will summon up in the +meditations of the most phlegmatic. Mr. Churchill, ever lucid, ever +cogent, ever earnest, ever forceful, was wont to be so convincing that +he would almost cause listeners to forget for the moment that, were +the particular project which just then happened to be uppermost in his +mind to be carried into execution, any small hopes which remained of +our ever winning the war would inevitably <span class="pagenum"><a id="page221" name="page221"></a>(p. 221)</span> be blotted out for +good and all. As for Mr. Lloyd George in drab days before he became +First Minister of the Crown in spite of his superhuman efforts to +avoid that undesired consummation, he always loved to make his voice +heard, and he always succeeded—just as a canary will in a roomful of +chattering women.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page222" name="page222"></a>(p. 222)</span> CHAPTER XII</h3> + +<h5>SOME INTER-ALLIES CONFERENCES</h5> + +<p class="resume">The Conference with the Italians in Paris in April-May 1915 — Its + constitution — Italians anxious that Allies should deliver big + offensive simultaneously with advance of Italian + army — Impossibility of giving a guarantee — Difficulties over the + naval proposals — Banquet given by M. Millerand at the War + Office — A visit to the front — Impressions — Mr. Churchill turns up + unexpectedly — A conference with General Joffre at Chantilly over + Salonika — Its unsatisfactory character — Admiral Gamble races + "<span lang="fr">Grandpère,</span>" and suffers discomfiture — A distinguished party + proceed to Paris — A formal conference with the French + Government — Messrs. Asquith, Grey and Lloyd George as + linguists — The French attitude over Salonika — Sir W. Robertson + gives his views — The decision — Dinner at the Élysée — Return to + London — Mr. Lloyd George and the soldiers on the Boulogne + jetty — Points of the destroyer as a yacht — Mr. Balfour and Sir W. + Robertson afloat — A chatty dinner on our side of the + Channel — Difficulty over Russian munitions owing to a Chantilly + conference — A conference at the War Office — Mr. Lloyd George as + chairman — M. Mantoux.</p> + +<p class="p2">The first meeting of importance with representatives of the Allies at +which I was present took place in Paris at the end of April 1915, and +has already been referred to on <a href="#page063">p. 63</a>. Sir H. Jackson and I were sent +over, as representing respectively the Admiralty and the War Office, +to take part in a secret conference that was to be held between +French, Russian, and British naval and military delegates on the one +side, and Italian naval and military delegates on the other side in +connection with Italy's entry into the war as an associate of the +Entente. That Italy was to join the Allies had already been arranged +secretly between the four governments, and it was understood that she +was to open hostilities in the latter part of May. The purpose of the +Conference was to permit of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page223" name="page223"></a>(p. 223)</span> the situation being discussed, +and formal naval and military conventions were to be drawn up between +the contracting Powers. Sir Henry and I were accompanied by small +staffs, and we put up at the Ritz in the Place Vendôme.</p> + +<p>M. Millerand, who was French War Minister at the time, presided at the +Conference which assembled in the War Office, and he made an ideal +chairman—the French are always admirable at managing such functions. +The principal French military delegate was General Pellé, General +Joffre's Chief of Staff; the Russians were represented by their +Military Attaché in Paris, Colonel Count Ignatieff, and the principal +Italian military delegate was a colonel (whose name I cannot recall), +a most attractive and evidently an extremely capable soldier, who +unhappily was killed within a few months when in command of a brigade +in one of the early fights near Gorizia. In so far as framing the +military convention was concerned, that part of the proceedings gave +little trouble. The Italian representatives, it is true, were anxious +that the Allies should undertake to embark upon an offensive on the +greatest possible scale practicable, simultaneously with the Italian +army crossing the frontier about the Isonzo; but General Pellé and I +could give no guarantee to that effect, the more so seeing that a +Franco-British offensive had already, as it was, been decided upon to +start in the Bethune-Vimy region within a few days and before the +Italian army would be ready. One had a pretty shrewd suspicion that +there was no opening whatever for an offensive on the Eastern Front in +view of our Russian Allies' grave munitions difficulties, although the +French seemed strangely unaware of the nakedness of the land in that +quarter; still, it was no part of the game to hint at joints in our +harness of that kind to the Italian representatives. Ignatieff, bluff +and cheery, was careful not to commit himself on the subject. The end +of it was that our military convention amounted to little more than an +agreement that we were all jolly fine fellows, accompanied <span class="pagenum"><a id="page224" name="page224"></a>(p. 224)</span> +by cordial expressions of good-will and of a determination on the part +of the four contracting Powers to do their best and to stick together. +The naval side of the problem, on the other hand, was beset by +pitfalls, and that part of the business was not satisfactorily +disposed of for several days.</p> + +<p>Even to a landsman like myself, it was apparent that the Italian +conception of war afloat in the year of grace 1915 was open to +criticism. Our new friends contemplated employing their fleet very +freely as an auxiliary to their army in its advance along the littoral +towards Trieste, a theory of naval operations which came upon one with +something of a shock at the very start. Pola and other well-sheltered +bowers for under-water craft lie pretty handy to the maritime district +in which King Victor's troops were going to take the field. For +battleships and cruisers to be pottering about in those waters serving +out succour to the soldiers on shore, succour which would in all +probability be of no great account in any case, suggested that those +battleships and cruisers would be transmogrified into submarines at a +very early stage of the proceedings. One wondered if the Ministry of +Marine away south by the Tiber had heard the tragic tale of the +<i>Hogue</i>, the <i>Cressy</i> and the <i>Aboukir</i>. Nor was that all. The Italian +naval delegates put forward requests that fairly substantial +assistance in the shape of war-craft of various types should be +afforded them within the Adriatic by the French and ourselves.</p> + +<p>All this struck even an outsider like myself as somewhat +unsatisfactory, and that was clearly the view which Sir H. Jackson +took. For, in some disorder, he let slip an observation to the effect +that it looked like the recently acquired collaborator with the +Entente being rather a nuisance than otherwise. The rendering of this +expression of opinion of the Admiral's into French at the hands of our +Naval Attaché in Paris (Captain Hodges) was a masterpiece of +diplomatic camouflage. In the end the Italian sailors were obliged to +ask for an adjournment <span class="pagenum"><a id="page225" name="page225"></a>(p. 225)</span> to allow of their communicating with +Rome, and, if I recollect aright, the principal one of them had to +proceed home to discuss the question at headquarters. All this took up +time, and we did not finally get the conventions signed for nearly a +fortnight.</p> + +<p>M. Millerand gave a banquet at the War Office in honour of us +delegates, at which we met M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, together +with other members of the French Cabinet. I enjoyed the good fortune +of sitting next to M. Delcassé, and so of making the acquaintance of +one of the great Foreign Ministers of our time. Paris is at its best +in spring, and had it not been war-time and had one not been in a +fidget to get back to Whitehall, a few days of comparative idleness +spent in <span lang="fr"><i>la ville lumière</i></span> after nine months of incessant office +work, while the international sailor-men settled their differences, +would have been not unwelcome. The pause, however, provided an +opportunity for motoring down to St. Omer and spending a couple of +days in the war zone—my first visit to the Front. Two points +especially struck me on this trip. One was the wonderful way that the +women and children of France (for scarcely an adult male was to be +seen about in the rural districts) were keeping their end up in the +fields. The other was the smart and soldier-like bearing of the +rank-and-file amongst our troops, in striking contrast to the +go-as-you-please methods which prevailed in South Africa, and to +which, indirectly, some of the "regrettable incidents" which occurred +on the veldt were traceable. It gave one confidence. Sir J. French and +some of G.H.Q. were at advanced headquarters at Hazebrouck as +offensive operations were impending, and Sir John, on the afternoon +that I saw him, was greatly pleased at a most successful retirement of +our line in a portion of the Ypres salient which General Plumer had +brought off on the previous night. On getting back to Paris it +transpired that the naval trouble was not yet settled.</p> + +<p>One morning, sitting with Admiral Gamble who was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page226" name="page226"></a>(p. 226)</span> over to +help Sir H. Jackson, in the long alley-way of the Ritz where one +enjoys early breakfast if that meal be not partaken of in private +apartments, Commodore Bartolomé, the First Lord's "Personal Naval +Assistant," was of a sudden descried in the offing and beating up for +the Bureau. "Good God!" exclaimed the Admiral, horror-stricken. +"Winston's come!" He had, so we learnt from Bartolomé; but what he had +come for nobody could make out. Telegraphic communication exists +between Paris and London, and Sir H. Jackson was in constant touch +with our Admiralty. However, to whatever cause the visit was to be +attributed, there was Mr. Churchill as large as life and most anxious +to get busy; and I personally was glad to see him, because he told me +all about what had been going on in the Gallipoli Peninsula since the +landing of a few days before. One did not gather that the French were +any more delighted at his jack-in-the-box arrival, and at his +interventions in the Conference discussions, than were our naval +representatives who had been officially accredited for the purpose. A +satisfactory agreement was, however, at last arrived at over the +Adriatic, the conventions were signed with due pomp and circumstance, +and our party returned to England. While in Paris I had paid one or +two visits to General Graziani, who was the Chief of the General Staff +at the French War Office; but we in Whitehall never could make out +exactly what were the relations between the military authorities in +Paris and those at Chantilly. The very fact that General Joffre's +Chief of Staff had been French military representative at our +Conference, and not General Graziani or his nominee, seemed odd.</p> + +<p>Some six months later, early in November, I again went over to France, +this time with Sir A. Murray, to attend a discussion with General +Joffre at Chantilly concerning Salonika. Admiralty representatives, +including Admiral Gamble and Mr. Graeme Thomson, Director of Naval +Transport, were of the party. Sir J. French with Sir W. Robertson, his +Chief of the General Staff, and Sir H. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page227" name="page227"></a>(p. 227)</span> Wilson came up from +St. Omer. It was by no means a satisfactory meeting. We from the War +Office in London desired to circumscribe British participation in this +new side-show to the utmost, and to keep the whole business as far as +possible within limits; but we got uncommonly little support from +G.H.Q. Sir W. Robertson expressed no opinion, nor was he called upon +to do so; he would have found it awkward to dissent from his +commander-in-chief. But the result was that when a much more important +conference over the same subject took place a few days later, this +time between the two Governments, Sir J. French was not present while +Sir W. Robertson was. These things do arrange themselves somehow.</p> + +<p>As the discussion took place at Chantilly late in the afternoon, +G.H.Q. and we put up at Amiens for the night. On our discovering that +General Joffre contemplated crossing the Channel next day to have a +chat with our Government, the C.I.G.S. prevailed upon Admiral Gamble +to hurry on in his motor to Boulogne next morning so as to catch the +packet there, to cross to Folkestone, and to get up to London in time +to warn our people of the somewhat expansive Salonika programme which +"<span lang="fr">Grandpère</span>" had up his sleeve. The Silent Navy, it is hardly necessary +to say, fairly rose to the occasion, for the Admiral was off under +forced draught in the dog-watch. Chancing things, however, when +weathering a promontory off Montreuil, he contrived to pile up his +craft on a shoal in a bad position, and he would have missed +trans-shipment at Boulogne altogether had he not got himself taken off +in a passing craft which was under charge of soldier-officers who were +likewise making for the packet. So he got across all right in the end +and he flashed up to town, only to find that old man Joffre had not +played the game. "<span lang="fr">Grandpère</span>" had slept peacefully in the train, had +boarded a destroyer at some unearthly hour of the morning, and was +already in Whitehall before our staunch, precipitate emissary had cast +off from Boulogne.</p> + +<p>On the occasion of that next pow-wow mentioned <span class="pagenum"><a id="page228" name="page228"></a>(p. 228)</span> above, +Messrs. Asquith, Balfour (now First Lord), Lloyd George and Sir Edward +Grey crossed over as our representatives. Sir H. Jackson (now First +Sea Lord), Sir W. Robertson, who had been summoned over to London, and +I accompanied them, as well as Colonel Hankey and some others. We +travelled by specials and a destroyer and took the Boulogne route. Our +warship tied up to the <i>East Anglia</i>, hospital ship, at Boulogne, and +as we passed across her some of us had a few words with nurses and +wounded on board, little anticipating that she would be mined next day +on the passage over to England, with most unfortunate loss of life. +Eventually we arrived at the Gare du Nord about midnight, to be +welcomed by a swarm of French Ministers and Lord Bertie, and to find +all arrangements made for us with typical French hospitality.</p> + +<p>The Conference took place at the Foreign Office on the Quai d'Orsay, +M. Briand presiding. Several members of the French Government were +present, besides Generals Joffre, Gallieni and Graziani; and with our +party, as well as interpreters, secretaries and others, there was +quite a gathering. After M. Briand had welcomed us cordially and in +felicitous terms, Mr. Asquith got a charming little speech in French +off his chest; it may perhaps have had a whiff of the lamp about it +and had probably been learnt by heart, but the P. M. undoubtedly +managed to serve up a savoury <span lang="fr"><i>appétitif</i></span>, and we felt that in the +matter of courtesy and the amenities our man had held his own. In the +course of the discussion that followed, Sir E. Grey's minute-gun +process of turning our host's delightful language to account afforded +all present ample time to take in the drift of his cogent, weighty +arguments and to appraise them at their proper worth. Had it been any +one else, Mr. Lloyd George would have been voted an unmitigated +nuisance on all hands. As a result of prolonged residence in the Gay +City at a somewhat later date, the Right Honourable Gentleman is now, +it is understood, in the habit of bandying badinage with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page229" name="page229"></a>(p. 229)</span> the +<span lang="fr"><i>midinettes</i></span> in the <span lang="fr"><i>argot</i></span> of the <span lang="fr">Quartier Latin</span>. But at the time +that I speak of his acquaintance with the Gallic tongue was strictly +limited (although he did put forward claims to be able to understand +"Grey's French"), and he kept from time to time insisting upon the +proceedings being brought to a halt while a translation of something +that had been said was furnished for his benefit, generally selecting +some particularly unprofitable platitude which had been uttered by one +of those present for the purpose of gaining time.</p> + +<p>The French took up a strong line over Salonika. In a sense they drove +our side into a corner, and the responsibility for hundreds of +thousands of French and British troops being interned in Macedonia for +years rests with them, and it was in great measure the outcome of that +day's debate. Sir W. Robertson was called upon to state his views. He +knows French perfectly well, but he absolutely refused to speak +anything but English, and his remarks were translated, sentence after +sentence, by a young French officer with a perfect command of the +latter tongue. After each successive sentence had been rendered into +French, Sir William, who was sitting beside me, would murmur, +"Infernal fellow, that's not what I said," as though repeating the +responses, the poor interpreter having in reality done his duty like a +man. The gist of his remarks was what might have been expected, viz. +that the Germans were the real enemy and that the proper course for +the Allies to pursue was to concentrate force against them and not to +be hunting about for trouble in the uttermost parts of the earth. +Views of that kind, enunciated bluntly and with considerable emphasis, +were very likely not wholly palatable to M. Briand; but it seemed to +me that they were not regarded with disfavour by General Joffre, nor +yet by General Gallieni, although those distinguished soldiers when +invited to give expression to their views contrived merely to say +nothing at considerable length. The end of it all was that we were +committed to dumping down three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page230" name="page230"></a>(p. 230)</span> more divisions at Salonika +in addition to the two already there or disembarking, and that we +were, moreover, committed to sending them thither without delay. When +they got there it took ages to get their impedimenta ashore owing to +lack of landing facilities—as we had fully foreseen. The amateur +strategist imagines that you can discharge an army out of a fleet of +transports and freight-ships just anywhere and as easily as you can +empty a slop-pail.</p> + +<p>We dined with the President and Mme. Poincaré at the Élysée that +night, and most of the French Cabinet, as well as Generals Joffre and +Gallieni, were likewise invited. Our Big Four were in some doubt as to +what garb to appear in, seeing that it was not to be a full-dress +function, sporting trinkets; and they eventually hit upon +dinner-jackets with black ties. So Sir W. Robertson and I decided to +doff breeches, boots and spurs, and to don what military tailors refer +to as "slacks" but what in non-sartorial circles are commonly called +trousers. The French civilians all wore frock-coats, so that there was +an agreeable lack of uniformity and formality when we assembled. I sat +next to M. Dumergue, the Colonial Minister, and between us we disposed +of the German Colonies in a spirit of give and take—or rather take, +because there was none of that opera-bouffe "mandate" which has since +then been wafted across from the Western Hemisphere, included in our +arrangements. In the course of the evening I managed to obtain General +Joffre's views concerning the feasibility of withdrawing from the +Gallipoli Peninsula without encountering heavy loss, a subject that +one had constantly in mind at that time. Père Joffre's opinion was +that, subject to favourable weather and to the retreat taking place at +night, the thing could be managed, and he emphasized the fact that the +conditions of trench warfare rather lent themselves to secret +withdrawals of that nature.</p> + +<p>We made our way back to London on the following day, leaving Paris in +the forenoon, and were to embark <span class="pagenum"><a id="page231" name="page231"></a>(p. 231)</span> at Calais; but owing to +some misunderstanding our special ran into Boulogne and out on to the +jetty, where numbers of troops were assembled as a leave-boat was +shortly to cross. This afforded me an opportunity of experiencing how +very engaging Mr. Lloyd George can make himself when dealing with a +somewhat critical audience. For the whole party got out, glad to +stretch their legs, and I wandered about with the Munitions Minister. +We got into conversation with some of the men, he was recognised, and +a crowd speedily gathered round us. He questioned them, and it is +hardly necessary to say that, being British soldiers, they did not +forget to grumble; they were particularly eloquent on the subject of +the quality and the quantity of hand-grenades. But Mr. Lloyd George +handled them most skilfully, got a great deal of useful information +out of them, delighted them with his cheery manner and apt chaff, and +when we had to hurry off as our train was about to move on, the men +cheered him to the echo. "Sure he's a great little man intoirely," I +heard a huge lump of an Irish sergeant remark to a taciturn +Highlander, who removed his pipe from his mouth to spit in unqualified +acquiescence.</p> + +<p>They say that a destroyer represents an invaluable form of +fighting-ship, and no doubt she does; but it is ridiculous to pretend +that she makes an agreeable pleasure-boat—at all events not at night +and with all lights out. In the first place there is nothing whatever +to prevent your falling out of the vessel altogether, and as the +gangways which pretend to be the deck are littered with anchors, +chains, torpedoes, funnels, ventilators, and what not, you dare not, +if you have been so ill-advised as to remain up top, roam about in +pitch darkness even in harbour, let alone when the craft is jumping +and wriggling and straining out in the open. Having tried the high-up +portion of the ship at the front end, where the cold was perishing and +the spray amounted to a positive outrage, on the way over, I selected +the wardroom aft on the way back and found this much more inhabitable. +There was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page232" name="page232"></a>(p. 232)</span> a nice open stove to sit before, a pleasant book +to read, and there was really nothing to complain about except the +rattle and whirr of the propellers. Sir W. Robertson is a very fine +soldier, but he does not cut much ice as a sailor; although it was as +settled as the narrow seas can fairly be expected to be in late +autumn, he lay perfectly flat on his back on a bunk with his hands +folded across his chest like the effigies of departed sovereigns in +Westminster Abbey, and he never moved an eyelid till we were inside +the Dover breakwaters. All the same, he stayed the course, and that is +more, I fear, than the First Lord of the Admiralty did. For the Ruler +of the King's Navy made a bee-line for the Lieutenant-Commander's own +private dug-out the moment he came aboard at Calais, and he remained +in ambuscade during the voyage.</p> + +<p>There used to be a ditty sung at a pantomime or some such +entertainment when I was at Haileybury—music-halls were less numerous +and less aristocratic in those days than they are now—of which the +refrain was to the effect that one must meet with the most unheard-of +experiences ere one would "cease to love." We used to spend an +appreciable portion of our time in form composing appropriate verses, +as effective a mental exercise perhaps as the labours we were supposed +to be engaged on. Mr. Goschen had recently been appointed First Lord +of the Admiralty, and one distich in the official version ran: "May +Goschen have a notion of the motion of the ocean, if ever I cease to +love." It is to be apprehended that Mr. Balfour acquired a better +notion of the motion of the ocean than he cared for, on these +destroyer trips in which he was in the habit of indulging; for when we +fetched up on this side of the Channel and made our way to the +attendant dining-car, where the trained eye instantly detected the +presence of glasses on the tables of that peculiar shape that denotes +the advent of bubbly wine (none of your peasant drinks when the +taxpayer is standing treat), the First Lord rolled up swathed in a +shawl, a lamentable bundle, and disappeared like a transient and +embarrassed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page233" name="page233"></a>(p. 233)</span> phantom into a corner, to be seen no more until +we steamed into Charing Cross.</p> + +<p>The run up to town from Dover by special was edifying and was not +uninstructive, for it threw some light upon the mystery that is +connected with the frequent leaking-out of matters which upon the +whole had better be kept secret. A train composed of only a couple of +cars makes less noise than the more usual sort, and our dining-car +happened to be a particularly smooth-running one. The consequence was +that almost every word that was said in the car could be heard by +anybody who chose to listen. The Big Three (Mr. Balfour had deserted +as we have seen) sat together at one table, whilst we lesser fry +congregated close at hand at others. The natural resilience following +upon the conclusion of the Conference and the happy termination of +cross-Channel buffetings may perhaps have been somewhat stimulated by +draughts of sparkling vintage; but, be that as it may, the Prime +Minister and the Minister of Munitions were in their most expansive +mood, and after a time their conversation was followed by the rest of +us with considerable interest. To the sailors present, as also to one +or two of the junior soldier-officers, it was probably news—and it +must surely have been news to the waiters—to learn that Sir J. French +was shortly to vacate command of the B.E.F. in France. Nor could we be +other than gratified at the discussions concerning Sir D. Haig's +qualifications as a successor; I was expecting every moment to hear +Sir W. Robertson's suitability for the post freely canvassed; he was +sitting back-to-back with the Munitions Minister, but with the +half-partition usual in our English dining-cars intervening. Cabinet +Ministers certainly are quaint people.</p> + +<p>I attended more than one Conference with the Allies on the subject of +munitions and supplies at a later stage of the war. They had a rather +inconvenient habit, some of them, of springing brand-new proposals +upon one without any warning, and they would without turning a hair +raise questions the discussion of which was wholly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page234" name="page234"></a>(p. 234)</span> +unforeseen and had not been prepared for. A good deal of trouble was, +for instance, caused on a certain occasion owing to the question of +armament for Russia being brought up at one of the Chantilly +Conferences which used to take place from time to time, without our +having a delegate present who was posted up in the actual situation +with regard to this particular problem. The Russians had, shortly +before, put forward requests that we should furnish them with a very +big consignment indeed of heavy guns and howitzers—somewhere about +600 pieces of sorts. We had no intention of falling in with this +somewhat extravagant demand; but we had more or less promised about +150. However, at a meeting of a Sub-Committee on munitions delegated +by this particular Chantilly Conference, only General Maurice, who was +not concerned in munitions details nor aware of the actual facts, +represented us; and at this meeting the Russians and French mentioned +in the course of the discussion that we had promised 600 pieces. Not +fully acquainted with the position, General Maurice did not contradict +the assertion. This caused some difficulty, because on later occasions +the French and Russians would say, "But you agreed to furnish 600 at +Chantilly," and would produce the protocol of the meeting. Similarly, +we were regularly rushed into a Conference at Paris over Greek +supplies in the autumn of 1917—the subject has already been mentioned +on <a href="#page216">p. 216</a>, and it will be referred to again farther on in this +volume—without knowing what the business was about. Greek supplies +and our connection with them were consequently in a shocking tangle +for months to come.</p> + +<p>There was one of these international gatherings, one that was held in +Mr. Lloyd George's room in the War Office about November 1916 when he +was Secretary of State for War, of which I have a vivid recollection. +M. Albert Thomas and General Dall' Olio, the respective Munitions +Ministers in France and Italy, had come over, accompanied by several +assistants; and the Russian <span class="pagenum"><a id="page235" name="page235"></a>(p. 235)</span> Military Attaché from Paris with +several representatives of the special Russian Commission in England +were present, as well as the Head of the Roumanian Military Mission in +France. The Russians, Roumanians and Italians all, needless to say, +wanted to get as much as they could out of us, and the French were +quite ready to back the Russians and Roumanians up. Mr. Lloyd George +made a tip-top chairman, conciliatory and, thanks to ignorance of +French, always unable to understand what was said when it happened to +be inconvenient to grasp the purport. At one juncture M. Thomas and +General Dall' Olio came rather to loggerheads over something or other, +steel I think. Had they been Britishers, one would have been preparing +to slip under the table so as to be out of harm's way; but Latin +nations are more gesticulatory than we are, and this sort of +effervescence does not mean quite so much with them as it does when it +shows a head amongst us frigid islanders. Just when the illustrious +pair of Ministers were inclined to get a little out of temper, arguing +of course in French, Mr. Lloyd George burst out laughing, threw +himself back in his chair and ejaculated, "Now will some kind friend +tell me what all that's about!" He had touched exactly the right note. +Everybody beamed. The disputants burst out laughing too, harmony was +completely restored, and the discussion was conducted thenceforward in +friendliest fashion.</p> + +<p>By far the most interesting feature, however, about this pow-wow, and +several others, was provided by the interventions of M. Mantoux, the +gifted interpreter who used to come over from Paris, and of whom I +believe great use was made at Conferences at various times at +Versailles. His performance on such occasions was a veritable <span lang="fr"><i>tour de +force</i></span>. He never took a note. He waited till the speaker had finished +all that he wanted to say—and your statesman generally has an +interminable lot to say—whether it was in French or in English. He +then translated what had been said into the other language—English or +French as the case might be—practically word <span class="pagenum"><a id="page236" name="page236"></a>(p. 236)</span> for word. His +memory, quite apart from his abnormal linguistic aptitudes, was +amazing. Nor was that all. He somehow contrived, almost automatically +it seemed, to imitate the very gestures and the elocution of the +speakers. M. Thomas is troubled with a rather unruly wisp of hair +which, when he gets wrought up in fiery moments, will tumble down over +his brow into his eyes, to be swept back every now and again with a +thrust of the hand accompanied by a muttered exclamation, presumably a +curse. Rendering M. Thomas into English, M. Mantoux would sweep back +an imaginary wisp of hair with an imprecation which I am confident was +a "damn!" Then again, no man can turn on a more irresistibly +ingratiating smile when he is getting the better of the other fellow +than Mr. Lloyd George, and he has mastered a dodge of at such moments +sinking his voice to a wheedling pitch calculated to coax the most +suspicious and recalcitrant of listeners into reluctant concurrence. +M. Mantoux would reproduce that smile to admiration, and his tones +when translating Mr. Lloyd George's seductive blandishments into +French were enough to cajole a crocodile.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page237" name="page237"></a>(p. 237)</span> CHAPTER XIII</h3> + +<h5>A FIRST MISSION TO RUSSIA</h5> + +<p class="resume">Reasons for Mission — An effectual staff officer — Our + distinguished representatives in Scandinavia — The + journey — Stockholm — Lapps — Crossing the frontier at + Haparanda — Arrival at Petrograd — Sir G. Buchanan — Interviews with + General Polivanoff, Admiral Grigorovitch and M. + Sazonoff — Imperial vehicles — Petrograd — We proceed to the + Stavka — Improper use of the title "Tsar" — The Imperial + headquarters — Meeting with the Emperor — Two disconcerting + incidents — Nicholas II. — His charm — His admiration for Lord + Kitchener's work — Conference with General + Alexeieff — Mohileff — Service in the church in honour of the Grand + Duchess Tatiana's birthday — Return to Petrograd — A rencontre with + an archbishop — The nuisance of swords — Return home.</p> + +<p class="p2">In spite of the <span lang="fr"><i>débâcle</i></span> which had taken place in the early summer of +1915, the information coming to hand from Russia in the War Office +later in the year was not wholly discouraging. It became apparent that +a strenuous effort was being made to repair the mischief. Marked +energy was being displayed locally in developing the output of +munitions and war material of all kinds. This, coupled with the +unequivocal confidence that was manifestly being displayed in Lord +Kitchener by the Emperor, the Grand Duke Nicholas, and the leading +statesmen of our great eastern Ally whether they belonged to the +Government or not, gave promise that the vast empire, with its +swarming population and its boundless internal resources, might yet in +the course of time prove a tremendous asset on the side of the +Entente.</p> + +<p>We had, however, never established a very satisfactory understanding +with the Russian General Staff. A number of British officers of high +rank had gone out to pay more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page238" name="page238"></a>(p. 238)</span> or less complimentary visits, +but rather more than that appeared to be needed. I had been thinking +in the latter part of 1915 that some steps ought to be taken in this +direction, and so, when it became known that Sir W. Robertson was +shortly coming over to become C.I.G.S. at the War Office, which would +assuredly mean other important changes of personnel, I wrote to him +suggesting that I should go out and talk things over with General +Alexeieff, the Russian Chief of the General Staff. After Sir William +had taken over charge and had considered the matter, he agreed, and he +gave me practically a free hand as regards making known our views, +only stipulating that I should return promptly and report to him.</p> + +<p>One of the many active and capable members on its rolls, Captain R. F. +Wigram, was picked out from the Director of Military Operations' staff +to perform the functions of Staff Officer and A.D.C. He possessed the +merit amongst many others of being young and of looking younger, and +he lost no time in exhibiting his remarkable fitness for the post. For +without one moment's hesitation he bereft his club in Pall Mall of the +services of a youth of seventeen, who by some mysterious process +became eighteen then and there, whom he converted into a private of +Foot, whom he fitted out with a trousseau extracted from the Ordnance +Department that a Prince of the Blood proceeding to the North Pole +might have coveted, and who thus, as by the stroke of a magician's +wand, became transformed into an ideal soldier-servant. We made our +way north-eastwards via Newcastle, Bergen and Stockholm, round the +north of the Gulf of Bothnia, and thence on through Finland to +Petrograd. Traversing the chilly northern waters between the Tyne and +the Norse fiords, it became possible to appreciate to some very small +degree what months of watching for a foe who could not be induced to +leave port on the surface must have meant to the sister service and to +its wonderful auxiliaries drawn from the Mercantile Marine. For if +there is a more dismal, odious, undisciplined stretch of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page239" name="page239"></a>(p. 239)</span> +ocean on the face of the globe than the North Sea, it has not been my +ill-fortune to have had to traverse it.</p> + +<p>Our Foreign Office has served as a butt for a good deal of criticism +of late years, some of which has perhaps not been wholly undeserved. +But whether it was by design or was the result of some happy accident, +Downing Street managed to be most efficiently represented at the +courts of northern Europe during the epoch of the Great War. Sir G. +Buchanan's outstanding services in Russia are now recognized on all +hands—even apparently by H.M. Government. But the country also owes +much to Sir E. Howard and to Sir M. Findlay, who represented us so +worthily in Sweden and Norway during periods of exceptional stress and +difficulty. It was a real pleasure when passing backwards and forwards +through Scandinavia to meet these two strong men who were so +successfully keeping the flag flying, to discuss with them the course +of events, to be made acquainted with the peculiar problems that were +constantly confronting them, to note the marked respect in which they +were held on all hands, and to enjoy the hospitality of two typical +English homes planted down in a foreign land. On one occasion Sir E. +Howard was good enough to make special arrangements for me to meet the +Russian and French Ministers at Stockholm and the French Military +Attaché at luncheon at the Legation, thereby enabling us to examine +into a number of points of common interest.</p> + +<p>Bergen was reputed to be a regular hotbed of German spydom, and +apparently with justice. A party of Russian officers coming over on a +mission to this country and France some months later were taken off +the Bergen-Newcastle packet by a U-boat. The commander of the U-boat +had a list of their names, with ranks and everything in order, and he +knew all about his prisoners. One officer was overlooked, and he +brought news of the <span lang="fr"><i>contretemps</i></span> to this country; he had, as it +happened, only joined the party at the very last moment as an +afterthought, and the Boche agents at Stockholm and Bergen <span class="pagenum"><a id="page240" name="page240"></a>(p. 240)</span> +had evidently overlooked him on the way through. An idea prevailed +over here that the Swedes in general were decidedly hostile to the +Entente; Stockholm, a cold spot in winter—almost as cold as, but +without the blistering rawness of, Petrograd—was undoubtedly full of +Germans, and the red, white and black colours were freely displayed. +But partiality for the Central Powers seemed in the main to be +confined to the upper classes and to the officers, and, even so, the +Swedish officials were always civility itself. It was indeed much +easier to get through the formalities at Haparanda on the Swedish side +of the frontier, going and coming, than it was at Tornea on the +Finnish side, although there we were honoured guests of the country +with special arrangements made on our behalf. One could not but be +impressed by the unmistakable signs of wealth in Stockholm, where +hospitality was being exercised on the most lavish scale at the +leading restaurants and at the palatial Grand Hotel—no bad place to +stop at when you are travelling on Government service and can send in +the bill. The good Swedes (who, like most other people, have an eye +for the main chance) were making money freely out of both sides in the +great contest, although they were always protesting against our +blockading measures.</p> + +<p>Travelling is particularly comfortable alike in Norway and in Sweden, +for the sleeping-cars are beyond reproach; owing to snowfalls, the +time-table is, however, a little uncertain during the winter months. +With their eternal pine-woods, Sweden and Finland are dismal enough +regions to traverse in the cold season of the year, although on the +Swedish side the line crosses a succession of uplands divided by deep +valleys, which are probably very picturesque after the melting of the +snows. It was noticeable that all the important viaducts in Sweden +were protected by elaborate zeribas of wire entanglement although the +country was neutral, a form of defensive measure which was much less +noticeable in England and Russia although they were belligerents. +Haparanda is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page241" name="page241"></a>(p. 241)</span> close to the Arctic circle, and there the Lapps +were very much <span lang="fr"><i>en evidence</i></span>, forming apparently the bulk of the +population—the children astonishingly sturdy creatures, maybe owing +to the amount of clothes that they had on. Lapps did all the heavy +work in the way of sleigh-driving, porterage at the station, and so +on; nor did they manifest much disposition to depreciate the value of +their services when it came to the paying stage.</p> + +<p>To the traveller without special credentials, the short journey from +Haparanda to the railway-car at Tornea which is to bear him onwards +must have been almost a foretaste of the Valley of the Shadow of +Death. Even for the members of a military mission with "red +passports," whose advent had been announced, it was one prolonged +agony; and it would probably have been even worse when the intervening +estuaries were not frozen over and when one had to take the ferry. All +the formalities had to be gone through twice over because there was an +island, although the Russian officials were the very pink of courtesy. +One learns a great deal of geography on journeys of this kind; we had +not realized the extent to which Finland, with its special money, its +special language, and its special frontier worries, was distinct from +Russia. The train took three days and nights between Stockholm and +Petrograd, and one was supposed to fetch up at the terminus somewhere +about midnight; but it always took two or three hours to get through +the frontier station between Finland and Russia at the last moment, +with the result that one might arrive at the capital at any hour of +the early morning. When we at last steamed into our destination we +found awaiting us on the platform Count Zamoyski, a great Polish +landowner and A.D.C. to the Emperor, who had been appointed to attend +me, with Colonel Knox, our Military Attaché, and we were driven off in +Imperial carriages to the Hotel d'Europe.</p> + +<p>Our object was to reach Mohileff, where Russian General Headquarters, +known as the "Stavka," were stationed. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page242" name="page242"></a>(p. 242)</span> But the Emperor +happened to be away from there just at the moment, so that we were +obliged to wait in Petrograd for two or three days until His Majesty +should have returned. Still, there was plenty to be done and seen in +the capital. In the first place there were the official calls on the +Imperial family to pay; that, however, was merely a case of writing +names in the books for the purpose. Then there was the Embassy to be +visited, to enable me to make the acquaintance of Sir G. Buchanan and +the Embassy staff. Sir George was not in the best of health, and he +obviously stood in need of a rest and change of air—the climate of +Petrograd is trying, making it an undesirable place for prolonged +residence—but the unique position that he held in the eyes of the +Russians of all shades of opinion made it almost impossible for him to +leave the capital. Diplomats as a class are not generally popular in +military circles abroad, and that was perhaps more marked in Russia +than in most countries, but our ambassador was held in extraordinary +esteem even amongst soldiers who only knew him by name. Properly +supported from home, he would have proved a priceless asset when +things were going from bad to worse in the latter part of 1916 and the +early days of 1917.</p> + +<p>I had interviews with General Polivanoff, the War Minister, Admiral +Grigorovitch, the Minister of Marine, and M. Sazonoff, the Foreign +Minister. General Polivanoff told me his plans, what he had already +effected and what he still hoped to effect, confirming the favourable +reports that we had received from General Hanbury-Williams and our +Military Attachés as to the efforts that were being made to set the +Russian army on its legs again; he also explained that his friendly +relations with a number of the leading Liberal men of affairs in the +Duma were proving of great assistance in connection with, his +extending the manufacture of war material throughout the country, in +which the "zemstvos" were lending willing aid. With M. Sazonoff I had +a very long and interesting conversation, all the pleasanter owing to +his complete command of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page243" name="page243"></a>(p. 243)</span> English. Like General Polivanoff, he +was sanguine that, given time, Russia would yet play a great rôle in +the war.</p> + +<p>In the meantime we were being royally entertained and looked after. +One had heard a great deal about Russia having "gone dry" by ukase; +but the drought was not permitted to cast its blight over guests of +the nation, and our presence ensured that those at the feast would be +enabled to abandon rigid temperance for the moment, an opportunity +which was not missed. Who, after all, ever heard of a pleasant party +round a pump? Imperial carriages, with the servants in gorgeous yellow +livery, all over eagles, were always at our disposal, and traffic was +held up as we passed. This was all very well when you were heading for +a Grand Duke's residence to leave cards, or proceeding to the Embassy; +but you felt rather the beggar on horseback when the object of the +drive was merely to procure a razor-strop at a big store in +replacement of one mislaid on the journey. Your desire was to purchase +the cheapest one that was to be had; but <span lang="fr"><i>noblesse oblige</i></span>, you simply +had to buy the most expensive one there was, and it was a mercy that +they had not got one set in brilliants. Zamoyski, most lighthearted +and unconventional of companions, was quite happy to remain in +Petrograd in preference to rushing off hot-foot to Mohileff, and he +made everything extremely pleasant for us. Dining at the Yacht Club +one night we met Admiral Phillimore, who had recently arrived on a +naval mission; having commanded the <i>Inflexible</i> at the Falkland +Islands fight and afterwards in the Dardanelles (where he had spent +some anxious hours after his ship had been holed by a drifting mine +during the big fight of the 18th of March), few naval officers of his +rank had enjoyed a more varied experience since the beginning of the +war.</p> + +<p>Petrograd is, or was then, in many respects a fine city, adorned by +numbers of imposing buildings and churches; while the view across the +half-mile-wide Neva, with its stately bridges and the famous fortress +of Peter and Paul <span class="pagenum"><a id="page244" name="page244"></a>(p. 244)</span> on the far side, is very impressive. But +its winter climate seemed detestable, cold and tempestuous, +accompanied by intervals of thaw which converted even the most +important streets into unspeakable slush, while the drip from the +roofs was moistening and unpleasant. It has to be confessed that the +exhibition of extravagance apparent on all hands in the capital of an +empire large portions of which were in the hands of a foreign foe, was +not altogether edifying; the atmosphere was so different from that of +Paris. Still, there were not wanting encouraging signs. The soldiers +in the streets were smart, well-set-up, stalwart fellows garbed in +excellent uniforms, and the training carried on on the Marsova Polye +(Champ de Mars) near the Embassy struck one as carried out on +excellent lines, particularly the bayonet work.</p> + +<p>After three days' stay we proceeded to Mohileff, leaving at night and +arriving on the following afternoon, to be put up at the hotel where +Hanbury-Williams and the other foreign missions were housed. We dined +and had luncheon at the Emperor's mess while at the Stavka, as always +did the heads of the various foreign missions. Now that the glories of +the House of Romanoff have suffered eclipse consequent upon the +terrible end of Nicholas II. and his family, interest in it has no +doubt to a great extent evaporated. But it may perhaps be mentioned +here that our practice of referring to the Autocrat of All the Russias +as the "Tsar" is incorrect, and the custom indeed seems to have been +almost peculiar to this country. You never heard the terms "Tsar" and +"Tsaritza" employed in Russia, not, at all events, in French; they +were always spoken of as "<span lang="fr">L'Empereur</span>" and "<span lang="fr">L'Impératrice,</span>" and in the +churches it was always "Imperator." On the other hand, one did hear of +the "Tsarevitch," although he was generally spoken of in French as "<span lang="fr">Le +Prince Héritier</span>"—rather a mouthful. How we arrived at that +extraordinary misspelling, "Czar" (which is unpronounceable in +English), goodness only knows.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page245" name="page245"></a>(p. 245)</span> The Emperor and his personal staff occupied a couple of fine +provincial government buildings, which Davoust had made his +headquarters at the time of the battle of Mohileff in 1812, standing +in an enclosure which shut them off from the rather unattractive town +and overlooking the Dneiper. The practice at meals was for the party +to assemble in the antechamber; the Emperor would then come in from +his private apartments, would go round the circle speaking a few words +to some of those present, and would then lead the way into the +dining-room. There, after we had partaken of the national "zakuska" +preceded by a nip of vodka, he presided, sitting in the centre of the +long table with General Pau, the senior foreign officer, generally on +his right, and one of the other foreign officers taken by rote, or +else a visitor, on his left. I understood that General Alexeieff had +excused himself from these somewhat protracted repasts, on the ground +that he really had not the time to devote to them; but one or two +others of the Headquarters Staff were generally present, besides the +Household. After the meal the Emperor would talk for a short time to +some of those present in the antechamber, and would then retire to his +own apartments while we of the foreign missions made our way back to +our hotel.</p> + +<p>I was presented to him while he was making his round before dinner on +the first night. That clicking of heels business is highly effective +on such occasions, but it is a perilous practice when you are adorned +with hunting spurs; they have protuberances which have a way of +catching. There is no getting over it—to find, when conversing with +an Emperor, that your feet have become locked together and that if you +stir you will topple forward into his arms, does place you at a +disadvantage. An even worse experience once befell me when on the +staff at Devonport a good many years ago. Our general liked a certain +amount of ceremonial to take place before the troops marched back to +barracks of a Sunday after the parade service at the garrison church; +a staff officer <span class="pagenum"><a id="page246" name="page246"></a>(p. 246)</span> collected the reports and reported to +another staff officer, who reported to a bigger staff officer, and so +on; there was any amount of saluting and of reassuring prattle before +the general was at last made aware that everything was all right. One +Sunday it was my turn to collect the reports and to report to the +D.A.A.G. In those days cocked hats had (and they probably still have) +a ridiculous scrap of ribbed gold-wire lace of prehensile tendencies +at their fore-end—at their prow, so to speak. While exchanging +intimate confidences with the D.A.A.G., the prows of our cocked hats +became interlocked; so there we were, almost nose to nose, afraid to +move lest one or both of us should part with our headgear. But he +never lost his presence of mind. "Hold your infernal hat on with your +hand, man," he hissed, and did the same. We backed away from each +other gingerly, came asunder, and there was no irretrievable disaster; +but the troops (who ought all to have been looking straight to their +front) had apparently been watching our performance with eager +interest, because there was a fatuous grin on the face of every one of +them, officers and all. The colonel of the Rifle Brigade said to me +afterwards that he trusted the staff did not mean to make a hobby of +these knock-about-turns on parade, because if they did it would +undermine the discipline of his battalion.</p> + +<p>After dinner the Emperor summoned me into his room and we had a long +conversation. He spoke English perfectly, almost without trace of +foreign accent, and was most cordial, being evidently pleased at the +possibility of a closer understanding being arrived at between his +General Staff and ours. He expressed the hope that I would speak quite +openly to General Alexeieff at the conference which we were to have on +the following day. I sat next to him at dinner that next day after the +conference and he was most anxious to hear my report of it, having +previously seen General Alexeieff and heard what he had to say. The +Emperor had the gift of putting one completely at one's ease on such +occasions, and, being an <span class="pagenum"><a id="page247" name="page247"></a>(p. 247)</span> admirable conversationalist, +interested in everything and ready to talk on any subject, it was a +pleasure to be with him. He spoke most affectionately of our Royal +Family—His Majesty the King had been pleased to entrust me with a +private letter to him—and, referring to the Prince of Wales and +Prince Albert, he remarked what a fine thing it was that they were old +enough to take their share in the Great War, whereas his boy was too +young. The little Tsarevitch had been staying at the Stavka shortly +before, and the foreign officers agreed that he was a bright, +intelligent, mischievous youngster; but the Emperor told me the boy +was momentarily in disgrace. It appeared that they had on a recent +occasion been going to some big parade at the front. At these +ceremonials the Emperor, or whoever is carrying out the inspection, +salutes the troops on reaching the ground by calling out "Good day, +brothers"; but the Tsarevitch had managed to get off before the flag +fell and, slipping on in front, had appeared first and called out, +"Good day, brothers," to which the troops had lustily responded. It +had upset the whole business. "The young monkey!" said the Emperor.</p> + +<p>He expressed the utmost detestation of the Germans in consequence of +their shameless conduct in Belgium and France, and he referred in +indignant terms to their treatment of Russian prisoners. If I inquired +of the Austro-Hungarian captives, of whom a number were employed on +road-mending and similar useful labours in Mohileff, I would find, he +said, that they were perfectly contented and were as well looked after +in respect to accommodation and to food as were his own troops. Of +Lord Kitchener and his work he spoke with admiration, and he asked me +many questions about the New Armies, their equipment, their training, +their numbers and so on. He talked with wonder of what our great War +Minister had accomplished in the direction of transforming the United +Kingdom into a first-class military Power in less than a year. In this +respect he, however, merely reflected the opinion held in military +circles right throughout <span class="pagenum"><a id="page248" name="page248"></a>(p. 248)</span> Russia; one heard on all hands +eulogy of the miracles that had been accomplished in this direction. +His Imperial Majesty was also most appreciative of what our War Office +was doing towards assisting the Russians in the all-important matter +of war material, and he asked me to convey his thanks to all concerned +for their loyalty and good offices.</p> + +<p>General Alexeieff had likewise pronounced himself most cordially with +regard to Lord Kitchener, his achievements and his aid to Russia, at +the conference which Hanbury-Williams and I had had with him that +afternoon. The general was not a scion of the aristocracy, as were so +many of the superior officers in the Emperor Nicholas's hosts; he +could not talk French although he evidently could follow what was said +in that language. He said he did not know German, so we had to work +through an interpreter, an officer of the General Staff, employing +French. Alexeieff was very pleasant to deal with, as he expressed +himself freely, straightforwardly and even bluntly with regard to the +various points that we touched upon. Our meeting was taking place late +in January 1916, and at a moment when active operations on both the +Western and the Eastern Front were virtually at a standstill; but he +was anxious to know when we should be in a position to assume the +offensive on a great scale, and he seemed disappointed when I said +that, merely expressing my own personal opinion, I doubted whether we +should be ready to do much before the summer, as so many of our New +Army divisions were short of training and as we were still in arrear +to some extent in the matter of munitions. As a matter of fact, the +great German offensive against Verdun was rather to settle this +question for us; for it kept the French on the defensive and General +Joffre was not obliged to call upon Sir D. Haig for aid, which allowed +our troops just that comparative leisure (apart from holding the line) +that enabled them to prepare for the Battle of the Somme.</p> + +<p>Mohileff was reputed to be about the most Jewish <span class="pagenum"><a id="page249" name="page249"></a>(p. 249)</span> township in +Russia, and, judging by the appearance of the inhabitants, that +reputation was not undeserved. One had heard a lot about pogroms in +the past, but they would not appear to be of the really thoroughgoing +sort. It is an unattractive spot in the winter-time in spite of its +effective position, emplaced on a plateau with the Dneiper winding +round two sides of it in a deep trough. Hanbury-Williams was a great +walker, always anxious for exercise, and each afternoon we wandered +out somewhere in the snow for a constitutional; the Emperor used to do +the same, but he always motored a good way out into the country before +starting on his tramp. The only exercise that the other foreign +officers ever seemed to take consisted in motoring backwards and +forwards between the hotel and the Imperial headquarters for meals. It +is wonderful how any of them survived.</p> + +<p>The last forenoon that we spent there, a special service took place in +the principal church in honour of the Grand Duchess Tatiana's +birthday; and the foreign missions received a hint to go, it being +understood that the Emperor proposed to be present in person. This, +however, proved to be a false alarm. The service began at 10 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span>, and +we went at 11.30 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> and stayed till noon; it was still going on at +that time, and we understood that they were only in the middle of it. +Even half an hour of this was something of an ordeal, seeing that the +church was overheated (as Russian interiors always are), that we had +our furs on, and that we had to choose between standing or else +kneeling down on the stone floor. Services of the Orthodox Church are +not unimpressive even when one cannot follow them; the Chief Priest at +Mohileff had a real organ voice and made the very most of it; he was +almost deafening indeed at times. The prayers appeared to be devoted +entirely to the welfare of the Imperial family; at all events the +names of the Emperor, of the Empress, of the Empress Marie, of the +Tsarevitch and of the Grand Duchess herself were thundered out every +minute or two—they were the only words that I could understand +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page250" name="page250"></a>(p. 250)</span> Listening to the priest's sonorous incantation reverberating +through the building that morning, one little dreamt that within less +than two years' time the winsome princess—her photograph was to be +seen everywhere in the Petrograd streets and she seemed to be +especially popular—whose day we were engaged in celebrating, would +have been foully done to death by miscreants in some remote eastern +spot of Russia.</p> + +<p>We left for Petrograd in the evening, and shortly after the train got +under way a message came to hand to say that the Archbishop of +Petrograd was on board and hoped that I would pay him a visit in his +compartment. At the first hint of this, Wigram, being a man of +resource, went to sleep in self-protection; so only Zamoyski and I +proceeded to His Grace's lair. It turned out that the Archbishop could +not speak French, so that conversation had to be carried on through +Zamoyski. Our host, as is usual, sent for tea, and we spent about half +an hour talking about the war, the Emperor, Lord Kitchener and other +matters. His Grace, however, intimated that he was particularly +interested in the possibility of a union being effected between the +Orthodox and the Anglican Churches, and he expressed himself as most +anxious to have my opinion on the subject. Now this was not a matter +that I should have felt myself especially competent to debate at a +moment's notice even in English; but, seeing that the discussion was +being conducted in French, with a Pole as intermediary who happened to +be a Roman Catholic, the perplexities of the situation were +appreciably aggravated. A safe line to take, however, was to declare +that a union such as was proposed would be all to the good, and the +Archbishop pronounced himself as much gratified to find that I was +entirely in accord with him. He said something to his secretary, who +disappeared and turned up again presently with a beautiful little gold +pectoral cross and chain which His Grace presented me with, Zamoyski +receiving a smaller replica. When we got back to our own carriage and +the Staff Officer saw <span class="pagenum"><a id="page251" name="page251"></a>(p. 251)</span> what we had carried off, he intimated +his intention of keeping awake in future when high dignitaries of the +Church were about.</p> + +<p>Swords, it may here be mentioned, were a regular nuisance to British +officers visiting the dominions of the Emperor Nicholas during all the +earlier months of the war. The Russians had not, like the French, +Belgians and Italians, copied our practice, acquired during the South +African War, of putting away these symbols of commissioned authority +for the time being. They were not worn actually at the front; but +officers were supposed to appear in them elsewhere just as used to be +the invariable practice on the Continent in pre-war days. That our +airmen should not possess swords took the Russians quite aback, a +sabre being about as appropriate in an aeroplane as are spurs on a +destroyer. Transporting a sword through Sweden was apt to stamp you as +a belligerent officer, so that all sorts of dodges had to be contrived +to camouflage an article of baggage that, owing to its dimensions, +refuses to lend itself to operations of concealment. Wigram's absurd +weapon gave us away as a matter of course, although no harm befell. I +was all right on the journey, because General Wolfe-Murray, who had +recently been out on a visit to present decorations, had left his at +the Embassy at Petrograd for the use of any other general who might +come along later. It, however, was one of the full-dress, +scimitar-shaped variety that has been affected by our general officers +ever since one of them brought back a richly jewelled sample, the gift +of Soliman the Magnificent or some other Grand Turk for a service at +Belgrade. It is not a pattern of sabre designed to fit readily into +the frog of a Sam Brown belt, and it used to be a regular business +getting my borrowed one off and on when one went to a meal in a club +or a restaurant in Petrograd.</p> + +<p>Most cordial invitations had been extended to us to visit the front. +But this must have involved several days' delay. It was not always +easy to get a move on in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page252" name="page252"></a>(p. 252)</span> Russia, and no great value was set +upon the element of time; so that, although such a trip would +assuredly have been interesting and it might have been instructive, we +were obliged to decline. Instructions ran that I was to return to +London as soon as possible after visiting the Stavka. We consequently +spent only twenty-four hours in Petrograd before taking the train back +for Tornea, and thence via Stockholm and Christiania to Bergen; we, +however, stayed for a few hours in each of the Scandinavian capitals. +Since quitting Bergen about three weeks earlier a sore misfortune had +befallen the place, for a great part of the best quarter of the town +had been destroyed in a disastrous conflagration which had obliterated +whole streets. But the flames fortunately had not reached the railway +station, nor yet the quays on the side of the harbour where the +steamers berthed, so that transit was not appreciably interfered with. +We were back at the War Office within four weeks of setting out, +having only passed ten days actually within the Russian Empire.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page253" name="page253"></a>(p. 253)</span> CHAPTER XIV</h3> + +<h5>A SECOND MISSION TO RUSSIA</h5> + +<p class="resume">Object of this second mission — The general military + situation — Verdun and Kut — Baron Meyendorff — We partially adopt + Russian uniform — Stay in Petrograd — Sir Mark Sykes — Presentation + of decorations at the Admiralty — Mohileff — Conference with + General Alexeieff — He raises the question of an expedition to + Alexandretta — Asks for heavy artillery — The Emperor — A + conversation with him — The dismissal of Polivanoff — Disquieting + political conditions in Russia — Nicholas II.'s attitude — The + journey to Tiflis — We emerge from the snow near the Sea of + Azov — Caucasia — Tiflis — General Yanushkhevitch — Conference with + the Grand Duke Nicholas — Proposes that we should smash + Turkey — Constantinople? — Major Marsh — The Grand Duke — Presenting + the G.C.M.G. to General Yudenitch — Our stay at Tiflis — Proceed to + Batoum — A day at Batoum — Visit to the hospital ship + <i>Portugal</i> — Proceed by destroyer to Off — Sinking of the + <i>Portugal</i> — Off — General Liakoff — A ride to the scene of a very + recent fight — A fine view — The field force dependent upon + maritime communications — Landing difficulties — Return to + Tiflis — A gala dinner at the palace — Journey to + Sarikamish — Russian pronunciation of names — Kars — Greeting the + troops — One of the forts — Welcome at Sarikamish — General + Savitzky — Russian hospitality — The myth about Russians being good + linguists — A drive in a blizzard — Colonel Maslianikoff describes + his victory over the Turks in December 1914, on the site of his + command post — Our visit to this part of the world much + appreciated — A final interview with the Grand Duke — Proceed to + Moscow — The Kremlin — View of Moscow from the Sparrow Hills — Visit + to a hospital — Observations on such visits — A talk with our + acting Consul-General — Back to Petrograd — Conclusions drawn from + this journey through Russia — Visit to Lady Sybil Grey's + hospital — A youthful swashbuckler — Return home — We encounter a + battle-cruiser squadron on the move.</p> + +<p class="p2">We made a fresh start for Russia by the same route about three weeks +later, the party swelled by Captain Guy MacCaw, Hanbury-Williams' +staff officer, who had been home on leave. Sir W. Robertson wished me +to see <span class="pagenum"><a id="page254" name="page254"></a>(p. 254)</span> General Alexeieff again, and then to proceed to +Tiflis to discuss the position of affairs with the Grand Duke Nicholas +and his staff. H.M. the King desired that this opportunity should also +be taken to present the G.C.M.G. to General Yudenitch, who a short +time before had achieved a brilliant success in Armenia in the capture +of Erzerum almost in midwinter, and also to the Minister of Marine in +Petrograd.</p> + +<p>The general military situation was not at this time wholly reassuring. +It was known that a great German attack upon Verdun was imminent. We +had our own special anxieties in Asia owing to the unfortunate turn +taken by affairs in Mesopotamia. News had come of the failure of the +attempt to relieve Kut by an advance on the right bank of the Tigris, +and this, following upon a similar failure some weeks earlier on the +left bank, rendered the conditions decidedly ominous. A study of the +large-scale maps and of the available reports at the War Office, had +served to indicate that the prospects of saving the beleaguered +garrison were none too hopeful, even allowing for the fact that +General Maude's division, fresh from Egypt and the Dardanelles, was +bringing welcome reinforcements to Sir P. Lake. Whatever plan should +be adopted for the final effort, this must inevitably partake of the +character of attacking formidable entrenchments with but limited +artillery support, and of having to carry out a difficult operation of +war against time. The Grand Duke Nicholas had expressed a readiness to +help from the side of Persia, but little consideration was needed to +establish the fact that effective aid from that quarter was virtually +out of the question. Situated as the Russian forces were in the Shah's +territories, they would be in the position of having either to advance +in considerable strength and to be starved, or to move forward as a +weak column and to meet with disaster at the hands of the Turks on the +plains of Irak.</p> + +<p>One read at Stockholm on the way through of the early successes gained +by the Germans at Verdun, the news <span class="pagenum"><a id="page255" name="page255"></a>(p. 255)</span> sounding by no means +encouraging; so that it was a great relief on arriving in Petrograd to +find that the heroic French resistance before the fortress had brought +the enemy's vigorous thrust practically to a standstill. We met Sir A. +Paget at Tornea on his way back from handing, to the Emperor his baton +of British Field-Marshal. There we also found Colonel Baron Meyendorff +awaiting us, who had been deputed to accompany me during my travels. +The Emperor was absent from the Stavka when we arrived at the capital, +with the consequence that we were detained there for several days. As +we were to make a somewhat prolonged stay in the country this time we +fitted ourselves out with the Russian cap and flat silver-lace +shoulder-straps; the Grand Duke Nicholas had indeed insisted, when he +was Commander-in-Chief, upon foreign officers when at the front +wearing these distinctive articles of Russian uniform as a protection. +Cossacks are fine fellows, but they were apt to be hasty; their plan, +when they came across somebody whose identity they felt doubtful +about, was to shoot first and to make inquiries afterwards.</p> + +<p>Meyendorff, who was married to an English lady and who spoke our +language fairly well, looked after us assiduously and provided us with +occupation and amusement during the stay at the capital. One day he +took us to see trotting matches, a very popular form of sport in +Petrograd although it struck me as rather dull. We dined at different +clubs, went to the Ballet one night, and another night were taken to +the Opera where we occupied the Imperial box in the middle of the +house. In those days Russian society thoroughly understood the art of +welcoming a guest of the country, for the different national anthems +of the Allied Powers were played through before the Second Act, +everybody standing up, and when it came to the turn of "God save the +King," the entire audience wheeled round to face the Imperial box, our +national anthem was played twice over, and I received a regular +ovation although all that those <span class="pagenum"><a id="page256" name="page256"></a>(p. 256)</span> present can have known, or +cared, was that here was a British general turned up on some official +business. One result of wearing what amounted to a very good imitation +of Russian uniform was that officers and rank and file all saluted, +instead of staring at one in some surprise; it was the rule for +non-commissioned officers and private soldiers when they met a general +to pull up and front before saluting; this looked smart, but it was +rather a business when one promenaded along the Nevski Prospekt which +always swarmed with the military. It was, moreover, the custom in +restaurants, railway dining-cars, etc., for officers who were present +when a general came in, not only to rise to their feet (if anywhere +near where the great man settled down), but also to crave permission +to proceed with their meal. This was a little embarrassing until one +realized that a gracious wave of the hand to indicate that they might +carry on was all that was called for.</p> + +<p>The late Sir Mark Sykes had worked under me in Whitehall since an +early date in the war; his knowledge of the Near East was so valuable +that I had been obliged to detain him and to prevent his going to +France in command of his Territorial battalion, much to his +disappointment. Latterly, however, he had been acting for the Foreign +Office, although under the aegis of the War Office as this plan was +found convenient. He was now in Petrograd in connection with certain +negotiations dealing with the future of Turkey in Asia, and as it was +desirable that he should visit the Stavka and also Transcaucasia, he +attached himself to me for the time being.</p> + +<p>One forenoon before leaving for Mohileff I proceeded, accompanied by +our Naval Attaché, Meyendorff and Wigram, to the Admiralty to present +the G.C.M.G. to the Minister of Marine and the K.C.M.G. to the Chief +of the Naval Staff. It seemed desirable to make as much of a ceremony +of the business as possible—British decorations were, indeed, very +highly prized in Russia; warning had therefore been sent that we were +coming, and why. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page257" name="page257"></a>(p. 257)</span> On arriving we were met at the gates by +several naval officers, and were conducted to outside the door of the +Minister's room where the presentation was to take place. One then +assumed the simper of the diplomatist, Wigram (who always managed to +turn pink on dramatic occasions, which had a particularly good effect) +bore the cases containing the insignia, the door was flung open, and +we marched solemnly in. I addressed the recipients in my best French, +saying that His Majesty had entrusted me with the pleasant duty, and +so on, finishing up with my personal congratulations and by handing +over the cases. The recipients replied in suitable terms, expressing +their gratification and their thanks; we had a few minutes' +conversation, and were introduced to the other officers present—there +were quite a lot—and we then cleared out, escorted to our gorgeous +Imperial carriages by some of the junior officers. The Naval Attaché +spoilt the whole thing by remarking afterwards, "You know, general, +those Johnnies know English just as well as you do." It was most +inconsiderate of him, and he may not have been right; Russian naval +officers down Black Sea way did not seem to know English or even +French.</p> + +<p>On this second occasion we only spent twenty-four hours at Mohileff; +the interview with General Alexeieff was successfully brought off on +the first afternoon, MacCaw accompanying me as he understood Russian +thoroughly, although a General Staff Officer interpreted. I told +Alexeieff that our chances of relieving Kut appeared to be slender, +and that he ought to be prepared for its fall although there was still +hope. He thereupon raised the question of our sending a force to near +Alexandretta, so as to aid the contemplated Russian campaign in +Armenia. Such a project was totally opposed to the views of Sir W. +Robertson and our General Staff, and it had at the moment—late in +March—nothing to recommend it at all, apart from the point of view of +the Armenian operations. Although Lord Kitchener and Sir J. Maxwell +had been a little nervous about Egypt during the winter, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page258" name="page258"></a>(p. 258)</span> the +General Staff at the War Office had felt perfectly happy on the +subject in view of the garrison assembled there after the evacuation +of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Now that spring was at hand, any prospect +of serious Turkish attempts across the Sinai Desert was practically at +an end as the dry months were approaching. Troops sent to the Gulf of +Iskanderun at this stage—to get them there must take some +weeks—could not possibly aid Kut, even indirectly. Such side-shows +were totally at variance with our General Staff's views concerning the +proper conduct of the Great War. We wished the Russians well, of +course, in their Armenian operations, and as they held the Black Sea +there appeared to be every prospect of their achieving a considerable +measure of success. But nothing that happened in that part of the +world would be likely to exercise any paramount influence over the +decision of the conflict as a whole.</p> + +<p>Alexeieff suggested our transferring troops from Salonika to +Alexandretta. I do not think that he fully realized what that kind of +thing meant in time, shipping, and so on; but it was pointed out to +him that the French would disapprove of such a move owing to the +importance they attached to the Macedonian affair, while, as for us, +if we took away part of our forces from Salonika we would want to send +them to France to fight the Germans, not to dissipate them on +non-essentials. It was also pointed out that there were very serious +naval objections to starting a brand-new campaign based on the Gulf of +Iskanderun, that the tonnage question was beginning to arouse anxiety, +and that Phillimore (who was at the Stavka at the time) would +certainly endorse this contention. The Russian C.G.S. was not quite +convinced, I am afraid. In the course of the discussion he made a +remark, which was not translated by the interpreter but which MacCaw +told me was to the effect that we could do what he asked perfectly +easily if we liked. That was true enough. We could have deposited an +army at Ayas Bay, no doubt, and could have secured its maritime +communications <span class="pagenum"><a id="page259" name="page259"></a>(p. 259)</span> while it was ashore; but we would have been +playing entirely the wrong game, wasting military resources, and +throwing a strain upon the Allies' sea-power without any adequate +justification. Still, our conference was throughout most amicable. +Alexeieff expressed confidence as regards effecting a powerful +diversion on the Eastern Front during the summer; but he begged me to +try to extract some of our heavy howitzers for him out of our War +Office, as he was terribly handicapped, he said, for want of that type +of artillery. It was the last that I was to see of this eminent +soldier and patriot, who died some time in 1918, broken down under the +exertion and anxiety of trying to save his country from the horrors of +Bolshevik ascendancy.</p> + +<p>The Emperor, as I sat next to him at dinner in the evening, referred +to Alexandretta; he had evidently seen Alexeieff in the meantime. He +also begged me to press the question of heavy howitzers for Russia at +home. He asked a good deal about Sir W. Robertson, and he commented on +the fact that two soldiers who had enjoyed no special advantages such +as are not uncommon in the commissioned ranks of most armies, +Robertson and Alexeieff, should have been forced to the front under +the stern pressure of war and should now be simultaneously Chiefs of +the General Staff in England and Russia. He spoke of the possibility +of Lord Kitchener visiting Russia now that his labours at our War +Office were somewhat lightened. He told me that Sykes, who had had a +long discussion with the General Staff about Armenia and Kurdistan, +had enormously impressed those who had heard him by his knowledge of +the geography and the people of those regions, and he asked why, when +Wigram and I were wearing the Russian shoulder-straps, Sykes was not; +he evidently liked our doing so. The Grand Duke Serge, who was +Inspector-General of the Artillery, was staying with the Emperor; he +also spoke about the urgent need of heavy howitzers, saying that he +hoped within a few months to be on velvet as regards field-guns +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page260" name="page260"></a>(p. 260)</span> and ammunition, but that aid with the heavier natures of +ordnance must come from outside.</p> + +<p>In conversations that we had at Mohileff, Hanbury-Williams expressed +himself as somewhat anxious about the internal situation in Russia. +General Polivanoff had recently been dismissed from his post as War +Minister in spite of the good that he had effected within a very few +months, and this was simply the result of a Court intrigue against an +official who was known to have Liberal tendencies and was a <span lang="la"><i>persona +grata</i></span> with leading spirits in the Duma. That kind of attitude was +calculated to arouse dissatisfaction, not merely amongst the educated +portion of the community in general, but also in the ranks of the +army; for in military circles the extent to which the troops had been +sacrificed as a result of gross misconduct in connection with the +provision of war material was bitterly resented. The losses suffered +by the nation in the war already amounted to a huge figure, and +although at this time the people at large probably held no very +pronounced views on the subject of abandoning the contest, there +undoubtedly was discontent. Under such circumstances, statesmanship +imperatively demanded that mutual confidence should be maintained +between the Court and Government on the one side, and the leaders of +popular opinion on the other side. The removal of Polivanoff, who was +doing so well, was just the kind of act to antagonize the educated +classes and the military. Suspicion, moreover, existed that some of +those in high places were not uncontaminated by German influence and +were pro-German at heart.</p> + +<p>No reasonable doubt has ever existed amongst those behind the scenes +that the Emperor personally was heart and soul with the Allies: but +that did not hold good, there is every ground for believing, amongst +some of those with whom he was closely associated. No stranger brought +into contact with Nicholas II. could help being attracted by his +personal charm; but he was a reactionary surrounded by +ultra-reactionaries and evil counsellors, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page261" name="page261"></a>(p. 261)</span> who played upon +his superstitions and his belief in the Divine Right of Kings and who +brought him to his ruin together with his country. One had heard much +in the past of the veneration in which Russians of all ranks and +classes held their Sovereign as a matter of course. But, when brought +into contact with Russian officers in 1916, one speedily realized that +the Emperor Nicholas had lost his hold upon the affections of the +army. Not that they spoke slightingly of him—they merely appeared to +take no interest in him, which was perhaps worse. As for the Empress, +there was little concealment in respect to her extreme unpopularity. +Rasputin I never heard mentioned by a Russian in Russia; but one knew +all about that sinister figure from our own people.</p> + +<p>Owing to a telegram that he received in connection with his special +negotiations, Sykes left hurriedly that night, making straight for +Tiflis, and I did not see him again in Russia. We, on the other hand, +returned to Petrograd for a day or two. There were special entrances, +with rooms attached, for the Imperial family at all the Petrograd +stations and also at stations in important cities like Moscow and +Rostoff; we were always conducted to and from the trains through +these, which was much pleasanter than struggling along with the crowd. +For the journey to Transcaucasia we were provided with a special car +of our own. In this we lived except when actually at Tiflis—a much +more comfortable arrangement than going to hotels at places like +Batoum and Kars; we each had a double compartment to ourselves, and +another was shared by our soldier-servant with one of the Imperial +household, who accompanied us in the capacity of courier, interpreter +and additional servant. There is no getting away from it, travelling +under these somewhat artificial conditions has its points. As far as +the Don we used the ordinary dining-cars; but beyond that point +dining-cars did not run, and meals were supposed to be taken at the +station restaurants. For us, however, cook, meal and all used to come +aboard our car and travel along to some <span class="pagenum"><a id="page262" name="page262"></a>(p. 262)</span> station farther on, +where the cook would be shot out with the debris; it was admirably +managed, however it was done, and was more the kind of thing one +expects in India than in Europe. Although our soldier-servant had +never been on parade in his life (I had taught him to salute when at +Petrograd by making him salute himself in front of the big glass in my +room, a plan worth any amount of raucous patter from the +drill-sergeant), the very fact of his being in khaki seemed to turn +him into a Russian scholar by that mysterious process adopted by +British soldiers in foreign lands. Wigram had a grammar, and I had +known a little Russian in the past; but in the absence of Meyendorff +and the courier neither Wigram nor I could get what we wanted, while +the soldier-servant could.</p> + +<p>Having seen nothing but everlasting dreary white expanses since +quitting the immediate environs of Petrograd, except where the railway +occasionally passed through some township, it was pleasant to find the +snow gradually disappearing as one approached the Sea of Azov near +Taganrog. Then, after crossing the Don at Rostoff, where extensive +railway works were in progress and a fine new bridge over the great +river was in course of construction, we found ourselves in a balmy +spring atmosphere, although it was only the end of March. From there +on to the Caspian the railway almost continuously traversed vast +tracts of corn-land, the young crop just beginning to show above +ground; at dawn the huge range of the Caucasus, its glistening summits +clear of clouds, made a glorious spectacle. In this part of the +country oil-fuel was entirely used on the locomotives, and at Baku, +where the petroleum oozes out of the sides of the railway cuttings, +and beyond that city, the whole place reeked of the stuff. If you fell +into the error of touching anything on the outside of the car, a +doorhandle or railing, you could not get your hand clean again any +more than Lady Macbeth. We arrived at Tiflis late one afternoon, +having taken within three or <span class="pagenum"><a id="page263" name="page263"></a>(p. 263)</span> four hours of five complete +days on the run from Petrograd. There we were met by a crowd of +officers, and were conducted to a hotel.</p> + +<p>Next morning we paid a number of formal visits. General +Yanushkhevitch, Chief of the Staff, had held that same position when +the Grand Duke Nicholas had been commander-in-chief at the Stavka. +Tall, handsome and debonair, he was a man whom it was a pleasure to +meet, although he may not perhaps intellectually have been quite equal +to the great responsibilities placed on his shoulders in the early +days of the war. This distinguished soldier of very attractive +personality was murdered by revolutionaries while travelling by +railway somewhere near Petrograd in 1917. General Yudenitch, we found, +happened to be in Tiflis, and at the call that we paid him I arranged +to present him with his order on the following morning.</p> + +<p>I had a prolonged interview with the Grand Duke at the palace during +the course of the day. He was not only Commander-in-Chief in +Transcaucasia but was also Governor-General, and he told me that civil +duties took up more of his time than military duties. Like Alexeieff, +and probably by arrangement with the Stavka, he raised the question of +our sending a force to near Alexandretta, and he put in a new plea for +which I was not quite prepared. As he spoke at considerable length it, +however, gave one time to think. He maintained that the right policy +for the Allies to adopt was to knock the Turks out for good and to +have done with them, expressing the opinion that it would not be +difficult to induce them to make peace once they had undergone a good +hammering. I replied that there appeared to be political problems +involved in this which were quite outside my province, but that +certain obvious factors came into the question. The prospects of +prevailing upon the Sublime Porte to come to terms hinged upon what +those terms were to be, and Constantinople seemed likely to prove a +stumbling-block to an understanding. The Ottoman Government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page264" name="page264"></a>(p. 264)</span> +might be prepared to part with Erzerum and Trebizond and Basrah, and +even possibly Syria and Palestine, but Stamboul and the Straits were +quite a different pair of shoes. H.I.H. gripped my hand and pressed it +till I all but squealed. It was delightful to talk to a soldier who +went straight to the point, said he, but he dashed off on another +tack, asking what were our military objections to the Alexandretta +plan; so I went over much the same ground as had already been gone +over at Mohileff, promising to let him have a memorandum on the +subject.</p> + +<p>He pronounced himself as most anxious to aid us in Mesopotamia, did +not seem satisfied with what his troops in Persia had accomplished, +and was concerned at my rather pessimistic views with regard to Kut. +Kut actually held out for ten days longer than I had been given to +understand was possible at the War Office. He also conveyed to me a +pretty clear hint that in his view Major Marsh, our Military Attaché +with him, ought to have his status improved. There I was entirely with +him, but did not say so; there had been a misunderstanding with regard +to rank in Russia, for which I, when D.M.O., had been in a measure +responsible. The fact that there is no equivalent to our grade of +major in Russia had been overlooked. The Military Secretary's +department had all along been ready enough to give subalterns the +temporary rank of captain, or to improve captains into majors; but +they had invariably humped their backs against converting a major into +a lieutenant-colonel for the time being. The consequence was that +there were a lot of newly caught British subalterns doing special jobs +who had been given the rank of captain, and there were a certain +number of captains whom we called temporary majors but who were merely +captains in Russia. Marsh was a real live major of some standing in +the Indian army, with two or three campaigns to his credit and a Staff +College man, and yet at Tiflis he was simply regarded as a captain. +This was put right by the War Office on representation being made.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page265" name="page265"></a>(p. 265)</span> The Grand Duke spoke confidently as to the forthcoming +capture of Trebizond, for which the plans were nearly ready. Good +progress, he said, was being made by the force which was working +forward along the coast, and he promised that the necessary +arrangements should be made for us to visit the front in that quarter. +He was most cordial, and he made many enquiries about Lord Kitchener +for whom he expressed the highest regard. The interview was an +extremely pleasant one, for the Grand Duke's manner, while dignified +and impressive, was at the same time very winning, and he made it a +strong point that I should discuss everything with him direct although +also approving of my holding consultations with his staff. Sykes' +visit, he assured me, was highly appreciated both by himself and by +his experts, who had been astonished at the knowledge of the country +and the people which Sir Mark had displayed.</p> + +<p>Next day the presentation of the G.C.M.G. to General Yudenitch was +successfully brought off; that brilliant soldier was more at home in +the field than in French, and he would probably have dispensed with +all ceremony gladly enough. Scarcely had we got back to the hotel +after the performance when he turned up to call, arrayed in all the +insignia except the collar. He hoped that he had not done wrong in +omitting this, and he was anxious to know when it was supposed to be +put on. He rather had me there, because I did not know; but it was +easy to say that the collar was only worn on very great occasions. +Inside the case containing the Russian order which the Emperor had +handed me at my farewell visit to him before returning home a few +weeks earlier, there had been instructions in French with regard to +the wearing of the different classes of the decoration, a similar plan +might prove useful in these days when British orders are freely +conferred upon foreign officers.</p> + +<p>The city of Tiflis and the country around are worth seeing, and as we +had a car at our disposal we made one or two short trips to points of +interest. The Grand <span class="pagenum"><a id="page266" name="page266"></a>(p. 266)</span> Ducal entourage and the staff did all +they could to make our stay pleasant. No Allied general had visited +Transcaucasia since the outbreak of hostilities, so that we were made +doubly welcome. At luncheon at the palace we made the acquaintance of +the Grand Duchess and of several young Grand Duchess nieces of the +Grand Duke's, with whom Wigram proved an unqualified success; in +conversation with these charming young ladies it was only necessary to +mention the name of the Staff Officer and they thereupon did the rest +of the talking. But after three or four days of comparative leisure, +Meyendorff announced that all was ready for us to go on to Batoum, so +we took up our residence in our railway-car again one evening after +dinner and found ourselves by the Black Sea shore next morning.</p> + +<p>We were most hospitably entertained at Batoum by the general in +command and his staff, our railway-car being run away into a quiet +siding. We were driven out first to a low-lying coast battery in which +a couple of 10-inch guns had very recently been mounted, and where we +saw detachments at drill; it appeared that the <i>Breslau</i> had paid a +call some four or five months before, had fired a few projectiles into +the harbour and the town, and had then made off; it was hoped to give +her a warm welcome should she repeat her tricks. The emplacement +between the two filled by the 10-inch was occupied by a huge +range-finder, apparently on the Barr and Stroud principle, with very +powerful lenses. We afterwards drove up to one of the forts guarding +the town on the land side, from which a fine view was obtained over +the surrounding country. Then we went on board the hospital ship +<i>Portugal</i>. A Baroness Meyendorff, cousin of our Meyendorff, was found +to be matron-in-chief, and she took us all over the vessel, which was +to proceed during the night to pick up wounded at Off, the advanced +base of the force which was moving on Trebizond and which we were to +visit next day. In the afternoon we had a fine run along an +excellently engineered road up the Tchorok valley, a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page267" name="page267"></a>(p. 267)</span> deep +trough in the mountains. The air in this part of the world seemed +delightfully genial after the rigours of Scandinavia, Petrograd and +Mohileff, reminding one of Algiers in spring; the vegetation was +everywhere luxuriant on the hillsides, the ground was carpeted with +wildflowers, and oranges abounded in the groves around the town.</p> + +<p>Up about 3 the next morning, we boarded a destroyer to make the run to +Off, which was eighty-five miles away along the coast, and put off out +of the harbour through the gap in the torpedo-net about dawn. It was a +lovely morning without a breath of air; this was as well perhaps, +because the interior of the vessel, an old-type craft making a +tremendous fuss over going, say, 18 knots, was not particularly +attractive. The officers on board could not speak English or French, +which struck one as odd, but apparently the personnel of the Black Sea +fleet rarely proceeded to other waters—to the Baltic, for instance, +or the Far East. All went smoothly until we were within about a dozen +miles of our destination when a wireless message was picked up +announcing that the <i>Portugal</i> had just been torpedoed and was sinking +close to Off, and asking for help. We cracked on all speed, the craft +straining and creaking as if she would tumble to pieces, and I doubt +if we were making much more than 25 knots then; but by the time that +we reached the scene of the disaster any of the personnel who could be +saved were already on board other vessels and being landed. We learnt +that several of the male personnel and two or three of the nurses, +including the Baroness Meyendorff, had, unhappily, been drowned.</p> + +<p>The <i>Portugal</i> was the second hospital ship that I had set foot on +since the beginning of the war, and, like the <i>East Anglia</i> mentioned +on <a href="#page228">p. 228</a>, she had gone to the bottom within twenty-four hours of my +visit. I determined to give hospital ships a wide berth in future if +possible—I did not bring them luck. With her Red Cross markings she +was perfectly unmistakable; she had been attacked in broad daylight on +an almost glassy sea, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page268" name="page268"></a>(p. 268)</span> and the U-boat commander must have +been perfectly well aware of her identity when he sank her. The tragic +occurrence naturally cast a gloom over Off, where we landed on the +open beach and were met by General Liakoff, commanding the Field +Force, with a numerous staff.</p> + +<p>There had been a sharp combat by night some thirty-six hours before, +when the Turks had delivered a most determined onset upon a portion of +the Russian position; it had, indeed, been touch-and-go for a time. +General Liakoff proposed to take us up to the scene of the fight; so +the whole party mounted on wiry Cossack horses and cobs, and the +cavalcade after crossing the little river near Off proceeded to breast +the heights, our animals scrambling up the rugged hill-tracks like +cats, till we reached the summit of a detached spur where the affray +had been the most violent. The enemy had almost surrounded this spur, +and the numerous bodies of dead Turks lying about on the slopes and in +the gullies testified to the severity of the fight; Wigram, whose +experiences of the battlefield had hitherto been limited to a visit to +the Western Front on a special job, was as delighted with these grim +relics as a dog is who has found some abomination in the road. +Quantities of used and unused cartridges, Turkish and Russian, were +strewed about, and it was evident that the defenders had only managed +to hold on by the skin of their teeth. General Liakoff told me that +his troops were especially pleased at their success, as it had +transpired that the assailants were Turks belonging to picked corps +recently arrived from the Gallipoli Peninsula.</p> + +<p>The Russian outposts were now on the next ridge, beyond a narrow +valley, and all was quiet at the moment. The views from the spur were +very fine, commanding the coast-line in both directions. Trebizond, +some fifteen miles off but looking to be nearer, glistened white in +the midday sunshine; each patch of level was bright green with growing +corn, the higher hills were still crowned <span class="pagenum"><a id="page269" name="page269"></a>(p. 269)</span> with snow, and the +littoral as a whole in its colouring and its features was the Riviera +faced about and looking north. The general gave me to understand that +he would be unable to advance for some days, as he had to make up his +reserves of supplies; but the Grand Duke had let me know that +considerable reinforcements were to be brought across the Black Sea +before the final attack upon Trebizond took place.</p> + +<p>We spent the afternoon down at Off. With recollections of Afghan and +South African accumulations of war material and condiments, one was +struck with the very limited amount of impedimenta and stores which +this Field Force carried with it. The advanced base of a little army +comprising a couple of divisions, with odds and ends, scarcely +exhibited the amount of transport and food dumps that one of our +1901-2 mobile columns on the veldt would display when it was taking a +rest. The weather had been particularly favourable for landing +operations for some days, we were told, and that afternoon a small +freight ship, with a queer elongated prow that enabled her to run her +nose right up on to the beach, was discharging her cargo straight on +to the foreshore. But it was obvious that, with anything like a breeze +blowing home, landing operations at Off would be brought to a +standstill, and that the progress of the campaign was very dependent +upon the moods of the Black Sea. A road was, it is true, being +constructed along the shore from Batoum, and a railway was talked of; +but for the time being the Field Force had to rely almost entirely +upon maritime communications. A different destroyer from the one we +had come in took us back, several of the nurses saved from the +<i>Portugal</i> also being on board, and we got ashore at Batoum after 9 +<span class="smcap">P.M.</span>, to find the general and staff anxiously awaiting our arrival in +anticipation of dinner which we travellers were more than ready for. +We returned to Tiflis next day.</p> + +<p>We had hoped to make a trip to Erzerum, so famous in the chequered +annals of Russo-Turkish conflicts in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page270" name="page270"></a>(p. 270)</span> Asia; but the thaw had +set in on the uplands of Armenia, the staff at Tiflis said it would be +almost impossible to get a car through the slush for the hundred miles +from the railhead at Sarikamish, and we had no excuse for going other +than curiosity; so the idea was abandoned. It was arranged, however, +that we should proceed to Kars and Sarikamish. A short time elapsed +before we could start, and during this delay we were bidden to a gala +dinner at the palace given in our honour, at which Marsh also was +present. The palace is not a specially imposing building, but it has a +fine broad staircase, and the effect of the Cossacks of the Guard +lining this in their dark red cloaks was very striking. In his speech +the Grand Duke expressed great satisfaction at our visit to +Transcaucasia, as indicating that Russian efforts in this region were +appreciated in England.</p> + +<p>From Tiflis up to Kars means a rise of over 4000 feet, and the +locomotives on the line were specially constructed for this climbing +work, having funnels at either end. Whatever may be the case at other +times, Armenia when the snows are melting is a singularly dreary +region, almost treeless and seemingly destitute of vegetation; some of +the scenery along the line was grand enough in a rugged way, however, +and near Alexandropol the railway traversed plateau land with outlook +over a wide expanse of country. Studying the large-scale map, it +looked as if one ought to be able to see Mount Ararat, eighty miles +away to the south, but there was a tiresome hill in the way +obstructing the view in the required direction.</p> + +<p>Mention of Alexandropol suggests a reference to the pronunciation of +Russian names, which we always manage to get wrong in this country. +Slavs throw the accent nearer the end of words than we are inclined to +do. Thus in Alexandropol they put the accent on the "dro," not on the +"and" as we should. We always put the accent on the "bas" in +Sebastopol, but the accent properly is on the "to." In Alexeieff the +accent is on the second "e," and in Korniloff it is on the "i." You +will not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page271" name="page271"></a>(p. 271)</span> generally go far wrong if you throw the accent one +syllable farther from the beginning of the word than you naturally +would when speaking English.</p> + +<p>Twenty-four hours were spent at Kars, a filthy, but on account of its +associations and of the works being carried on, extremely interesting +place; unfortunately, I was not familiar with the story of Sir Fenwick +Williams' great defence of the stronghold during the Crimean War, for +the old battlements and outworks still existed, if in a ruinous +condition. We were taken all round the place by car, were shown the +elaborate magazines being excavated in the heart of a mountain, and +fetched up at one of the outlying forts in which a large garrison +resided. By this time I was getting quite accustomed to the ceremony +gone through when one met troops on parade or in barracks. You called +out, "<span lang="ru">Starova bradzye?</span>" which being interpreted apparently means "How +are you, brothers?" There followed an agonizing little pause during +which you had time to think that you had got the thing wrong, had made +an ass of yourself, and were disgraced for evermore. Then they all +sang out in unison, "Wow wow wow-wow wow"—that, at all events, is +what it sounded like. Goodness knows what it meant. One had too much +sense to ask, because one might have got the two sentences mixed, +which would have meant irretrievable disaster. The effect, however, +when there were a lot of troops on the ground was excellent, as they +always performed their share with rare gusto. The rank and file +particularly appreciated a foreign officer giving them the customary +greeting.</p> + +<p>The size of the garrison of this outlying fort afforded evidence of +the Russian wealth in man-power. There were a good many guns mounted, +of no great value, and some machine-guns flanked the ditches; but the +amount of personnel seemed out of all proportion to the importance of +the work or the nature of its armament. The men were packed pretty +tight in the casemates, arranged in a double tier, the sojourners on +the upper tier only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page272" name="page272"></a>(p. 272)</span> having the bare boards to lie on. +Afterwards we went out to an entirely new fort which was not yet quite +completed, situated on the plain some six miles from the town. The +Russians were making Kars into a great place of arms on modern lines, +and one rather wondered why.</p> + +<p>Continuing the journey in the afternoon, we were met at Sarikamish +station by General Savitzky, commanding the Sixty-sixth Division and +the garrison, with his staff and a swarm of officers. The place had +been the frontier station before the war and was well laid out as an +up-to-date cantonment, although owing to the thaw the mud was +indescribable. The environs constituted almost an oasis in the bleak +Armenian uplands owing to the hills being clothed in pine-woods, and +Sarikamish had the reputation of making a pleasant summer resort, +people coming out from Tiflis to spend a few weeks so as to escape the +heat. We were treated with almost effusive cordiality, dined at the +staff mess that night, and Cossacks gave an exhibition of their +spirited dancing afterwards and sang songs. Of the large number of +officers acting as hosts, only one, unfortunately, could speak French, +so that Meyendorff was kept busy acting as an intermediary.</p> + +<p>The idea prevalent in this country that Russians in general are good +linguists, it may here be observed, is a delusion. The aristocracy, no +doubt, all speak French perfectly. In the Yacht Club in Petrograd most +of the members appeared to be quite at home in either French or +English, and no doubt could have chattered away in German if put to +it; but away from the capital and Moscow it was not easy to get on +without a knowledge of Russian. The staff at Sarikamish were anxious +that I should meet the Turkish officer prisoners interned there, as +they believed that a couple of them were Boches and nobody able to +speak German had come along for months; but as it turned out, there +was no time for a meeting.</p> + +<p>Next morning we started off in a blizzard to proceed by car some way +in the direction of Erzerum along the high-road over the col which +marked the frontier; the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page273" name="page273"></a>(p. 273)</span> pass would be about 7600 feet above +sea-level; as the elevation of Sarikamish was given as 6700. This +high-road constituted the main line of communications of the Russian +forces in the field beyond railhead, and the traffic along it was +unceasing. With a long, stiff upward incline, there were the usual +sights of broken-down vehicles and of dead animals on all hands; but +the organization appeared to be good, if rough and ready, and the +transport was serviceable enough. Getting the cars along past the +strings of vehicles and animals was no easy job, and it proved a +chilly drive. But the weather brightened, and on the way back we got +out and proceeded on foot to a hill-top of historic interest known as +the "Crow's Nest," above Sarikamish. For it had been the site of +headquarters on the occasion of those very critical conflicts in +December 1914, when the Ottoman commanders had made a determined +effort to break through into Russian Transcaucasia, and when their +plans had only been brought to nought by a most signal combination of +war on the part of the defenders.</p> + +<p>There, on the scene of his triumph, Colonel Maslianikov of the 16th +Caucasian Rifle Regiment described to a gathering of us fur-clad +figures how, with his regiment and some other troops hastily scraped +together, he had brought the leading Turkish divisions to a +standstill, largely by pure bluff and by audacious handling of an +inferior force, and so had prepared the way for the dramatic overthrow +of three Osmanli army corps which transformed a situation that had +been full of menace into one which became rich in promise. News of +this dramatic feat of arms reached the War Office at the time, but +without particulars. That the victor of this field, a field won by a +masterpiece of soldiership, should remain a simple colonel, suggested +a singular indifference on the part of authorities at the heart of the +empire to what wardens of the marches accomplished in peace and war. +That pow-wow in an icy blast amid the snow recalled the Grand Duke +Nicholas's appeal to Lord Kitchener that we should <span class="pagenum"><a id="page274" name="page274"></a>(p. 274)</span> make some +effort to take pressure off his inadequate and hard-pressed forces in +Armenia, an appeal which landed us in the Dardanelles Campaign; and it +further recalled the fact that the colonel's feat near Sarikamish had +put an end to all need for British intervention almost before the +Grand Duke made his appeal. The Russian victory, the details of which +were explained to us that day by its creator, was gained on a date +preceding by some weeks the Allies' naval attempt to conquer the +Straits single-handed.</p> + +<p>After a belated luncheon at the staff mess, following on this long +programme, we had to hurry off accompanied by Savitzky and his staff +to our railway-car. All the officers and a goodly number of the rank +and file in Sarikamish seemed to have collected at the station to give +us a rousing send-off, making it evident that our visit had been much +appreciated. This was not unnatural. Here were Allies fighting in a +region far removed from the principal theatres of war in which the +armies of the Entente were engaged, and they were with justice +desirous that their efforts should not remain wholly unknown. Like +Off, Sarikamish conveyed a very favourable impression of the working +of the Transcaucasian legions under the supreme leadership of the +Grand Duke Nicholas, of whom officers all spoke with enthusiasm, and +whose personality undoubtedly counted for much amongst the +impressionable moujik soldiery. What one had seen in these forward +situations inspired confidence in the future. Nor was that confidence +misplaced, for the Russian forces in Armenia were to achieve great +triumphs ere 1916 was out.</p> + +<p>We had hoped to cross the Caucasus from Tiflis to Vladikavkas by the +great military road over the Dariel Pass, but the staff would not hear +of it, as there was still some risk from avalanches and as the route +was not properly open. We had a farewell luncheon at the palace, and I +had a long talk on military questions with the Grand Duke beforehand, +at which he entrusted me with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page275" name="page275"></a>(p. 275)</span> special messages to Lord +Kitchener and Sir W. Robertson, and expressed an earnest desire for +close co-ordination between his forces in Persia and ours in +Mesopotamia. News had arrived of the repulse of the Kut Relief Force +at Sannaiyat after its having made a promising beginning at Hannah, so +that there was no disguising the fact that little hope remained of +saving Townshend's force. I did not know what course might be adopted +by our Government in this discouraging theatre of war, assuming that +Kut fell; but there could be no doubt that co-ordination was +desirable, as we were bound to hold on to the Shatt-el-Arab and the +oil-fields, whatever happened; it was therefore quite safe to promise +that we would do our best. Having made our farewells, our little party +proceeded straight from Tiflis to Moscow.</p> + +<p>In that famous city we were put up in the palace within the Kremlin, +and we passed a couple of days mainly devoted to sight-seeing. What +has become of all the marvels gathered together within the grim +fortress walls in the heart of the ancient Russian capital? Of the +jewelled ikons, of the priceless sacerdotal vestments, of the gorgeous +semi-barbaric Byzantine temples, of the galleries of historic +paintings, of the raiment, the boots and the camp-bed of Peter the +Great? One wearied of wandering from basilica to basilica, from +edifice to edifice and from room to room. Only the globe-trotting +American keeping a diary can suffer an intensity of this sort of +thing. But then we were taken out one of the afternoons by car to the +Sparrow Hills ridge above the Moskva, about three miles outside the +city and not far from where one morning in 1812 the Grand Army topped +a rise and of a sudden beheld the goal which it had travelled so far +to seek. From there we viewed the spectacle of a riot of gilded +cupolas gleaming in the sun, a sight incomparably more striking in its +majesty than that of the interiors and memorials of the past we had +been reconnoitring at close quarters.</p> + +<p>Another afternoon we drove out to a palace in the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page276" name="page276"></a>(p. 276)</span> outskirts, +which had been converted into a military hospital and was being +maintained by the Emperor out of his private purse. There are some +writers of war experiences on the Western Front who have revelled in +pouring ridicule upon the inspections that are ever proceeding at our +hospitals in the field, although these functions furnish the humorist +with just that opportunity which his soul craves for. My experience, +however, is that in the military world doctors and nurses simply love +to have their tilt-yard visited by people who have no business there. +You could not meet with a Russian hospital-train on its journey, drawn +up at some railway station, but you were gently, if firmly, coerced +into traversing its corridors from end to end. When following the +course of the Turko-Greek conflict in 1897 on the side of the +Hellenes, where almost every known European nation had its Red Cross +hospital, I was dragged round these establishments one and all. To +have strangers tramping about staring at them must be an intolerable +nuisance to wounded men who are badly in need of peace and quiet. One +went through the "<span lang="ru">starova bradzye</span>" game in each hospital ward visited +in Russia, and the din of the "wow wow wow-wow wow-ings" reverberating +through these halls seemed strangely out of place amidst surroundings +of gloom and suffering, where many a poor fellow was nearing his end. +Our acting Consul-General came to pay me a visit at the palace, and we +had a long talk about the internal conditions of Russia, of which he +took none too rosy a view; distrust and discontent were growing apace, +he implied, for the Court was entirely out of touch with the people, +and the Government seemed to be going the way of the Court. On the +night that we were leaving we were taken to the ballet at the Opera +House, and we went straight from the theatre to board the train, which +left about midnight for Petrograd.</p> + +<p>There we found Hanbury-Williams putting up at the Astoria, and I was +able to have several conversations with him and also with Sir G. +Buchanan and Colonel <span class="pagenum"><a id="page277" name="page277"></a>(p. 277)</span> Blair, our Assistant Military Attaché. +From what I gathered from them and observations during the trip, it +would be safe to report to the War Office that from the military point +of view the outlook in Russia was distinctly promising. Even if there +was little prospect of anything of real importance being effected on +the Eastern Front this year, we might reasonably reckon upon the +immense forces of the empire, adequately fitted out with rifles, +machine-guns, field-artillery and ammunition, and with some heavy guns +and howitzers to help, performing a dominant rôle in the campaign of +1917. And yet all was not well. The political conditions, if not +exactly ominous, gave grounds for anxiety. The dim shadow of coming +events was already being cast before. The internal situation required +watching, and it was on the cards that the influence of the Allies +might have to be thrown into the scale in order to prevent a dire +upheaval.</p> + +<p>While at the capital on this occasion we paid a visit to the British +hospital, occupying a palace on the Nevski Prospekt, which was under +the management of Lady Sybil Grey. The most interesting patient in +this admirably appointed institution was a sturdy little lad of about +fourteen, who had been to the front, had got hit with a bullet, and +had been converted into a sergeant. He was evidently made much of, +accompanying us round as a sort of assistant Master of the Ceremonies, +and he seemed to be having a good time; but he complained, so we were +given to understand, that the nurses would insist on kissing him. If +that was the only inconvenience resulting from a wound, it seemed to +me to be a form of unpleasantness that one might manage to put up +with.</p> + +<p>When the time for departure came, Meyendorff was quite unhappy at my +objecting to his accompanying us all the way to Tornea; but we meant +to travel through Finland disguised as small fry and in plain clothes. +On the occasion of our previous heading for home, our leaving had been +advertised in all the newspapers; the Embassy had drawn the attention +of the authorities to this, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page278" name="page278"></a>(p. 278)</span> the Press had been directed +to make no mention in future of foreign officers starting for +Scandinavia. Even if the enemy under-water flotilla was hardly likely +to make special endeavours to catch us on the Bergen-Newcastle trip, +there was no object in running unnecessary risks by letting them know +that we were coming along.</p> + +<p>We enjoyed a rare stroke of luck on the voyage across the North Sea +this time. Our packet was plodding peacefully along on a hazy, grey +forenoon, about half-way to the Tyne, when the faint silhouettes of a +brace of destroyers were descried racing athwart our course a good +many miles ahead. We were watching them disappear far away on the +starboard bow, when others suddenly hove in sight looming up through +the mist, all of them going like mad in the same direction, and then +four great shadowy battle-cruisers showed themselves steaming hard +across our front, four or five miles away. The armada, a signal +manifestation of vitality and power and speed, was evidently making +for Rosyth; it had no doubt been on the prowl about the Skagerrack, +and it presumably meant to coal at high pressure and then to get busy +again. Such a spectacle would naturally be an everyday occurrence to +the Sister Service; but to a landsman this assemblage of fighting +craft going for all they were worth was tremendously impressive as a +demonstration of British maritime might—far more impressive than +interminable rows of warships, moored and at rest, such as one had +seen gathered together between Southampton Water and Spithead for a +Royal Review.</p> + +<p>What surprised one most perhaps was the wide extent of the water-area +which this battle-cruiser squadron covered, consisting as it did of +only a quartette of capital ships after all, with their attendant ring +of mosquito-craft keeping guard ahead, astern and on the flanks. The +leading pair of destroyers cannot have been much short of twenty miles +in advance of the two scouts which came racing up at the tail of the +hunt. Our old tub had got well within the water-area by the time that +these <span class="pagenum"><a id="page279" name="page279"></a>(p. 279)</span> latter sleuths approached, and their track passed +astern of us; but at the last moment one of them pivoted round, just +as a Canadian canoe will pivot round in the hands of an artist, and +came tearing along after us—it may have been to look at us or it may +merely have been to show off—passed us on the port hand not more than +a cable's length off as if we were standing still, shot across our +bows, and was off like a flash after her consort. Of those +battle-cruisers that looked so imposing as they rushed along towards +the Firth of Forth that forenoon, at least one was to meet her fate +before many days had passed. The Battle of Jutland was fought about +three weeks later.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page280" name="page280"></a>(p. 280)</span> CHAPTER XV</h3> + +<h5>THE RUSSIAN BUNGLE</h5> + +<p class="resume">The Russian Revolution the worst disaster which befell the + Entente during the Great War — The political situation in Russia + before that event much less difficult to deal with than had been + the political situation in the Near East in 1915 — The Allies' + over-estimate of Russian strength in the early months of the + war — We hear first about the ammunition shortage from + Japan — Presumable cause of the breakdown — The Grand Duke + Nicholas's difficulties in the early months — Great improvement + effected in respect to munitions subsequent to the summer of + 1915 — Figures — Satisfactory outlook for the campaign of + 1917 — Political situation goes from bad to worse — Russian Mission + to London; no steps taken by our Government — Our representatives + in Russia — Situation at the end of 1916 — A private letter to Mr. + Lloyd George — The Milner Mission to Russia — Its failure to + interpret the portents — Had Lord Kitchener got out it might have + made all the difference — Some excuse for our blundering + subsequent to the Revolution — The delay in respect to action in + Siberia and at Vladivostok.</p> + +<p class="p2">Incomparably the most grievous disaster met with by the Entente during +the progress of the Great War was the Russian Revolution of March +1917. All the other mishaps, great and small, which the Allies had to +deplore—the occupation of Belgium and of wide areas of France by +German hosts at the very outset, the collapse of the Emperor +Nicholas's legions in Poland in 1915, the Dardanelles failure, +Bulgaria's accession to the ranks of our enemies and the resultant +overthrow of Serbia, the fall of Kut, Roumania's unhappy +experience—sink into insignificance compared with the downfall of the +Romanoffs and what that downfall led to.</p> + +<p>Had the cataclysmic upheaval in Russia been averted, or at least been +delayed until hostilities were at an end, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page281" name="page281"></a>(p. 281)</span> the war would have +been brought to a successful conclusion before the close of the year +1917. Much loss of life would have been saved. The European +belligerents, one and all and whichever side they fought on during the +contest, would be in an incomparably less anxious economic position +than they actually are in to-day. The Eastern Hemisphere would have +settled its own affairs without intervention, other than naval and +financial, from the farther side of the Atlantic. Peace would in +consequence have been concluded within a very few months of the +cessation of hostilities, instead of negotiations starting on a +preposterous basis and being protracted for more than a year.</p> + +<p>That the Revolution could have been prevented, or at all events could +have been deferred until subsequent to the end of the war, I firmly +believe. Our diplomacy has been severely criticized in connection with +Near Eastern affairs in 1915; nor will any one maintain that it was +successful, judged by results. But the situation in the Balkans was +one of extraordinary perplexity in any case, and the problem was +complicated by the fact that the Allies were not all of one mind as to +what course to pursue on almost any single occasion. The position of +affairs during the critical months leading up to March 1917 in Russia, +on the other hand, was no puzzle, and the political situation had +never been a puzzle since the outbreak of war. Our French and Italian +friends, moreover, fully realized that this country, if it chose to do +so, possessed the means of exerting a special and controlling +influence within the governing clique holding sway at the head of the +empire, and they were most anxious that that influence should be +exercised. But before touching on this question some comments on the +military conditions within the territories of our whilom eastern Ally +previous to, and at the time of, the catastrophe will not be out of +place.</p> + +<p>The potentialities of Russia for carrying on a war of first-class +magnitude had been altogether overestimated <span class="pagenum"><a id="page282" name="page282"></a>(p. 282)</span> at the outset in +the United Kingdom and in France, alike by the public and by the +military authorities—in France perhaps even more so than in this +country. The armies of our eastern Ally did, it is true, accomplish +greater things in some respects than had been anticipated, because +they struck an effective blow at an earlier date than had been +believed possible, and they thereby relieved pressure in the West at a +critical juncture even if their enterprising and loyal action in East +Prussia was later to lead them into a terrible disaster. During the +first two or three months after the outbreak of hostilities their +weakness in regard to equipment and to munitions was not, however, +known, or at all events was only partially known. There was much talk +in the Press about the "steam-roller" which was going to flatten the +Central Powers out. We at the War Office had received warnings from +our very well-informed Military Attaché, it is true; but those +warnings did not convey to us the full gravity of the position, a +gravity which was probably not recognized even in high places in +Russia for some time. Moreover, as far as we could judge, Paris had no +idea that anything was seriously amiss beyond the Vistula, in spite of +the Franco-Russian alliance having been in force for some years.</p> + +<p>The first really alarming tidings on this subject that we received +came to hand, oddly enough, from Japan; and it bears testimony to the +efficiency of our Far Eastern Ally's intelligence service that the +Island Empire should have been so intimately acquainted with the +military conditions in a State with which it had been at war only a +very few years before. This information reached us, I think, in +October 1914. But as far as I recollect, that warning, inexorable as +it was, only touched the question of ammunition. We were told plainly +that the Russians were likely to run out of this indispensable at an +early date; but the message did not mention rifles, although these +already began to run short within eight months of the commencement of +the struggle. How it came about <span class="pagenum"><a id="page283" name="page283"></a>(p. 283)</span> that there should have been +so deplorable a breakdown in respect to war material can only be a +matter of conjecture; but we may hazard a pretty shrewd guess that the +collapse which was to lead to such deplorable results in the early +summer of 1915, was attributable to graft on a Homeric scale. For the +Russian army budgets had for several years before the war been framed +on lavish lines; that for 1914, for instance, mounted up to +725,000,000 roubles, which represented a higher figure than the +corresponding budgets in either Germany or France. General +Sukhomlinoff, the War Minister on the Neva from 1910 to 1915, was, as +is well known, disgraced in the latter year, and he was tried for his +life after the Revolution.</p> + +<p>The Russian victories in Galicia during the winter of 1914-15, +followed as they were by the reduction of the important place of arms, +Przemysl, caused unbounded satisfaction in this country. But those +behind the scenes feared, with only too good reason, that such +triumphs represented no more than a flash in the pan, and that, should +the Germans decide to throw heavy forces into the scale, the Grand +Duke Nicholas would speedily find himself obliged to abandon the +conquests which looked so gratifying on paper. We in the War Office +learnt, indeed, that the Russian generalissimo, who recognized that +the munitions situation did not justify offensive operations on an +ambitious scale, had been indisposed to undertake the capture of +Przemysl, but that political pressure had been brought to bear on him.</p> + +<p>Lord Kitchener was constantly watching the Eastern Front with anxiety +during the early months of 1915, fearing that in view of the Russian +weakness some great transfer of enemy forces from East to West might +be instituted. A strategical combination on such lines on the part of +the German Great General Staff would under the existing circumstances +have been a very natural one to adopt. But it is conceivable (if not +very probable) that the higher military authorities in Berlin were +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page284" name="page284"></a>(p. 284)</span> not fully aware of the condition of their antagonists in +Poland. The fact, moreover, remains that in their accounts of the +campaign of 1915 the numerous books on the war which have appeared in +Germany ignore to a remarkable extent the munitions difficulties under +which the Grand Duke Nicholas was suffering. That, however, may be +attributable to a disinclination to admit that Hindenburg's successes +were due, not to any outstanding brilliance in the handling of his +troops nor to the gallantry and efficiency of those concerned in the +operations under his orders, but simply to his opponent being almost +bereft of armament. Be that as it may, Russia was in such evil plight +for arms and ammunition from the summer of 1915 on to that of 1916 +that she was wellnigh powerless, except in Armenia. She only became +really formidable again during the period of quiescence that, as +usual, set in during the winter of 1916-17.</p> + +<p>Shortly after returning home in May 1916, I took over charge (under +circumstances to be mentioned in the next chapter) of the War Office +branch which dealt with munitions and supplies for Russia, and I am +consequently familiar with this question. To show what strides were +made towards fitting the military forces out for a strenuous campaign +in 1917, some output figures may be given. (I have none for dates +prior to January 1916.) It should be mentioned that the output of +field-artillery ammunition had already, owing to General Polivanoff's +exertions, been greatly expanded during the latter part of 1915, and +there was no very marked increase in this during 1916; the French +supplied large numbers of rounds, and it had been hoped that great +quantities would come to hand from the United States, but the influx +from this latter source hardly materialized before the winter of +1916-17. Seeing how greatly the Russian armies had suffered from lack +of heavy artillery during the first year of the war, the huge increase +in output of howitzer and 6-inch rounds is particularly worth noting.</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page285" name="page285"></a>(p. 285)</span> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="ammunition"> +<colgroup> + <col width="40%"> + <col width="20%"> + <col width="10%"> + <col width="20%"> + <col width="10%"> +</colgroup> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">January</td> +<td>1916.</td> +<td class="td-right">January</td> +<td>1917.</td> +</tr> +<tr><td colspan="5"> </td></tr> +<tr> +<td>Rifles</td> +<td class="td-right">93,000</td> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">129,000</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Machine-guns</td> +<td class="td-right">712</td> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">1,200</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Small-arms ammunition</td> +<td class="td-right">96,000,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +<td class="td-right">173,000,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Field-guns</td> +<td class="td-right">169</td> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">407</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Field-howitzers</td> +<td class="td-right">33</td> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">62</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Field-howitzer ammunition</td> +<td class="td-right">72,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +<td class="td-right">369,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>6-inch guns and howitzers</td> +<td class="td-right">1</td> +<td> </td> +<td class="td-right">17</td> +<td> </td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>6-inch gun and howitzer ammunition</td> +<td class="td-right">32,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +<td class="td-right">230,000</td> +<td>rounds</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>By the early weeks of 1917 the empire was not dependent upon its own +resources alone. Great contracts for rifles, machine-guns, small-arms +ammunition, and field-gun ammunition had been placed in the United +States under arrangements made by Lord Kitchener in the summer of +1915. The factories on the farther side of the Atlantic only began to +produce during the summer of 1916, and they had not got into full +swing before the latter part of the year; but by March 1917, 412,000 +rifles, 12,200 machine-guns, 240,000,000 rounds of small-arms +ammunition, and 4,750,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition had already +been handed over, and great part of this armament had been shipped +(the field-gun ammunition mainly to Vladivostok across the Pacific); +and a great output was still in progress. Over 800 howitzers and heavy +guns, with abundant ammunition for them, had also by that time been +despatched to Russia from the United Kingdom and France, and nearly +6,000,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition from France. Such statistics +could be multiplied. Suffice it to say that there was every reason to +assume that the Emperor Nicholas's legions would be adequately +supplied with most forms of munitions for the 1917 campaign, and that, +thanks to the great increase in the numbers of rifles, machine-guns +and pieces of artillery available, they would take the field in far +stronger force numerically than at any previous period of the war.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page286" name="page286"></a>(p. 286)</span> From the purely military point of view the position of +affairs in the winter of 1916-17 was, in fact, decidedly promising. A +huge force was under arms and was coming to be well equipped. General +Brusiloff's successes in the summer of 1916, even if they made no +appreciable alteration in the general strategical situation, had +afforded most satisfactory evidence that the stubborn fighting spirit +of the Russian troops had suffered no eclipse consequent upon +disasters of the past. Confidence reigned at the Stavka, and competent +leaders had been forced to the front. But the internal situation, on +the other hand, had become ominous in the extreme.</p> + +<p>Some references were made in the last chapter to the discontent that +was manifesting itself throughout the country even early in 1916, and +to the attitude of marked indifference that was being displayed by the +officers in respect to the Sovereign to whom they owed allegiance. But +things had gone rapidly from bad to worse since that date. M. +Sazonoff, the eminent Foreign Minister, to whose efforts before the +war the satisfactory understanding between Great Britain and Russia +was largely due and whose policy was uncompromisingly anti-German, had +been got out of the way by the machinations of the Court clique. (The +Emperor, it may be mentioned, had been almost cringingly apologetic to +our representatives about this step, which he could not but realize +would create a very bad impression in London and Paris.) Successive +substitutions carried out amongst the personnel of the Executive had +all tended towards introducing elements that were reactionary from the +point of view of internal policy and were suspect from the point of +view of the Entente. Dissatisfaction and loss of confidence had been +growing apace amongst the public, and what had been merely +indifference manifested amongst the officers towards the Autocrat at +the head of the State was giving place to openly expressed dislike and +even to contempt for a potentate who, however well-meaning he might +be, was constantly affording evidence that he was in the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page287" name="page287"></a>(p. 287)</span> +hands of mischievous counsellors and possessed no will of his own.</p> + +<p>A special Mission had come over to England from Russia in August, +including amongst its numerous personnel the Finance Minister and the +Chief of the General Staff at the Ministry of War. This Mission had +obtained from us promises of financial assistance running into scores +of millions sterling, to say nothing of an undertaking to furnish +substantial consignments of war material. But in the understanding +that was then arrived at, I never could detect any trace of conditions +designed to check the dangerous policy which all who were behind the +scenes realized the Emperor to be adopting. Who paid the piper never +called one note of the tune. There was an ingenuousness about the +proceedings on the part of our Government that was startling in its +Micawberism and improvidence.</p> + +<p>Now, our Cabinet was extraordinarily fortunate in the British +representatives within the Russian Empire upon whom they depended or +ought to have depended. They were admirably served on the Neva, at the +Stavka and in the field. We had an ambassador who was trusted to an +unprecedented extent by all ranks and classes in the realm which he +was making his temporary home. The Head of our Military Mission, +Hanbury-Williams, was a <span lang="la"><i>persona gratissima</i></span> with the Emperor. Our +Military Attachés—Knox, Blair, and Marsh—were masters of the Russian +language, and, in common with several British officers especially +accredited to the different armies, ever had their fingers on the +pulse of military sentiment on the fighting fronts. How it came about +that our Government—or rather Governments, because Mr. Lloyd George +and his War Cabinet replaced Mr. Asquith and his sanhedrin of +twenty-three just when things were becoming highly critical—shambled +blindly along trusting to luck and did nothing, it is hard to say. But +among them they nearly lost us the war.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of the year 1916 the situation was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page288" name="page288"></a>(p. 288)</span> already +becoming almost desperate, even if the putting away of the horrible +Rasputin did seem for a moment to relieve the gloom. Officers high up +in the army were imploring our military representatives for British +intervention with their rulers. Our ambassador appears to have done +everything that man could do, even remonstrating in set terms with the +Emperor; but he would not seem to have been accorded the strenuous +support from home which he had a right to look for, and which would +have given his representations that compelling weight demanded by an +exceedingly precarious situation.</p> + +<p>Owing to the nature of my duties in connection with supplies of all +kinds for Russia, following upon visits to that country, I had been +closely in touch with the situation for some months, heard from our +military representatives from time to time, and saw Russians in an +official position in London practically daily. By the end of the year +the position seemed to me so fraught with peril that, on learning of +the contemplated despatch of a special political and military Mission +to Murmansk <span lang="fr"><i>en route</i></span> for the interior, I wrote a private letter to +Mr. Lloyd George, and this was duly acknowledged with thanks by his +Private Secretary. This communication warned the Prime Minister that +Russia was on the brink of revolution owing to the reactionary +tendencies of her government; it pointed out that if a revolution were +to break out the consequences must be disastrous to the campaign of +1917 on the Eastern Front, as all arrangements would inevitably be +thrown out of gear; and it proposed that we should play our trump +card, that, backed by the express authority and enforced by the active +intervention of the War Cabinet, we should turn to its fullest account +the influence of our Royal House with the Emperor Nicholas. The remedy +might not have produced the desired effect. The diagnosis at all +events turned out to be correct.</p> + +<p>One never anticipated, needless to say, that if the revolution which +seemed to be imminent were actually to take place, the consequences +would be quite so terrible <span class="pagenum"><a id="page289" name="page289"></a>(p. 289)</span> as those which have actually +supervened. One never dreamt of the executive power over great part of +the vast dominions then under the sway of the Romanoff dynasty falling +into the hands of wretches such as Peter the Painter, Trotzky and +Lenin. But, even assuming a more or less stable form of reasonable +republican government to replace the existing autocracy, it could not +be other than obvious to all who were in any way conversant with the +social conditions holding good in this enormous area, peopled as it +was by illiterate and profoundly ignorant peasants, that a revolution +was bound to produce a state of affairs for the time being bordering +on chaos. What ought to prove the decisive year of the war was at +hand. Revolution must be staved off at all costs.</p> + +<p>The special Mission actually started for Murmansk some two or three +weeks later. Although the list of its personnel made a good enough +show on paper, it lacked the one element that was practically +indispensable if its representations were to save the situation. They +say that Lord Milner, on getting back, gave the War Cabinet to +understand that all was going on fairly well in Russia, and that there +was little or no fear of a <span lang="fr"><i>bouleversement</i></span>. This would have seemed to +me incredible had I not met several of the members of the Mission when +they turned up again, and had they not, one and all, appeared +perfectly satisfied with the internal situation of the empire on which +they had paid a call. Whom these good people saw out there, where they +went, what steps they took to acquire knowledge in quarters other than +official circles, how it came about that they returned to this country +with no more idea of the state of affairs than a cassowary on the +plains of Timbuctoo, furnishes one of those mysteries which cast such +a recondite glamour over our public life. Why, the Babes in the Wood +were prodigies of analysis and wizards of cunning compared with this +carefully selected civilian and military party, which, it has to be +acknowledged, spent a by no means idle time while sojourning in the +territories of our eastern <span class="pagenum"><a id="page290" name="page290"></a>(p. 290)</span> Ally. For among them they +promised away any amount more munitions and war material of all kinds. +They went into the details of the contemplated deal with meticulous +care and consummate administrative skill. They elaborated a programme +which would undoubtedly have proved in the highest degree advantageous +to Russia, had the conditions not undergone a complete metamorphosis +owing to the outbreak of the Revolution in Petrograd a very few days +after they landed, sanguine and reassuring, in this country on their +return journey.</p> + +<p>Had it not been for the <i>Hampshire</i> disaster, had Lord Kitchener +succeeded in carrying out his mission in the summer of 1916, it is +conceivable that, in virtue of that almost uncanny intuition that he +possessed, he would have pieced together the realities of the +situation, and would have managed to teach his colleagues in our +Cabinet to understand them on his return. His personal influence might +have made all the difference in the world in Russia. He would have +gained touch with all sorts and conditions of men while out there, and +would have got to the back of their minds by methods all his own. The +very fact that Russians have so much of the oriental strain in them +would have helped him in this. But it was not to be.</p> + +<p>Of what followed after the Revolution much might be said; but, in so +far as the blunders committed by our Government are concerned, it has +to be admitted that the situation was no easy one to grapple with. +When you have been such an ass as to ride your horse into a bog, there +is a good deal of excuse for your botching getting the beast out +again, as that is in the nature of things a difficult job. The +mischief was done when the Revolution was allowed to occur. After that +it became a case of groping with a bewildering, kaleidoscopic, +intangible state of affairs. Mr. Henderson's performances have excited +much ridicule, but against his absurd belief in M. Kerensky must be +set his prompt recognition of his own unfitness for the position of +representative of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page291" name="page291"></a>(p. 291)</span> British Government on the banks of the +Neva. M. Kerensky, no doubt, may have meant well by the Allies after +his own fashion; but as he can claim so great a share in the work of +destroying the discipline of the Russian army, he proved the kind of +friend who in practice is more pernicious than are open and +undisguised enemies. One of the most singular features, indeed, in the +epoch-making events of 1917 in Eastern Europe was the fact that a +windbag of this sort should ever have gained power, and that, having +gained power, he should have retained it for the space of several +months. Only in Russia could such a thing have happened. It must be +added that the perplexities to which the Entente Governments were a +prey in connection with the Russian problem subsequent to March 1917 +were aggravated from the outset—and yet more so after Lenin's gaining +the mastery—by the very divergent views which prevailed amongst them +in connection with most of the awkward questions that arose.</p> + +<p>This was illustrated by the strange happenings concerning Siberia and +Vladivostok of the early part of 1918. Gathered together at the +extreme eastern doorway into Russia were enormous accumulations of war +material and of vital commodities of all kinds—most of them, it may +be observed incidentally, being goods which had been procured in the +United States by British credits on behalf of pre-Bolshevist +governments, Imperial and republican. It was imperative that these +should not fall into the hands of Lenin's warrior rabble that was +spreading eastwards from beyond the Ural Mountains, and it was equally +imperative that the progress of these tumultuary Bolshevist levies +into Siberia should be stayed at the earliest possible moment. These +were duties which, owing to the geographical conditions, naturally +devolved upon the United States and Japan, and, seeing that the United +States were hurrying soldiers in hot haste to the European theatre of +war, the duties in reality properly devolved upon Japan. But it was +now no longer a question of reconciling the views merely of London, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page292" name="page292"></a>(p. 292)</span> Paris, Rome, and Tokio. A disturbing factor had cropped up. +President Wilson had entered the lists.</p> + +<p>The fact that no decision as to Siberia and Vladivostok was arrived at +for weeks, and that when it was arrived at it was an unsatisfactory +one, was not the fault of the British, nor of the French, nor of the +Italian, nor yet of the Japanese Government. We have heard a good deal +at times about "wait and see"; but Mr. Asquith is a very Rupert +compared to the Autocrat reigning in the White House in 1918. Had +Japan been given a free hand, with the full moral support of the +Allies, and with some financial support and support in the shape of +certain forms of war material, Bolshevism might have been stamped out +even before the Central Powers were brought to their knees in 1918. It +would surely be to the interest of the United States, as it would +undoubtedly be to the interest of Canada and Australasia, that the +swelling millions peopling eastern Asia should be encouraged to expand +westwards into the rich but sparsely populated regions lying north of +Mongolia, rather than that they should be seeking to expand across the +Pacific Ocean. As it was, Japan received scanty encouragement, and +only received it after procrastination had been developed to the very +utmost.</p> + +<p>What occurred in connection with Siberia and Vladivostok on that +occasion provided an unpleasant foretaste of the pathetic performance +which was to go on for months and months in the following year at +Versailles. It moreover foreshadowed and furthered that untoward +extension of Bolshevism far and wide which has since taken place. Some +of us would willingly have made shift to get on without a League of +Nations could we have been saved from the disastrous consequence of +action on the part of civilization in Siberia in 1918 having been so +unjustifiably delayed, and its having taken so perfunctory a form.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page293" name="page293"></a>(p. 293)</span> CHAPTER XVI</h3> + +<h5>CATERING FOR THE ALLIES</h5> + +<p class="resume">The appointment of Colonel Ellershaw to look after Russian + munition supplies — His remarkable success — I take over his branch + after his death — Gradual alteration of its functions — The + Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement — Its efficiency — The + despatch of goods to Russia — Russian technical abilities in + advance of their organizing power — The flame projector and the + Stokes mortar — Drawings and specifications of Tanks — An early + contretemps in dealing with a Russian military + delegate — Misadventure in connection with a 9.2-inch + howitzer — Difficulties at the northern Russian ports — The + American contracts — The Russian Revolution — This transforms the + whole position as to supplies — Roumania — Statesmen in + conflict — Dealings with the Allies' delegates in + general — Occasional difficulties — Helpfulness of the United + States representatives — The Greek muddle — Getting it + disentangled — Great delays in this country and in France in + fitting out the Greeks, and their consequences — Serbian + supplies — The command in Macedonia ought on administrative + grounds to have been in British hands.</p> + +<p class="p2">One day early in the summer of 1915 Lord Kitchener sent for me to say +that I must find him an artillery officer to take general charge of +the arrangements that he was setting on foot for supplying the +Russians with armament from the United States and elsewhere. I +repaired to Colonel Malcolm Peake, who dealt with all questions of +artillery personnel (he was killed on the Western Front very shortly +after taking up an artillery command there), who asked what +qualifications were needed. It was intimated that the officer must be +something of an Admirable Crichton, must be a thoroughly up-to-date +gunner of sufficient standing to be able to keep his end up when +dealing with superior Russian officials, must be possessed of business +capacity, must be gifted with tact and be a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page294" name="page294"></a>(p. 294)</span> reservoir of +energy, and ought to have a good working knowledge of French.</p> + +<p>Peake asked for time, and next day proposed Colonel W. Ellershaw for +the appointment. Ellershaw had just been ordered home from France to +assume charge of an important artillery school on Salisbury Plain, and +he was duly instructed to come and report himself to me. He was by no +means enthusiastic on his being informed of the proposal to divert him +from the work that he had arrived to take over and which particularly +appealed to him, and he displayed a diffidence for which, it speedily +became apparent, there were no grounds whatever, for he proved himself +to be absolutely made for the Russian job. As a result of his +practical knowledge, of his genius for administration, of his driving +power and of his personal charm, he gained the complete confidence of +Lord Kitchener and of all Russians who were brought into contact with +him. I kept him in a manner under my wing till the end of the year, +although his work was not, properly speaking, General Staff work; but +his little branch was transferred to General von Donop's department +when Sir W. Robertson arrived and reorganised the General Staff +arrangements at the War Office.</p> + +<p>Ellershaw formed one of the party which accompanied Lord Kitchener on +the ill-fated expedition that terminated off the Orkneys, and he was +drowned with his Chief. His death, like that of Colonel Fitzgerald and +Mr. O'Beirne, was a real loss to his country, and it was greatly +deplored by the many highly placed Russians who had had dealings with +him and who had been enormously impressed by his work on their behalf. +For some weeks after the <i>Hampshire</i> catastrophe his place was not +filled up; but General von Donop eventually asked me to take charge of +his branch, which I agreed to by no means willingly, the work being +entirely out of my line and my technical knowledge being virtually +non-existent. Ellershaw, however, had everything in such good order +and had got together such efficient assistants that the duty of +superintendence <span class="pagenum"><a id="page295" name="page295"></a>(p. 295)</span> did not, as it turned out, prove so +difficult as had seemed likely. General Furse, on succeeding General +von Donop some months later, objected to having under him a branch +which was not a supply branch, but a liaison branch between the +Russians on the one hand and his department and the Munitions Ministry +on the other hand, so it was then settled that we should come directly +under the Under-Secretary of State—a very appropriate arrangement.</p> + +<p>As all armament for Roumania had to pass through Russia, it became +convenient that my branch should look after this as well, and we +gradually came to be co-ordinating the supply of armament to all the +Allies. Then, early in 1918, as a consequence mainly of the muddle +that the War Office had got into over the question of supplies for +Greece (of which armament only formed a small proportion), it was +decided, somewhat late in the day, that we should deal with supplies +of all kinds furnished by the War Office to the Allies. But it was +arranged at the same time that my branch, instead of remaining under +the Under-Secretary of State, its proper place, should be included in +the new-fangled civilian department of the Surveyor-General of +Supplies which had nothing to do with armament, a plan that set +fundamental principles of administration at defiance inasmuch as the +branch actually supplied nothing and merely acted as a go-between. It +simultaneously acquired a title that constituted a very miracle of +obscurantism and incongruity, warranted to bewilder everybody. Labours +in connection with Russia and Roumania were by that time, however, +virtually at an end, the importance of the branch had to a great +extent lapsed, and it was afforded a not unedifying experience. For it +became possible to compare the working of the military departments +within the War Office with that of a department set up within that +institution and run on the lines of the Man of Business, just as it +had been possible before to compare the working of those military +departments within the War Office <span class="pagenum"><a id="page296" name="page296"></a>(p. 296)</span> with that of the Ministry +of Munitions. If the military departments of the War Office came out +with flying colours, it must in fairness be allowed that, as they were +of the old-established and not the mushroom type, their competitors +were giving away a lot of weight.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, the branch had never in principle been supposed +to deal direct with the representatives of the Allies, although in +practice we were in close and constant touch with them. Official +business transactions with them were carried out, accounts kept, and +so forth, by the "<span lang="fr">Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement,</span>" and, +until we became entangled with the Surveyor-General of Supplies people +and were obliged to shift quarters, we were accommodated in the +building occupied by the "Commission," which constituted a very +important department, nominally under the Board of Trade but for all +practical purposes independent. This C.I.R.—departments and branches +are always described by their initials in official life; the day would +not be long enough nor would available stationery suffice to give them +their full titles—was an admirably managed institution. It enjoyed +the good fortune of being under charge of an experienced Civil +Servant, Sir E. Wyldbore Smith, who had one or two of the same sort to +help him, although the bulk of the staff were of the provisional type; +and, as the various foreign delegations dealing with supplies were +housed under the same roof, this was manifestly the proper place for +us to be. We were in close touch with the people we actually had to +deal with. The foreign delegates could always look in on us and could +discuss points of detail with us on the spot, thereby avoiding +misunderstandings and friction. Consisting, as they did, for the most +part of officers, they liked to have officers to deal with. A foreign +officer of junior rank will take "no" for an answer from a general and +be perfectly happy, whereas he may jib at receiving the same answer +from a civilian or from an officer of his own standing. Points of that +kind are apt to be overlooked in a non-military country like ours.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page297" name="page297"></a>(p. 297)</span> My branch had an extremely busy time in connection with the +supply of the munitions which were promised to the Russians on the +occasion of that mission of theirs which was sent to England just at +the time that I took over charge, and which is mentioned on <a href="#page287">p. 287</a> in +the last chapter. These munitions included war material of all kinds, +but particularly field-howitzers and heavy artillery. The Russian +delegation were quite ready to leave all the arrangements for getting +the goods to Archangel from wherever they were turned out in this +country, to the C.I.R. and us, working in conjunction with the Naval +Transport Department of the Admiralty at first and afterwards with the +Ministry of Shipping. They recognized their own administrative +shortcomings and wisely left such matters under British control. Some +difficulty did, however, arise in respect to the apportionment of +tonnage space, as between the armament supplied by the War Office and +commodities of other kinds which the delegates procured more or less +direct from the trade through the C.I.R. Some regrettable delay +occurred in the winter of 1916-17 in getting armament shipped which +had been hurried from the factories to Liverpool, owing to its being +shut out by goods of much less importance. It was imperative to get +heavy artillery out as soon as possible in view of the coming +campaign, and it was exasperating to have valuable howitzers idle at +the docks which our own army in France would have welcomed. One had to +take a high hand; but the Russians were easy to manipulate in such +matters, and they never resented virtual dictation in the least so +long as the iron hand remained concealed within the velvet glove. +Relations were, indeed, always particularly pleasant.</p> + +<p>Although the average standard of education was probably lower in +Russia than in any other State which could be called civilized, the +country has produced many scientists of the very foremost rank, and +the Russian artillery included many highly scientific—almost too +scientific—officers. It used to be a little trying to find <span class="pagenum"><a id="page298" name="page298"></a>(p. 298)</span> +them, after they had received a consignment of our own pattern +armament (which the French or the Italians or the Belgians would have +jumped at), picking it to pieces, so to speak, criticising the details +of high-explosive shell or of fuses from every point of view, and +showing greater disposition to worry over such points than to get the +stuff into the field and to kill Germans with it. The technicalist, +indeed, almost seemed to rule the roost, although this unfortunately +did not lead to even reasonably good care being taken of war material +that arrived in the country. The Russians had done wonders in respect +to developing the port of Archangel; they had performed the miracle +actually during the war. But if they had achieved a veritable +administrative triumph in this matter, their methods were terribly at +fault in assembling goods as they arrived and in getting the goods +through to their destination in good order. If they undoubtedly were +strong on the scientific side, they were correspondingly weak on the +practical side, as is illustrated by the following experience.</p> + +<p>I was taken down one afternoon to Hatfield Park to see a demonstration +of a certain flame-producing arrangement, of which they had ordered +large numbers. This was a pleasant outing, and the demonstration was +interesting enough in itself; but the elaborate contrivance seemed to +me totally unsuited to the conditions on the Russian front, because +the flame was only projected eighty yards—one was quite comfortable a +hundred and fifty yards straight in front of the projector—and the +device was only adapted to conditions such as had existed in the +Gallipoli Peninsula and as held good at a very few points on the +Western Front, where the opposing trenches happened to be quite close +together. As a matter of fact, the contrivance had been found of very +little use when tried by us in the field. Strong recommendations came +to hand shortly afterwards from some of our officers accredited to the +Russian armies that a goodly supply of trench mortars should be sent +out, and particularly of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page299" name="page299"></a>(p. 299)</span> the invaluable Stokes mortars; it +was foreseen by the applicants that, once the pattern was available, +these could easily be constructed locally in Russia. But one +encountered the greatest difficulty in inducing the delegation in this +country to have anything to say to the Stokes mortar, because of its +comparatively short range. And yet the range of the very oldest +pattern of Stokes mortar was five times that of the flame projector, +upon which material and time and labour and tonnage were being wasted.</p> + +<p>Then, again, there arose the question of tanks. Now a tank could not +possibly at that time have been got along the Murmansk railway without +squashing the whole track down for good and all into the marshes +across which the permanent way was conveyed by precarious and +provisional processes. Needless to say, we had no tanks to spare to be +kept reposing idle for months at ports and congested junctions, +awaiting transport to Vilna or Podolia. But as they could not get +tanks, nor transport them if they were to secure some in this country, +the Russians were anxious to procure drawings and specifications of +these new-fangled engines of war. There was no reasonable likelihood +of such a contraption ever being turned out in Russia owing to lack of +raw material and to manufacturing difficulties, even supposing +drawings and all the rest of it to be available. There were secrets in +connection with the internals of a tank which must be zealously +guarded. Under the circumstances, I suggested to the General Staff, +when putting forward a request on behalf of the Commission for the +paper stuff, that faked drawings and details should be furnished to +keep the Russians quiet. This was done; but what was furnished would +not have bluffed a novice in a select seminary for young ladies of +weak intellect. So I sent the rubbish off to General Poole (who was +representing this country out there in connection with the munitions +that were arriving), telling him the facts of the case and leaving him +to do as he thought fit. I was thus able to say, when pressed by +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page300" name="page300"></a>(p. 300)</span> the Commission, that this valuable documentary material had +already been sent straight to Poole. No doubt he put it all in the +wastepaper-basket. Sir A. Stern mentions in his book that he deemed it +expedient to hand over a "child's drawing and incorrect details." It +is satisfactory to find that he thought of adopting the exact course +which I had proposed when originally putting forward the request on +behalf of the Russians.</p> + +<p>That reminds me of a droll incident that occurred in connection with a +Russian delegate quite early in the war. We had no clear understanding +with our Allies at that date with regard to the allocation of material +between us, nor as to the imperative necessity of preventing anything +in the shape of competition in the British markets amongst us +partners. The War Office had a certain article in mind that was being +produced somewhere up north—at Manchester, I think, but anyway we +will call it Manchester. The Russians happened to be after the same +thing, and, without our knowing it, one of their officers who was in +this country was about to enter into negotiations with the people up +north with a view to securing it, and in due course he proceeded to +Manchester with the purchase in view. But he was of an inquisitive +disposition; he managed to get into some place or other to which he +did not possess the entrée. So, being a foreigner, he was promptly run +in, and he spent about twenty-four hours incarcerated in some lock-up +before he could establish his credentials. During that very +twenty-four hours a representative of the War Office appeared in +Manchester and snapped up what the captive was after.</p> + +<p>The Russian Military Attaché came to the War Office to enter a strong +protest at the outrage of which his brother officer had been the +victim. He evidently meant to kick up no end of a row, and he had just +got into his stride and was going strong and well, when he suddenly +went off into a tempest of giggles. He saw the humour of the +situation. He was fully persuaded that we had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page301" name="page301"></a>(p. 301)</span> deliberately +arrested his friend so as to get him out of the way while we managed +to push the deal through ourselves, and he evidently gave us +gratifying credit for being so wide-awake. It was not the slightest +use our explaining that this was one of those coincidences in real +life which are stranger than fiction, that we had been wholly unaware +that the Russian officer was even thinking about the article that we +had secured, that we knew nothing whatever about him or his +adventures. The Military Attaché was politeness itself; but he +evidently did not believe a word we said—who, under the +circumstances, would? Still, we had come out top-dog in the business, +so we left it at that.</p> + +<p>It must not be supposed that things never went wrong in spite of the +elaborate system that we were adopting for transferring war material +to Archangel under our control. Late in the autumn of 1916 I extracted +out of von Donop a 9.2-inch howitzer and mounting all complete—he did +not part readily with his goods—so as to send them on ahead and to +afford the Russians an opportunity of learning the points of this +ordnance, in anticipation of the arrival of a regular consignment of +the weapons which had been promised for a later date. But part of the +concern somehow found its way into one ship and the rest of it into +another ship, and one of the ships managed to get rid of her propeller +in the North Sea, drifted aimlessly for a whole month, was believed to +have foundered, and was eventually discovered and towed ignominiously +back to one of our northern ports. She was lucky not to meet with a +U-boat during her wanderings. The result was that the Russians +received either a howitzer and no mounting or a mounting and no +howitzer, I forget which, and the whole bag of tricks was not +assembled at its destination until after part of the regular +consignment of 9.2-inch howitzers had arrived in Petrograd about +April.</p> + +<p>In connection with this business of shipping goods to our eastern +Ally, it should be mentioned that the sealing up of the port of +Archangel and of the White Sea in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page302" name="page302"></a>(p. 302)</span> general from about +mid-November until well on in May—the exact period varied in +different seasons, and depended to some extent upon the direction of +the wind—complicated the problem. Some forty of our ships had been +embedded in ice for months in these waters in the winter of 1915-16, +and the Admiralty were taking no risks this time. It was not a +question merely of getting a vessel to its destination, but also a +question of getting her discharged and out of the trap before it +snapped-to. That a railway had not been constructed to Murmansk years +before, illustrates the torpor and lack of enterprise of the ruling +classes in Russia. Although Archangel is icebound somewhat longer, the +Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia likewise become impassable for navigation +during the winter; so that for some months of the year maritime +communication between northern portions of the empire and the outer +world was almost necessarily to a great extent cut off. And yet all +the time there existed a fine natural harbour of great extent on the +Arctic coast which was never frozen over, simply asking to be made use +of. Not until a state of affairs, which ought to have been foreseen, +arose in actual war—the Baltic and exit from the Black Sea barred by +hostile belligerents—was anything done. A British company was trying +hard to obtain powers to construct a railway to Murmansk at the time +of the outbreak of hostilities; but a line was not completed till more +than two years had elapsed and was then of the most ramshackle +character.</p> + +<p>It was not only from the United Kingdom and from France that war +material and other goods were being conveyed by sea to Russia, but +also from America; and it was infinitely preferable for these latter +to take the easterly route to the northern ports of the empire, than +for them to take the westerly route across the Pacific to Vladivostok, +involving a subsequent journey of thousands of miles along a railway +that was very deficient in rolling stock. Matters in connection with +Lord Kitchener's contracts in the United States were in the hands of +Messrs. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page303" name="page303"></a>(p. 303)</span> Morgan on the farther side of the Atlantic, with a +Russo-British Commission on the spot watching developments. +Responsibilities in connection with the transactions in this country +had come under charge of the Ministry of Munitions. My branch noted +progress, kept the General Staff informed, and represented the War +Office in connection with the subject when questions arose. Experience +of these huge American contracts fully bore out what had occurred at +home in connection with the expansion of munitions production on the +part of the War Office after the outbreak of war—only in a somewhat +exaggerated form. Whereas in this country output began to intensify +rapidly within twelve months and the credit was appropriated by Mr. +Lloyd George, owing to intensification for which the War Office was +solely responsible taking place after the setting up of the Munitions +Ministry, output only began really to sprout in the United States +about sixteen months after the start. All, however (as already +mentioned in the last chapter), was full of promise when the crash of +the Revolution came to nullify what had been achieved.</p> + +<p>Up to the date of that disastrous event, and even for a few weeks +subsequently, one did one's best to accelerate the supply and the +despatch of war material from this country to Archangel and, after the +closing of that great port by ice, Murmansk, which was just beginning +to serve as an avenue into the country owing to the completion—after +a fashion—of its unstable railway. The Milner Mission had been as +profuse in its pledges as it had been erratic in its anticipations, +and had committed itself to somewhat comprehensive engagements in +connection with the furnishing of further war material. So that, +almost synchronizing with the downfall of the Romanoff dynasty and the +setting up of a new regime, this country found itself let in for +diverting munitions of all sorts, in addition to what had already been +promised, to an Ally in whom trust could no longer be placed. On one +occasion in the course of the winter I had defeated the combined +forces <span class="pagenum"><a id="page304" name="page304"></a>(p. 304)</span> of Sir W. Robertson and the Master-General of the +Ordnance before the War Cabinet over the question of deflecting a few +howitzers to Russia. But one's point of view underwent a +transformation subsequent to the dire events of March in Petrograd. So +far from pushing the claims of the revolutionary government for war +material, it then seemed expedient to act as a drag on the wheel, and +to take the side of the C.I.G.S. and General Furse when Lord Milner +from time to time pressed the question of sending out armament. The +War Office deprecated depriving our own troops of munitions for the +sake of trying to bolster up armies that were disintegrating apace +owing to the action of Kerensky and his like. It was very +disappointing—apart from the threatening political situation, +prospects had seemed so good in Russia. But all the endeavours that +had been made to assist during the previous few months were evidently +going to be to no purpose. Just when the despatch of what our Ally +required had been got on a thoroughly sound footing, the organization +was to prove of no avail.</p> + +<p>Still, there was always Roumania to be thought of, even if the problem +of getting goods through to that country in face of the chaos which +was rapidly making way in Russia was almost becoming insoluble. The +French, like ourselves, were most anxious to afford succour to that +stricken kingdom. Amongst other things, they requested us to send off +to Moldavia a certain consignment (thirty, I think it was) of 6-inch +howitzers, which M. Thomas declared Mr. Lloyd George had promised him +for the French army. But the worst of it was, there was a difference +of opinion in regard to this reputed undertaking. The stories of these +two eminent public servants clashed in a very important particular, +for our man strenuously denied ever having committed himself to the +alleged engagement. On only one point, indeed, were the pair in full +agreement, and this was that the discussion in connection with the +matter had taken place after luncheon.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page305" name="page305"></a>(p. 305)</span> Bearing in mind Mr. Lloyd George's irrepressible passion for +pleasing, and taking the fact into account that generosity with what +belongs to somebody else is in the United Kingdom recognized as the +masterstroke of Radical statesmanship, there did seem to be just a +last possibility of M. Thomas having right on his side. Still, +expansiveness, fantasy and oblivion serve for epilogue to a grateful +midday meal, and, when all is said and done, possession is nine points +of the law—we had the howitzers, so it was for the other party to get +them out of us. But we should, no doubt, have sent them out to our +Roumanian friends in due course had it not become virtually +impracticable to get such goods through from the North Russian ports +by the date that the subject came up for final decision.</p> + +<p>It has to be confessed that all of our Continental Allies were not +quite so well disciplined in the matter of procuring goods in this +country as were the Russians. As time went on and raw material and +manufactured commodities began to run short in the United Kingdom, +<span lang="fr"><i>tracasseries</i></span> would from time to time arise in connection with +certain rules which had been laid down in the interests of us all. The +delegations manifested a highly inconvenient bent for purchasing in +the open market, which did not by any means suit our book, as such +procedure tended to run up prices and to disturb equilibrium. The +trade, moreover, was ready enough to meet them, and occasionally to +let them have goods more quickly and even cheaper than they could be +procured through the authorized channels. A firm attitude had to be +taken up in regard to this, even if it led to some misunderstandings. +In the case of one of our pals (who shall be nameless) it was like +fly-fishing for oysters on the Horse Guards Parade to try to extract +receipts for goods received; an embargo had, indeed, to be placed on +further issues until overdue receipts were handed in.</p> + +<p>But the United States representatives were always particularly +considerate and helpful. When they came to be dealing with us on at +least as great a scale as any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page306" name="page306"></a>(p. 306)</span> other Ally, their delegates +appreciated the position that this country was in, and they took full +cognizance of the risks that we were incurring of running out of vital +commodities altogether unless disposal of these was kept under rigid +control. They always fell in readily with our requirements, +inconvenient as some of these may have proved. Still, all our friends +were alike in one respect—they were all of them intent upon getting +their full money's worth. As a pillar of literary culture in khaki, +indeed, remarked to me in this connection; "They must, like Fagin in +the 'Merchant of Venice,' have their pound of flesh." Such +difficulties as arose could generally be smoothed over by personal +intercourse, and the head of the Commission Internationale de +Ravitaillement could charm the most unruly member of his flock to eat +out of his hand by dint of tact and kindness.</p> + +<p>It was just at the time when I was acting as D.C.I.G.S. in the summer +of 1917 that the French suddenly wired over to the War Office to +request us to send representatives to Paris to discuss with them what +we were prepared to let Greece have, now that the Hellenes had come +down off the fence and were going to afford active assistance to the +Allies in the Balkans, but stood in need of equipment and of supplies +of all kinds. Had I been free at the time, I should have proposed to +go even though our new friends wanted clothing, personal equipment, +transport, animals and food—goods with which my branch had nothing to +do—rather than munitions. As it was, a couple of senior officers went +over who had no proper authority to act, and who hardly knew the +ropes. The Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement was forgotten +altogether, and as for the poor dear old Treasury, not only was that +Department of State treated with scorn, but the Lords Commissioners +were not even informed, when our delegates were retrieved from the Gay +City, that a casual sort of agreement, which <span lang="la"><i>inter alia</i></span> involved +appreciable financial obligations, had been entered into with our +friends on the other side of the Channel. No <span class="pagenum"><a id="page307" name="page307"></a>(p. 307)</span> determinate +Convention of any kind or sort was drawn up or signed, what had been +provisionally promised remained for a long time in a condition of +ambiguity, and the transaction as a whole cannot be claimed as one of +the cardinal achievements of the War Office during the course of the +four years' conflict.</p> + +<p>The French undertook to find almost all the requisite armament; that +we did not mean to find any was about the only point that was clearly +laid down during the Paris negotiations, although this was altered +later. My branch was therefore little concerned in the business until, +as has been mentioned on <a href="#page216">p. 216</a>, the dilemma that various departments +were in over the affair was thrust before the War Cabinet, and steps +were taken to get something done. Even then, it took some weeks before +we arrived at a clear understanding with the French and the Greeks as +to what exactly we were going to provide, and before a proper +Convention was tabled. Much time was therefore wasted, and time must +not be wasted in time of war.</p> + +<p>Then, when it had at last been established what goods this country was +to provide, there was fresh and almost unaccountable dilatoriness in +certain quarters in furnishing important commodities, although the +military departments of the War Office grappled with their side of the +problem and overcame serious difficulties with commendable despatch. +General R. Reade had been sent out to Athens to look after things at +that end, and he with his assistants kept us fully informed of +requirements and of progress; but he had to put up with a +procrastination at this end which was unquestionably preventible. One +has to face uphill jobs from time to time in the army; but in +thirty-six years of active service I never wrestled with so uphill a +job as that of trying, in the year of grace 1918, to get our share of +the fitting out of the Hellenic forces fulfilled. The only thing to be +said is that the French, who had easier problems to contend with and +less to do than we had, were almost equally behindhand. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page308" name="page308"></a>(p. 308)</span> But +the result of it all was that, of the 200,000 troops whom, entirely +apart from reserves, the Greek Government were prepared to mass on the +fighting front if only they could be fitted out, barely half were +actually in the field when (fortunately for those who were responsible +for mismanaging the despatch of the requisite supplies from this +country and from France) the Bulgarians realized that the game of the +Central Powers was up, and they virtually threw up the sponge.</p> + +<p>In so far as Serbia was concerned, a detailed Convention had been +drawn up with the French in 1916, clearly indicating what the two +respective Governments were to furnish for the service of Prince +Alexander's war-worn troops. Under the terms of this agreement, we +were concerned chiefly with the question of food and forage; but we +also, needless to say, provided the bulk of the shipping on which the +Serbian contingents depended for their existence. They, as it +happened, came to be none too well equipped, and it was a pity perhaps +that we had not undertaken somewhat heavier obligations in connection +with these sorely tried Allies of ours and thereby ensured their being +properly clothed. A fresh Convention was drawn up in London in +September 1918, under which we accepted somewhat increased +responsibilities, and Brigadier-General the Hon. C. G. Fortescue was +sent out to look after matters in Macedonia in the Serbian interest. +The end came, however, before the arrangements made could exercise any +appreciable effect during the actual fighting; but I believe that good +work has been done since that date.</p> + +<p>Considering the exceedingly burdensome character of our liabilities in +connection with maintaining the associated forces of the Entente in +Macedonia for the space of three years—for practical purposes we had +to find pretty well all the food, and we had, moreover, to get the +food (and almost everything else) to Salonika in our ships, which paid +heavy toll to enemy submarines during the process—it was a faulty +arrangement that the chief command out there was not reposed in +British hands. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page309" name="page309"></a>(p. 309)</span> To press for it would have been awkward, +seeing that the chief command in the Dardanelles operations that had +proved so abortive had rested with us; and it was, moreover, perfectly +well known in Paris that the military authorities in this country +looked askance at the whole business and that our Government +entertained doubts on the subject. Had the operations been conducted +by a British commander-in-chief they might not have been attended by +greater success than they actually were, but, considering the strength +of the mixed forces which remained locked up so long in this barren +field of endeavour, they could hardly have proved less effective than +they actually were for nearly three years.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page310" name="page310"></a>(p. 310)</span> CHAPTER XVII</h3> + +<h5>THE PRESS</h5> + +<p class="resume">The constant newspaper attacks upon the War Office — Often arise + from misunderstandings or sheer ignorance — The mistake made with + regard to war correspondents at the start — The pre-war intentions + of the General Staff — How they were set on one + side — Inconvenience of this from the War Office point of view — A + breach of faith — The mischievous optimism of newspapers in the + early days — Tendency of the military authorities to conceal bad + news — Experts at fault in the Press — Tendency to take the Press + too seriously in this country — Some of its blunders during the + war — A proposal to put German officer prisoners on board + transports as a protection — A silly mistake over the promotion of + general-officers — Why were tanks not adopted before the war! — A + paean about Sukhomlinoff — A gross misstatement — Temporary + officers and high positions in the field — A suggestion that the + Press should censor itself in time of war — Its absurdity — The + Press Bureau — Some of its mistakes — Information allowed to appear + which should have been censored — Difficulties of the censors — The + case of the shell shortage — Difficulty of laying down rules for + the guidance of the censors — The Press and the air-raids — A + newspaper proprietor placed at the head of the Air Service — The + result — The question of announcing names of units that have + distinguished themselves — Conclusion.</p> + +<p class="p2">It is inevitable, perhaps, that a rather time-honoured War Office +hand—thirteen years of it, covering different periods between 1887 +and 1918—should entertain somewhat mixed feelings with regard to the +Press. As long as I can remember, practically, the War Office has +provided a sort of Aunt Sally for the young men of Fleet Street to +take cock-shies at when they can think of nothing else to edify their +readers with, and uncommonly bad shots a good many of them have made. +Assessment at the hands of the newspaper world confronts every public +department. Nor can this in principle be objected <span class="pagenum"><a id="page311" name="page311"></a>(p. 311)</span> to; +healthy, well-informed criticism is both helpful and stimulating. But +although many of the attacks delivered upon the War Office by the +Fourth Estate, in the course of that perpetual guerilla warfare which +is carried on by journalism in general against the central +administration of the army, have been fully warranted, the fact +remains that no small proportion of them has been based upon +misapprehension, and that a good many of them can be put down to pure +ignorance. Never has this been more apparent than during the progress +of the Great War. But a reason for this suggests itself at once; many +newspapers, no doubt, for the time being lost the services of members +of their staff who possessed some qualification for expatiating upon +military questions.</p> + +<p>It has to be acknowledged that the Press was badly treated by the War +Office and G.H.Q. at the outset. This circumstance may have +contributed towards setting up relations during the contest between us +in Whitehall and the world of journalism which were not always too +cordial. The question of correspondents in the war zone naturally +cropped up at a very early stage, and the decision arrived at, for +better or for worse, was that none of them were to go. The wisdom of +the attitude taken up by the military authorities in this matter is a +question of opinion; but my view was, and still is, that the +newspapers were treated injudiciously and that the decision was wrong. +I was, indeed, placed in the uncomfortable position of administering a +policy which I disliked, and which I believed to be entirely mistaken. +It, moreover, practically amounted to a breach of faith.</p> + +<p>The General Staff had for some years prior to 1914 always intended +that a reasonable number of correspondents should proceed to the front +under official aegis on the outbreak of a European war. A regular +organization for the purpose actually took shape automatically within +the War Office, in concert with the Press, on mobilization. A small +staff, under charge of a staff-officer who had been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page312" name="page312"></a>(p. 312)</span> +especially designated for the job two or three years before, with +clerks, cars, and so on, came into being <i>pari passu</i> with G.H.Q. of +the Expeditionary Force on the historic 5th of August. The officer, +Major A. G. Stuart, a man of attractive personality and forceful +character, master of his profession and an ideal holder of the post, +had been in control of the Press representatives at Army Manœuvres +in 1912 and 1913, and he was therefore personally acquainted with the +gentlemen chosen to take the field. (He was unfortunately killed while +serving on the staff in France, in the winter of 1915-16.) The General +Staff had, moreover, gone out of their way to impress upon +correspondents at manœuvres that they ought to regard the +operations in the light of instruction for themselves in duties which +they would be performing in the event of actual hostilities. They were +given confidential information with regard to the programme on the +understanding that they would keep it to themselves, and they always +played the game.</p> + +<p>But when war came, all this went by the board. Leave for +correspondents to go to the front, whether under official auspices or +any other way, was refused, and the staff and the clerks and the cars +abode idle in London under my wing. The Press world accepted this +development philosophically for the opening two or three weeks, +realizing that the moment when the Expeditionary Force was being +spirited over to France was no time for visitors in the war zone. But +after that the Fourth Estate became decidedly restive. Enterprising +reporters proceeded to the theatre of war without permission, while +experienced journalists, deluded by past promises, remained patiently +behind hoping for the best. The old hounds, in fact, were kept in the +kennel, while the young entry ran riot with no hunt servants to rate +them. Some unauthorized representatives of the British Press were, it +is true, arrested by the French, and had the French dealt with them in +vertebrate fashion—decapitated them or sent them to the Devil's +Island—we should have known where we were. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page313" name="page313"></a>(p. 313)</span> But as the +culprits were simply dismissed with a caution the situation became +ridiculous, because no newspaper man bothers about marching to a +dungeon with gyves upon his wrists and tarrying there for some hours +without sustenance. It is part of the game. So the military +authorities were openly flouted.</p> + +<p>One result of the abrupt change of policy also was that, instead of +the supervision of messages emanating from the front falling upon +officers at G.H.Q. who were in a position to wrestle with them to good +purpose, this task devolved upon the Press Bureau in London, which +naturally could not perform the office nearly so well and which was, +moreover, smothered under folios of journalistic matter originating in +quarters other than the theatre of war. Furthermore, editors and +managers and proprietors of our more prominent organs considered that +we had broken our engagements—as, indeed, we had. At the very fall of +the flag, the Press of the country was in my opinion gratuitously +fitted out with a legitimate grievance. This could not but react +hurtfully from that time forward upon the relations between the +military authorities and British journalism as a whole.</p> + +<p>There was one direction in which the Fourth Estate did serious +mischief in the early days of the war. As being behind the scenes +during those strenuous, apprehensive months, when the process of +transforming the United Kingdom into a great military nation at the +very time when the enemy was in the gate was making none too rapid +progress, I have no hesitation in asserting that one of the principal +obstacles in the way was the excessive optimism of our Press. Every +trifling success won by, or credited to, the Allies was hailed as a +transcendent triumph and was placarded on misleading posters. When +mishaps occurred—as they too often did—their seriousness was +whittled down or ignored. The public took their cue only too readily +from the newspapers, and the consequence was that a check was placed +alike on recruiting and on the production of the war material +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page314" name="page314"></a>(p. 314)</span> which was urgently required for such troops as we could +place in the field.</p> + +<p>And yet, journalists could plead in excuse that they were in some +measure following a lead set by the authorities. It has already been +admitted in Chapter II. that a system of official secretiveness in +connection with reverses was adopted, and that it did no good. This +took the form of concealing, or at any rate minimizing, sets-back when +these occurred—an entirely new attitude for soldiers in this country +to take up, and one which was to be deprecated. We should never have +gathered together those swarms of volunteers in South Africa in 1900, +volunteers drawn from the United Kingdom and from the Dominions and +from the Colonies, had Stormberg and Magersfontein and Colenso been +artistically camouflaged. The facts were blurted out. The Empire rose +to the occasion. Hiding the truth in 1914-15 was a blunder from every +point of view, because there never was the slightest fear of the +people of this country losing heart. No doubt the incorporation of +ordinances directed against the propagation of alarmist reports +calculated to cause despondency, as part of the Defence of the Realm +Act, was necessary. But one at times positively welcomed the +appearance of well-informed jeremiads in the newspapers, as an +antidote to the exultant cackle which was hindering a genuine, +comprehensive, universal mobilization of our national resources in men +and material.</p> + +<p>This excessive optimism which did so much harm was, it should be +observed, to some extent the handiwork of "experts" whose names +carried a certain amount of weight, who turned out several columns of +comment weekly, and whose opinions would have been well enough worth +having had they been better acquainted with the actual facts. For one +thing, they did not realize that the augmentation of our military +forces was hampered by the virtual impossibility of synchronizing +development in output of equipment and munitions with the expansion +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page315" name="page315"></a>(p. 315)</span> of numbers in the ranks. They were, moreover, entirely +unaware of the unfortunate condition of the Russian armies in respect +to war material; they imagined that those hosts were far larger +numerically than the insufficiency of armament permitted, and they +consequently greatly overrated the potentialities of our eastern Ally +in the conflict. To such an extent, indeed, was one of them +unintentionally deceiving his readers as to the position of affairs in +that quarter that I wrote to him privately giving him an inkling of +the situation; he gave that side of Europe a wide berth for a long +time afterwards.</p> + +<p>The mischief done in this matter rather influenced one against the +Press, and perhaps made one all the more ready to take cognizance of +its blunders and to accept its criticisms (when these were +ill-informed) in bad part. Are we not, however, in any case rather +disposed to take our journals too seriously, and is not one result of +this that we have the Press that we deserve? Public men have to treat +the journalistic world with respect, or it will undo them; but that +does not apply to mere ordinary people. Yet we all bow the knee before +it, submissively accept it at its own valuation, and consequently it +fools us to the top of our bent. We believe what we see stated in our +paper as a matter of course, unless we happen by some accident to know +that the statement is totally contrary to the actual fact. The Fourth +Estate is exalted into an acknowledged autocrat because it is allowed +to have things all its own way; and your autocrat, whether he be a +trade union official or he be a sceptred potentate or he be the +President of a republic saddled with a paradoxical constitution, is an +anachronism in principle and is apt to be a curse in practice.</p> + +<p>Autocracy is particularly to be deprecated in the case of the Press, +seeing that here we have what is in reality the most widespread trade +union in the country. Journalism harbours its internal squabbles and +jealousies, no doubt, just as is the case with most great +associations; but, assail it from without, and it closes up its ranks +as a nation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page316" name="page316"></a>(p. 316)</span> rent with faction will on threat from some +foreign foe. It is generally acknowledged that in political life a +formidable opposition in the legislature renders the government of the +day all the more efficient. But the Press, in what may be called its +corporate capacity, is not disciplined nor stimulated by any organized +opposition at all, and the consequence is that it has perhaps got just +a little too big for its boots. Judged by results in respect to its +handling of military questions during the Great War, the Fourth Estate +has not (taken as a whole, and lumping together journals of the meaner +class with the representative organs which have great financial +resources to refresh them) proved itself quite so efficient an +institution as its protagonists claim it to be.</p> + +<p>Before the war, one was disposed to accept as gospel the pontifical +utterances of newspapers concerning matters with which one was +unacquainted—the law, say, or economics, or art. But never again! +Journalists on occasion gave themselves away too badly during those +years over warlike operations, army organization, and so forth, for +one to let oneself be bluffed in future. Given the leisure, the +inclination, and the necessary access to a large number of the organs +of the Press, a libraryful of scrap-books could have been got +together, replete with gaffes and absurdities seriously and solemnly +set out in print. One or two examples of such blunders may be given +for purposes of illustration.</p> + +<p>After a shameful U-boat outrage committed on a hospital ship, a London +morning paper actually urged, in its first leader, that half a dozen +German officers should be "sent to sea in every hospital ship <i>and in +every transport</i>" (the italics are mine). Here was a case of an editor +(surely editors read through the leaders which are supposed to give +the considered opinion of the journal of which they are in charge) +deliberately proposing that this country should play as dirty a trick +as any Boche was ever guilty of. A belligerent has a perfect right to +sink a transport in time of war, just as he has a perfect right to +bomb a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page317" name="page317"></a>(p. 317)</span> train full of enemy troops. The Japanese sank a +Chinese transport at the outbreak of the war of 1894 in the Far East, +causing serious loss of life; the vessel was conveying troops from +Wei-hai-wei to the Korean coast. According to this newspaper, a +hostile attack upon the flotilla of vessels of various sorts and kinds +which conveyed our Expeditionary Force to France would have been as +much an act of treachery and a breach of the customs of war, as would +an attack upon the vessels covered by the Red Cross which brought the +wounded back.</p> + +<p>An Army Order in April 1918, again, laid down that promotion to the +rank of general would in future be by selection, not by seniority. A +number of newspapers of quite good standing thereupon promptly tumbled +head over heels into a pitfall entirely of their own creation. They +started an attack upon the War Office for not having recognized the +principle of advancement in the higher grades of the army by merit +sooner, having failed to notice that the Army Order concerned the +question of promotion to the rank of full general. Of their own +accord, and quite gratuitously, they exposed their ignorance of the +fact that promotions to the ranks of brigadier-general, major-general +and lieutenant-general had been effected by selection for several +years previously; and they also exposed their ignorance of the fact +that, up till the time of the Great War, there had never been any +special importance attached to the rank of full general. In the South +African War, when we had a far larger military force on active service +than ever previously in our history, only three general officers of +higher rank than lieutenant-general were employed—Lord Roberts, Sir +R. Buller, and Lord Kitchener—and, although all three were in the +field together, Lord Roberts was a field-marshal; when, later, Lord +Kitchener was in supreme command he had no full general under him.</p> + +<p>The Great War produced an entirely new condition of things, because we +then came to have operating in the field, not merely one army but +several armies, each <span class="pagenum"><a id="page318" name="page318"></a>(p. 318)</span> consisting of several army corps, and +each of those army corps commanded by a lieutenant-general. It was +therefore convenient that the armies should be commanded by full +generals, and the rank of full general suddenly assumed a real instead +of merely a nominal importance. It thus became necessary to effect +promotion to full general by selection instead of by seniority. Nobody +expects editors to know details of this kind; but it surely is their +duty to investigate before starting on a crusade. In the case of +people who knew the facts, this particular blunder merely made the +newspapers that committed it look ridiculous; but the majority of +those who read the drivel in all probability had no idea of the facts, +and were led to imagine that promotions to the various ranks of +general officer had hitherto all been a matter of seniority. It is an +example of the way in which the public have been misled about the War +Office by the Press for years past.</p> + +<p>A year or so after the Armistice, one of the London evening papers, +when criticizing the disinclination of the War Office to adopt new +ideas in respect to devices for use in the field (a fair enough +subject of discussion in itself), gave itself away by complaining that +"tanks were not adopted before the war"! In that case the absurdity +was so obvious that its effect upon most readers of the article +probably was to make them regard the whole of it as rubbish, which was +not correct. One wonders whether the following passage, which appeared +in the very early days of the war in one of our foremost newspapers, +may not have had something to do with that entirely unwarranted +confidence in the "steam-roller" on the Eastern Front which prevailed +in England between August 1914 and May 1915: "I refer to General +Sukhomlinoff, the Russian Kitchener, who is reorganizing the Russian +armies. Thanks to him, the Tsar's armies are irreproachably equipped." +Compare <a href="#page283">p. 283</a>.</p> + +<p>An article appeared in a leading Sunday newspaper in the spring of +1919, signalized by this amazing travesty <span class="pagenum"><a id="page319" name="page319"></a>(p. 319)</span> of the actual +facts. In a reference to our land forces of the early days of the +struggle, the writer spoke of "armies sent to war lacking almost every +modern requisite." Now, the Press generally manages to avoid grossly +false statements of that kind when referring to individuals; if it +does fall into such an error, the sequel is either an abject apology +or else an uphill fight in the law courts followed by the payment of +heavy damages. It is quite conceivable that the author of this +unpardonable misrepresentation imagined himself to be telling the +truth and that he erred out of sheer ignorance; but, if so, that +merely serves to indicate how badly informed journalists often are of +the matters which they are dealing with, when the question at issue +happens to concern military subjects.</p> + +<p>The expediency of affording greater opportunities to that great body +of temporary officers who had joined up (many of them men of marked +ability and advanced education), for occupying superior positions on +the staff or for holding high command, was taken up warmly by a number +of newspapers at the beginning of 1918. It is not proposed to discuss +the theme on its merits—there was a good deal to be said for the +contention. The matter is merely referred to because of the manner in +which it was handled by the organs that were pressing it upon the +notice of the public. Reference was very properly made to brains. But +not one word was said about knowledge. Now, brains without knowledge +may make an efficient Pressman—one is sometimes tempted to assume +that the battalions of journalism are to some extent recruited from +this source of supply. But brains without knowledge will no more make +a superior staff officer who can be trusted, nor a commander of troops +of all arms who will be able to make the most of them in face of the +enemy, than will they make a successful physician or a proficient +electrical engineer. It was also completely overlooked by the +propagandists of this particular stunt that the experience which on +every <span class="pagenum"><a id="page320" name="page320"></a>(p. 320)</span> front, other than the Mesopotamian, temporary officers +had been gaining was for practical purposes confined to trench +warfare, and that, if a decision was ever going to be reached at all, +it would be brought about under profoundly different tactical +conditions from those which had been prevailing. The whole question +hinged upon whether the requisite knowledge could be acquired, and +upon what steps would be necessary to bring that desirable result +about. The writers who dealt with the point perhaps recognized that +brains were merely a means to the end, and not the end. But if they +did, why did they fail ever even to mention the pinion upon which the +whole question in reality hinged?</p> + +<p>Journalists, when complaining of the censorship, have put forward the +suggestion that this sort of thing ought to be left to the patriotism +and honour of newspapers, that, if such a plan were adopted, the Press +would of its own accord refrain from publishing any information that +might be of value to the enemy in time of war, and that there would +then be no need for any special official department dealing with this +matter. That sounds plausible, but it will not stand examination for a +moment. Granted that the great majority of editors and their staffs +would never dream of wittingly disclosing information injurious to +their country during hostilities, the fact remains that a chain is no +stronger than its weakest link. If one journal, in its eagerness to +attract, prints what ought to have been kept secret, the reticence of +the remainder is of no avail. Nor is this merely a question of honour +and patriotism. It is also a question of competence. Censorship +responsibilities demand knowledge and call for certain qualifications +which the personnel of the Press in general does not possess. A few +editors, no doubt, could be trusted to do the work efficiently; but +that claim to omniscience which is unobtrusively, but none the less +insistently, put forward by the Fourth Estate has no solid foundation. +One of the lessons of the Great War has been that censorship is an +extremely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page321" name="page321"></a>(p. 321)</span> difficult operation to carry out even when in the +hands of individuals well versed in the conditions that arise in times +of national emergency. The idea that the Press could censor itself is +ridiculous. That such a theory should ever have been put forward +argues a strange inability to understand the essentials of the +subject, and sets up a doctrine of infallibility in the world of +journalism for which there is no justification.</p> + +<p>The Press Bureau which was established at the commencement of the war +was a civil department, entirely independent of the Admiralty and the +War Office although it was in close touch with those institutions, as +also with the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade and other branches of +the Government. In so far as the War Office was concerned, the Bureau +dealt with the Operations Directorate, which was responsible for +watching the censorship of newspapers in general, just as it was +responsible for actually controlling the censorship of cables and +foreign correspondence. As the primary <span lang="fr"><i>raison d'être</i></span> of newspapers +is to provide their readers with news, it was inevitable that +restrictions placed upon publication of information, however necessary +they might be in the interest of the State, would hamper the +activities of those in charge and be regarded as a nuisance. It was +natural that the Press should chafe at the restraint and should be +disposed to exaggerate the inconvenience to which it was put. But the +public, it must be remembered, have heard only one side of the story. +The country has derived its information concerning the Press +censorship from the Press itself—in other words, from what is to all +intents and purposes a tainted source. The nation has had to decide on +a subject of general interest on one-sided evidence.</p> + +<p>In so far as the military share of the Press censorship was concerned, +some of the groans of its victims were, no doubt, well justified. +Delays were inevitable. But cases of unnecessary delay no doubt +occurred. Instances could be mentioned of one censor sanctioning the +publication <span class="pagenum"><a id="page322" name="page322"></a>(p. 322)</span> of a given item of news while another forbade +mention thereof. It is human to err, and individual censors were +guilty of errors of judgment on occasion. Examples of information, +which might have been given to the world with perfect propriety, being +withheld, could easily be brought to light. How the humorists of the +Fourth Estate did gloat over "the Captains and the Kings"! There was +at least one instance early in the conflict of an official +<span lang="fr"><i>communiqué</i></span> that had been issued by the French military authorities +in Paris being bowdlerized before publication on this side of the +Channel.</p> + +<p>Few of the detractors of the military Press Censorship, on the other +hand, gave evidence of possessing more than a shadowy conception of +the difficult and delicate nature of the duties which that institution +was called upon to carry out. There is little evidence to indicate +that the critics had the slightest idea of the value of the services +which it performed. Nor would they appear to be aware that the +blunders committed by the censors, such as they were, were by no means +confined to malapert blue-pencilling of items of information that +might have appeared without disclosing anything whatever to the enemy. +As a matter of fact, cases occurred of intelligence slipping through +the meshes which ought not on any account to have been made public +property.</p> + +<p>When, for example, one particular London newspaper twice over during +the very critical opening weeks of the struggle divulged movements of +troops in France, the peccant passage was, on each occasion, found on +investigation to have been acquiesced in by a censor—lapses on the +part of overworked and weary men poring over sheaves of proof-slips +late at night. Nearly all our newspapers published a Reuter's message +which stated the exact strength of the Third Belgian Division when it +got back by sea to Ostend—not a very important piece of information, +but one that obviously ought not to have been allowed to appear. At a +somewhat later date, a journal, in reporting His Majesty's farewell +visit to the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page323" name="page323"></a>(p. 323)</span> troops, contrived to acquaint all whom it might +concern that the Twenty-eighth Division, made up of regular battalions +brought from overseas, was about to cross the Channel.</p> + +<p>It will readily be understood that incidents of this kind—those +quoted are merely samples—worried the officials charged with +supervision, and tended to make them almost over-fastidious. Soldiers +of experience, as the censors were, remembered Nelson's complaint that +his plans were disclosed by a Gibraltar print, Wellington's +remonstrances during the Peninsular War, the details as to the +siege-works before Sebastopol that were given away to the enemy by +<i>The Times</i>, and the information conveyed to the Germans by a Paris +newspaper of MacMahon's movement on Sedan. They were, moreover, aware +that indignant representations with reference to the untoward +communicativeness of certain of our prominent journals were being made +by the French and Belgians. So the Press Bureau took to sending +doubtful passages across for our decision—a procedure which +necessarily created delay and caused inconvenience to editors. +Publication, it may be mentioned, was approved in quite four cases out +of five when such references were made. One rather wondered at times, +indeed, where the difficulty came in.</p> + +<p>But a verdict was called for in one case which imposed an +uncomfortable responsibility upon me. This was when a telegram from +the Military Correspondent of <i>The Times</i> from the front, revealing +the shell shortage from which our troops were suffering, was submitted +from Printing House Square to the Press Bureau in the middle of May +1915, and was transmitted by the Press Bureau to us for adjudication. +It was about three weeks after Mr. Asquith's unfortunate reference to +this subject in his Newcastle speech. Publication of the message could +at the worst only be confirmatory to the enemy of information already +fully known, and national interests did seem to demand that the people +of the country should be made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page324" name="page324"></a>(p. 324)</span> aware how this particular +matter stood, seeing that the labour world had not yet fully risen to +its responsibilities in connection with the prosecution of the war +which depended to so great an extent upon our factories. Choice of +three alternatives presented itself to me—leave might be refused, +higher authority might be referred to, publication might be sanctioned +then and there. The third alternative was adopted, although one or two +minor details in regard to particular types of ordnance were excised. +It seems to be generally acknowledged that publication of the truth +about the shell shortage was of service to the cause; but for some of +the attacks upon the War Office to which the publication of the truth +gave rise there was no justification whatever. The attacks, indeed, +took the form of a conspiracy, which has only been exposed since +mouths that had to remain closed during the war have been opened.</p> + +<p>For the General Staff at the War Office to have formulated apposite, +hard-and-fast regulations for the guidance of the Press Bureau +covering all questions likely to arise, would, it may be observed, +have been virtually impracticable, or at all events would not have +really solved the problem. Sir S. Buckmaster, when in charge of the +Bureau, pressed me as regards this subject more than once, but there +were serious objections to hard-and-fast rules. Everything must +necessarily depend upon the interpretation placed on such ordinances +by the individuals who were to be guided by them. Thus a rigorous +enactment governing any particular type of subject, if strictly +interpreted by harassed censors, would prevent any tidings as to that +subject leaking out at all; while an indulgent enactment, if loosely +interpreted by the staff of the Bureau, might well lead to most +undesirable disclosures being made in the columns of the Press. +Censors planted down in London could not, furthermore, be kept fully +acquainted with the position of affairs at the front—a factor which +greatly aggravated the perplexities of their task. We of the General +Staff in Whitehall were <span class="pagenum"><a id="page325" name="page325"></a>(p. 325)</span> in this respect very differently +situated from G.H.Q. Over on the other side, where the situation of +our own troops and of the French and the Belgians was known from hour +to hour, newspaper representatives could always have been instructed +by the bear-leaders in charge of them as to exactly what they might, +and what they might not, touch upon in reference to any operations in +progress.</p> + +<p>Matters in connection with the air service and the anti-aircraft +service—the two things to a great extent go together—are primarily +problems for experts; but it seemed to me, as an outsider, that +certain powerful organs of the Press made themselves so great a +nuisance over the subject of air-raids at one time that they +constituted an actual danger. Ridicule was poured upon the plan of +darkening the streets of the metropolis until an attack took place; +the first Zeppelin visit put an end to that. Then, when the threat of +raids became a serious reality, the demand for retaliation was loudest +from a combination of journals which happens to be extremely well +informed, although it was almost a matter of common knowledge that +anything of the kind was impracticable at the time because we had not +got the requisite long-distance machines. It was even contended that +the physical difficulties to be overcome in an attack upon the +Westphalian cities were far less than those which an enemy faced when +flying to London from the Belgian coast, although the distance to be +traversed over territory in the antagonist's hands was three or four +times as great in the former case as in the latter. (Not one reader in +fifty will look at the atlas in a case like this and learn, at a +glance, that he is being made a fool of.) This Press campaign did +grave mischief. Dwellers in the East End, who were suffering seriously +from the raids and were almost in a condition of panic, were induced +to believe that pro-German influence in high places was at the bottom +of our failure to resort to retaliatory counter-measures.</p> + +<p>When the Prime Minister placed a newspaper proprietor <span class="pagenum"><a id="page326" name="page326"></a>(p. 326)</span> in +charge of the Air Service, he made in some respects a clever move. +Press criticism practically ceased, and what there was of it mainly +took the form of demands for a separate Ministry of Air. It would have +been far better, however, if no decision had been arrived at on this +subject until after the war was over, when the question could have +been gone into carefully, and when a newspaper man would not have been +actually in charge.</p> + +<p>It may be remarked in conclusion that, had procedure within the War +Office subsequent to mobilization more nearly followed the lines +contemplated before the war, and which were only resumed some months +later, there would probably have been less friction with the Press. +The question of the war correspondents which has been mentioned above +is a case in point. Then, again, a branch like mine which possessed an +adequate staff, had it been given a freer hand, had it been allowed +the requisite responsibility, and had it been kept better informed of +what was actually going on in respect to operations, could have +furnished newspapers with useful hints on many subjects. Take, for +instance, that incessant outcry during the first two years or so of +the war over the services of individual corps in action not being made +known. As far as I am aware, journalists were never informed that the +chief grounds for reticence in this matter arose from a simple sense +of fairness. Everybody who has had to deal with history of military +operations knows how hard it is to discover the actual facts in +connection with any tactical event, and what careful weighing of +different reports is necessary before the truth can be established. In +these days of electric communications, official reports are sent off +at very short notice and before details can possibly be known. If some +unit is especially singled out for praise, injustice is likely to have +been done; some other unit, or units, may in reality have done better +without the full story having come to hand when the report was +despatched.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page327" name="page327"></a>(p. 327)</span> In matters of this kind, the Press might advantageously have +received greater assistance from the War Office. At all events that +was so during the earlier portion of the time when the branch, which +in pre-war days had been supposed to control such subjects, was under +me, but only held restricted powers. The foregoing paragraphs have not +been intended for one moment to suggest that British journalism did +not, take it all round, behave admirably during the war. Newspapers +almost always fell in readily with the wishes of the military +authorities. On many occasions they were of the utmost assistance in +making things known which it was desirable from the military point of +view should be known. But there is no such thing as perfection in this +world, and, even supposing the Press to be conscious of certain +foibles of which it has been guilty, it can hardly be expected to +advertise them itself. So an attempt has been made in this chapter to +indicate certain directions in which it was occasionally at fault. The +most important point of all, however, is that, when journalism and +officialism happen to come into collision, the public in practice only +hears the Fourth Estate's side of the story.</p> + + + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page328" name="page328"></a>(p. 328)</span> CHAPTER XVIII</h3> + +<h5>SOME CRITICISMS, SUGGESTIONS, AND GENERALITIES</h5> + +<p class="resume">Post-war extravagance — The Office of Works lavish all + through — The Treasury — Its unpopularity in the spending + departments — The Finance Branch of the War + Office — Suggestions — The change made with regard to saluting — Red + tabs and red cap-bands — A Staff dandy in the West — The age of + general-officers — Position of the General Staff in the War + Office — The project of a Defence Ministry — No excuse for it + except with regard to the air services, and that not a sufficient + excuse — Confusion between the question of a Defence Ministry and + that of the Imperial General Staff — The time which must elapse + before newly constituted units can be fully depended upon, one of + the most important lessons of the war for the public to + realize — This proved to be the case in almost every theatre and + in the military forces of almost every + belligerent — Misapprehensions about South Africa — Improvised + units could not have done what the "Old Contemptibles" + did — Conclusion.</p> + +<p class="p2">My period of service on the active list closed a very few days before +the Armistice of the 11th of November, so that no claim can be put +forward to have formed one of that band of dug-outs who became +dug-ins, and who continued to serve their country for extended periods +with self-sacrificing devotion although the enemy was no longer in the +gate. But even in the disguises of private life a craftsman, fully +initiated into the mysteries by long practice, could appraise the +proceedings of the central administration of the Army from the +standpoint of inner knowledge, could watch its post-war proceedings +with detachment, and could note that amongst the numberless Government +institutions which took "it's never too late to spend" for their motto +after the conclusion of hostilities, the War Office was not absolutely +the most backward. Only by such formidable competitors as the +Munitions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page329" name="page329"></a>(p. 329)</span> Ministry, the Air Ministry, and, last but not +least, the Office of Works did it apparently allow itself to be +outpaced.</p> + +<p>For relative prodigality during the course of the great emergency and +after it was over, the Office of Works perhaps, upon the whole, took +precedence over all rivals. Its prodigality was, to do it justice, +tempered by extortion. Did the system of commandeering hotels and +mammoth blocks of offices create new Departments of State? Or did the +creation of new Departments of State precede the commandeering of the +hotels and blocks of offices? Were the owners and occupiers of the +blocks of offices paid for them, or were they bilked like the hotel +proprietors? We know that householders were not only paid, but that +they were in many cases preposterously overpaid. And the worst of it +was that the Office of Works was not one of those <span lang="fr"><i>parvenu</i></span> +institutions, set on foot by Men of Business, which welled up so +irrepressibly on all sides. It was not one of those <span lang="fr"><i>macédoines</i></span> of +friends of Men of Business, and of fish-out-of-water swashbucklers in +khaki, and of comatose messengers, and of incompletely dressed +representatives of the fair sex perpetually engaged in absorbing +sweets. It was an old-established portion of the structure of State. A +nomad offshoot of the War Office, such as that I was in charge of for +the last two years of the war, which after quitting the parent +building shifted its home three times within the space of twelve +months, enjoyed somewhat unusual opportunities for sizing up the +Office of Works.</p> + +<p>In the matter of numerical establishment of its personnel, one +Department of State with which I was brought a good deal into contact +during the war, the Treasury, almost seemed to go into the opposite +extreme from that which found favour in most limbs of the public +service. If the guardians of the nation's purse-strings practically +let the strings go during the early months of the contest, this may +have been due to the effervescent personality of the then Chancellor +of the Exchequer. But they took <span class="pagenum"><a id="page330" name="page330"></a>(p. 330)</span> an uncommonly long time to +recover possession of the strings. Was this in any way attributable to +insufficiency of staff in times of great pressure? There was none of +that cheery bustle within the portals of Treasury Buildings such as +prevailed in the caravanseries of Northumberland Avenue after the +Munitions Ministry had seized them; typewriters were not to be heard +clicking frantically, no bewitching flappers flitted about, the place +always seemed as uninhabited as a railway terminus when the N.U.R. +takes a holiday.</p> + +<p>The Treasury has ever, rightly or wrongly, been anathema to the +professional side of the War Office. The same sentiments would appear +to prevail amongst the sea-dogs who lurk in the Admiralty; for after +my having a slight difference of opinion with the Treasury +representative at a meeting of the War Cabinet one day, an Admiral who +happened to be present came up to me full of congratulations as we +withdrew from the battlefield. "I don't know from Adam what it was all +about," he declared, "but I longed to torpedo the blighter under the +table." But when one had direct dealings with the Treasury its +officials always were quite ready to see both sides of any question, +to take a common-sense view, and to give way if a good case could be +put to them; moreover, when they stuck their toes in and got their +ears back, they generally had some right on their side. Such feeling +of hostility as exists in the case of the War Office towards the +controllers of national expenditure housed on the farther side of +Whitehall is perhaps to some extent a result of unsatisfactory +internal administration on its own side of the street.</p> + +<p>It is the manifest duty of the Finance Branch of the War Office to +keep down expenditure where possible, to examine any new proposal +involving outlay with meticulous care and critically, and to intimate +what the effect will be in terms of pounds, shillings and pence +supposing that some new policy which is under consideration should +come to be adopted. But, once a point has been decided by the Army +Council (the Finance Branch having had its <span class="pagenum"><a id="page331" name="page331"></a>(p. 331)</span> say), that branch +should fight the War Office corner "all out," and should regard itself +as the champion, not of the Treasury but of the Department of State of +which it itself forms a part. The Treasury, it should be mentioned, is +treated entirely differently as a matter of routine from other outside +institutions. Letters to it have to emanate from the Finance Branch, +while letters to other Departments of State—the Colonial Office, say, +or the Board of Trade—can be drafted and, after signature by the +Secretary, despatched by any branch of the War Office concerned. This +rule might perhaps be modified. A regulation should also exist that +the Finance Branch must not despatch a letter to the Treasury +concerning some matter in which another branch is interested, without +that branch having been given an opportunity of concurring in the +terms of the draft.</p> + +<p>But no officials in any State Department probably were set a harder +and a more thankless task during the war than were the staff of the +Finance Branch of the War Office, and in spite of this its members +were always approachable and ready to meet one half-way in an amicable +discussion. They are also entitled to sympathy, in that the close of +hostilities in their case has probably brought them little or no +relief in respect to length of office hours and to weight of work. To +revert to normal conditions in their case will probably take years. +The grievance of the military side is that under existing conditions +the financial experts are too much in the position of autocrats, when +they happen to be recalcitrant on any point.</p> + +<p>Who can that caitiff have been who abolished the plan of the soldier +saluting with the hand away from the individual saluted? Travelling on +the Continent before the war one was struck with one point in which +our methods were superior to those abroad—in many foreign countries +private soldiers had to salute non-commissioned officers in the +streets, which must have been an intolerable nuisance to all +concerned, and in all of them the soldier <span class="pagenum"><a id="page332" name="page332"></a>(p. 332)</span> always saluted +with the right hand instead of adopting the obvious and convenient +procedure of saluting with the outer hand. There at least we showed +common sense. The Army Council were, no doubt, responsible in their +corporate capacity for abolishing the left-hand salute, but there must +have been some busybody who put them up to it. Whoever he was, I wish +that he had had to walk daily along the Strand for months (as I had) +constantly expecting to be hit in the face or to have his cap knocked +off by some well-intentioned N.C.O. or private trying to salute with +the hand next to him in a crowd. Their contortions were painful to +see. Had the War Office been guilty of such <span lang="fr"><i>bêtises</i></span> when dealing +with the things that really mattered during the struggle, they would +have lost us the war. The reform was so inconvenient to all concerned +that it may have helped to produce those untoward post-war conditions +under which the men, if not belonging to the Guards, virtually +abandoned the practice of saluting officers altogether in the streets +of London.</p> + +<p>Then, how about those red tabs? The expression "red tabs" is, however, +employed rather as a shibboleth; staff-officers must be distinguished +somehow when they are not wearing armlets, and were the tabs less +conspicuous there would be no special harm in them. It is the red band +round the cap that is so utterly inappropriate when imposed upon +service dress. It ought to have been abolished within six months of +the beginning of the war. General-officers and staff-officers who came +under fire had to adopt a khaki valance to conceal their cap-band; +they were to be seen going about in this get-up in the Metropolis when +over on duty or on leave, and yet no steps were taken officially to +assimilate their headgear to that of the ordinary officer. But for the +red band and its distinctive effect, it is open to question whether +officers performing every kind of special duty would have been so +perpetually clamouring to be allowed to wear the red tabs. The +practice of glorifying the staff-officer in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page333" name="page333"></a>(p. 333)</span> his dress as +compared with regimental officers is to be deprecated, although his +turn-out should of course be, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion—to +which I remember an exception when making first acquaintance with a +staff I had come to join.</p> + +<p>On reporting myself at headquarters at Devonport in the morning after +arriving to take up an appointment a good many years ago, I learnt +that there was to be no end of a pageant that afternoon. The British +Association, or some such body, had descended upon Plymouth for a +palaver. There was to be a review in Saltram Park on the farther side +of the Three Towns so as to make sport for the visitors. The general +was very keen on mustering as many cocked hats around him for the +performance as could be got together, and he pressed me to borrow a +horse somehow and to put in an appearance, proposing that I should +ride out with him and the A.D.C. as, being a stranger, I would not +know the way. So a crock was procured, saddlery was fished out of its +case and polished up in frantic haste, and in due course we jogged out +to the venue. On arriving in the park we found the garrison, +reinforced by a substantial Naval Brigade which had been extracted +from H.M. ships in harbour, drawn up and looking very imposing, while +people from round about had gathered in swarms and their best clothes +to witness the spectacle. As we rode on to the ground the +Assistant-Adjutant-General came cantering up. "The parade's all ready +for you, sir," he reported, "and everything's all correct—except the +Assistant-Quartermaster-General. He, sir, is <i>in rags</i>." He was.</p> + +<p>There was one broad principle, the truth of which was brought out very +clearly during the course of our British campaigns between 1914 and +1919—the principle that commanders of brigades and divisions require +to be young and active men. There were exceptions, no doubt; but the +exceptions only proved what came to be a generally accepted rule. The +old methods of promotion in the Army, methods which hinged partly on +the purchase system and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page334" name="page334"></a>(p. 334)</span> partly on the prizes of the service +going by interest and by favour, were highly objectionable; but those +methods did have the advantage that commanders in the field, whether +they turned out to be efficient or to be inefficient, were at least +fairly young in years as a rule. Wellington himself, and all his +principal subordinates other than Graham and Picton, were well under +fifty years of age at the end of the Peninsular War; Wellington was +forty-five, Beresford was forty-six, Hill was forty-two, Lowry Cole +was forty-two. Wolfe, again, and Clive, Amherst and Granby, the most +distinguished British commanders of the eighteenth century except +Marlborough, were all comparatively young men at the time when they +made their mark. It was only in the course of the long peace that +followed Waterloo that our general-officers as a body came to be well +on in life—Lord Raglan at the beginning of the Crimean War was +sixty-six, Brown was sixty-four, Cathcart was sixty—even if at a +somewhat later date a prolonged course of small wars did produce a +sufficiency of young commanders to go round for minor campaigns. It +would seem advisable to reduce the limit of age for promotion to the +grade of major-general from fifty-seven to fifty, and that for the +grade of lieutenant-general from sixty-two to fifty-seven. The great +obstacle in the way of a reform of this kind, as a rule, arises from +the fact that the decision rests to a large extent in the hands of +comparatively old officers, who do not always quite realize that they +are past the age for work in the field. That is not so much the case +now, so that it seems to be the right time to act.</p> + +<p>The position of the General Staff within the War Office appears to be +pretty well assured now. But it also appeared to be pretty well +assured before the war; and yet there were those incidents of the +non-existence of the high-explosive shell for our field artillery +which nearly all foreign field artilleries possessed, and of Colonel +Swinton's Tank projects being dealt with by a technical branch and the +General Staff never hearing of it, which have been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page335" name="page335"></a>(p. 335)</span> mentioned +in this volume. The military technicalist, be he an expert in +ballistics or in explosives or in metallurgy or in electrical +communications or in any other form of scientific knowledge, is a very +valuable member of the martial community. But he is a little inclined +to get into a groove. He stood in some need of being stirred up from +outside during the Great War, and he must learn that he is subordinate +to the General Staff.</p> + +<p>The old project of instituting a Ministry of Defence has cropped up +again, very largely owing to the importance that aeronautics have +assumed in war and to the anomalous position of affairs which the +creation of an Air Ministry has brought about. Could aviation in its +various forms be left entirely out of consideration in connection with +defence problems, no case whatever could be put forward for setting up +such a central Department of State. The relations between the sea +service and the land service are on a totally different basis now from +what they were when Lord Randolph Churchill, thirty years ago, +proposed the establishment of a Ministry which would link together the +Admiralty and the War Office, each of which was under his plan to be +controlled by a professional head. It was in many respects an +attractive scheme in those days. The departments that were +respectively administering the Royal Navy and the Army were not then +in close touch, as they are now; they badly required association in +some form or other. But it has been found possible to secure the +needed collaboration and concert between them without resorting to +heroic measures such as Lord Randolph contemplated. The sea service +and the land service generally worked in perfect harmony during the +Great War—except in the one matter of their respective air +departments. There was a certain amount of unwholesome competition +between them over aeronautical material up to the time when one single +air department was established late in 1917.</p> + +<p>Aeronautics do unquestionably constitute a difficulty, and a +difficulty which did not make itself apparent during <span class="pagenum"><a id="page336" name="page336"></a>(p. 336)</span> the +late conflict in quite the same form as it might in future wars. The +Navy and the Army must both have air services absolutely under their +control in peace and in war; but there is also, no doubt, immense +scope for independent aeronautical establishments, kept separate from +the righting forces on the sea and on land. Three more or less +distinct air services, in fact, seem to be needed, and the question of +equitable distribution of material between them at once crops up. +Supposing all three to be administered, from the supply point of view, +by an Air Ministry, this institution may show itself disposed to look +better after its own child, the independent air service, than after +its stepchildren, the naval and military air services. Were a Minister +of Defence to be set up as overlord, he could act as impartial +referee. But this one phase of our defence problems as a whole can +surely be dealt with effectively without creating an entirely new +Ministry, for the establishment of which no other good excuse can be +put forward. The problem of preventing competition and rivalry in +respect to material between the three branches of combatant +aeronautics ought not to be an insuperable one, if firmly handled.</p> + +<p>In this connection it may be observed that a certain confusion of +ideas appears to exist in some quarters between a Defence Ministry +co-ordinating naval, military and aeronautical questions, and an +Imperial General Staff concerning itself with the sea, the land and +the air. The two things are, and must always be, totally distinct. A +Defence Ministry would in the nature of things be an executive +institution. In the Empire as it is now constituted, an Imperial +General Staff can only be a consultative institution. A General Staff +in the ordinary meaning of the term is executive as well as +consultative; it issues orders with regard to certain matters, and it +administers certain military departments and branches. But so long as +the Empire comprises a number of self-governing Dominions and has no +common budget for defence purposes, the Imperial General Staff can +only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page337" name="page337"></a>(p. 337)</span> make recommendations and tender advice; it can order +nothing.</p> + +<p>Amongst the innumerable professional lessons taught by the experiences +of the Great War, there is one which professional soldiers had learnt +before it began, but which the public require to learn. This is that +newly organized troops or troops of the militia type such as our +Territorials of pre-war days, who necessarily have undergone little +training previous to the outbreak of hostilities, do not make really +effective instruments in the hands of a commander for a considerable +period after embodiment. The course of events proved, it is true, that +the individual soldier and officer can be adequately prepared for the +ordeal in a shorter space of time than had generally been believed +necessary by military men, and that they can be incorporated in drafts +for the front within a very few months of their joining the colours. +But that does not hold good with individual units. Still less does it +hold good with collections of individual units such as brigades and +divisions.</p> + +<p>The records of the New Army, of the Territorials, of the improvised +formations sent to fight by the great Dominions oversea, all go to +show that such troops need to be broken in gradually after they take +the field before they can safely be regarded as fully equal to serious +operations. Our Allies' and our enemies' experiences were similar. We +know from enemy works that, although the German "Reserve Corps" fought +gallantly during the early months, they achieved less and suffered +more heavily in casualties than would have been the case had Regular +Corps been given corresponding tasks to carry out. It was the same +with the French Territorial Divisions. The American troops proved fine +fighters from the outset, but owing to lack of experience and of +cohesion they took a considerable time before they pulled their +weight; moreover, the larger the bodies in which they fought +independently of French and British command, the more noticeable this +was.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page338" name="page338"></a>(p. 338)</span> Certain regiments hastily got together on the spot from men +who could shoot and ride and who knew the Boers and their ways, +performed most distinguished service during the South African War, so +much so, indeed, that an idea got abroad amongst civilians at that +time that the need for the elaborate and prolonged training, which +professional soldiers always insisted upon, was merely a question of +prejudice. Happily those who were responsible for our Army +organization and for its preparation for war knew better, and August +1914 proved that they were right. It was not merely due to the +stubborn grit of their personnel that the "Old Contemptibles" carried +out their retreat from Mons in face of greatly superior hostile forces +with what was in reality comparatively small loss, and that they were +ready to advance and fight again as soon as they got the word. It was +also due to rank and file and regimental officers and staff knowing +their business thoroughly. Had those five divisions been, say, New +Army divisions just arrived at the front, or divisions such as landed +under General Birdwood's orders at Anzac on the 25th of April, they +would have been swept back in hopeless confusion. They would not have +known enough about the niceties of the game to play it successfully +under such adverse conditions. The framework would not have stood the +strain.</p> + +<p>The sedentary type of operations which for three years played so big a +part in most theatres was, it must be remembered, particularly +favourable to newly created formations. Mobile warfare imposes a much +more violent test. When really active work is being carried on in the +field by partially trained troops, the platoon may do capitally, the +company fairly well, the battalion not altogether badly; but the +brigade will be all over the place, and the division will be in a +state of chaos. Whatever conditions future campaigns may bring forth, +trench warfare is unlikely to supervene immediately, nor to be brought +about until something fairly important has happened; and it will not +continue to the end unless the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page339" name="page339"></a>(p. 339)</span> result of the conflict is to +be indecisive. In 1918 there was nothing to choose between British +divisions which had had no existence in August 1914 and those which +had fought as the point of England's lance at Le Cateau, on the Marne +and on the Aisne. But wars will not always last four years. Nor will +the belligerent who has to create entirely new armies to carry on the +struggle always prove victorious in the end.</p> + + + +<h3>THE END</h3> + +<h5><i>Printed in Great Britain by</i> <span class="smcap">R. & R. Clark, Limited</span>, <i>Edinburgh</i>.</h5> + +<p><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1"></a> +<b>Footnote 1:</b> <i>Anglice</i>, bank.<a href="#footnotetag1">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2"></a> +<b>Footnote 2:</b> He brought his revolution off all right and was for a +time President of the Southern China Republic.<a href="#footnotetag2">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3"></a> +<b>Footnote 3:</b> While this volume has been in the press Sir G. Arthur's +<i>Life of Lord Kitchener</i> has appeared, giving a different version of +this story and probably the correct one. Walter Kitchener was +speaking, I think, from hearsay.<a href="#footnotetag3">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4"></a> +<b>Footnote 4:</b> A single "preliminary scheme of operations" would have +been of little service to the C.-in-C. of "Medforce"—it must have +been based on the mistaken assumption (which held good when he +started) that the fleet would force the Straits, and it would +consequently have concerned itself with undertakings totally different +from those which, in the event, Sir Ian had to carry out. If the army +was to derive any benefit from projects elaborated in the War Office, +there must have been a second "preliminary scheme of operations" based +on the assumption that the fleet was going to fail. What profit is +there in a plan of campaign that dictates procedure to be followed +after the first great clash of arms? In the case under consideration, +the first great clash of arms befell on the 18th of March, five days +after Sir Ian left London with his instructions, and it turned the +whole business upside down.<a href="#footnotetag4">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5"></a> +<b>Footnote 5:</b> The first I heard of the Tanks, which made so dramatic a +debut near the Somme a year and a half later.<a href="#footnotetag5">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6"></a> +<b>Footnote 6:</b> So late as the 21st of April 1920 <i>The Times</i> included +the following passage in a leading article: "Every gunner officer on +the Western Front during the winter of 1914-15 knows that there was a +grave and calamitous deficiency of shells, and that no satisfactory +attempt was made to rectify it until the matter was exposed in <i>The +Times</i>." Dragging in the "gunner officer" at the front (who could not +possibly tell what steps were being taken to rectify the deficiency) +does not alter the fact that this passage amounts to an accusation +that no satisfactory attempt was made to rectify the deficiency until +after the Northcliffe Press stunt. <i>The Times</i> may have been so +ill-informed as to the actual facts in 1915 as to suppose that this +was true. <i>The Times</i> cannot have been so ill-informed as to the +actual facts in 1920 as to suppose that it was true.<a href="#footnotetag6">(Back to main text)</a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7"></a> +<b>Footnote 7:</b> On the 1st July we had 23 divisions (exclusive of Indian +divisions) in the field, and one on the water. The "Expeditionary +Force" consisted of six divisions, but a vague sort of organization +for a seventh had also existed on paper.<a href="#footnotetag7">(Back to main text)</a></p> + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918, by +Charles Edward Callwell + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EXPERIENCES OF A DUG-OUT *** + +***** This file should be named 21833-h.htm or 21833-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/1/8/3/21833/ + +Produced by David Clarke, Christine P. 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