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diff --git a/24107.txt b/24107.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..457ed9d --- /dev/null +++ b/24107.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11326 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The New World of Islam, by Lothrop Stoddard + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The New World of Islam + +Author: Lothrop Stoddard + +Release Date: January 1, 2008 [EBook #24107] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM *** + + + + +Produced by Brownfox, Michael Ciesielski and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM + + BY + + LATHROP STODDARD, A.M., PH.D. (Harv.) + + AUTHOR OF: THE RISING TIDE OF COLOUR, + THE STAKES OF THE WAR, + PRESENT DAY EUROPE: ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND, + THE TRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO, ETC. + + WITH MAP + + _SECOND IMPRESSION_ + + LONDON + + CHAPMAN AND HALL, LTD. + + 1922 + PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY + RICHARD CLAY & SONS LIMITED. + BUNGAY, SUFFOLK + + + + +PREFACE + + +The entire world of Islam is to-day in profound ferment. From Morocco to +China and from Turkestan to the Congo, the 250,000,000 followers of the +Prophet Mohammed are stirring to new ideas, new impulses, new +aspirations. A gigantic transformation is taking place whose results +must affect all mankind. + +This transformation was greatly stimulated by the late war. But it began +long before. More than a hundred years ago the seeds were sown, and ever +since then it has been evolving; at first slowly and obscurely; later +more rapidly and perceptibly; until to-day, under the stimulus of +Armageddon, it has burst into sudden and startling bloom. + +The story of that strange and dramatic evolution I have endeavoured to +tell in the following pages. Considering in turn its various +aspects--religious, cultural, political, economic, social--I have tried +to portray their genesis and development, to analyse their character, +and to appraise their potency. While making due allowance for local +differentiations, the intimate correlation and underlying unity of the +various movements have ever been kept in view. + +Although the book deals primarily with the Moslem world, it necessarily +includes the non-Moslem Hindu elements of India. The field covered is +thus virtually the entire Near and Middle East. The Far East has not +been directly considered, but parallel developments there have been +noted and should always be kept in mind. + + LOTHROP STODDARD. + + + + + CONTENTS + + +CHAP PAGE + +INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD 1 + +I. THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 20 + +II. PAN-ISLAMISM 37 + +III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 75 + +IV. POLITICAL CHANGE 110 + +V. NATIONALISM 132 + +VI. NATIONALISM IN INDIA 201 + +VII. ECONOMIC CHANGE 226 + +VIII. SOCIAL CHANGE 250 + +IX. SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM 273 + + CONCLUSION 300 + + INDEX 301 + + MAP + + THE WORLD OF ISLAM _at end of volume_ + + + + +THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM + + "Das Alte stuerzt, es aendert sich die Zeit, + Und neues Leben blueht aus den Ruinen." + + SCHILLER, _Wilhelm Tell_. + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD + + +The rise of Islam is perhaps the most amazing event in human history. +Springing from a land and a people alike previously negligible, Islam +spread within a century over half the earth, shattering great empires, +overthrowing long-established religions, remoulding the souls of races, +and building up a whole new world--the world of Islam. + +The closer we examine this development the more extraordinary does it +appear. The other great religions won their way slowly, by painful +struggle, and finally triumphed with the aid of powerful monarchs +converted to the new faith. Christianity had its Constantine, Buddhism +its Asoka, and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each lending to his chosen cult +the mighty force of secular authority. Not so Islam. Arising in a desert +land sparsely inhabited by a nomad race previously undistinguished in +human annals, Islam sallied forth on its great adventure with the +slenderest human backing and against the heaviest material odds. Yet +Islam triumphed with seemingly miraculous ease, and a couple of +generations saw the Fiery Crescent borne victorious from the Pyrenees +to the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central Asia to the deserts of +Central Africa. + +This amazing success was due to a number of contributing factors, chief +among them being the character of the Arab race, the nature of +Mohammed's teaching, and the general state of the contemporary Eastern +world. Undistinguished though the Arabs had hitherto been, they were a +people of remarkable potentialities, which were at that moment patently +seeking self-realization. For several generations before Mohammed, +Arabia had been astir with exuberant vitality. The Arabs had outgrown +their ancestral paganism and were instinctively yearning for better +things. Athwart this seething ferment of mind and spirit Islam rang like +a trumpet-call. Mohammed, an Arab of the Arabs, was the very incarnation +of the soul of his race. Preaching a simple, austere monotheism, free +from priestcraft or elaborate doctrinal trappings, he tapped the +well-springs of religious zeal always present in the Semitic heart. +Forgetting the chronic rivalries and blood-feuds which had consumed +their energies in internecine strife, and welded into a glowing unity by +the fire of their new-found faith, the Arabs poured forth from their +deserts to conquer the earth for Allah, the One True God. + +Thus Islam, like the resistless breath of the sirocco, the desert wind, +swept out of Arabia and encountered--a spiritual vacuum. Those +neighbouring Byzantine and Persian Empires, so imposing to the casual +eye, were mere dried husks, devoid of real vitality. Their religions +were a mockery and a sham. Persia's ancestral cult of Zoroaster had +degenerated into "Magism"--a pompous priestcraft, tyrannical and +persecuting, hated and secretly despised. As for Eastern Christianity, +bedizened with the gewgaws of paganism and bedevilled by the maddening +theological speculations of the decadent Greek mind, it had become a +repellent caricature of the teachings of Christ. Both Magism and +Byzantine Christendom were riven by great heresies which engendered +savage persecutions and furious hates. Furthermore, both the Byzantine +and Persian Empires were harsh despotisms which crushed their subjects +to the dust and killed out all love of country or loyalty to the state. +Lastly, the two empires had just fought a terrible war from which they +had emerged mutually bled white and utterly exhausted. + +Such was the world compelled to face the lava-flood of Islam. The result +was inevitable. Once the disciplined strength of the East Roman legions +and the Persian cuirassiers had broken before the fiery onslaught of the +fanatic sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no patriotic +resistance. The down-trodden populations passively accepted new masters, +while the numerous heretics actually welcomed the overthrow of +persecuting co-religionists whom they hated far worse than their alien +conquerors. In a short time most of the subject peoples accepted the new +faith, so refreshingly simple compared with their own degenerate cults. +The Arabs, in their turn, knew how to consolidate their rule. They were +no bloodthirsty savages, bent solely on loot and destruction. On the +contrary, they were an innately gifted race, eager to learn and +appreciative of the cultural gifts which older civilizations had to +bestow. Intermarrying freely and professing a common belief, conquerors +and conquered rapidly fused, and from this fusion arose a new +civilization--the Saracenic civilization, in which the ancient cultures +of Greece, Rome, and Persia were revitalized by Arab vigour and +synthesized by the Arab genius and the Islamic spirit. For the first +three centuries of its existence (circ. A.D. 650-1000) the realm of +Islam was the most civilized and progressive portion of the world. +Studded with splendid cities, gracious mosques, and quiet universities +where the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved and appreciated, the +Moslem East offered a striking contrast to the Christian West, then sunk +in the night of the Dark Ages. + +However, by the tenth century the Saracenic civilization began to +display unmistakable symptoms of decline. This decline was at first +gradual. Down to the terrible disasters of the thirteenth century it +still displayed vigour and remained ahead of the Christian West. Still, +by the year A.D. 1000 its golden age was over. For this there were +several reasons. In the first place, that inveterate spirit of faction +which has always been the bane of the Arab race soon reappeared once +more. Rival clans strove for the headship of Islam, and their quarrels +degenerated into bloody civil wars. In this fratricidal strife the +fervour of the first days cooled, and saintly men like Abu Bekr and +Omar, Islam's first standard-bearers, gave place to worldly minded +leaders who regarded their position of "Khalifa"[1] as a means to +despotic power and self-glorification. The seat of government was moved +to Damascus in Syria, and afterward to Bagdad in Mesopotamia. The reason +for this was obvious. In Mecca despotism was impossible. The fierce, +free-born Arabs of the desert would tolerate no master, and their innate +democracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had explicitly +declared that all Believers were brothers. The Meccan caliphate was a +theocratic democracy. Abu Bekr and Omar were elected by the people, and +held themselves responsible to public opinion, subject to the divine law +as revealed by Mohammed in the Koran. + +But in Damascus, and still more in Bagdad, things were different. There +the pure-blooded Arabs were only a handful among swarms of Syrian and +Persian converts and "Neo-Arab" mixed-bloods. These people were filled +with traditions of despotism and were quite ready to yield the caliphs +obsequious obedience. The caliphs, in their turn, leaned more and more +upon these complaisant subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers, +officials, and ultimately soldiers. Shocked and angered, the proud Arabs +gradually returned to the desert, while the government fell into the +well-worn ruts of traditional Oriental despotism. When the caliphate was +moved to Bagdad after the founding of the Abbaside dynasty (A.D. 750), +Persian influence became preponderant. The famous Caliph +Haroun-al-Rashid, the hero of the _Arabian Nights_, was a typical +Persian monarch, a true successor of Xerxes and Chosroes, and as +different from Abu Bekr or Omar as it is possible to conceive. And, in +Bagdad, as elsewhere, despotic power was fatal to its possessors. Under +its blight the "successors" of Mohammed became capricious tyrants or +degenerate harem puppets, whose nerveless hands were wholly incapable of +guiding the great Moslem Empire. + +The empire, in fact, gradually went to pieces. Shaken by the civil wars, +bereft of strong leaders, and deprived of the invigorating amalgam of +the unspoiled desert Arabs, political unity could not endure. Everywhere +there occurred revivals of suppressed racial or particularist +tendencies. The very rapidity of Islam's expansion turned against it, +now that the well-springs of that expansion were dried up. Islam had +made millions of converts, of many sects and races, but it had digested +them very imperfectly. Mohammed had really converted the Arabs, because +he merely voiced ideas which were obscurely germinating in Arab minds +and appealed to impulses innate in the Arab blood. When, however, Islam +was accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinctively interpreted the +Prophet's message according to their particular racial tendencies and +cultural backgrounds, the result being that primitive Islam was +distorted or perverted. The most extreme example of this was in Persia, +where the austere monotheism of Mohammed was transmuted into the +elaborate mystical cult known as Shiism, which presently cut the +Persians off from full communion with the orthodox Moslem world. The +same transmutive tendency appears, in lesser degree, in the +saint-worship of the North African Berbers and in the pantheism of the +Hindu Moslems--both developments which Mohammed would have +unquestionably execrated. + +These doctrinal fissures in Islam were paralleled by the disruption of +political unity. The first formal split occurred after the accession of +the Abbasides. A member of the deposed Ommeyyad family fled to Spain, +where he set up a rival caliphate at Cordova, recognized as lawful not +only by the Spanish Moslems, but by the Berbers of North Africa. Later +on another caliphate was set up in Egypt--the Fatimite caliphate, +resting its title on descent from Mohammed's daughter Fatima. As for the +Abbaside caliphs of Bagdad, they gradually declined in power, until they +became mere puppets in the hands of a new racial element, the Turks. + +Before describing that shift of power from Neo-Arab to Turkish hands +which was so momentous for the history of the Islamic world, let us +first consider the decline in cultural and intellectual vigour that set +in concurrently with the disruption of political and religious unity +during the later stages of the Neo-Arab period. + +The Arabs of Mohammed's day were a fresh, unspoiled people in the full +flush of pristine vigour, eager for adventure and inspired by a high +ideal. They had their full share of Semitic fanaticism, but, though +fanatical, they were not bigoted, that is to say, they possessed, not +closed, but open minds. They held firmly to the tenets of their +religion, but this religion was extremely simple. The core of Mohammed's +teaching was theism _plus_ certain practices. A strict belief in the +unity of God, an equally strict belief in the divine mission[2] of +Mohammed as set forth in the Koran, and certain clearly defined +duties--prayer, ablutions, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage--these, +and these alone, constituted the Islam of the Arab conquerors of the +Eastern world. + +So simple a theology could not seriously fetter the Arab mind, alert, +curious, eager to learn, and ready to adjust itself to conditions ampler +and more complex than those prevailing in the parched environment of the +desert. Now, not only did the Arabs relish the material advantages and +luxuries of the more developed societies which they had conquered; they +also appreciated the art, literature, science, and ideas of the older +civilizations. The effect of these novel stimuli was the remarkable +cultural and intellectual flowering which is the glory of Saracenic +civilization. For a time thought was relatively free and produced a +wealth of original ideas and daring speculations. These were the work +not only of Arabs but also of subject Christians, Jews, and Persians, +many of them being heretics previously depressed under the iron bands of +persecuting Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism. + +Gradually, however, this enlightened era passed away. Reactionary forces +appeared and gained in strength. The liberals, who are usually known +under the general title of "Motazelites," not only clung to the +doctrinal simplicity of primitive Islam, but also contended that the +test of all things should be reason. On the other hand, the conservative +schools of thought asserted that the test should be precedent and +authority. These men, many of them converted Christians imbued with the +traditions of Byzantine orthodoxy, undertook an immense work of Koranic +exegesis, combined with an equally elaborate codification and +interpretation of the reputed sayings or "traditions" of Mohammed, as +handed down by his immediate disciples and followers. As the result of +these labours, there gradually arose a Moslem theology and scholastic +philosophy as rigid, elaborate, and dogmatic as that of the mediaeval +Christian West. + +Naturally, the struggle between the fundamentally opposed tendencies of +traditionalism and rationalism was long and bitter. Yet the ultimate +outcome was almost a foregone conclusion. Everything conspired to favour +the triumph of dogma over reason. The whole historic tradition of the +East (a tradition largely induced by racial and climatic factors[3]) was +toward absolutism. This tradition had been interrupted by the inrush of +the wild libertarianism of the desert. But the older tendency presently +reasserted itself, stimulated as it was by the political transformation +of the caliphate from theocratic, democracy to despotism. + +This triumph of absolutism in the field of government in fact assured +its eventual triumph in all other fields as well. For, in the long run, +despotism can no more tolerate liberty of thought than it can liberty of +action. Some of the Damascus caliphs, to be sure, toyed with Motazelism, +the Ommeyyads being mainly secular-minded men to whom freethinking was +intellectually attractive. But presently the caliphs became aware of +liberalism's political implications. The Motazelites did not confine +themselves to the realm of pure philosophic speculation. They also +trespassed on more dangerous ground. Motazelite voices were heard +recalling the democratic days of the Meccan caliphate, when the +Commander of the Faithful, instead of being an hereditary monarch, was +elected by the people and responsible to public opinion. Some bold +spirits even entered into relations with the fierce fanatic sects of +inner Arabia, like the Kharijites, who, upholding the old desert +freedom, refused to recognize the caliphate and proclaimed theories of +advanced republicanism. + +The upshot was that the caliphs turned more and more toward the +conservative theologians as against the liberals, just as they favoured +the monarchist Neo-Arabs in preference to the intractable pure-blooded +Arabs of the desert. Under the Abbasides the government came out frankly +for religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic orthodoxy were +established, Motazelites were persecuted and put to death, and by the +twelfth century A.D. the last vestiges of Saracenic liberalism were +extirpated. The canons of Moslem thought were fixed. All creative +activity ceased. The very memory of the great Motazelite doctors faded +away. The Moslem mind was closed, not to be re-opened until our own day. + +By the beginning of the eleventh century the decline of Saracenic +civilization had become so pronounced that change was clearly in the +air. Having lost their early vigour, the Neo-Arabs were to see their +political power pass into other hands. These political heirs of the +Neo-Arabs were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of that +congeries of nomadic tribes which, from time immemorial, have roamed +over the limitless steppes of eastern and central Asia, and which are +known collectively under the titles of "Uralo-Altaic" or "Turanian" +peoples. The Arabs had been in contact with the Turkish nomads ever +since the Islamic conquest of Persia, when the Moslem generals found the +Turks beating restlessly against Persia's north-eastern frontiers. In +the caliphate's palmy days the Turks were not feared. In fact, they were +presently found to be very useful. A dull-witted folk with few ideas, +the Turks could do two things superlatively well--obey orders and fight +like devils. In other words, they made ideal mercenary soldiers. The +caliphs were delighted, and enlisted ever larger numbers of them for +their armies and their body-guards. + +This was all very well while the caliphate was strong, but when it grew +weak the situation altered. Rising everywhere to positions of authority, +the Turkish mercenaries began to act like masters. Opening the eastern +frontiers, they let in fresh swarms of their countrymen, who now came, +not as individuals, but in tribes or "hordes" under their hereditary +chiefs, wandering about at their own sweet will, settling where they +pleased, and despoiling or evicting the local inhabitants. + +The Turks soon renounced their ancestral paganism for Islam, but Islam +made little change in their natures. In judging these Turkish newcomers +we must not consider them the same as the present-day Ottoman Turks of +Constantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanli are so saturated with +European and Near Eastern blood, and have been so leavened by Western +and Saracenic ideas, they that are a very different people from their +remote immigrant ancestors. Yet, even as it is, the modern Osmanli +display enough of those unlovely Turanian traits which characterize the +unmodified Turks of central Asia, often called "Turkomans," to +distinguish them from their Ottoman kinsfolk to the west. + +Now, what was the primitive Turkish nature? First and foremost, it was +that of the professional soldier. Discipline was the Turk's watchword. +No originality of thought, and but little curiosity. Few ideas ever +penetrated the Turk's slow mind, and the few that did penetrate were +received as military orders, to be obeyed without question and adhered +to without reflection. Such was the being who took over the leadership +of Islam from the Saracen's failing grasp. + +No greater misfortune could have occurred both for Islam and for the +world at large. For Islam it meant the rule of dull-witted bigots under +which enlightened progress was impossible. Of course Islam did gain a +great accession of warlike strength, but this new power was so wantonly +misused as to bring down disastrous repercussions upon Islam itself. +The first notable exploits of the immigrant Turkish hordes were their +conquest of Asia Minor and their capture of Jerusalem, both events +taking place toward the close of the eleventh century[4]. Up to this +time Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian world. The original +Arab flood of the seventh century, after overrunning Syria, had been +stopped by the barrier of the Taurus Mountains; the Byzantine Empire had +pulled itself together; and thenceforth, despite border bickerings, the +Byzantine-Saracen frontier had remained substantially unaltered. Now, +however, the Turks broke the Byzantine barrier, overran Asia Minor, and +threatened even Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christendom. As +for Jerusalem, it had, of course, been in Moslem hands since the Arab +conquest of A.D. 637, but the caliph Omar had carefully respected the +Christian "Holy Places," and his successors had neither persecuted the +local Christians nor maltreated the numerous pilgrims who flocked +perennially to Jerusalem from every part of the Christian world. But the +Turks changed all this. Avid for loot, and filled with bigoted hatred of +the "Misbelievers," they sacked the holy places, persecuted the +Christians, and rendered pilgrimage impossible. + +The effect of these twin disasters upon Christendom, occurring as they +did almost simultaneously, was tremendous. The Christian West, then at +the height of its religious fervour, quivered with mingled fear and +wrath. Myriads of zealots, like Peter the Hermit, roused all Europe to +frenzy. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the Christian West poured upon +the Moslem East vast hosts of warriors in those extraordinary +expeditions, the Crusades. + +The Turkish conquest of Islam and its counterblast, the Crusades, were +an immense misfortune for the world. They permanently worsened the +relations between East and West. In the year A.D. 1000 Christian-Moslem +relations were fairly good, and showed every prospect of becoming +better. The hatreds engendered by Islam's first irruption were dying +away. The frontiers of Islam and Christendom had become apparently +fixed, and neither side showed much desire to encroach upon the other. +The only serious debatable ground was Spain, where Moslem and Christian +were continually at hand-grips; but, after all, Spain was mutually +regarded as a frontier episode. Between Islam and Christendom, as a +whole, intercourse was becoming steadily more friendly and more +frequent. This friendly intercourse, if continued, might ultimately have +produced momentous results for human progress. The Moslem world was at +that time still well ahead of western Europe in knowledge and culture, +but Saracenic civilization was ossifying, whereas the Christian West, +despite its ignorance, rudeness, and barbarism, was bursting with lusty +life and patently aspiring to better things. Had the nascent amity of +East and West in the eleventh century continued to develop, both would +have greatly profited. In the West the influence of Saracenic culture, +containing, as it did, the ancient learning of Greece and Rome, might +have awakened our Renaissance much earlier, while in the East the +influence of the mediaeval West, with its abounding vigour, might have +saved Moslem civilization from the creeping paralysis which was +overtaking it. + +But it was not to be. In Islam the refined, easygoing Saracen gave place +to the bigoted, brutal Turk. Islam became once more aggressive--not, as +in its early days, for an ideal, but for sheer blood-lust, plunder, and +destruction. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the only +possible civilization and the most brutal and hopeless barbarism. +Furthermore, this war was destined to last for centuries. The Crusades +were merely Western counter-attacks against a Turkish assault on +Christendom which continued for six hundred years and was definitely +broken only under the walls of Vienna in 1683. Naturally, from these +centuries of unrelenting strife furious hatreds and fanaticisms were +engendered which still envenom the relations of Islam and Christendom. +The atrocities of Mustapha Kemal's Turkish "Nationalists" and the +atrocities of the Greek troops in Asia Minor, of which we read in our +morning papers, are in no small degree a "carrying on" of the mutual +atrocities of Turks and Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago. + +With the details of those old wars between Turks and Christians this +book has no direct concern. The wars themselves should simply be noted +as a chronic barrier between East and West. As for the Moslem East, with +its declining Saracenic civilization bowed beneath the brutal Turkish +yoke, it was presently exposed to even more terrible misfortunes. These +misfortunes were also of Turanian origin. Toward the close of the +twelfth century the eastern branches of the Turanian race were welded +into a temporary unity by the genius of a mighty chieftain named Jenghiz +Khan. Taking the sinister title of "The Inflexible Emperor," this +arch-savage started out to loot the world. He first overran northern +China, which he hideously ravaged, then turned his devastating course +toward the west. Such was the rise of the terrible "Mongols," whose name +still stinks in the nostrils of civilized mankind. Carrying with them +skilled Chinese engineers using gunpowder for the reduction of fortified +cities, Jenghiz Khan and his mounted hosts proved everywhere +irresistible. The Mongols were the most appalling barbarians whom the +world has ever seen. Their object was not conquest for settlement, not +even loot, but in great part a sheer satanic lust for blood and +destruction. They revelled in butchering whole populations, destroying +cities, laying waste countrysides--and then passing on to fresh fields. + +Jenghiz Khan died after a few years of his westward progress, but his +successors continued his work with unabated zeal. Both Christendom and +Islam were smitten by the Mongol scourge. All eastern Europe was ravaged +and re-barbarized, the Russians showing ugly traces of the Mongol +imprint to this day. But the woes of Christendom were as nothing to the +woes of Islam. The Mongols never penetrated beyond Poland, and western +Europe, the seat of Western civilization, was left unscathed. Not so +Islam. Pouring down from the north-east, the Mongol hosts whirled like a +cyclone over the Moslem world from India to Egypt, pillaging, murdering, +and destroying. The nascent civilization of mediaeval Persia, just +struggling into the light beneath the incubus of Turkish harryings, was +stamped flat under the Mongol hoofs, and the Mongols then proceeded to +deal with the Moslem culture-centre--Bagdad. Bagdad had declined +considerably from the gorgeous days of Haroun-al-Rashid, with its +legendary million souls. However, it was still a great city, the seat of +the caliphate and the unquestioned centre of Saracenic civilization. The +Mongols stormed it (A.D. 1258), butchered its entire population, and +literally wiped Bagdad off the face of the earth. And even this was not +the worst. Bagdad was the capital of Mesopotamia. This "Land between the +Rivers" had, in the very dawn of history, been reclaimed from swamp and +desert by the patient labours of half-forgotten peoples who, with +infinite toil, built up a marvellous system of irrigation that made +Mesopotamia the perennial garden and granary of the world. Ages had +passed and Mesopotamia had known many masters, but all these conquerors +had respected, even cherished, the irrigation works which were the +source of all prosperity. These works the Mongols wantonly, methodically +destroyed. The oldest civilization in the world, the cradle of human +culture, was hopelessly ruined; at least eight thousand years of +continuous human effort went for naught, and Mesopotamia became the +noisome land it still remains to-day, parched during the droughts of low +water, soaked to fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods, +tenanted only by a few mongrel fellahs inhabiting wretched mud villages, +and cowed by nomad Bedouin browsing their flocks on the sites of ancient +fields. + +The destruction of Bagdad was a fatal blow to Saracenic civilization, +especially in the East. And even before that dreadful disaster it had +received a terrible blow in the West. Traversing North Africa in its +early days, Islam had taken firm root in Spain, and had so flourished +there that Spanish Moslem culture was fully abreast of that in the +Moslem East. The capital of Spanish Islam was Cordova, the seat of the +Western caliphate, a mighty city, perhaps more wonderful than Bagdad +itself. For centuries Spanish Islam lived secure, confining the +Christians to the mountainous regions of the north. As Saracen vigour +declined, however, the Christians pressed the Moslems southward. In 1213 +Spanish Islam was hopelessly broken at the tremendous battle of Las +Navas de Tolosa. Thenceforth, for the victorious Christians it was a +case of picking up the pieces. Cordova itself soon fell, and with it the +glory of Spanish Islam, for the fanatical Christian Spaniards extirpated +Saracenic civilization as effectually as the pagan Mongols were at that +time doing. To be sure, a remnant of the Spanish Moslems held their +ground at Granada, in the extreme south, until the year Columbus +discovered America, but this was merely an episode. The Saracen +civilization of the West was virtually destroyed. + +Meanwhile the Moslem East continued to bleed under the Mongol scourge. +Wave after wave of Mongol raiders passed over the land, the last notable +invasion being that headed by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlane, +early in the fifteenth century. By this time the western Mongols had +accepted Islam, but that made little difference in their conduct. To +show that Tamerlane was a true scion of his ancestor Jenghiz Khan, it +may be remarked that his foible was pyramids of human skulls, his prize +effort being one of 70,000 erected after the storming of the Persian +city of Ispahan. After the cessation of the Mongol incursions, the +ravaged and depopulated Moslem East fell under the sway of the Ottoman +Turks. + +The Ottoman Turks, or "Osmanli," were originally merely one of the many +Turkish hordes which entered Asia Minor after the downfall of Byzantine +rule. They owed their greatness mainly to a long line of able sultans, +who gradually absorbed the neighbouring Turkish tribes and used this +consolidated strength for ambitious conquests both to east and west. In +1453 the Osmanli extinguished the old Byzantine Empire by taking +Constantinople, and within a century thereafter they had conquered the +Moslem East from Persia to Morocco, had subjugated the whole Balkan +Peninsula, and had advanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna. +Unlike their Mongol cousins, the Ottoman Turks built up a durable +empire. It was a barbarous sort of empire, for the Turks understood very +little about culture. The only things they could appreciate were +military improvements. These, however, they thoroughly appreciated and +kept fully abreast of the times. In their palmy days the Turks had the +best artillery and the steadiest infantry in the world, and were the +terror of Europe. + +Meantime Europe was awakening to true progress and higher civilization. +While the Moslem East was sinking under Mongol harryings and Turkish +militarism, the Christian West was thrilling to the Renaissance and the +discoveries of America and the water route to India. The effect of these +discoveries simply cannot be over-estimated. When Columbus and Vasco da +Gama made their memorable voyages at the end of the fifteenth century, +Western civilization was pent up closely within the restricted bounds of +west-central Europe, and was waging a defensive and none-too-hopeful +struggle with the forces of Turanian barbarism. Russia lay under the +heel of the Mongol Tartars, while the Turks, then in the full flush of +their martial vigour, were marching triumphantly up from the south-east +and threatening Europe's very heart. So strong were these Turanian +barbarians, with Asia, North Africa, and eastern Europe in their grasp, +that Western civilization was hard put to it to hold its own. Western +civilization was, in fact, fighting with its back to the wall--the wall +of a boundless ocean. We can hardly conceive how our mediaeval +forefathers viewed the ocean. To them it was a numbing, constricting +presence; the abode of darkness and horror. No wonder mediaeval Europe +was static, since it faced on ruthless, aggressive Asia, and backed on +nowhere. Then, in the twinkling of an eye, the sea-wall became a +highway, and dead-end Europe became mistress of the ocean--and thereby +mistress of the world. + +The greatest strategic shift of fortune in all human history had taken +place. Instead of fronting hopelessly on the fiercest of Asiatics, +against whom victory by direct attack seemed impossible, the Europeans +could now flank them at will. Furthermore, the balance of resources +shifted in Europe's favour. Whole new worlds were unmasked whence Europe +could draw limitless wealth to quicken its home life and initiate a +progress that would soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreaded +Asiatic assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant Moslem East +compared with those of the Americas and the Indies? So Western +civilization, quickened, energized, progressed with giant strides, shook +off its mediaeval fetters, grasped the talisman of science, and strode +into the light of modern times. + +Yet all this left Islam unmoved. Wrapping itself in the tatters of +Saracenic civilization, the Moslem East continued to fall behind. Even +its military power presently vanished, for the Turk sank into lethargy +and ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time the West, busied with +internal conflicts, hesitated to attack the East, so great was the +prestige of the Ottoman name. But the crushing defeat of the Turks in +their rash attack upon Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the Ottoman +Empire was far gone in decrepitude. Thenceforth, the empire was harried +mercilessly by Western assaults and was saved from collapse only by the +mutual jealousies of Western Powers, quarrelling over the Turkish +spoils. + +However, not until the nineteenth century did the Moslem world, as a +whole, feel the weight of Western attack. Throughout the eighteenth +century the West assailed the ends of the Moslem battle-line in eastern +Europe and the Indies, but the bulk of Islam, from Morocco to Central +Asia, remained almost immune. The Moslem world failed to profit by this +respite. Plunged in lethargy, contemptuous of the European +"Misbelievers," and accepting defeats as the inscrutable will of Allah, +Islam continued to live its old life, neither knowing nor caring to know +anything about Western ideas or Western progress. + +Such was the decrepit Moslem world which faced nineteenth-century +Europe, energized by the Industrial Revolution, armed as never before by +modern science and invention which had unlocked nature's secrets and +placed hitherto-undreamed-of weapons in its aggressive hands. The result +was a foregone conclusion. One by one, the decrepit Moslem states fell +before the Western attack, and the whole Islamic world was rapidly +partitioned among the European Powers. England took India and Egypt, +Russia crossed the Caucasus and mastered Central Asia, France conquered +North Africa, while other European nations grasped minor portions of the +Moslem heritage. The Great War witnessed the final stage in this process +of subjugation. By the terms of the treaties which marked its close, +Turkey was extinguished and not a single Mohammedan state retained +genuine independence. The subjection of the Moslem world was +complete--on paper. + +On paper! For, in its very hour of apparent triumph, Western domination +was challenged as never before. During those hundred years of Western +conquest a mighty internal change had been coming over the Moslem +world. The swelling tide of Western aggression had at last moved the +"immovable" East. At last Islam became conscious of its decrepitude, and +with that consciousness a vast ferment, obscure yet profound, began to +leaven the 250,000,000 followers of the Prophet from Morocco to China +and from Turkestan to the Congo. The first spark was fittingly struck in +the Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam. Here at the opening of the +nineteenth century, arose the Wahabi movement for the reform of Islam, +which presently kindled the far-flung "Mohammedan Revival," which in its +turn begat the movement known as "Pan-Islamism." Furthermore, athwart +these essentially internal movements there came pouring a flood of +external stimuli from the West--ideas such as parliamentary government, +nationalism, scientific education, industrialism, and even ultra-modern +concepts like feminism, socialism, Bolshevism. Stirred by the +interaction of all these novel forces and spurred by the ceaseless +pressure of European aggression, the Moslem world roused more and more +to life and action. The Great War was a shock of terrific potency, and +to-day Islam is seething with mighty forces fashioning a new Moslem +world. What are those forces moulding the Islam of the future? To their +analysis and appraisal the body of this book is devoted. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _I. e._ "Successor"; anglicized into the word "Caliph." + +[2] To be carefully distinguished from divinity. Mohammed not only did +not make any pretensions to divinity, but specifically disclaimed any +such attributes. He regarded himself as the last of a series of divinely +inspired prophets, beginning with Adam and extending through Moses and +Jesus to himself, the mouthpiece of God's last and most perfect +revelation. + +[3] The influence of environment and heredity on human evolution in +general and on the history of the East in particular, though of great +importance, cannot be treated in a summary such as this. The influence +of climatic and other environmental factors has been ably treated by +Prof. Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as _The Pulse of +Asia_ (Boston, 1907); _Civilization and Climate_ (Yale Univ. Press, +1915), and _World-Power and Evolution_ (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). See +also Chap. III. in Arminius Vambery--_Der Islam im neunzehnten +Jahrhundert. Eine culturgeschichtliche Studie_ (Leipzig, 1875). For a +summary of racial influences in Eastern history, see Madison Grant--_The +Passing of the Great Race_ (N. Y., 1916). + +[4] The Turkish overrunning of Asia Minor took place after the +destruction of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert, A.D. +1071. The Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL + + +By the eighteenth century the Moslem world had sunk to the lowest depth +of its decrepitude. Nowhere were there any signs of healthy vigour, +everywhere were stagnation and decay. Manners and morals were alike +execrable. The last vestiges of Saracenic culture had vanished in a +barbarous luxury of the few and an equally barbarous degradation of the +multitude. Learning was virtually dead, the few universities which +survived fallen into dreary decay and languishing in poverty and +neglect. Government had become despotism tempered by anarchy and +assassination. Here and there a major despot like the Sultan of Turkey +or the Indian "Great Mogul" maintained some semblance of state +authority, albeit provincial pashas were for ever striving to erect +independent governments based, like their masters', on tyranny and +extortion. The pashas, in turn, strove ceaselessly against unruly local +chiefs and swarms of brigands who infested the countryside. Beneath this +sinister hierarchy groaned the people, robbed, bullied, and ground into +the dust. Peasant and townsman had alike lost all incentive to labour or +initiative, and both agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowest +level compatible with bare survival. + +As for religion, it was as decadent as everything else. The austere +monotheism of Mohammed had become overlaid with a rank growth of +superstition and puerile mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented and +ruinous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which, decked out in +amulets, charms, and rosaries, listened to squalid fakirs or ecstatic +dervishes, and went on pilgrimages to the tombs of "holy men," +worshipped as saints and "intercessors" with that Allah who had become +too remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted souls. As +for the moral precepts of the Koran, they were ignored or defied. +Wine-drinking and opium-eating were well-nigh universal, prostitution +was rampant, and the most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed. +Even the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, were sink-holes of iniquity, +while the "Hajj," or pilgrimage ordained by the Prophet, had become a +scandal through its abuses. In fine: the life had apparently gone out of +Islam, leaving naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degrading +superstition behind. Could Mohammed have returned to earth, he would +unquestionably have anathematized his followers as apostates and +idolaters. + +Yet, in this darkest hour, a voice came crying out of the vast Arabian +desert, the cradle of Islam, calling the faithful back to the true path. +This puritan reformer, the famous Abd-el-Wahab, kindled a fire which +presently spread to the remotest corners of the Moslem world, purging +Islam of its sloth and reviving the fervour of olden days. The great +Mohammedan Revival had begun. + +Mahommed ibn Abd-el-Wahab was born about the year A.D. 1700 in the heart +of the Arabian desert, the region known as the Nejd. The Nejd was the +one clean spot in the decadent Moslem world. We have already seen how, +with the transformation of the caliphate from a theocratic democracy to +an Oriental despotism, the free-spirited Arabs had returned scornfully +to their deserts. Here they had maintained their wild freedom. Neither +caliph nor sultan dared venture far into those vast solitudes of burning +sand and choking thirst, where the rash invader was lured to sudden +death in a whirl of stabbing spears. The Arabs recognized no master, +wandering at will with their flocks and camels, or settled here and +there in green oases hidden in the desert's heart. And in the desert +they retained their primitive political and religious virtues. The +nomad Bedouin lived under the sway of patriarchal "sheiks"; the settled +dwellers in the oases usually acknowledged the authority of some leading +family. But these rulers possessed the slenderest authority, narrowly +circumscribed by well-established custom and a jealous public opinion +which they transgressed at their peril. The Turks, to be sure, had +managed to acquire a precarious authority over the holy cities and the +Red Sea littoral, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was free. And, in +religion, as in politics, the desert Arabs kept the faith of their +fathers. Scornfully rejecting the corruptions of decadent Islam, they +held fast to the simple theology of primitive Islam, so congenial to +their Arab natures. + +Into this atmosphere of an older and better age, Abd-el-Wahab was born. +Displaying from the first a studious and religious bent, he soon +acquired a reputation for learning and sanctity. Making the Meccan +pilgrimage while still a young man, he studied at Medina and travelled +as far as Persia, returning ultimately to the Nejd. He returned burning +with holy wrath at what he had seen, and determined to preach a puritan +reformation. For years he wandered up and down Arabia, and at last he +converted Mahommed, head of the great clan of Saud, the most powerful +chieftain in all the Nejd. This gave Abd-el-Wahab both moral prestige +and material strength, and he made the most of his opportunities. +Gradually, the desert Arabs were welded into a politico-religious unity +like that effected by the Prophet. Abd-el-Wahab was, in truth, a +faithful counterpart of the first caliphs, Abu Bekr and Omar. When he +died in 1787 his disciple, Saud, proved a worthy successor. The new +Wahabi state was a close counterpart of the Meccan caliphate. Though +possessing great military power, Saud always considered himself +responsible to public opinion and never encroached upon the legitimate +freedom of his subjects. Government, though stern, was able and just. +The Wahabi judges were competent and honest. Robbery, became almost +unknown, so well was the public peace maintained. Education was +sedulously fostered. Every oasis had its school, while teachers were +sent to the Bedouin tribes. + +Having consolidated the Nejd, Saud was now ready to undertake the +greater task of subduing and purifying the Moslem world. His first +objective was of course the holy cities. This objective was attained in +the opening years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand against +the rush of the Wahabi hosts burning with fanatic hatred against the +Turks, who were loathed both as apostate Moslems and as usurpers of that +supremacy in Islam which all Arabs believed should rest in Arab hands. +When Saud died in 1814 he was preparing to invade Syria. It looked for a +moment as though the Wahabis were to sweep the East and puritanize all +Islam at a blow. + +But it was not to be. Unable to stem the Wahabi flood, the Sultan of +Turkey called on his powerful vassal, the famous Mehemet Ali. This able +Albanian adventurer had by that time made himself master of Egypt. +Frankly recognizing the superiority of the West, he had called in +numerous European officers who rapidly fashioned a formidable army, +composed largely of hard-fighting Albanian highlanders, and disciplined +and equipped after European models. Mehemet Ali gladly answered the +Sultan's summons, and it soon became clear that even Wahabi fanaticism +was no match for European muskets and artillery handled by seasoned +veterans. In a short time the holy cities were recaptured and the +Wahabis were driven back into the desert. The nascent Wahabi empire had +vanished like a mirage. Wahabism's political role was ended.[5] + +However, Wahabism's spiritual role had only just begun. The Nejd +remained a focus of puritan zeal whence the new spirit radiated in all +directions. Even in the holy cities Wahabism continued to set the +religious tone, and the numberless "Hajjis," or pilgrims, who came +annually from every part of the Moslem world returned to their homes +zealous reformers. Soon the Wahabi leaven began to produce profound +disturbances in the most distant quarters. For example, in northern +India a Wahabi fanatic, Seyid Ahmed,[6] so roused the Punjabi +Mohammedans that he actually built up a theocratic state, and only his +chance death prevented a possible Wahabi conquest of northern India. +This state was shattered by the Sikhs, about 1830, but when the English +conquered the country they had infinite trouble with the smouldering +embers of Wahabi feeling, which, in fact, lived on, contributed to the +Indian mutiny, and permanently fanaticized Afghanistan and the wild +tribes of the Indian North-West Frontier.[7] It was during these years +that the famous Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi came from his Algerian home +to Mecca and there imbibed those Wahabi principles which led to the +founding of the great Pan-Islamic fraternity that bears his name. Even +the Babbist movement in Persia, far removed though it was doctrinally +from Wahabi teaching, was indubitably a secondary reflex of the Wahabi +urge.[8] In fact, within a generation, the strictly Wahabi movement had +broadened into the larger development known as the Mohammedan Revival, +and this in turn was developing numerous phases, chief among them being +the movement usually termed Pan-Islamism. That movement, particularly on +its political side, I shall treat in the next chapter. At present let +us examine the other aspects of the Mohammedan Revival, with special +reference to its religious and cultural phases. + +The Wahabi movement was a strictly puritan reformation. Its aim was the +reform of abuses, the abolition of superstitious practices, and a return +to primitive Islam. All later accretions--the writings and +interpretations of the mediaeval theologians, ceremonial or mystical +innovations, saint worship, in fact every sort of change, were +condemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed was preached in all its +uncompromising simplicity, and the Koran, literally interpreted, was +taken as the sole guide for human action. This doctrinal simplification +was accompanied by a most rigid code of morals. The prayers, fastings, +and other practices enjoined by Mohammed were scrupulously observed. The +most austere manner of living was enforced. Silken clothing, rich food, +wine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and all other indulgences were sternly +proscribed. Even religious architecture was practically tabooed, the +Wahabis pulling down the Prophet's tomb at Medina and demolishing the +minarets of mosques as godless innovations. The Wahabis were thus, +despite their moral earnestness, excessively narrow-minded, and it was +very fortunate for Islam that they soon lost their political power and +were compelled thenceforth to confine their efforts to moral teaching. + +Many critics of Islam point to the Wahabi movement as a proof that Islam +is essentially retrograde and innately incapable of evolutionary +development. These criticisms, however, appear to be unwarranted. The +initial stage of every religious reformation is an uncritical return to +the primitive cult. To the religious reformer the only way of salvation +is a denial of all subsequent innovations, regardless of their +character. Our own Protestant Reformation began in just this way, and +Humanists like Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by Protestantism's +puritanical narrowness, could see no good in the movement, declaring +that it menaced all true culture and merely replaced an infallible Pope +by an infallible Bible. + +As a matter of fact, the puritan beginnings of the Mohammedan Revival +presently broadened along more constructive lines, some of these +becoming tinged with undoubted liberalism. The Moslem reformers of the +early nineteenth century had not dug very deeply into their religious +past before they discovered--Motazelism. We have already reviewed the +great struggle which had raged between reason and dogma in Islam's early +days, in which dogma had triumphed so completely that the very memory of +Motazelism had faded away. Now, however, those memories were revived, +and the liberal-minded reformers were delighted to find such striking +confirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the Motazelite +doctors and in the sacred texts themselves. The principle that reason +and not blind prescription was to be the test opened the door to the +possibility of all those reforms which they had most at heart. For +example, the reformers found that in the traditional writings Mohammed +was reported to have said: "I am no more than a man; when I order you +anything respecting religion, receive it; when I order you about the +affairs of the world, then I am nothing more than man." And, again, as +though foreseeing the day when sweeping changes would be necessary. "Ye +are in an age in which, if ye abandon one-tenth of that which is +ordered, ye will be ruined. After this, a time will come when he who +shall observe one-tenth of what is now ordered will be redeemed."[9] + +Before discussing the ideas and efforts of the modern Moslem reformers, +it might be well to examine the assertions made by numerous Western +critics, that Islam is by its very nature incapable of reform and +progressive adaptation to the expansion of human knowledge. Such is the +contention not only of Christian polemicists,[10] but also of +rationalists like Renan and European administrators of Moslem +populations like Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer, in fact, pithily summarizes +this critical attitude in his statement: "Islam cannot be reformed; that +is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something else."[11] + +Now these criticisms, coming as they do from close students of Islam +often possessing intimate personal acquaintance with Moslems, deserve +respectful consideration. And yet an historical survey of religions, and +especially a survey of the thoughts and accomplishments of Moslem +reformers during the past century, seem to refute these pessimistic +charges. + +In the first place, it should be remembered that Islam to-day stands +just about where Christendom stood in the fifteenth century, at the +beginning of the Reformation. There is the same supremacy of dogma over +reason, the same blind adherence to prescription and authority, the same +suspicion and hostility to freedom of thought or scientific knowledge. +There is no doubt that a study of the Mohammedan sacred texts, +particularly of the "sheriat" or canon law, together with a glance over +Moslem history for the last thousand years, reveal an attitude on the +whole quite incompatible with modern progress and civilization. But was +not precisely the same thing true of Christendom at the beginning of the +fifteenth century? Compare the sheriat with the Christian canon law. The +spirit is the same. Take, for example, the sheriat's prohibition on the +lending of money at interest; a prohibition which, if obeyed, renders +impossible anything like business or industry in the modern sense. This +is the example oftenest cited to prove Islam's innate incompatibility +with modern civilization. But the Christian canon law equally forbade +interest, and enforced that prohibition so strictly, that for centuries +the Jews had a monopoly of business in Europe, while the first +Christians who dared to lend money (the Lombards) were regarded almost +as heretics, were universally hated, and were frequently persecuted. +Again, take the matter of Moslem hostility to freedom of thought and +scientific investigation. Can Islam show anything more revolting than +that scene in Christian history when, less than three hundred years +ago,[12] the great Galileo was haled before the Papal Inquisition and +forced, under threat of torture, to recant the damnable heresy that the +earth went round the sun? + +As a matter of fact, Mohammed reverenced knowledge. His own words are +eloquent testimony to that. Here are some of his sayings: + +"Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of China." + +"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave." + +"One word of knowledge is of more value than the reciting of a hundred +prayers." + +"The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of martyrs." + +"One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a Moslem brother, +outweighs the prayers of a whole year." + +"Wise men are the successors of the Prophet." + +"God has created nothing better than reason." + +"In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms, made pilgrimage, +and all other good works; nevertheless, he shall be rewarded only in the +measure that he has used his common sense." + +These citations (and there are others of the same tenor) prove that the +modern Moslem reformers have good scriptural backing for their liberal +attitude. Of course I do not imply that the reform movement in Islam, +just because it is liberal and progressive, is thereby _ipso facto_ +assured of success. History reveals too many melancholy instances to the +contrary. Indeed, we have already seen how, in Islam itself, the +promising liberal movement of its early days passed utterly away. What +history does show, however, is that when the times favour progress, +religions are adapted to that progress by being reformed and +liberalized. No human society once fairly on the march was ever turned +back by a creed. Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists, +the doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, undermined, flanked, or +swept aside. Now there is no possibility that the Moslem world will +henceforth lack progressive influences. It is in close contact with +Western civilization, and is being increasingly permeated with Western +ideas. Islam cannot break away and isolate itself if it would. +Everything therefore portends its profound modification. Of course +critics like Lord Cromer contend that this modified Islam will be Islam +no longer. But why not? If the people continue to call themselves +Mohammedans and continue to draw spiritual sustenance from the message +of Mohammed, why should they be denied the name? Modern Christianity is +certainly vastly different from mediaeval Christianity, while among the +various Christian churches there exist the widest doctrinal variations. +Yet all who consider themselves Christians are considered Christians by +all except bigots out of step with the times. + +Let us now scrutinize the Moslem reformers, judging them, not by texts +and chronicles, but by their words and deeds; since, as one of their +number, an Algerian, very pertinently remarks, "men should be judged, +not by the letter of their sacred books, but by what they actually +do."[13] + +Modern Moslem liberalism, as we have seen, received its first +encouragement from the discovery of the old Motazelite literature of +nearly a thousand years before. To be sure, Islam had never been quite +destitute of liberal minds. Even in its darkest days a few voices had +been raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example, in the +sixteenth century the celebrated El-Gharani had written: "It is not at +all impossible that God may hold in reserve for men of the future +perceptions that have not been vouchsafed to the men of the past. Divine +munificence never ceases to pour benefits and enlightenment into the +hearts of wise men of every age."[14] These isolated voices from Islam's +Dark Time helped to encourage the modern reformers, and by the middle of +the nineteenth century every Moslem land had its group of +forward-looking men. At first their numbers were, of course, +insignificant, and of course they drew down upon themselves the +anathemas of the fanatic Mollahs[15] and the hatred of the ignorant +multitude. The first country where the reformers made their influence +definitely felt was in India. Here a group headed by the famous Sir Syed +Ahmed Khan started an important liberal movement, founding associations, +publishing books and newspapers, and establishing the well-known college +of Aligarh. Sir Syed Ahmed is a good type of the early liberal +reformers. Conservative in temperament and perfectly orthodox in his +theology, he yet denounced the current decadence of Islam with truly +Wahabi fervour. He also was frankly appreciative of Western ideas and +eager to assimilate the many good things which the West had to offer. As +he wrote in 1867: "We must study European scientific works, even though +they are not written by Moslems and though we may find in them things +contrary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate the Arabs of +olden days, who did not fear to shake their faith by studying +Pythagoras."[16] + +This nucleus of Indian Moslem liberals rapidly grew in strength, +producing able leaders like Moulvie Cheragh Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whose +scholarly works in faultless English are known throughout the world.[17] +These men called themselves "Neo-Motazelites" and boldly advocated +reforms such as a thorough overhauling of the sheriat and a general +modernization of Islam. Their view-point is well set forth by another of +their leading figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. "Nothing was more distant from +the Prophet's thought," he writes, "than to fetter the mind or to lay +down fixed, immutable, unchanging laws for his followers. The Quran is a +book of guidance to the faithful, and not an obstacle in the path, of +their social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress." He laments +Islam's present backwardness, for he continues: "Modern Islam, with its +hierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and +superstitious practices is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam of the +Prophet Mohammed." He concludes with the following liberal confession of +faith: "Is Islam hostile to progress? I will emphatically answer this +question in the negative. Islam, stripped of its theology, is a +perfectly simple religion. Its cardinal principle is belief in one God +and belief in Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion, +superfluity."[18] + +Meanwhile, the liberals were making themselves felt in other parts of +the Moslem world. In Turkey liberals actually headed the government +during much of the generation between the Crimean War and the despotism +of Abdul Hamid,[19] and Turkish liberal ministers like Reshid Pasha and +Midhat Pasha made earnest though unavailing efforts to liberalize and +modernize the Ottoman Empire. Even the dreadful Hamidian tyranny could +not kill Turkish liberalism. It went underground or into exile, and in +1908 put through the revolution which deposed the tyrant and brought the +"Young Turks" to power. In Egypt liberalism took firm root, represented +by men like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University and +respected friend of Lord Cromer. Even outlying fragments of Islam like +the Russian Tartars awoke to the new spirit and produced liberal-minded, +forward-looking men.[20] + +The liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of course form the +part of evolutionary progress in Islam. They are in the best sense of +the word conservatives, receptive to healthy change, yet maintaining +their hereditary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith in +Islam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue to draw their +spiritual sustenance. + +There are, however, other groups in the Moslem world who have so far +succumbed to Western influences that they have more or less lost touch +with both their spiritual and cultural pasts. In all the more civilized +portions of the Moslem world, especially in countries long under +European control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there are many Moslems, +Western educated and Western culture-veneered, who have drifted into an +attitude varying from easygoing religious indifference to avowed +agnosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has entirely departed. +The Algerian Ismael Hamet well describes the attitude of this class of +his fellow-countrymen when he writes: "European scepticism is not +without influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have kept +some attachment for the external forms of their religion, usually ignore +the unhealthy excesses of the religious sentiment. They do not give up +their religion, but they no longer dream of converting all those who do +not practise it; they want to hand it on to their children, but they do +not worry about other men's salvation. This is not belief; it is not +even free thought; but it is lukewarmness."[21] + +Beyond these tepid latitudinarians are still other groups of a very +different character. Here we find combined the most contradictory +sentiments: young men whose brains are seething with radical Western +ideas--atheism, socialism, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet, curiously +enough, these fanatic radicals tend to join hands with the fanatic +reactionaries of Islam in a common hatred of the West. Considering +themselves the born leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant masses, the +radicals hunger for political power and rage against that Western +domination which vetoes their ambitious pretensions. Hence, they are +mostly extreme "Nationalists," while they are also deep in Pan-Islamic +reactionary schemes. Indeed, we often witness the strange spectacle of +atheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a truly dervish zeal. +Mr. Bukhsh well describes this type when he writes: "I know a gentleman, +a _Mohammedan by profession_, who owes his success in life to his faith. +Though, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of Islam and +occasionally stands up in public as the champion and spokesman of his +co-religionists; yet, to my utter horror, I found that he held opinions +about his religion and its founder which even Voltaire would have +rejected with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating contempt."[22] + +Later on we shall examine more fully the activities of these gentry in +the chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism and Nationalism. What I desire to +emphasize here is their pernicious influence on the prospects of a +genuine Mohammedan reformation as visualized by the true reformers whom +I have described. Their malevolent desire to stir up the fanatic +passions of the ignorant masses and their equally malevolent hatred of +everything Western except military improvements are revealed by +outbursts like the following from the pen of a prominent "Young Turk." +"Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in open hostility to all your world of +progress. Learn, ye European observers, that a Christian, whatever his +position, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our eyes a +being devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning is simple and +definitive. We say: the man whose judgment is so perverted as to deny +the evidence of the One God and to fabricate gods of different kinds, +cannot be other than the most ignoble expression of human stupidity. To +speak to him would be a humiliation to our reason and an offence to the +grandeur of the Master of the Universe. The worshipper of false gods is +a monster of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; to +combat him, convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest task of the +Faithful. These are the eternal commands of our One God. For us there +are in this world only Believers and Misbelievers; love, charity, +fraternity to Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers. Among +Misbelievers, the most odious and criminal are those who, while +recognizing God, create Him of earthly parents, give Him a son, a +mother; so monstrous an aberration surpasses, in our eyes, all bounds of +iniquity; the presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our +existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith; +their contact a pollution for our bodies; any relation with them a +torture for our souls. + +"While detesting you, we have been studying your political institutions +and your military organizations. Besides the new arms which Providence +procures for us by your own means, you yourselves have rekindled the +inextinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, our +Babis, our new fraternities, all are sects in their varied forms, are +inspired by the same thought, the same purpose. Toward what end? +Christian civilization? Never!"[23] + +Such harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among the Moslem masses. +Although the liberal reformers are a growing power in Islam, it must not +be forgotten that they are as yet only a minority, an elite, below whom +lie the ignorant masses, still suffering from the blight of age-long +obscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own world, which they +regard as the highest ideal of human existence, and fanatically hating +everything outside as wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even when +compelled to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it none the +less. They rebel blindly against the spirit of change which is forcing +them out of their old ruts, and their anger is still further heightened +by that ubiquitous Western domination which is pressing upon them from +all sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the Pan-Islamic and +Nationalist leaders who mould the multitude to their own sinister ends. + +Islam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of liberal reform and +chauvinistic reaction. The liberals are not only the hope of an +evolutionary reformation, they are also favoured by the trend of the +times, since the Moslem world is being continually permeated by Western +progress and must continue to be thus permeated unless Western +civilization itself collapses in ruin. Yet, though the ultimate triumph +of the liberals appears probable, what delays, what setbacks, what fresh +barriers of warfare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionaries +bring about! Neither the reform of Islam nor the relations between East +and West are free from perils whose ominous possibilities we shall later +discuss. + +Meanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that throughout the Moslem +world a numerous and powerful minority, composed not merely of +Westernized persons but also of orthodox conservatives, are aware of +Islam's decadence and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformation +along liberal, progressive lines is at once a practical necessity and a +sacred duty. Exactly how this reformation shall be legally effected has +not yet been determined, nor is a detailed discussion of technical +machinery necessary for our consideration.[24] History teaches us that +where the will to reform is vitally present, reformation will somehow or +other be accomplished. + +One thing is certain: the reforming spirit, in its various +manifestations, has already produced profound changes throughout Islam. +The Moslem world of to-day is vastly different from the Moslem world of +a century ago. The Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindled +a purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not been without +moral compensations. The spread of liberal principles and Western +progress goes on apace. If there is much to fear for the future, there +is also much to hope. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[5] On the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au +dix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern +Questions_ (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, _Muslim Theology_ (London, +1903); J. L. Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys_ (2 vols., +London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le Deisme des Wahhabis," _Journal +Asiatique_, IV., Vol. II., pp. 168 _et seq._ + +[6] Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslem +liberal of the mid-nineteenth century. + +[7] For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North Indian +Moslems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W. +W. Hunter, _The Indian Musalmans_ (London, 1872). + +[8] For the Babbist movement, see Clement Huart, _La Religion de Bab_ +(Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, +1867). A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan +revival is found in Le Chatelier, _op. cit._ + +[9] _Mishkat-el-Masabih_, I., 46, 51. + +[10] The best recent examples of this polemical literature are the +writings of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well known missionary to the +Arabs; especially his _Arabia, the Cradle of Islam_ (Edinburgh, 1900), +and _The Reproach of Islam_ (London, 1915). Also see volume entitled +_The Mohammedan World of To-day_, being a collection of the papers read +at the Protestant Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906. + +[11] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II., p. 229 (London, 1908). For +Renan's attitude, see his _L'Islamisme et la Science_ (Paris, 1883). + +[12] In the year 1633. + +[13] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_ (Paris, +1906). + +[14] Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877). + +[15] The Mollahs are the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactly +correspond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anything +like a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordained +priestly class or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, +Brahmanism, and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conduct +religious services. As time passed, however, a class of men developed +who were learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately became +practically priests, though theoretically they should be regarded as +theological lawyers. There also developed religious orders of dervishes, +etc.; but primitive Islam knew nothing of them. + +[16] From the article by Leon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, _Histoire +Generale_, Vol. XII., p. 498. This article gives an excellent general +survey of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in the +nineteenth century. + +[17] Especially his best-known book, _The Spirit of Islam_ (London, +1891). + +[18] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 20, 24, 284. +(London, 1912). + +[19] 1856 to 1878. + +[20] For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see Arminius +Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_ (London, 1906). + +[21] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_, p. 268 +(Paris, 1906). + +[22] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _op. cit._, p. 241. + +[23] Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, _Mecheroutiette_, of +August, 1921. Quoted from A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, +Constantine, Algeria, 1913. + +[24] For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, _The Future +of Islam_ (London, 1882); A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme +Siecle_ (Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877); H. N. +Brailsford "Modernism in Islam," _The Fortnightly Review_, September, +1908; Sir Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed?" _The Nineteenth +Century and After_, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique," +_Revue Politique Internationale_, July, 1916; XX, "L'Islam apres la +Guerre," _Revue de Paris_, 15 January, 1916. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +PAN-ISLAMISM + + +Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival is highly complex. +Starting with the simple, puritan protest of Wahabism, it has developed +many phases, widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In the +previous chapter we examined the phase looking toward an evolutionary +reformation of Islam and a genuine assimilation of the progressive +spirit as well as the external forms of Western civilization. At the +same time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only a +minority, an elite; while the Moslem masses, still plunged in ignorance +and imperfectly awakened from their age-long torpor, are influenced by +other leaders of a very different character--men inclined to militant +rather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than receptive to the +West. These militant forces are, in their turn, complex. They may be +grouped roughly under the general concepts known as "Pan-Islamism" and +"Nationalism." It is to a consideration of the first of these two +concepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter is devoted. + +Pan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling of solidarity +between all "True Believers," is as old as the Prophet, when Mohammed +and his few followers were bound together by the tie of faith against +their pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To Mohammed the +principle of fraternal solidarity among Moslems was of transcendent +importance, and he succeeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem +hearts that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. The bond +between Moslem and Moslem is to-day much stronger than that between +Christian and Christian. Of course Moslems fight bitterly among +themselves, but these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family +quarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel aggression. +Islam's profound sense of solidarity probably explains in large part its +extraordinary hold upon its followers. No other religion has such a grip +on its votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christianity and +Brahmanism,[25] and has driven Magism from the face of the earth;[26] +yet there has been no single instance where a people, once become +Moslem, has ever abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been, +like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy. + +Islam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of its fundamental +institutions: the "Hajj," or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the caliphate. +Contrary to the general opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than +the caliphate which has exerted the more consistently unifying +influence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme act of faith, and +every year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive, drawn from every quarter of +the Moslem world. There, before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all +races, tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstasy of common +devotion, returning to their homes bearing the proud title of "Hajjis," +or Pilgrims--a title which insures them the reverent homage of their +fellow Moslems for all the rest of their days. The political +implications of the Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial +Pan-Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are discussed +by delegates from every part of the Mohammedan world, and where plans +are elaborated for Islam's defence and propagation. Here nearly all the +militant leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, Mahommed ben +Sennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani, and many more) felt the imperious +summons to their task.[27] + +As for the caliphate, it has played a great historic role, especially in +its early days, and we have already studied its varying fortunes. +Reduced to a mere shadow after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was +revived by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and were +recognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world.[28] However, these +sultan-caliphs of Stambul[29] never succeeded in winning the religious +homage accorded their predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes, +especially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anachronism to which +they could never be truly reconciled. Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure, +made an ambitious attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness, +but such success as he attained was due more to the general tide of +Pan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency of the caliphal name. +The real leaders of modern Pan-Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely +qualified allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. This +was not realized in Europe, which came to fear Abdul Hamid as a sort of +Mohammedan pope. Even to-day most Western observers seem to think that +Pan-Islamism centres in the caliphate, and we see European publicists +hopefully discussing whether the caliphate's retention by the +discredited Turkish sultans, its transference to the Shereef of Mecca, +or its total suppression, will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This, +however, is a distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal institution is +still undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd leaders of the +modern Pan-Islamic movement have long been working on a much broader +basis. They realize that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day lies +not in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and the great +Pan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, of which I shall +presently speak.[30] + +Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. Its first stage +was of course the Wahabi movement. The Wahabi state founded by +Abd-el-Wahab in the Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the +Meccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely disciple, Saud, loosed +his fanatic hosts upon the holy cities, he dreamed that this was but the +first step in a puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem +world. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nevertheless, soon +produced profound political disturbances in distant regions like +northern India and Afghanistan, as I have already narrated. They were, +however, all integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially +protests against the political decadence of Moslem states and the moral +decadence of Moslem rulers. These outbreaks were not inspired by any +special fear or hatred of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously +assailing Islam except in outlying regions like European Turkey or the +Indies, and the impending peril was consequently not appreciated. + +By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the situation had +radically altered. The French conquest of Algeria, the Russian +acquisition of Transcaucasia, and the English mastery of virtually all +India, convinced thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly +peril of falling under Western domination. It was at this time that +Pan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti-Western character which it +has ever since retained. At first resistance to Western encroachment was +sporadic and unco-ordinated. Here and there heroic figures like +Abd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the Caucasus fought brilliantly +against the European invaders. But though these paladins of the faith +were accorded widespread sympathy from Moslems, they received no +tangible assistance and, unaided, fell. + +Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew in intensity, and +the seventies saw the Moslem world swept from end to end by a wave of +militant fanaticism. In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of +1871, while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men" preaching +holy wars, the greatest of these being the Mahdist insurrection in the +Egyptian Sudan, which maintained itself against England's best efforts +down to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of the century. +In Afghanistan there was an intense exacerbation of fanaticism awakening +sympathetic echoes among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the +British much trouble. In Central Asia there was a similar access of +fanaticism, centring in the powerful Nakechabendiya fraternity, +spreading eastward into Chinese territory and culminating in the great +revolts of the Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and Yunnan. +In the Dutch East Indies there was a whole series of revolts, the most +serious of these being the Atchin War, which dragged on interminably, +not being quite stamped out even to-day. + +The salient characteristic of this period of militant unrest is its lack +of co-ordination. These risings were all spontaneous outbursts of local +populations; animated, to be sure, by the same spirit of fear and +hatred, and inflamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evidence +of a central authority laying settled plans and moving in accordance +with a definite programme. The risings were inspired largely by the +mystical doctrine known as "Mahdism." Mahdism was unknown to primitive +Islam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But in the "traditions," +or reputed sayings of Mohammed, there occurs the statement that the +Prophet predicted the coming of one bearing the title of "El Mahdi"[31] +who would fill the earth with equity and justice. From this arose the +widespread mystical hope in the appearance of a divinely inspired +personage who would effect the universal triumph of Islam, purge the +world of infidels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems. This +doctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history. At various times +fanatic leaders have arisen claiming to be El Mahdi, "The Master of the +Hour," and have won the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just as +certain "Messiahs" have similarly excited the Jews. It was thus natural +that, in their growing apprehension and impotent rage at Western +aggression, the Moslem masses should turn to the messianic hope of +Mahdism. Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothing +constructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire; flaring up fiercely +here and there, then dying down, leaving the disillusioned masses more +discouraged and apathetic than before. + +Now all this was recognized by the wiser supporters of the Pan-Islamic +idea. The impotence of the wildest outbursts of local fanaticism against +the methodical might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that long +preparation and complete co-ordination of effort were necessary if Islam +was to have any chance of throwing off the European yoke. Such men also +realized that they must study Western methods and adopt much of the +Western technique of power. Above all, they felt that the political +liberation of Islam from Western domination must be preceded by a +profound spiritual regeneration, thereby engendering the moral forces +necessary both for the war of liberation and for the fruitful +reconstruction which should follow thereafter. At this point the ideals +of Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both recognize +Islam's present decadence; both desire its spiritual regeneration. It is +on the nature of that regeneration that the two parties are opposed. The +liberals believe that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas. The +Pan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that primitive Islam contains +all that is necessary for regeneration, and contend that only Western +methods and material achievements should be adopted by the Moslem world. + +The beginnings of self-conscious, systematic Pan-Islamism date from +about the middle of the nineteenth century. The movement crystallizes +about two foci: the new-type religious fraternities like the Sennussiya, +and the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by Djemal-ed-Din. Let +us first consider the fraternities. + +Religious fraternities have existed in Islam for centuries. They all +possess the same general type of organization, being divided into lodges +("Zawias") headed by Masters known as "Mokaddem," who exercise a more or +less extensive authority over the "Khouan" or Brethren. Until the +foundation of the new-type organizations like the Sennussi, however, the +fraternities exerted little practical influence upon mundane affairs. +Their interests were almost wholly religious, of a mystical, devotional +nature, often characterized by great austerities or by fanatical +excesses like those practised by the whirling and howling dervishes. +Such political influence as they did exert was casual and local. +Anything like joint action was impossible, owing to their mutual +rivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraternities still exist in +great numbers, but they are without political importance except as they +have been leavened by the new-type fraternities. + +The new-type organizations date from about the middle of the nineteenth +century, the most important in every way being the Sennussiya. Its +founder, Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem, Algeria, +about the year 1800. As his title "Seyid" indicates, he was a descendant +of the Prophet, and was thus born to a position of honour and +importance.[32] He early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety, +studying theology at the Moorish University of Fez and afterwards +travelling widely over North Africa preaching a reform of the prevailing +religious abuses. He then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there his +reformist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi teachers. It +was at that time that he appears to have definitely formulated his plan +of a great puritan order, and in 1843 he returned to North Africa, +settling in Tripoli, where he built his first Zawia, known as the "Zawia +Baida," or White Monastery, in the mountains near Derna. So impressive +was his personality and so great his organizing ability that converts +flocked to him from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soon +alarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations became so +strained that Seyid Mahommed presently moved his headquarters to the +oasis of Jarabub, far to the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in +1859, his organization had spread over the greater part of North Africa. + +Seyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninterruptedly by his son, usually +known as Sennussi-el-Mahdi. The manner in which this son gained his +succession typifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two sons, El +Mahdi being the younger. While they were still mere lads, their father +determined to put them to a test, to discover which of them had the +stronger faith. In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons climb +a tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his Prophet to leap +to the ground. The younger lad leaped at once and reached the ground +unharmed; the elder boy refused to spring. To El Mahdi, "who feared not +to commit himself to the will of God," passed the right to rule. +Throughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justified his father's +choice, displaying wisdom and piety of a high order, and further +extending the power of the fraternity. During the latter part of his +reign he removed his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, still farther +into the Lybian desert, where he died in 1902, and was succeeded by his +nephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the Order, who also appears +to possess marked ability. + +With nearly eighty years of successful activity behind it, the Sennussi +Order is to-day one of the vital factors in Islam. It counts its +adherents in every quarter of the Moslem world. In Arabia its followers +are very numerous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life of +the holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however, still remains +the focus of Sennussism. The whole of northern Africa, from Morocco to +Somaliland, is dotted with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutely +dependent upon the Grand Lodge, headed by The Master, El Sennussi. The +Sennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of the Lybian Sahara. +Only one European eye[33] has ever seen this mysterious spot. Surrounded +by absolute desert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes of +approach known only to experienced Sennussi guides, every one of whom +would suffer a thousand deaths rather than betray him, El Sennussi, The +Master, sits serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North Africa. + +The influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound. The local Zawias +are more than mere "lodges." Besides the Mokaddem, or Master, there is +also a "Wekil," or civil governor, and these officers have discretionary +authority not merely over the Zawia members but also over the community +at large--at least, so great is the awe inspired by the Sennussiya +throughout North Africa, that a word from Wekil or Mokaddem is always +listened to and obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonial +authorities, British, French, or Italian, as the case may be, there +exists an occult government with which the colonial authorities are +careful not to come into conflict. + +On their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid a downright +breach with the European Powers. Their long-headed, cautious policy is +truly astonishing. For more than half a century the order has been a +great force, yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many of +the fanatic risings which have occurred in various parts of Africa, +local Sennussi have undoubtedly taken part, and the same was true during +the Italian campaign in Tripoli and in the late war, but the order +itself has never officially entered the lists. + +In fact, this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and haughty aloofness +is maintained not only towards Christians but also towards the other +powers that be in Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolute +freedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have never been cordial. +Even the wily Abdul Hamid, at the height of his prestige as the champion +of Pan-Islamism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldly +platonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el-Mahdi's +favourite remarks was said to have been: "Turks and Christians: I will +break both of them with one and the same stroke." Equally characteristic +was his attitude toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the "Mahdist" +uprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with victory, Mahommed Ahmed +sent emissaries to El Sennussi, asking his aid. El Sennussi refused, +remarking haughtily: "What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? Am +I not myself Mahdi if I choose?" + +These Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi are idle. Far from +it. On the contrary, they are ceaselessly at work with the spiritual +arms of teaching, discipline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme is +the welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole Moslem +world into the revived "Imamat" of Islam's early days; into a great +theocracy, embracing all True Believers--in other words, Pan-Islamism. +But they believe that the political liberation of Islam from Christian +domination must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration. Toward +this end they strive ceaselessly to improve the manners and morals of +the populations under their influence, while they also strive to improve +material conditions by encouraging the better cultivation of oases, +digging new wells, building rest-houses along the caravan routes, and +promoting trade. The slaughter and rapine practised by the Sudanese +Mahdists disgusted the Sennussi and drew from their chief words of +scathing condemnation. + +All this explains the Order's unprecedented self-restraint. This is the +reason why, year after year and decade after decade, the Sennussi +advance slowly, calmly, coldly; gathering great latent power, but +avoiding the temptation to expend it one instant before the proper time. +Meanwhile they are covering North Africa with their lodges and schools, +disciplining the people to the voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils; and, +to the southward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith of +Islam.[34] + +Nothing better shows modern Islam's quickened vitality than the revival +of missionary fervour during the past hundred years. Of course Islam has +always displayed strong proselytizing power. Its missionary successes in +its early days were extraordinary, and even in its period of decline it +never wholly lost its propagating vigour. Throughout the Middle Ages +Islam continued to gain ground in India and China; the Turks planted it +firmly in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and sixteenth +centuries Moslem missionaries won notable triumphs in such distant +regions as West Africa, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines. +Nevertheless, taking the Moslem world as a whole, religious zeal +undoubtedly declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenth +century. + +The first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however, blew the +smouldering embers of proselytism into a new flame, and everywhere +except in Europe Islam began once more advancing portentously along all +its far-flung frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some extent, a born +missionary and instinctively propagates his faith among his non-Moslem +neighbours, so the work was carried on not only by priestly specialists +but also by multitudes of travellers, traders, and humble migratory +workers.[35] Of course numerous zealots consecrated their lives to the +task. This was particularly true of the religious fraternities. The +Sennussi have especially distinguished themselves by their apostolic +fervour, and from those natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara, +thousands of "Marabouts" have gone forth with flashing eyes and swelling +breasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured with a zeal like that +of the Christian mendicant friars of the Middle Ages. Islam's +missionary triumphs among the negroes of West and Central Africa during +the past century have been extraordinary. Every candid European observer +tells the same story. As an Englishman very justly remarked some twenty +years ago: "Mohammedanism is making marvellous progress in the interior +of Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it the Christian +propaganda is a myth."[36] And a French Protestant missionary remarks in +similar vein: "We see Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down but +never stopped, towards the heart of Africa. Despite all obstacles +encountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears nothing. Even +Christianity, its most serious rival, Islam regards without hate, so +sure is it of victory. While Christians dream of the conquest of Africa, +the Mohammedans do it."[37] + +The way in which Islam is marching southward is dramatically shown by a +recent incident. A few years ago the British authorities suddenly +discovered that Mohammedanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigation +brought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar Arabs. They began +their propaganda about 1900. Ten years later almost every village in +southern Nyassaland had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Although +the movement was frankly anti-European, the British authorities did not +dare to check it for fear of repercussions elsewhere. Many European +observers fear that it is only a question of time when Islam will cross +the Zambezi and enter South Africa. + +And these gains are not made solely against paganism. They are being won +at the expense of African Christianity as well. In West Africa the +European missions lose many of their converts to Islam, while across +the continent the ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost against +Islam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem tide. Not by +warlike incursions, but by peaceful penetration, the Abyssinians are +being Islamized. "Tribes which, fifty or sixty years ago, counted hardly +a Mohammedan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according to the +precepts of Islam."[38] + +Islam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most noteworthy missionary +victories, but they by no means tell the whole story, as a few instances +drawn from other quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previous +chapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars. +That, however, was only one phase of the Mohammedan Revival in that +region, another phase being a marked resurgence of proselyting zeal. +These Tartars had long been under Russian rule, and the Orthodox Church +had made persistent efforts to convert them, in some instances with +apparent success. But when the Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartars +early in the nineteenth century, they immediately began labouring with +their christianized brethren, and in a short time most of these reverted +to Islam despite the best efforts of the Orthodox Church and the +punitive measures of the Russian governmental authorities. Tartar +missionaries also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes to +the northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their Russian +masters.[39] + +In China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed an extraordinary +development of Moslem energy. Islam had reached China in very early +times, brought in by Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers. +Despite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women, their descendants +still differ perceptibly from the general Chinese population, and +regard themselves as a separate and superior people. The Chinese +Mohammedans are mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan +and the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially Chinese Moslems, +another centre of Mohammedan population is found in the Chinese +dependency of Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocks +and conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century. Until +comparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems were well treated, but +gradually their proud-spirited attitude alarmed the Chinese Government, +which withdrew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in the +nineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan Revival reached China, +as it did every other part of the Moslem world, and the Chinese +Mohammedans, inflamed by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revolts +culminating in the great rebellions which took place about the year +1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan. As usual, these +fanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fighting power. The Turkestan +rebels found an able leader, one Yakub Beg, and for some years both +Turkestan and Yunnan were virtually independent. To many European +observers at that time it looked as though the rebels might join hands, +erect a permanent Mohammedan state in western China, and even overrun +the whole empire. The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem world, +the Sultan of Turkey honouring him with the high title of Commander of +the Faithful. After years of bitter fighting, accompanied by frightful +massacres, the Chinese Government subdued the rebels. The Chinese +Moslems, greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their former +strength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and to-day they number +fully 10,000,000. Thus, Chinese Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factor +to be reckoned with in the future.[40] + +The above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's activities during +the past century. In India, for example, Islam has continued to gain +ground rapidly, while in the Dutch Indies it is the same story.[41] +European domination actually favours rather than retards the spread of +Islam, for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the railroad, +the post-office, and the printing-press, useful adjuncts to Islamic +propaganda. + +Let us now consider the second originating centre of modern +Pan-Islamism--the movement especially associated with the personality of +Djemal-ed-Din. + +Seyid Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani was born early in the nineteenth century +at Asadabad, near Hamadan, in Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he was +of Afghan rather than Iranian descent, while his title "Seyid," meaning +descendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood. Endowed with +a keen intelligence, great personal magnetism, and abounding vigour, +Djemal-ed-Din had a stormy and chequered career. He was a great +traveller, knowing intimately not only most of the Moslem world but +western Europe as well. From these travels, supplemented by wide +reading, he gained a notable fund of information which he employed +effectively in his manifold activities. A born propagandist, +Djemal-ed-Din attracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islam +his strong personality started an intellectual ferment. Unlike El +Sennussi, he concerned himself very little with theology, devoting +himself to politics. Djemal-ed-Din was the first Mohammedan who fully +grasped the impending peril of Western domination, and he devoted his +life to warning the Islamic world of the danger and attempting to +elaborate measures of defence. By European colonial authorities he was +soon singled out as a dangerous agitator. The English, in particular, +feared and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India, he went to +Egypt about 1880, and had a hand in the anti-European movement of Arabi +Pasha. When the English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelled +Djemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching Constantinople. +Here he found a generous patron in Abdul-Hamid, then evolving his +Pan-Islamic policy. Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, and +promptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propaganda bureau. In +fact, it is probable that the success of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policy +was largely due to Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at an +advanced age, active to the last. + +Djemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as follows: + +"The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race and +nationality, is, as against the East and especially as against Islam, +united for the destruction of all Mohammedan states. + +"The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peter +the Hermit. At heart, Christendom still regards Islam with fanatical +hatred and contempt. This is shown in many ways, as in international +law, before which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of +Christian nations. + +"Christian governments excuse the attacks and humiliations inflicted +upon Moslem states by citing the latter's backward and barbarous +condition; yet these same governments stifle by a thousand means, even +by war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands. + +"Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to some +of them, and the result of this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort for +Islam's destruction. + +"Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured and calumniated by +Christendom. 'The Europeans call in the Orient "fanaticism" what at home +they call "nationalism" and "patriotism." And what in the West they call +"self-respect," "pride," "national honour," in the East they call +"chauvinism." What in the West they esteem as national sentiment, in the +East they consider xenophobia.'[42] + +"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world must unite in a +great defensive alliance, to preserve itself from destruction; and, to +do this, it must acquire the technique of Western progress and learn the +secrets of European power." + +Such, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din, propagated with +eloquence and authority for many years. Given the state of mingled fear +and hatred of Western encroachment that was steadily spreading +throughout the Moslem world, it is easy to see how great Djemal's +influence must have been. And of course Djemal was not alone in his +preaching. Other influential Moslems were agitating along much the same +lines as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. One of these +pioneers was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to remark: +"What we want is rather an increase of fanaticism than a diminution of +it."[43] Arminius Vambery, the eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar, +states that shortly after the Crimean War he was present at a militant +Pan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far parts of the +Moslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace.[44] + +Such were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul Hamid built his +ambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul Hamid is one of the strangest +personalities of modern times. A man of unusual intelligence, his mind +was yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge of insanity. +Nursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he tried to carry them out by +dark and tortuous methods which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian, +were sometimes absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he strove to +keep the smallest decisions dependent on his arbitrary will, albeit he +was frequently guided by clever sycophants who knew how to play upon his +superstitions and his prejudices. + +Abdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very difficult +circumstances. The country was on the verge of a disastrous Russian war, +while the government was in the hands of statesmen who were endeavouring +to transform Turkey into a modern state and who had introduced all sorts +of Western political innovations, including a parliament. Abdul Hamid, +however, soon changed all this. Taking advantage of the confusion which +marked the close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and made +himself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors had ever been. +Secure in his autocratic power, Abdul Hamid now began to evolve his own +peculiar policy, which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamic +trend[45]. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid determined to +use his position as caliph for far-reaching political ends. Emphasizing +his spiritual headship of the Mohammedan world rather than his political +headship of the Turkish state, he endeavoured to win the active support +of all Moslems and, by that support, to intimidate European Powers who +might be formulating aggressive measures against the Ottoman Empire. +Before long Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic propaganda +organization, working mainly by secretive, tortuous methods. +Constantinople became the Mecca of all the fanatics and anti-Western +agitators like Djemal-ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forth +swarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant parts of Islam +the Caliph's message of hope and impending deliverance from the menace +of infidel rule. + +Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda went on uninterruptedly for nearly +thirty years. Precisely what this propaganda accomplished is very +difficult to estimate. In the first place, it was cut short, and to some +extent reversed, by the Young-Turk resolution of 1908 which drove Abdul +Hamid from the throne. It certainly was never put to the test of a war +between Turkey and a first-class European Power. This is what renders +any theoretical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did succeed in +gaining the respectful acknowledgment of his spiritual authority by most +Moslem princes and notables, and he certainly won the pious veneration +of the Moslem masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard the +mighty Caliph in Stambul as, in very truth, the Defender of the Faith, +and to consider his empire as the bulwark of Islam. On the other hand, +it is a far cry from pious enthusiasm to practical performance. +Furthermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning over powerful +Pan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who suspected his motives and +questioned his judgment; while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked him +for his despotic, reactionary, inefficient rule. It is thus a very +debatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever called upon the +Moslem world for armed assistance in a "holy war," he would have been +generally supported. + +Yet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general spread of Pan-Islamic +sentiment throughout the Moslem world. In this larger sense he +succeeded; albeit not so much from his position as caliph as because he +incarnated the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may conclude +that Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda did produce profound and +lasting effects which will have to be seriously reckoned with. + +The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated the situation. It +was soon followed by the Persian revolution and by kindred symptoms in +other parts of the East. These events brought into sudden prominence new +forces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and even social unrest, +which had long been obscurely germinating in Islam but which had been +previously denied expression. We shall later consider these new forces +in detail. The point to be here noted is their complicating effect on +the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was, in fact, cross-cut and +deflected from its previous course, and a period of confusion and mental +uncertainty supervened. + +This interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism had recovered its +poise and was moving forward once more. The reason was renewed pressure +from the West. In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's African +dependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Christian Balkan states +attacked Turkey in the Balkan War, which sheared away Turkey's European +provinces to the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled and +discredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years Russia and England +strangled the Persian revolution, while France, as a result of the +Agadir crisis, closed her grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years, +the Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults not only +unprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes, quite without provocation. + +The effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of mingled despair and +rage swept the Moslem world from end to end. And, of course, the +Pan-Islamic implication was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam's +agitators had been preaching for fifty years--the Crusade of the West +for Islam's destruction. What could be better confirmation of the +warnings of Djemal-ed-Din? + +The results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks and Arabs had been +on the worst of terms, both races clasped hands in a sudden access of +Pan-Islamic fervour, and the Italian invaders were met with a fanatical +fury that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western observers +with grave disquietude. "Why has Italy found 'defenceless' Tripoli such +a hornets' nest?" queried Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister of +foreign affairs. "It is because she has to do, not merely with Turkey, +but with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball rolling--so much the +worse for her--and for us all."[46] The Anglo-Russian man-handling of +Persia likewise roused much wrathful comment throughout Islam,[47] while +the impending extinction of Moroccan independence at French hands was +discussed with mournful indignation. + +But with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of Islam knew no bounds. +From China to the Congo, pious Moslems watched with bated breath the +swaying battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news of +Turkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish rose hoarse and +high. A prominent Indian Mohammedan well expressed the feelings of his +co-religionists everywhere when he wrote: "The King of Greece orders a +new Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls to Christian +fanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already speaks of the planting of the +Cross on the dome of Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrow +they will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar. Brothers! Be +ye of one mind, that it is the duty of every True Believer to hasten +beneath the Khalifa's banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety of +the faith."[48] And another Indian Moslem leader thus adjured the +British authorities: "I appeal to the present government to change its +anti-Turkish attitude before the fury of millions of Moslem +fellow-subjects is kindled to a blaze and brings disaster."[49] + +Most significant of all were the appeals made at this time by Moslems to +non-Mohammedan Asiatics for sympathy and solidarity against the hated +West. This was a development as unprecedented as it was startling. +Mohammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testaments, and regarding +himself as the successor of the divinely inspired prophets Moses and +Jesus, had enjoined upon his followers relative respect for Christians +and Jews ("Peoples of the Book") in contrast with other non-Moslems, +whom he stigmatized as "Idolaters." These injunctions of the Prophet had +always been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of Moslems for +Christians, however bitter, had been as nothing compared with their +loathing and contempt for "Idolaters" like the Brahmanist Hindus or the +Buddhists and Confucianists of the Far East. + +The first symptom of a change in attitude appeared during the +Russo-Japanese War of 1904. So great had Islam's fear and hatred of the +Christian West then become, that the triumph of an Asiatic people over +Europeans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems, even though the +victors were "Idolaters." It was quite in keeping with Pan-Islamism's +strong missionary bent that many pious Moslems should have dreamed of +bringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to get in touch +with Japan were made. Propagandist papers were founded, missionaries +were selected, and the Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamic +delegation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conversion of Japan +was widely discussed. Said an Egyptian journal in the year 1906: +"England, with her sixty million Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion. +With a Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change entirely."[50] +And, at the other end of the Moslem world, a Chinese Mohammedan sheikh +wrote: "If Japan thinks of becoming some day a very great power and +making Asia the dominator of the other continents, it will be only by +adopting the blessed religion of Islam."[51] + +Of course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts that while Japan +received Islam's emissaries with smiling courtesy, she had not the +faintest intention of turning Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first step +had been taken towards friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia, and the +Balkan War drove Moslems much further in this direction. The change in +Moslem sentiment can be gauged by the numerous appeals made by the +Indian Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen from the +following sample entitled significantly "The Message of the East." +"Spirit of the East," reads this noteworthy document, "arise and repel +the swelling flood of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid us +with your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your power, the +birthright and heritage of the Hindu! Let the Spirit Powers hidden in +the Himalayan mountain-peaks arise. Let prayers to the god of battles +float upward; prayers that right may triumph over might; and call to +your myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!"[52] + +To any one who realizes the traditional Moslem attitude towards +"Idolaters" such words are simply amazing. They betoken a veritable +revolution in outlook. And such sentiments were not confined to Indian +Moslems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems as well. Said a +Mohammedan newspaper of Chinese Turkestan, advocating a fraternal union +of all Chinese against Western aggression: "Europe has grown too +presumptuous. It will deprive us of our liberty; it will destroy us +altogether if we do not bestir ourselves promptly and prepare for a +powerful resistance."[53] During the troublous first stages of the +Chinese revolution, the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulky +aloofness, co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucian +fellow-patriots that Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican leader, announced +gratefully: "The Chinese will never forget the assistance which their +Moslem fellow-countrymen have rendered in the interest of order and +liberty."[54] + +The Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply stirred against +European aggression, keenly conscious of its own solidarity, and frankly +reaching out for Asiatic allies in the projected struggle against +European domination. + +Under these circumstances it may at first sight appear strange that no +general Islamic explosion occurred when Turkey entered the lists at the +close of 1914 and the Sultan Caliph issued a formal summons to the Holy +War. Of course this summons was not the flat failure which Allied +reports led the West to believe at the time. As a matter of fact, there +was trouble in practically every Mohammedan land under Allied control. +To name only a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumult +smothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements, Tripoli burst +into a flame of insurrection that drove the Italians headlong to the +coast, Persia was prevented from joining Turkey only by prompt +Russo-British intervention, while the Indian North-West Frontier was the +scene of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a million +Anglo-Indian troops. The British Government has officially admitted that +during 1915 the Allies' Asiatic and African possessions stood within a +hand's breadth of a cataclysmic insurrection. + +That insurrection would certainly have taken place if Islam's leaders +had everywhere spoken the fateful word. But the word was not spoken. +Instead, influential Moslems outside of Turkey generally condemned the +latter's action and did all in their power to calm the passions of the +fanatic multitude. + +The attitude of these leaders does credit to their discernment. They +recognized that this was neither the time nor the occasion for a +decisive struggle with the West. They were not yet materially prepared, +and they had not perfected their understandings either among themselves +or with their prospective non-Moslem allies. Above all, the moral urge +was lacking. They knew that athwart the Khalifa's writ was stencilled +"Made in Germany." They knew that the "Young-Turk" clique which had +engineered the coup was made up of Europeanized renegades, many of them +not even nominal Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had no +intention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, nor did they +wish to further Prussian schemes of world-dominion which for themselves +would have meant a mere change of masters. Far better to let the West +fight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal fully its future +intentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide its time, grow in strength, and +await the morrow. + +The Versailles peace conference was just such a revelation of European +intentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders had been waiting for in order to +perfect their programmes and enlist the moral solidarity of their +followers. At Versailles the European Powers showed unequivocally that +they had no intention of relaxing their hold upon the Near and Middle +East. By a number of secret treaties negotiated during the war, the +Ottoman Empire had been virtually partitioned between the victorious +Allies, and these secret treaties formed the basis of the Versailles +settlement. Furthermore, Egypt had been declared a British protectorate +at the very beginning of the war, while the Versailles conference had +scarcely adjourned before England announced an "agreement" with Persia +which made that country another British protectorate in fact if not in +name. The upshot was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle East +were subjected to European political domination as never before. + +But there was another side to the shield. During the war years the +Allied statesmen had officially proclaimed times without number that the +war was being fought to establish a new world-order based on such +principles as the rights of small nations and the liberty of all +peoples. These pronouncements had been treasured and memorized +throughout the East. When, therefore, the East saw a peace settlement +based, not upon these high professions, but upon the imperialistic +secret treaties, it was fired with a moral indignation and sense of +outraged justice never known before. A tide of impassioned determination +began rising which has set already the entire East in tumultuous +ferment, and which seems merely the premonitory ground-swell of a +greater storm. So ominous were the portents that even before the +Versailles conference had adjourned many European students of Eastern +affairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the judgment of +Leone Caetani, Duke of Sermoneta, an Italian authority on Mohammedan +questions. Speaking in the spring of 1919 on the war's effect on the +East, he said: "The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental +civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world, from China +to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of +anti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, +discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, +and Lybia are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment, +and have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world against +European civilization."[55] + +Those words are a prophetic forecast of what has since occurred in the +Moslem world. Because recent events are perhaps even more involved with +the nationalistic aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are with +the strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their detailed +discussion till the chapter on Nationalism. We should, however, remember +that Moslem nationalism and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internal +differences, tend to unite against the external pressure of European +domination and equally desire Islam's liberation from European +political control. Remembering these facts, let us survey the present +condition of the Pan-Islamic movement. + +Pan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by Western pressure, +especially by the late war and the recent peace settlements. However, +Pan-Islamism must not be considered as merely a defensive political +reaction against external aggression. It springs primarily from that +deep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to Moslem by bonds much +stronger than those which unite the members of the Christian world. +These bonds are not merely religious, in the technical sense; they are +social and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world, despite wide +differences in local customs and regulations, the basic laws of family +and social conduct are everywhere the same. "The truth is that Islam is +more than a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civilization +with a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own; in its long +struggle against the rival civilization of Christendom it has become an +organic unit conscious of itself."[56] + +To this Islamic civilization all Moslems are deeply attached. In this +larger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal. Even the most liberal-minded +Moslems, however much they may welcome Western ideas, and however +strongly they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of the +political Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in Islam's essential +solidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem liberal, The Aga Khan, remarks: +"There is a right and legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and +believing Mohammedan belongs--that is, the theory of the spiritual +brotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. The real spiritual +and cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to the follower of the +Prophet it is the foundation of the life and the soul."[57] + +If such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly conversant with +Western culture and receptive to Western progress, what must be the +feelings of the Moslem masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical? +Besides perfectly understandable fear and hatred due to Western +aggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great deal of genuine +fanaticism caused, not by European political domination, but by +religious bigotry and blind hatred of Western civilization.[58] But this +fanaticism has, of course, been greatly inflamed by the political events +of the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and political +hatred of the West have coalesced in a state of mind decidedly ominous +for the peace of the world. We should not delude ourselves into +minimizing the dangerous possibilities of the present situation. Just +because the fake "Holy War" proclaimed by the Young-Turks at German +instigation in 1914 did not come off is no reason for believing that a +real holy war is impossible. As a German staff-officer in Turkish +service during the late struggle very candidly says: "The Holy War was +an absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War."[59] I have +already explained how most Moslems saw through the trick and refused to +budge. + +However, the long series of European aggressions, culminating in the +recent peace settlements which subjected virtually the entire Moslem +world to European domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslem +hearts a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrous +consequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have long been +heaping high. More than twenty years ago Arminius Vambery, who knew the +Moslem world as few Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of the +perils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies. "As time +passes," he wrote in 1898, "the danger of a general war becomes ever +greater. We should not forget that time has considerably augmented the +adversary's force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment of +solidarity which is becoming livelier of late years among the peoples of +Islam, and which in our age of rapid communication is no longer a +negligible quantity, as it was even ten or twenty years ago. + +"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of our +nineteenth-century Crusaders to the importance of the Moslem press, +whose ramifications extend all over Asia and Africa, and whose +exhortations sink more profoundly than they do with us into the souls of +their readers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt, and +Algeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin to exert a profound +influence. Everything that Europe thinks, decides, and executes against +Islam spreads through those countries with the rapidity of lightning. +Caravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the equator, where +the tidings are commented upon in very singular fashion. Certain sparks +struck at our meetings and banquets kindle, little by little, menacing +flames. Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close our eyes to +the dangers lurking beneath an apparent passivity. What the _Terdjuman_ +of Crimea says between the lines is repeated by the Constantinople +_Ikdam_, and is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by _The Moslem +Chronicle_. + +"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is composed of tenuous +and dispersed strands. But Western aggression might easily unite those +strands into a solid whole, bringing about a general war".[60] + +In the decades which have elapsed since Vambery wrote those lines the +situation has become much more tense. Moslem resentment at European +dominance has increased, has been reinforced by nationalistic +aspirations almost unknown during the last century, and possesses +methods of highly efficient propaganda. For example, the Pan-Islamic +press, to which Vambery refers, has developed in truly extraordinary +fashion. In 1900 there were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200 +propagandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 there were +well over 1000.[61] Moslems fully appreciate the post-office, the +railroad, and other modern methods of rapidly interchanging ideas. +"Every Moslem country is in communication with every other Moslem +country: directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travellers, +traders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means of Mohammedan +newspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets, and periodicals. I have met with +Cairo newspapers in Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinople +newspapers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in Mohammerah, +Kerbela, and Port Said."[62] As for the professional Pan-Islamic +propagandists, more particularly those of the religious fraternities, +they swarm everywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people: "Travelling +under a thousand disguises--as merchants, preachers, students, doctors, +workmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks, pretended fools or rhapsodists, +these emissaries are everywhere well received by the Faithful and are +efficaciously protected against the suspicious investigations of the +European colonial authorities."[63] + +Furthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a widespread +conviction, held by liberals and chauvinists alike (albeit for very +different reasons), that Islam is entering on a period of Renaissance +and renewed glory. Says Sir Theodore Morison: "No Mohammedan believes +that Islamic civilization is dead or incapable of further development. +They recognize that it has fallen on evil days; that it has suffered +from an excessive veneration of the past, from prejudice and bigotry and +narrow scholasticism not unlike that which obscured European thought in +the Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam too is about to have its +Renaissance, that it is receiving from Western learning a stimulus which +will quicken it into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this new +life are everywhere manifest."[64] + +Sir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem liberals. How +Pan-Islamists with anti-Western sentiments feel is well set forth by an +Egyptian, Yahya Siddyk, in his well-known book, _The Awakening of the +Islamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira_.[65] The book +is doubly interesting because the author has a thorough Western +education, holding a law degree from the French university of Toulouse, +and is a judge on the Egyptian bench. Although, writing nearly a decade +before the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the imminence of the +European War. "Behold," he writes, "these Great Powers ruining +themselves in terrifying armaments; measuring each other's strength with +defiant glances; menacing each other; contracting alliances which +continually break and which presage those terrible shocks which overturn +the world and cover it with ruins, fire, and blood! The future is God's, +and nothing is lasting save His Will." + +Yahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate. "Does this mean," +he asks, "that Europe, our 'enlightened guide,' has already reached the +summit of its evolution? Has it already exhausted its vital force by two +or three centuries of hyperexertion? In other words: is it already +stricken with senility, and will it see itself soon obliged to yield its +civilizing role to other peoples less degenerate, less neurasthenic, +that is to say, younger, more robust, more healthy, than itself? In my +opinion, the present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colonial +expansion means, not strength, but weakness. Despite the aureole of so +much grandeur, power, and glory, Europe is to-day more divided and more +fragile than ever, and ill conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and its +anguish. Its destiny is inexorably working out!... + +"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both much good and much +evil: good, in the material and intellectual sense; evil, from the moral +and political point of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by a +brilliant civilization, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell into a +malaise; but they are not stricken, they are not dead! These peoples, +conquered by the force of cannon, have not in the least lost their +unity, even under the oppressive regimes to which the Europeans have +long subjected them.... + +"I have said that the European contact has been salutary to us from both +the material and intellectual point of view. What reforming Moslem +princes wished to impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-day +realized a hundredfold. So great has been our progress in the last +twenty-five years in science, letters, and art that we may well hope to +be in all these things the equals of Europe in less than half a +century.... + +"A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of the Hegira, and +this happy century will mark our Renaissance and our great future! A new +breath animates the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems are +penetrated with the necessity of work and instruction! We all wish to +travel, do business, tempt fortune, brave dangers. There is in the East, +among the Mohammedans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknown +twenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public opinion throughout +the East." + +The author concludes: "Let us hold firm, each for all, and let us hope, +hope, hope! We are fairly launched on the path of progress: let us +profit by it! It is Europe's very tyranny which has wrought our +transformation! It is our continued contact with Europe that favours our +evolution and inevitably hastens our revival! It is simply history +repeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling itself despite all +opposition and all resistance.... Europe's tutelage over Asiatics is +becoming more and more nominal--the gates of Asia are closing against +the European! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution without parallel +in the world's annals. A new age is at hand!" + +If this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the opening years of +the century, it is clear that their views must have been confirmed and +intensified by the Great War.[66] The material power of the West was +thereby greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by the +character of the peace settlement and by the attendant disputes which +broke out among the victors. The mutual rivalries and jealousies of +England, France, Italy, and their satellites in the East have given +Moslems much food for hopeful thought, and have caused corresponding +disquietude in European minds. A French publicist recently admonished +his fellow Europeans that "Islam does not recognize our colonial +frontiers," and added warningly, "the great movement of Islamic union +inaugurated by Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani is going on."[67] + +The menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious agitation which has +been going on for the last three years among India's 70,000,000 Moslems +against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This agitation is not +confined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and Sir Theodore +Morison does not overstate the case when he says: "It is time the +British public realized the gravity of what is happening in the East. +The Mohammedan world is ablaze with anger from end to end at the +partition of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far remote +as Kabul and Cairo are symptoms only of this widespread resentment. I +have been in close touch with Mohammedans of India for close upon thirty +years and I think it is my duty to warn the British public of the +passionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed dismemberment +of the Turkish Empire. The diplomats at Versailles apparently thought +that outside the Turkish homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. This +is a disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mohammedan now in +London to realize the white heat to which their anger is rising. In +India itself the whole of the Mohammedan community from Peshawar to +Arcot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women inside the +Zenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who usually take no interest in +public affairs are leaving their shops and counting-houses to organize +remonstrances and petitions; even the mediaeval theologians of Deoband +and the Nadwatul-Ulama, whose detachment from the modern world is +proverbial, are coming from their cloisters to protest against the +destruction of Islam."[68] + +Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslem +liberals are being driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism. +Receptive though the liberals are to Western ideas, and averse though +they are to Pan-Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies, +Europe's intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a temporary +alliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist groups, even though the +liberals know that anything like a holy war would dig a gulf between +East and West, stop the influx of Western stimuli, favour reactionary +fanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a modernist reformation +of Islam. + +Perhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper in Islam that the +last few years have witnessed the rapid spread of two new puritan, +fanatic movements--the Ikhwan and the Salafiya. The Ikhwan movement +began obscurely about ten years ago in inner Arabia--the Nejd. It is a +direct outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it differs in no essential +respect. So rapid has been Ikhwanism's progress that it to-day +absolutely dominates the entire Nejd, and it is headed by desert +Arabia's most powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud who +headed the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago. The fanaticism of the +Ikhwans is said to be extraordinary, while their programme is the old +Wahabi dream of a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world.[69] As +for the Salafi movement, it started in India even more obscurely than +Ikhwanism did in Arabia, but during the past few years it has spread +widely through Islam. Like Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical in +spirit, its adherents being found especially among dervish +organizations.[70] Such phenomena, taken with everything else, do not +augur well for the peace of the East. + +So much for Pan-Islamism's religious and political sides. Now let us +glance at its commercial and industrial aspects--at what may be called +economic Pan-Islamism. + +Economic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the permeation of Western +ideas. Half a century ago the Moslem world was economically still in the +Middle Ages. The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such as +the prohibition of interest rendered economic life in the modern sense +impossible. What little trade and industry did exist was largely in the +hands of native Christians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic life +of the East was being disorganized by the aggressive competition of the +West. Europe's political conquest of the Moslem world was, in fact, +paralleled by an economic conquest even more complete. Everywhere +percolated the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made goods, +while close behind came European capital, temptingly offering itself in +return for loans and concessions which, once granted, paved the way for +European political domination. + +Yet in economics as in politics the very completeness of Europe's +triumph provoked resistance. Angered and alarmed by Western +exploitation, Islam frankly recognized its economic inferiority and +sought to escape from its subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began casting +about for a _modus vivendi_ with modern life that would put Islam +economically abreast of the times. Western methods were studied and +copied. The prohibitions of the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored. + +The upshot has been a marked evolution toward Western economic +standards. This evolution is of course still in its early stages, and is +most noticeable in lands most exposed to Western influences like India, +Egypt, and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the trend is the +same. The details of this economic transformation will be discussed in +the chapter devoted to economic change. What we are here concerned with +is its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong. Nowhere does +Islam's innate solidarity come out better than in the economic field. +The religious, cultural, and customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslem +enable Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part of the +Islamic world, while Western methods of transit and communication enable +Mohammedans to travel and keep in touch as they never could before. New +types of Moslems--wholesale merchants, steamship owners, business men, +bankers, even factory industrialists and brokers--are rapidly evolving; +types which would have been simply unthinkable a century, or even half a +century, ago. + +And these new men understand each other perfectly. Bound together both +by the ties of Islamic fraternity and by the pressure of Western +competition, they co-ordinate their efforts much more easily than +politicals have succeeded in doing. Here liberals, Pan-Islamists, and +nationalists can meet on common ground. Here is no question of political +conspiracies, revolts, or holy wars, challenging the armed might of +Europe and risking bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary, +here is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for economic ends +by business methods which the West cannot declare unlawful and dare not +repress. + +What, then, is the specific programme of economic Pan-Islamism? It is +easily stated: the wealth of Islam for Moslems. The profits of trade and +industry for Moslem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of Western +capital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking of Europe's grip on +Islam's natural resources by the termination of concessions in lands, +mines, forests, railways, custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamic +lands is to-day drained away to foreign shores. + +Such are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism. They are wholly +modern concepts, the outgrowth of those Western ideas whose influence +upon the Moslem world I shall now discuss.[71] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[25] Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism's homeland, +but has also converted virtually the entire populations of the +great islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerly +ascendant. + +[26] The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are the +sole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded by +Zoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in the +seventh century A.D. + +[27] Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans have +managed to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written their +impressions. Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's _Mekka_ (2 vols., The Hague, +1888) and _Het Mekkaansche Feest_ (Leiden, 1889) are the most recent +good works. Also see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of value +from the pen of a Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, _With the +Pilgrims to Mecca; The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A.D. 1902)_, with +an Introduction by Arminius Vambery (London, 1905). + +[28] The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite or +orthodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to their +own Shereefian sultans. + +[29] The Turkish name for Constantinople. + +[30] On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, _The Caliphate: Its Rise, +Decline, and Fall_ (Edinburgh, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, _The Caliph's Last +Heritage_ (London, 1915); XX, "L'Islam apres la Guerre," _Revue de +Paris_, 15 January, 1916; "The Indian Khilafat Delegation," _Foreign +Affairs_, July, 1920 (Special Supplement). + +[31] Literally, "he who is guided aright." + +[32] "Seyid" means "Lord." This title is borne only by descendants of +the Prophet. + +[33] The explorer Dr. Nachtigal. + +[34] On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya in +particular see W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); O. +Depont and X. Coppolani, _Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes_ (Paris, +1897); H. Duveyrier, _La Confrerie musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es +Senoussi_ (Paris, 1884); A. Le Chatelier, _Les Confreries musulmanes du +Hedjaz_ (Paris, 1887); L. Petit, _Confreries musulmanes_ (Paris, 1899); +L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_ (Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, _Le +Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); Simian, _Les +Confreries islamiques en Algerie_ (Algiers, 1910); Achmed Abdullah +(himself a Sennussi), "The Sennussiyehs," _The Forum_, May, 1914; A. R. +Colquhoun, "Pan-Islam," _North American Review_, June, 1906; T. R. +Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," _Nineteenth Century_, +March, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, "The Moslem Menace," _Nineteenth +Century and After_, September, 1907; ... "La Puissance de l'Islam: Ses +Confreries Religieuses," _Le Correspondant_, 25 November and 10 +December, 1909. The above judgments, particularly regarding the +Sennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others minimizing +its importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that of +Commandant Binger, "Le Peril de l'Islam," _Bulletin du Comite de +l'Afrique francaise_, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems with +El Sennussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, "Chez les Senoussia et les +Touareg," _L'Expansion Coloniale francaise_, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman, +_Voyage au Pays des Senoussia a travers la Tripolitaine_ (translated +from the Arabic), Paris, 1903. + +[35] On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, _Verbreitung +des Islams_ (Berlin, 1897); M. Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, pp. 46-49, +60-61, 81; A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris, +1888); various papers in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906). + +[36] T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," _Nineteenth +Century_, March, 1900. + +[37] D. A. Forget, _L'Islam et le Christianisme dans l'Afrique +centrale_, p. 65 (Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslem +missionary activity in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, _L'Islamisme et le +Christianisme en Afrique_ (Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, _Christianity, +Islam, and the Negro Race_ (London, 1887); Forget, _op. cit._ + +[38] A. Guerinot, "L'Islam et l'Abyssinie," _Revue du Monde musulman_, +1918. Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K. +Cederquist, "Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia," _The Moslem World_, +April, 1921. + +[39] S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," _The Moslem World_, January, +1911. + +[40] Broomhall, _Islam in China_ (London, 1910); Nigarende, "Notes sur +les Musulmans Chinois," _Revue du Monde musulman_, January, 1907; paper +on Islam in China in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906). + +[41] See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in _The Mohammedan World +To-day_ (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch East +Indies_ (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916. + +[42] Quoted from article by "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," +_Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913. This authoritative article is, +so the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan--"un +homme d'etat musulman." For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see A. +Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, pp. 10-13. + +[43] Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern Questions_, p. 111 +(London, 1872). + +[44] A. Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, p. 351 (London, +1906). + +[45] Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned by +the French publicist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warnings +were published in his prophetic book _L'Avenir de la Turquie--Le +Panislamisme_ (Paris, 1883). + +[46] Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Crise mediterraneenne et l'Islam," _Revue +Hebdomadaire_, April 13, 1912. + +[47] See "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde +musulman_, June, 1914; B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in +World-Politics," _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, May 4, +1910; W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912). + +[48] Quoted from A. Vambery, "Die tuerkische Katastrophe und die +Islamwelt," _Deutsche Revue_, July, 1913. + +[49] Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, "Recent Turkish Events and Moslem +India," _Asiatic Review_, October, 1913. + +[50] Quoted by F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam," _Revue du Monde +musulman_, November, 1906. + +[51] Farjanel, _supra_. + +[52] Quoted by Vambery, _supra_. + +[53] Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," _Nineteenth +Century and After_, April, 1912. + +[54] Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," _Nineteenth +Century and After_, April, 1912. + +[55] Special cable to the New York _Times_, dated Rome, May 28, 1919. + +[56] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _Nineteenth Century and +After_, July, 1919. + +[57] H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 158 (London, 1918). + +[58] This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed in +the next chapter. + +[59] Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief of +general staff, in the _Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. + +[60] A. Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp. +71, 72 (Paris, 1898). + +[61] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 182. + +[62] B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics," _Proceedings of +the Central Asian Society_, May, 1910. + +[63] L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_, p. vi. + +[64] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _op. cit._ + +[65] Yahya Siddyk, _Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au quatorzieme +Siecle de l'Hegire_ (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic. + +[66] For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiatic +and African peoples, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour against +White World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920). + +[67] L. Massignon, "L'Islam et la Politique des Allies," _Revue des +Sciences politiques_, June, 1920. + +[68] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _op. cit._ + +[69] For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, "The Situation in +Arabia," _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, "The +Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia," _The Moslem World_, July, 1919. + +[70] For the Salafi movement, see "Wahhabisme--Son Avenir sociale et le +Mouvement salafi," _Revue du Monde musulman_, 1919. + +[71] On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. Le +Chatelier, "Le Reveil de l'Islam--Sa Situation economique," _Revue +Economique internationale_, July, 1910; also his article "Politique +musulmane," _Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910; M. Pickthall, +"La Morale islamique," _Revue Politique internationale_, July, 1916; S. +Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912). + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST + + +The influence of the West is the great dynamic in the modern +transformation of the East. The ubiquitous impact of Westernism is +modifying not merely the Islamic world but all non-Moslem Asia and +Africa,[72] and in subsequent pages we shall examine the effects of +Western influence upon the non-Moslem elements of India. Of course +Western influence does not entirely account for Islam's recent +evolution. We have already seen that, for the last hundred years, Islam +itself has been engendering forces which, however quickened by external +Western stimuli, are essentially internal in their nature, arising +spontaneously and working toward distinctive, original goals. It is not +a mere copying of the West that is to-day going on in the Moslem world, +but an attempt at a new synthesis--an assimilation of Western methods to +Eastern ends. We must always remember that the Asiatic stocks which +constitute the bulk of Islam's followers are not primitive savages like +the African negroes or the Australoids, but are mainly peoples with +genuine civilizations built up by their own efforts from the remote +past. In view of their historic achievements, therefore, it seems safe +to conclude that in the great ferment now stirring the Moslem world we +behold a real _Renaissance_, whose genuineness is best attested by the +fact that there have been similar movements in former times. + +The modern influence of the West on the East is quite unprecedented in +both intensity and scope. The far more local, partial influence of +Greece and Rome cannot be compared to it. Another point to be noted is +that this modern influence of the West upon the East is a very recent +thing. The full impact of Westernism upon the Orient as a whole dates +only from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then, +however, the process has been going on by leaps and bounds. Roads and +railways, posts and telegraphs, books and papers, methods and ideas, +have penetrated, or are in process of penetrating, every nook and cranny +of the East. Steamships sail the remotest seas. Commerce drives forth +and scatters the multitudinous products of Western industry among the +remotest peoples. Nations which only half a century ago lived the life +of thirty centuries ago, to-day read newspapers and go to business in +electric tram-cars. Both the habits and thoughts of Orientals are being +revolutionized. To a discussion of the influence of the West upon the +Moslem world the remainder of this book will be devoted. The chief +elements will be separately analysed in subsequent chapters, the present +chapter being a general survey of an introductory character. + +The permeation of Westernism is naturally most advanced in those parts +of Islam which have been longest under Western political control. The +penetration of the British "Raj" into the remotest Indian jungles, for +example, is an extraordinary phenomenon. By the coinage, the +post-office, the railroads, the administration of justice, the +encouragement of education, the relief of famine, and a thousand other +ways, the great organization has penetrated all India. But even in +regions where European control is still nominal, the permeation of +Westernism has gone on apace. The customs and habits of the people have +been distinctly modified. Western material improvements and comforts +like the kerosene-oil lamp and the sewing-machine are to-day part and +parcel of the daily life of the people. New economic wants have been +created; standards of living have been raised; canons of taste have been +altered.[73] + +In the intellectual and spiritual fields, likewise, the leaven of +Westernism is clearly apparent. We have already seen how profoundly +Moslem liberal reformers have been influenced by Western ideas and the +spirit of Western progress. Of course in these fields Westernism has +progressed more slowly and has awakened much stronger opposition than it +has on the material plane. Material innovations, especially mechanical +improvements, comforts, and luxuries, make their way much faster than +novel customs or ideas, which usually shock established beliefs or +ancestral prejudices. Tobacco was taken up with extraordinary rapidity +by every race and clime, and the kerosene-lamp has in half a century +penetrated the recesses of Central Asia and of China; whereas customs +like Western dress and ideas like Western education encounter many +setbacks and are often adopted with such modifications that their +original spirit is denatured or perverted. The superior strength and +skill of the West are to-day generally admitted throughout the East, but +in many quarters the first receptivity to Western progress and zeal for +Western ideas have cooled or have actually given place to a reactionary +hatred of the very spirit of Western civilization.[74] + +Western influences are most apparent in the upper and middle classes, +especially in the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ which to-day exists +in every Eastern land. These elites of course vary greatly in numbers +and influence, but they all possess a more or less definite grasp of +Western ideas. In their reactions to Westernism they are sharply +differentiated. Some, while retaining the fundamentals of their +ancestral philosophy of life, attempt a genuine assimilation of Western +ideals and envisage a higher synthesis of the spirits of East and West. +Others break with their traditional pasts, steep themselves in +Westernism, and become more or less genuinely Westernized. Still others +conceal behind their Western veneer disillusionment and detestation.[75] + +Of course it is in externals that Westernization is most pronounced. The +Indian or Turkish "intellectual," holding Western university degrees and +speaking fluently several European languages, and the wealthy prince or +pasha, with his motor-cars, his racing-stables, and his annual "cure" at +European watering-places, appear very Occidental to the casual eye. Such +men wear European clothes, eat European food, and live in houses partly +or wholly furnished in European style. Behind this facade exists every +possible variation of inner life, from earnest enthusiasm for Western +ideals to inveterate reaction. + +These varied attitudes toward Westernism are not parked off by groups or +localities, they co-exist among the individuals of every class and every +land in the East. The entire Orient is, in fact, undergoing a prodigious +transformation, far more sudden and intense than anything the West has +ever known. Our civilization is mainly self-evolved; a natural growth +developing by normal, logical, and relatively gradual stages. The East, +on the contrary, is undergoing a concentrated process of adaptation +which, with us, was spread over centuries, and the result is not so much +evolution as revolution--political, economic, social, idealistic, +religious, and much more besides. The upshot is confusion, uncertainty, +grotesque anachronism, and glaring contradiction. Single generations +are sundered by unbridgeable mental and spiritual gulfs. Fathers do not +understand sons; sons despise their fathers. Everywhere the old and the +new struggle fiercely, often within the brain or spirit of the same +individual. The infinite complexity of this struggle as it appears in +India is well summarized by Sir Valentine Chirol when he speaks of the +many "currents and cross-currents of the confused movement which is +stirring the stagnant waters of Indian life--the steady impact of alien +ideas on an ancient and obsolescent civilization; the more or less +imperfect assimilation of those ideas by the few; the dread and +resentment of them by those whose traditional ascendancy they threaten; +the disintegration of old beliefs, and then again their aggressive +revival; the careless diffusion of an artificial system of education, +based none too firmly on mere intellectualism, and bereft of all moral +or religious sanction; the application of Western theories of +administration and of jurisprudence to a social formation stratified on +lines of singular rigidity; the play of modern economic forces upon +primitive conditions of industry and trade; the constant and unconscious +but inevitable friction between subject races and their alien rulers; +the reverberation of distant wars and distant racial conflicts; the +exaltation of an Oriental people in the Far East."[76] These lines, +though written about India, apply with fair exactitude to every other +portion of the Near and Middle East to-day. As a French writer remarks +with special reference to the Levant: "The truth is that the Orient is +in transformation, and the Mohammedan mentality as well--though not +perhaps exactly as we might wish. It is undergoing a period of crisis, +wherein the past struggles everywhere against the present; where ancient +customs, impaired by modern innovations, present a hybrid and +disconcerting spectacle."[77] + +To this is largely due the unlovely traits displayed by most of the +so-called "Westernized" Orientals; the "stucco civilization"[78] of the +Indian Babu, and the boulevardier "culture" of the Turkish +"Effendi"--syphilized rather than civilized. Any profound transformation +must engender many worthless by-products, and the contemporary +Westernization of the Orient has its dark as well as its bright side. +The very process of reform, however necessary and inevitable, lends +fresh virulence to old ills and imports new evils previously unknown. As +Lord Cromer says: "It is doubtful whether the price which is being paid +for introducing European civilization into these backward Eastern +societies is always recognized as fully as it should be. The material +benefits derived from European civilization are unquestionably great, +but as regards the ultimate effect on public and private morality the +future is altogether uncertain."[79] + +The good and the evil of Westernization are alike mostly clearly evident +among the ranks of the educated elites. Some of these men show the +happiest effects of the Western spirit, but an even larger number fall +into the gulf between old and new, and there miserably perish. Lord +Cromer characterized many of the "Europeanized" Egyptians as "at the +same time de-Moslemized Moslems and invertebrate Europeans";[80] while +another British writer thus pessimistically describes the superficial +Europeanism prevalent in India: "Beautiful Mogul palaces furnished with +cracked furniture from Tottenham Court Road. That is what we have done +to the Indian mind. We have not only made it despise its own culture and +throw it out; we have asked it to fill up the vacant spaces with +furniture which will not stand the climate. The mental Eurasianism of +India is appalling. Such minds are nomad. They belong to no +civilization, no country, and no history. They create a craving that +cannot be satisfied, and ideals that are unreal. They falsify life. +They deprive men of the nourishment of their cultural past, and the +substitutes they supply are unsubstantial.... We sought to give the +Eastern mind a Western content and environment; we have succeeded too +well in establishing intellectual and moral anarchy in both."[81] + +These patent evils of Westernization are a prime cause of that +implacable hatred of everything Western which animates so many +Orientals, including some well acquainted with the West. Such persons +are precious auxiliaries to the ignorant reactionaries and to the rebels +against Western political domination. + +The political predominance of the West over the East is, indeed, the +outstanding factor in the whole question of Western influence upon the +Orient. We have already surveyed Europe's conquest of the Near and +Middle East during the past century, and we have seen how helpless the +backward, decrepit Moslem world was in face of the twofold tide of +political and economic subjugation. In fact, the economic phase was +perhaps the more important factor in the rapidity and completeness of +Europe's success. To be sure, some Eastern lands were subjugated at a +stroke by naked military force, as in the French expedition to Algiers, +the Russian conquest of central Asia, and the Italian descent upon +Tripoli. Much oftener, however, subjection began by the essentially +economic process known as "pacific penetration"--the acquirement of a +financial grip upon a hitherto independent Oriental country by Western +capital in the form of loans and concessions, until the assumption of +Western political control became little more than a formal registration +of what already existed in fact. Such is the story of the subjection of +Egypt, Morocco, and Persia, while England's Indian Empire started in a +purely trading venture--the East India Company. The tremendous potency +of "pacific penetration" is often not fully appreciated. Take the +significance of one item alone--railway concessions. Says that keen +student of _Weltpolitik_, Doctor Dillon: "Railways are the iron +tentacles of latter-day expanding Powers. They are stretched out +caressingly at first. But once the iron has, so to say, entered the soul +of the weaker nation, the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawny +arms, and the embrace tightens to a crushing grip."[82] + +On the question of the abstract rightness or wrongness of this +subjection of the East by the West, I do not propose to enter. It has +been exhaustively discussed, pro and con, and every reader of these +pages is undoubtedly familiar with the stock arguments on both sides. +The one thing certain is that this process of subjugation was, broadly +speaking, inevitable. Given two worlds at such different levels as East +and West at the beginning of the nineteenth century--the West +overflowing with vitality and striding at the forefront of human +progress, the East sunk in lethargy and decrepitude--and it was a +foregone conclusion that the former would encroach upon the latter. + +What does concern us in our present discussion is the effect of European +political control upon the general process of Westernization in Eastern +lands. And there can be no doubt that such Westernization was thereby +greatly furthered. Once in control of an Oriental country, the European +rulers were bound to favour its Westernization for a variety of reasons. +Mere self-interest impelled them to make the country peaceful and +prosperous, in order to extract profit for themselves and reconcile the +inhabitants to their rule. This meant the replacement of inefficient and +sanguinary native despotisms inhibiting progress and engendering anarchy +by stable colonial governments, maintaining order, encouraging +industry, and introducing improvements like the railway, the post, +sanitation, and much more besides. In addition to these material +innovations, practically all the Western governments endeavoured to +better the social, intellectual, and spiritual condition of the peoples +that had come under their control. The European Powers who built up +colonial empires during the nineteenth century were actuated by a spirit +far more enlightened than that of former times, when the early colonial +empires of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and the English East India Company +had been run on the brutal and short-sighted doctrine of sheer +exploitation. In the nineteenth century all Western rule in the Orient +was more or less impregnated with the ideal of "The White Man's Burden." +The great empire-builders of the nineteenth century, actuated as they +were not merely by self-interest and patriotic ambition but also by a +profound sense of obligation to improve the populations which they had +brought under their country's sway, felt themselves bearers of Western +enlightenment and laboured to diffuse all the benefits of Western +civilization. They honestly believed that the extension of Western +political control was the best and quickest, perhaps the only, means of +modernizing the backward portions of the world. + +That standpoint is ably presented by a British "liberal imperialist," +Professor Ramsay Muir, who writes: "It is an undeniable fact that the +imperialism of the European peoples has been the means whereby European +civilization has been in some degree extended to the whole world, so +that to-day the whole world has become a single economic unit, and all +its members are parts of a single political system. And this achievement +brings us in sight of the creation of a world-order such as the wildest +dreamers of the past could never have anticipated. Without the +imperialism of the European peoples North and South America, Australia, +South Africa, must have remained wildernesses, peopled by scattered +bands of savages. Without it India and other lands of ancient +civilization must have remained, for all we can see, externally subject +to that endless succession of wars and arbitrary despotisms which have +formed the substance of their history through untold centuries, and +under which neither rational and equal law nor political liberty, as we +conceive them, were practicable conceptions. Without it the backward +peoples of the earth must have continued to stagnate under the dominance +of an unchanging primitive customary regime, which has been their state +throughout recorded time. If to-day the most fruitful political ideas of +the West--the ideas of nationality and self-government--which are purely +products of Western civilization, are beginning to produce a healthy +fermentation in many parts of the non-European world, that result is due +to European Imperialism."[83] + +The ethics of modern imperialism have nowhere been better formulated +than in an essay by Lord Cromer. "An imperial policy," he writes, "must, +of course, be carried out with reasonable prudence, and the principles +of government which guide our relations with whatsoever races are +brought under our control must be politically and economically sound and +morally defensible. This is, in fact, the keystone of the imperial arch. +The main justification of imperialism is to be found in the use which is +made of imperial power. If we make good use of our power, we may face +the future without fear that we shall be overtaken by the Nemesis which +attended Roman misrule. If the reverse is the case, the British Empire +will deserve to fall, and of a surety it will ultimately fall."[84] + +Such are the basic sanctions of Western imperialism as evolved during +the nineteenth century. Whether or not it is destined to endure, there +can be no question that this prodigious extension of European political +control greatly favoured the spread of Western influences of every kind. +It is, of course, arguable that the East would have voluntarily adopted +Western methods and ideas even if no sort of Western pressure had been +applied. But they would have been adopted much more slowly, and this +vital element of time renders such arguments mere academic speculation. +For the vital, expanding nineteenth-century West to have deliberately +restrained itself while the backward East blunderingly experimented with +Westernism, accepting and rejecting, buying goods and refusing to pay +for them, negotiating loans and then squandering and repudiating them, +inviting in Europeans and then expelling or massacring them, would have +been against all history and human nature. + +As a matter of fact, Western pressure was applied, as it was bound to be +applied; and this constant, ubiquitous, unrelenting pressure, broke down +the barriers of Oriental conservatism and inertia as nothing else could +have done, forced the East out of its old ruts, and compelled it to take +stock of things as they are in a world of hard facts instead of +reminiscent dreams. In subsequent chapters we shall examine the manifold +results of this process which has so profoundly transformed the Orient +during the past hundred years. Here we will continue our general survey +by examining the more recent aspects of Western control over the East +and the reactions of the East thereto. + +In my opinion, the chief fallacy involved in criticisms of Western +control over Eastern lands arises from failure to discriminate between +nineteenth-century and twentieth-century imperialism. Nineteenth-century +imperialism was certainly inevitable, and was apparently beneficial in +the main. Twentieth-century imperialism cannot be so favourably judged. +By the year 1900 the Oriental peoples were no longer mere fanatical +obscurantists neither knowing nor caring to know anything outside the +closed circle of their ossified, decadent civilizations. The East had +been going to school, and wanted to begin to apply what it had been +taught by the West. It should have been obvious that these peoples, +whose past history proved them capable of achievement and who were now +showing an apparently genuine desire for new progress, needed to be +treated differently from what they had been. In other words, a more +liberal attitude on the part of the West had become advisable. + +But no such change was made. On the contrary, in the West itself, the +liberal idealism which had prevailed during most of the nineteenth +century was giving way to that spirit of fierce political and economic +rivalry which culminated in the Great War.[85] Never had Europe been so +avid for colonies, for "spheres of influence," for concessions and +preferential markets; in fine, so "imperialistic," in the unfavourable +sense of the term. The result was that with the beginning of the +twentieth century Western pressure on the East, instead of being +relaxed, was redoubled; and the awakening Orient, far from being met +with sympathetic consideration, was treated more ruthlessly than it had +been for two hundred years. The way in which Eastern countries like +Turkey and Persia, striving to reform themselves and protect their +independence, were treated by Europe's new _Realpolitik_ would have +scandalized the liberal imperialists of a generation before. It +certainly scandalized present-day liberals, as witness these scathing +lines written in 1912 by the well-known British publicist Sidney Low: + +"The conduct of the Most Christian Powers during the past few years has +borne a striking resemblance to that of robber-bands descending upon an +unarmed and helpless population of peasants. So far from respecting the +rights of other nations, they have exhibited the most complete and +cynical disregard for them. They have, in fact, asserted the claim of +the strong to prey upon the weak, and the utter impotence of all ethical +considerations in the face of armed force, with a crude nakedness which +few Eastern military conquerors could well have surpassed. + +"The great cosmic event in the history of the last quarter of a century +has been the awakening of Asia after centuries of somnolence. The East +has suddenly sprung to life, and endeavoured to throw itself vigorously +into the full current of Western progress. Japan started the enterprise; +and, fortunately for herself, she entered upon it before the new Western +policy had fully developed itself, and while certain archaic ideals +about the rights of peoples and the sanctity of treaties still +prevailed. When the new era was inaugurated by the great Japanese +statesmen of the nineteenth century, Europe did not feel called upon to +interfere. We regarded the Japanese renaissance with interest and +admiration, and left the people of Nippon to work out the difficulties +of their own salvation, unobstructed. If that revolution had taken place +thirty years later, there would probably have been a different story to +tell; and New Japan, in the throes of her travail, would have found the +armed Great Powers at her bedside, each stretching forth a mailed fist +to grab something worth taking. Other Eastern countries which have +endeavoured to follow the example of Japan during the present century +have had worse luck. During the past ten years a wave of sheer +materialism and absolute contempt for international morality has swept +across the Foreign Offices of Europe, and has reacted disastrously upon +the various Eastern nations in their desperate struggles to reform a +constitutional system. They have been attempting to carry out the +suggestions made to them for generations by benevolent advisers in +Christendom. + +"Now, when they take these counsels to heart, and endeavour, with +halting steps, and in the face of immense obstacles, to pursue the path +of reform, one might suppose that their efforts would be regarded with +sympathetic attention by the Governments of the West; and that, even if +these offered no direct aid, they would at least allow a fair trial." +But, on the contrary, "one Great Power after another has used the +opportunity presented by the internal difficulties of the Eastern +countries to set out upon a career of annexation."[86] + +We have already seen how rapid was this career of annexation, +extinguishing the independence of the last remaining Mohammedan states +at the close of the Great War. We have also seen how it exacerbated +Moslem fear and hatred of the West. And the West was already feared and +hated for many reasons. In the preceding chapter we traced the growth of +the Pan-Islamic movement, and in subsequent chapters we shall trace the +development of Oriental nationalism. These politico-religious movements, +however, by no means exhaust the list of Oriental reactions to +Westernism. There are others, economic, social, racial in character. In +view of the complex nature of the Orient's reaction against Westernism, +let us briefly analyse the problem in its various constituent elements. + +Anti-Western feeling has been waning in some quarters and waxing in +others during the past hundred years. By temperamental reactionaries and +fanatics things Western have, of course, always been abhorred. But, +leaving aside this intransigeant minority, the attitude of other +categories of Orientals has varied greatly according to times and +circumstances. By liberal-minded persons Western influences were at +first hailed with cordiality and even with enthusiasm. In the opening +chapter we saw how the liberal reformers welcomed the Western concept of +progress and made it one of the bases of their projected religious +reformation. And the liberals displayed the same attitude in secular +matters. The liberal statesmen who governed Turkey during the third +quarter of the nineteenth century made earnest efforts to reform the +Ottoman State, and it was the same in other parts of the Moslem world. +An interesting example is the attempt made by General Kheir-ed-Din to +modernize Tunis. This man, a Circassian by birth, had won the confidence +of his master, the Bey, who made him vizier. In 1860 he toured Europe +and returned greatly impressed with its civilization. Convinced of +Europe's infinite superiority, he desired passionately to transplant +Western ideas and methods to Tunis. This he believed quite feasible, and +the result would, so he thought, be Tunis's rapid regeneration. +Kheir-ed-Din was not in the least a hater of the West. He merely +recognized clearly the Moslem world's peril of speedy subjection to the +West if it did not set its house rapidly in order, and he therefore +desired, in a perfectly legitimate feeling of patriotism, to press his +country along the road of progress, that it might be able to stand alone +and preserve its independence. + +So greatly was the Bey impressed by Kheir-ed-Din's report that he gave +him a free hand in his reforming endeavours. For a short time +Kheir-ed-Din displayed great activity, though he encountered stubborn +opposition from reactionary officials. His work was cut short by his +untimely death, and Tunis, still unmodernized, fell twenty years later +under the power of France. Kheir-ed-Din, however, worked for posterity. +In order to rouse his compatriots to the realities of their situation he +published a remarkable book, _The Surest Means of Knowing the State of +Nations_. This book has profoundly influenced both liberals and +nationalists throughout the Near East, especially in North Africa, where +it has become the bible of Tunisian and Algerian nationalism. In his +book Kheir-ed-Din shows his co-religionists the necessity of breaking +with their attitude of blind admiration for the past and proud +indifference to everything else, and of studying what is going on in the +outer world. Europe's present prosperity is due, he asserts, not to +natural advantages or to religion, but "to progress in the arts and +sciences, which facilitate the circulation of wealth and exploit the +treasures of the earth by an enlightened protection constantly given to +agriculture, industry, and commerce: all natural consequences of justice +and liberty--two things which, for Europeans, have become second +nature." In past ages the Moslem world was great and progressive, +because it was then liberal and open to progress. It declined through +bigotry and obscurantism. But it can revive by reviving the spirit of +its early days. + +I have stressed the example of the Tunisian Kheir-ed-Din rather than the +better-known Turkish instances because it illustrates the general +receptivity of mid-nineteenth-century Moslem liberals to Western ideas +and their freedom from anti-Western feeling.[87] As time passed, +however, many of these erstwhile liberals, disillusioned with the West +for various reasons, notably European aggression, became the bitterest +enemies of the West, hating the very spirit of Western civilization.[88] + +This anti-Western feeling has, of course, been greatly exacerbated since +the beginning of the present century. As an influential Mohammedan wrote +just before the Great War: "The events of these last ten years and the +disasters which have stricken the Mohammedan world have awakened in its +bosom a sentiment of mutual cordiality and devotion hitherto unknown, +and a unanimous hatred against all its oppressors has been the ferment +which to-day stirs the hearts of all Moslems."[89] The bitter rancour +seething in many Moslem hearts shows in outbursts like the following, +from the pen of a popular Turkish writer at the close of the Balkan +Wars: "We have been defeated, we have been shown hostility by the +outside world, because we have become too deliberative, too cultured, +too refined in our conceptions of right and wrong, of humanity and +civilization. The example of the Bulgarian army has taught us that every +soldier facing the enemy must return to the days of barbarism, must have +a thirst of blood, must be merciless in slaughtering children and women, +old and weak, must disregard others' property, life, and honour. Let us +spread blood, suffering, wrong, and mourning. Thus only may we become +the favourites of the civilized world like King Ferdinand's army."[90] + +The Great War itself was hailed by multitudes of Moslems as a +well-merited Nemesis on Western arrogance and greed. Here is how a +leading Turkish newspaper characterized the European Powers: "They would +not look at the evils in their own countries or elsewhere, but +interfered at the slightest incident in our borders; every day they +would gnaw at some part of our rights and our sovereignty; they would +perform vivisection on our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of +it. And we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of rebellion in our hearts +and with clinched but powerless fists, silent and depressed, would +murmur as the fire burned within: 'Oh, that they might fall out with one +another! Oh, that they might eat one another up!' And lo! to-day they +are eating each other up, just as the Turk wished they would."[91] + +Such anti-Western sentiments are not confined to journalists or +politicians, they are shared by all classes, from princes to peasants. +Each class has its special reasons for hating European political +control. The native princes, even when maintained upon their thrones and +confirmed in their dignities and emoluments, bitterly resent their state +of vassalage and their loss of limitless, despotic power. "Do you know, +I can hardly buy a pen or a sword for myself without asking the Resident +for permission?" remarked an Indian rajah bitterly. His attitude was +precisely that of Khedive Tewfik Pasha, who, in the early days of the +British occupation of Egypt, while watching a review of British troops, +said to one of his ministers: "Do you suppose I like this? I tell you, I +never see an English sentinel in my streets without longing to jump out +of my carriage and strangle him with my own hands."[92] The upper +classes feel much the same as their sovereigns. They regret their former +monopoly of privilege and office. This is especially true of the +Western-educated _intelligentsia_, who believe that they should hold all +government posts and resent bitterly the reservation of high-salaried +directive positions for Europeans. Of course many intelligent liberals +realize so fully the educative effect of European control that they +acquiesce in a temporary loss of independence in order to complete their +modernization and ultimately be able to stand alone without fear of +reaction or anarchy. However, these liberals are only a small minority, +hated by their upper-class fellows as time-servers and renegades, and +sundered by an immense gulf from the ignorant masses. + +At first sight we might think that the masses would, on the whole, be +favourably disposed toward European political control. Despite certain +economic disadvantages that Westernization has imposed, the masses have +unquestionably gained most by European rule. Formerly exploited +ruthlessly by both princes and upper classes, the peasants and town +workers are to-day assured peace, order, justice, and security for +their landholdings and the fruits of their toil. Now it would be a +mistake to think that the masses are insensible to all this. The fact +is, they do recognize the benefits of European rule. Nevertheless, the +new rulers, while tolerated and even respected, are never beloved. +Furthermore, as the generation which knew the old regime dies off, its +evils are forgotten, and the younger generation, taking present benefits +for granted, murmurs at the flaws in the existing order, and lends a +readier ear to native agitators extolling the glories of independence +and idealizing the "good old times." + +The truth of the matter is that, despite all its shortcomings, the +average Oriental hankers after the old way of life. Even when he +recognizes the good points of the new, he nevertheless yearns +irrationally for the old. "A Moslem ruler though he oppress me and not a +_kafir_[93] though he work me weal" is a Moslem proverb of long +standing. Every colonial administration, no matter how enlightened, runs +counter to this ineradicable aversion of Moslems for Christian rule. A +Russian administrator in Central Asia voices the sentiments of European +officials generally when he states: "Pious Moslems cannot accommodate +themselves to the government of _Giaours_."[94] + +Furthermore, it must be remembered that most Orientals either do not +recognize much benefit in European rule, or, even though they do +recognize considerable benefits, consider these more than offset by many +points which, in their eyes, are maddening annoyances or burdens. The +very things which we most pride ourselves on having given to the +Orient--peace, order, justice, security--are not valued by the Oriental +anywhere near as highly as we might expect. Of course he likes these +things, but he would prefer to get less of them if what he did get was +given by native rulers, sharing his prejudices and point of view. Take +the single factor of justice. As an English writer remarks: "The Asiatic +is not delighted with justice _per se_; indeed, the Asiatic really cares +but little about it if he can get _sympathy_ in the sense in which he +understands that misunderstood word.... This is the real reason why +every Asiatic in his heart of hearts prefers the rule of his own +nationality, bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of aliens. For +when he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt with by people who +understand his frailties, and who, though they may savagely punish him, +are at least in sympathy with the motives which prompt his +delinquencies."[95] + +Take again the matter of order. The average Oriental not only does not +appreciate, but detests, our well-regulated, systematic manner of life. +Accustomed as he has been for centuries to a slipshod, easygoing +existence, in which, if there was much injustice, there was also much +favouritism, he instinctively hates things like sanitary measures and +police regulations. Accustomed to a wide "personal liberty" in the +anarchic sense, he is not willing to limit this liberty for the common +weal. He wants his own way, even though it involves possible dangers to +himself--dangers which may always be averted by bribery, favouritism, or +violence. Said an American who had listened to a Filipino's glowing +words on independence: "What could you do, if you were independent, that +you cannot do now?" "I could build my house there in the middle of the +street, if I wanted to." "But suppose your neighbour objected and +interfered?" "I would 'get' him." "But suppose he 'got' you?" A shrug of +the shoulders was the only answer.[96] + +The fact is that the majority of Orientals, despite the considerable +penetration of Western ideas and methods that has been going on for the +last century, still love their old ruts and hate to be budged out of +them. They realize that Western rule furthers more than anything else +the Westernization of their social system, their traditional manner of +life, and they therefore tend to react fanatically against it. Every +innovation imposed by the colonial authorities is apt to rouse the most +purblind resistance. For example, compulsory vaccination was bitterly +opposed for years by the natives of Algeria. The French officials +pointed out that smallpox, hitherto rampant, was being rapidly +extirpated. The natives replied that, in their opinion, it was merely a +crafty scheme for sterilizing them sexually and thus make room for +French colonists. The officials thereupon pointed to the census figures, +which showed that the natives were increasing at an unprecedented rate. +The natives merely shrugged their shoulders and continued to inveigh +against the innovation. + +This whole matter has been well summarized by a French writer with a +wide knowledge of Mohammedan lands. Says Louis Bertrand: + +"In reality, all these peoples, indisposed as they are by their +traditions, customs, and climates to live according to our social ideal, +hate to endure the constraint of our police, of our administration--in a +word, of any sort of _regulated_ government, no matter how just and +honest. Delivered from the most anarchic and vexatious of tyrannies, +they remain in spirit more or less like our vagabonds, always hoping to +escape from the gendarmes. In vain do we point out to the Arabs of North +Africa that, thanks to the protection of France, they are no longer +pillaged by Turkish despots nor massacred and tortured by rival tribes. +They see only one thing: the necessity of paying taxes for matters that +they do not understand. We shall never realize the rage, the fury, +aroused in our Algerian towns by the simple health department ordinance +requiring the emptying of a garbage-can at a fixed hour. At Cairo and +elsewhere I have observed the same rebellious feelings among the +donkey-boys and cab-drivers subjected to the regulations of the English +policeman. + +"But it is not merely our municipal and administrative regulations which +they find insupportable; it is all our habits, taken _en bloc_--in a +word, the _order_ which regulates our civilized life. For instance: on +the railway-line from Jaffa to Jerusalem the train stops at a station +beside which stands the tomb of a holy man. The schedule calls for a +stop of a minute at most. But no sooner had we arrived than what was my +stupefaction to see all the Mohammedans on the train get off, spread +their prayer-rugs, and tranquilly begin their devotions. The +station-master blew his whistle, the conductor yelled at them that he +was going to leave them behind; nobody budged. A squad of railway +employees had to be mobilized, who, with blows and curses, finally +bundled these pious persons back into the train again. The business +lasted a good quarter of an hour, and was not easy. The more vigorous of +the worshippers put up an energetic resistance. + +"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at random. What is certain +is that these peoples do not yet understand what we mean by exactitude, +and that the concept of a well-regulated existence has not yet +penetrated their heads."[97] + +What has just been written of course applies primarily to the ignorant +masses. But this attitude of mind is more or less common to all classes +of Oriental peoples. The habits of centuries are not easily transformed. +In fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were able to +enjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty of the unmodified East, +and that, therefore, though they may be better able to understand the +value of Westernization, they have in one sense the most to lose.[98] + +In fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the "good old times" +had charms which they mournfully regret. For the prince, the pasha, the +courtier, existence was truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, the +prince might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival monarch; the +pasha strangled at his master's order; the courtier tortured through a +superior's whim. But, meanwhile, it was "life," rich and full. "Each of +these men had his own character and his own renown among his countrymen, +and each enjoyed a position such as is now unattainable in Europe, in +which he was released from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad or +good, and was fed every day and all day with the special flattery of +Asia--that willing submissiveness to mere volition which is so like +adoration, and which is to its recipients the most intoxicating of +delights. Each, too, had his court of followers, and every courtier +shared in the power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his lord. +The power was that of life and death; the luxury included possession of +every woman he desired; the adulation was, as I have said, almost +religious worship."[99] + +But, it may be asked, what about the poor man, exploited by this +hierarchy of capricious despots? What had he to gain from all this? +Well, in most cases, he got nothing at all; but he _might_ gain a great +deal. Life in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery. Any one, however +humble, who chanced to please a great man, might rise to fame and +fortune at a bound. And this is just what pleases the Eastern +temperament; for in the East, "luck" and caprice are more prized than +the "security" cherished in the West. In the Orient the favourite +stories are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts of +fortune--beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and all in a +single night. To the majority of Orientals it is still the uncertainties +of life, and the capricious favour of the powerful, which make it most +worth living; not the sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labour. +All these things made the life of the Orient infinitely _interesting_ +to _all_. And it is precisely this gambler's interest which +Westernization has more or less destroyed. As an English writer very +justly remarks _a propos_ of modern Egypt: "Our rule may be perfect, but +the East finds it dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it was +gay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. 'Ah! yes,' said an Egyptian to a +champion of English rule, 'but in the old days a beggar might sit at the +gate, and if he were found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, he +might be a great man on the morrow.' There is a natural and inevitable +regret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when favour took the place of +justice, and life had great heights and depths--for the Egypt of Joseph, +Haroun-al-Rashid, and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat of +broadcloth over the radiant garment."[100] + +Saddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so much that they hold +dear, it is not strange that many Eastern conservatives glorify the past +as a sort of Golden Age, infinitely superior to anything the West can +produce, and in this they are joined by many quondam liberals, +disillusioned with Westernism and flying into the arms of reaction. The +result is a spirit of hatred against everything Western, which sometimes +assumes the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand: "During a +lecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker contended that France owed +Islam (1) its civilization and sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3) +all that was best in the character and mentality of its population, +seeing that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789, all the +reformers who laboured for its enfranchisement--Albigensians, Vaudois, +Calvinists, and Camisards--were probably descendants of the Saracens. It +was nothing less than the total annexation of France to Morocco." +Meanwhile, "it has become the fashion for fervent (Egyptian) +nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazar +of Seville or in the patios of the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct +splendours of western Islam."[101] + +Even more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu wing of this Golden +Age school. These Hindu enthusiasts far outdo the wildest flights of +their Moslem fellows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the nursery +and home of all true religion, philosophy, culture, civilization, +science, invention, and everything else; and they aver that when India's +present regrettable eclipse is past (an eclipse of course caused +entirely by English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory for +the salvation of the whole world. Employing to the full the old adage +that there is nothing new under the sun, they have "discovered" in the +Vedas and other Hindu sacred texts "irrefutable" evidence that the +ancient Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including such +up-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes and the League of +Nations.[102] + +All this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the long run, prove +futile. The East, like the West, has its peculiar virtues; but the East +also has its special faults, and it is the faults which, for the last +thousand years, have been gaining on the virtues, resulting in +backwardness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is being +penetrated--and quickened--by the West. The outcome will never be +complete Westernization in the sense of a mere wholesale copying and +absolute transformation; the East will always remain fundamentally +itself. But it will be a new self, the result of a true assimilation of +Western ideas. The reactionaries can only delay this process, and +thereby prolong the Orient's inferiority and weakness. + +Nevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unintelligent, is +intelligible. Westernization hurts too many cherished prejudices and +vested interests not to arouse chronic resistance. This resistance would +occur even if Western influences were all good and Westerners all angels +of light. But of course Westernization has its dark side, while our +Western culture-bearers are animated not merely by altruism, but also by +far less worthy motives. This strengthens the hand of the Oriental +reactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanctions. In addition +to the extremely painful nature of any transformative process, +especially in economic and social matters, there are many incidental +factors of an extremely irritating nature. + +To begin with, the mere presence of the European, with his patent +superiority of power and progress, is a constant annoyance and +humiliation. This physical presence of the European is probably as +necessary to the Orient's regeneration as it is inevitable in view of +the Orient's present inferiority. But, however beneficial, it is none +the less a source of profound irritation. These Europeans disturb +everything, modify customs, raise living standards, erect separate +"quarters" in the cities, where they form "extraterritorial" colonies +exempt from native law and customary regulation. An English town rises +in the heart of Cairo, a "Little Paris" eats into Arabesque Algiers, +while European Pera flaunts itself opposite Turkish Stambul. + +As for India, it is dotted with British "enclaves". "The great +Presidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, are European cities planted +on Indian soil. All the prominent buildings are European, though in some +of the more recent ones an endeavour has been made to adopt what is +known as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of architecture. For the rest, the +streets are called by English names, generally the names of bygone +viceroys and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land and +quelled the mutiny--heroes whose effigies meet you at every turn. The +shops are English shops, where English or Eurasian assistants traffic in +English goods. English carriages and motors bowl along the macadamized +or tarred roads of Old England. On every hand there is evidence of the +instinctive effort to reproduce, as nearly as the climate will permit, +English conditions of life.... Almost the whole life of the people of +India is relegated to the back streets, not to say the slums--frankly +called in Madras the Black Town. There are a few points--clubs and +gymkhanas specially established to that end--where Englishmen, and even +women, meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier classes, on a +basis of social equality. But few indeed are the points of contact +between the Asian town and the European city which has been superimposed +upon it. The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps the +curiosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the bazaars; but the +European community as a whole cares no more for the swarming brown +multitudes around it than the dwellers on an island care for the fishes +in the circumambient sea."[103] And what is true of the great towns +holds good for scores of provincial centres, "stations," and +cantonments. The scale may be smaller, but the type is the same. + +The European in the Orient is thus everywhere profoundly an alien, +living apart from the native life. And the European is not merely an +aloof alien; he is a ruling alien as well. Always his attitude is that +of the superior, the master. This attitude is not due to brutality or +snobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situation. Of course +many Europeans have bad manners, but that does not change the basic +reality of the case. And this reality is that, whatever the future may +bring, the European first established himself in the Orient because the +West was then infinitely ahead of the East; and he is still there to-day +because, despite all recent changes, the East is still behind the West. +Therefore the European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long as +he stays there _must_ continue to rule--justly, temperately, with +politic regard for Eastern progress and liberal devolution of power as +the East becomes ripe for its liberal exercise--but, nevertheless, +_rule_. Wherever the Occidental has established his political control, +there are but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in his +governing, the Occidental must rule according to his own lights; despite +all concessions to local feeling, he must, in the last analysis, act as +a Western, not as an Eastern, ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of all +true colonial government when he says: "In governing Oriental races the +first thought must be what is good for them, but not necessarily what +they think is good for them."[104] + +Now all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident. Nevertheless, +the fact remains that even the most enlightened Oriental can hardly +regard it as other than a bitter though salutary medicine, while most +Orientals feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very virtues of +the European are prime causes of his unpopularity. For, as Meredith +Townsend well says: "The European is, in Asia, the man who will insist +on his neighbour doing business just after dinner, and being exact when +he is half-asleep, and being 'prompt' just when he wants to enjoy,--and +he rules in Asia and is loved in Asia accordingly."[105] + +Furthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked not merely as a +ruler and a disturber, but also as a man of widely different race. This +matter of race is very complicated,[106] but it cuts deep and is of +fundamental importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Middle East +with which our present discussion is concerned belong to what is known +as the "brown" category of the human species. Of course, in strict +anthropology, the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set off +a sharply differentiated group of "brown" types as a "brown race," as we +can set off the "white" types of Europe as a "white race" or the +"yellow" Mongoloid types of the Far East as a "yellow race." This is +because the Near and Middle East have been racially a vast melting-pot, +or series of melting-pots, wherein conquest and migration have +continually poured new heterogeneous elements, producing the most +diverse ethnic amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and Middle +Eastern peoples are largely white, like the Persians and Ottoman Turks; +others, like the southern Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black; +while still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peoples, have +much yellow blood. Again, as there is no brown racial type-norm, as +there are white and yellow type-norms, so there is no generalized brown +culture like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great brown +spiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat of brown +population, Islam is professed by only one-fifth of the inhabitants. +Lastly, while the spiritual frontiers of the Moslem world coincide +mainly with the ethnic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps at +several points, including some pure whites in eastern Europe, many true +yellows in the Far East, and multitudes of negroes in Africa. + +Nevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the terms "brown +race" and "brown world" do connote genuine realities which science and +politics alike recognize to be essentially true. There certainly is a +fundamental comity between the brown peoples. This comity is subtle and +intangible in character; yet it exists, and under certain circumstances +it is capable of momentous manifestations. Its salient feature is the +instinctive recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that they +are fellow "Asiatics," however bitter may be their internecine feuds. +This instinctive "Asiatic" feeling has been noted by historians for +more than two thousand years, and it is true to-day as in the past. + +The great racial divisions of mankind are the most fundamental, the most +permanent, the most ineradicable things in human experience. They are +not mere diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion, stature, +and hair-formation are merely the outward, visible symbols of +correlative mental and spiritual differences which reveal themselves in +sharply contrasted temperaments and view-points, and which translate +themselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent group-life. + +Now it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage which runs between +"East" and "West." Broadly speaking, the Near and Middle East is the +"brown world," and this differentiates it from the "white world" of the +West in a way which never can be really obliterated. Indeed, to attempt +to obliterate the difference by racial fusion would be the maddest of +follies. East and West can mutually quicken each other by a mutual +exchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each other by +transfusions of blood. To unite physically would be the greatest of +disasters. East and West have both given much to the world in the past, +and promise to give more in the future. But whatever of true value they +are to give can be given only on condition that they remain essentially +themselves. Ethnic fusion would destroy both their race-souls and would +result in a dreary mongrelization from which would issue nothing but +degeneration and decay. + +Both East and West instinctively recognize the truth of this, and show +it by their common contempt for the "Eurasian"--the mongrel offspring of +unions between the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: "The chasm +between the brown man and the white is unfathomable, has existed in all +ages, and exists still everywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, no +brown man marries a white wife, without an inner sense of having been +false to some unintelligible but irresistible command."[107] + +The above summary of the political, economic, social, and racial +differences between East and West gives us a fair idea of the numerous +cross-currents which complicate the relations of the two worlds and +which hinder Westernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly going +on, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far-reaching is its +scope. But the factors just considered will indicate the possibilities +of reaction and will roughly assign the limits to which Westernization +may ultimately extend. + +One thing is certain: Western political control in the Orient, however +prolonged and however imposing in appearance, must ever rest on +essentially fragile foundations. The Western rulers will always remain +an alien caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never loved and +never regarded as anything but foreigners. Furthermore, Western rule +must necessarily become more precarious with the increasing +enlightenment of the subject peoples, so that the acquiescence of one +generation may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It is +indeed an unstable equilibrium, hard to maintain and easily upset. + +The latent instability of European political control over the Near and +Middle East was dramatically shown by the moral effect of the +Russo-Japanese War. Down to that time the Orient had been so helpless in +face of European aggression that most Orientals had come to regard +Western supremacy with fatalistic resignation. But the defeat of a +first-class European Power by an Asiatic people instantly broke the +spell, and all Asia and Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication which +we can scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionary thus describes the effect +of the Japanese victories on northern India, where he was stationed at +the time: "A stir of excitement passed over the north of India. Even the +remote villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in +their circles and passed round the huqqa at night. One of the older men +said to me, 'There has been nothing like it since the mutiny'. A Turkish +consul of long experience in Western Asia told me that in the interior +you could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the +news. Asia was moved from end to end, and the sleep of the centuries was +finally broken. It was a time when it was 'good to be alive,' for a new +chapter was being written in the book of the world's history."[108] + +Of course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this new spirit, whose +roots lay in the previous epoch of subtle changes that had been going +on. The Russo-Japanese War was thus rather the occasion than the cause +of the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over Asia and Africa +in the year 1904. But it did dramatize and clarify ideas that had been +germinating half-unconsciously in millions of Oriental minds, and was +thus the sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for a +revivified Orient. + +Furthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced the Orient's +attitude toward the series of fresh European aggressions which then +began. It is a curious fact that just when the Far East had +successfully resisted European encroachment, the Near and Middle East +should have been subjected to European aggressions of unparalleled +severity. We have already noted the furious protests and the unwonted +moral solidarity of the Moslem world at these manifestations of Western +_Realpolitik_. It would be interesting to know exactly how much of this +defiant temper was due to the heartening example of Japan. Certainly +our ultra-imperialists of the West were playing a dangerous game during +the decade between 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vambery remarked after +the Italian raid on Tripoli: "The more the power and authority of the +West gains ground in the Old World, the stronger becomes the bond of +unity and mutual interest between the separate factions of Asiatics, +and the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it wise or +expedient by useless provocation and unnecessary attacks to increase +the feeling of animosity, to hurry on the struggle between the two +worlds, and to nip in the bud the work of modern culture which is now +going on in Asia?"[109] + +The Great War of course immensely aggravated an already critical +situation. The Orient suddenly saw the European peoples, who, in racial +matters, had hitherto maintained something like solidarity, locked in an +internecine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw those same +peoples put one another furiously to the ban as irreconcilable foes; it +saw white race-unity cleft by moral and political gulfs which white men +themselves continuously iterated would never be filled. The one +redeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the liberal +programme which the Allied statesmen inscribed upon their banners. But +when the war was over and the Allies had won, it promptly leaked out +that at the very time when the Allied leaders were making their liberal +speeches they had been negotiating a series of secret treaties +partitioning the Near East between them in a spirit of the most cynical +imperialism; and in the peace conferences that closed the war it was +these secret treaties, not the liberal speeches, which determined the +Oriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the total +subjugation of the Near and Middle East to European political control. + +The wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over the East was not confined +to furious remonstrance like the protests of pre-war days. There was a +note of immediate resistance and rebellion not audible before. This +rebellious temper has translated itself into warlike action which has +already forced the European Powers to abate some of their extreme +pretensions and which will undoubtedly make them abate others in the +near future. The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed in +later chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great War has shattered +European prestige in the East and has opened the eyes of Orientals to +the weaknesses of the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic course +of education. For one thing, millions of Orientals and negroes were +taken from the remotest jungles of Asia and Africa to serve as soldiers +and labourers in the White Man's War. Though the bulk of these +auxiliaries were used in colonial operations, more than a million of +them were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white men, raped +white women, tasted white luxuries, learned white weaknesses--and went +home to tell their people the whole story.[110] Asia and Africa to-day +know Europe as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that they +will make use of their knowledge. The most serious factor in the +situation is that the Orient realizes that the famous Versailles "Peace" +which purports to have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather an +unconstructive, unstatesmanlike futility that left old sores unhealed +and even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies debilitated and uncured, +while Asia and Africa see in this a standing incitement to rash dreams +and violent action. + +Such is the situation to-day: an East, torn by the conflict between new +and old, facing a West riven with dissension and sick from its mad +follies. Probably never before have the relations between the two +worlds contained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possibilities. +The point to be here noted is that this strange new East which now faces +us is mainly the result of Western influences permeating it in +unprecedented fashion for the past hundred years. To the chief elements +in that permeation let us now turn. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[72] For the larger aspects, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour +against White World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920). + +[73] On these points, see Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern +Lands_ (London, 1906); also his _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant +Quarante Ans_ (Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the +Orient_ (New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ +(London, 1912); A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," _The Century_, +March, 1904. + +[74] For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see +Vambery, _op. cit._; Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_ (London, +1910); J. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York, +1915); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Study of Social, +Political, and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of +Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, especially Vol. II., pp. 228-243 (London, 1908). + +[75] For the Westernised elites, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage Orientale_ +(Paris, 1910); Cromer, _op. cit._; A. Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: +Etude Sociale_ (Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, "Politique musulmane," +_Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910. + +[76] Chirol, _op. cit._, pp 321-322. + +[77] Bertrand, _op. cit._, p 39. See also Bukhsh, _op. cit._; Farquhar, +_op. cit._; Morrison, _op. cit._; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations of +Indian Economics_ (London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in +India," _Economic Journal_, December, 1910. + +[78] W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_, p. 243 (London, 1902). + +[79] Cromer, _op. cit._, Vol. II., p. 231. + +[80] _Ibid._, p. 228. + +[81] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 171-172 +(London, 1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, +Cromer, Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish +Peasantry of Anatolia," _Quarterly Review_, January, 1918; H. M. +Hyndman, _The Awakening of Asia_ (New York, 1919); T. Rothstein, +_Egypt's Ruin_ (London, 1910); Captain P. Azan, _Recherche d'une +Solution de la Question indigene en Algerie_ (Paris, 1903). + +[82] E. J. Dillon, "Persia," _Contemporary Review_, June, 1910. + +[83] Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World," _The New Europe_, +June 28, 1917. + +[84] The Earl of Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 5 (London, +1913). + +[85] For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see my +_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, especially chaps. +vi. and vii. + +[86] Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers," _Fortnightly Review_, +March, 1912. + +[87] On this point see also A. Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern +Lands_ (London, 1906); W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, +1882); also the two articles by Leon Cahun on intellectual and social +developments in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in +Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vol. XI., chap. xv.; Vol. XII., +chap. xiv. + +[88] See A. Vambery, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_, chap. vi. +(Leipzig, 1875). + +[89] "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde +musulman_, June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this +anonymous writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official--"un homme +d'etat musulman." + +[90] Ahmed Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its +Press_, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914). + +[91] The Constantinople _Tanine_. Quoted from _The Literary Digest_, +October 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the +European Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common to +non-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling throughout +the world, see my _Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, +pp. 13-16. + +[92] Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper, _The +Modernizing of the Orient_, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914). + +[93] An "Unbeliever"--in other words, a Christian. + +[94] Quoted by A. Woeikof, _Le Turkestan russe_ (Paris, 1914). + +[95] B. L. Putnam Weale, _The Conflict of Colour_, p. 193 (London, +1910). + +[96] Quoted from H. H. Powers, _The Great Peace_, p. 82 (New York, +1918). + +[97] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910). + +[98] On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend +entitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics," in his book _Asia and +Europe_, pp. 120-128. + +[99] Townsend, _op. cit._, p. 104. + +[100] H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey," _Contemporary Review_, +October, 1906. + +[101] Bertrand, pp. 209, 210. + +[102] For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer, _India and +the Future_ (London, 1918); Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_ +(London, 1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra, +_Hinduism: The World-Ideal_ (London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy, _The Dance +of Siva_ (New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the Next +War," _Journal of Race Development_, April, 1916. + +[103] Archer, pp. 11, 12. + +[104] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 25. + +[105] Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, p. 128. + +[106] I have dealt with it at length in my _Rising Tide of Colour +against White World-Supremacy_. + +[107] Townsend, p. 97. + +[108] Rev. C. F. Andrews, _The Renaissance in India_, p. 4 (London, +1911). For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese +War upon Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest," +_The Forum_, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam," _Revue +du Monde musulman_, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by the +Russo-Japanese War," _American Review of Reviews_, February, 1905; A. +Vambery, "Japan and the Mahometan World," _Nineteenth Century and +After_, April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk, _op. cit._, p. 42. + +[109] A. Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," +_Nineteenth Century and After_, April, 1912. + +[110] For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon, +_Le Declin de l'Europe_ (Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman, _The Awakening of +Asia_ (New York, 1919); E. D. Morel, _The Black Man's Burden_ (New York, +1920); F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_ (New York, 1919); also, +my _Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy_. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +POLITICAL CHANGE + + +The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political tradition. +From earliest times the typical form of government in the East has been +despotism--the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are +slaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at his +will and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon Oriental despotism has +been religion. Some critics may add "custom"; but it amounts to the same +thing, for in the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. The +mantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the priests forming a +privileged caste. But, with these exceptions, Oriental despotism has +usually known no bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected +religion and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as he +chose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh exhausting all Egypt +to gratify his whim for a colossal pyramid tomb, and throughout history +Oriental life has been cursed by this fatal political simplicity. + +Now manifold human experience has conclusively proved that despotism is +a bad form of government in the long run. Of course there is the +legendary "benevolent despot"--the "father of his people," surrounded by +wise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke of the pen. +That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But in real life the "benevolent +despot" rarely happens and still more rarely succeeds himself. The +"father of his people" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grandson, +who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy trinity--David, Solomon, +Rehoboam--has reappeared with depressing regularity throughout history. + +Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his limitations. The trouble +with all despots, good or bad, is that their rule is entirely +_personal_. Everything, in the last analysis, depends on the despot's +personal will. Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot +himself may discard his benevolence overnight, and the fate of an empire +may be jeopardized by the monarch's infatuation for a woman or by an +upset in his digestion. + +We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despotism," in its Simon +Pure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can +hardly conceive what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot we +usually think of the "enlightened autocrats" of eighteenth-century +Europe, such as Frederick the Great. But these monarchs were not +"despots" as Orientals understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He +was regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. Those proud +Prussian officers, starched bureaucrats, stiff-necked burghers, and +stubborn peasants each had his sense of personal dignity and legal +status. The unquestioning obedience which they gave Frederick was given +not merely because he was their king, but also because they knew that he +was the hardest-working man in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to +the state. If Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved, +capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have soon showed him +that there were limits to his power. + +In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East "there lies upon the +eyes and foreheads of all men a law which is not found in the European +decalogue; and this law runs: 'Thou shalt honour and worship the man +whom God shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, thou +shalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee thou shalt still love +him, for thou art his slave and his chattel.'"[111] The Eastern monarch +may immure himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the +shoulders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth limitless +power; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet, any evening, at +the pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to the +vizier's palace a negro "mute," armed with the bowstring. And when that +black mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of office, and with +neither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled. +That is real despotism--the despotism that the East has known. + +Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is surely obvious +that under such a tradition neither ordered government nor consistent +progress is possible. Eastern history is, in fact, largely a record of +sudden flowerings and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cuts +his way to power in a period of confusion and decay. He must be strong +and able, or he would not win over other men of similar nature +struggling for the coveted prize. His energy and ability soon work +wonders. He knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. His +vigour and resolution supply the driving-power required to compel his +subordinates to act with reasonable efficiency, especially since +incompetence or dishonesty are punished with the terrible severity of +the Persian king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skin +into the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap sat to +administer justice. + +While the master lives, things may go well. But the master dies, and is +succeeded by his son. This son, even assuming that he has inherited much +of his father's ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raised +in the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and designing women, +neither his pride nor his passions have been effectively restrained, and +he grows up a pompous tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a +man will not be apt to look after things as his father did. And as soon +as the master's eye shifts, things begin to go to pieces. How can it be +otherwise? His father built up no governmental machine, functioning +almost automatically, as in the West. His officers worked from fear or +personal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of duty or impersonal +_esprit de corps_. Under the grandson, matters get even worse, power +slips from his incompetent hands and is parcelled out among many local +despots, of whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that the +decadent state is not overrun by some foreign conqueror. In either +eventuality, the old cycle--David, Solomon, Rehoboam--is finished, and a +new cycle begins--with the same destined end. + +That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. It has, +however, been modified or temporarily interrupted by the impact of more +liberal political influences, exerted sometimes from special Eastern +regions and sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been given +over to unrelieved despotism. Here and there have been peoples (mostly +mountain or pastoral peoples) who abhorred despotism. Such a people have +always been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs, fired by +Islam, established a mighty caliphate which, in its early days, was a +theocratic democracy. Of course we have also seen how the older +tradition of despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem world, +how the democratic caliphate turned into a despotic sultanate, and how +the liberty-loving Arabs retired sullenly to their deserts. Political +liberalism, like religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten. +Almost--not quite; for memories of the Meccan caliphate, like memories +of Motazelism, remained in the back of men's minds, ready to come forth +again with better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with every +Arab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it kept free. And then, +there was Islam. No court theologian could entirely explain away the +fact that Mohammed had said things like "All Believers are brothers" and +"All Moslems are free." No court chronicler could entirely expunge from +Moslem annals the story of Islam's early days, known as the +Wakti-Seadet, or "Age of Blessedness." Even in the darkest times +Moslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly interested to read +that the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after his election by the people, said: +"Oh nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your +caliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise, +admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable, +and lies are despicable.... As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me +only so long as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see that I +deviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me no +more."[112] + +In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely obliterate the fact +that primitive Islam was the supreme expression of a freedom-loving folk +whose religion must necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Even +the sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states, +"fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism."[113] +Vambery well summarizes this matter when he writes: "It is not Islam and +its doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia and +brought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of +the Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the +Prophet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their +despotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in +matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all +liberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem +Renaissance."[114] + +In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evil +maximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival was +not merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part a +political protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants who +misruled the Moslem world. This internal movement of political +liberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming in +from the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem East +with Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning to +recognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusion +that their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments. +Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there must +be some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were to +be saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type of +Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of +Egypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenth +century. + +Of course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea of +granting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transforming +themselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but +absolute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" of Europe and +less in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted were +true organs of government--army, civil service, judiciary, etc.--which +would function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmental +machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to be +continuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to get +anything done. + +Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in their +new policies, but the outcome of these "reforms from above" was, on the +whole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux on +European models and fill them with soldiers and bureaucrats in European +clothes, but they did not get European results. Most of these +"Western-type" officials knew almost nothing about the West, and were +therefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. In fact, they +had small heart for the business. Devoid of any sort of enthusiasm for +ideas and institutions which they did not comprehend, they applied +themselves to the work of reform with secret ill-will and repugnance, +moved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's command. As time +passed, the military branches did gain some modern efficiency, but the +civil services made little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic +vices but few or none of the virtues. + +Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to appear: men +demanding Western innovations like constitutions, parliaments, and other +phenomena of modern political life. Their numbers were constantly +recruited from the widening circles of men acquainted with Western ideas +through the books, pamphlets, and newspapers which were being +increasingly published, and through the education given by schools on +the Western model which were springing up. The third quarter of the +nineteenth century saw the formation of genuine political parties in +Turkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups actually wrung from a weak sultan +the grant of a parliament. + +These early successes of Moslem political liberalism were, however, +followed by a period of reaction. The Moslem princes had become +increasingly alarmed at the growth of liberal agitation among their +subjects and were determined to maintain their despotic authority. The +new Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly suppressed his parliament, +savagely persecuted the liberals, and restored the most uncompromising +despotism. In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal movement with +equal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift rule of Khedive Ismail +ended all native political life by provoking European intervention and +the imposition of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution of +1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation in those Moslem +countries which still retained their independence. Nevertheless, the +agitation was there, working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriots +fled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct their liberal +propaganda, and from havens of refuge like Switzerland these +"Young-Turks," "Young-Persians," and others issued manifestoes and +published revolutionary literature which was smuggled into their +homelands and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren.[115] + +As the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily in strength. A +young Turkish poet wrote at this time: "All that we admire in European +culture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome of +liberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty. +Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without liberty +there is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life, +eternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shining +light of freedom!"[116] By the close of the nineteenth century +keen-sighted European observers noted the working of the liberal ferment +under the surface calm of absolutist repression. Thus, Arminius Vambery, +revisiting Constantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberal +evolution that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey forty +years before. Although Constantinople was subjected to the severest +phase of Hamidian despotism, Vambery wrote, "The old attachment of +Turkey for the absolute regime is done for. We hear much in Europe of +the 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a constitutional movement, +political emigres, revolutionary pamphlets. But what we do not realize +is the ferment which exists in the different social classes, and which +gives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and is no longer +clay in the hands of his despotic potter. In Turkey, therefore, it is +not a question of a Young-Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman +belongs to this party."[117] + +In this connection we should note the stirrings of unrest that were now +rapidly developing in the Eastern lands subject to European political +control. By the close of the nineteenth century only four considerable +Moslem states--Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghanistan--retained +anything like independence from European domination. Since Afghanistan +and Morocco were so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as +civilized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that genuine +liberal movements against native despotism could arise. But in +European-ruled countries like India, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural +level of the inhabitants was high enough to engender liberal political +aspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule which may be +felt by savages as well as by civilized peoples. + +These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated by the movements +against native despotism in Turkey and Persia. Nevertheless, the two +sets of phenomena must be sharply distinguished from each other. The +Turkish and Persian agitations were essentially movements of liberal +reform. The Indian, Egyptian, Algerian, and kindred agitations were +essentially movements for independence, with no settled programme as to +how that independence should be used after it had been attained. These +latter movements are, in fact, "nationalist" rather than liberal in +character, and it is in the chapters devoted to nationalism that they +will be discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are really +coalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men holding very diverse +political ideas, embracing as these "nationalist" coalitions do not +merely genuine liberals but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark +reactionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberated countries +the yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course all the nationalist groups +use the familiar slogans "freedom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, what +many of them mean is merely freedom and liberty _from foreign +tutelage_--in other words, independence. We must always remember that +patriotism has no essential connection with liberalism. The Spanish +peasants, who shouted "liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies, +greeted their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm and +welcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries of "Long live +chains!" + +The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted Turkey and Persia +since the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century came +dramatically to an end in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into +revolution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, the Persians +rising against their infamous ruler Muhammad Ali Shah, "perhaps the most +perverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the +throne of Persia in many generations."[118] These revolutions released +the pent-up liberal forces which had been slowly gathering strength +under the repression of the previous generation, and the upshot was that +Turkey and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, parliaments, +and all the other political machinery of the West. + +How the new regimes would have worked in normal times it is profitless +to speculate, because, as a matter of fact, the times were abnormal to +the highest degree. Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had +made their revolutions just when the world was entering that profound +_malaise_ which culminated in the Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia +were allowed time to attempt the difficult process of political +transformation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every blunder and, +in the inevitable weakness of transition, pounced upon them to their +undoing. The Great War merely completed a process of Western aggression +and intervention which had begun some years before. + +This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders largely academic any +discussion of the much-debated question whether or not the peoples of +the Near and Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is, of +establishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional political life. +Opinions on this point are at absolute variance. Personally, I have not +been able to make up my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself +with stating the various arguments without attempting to draw any +general conclusion. Before stating these contrasted view-points, +however, I would draw attention to the distinction which should be made +between the Mohammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus of India. +Moslems everywhere possess the democratic political example of Arabia as +well as a religion which, as regards its own followers at least, +contains many liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this. +Their political tradition has been practically that of unrelieved +Oriental despotism, the only exceptions being a few primitive +self-governing communities in very early times, which never exerted any +widespread influence and quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the +Hindu religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever +afflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an infinity of rigid +castes between which no real intercourse is possible; each caste +regarding all those of lesser rank as unclean, polluting creatures, +scarcely to be distinguished from animals. It is obvious that with such +handicaps the establishment of true self-government will be apt to be +more difficult for Hindus than for Mohammedans, and the reader should +keep this point in mind in the discussion which follows. + +Considering first the attitude of those who do not believe the peoples +of the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in the +Western sense either now or in the immediate future, we find this +thesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer +believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong to +be overcome, at least in our time. "From the dawn of history," he +asserts, "Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. +Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of +despotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception +of ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all, +will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries.... Our +primary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under the +specious cloak of free institutions, will enable a small minority of +natives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which will +enable the mass of the population to be governed according to the code +of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposing +such a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for the +protection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance +can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way, +would not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit of +presenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain +anything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they will +have to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought." And +Lord Cromer concludes pessimistically: "It will probably never be +possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear."[119] + +In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writing +after the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in their +success, and ridiculed the current "faith in the sacramental virtue of +constitutional government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet +manufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons of men, can do +away with the foundations of national character. Flashy phrases and +elegant declamations may persuade people that they have been transmuted; +but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utter +incapacity for self-government." Referring to the Persian revolution, +Doctor Dillon continues: "At bottom, only names of persons and things +have been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on for +ever.... Financial support of the new government is impossible. For +foreign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibusters +and irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appear +on the surface and disappear at once."[120] + +A high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians and +other Moslem populations of French North Africa: "Our natives need to be +governed. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We should +guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers and +agents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, direct +them paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by the +constant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vain +humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of the +natives themselves."[121] + +Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointed +with the way Orientals have used experimental first steps in +self-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers; +have used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power, +instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. As Lord Kitchener +said in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: "Representative bodies +can only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of +performing adequately their present functions, and that there is good +hope that they could undertake still more important and arduous +responsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form, +is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more +useful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enough +to consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unable +to carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it +should therefore be given a larger measure of power and control."[122] + +These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upper +classes and Western-educated elites, however successful they may be in +inflaming the ignorant masses, who are often quite contented with the +material benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is well +brought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetime +of experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: "The common +people of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their +government than they ever were before. It is the classes, rather, who +reveal the real spirit of discontent.... If the common people were let +alone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earth +than the people of India. But the educated classes are certainly +possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remain +satisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts of +emolument.... These people have little or no sympathy with the kind of +government which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they do +not ask for representative institutions, which will give them a share in +the government of their own land. What they really seek is absolute +control. The Brahmin (only five per cent. of the community) believes that +he has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withhold +the franchise from all others. The Sudra--the Bourgeois of India--would +no more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of the +land than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that has +introduced, and now maintains, the equality of rights and privileges +for all the people of the land."[123] + +The apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might be +exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only by +Western observers but also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known +collectively as the "Depressed Classes". These people oppose the Indian +nationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection under +the British "Raj." They believe that India still needs generations of +education and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much less +independence, and they have organized into a powerful association the +"Namasudra," which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character. + +The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair. +"Democracy as a catchword," he says, "has already reached India and is +widely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, and +will find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is +strongly intrenched.... I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing +the lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher +castes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the +non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castes +below him.... We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, however +camouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy is +established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say that +we should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, having +more trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympathetic +oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us in +the past and will do so again but for the British Government. Our +attitude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of +self-preservation."[124] + +Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe for +self-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or in +the immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The +Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasons +expressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who +remarks: "Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern +Indian politics, and I have always held that we should devote more +attention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less to +politics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I am +firmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leaving +politics severely alone.... It is not a handful of men armed with the +learning and culture of the West, but it is the masses that must feel, +understand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. The +infinitesimal educated minority do not constitute the population of +India. It is the masses, therefore, that must be trained, educated, +brought to the level of unassailable uprightness and devotion to their +country. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we +attain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile and +illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off the +swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above the +illusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learn +austerity of principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope to +raise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continue +to subordinate the interest of our community and country to our +own."[125] + +Such pronouncements as these from considerable portions of the native +population give pause even to those liberal English students of Indian +affairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home +rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When Indian Nationalists ask +for freedom, they mean autonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner. +Our answer as given in the reforms is:[126] 'Yes, autonomy you shall +have, but on one condition--that you have democracy as well. We will +give up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which can +control its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian +oligarchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between those who say +that India might have self-government immediately and those who say that +India can only become capable of self-government with time. For the +former, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly true +that India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign control +were withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group of +governments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come into +being in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would be +the despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning."[127] + +The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, both +Western and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near and +Middle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at least +to-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of those +who hold a more optimistic attitude. Some observers stress strongly +Islam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect political +structures in the modern sense. Vambery says, "Islam is still the most +democratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty and +equality. If there ever was a constitutional government, it was that of +the first Caliphs."[128] A close English student of the Near East +declares: "Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government, +and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continues +democratic--as many a would-be despot knows to his cost."[129] +Regarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks: +"Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary institutions as might at +first sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation, +and a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religious +and the secular institutions of Turkey involve precedents for a +parliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of his +companions. The Ulema[130] have taken counsel together up to the present +time. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposed +in essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental law +enables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a +Constitution." He points out that the early sultans had their "Divan," +or assemblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultan +information and advice, while more recently there have been a Council of +State and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of +1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidian +absolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all this +Professor Lybyer concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore be +regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement and +improvement of familiar institutions."[131] + +Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, whom the Persian +Revolutionary Government called in to organize the country's finances, +and who was ousted in less than a year by Russo-British pressure, +expresses an optimistic regard for the political capacities of the +Persian people. + +"I believe," he says, "that there has never been in the history of the +world an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolute +monarchy to a constitutional or representative form of government and at +once succeeded in displaying a high standard of political wisdom and +knowledge of legislative procedure. Such a thing is inconceivable and +not to be expected by any reasonable person. The members of the first +Medjlis[132] were compelled to fight for their very existence from the +day that the Parliament was constituted.... They had no time for serious +legislative work, and but little hope that any measures which they might +enact would be put into effect. + +"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members I knew +personally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be judged by the +standards of the British Parliament or the American Congress. It would +be strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried government in a land +filled with the decay of ages should, from the outset, be able to +conduct its business as well as governments with generations and even +centuries of experience behind them. We should make allowances for lack +of technical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is that +the Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals and +aspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men of more than +average education; some displayed remarkable talent, character, and +courage.... They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestion +which was put before them. They themselves lacked any great knowledge of +governmental finances, but they realized the situation and were both +willing and anxious to put their full confidence in any foreign advisers +who showed themselves capable of resisting political intrigues and +bribery and working for the welfare of the Persian people. + +"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent when it has the support +of an entire people, when it recognizes its own limitations, and when +its members are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's +dignity and sovereign rights.... + +"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to generalize. The +great mass of the population is composed of peasants and tribesmen, all +densely ignorant. On the other hand, many thousands have been educated +abroad, or have travelled after completing their education at home. +They, or at least certain elements among them which had had the support +of the masses, proved their capacity to assimilate Western civilization +and ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the face of untold +obstacles. Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man of +ability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they showed +during the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for education. +Hundreds of schools were established during the Constitutional regime. A +remarkable free press sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came +forward to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within their +country or without. The Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale the +political, ethical, and business codes of the most modern and +progressive nations. They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest +which pervades India, which produced the 'Young-Turk' movement, and +which has more recently manifested itself in the establishment of the +Chinese Republic."[133] + +Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle the +East. This includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Western +ideals _can_ hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they +are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to themselves. As a +matter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal of race-pride and +patriotism, are as strong in the East as in the West, though it does not +lie so near the surface, and naturally the Oriental displays no great +desire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only to the +Westerner."[134] + +Indeed, many Western liberals believe that European rule, however +benevolent and efficient, will never prepare the Eastern peoples for +true self-government; and that the only way they will learn is by trying +it out themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the well-known +British publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking of India, Mr. Curtis says that +education and kindred benefits conferred by British rule will not, of +themselves, "avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible +government. On the contrary, education will prove a danger and positive +mischief, unless accompanied by a definite instalment of political +responsibility. It is in the workshops of actual experience alone that +electorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highly +educated they may be. + +"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite powers on electorates. +The officers of Government[135] must give every possible help and advice +to the new authorities, for which those authorities may ask. They must +act as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if the new +authorities are to learn the art of responsible government, they must be +free from control from above. Not otherwise will they learn to feel +themselves responsible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates +themselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings rests in their own +hands. Suffering there will be, and it is only by suffering, +self-inflicted and perhaps long endured, that a people will learn the +faculty of self-help, and genuine electorates be brought into being.... + +"I am proud to think that England has conferred immeasurable good on +India by creating order and showing Indians what orderly government +means. But, this having been done, I do not believe the system can now +be continued as it is, without positive damage to the character of the +people. The burden of trusteeship must be transferred, piece by piece, +from the shoulders of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able +to bear it. Their strength and numbers must be developed. But that can +be done by the exercise of actual responsibility steadily increased as +they can bear it. It cannot be done by any system of school-teaching, +though such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process. + +"The goal now set by the recent announcement of the Secretary of +State[136] will only be reached through trouble. Yet troublous as the +times before us may be, we have at last reached that stage of our work +in India which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The task is +one worthy of this epoch in our history, if only because it calls for +the effacement of ourselves."[137] + +Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process which is to-day +actually going on, not only in India but in other parts of the East as +well. The Great War has so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations +and has so weakened European power and prestige that a widespread +relaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is taking place. This process +may make for good or for ill, but it is apparently inevitable; and a +generation (perhaps a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle +East autonomous or even independent. Whether the liberated peoples will +misuse their opportunities and fall into despotism or anarchy, or +whether they succeed in establishing orderly, progressive, +constitutional governments, remains to be seen. We have examined the +factors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the only way in which +to-day it can scientifically be left--on a note of interrogation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[111] T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_, p. 43 (London, 1899). + +[112] Quoted from Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, +pp. 305-306 (London, 1906). + +[113] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the +American Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., p. 67 (1910). + +[114] Vambery, _op. cit._, p. 307. + +[115] A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth +century is found in Vambery, "Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischen +Asien," _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1893; a shorter summary +of Vambery's views is found in his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, +especially chap. v. Also, see articles by Leon Cahun, previously noted, +in Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vols. XI. and XII. + +[116] Vambery, _supra_, p. 332. + +[117] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 22 +(Paris, 1898). + +[118] W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, p. xxi (New York, +1912). + +[119] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, pp. 25-28. + +[120] E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self-Government," _Contemporary +Review_, April, 1910. + +[121] E. Mercier, _La Question indigene_, p. 220 (Paris, 1901). + +[122] "Egypt," No. 1 (1914), p. 6. + +[123] Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," _Journal of +Race Development_, July, 1910. + +[124] Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy," _Edinburgh Review_, +October, 1918. + +[125] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912). + +[126] _I. e._, the increase of self-government granted India by Britain +as a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. + +[127] E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India," _The New Europe_, January 29, +1920. + +[128] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. +58. + +[129] G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919). + +[130] The assembly of religious notables. + +[131] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," _Proceedings of the +American Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., pp. 66-67 (1910). + +[132] The name of the Persian Parliament. + +[133] Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, pp. 240-246. + +[134] _Ibid._, p. 333. + +[135] _I. e._, the British Government of India. + +[136] _I. e._, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted. + +[137] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on Responsible +Government_, pp. 159-160 (London, 1918). + + + + +CHAPTER V + +NATIONALISM + + +The spirit of nationality is one of the great dynamics of modern times. +In Europe, where it first attained self-conscious maturity, it radically +altered the face of things during the nineteenth century, so that that +century is often called the Age of Nationalities. But nationalism is not +merely a European phenomenon. It has spread to the remotest corners of +the earth, and is apparently still destined to effect momentous +transformations. + +Given a phenomenon of so vital a character, the question at once arises: +What is nationalism? Curiously enough, this question has been endlessly +debated. Many theories have been advanced, seeking variously to identify +nationalism with language, culture, race, politics, geography, +economics, or religion. Now these, and even other, matters may be +factors predisposing or contributing to the formation of national +consciousness. But, in the last analysis, nationalism is something over +and above all its constituent elements, which it works into a new and +higher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite or mysterious about +nationalism, despite all the arguments that have raged concerning its +exact meaning. As a matter of fact, nationalism is _a state of mind_. +Nationalism is a _belief_, held by a fairly large number of individuals, +that they constitute a "Nationality"; it is a sense of _belonging +together_ as a "Nation." This "Nation," as visualized in the minds of +its believers, is a people or community associated together and +organized under one government, and dwelling together in a distinct +territory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, we have what is known +as a body-politic or "State." But we must not forget that this "State" +is the material manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existed +for generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangible attributes +like state sovereignty or physical frontiers. Conversely, we must +remember that a state need not be a nation. Witness the defunct Hapsburg +Empire of Austria-Hungary, an assemblage of discordant nationalities +which flew to pieces under the shock of war. + +The late war was a liberal education regarding nationalistic phenomena, +especially as applied to Europe, and most of the fallacies regarding +nationality were vividly disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland--a +country whose very existence flagrantly violates "tests" like language, +culture, religion, or geography, and where nevertheless a lively sense +of nationality emerged triumphant from the ordeal of Armageddon. + +So familiar are these matters to the general public that only one point +need here be stressed: the difference between nationality and race. +Unfortunately the two terms have been used very loosely, if not +interchangeably, and are still much confused in current thinking. As a +matter of fact, they connote utterly different things. Nationality is a +psychological concept or state of mind. Race is a physiological fact, +which may be accurately determined by scientific tests such as +skull-measurement, hair-formation, and colour of eyes and skin. In other +words, race is what people anthropologically _really_ are; nationality +is what people politically _think_ they are. + +Right here we encounter a most curious paradox. There can be no question +that, as between race and nationality, race is the more fundamental, +and, in the long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity is +obviously dependent upon his heredity, and no matter how stimulating may +be his environment, the potential limits of his reaction to that +environment are fixed at his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains that +men pay scant attention to race, while nationalism stirs them to their +very souls. The main reason for this seems to be because it is only +about half a century since even savants realized the true nature and +importance of race. Even after an idea is scientifically established, it +takes a long time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, and +only after it has been thus accepted will it form the basis of practical +conduct. Meanwhile the far older idea of nationality has permeated the +popular consciousness, and has thereby been able to produce tangible +effects. In fine, our political life is still dominated by nationalism +rather than race, and practical politics are thus conditioned, not by +what men really are, but by what they think they are. + +The late war is a striking case in point. That war is very generally +regarded as having been one of "race." The idea certainly lent to the +struggle much of its bitterness and uncompromising fury. And yet, from +the genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind. Ethnologists +have proved conclusively that, apart from certain palaeolithic survivals +and a few historically recent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited by +only three stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed "Nordic" race, (2) the +medium-complexioned, round-headed "Alpine" race, (3) the _brunet_, +long-headed "Mediterranean" race. These races are so dispersed and +intermingled that every European nation is built of at least two of +these stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly speaking, +therefore, the European War was not a race-war at all, but a domestic +struggle between closely knit blood-relatives. + +Now all this was known to most well-educated Europeans long before 1914. +And yet it did not make the slightest difference. The reason is that, in +spite of everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe that +they fit into an entirely different race-category. They think they +belong to the "Teutonic" race, the "Latin" race, the "Slav" race, or the +"Anglo-Saxon" race. The fact that these so-called "races" simply do not +exist but are really historical differentiations, based on language and +culture, which cut sublimely across genuine race-lines--all that is +quite beside the point. Your European may apprehend this intellectually, +but so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have no +appreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of hearts he will +still believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. For +his blood-race he will not stir; for his thought-race he will die. For +the glory of the dolichocephalic "Nordic" or the brachycephalic "Alpine" +he will not prick his finger or wager a groat; for the triumph of the +"Teuton" or the "Slav" he will give his last farthing and shed his +heart's blood. In other words: Not what men really are, but what they +think they are. + +At first it may seem strange that in contemporary Europe thought-race +should be all-powerful while blood-race is impotent. Yet there are very +good reasons. Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been nationalism, +but also nationalism has seized upon the nascent racial concept and has +perverted it to its own ends. Until quite recent times "Nationality" was a +distinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate identity of culture, +language, and historic past. It was the logical product of a relatively +narrow European outlook. Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlook +which had contented itself with the regional, feudal, and dialectic +loyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the nineteenth century +saw a still further widening of the European outlook to a continental or +even to a world horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceased +to satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended to embrace all those +of kindred speech, culture, and historic tradition, however distant such +persons might be. Obviously a new terminology was required. The keyword +was presently discovered--"Race." Hence we get that whole series of +_pseudo_ "race" phrases--"Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," "Pan-Angleism," +"Pan-Latinism," and the rest. Of course these are not racial at all. They +merely signify nationalism brought up to date. But the European peoples, +with all the fervour of the nationalist faith that is in them, believe and +proclaim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical politics are +concerned, they _are_ racial and will so continue while the nationalist +dynamic endures. + +This new development of nationalism (the "racial" stage, as we may call +it) was at first confined to the older centres of European civilization, +but with the spread of Western ideas it presently appeared in the most +unexpected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for example, quickly +engendered those fanatical propagandas, "Pan-Hellenism," "Pan-Serbism," +etc., which turned that unhappy region first into a bear-garden and +latterly into a witches' sabbath. + +Meanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the first +phase of nationalism had patently passed into Asia. The "Young-Turk" and +"Young-Egyptian" movements, and the "Nationalist" stirrings in regions +so far remote from each other as Algeria, Persia, and India, were +unmistakable signs that Asia was gripped by the initial throes of +nationalist self-consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years of +the twentieth century, numerous symptoms proclaimed the fact that in +Asia, as in the Balkans, the second or "racial" stage of nationalism had +begun. These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung "Pan-" +movements: "Pan-Turanism," "Pan-Arabism," and (most amazing of apparent +paradoxes) "Pan-Islamic Nationalism." + + + I + +Let us now trace the genesis and growth of nationalism in the Near and +Middle East, devoting the present chapter to nationalist developments in +the Moslem world with the exception of India. India requires special +treatment, because there nationalist activity has been mainly the work +of the non-Moslem Hindu element. Indian nationalism has followed a +course differing distinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore be +considered in the following chapter. + +Before it received the Western impact of the nineteenth century, the +Islamic world was virtually devoid of self-conscious nationalism. There +were, to be sure, strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intense +dynastic sentiment like the Turks' devotion to their "Padishas," the +Ottoman sultans. There was also marked pride of race such as the Arabs' +conviction that they were the "Chosen People." Here, obviously, were +potential nationalist elements. But these elements were as yet dispersed +and unco-ordinated. They were not yet fused into the new synthesis of +self-conscious nationalism. The only Moslem people which could be said +to possess anything like true nationalist feeling were the Persians, +with their traditional devotion to their plateau-land of "Iran." The +various peoples of the Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary, +inchoate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary spirit; +capable of development, perhaps, but as yet scarcely perceptible even to +outsiders and certainly unperceived by themselves. + +Furthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hostile to nationalism. +Islam's insistence upon the brotherhood of all True Believers, and the +Islamic political ideal of the "Imamat," or universal theocratic +democracy, naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign, +mutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent nationalities of +Renaissance Europe conflicted with the mediaeval ideals of universal +papacy and "Holy Roman Empire." + +Given such an unfavourable environment, it is not strange to see Moslem +nationalist tendencies germinating obscurely and confusedly throughout +the first half of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half of +the century is there any clear conception of "Nationalism" in the +Western sense. There are distinct nationalist tendencies in the +teachings of Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani (who is philosophically the +connecting link between Pan-Islamism and Moslem nationalism), while the +Turkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were patently influenced +by nationalism as they were by other Western ideas. It was, in fact, in +Turkey that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared. Working +upon the Turks' traditional devotion to their dynasty and pride in +themselves as a ruling race lording it over many subject peoples both +Christian and Moslem, the Turkish nationalist movement made rapid +progress. + +Precisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in Turkey began with a +revival of historic memories and a purification of the language. Half a +century ago the Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins or +their history. The martial deeds of their ancestors and the stirring +annals of their empire were remembered only in a vague, legendary +fashion, the study of the national history being completely neglected. +Religious discussions and details of the life of Mohammed or the early +days of Islam interested men more than the spread of Ottoman power in +three continents. The nationalist pioneers taught their +fellow-countrymen their historic glories and awakened both pride of past +and confidence in the future. + +Similarly with the Turkish language; the early nationalists found it +virtually cleft in twain. On the one hand was "official" Turkish--a +clumsy hotchpotch, overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and cryptic +expressions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraordinary jargon, +couched in a bombastic style, was virtually unintelligible to the +masses. The masses, on the other hand, spoke "popular" Turkish--a +primitive, limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised as +uncouth and boorish by "educated" persons. The nationalists changed all +this. Appreciating the simple, direct strength of the Turkish tongue, +nationalist enthusiasts trained in European principles of grammar and +philology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language in the Western +sense. So well did they succeed that in less than a generation they +produced a simplified, flexible Turkish which was used effectively by +both journalists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes, +and became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and the canon of +style.[138] + +Of course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism was Western +political pressure. The more men came to love their country and aspire +to its future, the more European assaults on Turkish territorial +integrity spurred them to defend their threatened independence. The +nationalist ideal was "Ottomanism"--the welding of a real "nation" in +which all citizens, whatever their origin or creed, should be +"Ottomans," speaking the Turkish language and inspired by Ottoman +patriotism. This, however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior) +nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire, to say nothing of +the new Arab nationalism which was taking shape at just this same time. +Turkish nationalism was also frowned on by Sultan Abdul Hamid. Abdul +Hamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist movements, both as +limitations to his personal absolutism and as conflicting with that +universal Pan-Islamic ideal on which he based his policy. Accordingly, +even those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete loyalty were +suspect, while those with liberal tendencies were persecuted and driven +into exile. + +The revolution of 1908, however, brought nationalism to power. Whatever +their differences on other matters, the Young-Turks were all ardent +nationalists. In fact, the very ardour of their nationalism was a prime +cause of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of fanatics the +Young-Turks tried to "Ottomanize" the whole empire at once. This enraged +all the other nationalities, alienated them from the revolution, and +gave the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attack +disorganized Turkey in 1912. + +The truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism was evolving in a +direction which could only mean heightened antagonism between the +Turkish element on the one side and the non-Turkish elements, Christian +or Moslem, on the other. Turkish nationalism had, in fact, now reached +the second or "racial" stage. Passing the bounds of the limited, mainly +territorial, idea connoted by the term "Ottomanism," it had embraced the +far-flung and essentially racial concepts known as "Pan-Turkism" and +"Pan-Turanism." These wider developments we shall consider later on in +this chapter. Before so doing let us examine the beginnings of +nationalism's "first stage" in other portions of the Moslem world. + +Shortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a nationalistic +awakening, kindred symptoms began to appear among the Arabs. As in all +self-conscious nationalist movements, it was largely a protest _against_ +some other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest was naturally +directed against their Turkish rulers. We have already seen how Desert +Arabia (the Nejd) had always maintained its freedom, and we have also +seen how those Arab lands like Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hedjaz which +fell under Turkish control nevertheless continued to feel an +ineradicable repugnance at seeing themselves, Islam's "Chosen People," +beneath the yoke of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstart +barbarians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination the two races +never got on well together, their racial temperaments being too +incompatible for really cordial relations. The profound temperamental +incompatibility of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a French +writer. Says Victor Berard: "Such are the two languages and such the two +peoples: in the latitude of Rome and in the latitude of Algiers, the +Turk of Adrianople, like the Turk of Adalia, remains a man of the north +and of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab remains a man of the +south and of the extreme south. To the Arab's suppleness, mobility, +imagination, artistic feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchic +individualism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense of +discipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turkish master has +always felt disdain for the 'artistic canaille,' whose pose, +gesticulations, and indiscipline, shock him profoundly. On their side, +the Arabs see in the Turk only a blockhead; in his placidity and +taciturnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for law only +slavishness; and in his love of material well-being only gross +bestiality. Especially do the Arabs jeer at the Turk's artistic +incapacity: after having gone to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs, +and Greeks, the Turk remains, in Arab eyes, just a big booby of barrack +and barnyard."[139] + +Add to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks as perverters of +the Islamic faith, and we need not be surprised to find that Turkey's +Arab subjects have ever displayed symptoms of rebellious unrest. We have +seen how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed against Turkish +control of the holy cities, and despite the Wahabi defeat, Arab +discontent lived on. About 1820 the German explorer Burckhardt wrote of +Arabia: "When Turkish power in the Hedjaz declines, the Arabs will +avenge themselves for their subjection."[140] And some twenty years +later the Shereef of Mecca remarked to a French traveller: "We, the +direct descendants of the Prophet, have to bow our heads before +miserable Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to power by +the most shameful courses."[141] Throughout the nineteenth century every +Turkish defeat in Europe was followed by a seditious outburst in its +Arab provinces. + +Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these seditious stirrings +remained sporadic, unco-ordinated outbursts of religious, regional, or +tribal feeling, with no genuinely "Nationalistic" programme of action or +ideal. But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation appeared. +Its birthplace was Syria. That was what might have been expected, since +Syria was the part of Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western +influences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, did not +amount to much. Directed by a small group of noisy agitators devoid of +real ability, the Turkish Government suppressed it without much +difficulty. + +The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew the scattered embers +into a fresh flame. For several years Turkey's Arab provinces were in +full ferment. The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turkish +yoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit confederation headed +by a religious potentate, probably the Shereef of Mecca. This was +obviously an adaptation of Western nationalism to the traditional Arab +ideal of a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan caliphate +and the Wahabi government of the Nejd. + +This second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise of short duration. +Turkey was now ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's +Pan-Islamic policy looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects. +Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, favours were heaped +upon Arab chiefs and notables, while efforts were made to promote the +contentment of the empire's Arab populations. At the same time the +construction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz gave the +Turkish Government a stronger grip over its Arab provinces than ever +before, and conversely rendered successful Arab revolts a far more +remote possibility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda +was specially directed toward awakening a sense of Moslem solidarity +between Arabs and Turks as against the Christian West. These efforts +achieved a measure of success. Certainly, every European aggression in +the Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to forget, or at +least adjourn, their domestic quarrels in face of the common foe. + +Despite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts, a considerable +section of his Arab subjects remained unreconciled, and toward the close +of the nineteenth century a fresh stirring of Arab nationalist +discontent made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the Turkish +authorities, the Arab nationalist agitators, mostly Syrians, went into +exile. Gathering in near-by Egypt (now of course under British +governance) and in western Europe, these exiles organized a +revolutionary propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the year +1895, when the "Arabian National Committee" was created at Paris. For a +decade their propaganda went on obscurely, but evidently with effect, +for in 1905 the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into armed +insurrection. This insurrection, despite the best efforts of the Turkish +Government, was never wholly suppressed, but dragged on year after year, +draining Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing materially to +her Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12. + +The Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's attention upon "The Arab +Question," and the nationalist exiles made the most of their opportunity +by redoubling their propaganda, not only at home but in the West as +well. Europe was fully informed of "Young Arabia's" wrongs and +aspirations, notably by an extremely clever book by one of the +nationalist leaders, entitled _The Awakening of the Arab Nation_,[142] +which made a distinct sensation. The aims of the Arab nationalists are +clearly set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National Committee, +addressed to the Great Powers and published early in 1906. Says this +manifesto: "A great pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey. +The Arabs, whom the Turks tyrannized over only by keeping them divided +on insignificant questions of ritual and religion, have become conscious +of their national, historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detach +themselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order to form themselves +into an independent state. This new Arab Empire will extend to its +natural frontiers, from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the +Isthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman. It will +be governed by the constitutional and liberal monarchy of an Arabian +sultan. The present Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territory +of Medina, will form an independent empire whose sovereign will be at +the same time the religious Khalif of all the Mohammedans. Thus, one +great difficulty, the separation of the civil and the religious powers +in Islam, will have been solved for the greater good of all." + +To their fellow Arabs the committee issued the following proclamation: +"Dear Compatriots! All of us know how vile and despicable the glorious +and illustrious title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of all +foreigners, especially Turks. All of us see to what depths of misery and +ignorance we have fallen under the tyranny of these barbarians sprung +from Central Asia. Our land, the richest and finest on earth, is to-day +an arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the world in a hundred +years; we spread everywhere sciences, arts, and letters; for centuries +we led world-civilization. But, since the spawn of Ertogrul[143] usurped +the caliphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to exploit us to +such a degree that we have become the poorest people on earth." The +proclamation then goes on to declare Arabia's independence.[144] + +Of course "Young Arabia" did not then attain its independence. The +revolt was kept localized and Turkey maintained its hold over most of +its Arab dominions. Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During the +remainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces were in a sort of +unstable equilibrium, torn between the forces of nationalist sedition on +the one hand and Pan-Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other. + +The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new shift in the situation. +The Arab provinces, like the other parts of the empire, rejoiced in the +downfall of despotism and hoped great things for the future. In the +Turkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well represented, and their +deputies asked for a measure of federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks, +bent upon "Ottomanization," curtly refused. The result was profound +disillusionment in the Arab provinces and a revival of separatist +agitation. It is interesting to note that the new independence agitation +had a much more ambitious programme than that of a few years before. The +Arab nationalists of Turkey were by this time definitely linking up with +the nationalists of Egypt and French North Africa--Arabic-speaking lands +where the populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arab +nationalism was beginning to speak aloud what it had previously +whispered--the programme of a great "Pan-Arab" empire stretching right +across North Africa and southern Asia from the Atlantic to the Indian +Oceans. Thus, Arab nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, was evolving +into the "second," or racial, stage. + +Deferring discussion of this broader development, let us follow a trifle +further the course of the more restricted Arab nationalism within the +Turkish Empire. Despite the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by the +European aggressions of 1911-12, nationalist feeling was continually +aroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the Young-Turk government, and +the independence agitation was presently in full swing once more. In +1913 an Arabian nationalist congress convened in Paris and revolutionary +propaganda was inaugurated on an increased scale. When the Great War +broke out next year, Turkey's Arab provinces were seething with +seditious unrest.[145] The Turkish authorities took stern measures +against possible trouble, imprisoning and executing all prominent +nationalists upon whom they could lay their hands, while the +proclamation of the "Holy War" rallied a certain portion of Arab public +opinion to the Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Egypt was +a possibility. But as the war dragged on the forces of discontent once +more raised their heads. In 1916 the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gave +the signal for the downfall of Turkish rule. This revolt, liberally +backed by England, gained the active or passive support of the Arab +elements throughout the Turkish Empire. Inspired by Allied promises of +national independence of a most alluring character, the Arabs fought +strenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor in the _debacle_ +of Ottoman military power in the autumn of 1918.[146] + +Before discussing the momentous events which have occurred in the Arab +provinces of the former Ottoman Empire since 1918, let us consider +nationalist developments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lying +to the westward. Of these developments the most important is that of +Egypt. The mass of the Egyptian people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time, +of the old "Nilotic" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, the +Egyptian "fellaheen" have submitted passively to a long series of +conquerors, albeit this passivity has been occasionally broken by +outbursts of volcanic fury presently dying away into passivity once +more. Above the Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper class +descended chiefly from Egypt's more recent Asiatic conquerors--Arabs, +Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, and Turks. In addition to this upper +class, which until the English occupation monopolized all political +power, there are large European "colonies" with "extraterritorial" +rights, while a further complication is added by the persistence of a +considerable native Christian element, the "Copts," who refused to turn +Mohammedan at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one-tenth of +the total population. + +With such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures, and with so prolonged +a tradition of foreign domination, Egypt might seem a most unlikely +_milieu_ for the growth of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt has +been more exposed to Western influences than any other part of the Near +East. Bonaparte's invasion at the close of the eighteenth century +profoundly affected Egyptian life, and though the French were soon +expelled, European influences continued to permeate the valley of the +Nile. Mehemet Ali, the able Albanian adventurer who made himself master +of Egypt after the downfall of French rule, realized the superiority of +European methods and fostered a process of Europeanization which, +however superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western ideas. +Mehemet Ali's policy was continued by his successors. That magnificent +spendthrift Khedive Ismail, whose reckless contraction of European loans +was the primary cause of European intervention, prided himself on his +"Europeanism" and surrounded himself with Europeans. + +Indeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism took the form of a +protest against the noxious, parasitical "Europeanism" of Khedive Ismail +and his courtiers. Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed at +the way Ismail was mortgaging Egypt's independence by huge European +loans and sucking its life-blood by merciless taxation. Inspired +consciously or unconsciously by the Western concepts of "nation" and +"patriotism," these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive course and +to safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their efforts were directed not +merely against the motley crew of European adventurers and +concessionaires who were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances, +but also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian pashas, and the +Armenian and Syrian usurers, who were the instruments of Ismail's will. +The nascent movement was thus basically a "patriotic" protest against +all those, both foreigners and native-born, who were endangering the +country. This showed clearly in the motto adopted by the agitators--the +hitherto unheard-of slogan: "Egypt for the Egyptians!" + +Into this incipient ferment there was presently injected the dynamic +personality of Djemal-ed-Din. Nowhere else did this extraordinary man +exert so profound and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not too +much to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptian +nationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators like Arabi Pasha +but also conservative reformers like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realized +Egypt's weakness and were content to labour patiently by evolutionary +methods for distant goals. + +For the moment the apostles of violent action had the stage. In 1882 a +revolutionary agitation broke out headed by Arabi Pasha, an army +officer, who, significantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first man +of Nilotic stock to sway Egypt's destinies in modern times. Raising +their slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," the revolutionists sought to +drive all "foreigners," both Europeans and Asiatics, from the country. +Their attempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massacre of +Europeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once precipitated European +intervention. An English army crushed the revolutionists at the battle +of Tel-el-Kebir, and after this one battle, disorganized, bankrupt Egypt +submitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer. +The khedivial dynasty was, to be sure, retained, and the native forms of +government respected, but all real power centred in the hands of the +British "Financial Adviser," the representative of Britain's imperial +will. + +For twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and the record of this +able proconsul will place him for ever in the front rank of the world's +great administrators. His strong hand drew Egypt from hopeless +bankruptcy into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, however, did +not kill Egyptian nationalism. Scattered to the winds before the British +bayonet charges, the seeds of unrest slowly germinated beneath the +fertile Nilotic soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the numbing +shock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationalist sentiment grew steadily as the years +wore on, and by the closing decade of the nineteenth century it had +become distinctly perceptible to keen-sighted European observers. +Passing through Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorer +Schweinfurth was struck with the psychological change which had occurred +since his earlier visits to the valley of the Nile. "A true national +self-consciousness is slowly beginning to awaken," he wrote. "The +Egyptians are still very far from being a true Nationality, but the +beginning has been made."[147] + +With the opening years of the twentieth century what had previously been +visible only to discerning eyes burst into sudden and startling bloom. +This resurgent Egyptian nationalism had, to be sure, its moderate wing, +represented by conservative-minded men like Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El +Azhar University and respected friend of Lord Cromer, who sought to +teach his fellow-countrymen that the surest road to freedom was along +the path of enlightenment and progress. In the main, however, the +movement was an impatient and violent protest against British rule and +an intransigeant demand for immediate independence. Perhaps the most +significant point was that virtually all Egyptians were nationalists at +heart, conservatives as well as radicals declining to consider Egypt as +a permanent part of the British Empire. The nationalists had a sound +legal basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British rule +rested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. England had intervened in +Egypt as a self-constituted "Mandatory" of European financial interests. +Its action had roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in France, +and to allay this opposition the British Government had repeatedly +announced that its occupation of Egypt was of a temporary nature. In +fact, Egyptian discontent was deliberately fanned by France right down +to the conclusion of the _Entente Cordiale_ in 1904. This French +sympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital importance in the +development of the nationalist movement. In Egypt, France's cultural +prestige was predominant. In Egyptian eyes a European education was +synonymous with a French education, so the rising generation inevitably +sat under French teachers, either in Egypt or in France, and these +French preceptors, being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunity +for instilling dislike of England and aversion to British rule. + +The radical nationalists were headed by a young man named Mustapha +Kamel. He was a very prince of agitators; ardent, magnetic, +enthusiastic, and possessed of a fiery eloquence which fairly swept away +both his hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist, he +edited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals, and as fast as one +organ was suppressed by the British authorities he started another. His +uncompromising nationalism may be gauged from the following examples +from his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase "The Egyptians for +Egypt; Egypt for the Egyptians," he wrote as early as 1896: "Egyptian +civilization cannot endure in the future unless it is founded by the +people itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the pupil, +in fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man has sacred, intangible +rights; that he is not created to be a tool, but to lead an intelligent +and worthy life; that love of country is the most beautiful sentiment +which can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is a +nation without existence! It is by patriotism that backward peoples come +quickly to civilization, to greatness, and to power. It is patriotism +that forms the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations, and +it is patriotism that gives life to every living being." + +The English, of course, were bitterly denounced. Here is a typical +editorial from his organ _El Lewa_: "We are the despoiled. The English +are the despoilers. We demand a sacred right. The English are the +usurpers of that right. This is why we are sure of success sooner or +later. When one is in the right, it is only a question of time." + +Despite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamel had a sense of realities, +and recognized that, for the moment at least, British power could not be +forcibly overthrown. He did not, therefore, attempt any open violence +which he knew would merely ruin himself and his followers. Early in 1908 +he died, only thirty-four years of age. His mantle fell upon his leading +disciple, Mohammed Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal calibre, +tried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence by the violence of +his invective. The difference between the two leaders can be gauged by +the editorial columns of _El Lewa_. Here is an editorial of September, +1909: "This land was polluted by the English, putrefied with their +atrocities as they suppressed our beloved _dustour_ [constitution], tied +our tongues, burned our people alive and hanged our innocent relatives, +and perpetrated other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble, +the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let us take a new +step. Let our lives be cheap while we seek our independence. Death is +far better than life for you if you remain in your present condition." + +Mohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposition led him into +tactical blunders like alienating the native Christian Copts, whom +Mustapha Kamel had been careful to conciliate. The following diatribe +(which, by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and Eastern +ideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the increasing violence of his +propaganda: "The Copts should be kicked to death. They still have faces +and bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof that +they hide poisonous spirits within their souls. The fact that they exist +in the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generated +from monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You descendants of the +bearers of trays! You tails of camels with your monkey faces! You bones +of bodies!" + +In this more violent attitude the nationalists were encouraged by +several reasons. For one thing, Lord Cromer had laid down his +proconsulate in 1907 and had been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new +ruler represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in power, which +wished to appease Egyptian unrest by conciliation instead of by Lord +Cromer's autocratic indifference. In the second place, the Young-Turk +revolution of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry for +constitutional self-government. Lastly, France's growing intimacy with +England dashed the nationalist's cherished hope that Britain would be +forced by outside pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and +evacuate the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely more on +their own exertions. + +Given this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt was foredoomed to +failure. For, however conciliatory Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details, +he could not promise the one thing which the nationalists supremely +desired--independence. This demand England refused even to consider. +Practically all Englishmen had become convinced that Egypt with the Suez +Canal was a vital link between the eastern and western halves of the +British Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt was thus an absolute +necessity. There was thus a fundamental deadlock between British +imperial and Egyptian national convictions. Accordingly, the British +Liberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even Sir Eldon Gorst +admitted in his official reports that concessions were simply regarded +as signs of weakness. + +Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence grew to such +proportions that the British Government became convinced that only +strong measures would save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir Eldon +Gorst was replaced by Lord Kitchener--a patent warning to the +nationalists that sedition would be given short shrift by the iron hand +which had crushed the Khalifa and his Dervish hordes at Omdurman. +Kitchener arrived in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order, +and this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The Egyptians were +told plainly that England neither intended to evacuate the Nile valley +nor considered its inhabitants fit for self-government within any +discernible future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts from +politics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture, at which they were +so good. As for seditious propaganda, new legislation enabled Lord +Kitchener to deal with it in summary fashion. Practically all the +nationalist papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders were +imprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the British Government did its +best to distract attention everywhere from Egypt, the British press +co-operating loyally by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was that +Egypt became quieter than it had been for a generation. + +However, it was only a surface calm. Driven underground, Egyptian unrest +even attained new virulence which alarmed close observers. In 1913 the +well-known English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investigation +of the Egyptian situation, wrote: "We are not popular in Egypt. Feared +we may be by some; respected I doubt not by many others; but really +liked, I am sure, by very few."[148] Still more outspoken was an article +significantly entitled "The Darkness over Egypt," which appeared on the +eve of the Great War.[149] Its publication in a semi-scientific +periodical for specialists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy of +serious attention. "The long-continued absence of practically all +discussion or even mention of Egyptian internal affairs from the British +press," asserted this article, "is not indicative of a healthy +condition. In Egypt the superficial quiet is that of suppressed +discontent--of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government of the +Occupation. Certain recent happenings have strengthened in Egyptian +minds the conviction that the Government is making preparations for the +complete annexation of the country.... We are not concerned to question +how far the motives attributed to the Government are true. The essential +fact is that the Government of the Occupation has not yet succeeded in +endearing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian people, but is, +on the contrary, an object of suspicion, an occasion of enmity." The +article expresses grave doubt whether Lord Kitchener's repressive +measures have done more than drive discontent underground, and shows +"how strong is the Nationalist feeling in Egypt to-day in spite of the +determined attempts to stamp out all freedom of political opinion. As +might be expected, this wholesale muzzling of the press has not only +reduced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of internal ferment, but +has seriously alienated the hitherto loyal Copts. It may be that the +Government can discover no better means of recommending itself to the +confidence and good-will of the Egyptian people; it may be that only by +the instant repression of every outward sign of discontent can it feel +secure in its occupation; but if such be the case, it is an admission of +extreme weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure." The article +concludes with the following warning as to the problem's wider +implications: "Egypt, though a subject of profound indifference to the +English voter, is being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans, +and by the whole of our West and Central African subjects--themselves +strongly Moslem in sympathy, and at the present time jealously +suspicious of the political activities of Christian Imperialism." + +Such being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the outbreak of the +Great War was bound to produce intensified unrest. England's position in +Egypt was, in truth, very difficult. Although in fact England exercised +complete control, in law Egypt was still a dependency of the Ottoman +Empire, Britain merely exercising a temporary occupation. Now it soon +became evident that Turkey was going to join England's enemies, the +Teutonic empires, while it was equally evident that the Egyptians +sympathized with the Turks, even the Khedive Abbas Hilmi making no +secret of his pro-Turkish views. During the first months of the European +War, while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian native +press, despite the British censorship, was full of veiled seditious +statements, while the unruly attitude of the Egyptian populace and the +stirrings among the Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to how +the wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed. Accordingly, when +Turkey entered the war in November, 1914, England took the decisive +plunge, deposed Abbas Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel +"Sultan," and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire. + +This stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like formal rebellion was +rendered impossible by the heavy masses of British and colonial troops +which had been poured into the country. Nevertheless, there was a good +deal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a stern application of the +"State of Siege." A French observer thus vividly describes these +critical days: "The Jehadd is rousing the anti-Christian fanaticism +which always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since the end of +October one could read in the eyes of the low-class Mohammedan natives +their hope--the massacre of the Christians. In the streets of Cairo they +stared insolently at the European passers-by. Some even danced for joy +on learning that the Sultan had declared the Holy War. Denounced to the +police for this, they were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearest +police-station. The same state of mind reigned at El Azhar, and I am +told that Europeans who visit the celebrated Mohammedan University have +their ears filled with the strongest epithets of the Arab +repertory--that best-furnished language in the world."[150] + +The nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad what their fellows +could not say at home. Their leader, Mohammed Farid Bey, issued from +Geneva an official protest against "the new illegal regime proclaimed by +England the 18th of last December. England, which pretends to make war +on Germany to defend Belgium, ought not to trample underfoot the rights +of Egypt, nor consider the treaties relative thereto as 'scraps of +paper.'"[151] These exiles threw themselves vehemently into the arms of +Germany, as may be gauged from the following remarks of Abd-el-Malek +Hamsa, secretary of the nationalist party, in a German periodical: +"There is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England may be +beaten and her Empire fall in ruins. During the early days of the war, +while I was still in Egypt, I was a witness of this popular feeling. In +cities and villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced in +the Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its caliph, and they are +hoping and praying for Germany's victory."[152] + +Of course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison in Egypt, such +pronouncements were as idle as the wind. The hoped-for Turkish attacks +were beaten back from the Suez Canal, the "State of Siege" functioned +with stern efficiency, and Egypt, flooded with British troops, lapsed +into sullen silence, not to be broken until the end of the war. + +Turning back at this point to consider nationalist developments in the +rest of North Africa, we do not, as in Egypt, find a well-marked +territorial patriotism. Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, but +such "patriotic" sentiments as exist belong rather to those more +diffused types of nationalist feeling known as "Pan-Arabism" and +"Pan-Islamic Nationalism," which we shall presently discuss. + +The basic reason for this North African lack of national feeling, in its +restricted sense, is that nowhere outside of Egypt is there a land which +ever has been, or which shows distinct signs of becoming, a true +"nation." The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast band of +territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert are +"Berbers"--an ancient stock, racially European rather than Asiatic or +negroid, and closely akin to the "Latin" peoples across the +Mediterranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albanians: they are +extremely tenacious of their language and customs, and they have an +instinctive racial feeling; but they are inveterate particularists, +having always been split up into many tribes, sometimes combining into +partial confederations but never developing true national +patriotism.[153] + +Alongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying proportion of Arabs. +The Arabs have colonized North Africa ever since the Moslem conquest +twelve centuries ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arab +culture, but they never made North Africa part of the Arab world as they +did Syria and Mesopotamia, and in somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The two +races have never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years of +Arab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains distinct. They have +largely kept their language, and there has been comparatively little +intermarriage. Pure-blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups, +but they are still, in a way, foreigners.[154] + +With such elements of discord, North Africa's political life has always +been troubled. The most stable region has been Morocco, though even +there the sultan's authority has never really extended to the mountain +tribes. As for the so-called "Barbary States" (Algiers, Tunis, and +Tripoli), they were little more than port-cities along the coast, the +hinterland enjoying practically complete tribal independence. Over this +confused turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning with +Algiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day.[155] France brought +peace, order, and material prosperity, but here, as in other Eastern +lands, these very benefits of European tutelage created a new sort of +unity among the natives in their common dislike of the European +conqueror and their common aspiration toward independence. Accordingly, +the past generation has witnessed the appearance of "Young Algerian" and +"Young Tunisian" political groups, led by French-educated men who have +imbibed Western ideas of "self-government" and "liberty."[156] However, +as we have already remarked, their goal is not so much the erection of +distinct Algerian and Tunisian "Nations" as it is creation of a larger +North African, perhaps Pan-Islamic, unity. It must not be forgotten that +they are in close touch with the Sennussi and kindred influences which +we have already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism. + +So much for "first-stage" nationalist developments in the Arab or +Arabized lands. There is, however, one more important centre of +nationalist sentiment in the Moslem world to be considered--Persia. +Persia is, in fact, the land where a genuine nationalist movement would +have been most logically expected, because the Persians have for ages +possessed a stronger feeling of "country" than any other Near Eastern +people. + +In the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such deep decrepitude +that its patent weakness excited the imperialistic appetites of Czarist +Russia and, in somewhat lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadence +and external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking Persians, and +a series of reformist agitations took place, beginning with the +religious movement of the Bab early in the nineteenth century and +culminating with the revolution of 1908.[157] That revolution was +largely precipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by which +England and Russia virtually partitioned Persia; the country being +divided into a Russian "sphere of influence" in the north and a British +"sphere of influence" in the south, with a "neutral zone" between. The +revolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of the Persian +patriots to set their house in order and avert, at the eleventh hour, +the shadow of European domination which was creeping over the land. But +the revolution was not merely a protest against European aggression. It +was also aimed at the alien Khadjar dynasty which had so long misruled +Persia. These Khadjar sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had never +become really Persianized, as shown by the fact that the intimate court +language was Turki, not Persian. They occupied a position somewhat +analogous to that of the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. The +Persian revolution was thus basically an _Iranian_ patriotic outburst +against all alien influences, whether from East or West. + +We have already seen how this patriotic movement was crushed by the +forcible intervention of European imperialism.[158] By 1912 Russia and +England were in full control of the situation, the patriots were +proscribed and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence. As a +British writer then remarked: "For such broken spirit and shattered +hopes, as for the 'anarchy' now existing in Persia, Russia and Great +Britain are directly responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will one +day be held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement in the +situation, when the only Government in Persia consists of a Cabinet +which does not command the confidence of the people, terrorized by +Russia, financially starved by both Russia and England, allowed only +miserable doles of money on usurious terms, and forbidden to employ +honest and efficient foreign experts like Mr. Shuster; when the King is +a boy, the Regent an absentee, the Parliament permanently suspended, and +the best, bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driven +into exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession-hunters and +land-grabbers presses ever harder on the exhausted victim, whose +struggles grow fainter and fainter. Little less than a miracle can now +save Persia."[159] + +So ends our survey of the main "first-stage" nationalist movements in +the Moslem world. We should of course remember that a nationalist +movement was developing concurrently in India, albeit following an +eccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember that, in addition to +the main movements just discussed, there were minor nationalist +stirrings among other Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, the +Chinese Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch Indies. Lastly, +we should remember that these nationalist movements were more or less +interwoven with the non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and with +those "second-stage," "racial" nationalist movements which we shall now +consider. + + + II + +Earlier in this chapter we have already remarked that the opening years +of the twentieth century witnessed the appearance in Asia of +nationalism's second or racial stage, especially among the Turkish and +Arab peoples. This wider stage of nationalism has attained its highest +development among the Turks; where, indeed, it has gone through two +distinct phases, describable respectively by the terms "Pan-Turkism" and +"Pan-Turanism." We have described the primary phase of Turkish +nationalism in its restricted "Ottoman" sense down to the close of the +Balkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that time that the secondary or +"racial" aspects of Turkish nationalism first come prominently to the +fore. + +By this time the Ottoman Turks had begun to realize that they did not +stand alone in the world; that they were, in fact, the westernmost +branch of a vast band of peoples extending right across eastern Europe +and Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean to +the Arctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists have assigned the name of +"Uralo-Altaic race," but who are more generally termed "Turanians." This +group embraces the most widely scattered folk--the Ottoman Turks of +Constantinople and Anatolia, the Turkomans of Persia and Central Asia, +the Tartars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary, +the Finns of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes of +Siberia, and even the distant Mongols and Manchus. Diverse though they +are in culture, tradition, and even personal appearance, these people +nevertheless possess certain well-marked traits in common. Their +languages are all similar, while their physical and mental make-up +displays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for great physical +vitality combined with unusual toughness of nerve-fibre. Though somewhat +deficient in imagination and creative artistic sense, they are richly +endowed with patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all, they have +usually displayed extraordinary military capacity, together with a no +less remarkable aptitude for the masterful handling of subject peoples. +The Turanians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that the world +has ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad and his Magyars, Isperich and +his Bulgars, Alp Arslan and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans, +Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane with their "inflexible" Mongol hordes, Baber +in India, even Kubilai Khan and Nurhachu in far-off Cathay: the type is +ever the same. The hoof-print of the Turanian "man on horseback" is +stamped deep all over the palimpsest of history. + +Glorious or sinister according to the point of view, Turan's is +certainly a stirring past. Of course one may query whether these diverse +peoples actually do form one genuine race. But, as we have already seen, +so far as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Possessed of +kindred tongues and temperaments, and dowered with such a wealth of +soul-stirring tradition, it would suffice for them to _think_ themselves +racially one to form a nationalist dynamic of truly appalling potency. + +Until about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of such a movement +were visible. Not only were distant stocks like Finns and Manchus quite +unaware of any common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like +Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded one another with +indifference or contempt. Certainly the Ottoman Turks were almost as +devoid of racial as they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambery +tells how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, "the word +_Turkluk_ (_i. e._, 'Turk') was considered an opprobrious synonym of +grossness and savagery, and when I used to call people's attention to +the racial importance of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople +to the Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing us with +Kirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary.' ... With a few +exceptions, I found no one in Constantinople who was seriously +interested in the questions of Turkish nationality or language."[160] + +It was, in fact, the labours of Western ethnologists like the Hungarian +Vambery and the Frenchman Leon Cahun that first cleared away the mists +which enshrouded Turan. These labours disclosed the unexpected vastness +of the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a most unacademic +significance. The writings of Vambery and his colleagues spread far and +wide through Turan and were there devoured by receptive minds already +stirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The normality of the +Turanian movement is shown by its simultaneous appearance at such widely +sundered points as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres along +the Russian Volga. Indeed, if anything, the leaven began its working on +the Volga sooner than on the Bosphorus. This Tartar revival, though +little known, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in all +nationalist history. The Tartars, once masters of Russia, though long +since fallen from their high estate, have never vanished in the Slav +ocean. Although many of them have been for four centuries under Russian +rule, they have stubbornly maintained their religious, racial, and +cultural identity. Clustered thickly along the Volga, especially at +Kazan and Astrakhan, retaining much of the Crimea, and forming a +considerable minority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct +"enclaves" in the Slav Empire, widely scattered but indomitable. + +The first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness among the Russian +Tartars appeared as far back as 1895, and from then on the movement grew +with astonishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restrictions at +the time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was followed by a regular +literary florescence. Streams of books and pamphlets, numerous +newspapers, and a solid periodical press, all attested the vigour and +fecundity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of the Russian +Tartars assured the material sinews of war. The Tartar oil millionaires +of Baku here played a conspicuous role, freely opening their capacious +purses for the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showed +distinct political ability and soon gained the confidence of their +Turkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia, who were also stirring to the +breath of nationalism. The first Russian Duma contained a large +Mohammedan group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led that +Russian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and encouraged the +government to diminish Tartar influence in Russian parliamentary life by +summary curtailments of Mohammedan representation.[161] + +Of course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to proclaim their +political loyalty to the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, many earnest +spirits revealed their secret aspirations by seeking a freer and more +fruitful field of labour in Turkish Stambul, where the Russian Tartars +played a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan-Turanian movements +within the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf Bey +Akchura Oglu, who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian society +at Constantinople, and his well-known book, _Three Political Systems_, +became the text on which most subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have been +based.[162] + +Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan-Turanism was somewhat +under a cloud at Stambul. Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was a +Pan-Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist movements. +Accordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not actually persecuted, were +never in the Sultan's favour. With the advent of Young-Turk nationalism +to power, however, all was changed. The "Ottomanizing" leaders of the +new government listened eagerly to Pan-Turanian preaching, and most of +them became affiliated with the movement. It is interesting to note that +Russian Tartars continued to play a prominent part. The chief +Pan-Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed Bey Agayeff, a +Volga Tartar. His well-edited organ, _Turk Yurdu_ (_Turkish Home_), +penetrated to every corner of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised great +influence on the development of its public opinion. + +Although leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly visualized the entire +Turanian world from Finland to Manchuria as a potential whole, and were +thus full-fledged "Pan-Turanians," their practical efforts were at first +confined to the closely related Turko-Tartar segment; that is, to the +Ottomans of Turkey, the Tartars of Russia, and the Turkomans of central +Asia and Persia. Since all these peoples were also Mohammedans, it +follows that this propaganda had a religious as well as a racial +complexion, trending in many respects toward Pan-Islamism. Indeed, even +disregarding the religious factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanian +in theory, the movement was at that time in practice little more than +"Pan-Turkism." + +It was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really precipitated full-fledged +Pan-Turanism. Those wars not merely expelled the Turks from the Balkans +and turned their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused such +hatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of Hungarians and +Bulgarians that both these peoples proclaimed their "Turanian" origins +and toyed with ideas of "Pan-Turanian" solidarity against the menace of +Serbo-Russian "Pan-Slavism."[163] The Pan-Turanian thinkers were +assuredly evolving a body of doctrine grandiose enough to satisfy the +most ambitious hopes. Emphasizing the great virility and nerve-force +everywhere patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers saw in Turan +the dominant race of the morrow. Zealous students of Western +evolutionism and ethnology, they were evolving their own special theory +of race grandeur and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian teaching, the +historic peoples of southern Asia--Arabs, Persians, and Hindus--are +hopelessly degenerate. As for the Europeans, they have recently passed +their apogee, and, exhausted by the consuming fires of modern +industrialism, are already entering upon their decline. It is the +Turanians, with their inherent virility and steady nerves unspoiled by +the wear and tear of Western civilization, who must be the great dynamic +of the future. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far as to +proclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race to revitalize a +whole senescent, worn-out world by the saving infusion of regenerative +Turanian blood.[164] + +Of course the Pan-Turanians recognized that anything like a realization +of their ambitious dreams was dependent upon the virtual destruction of +the Russian Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Turkomans, +Kirghiz, Finns, and numerous kindred tribes, was in Pan-Turanian eyes +merely a Slav alluvium laid with varying thickness over a Turanian +subsoil. This turning of Russia into a vast "Turania irredenta" was +certainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan-Turanians counted on +powerful Western backing. They realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary +were fast drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such a +cataclysm, however perilous, would also offer most glorious +possibilities. + +These Pan-Turanian aspirations undoubtedly had a great deal to do with +driving Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Empires. +Certainly, Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the governing +group had long been more or less affiliated with the Pan-Turanian +movement. Of course the Turkish Government had more than one string to +its bow. It tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in double +harness, using the "Holy War" agitation for pious Moslems everywhere, +while it redoubled Pan-Turanian propaganda among the Turko-Tartar +peoples. A good statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early years +of the war is that of the publicist Tekin Alp in his book, _The Turkish +and Pan-Turkish Ideal_, published in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: "With the +crushing of Russian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and Turkish +armies, 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 Turanians will receive their +independence. With the 10,000,000 Ottoman Turks, this will form a nation +of 50,000,000, advancing toward a great civilization which may perhaps +be compared with that of Germany, in that it will have the strength and +energy to rise even higher. In some ways it will be superior to the +degenerate French and English civilizations." + +With the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution at the end of +1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no bounds. So certain were they of triumph +that they began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing that +hatred of all Europeans which had always lurked at the back of their +minds. A German staff-officer thus describes the table-talk of Halil +Pasha, the Turkish commander of the Mesopotamian front and uncle of +Enver: "First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother-tongue must be +forged into a single nation. The national principle was supreme; so it +was the design to conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power and +glory. That was the first task. From that base connections must be +established with the Yakutes of Siberia, who were considered, on account +of their linguistic kinship, the remotest outposts of the Turkish blood +to the eastward. The closely related Tartar tribes of the Caucasus must +naturally join this union. Armenians and Georgians, who form minority +nationalities in that territory, must either submit voluntarily or be +subjugated.... Such a great compact Turkish Empire, exercising hegemony +over all the Islamic world, would exert a powerful attraction upon +Afghanistan and Persia.... In December, 1917, when the Turkish front in +Mesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha said to me, half vexed, half +jokingly: 'Supposing we let the English have this cursed desert hole and +go to Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little boy.' He +had named his youngest son after the great conqueror and destroyer, +Jenghiz Khan."[165] + +As a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcaucasia and northern +Persia overrun by Turkish armies headed for Central Asia. Then came the +German collapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently dooming +Turkey to destruction. For the moment the Pan-Turanians were stunned. +Nevertheless, their hopes were soon destined to revive, as we shall +presently see. + +Before describing the course of events in the Near East since 1918, +which need to be treated as a unit, let us go back to consider the +earlier developments of the other "second-stage" nationalist movements +in the Moslem world. We have already seen how, concurrently with Turkish +nationalism, Arab nationalism was likewise evolving into the "racial" +stage, the ideal being a great "Pan-Arab" empire, embracing not merely +the ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but also +the Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli, French North Africa, and the +Sudan. + +Pan-Arabism has not been as intellectually developed as Pan-Turanism, +though its general trend is so similar that its doctrines need not be +discussed in detail. One important difference between the two movements +is that Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan-Islamic in character, +the Arabs regarding themselves as "The Chosen People" divinely +predestined to dominate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacks +Pan-Turanism's unity of direction. There have been two distinct +intellectual centres--Syria and Egypt. In fact, it is in Egypt that +Pan-Arab schemes have been most concretely elaborated, the Egyptian +programme looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands under the +Khedive--perhaps at first subject to British tutelage, though ultimately +throwing off British control by concerted Pan-Arab action. The late +Khedive Abbas Hilmi, deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to have +encouraged this movement.[166] + +The Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism, especially by its +creation of an independent Arab kingdom in the Hedjaz with claims on +Syria and Mesopotamia. However, the various Arab peoples are so +engrossed with local independence agitations looking toward the +elimination of British, French, and Italian control from specific +regions like Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Tripoli, that the larger +concept of Pan-Arabism, while undoubtedly an underlying factor, is not +to-day in the foreground of Arab nationalist programmes. + +Furthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism is interwoven with the +non-racial concepts of Pan-Islamism and "Pan-Islamic Nationalism." This +latter concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of terms. So it +may be to us Westerners. But it is not necessarily so to Eastern minds. +However eagerly the East may have seized upon our ideas of nationality +and patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full of concepts +like Islamic solidarity and the brotherhood of all True Believers. The +result has been a subtle coloration of the new by the old, so that even +when Moslems use our exact words, "nationality," "race," etc., their +conception of what those words mean is distinctly different from ours. +These differences in fact extend to all political concepts. Take the +word "State," for example. The typical Mohammedan state is not, like +the typical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with fixed boundaries +and full sovereignty exercised everywhere within its frontiers. It is +more or less an amorphous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of an +authority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic independence. Of +course, in the past half-century, most Mohammedan states have tried to +remodel themselves on Western lines, but the traditional tendency is +typified by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian north-west +frontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy practical independence and have +frequently conducted private wars of their own against the British which +the Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not held him +responsible. + +Similarly with the term "Nationality." In Moslem eyes, a man need not +be born or formally naturalized to be a member of a certain Moslem +"Nationality." Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part of +Islam, so a man may just happen into a particular country and thereby +become at once, if he wishes, a national in good standing. For +example: "Egypt for the Egyptians" does not mean precisely what we +think. Let a Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo. +Nothing prevents him from acting, and being considered as, an +"Egyptian Nationalist" in the full sense of the term. This is because +Islam has always had a distinct idea of territorial as well as +spiritual unity. All predominantly Mohammedan lands are believed by +Moslems to constitute "Dar-ul-Islam,"[167] which is in a sense the +joint possession of all Moslems and which all Moslems are jointly +obligated to defend. That is the reason why alien encroachments on any +Moslem land are instantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end of +the Moslem world, who could have no possible material interest in the +matter. + +We are now better able to understand how many Moslem thinkers, combining +the Western concept of nationality with the traditional idea of +Dar-ul-Islam, have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by the +term "Pan-Islamic Nationalism." This trend of thought is well set forth +by an Indian Moslem, who writes: "In the West, the whole science of +government rests on the axiom that the essential divisions of humanity +are determined by considerations of race and geography; but for +Orientals these ideas are very far from being axioms. For them, humanity +divides according to religious beliefs. The unity is no longer the +nation or the State, but the 'Millah.'[168] Europeans see in this a +counterpart to their Middle Ages--a stage which Islam should pass +through on its way to modernity in the Western sense. How badly they +understand how religion looks to a Mohammedan! They forget that Islam is +not only a religion, but also a social organization, a form of culture, +and a nationality.... The principle of Islamic fraternity--of +Pan-Islamism, if you prefer the word--is analogous to patriotism, but +with this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though resulting in +identity of laws and customs, has not (like Western Nationality) been +brought about by community of race, country, or history, but has been +received, as we believe, directly from God."[169] + +Pan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has not +been doctrinally worked out. Nevertheless it is visible throughout the +Moslem world and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions like +North Africa and India, where strong territorial patriotism has, for one +reason or another, not developed. As a French writer remarks: +"Mohammedan Nationalism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It is +a broad tide, which is flowing over the whole Islamic world of Asia, +India, and Africa. Nationalism is a new form of the Mohammedan faith, +which, far from being undermined by contact with European civilization, +seems to have discovered a surplus of religious fervour, and which, in +its desire for expansion and proselytism, tends to realize its unity by +rousing the fanaticism of the masses, by directing the political +tendencies of the elites, and by sowing everywhere the seeds of a +dangerous agitation."[170] Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus, in the +future, become a major factor which will have to be seriously reckoned +with.[171] + + + III + +So ends our survey of nationalist movements in the Moslem world. Given +such a tangled complex of aspirations, enormously stimulated by +Armageddon, it was only natural that the close of the Great War should +have left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Obviously, anything +like a constructive settlement could have been effected only by the +exercise of true statesmanship of the highest order. Unfortunately, the +Versailles peace conference was devoid of true statesmanship, and the +resulting "settlement" not only failed to give peace to Europe but +disclosed an attitude toward the East inspired by the pre-war spirit of +predatory imperialism and cynical _Realpolitik_. Apparently oblivious of +the mighty psychological changes which the war had wrought, and of the +consequent changes of attitude and policy required, the victorious +Allies proceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were a +skirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a century ago. + +In fact, disregarding both the general pronouncements of liberal +principles and the specific promises of self-determination for Near +Eastern peoples which they had made during the war, the Allies now +paraded a series of secret treaties (negotiated between themselves +during those same war-years when they had been so unctuously orating), +and these secret treaties clearly divided up the Ottoman Empire among +the victors, in absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants. The +purposes of the Allies were further revealed by the way in which the +Versailles conference refused to receive the representatives of Persia +(theoretically still independent), but kept them cooling their heels in +Paris while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's government to +enter into an "agreement" that made Persia a virtual protectorate of the +British Empire. As for the Egyptians, who had always protested against +the protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its own initiative in +1914, the conference refused to pay any attention to their delegates, +and they were given to understand that the conference regarded the +British protectorate over Egypt as a _fait accompli_. The upshot was +that, as a result of the war, European domination over the Near and +Middle East was riveted rather than relaxed. + +But the strangest feature of this strange business remains to be told. +One might imagine that the Allied leaders would have realized that they +were playing a dangerous game, which could succeed only by close +team-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the very reverse was +the case. After showing their hand, and thereby filling the East with +disillusionment, despair, and fury, the Allies proceeded to quarrel over +the spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France, and Italy +were able to come to an even superficial agreement as to the partition +of the Ottoman Empire, and meanwhile they had been bickering and +intriguing against each other all over the Near East. This was sheer +madness. The destined victims were thereby informed that European +domination rested not only on disregard of the moral "imponderables" but +on diplomatic bankruptcy as well. The obvious reflection was that a +domination resting on such rotten foundations might well be overthrown. + +That, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals read the +situation, and their rebellious feelings were stimulated not merely by +consciousness of their own strength and Western disunion, but also by +the active encouragement of a new ally--Bolshevik Russia. Russian +Bolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to Western civilization, and in +the desperate struggle which was now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw with +terrible glee the golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. The +details of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be considered in the +chapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to remember here that Bolshevik +propaganda is an important element in that profound ferment which +extends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment which has reduced +some regions to the verge of chaos and which threatens to increase +rather than diminish in the immediate future. + +To relate all the details of contemporary Eastern unrest would fill a +book in itself. Let us here content ourselves with considering the chief +centres of this unrest, remembering always that it exists throughout the +Moslem world from French North Africa to Central Asia and the Dutch +Indies. The centres to be here surveyed will be Egypt, Persia, and the +Turkish and Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth main +centre of unrest--India--will be discussed in the next chapter. + +The gathering storm first broke in Egypt. During the war Egypt, flooded +with British troops and subjected to the most stringent martial law, had +remained quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of passivity. +We have seen how, with the opening years of the twentieth century, +virtually all educated Egyptians had become more or less impregnated +with nationalist ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed in +evolutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief hope of the +moderates had been the provisional character of English rule. So long as +England declared herself merely in "temporary occupation" of Egypt, +anything was possible. But the proclamation of the protectorate in 1914, +which declared Egypt part of the British Empire, entirely changed the +situation. Even the most moderate nationalists felt that the future was +definitely prejudged against them and that the door had been irrevocably +closed upon their ultimate aspirations. The result was that the +moderates were driven over to the extremists and were ready to join the +latter in violent action as soon as opportunity might offer. + +The extreme nationalists had of course protested bitterly against the +protectorate from the first, and the close of the war saw a delegation +composed of both nationalist wings proceed to Paris to lay their claims +before the Versailles conference. Rebuffed by the conference, which +recognized the British protectorate over Egypt as part of the peace +settlement, the Egyptian delegation issued a formal protest warning of +trouble. This protest read: + +"We have knocked at door after door, but have received no answer. In +spite of the definite pledges given by the statesmen at the head of the +nations which won the war, to the effect that their victory would mean +the triumph of Right over Might and the establishment of the principle +of self-determination for small nations, the British protectorate over +Egypt was written into the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain +without the people of Egypt being consulted as to their political +status. + +"This crime against our nation, a breach of good faith on the part of +the Powers who have declared that they are forming in the same Treaty a +Society of Nations, will not be consummated without a solemn warning +that the people of Egypt consider the decision taken at Paris null and +void.... If our voice is not heard, it will be only because the blood +already shed has not been enough to overthrow the old world-order and +give birth to a new world-order."[172] + +Before these lines had appeared in type, trouble in Egypt had begun. +Simultaneously with the arrival of the Egyptian delegation at Paris, the +nationalists in Egypt laid their demands before the British authorities. +The nationalist programme demanded complete self-government for Egypt, +leaving England only a right of supervision over the public debt and the +Suez Canal. The nationalists' strength was shown by the fact that these +proposals were indorsed by the Egyptian cabinet recently appointed by +the Khedive at British suggestion. In fact, the Egyptian Premier, +Roushdi Pasha, asked to be allowed to go to London with some of his +colleagues for a hearing. This placed the British authorities in Egypt +in a distinctly trying position. However, they determined to stand firm, +and accordingly answered that England could not abandon its +responsibility for the continuance of order and good government in +Egypt, now a British protectorate and an integral part of the empire, +and that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the Egyptian +leaders to go to London and there advance immoderate demands which could +not possibly be entertained. + +The English attitude was firm. The Egyptian attitude was no less firm. +The cabinet at once resigned, no new cabinet could be formed, and the +British High Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assume +unveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced that they were +going to hold a plebiscite to determine the attitude of the Egyptian +people. Forbidden by the British authorities, the plebiscite was +nevertheless illegally held, and resulted, according to the +nationalists, in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their demands. +This defiant attitude determined the British on strong action. +Accordingly, in the spring of 1919, most of the nationalist leaders were +seized and deported to Malta. + +Egypt's answer was an explosion. From one end of the country to the +other, Egypt flamed into rebellion. Everywhere it was the same story. +Railways and telegraph lines were systematically cut. Trains were +stalled and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers were +murdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were sacked by the mob. +Soon the danger was rendered more acute by the irruption out of the +desert of swarms of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days Egypt +trembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British Government admitted in +Parliament that all Egypt was in a state of insurrection. + +The British authorities met the crisis with vigour and determination. +The number of British troops in Egypt was large, trusty black regiments +were hurried up from the Sudan, and the well-disciplined Egyptian native +police generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of sharp fighting +and heavy loss of life, Egypt was again gotten under control. + +Order was restored, but the outlook was ominous in the extreme. Only the +presence of massed British and Sudanese troops enabled order to be +maintained. Even the application of stern martial law could not prevent +continuous nationalist demonstrations, sometimes ending in riots, +fighting, and heavy loss of life. The most serious aspect of the +situation was that not only were the upper classes solidly nationalist, +but they had behind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. The +war-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military exigencies had +compelled Britain to conscript fully a million of them for forced +labour in the Near East and even in Europe, while there had also been +wholesale requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supplies. These +things had caused profound discontent and had roused among the fellaheen +not merely passive dislike but active hatred of British rule. +Authoritative English experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortly +after the riots Sir William Willcocks, the noted engineer, said in a +public statement: "The keystone of the British occupation of Egypt was +the fact that the fellaheen were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governing +classes, and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, but +nothing counted for much while the millions of fellaheen were solid for +the occupation. The British have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship +and confidence of the fellaheen." And Sir Valentine Chirol stated in the +London _Times_: "We are now admittedly face to face with the ominous +fact that for the first time since the British occupation large numbers +of the Egyptian fellaheen, who owe far more to us than does any other +class of Egyptians, have been worked up into a fever of bitter +discontent and hatred. Very few people at home, even in responsible +quarters, have, I think, the slightest conception of the very dangerous +degree of tension which has now been reached out here." + +All foreign observers were impressed by the nationalist feeling which +united all creeds and classes. Regarding the monster demonstrations held +during the summer of 1919, an Italian publicist wrote: "For the first +time in history, the banners flown showed the Crescent interwoven with +the Cross. Until a short time ago the two elements were as distinct from +each other as each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as has +happened in India among the Mussulmans and the Hindus, every trace of +religious division has departed. All Egyptians are enrolled under a +single banner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning with the +same faith, and confident that his cause will ultimately triumph."[173] +And a Frenchwoman, a lifelong resident of Egypt, wrote: "We have seen +surprising things in this country, so often divided by party and +religious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques, ulemas +preaching in Christian churches; Syrian, Maronite, or Mohammedan +students; women, whether of Turkish or Egyptian blood, united in the +same fervour, the same ardent desire to see break over their ancient +land the radiant dawn of independence. For those who, like myself, have +known the Egypt of Tewfik, the attitude of the women these last few +years is the most surprising transformation that has happened in the +valley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant life, the almost +complete indifference to anything savouring of politics, to appreciate +the enormous steps taken in the last few months. For example: last +summer a procession of women demonstrators was surrounded by British +soldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the women, threatened by a soldier, +turned on him, baring her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so that +there may be another Miss Cavell.'"[174] + +Faced by this unprecedented nationalist fervour, Englishmen on the spot +were of two opinions. Some, like Sir William Willcocks and Sir Valentine +Chirol, stated that extensive concessions must be made.[175] Other +qualified observers asserted that concessions would be weakness and +would spell disaster. Said Sir M. McIlwraith: "Five years of a +Nationalist regime would lead to hopeless chaos and disorder.... If +Egypt is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and anarchy from +which we rescued her in 1882, with the still greater horrors of +Bolshevism, of which there are already sinister indications, +superadded, Britain must not loosen her control."[176] In England the +Egyptian situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer of 1919 +the British Government announced the appointment of a commission of +inquiry headed by Lord Milner to investigate fully into Egyptian +affairs. + +The appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was one of the ablest +figures in British political life, a man of long experience with +imperial problems, including that of Egypt, and possessed of a +temperament equally remote from the doctrinaire liberal or the hidebound +conservative. In short, Lord Milner was a _realist_, in the true sense +of the word, as his action soon proved. Arriving in Egypt at the +beginning of 1920, Lord Milner and his colleagues found themselves +confronted with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had gone +forth to boycott the commission, and not merely nationalist politicians +but also religious leaders like the Grand Mufti refused even to discuss +matters unless the commissioners would first agree to Egyptian +independence. This looked like a deadlock. Nevertheless, by infinite +tact and patience, Lord Milner finally got into free and frank +discussion with Zagloul Pasha and the other responsible nationalist +leaders. + +His efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain developments within Egypt +itself. In Egypt, as elsewhere in the East, there were appearing +symptoms not merely of political but also of social unrest. New types of +agitators were springing up, preaching to the populace the most extreme +revolutionary doctrines. These youthful agitators disquieted the regular +nationalist leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party chiefs +and as men of social standing and property. The upshot was that, by the +autumn of 1920, Lord Milner and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basis +of what looked like a genuine compromise. According to the intimations +then given out to the press, and later confirmed by the nature of Lord +Milner's official report, the lines of the tentative agreement ran as +follows: England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to declare +Egypt independent. This independence was qualified to about the same +extent that Cuba's is toward the United States. Egypt was to have +complete self-government, both the British garrison and British civilian +officials being withdrawn. Egypt was, however, to make a perpetual +treaty of alliance with Great Britain, was to agree not to make treaties +with other Powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant Britain +a military and naval station for the protection of the Suez Canal and of +Egypt itself in case of sudden attack by foreign enemies. The vexed +question of the Sudan was left temporarily open. + +These proposals bore the earmarks of genuinely constructive compromise. +Unfortunately, they were not at once acted upon.[177] Both in England +and in Egypt they roused strong opposition. In England adverse official +influences held up the commission's report till February, 1921. In Egypt +the extreme nationalists denounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, though +moderate opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commission's +report, as finally published, declared that the grant of self-government +to Egypt could not be safely postponed; that the nationalist spirit +could not be extinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the teeth +of a hostile people would be "a difficult and disgraceful task"; and +that it would be a great misfortune if the present opportunity for a +settlement were lost. However, the report was not indorsed by the +British Government in its entirety, and Lord Milner forthwith resigned. +As for Zagloul Pasha, he still maintains his position as nationalist +leader, but his authority has been gravely shaken. Such is the +situation of Egypt at this present writing: a situation frankly not so +encouraging as it was last year. + +Meanwhile the storm which had begun in Egypt had long since spread to +other parts of the Near East. In fact, by the opening months of 1920, +the storm-centre had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Allies +themselves were largely to blame. Of course a constructive settlement of +these troubled regions would have been very difficult. Still, it might +not have proved impossible if Allied policy had been fair and +above-board. The close of the war found the various peoples of the +Ottoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war-aims professed by the Allied +spokesmen would be redeemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful, +because they had been given a whole series of Allied promises (shortly +to be repudiated, as we shall presently see), while even the beaten +Turks were not entirely bereft of hope in the future. Besides the +general pronouncements of liberal treatment as formulated in the +"Fourteen Points" programme of President Wilson and indorsed by the +Allies, the Turks had pledges of a more specific character, notably by +Premier Lloyd George, who, on January 5, 1918, had said: "Nor are we +fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned +lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in +race." In other words, the Turks were given unequivocally to understand +that, while their rule over non-Turkish regions like the Arab provinces +must cease, the Turkish regions of the empire were not to pass under +alien rule, but were to form a Turkish national state. The Turks did not +know about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, begun in +1915, which partitioned practically the whole of Asia Minor between the +Allied Powers. These were to come out a little later. For the moment the +Turks might hope. + +In the case of the Arabs there were far brighter grounds for +nationalist hopes--and far darker depths of Allied duplicity. We have +already mentioned the Arab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in the +Hedjaz under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently spread +through all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and contributed so +largely to the collapse of Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however, +not a sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully planned, and +was due largely to Allied backing--and Allied promises. From the very +beginning of the war Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch with +the British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly welcomed and +encouraged in their separatist schemes, because an Arab rebellion would +obviously be of invaluable assistance to the British in safeguarding +Egypt and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into Turkish +territory. + +The Arabs, however, asked not merely material aid but also definite +promises that their rebellion should be rewarded by the formation of an +Arab state embracing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. +Unfortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British and French +Governments had their own ideas as to the future of Turkey's Arab +provinces. Both England and France had long possessed "spheres of +influence" in those regions. The English sphere was in southern +Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The French sphere was the +Lebanon, a mountainous district in northern Syria just inland from the +Mediterranean coast, where the population, known as Maronites, were +Roman Catholics, over whom France had long extended her diplomatic +protection. Of course both these districts were legally Turkish +territory. Also, both were small in area. But "spheres of influence" are +elastic things. Under favourable circumstances they are capable of +sudden expansion to an extraordinary degree. Such a circumstance was the +Great War. Accordingly the British and French Foreign Offices put their +heads together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments signed a +secret treaty by the terms of which France was given a "predominant +position" in Syria and Britain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. No +definite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was to stake out +claims which would partition Turkey's Arab provinces between England and +France. + +Naturally the existence of this secret treaty was an embarrassment to +the British officials in Egypt in their negotiations with the Arabs. +However, an Arab rebellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and the +British negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied the Arab +leaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of Mecca's representative at +Cairo was given a document by the Governor-General of Egypt, Sir Henry +McMahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional upon an Arab +revolt, to recognize the independence of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire +except in southern Mesopotamia, where British interests required special +measures of administrative control, and also except areas where Great +Britain was "not free to act without detriment to the interests of +France." This last clause was of course a "joker." However, it achieved +its purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret treaty, +supposed it referred merely to the restricted district of the Lebanon. +They went home jubilant, to prepare the revolt which broke out next +year. + +The revolt began in November, 1916. It might not have begun at all had +the Arabs known what had happened the preceding May. In that month +England and France signed another secret treaty, the celebrated +Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely partitioned Turkey's +Arab provinces along the lines suggested in the initial secret treaty of +the year before. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia was to +be definitely British, while the Syrian coast from Tyre to Alexandretta +was to be definitely French, together with extensive Armenian and Asia +Minor regions to the northward. Palestine was to be "international," +albeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and the implication +was that Palestine fell within the English sphere. As to the great +hinterland lying between Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be +"independent Arab under two spheres of influence," British and French; +the French sphere embracing all the rest of Syria from Aleppo to +Damascus, the English sphere embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia--the +region about Mosul. In other words, the independence promised the Arabs +by Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into thin air. + +This little shift behind the scenes was of course not communicated to +the Arabs. On the contrary, the British did everything possible to +stimulate Arab nationalist hopes--this being the best way to extract +their fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Government sent the +Arabs a number of picked intelligence officers, notably a certain +Colonel Lawrence, an extraordinary young man who soon gained unbounded +influence over the Arab chiefs and became known as "The Soul of the +Arabian Revolution."[178] These men, chosen for their knowledge of, and +sympathy for, the Arabs, were not informed about the secret treaties, so +that their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred by any lack of +sincerity. Similarly, the British generals were prodigal of promises in +their proclamations.[179] The climax of this blessed comedy occurred at +the very close of the war, when the British and French Governments +issued the following joint declaration which was posted throughout the +Arab provinces: "The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in +waging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition, +is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples, +so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national governments and +administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative +and free will of the people themselves." + +This climax was, however, followed by a swift _denouement_. The war was +over, the enemy was beaten, the comedy was ended, the curtain was rung +down, and on that curtain the Arabs read--the inner truth of things. +French troops appeared to occupy the Syrian coast, the secret treaties +came out, and the Arabs learned how they had been tricked. Black and +bitter was their wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once had it +not been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially Prince Feisal, the son +of the Shereef of Mecca, who had proved himself a real leader of men +during the war and who had now attained a position of unquestioned +authority. Feisal knew the Allies' military strength and realized how +hazardous war would be, especially at that time. Feeling the moral +strength of the Arab position, he besought his countrymen to let him +plead Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference, and he had +his way. During the year 1919 the Arab lands were quiet, though it was +the quiet of suspense. + +Prince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace conference with +eloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed. The covenant of the League of +Nations might contain the benevolent statement that "certain communities +formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of +development where their existence as independent nations can be +provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative +advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to +stand alone."[180] The Arabs knew what "mandatories" meant. Lloyd George +might utter felicitous phrases such as "Arab forces have redeemed the +pledges given to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges."[181] +The Arabs had read the secret treaties. "In vain is the net spread in +the sight of any bird." The game no longer worked. The Arabs knew that +they must rely on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war. + +Feisal still counselled peace. He was probably influenced to this not +merely by the risks of armed resistance but also by the fact that the +Allies were now quarrelling among themselves. These quarrels of course +extended all over the Near East, but there was none more bitter than the +quarrel which had broken out between England and France over the +division of the Arab spoils. This dispute originated in French +dissatisfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the Sykes-Picot +Agreement been published than large and influential sections of French +opinion began shouting that they had been duped. For generations French +imperialists had had their eye on Syria,[182] and since the beginning of +the war the imperialist press had been conducting an ardent propaganda +for wholesale annexations in the Near East. "La Syrie integrale!" "All +Syria!" was the cry. And this "all" included not merely the coast-strip +assigned France by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and the +vast Aleppo-Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields of +Mosul. To this entire region, often termed in French expansionist +circles "La France du Levant," the imperialists asserted that France had +"imprescriptible historic rights running back to the Crusades and even +to Charlemagne." Syria was a "second Alsace," which held out its arms to +France and would not be denied. It was also the indispensable fulcrum of +French world-policy. These imperialist aspirations had powerful backing +in French Government circles. For example, early in 1915, M. Leygues had +said in the Chamber of Deputies: "The axis of French policy is in the +Mediterranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers, Tunis, and +Morocco. The other must lie in the East, with Syria, Lebanon, +Palestine."[183] + +After such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on French +imperialists can be imagined. Their anger turned naturally upon the +English, who were roundly denounced and blamed for everything that was +happening in the East, Arab nationalist aspirations being stigmatized as +nothing but British propaganda. Cried one French writer: "Some +psychiatrist ought to write a study of these British colonial officials, +implacable imperialists, megalomaniacs, who, night and day, work for +their country without even asking counsel from London, and whose +constant care is to annihilate in Syria, as they once annihilated in +Egypt, the supremacy of France."[184] In answer to such fulminations, +English writers scored French "greed" and "folly" which was compromising +England's prestige and threatening to set the whole East on fire.[185] +In fine, there was a very pretty row on between people who, less than a +year before, had been pledging their "sacred union" for all eternity. +The Arabs were certainly much edified, and the other Eastern peoples as +well. + +Largely owing to these bickerings, Allied action in the Near East was +delayed through 1919. But by the spring of 1920 the Allies came to a +measure of agreement. The meeting of the Allied Premiers at San Remo +elaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed on Turkey, dividing +Asia Minor into spheres of influence and exploitation, while the Arab +provinces were assigned England and France according to the terms of the +Sykes-Picot Agreement--properly camouflaged, of course, as "mandates" of +the League of Nations. England, France, and their satellite, Greece, +prepared for action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopotamia and +Palestine; French reinforcements were sent to Syria; an +Anglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to occupy Constantinople, and Premier +Venizelos promised a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The one +rift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brewing and determined +not to be directly involved. Said Premier Nitti to an English journalist +after the San Remo conference: "You will have war in Asia Minor, and +Italy will not send a single soldier nor pay a single lira. You have +taken from the Turks their sacred city of Adrianople; you have placed +their capital city under foreign control; you have taken from them every +port and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turkish +delegates whom you will select will sign a treaty which will not have +the sanction of the Turkish people or the Turkish Parliament." + +Premier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past the Turkish +nationalists, knowing what was in store for them, had been building up a +centre of resistance in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the former +nationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since fled to distant +havens like Transcaucasia or Bolshevik Russia, but new leaders appeared, +notably a young officer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. +With great energy Mustapha Kemal built up a really creditable army, and +from his "capital," the city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, he +now defied the Allies, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the French +garrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia Minor just north of +Syria), inflicting heavy losses. + +The Arabs also were preparing for action. In March a "Pan-Syrian +Congress" met at Damascus, unanimously declared the independence of +Syria, and elected Feisal king. This announcement electrified all the +Arab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone riots broke out +against the French; in Palestine there were "pogroms" against the Jews, +whom the Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, hated for their "Zionist" +plans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic uprisings of tribesmen. + +Faced by this ominous situation, the "mandatories" took military +counter-measures. The French took especially vigorous action. France now +had nearly 100,000 men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud, +a veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in "strong-arm" methods. +On July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an ultimatum requiring complete +submission. Feisal, diplomatic to the last, actually accepted the +ultimatum, but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality and +struck for Damascus with 60,000 men. Feisal attempted no real +resistance, fighting only a rearguard action and withdrawing into the +desert. On July 25 the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital, +deposed Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Opposition was +punished with the greatest severity. Damascus was mulcted of a +war-contribution of 10,000,000 francs, after the German fashion in +Belgium, many nationalist leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gouraud +announced that the death of "one French subject or one Christian" would +be followed by wholesale "most terrible reprisals" by bombing +aeroplanes.[186] + +Before this Napoleonic "thunder-stroke" Syria bent for the moment, +apparently terrorized. In Mesopotamia, however, the British were not so +fortunate. For some months trouble had patently been brewing, and in +March the British commander had expressed himself as "much struck with +the volcanic possibilities of the country." In July all Mesopotamia +flamed into insurrection, and though Britain had fully 100,000 troops in +the province, they were hard put to it to stem the rebellion. + +Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, to force acceptance +of the draft treaty of peace. Naturally, there was no resistance, +Constantinople being entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the +silence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incoming troops filled +some Allied observers with disquietude. A French journalist wrote: "The +silence of the multitude was more impressive than boisterous protests. +Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through this throng of +mute, prostrated, hopeless people circulated watchful and sinuous +emissaries, who were to carry word of this misfortune to the remotest +confines of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. A couple of +days later the news would have spread to Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a +brief space of time it would be heralded throughout the regions of +Bolshevist influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In a few +weeks all these centres of agitation will be preparing their +counter-attack. Asia and Africa will again cement their union of faith. +Intelligent agents will record in the retentive minds of people who do +not read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries of +insurrection and fanaticism come from every race and class of society. +Educated and refined men disguise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in +order to spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter +vengeance."[187] + +Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the Italian Premier Nitti +had foretold. The Allied masters of Constantinople compelled the Sultan +to appoint a "friendly" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha Kemal +and his "rebels," and sent a hand-picked delegation to Sevres, France, +where they dutifully "signed on the dotted line" the treaty that the +Allies had prepared. The Allies had thus "imposed their will"--on paper. +For every sensible man knew that the whole business was a roaring farce; +knew that the "friendly" government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was +as nationalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the real Turkish +capital was not Constantinople but Angora, and that the Allies' power +was measured by the range of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his +comment on the Sevres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of the +world." + +The Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing situation, especially +since "The Allies" now meant only England and France. Italy was out of +the game. As Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a single +soldier nor pay a single lira." With 200,000 soldiers holding down the +Arabs, and plenty of trouble elsewhere, neither France nor Britain had +the troops to crush Mustapha Kemal--a job which the French staff +estimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, however, they still +possessed--Greece. In return for large territorial concessions, Premier +Venizelos offered to bring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted, +and 100,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign was +not a success. Even 100,000 men soon wore thin when spread out over the +vast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle, +harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing the +French in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks "dug in," and +a deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon +caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to "carry on" as +the Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtually +on a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the +November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990,000 to +10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by the +Allies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was out +of the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilities +with the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something very +different from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist regime. The +Allies' weapon had thus broken in their hands. + +Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority in +Asia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he was +establishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange to +find such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-British +policy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearly +explained by no less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab +Revolution"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speak +his mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion. +In one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said: +"The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because the +Turkish Government was notably bad, but because they wanted +independence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters, +to become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State of +their own." The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arab +nationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed to +the Syrian adventure. Said this leader: "Both the French and the English +should know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religion +with the Turks, and have been politically identified with them for +centuries, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from their +fellow believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to the domination +of a European nation, no matter what form the latter's suzerainty may +assume.... It is no use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought +of trespassing in any respect upon the independence of these people.' No +one is deceived by such statements as that. The armistice was signed in +accordance with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as soon as +Germany and its allies were helpless, the promises of the armistice were +trodden underfoot, as well as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of +the promises of complete independence, so prodigally made to the Arabs +on so many occasions, has resulted in re-uniting closer than ever the +Arabs and the Turks. It has taken but a few months to restore that +intimacy.... It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of +150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, will be able +to subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will not finish the task. The +interior of that country borders upon other lands inhabited by Arabs, +Kurds, and Turks, and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with +4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 15,000,000 Arabs in +the Levant, most of whom are armed tribes, without including the other +Mohammedan peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity and +organization under the blows that are being dealt them by the Entente. +If you believe I am exaggerating, all you have to do is to investigate +the facts yourself. But what good will it do to confirm the truth too +late, and after floods of blood have flowed?"[188] + +In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became everywhere apparent. To +be sure, this co-operation was not openly avowed either by Mustapha +Kemal or by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, continued his +diplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought beside Turks against the +French in Cilicia; Turks and Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their +continual local risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in the +rebellion against the British in Mesopotamia. + +This Arab _entente_ was not the whole of Mustapha Kemal's foreign +policy. He was also reaching out north-eastward to the Tartars of +Transcaucasia and the Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was +by this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle between Moslem +Tartars and Turkomans, Christian Armenians and Georgians, and various +Russian factions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to chaos. +Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened by Pan-Turanian propaganda, +Mustapha Kemal found enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were +supported by a third ally--Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, which, as +we have already stated, was seeking to stir up trouble against the +Western Powers throughout the East, had watched Kemal's rise with great +satisfaction. At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for the +Turkish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, but the +collapse of Wrangel's "White" army in November, 1920, and the consequent +overrunning of all south Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct line +from Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth Mustapha Kemal +was supplied with money, arms, and a few men. + +Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were starting trouble in Persia. +That country was in a most deplorable condition. During the war Persia, +despite her technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between the +Anglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-Germans on the other. +Russia's collapse in 1917 had led to her military withdrawal from +Persia, and England, profiting by the situation, had made herself +supreme, legalizing her position by the famous "Agreement" "negotiated" +with the Shah's government in August, 1919.[189] This treaty, though +signed and sealed in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian +people. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshevik propaganda. +Accordingly, the Bolshevik government renounced all rights in Persia +acquired by the Czarist regime and proclaimed themselves the friends of +the Persian people against Western imperialism. Naturally the game +worked, and Persia soon became honeycombed with militant unrest. In the +early summer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the Caspian Sea +and landed on the Persian shore. They did not penetrate far into the +country. They did not need to, for the country simply effervesced in a +way which made the British position increasingly untenable. For many +months a confused situation ensued. In fact, at this writing the +situation is still obscure. But there can be no doubt that Britain's +hold on Persia is gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled to +evacuate the country, with the possible exception of the extreme south. + +Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of England and France +in the Near East had become far from bright. Deserted by Italy and +Greece, defied by the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the +Egyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings of +Bolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire was +proving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000 +sterling, with no relief in sight. + +Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England and +France Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood of +criticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. The +Mesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. For +example, Colonel Lawrence stated: "We are to-day not far from disaster. +Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14,000 +local conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabs +in maintaining peace. We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armoured +cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10,000 Arabs +in the rising this summer."[190] Influenced by such criticisms and by +the general trend of events, the British Government modified its +attitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir +Percy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realities +and an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discuss +large concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made a +good impression upon them. At this writing matters have not been +definitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limit +her direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head of +the Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914. + +Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintaining +relative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highly +unstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even the +Catholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating. +General Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting the +leaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's only +real friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things +have not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leygues +remarked of Syria, "France will occupy all of it, and always"; while +still more recently General Gouraud stated: "France must remain in +Syria, both for political and economic reasons. The political +consequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Our +prestige and influence in the Levant and the Mediterranean would be +doomed. The economic interests of France also compel us to remain there. +When fully developed, Syria and Cilicia will have an economic value +fully equal to that of Egypt." + +However, despite the French Government's firmness, there is an +increasing public criticism of the "Syrian adventure," not merely from +radical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative +circles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative French +political periodicals has stated: "Jealous of its autonomy, the Arab +people, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreign +domination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria +wishes to be entirely independent."[191] And recently Senator Victor +Berard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made a +speech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian +policy from the very start and declaring that a "free Syria" was "a +question of both interest and honour." + +Certainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs, +has reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the Sevres +Treaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish +nationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, both +France and England know that the Sevres Treaty is unworkable, and that +Turkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be +recognized. + +In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get him +to throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend +of events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoples +against Western political control. A most remarkable portent in this +direction is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. +This conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effective +Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the high +orthodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodox +chiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the Zaidite +Emir of Yemen--leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodox +Sunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all, +the press reports state that the conference was presided over by no +less a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we have +already seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union of +all Islam against Western domination. + +Such is the situation in the Near East--a situation very grave and full +of trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of the +British Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequent +modifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and Sir +Percy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely be +wholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants of +Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political tradition +which has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appeared +hopeless. + +On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continued +intransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policy +apparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it +must unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty or +forty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing out +of the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict +of many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French policy has +deserved it." + +Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to the +inscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the great +political problem of the Middle East--the nationalist movement in +India. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[138] For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see +Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_; and his +_Western Culture in Eastern Lands_. Also the articles by Leon Cahun in +_Lavisse et Rambaud_, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, _L'Effort +Ottoman_ (Paris, 1907). + +[139] Berard, _Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances_, p. 16 (Paris, +1907). + +[140] Cited by Berard, p. 19. + +[141] Cited by Berard, p. 20. + +[142] _Le Reveil de la Nation arabe_, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905). + +[143] The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire. + +[144] The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently +found in E. Jung, _Les Puissances devant la Revolte arabe: La Crise +mondiale de Demain_, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906). + +[145] A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is +that of the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde +arabe," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury, +_Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen_ (London, 1915). + +[146] For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, +"L'Independance arabe et la Revolte actuelle," _La Revue_, 1 August, +1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks," _American Review of Reviews_, +November, 1916; A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig, +1918); G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_ (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The +Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia," _The Moslem World_, July, 1919; +L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," _Asia_, +April, May, June, 1920. + +[147] Georg Schweinfurth, _Die Wiedergeburt Aegyptens im Lichte eines +aufgeklaerten Islam_ (Berlin, 1895). + +[148] Low, _Egypt in Transition_, p. 260 (London, 1914). + +[149] _The Asiatic Review_, April, 1914. + +[150] "L'Egypte et les Debuts du Protectorat," _Revue des Sciences +Politiques_, 15 June, 1915. + +[151] Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Egypte et la Guerre," _Revue Politique +Internationale_, May, 1915. + +[152] Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die aegyptische Frage," _Asien_, November, +1916. + +[153] A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, _Les Blancs +d'Afrique_ (Paris, 1910). + +[154] For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de +Saint-Aymour, _Arabes et Kabyles_ (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, _Coup d'Oeil +sur l'Islam en Berberie_ (Paris, 1917). + +[155] For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European +Reconquest of North Africa," _American Historical Review_, July, 1912. + +[156] For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. +Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. +Lapie, _Les Civilisations tunisiennes_ (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les +Jeunes-Algeriens," _Revue de Paris_, 1 November, 1913. + +[157] A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is +found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde +musulman_, June, 1914. See also Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern +Lands_; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia," +_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, 13 March, 1907. + +[158] See W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, +1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, _The +Revolution in Persia_ (London, 1910). + +[159] E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia," _Contemporary +Review_, November, 1912. + +[160] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp. +11-12. + +[161] For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," +_The Moslem World_, January, 1911; Fevret, "Les Tatars de Crimee," +_Revue du Monde musulman_, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmans +russes," _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, "Die +Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Voelkerschaften," _Deutsche Rundschau_, +March, 1918; Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; H. +Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans," _Russian Review_, February, 1914; +"X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," _Revue du Monde musulman_, +March, 1913. + +[162] For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed +Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press_ (New +York, 1914). + +[163] For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my +article "Pan-Turanism," _American Political Science Review_, February, +1917. + +[164] See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants +politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine," _Revue du Monde musulman_, +December, 1912. + +[165] Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the +_Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist +activities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199--_A +Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the +Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, +Admiralty_ (London, 1919); E. F. Benson, _Crescent and Iron Cross_ +(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, _The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry +into the Pan-Turanian Problem_ (Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau, +_Ambassador Morgenthau's Story_ (New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stuermer, +_Two War-Years in Constantinople_ (New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "The +Turkish Spirit," _New Europe_, April 22, 1920. + +[166] For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von +Arabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the +Present Crisis," _Asiatic Review_, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, _Le +Nationalisme musulman_; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet +der arabischen Sprache," _Preussische Jahrbuecher_, September, 1916. + +[167] Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively +known as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War." + +[168] _I. e._, the organized group of followers of a particular +religion. + +[169] Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde," _Revue +Politique Internationale_, January, 1914. He headed the so-called +"Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to +protest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace +treaties. + +[170] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 181. + +[171] For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, +quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_ +(Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane," _Revue du Monde +Musulman_, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," +_Nineteenth Century and After_, July, 1919; G. Demorgny, _La Question +Persane_, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past +and Present," _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920. + +[172] _Egyptian White Book_: Collection of Official Correspondence of +the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919). + +[173] G. Civimini, in the _Corriere della Sera_, December 30, 1919. + +[174] Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Egypte," _Revue de Paris_, September 15, +1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like +character. See also Annexes to _Egyptian White Book_, previously quoted. +These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by +photographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops. + +[175] Contained in the press statements previously mentioned. + +[176] Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism," _Edinburgh Review_, +July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt," _New +Europe_, November 6, 1919. + +[177] For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, +"Conflicting Policies in the East," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920. + +[178] For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of +articles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," +_Asia_, April, May, June, July, 1920. + +[179] A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the +Mesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917. + +[180] Article xxii. + +[181] From a speech delivered September 19, 1919. + +[182] For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. +Poignant, "Les Interets francais en Syrie," _Questions diplomatiques et +coloniales_, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author +cites Premier Poincare's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, +December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria +particularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make +them respected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question +syrienne," _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, October 16, 1913; L. +Le Fur, _Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient_ +(Paris, 1914). + +[183] Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie +et en Palestine," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, June 5, 1915. For other +examples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, +C. G. Bassim, _La Question du Liban_ (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La +Syrie: Champ de Bataille politique," _La Revue Mondiale_, February 1-15, +1920; Comte Cressaty, _La Syrie francaise_ (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La +France du Levant," _Revue Hebdomadaire_, March 1, 1919. + +[184] Baudouin, _supra_. For other violent anti-British comment, see +Laudet, _supra_. + +[185] For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see +Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_, +September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause," _Balkan Review_, +September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British +forces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in the +_Balkan Review_, August and October, 1920. + +[186] For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted. + +[187] B. G. Gaulis in _L'Opinion_, April 24, 1920. + +[188] _Le Populaire_, February 16, 1920. + +[189] For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in _The +Century_, January, 1920. + +[190] Statement given to the press in August, 1920. + +[191] Henri de Chambon, editor of _La Revue Parlementaire_. Quoted by +Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," _National Review_, +September, 1920. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +NATIONALISM IN INDIA + + +India is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental geographical unity, +India has never known real political union save that recently imposed +externally by the British "Raj." Full of warlike stocks, India has never +been able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races, these races have +never really fused, but have remained distinct and mutually hostile, +sundered by barriers of blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India, +large and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like China, evolved +a generalized national unity; nor, like Europe, has developed a +specialized national diversity; but has remained an amorphous, unstable +indeterminate, with tendencies in both directions which were never +carried to their logical conclusion. + +India's history has been influenced mainly by three great invasions: the +Aryan invasion, commencing about 1500 B.C.; the Mohammedan invasion, +extending roughly from A.D. 1000 to 1700, and the English invasion, +beginning about A.D. 1750 and culminating a century later in a complete +conquest which has lasted to the present day. + +The Aryans were a fair-skinned people, unquestionably of the same +general stock as ourselves. Pressing down from Central Asia through +those north-western passes where alone land-access is possible to India, +elsewhere impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of the Himalayas, the +Aryans subdued the dark-skinned Dravidian aborigines, and settled down +as masters. This conquest was, however, superficial and partial. The +bulk of the Aryans remained in the north-west, the more adventurous +spirits scattering thinly over the rest of the vast peninsula. Even in +the north large areas of hill-country and jungle remained in the +exclusive possession of the aborigines, while very few Aryans ever +penetrated the south. Over most of India, therefore, the Aryans were +merely a small ruling class superimposed upon a much more numerous +subject population. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian ocean, +the Aryans attempted to preserve their political ascendancy and racial +purity by the institution of "caste," which has ever since remained the +basis of Indian social life. Caste was originally a "colour line." But +it was enforced not so much by civil law as by religion. Society was +divided into three castes: Brahmins, or priests; Kshatriyas, or +warriors; and Sudras, or workers. The Aryans monopolized the two upper +castes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject population. These castes +were kept apart by a rigorous series of religious taboos. Intermarriage, +partaking of food and drink, even physical propinquity, entailed +ceremonial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience to these taboos +was punished with the terrible penalty of "outcasting," whereby the +offender did not merely fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy but +sank even below the Sudra and became a "Pariah," or man of no-caste, +condemned to the most menial and revolting occupations, and with no +rights which even the Sudra was bound to respect. Thus Indian society +was governed, not by civil, but by ceremonially religious law; while, +conversely, the nascent Indian religion ("Brahminism") became not +ethical but social in character. + +These things produced the most momentous consequences. As a "colour +line," caste worked very imperfectly. Despite its prohibitions, even the +Brahmins became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood.[192] But +as a social system caste continued to function in ways peculiar to +itself. The three original castes gradually subdivided into hundreds and +even thousands of sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing of +the original racial significance. But they were all just as exclusive as +the primal trio, and the outcome was a shattering of Indian society into +a chaos of rigid social atoms, between which co-operation or even +understanding was impossible. The results upon Indian history are +obvious. Says a British authority: "The effect of this permanent +maintenance of human types is that the population is heterogeneous to +the last degree. It is no question of rich and poor, of town and +country, of employer and employed: the differences lie far deeper. The +population of a district or a town is a collection of different +nationalities--almost different species--of mankind that will not eat or +drink or intermarry with one another, and that are governed in the more +important affairs of life by committees of their own. It is hardly too +much to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are +differentiated into over two thousand species, which, in the intimate +physical relations of life, have as little in common as the inmates of a +zoological garden."[193] + +Obviously, a land socially atomized and politically split into many +principalities was destined to fall before the first strong invader. +This invader was Islam. The Mohammedans attacked India soon after their +conquest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere border raids +without lasting significance. The first real Mohammedan invasion was +that of Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan prince, in A.D. 1001. Following the +road taken by the Aryans ages before, Mahmud conquered north-western +India, the region known as the Punjab. Islam had thus obtained a firm +foothold in India, and subsequent Moslem leaders spread gradually +eastward until most of northern India was under Moslem rule. The +invaders had two notable advantages: they were fanatically united +against the despised "Idolaters," and they drew many converts from the +native population. The very antithesis of Brahminism, Islam, with its +doctrine that all Believers are brothers, could not fail to attract +multitudes of low-castes and out-castes, who by conversion might rise to +the status of the conquerors. This is the main reason why the +Mohammedans in India to-day number more than 70,000,000--over one-fifth +of the total population. These Indian Moslems are descended, not merely +from Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even more from the +millions of Hindu converts who embraced Islam. + +For many generations the Moslem hold on India was confined to the north. +Then, early in the sixteenth century, the great Turko-Mongol leader +Baber entered India and founded the "Mogul" Empire. Baber and his +successors overran even the south, and united India politically as it +had never been united before. But even this conquest was superficial. +The Brahmins, threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival; the +Mogul dynasty petered out; and at the beginning of the eighteenth +century the Mogul Empire collapsed, leaving India a welter of warring +principalities, Mohammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for religion, +for politics, or for sheer lust of plunder. + +Out of this anarchy the British rose to power. The British were at first +merely one of several other European elements--Portuguese, Dutch, and +French--who established small settlements along the Indian coasts. The +Europeans never dreamed of conquering India while the Mogul power +endured. In fact, the British connection with India began as a purely +trading venture--the East India Company. But when India collapsed into +anarchy the Europeans were first obliged to acquire local authority to +protect their "factories," and later were lured into more ambitious +schemes by the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British ousted +their European rivals and established a solid political foothold in +India. The one stable element in a seething chaos, the British +inevitably extended their authority. At first they did so reluctantly. +The East India Company long remained primarily a trading venture, aiming +at dividends rather than dominion. However, it later evolved into a real +government with an ambitious policy of annexation. This in turn awakened +the fears of many Indians and brought on the "Mutiny" of 1857. The +mutiny was quelled, the East India Company abolished, and India came +directly under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later proclaimed +Empress of India. These events in turn resulted not only in a +strengthening of British political authority but also in an increased +penetration of Western influences of every description. Roads, railways, +and canals opened up and unified India as never before; the piercing of +the Isthmus of Suez facilitated communication with Europe; while +education on European lines spread Western ideas. + +Over this rapidly changing India stood the British "Raj"--a system of +government unique in the world's history. It was the government of a few +hundred highly skilled administrative experts backed by a small +professional army, ruling a vast agglomeration of subject peoples. It +was frankly an absolute paternalism, governing as it saw fit, with no +more responsibility to the governed than the native despots whom it had +displaced. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty, and sense of +duty, the government of India is probably the best example of +benevolent absolutism that the world has ever seen. It gave India +profound peace. It played no favourites, holding the scales even between +rival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India a real political +entity--something which India had never been before. For the first time +in its history, India was firmly united under one rule--the rule of the +_Pax Britannica_. + +Yet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of future trouble. +Generations grew up, peacefully united in unprecedented +acquaintanceship, forgetful of past ills, seeing only European +shortcomings, and, above all, familiar with Western ideas of +self-government, liberty, and nationality. In India, as elsewhere in the +East, there was bound to arise a growing movement of discontent against +Western rule--a discontent varying from moderate demands for increasing +autonomy to radical demands for immediate independence. + +Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, organized political +agitation against the British "Raj" was virtually unknown. Here and +there isolated individuals uttered half-audible protests, but these +voices found no popular echo. The Indian masses, pre-occupied with the +ever-present problem of getting a living, accepted passively a +government no more absolute, and infinitely more efficient, than its +predecessors. Of anything like self-conscious Indian "Nationalism" there +was virtually no trace. + +The first symptom of organized discontent was the formation of the +"Indian National Congress" in the year 1885. The very name showed that +the British Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India's +diverse elements a certain common point of view and aspiration. However, +the early congresses were very far from representing Indian public +opinion, in the general sense of the term. On the contrary, these +congresses represented merely a small class of professional men, +journalists, and politicians, all of them trained in Western ideas. The +European methods of education which the British had introduced had +turned out an Indian _intelligentsia_, conversant with the English +language and saturated with Westernism. + +This new _intelligentsia_, convinced as it was of the value of Western +ideals and achievements, could not fail to be dissatisfied with many +aspects of Indian life. In fact, its first efforts were directed, not so +much to politics, as to social and economic reforms like the suppression +of child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, and wider education. But, +as time passed, matters of political reform came steadily to the fore. +Saturated with English history and political philosophy as they were, +the Indian intellectuals felt more and more keenly their total lack of +self-government, and aspired to endow India with those blessings of +liberty so highly prized by their English rulers. Soon a vigorous native +press developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the intellectuals +into a self-conscious unity, and moulding a genuine public opinion. By +the close of the nineteenth century the Indian _intelligentsia_ was +frankly agitating for sweeping political innovations like representative +councils, increasing control over taxation and the executive, and the +opening of the public services to Indians all the way up the scale. + +Down to the closing years of the nineteenth century Indian discontent +was, as already said, confined to a small class of more or less +Europeanized intellectuals who, despite their assumption of the title, +could hardly be termed "Nationalists" in the ordinary sense of the word. +With a few exceptions, their goal was neither independence nor the +elimination of effective British oversight, but rather the reforming of +Indian life along Western lines, including a growing degree of +self-government under British paramount authority. + +But by the close of the nineteenth century there came a change in the +situation. India, like the rest of the Orient, was stirring to a new +spirit of political and racial self-consciousness. True nationalist +symptoms began to appear. Indian scholars delved into their musty +chronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories of India's +historic past. Reformed Hindu sects like the Arya Somaj lent religious +sanctions. The little band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined by +other elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms on Western +models, but of a new India, rejuvenated from its own vital forces, and +free to work out its own destiny in its own way. From the nationalist +ranks now arose the challenging slogan: "Bandemataram!" ("Hail, +Motherland!")[194] + +The outstanding feature about this early Indian nationalism was that it +was a distinctively Hindu movement. The Mohammedans regarded it with +suspicion or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The ideal of +the new nationalists was Aryan India, the India of the "Golden Age." +"Back to the Vedas!" was a nationalist watchword, and this implied a +veneration for the past, including a revival of aggressive Brahminism. +An extraordinary change came over the _intelligentsia_. Men who, a few +years before, had proclaimed the superiority of Western ideas and had +openly flouted "superstitions" like idol-worship, now denounced +everything Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu gods. The +"sacred soil" of India must be purged of the foreigner.[195] But the +"foreigner," as these nationalists conceived him, was not merely the +Englishman; he was the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the past +with a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu-Mohammedan division had +run like a chasm athwart India. It had never been closed, but it had +been somewhat veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British Raj. Now +the veil was torn aside, and the Mohammedans saw themselves menaced by a +recrudescence of militant Hinduism like that which had shattered the +Mogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb two hundred years +before. The Mohammedans were not merely alarmed; they were infuriated as +well. Remembering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hindus did +the glories of Aryan India, they considered themselves the rightful +lords of the land, and had no mind to fall under the sway of despised +"Idolaters." The Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they hated +the Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a bulwark against the +potential menace of hereditary enemies who outnumbered them nearly five +to one. Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationalism and proclaimed +their loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the Indian Moslems were also +affected by the general spirit of unrest which was sweeping over the +East. They too felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, being +a minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of territorial +"patriotism," but of those more diffused sentiments, Pan-Islamism and +Pan-Islamic nationalism, which we have already discussed.[196] + +Early Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in character; it was +distinctly "Brahminical" as well. More and more the Brahmins became the +driving-power of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy in +the India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in the India of the past. +But this aroused apprehension in certain sections of Hindu society. Many +low-castes and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or even +autonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy which +would deny them the benefits they now enjoyed under British rule.[197] +Also, many of the Hindu princes disliked the thought of a theocratic +regime which might reduce them to shadows.[198] Thus the nationalist +movement stood out as an alliance between the Brahmins and the +Western-educated _intelligentsia_, who had pooled their ambitions in a +programme for jointly ruling India. + +Quickened by this ambition and fired by religious zeal, the nationalist +movement rapidly acquired a fanatical temper characterized by a mystical +abhorrence of everything Western and a ferocious hatred of all +Europeans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this spirit, and the +very next year (1905) an act of the Indian Government precipitated the +gathering storm. This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. The +partition was a mere administrative measure, with no political intent. +But the nationalists made it a "vital issue," and about this grievance +they started an intense propaganda that soon filled India with seditious +unrest. The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, +who has been called "the father of Indian unrest." Tilak typified the +nationalist movement. A Brahmin with an excellent Western education, he +was the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization. An able +propagandist, his speeches roused his hearers to frenzy, while his +newspaper, the _Yugantar_, of Calcutta, preached a campaign of hate, +assassination, and rebellion. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangible +results, numerous riots, "dacoities," and murders of Englishmen taking +place. And of course the _Yugantar_ was merely one of a large number of +nationalist organs, some printed in the vernacular and others in +English, which vied with one another in seditious invective. + +The violence of the nationalist press may be judged by a few quotations. +"Revolution," asserted the _Yugantar_, "is the only way in which a +slavish society can save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man in +life, play the man in death. Foreigners have come and decided how you +are to live. But how you are to die depends entirely upon yourself." +"Let preparations be made for a general revolution in every household! +The handful of police and soldiers will never be able to withstand this +ocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may be made prisoners and may +die, but thousands of others will spring into their places. Do not be +afraid! With the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile. +Do not be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes. There is no dearth +of money; glory awaits you! A single frown (a few bombs) from your eyes +has struck terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic has +filled the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the ocean of bloodshed!" The +assassination note was vehemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma in _The +Indian Sociologist_: "Political assassination is not murder, and the +rightful employment of physical force connotes 'force used defensively +against force used aggressively.'" "The only subscription required," +stated the _Yugantar_, "is that every reader shall bring the head of a +European." Not even women and children were spared. Commenting on the +murder of an English lady and her daughter, the _Yugantar_ exclaimed +exultantly: "Many a female demon must be killed in course of time, in +order to extirpate the race of Asuras from the breast of the earth." The +fanaticism of the men (usually very young men) who committed these +assassinations may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a high +English official, Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly before his execution: +"I believe that a nation held down by foreign bayonets is in a perpetual +state of war. Since open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed +race, I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I drew my +pistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong to my country is an +insult to the gods. Her cause is the cause of Shri Ram; her service is +the service of Shri Krishna. Poor in wealth and intellect, a son like +myself has nothing else to offer the Mother but his own blood, and so I +have sacrificed the same on Her altar. The only lesson required in India +at present is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is to +die ourselves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom. This war will +continue between England and India so long as the Hindee and English +races last, if the present unnatural relation does not cease."[199] + +The government's answer to this campaign of sedition and assassination +was of course stern repression. The native press was muzzled, the +agitators imprisoned or executed, and the hands of the authorities were +strengthened by punitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was the +European community by the murders and outrages committed by the +nationalists that many Englishmen urged the withdrawal of such political +privileges as did exist, the limiting of Western education, and the +establishment of extreme autocratic rule. These angry counsels were at +once caught up by the nationalists, resulted in fresh outrages, and were +answered by more punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists on +both sides lashed each other to hotter fury and worsened the situation. +For several years India seethed with an unrest which jailings, hangings, +and deportations did little to allay. + +Presently, however, things took at least a temporary turn for the +better. The extremists were, after all, a small minority, and cool +heads, both British and Indian, were seeking a way out of the _impasse_. +Conservative Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism, and +besought their countrymen to seek the realization of their aspirations +by peaceful means. On the other hand, liberal-minded Englishmen, while +refusing to be stampeded, sought a programme of conciliation. Indian +affairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal statesman John +Morley, and the fruit of his labours was the Indian Councils Act of +1909. The act was a distinct departure from the hitherto almost +unlimited absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indian +opposition greatly increased opportunities for advice, criticism, and +debate, and it initiated a restricted scheme of elections to the +legislative bodies which it established. The salutary effect of these +concessions was soon apparent. The moderate nationalist elements, while +not wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of subsequent +concessions and as a proof of British good-will. The terrorism and +seditious plottings of the extremists, while not stamped out, were held +in check and driven underground. King George's visit to India in 1911 +evoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the peninsula and augured +well for the future. + +The year 1911 was the high-water mark of this era of appeasement +following the storms of 1905-9. The years after 1911 witnessed a gradual +recrudescence of discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act wore +off and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened the appetite for +more. In fact, during these years, Indian nationalism was steadily +broadening its base. In one sense this made for stability, for the +nationalist movement ceased to be a small minority of extremists and +came more under the influence of moderate leaders like Mr. Gokhale, who +were content to work for distant goals by evolutionary methods. It did, +however, mean an increasing pressure on the government for fresh +devolutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom of nationalist +growth was the rallying of a certain section of Mohammedan opinion to +the nationalist cause. The Mohammedans had by this time formed their own +organization, the "All-India Moslem League." The league was the reverse +of nationalist in complexion, having been formed primarily to protect +Moslem interests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless, as +time passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the friendly attitude and +promises of the Hindu moderates, abandoned the league's anti-Hindu +attitude and joined the moderate nationalists, though refraining from +seditious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split into two +distinct groups, moderates and extremists. The extremists, condemned by +their fellows, kept up a desultory campaign of violence, largely +directed by exiled leaders who from the shelter of foreign countries +incited their followers at home to seditious agitation and violent +action. + +Such was the situation in India on the outbreak of the Great War; a +situation by no means free from difficulty, yet far less troubled than +it had been a few years before. Of course, the war produced an increase +of unrest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as a whole, +remained quiet. Throughout the war India contributed men and money +unstintedly to the imperial cause, and Indian troops figured notably on +European, Asiatic, and African battlefields. + +However, though the war-years passed without any serious outbreak of +revolutionary violence, it must not be thought that the far more +widespread movement for increasing self-government had been either +quenched or stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement fresh +impetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for not merely good +government but government acceptable to Indian patriots because +responsible to them. The very fact that India had proved her loyalty to +the Empire and had given generously of her blood and treasure were so +many fresh arguments adduced for the grant of a larger measure of +self-direction. Numerous were the memoranda presented to the British +authorities by various sections of Indian public opinion. These +memoranda were an accurate reflection of the different shades of Indian +nationalism. The ultimate goal of all was emancipation from British +tutelage, but they differed widely among themselves as to how and when +this emancipation was to be attained. The most conservative contented +themselves with asking for modified self-government under British +guidance, while the more ambitious asked for the full status of a +dominion of the British Empire like Australia and Canada. The +revolutionary element naturally held aloof, recognizing that only +violence could serve their aim--immediate and unqualified independence. + +Of course even the more moderate nationalist demands implied great +changes in the existing governmental system and a diminution of British +control such as the Government of India was not prepared at present to +concede. Nevertheless, the government met these demands by a +conciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh concessions in the near +future. In 1916 the Viceroy, Lord Harding, said: "I do not for a moment +wish to discountenance self-government for India as a national ideal. It +is a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the sympathy of all +moderate men, but in the present position of India it is not idealism +that is needed but practical politics. We should do our utmost to +grapple with realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes and +encourage unrealizable demands can only tend to delay and will not +accelerate political progress. I know this is the sentiment of wise and +thoughtful Indians. Nobody is more anxious than I am to see the early +realization of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am equally +desirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from the birth of +institutions which experience might prove to be premature." + +As a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of +State for India, came out from England with the object of thoroughly +canvassing Indian public opinion on the question of constitutional +reform. For months the problem was carefully weighed, conferences being +held with the representatives of all races, classes, and creeds. The +result of these researches was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montagu +and by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and published in July, 1918. + +The report recommended concessions far beyond any which Great Britain +had hitherto made. It frankly envisaged the gift of home rule for India +"as soon as possible," and went on to state that the gift was to be +conferred not because of Indian agitation, but because of "the faith +that is in us." There followed these memorable words: "We believe +profoundly that the time has come when the sheltered existence which we +have given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her national +life; that we have a richer gift for her people than any that we have +yet bestowed on them; that nationhood within the Empire represents +something better than anything India has hitherto attained; that the +placid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the soil on which such +Indian nationhood will grow, and that in deliberately disturbing it we +are working for her highest good." + +The essence of the report was its recommendation of the principle of +"diarchy," or division of governmental responsibility between +councillors nominated by the British executive and ministers chosen +from elective legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both the +central and provincial governments. The legislatures were to be elected +by a much more extensive franchise than had previously prevailed and +were to have greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been little +more than advisory bodies; now they were to become "legislatures" in the +Western sense, though their powers were still limited, many powers, +particularly that of the purse, being still "reserved" to the executive. +The British executive thus retained ultimate control and had the last +word; thus no true "balance of power" was to exist, the scales being +frankly weighted in favour of the British Raj. But the report went on to +state that this scheme of government was not intended to be permanent; +that it was frankly a transitional measure, a school in which the Indian +people was to serve its apprenticeship, and that when these first +lessons in self-government had been learned, India would be given a +thoroughly representative government which would not only initiate and +legislate, but which would also control the executive officials. + +The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively discussed both in India +and in England, and from these frank discussions an excellent idea of +the Indian problem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained. +The nationalists split sharply on the issue, the moderates welcoming the +report and agreeing to give the proposed scheme of government their +loyal co-operation, the extremists condemning the proposals as a snare +and a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a manifesto signed by +their leaders, headed by the eminent Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha, +which stated: "The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure capable +of improvement in some particulars, especially at the top, but is +nevertheless a progressive measure. The reforms are calculated to make +the provinces of India reach the goal of complete responsible +government. On the whole, the proposals are evolved with great +foresight and conceived in a spirit of genuine sympathy with Indian +political aspirations, for which the distinguished authors are entitled +to the country's gratitude." The condemnation of the radicals was voiced +by leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged "standing fast by the Indian +National Congress ideal," and Mr. Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: "It +is my deliberate opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Government +will be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to-day." + +Extremely interesting was the protest of the anti-nationalist groups, +particularly the Mohammedans and the low-caste Hindus. For it is a fact +significant of the complexity of the Indian problem that many millions +of Indians fear the nationalist movement and look upon the autocracy of +the British Raj as a shield against nationalist oppression and +discrimination. The Mohammedans of India are, on the question of +self-government for India, sharply divided among themselves. The +majority still dislike and fear the nationalist movement, owing to its +"Hindu" character. A minority, however, as already stated, have rallied +to the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in numbers during +the war-years, their increased friendliness being due not merely to +desire for self-government but also to anger at the Allies' policy of +dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the Near and +Middle East.[200] The Hindu nationalists were quick to sympathize with +the Mohammedans on these external matters, and the result was a +cordiality between the two elements never known before. + +The predominance of high-caste Brahmins in the nationalist movement +explains the opposition of many low-caste Hindus to Indian home rule. So +great is the low-caste fear of losing their present protection under the +British Raj and of being subjected to the domination of a high-caste +Brahmin oligarchy that in recent years they have formed an association +known as the "Namasudra," led by well-known persons like Doctor +Nair.[201] The Namasudra points out what might happen by citing the +Brahminic pressure which occurs even in such political activity as +already exists. For example: in many elections the Brahmins have +terrorized low-caste voters by threatening to "out-caste" all who should +not vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them "Pariahs"--untouchables, +with no rights in Hindu society. + +Such protests against home rule from large sections of the Indian +population gave pause even to many English students of the problem who +had become convinced of home rule's theoretical desirability. And of +course they greatly strengthened the arguments of those numerous +Englishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who asserted that India was as +yet unfit for self-government. Said one of these objectors in _The Round +Table_: "The masses care not one whit for politics; Home Rule they do +not understand. They prefer the English District Magistrate. They only +ask to remain in eternal and bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in +the Englishman because he has always shown himself the 'Protector of the +Poor,' and because he is neither Hindu nor Mussulman, and has a +reputation for honesty." And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism of +the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: "There are many defects in our +system of government in India. Reforms are needed; but they must be +based solely upon considerations of the welfare of the masses of India +as a whole. If the policy of 'deliberately' disturbing their +'contentment' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of State have +announced is carried out; if, through the 'whispering galleries of the +East,' the word is passed that the only authority that can maintain law +and order and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian nation is +weakening; if, as is proposed, the great public services are +emasculated; then the fierce old animosities will break out afresh, and, +assisted by a recrudescence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism, +they will within a few years bring to nought the noblest work which the +British race has ever accomplished."[202] + +Yet other English authorities on Indian affairs asserted that the +Montagu-Chelmsford proposals were sound and must be enacted into law if +the gravest perils were to be averted. Such were the opinions of men +like Lionel Curtis[203] and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated: "It is of +the utmost importance that there should be no unnecessary delay. We have +had object-lessons enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in +India as elsewhere time is on the side of the troublemakers.... We +cannot hope to reconcile Indian Extremism. What we can hope to do is to +free from its insidious influence all that is best in Indian public life +by opening up a larger field of useful activity."[204] + +As a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was accepted as the +basis of discussion by the British Parliament, and at the close of the +year 1919 its recommendations were formally embodied in law. +Unfortunately, during the eighteen months which elapsed between the +publication of the report and its legal enactment, the situation in +India had darkened. Militant unrest had again raised its head, and India +was more disturbed than it had been since 1909. + +For this there were several reasons. In the first place, all those +nationalist elements who were dissatisfied with the report began +coquetting with the revolutionary irreconcilables and encouraging them +to fresh terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the British +Parliament into wider concessions than the report had contemplated. But +there were other causes of a more general nature. The year 1918 was a +black one for India. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit India +particularly hard, millions of persons being carried off by the grim +plague. Furthermore, India was cursed with drought, the crops failed, +and the spectre of famine stalked through the land. The year 1919 saw an +even worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By the late +summer it was estimated that millions of persons had died of hunger, +with millions more on the verge of starvation. And on top of all came an +Afghan war, throwing the north-west border into tumult and further +unsettling the already restless Mohammedan element. + +The upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in an epidemic of +riots, terrorism, and seditious activity which gave the British +authorities serious concern. So critical appeared the situation that a +special commission was appointed to investigate conditions, and the +report handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a depressing +picture of the strength of revolutionary unrest. The report stated that +not only had a considerable number of young men of the educated upper +classes become involved in the promotion of anarchical movements, but +that the ranks were filled with men belonging to other social orders, +including the military, and that there was clear evidence of successful +tampering with the loyalty of the native troops. To combat this growing +disaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended fresh repressive +legislation. + +Impressed with the gravity of the committee's report, the Government of +India formulated a project of law officially known as the Anarchical and +Revolutionary Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt Bill. By +its provisions the authorities were endowed with greatly increased +powers, such as the right to search premises and arrest persons on mere +suspicion of seditious activity, without definite evidence of the same. + +The Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist opposition. Not +merely extremists, but many moderates, condemned it as a backward step +and as a provoker of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate in +the Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative Council, all the +native members save one opposed it, and the bill was finally passed on +strictly racial lines by the votes of the appointed English majority. +However, the government considered the bill an absolute pre-requisite to +the successful maintenance of order, and it was passed into law in the +spring of 1919. + +This brought matters to a head. The nationalists, stigmatizing the +Rowlatt law as the "Black Cobra Act," were unmeasured in their +condemnation. The extremists engineered a campaign of militant protest +and decreed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as a +national "Humiliation Day." On that day monster mass-meetings were held, +at which nationalist orators made seditious speeches and inflamed the +passions of the multitude. "Humiliation Day" was in fact the beginning +of the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny. For the next three months +a veritable epidemic of rioting and terrorism swept India, particularly +the northern provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civilians +were murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of property. At some +moments it looked as though India were on the verge of revolution and +anarchy. + +However, the government stood firm. Violence was countered with stern +repression. Riotous mobs were mowed down wholesale by rifle and +machine-gun fire or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flying +aeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was the so-called +"Amritsar Massacre," where British troops fired into a seditious +mass-meeting, killing 500 and wounding 1500 persons. In the end the +government mastered the situation. Order was restored, the seditious +leaders were swept into custody, and the revolutionary agitation was +once more driven underground. The enactment of the Montagu-Chelmsford +reform bill by the British Parliament toward the close of the year did +much to relax the tension and assuage discontent, though the situation +of India was still far from normal. The deplorable events of the earlier +part of 1919 had roused animosities which were by no means allayed. The +revolutionary elements, though driven underground, were more bitter and +uncompromising than ever, while opponents of home rule were confirmed in +their conviction that India could not be trusted and that any relaxation +of autocracy must spell anarchy. + +This was obviously not the best mental atmosphere in which to apply the +compromises of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremists +were determined that they should not be given a fair trial, regarding +the reforms as a snare which must be avoided at all costs. Recognizing +that armed rebellion was still impossible, at least for the present, the +extremists evolved the idea known as "non-co-operation." This was, in +fact, a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not merely were the new +voters urged to stay away from the polls and thus elect no members to +the proposed legislative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid +the courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen to go on strike, +shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell British-made goods, and even pupils +to leave the schools and colleges. This wholesale "out-casting" of +everything British would make the English in India a new sort of +Pariah--"untouchables"; the British Government and the British community +in India would be left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, rendered +unworkable, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands for +complete self-government. + +Such was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea soon found an able +exponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi, who had long possessed a reputation +for personal sanctity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with that +peculiar religious fervour which certain types of Indian ascetics have +always known how to arouse. Gandhi's propaganda can be judged by the +following extract from one of his speeches: "It is as amazing as it is +humiliating that less than 100,000 white men should be able to rule +315,000,000 Indians. They do so somewhat, undoubtedly, by force, but +more by securing our co-operation in a thousand ways and making us more +and more helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward. Let us +not mistake reformed councils (legislatures), more law-courts, and even +governorships for real freedom or power. They are but subtler methods of +emasculation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And so they +resort to all means, honourable and dishonourable, in order to retain +their hold on India. They want India's billions and they want India's +man-power for their imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply them +with men and money, we achieve our goal: namely, _Swaraj_,[205] +equality, manliness." + +The extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement have not been +realized. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms have been put in operation, and +the first elections under them were held at the beginning of 1921. But +the outlook is far from bright. The very light vote cast at the +elections revealed the effect of the non-co-operation movement, which +showed itself in countless other ways, from strikes in factories to +strikes of school-children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. And +this unrest is not merely political; it is social as well. The vast +economic changes which have been going on in India for the past +half-century have profoundly disorganized Indian society. These changes +will be discussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted is that +the extremist leaders are capitalizing social discontent and are +unquestionably in touch with Bolshevik Russia. Meanwhile the older +factors of disturbance are by no means eliminated. The recent atrocious +massacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh fanatics, and the +three-cornered riots between Hindus, Mohammedans, and native Christians +which broke out about the same time in southern India, reveal the hidden +fires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder beneath the +surface of Indian life. + +The truth of the matter is that India is to-day a battle-ground between +the forces of evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is an anxious +and a troubled time. The old order is obviously passing, and the new +order is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possibilities of +both good and evil, and no one can confidently predict the outcome. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[192] According to some historians, this race-mixture occurred almost at +once. The theory is that the Aryan conquerors, who outside the +north-western region had very few of their own women with them, took +Dravidian women as wives or concubines, and legitimatized their +half-breed children, the offspring of the conquerors, both pure-bloods +and mixed-bloods, coalescing into a closed caste. Further infiltration +of Dravidian blood was thus prevented, but Aryan race-purity had been +destroyed. + +[193] Sir Bampfylde Fuller, _Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment_, p. +40 (London, 1910). For other discussions of caste and its effects, see +W. Archer, _India and the Future_ (London, 1918); Sir V. Chirol, _Indian +Unrest_ (London, 1910); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Study +of Social, Political and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); Sir +H. Risley, _The People of India_ (London, 1908); also writings of the +"Namasudra" leader, Dr. Nair, previously quoted, and S. Nihal Singh, +"India's Untouchables," _Contemporary Review_, March, 1913. + +[194] For the nationalist movement, see Archer, Chirol, and Morrison, +_supra_. Also Sir H. J. S. Cotton, _India in Transition_ (London, 1904); +J. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York, 1915); +Sir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_ (London, +1903); W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_ (London, 1902); Sir V. +Lovett, _A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement_ (London, 1920); +J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_ (London, 1920); Sir T. +Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_ (London, 1899); J. D. Rees, _The Real +India_ (London, 1908); Sir J. Strachey, _India: Its Administration and +Progress_ (Fourth Edition--London, 1911); K. Vyasa Rao, _The Future +Government of India_ (London, 1918). + +[195] I have already discussed this "Golden Age" tendency in Chapter +III. For more or less Extremist Indian view-points, see A. Coomaraswamy, +_The Dance of Siva_ (New York, 1918); H. Maitra, _Hinduism: The +World-Ideal_ (London, 1916); Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the +Unrest in India," _Contemporary Review_, February, 1910; also various +writings of Lajpat Rai, especially _The Arya Samaj_ (London, 1915) and +_Young India_ (New York, 1916). + +[196] For Indian Mohammedan points of view, mostly anti-Hindu, see H. H. +The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_ (London, 1918); S. Khuda Bukhsh, +_Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912); Sir Syed Ahmed, _The +Present State of Indian Politics_ (Allahabad, 1888); Syed Sirdar Ali +Khan, _The Unrest in India_ (Bombay, 1907); also his _India of To-day_ +(Bombay, 1908). + +[197] This attitude of the "Depressed Classes," especially as revealed +in the "Namasudra Association," has already been discussed in Chapter +III, and will be further touched upon later in this present chapter. + +[198] Regarding the Indian native princes, see Archer and Chirol, +_supra_. Also J. Pollen, "Native States and Indian Home Rule," _Asiatic +Review_, January 1, 1917; The Maharajah of Bobbili, _Advice to the +Indian Aristocracy_ (Madras, 1905); articles by Sir D. Barr and Sir F. +Younghusband in _The Empire and the Century_ (London, 1905). + +[199] A good symposium of extremist comment is contained in Chirol, +_supra_. Also see J. D. Rees, _The Real India_ (London, 1908); series of +extremist articles in _The Open Court_, March, 1917. A good sample of +extremist literature is the fairly well-known pamphlet _India's +"Loyalty" to England_ (1915). + +[200] Discussed in the preceding chapter. + +[201] Quoted in Chapter IV. + +[202] Lord Sydenham, "India," _Contemporary Review_, November, 1918. For +similar criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, see G. M. +Chesney, _India under Experiment_ (London, 1918); "The First Stage +towards Indian Anarchy," _Spectator_, December 20, 1919. + +[203] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on Responsible +Government_, already quoted at the end of Chapter IV. + +[204] Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918. + +[205] _I. e._, self-government, in the extremist sense--practically +independence. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +ECONOMIC CHANGE + + +One of the most interesting phenomena of modern world-history is the +twofold conquest of the East by the West. The word "conquest" is usually +employed in a political sense, and calls up visions of embattled armies +subduing foreign lands and lording it over distant peoples. Such +political conquests in the Orient did of course occur, and we have +already seen how, during the past century, the decrepit states of the +Near and Middle East fell an easy prey to the armed might of the +European Powers. + +But what is not so generally realized is the fact that this political +conquest was paralleled by an economic conquest perhaps even more +complete and probably destined to produce changes of an even more +profound and enduring character. + +The root-cause of this economic conquest was the Industrial Revolution. +Just as the voyages of Columbus and Da Gama gave Europe the strategic +mastery of the ocean and thereby the political mastery of the world, so +the technical inventions of the later eighteenth century which +inaugurated the Industrial Revolution gave Europe the economic mastery +of the world. These inventions in fact heralded a new Age of Discovery, +this time into the realms of science. The results were, if possible, +more momentous even than those of the age of geographical discovery +three centuries before. They gave our race such increased mastery over +the resources of nature that the ensuing transformation of economic life +swiftly and utterly transformed the face of things. + +This transformation was, indeed, unprecedented in the world's history. +Hitherto man's material progress had been a gradual evolution. With the +exception of gunpowder, he had tapped no new sources of material energy +since very ancient times. The horse-drawn mail-coach of our +great-grandfathers was merely a logical elaboration of the horse-drawn +Egyptian chariot; the wind-driven clipper-ship traced its line unbroken +to Ulysses's lateen bark before Troy; while industry still relied on the +brawn of man and beast or upon the simple action of wind and waterfall. +Suddenly all was changed. Steam, electricity, petrol, the Hertzian wave, +harnessed nature's hidden powers, conquered distance, and shrunk the +terrestrial globe to the measure of human hands. Man entered a new +material world, differing not merely in degree but in kind from that of +previous generations. + +When I say "Man," I mean, so far as the nineteenth century was +concerned, the white man of Europe and its racial settlements overseas. +It was the white man's brain which had conceived all this, and it was +the white man alone who at first reaped the benefits. The two +outstanding features of the new order were the rise of machine-industry +with its incalculable acceleration of mass-production, and the +correlative development of cheap and rapid transportation. Both these +factors favoured a prodigious increase in economic power and wealth in +Europe, since Europe became the workshop of the world. In fact, during +the nineteenth century, Europe was transformed from a semi-rural +continent into a swarming hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital, +and men, pouring forth its wares to the remotest corners of the earth, +and drawing thence fresh stores of raw material for new fabrication and +exchange. + +Such was the industrially revolutionized West which confronted an East +as backward and stagnant in economics as it was in politics and the art +of war. In fact, the East was virtually devoid of either industry or +business, as we understand these terms to-day. Economically, the East +was on an agricultural basis, the economic unit being the +self-supporting, semi-isolated village. Oriental "industries" were +handicrafts, carried on by relatively small numbers of artisans, usually +working by and for themselves. Their products, while often exquisite in +quality, were largely luxuries, and were always produced by such slow, +antiquated methods that their quantity was limited and their market +price relatively high. Despite very low wages, therefore, Asiatic +products not only could not compete in the world-market with European +and American machine-made, mass-produced articles, but were hard hit in +their home-markets as well. + +This Oriental inability to compete with Western industry arose not +merely from methods of production but also from other factors such as +the mentality of the workers and the scarcity of capital. Throughout the +Near and Middle East economic life rested on the principle of status. +The Western economic principles of contract and competition were +virtually unknown. Agriculturalists and artisans followed blindly in the +footsteps of their fathers. There was no competition, no stimulus for +improvement, no change in customary wages, no desire for a better and +more comfortable living. The industries were stereotyped; the apprentice +merely imitated his master, and rarely thought of introducing new +implements or new methods of manufacture. Instead of working for profit +and advancement, men followed an hereditary "calling," usually hallowed +by religious sanctions, handed down from father to son through many +generations, each calling possessing its own unchanging ideals, its +zealously guarded craft-secrets. + +The few bolder, more enterprising spirits who might have ventured to +break the iron bands of custom and tradition were estopped by lack of +capital. Fluid "investment" capital, easily mobilized and ready to pour +into an enterprise of demonstrable utility and profit, simply did not +exist. To the Oriental, whether prince or peasant, money was regarded, +not as a source of profit or a medium of exchange, but as a store of +value, to be hoarded intact against a "rainy day." The East has been +known for ages as a "sink of the precious metals." In India alone, the +value of the gold, silver, and jewels hidden in strong-boxes, buried in +the earth, or hanging about the necks of women must run into billions. +Says a recent writer on India: "I had the privilege of being taken +through the treasure-vaults of one of the wealthiest Maharajahs. I could +have plunged my arm to the shoulder in great silver caskets filled with +diamonds, pearls, emeralds, rubies. The walls were studded with hooks +and on each pair of hooks rested gold bars three to four feet long and +two inches across. I stood by a great cask of diamonds, and picking up a +handful let them drop slowly from between my fingers, sparkling and +glistening like drops of water in sunlight. There are some seven hundred +native states, and the rulers of every one has his treasure-vaults on a +more or less elaborate scale. Besides these, every zamindar and every +Indian of high or low degree who can save anything, wants to have it by +him in actual metal; he distrusts this new-fangled paper currency that +they try to pass off on him. Sometimes he beats his coins into bangles +for his wives, and sometimes he hides money behind a loose brick or +under a flat stone in the bottom of the oven, or he goes out and digs a +little hole and buries it."[206] + +Remember that this description is of present-day India, after more than +a century of British rule and notwithstanding a permeation of Western +ideas which, as we shall presently see, has produced momentous +modifications in the native point of view. Remember also that this +hoarding propensity is not peculiar to India but is shared by the entire +Orient. We can then realize the utter lack of capital for investment +purposes in the East of a hundred years ago, especially when we remember +that political insecurity and religious prohibitions of the lending of +money at interest stood in the way of such far-sighted individuals as +might have been inclined to employ their hoarded wealth for productive +purposes. There was, indeed, one outlet for financial activity--usury, +and therein virtually all the scant fluid capital of the old Orient was +employed. But such capital, lent not for productive enterprise, but for +luxury, profligacy, or incompetence, was a destructive rather than a +creative force and merely intensified the prejudice against capital of +any kind. + +Such was the economic life of the Orient a hundred years ago. It is +obvious that this archaic order was utterly unable to face the +tremendous competition of the industrialized West. Everywhere the flood +of cheap Western machine-made, mass-produced goods began invading +Eastern lands, driving the native wares before them. The way in which an +ancient Oriental handicraft like the Indian textiles was literally +annihilated by the destructive competition of Lancashire cottons is only +one of many similar instances. To be sure, some Oriental writers contend +that this triumph of Western manufactures was due to political rather +than economic reasons, and Indian nationalists cite British governmental +activity in favour of the Lancashire cottons above mentioned as the sole +cause for the destruction of the Indian textile handicrafts. But such +arguments appear to be fallacious. British official action may have +hastened the triumph of British industry in India, but that triumph was +inevitable in the long run. The best proof is the way in which the +textile crafts of independent Oriental countries like Turkey and Persia +were similarly ruined by Western competition. + +A further proof is the undoubted fact that Oriental peoples, taken as a +whole, have bought Western-manufactured products in preference to their +own hand-made wares. To many Westerners this has been a mystery. Such +persons cannot understand how the Orientals could buy the cheap, shoddy +products of the West, manufactured especially for the Eastern market, in +preference to their native wares of better quality and vastly greater +beauty. The answer, however, is that the average Oriental is not an art +connoisseur but a poor man living perilously close to the margin of +starvation. He not only wants but must buy things cheap, and the wide +price-margin is the deciding factor. Of course there is also the element +of novelty. Besides goods which merely replace articles he has always +used, the West has introduced many new articles whose utility or charm +are irresistible. I have already mentioned the way in which the +sewing-machine and the kerosene-lamp have swept the Orient from end to +end, and there are many other instances of a similar nature. The +permeation of Western industry has, in fact, profoundly modified every +phase of Oriental economic life. New economic wants have been created; +standards of living have been raised; canons of taste have been altered. +Says a lifelong American student of the Orient: "The knowledge of modern +inventions and of other foods and articles has created new wants. The +Chinese peasant is no longer content to burn bean-oil; he wants +kerosene. The desire of the Asiatic to possess foreign lamps is equalled +only by his passion for foreign clocks. The ambitious Syrian scorns the +mud roof of his ancestors, and will be satisfied only with the bright +red tiles imported from France. Everywhere articles of foreign +manufacture are in demand.... Knowledge increases wants, and the +Oriental is acquiring knowledge. He demands a hundred things to-day that +his grandfather never heard of."[207] + +Everywhere it is the same story. An Indian economic writer, though a +bitter enemy of Western industrialism, bemoans the fact that "the +artisans are losing their occupations and are turning to agriculture. +The cheap kerosene-oil from Baku or New York threatens the oilman's[208] +existence. Brass and copper which have been used for vessels from time +immemorial are threatened by cheap enamelled ironware imported from +Europe.... There is also, _pari passu_, a transformation of the tastes +of the consumers. They abandon _gur_ for crystal sugar. Home-woven +cloths are now replaced by manufactured cloths for being too coarse. All +local industries are attacked and many have been destroyed. Villages +that for centuries followed customary practices are brought into contact +with the world's markets all on a sudden. For steamships and railways +which have established the connection have been built in so short an +interval as hardly to allow breathing-time to the village which +slumbered so long under the dominion of custom. Thus the sudden +introduction of competition into an economic unit which had from time +immemorial followed custom has wrought a mighty change."[209] + +This "mighty change" was due not merely to the influx of Western goods +but also to an equally momentous influx of Western capital. The +opportunities for profitable investment were so numerous that Western +capital soon poured in streams into Eastern lands. Virtually devoid of +fluid capital of its own, the Orient was bound to have recourse to +Western capital for the initiation of all economic activity in the +modern sense. Railways, mines, large-scale agriculture of the +"plantation" type, and many other undertakings thus came into being. +Most notable of all was the founding of numerous manufacturing +establishments from North Africa to China and the consequent growth of +genuine "factory towns" where the whir of machinery and the smoke of +tall chimneys proclaimed that the East was adopting the industrial life +of the West. + +The momentous social consequences of this industrialization of the +Orient will be treated in subsequent chapters. In the present chapter we +will confine ourselves to a consideration of its economic side. +Furthermore, this book, limited as it is to the Near and Middle East, +cannot deal with industrial developments in China and Japan. The reader +should, however, always bear in mind Far Eastern developments, which, in +the main, run parallel to those which we shall here discuss. + +These industrial innovations were at first pure Western transplantings +set in Eastern soil. Initiated by Western capital, they were wholly +controlled and managed by Western brains. Western capital could not +venture to entrust itself to Orientals, with their lack of the modern +industrial spirit, their habits of "squeeze" and nepotism, their lust +for quick returns, and their incapacity for sustained business +team-play. As time passed, however, the success of Western undertakings +so impressed Orientals that the more forward-looking among them were +ready to risk their money and to acquire the technique necessary for +success. At the close of Chapter II, I described the development of +modern business types in the Moslem world, and the same is true of the +non-Moslem populations of India. In India there were several elements +such as the Parsis and the Hindu "banyas," or money-lenders, whose +previous activities in commerce or usury predisposed them to financial +and industrial activity in the modern sense. From their ranks have +chiefly sprung the present-day native business communities of India, +exemplified by the jute and textile factories of Calcutta and Bombay, +and the great Tata iron-works of Bengal--undertakings financed by native +capital and wholly under native control. Of course, beside these +successes there have been many lamentable failures. Nevertheless, there +seems to be no doubt that Western industrialism is ceasing to be an +exotic and is rooting itself firmly in Eastern soil.[210] + +The combined result of Western and Eastern enterprise has been, as +already stated, the rise of important industrial centres at various +points in the Orient. In Egypt a French writer remarks: "Both banks of +the Nile are lined with factories, sugar-refineries and cotton-mills, +whose belching chimneys tower above the mud huts of the fellahs."[211] +And Sir Theodore Morison says of India: "In the city of Bombay the +industrial revolution has already been accomplished. Bombay is a modern +manufacturing city, where both the dark and the bright side of modern +industrialism strike the eye. Bombay has insanitary slums where +overcrowding is as great an evil as in any European city; she has a +proletariat which works long hours amid the din and whir of machinery; +she also has her millionaires, whose princely charities have adorned her +streets with beautiful buildings. Signs of lavish wealth and, let me +add, culture and taste in Bombay astonish the visitor from the inland +districts. The brown villages and never-ending fields with which he has +hitherto been familiar are the India which is passing away; Bombay is +the presage of the future."[212] + +The juxtaposition of vast natural resources and a limitless supply of +cheap labour has encouraged the most ambitious hopes in Oriental minds. +Some Orientals look to a combination of Western money and Eastern +man-power, expressed by an Indian economic writer in the formula: +"English money and Indian labour are the two cheapest things in the +world."[213] Others more ambitiously dream of industrializing the East +entirely by native effort, to the exclusion and even to the detriment +of the West. This view was well set forth some years ago by a Hindu, who +wrote in a leading Indian periodical:[214] "In one sense the Orient is +really menacing the West, and so earnest and open-minded is Asia that no +pretence or apology whatever is made about it. The Easterner has thrown +down the industrial gauntlet, and from now on Asia is destined to +witness a progressively intense trade warfare, the Occidental scrambling +to retain his hold on the markets of the East, and the Oriental +endeavouring to beat him in a battle in which heretofore he has been an +easy victor.... In competing with the Occidental commercialists, the +Oriental has awakened to a dynamic realization of the futility of +pitting unimproved machinery and methods against modern methods and +appliances. Casting aside his former sense of self-complacency, he is +studying the sciences and arts that have given the West its material +prosperity. He is putting the results of his investigations to practical +use, as a rule, recasting the Occidental methods to suit his peculiar +needs, and in some instances improving upon them." + +This statement of the spirit of the Orient's industrial awakening is +confirmed by many white observers. At the very moment when the above +article was penned, an American economic writer was making a study tour +of the Orient, of which he reported: "The real cause of Asia's poverty +lies in just two things: the failure of Asiatic governments to educate +their people, and the failure of the people to increase their productive +capacity by the use of machinery. Ignorance and lack of machinery are +responsible for Asia's poverty; knowledge and modern tools are +responsible for America's prosperity." But, continues this writer, we +must watch out. Asia now realizes these facts and is doing much to remedy +the situation. Hence, "we must face in ever-increasing degree the rivalry +of awakening peoples who are strong with the strength that comes from +struggle with poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to master +and apply all our secrets in the coming world-struggle for industrial +supremacy and for racial readjustment."[215] Another American observer of +Asiatic economic conditions reports: "All Asia is being permeated with +modern industry and present-day mechanical progress."[216] And Sir +Theodore Morison concludes regarding India's economic future: "India's +industrial transformation is near at hand; the obstacles which have +hitherto prevented the adoption of modern methods of manufacture have +been removed; means of transport have been spread over the face of the +whole country, capital for the purchase of machinery and erection of +factories may now be borrowed on easy terms; mechanics, engineers, and +business managers may be hired from Europe to train the future captains +of Indian industry; in English a common language has been found in which +to transact business with all the provinces of India and with a great +part of the Western world; security from foreign invasion and internal +commotion justifies the inception of large enterprises. All the +conditions are favourable for a great reorganization of industry which, +when successfully accomplished, will bring about an increase hitherto +undreamed of in India's annual output of wealth."[217] + +The factor usually relied upon to overcome the Orient's handicaps of +inexperience and inexpertness in industrialism is its cheap labour. To +Western observers the low wages and long hours of Eastern industry are +literally astounding. Take Egypt and India as examples of industrial +conditions in the Near and Middle East. Writing of Egypt in 1908, the +English economist H. N. Brailsford says: "There was then no Factory Act +in Egypt. There are all over the country ginning-mills, which employ +casual labour to prepare raw cotton for export during four or five +months of the year. The wages were low, from 7-1/2_d._ to 10_d._ (15 to +20 cents) a day for an adult, and 6_d._ (12 cents) for a child. Children +and adults alike worked sometimes for twelve, usually for fifteen, and +on occasion even for sixteen or eighteen hours a day. In the height of +the season even the children were put on night shifts of twelve +hours."[218] + +In India conditions are about the same. The first thorough investigation +of Indian industry was made in 1907 by a factory labour commission, and +the following are some of the data published in its report: In the +cotton-mills of Bombay the hours regularly worked ran from thirteen to +fourteen hours. In the jute-mills of Calcutta the operatives usually +worked fifteen hours. Cotton-ginning factories required their employees +to work seventeen and eighteen hours a day, rice and flour mills twenty +to twenty-two hours, and an extreme case was found in a printing works +where the men had to work twenty-two hours a day for seven consecutive +days. As to wages, an adult male operative, working from thirteen to +fifteen hours a day, received from 15 to 20 rupees a month ($5 to +$6.35). Child labour was very prevalent, children six and seven years +old working "half-time"--in many cases eight hours a day. As a result of +this report legislation was passed by the Indian Government bettering +working conditions somewhat, especially for women and children. But in +1914 the French economist Albert Metin, after a careful study, reported +factory conditions not greatly changed, the Factory Acts systematically +evaded, hours very long, and wages extremely low. In Bombay men were +earning from 10 cents to 20 cents per day, the highest wages being 30 +cents. For women and children the maximum was 10 cents per day.[219] + +With such extraordinarily low wages and long hours of labour it might at +first sight seem as though, given adequate capital and up-to-date +machinery, the Orient could not only drive Occidental products from +Eastern markets but might invade Western markets as well. This, indeed, +has been the fear of many Western writers. Nearly three-quarters of a +century ago Gobineau prophesied an industrial invasion of Europe from +Asia,[220] and of late years economists like H. N. Brailsford have +warned against an emigration of Western capital to the tempting lure of +factory conditions in Eastern lands.[221] Nevertheless, so far as the +Near and Middle East is concerned, nothing like this has as yet +materialized. China, to be sure, may yet have unpleasant surprises in +store for the West,[222] but neither the Moslem world nor India have +developed factory labour with the skill, stamina, and assiduity +sufficient to undercut the industrial workers of Europe and America. In +India, for example, despite a swarming and poverty-stricken population, +the factories are unable to recruit an adequate or dependable +labour-supply. Says M. Metin: "With such long hours and low wages it +might be thought that Indian industry would be a formidable competitor +of the West. This is not so. The reason is the bad quality of the work. +The poorly paid coolies are so badly fed and so weak that it takes at +least three of them to do the work of one European. Also, the Indian +workers lack not only strength but also skill, attention, and liking for +their work.... An Indian of the people will do anything else in +preference to becoming a factory operative. The factories thus get only +the dregs of the working class. The workers come to the factories and +mines as a last resort; they leave as soon as they can return to their +prior occupations or find a more remunerative employment. Thus the +factories can never count on a regular labour-supply. Would higher wages +remedy this? Many employers say no--as soon as the workers got a little +ahead they would quit, either temporarily till their money was spent, or +permanently for some more congenial calling."[223] These statements are +fully confirmed by an Indian economic writer, who says: "One of the +greatest drawbacks to the establishment of large industries in India is +the scarcity and inefficiency of labour. Cheap labour, where there is no +physical stamina, mental discipline, and skill behind it, tends to be +costly in the end. The Indian labourer is mostly uneducated. He is not +in touch with his employers or with his work. The labouring population +of the towns is a flitting, dilettante population."[224] + +Thus Indian industry, despite its very considerable growth, has not come +up to early expectations. As the official Year-Book very frankly states: +"India, in short, is a country rich in raw materials and in industrial +possibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishments."[225] In fact, +to some observers, India's industrial future seems far from bright. As a +competent English student of Indian conditions recently wrote: "Some +years ago it seemed possible that India might, by a rapid assimilation +of Western knowledge and technical skill, adapt for her own conditions +the methods of modern industry, and so reach an approximate economic +level. Some even now threaten the Western world with a vision of the +vast populations of China and India rising up with skilled organization, +vast resources, and comparatively cheap labour to impoverish the West. +To the present writer this is a mere bogey. The peril is of a very +different kind. Instead of a growing approximation, he sees a growing +disparity. For every step India takes toward mechanical efficiency, the +West takes two. When India is beginning to use bicycles and motor-cars +(not to make them), the West is perfecting the aeroplane. That is merely +symbolic. The war, as we know, has speeded up mechanical invention and +produced a population of mechanics; but India has stood comparatively +still. It is, up to now, overwhelmingly mediaeval, a country of domestic +industry and handicrafts. Mechanical power, even of the simplest, has +not yet been applied to its chief industry--agriculture. Yet the period +of age-long isolation is over, and India can never go back to it; +nevertheless, the gap between East and West is widening. What is to be +the outcome for her 300 millions? We are in danger in the East of seeing +the worst evils of commercialism developed on an enormous scale, with +the vast population of India the victims--of seeing the East become a +world slum."[226] + +Whether or not this pessimistic outlook is justified, certain it is that +not merely India but the entire Orient is in a stage of profound +transition; and transition periods are always painful times. We have +been considering the new industrial proletariat of the towns. But the +older social classes are affected in very similar fashion. The old-type +handicraftsman and small merchant are obviously menaced by modern +industrial and business methods, and the peasant masses are in little +better shape. It is not merely a change in technique but a fundamental +difference in outlook on life that is involved. The life of the old +Orient, while there was much want and hardship, was an easygoing life, +with virtually no thought of such matters as time, efficiency, output, +and "turnover." The merchant sat cross-legged in his little booth amid +his small stock of wares, passively waiting for trade, chaffering +interminably with his customers, annoyed rather than pleased if brisk +business came his way. The artisan usually worked by and for himself, +keeping his own hours and knocking off whenever he chose. The peasant +arose with the dawn, but around noon he and his animals lay down for a +long nap and slept until, in the cool of afternoon, they awoke, +stretched themselves, and, comfortably and casually, went to work again. + +To such people the speed, system, and discipline of our economic life +are painfully repugnant, and adaptation can at best be effected only +very slowly and under the compulsion of the direst necessity. Meanwhile +they suffer from the competition of those better equipped in the +economic battle. Sir William Ramsay paints a striking picture of the way +in which the Turkish population of Asia Minor, from landlords and +merchants to simple peasants, have been going down-hill for the last +half-century under the economic pressure not merely of Westerners but of +the native Christian elements, Armenians and Greeks, who had partially +assimilated Western business ideas and methods. Under the old state of +things, he says, there was in Asia Minor "no economic progress and no +mercantile development; things went on in the old fashion, year after +year. Such simple business as was carried on was inconsistent with the +highly developed Western business system and Western civilization; but +it was not oppressive to the people. There were no large fortunes; there +was no opportunity for making a great fortune; it was impossible for one +man to force into his service the minds and the work of a large number +of people, and so to create a great organization out of which he might +make big profits. There was a very large number of small men doing +business on a small scale."[227] Sir William Ramsay then goes on to +describe the shattering of this archaic economic life by modern business +methods, to the consequent impoverishment of all classes of the +unadaptable Turkish population. + +How the agricultural classes, peasants and landlords alike, are +suffering from changing economic conditions is well exemplified by the +recent history of India. Says the French writer Chailley, an +authoritative student of Indian problems: "For the last half-century +large fractions of the agricultural classes are being entirely despoiled +of their lands or reduced to onerous tenancies. On the other hand, new +classes are rising and taking their place.... Both ryots and +zamindars[228] are involved. The old-type nobility has not advanced with +the times. It remains idle and prodigal, while the peasant proprietors, +burdened by the traditions of many centuries, are likewise improvident +and ignorant. On the other hand, the economic conditions of British +India are producing capitalists who seek employment for their wealth. A +conflict between them and the old landholders was predestined, and the +result was inevitable. Wealth goes to the cleverest, and the land must +pass into the hands of new masters, to the great indignation of the +agricultural classes, a portion of whom will be reduced to the position +of farm-labourers."[229] + +The Hindu economist Mukerjee thus depicts the disintegration and decay +of the Indian village: "New economic ideas have now begun to influence +the minds of the villagers. Some are compelled to leave their +occupations on account of foreign competition, but more are leaving +their hereditary occupations of their own accord. The Brahmins go to the +cities to seek government posts or professional careers. The middle +classes also leave their villages and get scattered all over the country +to earn a living. The peasants also leave their ancestral acres and form +a class of landless agricultural labourers. The villages, drained of +their best blood, stagnate and decay. The movement from the village to +the city is in fact not only working a complete revolution in the +habits and ideals of our people, but its economic consequences are far +more serious than are ordinarily supposed. It has made our middle +classes helplessly subservient to employment and service, and has also +killed the independence of our peasant proprietors. It has jeopardized +our food-supply, and is fraught with the gravest peril not only to our +handicrafts but also to our national industry--agriculture."[230] + +Happily there are signs that, in Indian agriculture at least, the +transition period is working itself out and that conditions may soon be +on the mend. Both the British Government and the native princes have +vied with one another in spreading Western agricultural ideas and +methods, and since the Indian peasant has proved much more receptive +than has the Indian artisan, a more intelligent type of farmer is +developing, better able to keep step with the times. A good instance is +the growth of rural co-operative credit societies. First introduced by +the British Government in 1904, there were in 1915 more than 17,000 such +associations, with a total of 825,000 members and a working capital of +nearly $30,000,000. These agricultural societies make loans for the +purchase of stock, fodder, seed, manure, sinking of wells, purchase of +Western agricultural machinery, and, in emergencies, personal +maintenance. In the districts where they have established themselves +they have greatly diminished the plague of usury practised by the +"banyas," or village money-lenders, lowering the rate of interest from +its former crushing range of 20 to 75 per cent. to a range averaging +from 9 to 18 per cent. Of course such phenomena are as yet merely +exceptions to a very dreary rule. Nevertheless, they all point toward a +brighter morrow.[231] + +But this brighter agricultural morrow is obviously far off, and in +industry it seems to be farther still. Meanwhile the changing Orient is +full of suffering and discontent. What wonder that many Orientals +ascribe their troubles, not to the process of economic transition, but +to the political control of European governments and the economic +exploitation of Western capital. The result is agitation for +emancipation from Western economic as well as Western political control. +At the end of Chapter II we examined the movement among the Mohammedan +peoples known as "Economic Pan-Islamism." A similar movement has arisen +among the Hindus of India--the so-called "Swadeshi" movement. The +Swadeshists declare that India's economic ills are almost entirely due +to the "drain" of India's wealth to England and other Western lands. +They therefore advocate a boycott of English goods until Britain grants +India self-government, whereupon they propose to erect protective +tariffs for Indian products, curb the activities of British capital, +replace high-salaried English officials by natives, and thereby keep +India's wealth at home.[232] + +An analysis of these Swadeshist arguments, however, reveals them as +inadequate to account for India's ills, which are due far more to the +general economic trend of the times than to any specific defects of the +British connection. British governance and British capital do cost +money, but their undoubted efficiency in producing peace, order, +security, and development must be considered as offsets to the higher +costs which native rule and native capital would impose. As Sir Theodore +Morison well says: "The advantages which the British Navy and British +credit confer on India are a liberal offset to her expenditure on +pensions and gratuities to her English servants.... India derives a +pecuniary advantage from her connection with the British Empire. The +answer, then, which I give to the question 'What economic equivalent +does India get for foreign payments?' is this: India gets the equipment +of modern industry, and she gets an administration favourable to +economic evolution cheaper than she could provide it herself."[233] A +comparison with Japan's much more costly defence budgets, inferior +credit, and higher interest charges on both public and private loans is +enlightening on this point. + +In fact, some Indians themselves admit the fallacy of Swadeshist +arguments. As one of them remarks: "The so-called economic 'drain' is +nonsense. Most of the misery of late years is due to the rising cost of +living--a world-wide phenomenon." And in proof of this he cites +conditions in other Oriental countries, especially Japan.[234] As warm a +friend of the Indian people as the British labour leader, Ramsay +Macdonald, states: "One thing is quite evident, a tariff will not +re-establish the old hand-industry of India nor help to revive village +handicrafts. Factory and machine production, native to India itself, +will throttle them as effectively as that of Lancashire and Birmingham +has done in the past."[235] + +Even more trenchant are the criticisms formulated by the Hindu writer +Pramatha Nath Bose.[236] The "drain," says Mr. Bose, is ruining India. +But would the Home Rule programme, as envisaged by most Swadeshists, +cure India's economic ills? Under Home Rule these people would do the +following things: (1) Substitute Englishmen for Indians in the +Administration; (2) levy protective duties on Indian products; (3) grant +State encouragement to Indian industries; (4) disseminate technical +education. Now, how would these matters work out? The substitution of +Indian for British officials would not lessen the "drain" as much as +most Home Rulers think. The high-placed Indian officials who already +exist have acquired European standards of living, so the new official +corps would cost almost as much as the old. Also, "the influence of the +example set by the well-to-do Indian officials would permeate Indian +society more largely than at present, and the demand for Western +articles would rise in proportion. So commercial exploitation by +foreigners would not only continue almost as if they were Europeans, but +might even increase." As to a protective tariff, it would attract +European capital to India which would exploit labour and skim the +profits. India has shown relatively little capacity for indigenous +industrial development. Of course, even at low wages, many Indians might +benefit, yet such persons would form only a tithe of the millions now +starving--besides the fact that this industrialization would bring in +many new social evils. As to State encouragement of industries, this +would bring in Western capital even more than a protective tariff, with +the results already stated. As for technical education, it is a worthy +project, but, says Mr. Bose, "I am afraid the movement is too late, now. +Within the last thirty years the Westerners and the Japanese have gone +so far ahead of us industrially that it has been yearly becoming more +and more difficult to compete with them." + +In fact, Mr. Bose goes on to criticize the whole system of Western +education, as applied to India. Neither higher nor lower education have +proven panaceas. "Higher education has led to the material prosperity +of a small section of our community, comprising a few thousands of +well-to-do lawyers, doctors, and State servants. But their occupations +being of a more or less unproductive or parasitic character, their +well-being does not solve the problem of the improvement of India as a +whole. On the contrary, as their taste for imported articles develops in +proportion to their prosperity, they help to swell rather than diminish +the economic drain from the country which is one of the chief causes of +our impoverishment." Neither has elementary education "on the whole +furthered the well-being of the multitude. It has not enabled the +cultivators to 'grow two blades where one grew before.' On the contrary, +it has distinctly diminished their efficiency by inculcating in the +literate proletariat, who constitute the cream of their class, a strong +distaste for their hereditary mode of living and their hereditary +callings, and an equally strong taste for shoddy superfluities and +brummagem fineries, and for occupations of a more or less parasitic +character. They have, directly or indirectly, accelerated rather than +retarded the decadence of indigenous industries, and have thus helped to +aggravate their own economic difficulties and those of the entire +community. What they want is more food--and New India vies with the +Government in giving them what is called 'education' that does not +increase their food-earning capacity, but on the contrary fosters in +them tastes and habits which make them despise indigenous products and +render them fit subjects for the exploitation of scheming capitalists, +mostly foreign. Political and economic causes could not have led to the +extinction of indigenous industry if they had not been aided by change +of taste fostered by the Western environment of which the so-called +'education' is a powerful factor." + +From all this Mr. Bose concludes that none of the reforms advocated by +the Home Rulers would cure India's ills. "In fact, the chances are, she +would be more inextricably entangled in the toils of Western +civilization, without any adequate compensating advantage, and the grip +of the West would close on her to crush her more effectively." +Therefore, according to Mr. Bose, the only thing for India to do is to +turn her back on everything Western and plunge resolutely into the +traditional past. As he expresses it: "India's salvation lies, not in +the region of politics, but outside it; not in aspiring to be one of the +'great' nations of the present day, but in retiring to her humble +position--a position, to my mind, of solitary grandeur and glory; not in +going forward on the path of Western civilization, but in going back +from it so far as practicable; not in getting more and more entangled in +the silken meshes of its finely knit, widespread net, but in escaping +from it as far as possible." + +Such are the drastic conclusions of Mr. Bose; conclusions shared to a +certain extent by other Indian idealists like Rabindranath Tagore. But +surely such projects, however idealistic, are the vainest fantasies. +Whole peoples cannot arbitrarily cut themselves off from the rest of the +world, like isolated individuals forswearing society and setting up as +anchorites in the jungle. The time for "hermit nations" has passed, +especially for a vast country like India, set at the cross-roads of the +East, open to the sea, and already profoundly penetrated by Western +ideas. + +Nevertheless, such criticisms, appealing as they do to the strong strain +of asceticism latent in the Indian nature, have affected many Indians +who, while unable to concur in the conclusions, still try to evolve a +"middle term," retaining everything congenial in the old system and +grafting on a select set of Western innovations. Accordingly, these +persons have elaborated programmes for a "new order" built on a blend of +Hindu mysticism, caste, Western industry, and socialism.[237] + +Now these schemes are highly ingenious. But they are not convincing. +Their authors should remember the old adage that you cannot eat your +cake and have it too. When we realize the abysmal antithesis between the +economic systems of the old East and the modern West, any attempt to +combine the most congenial points of both while eschewing their defects +seems an attempt to reconcile irreconcilables and about as profitable as +trying to square the circle. As Lowes Dickinson wisely observes: +"Civilization is a whole. Its art, its religion, its way of life, all +hang together with its economic and technical development. I doubt +whether a nation can pick and choose; whether, for instance, the East +can say, 'We will take from the West its battleships, its factories, its +medical science; we will not take its social confusion, its hurry and +fatigue, its ugliness, its over-emphasis on activity.'... So I expect +the East to follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these +excesses, and to go right through, not round, all that we have been +through on its way to a higher phase of civilization."[238] + +This seems to be substantially true. Judged by the overwhelming body of +evidence, the East, in its contemporary process of transformation, will +follow the West--avoiding some of our more patent mistakes, perhaps, +but, in the main, proceeding along similar lines. And, as already +stated, this transformation is modifying every phase of Eastern life. We +have already examined the process at work in the religious, political, +and economic phases. To the social phase let us now turn. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[206] F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 53 (New York, 1920). + +[207] Rev. A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," _The Century_, +March, 1904. + +[208] _I. e._ the purveyor of the native vegetable-oils. + +[209] R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations of Indian Economics_, p. 5 (London, +1916). + +[210] On these points, see Fisher, _op. cit._; Sir T. Morison, _The +Economic Transition in India_ (London, 1911); Sir Valentine Chirol, +_Indian Unrest_ (London, 1910); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in +India," _Economic Journal_, December, 1910; J. P. Jones, "The Present +Situation in India," _Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910. + +[211] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 20-21 (Paris, 1910). + +[212] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, p. 181. + +[213] Quoted by Jones, _supra_. + +[214] _The Indian Review_ (Madras), 1910. + +[215] Clarence Poe, "What the Orient can Teach Us," _World's Work_, +July, 1911. + +[216] C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, p. 5 (New York, +1914). + +[217] Morison, _op. cit._, p. 242. + +[218] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, p. 114 (London, +1915). + +[219] A. Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, p. 336 (Paris, +1918). + +[220] In his book, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, 1858). + +[221] Brailsford, _op. cit._, pp. 83, 114-115. + +[222] Regarding conditions in China, especially the extraordinary +discipline and working ability of the Chinaman, see my _Rising Tide of +Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 28-30, 243-251. + +[223] Metin, _op. cit._, p. 337. + +[224] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, p. 183 (London, 1907). + +[225] "India in the Years 1917-1918" (official publication--Calcutta). + +[226] Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_, pp. 15-17 (London, 1920). + +[227] Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," _Quarterly +Review_, January, 1918. + +[228] _I. e._ peasants and landlords. + +[229] J. Chailley _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339 +(London, 1910--English translation). + +[230] Mukerjee, _op. cit._, p. 9. + +[231] On the co-operative movement in India, see Fisher, _India's Silent +Revolution_, pp. 54-58; R. B. Ewebank, "The Co-operative Movement in +India," _Quarterly Review_, April, 1916. India's economic problems, both +agricultural and industrial, have been carefully studied by a large +number of Indian economists, some of whose writings are extremely +interesting. Some of the most noteworthy books, besides those of +Mukerjee and Yusuf Ali, already quoted, are: Dadabhai Naoroji, _Poverty +and Un-British Rule in India_ (London, 1901); Romesh Dutt, _The Economic +History of India in the Victorian Age_ (London, 1906); H. H. Gosh, _The +Advancement of Industry_ (Calcutta, 1910); P. C. Ray, _The Poverty +Problem in India_ (Calcutta, 1895); M. G. Ranade, _Essays on Indian +Economics_ (Madras, 1920); Jadunath Sarkar, _Economics of British India_ +(Calcutta, 1911). + +[232] The best compendium of Swadeshist opinion is the volume containing +pronouncements from all the Swadeshi leaders, entitled, _The Swadeshi +Movement: A Symposium_ (Madras, 1910). See also writings of the +economists Gosh, Mukerjee, Ray, and Sarkar, above quoted, as well as the +various writings of the nationalist agitator Lajpat Rai. A good summary +interpretation is found in M. Glotz, "Le Mouvement 'Swadeshi' dans +l'Inde," _Revue du Mois_, July, 1913. + +[233] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, pp. 240-241. +Also see Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_, pp. 255-279; William +Archer, _India and the Future_, pp. 131-157. + +[234] Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, _India of To-day_, p. 19 (Bombay, 1908). + +[235] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, p. 133 (London, +1920). + +[236] In _The Hindustan Review_ (Calcutta), 1917. + +[237] Good examples are found in the writings of Mukerjee and Lajpat +Rai, already quoted. + +[238] G. Lowes Dickinson, _An Essay on the Civilizations of India, +China, and Japan_, pp. 84-85 (London, 1914). + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +SOCIAL CHANGE + + +The momentous nature of the contemporary transformation of the Orient is +nowhere better attested than by the changes effected in the lives of its +peoples. That dynamic influence of the West which is modifying +governmental forms, political concepts, religious beliefs, and economic +processes is proving equally potent in the range of social phenomena. In +the third chapter of this volume we attempted a general survey of +Western influence along all the above lines. In the present chapter we +shall attempt a detailed consideration of the social changes which are +to-day taking place. + +These social changes are very great, albeit many of them may not be so +apparent as the changes in other fields. So firm is the hold of custom +and tradition on individual, family, and group life in the Orient that +superficial observers of the East are prone to assert that these matters +are still substantially unaltered, however pronounced may have been the +changes on the external, material side. Yet such is not the opinion of +the closest students of the Orient, and it is most emphatically not the +opinion of Orientals themselves. These generally stress the profound +social changes which are going on. + +And it is their judgments which seem to be the more correct. To say that +the East is advancing "materially" but standing still "socially" is to +ignore the elemental truth that social systems are altered quite as much +by material things as by abstract ideas. Who that looks below the +surface can deny the social, moral, and civilizing power of railroads, +post-offices, and telegraph lines? Does it mean nothing socially as well +as materially that the East is adopting from the West a myriad +innovations, weighty and trivial, important and frivolous, useful and +baneful? Does it mean nothing socially as well as materially that the +Prophet's tomb at Medina is lit by electricity and that picture +post-cards are sold outside the Holy Kaaba at Mecca? It may seem mere +grotesque piquancy that the muezzin should ride to the mosque in a +tram-car, or that the Moslem business man should emerge from his harem, +read his morning paper, motor to an office equipped with a prayer-rug, +and turn from his devotions to dictaphone and telephone. Yet why assume +that his life is moulded by mosque, harem, and prayer-rug, and yet deny +the things of the West a commensurate share in the shaping of his social +existence? Now add to these tangible innovations intangible novelties +like scientific education, Occidental amusements, and the partial +emancipation of women, and we begin to get some idea of the depth and +scope of the social transformation which is going on. + +In those parts of the Orient most open to Western influences this social +transformation has attained notable proportions for more than a +generation. When the Hungarian Orientalist Vambery returned to +Constantinople in 1896 after forty years' absence, he stood amazed at +the changes which had taken place, albeit Constantinople was then +subjected to the worst repression of the Hamidian regime. "I had," he +writes, "continually to ask myself this question: Is it possible that +these are my Turks of 1856; and how can all these transformations have +taken place? I was astonished at the aspect of the city; at the stone +buildings which had replaced the old wooden ones; at the animation of +the streets, in which carriages and tram-cars abounded, whereas forty +years before only saddle-animals were used; and when the strident shriek +of the locomotive mingled with the melancholy calls from the minarets, +all that I saw and heard seemed to me a living protest against the old +adage: 'La bidaat fil Islam'--'There is nothing to reform in Islam.' My +astonishment became still greater when I entered the houses and was able +to appreciate the people, not only by their exteriors but still more by +their manner of thought. The effendi class[239] of Constantinople seemed +to me completely transformed in its conduct, outlook, and attitude +toward foreigners."[240] + +Vambery stresses the inward as well as outward evolution of the Turkish +educated classes, for he says: "Not only in his outward aspect, but also +in his home-life, the present-day Turk shows a strong inclination to the +manners and habits of the West, in such varied matters as furniture, +table-manners, sex-relations, and so forth. This is of the very greatest +significance. For a people may, to be sure, assimilate foreign +influences in the intellectual field, if it be persuaded of their +utility and advantage; but it gives up with more difficulty customs and +habits which are in the blood. One cannot over-estimate the numerous +sacrifices which, despite everything, the Turks have made in this line. +I find all Turkish society, even the Mollahs,[241] penetrated with the +necessity of a union with Western civilization. Opinions may differ as +to the method of assimilation: some wish to impress on the foreign +civilization a national character; others, on the contrary, are +partisans of our intellectual culture, such as it is, and reprobate any +kind of modification."[242] + +Most significant of all, Vambery found even the secluded women of the +harems, "those bulwarks of obscurantism," notably changed. "Yes, I +repeat, the life of women in Turkey seems to me to have been radically +transformed in the last forty years, and it cannot be denied that this +transformation has been produced by internal conviction as much as by +external pressure." Noting the spread of female education, and the +increasing share of women in reform movements, Vambery remarks: "This is +of vital importance, for when women shall begin to act in the family as +a factor of modern progress, real reforms, in society as well as in the +state, cannot fail to appear."[243] + +In India a similar permeation of social life by Westernism is depicted +by the Moslem liberal, S. Khuda Bukhsh, albeit Mr. Bukhsh, being an +insider, lays greater emphasis upon the painful aspects of the +inevitable transition process from old to new. He is not unduly +pessimistic, for he recognizes that "the age of transition is +necessarily to a certain extent an age of laxity of morals, indifference +to religion, superficial culture, and gossiping levity. These are +passing ills which time itself will cure." Nevertheless, he does not +minimize the critical aspects of the present situation, which implies +nothing less than the breakdown of the old social system. "The clearest +result of this breakdown of our old system of domestic life and social +customs under the assault of European ideas," he says, "is to be found +in two directions--in our religious beliefs and in our social life. The +old system, with all its faults, had many redeeming virtues." To-day +this old system, narrow-minded but God-fearing, has been replaced by a +"strange independence of thought and action. Reverence for age, respect +for our elders, deference to the opinions of others, are fast +disappearing.... Under the older system the head of the family was the +sole guide and friend of its members. His word had the force of law. He +was, so to speak, the custodian of the honour and prestige of the +family. From this exalted position he is now dislodged, and the most +junior member now claims equality with him."[244] + +Mr. Bukhsh deplores the current wave of extravagance, due to the +wholesale adoption of European customs and modes of living. "What," he +asks, "has happened here in India? We have adopted European costume, +European ways of living, even the European vices of drinking and +gambling, but none of their virtues. This must be remedied. We must +learn at the feet of Europe, but not at the sacrifice of our Eastern +individuality. But this is precisely what we have not done. We have +dabbled a little in English and European history, and we have commenced +to despise our religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. We +have unlearned the lessons of our history and our civilization, and in +their place we have secured nothing solid and substantial to hold +society fast in the midst of endless changes." In fine: "Destruction has +done its work, but the work of construction has not yet begun."[245] + +Like Vambery, Bukhsh lays strong emphasis on the increasing emancipation +of women. No longer regarded as mere "child-bearing machines," the +Mohammedan women of India "are getting educated day by day, and now +assert their rights. Though the purdah system[246] still prevails, it is +no longer that severe, stringent, and unreasonable seclusion of women +which existed fifty years ago. It is gradually relaxing, and women are +getting, step by step, rights and liberties which must in course of time +end in the complete emancipation of Eastern womanhood. Forty years ago +women meekly submitted to neglect, indifference, and even harsh +treatment from their husbands, but such is the case no longer."[247] + +These two descriptions of social conditions in the Near and Middle East +respectively enable one to get a fair idea of the process of change +which is going on. Of course it must not be forgotten that both writers +deal primarily with the educated upper classes of the large towns. +Nevertheless, the leaven is working steadily downward, and with every +decade is affecting wider strata of the native populations. + +The spread of Western education in the East during the past few decades +has been truly astonishing, because it is the exact antithesis of the +Oriental educational system. The traditional "education" of the entire +Orient, from Morocco to China, was a mere memorizing of sacred texts +combined with exercises of religious devotion. The Mohammedan or Hindu +student spent long years reciting to his master (a "holy man") +interminable passages from books which, being written in classic Arabic +or Sanskrit, were unintelligible to him, so that he usually did not +understand a word of what he was saying. No more deadening system for +the intellect could possibly have been devised. Every part of the brain +except the memory atrophied, and the wonder is that any intellectual +initiative or original thinking ever appeared. + +Even to-day the old system persists, and millions of young Orientals are +still wasting their time at this mind-petrifying nonsense. But alongside +the old there has arisen a new system, running the whole educational +gamut from kindergartens to universities, where Oriental youth is being +educated along Western lines. These new-type educational establishments +are of every kind. Besides schools and universities giving a liberal +education and fitting students for government service or the +professions, there are numerous technical schools turning out skilled +agriculturists or engineers, while good normal schools assure a supply +of teachers qualified to instruct coming student-generations. Both +public and private effort furthers Western education in the East. All +the European governments have favoured Western education in the lands +under their control, particularly the British in India and Egypt, while +various Christian missionary bodies have covered the East with a +network of schools and colleges. Also many Oriental governments like +Turkey and the native states of India have made sincere efforts to +spread Western education among their peoples.[248] + +Of course, as in any new development, the results so far obtained are +far from ideal. The vicious traditions of the past handicap or partially +pervert the efforts of the present. Eastern students are prone to use +their memories rather than their intellects, and seek to cram their way +quickly through examinations to coveted posts rather than acquire +knowledge and thus really fit themselves for their careers. The result +is that many fail, and these unfortunates, half-educated and spoiled for +any sort of useful occupation, vegetate miserably, come to hate that +Westernism which they do not understand, and give themselves up to +anarchistic revolutionary agitation. Sir Alfred Lyall well describes the +dark side of Western education in the East when he says of India: +"Ignorance is unquestionably the root of many evils; and it was natural +that in the last century certain philosophers should have assumed +education to be a certain cure for human delusions; and that statesmen +like Macaulay should have declared education to be the best and surest +remedy for political discontent and for law-breaking. In any case, it +was the clear and imperative duty of the British Government to attempt +the intellectual emancipation of India as the best justification of +British rule. We have since discovered by experience, that, although +education is a sovereign remedy for many ills--is indeed indispensable +to healthy progress--yet an indiscriminate or superficial administration +of this potent medicine may engender other disorders. It acts upon the +frame of an antique society as a powerful dissolvent, heating weak +brains, stimulating rash ambitions, raising inordinate expectations of +which the disappointment is bitterly resented."[249] + +Indeed, some Western observers of the Orient, particularly colonial +officials, have been so much impressed by the political and social +dangers arising from the existence of this "literate proletariat" of +semi-educated failures that they are tempted to condemn the whole +venture of Western education in the East as a mistake. Lord Cromer, for +example, was decidedly sceptical of the worth of the Western-educated +Egyptian,[250] while a prominent Anglo-Indian official names as the +chief cause of Indian unrest, "the system of education, which we +ourselves introduced--advisedly so far as the limited vision went of +those responsible; blindly in view of the inevitable consequences."[251] + +Yet these pessimistic judgments do not seem to make due allowance for +the inescapable evils attendant on any transition stage. Other observers +of the Orient have made due allowance for this factor. Vambery, for +instance, notes the high percentage of honest and capable native +officials in the British Indian and French North African civil service +(the bulk of these officials, of course, Western-educated men), and +concludes: "Strictly conservative Orientals, and also fanatically +inclined Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture the +primitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed, and that the +uncivilized Oriental was more faithful, more honest, and more reliable +than the Asiatic educated on European principles. This is a gross error. +It may be true of the half-educated, but not of the Asiatic in whose +case the intellectual evolution is founded on the solid basis of a +thorough, systematic education."[252] + +And, whatever may be the ills attendant upon Western education in the +East, is it not the only practicable course to pursue? The impact of +Westernism upon the Orient is too ubiquitous to be confined to books. +Granting, therefore, for the sake of argument, that colonial governments +could have prevented Western education in the formal sense, would not +the Oriental have learned in other ways? Surely it is better that he +should learn through good texts under the supervision of qualified +teachers, rather than tortuously in perverted--and more +dangerous--fashion. + +The importance of Western education in the East is nowhere better +illustrated than in the effects it is producing in ameliorating the +status of women. The depressed condition of women throughout the Orient +is too well known to need elaboration. Bad enough in Mohammedan +countries, it is perhaps at its worst among the Hindus of India, with +child-marriage, the virtual enslavement of widows (burned alive till +prohibited by English law), and a seclusion more strict even than that +of the "harem" of Moslem lands. As an English writer well puts it: +"'Ladies first,' we say in the West; in the East it is 'ladies last.' +That sums up succinctly the difference in the domestic ideas of the two +civilizations."[253] + +Under these circumstances it might seem as though no breath of the West +could yet have reached these jealously secluded creatures. Yet, as a +matter of fact, Western influences have already profoundly affected the +women of the upper classes, and female education, while far behind that +of the males, has attained considerable proportions. In the more +advanced parts of the Orient like Constantinople, Cairo, and the cities +of India, distinctly "modern" types of women have appeared, the +self-supporting, self-respecting--and respected--woman school-teacher +being especially in evidence. + +The social consequences of this rising status of women, not only to +women themselves but also to the community at large, are very important. +In the East the harem is, as Vambery well says, the "bulwark of +obscurantism."[254] Ignorant and fanatical herself, the harem woman +implants her ignorance and fanaticism in her sons as well as in her +daughters. What could be a worse handicap for the Eastern "intellectual" +than his boyhood years spent "behind the veil"? No wonder that +enlightened Oriental fathers have been in the habit of sending their +boys to school at the earliest possible age in order to get them as soon +as possible out of the stultifying atmosphere of harem life. Yet even +this has proved merely a palliative. Childhood impressions are ever the +most lasting, and so long as one-half of the Orient remained untouched +by progressive influences Oriental progress had to be begun again _de +novo_ with every succeeding generation. + +The increasing number of enlightened Oriental women is remedying this +fatal defect. As a Western writer well says: "Give the mothers education +and the whole situation is transformed. Girls who are learning other +things than the unintelligible phrases of the Koran are certain to +impart such knowledge, as daughters, sisters, and mothers, to their +respective households. Women who learn housewifery, methods of modern +cooking, sewing, and sanitation in the domestic-economy schools, are +bound to cast about the home upon their return the atmosphere of a +civilized community. The old-time picture of the Oriental woman spending +her hours upon divans, eating sweetmeats, and indulging in petty and +degrading gossip with the servants, or with women as ignorant as +herself, will be changed. The new woman will be a companion rather than +a slave or a toy of her husband. Marriage will advance from the stage of +a paltry trade in bodies to something like a real union, involving +respect towards the woman by both sons and fathers, while in a new pride +of relationship the woman herself will be discovered."[255] + +These men and women of the newer Orient reflect their changing ideas in +their changing standards of living. Although this is most evident among +the wealthier elements of the towns, it is perceptible in all classes of +the population. Rich and poor, urban and rural, the Orientals are +altering their living standards towards those of the West. And this +involves social changes of the most far-reaching character, because few +antitheses could be sharper than the living conditions prevailing +respectively in the traditional East and in the modern Western world. +This basic difference lies, not in wealth (the East, like the West, +knows great riches as well as great poverty), but rather in +_comfort_--using the word in its broad sense. The wealthy Oriental of +the old school spends most of his money on Oriental luxuries, like fine +raiment, jewels, women, horses, and a great retinue of attendants, and +then hoards the rest. But of "comfort," in the Western sense, he knows +virtually nothing, and it is safe to say that he lives under domestic +conditions which a Western artisan would despise.[256] + +To-day, however, the Oriental is discovering "comfort." And, high or +low, he likes it very well. All the myriad things which make our lives +easier and more agreeable--lamps, electric light, sewing-machines, +clocks, whisky, umbrellas, sanitary plumbing, and a thousand others: all +these things, which to us are more or less matters of course, are to the +Oriental so many delightful discoveries, of irresistible appeal. He +wants them, and he gets them in ever-increasing quantities. But this +produces some rather serious complications. His private economy is more +or less thrown out of gear. This opening of a whole vista of new wants +means a portentous rise in his standard of living. And where is he going +to find the money to pay for it? If he be poor, he has to skimp on his +bare necessities. If he be rich, he hates to forgo his traditional +luxuries. The upshot is a universal growth of extravagance. And, in this +connection, it is well to bear in mind that the peoples of the Near and +Middle East, taken as a whole, have never been really thrifty. Poor the +masses may have been, and thus obliged to live frugally, but they have +always proved themselves "good spenders" when opportunity offers. The +way in which a Turkish peasant or a Hindu ryot will squander his savings +and run into debt over festivals, marriages, funerals, and other social +events is astounding to Western observers.[257] Now add to all this the +fact that in the Orient, as in the rest of the world, the cost of the +basic necessaries of life--food, clothing, fuel, and shelter, has risen +greatly during the past two decades, and we can realize the gravity of +the problem which higher Oriental living-standards involves.[258] + +Certain it is that the struggle for existence is growing keener and that +the pressure of poverty is getting more severe. With the basic +necessaries rising in price, and with many things considered necessities +which were considered luxuries or entirely unheard of a generation ago, +the Oriental peasant or town working-man is finding it harder and harder +to make both ends meet. As one writer well phrases it: "These altered +economic conditions have not as yet brought the ability to meet them. +The cost of living has increased faster than the resources of the +people."[259] + +One of the main (though not sufficiently recognized) causes of the +economic-social crisis through which the Orient is to-day passing is +over-population. The quick breeding tendencies of Oriental peoples have +always been proverbial, and have been due not merely to strong sexual +appetites but also to economic reasons like the harsh exploitation of +women and children, and perhaps even more to religious doctrines +enjoining early marriage and the begetting of numerous sons. As a +result, Oriental populations have always pressed close upon the limits +of subsistence. In the past, however, this pressure was automatically +lightened by factors like war, misgovernment, pestilence, and famine, +which swept off such multitudes of people that, despite high +birth-rates, populations remained at substantially a fixed level. But +here, as in every other phase of Eastern life, Western influences have +radically altered the situation. The extension of European political +control over Eastern lands has meant the putting down of internal +strife, the diminution of governmental abuses, the decrease of disease, +and the lessening of the blight of famine. In other words, those +"natural" checks which previously kept down the population have been +diminished or abolished, and in response to the life-saving activities +of the West, the enormous death-rate which in the past has kept Oriental +populations from excessive multiplication is falling to proportions +comparable with the low death-rate of Western nations. But to lower the +Orient's prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. As a matter of +fact, that birth-rate keeps up with undiminished vigour, and the +consequence has been a portentous increase of population in nearly every +portion of the Orient under Western political control. In fact, even +those Oriental countries which have maintained their independence have +more or less adopted Western life-conserving methods, and have +experienced in greater or less degree an accelerated increase of +population. + +The phenomena of over-population are best seen in India. Most of India +has been under British control for the greater part of a century. Even a +century ago, India was densely populated, yet in the intervening +hundred years the population has increased between two and three +fold.[260] Of course, factors like improved agriculture, irrigation, +railways, and the introduction of modern industry enable India to +support a much larger population than it could have done at the time of +the British Conquest. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that excessive +multiplication has taken place. Nearly all qualified students of the +problem concur on this point. Forty years ago the Duke of Argyll stated: +"Where there is no store, no accumulation, no wealth; where the people +live from hand to mouth from season to season on a low diet; and where, +nevertheless, they breed and multiply at such a rate; there we can at +least see that this power and force of multiplication is no evidence +even of safety, far less of comfort." Towards the close of the last +century, Sir William Hunter termed population India's "fundamental +problem," and continued: "The result of civilized rule in India has been +to produce a strain on the food-producing powers of the country such as +it had never before to bear. It has become a truism of Indian statistics +that the removal of the old cruel checks on population in an Asiatic +country is by no means an unmixed blessing to an Asiatic people."[261] +Lord Cromer remarks of India's poverty: "Not only cannot it be remedied +by mere philanthropy, but it is absolutely certain--cruel and +paradoxical though it may appear to say so--that philanthropy enhances +the evil. In the days of Akhbar or Shah Jehan, cholera, famine, and +internal strife kept down the population. Only the fittest survived. Now +internal strife is forbidden, and philanthropy steps in and says that no +single life shall be sacrificed if science and Western energy or skill +can save it. Hence the growth of a highly congested population, vast +numbers of whom are living on a bare margin of subsistence. The fact +that one of the greatest difficulties of governing the teeming masses of +the East is caused by good and humane government should be recognized. +It is too often ignored."[262] + +William Archer well states the matter when, in answer to the query why +improved external conditions have not brought India prosperity, he says: +"The reason, in my view, is simple: namely, that the benefit of good +government is, in part at any rate, nullified, when the people take +advantage of it, not to save and raise their standard of living, but to +breed to the very margin of subsistence. Henry George used to point out +that every mouth that came into the world brought two hands along with +it; but though the physiological fact is undeniable, the economic +deduction suggested will not hold good except in conditions that permit +of the profitable employment of the two hands.... If mouths increase in +a greater ratio than food, the tendency must be towards greater +poverty."[263] + +It is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the situation that very few +Oriental thinkers yet realize that over-population is a prime cause of +Oriental poverty. Almost without exception they lay the blame to +political factors, especially to Western political control. In fact, the +only case that I know of where an Eastern thinker has boldly faced the +problem and has courageously advocated birth-control is in the book +published five years ago by P. K. Wattal, a native official of the +Indian Finance Department, entitled, _The Population Problem of +India_.[264] This pioneer volume is written with such ability and is of +such apparent significance as an indication of the awakening of +Orientals to a more rational attitude, that it merits special attention. + +Mr. Wattal begins his book by a plea to his fellow-countrymen to look at +the problem rationally and without prejudice. "This essay," he says, +"should not be constituted into an attack on the spiritual civilization +of our country, or even indirectly into a glorification of the +materialism of the West. The object in view is that we should take a +somewhat more matter-of-fact view of the main problem of life, viz., how +to live in this world. We are a poor people; the fact is indisputable. +Our poverty is, perhaps, due to a great many causes. But I put it to +every one of us whether he has not at some of the most momentous periods +of his life been handicapped by having to support a large family, and +whether this encumbrance has not seriously affected the chances of +advancement warranted by early promise and exceptional endowment. This +question should be viewed by itself. It is a physical fact, and has +nothing to do with political environment or religious obligation. If we +have suffered from the consequences of that mistake, is it not a duty +that we owe to ourselves and to our progeny that its evil effects shall +be mitigated as far as possible? There is no greater curse than +poverty--I say this with due respect to our spiritualism. It is not in a +spirit of reproach that restraint in married life is urged in these +pages. It is solely from a vivid realization of the hardships caused by +large families and a profound sympathy with the difficulties under which +large numbers of respectable persons struggle through life in this +country that I have made bold to speak in plain terms what comes to +every young man, but which he does not care to give utterance to in a +manner that would prevent the recurrence of the evil."[265] + +After this appeal to reason in his readers, Mr. Wattal develops his +thesis. The first prime cause of over-population in India, he asserts, +is early marriage. Contrary to Western lands, where population is kept +down by prudential marriages and by birth-control, "for the Hindus +marriage is a sacrament which must be performed, regardless of the +fitness of the parties to bear the responsibilities of a mated +existence. A Hindu male must marry and beget children--sons, if you +please--to perform his funeral rites lest his spirit wander uneasily in +the waste places of the earth. The very name of son, 'putra,' means one +who saves his father's soul from the hell called Puta. A Hindu maiden +unmarried at puberty is a source of social obloquy to her family and of +damnation to her ancestors. Among the Mohammedans, who are not +handicapped by such penalties, the married state is equally common, +partly owing to Hindu example and partly to the general conditions of +primitive society, where a wife is almost a necessity both as a domestic +drudge and as a helpmate in field work."[266] The worst of the matter is +that, despite the efforts of social reformers child-marriage seems to be +increasing. The census of 1911 showed that during the decade 1901-10 the +numbers of married females per 1000 of ages 0-5 years rose from 13 to +14; of ages 5-10 from 102 to 105; of 10-15 from 423 to 430, and of 15-20 +from 770 to 800. In other words, in the year 1911, out of every 1000 +Indian girls, over one-tenth were married before they were 10 years old, +nearly one-half before they were 15, and four-fifths before they were +20.[267] + +The result of all this is a tremendous birth-rate, but this is "no +matter for congratulation. We have heard so often of our high death-rate +and the means for combating it, but can it be seriously believed that +with a birth-rate of 30 per 1000 it is possible to go on as we are doing +with the death-rate brought down to the level of England or Scotland? Is +there room enough in the country for the population to increase so fast +as 20 per 1000 every year? We are paying the inevitable penalty of +bringing into this world more persons than can be properly cared for, +and therefore if we wish fewer deaths to occur in this country the +births must be reduced to the level of the countries where the +death-rate is low. It is, therefore, our high birth-rate that is the +social danger; the high death-rate, however regrettable, is merely an +incident of our high birth-rate."[268] + +Mr. Wattal then describes the cruel items in India's death-rate; the +tremendous female mortality, due largely to too early childbirth, and +the equally terrible infant mortality, nearly 50 per cent. of infant +deaths being due to premature birth or debility at birth. These are the +inevitable penalties of early and universal marriage. For, in India, +"everybody marries, fit or unfit, and is a parent at the earliest +possible age permitted by nature." This process is highly disgenic; it +is plainly lowering the quality and sapping the vigour of the race. It +is the lower elements of the population, the negroid aboriginal tribes +and the Pariahs or Outcastes, who are gaining the fastest. Also the +vitality of the whole population seems to be lowering. The census +figures show that the number of elderly persons is decreasing, and that +the average statistical expectation of life is falling. "The coming +generation is severely handicapped at start in life. And the chances of +living to a good old age are considerably smaller than they were, say +thirty or forty years ago. Have we ever paused to consider what it means +to us in the life of the nation as a whole? It means that the people who +alone by weight of experience and wisdom are fitted for the posts of +command in the various public activities of the country are snatched +away by death; and that the guidance and leadership which belongs to age +and mature judgment in the countries of the West fall in India to +younger and consequently to less trustworthy persons."[269] + +After warning his fellow-countrymen that neither improved methods of +agriculture, the growth of industry, nor emigration can afford any real +relief to the growing pressure of population on means of subsistence, he +notes a few hopeful signs that, despite the hold of religion and +custom, the people are beginning to realize the situation and that in +certain parts of India there are foreshadowings of birth-control. For +example, he quotes from the census report for 1901 this official +explanation of a slight drop in the birth-rate of Bengal: "The +postponement of the age of marriage cannot wholly account for the +diminished rate of reproduction. The deliberate avoidance of +child-bearing must also be partly responsible.... It is a matter of +common belief that among the tea-garden coolies of Assam means are +frequently taken to prevent conception, or to procure abortion." And the +report of the Sanitary Commissioner of Assam for 1913 states: "An +important factor in producing the defective birth-rate appears to be due +to voluntary limitation of birth."[270] + +However, these beginnings of birth-control are too local and partial to +afford any immediate relief to India's growing over-population. Wider +appreciation of the situation and prompt action are needed. "The +conclusion is irresistible. We can no longer afford to shut our eyes to +the social canker in our midst. In the land of the bullock-cart, the +motor has come to stay. The competition is now with the more advanced +races of the West, and we cannot tell them what Diogenes said to +Alexander: 'Stand out of my sunshine.' After the close of this gigantic +World War theories of population will perhaps be revised and a reversion +in favour of early marriage and larger families may be counted upon. +But, (1) that will be no solution to our own population problem, and (2) +this reaction will be only for a time.... The law of population may be +arrested in its operation, but there is no way of escaping it."[271] + +So concludes this striking little book. Furthermore, we must remember +that, although India may be the acutest sufferer from over-population, +conditions in the entire Orient are basically the same, prudential +checks and rational birth-control being everywhere virtually +absent.[272] Remembering also that, besides over-population, there are +other economic and social evils previously discussed, we cannot be +surprised to find in all Eastern lands much acute poverty and social +degradation. + +Both the rural and urban masses usually live on the bare +margin of subsistence. The English economist Brailsford thus describes +the condition of the Egyptian peasantry: "The villages exhibited a +poverty such as I have never seen even in the mountains of anarchical +Macedonia or among the bogs of Donegal.... The villages are crowded +slums of mud hovels, without a tree, a flower, or a garden. The huts, +often without a window or a levelled floor, are minute dungeons of baked +mud, usually of two small rooms neither whitewashed nor carpeted. Those +which I entered were bare of any visible property, save a few cooking +utensils, a mat to serve as a bed, and a jar which held the staple food +of maize."[273] As for the poorer Indian peasants, a British sanitary +official thus depicts their mode of life: "One has actually to see the +interior of the houses, in which each family is often compelled to live +in a single small cell, made of mud walls and with a mud floor; +containing small yards littered with rubbish, often crowded with cattle; +possessing wells permeated by rain soaking through this filthy surface; +and frequently jumbled together in inchoate masses called towns and +cities."[274] + +In the cities, indeed, conditions are even worse than in the country, +the slums of the Orient surpassing the slums of the West. The French +publicist Louis Bertrand paints positively nauseating pictures of the +poorer quarters of the great Levantine towns like Cairo, Constantinople, +and Jerusalem. Omitting his more poignant details, here is his +description of a Cairo tenement: "In Cairo, as elsewhere in Egypt, the +wretchedness and grossness of the poorer-class dwellings are perhaps +even more shocking than in the other Eastern lands. Two or three dark, +airless rooms usually open on a hall-way not less obscure. The plaster, +peeling off from the ceilings and the worm-eaten laths of the walls, +falls constantly to the filthy floors. The straw mats and bedding are +infested by innumerable vermin."[275] + +In India it is the same story. Says Fisher: "Even before the growth of +her industries had begun, the cities of India presented a baffling +housing problem. Into the welter of crooked streets and unsanitary +habits of an Oriental city these great industrial plants are wedging +their thousands of employees. Working from before dawn until after dark, +men and women are too exhausted to go far from the plant to sleep, if +they can help it. When near-by houses are jammed to suffocation, they +live and sleep in the streets. In Calcutta, twenty years ago,[276] land +had reached $200,000 an acre in the overcrowded tenement +districts."[277] Of Calcutta, a Western writer remarks: "Calcutta is a +shame even in the East. In its slums, mill hands and dock coolies do not +live; they pig. Houses choke with unwholesome breath; drains and +compounds fester in filth. Wheels compress decaying refuse in the roads; +cows drink from wells soaked with sewage, and the floors of bakeries are +washed in the same pollution."[278] In the other industrial centres of +India, conditions are practically the same. A Bombay native sanitary +official stated in a report on the state of the tenement district, drawn +up in 1904: "In such houses--the breeders of germs and bacilli, the +centres of disease and poverty, vice, and crime--have people of all +kinds, the diseased, the dissolute, the drunken, the improvident, been +indiscriminately herded and tightly packed in vast hordes to dwell in +close association with each other."[279] + +Furthermore, urban conditions seem to be getting worse rather than +better. The problem of congestion, in particular, is assuming ever +graver proportions. Already in the opening years of the present century +the congestion in the great industrial centres of India like Calcutta, +Bombay, and Lucknow averaged three or four times the congestion of +London. And the late war has rendered the housing crisis even more +acute. In the East, as in the West, the war caused a rapid drift of +population to the cities and at the same time stopped building owing to +the prohibitive cost of construction. Hence, a prodigious rise in rents +and a plague of landlord profiteering. Says Fisher: "Rents were raised +as much as 300 per cent., enforced by eviction. Mass-meetings of protest +in Bombay resulted in government action, fixing maximum rents for some +of the tenements occupied by artisans and labourers. Setting maximum +rental does not, however, make more room."[280] + +And, of course, it must not be forgotten that higher rents are only one +phase in a general rise in the cost of living that has been going on in +the East for a generation and which has been particularly pronounced +since 1914. More than a decade ago Bertrand wrote of the Near East: +"From one end of the Levant to the other, at Constantinople as at +Smyrna, Damascus, Beyrout, and Cairo, I heard the same complaints about +the increasing cost of living; and these complaints were uttered by +Europeans as well as by the natives."[281] To-day the situation is even +more difficult. Says Sir Valentine Chirol of conditions in Egypt since +the war: "The rise in wages, considerable as it has been, has ceased to +keep pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very necessities of +life. This is particularly the case in the urban centres, where the +lower classes--workmen, carters, cab-drivers, shopkeepers, and a host +off minor employees--are hard put to it nowadays to make both ends +meet."[282] As a result of all these hard conditions various phenomena +of social degradation such as alcoholism, vice, and crime, are becoming +increasingly common.[283] Last--but not least--there are growing +symptoms of social unrest and revolutionary agitation, which we will +examine in the next chapter. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[239] _I. e._ the educated upper class. + +[240] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. +13. + +[241] _I. e._ the priestly class. + +[242] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. +15. + +[243] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. +51. + +[244] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 221-226. + +[245] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, p. 240. + +[246] The purdah is the curtain separating the women's apartments from +the rest of the house. + +[247] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 254-255. + +[248] For progress in Western education in the Orient, under both +European and native auspices, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. +291-392; C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, pp. 3-13, 24-64. + +[249] In his Introduction to Sir Valentine Chirol's _Indian Unrest_, p. +xii. + +[250] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II., pp. 228-243. + +[251] J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, p. 162 (London, 1908). + +[252] Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, pp. 203-204. + +[253] H. E. Compton, _Indian Life in Town and Country_, p. 98 (London, +1904). + +[254] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. +32. + +[255] Cooper, _op. cit._, pp. 48-49. + +[256] On this point of comfort _v._ luxury, see especially Sir Bampfylde +Fuller, "East and West: A Study of Differences," _Nineteenth Century and +After_, November, 1911. + +[257] L. Bertrand, _op. cit._, 145-147; J. Chailley, _Administrative +Problems of British India_, pp. 138-139. For increased expenditure on +Western products, see A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," _The +Century_, March, 1904; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," +_Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations +of Indian Economics_, p. 5. + +[258] For higher cost of living in the East, see Chirol, _Indian +Unrest_, pp. 2-3; Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, pp. 46-60; Jones, +_op. cit._; T. T. Williams, "Inquiry into the Rise of Prices in India," +_Economic Journal_, December, 1915. + +[259] Brown, _op. cit._ + +[260] At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of India +is roughly estimated to have been about 100,000,000. According to the +census of 1911 the population was 315,000,000. + +[261] Sir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_, p. 42 +(London, 1903). + +[262] Cromer, "Some Problems of Government in Europe and Asia," +_Nineteenth Century and After_, May, 1913. + +[263] Archer, _India and the Future_, pp. 157, 162 (London), 1918. + +[264] P. K. Wattal, of the Indian Finance Department, Assistant +Accountant-General. The book was published at Bombay, 1916. + +[265] Wattal, pp. i-iii. + +[266] Wattal, p. 3. + +[267] _Ibid._, p. 12. + +[268] Wattal, p. 14. + +[269] _Ibid._, pp. 19-21. + +[270] Wattal, p. 28. + +[271] _Ibid._, p. 82. + +[272] For conditions in the Near East, see Bertrand, pp. 110, 124, +125-128. + +[273] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, pp. 112-113. See +also T. Rothstein, _Egypt's Ruin_, pp. 298-300 (London, 1910), Sir W. W. +Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," _Quarterly Review_, +January, 1918. + +[274] Dr. D. Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," _The +Survey_, February 18, 1911. + +[275] Bertrand, _op. cit._, pp. 111-112. + +[276] _I. e._, in 1900. + +[277] Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 51. + +[278] G. W. Stevens, _In India_. Quoted by Fisher, p. 51. + +[279] Dr. Bhalchandra Krishna. Quoted by A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour +in India_, p. 35 (London, 1907). + +[280] Fisher, pp. 51-52. + +[281] Bertrand, p. 141. + +[282] Sir V. Chirol, "England's Peril in Egypt," from the London +_Times_, 1919. + +[283] See Bertrand and Fisher, _supra_. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM + + +Unrest is the natural concomitant of change--particularly of sudden +change. Every break with past, however normal and inevitable, implies a +necessity for readjustment to altered conditions which causes a +temporary sense of restless disharmony until the required adjustment has +been made. Unrest is not an exceptional phenomenon; it is always latent +in every human society which has not fallen into complete stagnation, +and a slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of healthy +growth rather than a symptom of disease. In fact, the minimum degrees of +unrest are usually not called by that name, but are considered mere +incidents of normal development. Under normal circumstances, indeed, the +social organism functions like the human organism: it is being +incessantly destroyed and as incessantly renewed in conformity with the +changing conditions of life. These changes are sometimes very +considerable, but they are so gradual that they are effected almost +without being perceived. A healthy organism well attuned to its +environment is always plastic. It instinctively senses environmental +changes and adapts itself so rapidly that it escapes the injurious +consequences of disharmony. + +Far different is the character of unrest's acuter manifestations. These +are infallible symptoms of sweeping changes, sudden breaks with the +past, and profound maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified. +In other words, acute unrest denotes social ill-health and portends the +possibility of one of those violent crises known as "revolutions." + +The history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the above +generalizations. The formative period of Saracenic civilization was +characterized by rapid change and an intense idealistic ferment. The +great "Motazelite" movement embraced many shades of thought, its radical +wing professing religious, political, and social doctrines of a violent +revolutionary nature. But this changeful period was superficial and +brief. Arab vigour and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently to +leaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the old traditions +reasserted themselves--somewhat modified, to be sure, yet basically the +same Saracenic civilization became stereotyped, ossified, and with this +ossification changeful unrest died away. Here and there the radical +tradition was preserved and secretly handed down by a few obscure sects +like the Kharidjites of Inner Arabia and the Bettashi dervishes; but +these were mere cryptic episodes, of no general significance. + +With the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century, +however, symptoms of social unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimed +not merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a general +protest against the contemporary decadence of Moslem society. In many +cases it took the form of a popular revolt against established +governments. The same was true of the correlative Babbist movement in +Persia, which took place about the same time.[284] + +And of course these nascent stirrings were greatly stimulated by the +flood of Western ideas and methods which, as the nineteenth century wore +on, increasingly permeated the East. What, indeed, could be more +provocative of unrest of every description than the resulting +transformation of the Orient--a transformation so sudden, so intense, +and necessitating so concentrated a process of adaptation that it was +basically revolutionary rather than evolutionary in its nature? The +details of these profound changes--political, religious, economic, +social--we have already studied, together with the equally profound +disturbance, bewilderment, and suffering afflicting all classes in this +eminently transition period. + +The essentially revolutionary nature of this transition period, as +exemplified by India, is well described by a British economist.[285] +What, he asks, could be more anachronistic than the contrast between +rural and urban India? "Rural India is primitive or mediaeval; city India +is modern." In city India you will find every symbol of Western life, +from banks and factories down to the very "sandwichmen that you left in +the London gutters." Now all this co-exists beside rural India. "And it +is surely a fact unique in economic history that they should thus exist +side by side. The present condition of India does not correspond with +any period of European economic history." Imagine the effect in Europe +of setting down modern and mediaeval men together, with utterly disparate +ideas. That has not happened in Europe because "European progress in the +economic world has been evolutionary"; a process spread over centuries. +In India, on the other hand, this economic transformation has been +"revolutionary" in character. + +How unevolutionary is India's economic transformation is seen by the +condition of rural India. + +"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive usage, has been +invaded by ideas that are intensely hostile to the old state of things +It is primitive, _but not consistently primitive_. Competitive wages are +paid side by side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed by +custom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes. From the midst of a +population deeply rooted in the soil, men are being carried away by the +desire of better wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly and +partially intruded themselves in the realm of primitive morality. And, +if we turn to city India, we see a similar, though inverted, state of +things.... In neither case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusion +complete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated, too far apart, to +coalesce with ease.... + +"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution throughout all the +classes of an enormous and complex society. The only period in which +Europe offered even faint analogies to modern India was the Industrial +Revolution, from which even now we have not settled down into +comparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortunate circumstance for +Europe that the intellectual movement which culminated in the French +Revolution did not coincide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had, +it is possible that European society might have been hopelessly wrecked. +But, as it was, even when the French Revolution had spent its force in +the conquests of Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution stirred up enough +social and political discontent. When whole classes of people are +obliged by economic revolution to change their mode of life, it is +inevitable that many should suffer. Discontent is roused. Political and +destructive movements are certain to ensue. Not only the Revolutions of +'48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party sprang from the +Industrial Revolution. + +"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as that which is now in +operation in India. The invention of machinery and steam-power was, in +Europe, but the crowning event of a long series of years in which +commerce and industry had been constantly expanding, in which capital +had been largely accumulated, in which economic principles had been +gradually spreading.... No, the Indian economic revolution is vastly +greater and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolution, great as +that was. Railways have been built through districts where travel was +almost impossible, and even roads are unknown. Factories have been +built, and filled by men unused to industrial labour. Capital has been +poured into the country, which was unprepared for any such development. +And what are the consequences? India's social organization is being +dissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The ryot is no longer +bound to the soil. The banya is no longer the sole purveyor of capital. +The hand-weaver is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker can +no longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which this sudden +change has brought about, of the many who can no longer follow their +ancestral vocations, of the commotion which a less profound change +produced in Europe, and you will understand what is the chief +motive-power of the political unrest. It is small wonder. The wonder is +that the unrest has been no greater than it is. Had India not been an +Asiatic country, she would have been in fierce revolution long ago." + +The above lines were of course written in the opening years of the +twentieth century, before the world had been shattered by Armageddon and +aggressive social revolution had established itself in semi-Asiatic +Russia. But even during those pre-war years, other students of the +Orient were predicting social disturbances of increasing gravity. Said +the Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin Chandra Pal: "This so-called unrest +is not really political. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritual +upheaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with a new +organon and a new philosophy of life behind it."[286] And the French +publicist Chailley wrote of India: "There will be a series of economic +revolutions, which must necessarily produce suffering and +struggle."[287] + +During this pre-war period the increased difficulty of living +conditions, together with the adoption of Western ideas of comfort and +kindred higher standards, seem to have been engendering friction between +the different strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a British +sanitary expert assigned "wretchedness" as the root-cause of India's +political unrest. After describing the deplorable living conditions of +the Indian masses, he wrote: "It will of course be said at once that +these conditions have existed in India from time immemorial, and are no +more likely to cause unrest now than previously; but in my opinion +unrest has always existed there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in the +old days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison between their +own condition and that of more fortunate people; now they can compare +their own slums and terrible 'native quarters' with the much better +ordered cantonments, stations, and houses of the British officials and +even of their own wealthier brethren. So far as I can see, such misery +is always the fundamental cause of all popular unrest.... Seditious +meetings, political chatter, and 'aspirations' of babus and demagogues +are only the superficial manifestations of the deeper disturbance."[288] + +This growing social friction was indubitably heightened by the lack of +interest of Orientals in the sufferings of all persons not bound to them +by family, caste, or customary ties. Throughout the East, "social +service," in the Western sense, is practically unknown. This fact is +noted by a few Orientals themselves. Says an Indian writer, speaking of +Indian town life: "There is no common measure of social conduct.... +Hitherto, social reform in India has taken account only of individual or +family life. As applied to mankind in the mass, and especially to those +soulless agglomerations of seething humanity which we call cities, it is +a gospel yet to be preached."[289] As an American sociologist remarked +of the growing slum evil throughout the industrialized Orient: "The +greatest danger is due to the fact that Orientals do not have the high +Western sense of the value of the life of the individual, and are, +comparatively speaking, without any restraining influence similar to our +own enlightened public opinion, which has been roused by the struggles +of a century of industrial strife. Unless these elements can be +supplied, there is danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any the +West has known."[290] + +All this diffused social unrest was centring about two recently emerged +elements: the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ and the industrial +proletariat of the factory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the +_intelligentsia_, particularly of its half-educated failures, have been +already noted, and these latter have undoubtedly played a leading part +in all the revolutionary disturbances of the modern Orient, from North +Africa to China.[291] Regarding the industrial proletariat, some writers +think that there is little immediate likelihood of their becoming a +major revolutionary factor, because of their traditionalism, ignorance, +and apathy, and also because there is no real connection between them +and the _intelligentsia_, the other centre of social discontent. + +The French economist Metin states this view-point very well. Speaking +primarily of India, he writes: "The Nationalist movement rises from the +middle classes and manifests no systematic hostility toward the +capitalists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is on their +side."[292] As for the proletariat: "The coolies do not imagine that +their lot can be bettered. Like the ryots and the agricultural +labourers, they do not show the least sign of revolt. To whom should +they turn? The ranks of traditional society are closed to them. People +without caste, the coolies are despised even by the old-style artisan, +proud of his caste-status, humble though that be. To fall to the job of +a coolie is, for the Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workers +are not yet numerous enough to form a compact and powerful proletariat, +able to exert pressure on the old society. Even if they do occasionally +strike, they are as far from the modern Trade-Union as they are from the +traditional working-caste. Neither can they look for leadership to the +'intellectual proletariat'; for the Nationalist movement has not emerged +from the 'bourgeois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists.... + +"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages. In truth, the +material evolution which translates itself by the construction of +factories, and the social evolution which creates a proletariat, have +only begun to emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arise +the programmes of social demands has not even begun."[293] + +Other observers of Indian industrial conditions, however, do not share +M. Metin's opinion. Says the British Labour leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald: +"To imagine the backward Indian labourers becoming a conscious regiment +in the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams in which a +Western mind can indulge. But I sometimes wonder if it be so very vain +after all. In the first place, the development of factory industry in +India has created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched by the +same economic class in any other capitalist community; and to imagine +that this class is to be kept out, or can be kept out, of Indian +politics is far more vain than to dream of its developing a politics on +Western lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have shown a +willingness to respond to Trades-Union methods; they are forming +industrial associations and have engaged in strikes; some of the social +reform movements conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try to +establish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us in connection +with Trades-Union propaganda. A capitalist fiscal policy will not only +give this movement a great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India will +not be able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan, by +legislation. As yet, the true proletarian wage-earner, uprooted from his +native village and broken away from the organization of Indian society, +is but insignificant. It is growing, however, and I believe that it will +organize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian classes +of other capitalist countries. So soon as it becomes politically +conscious, there are no other lines upon which it can organize +itself."[294] + +Turning to the Near East--more than a decade ago a French Socialist +writer, observing the hard living conditions of the Egyptian masses, +noted signs of social unrest and predicted grave disturbances. "A +genuine proletariat," he wrote, "has been created by the multiplication +of industries and the sudden, almost abrupt, progress which has +followed. The cost of living has risen to a scale hitherto unknown in +Egypt, while wages have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound. +Some day suffering will provoke the people to complaints, perhaps to +angry outbursts, throughout this apparently prosperous Delta. It is true +that the influx of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when the +city or country labourer of Egyptian race comes clearly to perceive the +wrongs that are being done to him. He may miss the educational influence +of Socialism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than people expect. +It is not only among the successful and prosperous Egyptians that +intelligence is to be found. Those whose wages are growing gradually +smaller and smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it has +become a real question as to the hour when for the first time in the +land of Islam the flame of Mohammedan Socialism shall burst forth."[295] +In Algeria, likewise, a Belgian traveller noted the dawning of a +proletarian consciousness among the town working-men just before the +Great War. Speaking of the rapid spread of Western ideas, he wrote: +"Islam tears asunder like rotten cloth on the quays of Algiers: the +dockers, coal-passers, and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong, +leave their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality, that of +the proletarians of Europe, and they make common cause with their +European colleagues on the basis of a strictly economic struggle. If +there were many big factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soon +disappear there, as old-fashioned Catholicism has disappeared with us +under the shock of great industry."[296] + +Whatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emergence of organized +labour movements in the Orient, one thing seems certain: the unrest +which afflicted so many parts of the East in the years preceding the +Great War, though mainly political, had also its social side. Toward the +end of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal remarked pessimistically: +"We have already gone so far on the downward path that leads to +destruction that there are districts in what were once regarded as the +most settled parts of India which are being abandoned by the rich +because their property is not safe. So great is the contempt for the law +that it is employed by the unscrupulous as a means of offence against +the innocent. Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost unbelievable in +their daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation spreads in regard to +topics quite outside the business of orderly people. There is no matter +of domestic or foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible people +do not want to have their passionate way. Great grievances are made of +little, far-off things. What ought to be the ordered, spacious life of +the District Officer is intruded upon and disturbed by a hundred +distracting influences due to the want of discipline of the people. In +the subordinate ranks of the great services themselves, trades-unions +have been formed. Military and police officers have to regret that the +new class of recruits is less subordinate than the old, harder to +discipline, more full of complaints."[297] + +The Great War of course enormously aggravated Oriental unrest. In many +parts of the Near East, especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions, +and furious hates combined to reduce society to the verge of chaos. Into +this ominous turmoil there now came the sinister influence of Russian +Bolshevism, marshalling all this diffused unrest by systematic methods +for definite ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolution and +the destruction of Western civilization. To attain this objective the +Bolshevist leaders not only launched direct assaults on the West, but +also planned flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that if the +East could be set on fire, not only would Russian Bolshevism gain vast +additional strength but also the economic repercussion on the West, +already shaken by the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapse +would ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolution. + +Bolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short of universal, both +in area and in scope. No part of the world was free from the plottings +of its agents; no possible source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly +"Red" doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were very far +from being the only weapons in Bolshevism's armoury. Since what was +first wanted was the overthrow of the existing world-order, any kind of +opposition to that order, no matter how remote doctrinally from +Bolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accordingly, in every +quarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, as +in Europe, Bolshevik agitators whispered in the ears of the discontented +their gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspiration, every +political grievance, every social injustice, every racial +discrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's incitement to violence and +war.[298] + +Particularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity were the Near and +Middle East. Besides being a prey to profound disturbances of every +description, those regions as traditional objectives of the old Czarist +imperialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian agents who had +evolved a technique of "pacific penetration" that might be easily +adjusted to Bolshevist ends. To stir up political, religious, and racial +passions in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially against +England, required no original planning by Trotzky or Lenin. Czarism had +already done these things for generations, and full information lay both +in the Petrograd archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist agents +ready to turn their hands as easily to the new work as the old. + +In all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda which to-day +enmeshes the East we must discriminate between Bolshevism's two +objectives: one immediate--the destruction of Western political and +economic supremacy; the other ultimate--the bolshevizing of the Oriental +masses and the consequent extirpation of the native upper and middle +classes, precisely as has been done in Russia and as is planned for the +countries of the West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready to +respect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Oriental nationalist +movements. In the second stage, religions like Islam and nationalists +like Mustapha Kemal are to be branded as "bourgeois" and relentlessly +destroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavours to work these two schemes +in double harness, we shall presently see. + +Russian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated soon after its +accession to power at the close of 1917. The year 1918 was a time of +busy preparation. An elaborate propaganda organization was built up from +various sources. A number of old Czarist agents and diplomats versed in +Eastern affairs were cajoled or conscripted into the service. The +Russian Mohammedan populations such as the Tartars of South Russia and +the Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits. Even more +valuable were the exiles who flocked to Russia from Turkey, Persia, +India, and elsewhere at the close of the Great War. Practically all the +leaders of the Turkish war-government--Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and many +more, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance of the victorious +Entente Powers. The same was true of the Hindu terrorist leaders who had +been in German pay during the war and who now sought service under +Lenin. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental propaganda department +was well organized, divided into three bureaux, for the Islamic +countries, India, and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's Far +Eastern activities this book is not concerned, though the reader should +bear them in mind and should remember the important part played by the +Chinese in recent Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indian +bureaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bolshevik +literature into the various Oriental languages, training numerous secret +agents and propagandists for "field-work," and getting in touch with all +disaffected or revolutionary elements. + +With the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity throughout the Near +and Middle East became increasingly apparent. The wave of rage and +despair caused by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalist +aspirations[299] played splendidly into the Bolshevists' hands, and we +have already seen how Moscow supported Mustapha Kemal and other +nationalist leaders in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In the +Middle East, also, Bolshevism gained important successes. Not merely was +Moscow's hand visible in the epidemic of rioting and seditious violence +which swept northern India in the spring of 1919,[300] but an even +shrewder blow was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land of +turbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual thundercloud on +India's north-west frontier, had kept quiet during the Great War, mainly +owing to the Anglophile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer Habibullah +Khan. But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. Whether the Bolsheviki +had a hand in the matter is not known, but they certainly reaped the +benefit, for power passed to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan, +who was an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings with +Turco-German agents during the late war. Amanullah at once got in touch +with Moscow, and a little later, just when the Punjab was seething with +unrest, he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen, pouring +across the border, set the North-West Frontier on fire. After some hard +fighting the British succeeded in repelling the Afghan invasion, and +Amanullah was constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously dared not +press Amanullah too hard, for in the peace treaty the Ameer was released +from his previous obligation not to maintain diplomatic relations with +other nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired his +independence by maintaining ostentatious relations with Moscow. As a +matter of fact, the Bolsheviki had by this time established an important +propagandist subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Afghan +border, and this bureau's activities of course envisaged not merely +Afghanistan but the wider field of India as well.[301] + +During 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more pronounced throughout +the Near and Middle East. We have already seen how powerfully Bolshevik +Russia supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist movements. In fact, +the reckless short-sightedness of Entente policy was driving into +Lenin's arms multitudes of nationalists to whom the internationalist +theories of Moscow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head of +the Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed his reasons for +friendship with Soviet Russia, in an interview printed by the official +Soviet organ, _Izvestia_: "I am neither Communist nor Socialist, but my +political programme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia. I +am an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism in Asia, the chief +representatives of which are the English. On this point I coincide with +the Communists, and in this respect we are your natural allies.... +Afghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist state, and it +is very unlikely that even a parliamentary regime will take deep root in +these countries. It is so far difficult to say how subsequent events +will develop. I only know that the renowned address of the Soviet +Government to all nations, with its appeal to them to combat capitalists +(and for us a capitalist is synonymous with the word foreigner, or, to +be more exact, an Englishman), had an enormous effect on us. A still +greater effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the secret +treaties enforced by the imperialistic governments, and by the +proclaiming of the right of all nations, no matter how small, to +determine their own destiny. This act rallied around Soviet Russia all +the exploited nationalities of Asia, and all parties, even those very +remote from Socialism." Of course, knowing what we do of Bolshevik +propagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that the Afghan diplomat ever +said the things which the _Izvestia_ relates. But, even if the interview +be a fake, the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vast +numbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bolshevik propagandist +successes in Eastern lands. + +So successful, indeed, had been the progress of Bolshevik propaganda +that the Soviet leaders now began to work openly for their ultimate +ends. At first Moscow had posed as the champion of Oriental "peoples" +against Western "imperialism"; its appeals had been to "peoples," +irrespective of class; and it had promised "self-determination," with +full respect for native ideas and institutions. For instance: a +Bolshevist manifesto to the Turks signed by Lenin and issued toward the +close of 1919 read: "Mussulmans of the world, victims of the +capitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's pernicious policy +toward you and offers to help you overthrow English tyranny. She will +allow you freedom of religion and self-government. The frontiers +existing before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory will be +given Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will remain yours, and +Constantinople will remain the capital of the Mussulman world. The +Mussulmans in Russia will be given self-government. All we ask in +exchange is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would exploit +your country and make it a colony." Even when addressing its own people, +the Soviet Government maintained the same general tone. An "Order of the +Day" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders of India stated: +"Comrades of the Pamir division, you have been given a responsible task. +The Soviet Republic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on the +frontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and India. The Pamir +tableland divides revolutionary Russia from India, which, with its +300,000,000 inhabitants, is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On this +tableland the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag of the +army of liberation. May the peoples of India, who fight against their +English oppressors, soon know that friendly help is not far off. Make +yourselves at home with the liberty-loving tribes of northern India, +promote by word and deed their revolutionary progress, refute the mass +of calumnies spread about Soviet Russia by agents of the British +princes, lords, and bankers. Long live the alliance of the revolutionary +peoples of Europe and Asia!" + +Such was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propaganda. Presently, +however, propaganda of quite a different character began to appear. This +second-stage propaganda of course continued to assail Western +"capitalist imperialism." But alongside, or rather intermingled with, +these anti-Western, fulminations, there now appeared special appeals to +the Oriental masses, inciting them against all "capitalists" and +"bourgeois," native as well as foreign, and promising the "proletarians" +remedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist manifesto to the +Turkish masses, published in the summer of 1920. It is very different +from the manifestoes of a year before. "The men of toil," says this +interesting document, "are now struggling everywhere against the rich +people. These people, with the assistance of the aristocracy and their +hirelings, are now trying to hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It is +the rich people of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey. +Comrades, let us make common cause with the world's toilers. If we do +not do so we shall never rise again. Let the heroes of Turkey's +revolution join Bolshevism. Long live the Third International! Praise be +to Allah!" + +And in these new efforts Moscow was not content with words; it was +passing to deeds as well. The first application of Bolshevism to an +Eastern people was in Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first came +to power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan full +"self-determination," and the inhabitants had acclaimed their native +princes and re-established their old state-units, subject to a loose +federative tie with Russia. Early in 1920, however, the Soviet +Government considered Turkestan ripe for the "Social Revolution." +Accordingly, the native princes were deposed, all political power was +transferred to local Soviets (controlled by Russians), the native upper +and middle classes were despoiled of their property, and sporadic +resistance was crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiar +forms of Bolshevist terrorism.[302] In the Caucasus, also, the social +revolution had begun with the Sovietization of Azerbaidjan. The Tartar +republic of Azerbaidjan was one of the fragments of the former Russian +province of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence on the +collapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located in eastern +Transcaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azerbaidjan's capital was the city +of Baku, famous for its oil-fields. Oil had transformed Baku into an +industrial centre on Western lines, with a large working population of +mixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon the nascent +class-consciousness of this urban proletariat, the Bolshevik agents made +a _coup d'etat_ in the spring of 1920, overthrew the nationalist +government, and, with prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaijan a Soviet +republic. The usual accompaniments of the social revolution followed: +despoiling and massacring of the upper and middle classes, confiscation +of property in favour of the town proletarians and agricultural +labourers, and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of 1920, +Bolshevism was thus in actual operation in both the Near and Middle +East.[303] + +Having acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bolshevism now felt +strong enough to throw off the mask. In the autumn of 1920, the Soviet +Government of Russia held a "Congress of Eastern Peoples" at Baku, the +aim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient from Western +control but its Bolshevizing as well. No attempt at concealment of this +larger objective was made, and so striking was the language employed +that it may well merit our close attention. + +In the first place, the call to the congress, issued by the Third +(Moscow) International, was addressed to the "peasants and workers" of +the East. The summons read: + +"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran Government of the Khadjars +and its retinue of provincial Khans have plundered and exploited you +through many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws of the +Sheriat, was your common property, has been taken possession of more and +more by the lackeys of the Teheran Government; they trade it away at +their pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you; and when, +through their mismanagement, they got the country into such a condition +that they were unable to squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, they +sold Persia last year to English capitalists for 2,000,000 pounds, so +that the latter will organize an army in Persia that will oppress you +still more than formerly, and so the latter can collect taxes for the +Khans and the Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in South +Persia and thus helped plunder the country. + +"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have declared your country to be +independent; but 80,000 English soldiers are stationed in your country, +are robbing and plundering, are killing you and are violating your +women. + +"Peasants of Anatolia! The English, French, and Italian Governments hold +Constantinople under the mouths of their cannon. They have made the +Sultan their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to the +dismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory, they are forcing him +to turn the country's finances over to foreign capitalists in order to +make it possible for them better to exploit the Turkish people, already +reduced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They have occupied +the coal-mines of Heraclea, they are holding your ports, they are +sending their troops into your country and are trampling down your +fields. + +"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago you became the victims of +the intrigues of foreign capital, which launched heavy verbal attacks +against the massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited you to +fight against the Sultan in order to obtain through your blood new +concessions and fresh profits daily from the bloody Sultan. During the +war they not only promised you independence, but they incited your +merchants, your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of the +Turkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal conflict between the +Armenian and Turkish peoples, so that they could eternally derive +profits out of this conflict, for as long as strife prevails between you +and the Turks, just so long will the English, French, and American +capitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the menace of an +Armenian uprising and to use the Armenians as cannon-fodder through the +menace of a pogrom by Kurds. + +"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was promised to you by the +English and the French, and now they hold your country occupied by their +armies, now the English and the French dictate your laws, and you, who +have freed yourselves from the Turkish Sultan, from the Constantinople +Government, are now slaves of the Paris and London Governments, which +merely differ from the Sultan's Government in being stronger and better +able to exploit you. + +"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian peasants and workers +have risen against their traitorous Teheran Government. The peasants in +Mesopotamia are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants in +Anatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha in order to fight +against the foreign invasion, but at the same time we hear that you are +trying to organize your own party, a genuine peasants' party that will +be willing to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with the +Entente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you, Armenian peasants, whom +the Entente, despite its promises, allows to die from hunger in order to +keep you under better control, you are understanding more and more that +it is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente capitalists. Even your +bourgeois Government of the Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, is +compelled to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia +with an appeal for peace and help. + +"Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you organize yourselves, if +you form your own Workers' and Peasants' Government, if you arm +yourselves, if you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants' +Army, then you will be able to defy the English, French, and American +capitalists, then you will settle accounts with your own native +exploiters, then you will find it possible, in a free alliance with the +workers' republics of the world, to look after your own interests; then +you will know how to exploit the resources of your country in your own +interest and in the interest of the working people of the whole world, +that will honestly exchange the products of their labour and mutually +help each other. + +"We want to talk over all these questions with you at the Congress in +Baku. Spare no effort to appear in Baku on September 1 in as large +numbers as possible. You march, year in and year out, through the +deserts to the holy places where you show your respect for your past and +for your God--now march through deserts, over mountains, and across +rivers in order to come together to discuss how you can escape from the +bonds of slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as men, +free and equal." + +From this summons the nature of the Baku congress can be imagined. It +was, in fact, a social revolutionist far more than a nationalist +assembly. Of its 1900 delegates, nearly 1300 were professed communists. +Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries sent the largest +delegations, though there were also delegations from Arabia, India, and +even the Far East. The Russian Soviet Government was of course in +control and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The character of these +proceedings were well summarized by the address of the noted Bolshevik +leader Zinoviev, president of the Executive Committee of the Third +(Moscow) International, who presided. + +Zinoviev said: + +"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest events in history, +for it proves not only that the progressive workers and working peasants +of Europe and America are awakened, but that we have at last seen the +day of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thousands, of +hundreds of thousands, of millions of the labouring class of the peoples +of the East. These peoples form the majority of the world's whole +population, and they alone, therefore, are able to bring the war +between capital and labour to a conclusive decision.... + +"The Communist International said from the very first day of its +existence: 'There are four times as many people living in Asia as live +in Europe. We will free all peoples, all who labour.'... We know that +the labouring masses of the East are in part retrograde, though not by +their own fault; they cannot read or write, are ignorant, are bound in +superstition, believe in the evil spirit, are unable to read any +newspapers, do not know what is happening in the world, have not the +slightest idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Comrades, our +Moscow International discussed the question whether a socialist +revolution could take place in the countries of the East before those +countries had passed through the capitalist stage. You know that the +view which long prevailed was that every country must first go through +the period of capitalism ... before socialism could become a live +question. We now believe that this is no longer true. Russia has done +this, and from that moment we are able to say that China, India, Turkey, +Persia, Armenia also can, and must, make a direct fight to get the +Soviet System. These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to be +Soviet republics. + +"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons who do not believe +in our ideas, who are even opposed to us on some points. In this way, +the Soviet Government supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one moment do +we forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a communist movement. +We know it. I have here extracts from the verbatim reports of the first +session of the Turkish people's Government at Angora. Kemal himself says +that 'the Caliph's person is sacred and inviolable.' The movement headed +by Kemal wants to rescue the Caliph's 'sacred' person from the hands of +the foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's point of view. But is it a +communist point of view? No. We respect the religious convictions of +the masses; we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the work of +years. + +"We use great caution in approaching the religious convictions of the +labouring masses in the East and elsewhere. But at this Congress we are +bound to tell you that you must not do what the Kemal Government is +doing in Turkey; you must not support the power of the Sultan, not even +if religious considerations urge you to do so. You must press on, and +must not allow yourselves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan's +hour has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic power to +continue; you must destroy, you must annihilate, faith in the Sultan; +you must struggle to obtain real Soviet organizations. The Russian +peasants also were strong believers in the Czar; but when a true +people's revolution broke out there was practically nothing left of this +faith in the Czar. The same thing will happen in Turkey and all over the +East as soon as a true peasants' revolution shall burst forth over the +surface of the black earth. The people will very soon lose faith in +their Sultan and in their masters. We say once more, the policy pursued +by the present people's Government in Turkey is not the policy of the +Communist International, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declare +that we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight against the +English Government. + +"Yes, we array ourselves against the English bourgeoisie; we seize the +English imperialist by the throat and tread him underfoot. It is against +English capitalism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt. +That is so. But at the same time we must educate the labouring masses of +the East to hatred, to the will to fight the whole of the rich classes +indifferently, whoever they be. The great significance of the revolution +now starting in the East does not consist in begging the English +imperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose of then +permitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet on it all the more +comfortably; no, we will very politely ask all the rich to remove their +dirty feet from the table, so that there may be no luxuriousness among +us, no boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but that the +world may be ruled by the worker's horny hand." + +The Baku congress was the opening gun in Bolshevism's avowed campaign +for the immediate Bolshevizing of the East. It was followed by increased +Soviet activity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially in the +Caucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were Bolshevized in the spring +of 1921. + +These very successes, however, awakened growing uneasiness among Soviet +Russia's nationalist proteges. The various Oriental nationalist parties, +which had at first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against the +Entente Powers, now began to realize that Russian Bolshevism might prove +as great a peril as Western imperialism to their patriotic aspirations. +Of course the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's ultimate +goal, but hitherto they had felt themselves strong enough to control the +situation and to take Russian aid without paying Moscow's price. Now +they no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious +"proletarians" in the East might be very small. The communist philosophy +might be virtually unintelligible to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless, +the very existence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disregarded. +In Russia an infinitesimal communist minority, numbering, by its own +admission, not much over 600,000, was maintaining an unlimited despotism +over 170,000,000 people. Western countries might rely on their popular +education and their staunch traditions of ordered liberty; the East +possessed no such bulwarks against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact, +much like Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the masses; the +same absence of a large and powerful middle class; the same tradition of +despotism; the same popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthless +minorities. Finally, there were the ominous examples of Sovietized +Turkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nationalists bethought them +of the old adage that he who sups with the devil needs a long spoon. + +Everywhere it has been the same story. In Asia Minor, Mustapha Kemal has +arrested Bolshevist propaganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troops +have more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus frontiers. In Egypt +we have already seen how an amicable arrangement between Lord Milner and +the Egyptian nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear of +the social revolutionary agitators who were inflaming the fellaheen. In +India, Sir Valentine Chirol noted as far back as the spring of 1918 how +Russia's collapse into Bolshevism had had a "sobering effect" on Indian +public opinion. "The more thoughtful Indians," he wrote, "now see how +helpless even the Russian _intelligentsia_ (relatively far more numerous +and matured than the Indian _intelligentsia_) has proved to control the +great ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of government has been +hastily shattered."[304] In Afghanistan, likewise, the Ameer was losing +his love for his Bolshevist allies. The streams of refugees from +Sovietized Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection, +headed by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made Amanullah Khan do some +hard thinking, intensified by a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on the +Russian border, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers' +Councils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist agents might tempt him +by the loot of India, but the Ameer could also see that that would do +him little good if he himself were to be looted and killed by his own +rebellious subjects.[305] Thus, as time went on, Oriental nationalists +and conservatives generally tended to close ranks in dislike and +apprehension of Bolshevism. Had there been no other issue involved, +there can be little doubt that Moscow's advances would have been +repelled and Bolshevist agents given short shrift. + +Unfortunately, the Eastern nationalists feel themselves between the +Bolshevist devil and the Western imperialist deep sea. The upshot has +been that they have been trying to play off the one against the +other--driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression; driven toward +the West by every Soviet _coup_ of Lenin. Western statesmen should +realize this, and should remember that Bolshevism's best propagandist +agent is, not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud, with his +Senegalese battalions and "strong-arm" methods in Syria and the Arab +hinterland. + +Certainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the East would be a +terrible misfortune both for the Orient and for the world at large. If +the triumph of Bolshevism would mean barbarism in the West, in the East +it would spell downright savagery. The sudden release of the ignorant, +brutal Oriental masses from their traditional restraints of religion and +custom, and the submergence of the relatively small upper and middle +classes by the flood of social revolution would mean the destruction of +all Oriental civilization and culture, and a plunge into an abyss of +anarchy from which the East could emerge only after generations, perhaps +centuries. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[284] For these early forms of unrest, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au +dix-neuvieme Siecle_, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888). + +[285] D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," _Economic Journal_, +December, 1910. + +[286] Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Unrest in India," +_Contemporary Review_, February, 1910. + +[287] J. Chailley, _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339 +(London, 1910--English translation). + +[288] Dr. Ronald Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," _The +Survey_, 18 February, 1911. + +[289] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, pp. 3, 32 (London, +1907). + +[290] E. W. Capen, "A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence on the +Orient," _American Journal of Sociology_, May, 1911. + +[291] P. Khorat, "Psychologie de la Revolution chinoise," _Revue des +Deux Mondes_, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage orientale_, pp. +164-166; J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, pp. 162-163. + +[292] Albert Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, p. 276 +(Paris, 1918). + +[293] Albert Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, pp. 339-345. + +[294] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 133-134 +(London, 1920). + +[295] Georges Foucart. Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 17 August, 1907, +pp. 225-226. + +[296] A. Van Gennep, _En Algerie_, p. 182 (Paris, 1914). + +[297] _The Englishman_ (Calcutta). Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 21 +February, 1914, p. 369. + +[298] For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see Paul +Miliukov, _Bolshevism: An International Danger_ (London, 1920); also, my +_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 218-221, and +my article, "Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man," _The Century_, +June, 1919. + +[299] See Chapter V. + +[300] See Chapter VI. + +[301] For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich, +"The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan," _New Europe_, December 4, +1919; Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Fall of Bokhara," _The Near East_, October +28, 1920, and his "The Central Asian Tangle," _Asiatic Review_, October, +1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally, see +Miliukov, _op. cit._, pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir George +Aston, "Bolshevik Propaganda in the East," _Fortnightly Review_, August, +1920; W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," _Quarterly +Review_, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in +the Near East," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, "Awakening +Asia," _The Living Age_, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French); +Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, "Moslems and the Tangle in the +Middle East," _National Review_, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Russia +at Peace," _The Nation_ (New York), January 26, 1921; H. von Hoff, "Die +nationale Erhebung in der Tuerkei," _Deutsche Revue_, December, 1919; R. +G. Hunter, "Entente--Oil--Islam," _New Europe_, August 26, 1920; +"Taira," "The Story of the Arab Revolt," _Balkan Review_, August, 1920; +"Voyageur," "Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam," _New Europe_, June 10, +1920; Hans Wendt, "Ex Oriente Lux," _Nord und Sued_, May, 1920; George +Young, "Russian Foreign Policy," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920. + +[302] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._ + +[303] For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, +Past and Present," _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer, +"The Situation in the Transcaucasus," _New Europe_, September 2, 1920; +"D. Z. T.," "L'Azerbaidjan: La Premiere Republique musulmane," _Revue du +Monde musulman_, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Exit Georgia," _The Nation_ (New +York), March 30, 1921. + +[304] Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918. +Also see H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 17 (London, +1918). + +[305] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._ + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +Our survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end. What is the +outstanding feature of that survey? It is: Change. The "Immovable East" +has been moved at last--moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-day +in full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and profound than any it +has hitherto known. The world of Islam, mentally and spiritually +quiescent for almost a thousand years, is once more astir, once more on +the march. + +Whither? We do not know. Who would be bold enough to prophesy the +outcome of this vast ferment--political, economical, social, religious, +and much more besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe, +describe, and analyse the various elements in the great transition. + +Yet surely this is much. To view, however empirically, the mighty +transformation at work; to group its multitudinous aspects in some sort +of relativity; to follow the red threads of tendency running through the +tangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge and acquire +capacity to grasp the significance of future developments as they shall +successively arise. + +"To know is to understand"--and to hope: to hope that this present +travail, vast and ill-understood, may be but the birth-pangs of a truly +renascent East taking its place in a renascent world. + + + + +INDEX + + +Aali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 54 + +Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro Turkish views of, 155; + deposition of, 156; + Pan-Arabianism supported by, 170 + +Abd-el-Kader, French resisted by, 41 + +Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism of, 156 + +Abd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival begun by, 21, 40; + birth of, 21; + early life of, 22 _ff._; + influence of, 22; + death of, 22 + +Abdul Hamid, despotism of, 32; + as caliph, 39; + Sennussi's opposition to, 39, 46; + Djemal-ed-Din protected by, 53 _ff._; + Pan-Islam policy of, 53 _ff._; + character of, 54 _ff._; + government of, 55; + deposition of, 56, 119; + tyrannical policy of, 116; + nationalism opposed by, 139, 165; + Arabs conciliated by, 142 _ff._ + +Abu Bekr 22; + policy of, 114 _ff._ + +Abyssinian Church, Mohammedan threat against, 50 + +Afghanistan, religious uprisings in, 41; + nineteenth-century independence of, 118; + Bolshevism in, 286 _ff._; + rebellion of, 286_ff._ + +Africa, Mohammedan missionary work in, 49 _ff._ + _See_ also North Africa + +Agadir crisis, 57 + +Ahmed Bey Agayeff, Pan-Turanism aided by, 165 + +Alexandria, massacre of Europeans in, 149 + +Algeria, French conquest of, 40, 158; + Kabyle insurrection in, 41; + compulsory vaccination in, 95; + liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._; + need for European government in, 122 + +Allenby, General, Egypt in control of, 177 + +Amanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 286; + war on England declared by, 286; + present policy of, 298 + +Anatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292 + +Anglo-Russian Agreement, terms of, 159 _ff._ + +Arabi Pasha, Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148; + revolution in Egypt headed by, 148 + +Arabia, description of natives of, 21; + Turks fought by, 23; + defeat of, 23; + political freedom of, 113; + democracy in, 127; + nationalist spirit in, 140 _ff._; + Turkish rulers opposed by, 140 _ff._; + suppression of, 143; + 1905 rebellion of, 143; + effect of Young-Turk revolution on, 145 _ff._; + 1916 revolt of, 146; + Pan-Arabism in, 145; + religious character of Pan-Arab movement in, 169 _ff._; + effect of Great War on, 170, 183 _ff._; + Allied encouragement of, 184; + peace terms and, 185; + English agreement with, 185 _ff._; + revolt against Turks of, 185; + secret partition of, 185 _ff._; + Colonel Lawrence's influence in, 186; + secret treaties revealed to, 187; + France and England in, 187 _ff._; + Mustapha Kemal aided by 194, _ff._; + English negotiations with, 198; + Bolshevist manifesto to, 292 + +Arabian National Committee, creation of, 143 + +Archer William, on over-population in India, 263 + +Argyll, Duke of, over-population in India, 263 + +Armenia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292 + +Arya Somaj, 208 + +Atchin War, 41 + +Azerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in, 290 _ff._ + + +Babbist movement in Persia, 274 + +Baber, Mogul Empire founded by, 204 + +Baku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at, 291, 297 + +Balkan War, 57; + Mohammedans roused by, 58 + +Barbary States, French conquest of, 158 + +Berard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks and Arabs, 141 _ff._; + France's Syrian policy criticised by, 199 + +Bertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling in Orient described by, 95 _ff._; + on social conditions in the Levant, 269, 271 + +Bevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of, 125 _ff._ + +Bin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 72 + +Bolshevism, effects on Orient of, 175; + Mustapha Kemal aided by, 196 _ff._; + the East a field for, 283 _ff._; + propaganda of, 284 _ff._, 288 _ff._; + Oriental policy of, 285; + in Afghanistan, 286 _ff._; + manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._; + manifesto to Turks issued by, 289 _ff._; + "Congress of Eastern Peoples" held by, 291 _ff._ + +Bombay, English character of, 100; + social conditions in, 270 _ff._ + +Bose, Pramatha Nath, on economic conditions in India, 245 _ff._ + +Brahminism, illiberalism of, 120 + +Brailsford, H. N., on modern industry in Egypt, 236 _ff._; + on social conditions in Egypt, 269 _ff._ + +British East India Company, 205 + +Bukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of, 31 _ff._; + nationalism in India opposed by, 125 _ff._; + on Indian social conditions, 253 _ff._ + + +Caetani, Leone, 63 + +Cahun, Leon, Turanism and, 163 + +Cairo, revolt in, 178; + modern women in, 258 + +Calcutta, English character of, 100; + social conditions in, 270 + +Caliphate, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._; + history of, 39; + Turkey the head of, 39 _ff._ + +Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 216 _ff._ + +China, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._; + Mohammedan missionary work in, 50; + number of Mohammedans in, 51; + Mohammedan agitation in, 60 + +Chirol, Valentine, Western influence in Orient described by, 79 _ff._; + on Egyptian situation, 179 _ff._; + Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220; + on Egyptian conditions since the war, 271 _ff._; + on Bolshevism in India, 298 + +Congress of Eastern Peoples, 291 _ff._ + +Constantine, King, recalled, 194 + +Constantinople, Allied occupation of, 192 _ff._; + changes since 1896 in, 251 _ff._; + status of women in, 258 + +Cox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian negotiations made by, 198; + influence of, 200 + +Cromer, Lord, on Islam, 29, 32; + Western influence in Orient described by, 80; + ethics of imperialism formulated by, 84, 102, 120 _ff._; + Egyptian administration of, 149; + resignation of, 152; + on western-educated Egypt, 257; + on over-population in India, 263 + +Curtis, Lionel, nationalism in India supported by, 130 _ff._; + Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220 + +Curzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of, 212 + + +Damascus, French in, 191 _ff._ + +Dar-ul-Islam, 171 _ff._ + +Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern economics, 249 + +Djemal-ed-Din, birth of, 52; + character of, 52; + anti-European work of, 52; + in India, 52; + in Egypt, 53; + Abdul Hamid's protection of, 53 _ff._; + death of, 53; + teachings of, 53 _ff._; + nationalism taught by, 138; + Egypt influenced by, 148; + in Russia, 285 + +Dutch East Indies, Mohammedan uprisings in, 41; + Mohammedan missionary work in, 52 + + +Egypt, nationalism in, 32, 118 _ff._; + Mahdist insurrection in, 41; + 1914 insurrection of, 61; + exiled Arabs in, 143; + characteristics of people of, 147 _ff._; + early European influences in, 147; + nationalist agitation in, 148 _ff._; + influence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 148; + 1882 revolution in, 148 _ff._; + Lord Cromer's rule of, 149; + France's influence in, 150 _ff._; + failure of English liberal policy in, 153 _ff._; + Lord Kitchener's rule in, 153 _ff._; + effect of outbreak of World War on, 155 _ff._; + made English protectorate, 156 _ff._; + Pan-Arabism in, 169; + Versailles conference's treatment of, 174; + nationalist demands of, 177; + Allenby in control of, 177; + rebellion of, 178 _ff._; + martial law in, 178; + situation after rebellion in, 179 _ff._; + English commission of inquiry in, 181; + English compromise with, 182; + opposition to compromise in, 182 _ff._; + modern factories in, 234, 236; + industrial conditions in, 236 _ff._; + social conditions in, 269; + social revolution in, 281 _ff._ + +El-Gharami, 30 + +El Mahdi, 42 + +England, Egypt's rebellion against, 175 _ff._; + Commission of Inquiry into Egyptian affairs appointed by, 181; + Egyptian compromise with, 182; + opposition to compromise in, 182; + Arabia and, 184 _ff._; + in Mesopotamia, 185 _ff._; + in Palestine, 186; + French disagreement with, 188 _ff._; + at San Remo conference, 190; + Mesopotamian rebellion against, 192 _ff._; + Sevres Treaty and, 193; + Greek agreement with, 193; + Arabian negotiation with, 198; + in India, 204 _ff._ + +Enver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 167; + in Russia, 285 + + +Feisal, Prince, at peace conference, 187 _ff._; + peace counsels of, 188; + made king of Syria, 191 + +Fisher, on social conditions in India, 270 _ff._ + +France, Morocco seized by, 57; + anti-British propaganda of, 150 _ff._; + Arabia and, 184; + Syrian aspirations of, 185 _ff._; + at San Remo conference, 190; + Syrian rebellion and, 191 _ff._; + Sevres Treaty and, 193; + Greek agreement with, 193; + present Syrian situation of, 198 _ff._ + + +Gandhi, M. K., boycott of England advocated by, 224 + +Gorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer succeeded by, 152; + failure of policy of, 153 _ff._ + +Gouraud, General, Feisal subdued by, 191; + danger in methods of, 299 + +Greece, anti-Turk campaign of, 193; + Venizelos repudiated by, 194; + Constantine supported by, 194 + + +Habibullah Khan, Ameer, England supported by, 286; + death of, 286 + +Haifa, to be British, 186 + +Hajj, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._ + +Halil Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 168 + +Hanotaux, Gabriel, 57 + +Harding, Lord, Indian nationalist movement supported by, 215 + +Hedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 140 + +Hindustan, Islam's appeal to 60; + anti-Western feeling in, 99 _ff._; + illiberal tradition of, 120 + +Hunter, Sir William, on over-population in India, 263 _ff._ + +Hussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt, 156 + + +Ikhwan, beginning of, 71; + progress of, 71 + +Imam Yahya, 199 + +India, reform of Islamism in, 30; + English mastery of, 40; + Islam's missionary work in, 52; + 1914 insurrection in, 61; + English towns and customs in, 100; + effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 105, 210 _ff._; + liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._; + democracy introduced by England in, 122 _ff._; + opposition to nationalism in, 124 _ff._, 218 _ff._; + support of nationalism in, 129 _ff._, 136 _ff._; + history of, 201; + Aryan invasion of, 201 _ff._; + beginning of caste system in, 202 _ff._; + Mohammedan invasion of, 203 _ff._; + Mogul Empire founded in, 204; + British conquest of, 205 _ff._; + beginning of discontent in, 206 _ff._; + Hindu nationalist movement in, 208 _ff._, 212 _ff._; + English liberal policy in, 213 _ff._; + result of outbreak of war in, 214; + Montagu-Chelmsford Report in, 216 _ff._; + militant unrest in, 220 _ff._; + effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 222 _ff._; + English boycotted by, 223 _ff._; + present turmoil in, 224; + industries in, 233 _ff._; + industrial conditions in, 237 _ff._; + industrial future of, 239 _ff._; + agriculture in, 243 _ff._; + Swadeshi movement in, 244 _ff._; + social conditions in, 253 _ff._; + status of women in, 254, 258 _ff._; + education in, 255 _ff._; + over-population in, 262 _ff._; + condition of peasants in, 269; + city and rural life in, 275 _ff._; + economic revolution in, 276 _ff._; + attitude of Bolshevists toward, 289 _ff._ + +Indian Councils Act, terms of, 213; + effect of 213 + +Indian National Congress, 206 + +Islam, eighteenth-century decadence of, 20 _ff._; + revival of, 21; + Christian opinions of, 26 _ff._; + present situation of, 27 _ff._; + agnosticism in, 32 _ff._; + fanatics in, 33 _ff._; + solidarity of, 37 _ff._; + Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._; + caliphate an aid to, 38 _ff._; + Western successes against, 40; + proselytism of, 48 _ff._; + effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._; + effect of Russo-Japanese War on, 59, 105 _ff._; + Western influence on, 75 _ff._; + anti-Western reaction of, 88 _ff._; + race mixture in, 102 _ff._; + tyranny in, 111 _ff._; + early equality in, 113 _ff._; + political reformation in, 115 _ff._; + birth of nationalism in, 137 _ff._; + Bolshevist propaganda in, 284 _ff._ + _See_ also Pan-Islam + +Ismael, Hamet, on scepticism among Moslems, 32 + +Ismael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of, 116; + Egypt Europeanized by, 147 _ff._ + +Italy, Tripoli attacked by, 57; + San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190, 193 + + +Japan, Mohammedan missionary work in, 59 _ff._ + +Jowf, Sennussi stronghold, 45 + + +Kabyle insurrection, 41 + +Khadjar dynasty, Persian revolution against, 160 + +Kharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved by, 274 + +Khartum, capture of, 41 + +Kheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate Tunis made by, 89 + +Kitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection suppressed by, 41; + anti-nationalist beliefs of, 122; + nationalism in Egypt suppressed by, 153 _ff._ + +Krishnavarma, S., assassination commended by, 211 + + +Lawrence, Colonel, influence of, 186; + Arab-Turk agreement, views of, 194 _ff._; + Mesopotamia, views of, 197 + +Lebanon, France's control of, 184 + +Lenine, manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._ + +Low, Sidney, modern imperialism described by, 86 _ff._; + on Egyptian situation, 154 + +Lyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education in India, 256 _ff._ + +Lybyer, Professor A. H., democracy in Islam described by, 114, 127 + + +Macdonald, J. Ramsay, on economic conditions in India, 245; + on social revolution in India, 280 _ff._ + +McIlwraith, Sir M., on Egyptian situation, 180 + +McMahon, Sir Henry, agreement with Arabs made by, 185 _ff._ + +Madras, English character of, 100 + +Mahdism, definition of, 42 _ff._ + +Mahdist insurrection, 42 + +Mahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of, 115 + +Mahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by, 204 + +Mecca, decadence of, 21; + Abd-el-Wahab's pilgrimage to, 22; + Saud's subjugation of, 23; + Turkish reconquest of, 23; + aid to strength of Islam, 38 _ff._; + post cards sold at, 251 + +Medina, decadence of, 21; + Abd-el-Wahab's studies at, 22; + Saud's subjugation of, 23; + Turkish reconquest of, 23; + electricity at, 251 + +Mehemet Ali, army of, 23; + Turks aided by, 23; + Wahabi defeated by, 23; + liberal policy of, 115; + Egypt Europeanized by, 147 + +Mesopotamia, Turkish dominion of, 140; + England in, 184 _ff._; + rebellion against England of 192 _ff._; + denunciation of English policy in, 197; + Bolshevists' manifesto issued to, 292 + +Metin, Albert, on nationalist movement in India, 279 _ff._ + +Midhat Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32 + +Milner, Lord, Egyptian inquiry commission headed by, 181; + character of, 181; + compromise agreed on by, 182 _ff._; + resignation of, 182; + influence of, 200 + +Mogul Empire, foundation of, 204 + +Mohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal movement aided by, 32; + Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148; + conservative teachings of, 150 + +Mohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of, 46 + +Mohammed Farid Bey, anti-English policy of, 152; + mistakes of, 152 _ff._; + pro German policy of, 156 + +Mohammedan Revival. _See_ Pan-Islam + +Mollahs, anti-liberalism of, 30 + +Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 217 _ff._ + +Montagu, liberal policy of, 216 _ff._ + +Morison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem situation, 67, 70 _ff._; + on modern industry in India, 234 _ff._, 245 + +Morley, John, liberal policy of, 213 + +Morocco, French seizure of, 57, 158; + in nineteenth century, 118 + +Motazelism, re-discovery of, 26; + influence of, 30 + +Moulvie Cheragh Ali, reform work of, 31 + +Muhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia against, 119 + +Muir, Ramsay, European imperialism described by, 83 + +Mustapha Kemal, character of, 150; + beliefs of, 151 _ff._; + death of, 151; + Allies defied by, 191; + Turkish denunciation of, 193; + Greek campaign against, 193 _ff._; + Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._; + policy of, 196; + Bolshevists allied with, 196 _ff._; + French negotiations with, 199; + Bolshevist support of, 286, 295 + +Mutiny of 1857, 205 + + +Nair, Doctor T. Madavan, anti-nationalist opinions of, 124, 219 + +Nakechabendiya fraternity, 41 + +Namasudra, anti-nationalist organization, 124, 219 + +Nejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab in, 21 _ff._; + description of, 21 _ff._; + return of Abd-el-Wahab to, 22; + conversion of, 22; + consolidation of, 23 + +Nitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190 _ff._ + +North Africa, "Holy Men" insurrection in, 41; + lack of nationalism in, 157 _ff._; + races in, 158 _ff._ + +Nyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 49 _ff._ + + +Orient, _See_ Islam + + +Pal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 218; + on social revolution in India, 277 + +Palestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and, 185; + England in, 185 + +Pan-Islam, fanatics' scheme for, 33 _ff._; + definition of, 37 _ff._; + Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._; + caliphate an aid to, 39 _ff._; + anti-Western character of, 41 _ff._; + fraternities in, 43 _ff._; + Abdul Hamid's support of, 54 _ff._; + Young-Turk interruption of, 56; + renewal of, 57 _ff._; + effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._; + Great War and, 61 _ff._; + Versailles Treaty and, 62 _ff._; + press strength of, 67; + propaganda of, 67; + menacing temper of, 70 _ff._; + economic evolution in, 72 _ff._ + +Pan-Syrian Congress, 191 + +Pan-Turanism. _See_ Turanians + +Pan-Turkism, _See_ Turkey, rise of nationalism in + +Persia, 1914 insurrection in, 61; + an English protectorate, 62; + tyranny in, 116; + independence of, 118; + liberal movement in, 118; + 1908 revolution in, 119, 159 _ff._; + need for European government in, 122; + nineteenth-century conditions in, 159; + Versailles conference's treatment of, 174 _ff._; + war conditions in, 196; + Bolshevism in, 196 _ff._, 287 _ff._; + Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 291 + +_Population Problem of India, The_, 264 + + +Ramsay, Sir William, on economic conditions in Asia Minor, 241 _ff._ + +_Realpolitik_, treatment of Orient by, 86, 106 + +Reshid Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32 + +Roushdi Pasha, nationalist demands of, 177 _ff._ + +Rowlatt Bill, nationalist opposition to, 222 _ff._ + +Russia, Turanian antagonism for, 167 _ff._ + _See_ also Bolshevism and Soviet Russia + +Russo-Japanese War, Islam roused by, 59, 105 + + +Salafi, rise and growth of, 72; + spirit of, 72 + +San Remo, conference at, 190 _ff._ + +Saud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 22; + power and character of, 22; + government of, 22, 40; + holy cities subdued by, 23; + death of, 23 + +Saud, clan of, converted, 24 + +Schweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian nationalism described by, 149 _ff._ + +Sennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by, 44; + power of, 45 + +Sennussiya, foundation of, 43 _ff._; + leadership of, 45; + present power of, 45 _ff._; + government of, 45; + policy of, 46 _ff._; + proselytism of, 48 _ff._ + +Sevres Treaty, 193, 199 + +Seyid Ahmed, state in India founded by, 24; + conquest of, 24 + +Seyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 30 + +Seyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 31 + +Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in Mecca, 24, 39; + Abdul Hamid opposed by, 39, 44; + birth of, 44; + education of, 44; + "Zawias" built by, 44; + power of, 44 _ff._ + +Shamyl, Russia opposed by, 41 + +Shiah Emir, 199 + +Shuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political capacity described by, 127 _ff._ + +South Africa, Mohammedan threat against, 49 + +Soviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with, 287 _ff._; + Kemal supported by, 295; + success of, 297 _ff._ + +Sun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 60 + +Sydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford Report criticised by, 219 + +Swadeshi movement, 244 _ff._ + +Sykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 185 _ff._; + French opposition to, 189 _ff._; + fulfilment of, 190 + +Syria, Turkish dominion of, 140; + nationalist agitation in, 142 _ff._; + France in, 184 _ff._; + declaration of independence of, 191; + French suppression of, 191; + present situation in, 198 _ff._; + Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 293 + + +Tagore, Rabindranath, on economic conditions in India, 248 + +Talaat, in Russia, 285 + +Tartars, liberal movement among, 32; + Mohammedan missionary work among, 50 _ff._; + nationalist revival of, 163 _ff._; + Bolshevism among, 285 + +Tekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 167 + +Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 149 + +Tewfik Pasha, anti-English feeling of, 92 + +Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist work of, 210, 218 + +Townsend, Meredith, anti-Western feeling in Orient explained by, 102, 104 + +Transcaucasia, Russian conquest of, 40; + after-the-war situation in, 196; + Mustapha Kemal supported by, 196 + +Tripoli, Italy's raid on, 57; + Mohammedan resistance in, 57; + 1914 insurrection in, 61 + +Tunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 89 _ff._ + +Turanians, peoples composing, 162 _ff._; + nationalist movement among, 163 _ff._; + effect of Young-Turk Revolution on, 165; + effect of Balkan Wars on, 166 _ff._; + effect of Great War on, 167 _ff._ + +Turkestan, Bolshevism in, 286; + social revolution in, 290 + +Turkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in, 51; + revolt of, 51 + +Turkey, Islam conquered by, 23; + Arabs war against, 23 _ff._; + Mehemet Ali's aid of, 28; + liberal movement in, 31 _ff._; + 1908 revolution in, 32, 119; + Balkan attack on, 57 _ff._; + anti-Western feeling in, 90 _ff._; + effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 106; + independence of, 118; + liberal movement in, 118; + democracy in, 126; + birth of nationalism in, 138; + language of, 138; + Pan-Turanism in, 140 _ff._, 161 _ff._, 183 _ff._; + Arabian rebellion against, 141 _ff._; + Allied treaty with, 193; + Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._; + Western educational methods in, 256; + status of women in, 258; + Bolshevists' manifesto to, 289 _ff._ + +_Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, The_, 167 + + +Vambery, Arminius, warning against Mohammedans uttered by, 65 _ff._, 107; + Moslem politics described by, 114, 126; + Young-Turk party described by, 117; + Turanism and, 63; + on changes at Constantinople, 251 _ff._; + on native officials in East, 257 _ff._; + on status of woman in East, 259; + +Venizelos, Allied agreement with, 193; + Greek repudiation of, 194 + +Versailles Peace, Islam affected by 107 _ff._, 173; + secret treaties revealed by, 174 _ff._ + +Victoria, Queen, made Empress of India, 205 + + +Wacha, Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report 217 _ff._ + +Wahabi, formation of state of, 22, 40; + government of, 22, 41; + successful fighting of, 23; + defeat of, 23; + end of political power of, 23; + spiritual power of, 24; + in India, 24; + English conquest of, in India, 24; + influence of, 24; + characteristics of, 25 _ff._ + +Wattal, P. K., on over-population in India, 264 _ff._ + +Willcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian situation, 179 + + +Yahya Siddyk, on pro-war Mohammedan situation, 68 _ff._ + +Yakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led by, 51 + +Young Arabia, 143 _ff._ + +Young-Turk party, rise of, 116 _ff._; + nationalist policy of, 140; + Arabian nationalism and, 145 _ff._ + +Young-Turk revolution, 56, 119 + +_Yugantar_, anti-English organ, 211 _ff._ + +Yunnan, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._; + Chinese Mohammedans in, 51 + +Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Turanian society founded by, 165 + + +Zagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions with, 181; + Milner's compromise with, 182; + opposition to, 182 _ff._ + +Zaidite Emir, 199 + +Zawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 44 + +Zinoviev, on Third International, 294 _ff._ + +[Illustration: THE WORLD OF ISLAM] + + + + +TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES + +General: Accents and capitalisation, particularly on cited sources, have +been left as in the original. + +Pages 8, 274, 303: Spelling of Kharijites/Kharidjites/Kharadjites left +as in source. + +Page 21: Inquity replaced with iniquity. + +Page 39: Hyphen added to El-Afghani for consistency. + +Page 45: Zawais corrected to Zawias. + +Page 49: Hyphen removed from repercussions for consistency. + +Page 94: Hyphen removed from easy-going. + +Footnote 257: Italicisation removed from March following The Century. + +Footnotes 257 and 259 (originally on page 261): Full-stop (period) added +after op (in op. cit.) for consistency. + +Page 290: Hyphen added to oil-fields for consistency. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The New World of Islam, by Lothrop Stoddard + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM *** + +***** This file should be named 24107.txt or 24107.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/1/0/24107/ + +Produced by Brownfox, Michael Ciesielski and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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