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Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay +claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, +for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding +with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what +sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be +appropriate to that case only. + +On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which +have both the name and the definition answering to the name in +common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are +univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the +definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state +in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case +would be identical with that in the other. + +Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their +name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. +Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and +the courageous man from the word 'courage'. + +Part 2 + +Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the +latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of +the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. + +Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are +never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the +individual man, and is never present in a subject. + +By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts +are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart +from the said subject. + +Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never +predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of +grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not +predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be +present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet +it is never predicable of anything. + +Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present +in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, +it is predicable of grammar. + +There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in +a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man +or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which +is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable +of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such +being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical +knowledge is present in a subject. + +Part 3 + +When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is +predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the +subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but +'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be +predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is +both 'man' and 'animal'. + +If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are +themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus +'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', +'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of +knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One +species of knowledge does not differ from another in being +'two-footed'. + +But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing +to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater +class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae +of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject. + +Part 4 + +Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, +quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, +action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of +substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as +'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such +attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', +'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market +place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last +year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms +indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to +cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', +affection. + +No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; +it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative +statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be +either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any +way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be +either true or false. + +Part 5 + +Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of +the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor +present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. +But in a secondary sense those things are called substances +within which, as species, the primary substances are included; +also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, +the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the +genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, +therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus +'animal,-are termed secondary substances. + +It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the +definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. +For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in +this case the name of the species man' is applied to the +individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the +individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated +of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and +animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are +predicable of the individual. + +With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present +in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name +nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are +present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, +there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. +For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of +that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the +definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of +the body. + +Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a +primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes +evident by reference to particular instances which occur. +'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the +individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it +could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species +'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in +individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which +it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus +everything except primary substances is either predicated of +primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did +not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. + +Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than +the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if +any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, +he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper +to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. +Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual +man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was +animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual +in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the +man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will +give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' +than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. + +Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances +in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie +every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of +them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists +between primary substance and everything else subsists also +between the species and the genus: for the species is to the +genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated +of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the +genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the +species is more truly substance than the genus. + +Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, +no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a +more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the +species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual +horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, +of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than +another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an +individual ox. + +It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we +exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera +alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the +predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by +stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any +individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by +stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things +that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, +are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these +alone, apart from primary substances, should be called +substances. + +Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because +they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the +same relation that subsists between primary substance and +everything else subsists also between the species and the genus +to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and +every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. +For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual +man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the +species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good +in all cases. + +It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never +present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in +a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to +secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments +(apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For +'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in +any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In +the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, +but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a +subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in +which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of +secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, +applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the +species and that of the genus with reference to the individual +man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. + +Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case +that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The +characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of +the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in +man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be +predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. +For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated +of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic +may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' +is terrestrial. + +The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the +whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we +should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in +explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' +that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'. + +It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all +propositions of which they form the predicate, they are +predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their +subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, +inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it +can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary +substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the +genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the +differentiae are predicated of the species and of the +individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of +the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of +the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the +predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the +definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species +and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word +'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and +definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every +proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the +predicate, these are predicated univocally. + +All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the +case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the +thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we +speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech +gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which +is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a +secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a +certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary +substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more +than one subject. + +Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the +term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but +species and genus determine the quality with reference to a +substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. +The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case +of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word +'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who +uses the word 'man'. + +Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could +be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual +man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have +a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, +but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is +nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three +cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend +that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', +but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. + +Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of +degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more +or less truly substance than another, for it has already been +stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance +admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one +particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either +than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man +cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be +more or less white than some other white object, or as that which +is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other +beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist +in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being +white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, +being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other +time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it +is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, +nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. +Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. + +The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of +admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than +substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any +which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot +be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: +this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But +one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is +yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual +person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, +at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity +is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a +statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same +statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the +statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person in +question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same +applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is +sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if +still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be +allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in +which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that +substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which +was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. +Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was +bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all +other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of +admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions +themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the +alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality +comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains +unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, +according to circumstances. What has been said of statements +applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which +the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that +it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is +by itself changing that it does so. + +If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that +statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary +qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions +are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves +undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the +case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement +depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the +statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there +is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. +As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be +said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. + +But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within +the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of +admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within +itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in +this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary +qualities. + +To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of +admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place +through a change in the substance itself. + +Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. + +Part 6 + +Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some +quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative +position to the other parts: others have within them no such +relation of part to part. + +Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of +continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and +place. + +In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary +at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two +fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three +and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, +would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should +be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. +Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. + +The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: +for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that +speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for +its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at +which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from +the rest. + +A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is +possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In +the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the +case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane +have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common +boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a +line or a plane. + +Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, +past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, +likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid +occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it +follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the +parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of +the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous +quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. + +Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position +each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear +a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and +it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the +position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part +among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a +plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was +the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The +same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would +be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative +position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what +parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of +time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and +that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be +better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of +one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, +'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts +of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it +would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. +This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has +an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is +not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do +not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities +consist of parts which have position, and some of those which +have not. + +Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong +to the category of quantity: everything else that is called +quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we +have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, +that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of +what is white as large, because the surface over which the white +extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, +because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their +own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should +any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be +made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a +year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would +explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he +would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already +mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature +quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, +but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. + +Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities +this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of +'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or +of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' +was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these +are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small +absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of +comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain +large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than +others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference +here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and +'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called +small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people +in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are +many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a +house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the +theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits +long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms +'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for they have reference to +an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to +be classed as relative. + +Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have +no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute +which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by +reference to something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' +are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can +admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that +things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens +at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the +same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great +in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be +both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a +nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. +Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that +nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For +though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet +no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at +the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which +is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. + +Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be +contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of +'small', and the same thing is both great and small at the same +time, then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this +is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary +of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a +man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they +would not have contraries. + +It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears +to admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the +contrary of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they +mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing is farther from +the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. +Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men +have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those +things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated +by the greatest possible distance. + +Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One +thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. +Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more +truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three +more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is +not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any +other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with +regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The +category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of +degree. + +The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and +inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities +is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said +to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have +these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of +quantity that have been mentioned. + +That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be +termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular +disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by +no means compared with another in terms of equality and +inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the +distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and +unequal. + +Section 2 + +Part 7 + +Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be +of something else or related to something else, are explained by +reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' +is explained by reference to something else, for it is +superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the +expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the +double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything +else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. +habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The +significance of all these is explained by a reference to +something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of +something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the +attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that +have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the +nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the +preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate +the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison +with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by +comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar +must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes +have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and +standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is +itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not +themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid +attitudes. + +It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has +a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has +a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; +'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such +term. + +It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. +For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the +modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of +these is relative in character: for the terms 'like' and +'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a reference to something external. +Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of +variation of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this +modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term +'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the +master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by +'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that +which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater. + +So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to +express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by +knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that +which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, +perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is +apprehended by perception. + +Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to +exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which +the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states +that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion +between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be +possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The +reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the +wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many +creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, +then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be +reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference +necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as +being such because of its wings. + +Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word +exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we +define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our +definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have +this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have +no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the +word 'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word +'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition would +perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' +as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus +accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for +the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it +is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as +the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that of an +animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since +many animals have no head. + +Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing +is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a +name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the +first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, +when we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'. + +All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I +add this condition because, if that to which they are related is +stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to +be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in +the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for +each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is +denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, +but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if +defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or +anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in +relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. +Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and +the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant +attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in +virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with +that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the +correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, +though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as +'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, +and the attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation +existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it +is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other +hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, +when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in +virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated +correlation will be found to have disappeared. + +For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be +'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the +attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation +between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the +man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the +attribute 'winged' be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will +no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not +winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative. + +Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly +designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be +easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When +the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all +correlatives are interdependent. + +Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. +This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and +the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of +that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master +necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave +implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general +rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no +double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this +rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not +appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into +existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to +exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we +acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be +difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the +beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that +of its object. + +Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, +cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, +the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object +of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there +will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, +if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may +nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring +of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, +though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the +knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all +animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there +might yet be many objects of knowledge. + +This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the +object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of +perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also +will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not +cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a +body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if +that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the +body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if +the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases +to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that +of perception. + +But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the +perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that +perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, +heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. + +Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving +subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the +animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for +fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is +itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and +before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists +before perception. + +It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is +relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be +made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to +primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such +possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances +are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with +reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a +particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or +head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a +particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, +in the case of secondary substances; the species 'man' and the +species 'ox' are not defined with reference to anything outside +themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some +one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, +that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with +regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of +opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with +reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and +so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. +Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, +it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no +substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not +complete, if those things only are properly called relative in +the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary +condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma +may be found. + +The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the +fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else +does not make it essentially relative. + +>From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a +relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which +it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows +that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call +that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a +necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it +is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is +related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is +clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows +definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also +forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if +there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, +he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows +that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he +will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more +beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more +beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would +be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely +that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to +know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else +which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less +beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends +some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also +definitely to which it is related. + +Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is +possible to know their essential character definitely, but it +does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which +they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head +or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being +the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative +in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to +make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, +but to have raised questions with regard to details is not +without advantage. + +Part 8 + +By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be +such and such. + +Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of +quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from +disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. +The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for +knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it +is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, +unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or +any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, +self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, +so as to give place to vice. + +By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is +easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, +heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a +man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, +but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead +of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless +through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate +and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should +perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. + +It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits +which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to +displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but +volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards +knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or +worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in +this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent +and difficult to alter. + +Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are +not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit +may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus +disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have +not in all cases the corresponding habit. + +Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, +we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact +it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or +incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue +of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or +incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any +kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in +virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn +capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called +healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to +those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, +in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to +softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because +it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand +disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by +reason of the lack of that capacity. + +A third class within this category is that of affective qualities +and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of +this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; +heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective +qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those +things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such +by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it +contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains +whiteness; and so in all other cases. + +The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those +things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey +is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor +is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and +cold are called affective qualities, not because those things +which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said +qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of +perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of +taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these +qualities. + +Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not +said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they +themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many +changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is +ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so +on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such +affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his +constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the +corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of +bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily +present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a +man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding +colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, +therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and +lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor +and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we +are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they +originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about +through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or +indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to +be such and such because of these. + +Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may +easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, +not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such +virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to +be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale +through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather +to have been affected. + +Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. +In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of +the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its +origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I +mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for +people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. +Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but +arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are +difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called +qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and +such. + +Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered +ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a +man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a +bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper +somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are +therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. + +The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs +to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any +other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as +being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a +thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it +is straight or curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case +gives rise to a qualification of it. + +Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms +indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to +a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a +certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus +qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. +A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely +combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices +between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, +evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others. + +There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most +properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. + +These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name +from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on +them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, +indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified +is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', +'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives 'white', +'grammatical', 'just', and so on. + +There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under +consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed +of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the +name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of +an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for +lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the +inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to +which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is +classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' +or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those +disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. +Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which +takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a +derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character +from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name +given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does +not occur often. + +We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed +of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of +the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent +on it. + +One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the +contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The +things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of +these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that +which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is +white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the +case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no +contraries. + +If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a +quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we +apply the names used to denote the other categories; for +instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and +justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither +quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category +but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So +it is with all other contraries falling under the category of +quality. + +Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated +of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is +also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the +same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did +before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. + +Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if +we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, +difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all +those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, +who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that +justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree +themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they +possess these qualities, and that this is the case with +grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as +dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact +that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be +what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for +one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy +or just, than another, and so on. + +The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and +'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor +indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to +which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are +all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to +which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to +differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle +than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the +circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term +proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be +compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation +of degree. + +Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar +to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be +predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category +its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with +reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus +this forms the peculiar mark of quality. + +We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though +proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in +it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions +were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is +relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is +explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge +of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus +explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything +external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative +at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar +is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of +something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the +music of something. + +Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is +because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we +are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually +possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in +some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of +knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such +and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. +Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the +category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing +extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. + +Section 3 + +Part 9 + +Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of +variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being +heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they +admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for +it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be +heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection +also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with +regard to these categories. + +We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were +dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived +their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. + +As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily +intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the +beginning, that in the category of state are included such states +as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, +as was explained before. + +Part 10 + +The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. +We must next explain the various senses in which the term +'opposite' is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: +(i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one +another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives +to negatives. + +Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of +the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by +the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries +by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and +'positives' are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of +affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does +not sit'. + +(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation +are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the +reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some +other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that +which is double is explained as the double of something. +Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same +sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to +its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that +which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, +then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being +correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the +other. + +(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way +interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good +is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of +the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as +the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are +therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the +subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they +are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the +other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of +which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. +Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an +animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other +should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, +are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the +other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate +between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other +hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity +obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are +naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that +either the one or the other should be present in the body, +inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or +black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of +many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one +quality or the other should be present in that of which they are +predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be +good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries +have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are +grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the +intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the +one nor the other. + +Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow +and all the other colours that come between white and black; in +other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, +but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in +the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor +unjust. + +(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same +subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It +is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type +has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is +natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty +or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or +possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and +at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not +call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has +not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the +time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which +from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not +called toothless or blind. + +To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as +the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a +'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is +not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to +'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in +a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'. Moreover, if +'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be +predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be +blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. + +To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of +being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and +'privatives' themselves are opposite. There is the same type of +antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to +sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. + +That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or +denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by +'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of +the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are +said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and +denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. +For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two +propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which +constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed +to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not +sitting. + +It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed +each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not +explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of +blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the +relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of +sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, +reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there +would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which +it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called +the sight of blindness. + +That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and +'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, +is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such +that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be +present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of +which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,' in the +case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. +Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as +instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are +not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every +substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or +white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these +contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, +moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case +of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the +two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it +is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be +white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two +contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the +subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not +the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every +subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of +which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such +cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either +the one or the other, which must be present. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, +neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not +necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always +have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced +to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind +or to see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to +that class of contraries which consists of those which have no +intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to +that class which consists of contraries which have an +intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that +either the one or the other should form part of the constitution +of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the +stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said +either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, +signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for +it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should +be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the +other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an +intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the +one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, +but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be +present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain +that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in +either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. + +Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there +should be changes from either into the other, while the subject +retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a +constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it +is possible that that that which is healthy should become +diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, +that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if +he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may +make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, +even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, +or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more +and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement +was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will +make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as +this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish +him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of +time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, +change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change +from possession to privation, but not from privation to +possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his +sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the +man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. (iv) +Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly +to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case +only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the +other false. + +Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of +correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is +it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and +disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. +'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: +neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of +course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as +'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of +combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all +the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. + +At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed +statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of +opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is +ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such +composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must +always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one +will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both +will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is +well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does +not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the +subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and +the other false. For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of +'Socrates is blind' in the sense of the word 'opposite' which +applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it +is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for +when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are +false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. + +But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject +exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For +manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions +'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other +false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he +does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is +not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, +which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with +reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, +that one of the pair must be true and the other false. + +Part 11 + +That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the +contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. +But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an +evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, +this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is +equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a +few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the +contrary of an evil is a good. + +In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one +exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy +there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything +turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the +fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that +Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain +in one and the same individual at the same time, both these +contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well +was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one. + +It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in +subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and +health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and +black require a body, without further qualification; justice and +injustice require as their subject the human soul. + +Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all +cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary +genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the +same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, +virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but +are themselves actual genera, with terms under them. + +Part 12 + +There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be +'prior' to another. Primarily and most properly the term has +reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate +that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the +expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of +time. + +Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the +sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' +is 'prior' to 'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly +that 'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does not follow +necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting +cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of +two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other +depends is called 'prior' to that other. + +In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to +any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in +sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and +that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are +prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of +the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case +of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. + +Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which +is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. +In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love +as 'coming first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps +the most far-fetched. + +Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is +used. + +Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet +another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies +that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may +reasonably be said to be by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is +plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of +a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, +and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the +proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if +the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. +The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the +being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem +somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the +truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the +man's being or not being. + +Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses. + +Part 13 + +The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately +applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is +simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is +prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be +simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are +'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which +involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the +cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the +double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, +if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a +half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is +the cause of the being of the other. + +Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and +opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be +'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are +distinguished each from each by one and the same method of +division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the +'terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished +within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the +genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the +'water' species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to +another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be +'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, +the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into +subspecies. Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' +point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are +distinguished each from each by one and the same method of +differentiation. + +But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being +cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there +will be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus +'animal', it does not follow necessarily that there will be the +species 'water-animal'. + +Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, +the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at +the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other's +being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from +each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, +are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which +come into being at the same time. + +Part 14 + +There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, +increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. + +It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of +movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from +destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so +on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the +process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts +of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, +or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from +all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not +suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of +motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it +were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would +forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one +of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of +fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the +process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion +would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, +necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some +things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, +for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase +but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this +sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. + +Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the +different forms of motion have their own contraries in other +forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution +of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this +last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly +its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion +downwards and vice versa. + +In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those +that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its +contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should +define the contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or +as 'change in the direction of the contrary quality', just as we +defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place +or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered +when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its +quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called +the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way +becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is +alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a +qualitative nature takes place. + +Part 15 + +The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place +it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other +quality, for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a +virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for +instance, in the case of a man's height; for he is said to 'have' +a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with +regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat or tunic; or +in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as +a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of +us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the +case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said +to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such +cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has +been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is +also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this +appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use +of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. + +Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most +ordinary ones have all been enumerated. + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's etext, The Categories, by Aristotle + diff --git a/old/arist10.zip b/old/arist10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fab4d3b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/arist10.zip |