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diff --git a/26490-h/26490-h.htm b/26490-h/26490-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5acce9 --- /dev/null +++ b/26490-h/26490-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,22859 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html lang="en"> + +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>The Project Gutenberg e-Book of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa; Author: W. Basil Worsfold</title> + + +<style type="text/css"> +<!-- + +body {font-size: 1em; text-align: justify; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + +h1 {font-size: 120%; text-align: center; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h2 {font-size: 110%; text-align: center; margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 110%; text-align: center; margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 1em;} + +a:focus, a:active { outline:#ffee66 solid 2px; background-color:#ffee66;} +a:focus img, a:active img {outline: #ffee66 solid 2px; } + +ul {list-style-type: none;} + +table {border-collapse: collapse; table-layout: fixed; font-size: 95%; + width: 60%; margin-left: 5%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em;} +p.tn {margin-left: 10%; width: 80%; font-size: 80%; text-indent: 0em;} + +.pagenum {visibility: hidden; + position: absolute; right:0; text-align: right; + font-size: 10px; + font-weight: normal; font-variant: normal; + font-style: normal; letter-spacing: normal; + color: #C0C0C0; background-color: inherit;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +.p4 {margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 1em;} + +.center {text-align: center;} +.right {text-align: right;} +.noindent {text-indent: 0em;} +.left50 {margin-left: 50%;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps; font-size: 95%;} +.smaller {font-size: smaller;} +.small {font-size: 70%;} +.italic {font-style: italic;} + +.toc {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} +.index p {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; text-indent: -0em;} +.title {text-align: center; text-indent: 0em; font-variant: small-caps; font-size: 95%; margin-bottom: 2em;} +.quote {margin-left: 5%; font-size: 95%;} +.footnote {text-indent: 0em;} +.centered_block {text-indent: 0em; margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; font-size: smaller;} + +span.sidenote {font-size: 75%; + margin-left: -10%; margin-right: 1em; margin-top: 0.5em; + clear: left; float: left; + text-indent: 0em; text-align: left; + padding: 0.5em 0.3em 0.5em 0.3em; + background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} +span.sidenote2 {font-size: 75%; + margin-left: -16%; margin-right: 1em; margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; + clear: left; float: left; + text-indent: 0em; text-align: left; + padding: 0.5em 0.3em 0.5em 0.3em; + background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + +.add2em {margin-left: 2em;} +.add5em {margin-left: 5em;} + +.min1em {margin-left: -1em;} +.min2em {margin-left: -2em;} + +.figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center; margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 1.5em;} + +.ralign {position: absolute; right: 10%; top: auto;} +--> +</style> + +</head> + +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by W. Basil Worsfold + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lord Milner's Work in South Africa + From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902 + +Author: W. Basil Worsfold + +Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26490] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA *** + + + + +Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p class="tn">Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all +other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling +has been maintained.</p> + +<a id="img001" name="img001"></a> +<div class="figcenter"> +<img src="images/img001.jpg" width="400" height="506" alt="Milner" title=""> +</div> +<div class="figcenter"> +<img src="images/img001b.jpg" width="200" height="60" alt="Milner signature" title=""> +</div> + +<h1>LORD MILNER'S WORK<br> + IN SOUTH AFRICA</h1> + +<p class="center noindent">FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO<br> + THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902</p> + +<p class="center noindent p2 smcap">containing hitherto unpublished information</p> + +<h2>BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD</h2> + +<p class="center noindent p2 smcap">with portraits and map</p> + +<p class="centered_block p4"> + "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if + there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself + responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom + disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never + move?"—<span class="smcap">Lord Goschen</span> <span class="italic">in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906</span></p> + +<p class="p4 center noindent small"> + LONDON<br> + JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W<br> + 1906</p> + +<p class="center noindent p4 italic smaller">This Edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne +Convention, as well as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all British +Colonies and Dependencies.</p> + +<p class="center noindent p4 italic small">Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</p> + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagev" name="pagev"></a>(p. v)</span> PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way +of preface.</p> + +<p>The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside +twice for a considerable period in South Africa—first in the +neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg +(1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long +interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with +many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this +book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy +by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications, +my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these +sources.</p> + +<p>My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this +book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a +body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances +and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration +of peace—an event not yet five years old—a great change has been +wrought in the political and <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevi" name="pagevi"></a>(p. vi)</span> economic framework of this +province of the empire. None the less, with a few conspicuous +exceptions, almost all of the principal actors in these pages are +still there; and, presumably, they are very much the same men now as +they were before, and during, the war. And in this connection it +remains to notice an aspect of the South African struggle which +transcends all others in fruitfulness and importance. It was a +struggle to keep South Africa not a dependency of Great Britain, but a +part of the empire. The over-sea Britains, understanding it in this +sense, took their share in it. They made their voices heard in the +settlement. The service which they thus collectively performed was +great. It would have been infinitely greater if they had been directly +represented in an administration nominally common to them and the +mother country. No political system can be endowed with effective +unity—with that organic unity which is the only effective +unity—unless it is possessed of a single vehicle of thought and +action. To create this vehicle—an administrative body in which all +parts of the empire would be duly represented—is difficult to-day. +The forces of disunion, which are at work both at home and beyond the +seas, may make it impossible to-morrow.</p> + +<p class="right"> + W. B. W.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ridge, near Capel, Surrey</span>,<br> + <span class="italic add2em">October 19th, 1906</span></p> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevii" name="pagevii"></a>(p. vii)</span> CONTENTS</h2> +<a id="toc" name="toc"></a> +<div class="toc"> +<ul class="none"> +<li><span class="ralign smcap">Page</span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER I</li> +<li><span class="smcap">downing street and the man on the spot</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page001">1</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER II</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the creed of the afrikander nationalists</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page048">48</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER III</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">a year of observation</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page075">75</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER IV</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">under which flag?</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page130">130</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER V</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">playing for time</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page188">188</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER VI</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the ultimatum</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page253">253</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER VII</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the fall of the republics</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page300">300</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="pagenum"><a id="pageviii" name="pageviii"></a>(p. viii)</span> CHAPTER VIII</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the rebellion in the cape colony</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page341">341</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER IX</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the "conciliation" movement</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page373">373</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER X</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the disarmament of the dutch population</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page413">413</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER XI</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">preparing for peace</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page470">470</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER XII</li> + +<li><span class="smcap">the surrender of vereeniging</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page536">536</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2"><span class="min1em">INDEX</span> +<span class="ralign"><a href="#page585">585</a></span></li> +</ul> + +<p class="p2 title">ILLUSTRATIONS</p> + +<ul class="none"> +<li><span class="ralign smcap">Facing Page</span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">portrait of lord milner</span><br> + <span class="italic smaller">From a photograph by Elliott & Fry (Photogravure)</span> +<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img001">Frontispiece</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">lord milner at sunnyside</span> +<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img002">473</a></span></li> + +<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">map of south africa</span> +<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img003">At the End</a></span></li> +</ul> +</div> + + +<h1><span class="pagenum"><a id="page001" name="page001"></a>(p. 001)</span> LORD MILNER</h1> + +<h3>CHAPTER I</h3> + +<p class="title">DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT</p> + + +<p>The failure of British administration in South Africa during the +nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian +era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could +be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt, +why failure in South Africa? For failure it was. A century of wars, +missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty +administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two +European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social +differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military +resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel +the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all +white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of +failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the +nationality difficulty and the native question. But these are problems +of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in +Canada and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page002" name="page002"></a>(p. 002)</span> the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a +different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging +nature—the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult +for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to +wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material +disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt, +by Anglo-Saxon energy. We might apply the Socratic method throughout, +traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in +every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of +the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to +render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various +in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the +explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the +second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape +of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which +Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his +employers. Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David +Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted +by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his +charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head. The +theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy <span class="pagenum"><a id="page003" name="page003"></a>(p. 003)</span> +of a certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of +friendship with the Dutch—a circumstance which was sufficiently +apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an +hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with +the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled +to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant. It was the first +conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been +bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the +Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man +was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and +so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of +Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must +pursue.</p> + + <span class="sidenote">Van Riebeck's difficulty.</span> + +<p>He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if +apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to +the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual +robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at +Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending +Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the +countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era. +But unfortunately +it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers +and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent +of Africa, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page004" name="page004"></a>(p. 004)</span> to think of putting it into effect. He replied +that he had no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and +that the institution of private property was unknown among the +Hottentots. The only method by which the individual could be punished +was by punishing the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the +tribe and their cattle. But this was a course of action which was +repugnant to the Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a +vision of reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements +quite disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as +an item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a +large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be +a great addition to the resources of the settlement. The Chamber of +Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as +its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe +escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened +to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Afrikander stock.</span> + +<p>This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an +obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home +authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local +conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral +judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must +be equally valid in South Africa. By the time that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page005" name="page005"></a>(p. 005)</span> home +authority had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber +of Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these +misconceptions operated had become enlarged. The natives were there, +as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a +population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose +manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more +intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than +those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir. A +century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government—a +government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things +commercial purely monopolist"—had produced a people unlike any other +European community on the face of the earth. +Of the small original +stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter +were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were +German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the +inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood. But this racial change was by no +means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony +from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The +corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the +determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse—social, +intellectual, commercial, and political—with their kinsmen in Europe. +One fact will suffice to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page006" name="page006"></a>(p. 006)</span> show how perfectly this object was +attained. Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of +the eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape +Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means +of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by +which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European +civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it +is significant to the student of South African history. This +phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a +community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards +were those of the seventeenth.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The nationality difficulty.</span> + +<p>Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It +does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration; +but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make +the task of governing the Cape Colony—a task finally undertaken by +England in 1806—one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was +strange, but the European population was even more strange and +abnormal. +If we had been left to deal with the native population alone +we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them +harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for +entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of +their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to +modify <span class="pagenum"><a id="page007" name="page007"></a>(p. 007)</span> our native policy to suit the conditions of a +preexisting relationship between the white and black races that was +not of our creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects +repugnant to British ideas of justice. Nor was this all. The old +European population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and +fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed +from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a +political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the +mastership of the native African tribes.</p> + +<p>Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a +man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas, +while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth +century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the +first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than +ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that +his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical +with his own. When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the +other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course +make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to +contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had +grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage.</p> + +<p>Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government, +both Governors and High <span class="pagenum"><a id="page008" name="page008"></a>(p. 008)</span> Commissioners, soon learnt that +neither the natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on +the same footing as a Western European. But the British Government +cannot be said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in +almost the last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive +defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a +knowledge of the fact that we had been within an ace of losing South +Africa. Many, indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had +been thoroughly learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that +throughout the nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat +both the natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British +ideas; and that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict +with its own local representatives, who knew that the only hope of +success lay in dealing with both alike on a basis of South African +ideas.</p> + +<p>As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to +understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner +of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth +century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of +opinion between the home and the local authorities.</p> + +<p>At the very outset of British administration—during the temporary +occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808—we find a theoretically +perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early <span class="pagenum"><a id="page009" name="page009"></a>(p. 009)</span> +English Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier +farmers. It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions +for the treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the +Dutch East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800, +the third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the +Colonies, writes:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Non-interference.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Considering the tract of country over which these border + inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in + which they live, and the wild notions of independence which + prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce + civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow + in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution + and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to + occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of + government, than answer the beneficent views with which they + might be undertaken. In fact, it seems to me the proper system of + policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible + in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them + rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than + as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations + established within the precincts of Government. Mutual advantages + arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good + faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to + efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part + of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing + their attachment."</p> + +<p>Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it +is at first sight, contained <span class="pagenum"><a id="page010" name="page010"></a>(p. 010)</span> in itself the germ of a +political heresy of the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle +of non-interference, here for the first time enunciated and +subsequently followed with fatal effect, could not be applied by a +nineteenth-century administration to the case of a seventeenth-century +community without its virtually renouncing the functions of +government. Obviously this was not the intention of the home +authority. There remained the difficulty of knowing when to apply, and +when not to apply, the principle; and directly a specific case arose +there was the possibility that, while the local authority, with a full +knowledge of the local conditions, might think interference necessary, +the home authority, without such knowledge, might take an opposite +view.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Slaghter's Nek.</span> + +<p>A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of +the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with +the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects +of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent +occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted +of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657 +Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves. One of the first measures +of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series +of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots, +while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the +expense of the European population. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page011" name="page011"></a>(p. 011)</span> From the British, or +even European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to +which no man could possibly take exception. As applied to the +conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was, +in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and +internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest +known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek. +There was no +question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term +of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore +entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to +remove his property. All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came +to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the +Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he +considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and <span class="italic">his</span> +Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an +intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority."</p> + +<p>And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their +seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater +when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their +natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of +military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of +mountains—the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is +known to the people <span class="pagenum"><a id="page012" name="page012"></a>(p. 012)</span> of Great Britain. The Boer frontiersman, +with his aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin, +disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the +work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon +learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant +the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date +with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable +spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in +Downing Street and quite another in Capetown.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">D'Urban's policy.</span> + +<p>The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which +collectively the history of our South African administration owes its +sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin +D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg) +at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On +Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war, +needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in +the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their +cattle. After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British +settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made +with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban +and his local +advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from +further inroads. The Kafirs were to retire to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page013" name="page013"></a>(p. 013)</span> the line of +the Kei River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the +European settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion; +while a belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be +interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads. In +addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the +settlers for the enormous losses<a id="footnotetag1" name="footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1" title="Go to footnote 1"><span class="small">[1]</span></a> which they had incurred; since, as +a contemporary and not unfriendly writer<a id="footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2" title="Go to footnote 2"><span class="small">[2]</span></a> puts it, the British +Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations, +rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must +plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their +protection.</p> + +<p>The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of +His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the +result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of +the European settlers. D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate +the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the +treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the +Fish River—the original eastern boundary of the Colony—which the +Colonial Government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page014" name="page014"></a>(p. 014)</span> had made to its European subjects from +1817 onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether +out of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank +for the enmity of the natives—if, indeed, they had not deliberately +provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory.</p> + +<p>The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked. +To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed +views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts +would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall +two statements, each significant and authentic. Cloete, writing while +the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord +Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting +to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the +inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of +the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban +was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons: +"My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me +that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if +he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing +so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Great Trek.</span> + +<p>This settlement of a South African question <span class="pagenum"><a id="page015" name="page015"></a>(p. 015)</span> upon a basis of +British, or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as +notorious as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in +1819-20 the first and only effort to introduce a considerable British +population into South Africa had been successfully carried out when +the "Albany" settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were +established in this and other districts upon the eastern border of the +Cape Colony. The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion +of 1834-5 were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many +members of the new British population, and the divergence of opinion +between D'Urban and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since +in this case the British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It +was no longer merely a divergence of views as between the local and +the home authority, but as between the British in Britain and the +British in South Africa. It must also be remembered that, in the same +year as the Kafir invasion, a social revolution—the emancipation of +slaves—had been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the +British Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of +the railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively +trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the +Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the +safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came +at a bad time. Whether <span class="pagenum"><a id="page016" name="page016"></a>(p. 016)</span> the secession of the Emigrant Farmers +would in any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation +of slaves is a matter which cannot now be decided. But, however this +may be, the fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an +opinion on the subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the +first Prime Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining +influence which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction +of the British Government to the sense of injustice created by the +measures dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his +despatch.<a id="footnotetag3" name="footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3" title="Go to footnote 3"><span class="small">[3]</span></a> And this judgment is supported by the fact that the +wealthier Dutch of the Western Province were much more seriously +affected by the emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern +districts of the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who +provided the bulk of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the +years of the +Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an +extravagantly improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement +which divided European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained +divergence <span class="pagenum"><a id="page017" name="page017"></a>(p. 017)</span> of opinion between the home and local +authorities—both British.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The birth of the republic.</span> + +<p>The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the +Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered +settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the +Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854 +(Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics, +which half a +century later withstood for two years and eight months the whole +available military force of the British Empire. The first effect of +the secession was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power +which bid against the British Government for the territory and +allegiance of the natives. Secession, therefore, made the inevitable +task of establishing the supremacy of the white man in South Africa +infinitely more costly both in blood and treasure. The British nation +accepted the task, which fell to it as paramount power, with the +greatest reluctance. The endless and apparently aimless Kafir wars +exhausted the patience of the country, and the destruction of an +entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's<a id="footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href="#footnote4" title="Go to footnote 4"><span class="small">[4]</span></a> <span class="italic">impis</span> created a feeling of +deep resentment against the great High Commissioner, whose policy was +held—unreasonably enough—responsible for the military disaster of +Isandlhwana. Two opportunities of recovering the lost solidarity of +the Europeans were presented before the republican Dutch had set +themselves <span class="pagenum"><a id="page018" name="page018"></a>(p. 018)</span> definitely to work for the supremacy of South +Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk. That both were +lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British people at the +excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised administration +over the native population in South Africa. But in both cases the +immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home Government to +listen to the advice of its local representative. +<span class="sidenote">Sir George Grey.</span> +Sir George Grey +would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by taking +advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State Dutch +from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and +prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the +Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature, +consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several +states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the +pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in +England. The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and +increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well +aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the +peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing +to contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in +which they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not +hopeless, for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects +upon the tribes of the interior. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page019" name="page019"></a>(p. 019)</span> But the most powerful +argument which Grey used was his ruthless exposure of the futility of +the Conventions. By allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into +independent communities the British Government believed that not only +had they relieved themselves of responsibility for the republican +Dutch, but that they had secured, in addition, the unfaltering +allegiance of the larger Dutch population which remained behind in the +Cape Colony. Grey assured the Home Government that in both respects it +was the victim of a delusion bred of its complete ignorance of South +African conditions. The Boer Republics would give trouble. Apart from +the bad draftsmanship of the conventions—a fertile source of +disagreement—these small states would be centres of intrigue and +"internal commotions," while at the same time their revenues would be +too small to provide efficiently for their protection against the +warlike tribes. The policy of <span class="italic">divide et impera</span>—or, as Grey called +it, the "dismemberment" policy—would fail, since the political +barrier which had been erected was wholly artificial.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Although these European countries are treated as separate + nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names + as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of + the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the + same language—not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part + of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church. + They have the same laws—the Roman Dutch. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page020" name="page020"></a>(p. 020)</span> They have the + same sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and + frequently the same feelings regarding the native races....</p> + +<p>"I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or + popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of + calling these people different nations would not make them so, + nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them + sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison.... + Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the + south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on + the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of + the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href="#footnote5" title="Go to footnote 5"><span class="small">[5]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was +complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to +the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of +June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt +himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape +Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to +carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch,</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption + of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly + expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament, + and in your answers to the address from the State in question."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page021" name="page021"></a>(p. 021)</span> Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but +effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the +eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted +economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial +Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing +Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows +that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The burden of the empire.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes + on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more + than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of + the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the + Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to + serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster + will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off + from me. I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in + military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists + will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of + this country has been advantageously laid out."</p> + +<p>These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time +when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir. In the plain language of +the Secretary of State for the Colonies<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href="#footnote6" title="Go to footnote 6"><span class="small">[6]</span></a> in 1858, it was a time when +ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and +increasing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page022" name="page022"></a>(p. 022)</span> dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large +military establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one +more passage must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a +certain grim humour—although this is a valuable quality in such a +context—as because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in +support of the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to +follow the advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative +cause of the failure of British administration in South Africa. The +reply to the charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in +one leisurely sentence, runs as follows:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on + the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of + policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the + general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed + since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at + least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department, + each of whom held different views upon some important points of + policy connected with this country."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The discovery of diamonds.</span> + +<p>Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the +home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from +Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their +representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to +decide by what methods the objects of British <span class="pagenum"><a id="page023" name="page023"></a>(p. 023)</span> policy could +be most effectively advanced. But it was not until some considerable +time after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate +Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on +its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these +protests produced any appreciable effect. What really aroused an +interest in South Africa—that is to say a practical interest, as +distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary +enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare—was the +discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent +establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first +time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast +"hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial +possibilities. The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape +Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its +main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once +established, attracted British capital and British population, and by +so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to +do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South +Africa within the purview of the nation. Thanks to the Kimberley mines +the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were +exclusively pastoral and agricultural.</p> + +<p>The epoch of the next great divergence of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page024" name="page024"></a>(p. 024)</span> opinion was a more +hopeful time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who +was the first statesman to give practical expression to the belief +that the maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare +of the masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen, +and the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to +study Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit. +Something had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South +Africa. And yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most +ruinous of all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing +Street occurred.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Sir Bartle Frere.</span> + +<p>When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a +definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British +colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated +classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty +years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential +unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an +industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of +political power had shifted in England. The extension of the franchise +had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in +the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated +in the political and economic conditions of that country. The +divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page025" name="page025"></a>(p. 025)</span> in this case wider than ever. In short, it was the will of +the nation that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the +accomplishment of his task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal +party to administer South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in +contemptuous indifference of the profoundest convictions and most +solemn warnings of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the +Crown.</p> + +<p>The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story +is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from +the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he +foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated, +twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power +which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity +under the British flag was the Zulu people. The whole adult male +population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by +Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military +instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary +career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;<a id="footnotetag7" name="footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7" title="Go to footnote 7"><span class="small">[7]</span></a> and he had +prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South +Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing +supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle. But in doing +so he, or rather the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page026" name="page026"></a>(p. 026)</span> general entrusted with the command of +the military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This +revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete +confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South +African situation. His contention was that England must give evidence +of both her capacity and her intention to control the native +population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the +republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the +British colonies in a federal system under the British flag. A native +power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two +possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not +only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable +obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power, +the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the +reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the +question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's <span class="italic">impis</span> had been +exaggerated. To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an +emphatic "No."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The recall of Frere.</span> + +<p>The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's +cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated +his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the +return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was +allowed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page027" name="page027"></a>(p. 027)</span> to remain in office until August 1st, when he was +recalled by a telegraphic despatch. But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out +to him, there had been "so much divergence" between his views and +those of the Home Government that he would not have been allowed to +remain at the Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there +was a prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of +confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the +failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the +conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial +step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal +union.</p> + +<p>The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the +inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book +arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without +recalling the words which Mr. Krüger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney +on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ... +be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence +to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was +known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal +party of which Mr. Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone +Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before +"the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared.</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page028" name="page028"></a>(p. 028)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Frere's forecast.</span> + +<p>But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions +upon the central question of South African administration which Frere +put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most +elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will +suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of +South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took +upon themselves to reverse his policy. What, above all, Frere realised +was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa +must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted +the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the +strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The +annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time +or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he +asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained +at all costs. With this end in view, he urged that every +responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be +fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained +by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and +availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free +State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a +scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate +aspirations of the Boers for self-government without <span class="pagenum"><a id="page029" name="page029"></a>(p. 029)</span> +endangering the permanency of British rule. It included proposals for +administrative and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing +the cost of government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency, +for the reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the +proposed railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of +representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial +Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment +of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to +the Boers at the time of annexation.<a id="footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8"></a><a href="#footnote8" title="Go to footnote 8"><span class="small">[8]</span></a></p> + +<p>He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the +political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he +earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese +Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all +legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the +danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground" +either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in +due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape +at the end of July, 1879:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react + dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch + Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the + population <span class="pagenum"><a id="page030" name="page030"></a>(p. 030)</span> as any under the Crown, into dangerous + allies of the small anti-English Republican party, who are for + separation, thus paralysing the efforts of the loyal English + party now in power, who aim at making the country a + self-defending integral portion of the British Empire. Further, + any attempt to give back or restore the Boer Republic in the + Transvaal must lead to anarchy and failure, and probably, at no + distant period, to a vicious imitation of some South American + Republics, in which the more uneducated and misguided Boers, + dominated and led by better educated foreign + adventurers—Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home Rulers, and other + European Republicans and Socialists—will become a pest to the + whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous fulcrum to any + European Power bent on contesting our naval supremacy, or + injuring us in our colonies.</p> + +<p>"There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already + been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the + Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still + arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility.... + If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always + to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object + is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This + will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not + become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on + you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by + postponing the trial if we start with a good cause."</p> +</div> + +<p>Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is +impossible to resist the momentum of this thought.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The retrocession.</span> + +<p>The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not +likely to be effaced from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page031" name="page031"></a>(p. 031)</span> memory of this generation. +Frere had scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by +the joint efforts of Mr. Krüger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before +the former, with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon +the still desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put +down by force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's +cabinet recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might +have been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape +Colony. +The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the +Pretoria Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions +embodied in the London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely +established as fact that Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by +certain articles contained in both conventions, to secure to all +actual and potential British residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment +of all the political rights of citizenship possessed by the Boers. But +it is equally certain that the immediate contravention of Article XVI. +of the Pretoria Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence +necessary to qualify for the franchise was raised from two to five +years, was allowed to pass without protest from the Imperial +Government. And thus a breach of the Convention, which the discovery +of the Witwatersrand gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent +establishment of a great British industrial community made a matter of +vital importance, was condoned. A few years more and the country which +prided itself <span class="pagenum"><a id="page032" name="page032"></a>(p. 032)</span> upon being the home of liberty and of free +institutions was confounded by the spectacle of a South Africa of its +own making, in which a British majority denied the franchise in a +Dutch Republic, contrasted with a Dutch minority dominating and +controlling the machinery of responsible government in a British +colony.</p> + +<p>This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking +distance of the objective of the present work—the personality and +efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous +years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the +Zambesi to Capetown.</p> + +<p>If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression +upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement, +almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters +that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached +to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local +representative in South Africa. And with this sense of amazement a +generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the +injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon +loyal and capable servants of the Crown—an injustice so notorious +that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from +the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration +is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of +unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals <span class="pagenum"><a id="page033" name="page033"></a>(p. 033)</span> +of South Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of +South African conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home +Government, and who himself was recognised by the Government and +people of Great Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of +all loyal subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire.</p> + +<p>The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal +was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before +in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the +working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to +drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy +in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be +omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean +prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper +understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is +the Jameson Raid.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Jameson raid.</span> + +<p>In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not +sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious +events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in +relationship to the no less clearly defined events by which it was +preceded. Thus placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of +the Imperial Government to use the advice of its local +representative—or, more precisely, of the refusal to base its policy +on South African instead <span class="pagenum"><a id="page034" name="page034"></a>(p. 034)</span> of British conditions: and, as +such, it convinced the Imperial Government of the need of reviving the +power of its local representative. In other words, it is a connecting +link between the High Commissionerships of Frere and Milner. The +events which followed the recall of Frere were accepted by the British +inhabitants of South Africa as a practical demonstration of the +inherent viciousness of the system under which the decision of +cardinal questions of South African administration was left in the +hands of the House of Commons, a body in which they were not +represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose judgment was liable to +be warped by irrelevant considerations of English party politics; and +one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country and peoples whose +interests were vitally affected by the manner in which these questions +were decided. The lesson of the retrocession was taken to heart so +earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the British +residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for reform +which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while among +those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South Africa +its effect was to make them think, <span class="sidenote">Rhodes.</span> +as did Rhodes, that the machinery +of the various local British governments must be dissociated as much +as possible from the principles and methods of the Home Government. +Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination of the +Imperial factor." The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page035" name="page035"></a>(p. 035)</span> expression, as he afterwards +explained, was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British +connection. As read in the context in which it was originally used, it +meant merely that the European population of Bechuanaland,<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9"></a><a href="#footnote9" title="Go to footnote 9"><span class="small">[9]</span></a> being +mainly Boer immigrants, could be administered more successfully by +officers responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape +Colony, was well versed in South African conditions, than by officers +directly responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a +criticism of Downing Street, and still more of English party +government. In short, Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British +administration, based on South African conditions, was ever to be +carried on successfully, the local British authority, and not the Home +Government, must be the machine employed; and in order to allow it to +work freely, its action must be made as independent as possible of +Downing Street. For Downing Street was an authority which blew hot or +cold, in accordance with the views of the party for the time being in +power.<a id="footnotetag10" name="footnotetag10"></a><a href="#footnote10" title="Go to footnote 10"><span class="small">[10]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">New forces.</span> + +<p>And, in point of fact, both parties in England <span class="pagenum"><a id="page036" name="page036"></a>(p. 036)</span> acquiesced in +this judgment of the South African British. During the years between +Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High +Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch +did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they +lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home +Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to +local initiative. On the other hand, the progress which was made in +this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous +discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable. The +highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race, +and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur +beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the +magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch; +and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the +Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral +resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in +South African politics. The comparative decline in the activity of the +High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth +of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a +man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the +Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the +"great houses" of the Rand, to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page037" name="page037"></a>(p. 037)</span> find in private effort an +instrument for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government +even more appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he +had previously relied. For the work of these industrial corporations +had powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British +public. The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous +application of an otherwise meritorious and successful effort to +strengthen the British hold upon South Africa by private enterprise. +It was at once the measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure.</p> + +<p>One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to +which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British +population in South Africa. Only eighteen months<a id="footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11"></a><a href="#footnote11" title="Go to footnote 11"><span class="small">[11]</span></a> before the Raid +the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a +despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated +on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this +despatch, and press upon President Krüger personally the necessity for +giving effect to its recommendations. These instructions were +cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German +Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would +be regarded as an interference with the <span class="italic">status quo</span> in South Africa, +and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six +months later<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12"></a><a href="#footnote12" title="Go to footnote 12"><span class="small">[12]</span></a> <span class="pagenum"><a id="page038" name="page038"></a>(p. 038)</span> President Krüger, in attending a "Kommers" +given by the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm +II.'s birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop +England from "kicking" the child Republic.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Rhodes's Plan.</span> + +<p>The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and +solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes +the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the +Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial +federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one +only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government +by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification +is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr. Jameson's decision +to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political +and a military point of view. +But this opinion overlooks the fact that +the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did +not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's +troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the +Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the +Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual. The +representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in +armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself—so Rhodes +thought—in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page039" name="page039"></a>(p. 039)</span> of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf +of British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this +essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of +unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station +at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news +of Dr. Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once +Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform +Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold +Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could +bring.<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13"></a><a href="#footnote13" title="Go to footnote 13"><span class="small">[13]</span></a> Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at +Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant. +Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and +the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in +metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines +on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes.</p> + +<p>If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter +comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed +their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men. +Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact +that Rhodes <span class="pagenum"><a id="page040" name="page040"></a>(p. 040)</span> treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so +many pawns on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for +Dr. Jameson's action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and +ruins me," was Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had +"ridden in," in spite of his own orders to the contrary and the +message to the same effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf +of the Reformers. But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he +knew, that Rhodes's object in forcing the insurrection was not to make +the Uitlanders reduce Krüger, but to compel the Imperial Government to +step in? In this case he may well have thought that what was essential +was not that the rising should be successful, but that there should be +a rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to +arrest the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the +Imperial Government.</p> + +<p>According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial +Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's +visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances. In the +first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated +the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa +the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent +measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if +Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these +obstacles—if, that is to say, the intervention <span class="pagenum"><a id="page041" name="page041"></a>(p. 041)</span> of the +Imperial Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his +primary object—the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially +diminished. Now Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made under date February +4th, 1896, <span class="italic">i.e.</span> five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent +with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on +the day before the Raid took place.</p> + +<p>Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of +Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before—the +26th—nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement, +telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in +Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances +which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by +Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, +at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed +vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said—</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The reformers divided.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the + movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a <span class="italic">sine quâ + non</span>. +This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto + declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete + collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders + would make the best terms they could with President Krüger."</p> + +<p>The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th +contained the same facts, with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page042" name="page042"></a>(p. 042)</span> the further information that +Captain Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message +direct from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that +Rhodes at Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at +Johannesburg that Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however, +there was another point of view from which the situation might present +itself to Dr. Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in +reply to the High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of +Rhodes's statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14" title="Go to footnote 14"><span class="small">[14]</span></a> inquired of Lord +Rosmead, "Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the +collapse?"</p> + +<p>Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the +Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for +carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial +Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was +too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely +committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic +under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely +possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who +wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in +December, 1893:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of + the Transvaal, as well as those <span class="pagenum"><a id="page043" name="page043"></a>(p. 043)</span> of Cape Colony and + Natal, would be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves, + for they have never forgiven England for letting herself be + beaten by the Boers at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a + proceeding which has rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the + Dutch population of South Africa.... With me this is not a simple + impression, but a firm conviction."<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15" title="Go to footnote 15"><span class="small">[15]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Jameson's decision.</span> + +<p>If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his +decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor +with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the +message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside +his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to +disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram. +It was a +momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a +reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived +it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg? +Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the +insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the +answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson +is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption +of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's +stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of +speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page044" name="page044"></a>(p. 044)</span> expedition. Dr. Jameson reached Krügersdorp at three +o'clock on Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had +brought him congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal +was almost within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from +taking his little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from +Krügersdorp to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours' +delay caused, naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force +should be met and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the +Rand. He did not want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a +pirate." Sir John Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and +conclusive on the point. If the force had pushed on by road from +Krügersdorp to Johannesburg on Wednesday evening—had not, in +Willoughby's words, "messed about" at Krügersdorp in expectation of +the welcoming escort—Johannesburg would have been reached in safety +on Thursday morning. With Dr. Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead +speeding northwards in his special train, the way would have been +prepared for that decisive and successful action on the part of the +Imperial Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Why the raid failed.</span> + +<p>But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride +in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If +intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's +decision to "ride in" would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page045" name="page045"></a>(p. 045)</span> have gained, at the cost of few +lives and no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four +years later at the cost of twenty thousand lives and £220,000,000. As +it was, it failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not +Lord Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr. Chamberlain +at his back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal +of the greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in +the spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the +Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which +they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led +up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form"; +if he had used "plain language" to President Krüger; and if, above +all, he had remembered—as Mr. Chamberlain reminded him—that "the +people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable +concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and +until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the +President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would +remain,"—might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire +without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword?</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain.</span> + +<p>It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of +the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any +real sense—that is to say, success which would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page046" name="page046"></a>(p. 046)</span> have +strengthened British supremacy and promoted the union of European +South Africa—was impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead +returned to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The +question of concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between +President Krüger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so +questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial +Government to have derived any advantage from them. To have gained the +franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous +action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause +in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been +small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of +the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed +and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this +meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know. The ten +years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the +paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better +than the methods of the Raid was required. <span class="italic">Non tali auxilio, nec +defensoribus istis!</span> No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage +and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their +independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and +France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these <span class="pagenum"><a id="page047" name="page047"></a>(p. 047)</span> +qualities to the people of the parent stock. If such a race, embarked +upon what it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to +be overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as +strong. None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders +exhibited in Mr. Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British +as evidence that the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and +determined than his predecessors. For the first time in the history of +British administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown +itself more zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light +that broke the universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by +the catastrophe of the Raid.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page048" name="page048"></a>(p. 048)</span> CHAPTER II</h3> + +<p class="title">THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS<a id="footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16"></a><a href="#footnote16" title="Go to footnote 16"><span class="small">[16]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Carl Borckenhagen.</span> + +<p>In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by +the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may +seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention +that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa +was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability +to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army +Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the +Cape, is still to be met with. This attitude of mind—whether it be a +consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking +at things from any but a British point of view—is still to be +observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny +that any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page049" name="page049"></a>(p. 049)</span> trace of a definite plan of action, or of a +concerted purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy" +against British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population +of South Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war. It is +for the benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a +view of bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a +direct contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I +transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was +expounded by the German, +Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free +State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a +word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of +Borckenhagen.</p> + +<p>The passage, which is taken <span class="italic">verbatim</span> from a work entitled, "The +Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences +gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland," +and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the +text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a +burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President +Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the +policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by +Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz. The point of view from which the +Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was +succinctly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page050" name="page050"></a>(p. 050)</span> stated in an article published by the Amsterdam +<span class="italic">Handelsblad</span> in 1881.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland + in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this + trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from + Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein, + Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative + investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall + universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive + territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us + to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"></a><a href="#footnote17" title="Go to footnote 17"><span class="small">[17]</span></a></p> + +<p>Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href="#footnote18" title="Go to footnote 18"><span class="small">[18]</span></a> advocated the +establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name +has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda +in the Free State, because, as editor of <span class="italic">The Bloemfontein Express</span> up +to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most +consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist +creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the +Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="center smcap">"The Bond Programme</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">The doctrine of the Bond.</span> + +<p>"The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its + motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa + belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page051" name="page051"></a>(p. 051)</span> privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute + all in his power towards the expulsion of the English usurper. + The States of South Africa to be federated in one independent + Republic.</p> + +<p>The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation.</p> + +<p>Argument in justification:—</p> + +<p>(<span class="italic">a</span>) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government + took place by circumstances of <span class="italic">force majeure</span> and without the + consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of + the Afrikander or Boer nation.</p> + +<p>(<span class="italic">b</span>) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the + Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the + consideration agreed for.</p> + +<p>(<span class="italic">c</span>) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from + Natal by force of arms without just cause.</p> + +<p>The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in:</p> + +<p>(<span class="italic">a</span>) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every + Afrikander and other real friend of the cause.</p> + +<p>(<span class="italic">b</span>) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one + or more of the world's Powers.</p> + +<p>The means to accomplish those tasks are:</p> + +<p>Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy.</p> + +<p>The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a + select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause + and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such + measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest + of the members will devolve activities of a general character + under the direction of the selected chiefs.</p> + +<p>One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of + an effective fund, which is to be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page052" name="page052"></a>(p. 052)</span> regularly sustained. + Bond members will aid each other in all relations of public life + in preference to non-members.</p> + +<p>In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of + importance to distinguish three categories of persons:</p> + +<p>(1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated + by assimilative influences with the English race, whose + restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion, + and patience.</p> + +<p>(2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to + relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow. + This class is the most numerous by far.</p> + +<p>(3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with + intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt + to exercise influence over the rest.</p> + +<p class="p2">Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious + scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and + salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our + cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who + work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct + and conclusive arguments accessible to all.</p> + +<p>Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not + the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.</p> + +<p>In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides + force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and + stratagem.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">Anti-british methods.</span> + +<p>The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of + Anglicising the Boer nation—to submerge it by the process of + assimilation.</p> + +<p>A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is + the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that + insidious policy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page053" name="page053"></a>(p. 053)</span> It is only such an attitude that will preserve the + nation in its simple faith and habits of morality, and provide + safety against the dangers of contamination and pernicious + examples, with all their fateful consequences to body and soul.</p> + +<p>Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and + homes.</p> + +<p>Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as + unpatriotic.</p> + +<p>Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with + the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the + rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and + the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid + of English thraldom.</p> + +<p>Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic + sentiments.</p> + +<p>Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring + English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail + link which separates the English State Church from actual + Romanism, and its proselytism <span class="italic">en bloc</span> is only a matter of short + time.</p> + +<p>Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the + coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit, + at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with + spiritual authority—a policy which incites coloured people to + rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common + disaster.</p> + +<p>Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood, + relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.</p> + +<p>As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations + could more than fill the gap left by England, and such + connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards + obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with + it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page054" name="page054"></a>(p. 054)</span> If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free + State becomes established—as appears certain from discoveries + already made—England will not rest until these are also hers.</p> + +<p>The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both + Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that + the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood + and drawers of water for the usurpers.</p> + +<p>There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South + Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.</p> + +<p>Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is + designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its + rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious + Albion."<a id="footnotetag19" name="footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19" title="Go to footnote 19"><span class="small">[19]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form +arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free +State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through +the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual +intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881 +onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in +detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen +in his paper, <span class="italic">The Bloemfontein Express</span>, on April 7th, 1881, to which +Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the +pamphlet, <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span> (The Transvaal War), which he issued +from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist +creed, as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page055" name="page055"></a>(p. 055)</span> thus formulated, was preached consistently in the +Free State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet +the exigencies of Colonial politics.</p> + +<p>None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political +organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the +Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact +the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics +of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct +organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the +Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And +this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was +sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was +intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal +Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly +inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be +adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without +exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.<a id="footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20"></a><a href="#footnote20" title="Go to footnote 20"><span class="small">[20]</span></a></p> + +<p>In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the +predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South +Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page056" name="page056"></a>(p. 056)</span> must include some account of the origin and methods of this +remarkable organisation.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The origin of the Bond.</span> + +<p>The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles +written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>, +a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du +Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that +in 1881 he claimed that <span class="italic">De Patriot</span> had done more than any other +single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from +British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which +drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation, +that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete +"war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the +Transvaal burghers.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish + the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened + through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation + for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of + South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a + confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We + can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one + hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let + them take that away, and the confederation under the free + Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English + flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation. + And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice + is the best for them: they must just have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page057" name="page057"></a>(p. 057)</span> Simon's Bay + as a naval and military station on the road to India, and give + over all the rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."<a id="footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21" title="Go to footnote 21"><span class="small">[21]</span></a></p> + +<p>This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by +reiterated appeals to racial passion:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops + and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly + done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us + Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make + war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated, + language and all. And this is well."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The objects of the Bond.</span> + +<p>When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind +of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit +proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His <span class="italic">modus operandi</span> is +similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says +<span class="italic">De Patriot</span>, must boycott all English traders, except only those who +are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements, +shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be +replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The +Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with +cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he +cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000 +cartridges <span class="pagenum"><a id="page058" name="page058"></a>(p. 058)</span> made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have +begun to make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." +For the Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially +necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of +combating the growing use of the English language. "English +education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and +nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against +the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our +family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak +English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."</p> + +<p>Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being +by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after +life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain, +won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of +Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love +of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the +contemptuous Hollanders whom Krüger had invited to serve the Republic. +Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself +created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance +to an Empire-state.</p> + +<p>The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in <span class="italic">De Transvaalse +Oorlog</span>, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page059" name="page059"></a>(p. 059)</span> establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of +South Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing +body (<span class="italic">bestuur</span>), with provincial, district, and ward <span class="italic">besturen</span>. The +central <span class="italic">bestuur</span> was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape +Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who +were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the +component states." The provincial <span class="italic">besturen</span>, consisting of one +representative from each of the district <span class="italic">besturen</span>, were to meet +every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.<a id="footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22" title="Go to footnote 22"><span class="small">[22]</span></a></p> + +<p>The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in +1882. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its +members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in +South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme +of Principles" was the article:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only + suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government + existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our + national development must be a united South Africa under its own + flag.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's influence.</span> + +<p>And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the +earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free +State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet +Congress, however, the "Farmers' <span class="pagenum"><a id="page060" name="page060"></a>(p. 060)</span> Protection Association" was +amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, +and the influence of Mr. +J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified +"programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the +undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a +nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the +country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could +hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more +progressive section of the farming class. He also knew that an +organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would +rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the +growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of +the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its +own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were +omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members +were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent +Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond +secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and +it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain +itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main +body of the representatives elected by the British population; and +from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to +control the Legislature of the Colony <span class="pagenum"><a id="page061" name="page061"></a>(p. 061)</span> by making it +impossible for any ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond +members, although he refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen +into office. To have done this latter might have united the British +population and their representatives in a solid phalanx, and +endangered the success of the effort to separate the British settlers +in the country districts from the more recent arrivals from +England—mostly townsmen—which remained a fruitful source of +Afrikander influence up to the time of the Jameson Raid. By +representing the new British population, which followed in the wake of +the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers" and adventurers and not +genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not merely to widen the +natural line of cleavage between the townsman and the countryman, but +actually to detach the older British settlers from sympathy with the +mother country, and, by drawing them within the sphere of Afrikander +nationalist aspirations, to make them share its own antagonism to +British supremacy.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Merriman and the Bond.</span> + +<p>But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old +leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw +from Mr. J. X. Merriman—then a strong Imperialist in close +association with Mr. J. W. Leonard—a striking rebuke. The speech in +question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most +"English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with +complete appropriateness, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page062" name="page062"></a>(p. 062)</span> in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span> of July 10th, +1899. The struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years +before was then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a +member of a ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed +purpose of "combating the British Government."</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of + localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a + question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral + part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men + up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind + whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the + British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as + privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the + Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison + began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come + to this—Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in + South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of + loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who + should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the + idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole + teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was + between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent + section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in + the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the + British Government. In any other country such an organisation + could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it + has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes + well for the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page063" name="page063"></a>(p. 063)</span> British Government could have read the + leading articles of the <span class="italic">Zuid Africaan</span>, and <span class="italic">Express</span>, and <span class="italic">De + Patriot</span>, in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that + the maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the + object they have in view are absolutely different things. My + quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its + main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount + power in South Africa."</p> + +<p>This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence +as this—"in any other country such an organisation could not have +grown, but here, <span class="italic">among a scattered population</span>, it has insidiously +and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of +the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this +diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so +faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great +statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British +Empire,"—these things together make Mr. Merriman's Grahamstown speech +one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of +the period.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Change of Bond policy.</span> + +<p>In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first +and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the +place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the +South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each +represented by two delegates. This meeting revealed the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page064" name="page064"></a>(p. 064)</span> +practical difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from +adopting the definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in +the Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the +Cape Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the +latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5, +confirmed the Cape delegates +in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial +rather than inter-state lines. The result of the divergences of aim +manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape +Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond, +delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was +formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to +the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of +the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed + towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and + resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much + depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead + guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be + more cautious and guarded for the future."</p> + +<p>And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when +all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be +merged in the consciousness of a new and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page065" name="page065"></a>(p. 065)</span> common +nationality—pointing out, however, that the advent of that day +depended on "you and me, my fellow Bond members."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Rhodes and Hofmeyr.</span> + +<p>Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured +only by the complete separation of the local governments from the +Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the +manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European +communities of South Africa—the task which the Imperial Government +had abandoned as hopeless. As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr +during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the +Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter +of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance +afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South +Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon +which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance. Hofmeyr probably +never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was +the inevitable <span class="italic">dénouement</span> to which the administration of South +Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never +wavered in his loyalty to the British connection. But there was a +great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common, +which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished, +would leave each free to choose the path—Republican or Imperial—by +which the last stage was to be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page066" name="page066"></a>(p. 066)</span> traversed and the goal of +South African unity finally attained.</p> + +<p>The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such +peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the +subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts +of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to +attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the +limits of a few pages. None the less, there is one incident in his +political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple +reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to +the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it +developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the +years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true +to the aim which it had at first openly avowed—the aim of +establishing a united South Africa under its own flag. And second, +that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united +South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both +these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the +overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these +overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the +Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance +between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation. The occasion which +led to them was the opening of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page067" name="page067"></a>(p. 067)</span> the railway at Bloemfontein +in 1890—a railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly +arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which +afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a +means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity. +The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the +Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Rhodes and Borckenhagen.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at + Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I + think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many + there, and especially—and I speak of him with the greatest + respect—a gentleman who is dead, +Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me + and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I + never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will + tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards + came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my + speech. 'Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said, + 'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South + Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No; + there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,' + he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,' + he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of + course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No; + you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to + forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool, + because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by + yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his + <span class="italic">Express</span> towards myself, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page068" name="page068"></a>(p. 068)</span> I was made full sorry at + times by the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his + mind—an independent South Africa."<a id="footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23"></a><a href="#footnote23" title="Go to footnote 23"><span class="small">[23]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Effects of the raid.</span> + +<p>The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently +satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly +developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it. +The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had +cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to +see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked +truth.<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24"></a><a href="#footnote24" title="Go to footnote 24"><span class="small">[24]</span></a> From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its +chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its +bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the +other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own +nationality. From that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page069" name="page069"></a>(p. 069)</span> moment the Bond fell back upon the +policy of 1881. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an +active nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the +advocacy of anti-British aims increased in boldness and in +definiteness as the Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing +armaments.</p> + +<p>We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation +in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration, +controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George +Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial +Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain +the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over +them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the +British Crown. It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military +resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like +resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South +Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts +made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African +unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the +maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts, +prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated +by the Jameson Raid. All attempts to secure the reunion of South +Africa under the British flag having failed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page070" name="page070"></a>(p. 070)</span> alike under +Imperial and local British initiative, the way was open for the +Afrikander nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan +of a united South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated +in the year immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Situation in 1896.</span> + +<p>In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were +discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the +advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and +encouraged. +It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the +Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but +Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated +the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the +integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch +subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March +4th, 1896), Mr. J. G. Fraser, the head of the moderate party which +followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr. +Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of +Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the +"closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the +terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th, +1897. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view +of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the +general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krüger, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page071" name="page071"></a>(p. 071)</span> who +had ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened +the lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious +and educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony, +commenced methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to +the adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies.</p> + +<p>But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and +immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to +have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we +recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally +ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the +sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the +long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the +Bond, was revealed. The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for +which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion, +was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at +a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in +South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have +dislodged her. And more important still was the fact that the Raid, +with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all, +the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal +throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and +compelled the Imperial Government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page072" name="page072"></a>(p. 072)</span> to pledge itself to obtain +the redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's policy.</span> + +<p>Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain, +for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown +power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at +Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any +satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought +about through the agency of the High Commissioner. He, therefore, +invited President Krüger to visit England in the hope that his own +personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the +weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of +Transvaal unrest. But President Krüger refused to confer with the +Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis +of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such +as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr. Chamberlain, +therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed +conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to +destroy it, +proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would +enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great +Britain as paramount Power. His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in +the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial +Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch <span class="pagenum"><a id="page073" name="page073"></a>(p. 073)</span> +opinion as the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was +to be successfully applied to the Transvaal Government. In the +speech<a id="footnotetag25" name="footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25" title="Go to footnote 25"><span class="small">[25]</span></a> in which he sketched the main lines of this policy he +declared emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be +maintained at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be +permitted under any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the +Uitlanders were to be redressed:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able + in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as + it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs + the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population + in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion—the united + opinion—which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no + power in Africa can resist."</p> + +<p>With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that +Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a +policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his +"confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the +paramount Power. But it must be remembered that the evidence of the +real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the +preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated +Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and +politicians in England; and if these men had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page074" name="page074"></a>(p. 074)</span> attempted to +impart their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed +from the sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that +"British subjects" under responsible government could be anything but +loyal to the Imperial tie.</p> + +<p>But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces +of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African +situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success, +unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed +in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity. +When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of +the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship +for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to +dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time +past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in +Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to +the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and +successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize +Bechuanaland. His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime +Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the +ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in +1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and +indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a +third time.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page075" name="page075"></a>(p. 075)</span> CHAPTER III</h3> + +<p class="title">A YEAR OF OBSERVATION</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Sir Alfred Milner.</span> + +<p>Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so +different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. +Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the +man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in +South Africa—a position always difficult, but now more than ever +arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had +been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner—as he +then was—to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and +pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. +His +<span class="italic">métier</span> was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing +with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest) +for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to +Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the +Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable +assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, +in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page076" name="page076"></a>(p. 076)</span> +methods of raising revenue—the death duties. The principle of the +graduated death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked +out the elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and +enabled them eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, +however ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of +pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was +certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar +of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.<a id="footnotetag26" name="footnotetag26"></a><a href="#footnote26" title="Go to footnote 26"><span class="small">[26]</span></a> Whatever direct +knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the +impression created by his book <span class="italic">England in Egypt</span>. This was a work +which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English +statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative +system, working in a political society full of intrigue and +international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of +insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an +active association with so accomplished a master of financial and +administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment +for a colonial administrator.</p> + +<p>But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their +view of the appointment <span class="pagenum"><a id="page077" name="page077"></a>(p. 077)</span> from the opinions expressed by the +many prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The +leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of +the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir +Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March +28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained +admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life. +"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount +high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most +grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers," +pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all +affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked +throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of +our time has been received with a larger measure both of the +approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The +office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and +responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only +"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront +the new High Commissioner for South Africa:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an + intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should + arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as + belongs to any man of our acquaintance."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page078" name="page078"></a>(p. 078)</span> Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had +undertaken his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies +the reasoned basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his +earliest political convictions was the belief that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "there was no political object comparable in importance with that + of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the + United States]: the severance of another link in the great + Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill + any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed + to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to + render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide + State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had + ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one + absolutely believes, even failure—personal failure, I mean, for + the cause itself is not going to fail—would be preferable to an + easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Personal traits.</span> + +<p>This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the +paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and +already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of +all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was +closest to the life—"worthy of all praise and all affection." The +quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore +witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those +who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in +any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page079" name="page079"></a>(p. 079)</span> the Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in +Cairo would light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman +who had once been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue +officials still hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. +Such men had no claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts +of intellect; but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his +nature. "He was so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining +his name and personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But +the other side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and +inflexible resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be +brought into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his +South African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to +be accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner +became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to +secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon +the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear +mental vision—never more clear than in South Africa—became clouded +by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be +further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the +Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English +ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page080" name="page080"></a>(p. 080)</span> had universally inspired all his former associates, whether +equals or subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever +bitterness was displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer +and Afrikander leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due +to their perception that he was then—as always—a source of strength +and an inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as +their rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated +Bismarck—because he was the strong man on the other side.</p> + +<p>Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception +of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he +believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire, +irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship. +It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an +opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the +cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years +of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs +of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried +him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen +who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war, +when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him. +But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood +the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page081" name="page081"></a>(p. 081)</span> because they were by this time convinced of his complete +mastery of the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is +to this inability to understand the facts of the South African +situation, as he had learnt them, that we must attribute the +comparative feebleness shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the +perverse attempt which was made by the Liberal party, after the +General Election of 1906, to revoke the final arrangements of his +administration. The interval that separated Lord Milner's knowledge of +South Africa from that of the Liberal ministers was profound; but even +the Unionist chiefs showed but slight appreciation of the unassailable +validity of the administrative decisions with which they had +identified themselves, when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these +decisions again, and somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal +of the nation.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Arrival at Cape Town.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual +moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and +the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point. +In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded +the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of +1896—the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the +freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the +London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the +appearance of a British <span class="pagenum"><a id="page082" name="page082"></a>(p. 082)</span> squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the +despatch of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident +determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to +repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of +amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during +the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more +conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in +this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir +Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir +William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was +assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a +trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the +Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported +on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than +reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had +been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise +remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon +the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to +assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the +Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner's thoroughness.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with +the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he +attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page083" name="page083"></a>(p. 083)</span> problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month +of anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was +there anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, +or in the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from +putting his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the +reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration—a question +in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved—was +a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required +by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of +"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved, +therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country +districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch +population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and +Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible +to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial +Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of +his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and +September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia +(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898). +And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the +Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"—the former in order that he might +read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page084" name="page084"></a>(p. 084)</span> open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most +helps a man to know the character of his neighbour.</p> + +<p>Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the +speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear +and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period +he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of +President Krüger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of +the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in +view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High +Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions +relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which +some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and +custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate +matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of +these questions—questions which he handled with equal insight and +decision—must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by +which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of +which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa +depended—the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in +the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its +allegiance to the British Crown.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">His friendliness to the Boers.</span> + +<p>The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the +Transvaal Government was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page085" name="page085"></a>(p. 085)</span> one that was consistent alike with +his personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and +enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival +he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and +through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on +terms of intimacy with President Krüger, that he desired, as it were, +to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new +High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to +retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic +hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the +discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect +friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired, +on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope, +therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic +controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser +matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krüger +and himself.</p> + +<p>This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired +to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first +the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street +and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as +possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid +unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President +Krüger, was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page086" name="page086"></a>(p. 086)</span> manifested in all he did at this time. In the +course of the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee +by the British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was +asked to decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of +President Krüger, should come first upon the list at the public +banquet. He replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President +Krüger, as the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this +occasion, of all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most +careful to avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the +South African Republic or its chief magistrate."<a id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27"></a><a href="#footnote27" title="Go to footnote 27"><span class="small">[27]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner and the Conventions.</span> + +<p>While to President Krüger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot +arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the +Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform +there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But +before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will +not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make +things as easy as possible for President Krüger." +More than this, he +had almost as little belief in the utility <span class="pagenum"><a id="page087" name="page087"></a>(p. 087)</span> of the +Conventions<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28" title="Go to footnote 28"><span class="small">[28]</span></a> as Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers +did, or did not, call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small +matter—an etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was +essential was that men of British blood should not be kept under the +heel of the Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance +of the London Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a +remedy, were insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, +such as the attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury +to industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration, +and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical +observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord +Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of +the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of +grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the +subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial +Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions, +therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers +denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page088" name="page088"></a>(p. 088)</span> the text, +the Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma. +Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon +the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain +for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum +of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in +the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is +essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere +diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British +Government."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Transvaal affairs.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner's hope that President Krüger might meet him half-way, +although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of +foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour. +After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the +attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly +less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri" +Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's +Jubilee,<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29"></a><a href="#footnote29" title="Go to footnote 29"><span class="small">[29]</span></a> and at the same period the first and only step was taken +that offered a genuine <span class="pagenum"><a id="page089" name="page089"></a>(p. 089)</span> promise of reform from within. The +Industrial Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive +at the request of President Krüger, surprised the Uitlander community +by conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that +left no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the +conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded +a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints +put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr. +Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of +the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the +Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations +of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months +later President Krüger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or +of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there +remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government +being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner +consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the +Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon +began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.<a id="footnotetag30" name="footnotetag30"></a><a href="#footnote30" title="Go to footnote 30"><span class="small">[30]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page090" name="page090"></a>(p. 090)</span> If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krüger +and the Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of +the Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to +notice, the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee +celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which +he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch +in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion +in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses +or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial +Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar + interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware, + have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different + sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am + able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the + loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen. + People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as + well as the African natives, have vied with one another in + demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the + throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of + feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration + of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement + which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the + feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much + stronger than has sometimes been believed. In <span class="pagenum"><a id="page091" name="page091"></a>(p. 091)</span> my + opinion, the impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her + Majesty's Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South + Africa, and is likely to have a permanent value."<a id="footnotetag31" name="footnotetag31"></a><a href="#footnote31" title="Go to footnote 31"><span class="small">[31]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">First impressions of the Dutch.</span> + +<p>It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with +the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord +Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch +itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the +unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech, +and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the +result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support +the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal. +This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to +establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of +the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived +notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an +"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his +first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded +it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be +remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very +limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was +written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page092" name="page092"></a>(p. 092)</span> +South Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had +been confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; +that is to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the +Cape Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely +identified, from a social point of view, with the official and +mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.</p> + +<p>What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was +prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone +of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the +Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June +23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had +happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change +in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr. +Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an +imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? <span class="italic">Nemo repente fuit +turpissimus.</span> Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was +right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from +ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.</p> + +<p>The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an +element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which +posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in +South Africa to have been a just and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page093" name="page093"></a>(p. 093)</span> necessary, or a +needless and aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the +reader must first be possessed of some more precise information of the +political situation in the Cape Colony at this time.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Sprigg ministry.</span> + +<p>At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in +motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the +new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape +Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May, +1898. +The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg +upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid +(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last +thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander +Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet—Mr. +Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and +Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct +representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington, +who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been +himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon +Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the +intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully +and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It +was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page094" name="page094"></a>(p. 094)</span> of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British +interests was too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more +decided advocates of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his +more or less friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions +of the Dutch extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, +offering in itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by +Mr. Hofmeyr to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be +adopted, had secured for the Government the votes of the majority of +the Dutch members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the +subserviency of the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was +afforded upon Lord Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home +Government determined to reinforce the South African garrison, in +order to strengthen its demand upon the Transvaal Government for the +repeal of the Aliens Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition +was offered by the Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of +barrack accommodation in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for +placing obstacles in the way of its accomplishment. These difficulties +were successfully overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the +reinforcements arrived without giving rise to any political +excitement.<a id="footnotetag32" name="footnotetag32"></a><a href="#footnote32" title="Go to footnote 32"><span class="small">[32]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Navy contribution bill.</span> + +<p>A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond +to obstruct the business <span class="pagenum"><a id="page095" name="page095"></a>(p. 095)</span> of the Cape Parliament, in order +that Sir Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among +the other prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the +Colonial Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee +celebrations in England.<a id="footnotetag33" name="footnotetag33"></a><a href="#footnote33" title="Go to footnote 33"><span class="small">[33]</span></a> This was the beginning of a disagreement +between the Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in +seriousness after Sir Gordon's return from England, until it +culminated in the resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898). +The offer +of an annual contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was +affirmed in principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was +understood in England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the +British connection. In point of fact the measure received practically +no support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of +Parliament, on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's +action in the matter was employed as an effective argument to +stimulate disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr. +Hofmeyr, however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an +organisation, to commit itself to any overt opposition to the +principle of a contribution to the British Navy—an attitude which +would have been obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of +loyalty—and with characteristic irony the third reading of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page096" name="page096"></a>(p. 096)</span> +the Navy Contribution Bill was eventually passed, a year later, +without a division in the Legislative Assembly by a Ministry<a id="footnotetag34" name="footnotetag34"></a><a href="#footnote34" title="Go to footnote 34"><span class="small">[34]</span></a> +placed in office by Bond votes for the declared purpose of opposing +the policy of the Imperial Government on the one question—the reform +of the Transvaal Administration—upon the issue of which depended the +maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Rhodes's position.</span> + +<p>But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the +Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to +dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into +the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a +tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir +Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed +for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the +Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist +organisation, called the South African League, was established with +the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa. +Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention +of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of +devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But +upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the +Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much +warmth by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page097" name="page097"></a>(p. 097)</span> British population at Capetown in July, 1897, +that he had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same +position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was +afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr. +Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the +report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility +against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the +Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of +which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters +to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had +adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as +their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new +combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman +and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898, +found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for +the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually +destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now +almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape +electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution" +into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its +recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with +Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader, +depending in no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page098" name="page098"></a>(p. 098)</span> less a degree upon the Dutch population of +the Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that +threatened to deprive this population of its parliamentary +preponderance. And in a few months' time, as we shall see, the +Schreiner-Bond coalition took for its immediate aim the prevention of +British interference in the Transvaal; while the Progressive party +came, no less openly, to avow its determination to promote and support +the action of the Imperial Government in seeking to obtain redress for +the Uitlander grievances.</p> + +<p>The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well +known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at +Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too +authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance +which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources +of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For +the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or +party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and +ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and +circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our +question, which among these facts of personal observation and +experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape +Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of +the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer +of creative <span class="pagenum"><a id="page099" name="page099"></a>(p. 099)</span> literature, to exhibit the working of the human +mind. In the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only +what "has" happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged +and ennobled by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen. +But such satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is +at the disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and +running over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of +poetry, we know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet +speech the development of the great South African drama reached its +"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner +was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the +"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">No reform in the Transvaal.</span> + +<p>The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the +determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a +period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all +prospect of "reform from within." +The treatment accorded to the report +of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established +the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints +of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The +Commission was created by President Krüger; it was in effect the +fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the +grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page100" name="page100"></a>(p. 100)</span> +officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the +Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their +recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most +serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The +Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all, +but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into +effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no +loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the +Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of +burgher predominance. If what President Krüger was waiting for was a +convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This +reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk +Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krüger in +the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to +set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was +thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to +the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the +industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal +devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on +the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the +recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as +subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page101" name="page101"></a>(p. 101)</span> had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from +committee to Volksraad, until very little of the original +recommendations remained, the Government took action. In addition to +an immaterial reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the +Netherlands Railway Company—a concession subsequently alleged to have +been the price paid by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further +inquiry into its affairs—it was announced that, with the object of +lessening the cost of living on the Rand, the import duties upon +certain necessaries in common use would be reduced, in accordance with +the recommendations of the Commissioners on this point; but that, +since it was obviously inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the +Republic, the duties upon certain other articles of the same class +would be raised to an extent more than counterbalancing the loss upon +the reduction. <span class="italic">Parturiunt montes; nascitur ridiculus mus.</span></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Krüger re-elected president.</span> + +<p>This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the +closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr. +Krüger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for +the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his +candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal, +had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors. +The figures—Krüger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert +(Commandant-General) 2,001—were additional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page102" name="page102"></a>(p. 102)</span> evidence of the +impotency or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The +first act of President Krüger, on his return to power, was to dismiss +Chief Justice Kotzé. Mr. Kotzé's struggle for the independence of the +law courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with +what was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President +Krüger had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No. +1 of 1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the +right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their +opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that +extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the +entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were +adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged +through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President +undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the +independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged +themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In +February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotzé wrote to remind President Krüger +that his promise remained unfulfilled,<a id="footnotetag35" name="footnotetag35"></a><a href="#footnote35" title="Go to footnote 35"><span class="small">[35]</span></a> withdrawing at the same +time the conditional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page103" name="page103"></a>(p. 103)</span> pledge not to exercise the "testing" +right given by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotzé under +Law No. 1, compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had +supported the Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to +resign, and appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, +as Chief Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the +Reformers in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had +declared that "no honourable man could possibly accept the position of +a judge so long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was +now rendered subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were +thus deprived of their last constitutional safeguard against the +injustice of the Boer and Hollander oligarchy.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">His reactionary policy.</span> + +<p>This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President +Krüger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the +recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of +Chief Justice Kotzé, that he was determined not merely to set himself +against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under +which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the +fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority; +he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in +possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in +increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war. +Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page104" name="page104"></a>(p. 104)</span> his mission to +Europe, he had opened up communications with European Powers, that +placed him in a position to avail himself to the full of the possible +embarrassment of Great Britain through international rivalries or +disagreements. In South Africa he had carried through a treaty of +offensive and defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had +received more than one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander +nationalism had been kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.</p> + +<p>These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the +disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal +still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the +complaisance with which President Krüger's reactionary policy was +regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that +Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling +results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee +despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities +for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that +he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may +presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were +lost.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the Cape Dutch.</span> + +<p>In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At +every little town and <span class="italic">dorp</span>—wherever, in fact, he went—he conversed +with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness; +and all the speeches that he made in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page105" name="page105"></a>(p. 105)</span> reply to the addresses +of welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when +there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come +from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech +with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt—a feeling +which his audience must share—that now there was to be peace in South +Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner +were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to +this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was +accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter) +Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit +as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of +Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." +The +expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp +reproof from <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>. From this and many other such incidents it +must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of +the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">"Hands off" the Transvaal.</span> + +<p>And so it came about that in the months that President Krüger was busy +shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise +that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the +Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the +Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page106" name="page106"></a>(p. 106)</span> +It made no difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was +always, "<span class="italic">Our</span> Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened +both in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) +spring and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord +Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial +Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape +Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch +population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly +friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control +of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than +anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord +Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, <span class="italic">Ons +Land</span> presented the most authoritative and significant expression of +the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and +unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> rarely +contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence +of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more +subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the +attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than +of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented +and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it +than they were in that of any foreign country. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page107" name="page107"></a>(p. 107)</span> And, in South +African matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, +was not merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action +for the improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, +it took a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum +and substance of Bond policy.</p> + +<p>Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the +Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely +against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state +of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While +there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the +Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the +Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that +Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the +Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and +the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he +have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a +constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there +was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its +stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest +of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner at Graaf Reinet.</span> + +<p>It was with this accumulated evidence in his <span class="pagenum"><a id="page108" name="page108"></a>(p. 108)</span> mind that Lord +Milner travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf +Reinet, expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the +ordinary sort at the opening of the railway on the following day. The +conventional expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely +veiled hypocrisy and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at +the time when the whole weight of their influence was thrown against +Great Britain on the only South African question that really mattered, +had become nauseating even to his serene temper and generous +disposition. He was wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or +unfriendly reply from the Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable +proposals of the Imperial Government. Late at night there was brought +to him, in the train, a copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet +branch of the Afrikander Bond, which was to be presented to him on the +morrow. It contained, in more than usually pointed language, a protest +against "the charges of disloyalty made against the Bond," and a +request that the High Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the +expression of its unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine +how, in ominous contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, +something exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, +something which emphasised the inconsistency of these formal +professions of attachment to the throne with the very practical +hostility of their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page109" name="page109"></a>(p. 109)</span> authors to British policy, struck the +High Commissioner with peculiar force. The Dutch, who, under British +rule, enjoyed—one might almost say abused—every privilege of +citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite prepared to see the British +excluded, under Dutch rule, from these same privileges in the +Transvaal. More than that, they were determined to employ all the +agencies at their command to prevent any effective interference with +the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt that the time had +come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the impressions which had been +accumulating in his mind, he wrote down then and there his answer, +which was delivered on the following day.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her + Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be + allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason + could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully + well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its + great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural + disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the + position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her + Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in + material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress + are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means + always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely + free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging + the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of + law <span class="pagenum"><a id="page110" name="page110"></a>(p. 110)</span> manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, + and secure in the discharge of their high functions from all + external interference. You have—at least as regards the white + races—perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not + been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and + gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government, + justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy. + And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that + gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack + without your being asked to contribute one pound to that + protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of + course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.</p> + +<p>"And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have + to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may + put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or + less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to + shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the + population of the Colony—Dutch as well as English—are, I + firmly believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know + they live under a good constitution, and have no wish to change + it, and regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august + lady at the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to + consider; if political controversy were confined to the internal + affairs of the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of + hard language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among + the usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody + else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd—so obviously + absurd—that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges + would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">The loyalty of the Bond.</span> + +<p>"What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty <span class="pagenum"><a id="page111" name="page111"></a>(p. 111)</span> in + this case, what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under + it, is the fact that the political controversies of this country + at present unfortunately turn largely upon another question—I + mean the relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South + African Republic—and that, whenever there is any prospect of any + difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once + vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality, + espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that + they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the + politician—often the best of men, though singularly + injudicious—who, whenever any disputes arise with another + country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be + in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very + much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his + fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly + opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case + people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy + with the Government of the Transvaal—which, seeing the close tie + of relationship which unites a great portion of the population + here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly + natural—to a point which gives some ground for the assertion + that they seem to care much more for the independence of the + Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to + which they themselves belong.</p> + +<p>"For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in + espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open + rupture between that country and the British Government. They + loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they + think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government + that in case of war with the Transvaal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page112" name="page112"></a>(p. 112)</span> it would have a + great number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, + that is a way to prevent such a calamity.</p> + +<p>"But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the + assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the + independence of the Transvaal—that independence which it has + itself given—and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order + to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact + opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it + is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes + of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they + are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the + Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the + semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that + country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only + on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly + reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of + the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's + moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is + not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government + which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at + all. It is that unprogressiveness—I will not say the + retrogressiveness—of the Government of the Transvaal and its + deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it + devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every + impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers + which threaten it are internal.</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">Milner's appeal to the Dutch.</span> + +<p>"Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that + this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all + that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation + that at the present moment any advice that I could <span class="pagenum"><a id="page113" name="page113"></a>(p. 113)</span> + tender, or that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender + in that quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, + would be instantly rejected because it was British. But the same + does not apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and + especially to those who have gone so far in the expression of + their sympathy for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these + charges of disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least + cannot be suspected across the border; and if all they + desire—and I believe it is what they desire—is to preserve the + South African Republic, and to promote good relations between it + and the British Colonies and Government, then let them use all + their influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming + the Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its + Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing + it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even + more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its + administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa, + such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the + direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate + troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than + thirty years, is to be found."<a id="footnotetag36" name="footnotetag36"></a><a href="#footnote36" title="Go to footnote 36"><span class="small">[36]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No +such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High +Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now +eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action +and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect, +and grew uneasy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page114" name="page114"></a>(p. 114)</span> The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. +What is the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, +if you refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one +thing of all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should +feel—that the Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and +the tone and temper of its administration, to those of the free +communities of South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free +State."</p> + +<p>The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was +the weight of inevitable truth.</p> + +<p>A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to +urge President Krüger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he +says:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at + Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in <span class="italic">The + Cape Times</span>. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled + hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble + ahead....</p> + +<p>"Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the + future lies in the attitude of President Krüger and his vain hope + of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened + minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using + the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true + Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent + discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their + mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs + cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page115" name="page115"></a>(p. 115)</span> it will be well if the fall does not sweep away the + freedom of all of us.</p> + +<p>"I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in + the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and + good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between + the South African Republic and a catastrophe."<a id="footnotetag37" name="footnotetag37"></a><a href="#footnote37" title="Go to footnote 37"><span class="small">[37]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Sprigg and the Bond.</span> + +<p>Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the +British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased +by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had +been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the +essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been +vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had +done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to +do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was +unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the +different sections of the British population were manifesting a +tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this +movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge +the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time +past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population +of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by +any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary +representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the +Cape electoral <span class="pagenum"><a id="page116" name="page116"></a>(p. 116)</span> system was brought before the Ministry. The +indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotzé, and the +growing evidence of President Krüger's determination to ride +rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed +to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of +the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the +common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of +British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid +British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The +Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing +to Mr. Hofmeyr; +but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost +united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament, +resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was +approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. +Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.<a id="footnotetag38" name="footnotetag38"></a><a href="#footnote38" title="Go to footnote 38"><span class="small">[38]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Redistribution.</span> + +<p>Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the +parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He +had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his +Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to +throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page117" name="page117"></a>(p. 117)</span> Mr. +Rhodes was the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in +doubt. On the resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was +at once turned on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave +notice of a vote of "no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, +and in the meantime the second reading of the +Redistribution Bill was +met by the "previous question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of +the Provincial Council of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in +Parliament or in the Press, to conceal the fact that, under the +question of redistribution, wider and more momentous issues were at +stake. The counts in the Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out +in <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, were (1) its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the +proposed gift of a warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of +sympathy with the South African Republic. Against these crimes it had +nothing to place, except that it had permitted the employment of the +captured Bechuanas, as indentured labourers<a id="footnotetag39" name="footnotetag39"></a><a href="#footnote39" title="Go to footnote 39"><span class="small">[39]</span></a>—its sole merit, in +the opinion of the Bond journal. <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, on the other hand, +declared with equal frankness that the real point to be decided was, +whether the interests of President Krüger and the South African +Republic, or those of the Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, +had the greater claim upon the Government and Parliament of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page118" name="page118"></a>(p. 118)</span> Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when, on June 13th, he introduced +the "no confidence" motion, asked the House to condemn the Ministry on +the ground that it had not shown any "sympathy" with, or made any +"conciliatory approach" towards, the "sister Republic." On Monday, +June 20th, the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was carried +by a majority of seven, but two days later, June 22nd, the Ministry +found itself in a minority of five on Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no +confidence."<a id="footnotetag40" name="footnotetag40"></a><a href="#footnote40" title="Go to footnote 40"><span class="small">[40]</span></a> In these circumstances Sir Gordon Sprigg determined +not to resign, but to appeal to the electorate—a course justified by +constitutional usage—and Parliament was dissolved.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The general election, 1898.</span> + +<p>The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no +little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were +supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and +other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by +President Krüger and his agents from the revenues of the +Transvaal.<a id="footnotetag41" name="footnotetag41"></a><a href="#footnote41" title="Go to footnote 41"><span class="small">[41]</span></a> Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously +moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the +Malmesbury division, by whom he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page119" name="page119"></a>(p. 119)</span> was returned to Parliament, +contained a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to +which they belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented +the sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The +objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive +form by <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to +oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in +politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation +of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words, +to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the +diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general +preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The +under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch +population may be understood from the fact that the following frank +appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was +published in the columns of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it + must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The + majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go + bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two + Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the + stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at + least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape + Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page120" name="page120"></a>(p. 120)</span> + two Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the + stranger [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> British] are unable to continue the fight. One + day the question of who is to be master will have to be referred + to the arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend + upon the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our + side we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince + matters. This is the real point at issue; and in this light every + Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we + expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority + of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on + the sword when God's time comes."<a id="footnotetag42" name="footnotetag42"></a><a href="#footnote42" title="Go to footnote 42"><span class="small">[42]</span></a></p> + +<p>At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become +what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of +rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander +nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from +certain extracts from the <span class="italic">Studenten Blad</span> of the Theological Seminary +of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by <span class="italic">The Albert +Times</span>. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by +November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students +had at that date joined the Boer forces:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Anti-british sentiment.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors + of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as + their heart's blood—a people that followed our fathers to the + new fatherland which they had bought with their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page121" name="page121"></a>(p. 121)</span> blood + and snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their + freedom? Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and + retook the land with God's aid and with their blood. But England + is not satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same + people, and not only our freedom, but our language, our + nationality, our religion! Must we surrender everything, and + disown our fathers? I cannot agree with this. The thought is + hateful to me—the thought of trampling on the bodies of our + fathers as we extend the hand of friendship to those who have + slain our fathers in an unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say + that the Bible teaches us to love our enemies. I think, however, + that the text cannot be here applied. Race hatred is something + quite distinct from personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as + a private individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, + however, I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, + must regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion—as a + wolf that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the + chief reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the + enemies of our religion."</p> + +<p>At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were +over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned. +Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned +both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former +constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus +vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return +of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take +place until the 15th. As all three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page122" name="page122"></a>(p. 122)</span> constituencies were +expected to elect Progressives—an expectation which was +fulfilled—the result of the general election was to give the Bond a +bare majority of one, and this in spite of the fact that a +considerably larger total of votes had been cast for the Progressive +than for the Bond candidates.<a id="footnotetag43" name="footnotetag43"></a><a href="#footnote43" title="Go to footnote 43"><span class="small">[43]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner's impartiality.</span> + +<p>These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is +significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner +discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the +Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had +polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a +minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry +should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until +the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in +the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce +one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the +Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution +of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The +partial appropriation made by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page123" name="page123"></a>(p. 123)</span> Parliament before the +dissolution was exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be +provided without the authority of Parliament was the issue of +Governor's warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign +warrants to enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during +the unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last +appropriation and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of +the constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain +supply is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to +issue warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the +Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be +completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as +the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was, +no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair +prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to +put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have +failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A +loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with +or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run +the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and +of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might +otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But, +as Governor of the Colony, he refused <span class="pagenum"><a id="page124" name="page124"></a>(p. 124)</span> to allow any +considerations of party interest, on this or on any subsequent +occasion, to influence his judgment. While he conceived it to be his +duty to give advice and criticism to public men of all shades of +political opinion, he showed himself inexorably opposed to the thought +of straining his constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the +benefit of one side or the other.<a id="footnotetag44" name="footnotetag44"></a><a href="#footnote44" title="Go to footnote 44"><span class="small">[44]</span></a> Accordingly provision for the +expenses of administration was made by Governor's warrants up to +September 30th, and on the day following the Vryburg election +(September 16th), a proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th +was issued.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Schreiner, prime minister.</span> + +<p>On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no +confidence" by a majority of two.<a id="footnotetag45" name="footnotetag45"></a><a href="#footnote45" title="Go to footnote 45"><span class="small">[45]</span></a> On the 17th the House assembled +with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to +the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members +of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close +association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The +latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided +with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The +Progressives <span class="pagenum"><a id="page125" name="page125"></a>(p. 125)</span> continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon +Sprigg. Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an +"independent," since he had found himself unable to work in +association with a party in which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. +The new Ministry was not strong enough to resist the continued demand +of the Progressives for a measure of electoral reform; but the +Redistribution Bill, as now passed, took the form of a compromise so +disastrous to the British population that the Bond majority was +increased to eight by the new elections held in April, 1899.<a id="footnotetag46" name="footnotetag46"></a><a href="#footnote46" title="Go to footnote 46"><span class="small">[46]</span></a></p> + +<p>Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief +that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the +Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in +October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony +pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the +affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and +more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have +seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the +northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal +the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been +despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with +authority and funds calculated to enable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page126" name="page126"></a>(p. 126)</span> him to enlist the +active sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria +Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by +Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the +actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and +even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was +appointed to the office of State Attorney.<a id="footnotetag47" name="footnotetag47"></a><a href="#footnote47" title="Go to footnote 47"><span class="small">[47]</span></a> With the exception of +Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the +control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists +dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in +these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between +the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become +increasingly unsatisfactory.<a id="footnotetag48" name="footnotetag48"></a><a href="#footnote48" title="Go to footnote 48"><span class="small">[48]</span></a></p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page127" name="page127"></a>(p. 127)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Milner's visit to England.</span> + +<p>In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England. +Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th, +was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due +in part to the necessity for medical treatment;<a id="footnotetag49" name="footnotetag49"></a><a href="#footnote49" title="Go to footnote 49"><span class="small">[49]</span></a> but, in any case, +it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to +Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South +African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the +19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February +14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was +engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody +else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs +was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss +of South Africa.</p> + +<p>During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient +study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What +he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch +ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in +the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact, +as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was +in a position of distinct <span class="pagenum"><a id="page128" name="page128"></a>(p. 128)</span> inferiority to the Dutch; and this +although the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal +and the Free State were states subject to the authority of Great +Britain as paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord +Milner urged upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of +putting an end to an intolerable state of things which showed no +capacity of righting itself; of pressing for justice to the British +population of the Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain +it. That such a policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he +nor any one else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war +actually was. The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange +Free State, now bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party +of the Bond now in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even +the most moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the +British Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the +Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt +whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And +in any case he felt that there was no option for the British +Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a +shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved +in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the +danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page129" name="page129"></a>(p. 129)</span> the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting +ourselves be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and +indeed totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the +affection of the South African British or on the respect either of +British or Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger +may well have seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils +on both hands, he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go +forward, to make one supreme effort to save a situation which was +rapidly becoming a hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the +forces which were gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing +on every side, could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the +euthanasia of British dominion in South Africa.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">His verdict.</span> + +<p>It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the +magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of +herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of +ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander +ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in +statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of +the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my +might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at +Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing +conviction of the rightness of our cause."<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page130" name="page130"></a>(p. 130)</span> CHAPTER IV</h3> + +<p class="title">UNDER WHICH FLAG?</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Uitlanders' petition.</span> + +<p>Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered +in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain +had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the +dynamite contract in its new form (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> as, in effect, a "privileged +importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking") +was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of +the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on +the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's +reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long +after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the +opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to +interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of +the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the +agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at +Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.<a id="footnotetag50" name="footnotetag50"></a><a href="#footnote50" title="Go to footnote 50"><span class="small">[50]</span></a> This <span class="pagenum"><a id="page131" name="page131"></a>(p. 131)</span> event was +followed by the petition for protection, +which Sir William Butler (who +was General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High +Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January +4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up +of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the +Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April +14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March +24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which +it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony +and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial +Government.<a id="footnotetag51" name="footnotetag51"></a><a href="#footnote51" title="Go to footnote 51"><span class="small">[51]</span></a></p> + +<p>Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly +statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders<a id="footnotetag52" name="footnotetag52"></a><a href="#footnote52" title="Go to footnote 52"><span class="small">[52]</span></a> with +the memorable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page132" name="page132"></a>(p. 132)</span> words: "The case for intervention is +overwhelming." Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th +was written at white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in +no less a degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully +informed upon every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the +fact that all that is essential for the full comprehension of the +second Reform Movement at Johannesburg—the salient features of which +have been outlined above—is to be found within the limits of this +brief and notable State document:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The intervention despatch.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Having regard to the critical character of the South African + situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's + Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under + ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of + importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to + South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with + each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing + the whole position.</p> + +<p>"The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident. + But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was + certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing + of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal + blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It + was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page133" name="page133"></a>(p. 133)</span> with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at + the trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor, + in fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a + particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more + in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of + the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to + deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh + and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen + to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent + ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds + for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused + was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African + League, but the officials of the League were forced into action + by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances + once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the + smouldering but profound discontent of the population who + constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests + disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on + which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence, + should once more break into flame.</p> + +<p>"We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a + similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and + ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders + were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of, + and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied, + and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is + impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which + has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court + of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied + in the new draft Grondwet that any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page134" name="page134"></a>(p. 134)</span> resolution of the + Volksraad is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has + always been one of the most serious grievances. The new + Constitution provides for their permanent instability, the judges + being bound by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as + equally binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with + the provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing + this oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no + self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the + Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly + they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the + Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of + Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same + confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number + of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a + petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my + opinion of its substantial genuineness <span class="sidenote2">The movement not artificial.</span> +and the absolute <span class="italic">bona + fides</span> of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among + many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population, + who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State."</p> + +<p>"The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by + workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the + Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is + impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size. + Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or + another all large public buildings have been rendered + unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly + along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for + enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and + extent.</p> + +<p>"With regard to the attempt to represent that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page135" name="page135"></a>(p. 135)</span> movement + as artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional + agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The + defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances + are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many + capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of + its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the + lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor + dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform. + Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only + want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly + sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter + which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and + constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds + of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or + to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of + the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country. + They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance.</p> + +<p>"A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political + unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they + constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of + chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic + administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all + these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of + political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for + enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects, + accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply + the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent + subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power + to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal + Republic will never end till the permanent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page136" name="page136"></a>(p. 136)</span> Uitlander + population is admitted to a share in the government, and while + that turmoil lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate + progress in Her Majesty's South African dominions.</p> + +<p>"The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics + are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in + order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically, + they are all one country. The two principal white races are + everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to + dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they + can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all + round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six + Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and + political systems—perfect equality for Dutch and British in the + British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of + the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to + talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.</p> + +<p>"It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal + Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government. + No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace + of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great + Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders + is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The + majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect. + But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series + of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which + are not less serious because they are not individually + sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means + impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about + this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in + rare cases, and only when we are very <span class="pagenum"><a id="page137" name="page137"></a>(p. 137)</span> emphatic, do we + obtain any redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal + Republic is thus inevitably kept up, while the result in the way + of protection to our subjects is lamentably small. For these + reasons it has been, as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce + the number of our complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when + I ought to have protested from my great dislike of ineffectual + nagging. But I feel that the attempt to remedy the + hundred-and-one wrongs springing from a hopeless system by taking + up isolated cases, is perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, + but will never lead to real improvement."</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">Enfranchisement the remedy.</span> + +<p>"The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these + injuries—the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic + protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander + representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a + paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of + protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our + subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of + political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic. + But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of + difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely + remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great + Britain which at present dominates its internal and external + policy.</p> + +<p>"The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted + answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But, + in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for + years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not + true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to + worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the + Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page138" name="page138"></a>(p. 138)</span> effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of + leaving things alone a new lease of life, and with the old + consequences.</p> + +<p>"The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently + in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted + grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for + redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of + Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within + the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the + Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a + republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing + references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with + the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of + war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I + regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a + ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the + British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large + number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used + which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right, + even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth. + Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone, + perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are + being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding + exasperation on the side of the British.</p> + +<p>"I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous + propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her + Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South + Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice + would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair + share in the government of the country which owes everything to + their exertions. It could <span class="pagenum"><a id="page139" name="page139"></a>(p. 139)</span> be made perfectly clear that + our action was not directed against the existence of the + Republic. We should only be demanding the re-establishment of + rights which now exist in the Orange Free State, and which + existed in the Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after, + the withdrawal of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish + demand, as other Uitlanders besides those of British birth would + benefit by it. It is asking for nothing from others which we do + not give ourselves. And it would certainly go to the root of the + political unrest in South Africa, and, though temporarily it + might aggravate, it would ultimately extinguish the race feud, + which is the great bane of the country."<a id="footnotetag53" name="footnotetag53"></a><a href="#footnote53" title="Go to footnote 53"><span class="small">[53]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should +have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the +essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it +exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch +ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal—a +matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that +these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover, +the circumstance that President Krüger knew that they were before the +British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the +strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined +to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to +the Queen.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's intervention.</span> + +<p>Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr <span class="pagenum"><a id="page140" name="page140"></a>(p. 140)</span> knew that a +despatch of grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt, +a fairly accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord +Milner had warned some time before of "the gravity of the +situation."<a id="footnotetag54" name="footnotetag54"></a><a href="#footnote54" title="Go to footnote 54"><span class="small">[54]</span></a> It is not going beyond the limits of probability to +assume that the Master of the Bond realised the effect which the +publication of these plain truths, backed by the authority of the High +Commissioner, would produce upon the mind of the English people, and +that he thereupon determined to take steps to prevent a turn of +affairs which, as he conceived, would be most unfavourable to the +nationalist cause. Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five +days sufficed to place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if +he would favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krüger in +conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th) +a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of +President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less +certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take +place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the +publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of +the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of +those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in +all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's <span class="pagenum"><a id="page141" name="page141"></a>(p. 141)</span> statesmanship. Indeed, +the methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British +administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more +subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar +circumstances of the Home Rule campaign.</p> + +<p>The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of +May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt +both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the +incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is +necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which +Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections<a id="footnotetag55" name="footnotetag55"></a><a href="#footnote55" title="Go to footnote 55"><span class="small">[55]</span></a> +had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the +same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to +fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the +"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Bond and the ministry.</span> + +<p>The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist +for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the +Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the +Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the +Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and +its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page142" name="page142"></a>(p. 142)</span> of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by +either party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it +followed, <span class="italic">ex hypothesi</span>, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was +right, and England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, +on behalf of the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the +proposals of the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he +even knew what those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented +themselves as "mediators." They had as little intention of mediating +between the Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a +barrister, heavily feed and primed with his client's case, has of +mediating between his client and his client's opponent at the hearing +of a case in court.</p> + +<p>But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet—T. Nicholas +German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William +Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and +Richard Solomon—had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and +bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Schreiner ministry.</span> + +<p>The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of +so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a +parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High +Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise +of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the +Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page143" name="page143"></a>(p. 143)</span> he was bound to +administer the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice +tendered by his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged +to give him was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High +Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his +ministers—the alternative to accepting this advice—would have been +an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they +had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to +the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter +that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be +difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape +ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was +done by the Liberal Opposition—again collectively or individually—in +England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet, +whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened—and +was intended to lessen—the force of an effort on the part of the +Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity +for war.</p> + +<p>And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind +that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be +anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real +standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it +that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page144" name="page144"></a>(p. 144)</span> Richard +Solomon, came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their +respective motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of +the Bond?</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The prime minister.</span> + +<p>Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of +the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and +afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a +sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and +now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner +family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is +the authoress of <span class="italic">The Story of an African Farm</span>, and a second, Mrs. +Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a +determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at +the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge, +where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and +afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at +the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's +Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was +prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr. +Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the +position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we +have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General +Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page145" name="page145"></a>(p. 145)</span> Mr. +Schreiner and of his political position that the only word of sympathy +with the British connection, uttered from first to last during this +election by the Bond candidates or their supporters, was the +conventional reference to the greatness of the British Empire which, +as we have noticed, occurred in his address to the electors of +Malmesbury. With these political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was +compelled to be a South African first and a British subject second. +His is precisely the kind of case where true allegiance can be +expected only when a federal constitution has been created for the +Empire.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg, + "how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone + solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of + South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else + can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great + Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept + allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. + But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity, + without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal + devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South + Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for + the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."<a id="footnotetag56" name="footnotetag56"></a><a href="#footnote56" title="Go to footnote 56"><span class="small">[56]</span></a></p> + +<p>With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the +moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of +policy. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page146" name="page146"></a>(p. 146)</span> All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born +of pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so +largely into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as +they drew his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with +the cause of Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the +particular issue now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an +answer which he gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in +the course of the inquiry into the Raid (1897):</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Chamberlain:</span> I suppose your view is that the Imperial + Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government, + and should refrain from even friendly representations as not + being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders?</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Schreiner:</span> Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns + are concerned.<a id="footnotetag57" name="footnotetag57"></a><a href="#footnote57" title="Go to footnote 57"><span class="small">[57]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent +of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his +motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent +intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the +claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial +Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions; +while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander +nationalists made him blind to the existence of any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page147" name="page147"></a>(p. 147)</span> moral +right of interference that England might possess, as the Power +responsible for the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so, +partly by force of environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous +interpretation of the principles of international law,<a id="footnotetag58" name="footnotetag58"></a><a href="#footnote58" title="Go to footnote 58"><span class="small">[58]</span></a> the Boer +and Hollander oligarchy in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity +and administrative incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing +sacrosanct in his eyes. Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other +hand, desired to prevent intervention because they were perfectly +satisfied to see the British Uitlanders in a position of political +inferiority, and perfectly content with the whole situation, the +continuance of which, as they knew, was directly calculated to bring +about the supremacy of the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore +Hofmeyr made no effort to improve the state of affairs in the +Transvaal until he saw the storm bursting. And when, at a later stage, +he set himself to work in earnest to induce President Krüger to grant +reforms, he did so to save the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not +to assist the British Government in winning justice for the +Uitlanders.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Sir Richard Solomon.</span> + +<p>Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent +radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for +Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page148" name="page148"></a>(p. 148)</span> +the Cape Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His +presence, at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such +a ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a +supporter of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the +Uitlanders, he was in direct conflict with the characteristic +principles of the Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his +distrust of Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the +British connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is +probably to be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime +Minister. On the other hand, his ability, detachment from local +parties, and the respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset +to Mr. Schreiner.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.</span> + +<p>Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice +held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from +Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the +Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political +career have been already mentioned.<a id="footnotetag59" name="footnotetag59"></a><a href="#footnote59" title="Go to footnote 59"><span class="small">[59]</span></a> Fifteen years ago more +Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman +than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the +separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and +sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in +the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations <span class="pagenum"><a id="page149" name="page149"></a>(p. 149)</span> of +"capitalism" and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his +Afrikander allies, had an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had +tried to amalgamate the Diamond Mines at Kimberley—failing where +Rhodes and Beit afterwards succeeded—and who, attracted by the magnet +of gold discovery, for a short time had acted as manager of the +Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B. Robinson's interests at Johannesburg. +With political principles thus unstable and a mind strangely sensitive +to any emotional appeal, it is not surprising that Mr. Merriman +displayed the proverbial enthusiasm of the convert in his new +political creed. His original perception of the imprudence and +administrative incompetency of President Krüger's <span class="italic">régime</span> was rapidly +obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in turn gave place to an +unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause, combined with a bitter +antipathy against all who were concerned, whether in a civil or +military capacity, in giving effect to the intervention of the +Imperial Government on behalf of the British industrial community in +the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to exhibit his political +convictions in a manner so demonstrative that his words and acts, as +recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader in no doubt as to the +reality of his sympathy with the Boer and Afrikander cause. For the +moment, therefore, it is sufficient to notice that, although he shared +Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page150" name="page150"></a>(p. 150)</span> "capitalism" and +"capitalists," he was for many years of his life a promoter and +director of mining and other companies.</p> + +<p>Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the +Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good +repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr. +Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the +Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal.</p> + +<p>The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed +hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the +Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister +without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the +sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination +of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the +administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact +that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to +be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of +administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group +of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each +other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the +majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the +attainment of which they were prepared to make a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page151" name="page151"></a>(p. 151)</span> +considerable sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political +principles. The denial of political rights to the British population +in the Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy +in South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in +the Cape Colony—the Progressives—strong enough to act in +independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not +only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a +minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in +Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement +upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British +population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided +into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any +longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to +the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Policy of the ministry.</span> + +<p>Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives +on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to +prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in +Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea +of inducing President Krüger to grant such a "colourable measure of +reform"<a id="footnotetag60" name="footnotetag60"></a><a href="#footnote60" title="Go to footnote 60"><span class="small">[60]</span></a> as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least +deprive it of any justification <span class="pagenum"><a id="page152" name="page152"></a>(p. 152)</span> for interference by force of +arms, was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein +Conference took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to +President Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity," +he said,<a id="footnotetag61" name="footnotetag61"></a><a href="#footnote61" title="Go to footnote 61"><span class="small">[61]</span></a> "of bringing about a <span class="italic">rapprochement</span> between us, in which +the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, the +Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway, +apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa +increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the +pretext for outside interference."</p> + +<p>And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded +by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise +question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March—when +Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in +the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry +from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them +certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to +discourage the agitation for political rights—the same subject was +brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In +pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry—<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to +obtain a fictitious concession from President Krüger, instead of the +"fair share in the government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page153" name="page153"></a>(p. 153)</span> of the country" required by +the Imperial Government—it was proposed originally to exclude Lord +Milner altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the +Transvaal Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an +inter-State Conference consisting of representatives of the +governments of the two Republics and the self-governing British +Colonies. But Lord Milner was, happily, High Commissioner as well as +Governor of the Cape. As High Commissioner, he declared that at any +such Conference the Imperial Government must be separately +represented. Neither the Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to +enter a Conference on these terms, although they were acceptable to +the Cape Government; and the plan fell to the ground.</p> + +<p>It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's +despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic +swiftness to accept the rôle of peace-maker, which his predecessor, +Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the +grudging consent of President Krüger to meet the High Commissioner at +Bloemfontein.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's <span class="italic">tour de force</span>.</span> + +<p>The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's <span class="italic">tour de +force</span> are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was +telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon +apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from +the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page154" name="page154"></a>(p. 154)</span> Schreiner +received warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including +"Hofmeyr's best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to +President Steyn containing a "proposition" of so confidential a +character that it could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need +of haste.<a id="footnotetag62" name="footnotetag62"></a><a href="#footnote62" title="Go to footnote 62"><span class="small">[62]</span></a> On Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning +telegrams, and Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed +his hope that the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of +Saturday, might by this time "have been accepted, or that something +had been done which would achieve the same purpose."<a id="footnotetag63" name="footnotetag63"></a><a href="#footnote63" title="Go to footnote 63"><span class="small">[63]</span></a> On the same +day the Cape papers published an alarming telegram reproducing from +<span class="italic">The Daily Chronicle</span><a id="footnotetag64" name="footnotetag64"></a><a href="#footnote64" title="Go to footnote 64"><span class="small">[64]</span></a> a statement that the South African situation +was very serious, and that the British Government was prepared to +"take some risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present +at a dinner given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr. +Hofmeyr, who was among the guests, in the course of a long +conversation with him after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting +President Krüger at Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner +sent for Mr. Hofmeyr and discussed the subject more at length; and, a +little later, when he had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner +came in with a telegram <span class="pagenum"><a id="page155" name="page155"></a>(p. 155)</span> from President Steyn, in which the +Cape Prime Minister was requested to ascertain formally whether the +High Commissioner would be willing to accept an invitation to meet +President Krüger. This telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr. +Chamberlain, adding that the Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of +acceptance, and that Schreiner himself had declared that the +invitation was the result of the "influence which he (Schreiner) had +been using with the Transvaal Government ever since I had warned him +of the gravity of the situation."<a id="footnotetag65" name="footnotetag65"></a><a href="#footnote65" title="Go to footnote 65"><span class="small">[65]</span></a> Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May +12th), authorised Lord Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation, +and in doing so, to state that a despatch was already on its way which +contained a similar proposal made by the Imperial Government—</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The conference arranged.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive + at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept + and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable + concession to their just demands and a settlement of the + difficulties which have threatened the good relations"</p> + +<p class="noindent">between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th, +in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole +situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and +formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not +published until June 14th, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, after the Bloemfontein <span class="pagenum"><a id="page156" name="page156"></a>(p. 156)</span> +Conference had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord +Milner's despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete +record of all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord +Milner's appointment.</p> + +<p>In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly +between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President +Krüger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's +invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was +arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was +intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in +the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation +with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master +of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of +Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of +the communications which passed at this time, and during the four +succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican +confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely +found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water +who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way +of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd), +Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr. +Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself <span class="pagenum"><a id="page157" name="page157"></a>(p. 157)</span> +suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground; +since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a +satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been +achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line +indicated by Lord Milner:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he + telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first + instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time + if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath + modified."</p> + +<p>Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the +Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general +sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had +addressed to the Queen.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Motives of Afrikander leaders.</span> + +<p>There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which +had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort. +They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr. +Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to +avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate +plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which +involved the continuance of the present position—a position which was +one of moral superiority for the Dutch—would unite the whole of the +Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain +within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise <span class="pagenum"><a id="page158" name="page158"></a>(p. 158)</span> +question was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount +Power and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape +Dutch would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican +kinsmen. This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the +decisive action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth +of his estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet +speech, this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the +Transvaal was the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner +Ministry; "reform" was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place +of the first only when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord +Milner's resolution and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry +now, no less than before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British +Government in obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the +Transvaal armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was +too deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back +without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail +himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford. +When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram, +had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on +the part of President Krüger," Lord Milner had replied that he could +"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from +President Krüger <span class="pagenum"><a id="page159" name="page159"></a>(p. 159)</span> himself," and contained no indication of +"the basis or subject of discussion."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Krüger's obduracy.</span> + +<p>The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal +adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President +Krüger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de +Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of +the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on +this very errand of "mediation":</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as + I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on + him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, + would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice + had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with + the President.</p> + +<p>"I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad + with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.</p> + +<p>"It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily + from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them. + In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the + malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be + felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, + there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as + it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their + discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be + conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made + by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.</p> + +<p>"I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page160" name="page160"></a>(p. 160)</span> known + to my fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his + retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever + have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would + have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the + condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other + words, to recommence the war....</p> + +<p>"I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly, + but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object + in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are, + of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's + position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience + will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can + reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used + your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will + also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace + successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make + his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the + arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide + over immediate difficulties."</p> +</div> + +<p>And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief +Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in +allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw, + three months ago, that if President Krüger did not voluntarily + yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the + whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krüger's friends + to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is + war with England; on the other side there are concessions + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page161" name="page161"></a>(p. 161)</span> which will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, + decide at once how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English + five years' franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, + make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will + have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they become + burghers. The answer I got was: We have done too much already, + and cannot do more. Yet afterwards they did a great deal more. + The same policy of doing nothing except under pressure is still + being pursued. The longer the delay, the more they will have to + yield."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Afrikander advice.</span> + +<p>This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr. +Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir +Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed +to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a +convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate +of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience +has completely justified:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost + influence to bear on President Krüger to concede some colourable + measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as + in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is + the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing + off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless + hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should + recruit his Republic with new blood—and the sands are running + out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The + fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page162" name="page162"></a>(p. 162)</span> done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal + privileges would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a + maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against + the swamping of the old population."<a id="footnotetag66" name="footnotetag66"></a><a href="#footnote66" title="Go to footnote 66"><span class="small">[66]</span></a></p> + +<p>But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative +of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see +that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on +indefinitely—that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord, +unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect +of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of +Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken, +contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both +the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the +nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with +which Dr. Te Water served them.</p> + +<p>The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,<a id="footnotetag67" name="footnotetag67"></a><a href="#footnote67" title="Go to footnote 67"><span class="small">[67]</span></a> consists of three +letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the +Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The +replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the +public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes +heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference <span class="pagenum"><a id="page163" name="page163"></a>(p. 163)</span> +has been accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the +advisability of President Krüger's yielding on the ground, not of +justice, but of temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of +the Crown completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the +Afrikander nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private +telegraphic code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when +Schreiner was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our + friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the + head of the Government here, they have a better chance that + reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they + would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections + and our enemies were advisers.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">"Play to win time".</span> + +<p>"Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly + that things are extremely critical.</p> + +<p>"Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such + as J. H.'s<a id="footnotetag68" name="footnotetag68"></a><a href="#footnote68" title="Go to footnote 68"><span class="small">[68]</span></a> best friends, received by him on Saturday and this + morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win + time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present + team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward + before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less + hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded + in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."</p> +</div> + +<p>In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share +President Steyn's view that "all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page164" name="page164"></a>(p. 164)</span> the noise about war is +bluff." Then there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had +entertained expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that +even Dr. Te Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial +allegiance:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes, + "as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be + able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we + can be of more use than before?"</p> + +<p>Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the +event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape +Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or +words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous +views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested +during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers, +from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz + and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and + duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of + the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible + assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a + responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of + internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all + the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown; + at least if they did not do so they would be liable to + dismissal."</p> + + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page165" name="page165"></a>(p. 165)</span> Dr. Te Water then continues:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not + already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible, + to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for + the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully + about this."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Te Water and Steyn.</span> + +<p>The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a +curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed +between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know. +President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore, +reassures him:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram + also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private: + naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend + Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be + afraid; I shall not give you away."</p> + +<p>It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no +private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private +telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic + code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and + I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of + weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself <span class="italic">only</span>. It + is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and + the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am + afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."</p> + +<p>And he then drives home the advice given before: <span class="pagenum"><a id="page166" name="page166"></a>(p. 166)</span> "It is +honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later again +tighten the rope."</p> + +<p>One other letter must be given to complete this view of the +circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th, +1899—that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord +Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange +the conference with President Krüger. It is addressed to President +Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> + +<p><span class="add5em smcap">Department of Foreign Affairs</span>,<br> +<span class="left50 smcap">"Government Offices, Pretoria.</span><br> + <span class="ralign italic">"May 9th, 1899.</span></p> + +<p>"<span class="smcap">Dear Mr. President</span>,—</p> + +<p>"I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the + ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the + Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could + consequently not get the desired information earlier.</p> + +<p>"The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser + and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will + be able to supply you with any of either sort.</p> + +<p>"On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.</p> + +<p>"The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet + officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come + in it through your proposed plan. The copies <span class="italic">re</span> dynamite will + be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,</p> + +<p>"Your humble servant and friend,<br> + <span class="left50 smcap">"P. Groebler.</span>"<a id="footnotetag69" name="footnotetag69"></a><a href="#footnote69" title="Go to footnote 69"><span class="small">[69]</span></a></p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page167" name="page167"></a>(p. 167)</span> The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for +time," because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal +party to power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of +their policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics +were "playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until +their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them +to defy the British Government.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Bloemfontein conference.</span> + +<p>It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President +Krüger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st—June 5th). He was +accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary), +Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams +(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),<a id="footnotetag70" name="footnotetag70"></a><a href="#footnote70" title="Go to footnote 70"><span class="small">[70]</span></a> with Mr. +Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner +had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner, +following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of +the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he +was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the +Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of +"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on +the eve of the Conference.<a id="footnotetag71" name="footnotetag71"></a><a href="#footnote71" title="Go to footnote 71"><span class="small">[71]</span></a> Nor did Lord Milner avail <span class="pagenum"><a id="page168" name="page168"></a>(p. 168)</span> +himself of President Steyn's willingness to take part in the +proceedings; but, at the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer +(who was a member of the Free State Executive) was invited to act as +interpreter—a duty which he discharged to the satisfaction of both +parties. With President Krüger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk +Burger and Mr. A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), +Mr. J. C. Smuts (the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of +these, the High Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at +the meetings of the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined +to Lord Milner and President Krüger.<a id="footnotetag72" name="footnotetag72"></a><a href="#footnote72" title="Go to footnote 72"><span class="small">[72]</span></a> As regards the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page169" name="page169"></a>(p. 169)</span> +business in hand, the failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had +deprived Lord Milner of what would have proved a helpful influence. +Mr. Hofmeyr's action had procured an opportunity for "friendly +discussion." But the friendliness was to be all on the side of the +Imperial Government. For the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as +we have seen, to secure a fictitious concession on the part of +President Krüger. Lord Milner's aim was to obtain by friendly +discussion a genuine and substantial measure of reform; and the +prospect of his success would have been greatly increased if this +despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it had been before the public +when the Conference took place. It was written with the object of +making the British people and President Krüger alike aware how grave +was the judgment which he had formed of the existing situation. With +England alive to the near danger which threatened her supremacy in +South Africa, and President Krüger brought to understand that the man +with whom he had to deal was one who held these opinions, Lord Milner +could have been "friendly" without the risk of having his friendliness +mistaken for a readiness to accept the illusory concession which was +all that the Afrikander mediation was intended to secure.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's attitude.</span> + +<p>As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great +embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the +charge of entering upon the discussion in an <span class="pagenum"><a id="page170" name="page170"></a>(p. 170)</span> aggressive +spirit, calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a +conciliatory tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the +abortive protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully +filled the republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It +has been suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better +result if he had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had +been willing to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based +upon an entire misunderstanding of the method which the High +Commissioner did, in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise—the +Bloemfontein minimum—was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner +said, in effect, to President Krüger was this: "I have a whole sheaf +of grievances against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway +rates, interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious +police system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the +rest. I will let all these go in exchange for one thing—a franchise +reform which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander +population some appreciable representation in the government of the +Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise +that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose +from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that +could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing +a permanent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page171" name="page171"></a>(p. 171)</span> settlement of the Uitlander question, he had +nothing further to concede, and said so.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">President Krüger.</span> + +<p>No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and +antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented, +could have been found. At the evening reception given by President +Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly +buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and +then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face, +half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth +which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krüger, +<span class="italic">ætat.</span> 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krüger's large and powerful frame +had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as +the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become +shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his +stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he +retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of +its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources—all +that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the +Temple—to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of +his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of +defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which +the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to +the Conference <span class="pagenum"><a id="page172" name="page172"></a>(p. 172)</span> to make "one big straightforward effort to +avert a great disaster"; Krüger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end +was as Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of +reform seemed to President Krüger, in this mind, "worse than +annexation"; and on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is +absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation on either side +arising out of it."</p> + +<p>The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord +Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President +Krüger to the franchise question he had made the conference the +pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew, +when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting +with President Krüger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the +franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no +turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too, +that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any +subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the +attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift +proposals put forward by President Krüger at Bloemfontein.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">After the conference.</span> + +<p>The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect +upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the +address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page173" name="page173"></a>(p. 173)</span> +and from his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran +colonist, the British population of the Colony then (June 12th) +expressed their "admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf +of the Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared +their "entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these +unhappy differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord +Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found." +The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality +could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where +inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a +fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great +Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race, +that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of +subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the +Transvaal." And he concludes:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her + Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any + man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has + been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will + continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one + desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present + period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement + to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of + that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the + South African Republic <span class="pagenum"><a id="page174" name="page174"></a>(p. 174)</span> will yet see its way to adopt a + measure of reform more liberal than that proposed at + Bloemfontein. If not, there may be other means of achieving the + desired result. In any case, it is a source of strength to those + who are fighting the battle of reform, and will, I believe, + contribute more than anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel + that they have behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the + unanimous sympathy of the British people throughout the + world."<a id="footnotetag73" name="footnotetag73"></a><a href="#footnote73" title="Go to footnote 73"><span class="small">[73]</span></a></p> + +<p>In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden +of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have +crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An +Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its +confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond +Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krüger, +would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any +ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only +adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into +collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact +that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces +in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner, +was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and +in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a +war to compel the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page175" name="page175"></a>(p. 175)</span> Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary +political rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr. +Gladstone's Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the +"greatest calamity that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than +this, that if the Home Government did make war, it would be merely +playing the game of "the party of the Raid, the South African +League."<a id="footnotetag74" name="footnotetag74"></a><a href="#footnote74" title="Go to footnote 74"><span class="small">[74]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner and Butler.</span> + +<p>It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General +Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High +Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite +untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course, +different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the +Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal +Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund +Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of +course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines +followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of +the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been +discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of +the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means, +therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached +to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this +particular point <span class="pagenum"><a id="page176" name="page176"></a>(p. 176)</span> there was no opportunity for a conflict of +opinion. Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have +accepted the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of +General Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General +Butler's business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's. +From a wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It +was one of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have +led the Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument, +or unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this +account. This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the +general question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of +military precautions in view of the imminence of war.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Reinforcements requested.</span> + +<p>The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command +in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard +of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the +Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the +success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General +Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations +for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that +might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a +peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the +needs of the military situation to those of the political, they +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page177" name="page177"></a>(p. 177)</span> acted in direct opposition to the maxim <span class="italic">si pacem vis, +bellum para</span>. They carried this policy to such a point that they +disregarded the advice of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and +that of the Intelligence Department,<a id="footnotetag75" name="footnotetag75"></a><a href="#footnote75" title="Go to footnote 75"><span class="small">[75]</span></a> with the result that when the +war did break out the available British forces in South Africa were +found to be in a position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General +Butler's opposition was entirely different. +His view was that what +made the situation dangerous was not President Krüger's obduracy, but +what he called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the +British inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the +Transvaal. And he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the +Home Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General +Butler) was endeavouring to reduce by every means."<a id="footnotetag76" name="footnotetag76"></a><a href="#footnote76" title="Go to footnote 76"><span class="small">[76]</span></a> The position +in June and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary +as it was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority, +the Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military +adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority, +the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled +to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the +reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In +these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts +of Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page178" name="page178"></a>(p. 178)</span> Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming +military defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to +the interests of the empire.</p> + +<p>When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the +situation was becoming dangerous—and still more after the +Conference—he desired that preparations for war should be made by the +Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st, +1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised +from 5,409 to 9,593 men.<a id="footnotetag77" name="footnotetag77"></a><a href="#footnote77" title="Go to footnote 77"><span class="small">[77]</span></a> It remained at a little under 10,000 up +to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon +the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men +was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased +tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South +African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and +that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful +submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the +garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the +spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance +these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should +be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the +colonial borders, and that all supplies and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page179" name="page179"></a>(p. 179)</span> material of war +necessary to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and, +as far as possible, distributed.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">General Butler's objections.</span> + +<p>General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for +war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered +assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received +by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of +the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in +Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a +volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of +war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the +nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the +Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British +South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an +attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable +as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from +employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said +to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.<a id="footnotetag78" name="footnotetag78"></a><a href="#footnote78" title="Go to footnote 78"><span class="small">[78]</span></a> And +when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home +Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to +send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page180" name="page180"></a>(p. 180)</span> effort to strengthen the British military position in South +Africa, General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that +these additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their +being despatched.</p> + +<p>General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so +unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some +precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had +submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British +colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be +protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to +the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum +of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st, +1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the +Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the +despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of +supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and +that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what +action under these arrangements would be required of him on the +outbreak of war."<a id="footnotetag79" name="footnotetag79"></a><a href="#footnote79" title="Go to footnote 79"><span class="small">[79]</span></a> On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon +succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at +an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals +for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa +in the event <span class="pagenum"><a id="page181" name="page181"></a>(p. 181)</span> of war. At the same time the latest information +as to the military strength of the two Republics—showing, among other +things, a total of 40,000 burghers<a id="footnotetag80" name="footnotetag80"></a><a href="#footnote80" title="Go to footnote 80"><span class="small">[80]</span></a>—was forwarded to him, and his +attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command +must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose <span class="italic">rôle</span> would be +to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England. +In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was +again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> after the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British +colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in +cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On +June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had +been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in +South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do +you desire to make any observations?"</p> + +<span class="sidenote">"Ringing the War Office bell".</span> + +<p>The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the +one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and +I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on +with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked +upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The +Government did not seem to be aware of that, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page182" name="page182"></a>(p. 182)</span> this +telegram brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the +opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and +answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office +bell."</p> + +<p>The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was +this:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here + is highly excited, and doubtless the news <span class="italic">quoting</span> preparations + referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely + to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means. + Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my + estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war + between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and + subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity + that ever occurred in South Africa."</p> + +<p>This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private + opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy + by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and + whom you will, of course, loyally support."</p> + +<p>In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler +gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his +reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It +was never in your contemplation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page183" name="page183"></a>(p. 183)</span> that Mr. Krüger would +declare war?" he replied:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">General Butler's view.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle, + so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute + there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming + in, in front of, or behind, that party [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> "the party of the + Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state + of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability—no + possibility—of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the + time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions + were arrived at."</p> + +<p>And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before +the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure +to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in +his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands +of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and +render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had +by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."<a id="footnotetag81" name="footnotetag81"></a><a href="#footnote81" title="Go to footnote 81"><span class="small">[81]</span></a></p> + +<p>Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of +extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must +be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General +Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their +part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page184" name="page184"></a>(p. 184)</span> military +preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General +Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and +that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been +represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the +official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's +alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General +Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape +until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for +him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape +command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which +he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as +military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a +matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the +South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a +grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the +undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the +action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the +High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him +with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain +at the Cape until the latter part of August.</p> + +<p>General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier. +It is interesting, therefore, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page185" name="page185"></a>(p. 185)</span> to know what was his view, and +to compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which +dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August, +1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found +themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the +seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in +the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">What Lord Milner thought.</span> + +<p>As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military +unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently +stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to +form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, +it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord +Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his +estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed +from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation +presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military +point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least +for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South +Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be +absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were +prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that +such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one +that admitted of only two alternatives—it must never <span class="pagenum"><a id="page186" name="page186"></a>(p. 186)</span> be +made, or, being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness +of our position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt +which the Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole +social and political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look +the Dutch in the face as equals. If, after all our previous +humiliations and failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were +going to commence a struggle for equality—nothing more, and then not +to get it, the shame would be too grave for any great Power to +support, or for those who sympathised with us in South Africa to +endure. We had raised the British party in South Africa from the dust +by the stand which we had made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. +If we were going to retreat from that position, the discredit of our +action would compel England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, +and with the resignation of that claim England's rights in South +Africa would inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at +Simon's Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was +fundamental was not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of +retreat.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Retreat impossible.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if +the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line, +the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something +substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable, +that they would not yield, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page187" name="page187"></a>(p. 187)</span> that in this case a state of +tension would be created which must end in war. His position was, +therefore, definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing +a policy from which we cannot retreat—a policy that may lead to +war—it is wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, +unarmed, without a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And +so far from thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the +Imperial Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would +make war more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. +But even if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but +"retreat" that must be avoided at all costs.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page188" name="page188"></a>(p. 188)</span> CHAPTER V</h3> + +<p class="title">PLAYING FOR TIME</p> + + +<p>On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons, +that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new +situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this +remark into action, the South African War would have been less +disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of +considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling +General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the +preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From +the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the +British Government should have an absolutely good case as before the +world—a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of +the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea +British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to +overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which +international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes +its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all, +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page189" name="page189"></a>(p. 189)</span> it had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's +South African policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which +would necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the +differences which had arisen between the South African Republic and +the Imperial Government.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Policy of Home Government.</span> + +<p>Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give +effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it +existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so +far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the +dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of +these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to +raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point +sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional +force—an army corps—for any offensive movement against one or both +of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war +from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious +that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the +offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be +held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services +were required.</p> + +<p>To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was +now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page190" name="page190"></a>(p. 190)</span> of Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th, +1899,<a id="footnotetag82" name="footnotetag82"></a><a href="#footnote82" title="Go to footnote 82"><span class="small">[82]</span></a> and addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the +Commander-in-Chief advised the mobilisation in England of a force +consisting of one complete army corps, one cavalry division, one +battalion mounted infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of +communication; the collection of transport in South Africa; and the +immediate initiation of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for +conveying these additional troops and their equipment to the seat of +war. This advice was disregarded; but in place of the immediate +mobilisation of the Army Corps the Cabinet decided to increase the +efficiency of the existing force in South Africa, and General Butler +was informed of this decision, as we have seen, on June 21st. On July +7th,<a id="footnotetag83" name="footnotetag83"></a><a href="#footnote83" title="Go to footnote 83"><span class="small">[83]</span></a> Lord Wolseley recommended, in addition to the mobilisation of +the offensive force—which he still deemed necessary—that "the South +African garrisons should be strengthened by the despatch of 10,000 men +at a very early date." Instead of adopting these measures, the +Government confined itself to doing just the few necessary things, +both for defence and offence, that could be done without creating any +belief in its warlike intentions, and without involving any +appreciable expenditure of the public funds. Undoubtedly this latter +consideration—the desire to avoid any expenditure that might +afterwards prove to have been unnecessary—added <span class="pagenum"><a id="page191" name="page191"></a>(p. 191)</span> weight to +the purely political argument against immediate military preparation.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Preparations delayed.</span> + +<p>The course actually taken by the Salisbury Cabinet was this. Instead +of the immediate mobilisation of the offensive force, Lord Wolseley +was instructed to prepare a scheme for the "constitution, +organisation, and mobilisation" of such a force; and to do this in +consultation with Sir Redvers Buller, the General Officer commanding +at Aldershot, who had been selected to lead the British forces in +South Africa in the event of war. Instead of the immediate despatch of +additional troops sufficient to render the South African garrisons +capable of repelling invasion—which was what Lord Milner had +especially desired—the actual deficiencies of the existing Cape +garrison<a id="footnotetag84" name="footnotetag84"></a><a href="#footnote84" title="Go to footnote 84"><span class="small">[84]</span></a> were made good by the despatch in July of small additions +of artillery and engineers, and by directing General Butler to provide +the fresh transport without which even this diminutive force was +unable to mobilise. At the same time certain special service +officers,<a id="footnotetag85" name="footnotetag85"></a><a href="#footnote85" title="Go to footnote 85"><span class="small">[85]</span></a> including engineers and officers of the Army Service +Corps, were sent out to organise the materials, locally existing, for +the defence of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page192" name="page192"></a>(p. 192)</span> eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and +the southern districts of Rhodesia; and generally to make preliminary +preparations for the provisioning, transport, and distribution of any +British forces that might be despatched subsequently to the Cape +Colony.</p> + +<p>These were the utterly inadequate reinforcements sent in response to +Lord Milner's urgent appeal, and in disregard of General Butler's +protest that they were wholly undesirable—an opinion which was +endorsed in England by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, when, on June 17th, +1899, he declared that there was nothing in the South African +situation to justify even preparations for war.</p> + +<p>During the interval between the Bloemfontein Conference and General +Butler's recall in the latter part of August Lord Milner's position +was one of unparalleled difficulty. The Cape and Natal garrisons were +maintained in a state of perilous weakness by the policy of the Home +Government. The measures to be undertaken locally for the defence of +the colonies, which the Cabinet had sanctioned, were wholly +insufficient in Lord Milner's opinion. And the general execution of +these wholly insufficient local measures was left in the hands of a +General Officer who had told the Secretary of State that he absolutely +disapproved of them on political grounds, since the mere announcement +of their being made would "add largely to the ferment," which he "was +[then] endeavouring to reduce by every <span class="pagenum"><a id="page193" name="page193"></a>(p. 193)</span> means." The Cape +Ministry, with whom rested the disposal of the colonial forces, was a +ministry placed in office by the Bond for the especial purpose of +opposing British intervention in the Transvaal. In these circumstances +it needed all Lord Milner's mastery of South African conditions, and +all his tact and address, to make the relations between himself and +his Afrikander Cabinet tolerable; and, above all, in view of the +refusal of the Imperial Government to sanction the military +preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, it required ceaseless +vigilance on his part to prevent the acceptance of an illusory +settlement which would have sounded the death-knell of British +supremacy in South Africa.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">President Krüger's proposals.</span> + +<p>On the last day of the Conference President Krüger had put in a +memorandum in which he expressed his intention of introducing his +franchise scheme to the Volksraad, and his hope that the High +Commissioner would be able to recommend this, and a further proposal +for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, to the favourable +consideration of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had replied that +any such proposals would be considered on their merits; but that the +President must not expect them to be connected in any way with the +proceedings of the Conference, out of which, as he then declared, no +obligation had arisen on either side.</p> + +<p>The Raad met on Friday, June 9th; and on Monday, the 12th—the day on +which Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page194" name="page194"></a>(p. 194)</span> Milner received the Ebden address<a id="footnotetag86" name="footnotetag86"></a><a href="#footnote86" title="Go to footnote 86"><span class="small">[86]</span></a>—President +Krüger laid the draft Franchise law, containing his revised +Bloemfontein scheme, before it. On Tuesday, 13th, Mr. Chamberlain's +despatch of May 10th, on the position of the Uitlanders and the +petition to the Queen, was delivered to the Transvaal Government by +the British Agent; and on Wednesday, June 14th, as we have already +noticed, the Blue-book containing this despatch, Lord Milner's +despatch of May 4th, and the whole story of the franchise controversy +up to the Bloemfontein Conference, was published in England. As the +conditions under which Lord Milner's despatch had been telegraphed to +England were now changed, it would have been better if it had remained +unpublished, and the stage of fighting diplomacy, reached through the +failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, had been at once opened—and +opened in another way. What Lord Milner had learnt at Bloemfontein was +not merely that President Krüger was unwilling to yield, but that he +was psychologically incapable of yielding. He had learnt, that is to +say, not that Krüger was determined to refuse the particular reform +which the Imperial Government demanded, but that his whole system of +thought was irreconcilably opposed to that of any English statesman. +It is the knowledge which can be obtained only by personal dealings +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page195" name="page195"></a>(p. 195)</span> with the Boers, and no one who has had such personal +dealings can fail to remember the sense of hopelessness that such an +experience brings with it. The Boer may be faithful to his own canons +of morality; but his whole manner of life and thought is one that +makes his notion of the obligations of truth and justice very +different from that of the ordinary educated European. He is not +devoid of the conception of duty, but he applies this conception in +methods adapted to the narrow and illiberal conditions of his isolated +and self-centred life.</p> + +<p>As for the mediation of the Cape Afrikanders, Lord Milner estimated it +at its real value. The Cape nationalists believed that war would +result in disaster to their cause; the Republican nationalists did +not. They both hated the British in an equal degree. But the +Afrikander leaders at the Cape knew that they had the game in their +own hands. "For goodness' sake," they said, "keep quiet until we have +got rid of this creature, Milner; and the Salisbury Cabinet—the +'present team so unjustly disposed to us'—is replaced by a Liberal +Government."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's task.</span> + +<p>That was the meaning of their mediation—nothing more. Lord Milner +acquiesced in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, but what he wanted +was a polite but absolutely inflexible insistence upon the +Bloemfontein minimum, and at the same time such military preparations +as, in view of the clear possibility of a failure of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page196" name="page196"></a>(p. 196)</span> +negotiations, seemed to him absolutely vital. This, however, was not +the course which the Salisbury Cabinet thought right to adopt; and the +problem that now lay before him was to convert the illusory +concessions, which were all that Afrikander mediation was able or even +desirous to wring from President Krüger, into the genuine reform that +the British Government had twice pledged itself to secure.</p> + +<p>But Lord Milner had also grasped the fact that the one issue which +could drive a wedge into Dutch solidarity was the franchise question. +He had determined, therefore, that nothing that transpired at the +Bloemfontein Conference should permit President Krüger to change the +ground of dispute from this central issue. During the negotiations +between the Home Government and the Pretoria Executive that followed +the Conference, and especially during the period of Mr. Hofmeyr's +active intervention, his most necessary and pressing task was to +prevent the Salisbury Cabinet from being "jockeyed" by Boer diplomacy +out of the advantageous position which he had then taken up on its +behalf. The pressure of the Hofmeyr mediation increased the difficulty +of this task by driving President Krüger into a series of franchise +proposals of the utmost complexity. The danger was that Mr. +Chamberlain and his colleagues in the Cabinet, in their earnest desire +to avoid war, might recognise some illusory measures of reform as +satisfactory, and then, after further consideration, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page197" name="page197"></a>(p. 197)</span> finding +them to be worthless, be driven by their previous admission to make +war, after all, not on the single issue of "equality all round," but +on an issue that might be plausibly represented to South Africa and +the world as the independence of the Boers.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Draft Franchise Law.</span> + +<p>The period is crowded with demonstrations, despatches, mediations, +petitions, and incidents of all kinds. A tithe of these—disentangled +from the Blue-books, but vitalised by a knowledge of the master facts +that lie behind the official pen—will serve, however, to present the +play of the mingling, conflicting, and then frankly opposing forces. +The "formidable personalities" are all in motion. At first it seemed +as though the whole weight of the Schreiner Cabinet, acting in +conjunction with General Butler's political objection to military +preparation on the part of the Imperial Government, was to be thrown +into the scale against Lord Milner's efforts. On June 12th President +Krüger laid the draft of his new Franchise Law before the Raad, which +then (the 15th) adjourned, in order that the feeling of the burghers +might be ascertained. On the 17th a great assemblage of Boers met at +Paardekraal, and, among the warlike speeches then delivered was that +of Judge Kock,<a id="footnotetag87" name="footnotetag87"></a><a href="#footnote87" title="Go to footnote 87"><span class="small">[87]</span></a> a member of the Transvaal Executive, who "dwelt +upon the doctrine of 'what he called Afrikanderdom,' and said that he +'regarded the Afrikanders, from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page198" name="page198"></a>(p. 198)</span> Cape to the Zambesi as +one great family. If the Republics are lost,' he continued, 'the +Afrikanders would lose. The independence of the country was to them a +question of life and death. The Free State would stand by the +Transvaal, even to the death. Not only the Free State, but also the +Cape Colony.'" Nor was this boast without some foundation. A week +before (June 10th), Mr. Schreiner had requested Lord Milner to inform +Mr. Chamberlain that, in ministers' opinion, President Krüger's +franchise proposal was "practical, reasonable, and a considerable step +in the right direction."<a id="footnotetag88" name="footnotetag88"></a><a href="#footnote88" title="Go to footnote 88"><span class="small">[88]</span></a> Four days later (June 14th) he further +informed the Governor that, in ministers' opinion, there was nothing +in the existing situation to justify "the active interference of the +Imperial Government in what were the internal affairs of the +Transvaal."<a id="footnotetag89" name="footnotetag89"></a><a href="#footnote89" title="Go to footnote 89"><span class="small">[89]</span></a> And this expression of opinion the Prime Minister also +desired Lord Milner, as the only constitutional medium of +communication between the Cape Ministry and the Secretary of State, to +convey to Mr. Chamberlain. On the day (June 10th) on which the first +of these interviews between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner took place, +a meeting of five thousand persons—in Sir William Greene's words, +"the largest and most enthusiastic ever held at Johannesburg"—passed +three resolutions which sufficiently exhibit the extent to which the +views of the Cape <span class="pagenum"><a id="page199" name="page199"></a>(p. 199)</span> Ministry differed from those of the +Transvaal British. After affirming the principle of equal political +rights for all white inhabitants of South Africa, and declaring that +President Krüger's Bloemfontein proposals were "wholly inadequate," +this great meeting proceeded to place on record its "deep sense of +obligation" to Lord Milner for his endeavour to secure the redress of +the Uitlander grievances, and its willingness, in order to "support +his Excellency in his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement," to +endorse "his very moderate proposals on the franchise question as the +irreducible minimum that could be accepted."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Action of Schreiner ministry.</span> + +<p>In other words, the Schreiner Cabinet, immediately after the failure +of the Conference, used its influence unreservedly to assist the +Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by the +High Commissioner—a reform which, in the opinion of the community +most concerned and most capable of judging of its effect, constituted +an "irreducible minimum" only to be accepted in deference to Lord +Milner's judgment, and in the hope of avoiding war. Mr. Schreiner's +action on this occasion was characteristic of the blind partizanship +of the Cape Ministry. On June 10th, when the Prime Minister pressed +his and his colleagues' favourable view of President Krüger's +proposals upon Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, the draft Franchise +Law, with its intricate provisions, had not been laid before the +Volksraad. Mr. Schreiner, therefore, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page200" name="page200"></a>(p. 200)</span> had made haste to bless +before he knew what he was blessing. And a few weeks later, as we +shall notice, he let his zeal for the Boer oligarchy outrun his +discretion in an even more amazing manner.</p> + +<p>In these difficult circumstances Lord Milner displayed the highest +address in his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet. Thanks to his +mingled tact and firmness, aided by the outspoken support which he +received from Mr. Chamberlain, his intercourse with his ministers +remained outwardly friendly, while at the same time he had the +satisfaction of seeing that during the next few weeks the +considerations of policy, which he laid before them with absolute +frankness, appreciably modified their original attitude. He had at +once availed himself of the one point on which he and they were in +agreement. With reference to the first interview with Mr. Schreiner +(June 10th), he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"In reply I told him [Mr. Schreiner] I was prepared to + communicate this expression of his opinion, although I strongly + held an opposite view, as he was aware.</p> + +<p>"He admitted, in subsequent conversation, that the President of + the South African Republic's scheme could, in his opinion, be + improved in detail; for instance, by immediately admitting men + who had entered the country previous to 1890, and by making + optional the period of naturalisation....</p> + +<p>"In reply, I told him that these were points of first-rate + importance and not of detail, especially the latter; and that, + since after all he seemed to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page201" name="page201"></a>(p. 201)</span> agree with me more than + with the President of the South African Republic, he had better + address his advice to the latter, and not to Her Majesty's + Government."</p> +</div> + +<p>And at the long and rather unpleasant interview of June 14th, +although, as we have seen, Mr. Schreiner desired Lord Milner to inform +Mr. Chamberlain that the Cape Ministry considered the "active +interference" of the British Government unjustified, yet he also said +"that he and his colleagues were agreed that there were two respects +in which the Government of the South African Republic might better +their franchise scheme: (1) By admitting to the full franchise at once +persons who had entered the country before 1890; and (2) By making it +optional to obtain the full franchise without previous naturalisation +after seven years' residence."<a id="footnotetag90" name="footnotetag90"></a><a href="#footnote90" title="Go to footnote 90"><span class="small">[90]</span></a></p> + +<p>Mr. Chamberlain's reply (June 16th), contained a more direct +admonition. Lord Milner was instructed to inform the Cape Ministers +that the Government trusted that they would "use all the influence +they could to induce the Transvaal Government to take such action as +would relieve Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of +considering the question of being obliged to have recourse to +interference of such a nature."<a id="footnotetag91" name="footnotetag91"></a><a href="#footnote91" title="Go to footnote 91"><span class="small">[91]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's speech.</span> + +<p>This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to +aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page202" name="page202"></a>(p. 202)</span> Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind. +But Mr. Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility.</p> + +<p>In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations +of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty +years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although +deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put +right in South Africa.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which + are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty, + not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South + Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part + of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the + Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa, + and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole."</p> + +<p>This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and +effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of +10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on +Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing +circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by +refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief, +had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake +of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of +gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such +speeches were merely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page203" name="page203"></a>(p. 203)</span> food for President Krüger to use in +feeding the enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of +the Home Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible +demand for the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but +effective, military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel +will show, were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal +Opposition into a precisely opposite course in both these respects. +Their demand was vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while +their inadequate defensive preparations were more than neutralised by +the loudness with which, in deference to the views of the Liberal +Opposition, they proclaimed their reluctance to undertake military +measures on a scale that would really have made an impression on the +Boers.<a id="footnotetag92" name="footnotetag92"></a><a href="#footnote92" title="Go to footnote 92"><span class="small">[92]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Fischer-Hofmeyr mission.</span> + +<p>One result which Mr. Chamberlain's speech produced was to bring Mr. +Hofmeyr once more upon the scene. Before this date (June 26th) Mr. +Fischer, apparently considering that the failure of the Bloemfontein +Conference cast a reflection upon the statesmanship and influence of +the Free State Government, had commenced a second essay in mediation. +Early in June he had paid a visit to Capetown, where he was in close +communication with Mr. Hofmeyr and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page204" name="page204"></a>(p. 204)</span> Cape Ministers, and +had twice called upon the High Commissioner. He had left Capetown on +the 19th for Bloemfontein; and then proceeded to Pretoria, which he +reached on the 25th. At the Transvaal capital he entered into +negotiations with the Executive, calling upon the British Agent on the +26th, and again on the 28th, and maintaining communication, through +him, with Lord Milner. From Pretoria Mr. Fischer returned to +Bloemfontein in company with Mr. Smuts and Mr. Groebler,<a id="footnotetag93" name="footnotetag93"></a><a href="#footnote93" title="Go to footnote 93"><span class="small">[93]</span></a> on July +1st. Here he met Mr. Hofmeyr, who, leaving Capetown with Mr. Herholdt, +on the same day (July 1st), reached Bloemfontein early on the +following morning.</p> + +<p>Mr. Hofmeyr was in Bloemfontein, because the events of the last few +days had convinced him that the only hope of saving the +situation—saving it, that is, from the Afrikander nationalist point +of view—lay in prompt and energetic action on his part. On June 23rd +Mr. Schreiner had been informed by the High Commissioner of the +intention of the Home Government to "complete" the Cape garrison; and +shortly afterwards the despatch of the special service officers was +publicly announced in England. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham +on the 26th, cabled almost <span class="italic">in extenso</span> to the High Commissioner, was +communicated to the local press on the 28th. On the same evening a +mass meeting, held in the Good Hope Hall at Capetown, declared its +strong approval of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page205" name="page205"></a>(p. 205)</span> action of the Imperial Government on +behalf of the British population in the Transvaal. With these signs of +an approaching Armageddon before his eyes, Mr. Hofmeyr had overcome +his objection to personal dealings with President Krüger, and had +resolved to go to Pretoria to confer with the leaders of the Boer +oligarchy. But, in order to protect himself from the risk of a useless +rebuff, he had first arranged to meet Mr. Fischer at Bloemfontein, and +obtain through him and President Steyn some definite assurance that +his counsels would be treated with respect, before finally proceeding +to the Transvaal.</p> + +<p>On Sunday, July 2nd, and in these circumstances, a conference was held +between the Master of the Bond and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Smuts—two men +not unworthy to represent the cause of Afrikander nationalism in their +respective republics. As the result of their discussions, carried on +almost uninterruptedly from the early morning until nearly midnight, +Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Groebler, in the words of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, +"knew precisely what had to be done, in the opinion of the Colonial +representatives, to gain the moral support of Colonial Afrikanders and +to lead in the direction of peace."<a id="footnotetag94" name="footnotetag94"></a><a href="#footnote94" title="Go to footnote 94"><span class="small">[94]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr at Bloemfontein.</span> + +<p>On the following day (Monday, the 3rd) Mr. Fischer and his companions +arrived again in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page206" name="page206"></a>(p. 206)</span> Pretoria; but Mr. Hofmeyr remained at +Bloemfontein, since he had decided not to go to the Transvaal capital, +unless "he was assured of achieving something of importance there." Up +to the afternoon of Tuesday (the 4th) no such assurance had been +received; and, says <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, "as it seemed the assurance was almost +in a contrary direction, preparations were already made for the +homeward journey." But a little later on in the day Mr. Hofmeyr and +his companion "received a hint that, although their chances of success +at Pretoria were but slight, they were not altogether hopeless." The +facts thus far provided by <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> must now be supplemented by a +reference to the telegrams which fell into the hands of the British +authorities a year later upon the occupation of Bloemfontein. From +these documents we know that President Krüger at first telegraphed to +President Steyn a polite refusal of Mr. Hofmeyr's mediation. This was +followed, on Tuesday morning, by a telegram from Mr. Fischer himself, +informing President Steyn that the Transvaal Government "would be glad +to meet Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, but that he could not say what +chance there was of their mission succeeding until the Volksraad had +been consulted." This, as we have seen, was by no means sufficient for +Mr. Hofmeyr. But later on there came a second telegram—the telegram +which <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> delicately calls a "hint"—in which Mr. Fischer said +that President Krüger "was willing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page207" name="page207"></a>(p. 207)</span> to see Mr. Hofmeyr before +he brought the matter before the Raad," and that he himself "hoped to +obtain certain concessions from the Executive Council, with the +members of which he was in consultation."</p> + +<p>Thus encouraged, Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt at once left +Bloemfontein by special train, and, travelling all night, reached +Pretoria on Wednesday, the 5th, at seven o'clock.</p> + +<p>"From the station," says <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, "they were escorted by various +officials and friends to the Transvaal Hotel, where rooms had been +engaged for them as guests of the State. Even before they had taken +breakfast they had an audience with President Krüger. On the +invitation of His Honour they accompanied Mr. Fischer to three +meetings of the Executive Council—two on Wednesday and one on +Thursday. They had the opportunity, too, of meeting the greater part +of the Volksraad members, and of conversing with them. What occurred +on this occasion is, of course, private, and not for publication."</p> + +<p>Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt left Pretoria on Friday, the 7th, and +reached Capetown on Monday, the 10th.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner and the mission.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner did everything possible to secure the success of the +Fischer-Hofmeyr mission. Provided President Krüger was induced to give +the Uitlanders an appreciable share in the government of the +Transvaal, it made no difference to the Imperial Government whether he +did so from a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page208" name="page208"></a>(p. 208)</span> +desire to secure the "moral support" of the +<span class="sidenote">Bid for "moral support".</span> +Cape Afrikander party, or from any other motive of political +expediency. What was essential was that the existing franchise scheme +should be so far improved as to become a genuine, and no longer a +fictitious, measure of reform. On the understanding that the "mission" +had no less an object in view—an understanding which he gained from +conversation with Mr. Fischer himself as well as from Mr. Schreiner +and Mr. Hofmeyr—Lord Milner placed the British Government code at the +disposal of Mr. Fischer and the Prime Minister, and further arranged +with the former to communicate with him (Lord Milner) through the +British Agent at Pretoria. But Lord Milner especially impressed, alike +upon Mr. Fischer, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Schreiner, the necessity of +urging President Krüger to discuss any proposed modifications in the +Draft Law with the Imperial Government or its representatives, before +they were submitted to the Raad. The objection to the adoption of this +course, which, according to Mr. Fischer's statement,<a id="footnotetag95" name="footnotetag95"></a><a href="#footnote95" title="Go to footnote 95"><span class="small">[95]</span></a> the Pretoria +Executive did in fact make, was their inability to "recognise the +right of the British Government to be consulted on the franchise, +which was an internal matter." This objection, however, as Lord Milner +pointed out to the members of the Pretoria Executive, both directly +through Sir William Greene,<a id="footnotetag96" name="footnotetag96"></a><a href="#footnote96" title="Go to footnote 96"><span class="small">[96]</span></a> and indirectly through Mr. Hofmeyr and +Mr. Fischer, was a mere pretext. "The whole world," he said <span class="pagenum"><a id="page209" name="page209"></a>(p. 209)</span> +in effect, "knows that whatever alterations you make in the Draft +Law—and indeed the Law itself—will be the result of the pressure +brought to bear upon you by the British Government. That being so, to +refuse to discuss these alterations with us privately, and in a +friendly manner, because the franchise is an 'internal matter,' is to +strain at a gnat while you are all the while swallowing a camel." But +neither at this time, nor at any other period in the three months' +negotiations, did President Krüger desire to come to an agreement with +the British Government at the price of granting a genuine measure of +reform. As a bid for the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, but +without the slightest attempt to consult with the British Government +or its representatives, he recommended to the Volksraad, on July 7th, +certain amendments, the effect of which was to confer the franchise +upon a very small body of Uitlanders, and that only if they succeeded +in complying with certain cumbersome and protracted formalities.<a id="footnotetag97" name="footnotetag97"></a><a href="#footnote97" title="Go to footnote 97"><span class="small">[97]</span></a> +On the following morning the Bond Press announced, with a great +flourish of trumpets, that Mr. Hofmeyr's mission had been remarkably +successful, and set out the amendments of "The Great Reform Act" as +representing the fruit of his and Mr. Fischer's efforts. This was for +the public. To Mr. Fischer, Hofmeyr himself telegraphed on his return +journey to Capetown, that he "deplored the failure" of his mission, +when he "thought <span class="pagenum"><a id="page210" name="page210"></a>(p. 210)</span> he had reason to expect success." Mr. +Schreiner, on the other hand, was no less ready to bless the "Hofmeyr +compromise" than Krüger's original scheme. Upon receiving by telegram +the bare heads of the proposed amendments, and without waiting to +learn what practical effect they would have upon the position of the +Uitlanders, he hastily authorised <span class="italic">The South African News</span> to announce +(July 8th) that the Cape Government considered the proposals of the +amended law "adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a +peaceful settlement."<a id="footnotetag98" name="footnotetag98"></a><a href="#footnote98" title="Go to footnote 98"><span class="small">[98]</span></a> This opinion he subsequently modified; and, +at Lord Milner's request, he advised Mr. Fischer (July 11th) to urge +his friends at Pretoria to delay the passage of the bill through the +Volksraad. And Lord Milner was authorised by Mr. Chamberlain to +instruct Sir William Greene to offer the same advice to the Transvaal +Government, with the more precise intimation that "full particulars of +the new scheme" ought to be furnished officially to the Imperial +Government, if the proposals which it embodied were to form "any +element in the settlement of the differences between the two +Governments."<a id="footnotetag99" name="footnotetag99"></a><a href="#footnote99" title="Go to footnote 99"><span class="small">[99]</span></a> The High Commissioner's object was, of course, to +reduce the area of formal negotiations, and therefore the risk of +official friction, to its narrowest limits. But this was not President +Krüger's object. His principle was the very opposite of that of the +Imperial Government. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page211" name="page211"></a>(p. 211)</span> They abstained from preparations for +war in order to improve the prospect of a peaceable settlement. The +force upon which he relied was the warlike temper of his burghers, and +the answering enthusiasm which the spectacle of the Republic, prepared +to defy the British Empire, would arouse among the whole Dutch +population of South Africa. Mr. Reitz was, therefore, instructed to +decline Mr. Chamberlain's request on the ground that "the whole matter +was out of the hands of the Government";<a id="footnotetag100" name="footnotetag100"></a><a href="#footnote100" title="Go to footnote 100"><span class="small">[100]</span></a> meaning, thereby, that +it had already been submitted to the Volksraad. This, again, was the +thinnest of excuses, since President Krüger had never yet shown any +scruple in modifying or withdrawing proposals already laid before the +Volksraad, when it suited him to do so.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Bogus Conspiracy.</span> + +<p>It may be questioned, however, whether, even at this time, the "whole +matter" had not passed, in another and more serious sense, "out of the +hands" both of the Pretoria Executive and the British Government. The +political atmosphere of South Africa had become electric. The +Uitlanders themselves cherished no illusion on the subject of +President Krüger's proposals. Amended and re-amended, the Franchise +Law, as the Uitlander Council then and there declared, left the +granting of the franchise at the discretion of the Boer officials or +the Pretoria Executive, and as such it was "a most dangerous measure, +and apparently framed with the object of defeating the end it +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page212" name="page212"></a>(p. 212)</span> was presumed to have in view."<a id="footnotetag101" name="footnotetag101"></a><a href="#footnote101" title="Go to footnote 101"><span class="small">[101]</span></a> Further and convincing +evidence of the utterly vicious and depraved character of the +<span class="italic">personnel</span> of the Boer administration was afforded by the proceedings +arising out of the alleged "conspiracy" against the Republic, of which +the unfortunate Englishman Nicholls was the innocent victim (May 18th +to July 25th).<a id="footnotetag102" name="footnotetag102"></a><a href="#footnote102" title="Go to footnote 102"><span class="small">[102]</span></a> In this disgraceful affair the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page213" name="page213"></a>(p. 213)</span> gravest +offences against international comity were committed; high officials, +including Mr. Tjaart Krüger, the President's youngest son, were +implicated in a gross and scandalous prostitution of the machinery of +justice; and yet no apology was offered to the Imperial Government, +nor any compensation awarded to Nicholls for the two months' +imprisonment and continuous persecution by the agents-provocateurs, to +which he had been subjected. The impassioned speeches delivered at the +Paardekraal meeting was only one among many signs of the dangerous +hostility to England and everything English that had taken possession +of the Republic. <span class="sidenote">War fever in the Transvaal.</span> +The British residents who had petitioned the Queen +were denounced as "revolutionaries," and threatened with the vengeance +of the burghers. "If war breaks out," wrote <span class="italic">De Rand Post</span>,"<a id="footnotetag103" name="footnotetag103"></a><a href="#footnote103" title="Go to footnote 103"><span class="small">[103]</span></a> the +Johannesburg agitators are the real instigators, and to these +ringleaders capital punishment should be meted out." In the Volksraad +discussion of the Franchise Law the same passionate hatred of the +Uitlanders was manifested. "Is it the English only who have the right +to make conditions?" asked Mr. Lombard on July 15th. "If it comes to +be a question of war, there will be a great destruction. And who will +be destroyed if it comes to a collision? Why, the subjects of Her +Majesty in Johannesburg."<a id="footnotetag104" name="footnotetag104"></a><a href="#footnote104" title="Go to footnote 104"><span class="small">[104]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page214" name="page214"></a>(p. 214)</span> These expressions scarcely do justice to the spirit of +vindictiveness with which certain of the republican leaders regarded +the British population of the Rand. On May 22nd, 1900, less than a +year after the date of the Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Bill, +and when Lord Roberts was advancing rapidly upon Johannesburg, a +conversation took place with Mr. Smuts in Pretoria, which was reported +in <span class="italic">The Times</span>. In the course of this conversation the State Attorney +said, with reference to the proposed destruction of the mines, that +"he greatly regretted that Johannesburg should suffer, but that the +Government had no choice in the matter, as the popular pressure upon +them was too great to be resisted." This determination is rightly +characterised by Mr. Farrelly, the late legal adviser to the +Government of the South African Republic, as the "fiendish project of +wrecking the mines and plunging into hopeless misery for years tens of +thousands of innocent men, women, and children." But that is not all. +He has put upon record<a id="footnotetag105" name="footnotetag105"></a><a href="#footnote105" title="Go to footnote 105"><span class="small">[105]</span></a> the sinister fact that the man entrusted +with the execution of this infamous design was Mr. Smuts himself. The +mines were saved, therefore, not by the Boer Government, but in spite +of it, and solely through the independent action of Dr. Krause, the +Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, who "arrested the leader of the +wreckers, sent by Mr. Smuts, the day before the surrender to Lord +Roberts."<a id="footnotetag106" name="footnotetag106"></a><a href="#footnote106" title="Go to footnote 106"><span class="small">[106]</span></a></p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page215" name="page215"></a>(p. 215)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Action of the British.</span> + +<p>The British population, although it provided no such displays of +racial passion, was in an equally determined mood. Undismayed by the +threats of the Boers, the Uitlander Council continued calmly to +analyse the Franchise Bill in each successive phase—an unostentatious +but very useful service, which materially assisted Lord Milner in +following the windings and doublings of Boer diplomacy. After the +great meeting at Johannesburg (June 10th), the British centres in the +Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia gave similar demonstrations of their +confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, and their conviction of the +justice and necessity of the five years' franchise demanded by the +Imperial Government. On the other hand, the irritation against British +intervention was growing daily in the Free State; and the Dutch +Reformed Church and the Bond had organised a counter-demonstration in +the Cape Colony. The Synod of the former, meeting on June 30th, drew +up an address protesting that the differences between Lord Milner's +franchise proposals and those of President Krüger were not sufficient +to justify the "horrors of war," and requested the Governor to forward +it to the Queen. At Capetown (July 12th) and in the Dutch districts +throughout the Colony, Bond meetings were held at which resolutions +were passed in favour of a "compromise" as between Lord Milner's five +years' franchise and the scheme embodied in President Krüger's law. +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page216" name="page216"></a>(p. 216)</span> More sinister was the circumstance that the information, +that a consignment of 500 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges, landed at +Port Elizabeth on July 8th, had been permitted by the Cape Government +to be forwarded through the Colony to the Free State, only came to the +ears of the High Commissioner by an accident. In the meantime, more +definite evidence of the almost unanimous approval of Lord Milner's +policy by the British population in South Africa was forthcoming. In +all three British colonies petitions to the Queen praying for justice +to the Uitlanders, and affirming absolute confidence in Lord Milner, +were signed. The Natal petition contained the names of three-fourths +of the adult male population of the Colony, while the signatures to +the joint petition of the Cape and Rhodesia had already reached a +total of 40,500 before the end of July. In other respects the +testimony of Natal was clear and unmistakable. In this predominantly +English Colony identical resolutions supporting the action and policy +of the Imperial Government, were carried unanimously in both Chambers +of the Legislature.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's warning.</span> + +<p>In the middle of July the situation improved in a slight degree +through the influence which Lord Milner had exercised upon the +Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony. On the 14th the Cape Parliament +met, and on this day Mr. Hofmeyr, chagrined at a suggestion for +further support which he had received from the republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page217" name="page217"></a>(p. 217)</span> +nationalists at Pretoria, despatched a telegram to Mr. Smuts, in which +he, as the recognised head of the Afrikander Bond, reminded the +members of President Krüger's Executive that the promised co-operation +of the Cape Government with them had been definitely limited to "moral +support." And he plainly hinted that, unless greater deference was +shown to his advice, even this "moral support" might be withdrawn.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The most important suggestions sent from here will apparently + not be adopted. The independence of the Republics is in danger. + As to the Colony, the utmost prospect held out was moral support. + The Ministry and the Bond have acted up to that. If Parliament + [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> the Cape Parliament] goes too strongly in the same + direction, there may be a change of Ministry, with Sprigg or + Rhodes backed by Milner. Would your interests be benefited + thereby? <span class="italic">Verb. sat. sap.</span>"<a id="footnotetag107" name="footnotetag107"></a><a href="#footnote107" title="Go to footnote 107"><span class="small">[107]</span></a></p> + +<p>As President Krüger wanted to retain the "moral support" of the Cape +Government for a few weeks longer, he listened to Mr. Fischer's +advice<a id="footnotetag108" name="footnotetag108"></a><a href="#footnote108" title="Go to footnote 108"><span class="small">[108]</span></a> to humour their prejudices, and forthwith recommended a +further modification of the Franchise Bill to the Volksraad. This +final amendment, under which a uniform seven years' retrospective +franchise was substituted for a nine years' retrospective <span class="pagenum"><a id="page218" name="page218"></a>(p. 218)</span> +franchise, alternate with a seven years' retrospective franchise +taking effect five years after the passing of the law (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> in +1904), was accepted on July 18th, and the new Franchise Law was passed +on the 19th and promulgated on the 26th. Its provisions were so +obscure that it was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum furnished +by the State Attorney, Mr. Smuts. But even assuming that the legal +pitfalls could be removed, and the law, thus simplified, would be +worked in the most liberal spirit by the officials of the Republic, +President Krüger's proposals failed to provide the essential reform +which Lord Milner had pledged himself and the Imperial Government to +obtain. That reform was the immediate endowment of a substantial +proportion of the British residents in the Transvaal with the rights +of citizenship. To use his own words,<a id="footnotetag109" name="footnotetag109"></a><a href="#footnote109" title="Go to footnote 109"><span class="small">[109]</span></a> "the whole point" of his +Bloemfontein proposal was "to put the Uitlanders in a position to +fight their own battles, and so to avoid the necessity of pressing for +the redress of specific grievances."</p> + +<p>No one in South Africa had any doubt as to the entire inadequacy of +the Franchise Bill to fulfil this essential object. In the opinion of +the Uitlander Council it was<a id="footnotetag110" name="footnotetag110"></a><a href="#footnote110" title="Go to footnote 110"><span class="small">[110]</span></a> "expressly designed to exclude +rather than admit the newcomer." Sir Henry de Villiers complained<a id="footnotetag111" name="footnotetag111"></a><a href="#footnote111" title="Go to footnote 111"><span class="small">[111]</span></a> +to Mr. Fischer:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so <span class="pagenum"><a id="page219" name="page219"></a>(p. 219)</span> obscure + that the State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to + remove the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough + to speak for itself, and no Government or court of law will be + bound by the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what + those explanations are, but the very fact that they are required + condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to + carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. + Herholdt."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">An illusory measure.</span> + +<p>And Lord Milner, in his final analysis of the law on July 26th, +concludes<a id="footnotetag112" name="footnotetag112"></a><a href="#footnote112" title="Go to footnote 112"><span class="small">[112]</span></a> that "the Bill as it stands leaves it practically in +the hands of the Government to enfranchise, or not to enfranchise, the +Uitlanders as it chooses." And he then draws attention to the very +grave consideration that if the paramount Power once accepts this +illusory measure, it will deprive itself of any future right of +intervention on the franchise question.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "And the worst of it," he wrote, "is that should the Bill, + through a literal interpretation of its complicated provisions, + fail to secure the object at which it avowedly aims, no one will + be able to protest against the result."</p> + +<p>For one moment it seemed to the anxious warden of British interests in +South Africa as though the Home Government might be caught in +President Krüger's legislative net. The incident is one that well +exhibits the tireless effort and unflinching resolution with which +Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page220" name="page220"></a>(p. 220)</span> President Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme was a maze of legal +pitfalls. What these pitfalls were the reader may learn from the +analysis of the scheme which was published in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span> of June +10th, 1899. When the Franchise Bill was before the Volksraad this +complicated scheme, as we have seen, was amended and re-amended; and +each new provision was as intricate in its working as the parent +scheme. It is obvious that nothing short of a commission of inquiry +could have determined with certainty the manner in which the +representation of the Uitlanders was affected by each successive +amendment. While these changes were in progress in the Raadzaal at +Pretoria—changes so "numerous and so rapid," as Lord Milner +said,<a id="footnotetag113" name="footnotetag113"></a><a href="#footnote113" title="Go to footnote 113"><span class="small">[113]</span></a> that it was "absolutely impossible at any given moment to +know what the effect of the scheme, as existing at that moment, was +likely to be"—Lord Milner himself at Capetown was at one and the same +time overwhelmed with detailed criticisms from Uitlanders, anxious +that no legal pitfall or administrative obstacle should remain +undetected, and besieged with cables from the Colonial Office +requesting precise information upon any point upon which an energetic +member of the House of Commons might have chosen to interrogate the +Secretary of State. And, in addition to this rain of telegrams, people +on the spot were constantly calling at Government House to ask if the +High Commissioner <span class="pagenum"><a id="page221" name="page221"></a>(p. 221)</span> had observed this or that defect or trap +in clauses, the text of which he had not yet had time to receive, +still less to read or comprehend. All this, too, was over and above +the heavy administrative and official duties of the Governor and High +Commissioner—duties which Lord Milner was called upon to perform with +more than usual care, in view of the political ascendancy of the Dutch +party in the Cape Colony.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's assumption.</span> + +<p>On July 13th, Lord Milner sent warning telegrams to Mr. +Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag114" name="footnotetag114"></a><a href="#footnote114" title="Go to footnote 114"><span class="small">[114]</span></a> pointing out specific defects in the Franchise Bill, +and showing how seriously President Krüger's proposals fell short of +the Bloemfontein minimum. Five days later the Volksraad accepted the +final amendments. The face value of the Bill, as it now stood to be +converted into law, was a seven years' franchise, prospective and +retrospective. When, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain heard this same day +(July 18th) that the Volksraad had accepted the bill in this form with +only five dissentients, he seems to have assumed that a really +considerable concession had been made by President Krüger at the last +moment, and that, with the President and the Volksraad in this mood, +still further concessions would be forthcoming. Under this impression +he informed the House of Commons lobby correspondent of <span class="italic">The Times</span> +that "the crisis might be regarded as at an end." His words were +reproduced in <span class="italic">The Times</span> on the day <span class="pagenum"><a id="page222" name="page222"></a>(p. 222)</span> following (July 19th), +and at once cabled to South Africa.</p> + +<p>It is impossible for any one who has not lived in South Africa to +realise the sickening distrust and dread produced in the minds of the +loyal subjects of the Crown by this statement. War they were ready to +face. But to go back to every-day life once again bowed down with the +shame of a moral Majuba, to meet the eyes of the Dutch once more +aflame with the light of victory, to hear their words of insolent +contempt—was ignominy unspeakable and unendurable. The Uitlander +Council at once cabled an emphatic message of protest<a id="footnotetag115" name="footnotetag115"></a><a href="#footnote115" title="Go to footnote 115"><span class="small">[115]</span></a> to Mr. +Chamberlain, and every loyalist that had a friend in England +telegraphed to beg him to use all his influence to prevent the +surrender of the Government. How near the British population in South +Africa were to this ignominy may be gathered from the fact that on +this day Lord Milner received a telegram in which Mr. Chamberlain +congratulated him upon the successful issue of his efforts. Lord +Milner's reply <span class="pagenum"><a id="page223" name="page223"></a>(p. 223)</span> was one that could have left no doubt in Mr. +Chamberlain's mind as to the gravity of the misconception under which +he laboured. It was, of course, beyond the High Commissioner's power +to prevent the Home Government from accepting the Franchise Bill; but +he could at least remove the impression that he was anxious to +participate in an act, which would have made the breach between the +loyalists of South Africa and the mother country final and +irrevocable.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The relapse in England.</span> + +<p>It is scarcely possible to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord +Milner's telegrams before him, was himself prepared to accept +President Krüger's illusory franchise scheme. The source of the +weakness of the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, no less +than in its refusal to make adequate preparations for war, is to be +found in the inability of the mass of the people of England to +understand how completely British power in South Africa had been +undermined by the Afrikander nationalists during the last twenty +years. How could the average elector know that the refusal or +acceptance of the Volksraad Bill, differing only from the Bloemfontein +minimum in an insignificant—as it seemed—particular of two years, +would, in fact, make known to all European South Africa whether +President Krüger or the British Government was master of the +sub-continent? In view of this profound ignorance of South African +conditions, and the consequent uncertainty of any assured support, +even from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page224" name="page224"></a>(p. 224)</span> members of their own party, the Salisbury +Cabinet may well have argued: "Here is something at last that we can +represent as a genuine concession. Let us take it, and have done with +this troublesome South African question; or leave it to the next +Liberal Government to settle."</p> + +<p>If the Cabinet did so reason to themselves, what English statesman +could have "cast the first stone" at them? But how profound is the +interval between the spirit of the policy of "the man on the spot," +with his eyes upon the object, and the spirit of the policy of the +island statesman with one eye upon the hustings and the other strained +to catch an intermittent glimpse of an unfamiliar and distant Africa!</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's anxiety.</span> + +<p>This 19th of July was a dark day for the High Commissioner. In the +morning came Mr. Chamberlain's telegram with its ominous suggestion of +a change for the worse in the attitude of the Home Government. And +this change in the Cabinet was, as Lord Milner knew, only the natural +reflection of a wider change, which had manifested itself among the +supporters of the Government and in the country at large since the +publication, on June 14th, of his despatch of May 4th. Private letters +had made him aware that to men to whom Dutch ascendancy at the Cape +and Boer tyranny in the Transvaal, Afrikander nationalism and Boer +armaments, were meaningless expressions, his resolute advocacy of the +Uitlanders' cause and his frank presentation of the weakness of Great +Britain had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page225" name="page225"></a>(p. 225)</span> seemed the work of a disordered imagination or a +violent partisanship. Nor was his knowledge of the relapse in England +limited to the warnings or protests of his private friends. <span class="italic">The South +African News</span>, the ministerial organ, which of late had filled its +columns with adverse criticisms taken from the London Press, this +morning contained a bitter article on him reprinted from <span class="italic">Punch</span>, +which had arrived by the yesterday's mail. After all, it seemed, the +long struggle against mis-government in the Transvaal was going to end +in failure; and the British people would once more be befooled. With +such thoughts in his mind, Lord Milner must have found the work of +making up the weekly despatches for the Colonial Office—for it was a +Wednesday<a id="footnotetag116" name="footnotetag116"></a><a href="#footnote116" title="Go to footnote 116"><span class="small">[116]</span></a>—a wearisome and depressing task. The mail was detained +until long past the customary hour. But before it left, in spite of +discouragement and anxiety, Lord Milner had gathered together into a +brief compass all the documents necessary to put Mr. Chamberlain in +possession of every material fact relative to the new law—passed only +on the day before—and to the proceedings of the Transvaal Executive +and the Volksraad between the 12th and the 19th. And, in addition to +this, he had written a fresh estimate of the Franchise Bill in its +latest form, in which he emphasised his former verdict that the +proposals which it contained were not such as the Uitlanders <span class="pagenum"><a id="page226" name="page226"></a>(p. 226)</span> +would be likely to accept. And in particular he pointed out that the +fact of the final amendment being thus readily adopted by the +Volksraad disposed of the contention, upon which President Krüger had +laid so much stress at Bloemfontein, that his "burghers" would not +permit him to make the concessions which the British Government +required. He wrote:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "On July 12th Her Majesty's Government requested the Government + of the South African Republic to give them time to consider the + measure and communicate their views before it was proceeded with. + To this the Government of the South African Republic replied, on + July 13th, with a polite negative, saying that 'the whole matter + was out of the hands of the Government, and it was no longer + possible for the Government to satisfy the demands of the + Secretary of State.' The State-Attorney informed Mr. Greene<a id="footnotetag117" name="footnotetag117"></a><a href="#footnote117" title="Go to footnote 117"><span class="small">[117]</span></a> + at the same time that 'the present proposals represented + absolutely the greatest concession that could be got from the + Volksraad, and could not be enlarged. He personally had tried + hard for seven years' retrospective franchise, but the Raad would + not hear of it, and it was only with difficulty that the present + proposals were obtained.' This was on the 12th, but within a week + the seven years' retrospective franchise had been adopted. + Indeed, the statement of the absolute impossibility of obtaining + more than a particular measure of enfranchisement from the + Volksraad or the burghers has been made over and over again in + the history of this question—never more emphatically than by the + President himself at Bloemfontein—and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page227" name="page227"></a>(p. 227)</span> has over and + over again been shown to be a delusion."<a id="footnotetag118" name="footnotetag118"></a><a href="#footnote118" title="Go to footnote 118"><span class="small">[118]</span></a> +</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's statement.</span> + +<p>But this full record of the shifts and doublings of Boer diplomacy +would not reach London for another two weeks and a half. It was +necessary, therefore, to use the cable. Early the next morning Lord +Milner sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he warned +the Home Government of the extreme discouragement produced among all +who were attached to the British connection by <span class="italic">The Times</span> statement +of their readiness to accept the Franchise Bill. On that afternoon +(July 20th), Mr. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons +in which he took up a much more satisfactory position. The Government, +he said, were led to hope that the new law "might prove to be a basis +of settlement on the lines laid down" by Lord Milner at the +Bloemfontein Conference. They observed, however, that "a number of +conditions" which might be used "to take away with one hand what had +been given with the other" were still retained. But they—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "felt assured that the President, having accepted the principle + for which they had contended, would be prepared to reconsider any + detail of his schemes which could be shown to be a possible + hindrance to the full accomplishment of the objects in view, and + that he would not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value + by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of + administration."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page228" name="page228"></a>(p. 228)</span> That is to say, Mr. Chamberlain was no longer willing to take +the bill at its face value, but in accordance with his determination +to exhaust every possible resource of diplomacy before he turned to +force, he gave President Krüger credit for a genuine desire to promote +a peaceable settlement. A week later he formulated the method by which +the President was to be allowed an opportunity of justifying this +generous estimate of his intentions. In the meantime Lord Milner had +sent lengthy telegrams to the Secretary of State on the 23rd, and +again on the 26th, and the Salisbury Cabinet had determined to make a +definite pronouncement of its South African policy, and to endeavour +to arouse the country to a sense of the seriousness of the situation +with which President Krüger's continued obduracy would bring it face +to face. On July 27th Mr. Balfour declared, in addressing the Union of +Conservative Associations, that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "If endless patience, endless desire to prevent matters coming to + extremities, if all the resources of diplomacy, were utterly + ineffectual to untie the knot, other means must inevitably be + found by which that knot must be loosened."</p> + +<p>On the day following (July 28th) the Transvaal question was debated in +both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Lords the Prime Minister, +Lord Salisbury, delivered a moderate and almost sympathetic speech. +After making all allowance for the natural apprehension experienced by +President <span class="pagenum"><a id="page229" name="page229"></a>(p. 229)</span> Krüger at the sudden inrush of population caused +by the discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, he expressed the +opinion that an attempt "to put the two races fairly and honestly on +the same footing" would bring a peaceful solution of the crisis. But, +he added—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "How long we are to consider that solution, and what patience we + are bound to show, these things I will not discuss. We have to + consider not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the + Transvaal, but, what is more important, the feelings of our + fellow-subjects.... Whatever happens, when the validity of the + Conventions is impeached, they belong from that time entirely to + history. I am quite sure that if this country has to make + exertions in order to secure the most elementary justice for + British subjects,—I am quite sure [it] will not reinstate a + state of things that will bring back the old difficulties in all + their formidable character at the next turn of the wheel. Without + intruding on his thoughts, I do not think President Krüger has + sufficiently considered this."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Joint Commission.</span> + +<p>In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had proposed +to the Transvaal Government that a joint commission should be +appointed to test the efficacy of the scheme of electoral reform +embodied in the new Franchise Law. This proposal was set out in detail +in a despatch already addressed to the High Commissioner, the +substance of which had been telegraphed<a id="footnotetag119" name="footnotetag119"></a><a href="#footnote119" title="Go to footnote 119"><span class="small">[119]</span></a> to him on the preceding +day (July 27th). The British Government assumed that "the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page230" name="page230"></a>(p. 230)</span> +concessions now made to the Uitlanders were intended in good faith to +secure to them some approach to the equality which was promised in +1881"; they proposed that the "complicated details and questions of a +technical nature" involved in the new law should be discussed in the +first instance by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner and by +the South African Republic; and if, and when, a "satisfactory +agreement" had been reached on these points, they further proposed +that all disputes as to the terms of the Convention should be settled +by a "judicial authority, whose independence ... would be above +suspicion," and all remaining matters in respect of the political +representation of the Uitlanders by "another personal Conference" +between the High Commissioner and President Krüger.</p> + +<p>Although the position which the Salisbury Cabinet had now taken up was +one which placed them beyond the danger of accepting an illusory +franchise scheme in lieu of an adequate measure of reform, it was not +the course of action which was best to follow, except from the point +of view of opening the eyes of the British public. In itself further +delay was dangerous. It gave the Boers more time to arm, while we, for +this very reason for which it was necessary to protract the +negotiations, were prevented from arming vigorously. It discouraged +our friends in South Africa, and made them even begin to doubt whether +Great Britain "meant business." It was good policy <span class="pagenum"><a id="page231" name="page231"></a>(p. 231)</span> to offer +the Joint Inquiry, given the truth of the assumption upon which this +offer was based—namely, that the Bill represented an honest desire on +the part of President Krüger to provide a peaceable settlement of the +Uitlander question. Lord Milner knew, within the limits of human +intelligence, that this assumption was wholly unwarranted. The Home +Government apparently did not. As the result of this difference, Lord +Milner's policy was again deflected to the extent that two months of +negotiation were devoted to a purely futile endeavour to persuade the +Pretoria Executive to prove the good faith of a proposal, which was +never intended to be anything more than a pretext for delay. And, as +before, the injury to British interests lay in the fact that, while +the Home Government was prevented from making any adequate use of this +delay by its determination not to make preparations for war until war +was in sight, the period was fully utilised by President Krüger, who +since Bloemfontein had been resolutely hastening the arrangements +necessary for attacking the British colonies at a given moment with +the entire burgher forces of the two Republics.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Krüger urged to accept.</span> + +<p>The offer of the Joint Inquiry was formally communicated to the +Pretoria Executive in an eminently friendly telegram<a id="footnotetag120" name="footnotetag120"></a><a href="#footnote120" title="Go to footnote 120"><span class="small">[120]</span></a> from Lord +Milner on August 1st. Efforts were made on all sides to induce +President Krüger to accept it. Chief <span class="pagenum"><a id="page232" name="page232"></a>(p. 232)</span> Justice de Villiers +wrote strongly in this sense to Mr. Fischer,<a id="footnotetag121" name="footnotetag121"></a><a href="#footnote121" title="Go to footnote 121"><span class="small">[121]</span></a> and to his brother +Melius, the Chief Justice of the Free State. Mr. Schreiner telegraphed +to Mr. Fischer, and Mr. Hofmeyr to President Steyn, both urging that +the influence of the Free State should be used in favour of the +proposal. The Dutch Government advised the Republic "not to refuse the +English proposal";<a id="footnotetag122" name="footnotetag122"></a><a href="#footnote122" title="Go to footnote 122"><span class="small">[122]</span></a> and further informed Dr. Leyds that, in the +opinion of the German Government, "every approach to one of the Great +Powers in this very critical moment will be without any results +whatever, and very dangerous to the Republic."<a id="footnotetag123" name="footnotetag123"></a><a href="#footnote123" title="Go to footnote 123"><span class="small">[123]</span></a> Even the English +sympathisers of the Boers were in favour of acceptance. Mr. Montagu +White, the Transvaal Consul-General in London, cabled that "Courtney, +Labouchere, both our friends, and friendly papers without exception," +recommended this course; and that "refusal meant war and would +estrange friends." The letter which he wrote to Mr. Reitz on the same +day (August 4th), possesses an independent interest, as revealing the +degree in which the friends of the Boers in England had identified +themselves with the policy of the Afrikander party in the Cape Colony.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The essence of friendly advice," said Mr. White,<a id="footnotetag124" name="footnotetag124"></a><a href="#footnote124" title="Go to footnote 124"><span class="small">[124]</span></a> "is: + Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will + be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc., + and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the + Commission. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page233" name="page233"></a>(p. 233)</span> In other words: Gain as much time as you + can, and give the public time here to get out of the dangerous + frame of mind which Chamberlain's speeches have created.... + Labouchere said to me this morning: 'Don't, for goodness' sake, + let Mr. Krüger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little + skilful management, and he will give Master Joe another fall.' He + further said: 'You are such past-masters of the art of gaining + time; here is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right + hands lose their cunning, and you ought to spin out the + negotiations for quite two or three months.'"</p> + +<p>A week later (August 11th), President Krüger received a telegram<a id="footnotetag125" name="footnotetag125"></a><a href="#footnote125" title="Go to footnote 125"><span class="small">[125]</span></a> +in which fifty Afrikander members of the Cape Parliament advanced the +same argument. The acceptance of the Joint Commission, they pointed +out, would provide a way out of a crisis "which might prove fatal to +the best interests, not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren, +but also of the Afrikander party." They, therefore, begged his Honour +to "lay their words privately" before the Executive and the Volksraad.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Krüger resolved on war.</span> + +<p>But President Krüger, like Lord Milner, had his eyes fixed upon the +object. He looked beyond the Afrikander leaders to the rank and file +of the Dutch population in the British colonies, with whom he had been +in direct communication through his agents for many months past.<a id="footnotetag126" name="footnotetag126"></a><a href="#footnote126" title="Go to footnote 126"><span class="small">[126]</span></a> +He knew that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page234" name="page234"></a>(p. 234)</span> any such inquiry as Mr. Chamberlain proposed +would expose the flagrant insincerity of the Franchise Bill. On August +2nd he had telegraphed to President Steyn that compliance with the +Joint Commission was "tantamount to the destruction of the +independence of the Republic."<a id="footnotetag127" name="footnotetag127"></a><a href="#footnote127" title="Go to footnote 127"><span class="small">[127]</span></a> To the Dutch Consul-General<a id="footnotetag128" name="footnotetag128"></a><a href="#footnote128" title="Go to footnote 128"><span class="small">[128]</span></a> +he was perfectly frank: "Defeats such as the English had suffered in +the war for freedom, and later under Jameson, had never been suffered +by the Boers." His burghers were ready to "go on the <span class="italic">battue</span> of +Englishmen," when he gave the word.<a id="footnotetag129" name="footnotetag129"></a><a href="#footnote129" title="Go to footnote 129"><span class="small">[129]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Fischer ceases to "mediate".</span> + +<p>The burghers of the Free State could be counted upon with almost equal +certainty. Mr. Fischer, a more potent influence than President Steyn, +had by this time openly dissociated himself from the "mediation" +policy of the Cape nationalists, and was again (August 4th to 9th) at +Pretoria. Here he threw himself heart and soul into the work of +completing the military preparations of the two Republics. On the 6th +he telegraphed to President Steyn that the draft reply was prepared; +that it "invited discussion and asked questions to gain time," and +that, therefore, it "was not yet necessary to deliberate as to calling +together the Volksraad" for the final decision of peace or war. +"Military matters, especially artillery," he added, "seem to me very +faulty. Care will be taken to make all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page235" name="page235"></a>(p. 235)</span> necessary +preparations."<a id="footnotetag130" name="footnotetag130"></a><a href="#footnote130" title="Go to footnote 130"><span class="small">[130]</span></a> Nor did he leave the Transvaal capital until he +had settled the details of the invasion of Natal with General Joubert. +Indeed, from this time onwards to the despatch of the ultimatum—a +document which came, in its final form, from his pen—Mr. Fischer's +part in the conduct of the negotiations was second only to that of +President Krüger. In all he did he displayed the same reasoned +determination to oppose British supremacy in South Africa which he has +exhibited since the war in his control of the Bloemfontein <span class="italic">Friend</span>. +Orders for the inspection of the commando organisation in the Free +State had been given before Mr. Fischer had left Bloemfontein; and on +his return from Pretoria he responded to Mr. Schreiner's urgent and +continued representations of the desirability of inducing President +Krüger to accept Mr. Chamberlain's offer, by a request to be informed +of any probable movements of British forces. Mr. Schreiner's reply, +that the Free State must ask for such information from the High +Commissioner, caused him to apply to Mr. Hofmeyr for an explanation of +the Cape Premier's attitude. The inquiry produced a notable analysis +of Mr. Schreiner's position.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Hofmeyr says," Dr. Te Water telegraphed, "that whatever the + Premier's feelings or relations to our people are, he is at the + same time a minister of the Crown. As such he has on him claims + in two directions, of which he is acquitting himself to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page236" name="page236"></a>(p. 236)</span> + the best of his ability. He has no control over the movement of + troops. You had better come and have a quiet talk. Meanwhile the + Free State should surely refrain from an aggressive step."<a id="footnotetag131" name="footnotetag131"></a><a href="#footnote131" title="Go to footnote 131"><span class="small">[131]</span></a></p> + +<p>This well-meant advice was somewhat belated. In reply to a telegram +from President Steyn, asking whether it was true that the Imperial +Government was going to send 1,000 men to Bethulie Bridge, Lord Milner +replied on August 16th, that, "as a matter of fact, no despatch of +Imperial troops to the borders of the Orange Free State was in +contemplation." But he added that in view of the much more substantial +reports of the "importation of large quantities of munitions of war" +into that State and "the general arming of the burghers," it "would +not have been unnatural, if such military preparations had been +responded to by a defensive movement" on the part of the British +Government.<a id="footnotetag132" name="footnotetag132"></a><a href="#footnote132" title="Go to footnote 132"><span class="small">[132]</span></a> Indeed, the circumstances which had led to Mr. +Fischer's co-operation in Mr. Hofmeyr's "mediation" were rapidly +disappearing. The Port Elizabeth Mausers and ammunition were safely +through the Cape Colony; a further consignment of Mauser ammunition +arrived at Delagoa Bay (August 16th) in the German steamship +<span class="italic">Reichstag</span> at the very time that these telegrams were passing; and +both this and other enormous consignments were forwarded to Pretoria a +fortnight later in spite of an abortive attempt on the part of the +British Foreign Office <span class="pagenum"><a id="page237" name="page237"></a>(p. 237)</span> to induce the Portuguese authorities +to retain them. The possession of an adequate supply of ammunition was +a matter of cardinal importance to which, as we have seen, President +Steyn had drawn the attention of the Pretoria Executive nearly a month +before the Bloemfontein Conference. It was these Mauser cartridges +that were wanted especially, since, without them, the new arm—the +splendid Mauser magazine rifle—must have been rejected in place of +the inferior Martini-Henry for which the Boers had long been provided +with an ample reserve of ammunition.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Smuts-Greene negotiations.</span> + +<p>In the meantime the British Government was still waiting for a reply +to its offer of a Joint Inquiry. On August 7th the Volksraad discussed +the question, and on the 12th a despatch was written by Mr. Reitz +refusing the offer on the ground that such a proposal was inconsistent +with the independence of the Republic. It was held back, however, +until September 1st; that is to say, until the Portuguese authorities +had allowed the Transvaal ammunition to leave Lorenzo Marques. Then, +as we shall see, it was forwarded in conjunction with a second +despatch of September 2nd. The delay was won by a characteristic +display of "the art of gaining time," in which, as Mr. Labouchere +remarked, the Boers were past-masters. On the same day that Mr. Reitz +wrote his despatch (August 12th), Mr. Smuts approached Sir William +Greene<a id="footnotetag133" name="footnotetag133"></a><a href="#footnote133" title="Go to footnote 133"><span class="small">[133]</span></a> with the offer of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page238" name="page238"></a>(p. 238)</span> a still further simplified +seven years' franchise in lieu of the Joint Commission. When, however, +Sir William Greene assured him that the British Government would not +accept anything less than the Bloemfontein minimum, he subsequently +agreed to an arrangement of which the main items were: A five years' +franchise; the workable character of the new law to be secured by the +submission of its provisions to the British Agent with a legal +adviser; and increased representation in the Volksraad, together with +the use of the English language. After communications had passed +between Sir William Greene, Lord Milner, and Mr. Chamberlain, these +proposals, with certain reservations, were formally communicated to +the British Government by Mr. Reitz on August 19th. Two days later a +second note was forwarded in which the offer contained in the previous +note (August 19th) was declared to be subject to the acceptance by the +British Government of two conditions. These conditions—an undertaking +not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic in the future +and a specific withdrawal of the claim of suzerainty—amounted in +effect to a formal renunciation by Great Britain of its position as +paramount Power in South Africa. <span class="sidenote">Boer diplomacy.</span> +In other words, the Pretoria +Executive had repudiated the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir +William Greene. Mr. Chamberlain, noticing the material variation +between the original offer as initialled by Mr. Smuts and forwarded by +Sir William <span class="pagenum"><a id="page239" name="page239"></a>(p. 239)</span> Greene, and Mr. Reitz's note of August 19th, +instructed Sir William Greene to obtain an explanation of the +discrepancy from the Transvaal Government. The reply was a curt +rejoinder that there was not "the slightest chance of an alteration or +an amplification" of the terms of the arrangement as set out in the +note of the 19th.<a id="footnotetag134" name="footnotetag134"></a><a href="#footnote134" title="Go to footnote 134"><span class="small">[134]</span></a> In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain +telegraphed a reply on August 28th, in which he accepted the original +offer, and rejected the impossible conditions subsequently attached to +it.<a id="footnotetag135" name="footnotetag135"></a><a href="#footnote135" title="Go to footnote 135"><span class="small">[135]</span></a> The terms of settlement thus proposed were in substance the +same as those of the despatch of July 27th, with the exception that an +inquiry by the British Agent was substituted for the Joint Commission, +and the five years' franchise of the Smuts-Greene arrangement was +accepted in lieu of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad law. +The Transvaal reply was a further essay in the same useful "art of +gaining time." It was dated September 2nd, and contained a definite +withdrawal of the Smuts-Greene offer as embodied in the notes of +August 19th and 21st, and a vague return to the Joint Commission.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Under certain conditions," wrote Mr. Reitz,<a id="footnotetag136" name="footnotetag136"></a><a href="#footnote136" title="Go to footnote 136"><span class="small">[136]</span></a> "this + Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government + how they propose that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page240" name="page240"></a>(p. 240)</span> the Commission should be + constituted, and what place and time for meeting is + suggested."<a id="footnotetag137" name="footnotetag137"></a><a href="#footnote137" title="Go to footnote 137"><span class="small">[137]</span></a></p> + +<p>And this with the consoling promise of a "further reply" to other +questions arising out of the despatch of July 27th, which the +Transvaal Government had not yet been able to consider.</p> + +<p>The response to this astute document was the last effort of the +Salisbury Cabinet to arrange a settlement upon the basis of the +"friendly discussion" inaugurated at Bloemfontein. The British +Government, Mr. Chamberlain wrote, had "absolutely repudiated" the +claim, made in the notes of April 16th and May 9th, that the South +African Republic was a "sovereign international state," and they could +not, therefore, consider a proposal which was conditional on the +acceptance of this view of the status of the Republic. They "could not +now consent to go back to the proposals for which those of the note of +August 19th were intended as a substitute," since they were "satisfied +that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied, +was insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial +representation" of the Uitlanders. They were "still prepared to accept +the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of August 19th," +provided that an inquiry, joint or unilateral as the Transvaal +Government might prefer, showed that "the new scheme of representation +would not be encumbered <span class="pagenum"><a id="page241" name="page241"></a>(p. 241)</span> by conditions which would nullify +the intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the +Uitlanders." They assumed that "the new members of the Raad would be +permitted to use their own language." They expressed their belief that +"the acceptance of these terms would at once remove the tension +between the two Governments, and would in all probability render +unnecessary any further intervention" on the franchise question, and +their readiness—</p> + +<span class="sidenote">A definite demand.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between + the President of the South African Republic and the High + Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal + of Arbitration, and the questions ... which were neither + Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation"</p> + +<p class="noindent">of the Convention. And they added that if the reply of the Republic +was negative or inconclusive, "they would reserve to themselves the +right to reconsider the situation <span class="italic">de novo</span>, and to formulate their +own proposals for a final settlement."<a id="footnotetag138" name="footnotetag138"></a><a href="#footnote138" title="Go to footnote 138"><span class="small">[138]</span></a></p> + +<p>The text of this despatch was telegraphed to Lord Milner late at night +on September 8th. It was presented to the Transvaal Government on the +12th, with a request that the reply might reach the British Agent not +later than midday on the 14th. This limit of time was fixed by Sir +William Greene on his own initiative, and it was withdrawn by Lord +Milner's instructions, in order that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page242" name="page242"></a>(p. 242)</span> Pretoria Executive +might not be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered +on the 15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement, +re-stated by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise +reform, coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene.</p> + +<p>It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect +in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written +for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to +write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the +world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the +British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into +war.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope + that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will + feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals + more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, + and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal + for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of + State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and + subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it."<a id="footnotetag139" name="footnotetag139"></a><a href="#footnote139" title="Go to footnote 139"><span class="small">[139]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Reinforcements sanctioned.</span> + +<p>The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion +of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South +African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise +the strength of the Natal and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page243" name="page243"></a>(p. 243)</span> Cape forces to the total of +22,000, estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive +purposes, by the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly +6,000 were to be provided by the Indian Army.<a id="footnotetag140" name="footnotetag140"></a><a href="#footnote140" title="Go to footnote 140"><span class="small">[140]</span></a> The despatch +itself, definite in contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of +communication which, in Lord Milner's judgment, should have been +forwarded to the Transvaal Government after the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference; and the additional troops now ordered out +were nothing more than the substantial reinforcements for which he had +applied in June. The three months' negotiations had led the Salisbury +Cabinet to the precise conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at +Bloemfontein. The only hope of a peaceable settlement lay in a +definite demand, backed by preparations for war. But to do this in +June, and to do it in September, were two very different things. +Assuming that diplomatic pressure could in any case have availed to +secure the necessary reforms, it is obvious that, whatever prospect of +success attached to this course of action—Policy No. 2, as Lord +Milner called it—in June, was materially diminished in September. +During the interval the British Government had done practically +nothing to improve its military position. That of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page244" name="page244"></a>(p. 244)</span> President +Krüger had been conspicuously improved. He had carried the Free State +with him; he had got his Mauser ammunition and additional artillery, +and he had completed his arrangements for the simultaneous +mobilisation of the burghers of the two Republics. Even now the +military action of the British Government was confined to preparations +for defence; for the order to mobilise the army corps was not given +until the next Cabinet Council had been held on September 22nd. The +spirit of Pretoria was very different. The commandos were on their way +to the Natal border before the reply to this British despatch of +September 8th was delivered to the British Agent. That was President +Krüger's real answer—not the diplomatic fencing of September 15th.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Violence of the Boers.</span> + +<p>More than this, the three months' negotiations had embittered the +relations of the British and Dutch factions in every South African +state to such a degree that any compromise of the sort proposed by +Lord Milner at Bloemfontein was no longer sufficient to effect a +settlement. The moderate measure of representation then suggested +would have been rejected now by the Uitlanders as wholly inadequate +for their protection, in view of the violent antipathy to them and the +gold industry which the diplomatic struggle had evoked among all +classes of the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. The particulars of +the outrageous treatment, and still more outrageous threats, to which +the British Uitlanders were subjected from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page245" name="page245"></a>(p. 245)</span> this time onwards +up to the ultimatum are to be found in the Blue-books. As early as the +middle of August, when the Smuts-Greene negotiations had just been +commenced, Mr. Monypenny, the editor of the Johannesburg <span class="italic">Star</span>, was +warned that the Transvaal Government intended to issue a warrant for +his arrest on a charge of high treason. This intention, postponed +during the fortnight of delay won by these negotiations, was carried +out on September 1st, on which day Mr. Pakeman, the editor of the +<span class="italic">Transvaal Leader</span>, was secured, while Mr. Monypenny succeeded in +effecting his escape. This indefensible act was followed by a +characteristic attempt to disown it, made by Mr. Smuts, the State +Attorney, the nature of which is sufficiently exhibited in the +following telegram, despatched by the High Commissioner on September +4th to the Secretary of State:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"The charge against Pakeman has been reduced to one under the + Press Law of 1896, and he has been admitted to bail. There have + been no further arrests. Greene telegraphs as follows:</p> + +<p>"<span class="italic">Begins.</span>—A statement has been published through the Press this + morning by the State Attorney 'that no instructions had ever been + issued from Pretoria for the arrest of the editors of the + <span class="italic">Leader</span> or the <span class="italic">Star</span>.' The facts are as follows: On Friday + morning the Public Prosecutor of Johannesburg and Captain Vandam, + who had come over from Johannesburg to Pretoria, were interviewed + by the State Attorney in his office here. In the afternoon these + two officers returned <span class="pagenum"><a id="page246" name="page246"></a>(p. 246)</span> to Johannesburg, and arrested the + editor of the <span class="italic">Leader</span> the same evening, failing to capture the + editor of the <span class="italic">Star</span>.—<span class="italic">Ends.</span></p> + +<p>"There is no doubt that the arrest of both editors was decided by + the Government and other arrests contemplated, intimidation of + Uitlander leaders being the object. The exodus from Johannesburg + is taking formidable proportions. Many refugees of all classes + have come to Capetown. In Natal there are an even larger number. + A good deal of money is being spent on relief."<a id="footnotetag141" name="footnotetag141"></a><a href="#footnote141" title="Go to footnote 141"><span class="small">[141]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The violence of the Boers culminated a week before the Ultimatum +(October 9th-11th) in the wholesale expulsion of the British subjects +still remaining in the two Republics. Assuming that this measure was +justifiable on military grounds, there can be no excuse for the brutal +precipitancy with which it was enforced. It crowded the colonial ports +with homeless and impoverished fugitives; it inflicted unnecessary +suffering and pecuniary loss upon inoffensive and innocent +non-combatants, both European and native; and it was accompanied in +some instances by displays of wanton cruelty and deliberate spite +utterly unworthy of a people of European descent.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Anxiety of High Commissioner.</span> + +<p>Thus it was only when Lord Milner's foresight had been unmistakably +confirmed by the stern logic of facts that the British Government +ordered these 10,000 troops to South Africa, 6,000 of whom—the Indian +contribution—arrived just in time to save Natal from being overrun by +the Boers. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page247" name="page247"></a>(p. 247)</span> The three weeks preceding the Cabinet Council of +September 8th, at which this decision was arrived at, had been a +period of intense anxiety for the High Commissioner. With the +spectacle of the increasing activity of England's enemies, and the +increasing dismay of England's friends, before his eyes, his protests +against the inactivity of the Home Government had become more urgent. +In the middle of August he declared that he could no longer be +responsible for the administration of South Africa unless he were +provided immediately with another military adviser. General +Forestier-Walker was then appointed, and after the departure of +General Butler the Imperial Government intervened at length to check +the further passage of munitions of war through the Colony to the Free +State.<a id="footnotetag142" name="footnotetag142"></a><a href="#footnote142" title="Go to footnote 142"><span class="small">[142]</span></a> The <span class="italic">Norman</span>, the mail-boat of August 23rd in which Sir +William Butler sailed for England, took home the masterly +despatch<a id="footnotetag143" name="footnotetag143"></a><a href="#footnote143" title="Go to footnote 143"><span class="small">[143]</span></a> in which Lord Milner explained the position taken up by +him at the Bloemfontein Conference, and showed how completely the +proposals of the Transvaal Government differed from the spirit of the +settlement which he had then invited President Krüger to accept. In +doing so he reviewed the whole course of the subsequent negotiations, +pointed out the insidious character of the last Transvaal proposal +(August 19th and 21st), and emphatically protested against the +suggestion that the Imperial Government should <span class="pagenum"><a id="page248" name="page248"></a>(p. 248)</span> barter its +rights as paramount Power for "another hastily framed franchise +scheme," on account of its "superficial conformity" with what, after +all, was only a single item in the long list of questions that must be +adjusted before the peaceful progress of South Africa would be +assured.<a id="footnotetag144" name="footnotetag144"></a><a href="#footnote144" title="Go to footnote 144"><span class="small">[144]</span></a> On August 28th Mr. Schreiner, when called to account in +the Cape Parliament for having allowed, "in the usual course," the +Mausers and ammunition for the Free State to pass through the Colony, +made the strange declaration that in the event of war—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "he would do his very best to maintain [for the Cape Colony] the + position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with + regard to its forces and with regard to its people."</p> + +<p>Three days later (August 31st) Lord Milner sent a still more +impressive appeal for "prompt and decisive action" on the part of the +Home Government. The despatch, which was telegraphed, is otherwise +significant for its account of the situation in Johannesburg:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I am receiving representations from many quarters," he said, "to + urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense. + Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her + Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound + to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in + various reliable quarters, that the distress is now really + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page249" name="page249"></a>(p. 249)</span> serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. + Business there is at a standstill; many traders have become + insolvent, and others are only kept on their legs by the leniency + of their creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected + hitherto, are now suffering, owing to the withdrawal of workmen, + both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading + centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the + representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action, + not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her + Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for + extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the + vindication of British authority. It is a prolongation of the + negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded. + I fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling + against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag. + Please to understand that I invariably preach confidence and + patience—not without effect. But if I did not inform you of the + increasing difficulty in doing this, and of the unmistakable + growth of uneasiness about the present situation, and of a desire + to see it terminated at any cost, I should be failing in my + duty."<a id="footnotetag145" name="footnotetag145"></a><a href="#footnote145" title="Go to footnote 145"><span class="small">[145]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">The crisis in South Africa.</span> + +<p>Indeed, while in England Mr. Chamberlain was remarking (at Highbury, +August 27th) that he "could not truly say that the crisis was passed," +and picturesquely complaining of President Krüger "dribbling out +reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," every loyalist in South +Africa knew that the time for words had gone by. On September 6th and +7th public meetings were held respectively <span class="pagenum"><a id="page250" name="page250"></a>(p. 250)</span> at Maritzburg and +Capetown, at which resolutions were passed affirming the uselessness +of continuing the negotiations and the necessity for the prompt action +of the Imperial Government.</p> + +<p>Even this did not exhaust the evidence which was needed to persuade +the Salisbury Cabinet to make effective preparations for the defence +of the British colonies. The Cabinet Council of September 8th had +before it, in addition to the Transvaal note of September 2nd, a +direct and urgent request<a id="footnotetag146" name="footnotetag146"></a><a href="#footnote146" title="Go to footnote 146"><span class="small">[146]</span></a> for immediate reinforcements from the +Government of Natal—the loyal colony which, as Lord Milner had +declared, was to be defended "by the whole force of the empire."</p> + +<p>These were the circumstances in which the Salisbury Cabinet did in +September what Lord Milner had advised them to do in June. It is +impossible to maintain that the British Government had gained anything +in the way of political results comparable with the fatal loss of +military strength incurred by the three months' delay. The over-sea +British did not need to be taught either the justice or the necessity +of securing citizen rights for the industrial population of the +Transvaal. Before Lord Milner had been authorised to state that the +petition of the Uitlanders had been favourably received by the Home +Government, the citizens of Sydney had recorded in a public meeting +their "sympathy with their fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal," and +expressed their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page251" name="page251"></a>(p. 251)</span> hope "that Her Majesty might be pleased to +grant the prayer of her subjects." Queensland, Victoria, and New South +Wales had all three offered military contingents by July 21st;<a id="footnotetag147" name="footnotetag147"></a><a href="#footnote147" title="Go to footnote 147"><span class="small">[147]</span></a> +the other colonies refrained only from a desire not to embarrass the +Home Government in its negotiations with the Transvaal. Whatever good +effect was produced upon the public opinion of the continent of Europe +and the United States of America by the obvious reluctance of the +British Government to make war upon a puny enemy, was more than +counterbalanced by the spectacle of a great Power prevented from +employing the most elementary military precautions by a nice regard +for the susceptibilities of its political and commercial rivals. The +idea that the sentiment either of the world at large or of the +over-sea British would be favourably impressed by the three months of +futile negotiations was a sheer delusion. It was the people of England +who had to be educated.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Manchester meeting.</span> + +<p>How little they knew of the actual situation in South Africa, and of +the real character of the Boers may be seen from what happened on +September 15th. On this day a meeting was held at Manchester to +protest against the mere idea of England having to make war upon the +Transvaal. Lord (then Mr.) Courtney "hailed with satisfaction" the +British despatch of September 8th, which, having been published in the +Continental papers on the 13th, had appeared a day later (14th) in +those <span class="pagenum"><a id="page252" name="page252"></a>(p. 252)</span> of Great Britain. "It was a rebuke to the +fire-eaters," he said, "and a rebuke most of all to one whom I must +designate as a lost man, a lost mind—I mean Sir Alfred Milner." And +Mr. John Morley, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was convinced that +there was no need of any preparations for war; the Transvaal +Government "could not withdraw from the five years' franchise." The +day on which these words were uttered was the day on which the note +containing President Krüger's determination to "withdraw" from the +five years' franchise, and his refusal even to consider the British +offer of September 8th—hailed with satisfaction by his old ally, Lord +Courtney—was handed to Sir William Greene.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page253" name="page253"></a>(p. 253)</span> CHAPTER VI</h3> + +<p class="title">THE ULTIMATUM</p> + + +<p>The British people were destined to pay a heavy penalty for the +ignorance and irresolution that caused them to withhold, from June to +September, the mandate without which the Government was unable to +prepare for war. What that penalty was will be made sufficiently clear +when we come to consider the position of grave disadvantage in which +the British forces designated for the South African campaign were +placed at the outbreak of the war. For the moment it is enough to +notice that, just as the real source of the military weakness of +England in the war was the fact that only a very small proportion of +her adult male population had received an elementary training in arms, +so the futility of her peace strategy must be traced to the general +ignorance of the bitter hatred with which British supremacy was +regarded, not only by the Boers, but also by the Dutch subjects of the +Crown in the Cape Colony and Natal. In a world-wide and composite +State such as the British Empire, it is, of course, natural that the +people of one component part should be unfamiliar, in a greater or +lesser degree, with the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page254" name="page254"></a>(p. 254)</span> conditions of any other part. What +makes this mutual unfamiliarity dangerous is the circumstance that the +control of the foreign relations, and of the effective military and +naval forces, of the Empire as a whole, remains exclusively in the +hands of the people of one part—the United Kingdom. In the absence of +any administrative body in which the over-sea Britains are +represented, the power, thus possessed, of moulding the destiny of any +one province of the Empire lays upon the island people the duty of +informing themselves adequately upon the circumstances and conditions +of all its component parts. It is obvious that the likelihood of this +duty being efficiently performed has been diminished greatly by the +extension of the franchise. Fortunately, however, in the case of +Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, questions involving a decision to +employ the Army or Navy which Great Britain maintains for the defence +of the Empire have arisen rarely in recent years. It is in regard to +India and South Africa that these decisions have been constantly +required; and for half a century past each of these two countries in +turn has been the battlefield of English parties. But while the +efficiency of British administration has suffered in both cases by +variations of policy due to party oscillations, infinitely greater +injury has been done in South Africa than in India.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the island people.</span> + +<p>In respect of South Africa, while, speaking broadly, Liberal +Governments have sought to escape from existing responsibilities, or +to decline <span class="pagenum"><a id="page255" name="page255"></a>(p. 255)</span> new ones, Conservative Governments have sought to +discharge these responsibilities with the object of making this +country a homogeneous and self-supporting unit of the empire. To +persuade the nation to accept a policy which might, and probably +would, involve it in an immediate sacrifice both of men and money, was +plainly a more difficult task than to persuade it that no need existed +for any such sacrifices. The "long view" of the Imperialist statesmen +was supported in the present instance by past experience and by the +judgment of the great majority of the British population actually +resident in South Africa. The home English, remembering that the +recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been followed by Majuba and the +Retrocession, were anxious to maintain British supremacy unimpaired in +South Africa. What kept them irresolute was the uncertainty as to +whether this supremacy really was, or was not, in danger. Lord Milner +had told them that the establishment of a Dutch Republic, embracing +all South Africa, was being openly advocated, and that nothing but a +striking proof of Great Britain's intention to remain the paramount +Power—such as would be afforded by insisting upon the grant of equal +rights to the British population in the Transvaal—could arrest the +growth of the nationalist movement. He had pointed out also that the +conversion of the Boer Republic into an arsenal of munitions of war, +when, as in the case of Ketshwayo, there was no enemy against +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page256" name="page256"></a>(p. 256)</span> whom these arms could be turned other than Great Britain, +was in itself a definite and unmistakable menace to British supremacy. +This, moreover, was the deliberate and reasoned verdict of a man who +had been commissioned, with almost universal approval, to ascertain +the real state of affairs in South Africa. If the nation had believed +Lord Milner in June, the British Government would have received the +political support that would have enabled it to make the preparations +for war in that month which, as we have seen, it was now making in +September.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Liberal opposition.</span> + +<p>The agency which, by playing upon the ignorance of the public, +prevented the nation from accepting at once the truth of Lord Milner's +verdict, was the Liberal Opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the +official leader of the Liberal party, maintained throughout the three +months in question that no reason existed for military preparation. +Mr. Labouchere wrote, on the eve of the war: "The Boers invade Natal! +You might just as well talk of their invading England." When Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman maintained that there was no need for the +Government to make any military preparations, we must presume that he +believed one of two things: either that President Krüger would yield, +or that, if President Krüger did not yield, there was nothing in the +condition of South Africa to make it necessary for Great Britain to +give any proof of her ability to maintain her position as paramount +Power by force of arms. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page257" name="page257"></a>(p. 257)</span> The action of the Liberal Opposition +resolves itself, therefore, into a declaration, on its own authority +as against Lord Milner's, that neither the republican nor the colonial +Dutch had any intention of making war upon Great Britain in South +Africa, or any resources which would enable them to carry out such an +intention with any hope of success. Now, apart from the overwhelming +testimony to the utter falsity of this assertion which is afforded by +the facts of the campaign, and apart from such documents as the +manifestos issued by both Republics upon the outbreak of the war, we +possess—thanks to the exertions of the Intelligence Department—a +mass of evidence, in the shape of private and official correspondence, +which enables us to learn what was actually passing in the minds of +the Dutch at this time. On the 15th of this month of September, 1899, +the meeting to which we have referred<a id="footnotetag148" name="footnotetag148"></a><a href="#footnote148" title="Go to footnote 148"><span class="small">[148]</span></a> was held at Manchester, +with the object, not of strengthening the hands of the Government in +the military preparations which they were making thus tardily, but of +protesting against the very idea that there was anything in the +attitude of the Dutch in South Africa to make war necessary. A perusal +of two of these captured documents will enable the reader to judge for +himself in what degree this Liberal view of the situation corresponded +with the facts. The first is a letter written on September 25th—that +is to say, ten days after Lord Courtney was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page258" name="page258"></a>(p. 258)</span> denouncing Lord +Milner as "a lost mind" at Manchester—by Mr. Blignaut, brother to the +State Secretary of the Free State. It is concerned with the safe +arrival in the Free State of a Colonial Afrikander, who has left his +home in the Western Province of the Cape Colony to join the republican +forces:</p> + +<div class="quote"> + +<p class="center">[Translation.]</p> +<p><span class="left50 smcap">"Kroonstadt, Orange Free State</span>,<br> + <span class="ralign italic">"September 25th, 1899.</span></p> + +<p class="p2">"Your wire to hand this morning, to which I + replied. —— has arrived.</p> + +<p>"I never gave the youngster credit for such plans + to dodge Mr. ——, and not to be trapped and + taken back. I think he owes his friend —— something + for his advice how to proceed. As he is here + now, he can remain. I see myself he will never be + satisfied to stay there [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> in the colony] while there + is war going on.</p> + +<p>"The only thing we are afraid of now is that + Chamberlain, with his admitted fitfulness of temper, + will cheat us out of the war, and consequently the + opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and + Natal, and forming the Republican United States + of South Africa; for, in spite of [S. J. du Toit], + we have forty-six thousand fighting men who have + pledged themselves to die shoulder to shoulder in + defence of our liberty, and to secure the independence + of South Africa.</p> + +<p> + "Please forward ——'s luggage.</p> +<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">J. N. Blignaut</span>."<a id="footnotetag149" name="footnotetag149"></a><a href="#footnote149" title="Go to footnote 149"><span class="small">[149]</span></a></p> + +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Afrikander aspirations.</span> + +<p>This is not an isolated or exceptional expression of opinion. It is a +typical statement of what was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page259" name="page259"></a>(p. 259)</span> in the mind of ninety-nine out +of every hundred republican nationalists at this time. The aspirations +it contains were proclaimed a fortnight later to the world by +President Krüger himself in the boast that his Republic would "stagger +humanity." They appeared in the nonchalant remarks made a few days +later by Mr. Gregorowski, the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, in +bidding farewell to Canon Farmer,<a id="footnotetag150" name="footnotetag150"></a><a href="#footnote150" title="Go to footnote 150"><span class="small">[150]</span></a> who was preparing to leave his +cure at Pretoria in view of the certainty of war.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Is it really necessary for you to go? The war will be over in a + fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the + English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace."</p> + +<p>War, then, for the Boer meant "an opportunity of annexing the Cape +Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South +Africa." When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, Lord +Courtney, Mr. James Bryce, and other Liberal leaders saw no reason why +the British Government should make military preparations—did, in +fact, do all in their power to induce the English people to withhold +the support necessary to allow the British Government to make these +preparations—there were, twelve thousand British troops in South +Africa to oppose the "forty-six thousand fighting men who had pledged +themselves to die shoulder to shoulder" to secure the independence, +not of the Transvaal but of "South Africa".</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page260" name="page260"></a>(p. 260)</span> And what of the Dutch in the Cape Colony? Our second document +will enlighten us on this point. It is an invitation, composed in +doggerel rhyme, to the Boer forces to invade Griqualand West, signed +by the chairman of a district branch of the Afrikander Bond. The date +is not given; but as the proclamation under which Head-Commandant C. +J. Wessels annexed the districts in question is dated November 11th, +1899, it was obviously written during the first three or four weeks of +the war.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>[Translation.]</p> + +<p>"Dear countrymen of the Transvaal: Brothers of our religion and + language: Our hearts are burning for you all: when your brave men + fall, we pray to God night and day to help you with His might; we + are powerless by ourselves—the English are so angry with us that + they have taken away our ammunition, all our powder and + cartridges; if you can provide us each with a packet of ten and a + Mauser, you will see what we can do; Englishmen won't stand + before us, they will go to the devil. There are a few English + here, but we count them amongst the dead; for the rest we are all + Boers, and only wait for you to move us. Englishmen are not our + friends, and we will not serve under their flag; so we all shout + together, as Transvaal subjects, 'God save President Krüger, and + the Transvaal army; God save President Steyn, and all Free + Staters great and small!'"<a id="footnotetag151" name="footnotetag151"></a><a href="#footnote151" title="Go to footnote 151"><span class="small">[151]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Ignorance of Liberal leaders.</span> + +<p>But, apart from this profound misconception of the real feeling and +intentions of the Afrikander <span class="pagenum"><a id="page261" name="page261"></a>(p. 261)</span> nationalists in South Africa, +manifested with such disastrous effect during these critical +months—June to September, 1899—the leaders of the Liberal Opposition +otherwise displayed in their public utterances an ignorance of this +province of the Empire that can only be characterised as "wanton." For +what expression other than "wanton ignorance" can be used to describe +the habit of mind which permits public men to make statements in +direct conflict with the facts of South African history, as +established by ascertainable evidence, or to state as facts +allegations which proper inquiry would have shown to be untrue? Here +again, from a mass of material provided by the utterances which came +from the Liberal Opposition leaders on South African affairs, a few +instances only can be brought to the notice of the reader, and these +in the briefest form consistent with precision. On September 5th Mr. +John Morley, speaking at Arbroath, stated that Sir Bartle Frere had +"annexed the Transvaal." The present baronet, the late High +Commissioner's son, called him to account at once; but it required +three successive letters<a id="footnotetag152" name="footnotetag152"></a><a href="#footnote152" title="Go to footnote 152"><span class="small">[152]</span></a> to wring from Mr. John Morley a specific +acknowledgement of his error. The evidence which establishes the fact +that Frere did not annex the Transvaal is the following statement, +bearing his signature and published in February, 1881:<a id="footnotetag153" name="footnotetag153"></a><a href="#footnote153" title="Go to footnote 153"><span class="small">[153]</span></a></p> + +<p class="quote"> + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page262" name="page262"></a>(p. 262)</span> "It was an act which in no way originated with me, over + which I had no control, and with which I was only subsequently + incidentally connected.... It was a great question then, as now, + whether the annexation was justifiable."</p> + +<p>This was on the 5th. On the 27th a letter was published in <span class="italic">The Times</span> +in which Sir William Harcourt wrote, in respect of the suzerainty +question:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "All further argument is now superfluous, as the matter is + decisively disposed of by the publication at Pretoria of Lord + Derby's telegram of February 27th, 1884, in which the effect of + the London Convention of that date was stated in the following + words: 'There will be the same complete independence in the + Transvaal as in the Orange Free State.'"</p> + +<p>In a letter written on the day following, and published in <span class="italic">The Times</span> +of October 2nd, the writer of the present work pointed out, among +other inaccuracies, that the words actually telegraphed by Lord Derby +were: "same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in +Orange Free State." That is to say, before the word "independence" the +word "internal"—vitally important to the present issue—was inserted +in the original, and omitted in the Boer version, from which Sir +William Harcourt had quoted without referring to the Blue-book, Cd. +4,036.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Its injurious effect.</span> + +<p>The third instance occurred some three months later. Mr. James Bryce, +speaking on December <span class="pagenum"><a id="page263" name="page263"></a>(p. 263)</span> 14th, 1899, stated that Sir Bartle +Frere "sent to govern the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon, an officer +unfitted by training and character for so delicate and difficult a +task."<a id="footnotetag154" name="footnotetag154"></a><a href="#footnote154" title="Go to footnote 154"><span class="small">[154]</span></a> The following passage, which the present writer +subsequently published, affords precise and overwhelming evidence of +the absolute untruth of Mr. Bryce's assertion. It appears in a letter +written by Sir Bartle Frere on December 13th, 1878, to Mr. (now Sir) +Gordon Sprigg, then Premier of Cape Colony.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The Secretary of State has nominated Lanyon to take Shepstone's + place whenever he leaves [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> when Lanyon leaves Kimberley, + where he was Administrator of Griqualand West]. This was not my + arrangement, and had it been left to me I think I should have + arranged otherwise, for while I believe Lanyon to be one of the + most right-minded, hardworking, and able men in South Africa, I + know he does not fancy the work in the Transvaal, and I think I + could have done better. However, it does not rest with me, and + all I have to do is to find a man fit to take his place when he + leaves."<a id="footnotetag155" name="footnotetag155"></a><a href="#footnote155" title="Go to footnote 155"><span class="small">[155]</span></a></p> + +<p>All of these three men were of Cabinet rank. Two of them, Mr. Morley +and Mr. Bryce, enjoyed a great and deserved reputation as men of +letters; and their public utterances on the South African question, +accepted in large measure on the strength <span class="pagenum"><a id="page264" name="page264"></a>(p. 264)</span> of this literary +reputation, were responsible in an appreciable degree for the distrust +and coldness manifested by the people of the United States of America +towards Great Britain during the first year of the war. But this is a +consideration of secondary importance. The vital point to recognise is +that, so long as the Empire remains without a common representative +council, a knowledge of the conditions of the over-sea Britains must +be considered as necessary a part of the political equipment of any +English statesman as a knowledge of Lancashire or of Kent. After the +war had broken out, Lord Rosebery, almost alone among Liberal +statesmen, did something to support the Government. This distinguished +advocate of Imperial unity and national efficiency then recommended +the English people to educate themselves by reading Sir Percy +FitzPatrick's <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>, and encouraged them by +declaring his belief that England would "muddle through" this, as +other wars. It does not seem, however, to have occurred to Lord +Rosebery that, if he had used his undoubted influence in time to +prevent his party from making it impossible for the Salisbury Cabinet +to carry out in June the effective peace strategy long recommended by +Lord Milner, the prospect of a "muddle" would have been materially +diminished, if not altogether removed.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.</span> + +<p>There is one other fact that cannot be overlooked in estimating the +degree in which the Liberal leaders are answerable to the nation for +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page265" name="page265"></a>(p. 265)</span> the fatal error of postponing effective military +preparations from June to September. After the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference Lord Milner, as we have seen, asked for +immediate and substantial reinforcements. Mr. Chamberlain then +approached Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman with a proposal that the +Government should inform the Opposition leaders of the circumstances +that made military preparations necessary, and of the precise measures +which they might deem advisable to adopt from time to time, on the +understanding that the Opposition, on their part, should refrain from +raising any public discussion as to the expediency of these measures. +The object of this proposal was, of course, to enable the Government +to make effective preparations for war, without lessening the prospect +of achieving a peaceful settlement by the negotiations in progress. +Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's reply to this overture was a refusal to +make the Opposition a party to any such arrangement. If the Government +chose to make military preparations they must do so, he said, entirely +on their own responsibility.</p> + +<p>The significance of this refusal of Mr. Chamberlain's offer appears +from the answer which was subsequently put forward by the Prime +Minister, the late Lord Salisbury, to the charge of "military +unpreparedness" brought against the British Government after the early +disasters of the campaign. What prevented the Cabinet, according to +the Premier, from taking the measures required <span class="pagenum"><a id="page266" name="page266"></a>(p. 266)</span> by the +military situation in June was the British system of popular +government. Any preparations on the scale demanded by Lord Milner and +Lord Wolseley could not have been set on foot without provoking the +fullest discussion in Parliament and the Press. The leaders of the +Opposition would have contested fiercely the proposals of the +Government, and the perversion of these opportunities for discussion +into an anti-war propaganda might have exhibited England as a country +divided against itself. It may be questioned whether, in point of +fact, the Liberal leaders could have done anything more calculated to +injure the interests of their country if the Government had mobilised +the army corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in +June, than they did when these measures were postponed until +September. But, however this may be, the circumstance that this +proposal was made by Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H. +Campbell-Bannerman, is noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit +of lofty patriotism of which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its +initial error, was destined to give more than one proof in the course +of the war and as an example of a method of escaping from the +injurious results of a well-recognised defect in the democratic system +of government—a method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be +employed with success should the like occasion arise at any future +time.</p> + +<p>This, then, was the state of affairs in England. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page267" name="page267"></a>(p. 267)</span> The +Opposition throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was +out of the question, and that preparations for war were altogether +unnecessary. The people, being ignorant of the progress which the +nationalist movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and +withheld from the Government the support without which it could not +make adequate military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in +Parliament and possible loss of office.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Objects of Afrikander policy.</span> + +<p>What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the +position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and +do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects +of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The +ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the +Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that +the Afrikander nationalist<a id="footnotetag156" name="footnotetag156"></a><a href="#footnote156" title="Go to footnote 156"><span class="small">[156]</span></a> movement had made the moral supremacy +of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to +England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other +members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt +and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep +South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as +he was concerned) in his despatch of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page268" name="page268"></a>(p. 268)</span> May 4th, 1899, which +was withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The +Bloemfontein Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at +the Cape to avert a military conflict between the South African +Republic and Great Britain, which, they believed, would result not +merely in the destruction of the Republics, but in the loss of the +prospect—which they then enjoyed—of achieving through the existence +of the Republics the independence of the Afrikander nation as a whole. +All this Lord Milner made perfectly clear to Mr. Chamberlain. The +illusory concessions embodied in President Krüger's Franchise Law were +yielded by the Republics with the object of securing the "moral +support" of the Cape Afrikanders in the negotiations, and thereby +obtaining the delay which was required to complete their military +preparations; since the Republican nationalists, unlike those of the +Cape, believed that the independence of the Afrikander nation could be +wrested from Great Britain by force of arms. The efforts made by the +Cape nationalists, first to secure these concessions, and then to +induce the republican nationalists to grant the further concessions +which would have satisfied the British Government, were made for the +same purpose as the Bloemfontein Conference had been arranged—namely, +to avert a conflict which, being premature, would be disastrous to the +nationalist cause, not only in the Republics but in the Cape Colony. +The respective objects both of the republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page269" name="page269"></a>(p. 269)</span> and Cape +nationalists had been divined by Lord Milner, and, therefore, +immediately after the failure of the Conference, he had urged the Home +Government to send reinforcements to South Africa sufficient to defend +British territory from attack, and to check any incipient rebellion in +the Cape Colony. The negotiations might, or might not, result in a +peaceful settlement; but it was futile, nay more, it was dangerous, he +said, for Great Britain to go on as though war were out of the +question.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's position.</span> + +<p>This was the view of the South African situation which Lord Milner +laid before the Home Government in June. We have seen what was done by +them in response to these representations. Some special service +officers were sent out to organise locally the defences of the Cape +Colony and Rhodesia. The Cape and Natal garrisons were strengthened by +a few very inadequate reinforcements arriving in the course of the +next two months. General Butler was not recalled until the latter part +of August; his successor, General Forestier-Walker, did not arrive +until September 6th. We have traced the causes which made it +impossible for the Imperial Government, as they conceived, to do more +than this; and when in due course we come to consider the broad phases +of the war, the nature of the penalty which the British Army, and the +British nation, had to pay for the partial paralysis of the Government +will become sufficiently apparent.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page270" name="page270"></a>(p. 270)</span> The man who suffered most by all this was Lord Milner. When +he asked for military preparations, he was told that he could not have +them. When he asked for the removal of a military adviser with whom +he was supremely dissatisfied, he was told that he must put up with +General Butler for a little longer. He put up with him for two months. +His Colonial ministers, whose advice on many points he was bound to +accept so long as he did not dismiss them, were men placed in office +by the Dutch subjects of the Crown for the very purpose of +frustrating, by constitutional means, the successful intervention in +the Transvaal, by which alone, in his opinion, British supremacy could +be made a reality.</p> + +<p>Indeed, the odds were heavily against Lord Milner in his task of +saving England, in spite of herself and in spite of the enemies of +whose power she was wholly ignorant, and to whose very existence she +remained contemptuously indifferent. To the great mass of the British +population in South Africa, he stood for England and English justice. +To them he seemed the representative man, for whom they had waited +many a long year. They felt that he was fighting their battle and +doing their work; and, making allowance for local jealousies and +accidental partialities, they never ceased to regard him thus. This +was his one and only source of assured support. But he was far removed +from the active British centres: <span class="pagenum"><a id="page271" name="page271"></a>(p. 271)</span> from the group of towns +formed by the Albany settlers and their descendants in the Eastern +Province, and from Kimberley, Durban and Maritzburg, and Johannesburg. +In the Cape peninsula, of course, there was a considerable British +population of professional and commercial men; but this population had +been so closely related by business and social ties with the +preponderant Dutch population of the Western Province that many among +them hesitated to declare themselves openly against the Dutch party. +All who were members of the Progressive party, from the time of the +Graaf Reinet speech, had given unswerving support to Lord Milner's +policy; but the strength of the influence created by years of +alternate political co-operation with the Bond leaders may be gathered +from the fact that even so staunch a supporter of the British +connection as Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes did not publicly declare +his adhesion to the intervention policy until after the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference. Moreover, the increasing political solidarity +of the British population in the Cape Colony augmented the bitterness +with which the few English politicians, who had remained in alliance +with the Dutch party, regarded the man whose resolution and insight +had penetrated and exposed the designs of the Bond.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Intrigues and disaffection.</span> + +<p>It is difficult to convey any adequate impression of the atmosphere of +suspicion and intrigue by which Lord Milner was surrounded. The Dutch +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page272" name="page272"></a>(p. 272)</span> party was in the ascendant in the Colony. The Cape Civil +Service was tainted throughout with disaffection. Even the <span class="italic">personnel</span> +of the Government offices at Capetown, although it contained many +excellent and loyal men, included also many who were disaffected or +lukewarm. It is characteristic of the situation that during the most +critical period of the negotiations with the Transvaal, the +ministerial organ, <span class="italic">The South African News</span>, permitted itself to +indulge, where Lord Milner, was concerned, not only in the bitterest +criticisms but in outspoken personal abuse. To have abused the +representative of the Sovereign in a British colony of which one-half +of the population was seething with sedition, while a part had been +actually armed for rebellion by the secret emissaries of a state with +which Great Britain was on the verge of war, is an act which admits of +only one interpretation. Lord Milner was to be got rid of at all +costs; for the policy which <span class="italic">The South African News</span> was intended to +promote was that not of Great Britain, but of the Transvaal. The paper +was directly inspired—it is indeed not unlikely that the articles +themselves were written—by some of the members of the Ministry, Lord +Milner's "constitutional advisers," whom throughout he himself treated +with the respect to which their position entitled them.</p> + +<p>But nothing, perhaps, shows more vividly how extraordinary was the +position in which Lord Milner found himself than the fact, which we +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page273" name="page273"></a>(p. 273)</span> have already noted, that the passage of the large +consignment of 500 Mauser rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges for the Free +State, to which the Prime Minister's attention was "drawn specially, +because it was large," on July 15th, was not made known to him, the +Governor of the Cape Colony, until August 9th, and then only by +accident.<a id="footnotetag157" name="footnotetag157"></a><a href="#footnote157" title="Go to footnote 157"><span class="small">[157]</span></a> There is only one explanation of this remarkable +incident: the interests of the Dutch party were different from those +of the British Government. The Cape Colony was only in name a British +colony. Under the guise of constitutional forms it had attained +independence—virtual, though not nominal. If Lord Milner had +contracted the habit of Biblical quotation from the Afrikander +leaders, he might well have quoted the words of the psalmist: "Many +bulls have compassed me; strong bulls of Bashan have beset me +round."<a id="footnotetag158" name="footnotetag158"></a><a href="#footnote158" title="Go to footnote 158"><span class="small">[158]</span></a> Even the approaches to Government House were watched by +spies in President Krüger's pay, who carefully noted all who came and +went. Members of the Uitlander community were the special subjects of +this system of espionage.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Spies round Government House.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I + called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by + private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail + through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred + Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret + agents in British territory <span class="pagenum"><a id="page274" name="page274"></a>(p. 274)</span> and spies round or in + Government House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that + those things should not deter those who wished to call on him, as + he was there as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit + of British subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for + himself the facts of the case."<a id="footnotetag159" name="footnotetag159"></a><a href="#footnote159" title="Go to footnote 159"><span class="small">[159]</span></a></p> + +<p>The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with +the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most +unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly, +and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal +Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their +plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it +was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the +justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the +republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that +England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really +earnest in pressing President Krüger to grant a "colourable" measure +of franchise reform—to use Mr. Merriman's adjective—it was for their +own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs +through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly +in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to +15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page275" name="page275"></a>(p. 275)</span> September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr. +Hofmeyr to Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a +fatal effect on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander +party." And when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come +in spite of all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted +itself, and he found consolation for his impotence in an expression of +his hatred against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed +to President Steyn:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies, + which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the + Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon + this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as + the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip] + Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand + would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krüger will do; + but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example. + Future generations of your and my people will praise you."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's "bitter feelings".</span> + +<p>And on the 15th:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "You have no conception of my bitter feelings, which can hardly + be surpassed by that of our and your people, but the stronger my + feelings the more I am determined to repress them, when + considering questions of policy affecting the future weal or woe + of our people. May the Supreme Being help you, me, and them. Have + not seen the High Commissioner for weeks."</p> + +<p>The reply of the republican nationalists, addressed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page276" name="page276"></a>(p. 276)</span> to Mr. +Hofmeyr and forwarded through President Steyn, contains a +characteristically distorted version of the course of the +negotiations. They have made concession after concession, but all in +vain. "However much we recognise and value your kind intentions," they +write, "we regret that it is no longer possible for us to comply with +the extravagant and brutal requests of the British Government." Thus +the Pretoria Executive declared themselves on September 15th, 1899, to +the Master of the Bond, when they were in the act of refusing Mr. +Chamberlain's offer to accept a five years' franchise bill, provided +it was shown by due inquiry to be a genuine measure of reform. Very +different was the account of the same transaction given by Mr. Smuts, +when, in urging the remnant of the burghers of both Republics to +surrender, he said, on May 30th, 1902, at Vereeniging, "I am one of +those who, as members of the Government of the South African Republic, +<span class="italic">provoked the war with England</span>". But the passage in this document +which is most useful to the historian is that in which the republican +nationalists remind the Afrikander leaders at the Cape of the +insincerity of their original "mediation." In dialectics Mr. Fischer, +Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Reitz are quite able to hold their own with Mr. +Hofmeyr, Dr. Te Water, and Mr. Schreiner. They have not forgotten the +Cape Prime Minister's precipitate benediction alike of President +Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the seven years' <span class="pagenum"><a id="page277" name="page277"></a>(p. 277)</span> +franchise of the Volksraad proposals. They remember also how the +"Hofmeyr compromise" was proclaimed in the Bond and the ministerial +press as affording conclusive evidence of the "sweet reasonableness" +of President Krüger and his Executive. And so they remark, "We are +sorry not to be able to follow your advice; but we point out that you +yourself let it be known that we had your whole approval, if we gave +the present franchise as we were doing."<a id="footnotetag160" name="footnotetag160"></a><a href="#footnote160" title="Go to footnote 160"><span class="small">[160]</span></a> Here we have the kernel +of the whole matter. A nine years', seven years', or a five years' +franchise was all one to the Cape Nationalists, provided only that +England was kept a little longer from claiming her position as +paramount Power in South Africa. For these men knew, or thought they +knew, that for England "a little longer" would be "too late."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner.</span> + +<p>It was a greater achievement to have frustrated so subtle a +combination, directed by the astute mind of Mr. Hofmeyr—the man who +refused to allow his passions to interfere with his policy—than to +have prevented the British Government from falling a victim to the +coarse duplicity of President Krüger. Tireless effort and consummate +statesmanship alone would not have accomplished this purpose. To these +qualities Lord Milner added a personal charm, elusive, and yet +irresistible; and it was this "union of intellect with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page278" name="page278"></a>(p. 278)</span> +fascination," of which Lord Rosebery had spoken,<a id="footnotetag161" name="footnotetag161"></a><a href="#footnote161" title="Go to footnote 161"><span class="small">[161]</span></a> that enabled him +to transcend the infinite difficulty of his official relationship to +Mr. Schreiner. Even so that relationship must have broken down under +the strain of the negotiations and the war, had not Mr. Schreiner's +complex political creed included the saving clause of allegiance to +his sovereign. When once the British troops had begun to land Mr. +Schreiner accepted the new situation. No longer merely the +parliamentary head of the Dutch party and the agent of the Bond, he +realised also his responsibility as a minister of the Crown. None the +less there were matters of the gravest concern in which, both before +and after the ultimatum, the Prime Minister used all the +constitutional means at his disposal to oppose Lord Milner. When, upon +the arrival (August 5th) of the small additions to the Cape garrison +ordered out in June, Lord Milner determined to draw the attention of +the Ministry to the exposed condition of the Colony, he found that the +Prime Minister's views differed completely from his own. A few days +later he addressed a minute to his ministers on the subject of the +defence of Kimberley and other military questions. From this time +onwards, in almost daily battles, Mr. Schreiner resisted the plans of +local military preparation which Lord Milner deemed necessary for the +protection of the Colony. His object, as he said, was to keep the Cape +Colony out of the struggle.<a id="footnotetag162" name="footnotetag162"></a><a href="#footnote162" title="Go to footnote 162"><span class="small">[162]</span></a> On Friday, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page279" name="page279"></a>(p. 279)</span> September 8th, +when in London the Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided to +send out the 10,000 troops to reinforce the South African garrison, at +Capetown Lord Milner was engaged in a long endeavour to persuade his +Prime Minister that it was necessary to do something for the defence +of Kimberley.<a id="footnotetag163" name="footnotetag163"></a><a href="#footnote163" title="Go to footnote 163"><span class="small">[163]</span></a> Up to the very day on which the Free State +commandos crossed the border, Mr. Schreiner relied upon the definite +pledge given him by President Steyn that the territory of the Cape +Colony would not be invaded; and not until that day was he undeceived.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Schreiner and Steyn.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I said to the President," he declared in the Cape Parliament a + year later,<a id="footnotetag164" name="footnotetag164"></a><a href="#footnote164" title="Go to footnote 164"><span class="small">[164]</span></a> "that I would not believe he would invade south + of the Orange River.<a id="footnotetag165" name="footnotetag165"></a><a href="#footnote165" title="Go to footnote 165"><span class="small">[165]</span></a> President Steyn's reply was, 'Can you + give me a guarantee that no troops will come to the border?' Of + course, I could give no such guarantee, and I did not then + believe that, although such a guarantee could not be given, the + Free State would invade British territory with the object of + endeavouring to promote the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page280" name="page280"></a>(p. 280)</span> establishment of one + Republic in South Africa, as the Prime Minister<a id="footnotetag166" name="footnotetag166"></a><a href="#footnote166" title="Go to footnote 166"><span class="small">[166]</span></a> has said."</p> + +<p>As the Boer invasion spread further into the Colony Mr. Schreiner +receded proportionately from his original standpoint of neutrality. +Indeed, three distinct phases in the Prime Minister's progress can be +distinguished. In the first stage, which lasted until the actual +invasion of the Colony by the Boer commandos, he used all his +constitutional power to prevent the people of the Colony, British and +Dutch alike, from being involved in the war: and it was only after a +severe struggle that Lord Milner prevailed upon him even to call out +the Kimberley Volunteers on October 2nd, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, a week before the +Ultimatum. This, "the neutrality" stage, lasted up to the invasion. +After the invasion came the second stage, in which Mr. Schreiner seems +to have argued to himself in this manner: "As the Boers have invaded +this colony, I, as Prime Minister, cannot refuse that the local forces +should be called out to protect its territory." And so on October +16th, after Vryburg had gone over to the Boers, after Kimberley had +been cut off, and the whole country from Kimberley to Orange River was +in the hands of the enemy, he consented to the issue of a proclamation +calling out 2,000 volunteers for garrison duty within the Colony.<a id="footnotetag167" name="footnotetag167"></a><a href="#footnote167" title="Go to footnote 167"><span class="small">[167]</span></a> +But in making this tardy concession he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page281" name="page281"></a>(p. 281)</span> was careful to point +out to Lord Milner that the British cause would lose more than it +would gain. "I warn you," he said in effect, "that it is not to your +advantage; because you are the weaker party. In the Cape Colony more +men will fight for the Boers than will fight for you." The third stage +in Mr. Schreiner's conversion was reached when, in November, 1899, the +invading Boers had advanced to the Tembuland border, in the extreme +east of the Colony. Then Mr. Schreiner allowed the natives to be +called out for the defence of their own territory. In making this +final concession the Prime Minister yielded to the logic of facts in a +matter concerning which he had previously offered a most stubborn +resistance to the Governor's arguments.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Schreiner and local forces.</span> + +<p>For in the discussion of the measures urged by Lord Milner as +necessary for the protection of the Colony, the question of arming the +natives and coloured people had necessarily arisen. The Bastards in +the west and the Tembus in the east were known to be eager to defend +the Queen's country against invasion. Mr. Schreiner declared that to +arm the natives was to do violence to the central principle upon which +the maintenance of civilisation in South Africa was based—the +principle that the black man must never be used to fight against the +white. Lord Milner did not question the validity <span class="pagenum"><a id="page282" name="page282"></a>(p. 282)</span> of this +principle; but he maintained—and rightly, as Mr. Schreiner admitted +subsequently by his action in the case of the Tembu frontier—that it +could not be applied to the case in question. "If white men," he said, +"will go and invade the territory of the blacks, then the blacks must +be armed to repel the invasion."</p> + +<p>The change which came over Mr. Schreiner's attitude, due, no doubt, +partly to his gradual enlightenment as to the real aims of the +republican nationalists, but also to the skilful use which Lord Milner +made of that enlightenment, may be traced in the following contrasts. +Before the Boer invasion he refused to call out the local forces of +the Colony even for purposes of defence;<a id="footnotetag168" name="footnotetag168"></a><a href="#footnote168" title="Go to footnote 168"><span class="small">[168]</span></a> afterwards he not only +sanctioned the employment of these forces in the Colony, but allowed +them to take part in Lord Roberts' advance upon Bloemfontein and +Pretoria. Before the invading Boers, having already possessed +themselves of the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony, began to +threaten the purely native territories to the south, he would not hear +of the natives being armed for their own protection. But when the +Boers had actually reached the borders of Tembuland he consented. In +his advice to the Cape Government, no less than in that which he gave +to the Home Government, Lord Milner was shown to be in the right. In +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page283" name="page283"></a>(p. 283)</span> both cases he urged an effective preparation for war. In +both the measures which he advised were ultimately taken; but taken +only when they had lost all their power as a means of promoting peace, +and half of their efficacy as a contribution to the rapid and +successful prosecution of the war. In both cases Lord Milner was able, +in the face of unparalleled obstacles, to secure just the minimum +preparation for war which stood between the British Empire and +overwhelming military disaster.</p> + +<p>We have observed the position in Great Britain, and found that the +root cause of the impotence of the Home Government was the nation's +ignorance of South Africa. In the Cape Colony the evil was of a +different order. Lord Milner, although High Commissioner for South +Africa, had within the Colony only the strictly limited powers of a +constitutional governor. The British population were keenly alive to +the necessity for active preparations for the defence of their +country; were, indeed, indignant at the refusal of the Schreiner +Cabinet to allow the local forces to be called out: but the Dutch +party was in office, the Bond was "loyal," Mr. Schreiner was a +minister of the Crown, and the most that the Governor could do was to +urge upon his ministers the measures upon the execution of which he +had no power to insist.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Seven years after.</span> + +<p>The best comment upon this strange situation is that which is afforded +by a passage in Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords on February +26th, 1906. Seven years have gone by, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page284" name="page284"></a>(p. 284)</span> the great +proconsul has returned to England. He is drawn from his much-needed +rest by a sudden danger to the country which he has kept a part of the +Empire. The Unionist Government has fallen, and a Liberal Government +has been placed in power. He is warning this Government of the danger +of a premature grant of responsible government to the Orange River +Colony.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "What is going to happen under responsible government? It is more + than probable, it is, humanly speaking, certain, that the persons + to whom I have referred will form a large majority, if not almost + the whole, of that first elected Parliament of the Orange River + Colony to which, from the first hour of its existence, the whole + legislative and executive power in that colony is to be + entrusted. I do not suggest that they will begin by doing + anything sinister. All forms will be duly observed; as why should + they not be? It will be perfectly possible for them, with the + most complete constitutional propriety, little by little to + reverse all that has been done, and gradually to get rid of the + British officials, the British teachers, the bulk of the British + settlers, and any offensive British taint which may cling to the + statute-book or the administration. I can quite understand that, + from the point of view of what are known as the pro-Boers, such a + result is eminently desirable. They thought the war was a crime, + the annexation a blunder, and they think to-day that the sooner + you can get back to the old state of things the better. I say I + quite understand that view, though I do not suppose it is shared + by His Majesty's ministers, or, at any rate, by all of them. What + I cannot understand is how any human being, not being a pro-Boer, + can regard with equanimity the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page285" name="page285"></a>(p. 285)</span> prospect that the very + hand which drafted the ultimatum of October, 1899,<a id="footnotetag169" name="footnotetag169"></a><a href="#footnote169" title="Go to footnote 169"><span class="small">[169]</span></a> may + within a year be drafting 'Ministers' Minutes' for submission to + a British Governor who will have virtually no option but to obey + them. What will be the contents of those minutes, I wonder? As + time goes on it may be a proposal for dispensing with English as + an official language, or a proposal for the distribution to every + country farmer of a military rifle and so many hundred + cartridges, in view of threatened danger from the Basutos."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">"Just reminiscences".</span> + +<p>So far Lord Milner had dealt with the Orange River Colony. Then he let +his thoughts range back to these months of his great ordeal.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"I think I can see the Governor just hesitating a little to put + his hand to such a document. In that case I think I can hear the + instant low growl of menace from Press and platform and pulpit, + the hints of the necessity of his recall, and the answering + scream from the pro-Boer Press of Britain against the ruthless + satrap, ignorant of constitutional usage and wholly + misunderstanding his own position, who dared to trample upon the + rights of a free people. I may be told, I know I shall be told, + that such notions are the wild imaginings of a disordered brain, + that these are theoretical possibilities having no relation to + fact or to probability. <span class="italic">My Lords, they are not imaginings. They + are just reminiscences.</span></p> + +<p>"I know what it is to be Governor of a self-governing colony, + with the disaffected element in the ascendant. I was bitterly + attacked for not being sufficiently submissive under the + circumstances. Yet, even with the least submissive Governor, the + position is so weak that strange things happen. It was under + responsible government, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page286" name="page286"></a>(p. 286)</span> and in the normal working of + responsible government, that 1,000,000 cartridges were passed + through Cape Colony, on the eve of the war, to arm the people who + were just going to attack us, and that some necessary cannon were + stopped from being sent to a defenceless border town,<a id="footnotetag170" name="footnotetag170"></a><a href="#footnote170" title="Go to footnote 170"><span class="small">[170]</span></a> which + directly afterwards was besieged, and which, from want of these + cannon, was nearly taken."<a id="footnotetag171" name="footnotetag171"></a><a href="#footnote171" title="Go to footnote 171"><span class="small">[171]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Thus, six and a half years later, Lord Milner spoke of these months of +<span class="italic">Sturm und Drang</span> in the calm and passionless atmosphere of the House +of Lords.</p> + +<p>From Bloemfontein to the ultimatum, the British flag in South Africa +was stayed upon the "inflexible resolution" of one man. Two months +later, when the army corps was all but landed, the English at the Cape +gave speech. Then Sir David Gill's words at the St. Andrew's Day +celebration of November 30th, 1890 came as a fresh breeze dispersing +the miasmic humours of some low-lying, ill-drained plain.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">What the loyalists thought.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"In the history of the British colonies," he said, "no Governor + has ever been placed in greater difficulties. In spite of a + support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of + a want of understanding at home, His Excellency has not only had + to originate and carry out a policy, but he has had to instruct + the whole nation in the dangers which threatened; and the means + which were necessary to remove that danger.</p> + +<p>"When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honeycombed + with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the + overthrow of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page287" name="page287"></a>(p. 287)</span> British supremacy in this colony, and not + only in this colony, but in South Africa as well.... There have + been a mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty + lot of mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all, + and a mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and + Scotchmen) in this country—first of all to bring them into + contempt with the native population; secondly, to deprive them of + all political power; and thirdly, to deprive them of all material + power.... We have a minister who has gone to the front,<a id="footnotetag172" name="footnotetag172"></a><a href="#footnote172" title="Go to footnote 172"><span class="small">[172]</span></a> but + it is a remarkable fact that since that minister has gone to the + front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels have + been tenfold greater than they were before he went. It is in the + face of these innumerable difficulties that Sir Alfred Milner has + carried out his work."</p> +</div> + +<p>This is how it struck a distinguished man of science, and one who was +qualified, moreover, by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page288" name="page288"></a>(p. 288)</span> a residence at the Cape which dated +back to the days of the Zulu War, to understand the full significance +of what was going on around him.</p> + +<p>In July and August, President Krüger was winning all along the line. +The Home Government was kept harmless and inactive by the Franchise +Bill; the Cape Government tied the hands of the High Commissioner; +supplies of arms and ammunition were pouring in, the temper of the +burghers in both republics was rising, foreign military officers and +M. Léon of the Creuzot Works had arrived; in short, the military +preparations of four years were consummated without let or hindrance. +September was less exclusively favourable to the republican cause. On +September 8th, as we have seen, the Salisbury Cabinet determined to +send out the defensive forces for which Lord Milner had asked three +months before. Sir William Butler had been recalled; and General +Forestier-Walker did all in his power to carry out the measures urged, +and in most cases actually devised, by Lord Milner for the effective +employment of the few thousand Imperial troops at his disposal. On the +18th and 19th the Lancashire regiment was sent up-country from +Capetown—half to garrison Kimberley, and half to hold the bridge that +carried the main trunk line over the Orange River on its way +northwards to Kimberley and then past the Transvaal border to +Rhodesia. In doing this, however, Lord Milner was careful to point out +to President Steyn that no menace <span class="pagenum"><a id="page289" name="page289"></a>(p. 289)</span> was intended to the Free +State, which, "in case of war with the Transvaal Her Majesty's +Government hoped would remain neutral, and the neutrality of which +would be most strictly respected." Such excellent use was made by Lord +Milner of the six weeks which elapsed between the recall of General +Butler and the ultimatum (October 9th-11th), that the handful of +regulars dotted down before the Free State border of the colony, and +skilfully distributed at strategic points upon the railways, sufficed +to keep President Steyn's commandos from penetrating south of the +Orange River, until the army corps had begun to disembark at the Cape +ports. On this, as on another occasion to be subsequently noted, it is +difficult to withhold a tribute of admiration to the gifted +personality of the man who, himself a civilian, could thus readily +apply his unique knowledge of South African conditions to the uses of +the art of war. At the same time, the promptitude and efficiency +displayed by the Indian military authorities provided Natal, by +October 8th, with a force that proved just—and only just—sufficient +to prevent the Boer commandos from sweeping right through that colony +down to Durban.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The negotiations closed.</span> + +<p>In the meantime the negotiations, having served their purpose, were +being brought rapidly to a conclusion by the Pretoria Executive. On +September 15th, as we have seen, the Republic notified its refusal to +accept the terms offered in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page290" name="page290"></a>(p. 290)</span> the British despatch of the 8th; +and before that date, as we have also noted, some of the Transvaal +commandos had been ordered to take up their positions on the Natal +border. On the 22nd a meeting of the Cabinet was held in London, at +which it was decided to mobilise the army corps—a measure advised by +Lord Wolseley in June. At the same time Lord Milner was instructed by +telegraph to communicate to the South African Republic a despatch<a id="footnotetag173" name="footnotetag173"></a><a href="#footnote173" title="Go to footnote 173"><span class="small">[173]</span></a> +in which the British Government "absolutely denied and repudiated" the +claim of the South African Republic to be a "sovereign international +state," and informed the Pretoria Executive that its refusal to +entertain the offer made on September 8th—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "coming as it did at the end of nearly four months of protracted + negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending + over a period of more than five years, made it useless to further + pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that Her + Majesty's Government were now compelled to consider the situation + afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final + settlement"</p> + +<p class="noindent">of the questions at issue. The result of these deliberations was to be +communicated to Lord Milner in a later despatch.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Burghers mobilised.</span> + +<p>This note of September 22nd, together with a second communication of +the same date, in which Mr. Chamberlain warmly repudiated the charges +of bad faith brought against Sir William Greene, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page291" name="page291"></a>(p. 291)</span> reached the +Pretoria Executive on the 25th, and on the same day it was known that +a British force had entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe. On the 26th +intelligence of so serious a nature reached Lord Milner, that he +telegraphed to warn the Home Government that the Transvaal and Free +State were likely to take the initiative. According to Mr. Amery,<a id="footnotetag174" name="footnotetag174"></a><a href="#footnote174" title="Go to footnote 174"><span class="small">[174]</span></a> +an ultimatum had been drafted upon receipt of the British note, and +telegraphed on the following day to President Steyn for his approval. +At Bloemfontein, however, the document was entirely recast by Mr. +Fischer. Even so, in its amended form, it was ready on the 27th. On +that day the Free State Raad, after six days of secret session, +determined to join the sister Republic in declaring war upon Great +Britain, and on the 28th the Transvaal commandos were mobilised. The +ultimatum, according to the same authority, would have been delivered +to Sir William Greene on Monday, October 2nd, had not deficiencies in +the Boer transport and commissariat arrangements made it impossible +for the burgher forces to advance immediately upon the British troops +in Natal. At the last moment, also, President Steyn seems to have had +some misgivings. On September 26th, together with the draft ultimatum +from Pretoria, a suggestive telegram from Capetown, signed "Micaiah," +and bidding him "Read chapter xxii. 1st Book of Kings, and accept +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page292" name="page292"></a>(p. 292)</span> warning," had reached him;<a id="footnotetag175" name="footnotetag175"></a><a href="#footnote175" title="Go to footnote 175"><span class="small">[175]</span></a> and a few days later he +received, through Mr. Fischer, a powerful appeal for peace from Sir +Henry de Villiers.</p> + +<p>However this may be, the few administrative acts that remained to be +taken were quickly accomplished in both Republics. In the Transvaal +the remnant of the British population was already in flight; the law +courts were suspended; the control of the railways was assumed by the +Government and, in order to protect colonial recruits from the legal +penalties attached to rebellion, on September 29th the Executive was +empowered by the Volksraad to confer citizen rights on all aliens +serving in the forces of the Republic. Not content with their +barbarous expulsion of the British population, the Governments of both +Republics for a week before the expiry of the ultimatum treated those +of them who still remained as though a state of war had already been +in existence. During these last days telegrams and letters praying for +protection against some act of violence or spoliation were constantly +arriving at Government House. But what could the High Commissioner do? +The Army Corps was 6,000 miles away; the 10,000 defensive troops were +most of them still on the water. The Free State, in Mr. Fischer's +words, "did not recognise international law, and claimed to commandeer +all persons whatsoever" under its own. In the Transvaal, Mr. Reitz +(after consultation with Mr. Smuts) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page293" name="page293"></a>(p. 293)</span> was coolly replying to +the British Agent's protest against the seizure of the property of +British subjects, including £150,000 worth of bar gold, that "the +property of private individuals of whatever nationality could be, and +was being, commandeered to the value of £15 a head."<a id="footnotetag176" name="footnotetag176"></a><a href="#footnote176" title="Go to footnote 176"><span class="small">[176]</span></a> On October +2nd the Transvaal Raads adjourned, and on the same day President Steyn +informed the High Commissioner that the Free State burghers had been +summoned for commando service. An interchange of telegrams then +ensued, of which one, despatched on October 6th, is important as +showing how earnestly Lord Milner seconded Mr. Chamberlain's endeavour +to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement up to the last moment.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Last words.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I have the honour," he said, "to acknowledge Your Honour's long + telegram of yesterday afternoon [the 5th], the substance of which + I have communicated to Her Majesty's Government. There is, I + think, a conclusive reply to Your Honour's accusation against the + policy of Her Majesty's Government, but no good purpose would be + served by recrimination. The present position is that burgher + forces are assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity + to the frontiers of Natal, while the British troops occupy + certain defensive positions well within those borders. The + question is whether the burgher forces will invade British + territory, thus closing the door to any possibility of a pacific + solution. I cannot believe that the South African Republic will + take such aggressive action, or that Your Honour would + countenance such a course, which there is nothing to justify. + Prolonged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page294" name="page294"></a>(p. 294)</span> negotiations have hitherto failed to bring + about a satisfactory understanding, and no doubt such + understanding is more difficult than ever to-day, after the + expulsion of British subjects with great loss and suffering; but + until the threatened act of aggression is committed I shall not + despair of peace, and I feel sure that any reasonable proposal, + from whatever quarter proceeding, would be favourably considered + by Her Majesty's Government if it offered an immediate + termination of present tension and a prospect of permanent + tranquillity."<a id="footnotetag177" name="footnotetag177"></a><a href="#footnote177" title="Go to footnote 177"><span class="small">[177]</span></a></p> + +<p>With this—practically the final communication of the British +Government—it is instructive to compare the "last words" of the two +other protagonists. The Pretoria Executive, true to its policy of +playing for time, sends through Mr. Reitz two long and argumentative +replies to the British despatches of July 27th (the Joint Commission), +and May 10th (Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the petition to the Queen). +The Afrikander nationalists having failed to "mediate" in Pretoria and +Bloemfontein, consoled themselves with a final effort in the shape of +a direct appeal to the Queen. In a petition signed by the fifty-eight +Afrikander members of both Houses of the Cape Parliament, including, +of course, the members of the Schreiner Cabinet, they declare their +earnest belief that the South African Republic "is fully awakened to +the wisdom and discretion of making liberal provision for the +representation of the Uitlanders," and urge Her Majesty's Government +to appoint a Joint Commission—a proposal to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page295" name="page295"></a>(p. 295)</span> which the +British Government had declared that it was impossible to return. The +effect of this somewhat half-hearted effort was, however, on this +occasion appreciably diminished by the fact that the nationalist +petition was accompanied by a resolution presented by fifty-three +Progressive members of the Cape Parliament, embodying their entire +disapproval of the opinion put forward by the petitioners, and +containing the assurance that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon +their strongest support.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The ultimatum delivered.</span> + +<p>The ultimatum was delivered to Sir William Greene on the afternoon of +Monday, October 9th, and forthwith telegraphed to the High +Commissioner at Capetown. Although it was a week behind time at +Pretoria, its arrival was somewhat unexpected at Government House. +Saturday and Sunday had been days of quite unusual calm. The +Secretary, whose business it was to decode the official telegrams, +commenced his task with but languid interest. He had decoded so many +apparently unnecessary and inconclusive despatches of late. At first +this seemed very much like the others. But, as he worked on, he came +upon words that startled him to a sudden attention:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"This Government ... in the interest not only of this Republic, + but also of all South Africa,... feels itself called upon and + obliged ... to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the + assurance:</p> + +<p>"(<span class="italic">a</span>) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by + the friendly course of arbitration, or <span class="pagenum"><a id="page296" name="page296"></a>(p. 296)</span> by whatever + amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her + Majesty's Government.</p> + +<p>"(<span class="italic">b</span>) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be + instantly withdrawn.</p> + +<p>"(<span class="italic">c</span>) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in + South Africa since June 1st, 1899, shall be removed from South + Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this + Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee upon the + part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities + against any portion of the possessions of the British Government + shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within + a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the + Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, + be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from + the borders.</p> + +<p>"(<span class="italic">d</span>) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas + shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.</p> + +<p>"This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative + answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her + Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon + Wednesday, October 11th, 1899, not later than five o'clock p.m., + and it desires further to add that, in the event of unexpectedly + no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval, + it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of + Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will + not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and + that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place + within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our + borders, the Government will be compelled to regard that also as + a formal declaration of war.</p> + +<p> + "I have, etc.,</p> +<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">F. W. Reitz</span>, <span class="italic">State Secretary</span>."<a id="footnotetag178" name="footnotetag178"></a><a href="#footnote178" title="Go to footnote 178"><span class="small">[178]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page297" name="page297"></a>(p. 297)</span> +<span class="sidenote">An appeal to Afrikanders.</span> + +<p>The war had come; and come in the almost incredible form of a naked +assertion of the intention of the South African Republic to oust Great +Britain from its position of paramount Power in South Africa. And the +declaration of war,<a id="footnotetag179" name="footnotetag179"></a><a href="#footnote179" title="Go to footnote 179"><span class="small">[179]</span></a> published two days later by President Steyn, +was no less definite. It referred to Great Britain's "unfounded claim +to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this +State," and exhorted the burghers of the Free State to "stand up as +one man against the oppressor and violator of right." Even greater +frankness characterised the appeal to "Free Staters and Brother +Afrikanders" issued by Mr. Reitz. In this document<a id="footnotetag180" name="footnotetag180"></a><a href="#footnote180" title="Go to footnote 180"><span class="small">[180]</span></a> not only was +the entire Dutch population of South Africa invited to rid themselves, +by force of arms, of British supremacy, but the statement of the Boer +case took the form of an impeachment that covered the whole period of +British administration. Great Britain—</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"has, ever since the birth of our nation, been the oppressor of + the Afrikander and the native alike.</p> + +<p>"From Slagter's Nek to Laing's Nek, from the Pretoria Convention + to the Bloemfontein Conference—they have ever been the + treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and + the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they + want the gold-fields of the Witwatersrand.</p> + +<p>"Where is Waterboer to-day? He who had to be defended against the + Free State is to-day without <span class="pagenum"><a id="page298" name="page298"></a>(p. 298)</span> an inch of ground. Where + lies Lobengula in his unknown grave to-day, and what fillibusters + and fortune-hunters are possessors of his country?</p> + +<p>"Where are the native chiefs of Bechuanaland now, and who owns + their land?</p> + +<p>"Read the history of South Africa, and ask yourselves: Has the + British Government been a blessing or a curse to this + sub-continent?</p> + +<p>"Brother Afrikanders! I repeat, the day is at hand on which great + deeds are expected of us. WAR has broken out. What is it to be? A + wasted and enslaved South Africa, or—a Free, United South + Africa?</p> + +<p>"Come, let us stand shoulder to shoulder and do our holy duty! + The Lord of Hosts will be our Leader.</p> + +<p>"Be of good cheer.</p> +<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">F. W. Reitz.</span>"</p> +</div> + +<p>That Monday night, besides repeating the ultimatum to the Home +Government, Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the British authorities in +Natal, Rhodesia, Basutoland, and the frontier towns.</p> + +<p>The ultimatum reached the Colonial Office at 6.45 a.m. on Tuesday. The +reply, which was cabled to Lord Milner at 10.45 p.m. on the same day, +was not unworthy of the occasion:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The British reply.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the + peremptory demands of the Government of the South African + Republic. You will inform the Government of the South African + Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the South + African Republic are such as Her <span class="pagenum"><a id="page299" name="page299"></a>(p. 299)</span> Majesty's Government + deem it impossible to discuss."<a id="footnotetag181" name="footnotetag181"></a><a href="#footnote181" title="Go to footnote 181"><span class="small">[181]</span></a></p> + +<p>The High Commissioner was further desired to instruct Sir William +Greene, in delivering the British reply, to ask for his passports.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page300" name="page300"></a>(p. 300)</span> CHAPTER VII</h3> + +<p class="title">THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS</p> + + +<p>With the presentation of the Boer ultimatum the first and most +difficult part of Lord Milner's task was accomplished. The actual +pretensions of President Krüger and his republican confederates in the +Free State and the Cape Colony were declared in a manner that could +not fail to make them understood by the British people at home. The +nationalists were unmasked. To what assurance of victory their +military preparations had led them may be seen from the story of Mr. +Amery's meeting with Mr. Reitz, two days before October 2nd, the +Monday originally fixed for the delivery of the ultimatum. On the +afternoon of this day, September 30th, Mr. Amery was walking with the +State Secretary in Pretoria. Mr. Reitz, he tells us,<a id="footnotetag182" name="footnotetag182"></a><a href="#footnote182" title="Go to footnote 182"><span class="small">[182]</span></a> "suddenly +turned round and said, 'Have you read <span class="italic">Treasure Island</span>? 'Yes.' 'Then +you may remember the passage where they "tip the black spot" to Long +John Silver?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I expect it will fall to my lot on Monday +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page301" name="page301"></a>(p. 301)</span> to "tip the black spot" to Long John Greene.' And hereupon +the State Secretary cheerily detailed to his astounded listener the +terms of the ultimatum, compliance with which might yet save the +British Empire from war."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Effect of the ultimatum.</span> + +<p>Very different was the position at Capetown. Here there was no room +either for levity or the insolence of anticipated triumph. Knowing +what Lord Milner did—what he, of all men, had most cause to +know—both of our unreadiness, and of the preparedness and confidence +of the enemy, he could scarcely have looked forward to the future +without the very gravest apprehension. None the less the ultimatum +brought with it a certain sense of relief. The negotiations, which had +degenerated long since into a diplomatic farce, were terminated. The +situation had become once more clear. It has been the duty of few men +to bear so heavy and so prolonged a burden of responsibility as that +from which Lord Milner was thus set free. The danger that the Home +Government, in its earnest desire for peace, might accept a settlement +that would leave undecided the central issue of Boer or British +supremacy in South Africa had never been wholly absent from his mind +during the harassing negotiations that succeeded the Conference. Up to +the very end there had been a haunting dread lest, in spite of his +ceaseless vigilance and unstinted toil, a manifestation of British +loyalty that would never be repeated should be coldly discouraged, and +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page302" name="page302"></a>(p. 302)</span> the nationalist movement allowed to proceed unchecked, until +every colonist of British blood had surrendered the hope of remaining +a citizen of the Empire for the degrading necessity of securing for +himself and his children a tolerable position in the United States of +South Africa by a timely alliance with the more progressive Dutch. +From the presence of this danger Lord Milner was now relieved, since, +as he instantly foresaw, the whip-lash of this frank appeal to force +brought conviction where marshalled arguments were powerless to move. +He had done what the religious enthusiasm of Livingstone, the +political sagacity of Grey, the splendid devotion and prescience of +Frere, and the Elizabethan statecraft of Rhodes, had failed to do. <span class="italic">He +had made the Boer speak out.</span></p> + +<p>England was far from knowing all that these Boer aspirations meant, or +the progress already achieved in the direction of their realisation. +But this ignorance made the demands of the ultimatum seem the more +insolent. To Mr. Balfour it was as though President Krüger had gone +mad. But madness or insolence, the effect was the same. With the mass +of the nation all hesitation, all balancing of arguments, were at an +end. The one thing that was perceived was that any further attempt to +treat with a people so minded would be an admission to the world that +British supremacy had disappeared from South Africa. On this point, +outside the narrow influence of a few professional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page303" name="page303"></a>(p. 303)</span> partisans +and peace-makers, there had never been any doubt: the only question +was whether British supremacy was, or was not, in danger. The Boer +challenge having resolved this question, the mind of the nation was +made up. The army, as the instrument of its will, was called upon to +give effect to its decision.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">An anxious situation.</span> + +<p>Two years and eight months elapsed between the expiration of the two +days' grace allowed by the ultimatum and the surrender of Vereeniging. +During the first twelve months of this period Lord Milner's +initiative, though his position remained arduous, anxious, and +responsible, and his activity unceasing, was necessarily subordinated +to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South +Africa. But during the second period of the war—that is to say, from +November 29th, 1900, when Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts—the +constructive statesmanship of the High Commissioner was called forth +in an increasing degree as the area secured for peaceable occupation +became widened, and the problems involved in the settlement and future +administration of the new colonies emerged into increasing prominence +and importance. But even during the first period, when the task of the +army was the comparatively simple one of overcoming the organised +resistance of the Republics and subduing the rebellion in the Cape +Colony, Lord Milner's unshaken confidence and perfect mastery of South +African conditions proved of inestimable value.</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page304" name="page304"></a>(p. 304)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Results and unpreparedness.</span> + +<p>Five years later he described himself as an "incorrigible optimist." +Optimist or not, at this time he harboured no illusions. He knew that +the postponement or neglect of military preparations had left +thousands of loyal subjects of the Crown in a position of entire +defencelessness, and made rebellion easy for thousands of the +disaffected Dutch. The first days of war, like the last days of peace, +were punctuated by appeals for the troops that should have been in +South Africa, but were in England; or for guns, rifles, and ammunition +which Mr. Schreiner had kept idle in the colonial armouries until it +was too late. On Friday, October 13th, he held a long and anxious +consultation over the wires with Colonel Kekewich at Kimberley. A +thousand rifles were wanted, and wanted instantly. The Cape Artillery +15-pounders, reluctantly conceded at the last moment by Mr. Schreiner, +had not come. They never came, for the next day Kimberley was cut off, +and by Sunday morning Capetown had lost count of the border districts +from Kimberley southward to Orange River. On this Friday the first +definite piece of bad news reached the High Commissioner. An armoured +train, trying to run back to Mafeking, had been captured by the Boers. +In proportion as Lord Milner had urged the need of preparation for +war, so now he was the first to realise how grave would be the results +of unpreparedness. Fortunately, his comments upon the events of these +first three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page305" name="page305"></a>(p. 305)</span> months of the war have been preserved; and the +record of what was passing in his mind from day to day reveals a +burden of anxiety that contrasts sharply with the easy tolerance with +which the first bad news was received in England. On Wednesday, the +18th, a week after the ultimatum had expired, he wrote of Natal: "We +are being slowly surrounded, and our force unwisely split up." He was +gravely concerned for the safety of Kimberley, and he "doubted the +ability of Mafeking to hold out." On November 1st, the day after +General Buller had landed at Capetown, he wrote: "Things are going +from bad to worse to-day. In Natal the Orange Free State Boers are +making a move on Colenso, while in the Colony they have crossed in +force at Bethulie; and there is also some suspicion of an attack on +the line between Orange River bridge and De Aar." On November 9th, the +arrival of the <span class="italic">Rosslyn Castle</span>, the first of the Army Corps +transports, brought a gleam of brightness. She was a little late, as +she had been warned to go out of her course after leaving Las Palmas, +to avoid a suspicious vessel. But Methuen's first engagements seemed +to him to be Pyrrhic victories. It was "the old story of charging +positions from which the enemy simply clears, after having shot a lot +of our men." On December 5th "alarming rumours came pouring in from +all over the Colony," and two days later Lord Milner telegraphed to +warn the Secretary of State that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page306" name="page306"></a>(p. 306)</span> war was now aggravated +by rebellion. On Saturday, December 16th, the day after Colenso, he +wrote: "This has been a week of disasters, to-day being the worst of +all. News was received this morning that Buller had been severely +defeated yesterday in attempting to force the passage of the Tugela."</p> + +<p>It was a time when he was receiving the panic outcry for the immediate +relief of Kimberley, in which Rhodes vented his rage at the military +impotence to which for the moment England had allowed herself to be +reduced in South Africa; when his councils with his ministers were +"gloomy functions," and his Prime Minister's arguments against the +measures which he deemed necessary for the defence of the Colony and +the protection of the native territories had become not merely +wearisome but embittered. His main resource lay in his intense +activity. It was his custom, during this critical period, to begin the +day by seeing Mr. Eliot and Mr. Price, the heads of the railways, and +Mr. French, the Postmaster-General. In this way he received +information of every movement of any significance that had occurred +within the range of the railway and post-office systems during the +preceding twenty-four hours—information which was of the highest +utility both to him and to the military authorities. Then followed an +endless succession of visitors, from the Prime Minister to the most +recent newspaper correspondent out from home, and a long afternoon +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page307" name="page307"></a>(p. 307)</span> and evening of concentrated and unbroken labour upon +despatches, proclamations, minutes, and other official documents. A +short ride or walk was sometimes interpolated, but his days were a +dead round of continuous occupation. "One day is so like +another—crowded with work; all hateful, but with no very special +feature," he wrote. But of another he says: "Worked very hard all day; +the usual interviews. It was very difficult to take one's mind off the +absorbing subject of the ill success of our military operations."</p> + +<p>Mr. Balfour called the insolence of the ultimatum "madness." But Lord +Milner knew that it was no madness, but an assured belief in victory; +a confidence founded upon long years of earnest preparation for war; +upon the blood-ties of the most tenacious of European peoples; upon a +Nature that spread her wings over the rough children of the veld and +menaced their enemies with the heat and glamour of her sun, with +famine and drought and weariness, with all the hidden dangers that +lurked in her glittering plains and rock-strewn uplands.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Aspects of the war.</span> + +<p>It is not proposed to give any detailed account of the military +operations which led, first, to the annexation of the Boer Republics, +and then to the actual disarmament of the entire Dutch population of +South Africa. The most that the plan of this work permits of is to +present the broad outlines of the war in such a manner that the +several <span class="pagenum"><a id="page308" name="page308"></a>(p. 308)</span> phases of the military conflict may be seen in true +perspective, and the relationship between them and the administrative +efforts of Lord Milner be correctly indicated. But it will not be +found inconsistent with this restricted treatment to refer to certain +conspicuous features of the war upon which contemporary discussion has +chiefly centred, and in respect of which opinions have been pronounced +that do not seem likely to harmonise in all cases with the results of +a more mature judgment and a less interested inquiry.</p> + +<p>The test by which the success or failure of any given military effort +is to be measured is, of course, the test of results. But the +application of this test must not be embarrassed by the assumption, +which seems to have vitiated so much otherwise admirable criticism on +the conduct of the war in South Africa, that every action in which a +properly equipped and wisely directed force is engaged must +necessarily be successful: or that, if it be not successful, it +follows, as a matter of course, that the officer in command, or one of +his subordinates, must have committed some open and ascertainable +violation of the principles of military science. So far is this from +being the case, that military history is full of examples in which the +highest merit and resolution of a commander have been nullified or +cheated by the wanton interferences of physical nature, or by acts on +the part of subordinates admittedly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page309" name="page309"></a>(p. 309)</span> beyond the control of +any human skill or foresight.<a id="footnotetag183" name="footnotetag183"></a><a href="#footnote183" title="Go to footnote 183"><span class="small">[183]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Delay of operations.</span> + +<p>Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must +be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the +military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice +given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the +Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already<a id="footnotetag184" name="footnotetag184"></a><a href="#footnote184" title="Go to footnote 184"><span class="small">[184]</span></a> the grave inadequacy +of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa +between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of +General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of +4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with +24 field-guns in all.<a id="footnotetag185" name="footnotetag185"></a><a href="#footnote185" title="Go to footnote 185"><span class="small">[185]</span></a> On August 2nd the Government decided to +send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was +warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for +service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent +representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no +considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until +the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the +definite failure of the negotiations <span class="pagenum"><a id="page310" name="page310"></a>(p. 310)</span> initiated by Sir +William Greene through Mr. Smuts.</p> + +<p>Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September +8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the +remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons.</p> + +<p>Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104 +British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and +14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.<a id="footnotetag186" name="footnotetag186"></a><a href="#footnote186" title="Go to footnote 186"><span class="small">[186]</span></a> But the Army Corps, the +"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its +determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be +represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British +Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of +the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the +Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to +"formulate its own proposals" was communicated to the Transvaal +Government.<a id="footnotetag187" name="footnotetag187"></a><a href="#footnote187" title="Go to footnote 187"><span class="small">[187]</span></a> It was then calculated that three months must elapse +before this force could be equipped, transported, and placed in the +field in South Africa.</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page311" name="page311"></a>(p. 311)</span> +<span class="sidenote">No political gain.</span> + +<p>Before recording the disastrous effects of the postponement of +effective military preparations, from June to September, it remains to +consider whether any political gains, sufficient to compensate for the +loss of military strength, were secured. The policy of relying upon +Afrikander advice failed; since, as we have seen, the admonitions of +Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr. Hofmeyr came too late to turn President +Krüger from an obduracy founded upon long years of military +preparation. The over-sea British had made up their minds in June; and +nothing occurred in the subsequent negotiations to deepen their +conviction of the essential justice of the British cause. India was +unmoved; indeed, the Hindu masses were slightly sympathetic, while the +feudatory princes came forward with offers of men and treasure to the +Government of the Queen-Empress. The attitude of the respective +governments of France, Germany, and Russia was correct. But what +secured this result was not any perception of the moderation of the +British demands, or any recognition of the genuine reluctance of the +British Government to make war, but the sight of the British Navy +everywhere holding the seas, the rapidity and ease with which large +bodies of troops were transported from every quarter of the British +world, and the manner in which each reverse was met by a display of +new and unexpected reserves of military strength.</p> + +<p>If the British Government thought that it would win the peoples of +Continental Europe to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page312" name="page312"></a>(p. 312)</span> its side by a show of hesitation to +make war upon a weak state, the sequel proved that it had gravely +misunderstood the conditions under which international respect is +produced. Hatred of England rose in inverse ratio to the evidence of +the justness of her cause. When the Boers were victorious, or seemed +to be most capable of defying the efforts of the largest fighting +force that Great Britain had ever put into the field; when, that is to +say, it was most clearly demonstrated that British supremacy in South +Africa could only have been maintained by force of arms against the +formidable rival which had risen against it, then the wave of popular +hatred surged highest. When the British arms prospered, the clamour +sank; but only to rise again until it was finally allayed by the +knowledge that the Boer resistance was at an end, and that the British +Empire had emerged from the conflict a stronger and more united power.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the United States.</span> + +<p>The case of the United States was somewhat different. Here was an +industrial nation like our own; and one, moreover, whose people were +qualified alike by constitutional and legal tradition, habits of +thought, and identity of language, to have discerned the reality of +the reluctance displayed by the British Government to employ force +until every resource of diplomacy and every device of statecraft had +been exhausted, and to have drawn the conclusion that the power which +drove the Government into war was a sense of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page313" name="page313"></a>(p. 313)</span> duty, and not +greed of territory. Moreover, there was at this time, at any rate +among the more cultivated classes, a feeling of gratitude for the +action of Great Britain in preventing European intervention during the +Spanish-American war, and a genuine desire, on that ground alone, to +show sympathy with the English people in the conflict in which they +had become involved. In these circumstances it is somewhat strange +that public opinion in the United States was unmistakably inclined to +favour the Boers during almost the entire period of the war. It is +perfectly true that the United States Government was consistently +friendly; but this did not alter the fact that the dominant note in +nearly all public expressions of the sentiment of the United States' +people was one of sympathy with the Boer, and of hostility to the +British cause. It might have been thought that, just as most +Englishmen, in the case of the conflict between the United States and +Spain, were prepared to assume that a nation imbued with the +traditions and principles of the Anglo-Saxon race would not have +undertaken to enforce its will upon a weak Power without having +convinced itself first of the justice of its cause, so the Americans +would have entertained an equally favourable presumption in respect of +the people of Great Britain. That this was not done is due to a cause +which is as significant as it is well ascertained. Making all +allowance for the prejudice against England inevitably <span class="pagenum"><a id="page314" name="page314"></a>(p. 314)</span> +aroused in the minds of the less thoughtful members of a great +democratic community, by the fact that her opponent was both a weak +state and a republic, this very general refusal to accept the +political morality of the English people as a guarantee of the justice +of their action in South Africa suggests the presence of another and +more specific influence. The explanation given by Americans is that +the English nation was itself divided upon the question of the +morality of the South African War—or, at any rate, that the public +utterances that reached the United States were such as to convey this +impression. That being so, they ask, Can you blame us for hesitating +to adopt what was at the most, as we understood it, the opinion of a +majority? In support of this view they point to the public utterances, +before and after the war had broken out, of Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, and Mr. Bryce. Of these, the +former was the official head of the Liberal Party, while the two +latter were men whose literary achievements had made their names and +personalities both familiar and respected in the United States. If the +opinions of these public men were on this occasion wholly +unrepresentative, why, they ask, were their speeches and articles +unrefuted; or, at any rate, allowed to go forth to the world +uncondemned by any clear and authoritative manifestation of the +dissent and displeasure of their countrymen?</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page315" name="page315"></a>(p. 315)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Injurious declarations.</span> + +<p>That declarations such as these did in fact produce injurious effects +directly calculable in human lives, in money, and in the waste and +devastation of war, is a fact which will claim the attention of the +reader on a subsequent occasion. They came not merely from the mouths +of the Irish Nationalists, and of advanced Radicals such as Mr. +Lloyd-George and Mr. John Burns, but from men of wider repute. That +public opinion should have allowed responsible Englishmen in time of +war to "speak and write as though they belonged to the +enemy,"—whether due to an exaggerated regard for our traditional +freedom of speech, or to a failure to recognise that the altered +conditions produced by the extension and perfection of telegraphic +communication, and the development of the Press throughout the +civilised world, gave such utterances a value in international +relations altogether different from that possessed (say) by similar +utterances on the part of the anti-nationalists during the Napoleonic +wars—is a circumstance that merits the most serious consideration. No +one will deny that this unpatriotic form of opposition, so long as it +exists, constitutes an ever-recurring danger to the most vital +interests of the community. The ultimate remedy lies in the creation +of a representative council of the Empire, and the consequent +separation of questions of inter-imperial and foreign policy from the +local and irrelevant issues of party politics. Until this is done, it +remains <span class="pagenum"><a id="page316" name="page316"></a>(p. 316)</span> to establish a mutual understanding under which such +questions would be recognised as being outside the sphere of party +recrimination; and for this purpose it is necessary to create a force +of public opinion strong enough to compel the observance of this +understanding; or, failing this, to visit its non-observance with +political penalties commensurate to the injury inflicted.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Army Corps absorbed.</span> + +<p>The conflict which followed the expiration of the forty-eight hours +allowed by the Boer ultimatum is in more than one respect the most +extraordinary in the annals of war. The existence of the cable and +telegraph made instant and continuous communication possible between +the army in the field and the nation at home. Public opinion, informed +by the daily records furnished by the Press, became a factor in +determining the conduct of the war. Nor is it strange that a civilian +population, separated by 6,000 miles from the theatre of operations, +should have proved an injurious counsellor. The army was ordered to +conquer a people, but forbidden to employ the methods by which alone +it has been hitherto held that conquest is attainable. But no +influence exercised upon the course of the war by false +humanitarianism or political partisanship produced any results +comparable to the original injury inflicted upon the British Army by +the ignorance and irresolution displayed by the nation. The +postponement of effective military preparations by the Home Government +until the necessity <span class="pagenum"><a id="page317" name="page317"></a>(p. 317)</span> for these preparations had become so +plain that no effort of the Opposition could embarrass its action, was +the <span class="italic">fons et origo</span> of all subsequent disaster. The failure to +mobilise the Army Corps in June had placed the Army in a position of +disadvantage at the outbreak of the war, from which it never wholly +recovered. The original striking force—the Army Corps—was not +employed in its proper function, but absorbed, upon its arrival in +South Africa, in the task of supporting the defensive forces. +Twenty-two thousand men, with an Army Corps advancing upon +Bloemfontein or Pretoria, would have sufficed to repel attacks upon +the colonial frontiers, and to check rebellion in the Cape Colony. But +twenty-two thousand men defending one thousand miles of frontier from +a mobile force nearly twice as numerous with the Army Corps six +thousand miles away in England, was a very different thing. Yet this +was the situation in which the nation, by withholding from the +Government the support necessary to enable it to give effect to the +advice of Lord Wolseley, had elected to place the British Army. The +plan of mobilisation, long prepared and complete in all particulars, +worked with perfect success. Twenty Companies of the Army Service +Corps sailed on October 6th, a day before the actual mobilisation +order was issued. The rest of the offensive force—one Cavalry +Division, one Army Corps, and eight battalions of lines of +communication troops—began to be embarked on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page318" name="page318"></a>(p. 318)</span> October 20th, +and by November 17th the long succession of transports, bearing the +whole of the men, horses, and guns of which it was composed (with the +exception of one cavalry regiment detained by horse sickness), had +sailed for South Africa. This was Lord Wolseley's task, and it was +promptly and efficiently performed. The War Office was not +inefficient; but the refusal to mobilise in June had thrown the whole +scheme of the offensive and defensive campaign out of gear.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">General Buller.</span> + +<p>With the evidence of the War Commission before us, it is impossible to +divest General Buller of a share of responsibility for the disastrous +conditions under which the war was commenced. He was nominated to the +South African command in June, and he was consulted upon the strength +and composition of the force which was to be employed. On July 7th +Lord Wolseley asked the Government, apart from the immediate +mobilisation of the Army Corps which he still urged, to "consider +whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division +and one Cavalry Brigade—say 10,000 men—to South Africa," adding that +he had "no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our +military position." But ten days later the despatch of this +reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since, +according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting +held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General <span class="pagenum"><a id="page319" name="page319"></a>(p. 319)</span> Buller +used the weight of his authority to support General Butler's +opposition to Lord Milner's urgent request for immediate +reinforcements. In reply to a question as to the desirability of +strengthening the South African garrisons, he said on this occasion, +that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought, + and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot + did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out + any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our + position against any possible attack by the Boers on our + frontiers."</p> + +<p>This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words," +but the "exact meaning" of what he said.<a id="footnotetag188" name="footnotetag188"></a><a href="#footnote188" title="Go to footnote 188"><span class="small">[188]</span></a> It was the precise +opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home +Government.<a id="footnotetag189" name="footnotetag189"></a><a href="#footnote189" title="Go to footnote 189"><span class="small">[189]</span></a> Indeed the degree in which General Buller had +misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at +once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South +Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite +British army, which was to engage a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page320" name="page320"></a>(p. 320)</span> definite Boer army. When +he had learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually +was, he is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark: +"It seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa." +General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his +fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only +in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at +once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible +to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony. +Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added +that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to +say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the +most emphatic terms.<a id="footnotetag190" name="footnotetag190"></a><a href="#footnote190" title="Go to footnote 190"><span class="small">[190]</span></a></p> + +<p>The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to +hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In +the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect, +the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the +day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the +whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by +Joubert. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page321" name="page321"></a>(p. 321)</span> When at length the last units of the Army Corps +were landed (December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg, +organising a force for the relief of White; and practically the entire +offensive force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces, +or save them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army +Corps in Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men +for the relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to +strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the +railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and +checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony. +Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at +Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso +(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that, +however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely +defensive <span class="italic">rôle</span> must for the time be assigned to the troops then in +South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the +arrival of very considerable reinforcements.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">New striking force necessary.</span> + +<p>The perception of this fact caused the Government to appoint (December +17th) Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff, to the +South African command, and to prepare and despatch an entirely new +striking force. It was this new force and not the original Army Corps +that "marched to Pretoria," and struck the successive blows which +enabled Lord Roberts to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page322" name="page322"></a>(p. 322)</span> report to the Secretary of State for +War (November 15th, 1900) that; "with the occupation of Komati Poort, +and the dispersal of Commandant-General Louis Botha's army, the +organised resistance of the two Republics might be said to have +ceased." It was not, therefore, until Lord Roberts was able to march +from Modder River Station (February 11th, 1900), after a month spent +at the Cape in reorganising the transport and other preparations +essential to the success of an army destined to advance for many +hundreds of miles through a hostile country, that the British Army in +South Africa was in the position in which the acceptance of Lord +Wolseley's advice, given in June and July, 1899, would have put it +upon the outbreak of war. Nor was the force with which Lord Roberts +then advanced, 36,000 men, more numerous than the striking force which +would have been provided, by Lord Wolseley's scheme, had it been +carried out in the manner in which he desired. For the business with +which the scattered Army Corps was occupied when Lord Roberts arrived +at Capetown (January 10th, 1900)—the relief of Ladysmith and +Kimberley, and the defence of the eastern districts of the Cape Colony +from the Free State commandos and the colonial rebels—was work +directly caused by the absence of the Army Corps from South Africa +when the war broke out. It is not too much to say that the whole of +the serious losses incurred by the British forces in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page323" name="page323"></a>(p. 323)</span> South +Africa from the commencement of the war up to the date of Lord +Roberts's advance into the Free State territory, would have been +avoided if the state of public opinion had permitted the Salisbury +Cabinet in June to make military preparations commensurate with the +gravity of the situation as disclosed by Lord Milner.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The regular army exhausted.</span> + +<p>In forming an estimate of the performance of the British Army in South +Africa, from a military point of view, it is necessary to remember the +grave initial disadvantage in which it was placed; and that this +initial disadvantage was due, not to the War Office, not to the +Cabinet, but to the nation itself. The manner in which the losses thus +caused were repaired is significant and instructive. By the end of the +year (1899), the troops composing three divisions in excess of the +Army Corps were either landed in South Africa or under orders to +proceed to the seat of war. In addition to the 22,000 defensive troops +in South Africa on October 11th, the War Office had supplied, not +merely the 47,000 men of the Army Corps, but 85,000 men in all. But, +having done this, it had practically reached the limit of troops +available in the regular army for over-sea operations. By April, 1900, +all the reserves had been used up. There remained, it is true, 103,023 +"effectives" of all ranks of the regular army in the United Kingdom on +April 1st; but this total was composed of 37,333 "immature" troops; of +the recruits who had joined since October 1st, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page324" name="page324"></a>(p. 324)</span> 1899; of +reservists unfit for foreign service; and of sick and wounded sent +home from South Africa: that is to say, of men who, for one reason or +another, were all alike unfit for service abroad.<a id="footnotetag191" name="footnotetag191"></a><a href="#footnote191" title="Go to footnote 191"><span class="small">[191]</span></a> Further drafts +might have been made upon the British regulars in India; but this +course was held to be imprudent. In plain words, the exhaustion of the +regular army compelled the Government to avail itself more fully of +the offers of military aid which had reached it from the colonies, and +to utilise the militia and volunteer forces. On December 18th, 1899, +the announcement was made that the War Office would allow twelve +militia battalions to volunteer for service abroad, and that a +considerable force of yeomanry and a contingent of picked men from the +volunteers would be accepted. This appeal to the latent military +resources of the Empire met with a ready and ample response. +Throughout the whole course of the war the United Kingdom sent 45,566 +militia, 19,856 volunteers, and 35,520 yeomanry, with 7,273 South +African Constabulary, and 833 Scottish Horse; the over-sea colonies +(including 305 volunteers from India) provided 30,633 men;<a id="footnotetag192" name="footnotetag192"></a><a href="#footnote192" title="Go to footnote 192"><span class="small">[192]</span></a> while +of the small British population in South Africa no less than the +astonishing total of 46,858 took part in the war.<a id="footnotetag193" name="footnotetag193"></a><a href="#footnote193" title="Go to footnote 193"><span class="small">[193]</span></a> In all some +200,000 men—militia, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page325" name="page325"></a>(p. 325)</span> volunteers, and irregulars—came +forward to supplement the regular army.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Auxiliary forces utilised.</span> + +<p>It was mainly from the auxiliary forces and the colonial contingents, +and not from the regular army, that the reinforcements were supplied +which repaired the critical losses of the defensive campaign, and +enabled the new striking force to be organised. Nor can it be said +that the British Government failed to do all that was possible to +retrieve its original error, when once the defeats inflicted by the +Boer forces had awakened it to a knowledge of the real situation in +South Africa. In his despatch of February 6th, 1900, Lord Roberts was +able to report that, on January 31st, there was an effective fighting +force of nearly 40,000 men in Natal and another of 60,000 in the Cape +Colony. Mr. Chamberlain put the case for the Government at its highest +in speaking at Birmingham on May 11th, 1900:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Supposing that twelve months ago any man had said in public that + this country would be able to send out from its own shores and + from its own citizens an army of more than 150,000 men, fully + equipped, and that it would be joined by another force of more + than 30,000 men, voluntarily offered by our self-governing + colonies ... if he had said that this army, together numbering + 200,000 men, or thereabouts, could have been provided with the + best commissariat, with the most admirable medical appliances and + stores that had ever accompanied an army—if he could have said + that at the same time there would have remained behind in this + country something like half a million of men, who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page326" name="page326"></a>(p. 326)</span> + although they may not be equal man to man to the regulars and + best-drilled armies, are nevertheless capable of bearing arms to + some purpose—if he had said all this, he would have been laughed + to scorn."</p> + +<p>Moreover, the army was successful. The work which it was required to +do was done. In order to realise the merit of its success two +circumstances must be borne in mind: first, the enormous area of South +Africa, and, second, the fact that practically the whole of this area, +if we except the few considerable towns, was not only ill-provided +with means of communication and food supplies, but inhabited by a +population which was openly hostile, or, what was worse, secretly +disaffected. Lord Roberts, in the course of his despatches, +endeavoured to bring home both of these circumstances to the public in +England.</p> + +<p>Of the area he wrote:<a id="footnotetag194" name="footnotetag194"></a><a href="#footnote194" title="Go to footnote 194"><span class="small">[194]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Vastness of South Africa.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty's Imperial troops + have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised + if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of + communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded, + and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous + extent of the theatre of war, from one end of which to the other + troops have had to be frequently moved.</p> + +<p>"The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows:</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page327" name="page327"></a>(p. 327)</span> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" summary="Areas included in the theatre of war."> +<colgroup> + <col width="50%"> + <col width="50%"> +</colgroup> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td class="right">Square Miles.</td> +</tr> +<tr><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> +<tr> +<td>Cape Colony</td> +<td class="right">277,151</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Orange River Colony</td> +<td class="right">48,326</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Transvaal</td> +<td class="right">113,640</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Natal</td> +<td class="right">18,913</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td class="right">———</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="right">Total</td> +<td class="right">458,030</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td> </td> +<td class="right">———</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Rhodesia</td> +<td class="right">750,000</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>"And the distances troops have had to travel are:</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" summary="Distances."> +<colgroup> + <col width="50%"> + <col width="50%"> +</colgroup> +<tr> +<td>By Land</td> +<td class="right">Miles.</td> +</tr> +<tr><td colspan="2"> </td></tr> +<tr> +<td>Capetown to Pretoria</td> +<td class="right">1,040</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Pretoria to Komati Poort</td> +<td class="right">260</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Capetown to Kimberley</td> +<td class="right">647</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Kimberley to Mafeking</td> +<td class="right">223</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Mafeking to Pretoria</td> +<td class="right">160</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Mafeking to Beira</td> +<td class="right">1,135</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td>Durban to Pretoria</td> +<td class="right">511</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>"From these tables it will be seen that, after having been brought by +sea 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United Kingdom, the +army in South Africa had to be distributed over an area of greater +extent than France (204,146 square miles) and Germany (211,168 square +miles) put together, and, if we include that part of Rhodesia with +which we had to do, larger than the combined areas of France, Germany, +and Austria (261,649 square miles)."</p> +</div> + +<p>Of the nature of the country and its inhabitants he wrote:<a id="footnotetag195" name="footnotetag195"></a><a href="#footnote195" title="Go to footnote 195"><span class="small">[195]</span></a></p> + +<p class="quote"> + "And it should be remembered that over these great distances we + were dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply, + guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital + equipment, in fact, all the requirements of an army in the + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page328" name="page328"></a>(p. 328)</span> field, and that, along these lines, bridges and + culverts had been destroyed in many places, and rails were being + constantly torn up."</p> + +<p>And of the Cape Colony he wrote:<a id="footnotetag196" name="footnotetag196"></a><a href="#footnote196" title="Go to footnote 196"><span class="small">[196]</span></a></p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The difficulties of carrying on war in South Africa do not + appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. In + an enemy's country we should know exactly how we stood; but out + here we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern + frontier, but to maintain law and order within the colonial + limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, and no doubt a large + number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the British + rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand, + a considerable section would prefer a republican form of + government, and, influenced by ties of blood and association, + side with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Even the + public service at the Cape is not free from men whose sympathies + with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give valuable + assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The offensive campaign.</span> + +<p>Bearing in mind that the offensive campaign dates, not from the expiry +of the Boer ultimatum on October 11th, 1899, but from Lord Roberts's +advance from Modder River Station on February 11th, 1900, the mere +record of dates and events is sufficiently impressive. On February +12th the Free State border was crossed; on the 15th Kimberley was +relieved, on the 27th Cronje's force surrendered at Paardeberg, on the +28th Ladysmith was relieved, and on March 13th Bloemfontein, the +capital of the Free State, was occupied. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page329" name="page329"></a>(p. 329)</span> The army again +advanced early in May; Kroonstad was entered on the 12th; on May 24th, +the Queen's birthday, the Free State was annexed; the Vaal was crossed +on the 27th, Johannesburg was occupied on the 31st, and on June 5th +the British flag was hoisted on the Raadzaal at Pretoria. In the +meantime Mafeking had been relieved with absolute punctuality on May +17th.<a id="footnotetag197" name="footnotetag197"></a><a href="#footnote197" title="Go to footnote 197"><span class="small">[197]</span></a> On June 11th the Boers evacuated Laing's Nek and Majuba, +and the Natal Field Force, under Buller, entered the Transvaal from +the south-east. The next day Roberts defeated the Boers under Louis +Botha at Diamond Hill. On July 30th Prinsloo and 4,000 burghers +surrendered to Hunter; on August 27th the main Transvaal army, under +Louis Botha, was again defeated at Dalmanutha, and on September 1st +the Transvaal was annexed. On the 11th President Krüger fled the +Transvaal; Komati Poort, the eastern frontier town on the railway line +to Delagoa Bay, was entered on the 24th, and two days later railway +communication was re-opened between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria.</p> + +<p>In spite of the vast area and harassing conditions of the war, in +spite of its own military unpreparedness, and the unexpected strength +of the Boer attack, the Power which created the Republics had +destroyed them within less than <span class="pagenum"><a id="page330" name="page330"></a>(p. 330)</span> a twelvemonth from the day +on which they had defied it.</p> + +<p>At this point it will be convenient to place on record certain general +conclusions which arise out of the events and circumstances of the +South African War, and to consider certain military criticisms which +have been offered upon the conduct of the British Army in the field.</p> + +<p>We have seen that the initial losses of the campaign were due, not to +any defects in the Army as a fighting force, but to the position in +which the Army was placed by the irresolution of the nation. We have +seen also that within less than a year of the ultimatum the capitals +of the two Republics were occupied, and their power of "organised +resistance" was destroyed. During this stage of the war the regular +Army, small as it was, supplemented by selected reinforcements from +the auxiliary services, and by the colonial contingents, sufficed to +do the work required of it. In the second stage, when the work to be +accomplished was nothing less than the disarmament of the entire Dutch +population of South Africa, the character of the reinforcements +supplied had greatly depreciated,<a id="footnotetag198" name="footnotetag198"></a><a href="#footnote198" title="Go to footnote 198"><span class="small">[198]</span></a> and the prolongation of the war +was in part to be attributed to this circumstance. For the present, +however, it will be sufficient to confine our observations to the +period of "organised resistance."</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page331" name="page331"></a>(p. 331)</span> +<span class="sidenote">General conclusions.</span> + +<p>The first of these conclusions is the fact that the real evil revealed +by the South African War is not the inefficiency, or unpreparedness of +the War Office, but the ignorance,<a id="footnotetag199" name="footnotetag199"></a><a href="#footnote199" title="Go to footnote 199"><span class="small">[199]</span></a> and therefore unpreparedness, +of the country. From this unreadiness for war on the part of the +nation as a whole there sprang two results: (1) the refusal of the +Salisbury Cabinet to allow the War Office to make adequate military +preparations in June, and the disregard of the advice alike of Lord +Milner and Lord Wolseley; (2) the insufficient supply of reserves for +the forces in the field, arising ultimately from the small percentage +of men in the nation trained to the use of arms.</p> + +<p>The second conclusion to which we are led is that the specific result +of the absence of effective preparations for War in June was to throw +the War Office scheme of a fighting force out of gear. Twenty-two +thousand defensive troops, with a striking force of fifty thousand in +South Africa, would have proved sufficient to attain the ends of +British policy. As it was, the Army Corps being in England when +hostilities commenced, and not arriving in its entirety until December +4th, the fifty thousand offensive force was absorbed in the work of +extricating the twenty-two thousand defensive force. In other words, +the British Army was not put in the position contemplated by Lord +Wolseley's scheme until an entirely new fighting <span class="pagenum"><a id="page332" name="page332"></a>(p. 332)</span> force had +been organised and advanced from Modder River in the beginning of +February, 1900. This new striking force was identical in numbers with +the original striking force, the Army Corps,<a id="footnotetag200" name="footnotetag200"></a><a href="#footnote200" title="Go to footnote 200"><span class="small">[200]</span></a> provided by Lord +Wolseley's scheme.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Criticisms examined.</span> + +<p>Among criticisms on the British Army in the field there are two that +claim attention. The first of these is the allegation that military +efficiency was sacrificed to a desire to spare life. In so far as this +criticism is concerned with the handling of their troops by British +commanders, it is strenuously denied that either Lord Roberts, or any +of his subordinates, allowed a desire to spare the lives of the troops +under their command to interfere with the successful execution of any +military operation. The specific example of the alleged interference +of this motive, usually cited, is the conduct of the attack upon the +Boer position at Paardeberg. In respect of these operations the actual +facts, as they presented themselves to the mind of Lord Roberts, are +these. On reaching the Paardeberg position from Jacobsdal the +Commander-in-Chief found that in the operations of the preceding day +Lord Kitchener had lost a thousand men without gaining a single +advantage. The position held by the Boers, although it was commanded +by rising ground on all sides, was one which afforded admirable cover +in repelling an attacking force. In these circumstances Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page333" name="page333"></a>(p. 333)</span> +Roberts decided, as an application of the principles of military +science, to "sap up" to the Boer positions. The correctness of this +decision was proved by the result. The moment that the Boers realised +that they were to be given no further opportunity—such as a +repetition of a direct attack upon their position would have +afforded—of inflicting heavy loss on the British troops, whilst their +eventual surrender was no less inevitable, the white flag was hoisted.</p> + +<p>It is denied with equal definiteness that any general feeling of the +kind alleged existed among subordinate officers or the rank and file +of the British troops. Where, however, the allegation of "a desire to +spare life" has regard to the enemy and not to the British troops, the +answer is to be found in the fact that any humanity inconsistent with +military efficiency was apparent and not real. The comparative +immunity enjoyed by the enemy on occasions when he was defeated is due +to physical conditions wholly favourable to the Boers, to the +knowledge of the country possessed by the burghers individually and +collectively, and to the circumstance that the inhabitants of the +country districts were, in almost all cases, ready to give them every +possible assistance in escaping from the British. There is one +particular statement in connection with this criticism which admits of +absolute denial. It has been said that Lord Roberts, the +Commander-in-Chief, received instructions from the Home Government +directing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page334" name="page334"></a>(p. 334)</span> him to spare the enemy as much as possible. This +statement, in spite of its <span class="italic">prima facie</span> improbability, has met with +very general acceptance. None the less it is entirely baseless. The +only limitations imposed by the Home Government upon Lord Roberts's +complete freedom of action in the conduct of the military operations +which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced +in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number +and character required.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The German general staff.</span> + +<p>The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff, +forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional +merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British +Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to +"manœuvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe +losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form, +is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the +occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to +be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine +open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what +military science required of the commander directing the attacking +force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms +with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism, +however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond +Hill in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page335" name="page335"></a>(p. 335)</span> particular, and to the engagements fought in the +course of Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes +the form of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both +flanks was executed successfully, the full result of this initial +success was not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was +not pressed home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught +and destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically +true, and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established +their case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into +consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and +inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the +final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and +gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no +avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring +heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It +would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers.</p> + +<p>Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against +the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until +the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility by cutting +in on their line of retreat. The Boers, however, took every precaution +against such an eventuality; and the result was generally, as stated +by the German critics, that the Boers were "manœuvred" out of their +positions. But <span class="pagenum"><a id="page336" name="page336"></a>(p. 336)</span> this does not prove that the course adopted +by Lord Roberts was wrong; it merely proves the extreme difficulty of +inflicting a severe defeat upon an enemy who declines to risk a +decisive action, and whose mobility gives him the power to do so. The +course advocated by the critics would have been equally barren of +result, while the cost in lives would have been far greater.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Boers not in uniform.</span> + +<p>It remains to notice certain definite circumstances which caused the +British Army in South Africa to be confronted by difficulties which no +other army has been required to face. The Boers were accorded all the +privileges of a civilised army, although at the same time they +violated the most essential of the conditions upon the observance of +which these privileges are based. This condition is the wearing, by +the forces of a belligerent, of such a uniform and distinctive dress +as will be sufficient to enable the other belligerent to discriminate +with facility between the combatant and non-combatant population of +his enemy. The fact that the burgher forces were not in uniform and +were yet accorded the privileges claimed by civilised troops, was in +itself a circumstance that increased both the efforts required, and +the losses incurred, by the British Army to an extent which has not as +yet been fully realised. In the operations which Lord Roberts had +conducted in Afghanistan it was not the organised army but the +tribesmen that had proved difficult to overcome. The Afghan army +retreated, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page337" name="page337"></a>(p. 337)</span> or, if it stood its ground, was defeated. But the +tribesmen who "sniped" the British troops from the mountain slopes and +from behind stones and rocks, who assembled from all sides as rapidly +as they melted away, constituted the real difficulty of the campaign. +In South Africa the burgher forces were army and tribesmen alike. +Owing to the absence of any distinctive uniform the combatant Boers +mingled freely with the British soldiers, and went to and fro among +the non-combatant Boer population in the towns and districts occupied +by the British. On one day they were in the British camp as +ox-drivers, or provision-sellers, or what not, and on the next they +were in the burgher fighting line. A single instance will serve to +convey an impression of the complete immunity with which not merely +the rank and file, but commandants and generals, entered and left the +British lines. It is believed that on one night General Louis Botha +slept in Johannesburg close to Lord Roberts, the British +Commander-in-Chief. The next morning he left the town in company with +some of the British troops. And in the Natal campaign it is notorious +that the camps of the Ladysmith relieving force were swarming with +Boer spies whom it was impossible to detect and punish. Even in the +besieged town itself the utmost secrecy at headquarters did not always +avail to prevent a timely intimation of a contemplated attack from +reaching the enemy's lines. Add to this the fact that every Boer +farmhouse <span class="pagenum"><a id="page338" name="page338"></a>(p. 338)</span> throughout South Africa was an Intelligence Depôt +for the enemy, and it is easy to understand the facility displayed by +the mobile and ununiformed Boer forces in evading the British columns.</p> + +<p>Whether the humanity displayed by the British Government in thus +recognising the burghers as regular belligerents, and in other +respects, did not tend to bring about the very evil sought to be +avoided is another question. It is quite possible to maintain that the +comparative immunity from punishment and the disproportionate military +success which the Boers enjoyed did in fact, by contributing to the +prolongation of the war, ultimately produce a greater loss of life, +and a greater amount of material suffering, than would have been +incurred by the South African Dutch if the war had been waged with +greater severity on the part of Great Britain. That it increased the +cost of the war both in lives and in treasure to the British nation is +obvious. But this is a consideration which does not affect any +estimate of the merit or demerit displayed by the British Army in the +field that may be formed either by British or foreign critics. In +order to prove competency it is not necessary to show that no single +mistake was made or that nothing that was done might not have been +done better. No war department, no army ever has been or ever will be +created that could come scatheless from the application of such a test +of absolute efficiency. What we require to know is whether the same +standard of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page339" name="page339"></a>(p. 339)</span> efficiency was shown to have been attained in +the War Office and in the Army as is required and obtained in any +other branch of the public service, or in any successful or +progressive undertaking conducted by private enterprise. The +circumstances of the war were abnormal. From one point of view it was +a civil war; from another it was a rebellion, and from a third it was +a war between two rival military powers, each of whom desired to +become supreme in South Africa. What the military critic has to +consider is not so much how these circumstances arose, or whether they +could have been changed or avoided by any political action on the part +of Great Britain, but the degree in which the conditions imposed by +them upon the British Army must be taken into account in applying the +ordinary tests of military efficiency to the work which it +accomplished in this particular campaign.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Difficulties of the campaign.</span> + +<p>The nature of the difficulties presented by the vast extent of the +theatre of war, the deficiency of means of communication, the +imperfect cultivation of the land, the sparseness of the population +and their hostility to the British, and the physical and climatic +aspects of South Africa in general, have been broadly indicated in the +passages taken from Lord Roberts's despatches. To pursue the inquiry +further would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. That, +however, there is nothing unusual in the fact that civilian forces, +inspired by love of country and aided by physical conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page340" name="page340"></a>(p. 340)</span> +exceptionally favourable to themselves, should be able to offer a +successful resistance to professional soldiers may be seen by a +reference to one of the little wars of the seventeenth century. In the +year 1690 twenty-two thousand French and Savoyard troops were sent by +Louis XIV. to storm the Balsille—a rocky eminence <span class="italic">mutatis mutandis</span> +the equivalent of a South African kopje—held by 350 Piedmontese +Vaudois. Even so the besieged patriots made good their escape, and, +owing to the sudden change in the politics of Europe brought about by +the accession of William of Orange to the crown of England, actually +concluded an honourable peace with their sovereign, Victor Amadeus of +Savoy, a few days after they had been driven from the Balsille. +Assuming that the British troops employed from first to last in the +South African War were five times as numerous as the forces placed in +the field by the Dutch nationalists—say 450,000 as against 90,000—we +have here a numerical superiority which dwindles into insignificance +beside the magnificent disproportion of the professional troops +required to deal with a civilian force in this seventeenth-century +struggle.<a id="footnotetag201" name="footnotetag201"></a><a href="#footnote201" title="Go to footnote 201"><span class="small">[201]</span></a><a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page341" name="page341"></a>(p. 341)</span> CHAPTER VIII</h3> + +<p class="title">THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY</p> + + +<p>The direct share which Lord Milner took in the skilful disposition of +the handful of British troops available at the outbreak of the war for +the defence of the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony has been +mentioned. The part which he played during the first period of the war +in his relationship to the military authorities is sufficiently +indicated by the words which appear in Lord Roberts's final despatch.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd, + 1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit + I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of + Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high + privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage + never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which + surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of + his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message + or for the tactful solution of a difficult question."</p> + +<p>That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great +a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page342" name="page342"></a>(p. 342)</span> occasion—to be presently noted—Lord Milner's judgment did +not entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">An unnatural alliance.</span> + +<p>But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in +comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort +required to keep the machinery of administration available for the +Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of +the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative +Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less +complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it +impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an +elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a +load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and +mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an +end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown, +considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most +dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather +demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty +years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before +the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means, +and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the +Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable +distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page343" name="page343"></a>(p. 343)</span> +done and said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the +law constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of +the British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to +themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in +view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would +probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts +stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to +fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the +excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly +Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear +of military humiliation. Just as in the period before the war we found +the Afrikander leaders striving to "mediate" between the Transvaal and +the British Government; so now during the war we find them striving to +"conciliate" the two contending parties. In both cases their aim was +the same—to prevent the destruction of the Republics and the +consequent ruin of the nationalist cause. As in the former case +"mediation" was a euphemism for the diplomatic defeat of the British +Government, so now "conciliation" is synonymous with the restoration +of the independence of the Boers—that is, the renunciation of all +that the British people, whether islander or colonist, had fought to +secure. That any considerable body of Englishmen should have allowed +themselves to become <span class="pagenum"><a id="page344" name="page344"></a>(p. 344)</span> a second time the dupes of so coarse a +political hypocrisy may well arouse surprise to-day; to a future +generation it will seem almost incredible. The fact, however, admits +of neither doubt nor contradiction. It is writ large in Hansard, in +the Blue-books, and in the daily journals. The whole force of this +strange and unnatural alliance between England's most bitter and most +skilful enemies in South Africa and a section of her own sons at home, +was directed against Lord Milner during the remaining years of his +High Commissionership.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr Schreiners's attitude.</span> + +<p>For the moment, however, the ultimatum had rendered the British people +practically unanimous in the desire to chastise the insolence of the +Boer, and, in the face of this determination, no opposition was +manifested by the Afrikander Government to the free movement and +disembarkation of the Imperial troops. The employment of the local +forces in the defence of the colony was another matter. The Free State +commandos crossed the Orange River on October 31st, 1899. The delay +was not due to any regard felt by President Steyn for Mr. Schreiner, +but solely to military considerations. On the previous day General +Joubert had shut up Sir George White's force in Ladysmith; and there +was, therefore, no longer any likelihood that these commandos would be +required in Natal. The invasion of the Colony south of the Orange +River produced, as we have noticed, a marked change in Mr. Schreiner's +attitude; causing him finally <span class="pagenum"><a id="page345" name="page345"></a>(p. 345)</span> to abandon the neutrality +policy and recognise the necessity of employing the local volunteer +forces in the defence of the Colony. None the less the injury +inflicted upon British interests by the Prime Minister's attempt to +keep the people of the Cape Colony out of the conflict was +unquestionable. The ministers of the Crown in this British Colony had +allowed arms and ammunition to go through to the Free State, until the +Imperial authorities had interfered; they had refused to supply +Mafeking and Kimberley with much-needed artillery; they had refused to +call out the volunteers until the Colony was about to be invaded by +the Free State as well as by the Transvaal, and even then they had +delayed to supply these forces with Lee-Enfield rifles. These were +injuries the effect of which could not be repaired by any subsequent +co-operation with the representatives of the British Government. In +addition to calling out the volunteers, Mr. Schreiner allowed the +Imperial military authorities to take over the Cape Government +railways, and he consented to the proclamation of martial law in those +districts of the Colony in which the Dutch were in rebellion. But he +was far from yielding, even now, that full and complete assistance to +the Governor which would have been expected, as a matter of course, +from the Prime Minister of any other British colony. On one occasion, +at least, during this period the conflict between his views and those +of Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page346" name="page346"></a>(p. 346)</span> Milner became so acute that his resignation seemed +to be inevitable. But this was not to be the end of the Afrikander +Ministry. In proportion as Mr. Schreiner approached gradually to +agreement with Lord Milner, so did he incur the displeasure of Mr. +Hofmeyr and the Dutch, until (in June, 1901) the Ministry perished of +internal dissension.</p> + +<p>A week after Lord Roberts reached Capetown (January 10th, 1900), Lord +Milner sent home a despatch in which he tells the story of the +rebellion in the Cape Colony. The state of the districts on the +western border of the Republics, north of the Orange River, is +described in the words of a reliable and unbiassed witness who has +just arrived at Capetown from Vryburg, where he has been lately +resident:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts," + says this witness, "have joined the Boers, and I do not believe + that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch + community in the whole of Bechuanaland. The Field Cornets and + Justices of the Peace on the Dutch side have all joined ... the + conduct of the rebels has been unbearable."</p> + +<p>Of the position of that part of the Eastern Province of the Cape +Colony which, lying to the south of the Free State, formed the main +seat of the rebellion, Lord Milner himself writes:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Treatment of loyalists.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of + Colesberg, no less than five great districts—those of Colesberg, + Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse—had gone + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page347" name="page347"></a>(p. 347)</span> over without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to + the enemy. Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange + Free State had established their authority, and everywhere, in + the expressive words of a magistrate, British loyalists were + "being hunted out of town after town like sheep." In the invaded + districts the method of occupation has always been more or less + the same. The procedure is as follows:—A commando enters, the + Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the + courthouse, or market-place, and a Proclamation is read annexing + the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he + explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws + generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local + Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days + or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their + country. In either case they lose their property to a greater or + less extent. If they elect to quit they are often robbed before + starting or on the journey; if they stay their property and + themselves are commandeered.</p> + +<p>"The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined + the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed + districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I + shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during + November it was a number not less than the total of the invading + commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the + invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists + who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And + the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and + during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee + from the Albert district has estimated the total number of + colonial Boers who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page348" name="page348"></a>(p. 348)</span> have joined the enemy in the invaded + districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the + districts north of that river, to which I referred at the + beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding + to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately + before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of + taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion + that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now + fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more, + either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the + Queen."<a id="footnotetag202" name="footnotetag202"></a><a href="#footnote202" title="Go to footnote 202"><span class="small">[202]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>As it turned out, this eastern rebellion was kept within limits by +General French's advance upon Colesberg, and by the skilful and +successful cavalry operations which he subsequently carried out upon +the Free State border; but there is abundant evidence to support the +belief that any second reverse in the Eastern Province, such as that +which General Gatacre suffered at Stormberg, would have proved the +signal for a rising in the Western Province. The Bond was active; and +the tone of the meetings held by the various branches throughout the +Colony was as frankly hostile to the Imperial Government as it was +sympathetic to the Republics.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">State of western province.</span> + +<p>The extent to which Mr. Schreiner's qualified co-operation with the +Imperial authorities had aroused the hostility of the Bond will be +seen from the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Cape +Distriks-bestuur, held at the office <span class="pagenum"><a id="page349" name="page349"></a>(p. 349)</span> of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> at the +end of January (1900). It was a small meeting, but among those present +were Mr. Hofmeyr himself and Mr. Malan, the editor of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>. On +the motion of the latter, it was unanimously determined that the +forthcoming Annual Congress of the Bond should be asked to pass a—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "resolution (<span class="italic">a</span>) giving expression of Congress's entire + disapproval of the policy which led to the present bloody war + instead of to a peaceful solution of the differences with the + South African Republic by means of arbitration; and (<span class="italic">b</span>) urging + a speedy re-establishment of peace on fair and righteous + conditions, as also a thorough inquiry by our Parliament into the + way in which, during the war, private property, the civil + liberties, and constitutional rights of the subject have been + treated."<a id="footnotetag203" name="footnotetag203"></a><a href="#footnote203" title="Go to footnote 203"><span class="small">[203]</span></a></p> + +<p>Even more significant—as evidence of the dangerous feeling of +exaltation which possessed the Dutch at this time—was the New Year's +exhortation of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, the journalistic mouthpiece of Mr. Hofmeyr. +And Mr. Hofmeyr, it must be remembered, was not only the head of the +<span class="italic">Commissie van Toezicht</span>, or Executive of three which controlled the +Afrikander Bond, but the real master of the majority in the Cape +Parliament, upon which the Schreiner Cabinet depended for its +existence. After setting out the "mighty deeds" achieved by the +Afrikander arms during the last three months, this bitter and +relentless opponent of British supremacy in South Africa <span class="pagenum"><a id="page350" name="page350"></a>(p. 350)</span> +proceeded to declare that "still mightier deeds" were to be seen in +the coming year (1900), and that the Afrikander nation, so far from +being extinguished by the conflict with Great Britain, would be welded +into one compact mass, and flourish more and more.</p> + +<p>Nor was this all. In the closing days of the year (1899) information +reached the British military authorities that a plot was on foot to +seize Capetown. The Dutch from the country districts were to assemble +in the capital in the guise of excursionists who had come to town to +enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays. On New Year's Eve, the +night reported to have been fixed for the attempt, all the military +stations in Capetown were kept in frequent communication by telephone; +the streets were paraded by pickets; and, in the drill-shed the +Capetown Highlanders slept under arms. Whether any attempt of the sort +was seriously contemplated or not, there is no question as to the fact +that the utmost necessity for precaution was recognised by the +military authorities at Capetown during this period, in spite of the +security afforded by the reinforcements which the Home Government was +pouring into the Colony. It was an old boast of the militant Dutch in +the Cape Colony that they would find a way to prevent British troops +from using the colonial railways to attack the Boers.<a id="footnotetag204" name="footnotetag204"></a><a href="#footnote204" title="Go to footnote 204"><span class="small">[204]</span></a> And +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page351" name="page351"></a>(p. 351)</span> when at length, a month after Lord Roberts had arrived, the +transport system had been reorganised, the troops concentrated at De +Aar and Modder River, and everything was ready for the forward +movement, the most complete secrecy was observed as to the departure +of the Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener. Instead of leaving for +the front with the final drafts from the Capetown station in Adderley +Street, amid the cheering of the British population, these two +distinguished soldiers were driven in a close carriage, on the evening +of February 6th, from Government House to the Salt River Station, +where they caught the ordinary passenger train for De Aar.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Robert's advance.</span> + +<p>No one was more aware of the reality of the Dutch disaffection in the +Colony than Lord Milner. Before Lord Roberts left Capetown for the +front he addressed a memorandum to him, in which the attention of the +Commander-in-Chief was drawn to certain special elements of danger in +the whole situation in South Africa as affected by the rebellion of +the Dutch in the Cape Colony. With <span class="pagenum"><a id="page352" name="page352"></a>(p. 352)</span> reference to this +memorandum Lord Roberts writes, in the second of his despatches +(February 16th, 1900):</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Before quitting the seat of Government I received a memorandum + from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner reviewed + the political and military situation, and laid stress on the + possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch + population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the + purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free + State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the military + requirements of the case demanded an early advance into the + enemy's country; that such an advance, if successful, would + lessen the hostile pressure both on the northern frontiers of the + Colony and in Natal; that the relief of Kimberley had to be + effected before the end of February, and would set free most of + the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of + considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field + Artillery, by the 19th of February, would enable those points + along the frontier which were weakly held to be materially + strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that His Excellency's + apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt a certain amount + of risk had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to + involve more serious dangers than the bolder course which I have + decided to adopt."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's proposal.</span> + +<p>There cannot, of course, be any question as to the general wisdom of +this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance +from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by +taking his risks—risks that would have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page353" name="page353"></a>(p. 353)</span> reduced a lesser man +to inaction—that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of +a great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack. +But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the +real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary +to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually +in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any +course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of +the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated +enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our +rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and +possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly +present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord +Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be +definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there, +whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in +this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made +possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of +the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried +out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second +rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High +Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the +troops at his <span class="pagenum"><a id="page354" name="page354"></a>(p. 354)</span> disposal. In order to carry the war into the +enemy's country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of +troops. The subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and +disastrous influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was +destined to exercise upon the military decisions of the republican +leaders—an influence which would have been lessened materially, if +not altogether removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile +force. And, in point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the +rebellion might even now interfere with the success of the forward +movement, unless adequate provision was made to keep it in check, +received almost immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged +in the capture of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland +districts of Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon, lying to the west of +the railway from De Aar to Orange River, broke out into rebellion. +Although Lord Roberts at once directed certain columns to concentrate +upon this new area of disaffection, the situation had become so +serious that on March 8th—<span class="italic">i.e.</span>, the day after Poplar Grove, and in +the course of the rapid march upon Bloemfontein—Lord Roberts—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar with + the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such steps + as might be necessary to punish the rebels and to prevent the + spread of disaffection."<a id="footnotetag205" name="footnotetag205"></a><a href="#footnote205" title="Go to footnote 205"><span class="small">[205]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page355" name="page355"></a>(p. 355)</span> That is to say, the disclosure of a new centre of active +rebellion in the Colony deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the +services of Lord Kitchener, his Chief-of-Staff, when he was in the act +of executing one of the most critical movements of the campaign.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Boer peace overtures.</span> + +<p>The complete revolution in the military situation produced by Lord +Roberts's victorious advance into the Free State elicited from +Presidents Krüger and Steyn the "peace overtures" cabled to Lord +Salisbury on March 5th, 1900. In this characteristic document the two +Presidents remark that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "they consider it [their] duty solemnly to declare that this war + was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the + threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is + only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable + independence of both Republics as sovereign international states, + and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects + who have taken part with [them] in this war shall suffer no harm + whatever in person or property."</p> + +<p>They further declare that "on these conditions, but on these +conditions alone," they are now, as in the past, desirous of seeing +peace re-established in South Africa; and they add considerately that +they have refrained from making this declaration "so long as the +advantage was always on their side," from a fear lest it "might hurt +the feelings of honour of the British people." They conclude:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be + considered to be assured by the capture of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page356" name="page356"></a>(p. 356)</span> one of our + forces by Her Majesty's troops, and that we are thereby forced to + evacuate other positions which our forces had occupied, that + difficulty is over, and we can no longer hesitate clearly to + inform your Government and people, in the sight of the whole + civilised world, why we are fighting, and on what conditions we + are ready to restore peace."<a id="footnotetag206" name="footnotetag206"></a><a href="#footnote206" title="Go to footnote 206"><span class="small">[206]</span></a></p> + +<p>The best comment upon this grossly disingenuous document is that which +is afforded by certain passages in Mr. Reitz's book, <span class="italic">A Century of +Wrong</span>, which was written in anticipation of the outbreak of war and +issued so soon as this anticipation had been realised:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The struggle of now nearly a century," he writes in his appeal + to his brother Afrikanders, "hastens to an end; we are + approaching the last act in that great drama which is so + momentous for all South Africa.... The questions which present + themselves for solution in the approaching conflict have their + origin deep in the history of the past.... By its light we are + more clearly enabled to comprehend the truth to which our people + appeal as a final justification for embarking on the war now so + close at hand.... May the hope which glowed in our hearts during + 1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on + steadily! May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly + moving onwards through blood and through tears, until it leads us + to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory + or death, Liberty will assuredly rise on South Africa ... just as + freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more + than a century ago. Then from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page357" name="page357"></a>(p. 357)</span> Zambesi to Simon's Town + it will be Africa for the Afrikander."<a id="footnotetag207" name="footnotetag207"></a><a href="#footnote207" title="Go to footnote 207"><span class="small">[207]</span></a></p> + +<p>And to this may be added the following extract from a letter written +by "one of the distinguished members of the Volksraad" who voted for +war against Great Britain, to one of his friends, a member of the +Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Our plan is, with God's help, to take all that is English in + South Africa; so, in case you true Afrikanders wish to throw off + the English yoke, now is the time to hoist the Vier-kleur in + Capetown. You can rely on us; we will push through from sea to + sea, and wave one flag over the whole of South Africa, under one + Afrikander Government, if we can reckon on our Afrikander + brethren."<a id="footnotetag208" name="footnotetag208"></a><a href="#footnote208" title="Go to footnote 208"><span class="small">[208]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">The British reply.</span> + +<p>Lord Salisbury's reply, sent from the Foreign Office on March 11th, is +as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"I have the honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram dated + the 5th of March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is + principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall + recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African + Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international + states,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a + conclusion.</p> + +<p>"In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her + Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then + were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some + months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African + Republic, of which the object <span class="pagenum"><a id="page358" name="page358"></a>(p. 358)</span> was to obtain redress for + certain very serious grievances under which British residents in + the South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these + negotiations the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of + Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the + latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding + reinforcements to the British garrisons of Capetown and Natal. No + infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had up + to that point taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two + days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an + insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty, and the + Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any + discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were + immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three + towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two + colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and + life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of + extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those + dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In + anticipation of these operations, the South African Republic had + been accumulating for many years past military stores on an + enormous scale, which by their character could only have been + intended for use against Great Britain.</p> + +<p>"Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon + the object with which these preparations were made. I do not + think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But + the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy, + has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront + an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and + the loss of thousands of precious <span class="pagenum"><a id="page359" name="page359"></a>(p. 359)</span> lives. This great + calamity has been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered + for having in recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two + Republics.</p> + +<p>"In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the + position which was given to them, and the calamities which their + unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her + Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by + saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence + either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free + State."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Conventions to be annulled.</span> + +<p>This reply has been cited at length for two reasons. In the first +place it affords a concise and weighty statement of the British case +against the Republics, and, in the second, it contains a specific and +reasoned declaration of the central decision of the Salisbury Cabinet, +against which the efforts both of the Dutch party in the Cape and of +the friends of the Boers in England continued to be directed, until +the controversy was closed by the surrender of the republican leaders +at Vereeniging. In the Cape Colony the cry of "conciliation" was +raised to cloak the gross appearance of a movement which was, in fact, +a direct co-operation with the enemy. And the same specious word was +adopted in England, so soon as the strain of the war had begun to make +itself felt in the constituencies, as a decent flag under which the +party opponents of the Unionist Government in general could join +forces with the traditional friends of the Boers and other convinced +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page360" name="page360"></a>(p. 360)</span> opponents of Imperial consolidation. The decision of the +Salisbury Cabinet not to restore the system of the Conventions, which +was in fact the decision of the great mass of the British people both +at home and over-sea, was not reversed. It was confirmed in the House +of Commons by 208 votes against 52 on July 25th, 1900, and by the +verdict of the country in the General Election which followed.<a id="footnotetag209" name="footnotetag209"></a><a href="#footnote209" title="Go to footnote 209"><span class="small">[209]</span></a> +But the political agitation by which it was sought to reverse this +decision was none the less injurious alike to the Boer and British +peoples, since it acted as a powerful incentive to the republican +leaders to continued struggle which, except for the illusions created +by this agitation, they would have recognised as hopeless in itself +and unjustified by any prospect of military success. In both cases the +effect of the agitation was the same: the war was unnecessarily +prolonged—intentionally by the Afrikander nationalists, and +unintentionally by Lord (then Mr.) Courtney, Mr. Morley, Mr. Bryce, +and other opponents in England of the annexation of the Republics.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The 'Conciliation' movement.</span> + +<p>The Presidents had demanded the recognition of the independence of the +Republics and a free pardon for the Cape rebels as the price of peace. +The Afrikander nationalists at once began to co-operate with the +Republics in the endeavour <span class="pagenum"><a id="page361" name="page361"></a>(p. 361)</span> to wrest these terms from the +British Government. Mr. Schreiner, as we have seen, had already +incurred Mr. Hofmeyr's displeasure by allowing the Cape Government to +render assistance to the Imperial authorities in the prosecution of +the war. The breach thus created between the Prime Minister and Sir +Richard (then Mr.) Solomon, on the one hand, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. +Merriman, and Mr. Sauer, who shared the views of the Bond, on the +other, was, rapidly widened by the "conciliation" meetings held +throughout the Colony by the Afrikander nationalists in support of the +"peace overtures" of the Presidents. The British population at the +Cape was quick to realise the insidious and fatal character of the +"conciliation" movement thus inaugurated by the Afrikander +nationalists. The universal alarm and indignation to which it gave +rise among the loyalists of both nationalities found expression in the +impassioned speech which Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes delivered at +the Municipal Hall of Claremont<a id="footnotetag210" name="footnotetag210"></a><a href="#footnote210" title="Go to footnote 210"><span class="small">[210]</span></a> on March 30th, 1900. The purpose +of the meeting was to allow the British subjects thus assembled to +record their approval of Lord Salisbury's reply to the Republics, and +their conviction that "the incorporation of these States within the +dominions of the Queen could alone secure peace, prosperity, and +public freedom throughout South Africa." In supporting this +resolution, Sir James Rose Innes said:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page362" name="page362"></a>(p. 362)</span> "This question of permanent peace is the key-stone of + the whole matter, because, I take it, we none of us want to see + another war of this kind. We do not want to see the misery and + the suffering and the loss which a war of this kind entails. We + do not want to see our sandy plains drenched with the best blood + of England again, fighting against white men in this country. We + do not want to see the flower of colonial manhood shot down on + the plains of the Orange Free State and the Karroo, and neither + do we want to see brave men, born in South Africa, dying in + heaps, dying for what we know is a hopeless ideal. Therefore we + say, 'In Heaven's name give us peace! Have a settlement, but make + no settlement which shall not be calculated, as far as human + foresight can provide, to secure a permanent peace.'"</p> + +<p>These were strong words, and their significance was heightened by the +well-known independence of Sir James Innes's political outlook.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner at Bloemfontein.</span> + +<p>A fortnight later Lord Milner declared his mind on the same question. +Both the occasion and the speech are of special interest. The High +Commissioner had just returned from a fortnight at the front. On March +19th he left Capetown in company with Sir Richard Solomon for the +north-eastern districts of the Colony, which, having rebelled in +November, had just been reduced to order by General Brabant and the +"Colonial Division," when the Free State invaders had been drawn off +by Lord Roberts's advance. After a week in the Colony, Lord Milner +travelled on by rail to Bloemfontein, which he reached on the 27th. It +was a stimulating and suggestive moment. He was now <span class="pagenum"><a id="page363" name="page363"></a>(p. 363)</span> the +guest of the British Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency, where, just +ten months ago, as the guest of President Steyn, he had met Paul +Krüger for the first time. The little Free State capital, then wrapped +in its accustomed quietude, was now filled with the tumultuous +presence of a great army. But, complete as was the revolution +accomplished by Lord Roberts's advance, there were signs that the Boer +was dying hard, even if he were not coming to life again. On the 30th +a disquieting engagement was fought at Karree Siding, and on the 31st +de Wet dealt his second shrewd blow at Sannah's Post.</p> + +<p>With this experience of the actualities of war, Lord Milner, leaving +Bloemfontein on April 2nd, had returned to Capetown. On the 12th he +was presented with an appreciative address, signed by all, except one, +of the Nonconformist ministers of religion resident in and around +Capetown, in which personal affection for himself and approval of his +policy were expressed. The action of these men was altogether +exceptional. It was justified by the circumstance that in England Lord +Milner's policy had been subjected to the bitterest criticism in +quarters where Nonconformist influence was predominant. Not only to +Lord Courtney, but to other Liberal friends and associates, the High +Commissioner had become a "lost mind." To the Afrikander nationalists +he was "the enemy"; the efforts which had barely sufficed to keep the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page364" name="page364"></a>(p. 364)</span> administrative machinery of a British colony at the disposal +of the Imperial Government were represented as the unconstitutional +acts of a tyrannical proconsul; having ruthlessly exposed the +aspirations of the Afrikander nationalists he was now to become the +destroyer of the Boer nation. The personal note in the address was, +therefore, both instructive and welcome, and it elicited a response in +which the charm of a calm and generous nature shines through an +unalterable determination to know and do the right:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"As regards myself personally, I cannot but feel it is a great + source of strength at a trying time to be assured of the + confidence and approval of the men I see before me, and of all + whom they represent. You refer to my having to encounter + misrepresentation and antagonism. I do not wish to make too much + of that. I have no doubt been exposed to much criticism and some + abuse. There has, I sometimes think, been an exceptional display + of mendacity at my expense. But this is the fate of every public + man who is forced by circumstances into a somewhat prominent + position in a great crisis. And, after all, praise and blame have + a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give them + time.</p> + +<p>"I remember when I left England for South Africa three years ago, + it was amidst a chorus of eulogy so excessive that it made me + feel thoroughly uncomfortable. To protest would have been + useless: it would only have looked like affectation. So I just + placed the surplus praise to my credit, so to speak, as something + to live on in the days which I surely knew must come sooner or + later, if I did <span class="pagenum"><a id="page365" name="page365"></a>(p. 365)</span> my duty, when I would meet with + undeserved censure. And certainly I have had to draw on that + account rather heavily during the last nine months. But there is + still a balance on the right side which, thanks to you and + others, is now once more increasing. So I cannot pose as a + martyr, and, what is more important, I cannot complain of any + want of support. No man, placed as I have been in a position of + singular embarrassment, exposed to bitter attacks to which he + could not reply, and unable to explain his conduct even to his + own friends, has ever had more compensation to be thankful for + than I have had in the constant, devoted, forbearing support and + confidence of all those South Africans, whether in this Colony, + in Natal, or in the Republics, whose sympathy is with the British + Empire.</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">Never again.</span> + +<p>"In the concluding paragraph of your address you refer in weighty + and well-considered language to the conditions which you deem + necessary for the future peace and prosperity of South Africa, + and for the ultimate harmony and fusion of its white races. I can + only say that I entirely agree with the views expressed in that + paragraph. The longer the struggle lasts, the greater the + sacrifices which it involves, the stronger must surely be the + determination of all of us to achieve a settlement which will + render the repetition of this terrible scourge impossible. 'Never + again,' must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. It + is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, not from any + desire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, enemy, that we + desire that the settlement shall be no patchwork and no + compromise; that it shall leave no room for misunderstanding, no + opportunity for intrigue, for the revival of impossible + ambitions, or the accumulation of enormous armaments. President + Krüger has said that he wants no more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page366" name="page366"></a>(p. 366)</span> Conventions, and + I entirely agree with him. A compromise of that sort is unfair to + everybody. If there is one thing of which, after recent + experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital + interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present + enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that + there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political + systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided + must be one country. To agree to a compromise which would leave + any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity: it would be + weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty—ingratitude to the heroic + dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations.</p> + +<p>"But when I say that, do not think that I wish to join in the + outcry, at present so prevalent, against the fine old virtue of + magnanimity. I believe in it as much as ever I did, and there is + plenty of room for it in the South Africa of to-day. We can show + it by a frank recognition of what is great and admirable in the + character of our enemies; by not maligning them as a body because + of the sins of the few, or perhaps even of many, individuals. We + can show it by not crowing excessively over our victories, and by + not thinking evil of every one who, for one reason or another, is + unable to join in our legitimate rejoicings. We can show it by + striving to take care that our treatment of those who have been + guilty of rebellion, while characterised by a just severity + towards the really guilty parties, should be devoid of any spirit + of vindictiveness, or of race-prejudice. We can show it, above + all, when this dire struggle is over, by proving by our acts that + they libelled us who said that we fought for gold or any material + advantage, and that the rights and privileges which we have + resolutely claimed for ourselves we are prepared freely to extend + to others, even to those who have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page367" name="page367"></a>(p. 367)</span> fought against us, + whenever they are prepared loyally to accept them."<a id="footnotetag211" name="footnotetag211"></a><a href="#footnote211" title="Go to footnote 211"><span class="small">[211]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>It is the third of three critical utterances of which each is +summarised, as it were, in a single luminous phrase. To the Cape Dutch +he spoke at Graaf Reinet, after their own manner: "Of course you are +loyal!" To England, on the Uitlander's behalf, he wrote: "The case for +intervention is overwhelming." And now he gathered the whole long +lesson of the war into the two words, "never again."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">British policy.</span> + +<p>A month later Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham (May 11th), made +a general statement of the nature of the settlement upon which the +British Government had determined. The separate existence of the +Republics, "constantly intriguing as they had done with foreign +nations, constantly promoting agitation and disaffection in our own +colonies," was to be tolerated no longer; but the "individual +liberties" of the Boers were to be preserved. After the war was over a +period of Crown Colony government would be necessary; "but," he added, +"as soon as it is safe and possible it will be the desire and the +intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce these States into +the great circle of self-governing colonies." In making this +pronouncement Mr. Chamberlain referred in terms of just severity to +the injurious influence which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as the +official leader of the Liberal party, had exercised <span class="pagenum"><a id="page368" name="page368"></a>(p. 368)</span> upon the +diplomatic contest of the preceding year. At the precise period when a +word might have been worth anything to the cause of peace, Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, he said—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "had again and again declaimed his own opinion that not only was + war out of the question, but that military preparations of any + kind were altogether unnecessary. I do not speak of the wisdom + which dictated such an expression of opinion," Mr. Chamberlain + continued, "although he repeated that statement three days before + the ultimatum was delivered, and a week before the invasion of + Natal took place. I do not speak, therefore, of his foresight. + But what is to be said of the patriotism of a man who is not a + single individual but who represents a great party by virtue of + his position—although he does not represent it by virtue of his + opinion—what is to be said of such a man who, at such a time, + should countermine the endeavours for peace of Her Majesty's + Government?"</p> + +<p>And in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain warned his fellow-countrymen +"against the efforts which would be made by the politicians to snatch +from them the fruits of a victory which would be won by their +soldiers; and in particular against the campaign of misrepresentation +which had been commenced already by Mr. Paul, the Stop-the-War +Committee, and the other bodies which were so lavish with what they +were pleased to call their 'accurate information.'"</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.</span> + +<p>Had Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seen fit to profit by the experience +of the past, the whole of the suffering and loss of the next year and +a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page369" name="page369"></a>(p. 369)</span> half of wanton hostilities, in all human probability, +would have been avoided. But Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke was disregarded. +The senseless and unnatural alliance between the Afrikander +nationalists and the Liberal Opposition was renewed. It is quite true +that the official leader of the Opposition, in speaking at Glasgow on +June 7th, two days after Lord Roberts had occupied Pretoria, declared +that, in respect of the settlement, "one broad principle" must be laid +down—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "the British Imperial power, which has hitherto been supreme in + effect in South Africa, must in future be supreme in form as well + as in effect, and this naturally carries with it the point which + is sometimes put in the foreground, namely, that there must be no + possibility that any such outbreak of hostilities as we have been + witnessing shall again occur.... The two conquered States must, + in some form or under some condition, become States of the + British Empire."</p> + +<p>But when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to inform his audience +how this was to be done, he used expressions which not only robbed his +original statement of all significance as an indication of British +unanimity, but conveyed a direct intimation to the Afrikander +nationalists that their endeavours to frustrate the declared objects +of the Unionist Government would receive the support and encouragement +of the Opposition in England. His words were:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "We need have no doubt how it is to be done. By applying our + Liberal principles, the Liberal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page370" name="page370"></a>(p. 370)</span> principles from which + the strength of the Empire has been derived, and on which it + depends. Let us apply our Liberal principles, and whether our + party be in a majority, or in a minority, I think that it is well + in our power to secure that these principles shall be applied. + [The General Election was imminent.] Let us restore as early as + possible, and let us maintain, those rights of self-government + which give not only life and vigour, but contentment and loyalty + to every colony which enjoys them...."</p> + +<p>"Liberal principles," when applied to a given administrative problem, +as Mr. Chamberlain took occasion to point out (June 19th), meant, for +practical purposes, the opinions which prominent members of the +Liberal party were known to hold upon the matter in question. Lord +(then Mr.) Courtney was for autonomy—"the re-establishment of the +independence of the two Republics." Mr. Bryce advocated "the +establishment of two protected States, which would have a sham +independence of not much advantage to them for any practical or useful +purpose, but very dangerous to us." And then there was Mr. Morley. Now +Mr. Morley, only a week before, at Oxford (June 10th), had condemned +not only the war, but by implication, the rejection of President +Krüger's illusory Franchise Bill.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. John Morley.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I assert," said Mr. Morley, "that the evils which have resulted + from the war immeasurably transcend the evils with which it was + proposed to deal.... I abhor the whole transaction of the war. I + think in many ways it is an irreparable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page371" name="page371"></a>(p. 371)</span> situation. We + have done a great wrong—a wrong of which I believe there is + scarcely any Englishman living who will not bitterly + repent."<a id="footnotetag212" name="footnotetag212"></a><a href="#footnote212" title="Go to footnote 212"><span class="small">[212]</span></a></p> + +<p>With these words fresh in his memory, Mr. Chamberlain continued:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Is Mr. Morley a Liberal? I do not know in that case what would + become of the new territories if his principles were applied. But + this I do know—that in that case you would have immediately to + get rid of Sir Alfred Milner, who is the one great official in + South Africa who has shown from the first a true grasp of the + situation; and you would have also to get rid of the Colonial + Secretary, which would not, perhaps, matter."<a id="footnotetag213" name="footnotetag213"></a><a href="#footnote213" title="Go to footnote 213"><span class="small">[213]</span></a></p> + +<p>And so in 1900—after the Raid, after the long diplomatic conflict, +after the sudden revelation of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page372" name="page372"></a>(p. 372)</span> the military strength of the +Republics, after the ambitions of the Afrikander nationalists had been +unmasked, and after the Dutch subjects of the Queen had risen in +arms—the Liberal friends of the South African Dutch set themselves to +do again what they had done in 1880. Just as then President Krüger +wrote,<a id="footnotetag214" name="footnotetag214"></a><a href="#footnote214" title="Go to footnote 214"><span class="small">[214]</span></a> on behalf of himself and his Afrikander allies, to Lord +(then Mr.) Courtney: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere ... will be +useful.... We have done our duty, and used all legitimate influence to +cause the [Federation] proposals to fail"; so now these Boer +sympathisers prepared to work hand in hand with the Afrikander +nationalists in their endeavour to secure the "fall" of Lord Milner, +and to cause the Annexation proposals to "fail." Happily the analogy +ends here. Upon the "anvil" of Lord Milner the "hammers" of the +enemies of the Empire were worn out—<span class="italic">Tritantur mallei, remanet +incus</span>.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page373" name="page373"></a>(p. 373)</span> CHAPTER IX</h3> + +<p class="title">THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT</p> + + +<p>The correspondence forwarded to the Colonial Office during the first +half of the year 1900 by Lord Milner, and presented to the House of +Commons in time for the Settlement debate of July 25th, furnishes a +complete record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement. The +whole of this interesting and significant collection of documents is +worthy of attention; but all that can be done here is to direct the +notice of the reader to one or two of its more salient +features—features which illustrate the extraordinary condition of the +Cape Colony, and explain how the disaffection of the Dutch subjects of +the Crown was to be first aggravated, and then used as a means of +saving the independence of the Republics. The position taken up by the +Bond at the end of January (1900) in view of Mr. Schreiner's gradual +conversion to the side of the Imperial Government, is sufficiently +indicated in the resolution prepared for submission to the annual +Congress, to which reference has been already<a id="footnotetag215" name="footnotetag215"></a><a href="#footnote215" title="Go to footnote 215"><span class="small">[215]</span></a> made. It was, in +effect, a condemnation not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page374" name="page374"></a>(p. 374)</span> only of the British Government, +but of the Cape Government also, in so far as it had co-operated with +the Imperial authorities, and a determination to prevent the war from +being carried to a logical and successful conclusion by the +incorporation of the Boer Republics into the system of British South +Africa. The annual Congress, at which these opinions were to be +affirmed, was announced to be held at Somerset East, on March 8th. +Lord Milner, however, represented to Mr. Schreiner that it was very +undesirable that such a demonstration should take place; and, through +Mr. Schreiner's influence, the Congress was postponed. But the Prime +Minister, in undertaking to use his influence with the Bond to prevent +a denunciation of the policy of the Imperial Government at so critical +a period, expressed the hope that the loyalists on their side would +refrain from any public demonstration of an opposite character.</p> + +<p>This abstinence from agitation, which was obviously desirable in the +public interests at a time of intense political excitement, by no +means suited the leaders of the Bond. <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, in commenting upon +the postponement of the Congress, incidentally reveals the real +consideration which made it worth while for the Bond to promote an +agitation of this kind. The Bond organ regrets that the Congress has +been postponed. And why?</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "It is said that the [South African] League would have held a + Congress had the Bond Congress been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page375" name="page375"></a>(p. 375)</span> held. We have + nothing to do with what the League does or does not do; as a + matter of fact, its opinion has already been published in the + Imperial Blue-books. We were of opinion that it would have been + the duty of the Afrikander party to express itself at the + Congress in unmistakable terms, and resolutely, in order thereby + to maintain its true position and strengthen the hands of its + friends in England who have courageously and with self-sacrifice + striven for the good and just cause."<a id="footnotetag216" name="footnotetag216"></a><a href="#footnote216" title="Go to footnote 216"><span class="small">[216]</span></a></p> + +<p>This, then, was the real object of the agitation—to "strengthen the +hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England." The writer +of this article suggests, however, that there is still a prospect that +the "good cause" may be promoted, after all, in the way which he +desires.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Origin of the movement.</span> + +<p>This prospect was speedily realised. With characteristic astuteness, +the Bond leaders discovered a method by which their object could be +achieved without exposing themselves to the reproach of "stirring up +strife." The meetings were to be held, not as Bond meetings, but as +"conciliation" meetings. The manner in which the machinery of the +conciliation movement was originally set in motion will appear from +the following telegram, which President Krüger sent to President +Steyn, on January 20th—that is, a little more than a month before the +Bond Congress was postponed:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "A certain E. T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom Dr. + Leyds formerly wrote that he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page376" name="page376"></a>(p. 376)</span> had done much in Holland + to work up the peace memorial to Queen Victoria, has come here, + as he says, from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range + themselves openly on our side, to make propaganda in the Cape + Colony, provided an official declaration is given that the + Republics only desire to secure complete independence. He wished + that I should write a letter to Queen Victoria, but this I + refused, and thought it desirable that I should write a letter to + him personally, in which an answer is given to his question. He + thinks that a great propaganda can be made in the Cape Colony, + whereby influence can be brought to bear again on the English + people and the world. I myself do not expect much result, but + think that a letter can do good, and should be glad to have your + opinion and observations as soon as possible."<a id="footnotetag217" name="footnotetag217"></a><a href="#footnote217" title="Go to footnote 217"><span class="small">[217]</span></a></p> + +<p>This telegram, one of the many documents found at Bloemfontein upon +its occupation by Lord Roberts, is supplemented by the further facts +disclosed by the investigations of the Concessions Commission, that a +sum of £1,000 was advanced to Mr. Hargrove by the manager of the +Netherlands Railway on February 3rd, 1900, and that this loan, paid in +specie, was "debited to the account 'Political Situation,' to be +hereafter arranged with the Government." The purposes for which Mr. +Hargrove secured this large sum are stated in the following question +and answer:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Hargrove's £1,000.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Q. 591. "Did he ask for money to carry out this object [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to + stop the war on the assurance that the Boers wanted nothing more + than their independence]?"</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page377" name="page377"></a>(p. 377)</span> <span class="smcap">Mr. J. van Kretschmar</span>, General Manager of the + Netherlands South African Railway Company: "Yes; he said he had + travelling expenses to defray, a lot of publications to issue, + and books to be written, and he asked for money for these + purposes."<a id="footnotetag218" name="footnotetag218"></a><a href="#footnote218" title="Go to footnote 218"><span class="small">[218]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>Three months later President Krüger's telegram was laid before the two +ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's +request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating +or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it +contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove +had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner +which he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page378" name="page378"></a>(p. 378)</span> appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr. +Merriman himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To +this letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask + you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of + mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear + from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of + the cab which waits?..."</p> + +<p>In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and +presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr. +Hargrove wrote:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to + Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any + shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not + speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your + name in this way: I told President Krüger of a conversation I had + had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his attitude + would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their + forces from colonial territory on the condition that their + independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in + those circumstances he would, in his personal capacity, most + certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although + he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would + do the same."</p> + +<p>Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President +Krüger's telegram is due to the circumstance that it was probably +"dictated <span class="pagenum"><a id="page379" name="page379"></a>(p. 379)</span> in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and +contained a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk" +translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch.</p> + +<p>Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr. +Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more +intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,<a id="footnotetag219" name="footnotetag219"></a><a href="#footnote219" title="Go to footnote 219"><span class="small">[219]</span></a> he had +been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's +"well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was +immediately followed by the rebellion of that district."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Graaf Reinet congress.</span> + +<p>This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the +Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that +"the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be +strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May +30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British +Empire," he said,<a id="footnotetag220" name="footnotetag220"></a><a href="#footnote220" title="Go to footnote 220"><span class="small">[220]</span></a> "were not the Boers, but those who had set up +the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to +renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in +their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the +following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to +continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not +propose to rely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page380" name="page380"></a>(p. 380)</span> exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It +resolved to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple +truth as they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland.</p> + +<p>There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official +correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State +which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated +absolutely President Krüger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come +here [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In +view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the +letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded +to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be +sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert +Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of +South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of <span class="italic">The South African +News</span>—that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed +before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views +of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question <span class="italic">The South +African News</span> rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but +none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had +surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on +parole; by publishing stories of imaginary Boer victories; by +eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page381" name="page381"></a>(p. 381)</span> £1,000 from +the Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent +and vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr. +Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and +condemned to a term of imprisonment.<a id="footnotetag221" name="footnotetag221"></a><a href="#footnote221" title="Go to footnote 221"><span class="small">[221]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mischievous effects.</span> + +<p>The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a +passage in the despatch<a id="footnotetag222" name="footnotetag222"></a><a href="#footnote222" title="Go to footnote 222"><span class="small">[222]</span></a> which covers the transmission of the +newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After +stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the +postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the +leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public +demonstration of their opinions, he writes:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "There was a truce of God on both sides. Then came the + 'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to + end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous + than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of + course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would + have been useless—and, as a matter of fact, I did not + attempt—to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side. + Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to + pronounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to + give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government + and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these + meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the + tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of + violent things <span class="pagenum"><a id="page382" name="page382"></a>(p. 382)</span> have been said, and a certain amount of + unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those + [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary + provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been + the case."</p> + +<p>That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence +in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under +martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in +sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the +Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of +promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the +part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in +which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political +co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal +party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew +that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and +sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave +his adherence left him in no doubt on this point.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress, + "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple + aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in, + Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics + and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged + from generation to generation."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page383" name="page383"></a>(p. 383)</span> To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to +invite rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of +the Boers, and to embarrass the British authorities, both civil and +military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the +Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the +Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in +this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same +results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander +nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may +be left to form his own judgment.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Comrades or dupes.</span> + +<p>This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists +the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and +to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa, +was the co-operation of these Englishmen—whether comrades or +dupes—who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense +sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was +natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord +Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to +take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the +Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are + never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal, + why should they make <span class="pagenum"><a id="page384" name="page384"></a>(p. 384)</span> such furious efforts to keep it up + at the present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations + that the Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor + acquiesce, seems to me to indicate a considerable and + well-justified anxiety on their part lest these terrible things + should, after all, happen."</p> + +<p>But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British +soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and +Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and +enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th—May 1st), and +subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal, +considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of +the republican invaders and re-establishing British authority in the +districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of +these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of +the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the +treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr. +Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still +held the opinions of the Bond.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The punishment of rebels.</span> + +<p>In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a +despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home +Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and +the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers +to give formal expression to their views <span class="pagenum"><a id="page385" name="page385"></a>(p. 385)</span> upon the subjects +to which Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later +Lord Milner reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which +Mr. Schreiner and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for +persons indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be +impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a +special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature +of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner +wrote:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the + selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders, + whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose + punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the + remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound + policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious + Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation + of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their + good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except + those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to + their avocations."<a id="footnotetag223" name="footnotetag223"></a><a href="#footnote223" title="Go to footnote 223"><span class="small">[223]</span></a></p> + +<p>The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions, +and the arguments by which they were supported—notably an appeal to +the "Canadian precedent"—were telegraphed to the Home Government, and +on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While <span class="pagenum"><a id="page386" name="page386"></a>(p. 386)</span> +the people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling +against "those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's +forces, whether enemies or rebels"—did, in fact, desire that all +racial animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest +possible moment after the war was over—the "sentiments of both sides" +must be taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue +from "the rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels +were actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over +than those who had risked life and property in the determination to +remain "loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than +the bad results to be anticipated from any display of a revengeful +policy on the part of the loyalists. He continued:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of + Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an + obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two + policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of + future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be + indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful, + it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the + State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present + moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while + efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into + rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing + that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And + if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious + subjects are the mere tools of those who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page387" name="page387"></a>(p. 387)</span> have deceived + them, it is important that these should be made aware + individually that, whatever their leaders may tell them, + rebellion is a punishable offence.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">Clemency and justice.</span> + +<p>"Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to + rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and + under martial law, the punishment of death might have been + inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty, + and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to + return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are + many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government + desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing + effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those + who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal + fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to + the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag, + firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not + guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly + waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined + themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information + or furnishing provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily + prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her + Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible, + drawn between these different classes.</p> + +<p>"Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting + for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they + would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the + expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission + which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated + by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to + schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page388" name="page388"></a>(p. 388)</span> under the various heads indicated above. It would be + necessary to decide beforehand how the different categories + should then be dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of + course, be brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by + them. Might not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be + thereupon either sentenced to a fine carrying with it + disfranchisement, or released on recognisances, to come up for + judgment when called upon (this also to involve + disfranchisement), while 6 might be subjected to disfranchisement + alone? Her Majesty's Government offer these as suggestions for + the consideration of your ministers.</p> + +<p>"In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a + general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that + they are of a highly controversial character, and it is + impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication + of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required. + Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which + they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one + not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white + population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and + which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of + justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races + are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the + third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the + action to be taken in such cases depends upon circumstances which + must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada + in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's + authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions + which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the + day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has + been adhesion to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page389" name="page389"></a>(p. 389)</span> the Queen's enemies during war by + those who have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who + have for a generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In + Canada the insurrection was never a formidable one from a + military point of view; in the Cape it has added very largely to + the cost and difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and + heavy loss to Her Majesty's troops."<a id="footnotetag224" name="footnotetag224"></a><a href="#footnote224" title="Go to footnote 224"><span class="small">[224]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">The ministry divided.</span> + +<p>This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels—moderate in the light +of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the +practice of foreign States—failed to commend itself to the Afrikander +Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers' +minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner +inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the +disfranchisement proposed was for life or for a period only; and +further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the +representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government +were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May +4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June +10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the +policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as +to the period of disfranchisement, he pointed out that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it + disfranchisement for life, and if the offenders were spared the + other and severer penalties of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page390" name="page390"></a>(p. 390)</span> rebellion, justice + seemed to demand that they should suffer the full political + penalty. Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's + Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Mr. Schreiner resigns.</span> + +<p>On June 11th Lord Milner was informed by Mr. Schreiner that ministers +were hopelessly divided on the subject of the treatment of the rebels, +and that their differences could not be composed, and on the following +day he replied that, if he could not receive the support of a +unanimous Cabinet to which he, as Governor, was constitutionally +entitled, he would be compelled, in the discharge of his duty, to seek +it elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner's resignation, which was placed in Lord +Milner's hands on the next day, was followed by the appointment, on +June 18th, of a Progressive Ministry with Sir Gordon Sprigg as Prime +Minister and Sir James Rose Innes as Attorney-General. Mr. Schreiner, +in his memorandum of June 11th, had forwarded to Lord Milner documents +containing particulars of the individual views of the members of his +Cabinet. Mr. Solomon, the Attorney-General, was prepared to adopt a +policy in respect of the treatment of the rebels, and the machinery by +which that policy was to be carried out, which appeared to him to +involve nothing that would prevent "complete accord between Her +Majesty's Government and this Government on the question." And in this +view both Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Herholdt concurred. But the remaining +members of the Cabinet were entirely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page391" name="page391"></a>(p. 391)</span> opposed to any policy +other than that of granting a general amnesty to all rebels except the +"principal offenders," and allowing these latter to be tried by the +machinery of justice already in existence—<span class="italic">i.e.</span> by Afrikander +juries. The minutes which they respectively addressed to the Prime +Minister were bitter invectives directed alike against the Home +Government and Lord Milner.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "We are asked," Mr. Merriman wrote, on his own and Mr. Sauer's + behalf, with reference to the suggestions of the Home Government, + "to deal with a number of men who have, at worst, taken up arms + in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous + war—a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist + what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly + spoken of as a crime.... These men, irrespective of class, we are + asked to put under a common political proscription, to deprive + them of their civil rights, and by so doing (in fact, this is the + main commendation of the measure to the "loyals") to deprive + their friends and kinsfolk, who have rendered the Colony yeoman + service at the most critical time, of that legitimate influence + which belongs to a majority. We are asked, in fact, to create a + class of political 'helots' in South Africa, where we are now + waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of + putting an end to a similar state of affairs."</p> + +<p>Of course, all this and much more might have been read at any time +since the war began in the columns of <span class="italic">The South African News</span>, but in +a minister's memorandum to the Prime Minister, and over the signature +"John X. Merriman," its <span class="pagenum"><a id="page392" name="page392"></a>(p. 392)</span> naked hostility arrests the mind. +Dr. Te Water's memorandum, although much shorter than that of Mr. +Merriman, is even more outspoken. To him, the direct representative of +the republican nationalists in the Afrikander Cabinet, amnesty for the +rebels is the "sound and proper policy." And naturally, since in his +eyes the rebels themselves are—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "British subjects of Dutch extraction who, after vainly + endeavouring, by all possible constitutional means, to prevent + what they, in common with the rest of the civilised world, + believe to be an unjust and infamous war against their near + kinsmen, aided the Republics in the terrible struggle forced upon + them."<a id="footnotetag225" name="footnotetag225"></a><a href="#footnote225" title="Go to footnote 225"><span class="small">[225]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">A progressive ministry.</span> + +<p>This is vitriol-throwing, but it is none the less significant. These +three men formed half of the six ministers to whom collectively, Lord +Milner, as Governor of the Cape Colony, had to look for advice during +the two critical years that the Afrikander party was in power. +Fortunately, in his capacity of High Commissioner for South Africa, he +was free to act without their advice, as the representative of the +Queen. Even so, his achievement is little less than marvellous. Aided +by Mr. Schreiner's pathetic sense of loyalty to the person of the +sovereign, he had kept the Cape Government outwardly true to its +allegiance. The long hours of patient remonstrance, the word-battles +from which the Prime Minister had risen sometimes white with +passionate resentment, had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page393" name="page393"></a>(p. 393)</span> not been useless. By tact, by +serenity of disposition, by depth of conviction, and latterly by sheer +force of argument, Lord Milner had won Mr. Schreiner, not indeed to +the side of England, but at least to the side of that Empire-State of +which England was the head. With the Prime Minister went Sir Richard +Solomon, Mr. Herholdt, and one or two of the Afrikander rank and file. +Thus reinforced, the Progressives commanded a working majority in the +Legislative Assembly, and the ascendancy of the Afrikander party was +at an end.</p> + +<p>Apart from the secession of Mr. Schreiner and his immediate followers, +the Parliamentary strength of the Afrikander party was lessened by +another circumstance, to which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman referred +in the debate on the South African Settlement in the House of Commons +on July 25th. Certain members of the Cape Parliament, said the leader +of the Liberal Opposition, had been arrested for high treason, with +the result that the Afrikander party was deprived of their votes, and +the balance of power between that party and the Progressive party was +upset. And he protested against this manner of turning an Afrikander +majority into a minority. The reply which these remarks on the part of +this friend of the Afrikander party in England drew from the +Government is instructive:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "May I remind the right honourable gentleman," said Mr. Balfour, + "that the balance of parties was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page394" name="page394"></a>(p. 394)</span> disturbed by another + and different cause on which he has made no protest? Some members + of that Parliament, not sharing the views of those who are + imprisoned, are now fighting at the front and risking their lives + in the defence of the Empire. Their party is deprived of their + services in the Cape Parliament, and I should have thought that + this would have affected the right honourable gentleman much more + than the absence of men who, under any circumstances, must be + supposed to be under the darkest suspicion as to their view and + policy respecting the country to which they owe allegiance."</p> + +<p>The Cape Parliament met under the new Ministry in July, and the chief +business of the session, which lasted until the middle of October, was +the passing of the Treason Bill. On July 9th Lord Milner was able to +inform Mr. Chamberlain (by telegram) that the Bill had been prepared, +and to indicate the nature of its main provisions. These were: (1) An +indemnity for acts done under martial law; (2) the establishment of a +Special Court to try cases in which the Attorney-General might decide +to indict any person for high treason, such cases to be tried without +a jury; (3) the establishment of a Special Commission to "deal with +rebels not so indicted and to punish all found guilty with +disfranchisement for five years from the date of conviction"; and (4) +the legalisation of the already existing Compensation Commission. In a +despatch dated July 26th—the day after the Settlement debate in the +House of Commons—Mr. Chamberlain replied at length to the arguments +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page395" name="page395"></a>(p. 395)</span> put forward by the Schreiner Ministry in favour of a general +amnesty, and exposed in particular the historical inaccuracy of the +appeal to the "Canadian precedent." At the same time he stated that +Her Majesty's Government, while they could not be a consenting party +to a policy condoning adhesion to the enemy in the field, had no doubt +that "such a measure of penalty as the mass of loyal opinion in the +Colony considered adequate would meet with their concurrence." That is +to say, the proposal of the Home Government for disfranchisement for +life was not pressed, but was abandoned in favour of the lenient +penalty originally proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, independently of +any consideration of the views of the Colonial Office, and now adopted +by the Progressive Ministry.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The treason bill.</span> + +<p>In spite of its leniency, the Treason Bill met with the violent and +protracted resistance of the Afrikander party in the Legislative +Assembly. The opportunity thus afforded for the delivery of fierce +invectives against the Imperial authorities was utilised to the full, +and the fires of disaffection lighted by the "Conciliation" meetings +were kindled anew into the second and more disastrous conflagration +that culminated in the proceedings of the Worcester +Conference (December 6th). In the Cape Parliamentary Reports the +picture of this nightmare session is to be found faithfully presented +in all its ugly and grotesque details. Two facts will serve to show to +what a degree <span class="pagenum"><a id="page396" name="page396"></a>(p. 396)</span> the members of the Legislative Assembly of +this British colony had identified themselves with the cause of the +enemy. The first is the circumstance that it was a common practice of +the Afrikander members to refer in Parliament to the military +successes of the Boers with pride as "our" victories. The second is +the fact that Mr. Sauer, only three months ago a minister of the +Crown, declared, in opposing the second reading of the Bill, that "a +time would come when there would be very few Dutchmen who would not +blush when they told their children that they had not helped their +fellow-countrymen in their hour of need."<a id="footnotetag226" name="footnotetag226"></a><a href="#footnote226" title="Go to footnote 226"><span class="small">[226]</span></a> Morally, though not +legally, the Afrikander members had gone over to the enemy no less +than the rebels who had taken up arms against their sovereign. This +was the "loyalty" of the Bond.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner visits the colonies.</span> + +<p>The Treason Bill was promulgated, under the title of "The Indemnity +and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," on October 12th. On the same day +Lord Milner left Capetown for a brief visit to the Transvaal and +Orange River Colony. The intention of the Home Government to place the +administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies in his +hands had been made known to him informally; and it was obviously +desirable, therefore, that he should acquaint himself with the actual +state of affairs as soon as possible. After a somewhat adventurous +journey <span class="pagenum"><a id="page397" name="page397"></a>(p. 397)</span> through the Orange River Colony, he reached Pretoria +on the 15th, and remained at the capital until the 22nd. He then +proceeded to Johannesburg, where he spent the next three days (October +22nd to 25th). At both places he made provisional arrangements, in +consultation with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, for the early +establishment of so much of the machinery of civil administration as +the exigencies of the military situation permitted. Leaving +Johannesburg on the 25th, the High Commissioner stopped for the night +at Kroonstad, <span class="italic">en route</span> for Bloemfontein. On the morning following he +woke up to find the train still motionless, since the line had been +cut by the Boers—an almost daily occurrence at this period of the +war. After a few hours, however, the journey was resumed; but the High +Commissioner's train was preceded by an armoured train as far as +Smalldeel, from which point it ran without escort to Bloemfontein, +where he remained until November 1st. Here, in addition to making the +necessary arrangements for the beginning of civil administration in +the Orange River Colony, Lord Milner had the satisfaction of +inaugurating the career of the South African Constabulary under the +command of Major-General Baden-Powell. The departure from Bloemfontein +was delayed for a few hours by the destruction of the span of a +railway bridge by the Boers; but at 12 o'clock the High <span class="pagenum"><a id="page398" name="page398"></a>(p. 398)</span> +Commissioner's train, again preceded by its armoured companion, was +able to resume its journey southwards. In the course of the following +day (November 2nd) the English mail, going northwards from Capetown, +was met, and among other communications which Lord Milner then +received was the despatch of October 18th enclosing the commissions +under which he was appointed to administer the new colonies upon Lord +Roberts's approaching return to England.</p> + +<p>Lord Milner arrived at Capetown on November 3rd. During his three +weeks' absence the situation in the Cape Colony had changed for the +worse. After the Treason Bill debates the anti-British propaganda, +still carried on under the grotesque pretence of promoting +"conciliation," had taken a different and more sinister form. To their +denunciation of the Home Government and its treatment of the +Republics, the Afrikander nationalists now added slander and abuse of +the British and colonial troops in South Africa. In order to +understand how such calumnies were possible in the face of the +singular humanity with which the military operations of the Imperial +troops had been conducted, a brief reference to the course of the war +is necessary. The change from regular to guerilla warfare initiated by +the Boer leaders in the later months of this year (1900), and the +consequent withdrawal of British garrisons from insecurely held +districts both in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, were +accompanied by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page399" name="page399"></a>(p. 399)</span> return to arms of many burghers who, on +taking the oath of neutrality, had been allowed to resume their civil +occupations. This breach of faith, whether voluntary or compulsory, +compelled the British military commanders to adopt measures of greater +severity in the operations undertaken for the reconquest of the +revolted areas. The punishment inflicted upon the inhabitants of such +areas, especially those adjoining the colonial border, although +merciful in comparison with the penalties actually incurred under the +laws of war by those who, having surrendered, resumed their arms, was +considerably more rigorous than the treatment to which the republican +Dutch had been originally subjected. This legitimate and necessary +increase of severity, displayed by the British commanders in districts +where the burghers had surrendered, and then taken up arms a second, +or even a third time, was the sole basis of fact upon which the +Afrikander nationalists in the Cape Colony founded the vast volume of +imaginary outrage and inhumanity on the part of the Imperial troops +which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was held subsequently to have +endorsed by accusing the British Government of carrying on the war in +South Africa by "methods of barbarism."<a id="footnotetag227" name="footnotetag227"></a><a href="#footnote227" title="Go to footnote 227"><span class="small">[227]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Libels on the British troops.</span> + +<p>The weapon now adopted for the anti-British campaign was the +circulation through the Bond <span class="pagenum"><a id="page400" name="page400"></a>(p. 400)</span> Press, Dutch and English, of +accounts of cruel or infamous acts alleged to have been committed by +British soldiers, and described with every detail calculated to arouse +the passionate resentment of the colonial Dutch. There is only one way +in which the reader can be brought to understand the wantonly false +and wholly disgraceful character of these libels. It is to place +before his eyes the literal translation of two examples, printed in +Dutch in <span class="italic">The Worcester Advertiser</span> of November 23rd, 1900; that is to +say, in anticipation of the People's Congress, which was to be held +less than a fortnight later (December 6th) at the little town in the +Western Province so named. The article is headed: "Dreadful Murders +perpetrated on Farmers, Women, and Children, near Boshoff:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Two examples.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"... This unfortunate man [a Boer prisoner] left behind him his + dear wife and four children. One or two days after his departure + there came a couple of heroes in the house of the unfortunate + woman, locked the doors and set fire to the curtains. The woman, + awfully frightened by it, was in a cruel way handled by these + ruffians, and compelled to make known where the guns and + ammunition were hidden. The poor woman, surrounded by her dear + children (who were from time to time pushed back by these + soldiers), answered that she could swear before the holy God that + there was not a single gun or cartridge or anything of that sort + hidden on that farm. In the meantime the curtains were destroyed + by the smoke and flames to ashes. The house, at least, was not + attacked by the flames, but the low, mean lot put at the four + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page401" name="page401"></a>(p. 401)</span> corners of the house a certain amount of dynamite, to + destroy it in this way.</p> + +<p>"The heroic warrior and commander over a portion of the civilised + (?) British troops knocked with great force at the door of the + house—where still the poor wife and children were upon their + knees praying to the Heavenly Father for deliverance—saying, 'I + give you ten minutes' time to acquaint me and point out to me + where the weapons and ammunition are hidden, and if you do not + comply I shall make the house and all fly into the air.' The poor + wife fell upon her knees before the cruel man; prayed the cruel + man to spare her and her children, where God was her witness + there was nothing of the kind on the farm, neither was there + anything stowed away in the house.</p> + +<p>"Standing before him, as if deprived of her senses, [was] the + poor wife with her four innocent children, and when the ten + minutes had expired house and all were blown to atoms with + dynamite, and [there were] laid in ruins, the bodies of the + deplorable five. May the good God receive their souls with + Him!...</p> + +<p>"A wife of a Transvaal Boer (who is still in the field, fighting + for his freedom and right) was lodging with one of her relations, + when, two days later, after she had given birth to a baby boy, + she was visited by seven warriors, or so-called Tommy Atkins; the + young urchin was taken away from its mother by its two legs, by + the so-called noble British, and his head battered in against the + bed-post until it had breathed its last, and thereupon thrown out + by the door as if it was the carcase of a cat or dog. Then these + damn wretches began their play with this poor and weak woman, who + only 48 hours before was delivered of a child. The poor wife was + treated so low and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page402" name="page402"></a>(p. 402)</span> debauched by this seven that she, + after a few hours, gave up the spirit, and like her child [was] + murdered in the most dissolute manner.... Can we longer allow + that our fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, relatives, yes, our + children, are murdered by these coward and common murderers? or + has not the time yet arrived to prevent this civilised nation, or + to punish them for their atrocities?"<a id="footnotetag228" name="footnotetag228"></a><a href="#footnote228" title="Go to footnote 228"><span class="small">[228]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>On November 26th <span class="italic">The South African News</span> published the translation of +a letter to the Press, written by a member of the Legislative +Assembly, in view of the same meeting:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"I am yet glad that another People's Congress will be held.</p> + +<p>"It is our duty to speak now; it is more than time to protest, as + British subjects, against the extermination of defenceless women + and children....</p> + +<p>"But, in Heaven's name, let the Congress be a People's Congress + in reality. Let no one or other stay away for one or other small + difficulty. Let members of Parliament, clergymen, yes, every man, + old or young, be present at Worcester on the 6th of December + next. Let them turn up in numbers. Let us use our rights as + British subjects in a worthy and decided manner. Let us at least + adopt three petitions or resolutions: (1) Praying Her Majesty, + our Gracious Queen, to make an end to the burning of homes and + the ill-treatment of helpless women and children; if not, that + they may be murdered at once, rather than die slowly by hunger + and torture; (2) a petition in which it be urged that the war + should be ended, and the Republics allowed to retain their + independence; <span class="pagenum"><a id="page403" name="page403"></a>(p. 403)</span> and finally, a pledge that those who do + not wish to sign these petitions will no longer be supported by + us in any way.</p> + +<p>"[No shopkeeper, attorney, doctor, master, or any one—no + victuals, meat, bread, meal, sheep, oxen, horses, vegetables, + fruit whatsoever will he sell to the jingoes until the wrong is + righted and compensated.]</p> + +<p>"The dam is full. Our nation cannot, dare not, say with Cain, 'Am + I my brother's keeper?' There must be a way out for the + overflowing water. Disloyal deeds and talk are wrong. But if we, + as a nation, as one man, earnestly and decisively lay our hands + to the plough in a constitutional manner, and are determined, I + trust, through God's help, we shall—yes, we must—win."</p> +</div> + +<p>The passage placed in brackets, in which this member of the Cape +Parliament urges that all who may refuse to sign the two "petitions" +should be rigorously boycotted, was omitted—without any indication of +omission—by <span class="italic">The South African News</span>. <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, on the other hand, +expressed approval of the letter as it stood.<a id="footnotetag229" name="footnotetag229"></a><a href="#footnote229" title="Go to footnote 229"><span class="small">[229]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Worcester congress.</span> + +<p>These were the kind of stories, and the kind of appeals, with which +the mind of the colonial Dutch had been inflamed by the nationalist +leaders when the Worcester Congress met. The gathering is said to have +consisted of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons; and its promoters +claimed that a far larger number—120,000 persons—were represented by +the deputies sent from ninety-seven districts in the Colony. At the +close of the meeting a deputation was appointed to lay the resolutions +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page404" name="page404"></a>(p. 404)</span> passed by the Congress before the High Commissioner, and +request him to bring them officially to the notice of the Home +Government. It was composed of Mr. de Villiers, a minister of the +Dutch Reformed Church; a member of the Legislative Council; the member +of the Legislative Assembly for Worcester, and two others. This +deputation was received by Lord Milner at Government House on December +11th, and the circumstances of the remarkable interview which then +took place present a striking picture of the state of the Colony at +this time, and of the extraordinary attitude which the mass of the +Dutch population had assumed towards the representative of their +sovereign. It is one of those illuminating occasions in which a whole +situation is, as it were, gathered up into a single scene.</p> + +<p>The disloyal purpose of the deputation is heightened rather than +concealed by the disguise of the constitutional forms in which it is +clothed. The scarcely veiled demand for the independence of the Cape +Colony, now put forward by the Afrikander nationalists, is as +magnificently audacious as the ultimatum. Knowing the infamous +character of the methods by which the agitation in favour of the Boers +was being promoted, Lord Milner might have been excused if he had +given way to some strong expressions of indignation. No such note, +however, is heard in his reply. He is as dry and passionless as an +attorney receiving his clients. Yet his words are as frank as his +manner is composed. To these delegates he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page405" name="page405"></a>(p. 405)</span> speaks the most +terrible truths with the same freedom as he would have used, if the +business of their errand had been a pleasant interchange of +compliments, instead of a grim defiance that might, or might not, be +converted from words into deeds.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Deputation to Lord Milner.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner, who is accompanied only by his private secretary, +surprises the deputation at the outset by requesting that the +resolutions may be read forthwith in his presence. They are:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"1. We, men and women of South Africa assembled and represented + here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to + England, and having taken into earnest consideration the + deplorable condition into which the peoples of South Africa have + been plunged, and the grave dangers threatening our civilisation, + record our solemn conviction that the highest interest of South + Africa demand (1) A termination of the war now raging, with its + untold misery and horror, as well as the burning of houses, the + devastation of the country, the extermination of a white + nationality, and the treatment to which women and children are + subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting legacy of + bitterness and hatred, while seriously endangering the future + relationship between the forces of civilisation and barbarism in + South Africa; and (2) the retention by the Republics of their + independence, whereby alone the peace of South Africa can be + maintained.</p> + +<p>"2. That this meeting desires a full recognition of the right of + the people of this Colony to settle and manage its own affairs, + and expresses its grave disapproval of the policy pursued and + adopted in this matter by the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir + Alfred Milner.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page406" name="page406"></a>(p. 406)</span> "3. That this Congress solemnly pledges itself to labour + in a constitutional way unceasingly for the attainment of the + objects contained in the above resolutions, and resolves to send + a deputation to His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner to bring these + resolutions officially to the notice of Her Majesty's + Government."</p> +</div> + +<p>These resolutions having been read, Mr. de Villiers proceeds to make +two points. First, there will be no lasting peace in South Africa +until the independence of the Republics is restored; unless this is +done, race feeling will go on prevailing "for generations." And, +second, it is the "devastation of property" and "the treatment of the +women and children" by the British that has roused the colonial Dutch +to assemble at the Congress. Mr. Pretorius, the member of the +Legislative Council, then drives home both of these points by a short +but emphatic speech, delivered in Dutch, in which he asserts that one +of the consequences of the war will be a "never-ending irreconcilable +racial hatred" between the British and Dutch inhabitants.<a id="footnotetag230" name="footnotetag230"></a><a href="#footnote230" title="Go to footnote 230"><span class="small">[230]</span></a> Lord +Milner then rises from his chair and replies to the deputation:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's reply.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I accede to your request to bring these resolutions to the + notice of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is doubtful + whether I ought to do so, but in view of the prevailing + bitterness and excitement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page407" name="page407"></a>(p. 407)</span> it is better to err, if one + must err, on the side of conciliation and fairness. And, having + regard especially to the fact that one of the resolutions is + directed against myself, I wish to avoid any appearance of a + desire to suppress its companions on account of it. But, having + gone thus far on the road of concession, I take the liberty, in + no unfriendly and polemical spirit, of asking you quite frankly + what good you think can be done by resolutions of this character? + I am not now referring to the resolution against myself. That is + a matter of very minor importance. The pith of the whole business + is in resolution number one, a resolution evidently framed with + great care by the clever men who are engineering the present + agitation in the Colony. Now, that resolution asks for two +<span class="sidenote2">War no longer justifiable.</span> + things—a termination of the war, and the restoration of the + independence of the Republics. In desiring the termination of the + war we are all agreed, but nothing can be less conducive to the + attainment of that end than to encourage in those who are still + carrying on a hopeless resistance the idea that there is any, + even the remotest chance, of the policy of annexation being + reversed. I am not now speaking for myself. This is not a + question for me. I am simply directing your attention to the + repeatedly declared policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy + just endorsed by an enormous majority of the nation, and not only + by the ordinary supporters of the Government, but by the bulk of + those ordinarily opposed to it. Moreover, that policy is approved + by all the great self-governing colonies of the Empire, except + this one, and in this one by something like half the white + population, and practically the whole of the native. And this + approving half of the white population, be it observed, embraces + all those who, in the recent hour of danger, when this Colony + itself was invaded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page408" name="page408"></a>(p. 408)</span> and partially annexed, fought and + suffered for the cause of Queen and Empire. I ask you, is it + reasonable to suppose that Her Majesty's Government is going back + upon a policy deliberately adopted, repeatedly declared, and + having this overwhelming weight of popular support throughout the + whole Empire behind it? And if it is not, I ask you further: What + is more likely to lead to a termination of the war—a recognition + of the irrevocable nature of this policy, or the reiteration of + menacing protests against it? And there is another respect in + which I fear this resolution is little calculated to promote that + speedy restoration of peace which we have all at heart. I refer + to the tone of aggressive exaggeration which characterises its + allusions to the conduct of the war. No doubt the resolution is + mild compared with some of the speeches by which it was + supported, just as those speeches themselves were mild compared + with much that we are now too well accustomed to hear and to + read, in the way of misrepresentation and abuse of the British + Government, British statesmen, British soldiers, the British + people. But even the resolution, mild in comparison with such + excesses, is greatly lacking in that sobriety and accuracy which + it is so necessary for all of us to cultivate in these days of + bitterly inflamed passions. It really is preposterous to talk, + among other things, about 'the extermination of a white + nationality,' or to give any sort of countenance to the now fully + exploded calumny about the ill-treatment of women and children. + The war, gentlemen, has its horrors—every war has. Those horrors + increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy, + thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial + troops. But, having regard to the conditions, it is one of the + most humane wars that has ever been waged in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page409" name="page409"></a>(p. 409)</span> history. + It has been humane, I contend, on both sides, which does not, of + course, mean that on both sides there have not been isolated acts + deserving of condemnation. Still, the general direction, the + general spirit on both sides, has been humane. But it is another + question whether the war on the side of the enemy is any longer + justifiable. It is certainly not morally justifiable to carry on + a resistance involving the loss of many lives and the destruction + of an immense quantity of property, when the object of that + resistance can no longer, by any possibility, be attained. No + doubt, great allowance must be made for most of the men still + under arms, though it is difficult to defend the conduct of their + leaders in deceiving them. The bulk of the men still in the field + are buoyed up with false hopes. They are incessantly fed with + lies—lies as to their own chance of success, and, still worse, + as to the intention of the British Government with regard to them + should they surrender. And for that very reason it seems all the + more regrettable that anything should be said or done here which + could help still further to mislead them, still further to + encourage a resistance which creates the very evils that these + people are fighting to escape. It is because I am sincerely + convinced that a resolution of this character, like the meeting + at which it was passed, like the whole agitation of which that + meeting is part, is calculated, if it has any effect at all, + still further to mislead the men who are engaged in carrying on + this hopeless struggle, that I feel bound, in sending it to Her + Majesty's Government, to accompany it with this expression of my + strong personal dissent."<a id="footnotetag231" name="footnotetag231"></a><a href="#footnote231" title="Go to footnote 231"><span class="small">[231]</span></a></p> + +<p>The comment of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> upon Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester +Congress deputation was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page410" name="page410"></a>(p. 410)</span> an open defiance of the Imperial +authorities and a scarcely veiled incitement to rebellion. Mr. +Advocate Malan, the editor, who had been elected for the Malmesbury +Division upon the retirement of Mr. Schreiner—now rejected by the +Bond—wrote:<a id="footnotetag232" name="footnotetag232"></a><a href="#footnote232" title="Go to footnote 232"><span class="small">[232]</span></a></p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Sir Alfred Milner considers the request of the Afrikanders for + peace and justice unreasonable. The agitation has now reached the + end of the first period—that of pleading and petitioning. A deaf + ear has been turned to the cry of the Afrikanders and their + Church. But the battle for justice will continue from a different + standpoint—by mental and material powers. The path will be hard, + and sacrifices will be required, but the victory will be + glorious!"</p> + +<p>There were, of course, some voices that were raised, among both the +republican and colonial Dutch, in favour of more moderate counsels. In +the preceding month (November) Mr. Melius de Villiers, the late Chief +Justice of the Free State, wrote to a Dutch Reformed minister in the +Cape Colony to beg him to use all his influence against the efforts +being made in the Cape Colony to encourage the Boers to continue the +struggle. "However much I loved and valued the independence of the +Free State," he says, "it is now absolutely certain that the struggle +on the part of the burghers is a hopeless and useless one." And he +then suggests that the Dutch Reformed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page411" name="page411"></a>(p. 411)</span> ministers in the Cape +Colony, instead of petitioning the Queen to grant the independence of +the Republics, should intercede with ex-President Steyn and the +Federal leaders and induce them to discontinue the fight. Women's +Congresses and People's Congresses, held to denounce the barbarities +perpetrated in the war, will avail nothing; but the Dutch Reformed +Church could fulfil no higher mission than this genuine peace-making. +"It may go against their grain to urge our people to yield," he adds, +"but it seems to me a plain duty."<a id="footnotetag233" name="footnotetag233"></a><a href="#footnote233" title="Go to footnote 233"><span class="small">[233]</span></a> But such voices were powerless +to counteract the effect produced upon the Boers by the demonstrations +of hatred against the British Government, manifested by men whose +minds had been inflamed by the infamous slanders of the Imperial +troops to which the "conciliation" movement had given currency.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Second invasion of the colony.</span> + +<p>On the morning of December 16th, five days after he had received the +Worcester Congress deputation, Lord Milner heard that the burgher +forces had again crossed the Orange River between Aliwal North and +Bethulie. Before them lay hundreds of miles of country full of food +and horses, and inhabited by people who were in sympathy with them. On +the 20th martial law was proclaimed in twelve additional districts. On +the 17th of the following month the whole of the Cape Colony, with the +exception of Capetown, Simon's Town, Wynberg, Port Elizabeth, East +London, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page412" name="page412"></a>(p. 412)</span> native territories, was placed under the +same military rule. In the words of a protest subsequently addressed +by the Burgher Peace Committee to their Afrikander brethren, the +"fatal result of the Worcester Congress had been that the commandos +had again entered the Cape Colony." The friends of the Boers in +England, duped by the Afrikander nationalists, had involved England +and South Africa in a year and a half of costly, destructive, and +unnecessary war.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page413" name="page413"></a>(p. 413)</span> CHAPTER X</h3> + +<p class="title">THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION</p> + +<p>The new year (1901) opened with a full revelation of the magnitude of +the task which lay before the Imperial troops. Lord Roberts had +frankly recognised that the destruction of the Governments and +organised armies of the Republics would be followed by the more +difficult and lengthy task of disarming the entire Boer population +within their borders.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Recent events have convinced me," he wrote from Pretoria on + October 10th, 1900, "that the permanent tranquillity of the + Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete + disarmament of the inhabitants; and, though the extent of the + country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and + ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one, + its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience."</p> + +<p>That this task proved altogether more lengthy and more arduous than +Lord Roberts at this time expected, was due mainly, though not +exclusively, to the same cause as that which had placed the British +army in a position of such grave disadvantage at the outbreak of the +war—the play <span class="pagenum"><a id="page414" name="page414"></a>(p. 414)</span> of party politics in England. Lord Roberts had +foreseen that the process of disarming the Boers would be slow and +difficult; but he had not anticipated that the Imperial troops would +be hindered in the accomplishment of this task by the political action +of the friends of the Boers in England, or that the public utterances +of prominent members of the Liberal Opposition would re-act with such +dangerous effects upon the Afrikander nationalists that, after more +than a year of successful military operations, the process of +disarmament would have to be applied to the Cape Colony as well as to +the territories of the late Republics.</p> + +<p>Looking back to the year 1900, with the events of the intervening +period before us, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the +decision of the Boer leaders to continue the struggle was determined +by political, and not by military considerations. More than one +circumstance points to the fact that both the Boer generals and the +civilian members of the Executives of the late Republics recognised +that their position was practically hopeless from a military point of +view.<a id="footnotetag234" name="footnotetag234"></a><a href="#footnote234" title="Go to footnote 234"><span class="small">[234]</span></a> And while Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the +Transvaal, urged his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms after the +battle of Dalmanutha, it was President Steyn, a politician, and not a +fighting man, who manifested the stubborn determination <span class="pagenum"><a id="page415" name="page415"></a>(p. 415)</span> that +was directly responsible for the unnecessary devastation and suffering +which the guerilla war entailed upon the Boer people. The remote, but +still carefully cherished possibility of foreign intervention, the +belief that the colonial Dutch would even yet rise <span class="italic">en masse</span>, and the +reliance upon the traditional sympathy of the Liberal party with the +Boer aspirations for independence, were all considerations that +contributed to the decision. But of these three influences the last +was incomparably the most important; since it not only affected the +disposition of the republican leaders, but, what was more, stimulated +the Afrikander nationalists to make the efforts which brought the +Dutch in the Cape Colony to the condition of passionate resentment +that drew the Boer commandos, in the last month of 1900 and the +opening months of 1901, a second time across the Orange River.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">An injurious influence.</span> + +<p>We have seen the actual origin of this most injurious influence. The +"conciliation" movement was initiated in the Cape Colony by the +Afrikander nationalists in concert with President Krüger, in order +that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England +might be strengthened." They were strengthened. We have observed the +formation of a Conciliation Committee in England, working in close +connection with the parent organisation, founded by Mr. Hargrove, in +the Cape Colony; and we have noticed the declarations of Mr. Morley, +Lord Courtney, and Mr. Bryce, in favour of the restoration of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page416" name="page416"></a>(p. 416)</span> internal independence of the Boers—declarations all made in +opposition to the expressed determination of the British Government to +incorporate the Republics into the system of the British Empire. The +official leader of the Liberal party was less consistent. In June, +1900, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman signified in general terms his +recognition of the necessity of this measure. But he returned in +October to vague expressions of sympathy with the Boers, which, after +the general election had resulted in the return of the Unionist +majority, took the form of a direct condemnation of the South African +policy of the Government. In the course of the year 1901 he reiterated +two charges with increasing vehemence. The conduct of the war was +inhuman; and the Government, by refusing to offer any terms to the +republican leaders inconsistent with the decision to incorporate the +Republics into the Empire, were exacting the unnecessary humiliation +of an unconditional surrender from a gallant foe. These injurious +utterances at length provoked Lord Salisbury's indignant comment: +"England is, I believe, the only country in which, during a great war, +eminent men write and speak publicly as if they belonged to the +enemy;" and elicited from Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, +Mr. Haldane, and Sir Henry Fowler, the assurance that the +determination of the British people to "see the war through" had in no +way weakened. But, in spite of these patriotic utterances on the part +of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page417" name="page417"></a>(p. 417)</span> Liberal Imperialists, the fact remains that, +throughout the whole period of the guerilla war, the Boer commandos +were encouraged to resist the Imperial troops by the knowledge that +prominent members of the Liberal party in England had declared +themselves to be opposed to what they termed the "suppression" of the +Boer people,<a id="footnotetag235" name="footnotetag235"></a><a href="#footnote235" title="Go to footnote 235"><span class="small">[235]</span></a> and were condemning in unmeasured terms the British +military authorities for employing the sole methods by which the +guerilla leaders could be encountered on equal terms, and the +disarmament of the Dutch population could be accomplished.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Peace party among the Boers.</span> + +<p>There is another element in the attitude of the burgher population at +this critical period, a knowledge of which is essential to a correct +understanding of the methods and conditions of the guerilla war. The +existence among the republican Dutch of a considerable body of opinion +in favour of submission was a circumstance of which the Imperial +authorities were aware, and one of which they desired, naturally +enough, to take the fullest advantage. It was known also to the +militant Boer leaders; and it is obvious that any estimate of the +degree in which these leaders are to be held directly responsible for +the loss and suffering entailed by the decision to continue the war, +will depend largely upon the manner in which they dealt with those +members of their own community <span class="pagenum"><a id="page418" name="page418"></a>(p. 418)</span> who were prepared, after Lord +Roberts's victories, to become peaceable citizens of the British +Empire.</p> + +<p>The action of the Boer leaders in this respect is established by the +indisputable testimony of the official documents which fell into the +hands of the British authorities in the subsequent progress of the +war. Every endeavour of the peace party to make itself heard was +punished with rigorous, sometimes brutal, severity; fictitious +reports, calculated to raise false hopes of foreign intervention, were +circulated among the burghers in the field; and every effort was made +to prevent a knowledge of the British Government's proposals for the +future administration of the new colonies from reaching the rank and +file of the burgher population. The details of this action on the part +of the Boer leaders constitute collectively a body of evidence +sufficient to have justified the employment of measures infinitely +more severe than those which were in fact adopted by the British +military authorities for the capture of the Boer commandos and the +disarmament of the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; and in the face +of this evidence, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reiterated charges +against the Government, whether of "methods of barbarism" or of +prolonging the war by the neglect to offer reasonable terms to the +Boers, must be held as wanton in their origin as they were injurious +in their results.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Administrative changes.</span> + +<p>The despatch of October 18th, 1900, which, as we have seen, Lord +Milner received as he was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page419" name="page419"></a>(p. 419)</span> returning from his visit to the +new colonies, contained certain new commissions, under the terms of +which the "prospective administration" of the Transvaal and the Orange +River Colony was placed in his hands in succession to Lord Roberts, +while at the same time he remained Governor of the Cape Colony and +High Commissioner for South Africa. This combination of offices was +purely temporary, since Her Majesty's Government (Mr. Chamberlain +wrote to Lord Milner) "were anxious to take advantage of his unique +fitness for the great task of inaugurating the civil government of the +two new colonies." It was proposed therefore, that, as soon as the +necessary legal provision could be made for establishing constitutions +for the two new colonies, Lord Milner should be appointed as their +Governor, with a Lieutenant-Governor for the Orange River Colony, and +should cease to be the Governor of the Cape Colony. This new +arrangement, which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, involved the +severance of the High Commissionership from the Governorship of the +Cape Colony to which it had been attached for so long a period,<a id="footnotetag236" name="footnotetag236"></a><a href="#footnote236" title="Go to footnote 236"><span class="small">[236]</span></a> +did not take effect, however, until the end of February, 1901, when +Lord Milner finally left the Cape Colony for the Transvaal.</p> + +<p>Lord Roberts relinquished the command of the British forces in South +Africa on November 29th, 1900. The Home Government at this time +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page420" name="page420"></a>(p. 420)</span> attached great importance to the issue of a proclamation +setting out clearly the generous terms upon which the Boers would be +received into the empire; and, in connection with this question, Lord +Milner, during his recent visit to Pretoria, had discussed with Lord +Kitchener the methods by which the influence of the surrendered Boers +and the more moderate Afrikanders, who were in favour of submission, +could be brought to bear upon the general mass of the fighting +burghers. Lord Milner, however, upon his return to the Cape Colony, +expressed the opinion that the issue of a proclamation in the then +existing circumstances would be a mistake, since it would only be +regarded as a sign of weakness. And in support of this opinion he +states, in a telegram of December 11th, that the cabled summary of Mr. +Chamberlain's</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "recent speech in the House of Commons, containing virtually the + principal points in the proposed proclamation, has been instantly + seized upon by the Bond leaders [in the Cape Colony] and is + represented by them as a sign that Her Majesty's Government is + wavering in its policy, and that the reaction in British public + opinion, which they have always relied on, is setting in."<a id="footnotetag237" name="footnotetag237"></a><a href="#footnote237" title="Go to footnote 237"><span class="small">[237]</span></a></p> + +<p>Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener confirmed this judgment at the +time; and on January 28th, 1901—when de Wet was on the point of +breaking through the British troops into <span class="pagenum"><a id="page421" name="page421"></a>(p. 421)</span> the Cape +Colony—the latter telegraphed to Lord Milner:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "When the Boers are inclined to peace, they will want, I think, + to discuss various questions, and when that time comes a + proclamation which would meet as far as possible the points + raised would, no doubt, be very valuable.... But just now I do + not think they have any idea of making peace whilst the Colony + question is so prominent. I have let it be known that I would be + glad to see an officer or meet Botha at any time if he wished to + do so."<a id="footnotetag238" name="footnotetag238"></a><a href="#footnote238" title="Go to footnote 238"><span class="small">[238]</span></a></p> + +<p>Three days afterwards Lord Milner received a further telegram from +Lord Kitchener on the same subject, which he also forwarded to the +Colonial Office:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Ex-President Pretorius has just returned from seeing L. Botha + and Schalk Burger [the Commandant-General and the Acting + President of the South African Republic]. They stated that they + were fighting for their independence, and meant to continue to do + so to the bitter end, and would not discuss any question of + peace."<a id="footnotetag239" name="footnotetag239"></a><a href="#footnote239" title="Go to footnote 239"><span class="small">[239]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Boer leaders irreconcilable.</span> + +<p>In view of this irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Boer +leaders, Mr. Chamberlain abandoned the proposal, and the proclamation +was not issued until six months later, when the blockhouse system had +been successfully initiated.</p> + +<p>But, although Lord Milner had recognised the futility of the appeal by +proclamation, he had readily approved of Lord Kitchener's endeavour to +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page422" name="page422"></a>(p. 422)</span> make the British proposals known to the placable but +terrorised section of the fighting burghers, through the agency of +those of their kinsmen and friends who had surrendered. After all +advances to the Boer leaders in the field had totally failed, "it +seemed to us," Lord Milner reported to Mr. Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag240" name="footnotetag240"></a><a href="#footnote240" title="Go to footnote 240"><span class="small">[240]</span></a></p> + +<p class="quote"> + "that those who had already surrendered would have means not open + to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under + arms, persuading them of the hopelessness of their resistance, + and removing the misapprehension of our intentions, which some of + the commanders who were still holding out had sedulously + fostered."</p> + +<p>It was in these circumstances and with these objects in view that, +after Lord Roberts's departure, the Burgher Peace Committee was formed +at Pretoria; and it is to the address which Lord Kitchener then +delivered (December 21st, 1900) to this Committee that we must look +for the origin and purpose of the Burgher, or Concentration Camps.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Origin of the Burgher camps.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"It having been brought to Lord Kitchener's notice," says the + published report, "that the principal difficulty that burghers, + desirous of surrendering, experienced was that they were not + allowed to remain in their own districts, and were afraid of the + penalties attached to not having adhered strictly to the oath of + neutrality, which they had, in most cases, been made to break by + the coercive measures of Boers out on commando, he wished to give + the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page423" name="page423"></a>(p. 423)</span> burghers still in the field every opportunity of + becoming acquainted with the treatment he proposed now to extend + to them, their families, and their property.</p> + +<p>"Instructions had been issued to form laagers for all surrendered + burghers, their wives, families, and stock, on the railway in + their own districts under military protection; and, except where + it was proved that a burgher had voluntarily broken his oath and + gone out on commando, no difference would be made between those + who had not taken the oath. To protect deserted women and + children they would also be brought into these laagers, where + their husbands and sons, who desired to live peacefully, could + freely join them.</p> + +<p>"It was essential that the country should be thus cleared, + because so long as the means of subsistence remained in and on + the farms, so long small commandos were enabled to continue in + the field. In return, Lord Kitchener expected every assistance + from those to whom he gave protection. They must each and all + help to the best of their ability by influencing in every way in + their power those still in the field to surrender. These measures + would be applied gradually, and extended if they proved + successful. Burghers must understand that no responsibility could + be accepted for stock or property, except for that which they + brought in with them, and then only if they kept it within the + limits of the protection he was prepared to afford."<a id="footnotetag241" name="footnotetag241"></a><a href="#footnote241" title="Go to footnote 241"><span class="small">[241]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>The report of Lord Kitchener's speech from which these paragraphs are +taken was printed in Dutch and circulated by the Burgher Peace +Committee. It is certainly significant that a measure which was +subsequently held up to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page424" name="page424"></a>(p. 424)</span> the execration of the civilised +world by the official leader of the Liberal party and the friends of +the Boers in England, should have been carefully explained by Lord +Kitchener to an audience of Boers at Pretoria, and accepted by them as +a means of enabling the peaceably disposed burghers to escape from the +compulsion of their leaders. In this, as in many other matters, the +English friends of the Boers were <span class="italic">plus royalistes que le roi même</span>.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Boer coercive measures.</span> + +<p>These, then, were the means employed by the British military +authorities to avert a needless protraction of the war. We have now to +observe the methods by which the Boer leaders prevented their efforts +from producing the desired result. In view of the destruction of the +organised resistance of the Republics, Lord Roberts had made known by +proclamation that all burghers who surrendered their arms and took the +oath of neutrality would be allowed to return to their homes, or, if +at home, to remain there undisturbed. This implied an intention on the +part of the British authorities to provide such protection as would +enable the surrendered burghers to remain in peaceable possession of +their property. General Botha, as we have already noted, was +personally in favour of a general surrender after the battle of +Dalmanutha; but, when once the majority of the Boer leaders had +decided to continue to resist the establishment of British authority +by force of arms, it became his business to keep every fighting +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page425" name="page425"></a>(p. 425)</span> burgher in the field. Here, again, the work of the +Intelligence Department provides us with instructive evidence of the +purposes and acts of the enemy. In the course of the subsequent +military operations Sir Bindon Blood captured a number of official +documents in the Boer Government laager at Roos Senekal. One of these, +referring to the period in question, sufficiently indicates the nature +of the "coercive measures" to which Lord Kitchener had alluded. Under +date October 6th, 1900, General Botha gives instructions to the Boer +commandant at Bethel to telegraph round to the Boer generals and +officers certain military instructions, and he then adds:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from laying + down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to + this, to confiscate everything moveable or unmoveable, and also + to burn their houses. Get into direct communication with the + Standerton men, and destroy the railway line between Heidelberg + and Standerton, and especially derail and hold up trains. In this + manner we will obtain a large quantity of food."<a id="footnotetag242" name="footnotetag242"></a><a href="#footnote242" title="Go to footnote 242"><span class="small">[242]</span></a></p> + +<p>And, while the peaceably inclined burghers were prevented from +surrendering by the fear of these penalties, the courage of the +commandos was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page426" name="page426"></a>(p. 426)</span> maintained by the spread of false information. +Among these same papers found at Roos Senekal is a telegram despatched +on November 2nd, 1900, to General Viljoen, containing a number of +encouraging statements bearing upon the political and military +situation, of which the three following may be taken as +characteristic:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"October, 1900. A Congress of Delegates of the Powers was held at + Parijs [Paris], whereby England asked for an extension of six + months to carry on the war. This was refused by the powers on the + proposal of Holland and Austria.</p> + +<p>"France is ready to land troops in England on the 1st November.</p> + +<p>"Cape Colonial troops to the number of 2,500 have been sent back + by General Roberts, having quarrelled with the regulars. Their + arms were taken away and burnt. This last is official news + received by General Fourie."<a id="footnotetag243" name="footnotetag243"></a><a href="#footnote243" title="Go to footnote 243"><span class="small">[243]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">"Not civilised warfare".</span> + +<p>It was in order to counteract the effects of this system of terrorism +and deceit, that the endeavour was made to inform the mass of the +Boers still in arms of the actual state of affairs, both in respect of +the hopelessness of foreign intervention and the real intentions of +the British Government, through the agency of the Burgher Peace +Committee. The treatment accorded to these peace emissaries is +justifiable, possibly, by a strict interpretation of the laws of war; +but it fixes inevitably the responsibility for the needless sufferings +of the Boer people in the guerilla war, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page427" name="page427"></a>(p. 427)</span> upon Ex-President +Steyn, Schalk Burger, Louis Botha, Christian de Wet, and the other +Boer leaders. On January 10th, 1901, of three agents of the Peace +Committee taken prisoners to De Wet's laager near Lindley, one—a +British subject—was flogged and then shot, and two, who were +burghers, were flogged.<a id="footnotetag244" name="footnotetag244"></a><a href="#footnote244" title="Go to footnote 244"><span class="small">[244]</span></a> And on February 12th Meyer de Kock, the +Secretary of the Committee, was shot.<a id="footnotetag245" name="footnotetag245"></a><a href="#footnote245" title="Go to footnote 245"><span class="small">[245]</span></a></p> + +<p>But the efforts of the Peace Committee were not altogether thrown +away. The terrible deaths of these men, true martyrs of the Boer +cause, evoked more than one notable protest against the insensate +determination of Ex-President Steyn and De Wet.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Dear Brother, ... From what I hear you are so angry with me," + wrote General Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, "that you + have decided to kill me should you find me. May God not allow it + that you should have the opportunity to shed more innocent blood. + Enough has been shed already.... I beseech you, let us think over + the matter coolly for a moment, and see whether our cause is + really so pure and righteous that we can rely on God's + help."<a id="footnotetag246" name="footnotetag246"></a><a href="#footnote246" title="Go to footnote 246"><span class="small">[246]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page428" name="page428"></a>(p. 428)</span> And Mr. H. A. Du Plessis, the predikant at Lindley in the +Orange River Colony, addressed an "open letter" to the clergy of the +Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape Colony.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"It is not civilised warfare any more on the part of the + burghers. They have become desperate, and as fanatics do things + in conflict with a Christian spirit and civilisation.... About a + fortnight ago, G. Müller, one of my deacons and brother of the + late minister of Burghersdorp, was brutally ill-used. He had to + strip, and received twenty-five lashes with a stirrup leather—he + is not the only one—because he took letters from a member of the + Peace Committee to certain heads of the burgher force, in which + they were strongly advised to give in. At the same time Andries + Wessels and J. Morgendael were taken prisoners. They left + Kroonstad at their own request, and with the sanction of the + military authorities, in order to have an interview with the + leaders of the burgher force. Morgendael was mortally wounded by + Commandant Froneman without a hearing, and at the instigation of + General C. de Wet. He died afterwards.... In such a shameful, in + fact, inhuman, manner were these men treated; and for what + reason? Simply because they had tried to save their country and + people....</p> + +<p>"The burghers are kept totally in the dark by their leaders as to + what the real state of affairs is. Because I wish to save them + from certain ruin I make this appeal to you....</p> + +<p>"If [the burghers] knew what the true state of affairs was, a + large portion would long ago have come in and delivered up their + arms....</p> + +<p>"Therefore, I implore you, stand still for a few moments and + think of the true interests of the Afrikander nation, and see if + you will not alter <span class="pagenum"><a id="page429" name="page429"></a>(p. 429)</span> your opinion, and quench the fire of + war instead of feeding the flame....<a id="footnotetag247" name="footnotetag247"></a><a href="#footnote247" title="Go to footnote 247"><span class="small">[247]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>These letters, which were published in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, formed part +of an attempt made by the Burgher Peace Committee, "to induce some of +the leading men in the colony, who are known to sympathise with the +Boers, to tell the men still in the field that the hope of any +assistance from here is a delusion." But, in thus reporting this new +endeavour to Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner adds that he is not, +himself, "very sanguine" of its success.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Policy of the Bond.</span> + +<p>There was only too good ground for this opinion. The Afrikander +nationalists of the Cape hated England no less than did the republican +nationalists, though they feared her more. The policy which the Bond +had adopted after the occupation of the Republics by the British +forces was perfectly definite. Its object was to avert the final +disaster of the war by securing the maintenance of the Republics as +independent centres of Afrikander nationalism. In order to do this the +Bond resolved to keep the Cape Colony in a state of smouldering +rebellion, to encourage the continued resistance of the Boer +commandos, and to render all the material assistance to the guerilla +leaders and their forces that could be afforded without exposing the +Cape Dutch to the penalties of treason. It may be doubted, however, +whether the Bond leaders, in view of the resolute attitude of the +loyalist population <span class="pagenum"><a id="page430" name="page430"></a>(p. 430)</span> and their consistent and unfaltering +support of Lord Milner, would have embarked upon this policy, unless +they had calculated upon the co-operation of the Liberal Opposition in +England. As it was, their expectations in this respect had been amply +fulfilled, and the policy itself, as we have seen, had been admirably +carried into effect.</p> + +<p>The second invasion of the Cape Colony began, as we have noticed, with +the incursion of the Boers after the Worcester Congress. On December +16th, 1900, Kruitzinger, with seven hundred, and Hertzog with twelve +hundred men, crossed the Orange River; and by February 11th, 1901, De +Wet, who had been "headed back" in December, had succeeded in eluding +the British columns and entered the Colony.<a id="footnotetag248" name="footnotetag248"></a><a href="#footnote248" title="Go to footnote 248"><span class="small">[248]</span></a> At this moment +success seemed to be within measurable distance both to the Bond and +to De Wet. The point of view of the astute Afrikander statesmen is +different from that of the guerilla leader; but each party is equally +hopeful of the ultimate victory of the nationalist cause. Of the +attitude of the Bond in this month of February, 1901, Mr. Kipling +writes from Capetown:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Some of the extremists of the Bond are for committing themselves + now, fully, to the Dutch cause, De Wet and all; but some of the + others are hunting for some sort of side-path that will give them + a chance of keeping on the ground-level of the gallows, within + hail of a seat in the next Parliament. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page431" name="page431"></a>(p. 431)</span> If De Wet + wins—he is assumed to be in command of several thousands, all + lusting for real battle, and sure of a welcome among many more + thousands alight with the same desire—the Bond may, of course, + come out flat-footedly on his side. Just at present the apricots + are not quite ripe enough. But the Bond has unshaken faith in the + Opposition, whose every word and action are quoted here, and lead + to more deaths on the veld. <span class="italic">It is assumed that His Majesty's + Opposition will save the Bond, and South Africa for the Bond, if + only the commandos make the war expensive.</span>"<a id="footnotetag249" name="footnotetag249"></a><a href="#footnote249" title="Go to footnote 249"><span class="small">[249]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">De Wet in the colony.</span> + +<p>If this account of the attitude of the Bond stood alone, its value +would be merely that of an <span class="italic">ex parte</span> statement by a competent +observer on the spot. But it does not stand alone. The accident of the +capture of the Boer official papers at Roos Senekal, to which we have +referred before, has provided us with a record of the thoughts which +were in De Wet's mind at the time when Mr. Kipling's words were +written. In a report dated "On the Veld, February 14th, 1901," +Commandant-General Botha is informed that "De Wet's last news is that +the Cape Colony has risen to a man, and has already taken up arms. +They refused to give up to the British Government. Many more are only +waiting operations on part of De Wet to join him; and General De Wet +concludes this report with the words: 'It is certain that the ways of +the Lord are hidden from us, and that, after all, it seems <span class="pagenum"><a id="page432" name="page432"></a>(p. 432)</span> +that the day of a united South Africa is not far off.'"</p> + +<p>The writer of this despatch is the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the +Orange Free State; and to his report of De Wet's success in the Cape +Colony, he now adds an account of what is happening on the other side +of the Orange River:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The burghers in the Orange Free State are hopeful, and expecting + a happy ending. The grudge against the Britisher has now taken + deep root, and the women and girls are encouraging the burghers + to stick up to the bitter end. So that our cause now rests in the + union of the burghers, and, with God's help, we will accomplish + our end.... The enemy's plan is to starve us out, but he will + never do it, now we have an outlet from the Cape Colony, even if + we have to use force."<a id="footnotetag250" name="footnotetag250"></a><a href="#footnote250" title="Go to footnote 250"><span class="small">[250]</span></a></p> + +<p>De Wet was chased out of the Colony by the British columns on February +28th, but smaller commandos under Kruitzinger, Fouché, Scheepers, and +Malan remained behind. Apart from their mobility, and the persistent +manner in which they clung to rugged and mountainous districts, the +ability of these Boer raiders to keep the field against the Imperial +troops must be attributed to the sympathy and material assistance +which they received from the colonial Dutch. The actual number of +recruits which they secured was small; but, in Lord Kitchener's +words—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "the friendly feelings of a considerable portion of the rural + population assured to them at all times <span class="pagenum"><a id="page433" name="page433"></a>(p. 433)</span> not only an + ample food supply, but also timely information of the movements + of our pursuing columns—two points which told heavily in their + favour."<a id="footnotetag251" name="footnotetag251"></a><a href="#footnote251" title="Go to footnote 251"><span class="small">[251]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Effect of Cape rebellion.</span> + +<p>In view of the enormous area of the sparsely populated and difficult +country throughout which their movements were thus facilitated, it is +not surprising that these roaming commandos were never completely +suppressed. Of the 21,256 men who surrendered after Vereeniging, 3,635 +were Boers and rebels, who had been, up to that time, at large in the +Cape Colony.<a id="footnotetag252" name="footnotetag252"></a><a href="#footnote252" title="Go to footnote 252"><span class="small">[252]</span></a> The importance of the contribution which the +disloyal majority of the Cape Dutch were enabled, in this manner, to +make to the power of resistance exhibited by the Boers in the guerilla +war has scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. As it was, a large +body of Imperial troops, which would otherwise have been available for +completing the conquest of the new colonies, were kept employed, not +merely in guarding the all-important railway lines, but from time to +time in arduous, costly, and exhausting military operations in the +Cape Colony.<a id="footnotetag253" name="footnotetag253"></a><a href="#footnote253" title="Go to footnote 253"><span class="small">[253]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page434" name="page434"></a>(p. 434)</span> The value of this contribution was quite well understood by +the Afrikander nationalists of the Cape. In Mr. Kipling's vigorous +English, "north and south they were working for a common object—the +manufacture of pro-Boers in England by doubling the income-tax." And +it is in the extension of the area of the war by the establishment of +the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony that we must find the one valid +military consideration which underlay the failure of the peace +negotiations between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha +(February-April, 1901), and the final rejection of the British terms +of surrender by the Boer leaders in June. The point is made perfectly +plain in the official notice signed by Schalk Burger, as Acting +President of the South African Republic, and Steyn, as President of +the Orange Free State, which was issued to the burghers on June 20th, +1901. After reciting that the British terms had been referred to +"State President Krüger and the deputation in Europe," and that +President Krüger's reply had been considered by a conference of the +Governments of both Republics, at which Chief-Commandant C. De Wet, +Commandant-General L. Botha, and Assistant-Commandant J. H. De la Rey +had presented a full report, the document continues:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies, + where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the + Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence, + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page435" name="page435"></a>(p. 435)</span> considering further the invaluable personal and + material sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our + cause, which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby + the independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is + resolved] that no peace will be made ... by which our + independence and national existence, or the interests of our + colonial brothers, shall be the price paid, and that the war will + be vigorously prosecuted."<a id="footnotetag254" name="footnotetag254"></a><a href="#footnote254" title="Go to footnote 254"><span class="small">[254]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Afrikander statesmanship.</span> + +<p>It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the +Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that +enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the +apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift +and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to +the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the +Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the +Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch +population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent +in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added +the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South +Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an +affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might +still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone +would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the +people, and it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page436" name="page436"></a>(p. 436)</span> was for the people to make use of this +instrument, or to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British +claimed a voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among +them. The "younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South +Africa for the Empire.</p> + +<p>Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military +operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length +accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general +situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain +from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents +which he furnished to his official chief, none affords more convincing +evidence of cool judgment, mastery of South African conditions, and +sureness of statecraft than this. It is a letter, and not a despatch, +and as such it contains some personal details which would not have +found a place in more formal communications.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's survey.</span> + +<p>Two reasons, Lord Milner writes, have prevented him from sending for a +long time past any general review of South African affairs. "I am +occupied," he says, "every day that passes from morning till night by +business, all of which is urgent, and the amount and variety of which +you are doubtless able to judge from the communications on a great +variety of subjects which are constantly passing between us." And in +addition to this, he has always hoped that "some definite <span class="pagenum"><a id="page437" name="page437"></a>(p. 437)</span> +point would be reached, at which it might be possible to sum up that +chapter of our history which contained the war, and to forecast the +work of administrative construction which must succeed it." Now, +however, it is useless to wait longer for a "clear and clean-cut" +situation. Although he has not "the slightest doubt of the ultimate +result," he foresees that the work which still lies before the +Imperial troops will be "slower, more difficult, more harassing, and +more expensive than was at one time anticipated."</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of + retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly quiet, + at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the + Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a + considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western + districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority, + and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly + government and the pursuits of peace. To-day the scene is + completely altered."</p> + +<p>The "increased losses to the country," due to the prolongation of the +struggle and to the guerilla methods adopted by the Boer leaders, are +obvious.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of + small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are + similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual + fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it + would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers + operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over + supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page438" name="page438"></a>(p. 438)</span> which they pass, not only taking all the food they can + lay hands upon on the farms—grain, forage, horses, cattle, etc., + but looting the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, + sugar, etc., of all of which they are in great need. Our forces, + on their side, are compelled to denude the country of everything + moveable, in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No + doubt a considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not + wholly lost, but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are + now being established at many points along the railway lines. But + even under these circumstances the loss is great, through animals + dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live + upon when collected in large numbers at the camps. Indeed, the + loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the + destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard."</p> + +<p>And to this loss incidental to the campaign there has been added +recently "destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character." +This is the injury done to the mining plant in the outlying districts +of the Rand by the Boer raiders, a destruction for which there is no +possible excuse.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"It has no reason or justification in connection with military + operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of + civilised warfare.... Directly or indirectly, all South Africa, + including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the + mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal. + To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in + agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will + have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after + the ravages of war.</p> + +<p>"Fortunately the damage done to the mines has <span class="pagenum"><a id="page439" name="page439"></a>(p. 439)</span> not been + large, relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital + sunk in them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard + against purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, + because it is, so to speak, 'all length and no breadth'—one long + thin line, stretching across the country from east to west for + many miles. Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only + possible successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids + hitherto made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has + resulted in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done + to the single mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is + estimated that the mine is put out of working for two years. This + mine is only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of + the most important. These facts may afford some indication of the + ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal + and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that + general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just + before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out. + However serious in some respects may have been the military + consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa + owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash + forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of + all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Material destruction.</span> + +<p>As the result of the last six or seven months of destructive warfare, +"a longer period of recuperation will be required than was originally +anticipated." At the same time, Lord Milner points out that, with +Kimberley and the Rand, the "main engines of prosperity," virtually +undamaged, the economic consequences of the war, "though grave, do not +appear by any means appalling."</p> + +<p class="quote"> + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page440" name="page440"></a>(p. 440)</span> "The country population will need a good deal of help, + first to preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to + supply it with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. + And the great industry of the country will need some little time + before it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young + country with great recuperative powers, it will not take many + years before the economic ravages of the war are effaced."</p> + +<p>He then turns to consider the "moral effect" of the recrudescence of +the war, which is, in his opinion, more serious than the mere material +destruction of the last six months. In the middle of 1900 the feeling +in the Orange River Colony and the western districts of the Transvaal +was "undoubtedly pacific."</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly + astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair + and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and + it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in + the new régime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was + better than I have ever known it."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Recrudescence of the war.</span> + +<p>If it had been possible to screen those portions of the conquered +territories which were fast settling down to peaceful pursuits from +the incursions of the enemy still in the field, the worst results of +the guerilla war might have been avoided. But the "vast extent of the +country, and the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long +advance, first to Pretoria and then to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page441" name="page441"></a>(p. 441)</span> Komati Poort," made +this impossible. The Boer leaders raided the country already occupied, +but now left exposed; and, encouraged by the small successes thus +easily obtained, the commandos reappeared first in the south-east of +the Orange River Colony, then in the south-west of the Transvaal, and +finally in every portion of the conquered territory.</p> + +<p>Those among the burgher population who desired to submit to British +rule now found themselves in a position of great difficulty.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to + remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many + of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the + strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient + appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had + undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions in + arms when these reappeared among them appealing to their + patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very + men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were + up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases + by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from + the temptation to commit it.</p> + +<p>"The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally + led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling + conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own + troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same + leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did + not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same + severity with which I believe any other nation would have + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page442" name="page442"></a>(p. 442)</span> treated them. Entitled as we were by the universally + recognised rules of war to shoot the men who, having once been + prisoners in our hands and having been released on a distinct + pledge to abstain from further part in the war, had once more + taken up arms against us, we never in a single instance availed + ourselves of that right. But as our columns swept through the + revolted country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even + with treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no + doubt in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men + who had actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made + prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because + it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater + number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further + accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was + augmented by the evacuation, necessary for military reasons, of a + number of places, such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and + Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had + actually established a reasonably satisfactory civil + administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the + general demoralisation, and to afford places of refuge for those + willing to submit, by establishing camps along the railway lines + to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their + stock for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate + substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts. + Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children + whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us. + But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no + doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at + any of the numerous commandos roaming about the country, a good + many of their less willing members <span class="pagenum"><a id="page443" name="page443"></a>(p. 443)</span> will find their way + to one or other of these camps in order to avoid further + fighting."</p> +</div> + +<p>As the guerilla warfare thus swept back over the new colonies, the +Dutch in the Cape Colony, who at one time, about the middle of the +preceding year (1900), had seemed disposed to acquiesce in the union +of all South Africa under the British flag, became once more restless +and embittered.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">A carnival of mendacity.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our + troops, was exaggerated and made the most of, though what + principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged + instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. Never in my + life have I read of, much less experienced, such a carnival of + mendacity as that which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in + this Colony at the end of last year. And these libels still + continue to make themselves felt. It is true that excitement has + subsided somewhat during the last two months, partly because some + of the worst inventions about the conduct of the British troops + have been exposed and utterly discredited, and partly because the + general introduction of martial law has tended greatly to check + seditious writing and speaking. But even now the general feeling + in most of the country districts is very bad, and the commandos + which invaded the Colony in December and have been roaming about + ever since, while they have not gained many adherents among the + colonial farmers, have nevertheless enjoyed the very substantial + aid which the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants was + able to give them, in supporting themselves, obtaining fresh + supplies of food and horses, and evading the forces sent in + pursuit of them."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page444" name="page444"></a>(p. 444)</span> Of the general attitude of the Cape Dutch at this time Lord +Milner writes with the lenient judgment of complete understanding:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch + inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics, + however little they may be able to resist giving active + expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear + amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or + to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of + choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the + men of their own race from beyond the border. There are + extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony + overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial + ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to + stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of + the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps, + secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and + writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of + political firebrands through the country enables them to keep + quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against + the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably + well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that + purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations + too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their + daily lives.</p> + +<p>"That there has been an invasion at all is no doubt due to the + weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or + supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the + enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in + order to meet with general active <span class="pagenum"><a id="page445" name="page445"></a>(p. 445)</span> support. But this was + a miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very + pardonable one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their + favour as shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of + public meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the + writings of the Dutch Press, the very general wearing of the + republican colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth, + and they regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they + actually did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great + proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant + business had slipped away and joined the republican ranks long + ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left + the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the + experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary + measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in + the hands of the country population throughout the greater part + of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually is, + and far smaller than it was a year ago."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">British population in arms.</span> + +<p>In these circumstances the object to be aimed at is to screen off as +much of the country as possible from raids. But the Cape Colony is +considerably larger in area than France and the United Kingdom put +together; it has "an immense length of frontier that can be crossed +anywhere," and "exceedingly primitive means of communication." The +exclusion of mobile guerilla bands from across the frontier is, +therefore, "something of an impossibility." There is one method, and +one only, by which "the game of the invaders can be frustrated." It is +to provide each district with the means of defending itself. And so a +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page446" name="page446"></a>(p. 446)</span> local defence force has been formed in all districts, with +the exception of those—happily the least important in the Colony—in +which the population is extremely small and the loyalists are very +few.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"In the other districts, the response on the part of the British + population to the general call to arms recently made by the + Ministry has been better than the most sanguine expected. It was + always admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk + of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side + of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local + defence. The appeal was, therefore, virtually directed to the + British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no + doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who + have always been loyalists. These classes had been already + immensely drawn on by the Cape police, the regular volunteer + corps, and the numerous irregular mounted corps which had been + called into existence because of the war. There must have been + twelve thousand Cape Colonists under arms before the recent + appeal, and, as things are now going, we shall get as many more + under that appeal—a truly remarkable achievement under a purely + voluntary system. The fact that, if the war continues for a few + months longer, so large a number of the South African British + will be under arms (for, it must be remembered, in addition to + the Cape colonists we have about one thousand Rhodesians, and, I + should say, at least ten thousand Uitlanders) is one that cannot + be left out of account in considering either the present + imbroglio or the settlement after peace is restored.</p> + +<p>"It is, indeed, calculated to exercise a most important and, I + believe, beneficial influence upon the South African politics of + the future. Among <span class="pagenum"><a id="page447" name="page447"></a>(p. 447)</span> the principal causes of the trouble + of the past and present was the contempt felt by the Afrikander + countryman, used to riding and shooting, and generally in + possession of a good rifle and plenty of cartridges, for other + white men less habituated to arms than he was himself. That + feeling can hardly survive the experience of the past twelve + months, and especially of the last six weeks. The splendid + fighting of the despised Johannesburgers of the Imperial Light + Horse, and of the other South African Colonial Corps, has become + a matter of history, and the present <span class="italic">levée en masse</span> of the + British people, including the townsmen, of this Colony, is proof + positive that when the necessity is really felt they are equal to + the best in courage and public spirit. In this respect the events + of the past few months, unfortunate as they have been in many + ways, have undoubtedly their brighter side. The mutual respect of + the two principal white races is the first condition of a healthy + political life in the South Africa of the future. It is possible + that if the extreme strain of the most recent developments of the + war had never been felt throughout Cape Colony, the British + inhabitants would never have had the opportunity of showing that + they were inferior to none in their willingness to bear all the + burdens of citizenship, including that of personal service."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Remember the loyalists.</span> + +<p>And Lord Milner urges that in the future England should not forget +that there are loyalists in South Africa as well as Boers; and that +the loyalists are Dutch as well as British.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"The important part now played, even from the purely military + point of view, by the South African loyalists ought, as it seems + to me, to have a good effect not only in South Africa but in + England. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page448" name="page448"></a>(p. 448)</span> The inherent vice, if I may say so, of almost + all public discussion of our South African difficulties is the + tendency to concentrate attention too exclusively on the Boers. + Say what we will, the controversy always seems to relapse into + the old ruts—it is the British Government on the one hand and + the Boers on the other. The question how a particular policy will + affect not merely our enemies, but our now equally numerous + friends, seems seldom to be adequately considered. And yet it + would seem that justice and policy alike should lead us to be as + eager to consider the feelings and interests, and to retain the + loyalty, of those who are fighting on our side, as to disarm the + present enmity and win the future confidence of those who are + fighting against us. And this principle would seem all the easier + to adhere to because there is really nothing which the great body + of the South African loyalists desire which it is not for the + honour and advantage of the mother country to insist upon.</p> + +<p>"Of vindictiveness, or desire to oppress the Afrikanders, there + is, except in hasty utterances inevitable in the heat of the + conflict, which have no permanent significance, or in tirades + which are wholly devoid of influence, no sign whatever. The + attitude of almost all leading and representative men, and the + general trend of public feeling among the loyalists, even in the + intensity of the struggle, is dead against anything like racial + exclusiveness or domination. If this were not so it would be + impossible for a section of pure-bred Afrikanders, small no doubt + in numbers but weighty in character and position, to take the + strong line which they do in opposition to the views of the + majority of their own people, based as these are, and as they + know them to be, upon a misconception of our policy and + intentions. These men are among the most devoted adherents to the + Imperial cause, and would regard <span class="pagenum"><a id="page449" name="page449"></a>(p. 449)</span> with more disfavour + and alarm than any one the failure of the British nation to carry + out its avowed policy in the most complete manner. They are + absolutely convinced that the unquestioned establishment of + British supremacy, and the creation of one political system from + Capetown to the Zambesi, is, after all that has happened, the + only salvation for men of their own race, as well as for others."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">"One Country, One Flag."</span> + +<p>And, in conclusion, he writes of the "predominant, indeed the almost +unanimous, feeling of those South Africans who sympathise with the +Imperial Government," that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "they are sick to death of the war, which has brought ruin to + many of them, and imposed considerable sacrifices on almost all. + But they would rather see the war continue for an indefinite time + than run the risk of any compromise which would leave even the + remotest chance of the recurrence of so terrible a scourge in the + future. They are prepared to fight and suffer on in order to make + South Africa, indisputably and for ever, one country under one + flag, with one system of government, and that system the British, + which they believe to ensure the highest possible degree of + justice and freedom to men of all races."</p> + +<p>In this luminous review of what Lord Milner terms "if by no means the +most critical, possibly the most puzzling" state of affairs since the +outbreak of the war, it will be observed that he puts the time +required by South Africa to recover from the economic ravages of the +war at "not many years." In point of fact, two and a half years after +the surrender of Vereeniging nothing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page450" name="page450"></a>(p. 450)</span> remained but the +scattered graveyards upon the veld, the empty tins still tinkling upon +the wire fences by the railways, and an occasional blockhouse, to +remind the traveller of the devastating struggle from which the +country had so recently emerged. This estimate of the period of +recuperation affords a measure of the magnitude of Lord Milner's +achievement in the three concluding years of his administration. For +the rest, we look in vain for any trace of bitterness, or even of +partisanship, in his frank and penetrating analysis. It is the survey +of a man who is completely master of the situation; who is absolutely +convinced of the justice of the British cause; who has no illusions +and no fears.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Feeding the enemy.</span> + +<p>With the circumstances in which the burghers were induced by their +leaders to continue, or renew, their resistance to the Imperial troops +before us, both the long duration of the guerilla war, and the methods +by which it was finally brought to a close, become easily +intelligible. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, from a +purely military point of view, the relapse of the conquered +territories into war was due to the insufficiency of British troops. +By the end of April, 1900, as we have noticed before, all the reserves +of the regular army had been exhausted; and, in addition to this, at +the end of twelve months' service a considerable proportion of the +Home and over-sea auxiliaries left South Africa to return to civil +life. Had there been a sufficient number of trained soldiers <span class="pagenum"><a id="page451" name="page451"></a>(p. 451)</span> +to occupy effectively the Boer Republics, the war would not have swept +back through them and over their borders into the Colony. Even so, the +actual number of British troops in South Africa under Lord Roberts's +command would have sufficed to subjugate the Boers, had the British +military authorities employed the severe methods of warfare to which +any other belligerent would have had recourse under the like +conditions—methods of merciful severity which were employed, in fact, +by the Union forces in the civil war in America.<a id="footnotetag255" name="footnotetag255"></a><a href="#footnote255" title="Go to footnote 255"><span class="small">[255]</span></a> But, by the +irony of fate, the humane methods of the British, in the absence of a +practically unlimited supply of trained troops, made the revival of +hostilities possible on the part of the Boers, and thereby created the +necessity for the employment of those more rigorous, but, by +comparison, still humane and generous methods, in respect of which the +charge of inhumanity was brought against Great Britain by the friends +of the Boers in England and on the continent of Europe. No one will +maintain that it is a part of the duty of a belligerent to support the +non-combatant population of the enemy. Yet this duty was voluntarily +assumed throughout the war by the British military authorities, who, +from the occupation of Bloemfontein onwards, fed the non-combatant +Boer population as well as they fed their own troops.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Kitchener's task.</span> + +<p>An incident that happened after the occupation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page452" name="page452"></a>(p. 452)</span> of Pretoria +exhibits the remarkable generosity of the British attitude. At a time +when, owing to the Boer attacks upon the railway, the utmost +difficulty was experienced in getting supplies from the +thousand-miles'-distant base at the coast, Lord Roberts was compelled +to send away a part of the civilian population to General Botha, and +they were removed by the Boer Commandant-General to Barberton. That is +to say, while the British, on the one hand, were giving part of the +supplies on which the existence of their troops depended, to the +non-combatant population of the enemy, the enemy, on the other hand, +was doing his utmost to destroy the single line of railway which alone +stood between the British Army and starvation. When, therefore, Lord +Kitchener succeeded to the command of the British forces in South +Africa (November 29th, 1900), he found the task of disarmament +complicated by two factors. There was the desire of the Home +Government that the war should be conducted upon the humane lines +hitherto adopted, and there was also the fact that the Imperial troops +were not numerous enough to occupy effectively the whole territory of +the Republics, or, in other words, to do the one thing of all others +necessary to make this humane conduct of the war consistent with +military success. It was impossible, with the troops at his disposal, +for Lord Kitchener to hold the enormous territory of the conquered +Republics. It was impossible, perhaps, to support a larger force in a +country so poorly provided with food supplies <span class="pagenum"><a id="page453" name="page453"></a>(p. 453)</span> and means of +communication. An alternative plan had to be found. This plan was to +remove the horses, cattle, and food supplies from the areas which he +was unable to occupy, and to transport the non-combatant inhabitants +to places where they could be both fed and protected. And, when this +had been done—or, more correctly, while it was in process of being +done—he had to capture the small, mobile bodies of burghers operating +over the whole of the unprotected area of the late Republics and the +Cape Colony, and to collect gradually the fighting Boers, captured or +surrendered, into the colonial or over-sea prisoners' camps.</p> + +<p>Certain districts, of which those surrounding the towns of Kimberley, +Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were the more important, had +from the first been effectively occupied and securely held. All the +troops at Lord Kitchener's disposal, that were not absorbed in the +work of garrisoning these districts and maintaining the lines of +communication, were organised into mobile columns, which were +distributed among General Officers respectively attached to a +particular area. In a despatch of July 8th, 1901, Lord Kitchener was +able to report that, as the result of the recent work of these mobile +columns, the Boers, although "still able, in case of emergency, to +concentrate a considerable number of men," were, in his opinion, +"unable to undertake any large scheme of operations." Apart from the +heavy drain from prisoners <span class="pagenum"><a id="page454" name="page454"></a>(p. 454)</span> captured and deaths in the field, +the loss of their ox-waggons had seriously affected their mobility and +supply arrangements.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men," he + writes, "they are scattered all over the country without plans + and without hope, and on the approach of our troops they + disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men + pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance + without retaining anything, or defending the smallest portion of + this vast country."</p> + +<p>He estimates that there are not more than 13,500<a id="footnotetag256" name="footnotetag256"></a><a href="#footnote256" title="Go to footnote 256"><span class="small">[256]</span></a> Boers in the +field in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony. +But he adds that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "with long lines of railway to hold, every yard of which has to + be defended, both to secure our own civil and military supplies, + and, what is more important, to prevent the enemy from obtaining + necessaries from the capture of our trains, the employment of + large numbers of troops continues to be a necessity.... The Boer + party who declared war have quitted the field, and are now urging + those whom they deserted to continue a useless struggle by giving + lying assurances to the ignorant burghers of outside assistance, + and by raising absurdly deceitful hopes that Great Britain has + not sufficient endurance to see the matter through."<a id="footnotetag257" name="footnotetag257"></a><a href="#footnote257" title="Go to footnote 257"><span class="small">[257]</span></a></p> + +<p>But it had become evident that some more systematic effort was +required for the capture of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page455" name="page455"></a>(p. 455)</span> commandos, unless the slow +task of wearing down the Boer resistance was to be almost indefinitely +protracted; and this same month of July, 1901, witnessed the extension +of the blockhouse lines, which proved the turning-point in the +guerilla war. The origin of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouse +defence is described by him in his despatch of August 8th, 1901.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The blockhouse system.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Experience had shown," he writes, "that the line of defensible + posts, extending across the Orange River Colony, from Jacobsdal + to Ladybrand, constituted a considerable obstacle to the free + movement of the enemies' roving bands, and that the gradual + completion of chains of blockhouses placed at intervals of a + mile, sometimes less, along the Transvaal and Orange River Colony + railways, had obtained for our traffic a comparative security + which it had not previously enjoyed."<a id="footnotetag258" name="footnotetag258"></a><a href="#footnote258" title="Go to footnote 258"><span class="small">[258]</span></a></p> + +<p>In July, therefore, Lord Kitchener made arrangements for the +construction of three additional lines of blockhouses. The first ran +from Aliwal North westward, following the course of the Orange River, +to Bethulie, and was continued thence alongside the railway through +Stormberg, Rosmead, Naauwpoort, and De Aar, northward to Kimberley. +The second commenced at Frederickstad and ran northward by the source +of the Mooi River to Breed's Nek in the Magaliesberg, from which point +it was connected with the British garrison at Commando Nek, and thus +screened the western side of the Pretoria and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page456" name="page456"></a>(p. 456)</span> Johannesburg +area. The third, running from Eerste Fabriken in the north, by Springs +and Heidelberg, southward to the Vaal River, protected the same +district from attack upon the east. These new blockhouse lines, Lord +Kitchener wrote, promised to be of much assistance in the future. Not +only did they protect the British communications, and render +inter-communication between the different portions of the Boer forces +difficult, but, in the absence of frontiers, natural or artificial, +they served as barriers against which the British mobile columns were +able to drive bands of the enemy and force them to surrender. Indeed, +the blockhouse lines proved the chief instrument of success; for with +the gradual extension of the system, the area of active hostilities +was confined in an increasing degree to the vast half-deserted regions +through which the commandos roamed, and the British columns swept at +intervals in pursuit of them.</p> + +<p>A month later, August 8th, Lord Kitchener reported a further step in +advance. He had formed "some specially mobile columns for independent +and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some +distance from the operations of other troops." The commanders of these +new mobile columns had a free hand in respect of their movements, +since they were guided by the special intelligence, which they +themselves collected, and not solely by information from headquarters. +The effect produced by the development of the blockhouse <span class="pagenum"><a id="page457" name="page457"></a>(p. 457)</span> +system, combined with the greater freedom of initiative allowed to the +new mobile columns, became apparent in the increasing number of Boers +captured or voluntarily surrendering themselves in the month of +August, when altogether more than two thousand of the enemy were +accounted for.<a id="footnotetag259" name="footnotetag259"></a><a href="#footnote259" title="Go to footnote 259"><span class="small">[259]</span></a> On the 7th of this month the delayed<a id="footnotetag260" name="footnotetag260"></a><a href="#footnote260" title="Go to footnote 260"><span class="small">[260]</span></a> +proclamation was issued, and a date—September 15th—was fixed as the +limit within which the guerilla leaders might, by voluntarily +surrendering, avoid certain penalties which were duly set out. In +order to counteract the effect of this action on the part of the +British Government, General Botha stimulated his followers to +increased military enterprise.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "But," says Lord Kitchener, "though there has been no general + surrender, the device to which the Commandant-General resorted + for turning the thoughts of his burghers in another direction has + probably cost him and his cause [a heavier loss] than a simple + pursuance of the usual evasive tactics would have even entailed."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Large captures of Boers.</span> + +<p>The precise extent of this loss is shown in the returns for September, +which record captures and surrenders almost as numerous as those of +the preceding month.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "It cannot be expected," Lord Kitchener adds, "even under the + most favourable conditions, that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page458" name="page458"></a>(p. 458)</span> in the presence of the + ever-diminishing numbers opposing us in the field, these figures + can be maintained, but I feel confident that so long as any + resistance is continued, no exertion will be spared either by + officers or men of this force to carry out the task they still + have before them."<a id="footnotetag261" name="footnotetag261"></a><a href="#footnote261" title="Go to footnote 261"><span class="small">[261]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">The railway lines secured.</span> + +<p>In another month a position had been reached in which it was possible +for the work of administrative reconstruction—interrupted a year ago +by the development of the guerilla warfare—to be resumed. At this +date (November, 1901), the resistance of the Dutch population had been +weakened by the loss of 53,000 fighting Boers, of whom 42,000 were in +British custody, while the rest had been killed, wounded, or otherwise +put out of action. In the Transvaal 14,700 square miles, and in the +Orange River Colony 17,000 square miles of territory had been enclosed +by blockhouse lines. A square formed roughly by lines running +respectively from Klerksdorp to Zeerust on the west, from Zeerust to +Middelburg on the north, from Middelburg to Standerton on the east, +and from Standerton to Klerksdorp on the south, enclosing Pretoria and +the Rand, was the protected area of the Transvaal. The whole of the +Orange River Colony south of the blockhouse line, +Kimberley-Winberg-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand, was also a protected area; +and the Cape Colony, south of the main railway lines, was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page459" name="page459"></a>(p. 459)</span> +similarly screened off. But an application of what may be termed "the +railway-cutting test" yields, perhaps, the most eloquent testimony +both to the magnitude of the original task undertaken by the Imperial +troops, and to the degree of success which had been obtained. In +October, 1900, the railway lines, upon which the British troops +depended for supplies of food and ammunition, were cut thirty-two +times, or more than once a day. The number of times in which they were +cut in the succeeding November was thirty; in December twenty-one; in +January, 1901, sixteen; in February, as the result of De Wet's +invasion of the Cape Colony, they were cut thirty times; in March +eighteen; in April eighteen; in May twelve; in June eight; in July +four; in August four; in September twice; and in October not at all. +Still more significant of the approach of peace was the fact that now, +for the first time, the British population was allowed to return to +Johannesburg in any considerable numbers.<a id="footnotetag262" name="footnotetag262"></a><a href="#footnote262" title="Go to footnote 262"><span class="small">[262]</span></a></p> + +<p>It remains to consider two questions which cannot be omitted from any +account; however brief, of the manner in which the disarmament of the +Dutch in South Africa was effected. The first of these is the charge +of inhumanity brought against the Imperial military authorities in +respect of the deportation of the Boer non-combatants to the Burgher +Camps; and the second is the actual <span class="pagenum"><a id="page460" name="page460"></a>(p. 460)</span> effect produced upon the +burghers in the field by the public denunciations of the war by +members of the Liberal Opposition in England.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Burgher camps.</span> + +<p>In charging the British Government and Lord Kitchener with inhumanity +in the conduct of the war, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and other friends +of the Boer cause relied in the main upon the circumstance that a +certain proportion of the Boer population was removed compulsorily +from districts which the British troops were unable to occupy +effectively, and upon the further fact that the Burgher Camps +exhibited an unusually high rate of mortality. The necessity for the +removal of this non-combatant population will scarcely be disputed in +view of the methods adopted by the Boer leaders to compel the burghers +to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops, and the fact that +nearly every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, inhabited +by the Dutch, served as an intelligence office, a recruiting depôt, +and a base of supplies for the roving commandos. Nor will it be denied +that the responsibility for the unnecessary suffering incurred by the +Boer people in the guerilla war rests upon those of the Boer leaders +who formed and enforced the decision to continue the struggle, and not +upon the British Government. The alleged "inhumanity," therefore, of +the Imperial military authorities consists in the circumstance that, +instead of leaving these helpless non-combatants to be supported by +the Boer leaders, they removed them to places of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page461" name="page461"></a>(p. 461)</span> security, +where they were fed, housed, and generally maintained, in as little +discomfort as circumstances permitted. If the lesser suffering of the +Burgher Camps was the only alternative to greater suffering, and +possibly starvation, on the veld, the Boers had only their own leaders +to thank for the position in which they found themselves. The +death-rate of the Burgher Camps was exceptionally high as compared +with that of any ordinary European community. But the population of +the camps was no less exceptional. It consisted of women and children, +with a small proportion of adult males; and of all these the majority +had come to the camps as refugees, insufficiently clothed, weakened by +exposure and often by starvation. Obviously the death-rate of such a +refugee community would be much higher, under the most favourable +conditions, than that of an ordinary European town; and, in order to +find a valid point of comparison, we must seek statistics provided by +similar collections of refugees, brought together under the like +exceptional circumstances. We are unable to find any such parallel +case, for the sufficient reason that history records no other example +of a nation at war which, at the risk of impairing the efficiency of +its own forces in the field, has endeavoured, not merely to feed and +clothe, but to house, nurse, and even educate the non-combatant +population of its enemy.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Reduction of the death-rate.</span> + +<p>What we do know, however, is that, of the total deaths in these camps +of refuge, the great majority <span class="pagenum"><a id="page462" name="page462"></a>(p. 462)</span> were those of infants and +children. This is a circumstance which in itself goes far to make the +excess of the camp death-rate apparent rather than real; since, in the +first place, the Boer mothers, owing to their insanitary habits and +ignorance,<a id="footnotetag263" name="footnotetag263"></a><a href="#footnote263" title="Go to footnote 263"><span class="small">[263]</span></a> are not accustomed to bring more than one out of every +two children to maturity; and in the second, the rate of infant +mortality is abnormally high, as compared with that of a given +community as a whole, even in the most highly developed countries. The +highest monthly death-rate was that of October, 1901, when, out of a +population of 112,109 in all camps, there were 3,205 deaths, or 344 +per thousand per annum.<a id="footnotetag264" name="footnotetag264"></a><a href="#footnote264" title="Go to footnote 264"><span class="small">[264]</span></a> But of these deaths, 500 only (in round +numbers) were those of adults, and 2,700 were those of children. That +is to say, in this worst month we have in the refugee camps an adult +death-rate of (roughly) 50 per thousand, as compared with a European +death-rate varying from 16.7 in Norway to 33.2 in Hungary,<a id="footnotetag265" name="footnotetag265"></a><a href="#footnote265" title="Go to footnote 265"><span class="small">[265]</span></a> and a +children's death-rate of 300 per thousand, as compared with the 208 +per thousand of the contemporary rate of infant mortality in +thirty-three great towns of the United Kingdom, or in Birkenhead alone +of 362 per thousand. And from this time forward the death-rate of the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page463" name="page463"></a>(p. 463)</span> refugee camps was rapidly reduced. The reason for this +reduction is significant. By the development of the blockhouse lines +the British military authorities had been enabled to protect their +supplies from the attacks of the guerilla leaders. In other words, +Lord Kitchener was now able to defend the Boer non-combatants against +the efforts made by their own leaders to deprive them of food and +other necessaries of life. And ultimately the mortality in the Burgher +Camps was reduced to a point "much below the normal rates under +ordinary local circumstances."<a id="footnotetag266" name="footnotetag266"></a><a href="#footnote266" title="Go to footnote 266"><span class="small">[266]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page464" name="page464"></a>(p. 464)</span> The charge of prolonging the war by public declarations of +sympathy with the enemy<a id="footnotetag267" name="footnotetag267"></a><a href="#footnote267" title="Go to footnote 267"><span class="small">[267]</span></a> was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page465" name="page465"></a>(p. 465)</span> definitely formulated +against certain members of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish +Nationalist party by Lord St. Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), at +Oldham on October 10th, 1901.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Why the war was prolonged.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "The real cause of the prolongation of this war has been + something which, on my word, I believe could never have been seen + in any other country in the world. It has been the speeches in + Parliament of British members of the House of Commons, doing + everything they could against their country and in favour of her + enemies. It has been articles in certain journals taking + absolutely the same lines—I am not talking of mere attacks on + his Majesty's Government, or even calumnies of individual + ministers, that is part of the ordinary machinery of political + warfare, and one of the advantages of an absolutely free Press. + No, what I am talking of is the prominence given to the opinions + and sentiments of men who were called Pro-Boers, as if they + represented the feelings of a large section of their + fellow-countrymen. The invention of lies, like the alleged + quarrel between Lord Kitchener and the War Office, was intended + to damage this country in the conduct of the war, as was also the + wicked charges made against the humanity of our generals and our + soldiers in the Concentration Camps and in the field, the + attempts, such as I saw only the other day in one of these + papers, to prove that in those gallant contests at Fort + Itala<a id="footnotetag268" name="footnotetag268"></a><a href="#footnote268" title="Go to footnote 268"><span class="small">[268]</span></a> and on the borders of Natal our soldiers had not + repulsed their enemies, but were themselves the defeated party. + We here do not attach any importance to those things. We rate + them at their true value because we know <span class="pagenum"><a id="page466" name="page466"></a>(p. 466)</span> something + about their authors—but what do you think is thought of them + when they go out to South Africa? What do the Boers and their + leaders think when they read the newspapers written in England + which are full of these things? The Boers have many faults, but + they are a simple and patriotic people. They never can imagine + that English newspapers would print these things, that English + members of Parliament would speak them, taking always the side of + their country's enemies, unless these things were true. They are + deceived. They greedily swallow all this as representing the + opinion of a great section of the public in this country, and + those who have said these things and those who have circulated + them are the parties who are guilty before God of prolonging this + war. There are the Irish Nationalists. Let me read to you words + which I heard with the greatest pain in the last session of + Parliament from the leader of the Irish Nationalists, a man of + consummate eloquence and perfect self-control. What did Mr. John + Redmond say? He prayed God that the resistance of the Boers might + be strengthened, and that South Africa might take vengeance for + its wrongs by separating itself from the Empire which had deluged + it with blood, and become a free and independent nation. We in + England pass over words of that sort, though I believe they would + not have been uttered with impunity by a member of the + Legislative Assembly of any other country in the world."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Campbell-Bannerman's reply.</span> + +<p>Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reply to the charge brought against him +by Lord St. Aldwyn, and subsequently by Lord Salisbury,<a id="footnotetag269" name="footnotetag269"></a><a href="#footnote269" title="Go to footnote 269"><span class="small">[269]</span></a> is +contained in the words following, which were spoken by him at +Plymouth, on November 19th:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page467" name="page467"></a>(p. 467)</span> "Now I declare, ladies and gentlemen, for myself, that + from first to last I have never uttered one syllable that could + be twisted by any ingenuity into encouragement by the Boers. No, + I have never even expressed ordinary pity for, or sympathy with + them, because I did not wish to run the risk of being + misunderstood. What I have done, and what I hope I shall continue + to do, is to denounce the stupidity of the way in which the + Government were dealing with the Boers."</p> + +<p>There is only one method by which the amazing effrontery of this +denial can be sufficiently exhibited. It is to place underneath it +quotations from speeches delivered by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman +himself at Stirling on October 25th, by Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P., at +Galashiels on October 14th, and by Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., at Dundee +on October 16th, as printed in the "Official Organ of the Orange Free +State Government," dated September 21st, 1901, a copy of which was +found in a Boer laager on the veld. The extracts selected are these:</p> + +<p>Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The whole country in the two belligerent States, outside the + mining towns, is a howling wilderness. The farms are burned, the + country is wasted. The flocks and herds are either butchered or + driven off; the mills are destroyed, furniture and instruments of + agriculture smashed. These things are what I have termed methods + of barbarism. I adhere to the phrase. I cannot improve upon it. + If these are not the methods of barbarism, what methods did + barbarism employ?... My belief is that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page468" name="page468"></a>(p. 468)</span> mass of the + British people ... do not desire to see a brave people subjugated + or annihilated."</p> + +<p>Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P.:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The war was unnecessary, and therefore unjust.... He wished he + could agree that we were fighting in a just cause, that we had + always fought according to acknowledged civilised methods; but as + an honest man he could not do so."</p> + +<p>Mr. Edmund Robertson, M.P.:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The victory of the Government (at the last General Election) had + been the main cause of the prolongation of the war. If they had + been defeated their successors would have been men with a free + hand, and the Boers themselves might have been ready to make + concessions, which they would not make, and had not made, to + those whom they believed to be their enemies and persecutors. If + the Empire was to be saved, the Government must be + destroyed."<a id="footnotetag270" name="footnotetag270"></a><a href="#footnote270" title="Go to footnote 270"><span class="small">[270]</span></a></p> + +<p>Can any human being of ordinary intelligence believe that these +passages, containing denunciations of the war, were circulated by +Ex-President Steyn for any other purpose than that of encouraging the +burghers to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops?</p> + +<p>And to this evidence may be added the protest made by "An Old +Berliner" in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of November 27th, 1901:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">"Methods of barbarism".</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "What I want to impress upon your readers is the much more + serious and, indeed, incalculable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page469" name="page469"></a>(p. 469)</span> mischief done by the + public utterances of responsible politicians, and, to take the + most pernicious example of all, by the reckless language of Sir + Henry Campbell-Bannerman. The words he uttered about England's + methods of barbarism have been used ever since as the watchwords + of England's detractors throughout the length and breadth of + Germany."<a id="footnotetag271" name="footnotetag271"></a><a href="#footnote271" title="Go to footnote 271"><span class="small">[271]</span></a><a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page470" name="page470"></a>(p. 470)</span> CHAPTER XI</h3> + +<p class="title">PREPARING FOR PEACE</p> + + +<p>We have already noticed that arrangements were made in October, 1900, +under which the High Commissionership was to be separated from the +Governorship of the Cape Colony in order that Lord Milner might be +free to undertake the work of administrative reconstruction in the new +colonies. In pursuance of this decision of the Home Government, Lord +Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony +upon the departure of Lord Roberts (November 29th, 1900); but +circumstances did not permit him to resign the governorship of the +Cape Colony and remove to the Transvaal until three months later. The +new Governor of the Cape Colony was Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who +was himself succeeded, as Governor of Natal, by Sir Henry E. McCallum; +and at the same time (March 1st, 1901), Sir H. (then Major) +Goold-Adams was appointed Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River +Colony, where he took over the duties hitherto discharged by General +Pretyman as Military Governor.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner in the Transvaal.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner left Capetown to assume the administration of the new +colonies on February 28th, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page471" name="page471"></a>(p. 471)</span> 1901. The incidents of his +journey northwards are illustrative alike of the state of South Africa +at this time, and of the varied responsibilities of the High +Commissioner. After three months of continuous and successful conflict +with the forces of rebellion in the south, he was suddenly confronted +with a situation in the north even more pregnant with the +possibilities of disaster. This was the day on which +Commandant-General Louis Botha entered the British lines at Middelburg +to treat for peace with General Lord Kitchener; and many counsels of +precaution sped northwards upon the wires as the High Commissioner's +train crossed the plains and wound slowly up through the mountain +passes that led to the higher levels of the Karroo plateau. March 1st, +which was spent in the train, was the most idle day that Lord Milner +had passed for many months. The respite was of short duration. At +midnight, directly after the train had left De Aar junction, a long +telegram from Lord Kitchener, giving the substance of his interview +with Botha, caught the High Commissioner. But if peace was in the air +in the north, war held the field in the south. From De Aar to +Bloemfontein the railway line was astir with British troops, +concentrating or dispersing, in pursuit of De Wet. At Bloemfontein +station Lord Milner was met (March 2nd) by Lord Kitchener, and the +nature of the reply to be given to Botha was discussed between them. +On the next morning Lord Milner's saloon car was attached to the +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page472" name="page472"></a>(p. 472)</span> Commander-in-Chief's train, and a long telegram was drafted +and despatched to London.<a id="footnotetag272" name="footnotetag272"></a><a href="#footnote272" title="Go to footnote 272"><span class="small">[272]</span></a> The position which Lord Milner took up +on this occasion, and afterwards at the final negotiations of +Vereeniging, was that which he had himself condensed in the two words +"never again." He was anxious for peace; no man more than he; but a +peace upon terms that would leave South Africa with the remotest +prospect of a return to the abnormal political conditions which had +made the war inevitable, he regarded as a disaster to be avoided at +all costs. This telegram despatched, the train left Bloemfontein, and, +in spite of more than one sign of the proximity of the Boer raiders, +it reached Pretoria without delay at 9 a.m. on March 4th. The next ten +days Lord Milner remained at the capital of the Transvaal, in constant +communication with the Home Government on the subject of the peace +negotiations<a id="footnotetag273" name="footnotetag273"></a><a href="#footnote273" title="Go to footnote 273"><span class="small">[273]</span></a> with the Boers, which ultimately proved abortive; +but on the 9th he went over to Johannesburg for the day to see the +house which was being prepared for his occupation. On the 15th he left +Pretoria finally for Johannesburg. He was received at the station by a +guard of honour furnished by the Rand Rifles, and, thus escorted, +drove to Sunnyside, a pleasant house in what is now the suburb of +Parktown, commanding an unbroken view over <span class="pagenum"><a id="page473" name="page473"></a>(p. 473)</span> the veld to the +Magaliesberg range beyond Pretoria; and here he continued to reside +until he left South Africa on April 2nd, 1905.</p> + +<a id="img002" name="img002"></a> +<div class="figcenter"> +<img src="images/img002.jpg" width="600" height="388" alt="" title=""> +<p><span class="italic small">By permission of the Argus Printing and Publishing +Co., Ltd., Johannesburg.</span><br> LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Affairs in the Cape colony.</span> + +<p>From this time forward (March 15th, 1901), Lord Milner's +administrative activity is primarily concerned with the Transvaal and +Orange River Colony. Owing, however, to the continued resistance of +the Boers and the extension of the area of hostilities by the second +invasion of the Cape Colony, the administrative development of the new +colonies was confined within the narrowest limits, until six months of +strenuous military operations had enabled Lord Kitchener to render the +protected areas and the railways virtually secure against the raids of +the Boer commandos. Four out of these six months were occupied by Lord +Milner's second visit to England (May-August, 1901). But before we +approach this episode, and thereby resume the main current of the +narrative, it is necessary to trace the course of events in the Cape +Colony. With the government of the Colony once more in the hands of +the British party, Lord Milner had been relieved of the acute and +constant anxieties that marked his official relationship to the +Afrikander Ministry. On the vital question of the necessity of +establishing British authority upon terms that would make any +repetition of the war impossible, Sir Gordon Sprigg and his ministers +were absolutely at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government. +Whatever differences of opinion arose subsequently between the Cape +ministers and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page474" name="page474"></a>(p. 474)</span> Imperial authorities were differences not +of principle but of detail. For the most part they were such as would +have manifested themselves in any circumstances in a country where the +civil government was compelled, by the exigencies of war, to surrender +some of its powers to the military authority.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Bond and peace.</span> + +<p>By supporting the Treason Bill, Mr. Schreiner and Sir Richard Solomon +had dissociated themselves from the Afrikander nationalists; and +henceforward their influence was used unreservedly on the side of +British supremacy.<a id="footnotetag274" name="footnotetag274"></a><a href="#footnote274" title="Go to footnote 274"><span class="small">[274]</span></a> On the other hand, Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, +as we have seen, had openly denounced the policy of the Imperial +Government, and no less openly advocated the aims, and defended the +methods, of the Afrikander Bond. The Bond's determination to do all in +its power to secure the independence of the Boers, and thereby defeat +the policy of the Imperial Government, was manifested by the abrupt +refusal of its leaders to associate themselves with the efforts of the +Burgher Peace Committee. Mr. P. de Wet and the other peace delegates +who had visited the Colony in the circumstances already mentioned, +desired the Bond to co-operate with them by informing the republican +leaders that they must expect no military assistance from the +Afrikander party, and by formally advising them to end the war in the +interests of the Afrikander population. The details <span class="pagenum"><a id="page475" name="page475"></a>(p. 475)</span> of the +incident, as recorded in the Blue-book,<a id="footnotetag275" name="footnotetag275"></a><a href="#footnote275" title="Go to footnote 275"><span class="small">[275]</span></a> show that Mr. Theron, the +President of the Provincial Bestuur of the Bond and a member of the +Legislative Assembly, was at first disposed to regard the proposal of +the peace delegates with favour. But, after expressing himself to this +effect at Wellington, on February 15th, 1901, he went to Capetown to +consult the Bond leaders on the matter, and, as the result of this +consultation, he wrote to Mr. de Wet, five days later, declining to +meet the peace delegates again, or negotiate with them, on the ground +that the "principles of the Afrikander Bond" would be prejudiced by +his entering into official negotiations with the deputation, whose +official status he was unable, after inquiry, to recognise. It is +difficult not to connect this summary treatment of the peace delegates +by the Bond with the fact that, just at this time, General C. de Wet +was reporting to General Louis Botha that the "Cape Colony had risen +to a man."<a id="footnotetag276" name="footnotetag276"></a><a href="#footnote276" title="Go to footnote 276"><span class="small">[276]</span></a> However this may be, the wholesale manner in which the +Afrikander Bond had identified itself in the country districts with +the Boer invaders is sufficiently displayed by a return published six +months later, from which it appears that, out of a total of +thirty-three men holding official positions in the Bond organisation +in three districts in the Cape Colony, twenty-seven were accused of +high treason, of whom twenty-four were convicted, two absconded, and +one was acquitted.<a id="footnotetag277" name="footnotetag277"></a><a href="#footnote277" title="Go to footnote 277"><span class="small">[277]</span></a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page476" name="page476"></a>(p. 476)</span> With the Bond in this mood, with certain districts +practically maintaining the enemy and certain other districts +constantly exposed to the incursions of the guerilla leaders, with a +large proportion of the loyalist population fighting at the front, and +a still larger number organised for local defence, and with the whole +of the Colony, except the ports, under martial law, it was obviously +impossible for the machinery of representative government to continue +in its normal course.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Anti-British libels.</span> + +<p>The registration of electors, which, under the provisions of the +colonial law, was directed to take place not later than the last day +of February, 1901, was postponed to a more convenient season. The +existing register, while it contained the names of—it was +estimated—ten thousand persons disfranchised, or about to be +disfranchised, for rebellion, and of some thousands of others then in +arms against their sovereign, failed to include persons who had +acquired the necessary qualifications since the date of the last +registration (1899). Apart from the unsatisfactory condition of the +voters' lists, there were other circumstances that made it undesirable +as well as difficult not merely to hold the elections necessary to +fill up the nine or ten vacant seats in the Legislative Assembly, but +even to summon Parliament. Locomotion in many parts of the Colony was +inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous. So large a proportion of the +members of both chambers were absent in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page477" name="page477"></a>(p. 477)</span> Europe, or engaged +either in repelling the invaders or in repressing rebellion, that the +remainder, if assembled, would present a mere simulacrum of the actual +legislature of the Colony. Moreover, it was necessary that no fresh +opportunities for promoting disaffection should be provided by +discussions in Parliament or contested elections. The "carnival of +mendacity" which, culminating in the Worcester Congress, was mainly +responsible for the second invasion of the Colony, had been +inaugurated by the inflammatory speeches delivered in the last session +of Parliament by the Afrikander members during the debates on the +Treason Bill. The spirit of malevolence displayed at this period by +the anti-British Press, whether printed in Dutch or in English, may be +inferred from the list of convictions reported on April 19th by Sir W. +Hely-Hutchinson to the Colonial Office. Mr. Albert Cartwright, editor +of <span class="italic">The South African News</span> (the reputed organ of Mr. Merriman and Mr. +Sauer), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and +sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment without hard labour. Mr. +Advocate Malan, editor of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> (the reputed organ of Mr. +Hofmeyr), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on General French, +and sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. Mr. de Jong, editor +of <span class="italic">The Worcester Advertiser</span>, and Mr. Vosloo, editor of <span class="italic">Het Oosten</span>, +were both convicted of the same offence as Mr. Malan, and sentenced to +six months' imprisonment <span class="pagenum"><a id="page478" name="page478"></a>(p. 478)</span> without hard labour, while the +former was further charged with a seditious libel attributing +atrocities to the British troops, in respect of which he was convicted +and sentenced to a fine of £100 or two months' imprisonment.<a id="footnotetag278" name="footnotetag278"></a><a href="#footnote278" title="Go to footnote 278"><span class="small">[278]</span></a></p> + +<p>The extension of martial law in January (1901) had made such excesses, +whether on the platform or in the Press, no longer possible. But the +Afrikander nationalists in the ports, and especially in Capetown, +continued to render assistance to the guerilla leaders, both by +providing intelligence of the plans of the British military +authorities, and by forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition, until +the time (October 9th) when these towns were placed, like the rest of +the Colony, under martial law.</p> + +<p>In these circumstances Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, acting on the advice of +his ministers, prorogued the Cape Parliament from time to time, until +the actual termination of hostilities made it possible for the +inhabitants of the Colony to return to the normal conditions of their +political life. As, however, the provision for the ordinary cost of +administration made by the Colonial Parliament in its last session did +not extend beyond June 30th, 1901, it became necessary to provide for +the expenditure of the Colony after this date by the issue of +Governor's warrants, under which the Treasurer-General was authorised +to pay out funds in anticipation of legislative authority. This +technically <span class="pagenum"><a id="page479" name="page479"></a>(p. 479)</span> illegal procedure, by which the authority of the +Governor was substituted temporarily for that of Parliament, was +advised by the Cape ministers and sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain. In +this way provision was made for the financial needs of the Government; +and when, after the war, the Cape Parliament was able to meet again, +the necessary bills of indemnity, legalising these acts of the +Governor and acts committed by the military authorities in the +administration of martial law, were passed in due course.<a id="footnotetag279" name="footnotetag279"></a><a href="#footnote279" title="Go to footnote 279"><span class="small">[279]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Breakdown of government.</span> + +<p>The only alternative course was the suspension, or abrogation, of the +Cape constitution by the Home Government. In view of the appeal for +the suspension of the constitution made to Mr. Chamberlain a year +later, and refused by him—an appeal which was endorsed by the +judgment both of Lord Milner and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and supported by +the majority of the loyalists of both nationalities—it is interesting +to observe that petitions addressed to the Governor in June, 1901, +reveal a considerable body of opinion in favour of the proposal at +this date. These petitions came from the British inhabitants of the +small towns in the Eastern Province, since, in the vigorous language +of one of the petitioners, "it's those who live in small towns that +feel the Bond's iron heel." And the same correspondent asserts that a +great number of persons have been prevented from signing the petition, +although they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page480" name="page480"></a>(p. 480)</span> approve of it, by fear of the "Bond boycott," +adding, "Some of the Bond members have already remarked, 'Now martial +law is on we are not in it; but wait until it's removed, then it will +be our turn.'"<a id="footnotetag280" name="footnotetag280"></a><a href="#footnote280" title="Go to footnote 280"><span class="small">[280]</span></a></p> + +<p>The collapse of the system of responsible government in the Cape +Colony was complete. The truth upon which Lord Durham insisted in his +famous Report on Canada, that responsible government is only possible +where an effective majority of the inhabitants are British, was once +more demonstrated. In the granting of supplies, the characteristic +function of the lower chamber, the authority of the Governor was now +substituted for that of Parliament. The endeavour to check the +rebellion by the agency of the civil courts had been already +abandoned. The lenient penalties of the Treason Bill had produced a +large increase of disaffection. On April 6th, 1901, a notice was +issued by the Attorney-General warning the public that "any act of +treason or rebellion and any crime of a political character" committed +after the 12th instant would be brought no longer before the Special +Tribunals, with their mitigated penalties created by the Act of 1900, +but dealt with by the ordinary courts, and punishable by the severe +penalties of the common law of the Colony. But this warning of the +Attorney-General was superseded a fortnight later (April 22nd), by a +notice, issued by Lord Kitchener and published by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page481" name="page481"></a>(p. 481)</span> Cape +Government, under which it was declared that—</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The military courts.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "All subjects of His<a id="footnotetag281" name="footnotetag281"></a><a href="#footnote281" title="Go to footnote 281"><span class="small">[281]</span></a> Majesty and all persons residing in the + Cape Colony who shall, in districts thereof in which martial law + prevails, be actively in arms against His Majesty, or who shall + directly invite others to take up arms against him, or who shall + actively aid or assist the enemy or commit any overt act by which + the safety of His Majesty's forces or subjects is endangered, + shall immediately on arrest be tried by court martial, convened + by my authority, and shall on conviction be liable to the + severest penalties of the law."</p> + +<p>The decision to deal with such cases by military courts was taken by +Lord Kitchener, after consultation with Lord Milner, on the ground +that the state of the midland and north-western districts was such +that "only prompt and severe punishment could stop the spread of +rebellion and prevent general anarchy."<a id="footnotetag282" name="footnotetag282"></a><a href="#footnote282" title="Go to footnote 282"><span class="small">[282]</span></a> The Cape Government, +however, in assenting to the measure, stipulated that certain +conditions should be laid down for the constitution and procedure of +the military courts, sufficient to check the more obvious abuses to +which such tribunals are liable. These conditions, as expressed in a +minute of Sir James Innes, the Attorney-General, were embodied in a +set of instructions issued by Lord Kitchener to his officers +concurrently with the publication of the notice of April 22nd. Nor was +this all. In view of the continued assistance known to be rendered to +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page482" name="page482"></a>(p. 482)</span> Boer and rebel commandos by the Afrikander nationalists, +martial law was extended, on October 9th, to the Cape ports; and on +December 2nd the British Government announced that, as the result of +the establishment of martial law at the South African ports, no +persons would be allowed to land in South Africa from January 1st, +1902, onwards without a permit, except under certain special +circumstances.<a id="footnotetag283" name="footnotetag283"></a><a href="#footnote283" title="Go to footnote 283"><span class="small">[283]</span></a></p> + +<p>Ample evidence alike of the necessity of these measures, and of the +<span class="italic">de facto</span> suspension of the constitution, is provided by a Minister's +minute of September 12th, 1901. The immediate object of the minute is +to advise the Governor that it is impossible, in the opinion of the +Cape Ministry, to avoid the further prorogation of Parliament; and +this, although the Constitution Ordinance requires the Cape Parliament +to meet "once at least every year," and cannot, therefore, be complied +with, unless Parliament is summoned "for the despatch of business on +or before Saturday, 12th October." In support of this decision Sir +Gordon Sprigg and his colleagues referred to the Military Intelligence +Report for the current month, which showed that, south of the Orange +River, there were a dozen or more commandos, with a total of from +1,800 to 2,000 men; while in the portion of the Colony <span class="pagenum"><a id="page483" name="page483"></a>(p. 483)</span> north +of the river there were "numerous commandos also roaming about." Then +follows a startling revelation of the character of the men whom the +Bond organisation had sent to Parliament:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Condition of Cape parliament.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"One member of the House of Assembly," ministers write, "is + undergoing a term of imprisonment for seditious libel, three + members are awaiting their trial on the charge of high treason, + two seats are practically vacant by reason of the absence of the + members without leave during the whole of last session. Those two + members are alleged to have welcomed the invaders of the Colony, + and encouraged rebellion, and then fled to Holland, where they + are now living. One seat is vacant by the resignation of the + member, who has accepted an appointment in the Transvaal Colony. + Another seat is vacant on account of the death of the member, + another member is sending in his resignation owing to ill health, + which compels him to reside in Europe. In all these cases the + divisions concerned are either under martial law or in a state of + disturbance, which makes new elections impracticable.</p> + +<p>"Besides the cases enumerated there are members who have been + deported from their homes on account of the seditious influences + which the military authorities allege they were exercising, and + others who are under military observation, with respect to whom + their attendance in Parliament must be regarded as uncertain. + Several members also are engaged in military operations, whose + attendance could not, in the present condition of the country, be + relied on. There are also some members who would be unable to + attend owing to the state of war and rebellion prevailing in the + districts where they reside, whose personal presence <span class="pagenum"><a id="page484" name="page484"></a>(p. 484)</span> is + necessary for the protection of their families and property."</p> +</div> + +<p>Such a legislature, they concluded, could not be regarded as "fairly +representing the people." Moreover—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "There is also the further consideration that the probability of + good resulting from the meeting of Parliament now is but small, + while the likelihood of evil consequences accruing from the + publication of speeches of a character similar to many that were + delivered last session is strong. The tendency of such speeches + would be to encourage the spirit of rebellion which unhappily + prevails in the Colony over a large area, and ministers regard it + as an imperative duty to do everything in their power to subdue + that rebellious spirit, and restore peace and good-will to the + distracted country."<a id="footnotetag284" name="footnotetag284"></a><a href="#footnote284" title="Go to footnote 284"><span class="small">[284]</span></a></p> + +<p>The necessity for the more stringent action now taken by the Imperial +authorities was, therefore, undoubted. But here again, in placing the +ports, the centres of commercial life, under martial law, an endeavour +was made to render the restraints of military rule as little onerous +as possible. A Board, consisting of three persons nominated +respectively by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General +Commanding in the Cape Colony, was created for the consideration and, +where necessary, the redress of all complaints or grievances arising +out of martial law in the Colony, other than pecuniary claims against +the Government. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page485" name="page485"></a>(p. 485)</span> The fact that, on the whole, martial law was +judiciously administered is indicated by the Report of the proceedings +of this Board, presented on December 3rd by Mr. (now Sir Lewis) +Mitchell, who, as Manager of the Standard Bank, had been appointed +chairman by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. Out of 199 cases brought before +the Board, Mr. Mitchell writes:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "A fair number of substantial grievances have been redressed, but + in a majority of instances the Board have held that complainants + suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported, + imprisoned, or otherwise punished on reasonable grounds of + suspicion."<a id="footnotetag285" name="footnotetag285"></a><a href="#footnote285" title="Go to footnote 285"><span class="small">[285]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Loyalists defend the colony.</span> + +<p>In all this Sir Gordon Sprigg loyally co-operated with the Imperial +military authorities. His attitude, and that of the loyalist +inhabitants of the Colony, may be gathered from the speech which he +delivered at Capetown on December 1st, 1901. In this striking and +inspiring utterance we have the companion picture to that presented in +the minute of September 12th. Throughout there runs a note of +justifiable pride in the military efforts of the Cape Government, and +in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist +population. First there was the number of troops provided. The Cape +Government had placed, he said, 18,000 men in the field against the +invaders and rebels; they had a defensive force of 18,000 town guards, +of whom 3,000 were natives; <span class="pagenum"><a id="page486" name="page486"></a>(p. 486)</span> and, in addition, 7,000 natives +were under arms in the Transkei for the defence of those territories. +In respect of this force of 18,000 men in the field, Sir Gordon Sprigg +pointed out that such a number of men, coming from a population of +500,000, was equivalent to a force of 1,450,000 men from the United +Kingdom, with its population of over 40,000,000. He might have added +that, since half of the 500,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony were +"either actually in rebellion against the Crown or in positive +sympathy with rebellion," the more correct equivalent force from the +United Kingdom would have been 3,000,000 men. And as for the cost of +maintenance, the colony provided three-fourths of the expenditure upon +the 18,000 men in the field, while it wholly supported the town guards +and other purely defensive forces. He then dwelt with satisfaction +upon the fact that these local forces were now entirely controlled by +the Cape Government, which had made itself responsible for the defence +of no less than thirty-one districts of the Colony.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Months ago," he said, "we pressed strongly upon the + Commander-in-Chief to hand over to us the colonial forces then + under his direction. We thought that if we got them into our + possession, not only defraying the cost of their maintenance, but + taking charge of certain parts of the Colony, we could keep those + districts clear of the enemy. We were continually putting that + view before the Commander-in-Chief, and also before the High + Commissioner, Lord Milner, but still the matter <span class="pagenum"><a id="page487" name="page487"></a>(p. 487)</span> hung, + and we had communications going backwards and forwards till at + last the High Commissioner communicated with me, and he said, 'I + think the only way to come to an understanding in this matter is, + if we have a conference. If you could manage to meet Lord + Kitchener and myself, I have great hopes we should be able to + arrange what you desire.' I asked then if Lord Kitchener and Lord + Milner could come to meet me half-way, but Lord Kitchener said it + was not possible for him to leave Pretoria at that time, but he + would be only too delighted if I could come up and meet him and + Lord Milner upon the question. The result of that was that I went + up with two of my colleagues. It has been put about all over the + country that we were ordered by Lord Kitchener to proceed to + Pretoria, but, so far from that being the case, it was our + suggestion that we should take over the command of certain + portions of the country, and we went up to Pretoria to secure + that object. And in that we were successful, and the result of it + has been published very lately."<a id="footnotetag286" name="footnotetag286"></a><a href="#footnote286" title="Go to footnote 286"><span class="small">[286]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Second visit to England.</span> + +<p>These events, revealing the slow and laborious progress of the +Imperial troops in a South Africa rent by war from end to end, account +sufficiently for the postponement of the work of active administrative +reconstruction in the new colonies, to which Lord Milner owed the +opportunity for his second visit to England. On April 3rd, 1901, he +telegraphed a request that he might be allowed to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page488" name="page488"></a>(p. 488)</span> return +home at an early date, on leave, since he feared that, unless he had a +short rest, he would approach the onerous duty of superintending the +work of reconstruction with lessened efficiency. "I have now been +continuously in harness," he said, "without a day's holiday, for more +than two years ... and it is, undoubtedly, better for the public +service, if I am to get such a rest at all, that I should take leave +immediately while military operations still continue and the work of +civil administration is necessarily curtailed, rather than when it +will be possible to organise civil government in a more complete +fashion, and when many important problems which are for the moment in +abeyance will have to be dealt with." To this request Mr. Chamberlain +replied that, although His Majesty's Government greatly regretted that +it was necessary for Lord Milner to leave South Africa at present, +they quite recognised that it was unavoidable that he should take the +rest which the severe strain of the last two years had made +imperative.<a id="footnotetag287" name="footnotetag287"></a><a href="#footnote287" title="Go to footnote 287"><span class="small">[287]</span></a> He was, therefore, to take leave as soon as he found +it possible to do so.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Civil affairs in new colonies.</span> + +<p>None the less the little that could be done to develop the inchoate +machinery of administration which marked the transition from military +to civil order in the new colonies, was done, and done well, before +Lord Milner left Johannesburg. On May 4th, 1901, Sir H. Gould-Adams +was able to report that the chief departments of the administration +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page489" name="page489"></a>(p. 489)</span> of the Orange River Colony had been transferred from +military to civil officials, and reorganised on a permanent basis. In +the Transvaal the departments of finance, law, mines, and that of the +Secretary to the Administration, had been organised, and were +gradually taking over an increasing volume of administrative work from +the military officials. Even more significant was the establishment by +proclamation (May 8th), of a nominated Town Council for the management +of the municipal affairs of Johannesburg, and the consequent abolition +of the office of Military Governor, with the transfer of the +departments hitherto controlled by him to a Government Commissioner +and other officials of the civil administration. This step was +rendered possible by the circumstance that a certain number of the +principal residents, of whom twelve were nominated for service on the +Council, had now returned to their homes. It marked the recommencement +of the industrial life of the Rand, which had followed the permission, +given by Lord Kitchener in April, for three mines to resume work. From +this time forward the Uitlander refugees began to return; although, as +we have seen,<a id="footnotetag288" name="footnotetag288"></a><a href="#footnote288" title="Go to footnote 288"><span class="small">[288]</span></a> it was not possible to allow the general mass of +the inhabitants to leave the coast towns until the following November. +And, in addition to this, Lord Milner had obtained statements of the +views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the +settlement of the new colonies. Mr. Chamberlain <span class="pagenum"><a id="page490" name="page490"></a>(p. 490)</span> had attached +great importance to this interchange of opinions; rightly holding +that, in determining the conditions and methods of the settlement of +the conquered territories, the British South African colonies should +be taken into the counsels of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner +had, therefore, submitted to the colonial Governments the draft of the +Letters Patent, under which the system of Crown Colony government was +to be established in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, before +they were issued.<a id="footnotetag289" name="footnotetag289"></a><a href="#footnote289" title="Go to footnote 289"><span class="small">[289]</span></a> As the result of these consultations the terms +of surrender granted to the Boers at Vereeniging, and the consequent +administrative arrangements arising out of them, embodied decisions +based not merely on the judgment of the Imperial Government, but on +what was virtually the unanimous opinion of the loyal population of +South Africa. In this, as in the crisis of the negotiations before the +war, the loyalists found in Lord Milner their "representative man."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Milner in England.</span> + +<p>Lord Milner—then Sir Alfred Milner—left Capetown on May 8th, and +reached England on the 24th. On his arrival in London he was met at +the station by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and immediately +conducted to the King, who was at that time still residing at +Marlborough House. At the end of a long audience His Majesty announced +his intention of raising him to the peerage, the first of many marks +of royal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page491" name="page491"></a>(p. 491)</span> favour, including his elevation to the Privy +Council, which were shown to the High Commissioner during his stay in +England. The warm demonstrations of popular regard with which he had +been welcomed upon his arrival in London, were followed by a luncheon +given on the next day (Saturday, May 25th) in his honour by Mr. +Chamberlain, his official chief. The speech elicited by this notable +occasion is one in which a graceful humour is characteristically +blended with deep emotion. Those who have had the good fortune to hear +many of Lord Milner's speeches—speeches sometimes turning a page of +history, sometimes mere incidents of official or administrative +routine—know that they are all alike distinguished by the high +quality of sincerity.<a id="footnotetag290" name="footnotetag290"></a><a href="#footnote290" title="Go to footnote 290"><span class="small">[290]</span></a> But this was an occasion upon which even +adroitness of intellect and integrity of purpose might well have +sought the shelter of conventional expressions. Lord Milner dispenses +with any such protection. "In a rational world," he said, it would +have seemed better to everybody that he, "with a big unfinished job +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page492" name="page492"></a>(p. 492)</span> awaiting him," and many of his fellow workmen unable to take +the rest which they both deserved and needed, "should have arrived, +and stayed, and returned in the quietest possible manner." But it was +an age in which it "seemed impossible for many people to put a simple +and natural interpretation on anything; and his arrival in this quiet +manner would have been misconstrued to a degree, which would have been +injurious to the public interests." If his "hard-begged holiday" could +have been represented as a "veiled recall," then of course it was +obvious that, having taken the proverbial hansom from Waterloo to his +own chambers, this very harmless action would have been "trumpeted +over two continents as evidence of his disgrace."</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"It is hard, it is ludicrous," he continued, "that some of the + busiest men in the world should be obliged to occupy their time, + and that so many of my friends and well wishers should be put to + inconvenience—and on a day, too, when it would be so nice to be + in the country—merely in order to prove to persons with an + ingrained habit of self-delusion that the British Government will + not give up its agents in the face of the enemy, or that the + people of this country will not allow themselves to be bored into + abandoning what they have spent millions of treasure and so many + precious lives to obtain. All I can say is, that if it was + necessary (I apologise for it: I am sorry to be the centre of a + commotion from which no man could be constitutionally more averse + than myself), I can only thank you heartily for the kindness and + the cordiality with which the thing has been done. I feel indeed + that the praises which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page493" name="page493"></a>(p. 493)</span> have been bestowed, the honours + which have been heaped on me, are beyond my deserts. But the + simplest thing to do under these circumstances is to try to + deserve them in the future. In any case I am under endless + obligations. It is difficult to say these things in the face of + the persons principally concerned, but I feel bound to take this + opportunity, especially in view of the remarks which have been + made in certain quarters, to express my deep sense of gratitude + for the manner in which His Majesty's Government, and especially + my immediate chief, have shown me great forbearance, and given me + support most prompt at the moment when it was most needed, + without which I should have been helpless indeed. And I have also + to thank many friends, not a few of them here present, and some + not present, for messages of encouragement, for kindly words of + suggestion and advice received at critical moments, some of which + have been of invaluable assistance to me, and have made an + indelible impression on my heart. I am afraid, if I were to refer + to all my benefactors, it would be like the bidding prayer—and + you would all lose your trains.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">Hint from the bidding prayer.</span> + +<p>"But there is one hint I may take from the bidding prayer. Not + only in this place, but at all times and in all places, I am + specially bound to remember the devotion of the loyalists—the + Dutch loyalists, if you please, and not only the British—the + loyalists of South Africa. They responded to all my appeals to + act, and, harder still, to wait. They never lost their cheery + confidence in the darkest days of our misfortunes, they never + faltered in their fidelity to a man of whose errors and failings + they were necessarily more conscious than anybody else, but of + whose honesty of purpose they were long ago, and once for all, + convinced. If there is anything most gratifying to me on this + memorable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page494" name="page494"></a>(p. 494)</span> occasion it is the encouragement which I know + the events of yesterday and of to-day will give to thousands of + our South African fellow-countrymen, like minded with us, in the + homes and in the camps of South Africa.</p> + +<p>"Your Royal Highness,<a id="footnotetag291" name="footnotetag291"></a><a href="#footnote291" title="Go to footnote 291"><span class="small">[291]</span></a> Mr. Chamberlain, ladies, and + gentlemen—I am sure you will not desire me to enter into any + political questions to-day. More than that, I really have nothing + to add to what I have already said and written, I fear with + wearisome reiteration. It seems to me we are slowly progressing + towards the predestined end; latterly it has appeared as if the + pace was somewhat quickening, but I do not wish to make too much + of that or to speak with any too great confidence. However long + the road, it seems to me the only one to the object which we were + bound to pursue, and which seems now fairly in sight. What has + sustained me personally—if your kindness will allow me to make a + personal reference—what has sustained me personally on the weary + road is my absolute, unshakable conviction that it was the only + one which we could travel.</p> + +<p>"Peace we could have had by self-effacement. We could have had it + easily and comfortably on those terms. But we could not have held + our own by any other methods than those which we have been + obliged to adopt. I do not know whether I feel more inclined to + laugh or to cry when I have to listen for the hundredth time to + these dear delusions, this Utopian dogmatising that it only + required a little more time, a little more patience, a little + more tact, a little more meekness, a little more of all those + gentle virtues of which I know I am so conspicuously devoid, in + order to conciliate—to conciliate what? Panoplied hatred, + insensate ambition, invincible ignorance. I fully believe that + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page495" name="page495"></a>(p. 495)</span> the time is coming—Heaven knows how we desire it to + come quickly—when all the qualities of the most gentle and + forbearing statesmanship which are possessed by any of our people + will be called for, and ought to be applied, in South Africa. I + do not say for a moment there is not great scope for them even + to-day, but always provided they do not mar what is essential for + success in the future—the conclusiveness of the final scenes of + the present drama."</p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Merriman and Sauer mission.</span> + +<p>As a declaration to the British world that Lord Milner "possessed the +unabated confidence of his sovereign and of his fellow countrymen," +Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon was amply justified. The protraction of the +war was beginning to try the endurance of the nation. Mr. Sauer and +Mr. Merriman were in England for the express purpose of discrediting +Lord Milner, and behind these fierce political freelances was the +astute brain of the Bond Master, Hofmeyr. They had been commissioned +early in the year by the Afrikander nationalists to give effect to the +resolutions of the Worcester Congress by co-operating with their +friends in England in an agitation for the recall of the High +Commissioner. It was said that these two ex-ministers of the Crown +were authorised to offer an undertaking that the Bond would use its +influence with ex-President Krüger and Mr. Fischer<a id="footnotetag292" name="footnotetag292"></a><a href="#footnote292" title="Go to footnote 292"><span class="small">[292]</span></a> to terminate +the war, in exchange for the promise of "autonomy" <span class="pagenum"><a id="page496" name="page496"></a>(p. 496)</span> for the +Boers and a general armistice for the Cape rebels. However this may +be, the delegates of the Worcester Congress made it their chief +business to represent to the members of the Liberal party who favoured +their cause, that the recall of Lord Milner would remove the chief +obstacle to peace. This attempt never came within a measurable +distance of success; but its failure was not due to any want of effort +on the part of that section of the Liberal opposition which had been +opposed to the annexation of the Republics, and now denounced the +British Government and the Imperial troops for their "methods of +barbarism." <span class="sidenote">Liberals and Afrikanders.</span> +The completeness with which Lord Courtney, Mr. Bryce, Mr. +Lloyd-George, Lord Loreburn (Sir Robert Reid), Mr. Burns, and other +prominent members of the Liberal party identified themselves with the +policy and action of the Afrikander Bond, is disclosed by the +proceedings which marked the banquet given on June 5th in honour of +Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. Mr. Bryce, in a letter expressing his +approbation of the object of the banquet and his regret at his +inability to attend it, wrote: "Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer have not +only distinguished public records, but did excellent service, for +which the Government ought to have been grateful, in allaying passion +and averting disturbances in Cape Colony."<a id="footnotetag293" name="footnotetag293"></a><a href="#footnote293" title="Go to footnote 293"><span class="small">[293]</span></a> Lord (then Mr.) +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page497" name="page497"></a>(p. 497)</span> Courtney, in proposing a vote of thanks to the guests of the +evening, declared that the annexation of the Republics was "a wrong +and a blunder"; adding that the Liberal policy would some day be "to +temper annexation, if not to abrogate it." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. +Sauer revealed the aims of their mission with perfect frankness. The +former, after alluding to Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon as a display of +the "Imperial spirit of the servile senate who decreed ovations and +triumphs to Caligula and Domitian, when they had received rebuffs from +the ancestors both of ourselves and the heroic Dutch now struggling in +South Africa," and characterising Lord Milner's High Commissionership +as "a career of unmitigated and hopeless failure," proceeded to demand +his immediate recall. To employ Lord Milner in the settlement of the +new colonies, said Mr. Merriman, would be "a suicidal and ruinous +policy. He was a violent partizan; his predictions never came true; +the bursts of fustian and the frivolous utterances of his despatches +showed an ill-balanced and ill-regulated mind, which was utterly +unable to cope with the problem." While, as for the prospect of a +British army ever conquering the South African Dutch, he reasserted +the opinion which he held before the war—"Our <span class="pagenum"><a id="page498" name="page498"></a>(p. 498)</span> friends they +might be, but our subjects never."<a id="footnotetag294" name="footnotetag294"></a><a href="#footnote294" title="Go to footnote 294"><span class="small">[294]</span></a> Mr. Sauer, who "felt honoured +by seeing such a gathering, and seeing in it a Gladstone<a id="footnotetag295" name="footnotetag295"></a><a href="#footnote295" title="Go to footnote 295"><span class="small">[295]</span></a> and a +Leonard Courtney," was no less explicit:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I stand here," he said, "as a representative of the Dutch + people, and declare that they never mean to be a subject race. If + they cannot get their rights by justice they will get them by + other means.... I am glad to go back and tell my own people how + many there are in this country who appreciate their devotion to + an ideal, and are prepared to befriend them in the hour of + trial."<a id="footnotetag296" name="footnotetag296"></a><a href="#footnote296" title="Go to footnote 296"><span class="small">[296]</span></a></p> + +<p>A fortnight later a meeting of those who sympathised with the Boer +cause was held in the Queen's Hall, Langham Place. The spirit of this +notorious gathering, presided over by Mr. Labouchere, M.P., and +attended by Mr. Merriman. Mr. Sauer, Mr. Lloyd-George, M.P., and other +Radical members of Parliament, is sufficiently revealed by certain +characteristic incidents which marked the proceedings. The agents of +the meeting wore the Transvaal colours; a member of the audience who +uncovered at the mention of King <span class="pagenum"><a id="page499" name="page499"></a>(p. 499)</span> Edward was ejected; the +Union Jack was hissed and hooted; and, while a printed form was handed +round inviting the signatures of persons prepared to pay eight +and-a-half guineas for a tour in Holland and the privilege of seeing +ex-President Krüger, the name of the British sovereign was received by +the audience with marks of evident disapprobation.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Agitation for Milner's recall.</span> + +<p>The agitation for Lord Milner's recall was continued throughout the +year. It was accompanied by a repetition, in England and on the +continent of Europe, of the shameless calumnies upon the Imperial +troops, which had marked the "carnival of mendacity" that led to the +second invasion of Cape Colony. The injurious effect produced upon the +Boers in the field by the support thus given by public men in England +to the "continued resistance" policy of the Afrikander nationalists, +has been already noticed, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to say +more on this aspect of the subject. The attempt to discredit Lord +Milner culminated in the declaration made by Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, then recognised as the official leader of the +Liberal party, at Plymouth, on November 19th, 1901, that, unless the +British Government changed its methods, "the whole of the Dutch +population in our colonies, as well as in the two territories, would +in all probability be permanently and violently alienated from us" +when the war was ended. "I am ready to speak out to-night," he +continued, "and to say what I have never yet <span class="pagenum"><a id="page500" name="page500"></a>(p. 500)</span> said, that for +my part I despair of this peril being conjured away so long as the +present Colonial Secretary is in Downing Street and the present High +Commissioner is at Pretoria." When the full report of this speech had +reached the Cape, the Vigilance Committee, a body representing the +loyalists of both nationalities, met<a id="footnotetag297" name="footnotetag297"></a><a href="#footnote297" title="Go to footnote 297"><span class="small">[297]</span></a> under the presidency of Sir +Gordon Sprigg, and resolved:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the + statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the + effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in + South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained + their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms + that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by + the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a + settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the + honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and, + further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry + Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial + to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be + entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa."</p> + +<p>With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an +attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is +as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of +those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their +co-operation to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page501" name="page501"></a>(p. 501)</span> the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa +the issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts +to rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the +loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to +the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a +nation in which gratitude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to +sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself +yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent +terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Finances of the new colonies.</span> + +<p>In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His +"hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a +respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made +known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant +administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for +their immediate wants. The Letters Patent constituting him Governor +and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had +been passed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments +creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and +Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in +readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring +them into operation."<a id="footnotetag298" name="footnotetag298"></a><a href="#footnote298" title="Go to footnote 298"><span class="small">[298]</span></a> And on August 6th the House of Commons had +voted £6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page502" name="page502"></a>(p. 502)</span> +Transvaal and Orange River Colony. Of this sum £1,000,000 was required +for the purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military +Railways, still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel) +Girouard, and £500,000 was assigned to "relief and re-settlement," an +item which included the purchase of land and other arrangements for +the establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both +colonies. The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of +the spirit of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal +Opposition approached every aspect of the South African question. The +idea of the Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out +of the "hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir +William Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the +Exchequer, "was not the money required for the South African +Constabulary put forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of +being proposed in this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to +future repayment by the Transvaal, in which nobody believed?"<a id="footnotetag299" name="footnotetag299"></a><a href="#footnote299" title="Go to footnote 299"><span class="small">[299]</span></a></p> + +<p>This temporary financial assistance was of the utmost importance. Just +as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and +Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed +invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so +in the new colonies he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page503" name="page503"></a>(p. 503)</span> proposed to beat the guerilla leaders +at their game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a +new prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions +under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa +when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has +himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High +Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only +has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the +new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision +the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited +solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns +and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as +the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and +the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and +surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to +their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened +danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and +problems of repatriation—all these subjects are touched as by a +master of statecraft.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Improved situation.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible + not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the + military situation] since the time when I first took up my + residence in the Transvaal—just eight months ago. These are the + now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the + railways and the complete pacification <span class="pagenum"><a id="page504" name="page504"></a>(p. 504)</span> of certain + central districts. As regards the railways, I cannot illustrate + the contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of + last year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make + several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria, + and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful + preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was + frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been + blown up—not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but + in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were + always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to + say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line. + Since my return from England I have again traversed the country + from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from + Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant + journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion + has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm. + The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time. + They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful + country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is + typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of + it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown + to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then + it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common + event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need + not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement + which these instances illustrate. Not only have the derailments, + often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one + time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more + regular running, and especially the resumption <span class="pagenum"><a id="page505" name="page505"></a>(p. 505)</span> of night + running, the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly + increased. Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves + to meet the enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements + resulting from the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not + any interference from the enemy, which causes us whatever + difficulties—and they are still considerable—we now labour + under in the matter of transport. When the large amount of + additional rolling-stock ordered for the Imperial Military + Railways last summer is received—and the first instalment will + arrive very shortly—there will be a further great and + progressive improvement in the conveyance of supplies and + materials for the troops, the civil population of the towns, and + the concentration camps.</p> + +<span class="sidenote2">Contraction of area of war.</span> + +<p>"The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six + months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal + towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever + they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made + little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they + almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure + was over. It looked as though the process might go on + indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during + the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in + the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer + strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria + and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us + for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy + seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there....</p> + +<p>"To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now + firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest + is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page506" name="page506"></a>(p. 506)</span> both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except, + in some cases, for the native population. This is especially true + of the northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a + native district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some + other positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost + the only inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of + the latest stage of the war than the contraction of Boer + resistance within certain wide but fairly well-defined districts, + separated from one another by considerable spaces. Instead of + ranging indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics, + the enemy show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to + certain neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief, + though till recently by no means their exclusive, centres of + strength.... From time to time the commandos try to break out of + these districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the + failure of the latest of these raids—Botha's bold attempt to + invade Natal—shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now + labour in attempting to undertake distant expeditions.</p> + +<p>"The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the + increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and + supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their + numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the + field—not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of + burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the + war<a id="footnotetag300" name="footnotetag300"></a><a href="#footnote300" title="Go to footnote 300"><span class="small">[300]</span></a>—may take a considerable time yet, and will almost + certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast + either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the + concentration of the Boers, and the substitution of several + fairly well-defined small campaigns for that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page507" name="page507"></a>(p. 507)</span> sort of + running fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the + whole an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the + struggle within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it + seems to me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of + their main strength, even if such concentration makes the + commandos individually more dangerous and involves more desperate + fighting, and meanwhile to push on with might and main the + settlement of those parts of the country out of which they have + been driven. No doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual, + process. The full extent of the difficulty will appear from the + sequel. But it is the point to which the main efforts, of the + civil authorities at any rate, should be continually directed.</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">The return to the Rand.</span> + +<p>"If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained, + <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back + into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can + see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a + greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent + point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always + provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive + there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and + commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining + operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed + very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is + about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when + the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to + open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has + been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have + actually been started. This is slow work, but even this + beginning, modest as it is, has made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page508" name="page508"></a>(p. 508)</span> an immense + difference in the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here + in March last.</p> + +<p>"The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for + other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of + stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for + business generally can only expand <span class="italic">pari passu</span> with the + resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000 + people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them + being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil + servants and civilians in the employ of the military. Assuming + that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about + one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders + registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.'</p> + +<p>"The best that can be said on the thorny subject of the return of + the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been + steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed + us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above + permits given to officials or persons specially required for + particular services to the Army or the Government). This month + the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the + selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that + number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply + rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of + permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made, + there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a + certain number of people—not a large number—have not slipped + through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great + bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central + Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative + body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they + have been allotted on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page509" name="page509"></a>(p. 509)</span> well-defined principles, and with + great impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials, + even if our officials were not already over-worked in other + directions, could have done the business so well.</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">Labour and transport.</span> + +<p>"There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of + return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may + in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends + entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether + the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The + obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of + native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the + increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but + also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the + material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say, + is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in + the case of all those other industries, building, for instance, + which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity + in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of + everything—dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting, + water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for + every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting + at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the + dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work + with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the + carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is, + gives no promise of an early importation of quantities of bulky + material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of + transport are to be satisfied.</p> + +<p>"As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development + of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the + difficulty is that, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page510" name="page510"></a>(p. 510)</span> while natives can be found in + abundance to do surface work, the number of those who are willing + to go underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among + whom underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and + these reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware, + difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese + natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations + between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having + regard to the friendly attitude of the Governor-General, I have + every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even + then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx + of labourers from Portuguese territory....</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">The concentration camps.</span> + +<p>"The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it + were not for the existence of that other and still greater + obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have + already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this + latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by + the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration + camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps + increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never + contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state + of destitution in which many of the people arrived, and the + deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among + them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary + necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the + camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The + amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young + children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not, + indeed, agree with those who think—or assert—that the mortality + among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and + children had been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page511" name="page511"></a>(p. 511)</span> allowed to live on isolated farms in + a devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the + commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far + greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of + starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived + at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack + of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the + ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport + had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only + with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were, + as a matter of fact, supplied with great promptitude), but with + the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so + essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the + prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it + was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of + transport (especially at the time when the camps were first + started, and when railways were subject to continual + interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was + the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors, + nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be + found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to + find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look + after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material + has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the + carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best + to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in + visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too + highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government), + have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have + been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page512" name="page512"></a>(p. 512)</span> these requirements enter into competition, and most + serious competition, with the supply of food and materials + necessary for the revival even of our central industry, not to + say of industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new + colonies, of which, under the circumstances, it is, for the + moment, unfortunately impossible to think.</p> + +<p>"To decide between the competing demands upon the still very + limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after + the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is + indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done + all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of + conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands, + to grappling with the problem, I can confidently assert. And I am + equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may + yet be done, the amount of hardship must have been and must still + be very great. It would be amusing, if amusement were possible in + the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by + side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally + vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is + the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in + not making better provision for the people in the concentration + camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our + injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty + at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration + camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even + frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people + in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil + anybody, however much we might desire to do so....</p> + +<p>"The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees + and the maintenance of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page513" name="page513"></a>(p. 513)</span> Boers at present in the + concentration camps are, it is evident, only the first of a + series of problems of the most complicated character, which have + to be solved before the country can resume its normal life....</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">Re-settlement problems.</span> + +<p>"Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not + be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back + at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The + country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be + generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the + way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the + absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs.</p> + +<p>"Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the + prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the + whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not + only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately + wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the + railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work, + whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to + receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the + prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures + which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to + deal with the matter when the time comes.</p> + +<p>"Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced + under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already + upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets + down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the + tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far + returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the + Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many <span class="pagenum"><a id="page514" name="page514"></a>(p. 514)</span> grievances, + and with much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only + to be expected, and is of very small importance as long as people + are prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of + them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness, + in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the + immediate outlook.</p> + +<p>"Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of + agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well + complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an + amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which + will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty + years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural, + which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly + speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a + very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches + of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent + sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will + maintain a European population twenty times as large as the + present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not + economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social + change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood, + of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the + land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too + few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to + the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most + part, they have done little more than squat. But then the + introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though + it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task + beyond the powers of statesmanship to grapple with.</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">The land settlement report.</span> + +<p>"This despatch has dealt so largely with questions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page515" name="page515"></a>(p. 515)</span> of + immediate urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to + the work which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to + build up the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly + claim for myself that I have been able to give to that work + anything more than the most general supervision, as my time is + more than fully occupied in dealing with matters of present + urgency. But, thanks to the great energy displayed by the + principal officers of the Administration—by Major Goold-Adams + and Mr. Wilson at Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard + Solomon, and Mr. Duncan, at Pretoria, and by Sir Godfrey Lagden + and Mr. Wybergh here—a really surprising amount of ground has + been covered. Despite all the difficulties and discouragements of + the present time, the machinery of the Government is getting + rapidly into working order, and, as soon as normal conditions are + restored, the new colonies will find themselves provided with an + Administration capable of dealing with the needs of a great and + progressive community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts + of law. A number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and + will shortly be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River + Colony they do not involve any great change of system, but, in + the Transvaal, some most important reforms are at once necessary, + while an immense amount of useless rubbish, which encumbered the + Statute Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been + repealed."<a id="footnotetag301" name="footnotetag301"></a><a href="#footnote301" title="Go to footnote 301"><span class="small">[301]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent +inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal +importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page516" name="page516"></a>(p. 516)</span> +before the second year of the war had run its course. From the report +addressed to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of +which Mr. Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord +Milner by Sir William (then Mr.) Willcocks<a id="footnotetag302" name="footnotetag302"></a><a href="#footnote302" title="Go to footnote 302"><span class="small">[302]</span></a> on Irrigation in South +Africa, there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or +the ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found +in the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by +side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common +pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful +introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto +neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the +enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and +the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material +agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Witwatersrand +gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political, +irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa—this was the +essence of these two Reports.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land + Settlement Commissioners,<a id="footnotetag303" name="footnotetag303"></a><a href="#footnote303" title="Go to footnote 303"><span class="small">[303]</span></a> "that a well-considered scheme of + settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the + most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South + <span class="pagenum"><a id="page517" name="page517"></a>(p. 517)</span> Africa. We find among those who wish to see British + rule in South Africa maintained and its influence for good + extended, but one opinion upon this subject. There even seems + reason to fear lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure + which has marked the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some + strenuous effort be made to establish in the country, at the + close of the war, a thoroughly British population large enough to + make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The irrigation report.</span> + +<p>Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willcocks points +out,<a id="footnotetag304" name="footnotetag304"></a><a href="#footnote304" title="Go to footnote 304"><span class="small">[304]</span></a> South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years +ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and +even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century +ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent +comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single +family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid, +or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is +deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted. +What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the +water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of +the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical +revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great +intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India +and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page518" name="page518"></a>(p. 518)</span> in spite +of the latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been +"attempted"; for, with the exception of the extreme south-western +corner of the Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange +River Colony, and the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural +development of South Africa "depends entirely on irrigation."</p> + +<p>But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold +industry was at once more immediate and more imperative.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William + Willcocks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for + gold-washing at the Rand mines."</p> + +<p>And again:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the + Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the + prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years. + Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation + projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel + that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa, + the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first + putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water + supply is concerned, would have constituted me a bigot. Ten acres + of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with + Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a + rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay."</p> + +<p>And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present: +it is to be the instrument <span class="pagenum"><a id="page519" name="page519"></a>(p. 519)</span> for the development of the +permanent resources of the Transvaal:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Economic importance of Rand.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "The mineral wealth of the Transvaal is extra-ordinarily great, + but it is exhaustible, some say within a space of fifty years, + others within a space of one hundred years. It would be a + disaster indeed for the country if none of this wealth were + devoted to the development of its agriculture. Agricultural + development is slow, but it is permanent, and knows of no + exhaustion. If the companies working the gold, coal, and diamond + mines were by decree compelled to devote a percentage of their + gains to the execution of irrigation works on lines laid down by + the Government, they would assist in the permanent development of + the country and would be investing in works which, though slow to + give a remuneration, would, at any rate, be absolutely permanent. + It would thus happen, that when the mineral wealth of the country + had disappeared, its agricultural wealth would have been put on + such a solid basis that the country would not have to fall from + the height of prosperity to the depth of poverty."</p> + +<p>These were conclusions of so fundamental a nature that no statesman +could afford to overlook them; and, in point of fact, Lord Milner kept +them steadily in sight from first to last in all that he did for the +administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies.</p> + +<p>Another effort of the civil administration which was carried on +successfully during the war was the teaching of the Boer children in +the refugee camps. The narrative of the circumstances in which the +camp schools were first organised, of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page520" name="page520"></a>(p. 520)</span> manner in which +teachers came forward from all parts of the empire to offer their +services, and of the complete success which attended their efforts, +was told three years later by Mr. E. B. Sargant, the Education Adviser +to the Administration. The report in which the story appears not only +affords a record unique in the annals of educational effort, but adds +a pleasing and significant page to what is otherwise a gloomy chapter +of the war.<a id="footnotetag305" name="footnotetag305"></a><a href="#footnote305" title="Go to footnote 305"><span class="small">[305]</span></a> Mr. Sargant was invited by Lord Milner to organise +the work of educational reconstruction in the new colonies in the +autumn of 1900. He was then travelling in Canada, in the course of a +journey through the empire undertaken for the purpose of investigating +the methods and conditions of education in the several British +colonies; and he reached Capetown on November 6th, 1900. At that time +the headquarters of the new Transvaal Administration had not been +established in Pretoria; but in the Orange River Colony certain +schools along the railway line and elsewhere had been opened under the +military Government. From observations made in December in the two new +colonies, Mr. Sargant had begun to fear that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page521" name="page521"></a>(p. 521)</span> the work of +educational reorganisation would have to be indefinitely postponed, +when a visit to the Boer prisoners' camp at Seapoint, Capetown, gave +him the idea from which the whole system of the camp schools was +subsequently evolved. Here he found that a school for boys and young +men had been provided by the prisoners themselves, but that it was +destitute of books and of almost all the necessary appliances. Mr. +Sargant's appeal on behalf of this school met with a ready response +from the Cape Government. What could be done here, he thought, could +be done elsewhere. The nearest refugee camp to Capetown was at +Norval's Pont, on the borders of the Orange River Colony; and it was +here that Mr. Sargant determined to make his first experiment.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Origin of the camp schools.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "Having provided myself," Mr. Sargant says, "with several boxes + of school books, I left Capetown on the last day of January and + took up my quarters in the camp already named. The Military + Commandant threw himself heartily into the experiment, although + at that time the provision of food and shelter for each new + influx of refugees was a matter of great difficulty. Fortunately + Norval's Pont, being nearer the base of supplies than the other + camps, had a few marquees to spare. In two of these I opened the + first camp school, remaining for a fortnight as its headmaster. + The rest of the teachers were found in the camp itself. It was + apparent from the first that the school would be a success. The + children flocked to it, and the mothers who brought them were + well content with the arrangement that the religious instruction + should be given in Dutch and other <span class="pagenum"><a id="page522" name="page522"></a>(p. 522)</span> lessons in English. + Here, as in several other camps which were visited later, I found + that a school, taught through the medium of Dutch, had already + been opened by some of the more serious-minded of the people. In + this case, an offer was made to me by the Commandant to suppress + this school and to send the children to my marquees. This I + refused, and in less than two months I had the gratification of + knowing that teachers and children had come voluntarily to the + Government school, and that the tents in which they had been + taught formed one of a row of six which were needed to + accommodate the rapidly increasing number of scholars."<a id="footnotetag306" name="footnotetag306"></a><a href="#footnote306" title="Go to footnote 306"><span class="small">[306]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Over-sea teachers.</span> + +<p>After this initial success Mr. Sargant made arrangements, first from +Bloemfontein, and afterwards from Pretoria, for the establishment of +such schools in all the refugee camps; and by the end of May, 1901, +there were 4,000 children in the camp schools, as against 3,500 in the +town schools of the two colonies. In the following month it became +evident that the local supply of teachers would be insufficient to +meet the demands of the rapidly increasing schools; and Lord Milner +devoted much of his time during his leave of absence to making +arrangements for the introduction of a number of well-trained teachers +from England, and subsequently from the over-sea colonies. Before +these welcome reinforcements could arrive, however, the number of +children in the camp schools, apart from the Government schools in the +towns, had risen to 17,500, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page523" name="page523"></a>(p. 523)</span> supply of South African +teachers was exhausted. "In many cases," says Mr. Sargant, "the +services of young men and women who had passed the sixth, fifth, and +even fourth standard were utilised temporarily." With the new year, +1902, drafts of carefully chosen and well-qualified teachers from +England began to arrive. Both the Board of Education for England and +Wales and the Scotch Education Department took up the work of +selection and appointment, and the co-operation of the Canadian, +Australian, and New Zealand Governments was obtained.<a id="footnotetag307" name="footnotetag307"></a><a href="#footnote307" title="Go to footnote 307"><span class="small">[307]</span></a> From this +time forward the system of the camp schools was steadily extended; and +on May 31st, 1902, the date of the Vereeniging surrender, when the +attendance reached its highest point, more than 17,000 Boer children +were being thus educated in the Transvaal camps, and more than 12,000 +in those of the Orange River Colony.<a id="footnotetag308" name="footnotetag308"></a><a href="#footnote308" title="Go to footnote 308"><span class="small">[308]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Administrative progress, 1901.</span> + +<p>Apart from this unique and significant effort, the reports furnished +by the various departmental <span class="pagenum"><a id="page524" name="page524"></a>(p. 524)</span> heads to Lord Milner in December +afford striking and sufficient evidence of the progress of the civil +administration in both the new colonies during the year 1901. In the +Orange River Colony the sphere of operations of the departments +existing at the time when Sir H. Gould-Adams was appointed +Deputy-administrator (March, 1901), had been increased, and new +departments were being organised. A statement issued by the financial +adviser on August 29th showed that for the period March 13th, 1900 +(the occupation of Bloemfontein) to June 30th, 1901, the "real" +revenue and expenditure of the colony were respectively £301,800 8<span class="italic">s.</span> +and £217,974 18<span class="italic">s.</span>; an excess of revenue over expenditure of £83,825 +10<span class="italic">s.</span> And during the half-year July 1st-December 31st the revenue +collected was about one-third in excess of the actual civil +expenditure.<a id="footnotetag309" name="footnotetag309"></a><a href="#footnote309" title="Go to footnote 309"><span class="small">[309]</span></a> The progress in education was remarkable. At the end +of February, 1902, there were 13,384 children on the roll of the +Government schools, camp and town,<a id="footnotetag310" name="footnotetag310"></a><a href="#footnote310" title="Go to footnote 310"><span class="small">[310]</span></a> or nearly 5,000 more than the +greatest number at school at any one time under the Republic, and the +reorganisation of both higher and technical instruction had been taken +in hand. A system of local self-government had been commenced by the +establishment of Boards of Health at Bloemfontein <span class="pagenum"><a id="page525" name="page525"></a>(p. 525)</span> and in all +districts in the protected area, while in the capital itself the Town +Council was again at work. The Agricultural Department formed on July +1st, 1901, had taken over a large number of sheep and cattle from the +military authorities, and a commencement of tree-planting under an +experienced forester had been made. The Land Board was created in +October, with two branches concerned respectively with Settlement and +Repatriation. The Settlement branch was occupied especially in +procuring land suitable for agricultural purposes, and its efforts +were so successful that by the end of April, 1902, 150 British +settlers had been placed on farms. The Repatriation branch was engaged +in collecting information as to the whereabouts of the absentee Boer +landowners and their families, and the condition of their lands and +houses; in investigating the possibility of importing fresh stock, and +in collecting vehicles, implements, seed-corn, and the other +necessaries which would be required to enable the Boer population, +when repatriated, to resume their normal pursuits. Also temporary +courts, pending the re-opening of the ordinary civil courts, had been +established.</p> + +<p>In the Transvaal the work was on a larger scale. Five departments, +those of the Secretary to the Administration (afterwards Colonial +Secretary), the Legal Adviser (afterwards Attorney-General), the +Controller of the Treasury (afterwards Treasurer), the Mining +Commissioner and of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, were already +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page526" name="page526"></a>(p. 526)</span> organised. The progress achieved by the heads of these +departments in the Transvaal, and by Sir H. Gould-Adams and Mr. Wilson +in the Orange River Colony, formed collectively a record the merit of +which was acknowledged by "an expression of the high appreciation of +His Majesty's Government of the services which they had rendered in +circumstances of exceptional difficulty."<a id="footnotetag311" name="footnotetag311"></a><a href="#footnote311" title="Go to footnote 311"><span class="small">[311]</span></a></p> + +<p>It is difficult to present an account of the work already done in the +Transvaal in a form at once brief and representative. The report of +Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration,<a id="footnotetag312" name="footnotetag312"></a><a href="#footnote312" title="Go to footnote 312"><span class="small">[312]</span></a> recorded the +progress made in education, public works, and district administration. +Since July twenty-four new schools, of which seven were camp schools, +eight fee-paying schools, and nine free town schools, had been opened, +and 169 teachers were employed in the town schools, and 173 in the +camp schools, opened by the Administration. The public buildings, +including the hospitals and asylums at Johannesburg and Pretoria, the +post offices and the seventeen prisons administered by the department, +were being maintained and, where necessary, restored. In Johannesburg, +as we have seen, a Town Council had been established, but Pretoria was +still administered by a Military Governor, who controlled a temporary +Town Board and the police. The Administration, however, was empowered +by proclamation No. 28 of 1901 to appoint Boards of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page527" name="page527"></a>(p. 527)</span> Health +in places where no municipality existed, and it was expected that +Pretoria would be endowed, before long, with the same municipal +privileges as Johannesburg.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Legislative reforms.</span> + +<p>The volume of work handled in the Legal Adviser's office formed a +remarkable testimony to the energy and capacity of Sir Richard +Solomon. Resident magistrates' courts had been established in twelve +districts; temporary courts were being held in Pretoria and +Johannesburg; the offices of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Orphan +Master, and the Patent Office, were reorganised; and an ordinance +creating a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and five +Puisne Judges, was drafted ready to be brought into operation so soon +as circumstances permitted. The chaotic Statute Book of the late +Republic had been overhauled. A large number of laws, some obsolete, +some impliedly repealed, but still appearing on the Statute Book, and +others unsuited to the new <span class="italic">régime</span>, had been repealed by +proclamation; and at the same time many ordinances dealing with +matters of fundamental importance had been prepared for submission to +the future Legislative Council at the first opportunity.</p> + +<p>The report of Mr. Duncan, the Controller of the Treasury, showed that +the revenue actually being collected, mainly from the customs, the +Post Office, mining and trading licences, and native passes, would +provide for the ordinary expenditure of the civil administration. And, +in point of fact, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page528" name="page528"></a>(p. 528)</span> when the accounts were made up at the end +of the first financial year of the new colonies (July 1st, 1901-June +30th, 1902) it was found that the Orange River Colony had a balance in +hand of £231,000, while in the Transvaal the expenditure on civil +administration<a id="footnotetag313" name="footnotetag313"></a><a href="#footnote313" title="Go to footnote 313"><span class="small">[313]</span></a> had been covered by the revenue, which had assumed +already the respectable figure of £1,393,000.</p> + +<p>The Departments of Mines and Native Affairs had been reorganised, and +the work done by Mr. Wybergh and Sir Godfrey Lagden respectively in +these departments, in co-operation with Sir Richard Solomon, had +produced the administrative reforms immediately required to regulate +the employment of native labourers in the mines. By proclamations +amending or repealing existing laws and making fresh provisions where +necessary the native had been protected against oppression and robbery +at the hands of unscrupulous labour-agents, and the liquor traffic, +the chief cause of his insubordination and incapacity, had been +effectively repressed. Considerations of public security made the +maintenance of the "pass" system necessary, but modifications were +introduced into the working of the system sufficient to protect the +educated native from unnecessary humiliation and the native labourer +from excessive punishment. In addition to this departmental work two +commissions had been appointed by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page529" name="page529"></a>(p. 529)</span> Lord Milner to investigate +two matters of direct and immediate concern to the gold industry. The +first of these, over which Sir Richard Solomon presided, was engaged +in reviewing the existing gold laws, with a view to the introduction +of new legislation embodying such modifications as the best local +experience and the financial interests of the colony might require. +The second was employed in formulating measures necessary to provide +both the mines and the community of the Rand with a water-supply that +would be at once permanent and economic.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Johannesburg police.</span> + +<p>There remain certain special features of the administrative +reconstruction accomplished in 1901 that merit attention, as showing +the degree in which Lord Milner kept in view the fundamental +necessities of the situation revealed by the Land Settlement and +Irrigation Reports to which reference has been made above. As part of +the work of the Law Department, the Johannesburg Municipal Police had +been organised and placed under the control of Mr. Showers, the late +head of the Calcutta Police.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This fine body," Lord Milner wrote, "consists mainly of picked + men from the Army Reserve, including many old soldiers of the + Guards, and others who have fought in the war. The men are + dressed like London policemen, but carry rifles. This odd-looking + equipment is characteristic of the double nature of their duties. + On the one hand they do the work of ordinary town police, and + exhibit in that characteristic the same <span class="pagenum"><a id="page530" name="page530"></a>(p. 530)</span> efficiency and + civility as their London prototypes. On the other hand, they have + played an important part in assisting the military and the Rand + Rifles in the defence of the long line, fifty miles in extent of + towns and mining villages which constitute the Rand district. + Latterly, since the enemy have been quite driven out of this part + of the country, the military portion of their duties is + diminishing in importance, though the danger of small raids on + outlying portions of the Rand by parties coming from a distance + is not yet wholly removed. On the other hand, with the return of + the civil population, their work as police proper is greatly on + the increase. In their struggle with the illicit liquor dealers, + one of the most difficult of their duties, they have so far met + with a great measure of success."<a id="footnotetag314" name="footnotetag314"></a><a href="#footnote314" title="Go to footnote 314"><span class="small">[314]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">South African constabulary.</span> + +<p>Just as here, in the case of the Johannesburg police, so in the +formation of the South African Constabulary and in the reorganisation +of the railways, Lord Milner had determined that no opportunity of +adding to the permanent British population of the two colonies should +be lost. The South African Constabulary was formed in October, 1900, +by General Baden-Powell, mainly on the lines of the Canadian +North-West police, for the protection of the settled population in the +new colonies. Since July, 1901, however, when it had been called out +for military service, this force, at the time some 9,000 strong, had +been employed as part of the army under the direction of the +Commander-in-Chief, although its organisation, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page531" name="page531"></a>(p. 531)</span> finance, and +internal discipline were dealt with by the High Commissioner. The men +recruited for the Constabulary were of British birth, and every +endeavour was made in the selection of recruits to secure persons who +were adapted by pursuits and character to become permanent and useful +colonists. It is interesting to note that a body of 500 burgher +police, consisting of former burghers of the Orange Free State, and +placed under the colonel commanding the Orange Colony division, had +been associated with the Constabulary during the time that they were +thus serving with the troops. Nor is it necessary to point out that +the military experience, the knowledge of the country, and +acquaintance with the life of the veld which the Constabulary gained +at this period, largely contributed to the efficiency which they +displayed afterwards in the discharge of their regular duties.</p> + +<p>But of all the reconstructive work accomplished in this year of +continuous and harassing warfare, the reorganisation of the railways +was perhaps the most essential and the most successful in its +immediate results. Although the railways of the two new colonies +remained entirely under the control of the military authorities, their +future importance to the civil administration was so great that, as +Lord Milner wrote,<a id="footnotetag315" name="footnotetag315"></a><a href="#footnote315" title="Go to footnote 315"><span class="small">[315]</span></a> "questions affecting their organisation and +development naturally claimed his constant attention." And this all +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page532" name="page532"></a>(p. 532)</span> the more, since Sir Percy Girouard, the Director of Military +Railways, had been chosen by the Home Government to undertake the +management of the joint railway system of the two colonies so soon as +it was handed over to the civil authorities. The work accomplished +included the repair of the damage inflicted by the enemy, the increase +and improvement of the rolling-stock, the reorganisation of the staff +of European employees, and the construction of new lines required for +the industrial development of the country. Apart from 102 engines and +984 trucks, the Boers had destroyed many pumping-stations and station +buildings, 385 spans of bridges and culverts, and 25 miles of line. +These injuries to the "plant" of the railways were repaired "in an +absolutely permanent manner," and orders had been placed in August for +60 engines and 1,200 trucks over and above those required to replace +the rolling-stock destroyed by the enemy.<a id="footnotetag316" name="footnotetag316"></a><a href="#footnote316" title="Go to footnote 316"><span class="small">[316]</span></a> As the staff employed +in the time of the Republics had been "actively engaged on the side of +the enemy, and were animated by an exceedingly anti-British +spirit,"<a id="footnotetag317" name="footnotetag317"></a><a href="#footnote317" title="Go to footnote 317"><span class="small">[317]</span></a> they had to be almost entirely replaced.</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page533" name="page533"></a>(p. 533)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Reorganisation of railways.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "But," Lord Milner continues, "the many difficulties incidental + to the organisation of a large new staff, unaccustomed to work + with one another, are being successfully overcome, and business + is carried on with a smoothness which gives no indication of the + internal revolution so recently effected. The new railway staff + comprises some 4,000 men of British race, including 1,500 + Reservists or Irregulars who had fought in the war, and who, with + other newcomers, form a permanent addition to the British + population of South Africa."</p> + +<p>Thanks to the blockhouse system, supplemented where necessary by +armoured trains, the mail trains from the ports to Johannesburg were +running almost as rapidly and as safely as in time of peace. But the +demands of the military traffic were so enormous that opportunities +for ordinary traffic were still rigorously restricted.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Military requirements in food supplies, remounts and munitions + of war," Lord Milner wrote, "represented 29,000 tons weekly from + the ports; while the movements of men and horses to and fro over + the [then] huge theatre of war were as constant as they were + sudden."</p> + +<p>None the less the civil traffic was increasing. While in August only +684 refugees had returned, in November the number had risen to 2,623; +and while in August the tonnage of civil supplies forwarded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page534" name="page534"></a>(p. 534)</span> +to Bloemfontein and the Transvaal was 4,612, in November it was 8,522. +This result, moreover, had been obtained with the old rolling-stock, +and a much more rapid progress was anticipated in the future, since +the additional rolling-stock had already begun to arrive. And in +anticipation of this increased rate of progress, the +Commander-in-Chief had</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "now seen his way to allow the mines to start 400 fresh stamps + per month, as against an average of under 100 in previous months, + and had also consented to the grant of 1,600 permits a month + (representing about 4,000 persons) for return to the Transvaal."</p> + +<p>In addition to the repair and reorganisation of the lines running to +the coast, the Transvaal collieries had been re-opened and the coal +traffic had been resumed. Not only had progress been made in stocking +the mines with coal, timber, and machinery, preparatory to the full +resumption of working activity, but the large unemployed native +population found in Johannesburg at the time of Lord Milner's arrival +had been utilised for the construction of a new and much-needed coal +line, which ran for thirteen miles along the Rand.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "This short line," Lord Milner wrote, "would have no less than + thirty to forty miles of sidings leading from it to every + important mine, and securing direct delivery of about 1,000,000 + tons of coal per annum, as well as of a large tonnage of general + stores."</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page535" name="page535"></a>(p. 535)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Development by railways.</span> + +<p>And then follows a statement of the part to be played by railway +construction in the policy of material development, which was pursued +with such determination by Lord Milner after the restoration of peace.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further + railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new + colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are + far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the + great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to + stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of + commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently + required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of + these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they + pass are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers + of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on + Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be + a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is + one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the + old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will + thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest + land into touch with the best markets. And the British population + will be equally in favour of such a course."<a id="footnotetag318" name="footnotetag318"></a><a href="#footnote318" title="Go to footnote 318"><span class="small">[318]</span></a></p> + +<p>Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after +Lord Milner's return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well +in hand.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + +<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page536" name="page536"></a>(p. 536)</span> CHAPTER XII</h3> + +<p class="title">THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING</p> + + +<span class="sidenote">The gold industry re-started.</span> + +<p>With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate +submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks. +The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of +the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably +inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists, +and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the +most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River +Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great +industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not +only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles +within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange +River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms +before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story +of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly +records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold +industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission +to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page537" name="page537"></a>(p. 537)</span> set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to +November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first +time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress +was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round +numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953, +and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and +sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May, +1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output +to 138,600 oz., of the value of £600,000, and 30,000 additional +British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in +view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the +expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces +in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the +Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that +its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate +attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that +during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were +being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was +ultimately reduced below the normal.</p> + +<p>The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle +precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far +as his efforts could avail, it should not be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page538" name="page538"></a>(p. 538)</span> unprepared for +the economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a +despatch of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. +Chamberlain the importance of settling British colonists upon the +land, and pressed for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this +question.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Land settlement.</span> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote, + "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have + reached a point where little more progress can be made without a + decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British + colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale, + under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be + left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and + sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with + no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give + it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a + sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of + the population between the country districts and the towns. If we + do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an + industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost + wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural + population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not + possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave + misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners + upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting + life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new + element we may be simply laying up the material for further + trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the + rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy + with British ideas as ever.... <span class="pagenum"><a id="page539" name="page539"></a>(p. 539)</span> To satisfy these + demands, it is clear that no small and makeshift scheme will + suffice. Land settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; + otherwise, however useful, it will be <span class="italic">politically</span> unimportant.</p> + +<p>"The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely + necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses + arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my + profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we + provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the + settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity + will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which + will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and + prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these + first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be + required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I + contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this + line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty + in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do + fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize + every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to + our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want + to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game, + and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command + of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away + opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.</p> + +<p>"What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these + two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good + land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily, + if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the + affirmative, (2) what amount <span class="pagenum"><a id="page540" name="page540"></a>(p. 540)</span> shall we be able to + dispose of for this purpose in the immediate future?"<a id="footnotetag319" name="footnotetag319"></a><a href="#footnote319" title="Go to footnote 319"><span class="small">[319]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that +the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic +reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be +provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The +purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were +the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new +lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the +compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and +in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home +Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus +raised, a sum of £3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum +£2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and £1,000,000 in the +Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not +issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the +(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was +approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited +resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable +for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.</p> + +<p>Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme +importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa, +the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page541" name="page541"></a>(p. 541)</span> preparation of the administrative machinery, the +<span class="italic">matériel</span> of transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for +the repatriation of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing +activity. At the same time certain other administrative questions were +brought by him to the consideration of the Home Government during +these months (January to May, 1902), with the result that the ink was +scarcely dry upon the Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask +for, and obtain, decisions upon them.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">On the eve of peace.</span> + +<p>The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office +on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following +the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of +Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep +pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On +April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent. +tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining +industry. The rate is high—twice as high as the gold tax under the +Republic—and will yield an annual revenue of £500,000 or £600,000 on +a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes +that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed +while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope +that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to +show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the +decision on this matter of such general economic importance at +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page542" name="page542"></a>(p. 542)</span> once. Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further +information; and we find Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I +trust you will now agree to the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am +anxious to publish the Proclamation in next Friday's <span class="italic">Gazette</span>." And +to this Mr. Chamberlain replies on June 4th, "I agree to the +imposition of a 10 per cent. tax on the profits of gold mines." On +June 2nd, that is, two days after the terms of surrender have been +signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends a "most urgent" telegram on the +immediate financial position:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the + new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year, + but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good. + We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African + Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing + provided for the various extraordinary items which have been + hitherto financed out of the £500,000 grant for relief and + re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for + this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the £500,000 is + nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement, + which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped, + especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority + to spend another £500,000 on these purposes. This is independent + of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of + the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you + immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in + acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the + immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the + fundamental questions of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page543" name="page543"></a>(p. 543)</span> finance settled promptly, a + breakdown is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to + feel that services already started and working well were provided + for at least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new + and heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will + require all my attention in the immediate future."<a id="footnotetag320" name="footnotetag320"></a><a href="#footnote320" title="Go to footnote 320"><span class="small">[320]</span></a></p> + +<p>Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "You may incur expenditure up to £500,000 more for relief and + re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."</p> + +<p>On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating +the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these +lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval." +The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally. +Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the +persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for +a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch +on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is +proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs, +on June 20th:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">"It is vital to make a start".</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I + would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on + those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it + is vital to make a start."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page544" name="page544"></a>(p. 544)</span> There is land available, and there are men +available—over-sea colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of +agriculture, who have fought in the war, and have, therefore, a first +claim to be considered. But these desirable settlers cannot afford to +wait in a country like South Africa, where the cost of living is +abnormally high, without a definite prospect of employment.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be + bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being + severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."</p> + +<p>This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which +he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him +"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is +not possible to criticise effectively" in London.</p> + +<p>In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal +initiation of Crown Colony government:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord + Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and + my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."</p> + +<p>And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at +once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the +Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a +non-official element:</p> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page545" name="page545"></a>(p. 545)</span> +<span class="sidenote">Colonists and the settlement.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would + be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to + the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present + improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new + colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of + public business."</p> + +<p>To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief +telegram of July 7th.<a id="footnotetag321" name="footnotetag321"></a><a href="#footnote321" title="Go to footnote 321"><span class="small">[321]</span></a></p> + +<p>Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the +spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous +wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of +the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of +Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the +tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after +the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new +colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever +previously attained."<a id="footnotetag322" name="footnotetag322"></a><a href="#footnote322" title="Go to footnote 322"><span class="small">[322]</span></a> The story of this "tremendous effort," with +its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved +for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part +which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the +republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South +Africa.</p> + +<p>Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the +surrender of the Boer <span class="pagenum"><a id="page546" name="page546"></a>(p. 546)</span> forces in the field, it is necessary +to recall the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of +the new colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and +the Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the +preceding year (1901). In these communications—the origin of which +has been mentioned previously<a id="footnotetag323" name="footnotetag323"></a><a href="#footnote323" title="Go to footnote 323"><span class="small">[323]</span></a>—the significance attached by +loyalist opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily +left undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general +policy of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape +ministers, while recognising that full representative self-government +should be conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the +necessity of maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until +"such time as it was certain that representative institutions could be +established, due regard being had to the paramount necessity of +maintaining and strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in +question." And as, in their opinion, "this consummation would be +ultimately assured and materially strengthened by a large influx of +immigrants favourably disposed to British rule," they expressed the +hope that "no time would be lost after the conclusion of the war in +putting into effect a large scheme of land settlement." More than +this, with the object-lesson of the actual breakdown of representative +government in their own Colony before their eyes, they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page547" name="page547"></a>(p. 547)</span> added +a recommendation that this British immigration should not be confined +to the new colonies, but that a portion of the funds to be provided by +the Imperial Government for this purpose should be allocated to the +Cape Colony.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The language question.</span> + +<p>In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the +settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in +particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion +of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of +British government in the former Republics would afford. The +settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated +as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal +administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before +intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to +crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore, +insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the +predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support +of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the +"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so +called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from +"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No +one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth +of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education +sufficient to qualify him for the public <span class="pagenum"><a id="page548" name="page548"></a>(p. 548)</span> services, or for a +professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second +language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less +difficult—probably more difficult—to him than to learn English, the +desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English +becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical +convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making +English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority +to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the +language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a +matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South +Africa.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa + generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance + of the English language. The language question has done more, + probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke + racial animosity."</p> + +<p>They, therefore, recommend that—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "English should be the official and predominant language in the + higher courts, and in the public service—combined with such + concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and + circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached + to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their + services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as + in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in + all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools + situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all + other primary schools. Dutch <span class="pagenum"><a id="page549" name="page549"></a>(p. 549)</span> should be the medium of + instruction meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, + and it should be taught in all schools where there is a + reasonable demand for it."<a id="footnotetag324" name="footnotetag324"></a><a href="#footnote324" title="Go to footnote 324"><span class="small">[324]</span></a></p> + +<p>On the question of disarmament they wrote:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is + necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new + colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then + the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be + contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The native question.</span> + +<p>On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies, +the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given + political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect + of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would + materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and + be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives + should be taught habits of steady industry.</p> + +<p>"Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with + their language and customs.</p> + +<p>"The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal + to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English + have suffered from its influence.</p> + +<p>"A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely, + owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a + feeling that even the just rights of natives would be + disregarded. It is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page550" name="page550"></a>(p. 550)</span> essential, in the interests of the + natives themselves, generally, that the Home Government should + work in accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great + influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will + secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local + feeling."<a id="footnotetag325" name="footnotetag325"></a><a href="#footnote325" title="Go to footnote 325"><span class="small">[325]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<p>As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of +South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the +learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To +effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of +professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa, +and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil +service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of +service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They +also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of +the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this +claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully +annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial +Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on +the termination of the war.</p> + +<p>As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of +any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of +British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a +cost. As the representative man of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page551" name="page551"></a>(p. 551)</span> British in South +Africa, he was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender +contained no concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer +people calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative +union of the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility +laid upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might +be conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be +conceded, was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. +That the Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more +favourable terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, +is apparent from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively +with the former. In this object, however, they were entirely +unsuccessful, since the Home Government indicated from the first their +desire that Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for +negotiation; and in the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him +with the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the +Transvaal Administration.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The peace negotiations.</span> + +<p>The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations +originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen, +the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord +Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their +readiness to mediate between the British Government and the +Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, +with a view to the termination <span class="pagenum"><a id="page552" name="page552"></a>(p. 552)</span> of hostilities. To this offer +the British Government replied that, while they were sincerely +desirous of terminating the war, the only persons whom they could +recognise as competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the +Boer forces in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to +forward a copy of the correspondence between the British and +Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this +communication Mr. Schalk Burger, as acting President of the South +African Republic, informed Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to +treat for peace, but that before doing so he wished to see President +Steyn. He, therefore, asked for a safe-conduct through the British +lines and back to effect this purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home +Government authorised Lord Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and +Lord Milner agreed in thinking it desirable." As the result of the +consultation between Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free +State and Transvaal leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was +decided, on April 10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to +receive representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be +appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals." +The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President +Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey +met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The +proposals which the Boer representatives <span class="pagenum"><a id="page553" name="page553"></a>(p. 553)</span> then put forward +were wholly inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed +them to London with the remark:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's + Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the + independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they + must expect a refusal."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Independence refused.</span> + +<p>On the day following the British Government replied that they could +not</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former + independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to + the British Crown."</p> + +<p>Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up +the position that they were not competent to surrender the +independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning +thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked, +therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers. +This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had, +as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the +British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to +grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on +their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any +expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal +Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the +offer made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page554" name="page554"></a>(p. 554)</span> by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve +months before.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April + 16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer + leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.</p> + +<p>"The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have + been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not + entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the + two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume + that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of + independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces + still in the field.</p> + +<p>"They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to + discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence, + but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted + if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to + relinquish the demand for independence.</p> + +<p>"This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of + proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest + moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the + loss of so much life and treasure.</p> + +<p>"We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to + spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the + restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by + the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to + refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha + more than twelve months ago,<a id="footnotetag326" name="footnotetag326"></a><a href="#footnote326" title="Go to footnote 326"><span class="small">[326]</span></a> and to inform them that, + although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the + forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us + by the refusal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page555" name="page555"></a>(p. 555)</span> of that offer would justify us in + imposing far more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the + hope of a permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general + surrender on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications + in detail as may be agreed upon mutually.</p> + +<p>"You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them, + and to submit the result for our approval.</p> + +<p>"Communicate this to the High Commissioner."<a id="footnotetag327" name="footnotetag327"></a><a href="#footnote327" title="Go to footnote 327"><span class="small">[327]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Consulting the Burghers.</span> + +<p>Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives +put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham +Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,<a id="footnotetag328" name="footnotetag328"></a><a href="#footnote328" title="Go to footnote 328"><span class="small">[328]</span></a> might be +allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations, +and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation +and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both +these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener +was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the +burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two +days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in +the field—exclusive of those in the Cape Colony—to be elected, and +meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the +two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed, +every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to +the Boer leaders with the object of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page556" name="page556"></a>(p. 556)</span> enabling them to carry +out these arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and +passes for their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the +localities chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of +which had been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer +representatives left Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the +British troops. In spite, however, of the restrictions imposed upon +the activity of the forces under his command, Lord Kitchener was able +to report, on June 1st, that "good progress" had been made in the work +of the campaign up to the actual cessation of hostilities.<a id="footnotetag329" name="footnotetag329"></a><a href="#footnote329" title="Go to footnote 329"><span class="small">[329]</span></a></p> + +<p>The sixty Boer representatives—two for each commando—thus assembled +at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat +for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis +Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and +President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other +civilians,<a id="footnotetag330" name="footnotetag330"></a><a href="#footnote330" title="Go to footnote 330"><span class="small">[330]</span></a> proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th, +they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward +the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The terms drafted.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards + foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under + British supervision. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page557" name="page557"></a>(p. 557)</span> (3) We are prepared to surrender a + part of our territory."</p> + +<p>What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's +telegram to the Secretary for War:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for + negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid + down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion, + nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the + afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner + proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the + burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of + objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner + should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as + possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.<a id="footnotetag331" name="footnotetag331"></a><a href="#footnote331" title="Go to footnote 331"><span class="small">[331]</span></a> They + will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for + the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the + draft document."<a id="footnotetag332" name="footnotetag332"></a><a href="#footnote332" title="Go to footnote 332"><span class="small">[332]</span></a></p> + +<p>The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is +to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between +May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness +on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they +allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction +to"<a id="footnotetag333" name="footnotetag333"></a><a href="#footnote333" title="Go to footnote 333"><span class="small">[333]</span></a> the Middelburg <span class="pagenum"><a id="page558" name="page558"></a>(p. 558)</span> terms; admit that there is a +"fundamental difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their +own may be accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;<a id="footnotetag334" name="footnotetag334"></a><a href="#footnote334" title="Go to footnote 334"><span class="small">[334]</span></a> +and finally maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"<a id="footnotetag335" name="footnotetag335"></a><a href="#footnote335" title="Go to footnote 335"><span class="small">[335]</span></a> to the +Middelburg terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.<a id="footnotetag336" name="footnotetag336"></a><a href="#footnote336" title="Go to footnote 336"><span class="small">[336]</span></a> To all +this Lord Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take +your proposal into consideration."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Payment of Boer war debts.</span> + +<p>On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in +consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the +Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State +High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the +negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur; +but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the +the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military +and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The +Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by +their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be +recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments +for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner, +on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very +unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets +of the Republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page559" name="page559"></a>(p. 559)</span> Governments, all liabilities existing at +the time when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay +for expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a +war against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, +utterly indefensible. The British people, he said—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of + hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the + people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much + smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during + the war."</p> + +<p>As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and +receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing, +with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home +Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the +Middelburg terms.</p> + +<p>This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the +clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately +became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a +compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite +sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course +of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make +a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government +followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant—£3,000,000—and in +rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this <span class="pagenum"><a id="page560" name="page560"></a>(p. 560)</span> sum should +be devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued +by them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be +submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to +be appointed to distribute the £3,000,000 grant.</p> + +<p>The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in +the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the +Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful +general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and +anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and +arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping +military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army +or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted +statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South +Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and +interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are +being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is +exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the +actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once +accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of +surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to +an agreement, it will be the <span class="italic">English</span> document which will be wired to +England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page561" name="page561"></a>(p. 561)</span> and +which will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not +necessary to place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the +British Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a +particular matter, he replies:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain + promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to + which a reference may be made later should appear in it. + Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should + appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to + clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible + misunderstanding."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's vigilance.</span> + +<p>And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You +must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid +before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible +misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that +the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly +considered," he says:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am + convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this + document must contain everything about which there is anything in + the form of a pledge."</p> + +<p>And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he +draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language +to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page562" name="page562"></a>(p. 562)</span> +"completely annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement +should be signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, +or its terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."</p> + +<p>The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord +Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated, +unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer +commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months +of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of +their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion +and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new +agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the +whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home +Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer +"delegates."</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr. + Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag337" name="footnotetag337"></a><a href="#footnote337" title="Go to footnote 337"><span class="small">[337]</span></a> "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of + this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at + Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those + occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by + His Majesty's Government."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Approval of Home Government.</span> + +<p>At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement +was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain +informed Lord Milner by telegram that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page563" name="page563"></a>(p. 563)</span> Cabinet approved +of the submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and +with the new clause dealing with the grant of £3,000,000, to the +Assembly at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be +inflicted upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed +in private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener +and Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had +been settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner +and Mr. Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The +reason for this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, +while they objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made +part of the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless +quite willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which +it was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of +Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the +statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their +respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on +May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His +Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of +further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to +the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The +Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page564" name="page564"></a>(p. 564)</span> +same day for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of +Surrender were submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher +representatives. One other point had been raised and settled between +Lord Milner and the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August +7th, 1901, certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of +confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that +in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly +dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could +not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government +concurred.</p> + +<p>The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at +Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"<span class="italic">Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces + in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government.</span></p> + +<p>"His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord + Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T. + Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and + Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange + Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis + Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the + Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their + respective burghers desirous to terminate the present + hostilities, agree on the following articles:</p> + + <span class="sidenote2">The surrender agreement.</span> + +<p>"1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their + arms, handing over all guns, rifles, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page565" name="page565"></a>(p. 565)</span> and munitions of + war in their possession or under their control, and desist from + any further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King + Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The + manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between + Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant + Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.</p> + +<p>"2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal + or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present + outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring + their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King + Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as + transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence + ensured.</p> + +<p>"3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be + deprived of their personal liberty or their property.</p> + +<p>"4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any + of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in + connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this + clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of + war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the + Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial + immediately after the close of hostilities.</p> + +<p>"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the + Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the + children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when + necessary for the better and more effectual administration of + justice.</p> + +<p>"6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and + Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their + protection, on taking out a licence according to law.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page566" name="page566"></a>(p. 566)</span> "7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange + River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by + civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, + representative institutions, leading up to self-government, will + be introduced.</p> + +<p>"8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will + not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.</p> + +<p>"9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the + Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the + war.</p> + +<p>"10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the + local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each + district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the + presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of + assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and + supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide + themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, + stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their + normal occupation.</p> + +<p>"His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these + Commissions a sum of £3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will + allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African + Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the + late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a + Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government, + and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to + have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they + will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of + war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally + given.</p> + +<p>"In addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000, His + Majesty's Government will be prepared <span class="pagenum"><a id="page567" name="page567"></a>(p. 567)</span> to make advances + on loan for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and + afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent. + interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit + of this clause."<a id="footnotetag338" name="footnotetag338"></a><a href="#footnote338" title="Go to footnote 338"><span class="small">[338]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="sidenote">Punishment of rebels.</span> + +<p>To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of +the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer +commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of +Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the + treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion + and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be + determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the + laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have + joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that + part of the British Empire to which they belong.</p> + +<p>"His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government + that the following are their views as to the terms which should + be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the + field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th + April, 1901:</p> + +<p>"With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon + surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the + resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes + place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the + punishment to be awarded to them, provided they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page568" name="page568"></a>(p. 568)</span> shall + not have been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the + usages of civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be + entitled for life<a id="footnotetag339" name="footnotetag339"></a><a href="#footnote339" title="Go to footnote 339"><span class="small">[339]</span></a> to be registered as voters or to vote at + any Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With + reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape + Colony and all other persons holding an official position under + the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of + commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for + high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such + special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the + punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the + court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of + death be inflicted.</p> + +<p>"The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt + with according to the law of the Colony."<a id="footnotetag340" name="footnotetag340"></a><a href="#footnote340" title="Go to footnote 340"><span class="small">[340]</span></a></p> +</div> + +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page569" name="page569"></a>(p. 569)</span> +<span class="sidenote">The last debates.</span> + +<p>With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final +stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still +required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly +at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the +morning of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page570" name="page570"></a>(p. 570)</span> 29th the delegates assembled in the tent +provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the +proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer +commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, +as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that +the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses +should be taken—to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or +to surrender unconditionally.<a id="footnotetag341" name="footnotetag341"></a><a href="#footnote341" title="Go to footnote 341"><span class="small">[341]</span></a> The rest of the morning sitting, +and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in +questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various +Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding +between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the +Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the +delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually +proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on +the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so +much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in +the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria +convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of +accepting the British terms, <span class="sidenote">Accepting the inevitable.</span> +each of them was anxious, individually, +to avoid any action <span class="pagenum"><a id="page571" name="page571"></a>(p. 571)</span> which would fix the responsibility of +the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as +possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his +neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead +of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after +the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the +Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted +discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the +afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the +limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long +debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke +more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments +used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering +that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he +said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of +indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be +continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the +form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the +substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice +the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From +this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words +of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute—for every man +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page572" name="page572"></a>(p. 572)</span> was preparing himself for the bitter end—they came to an +agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and +empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was +adopted by 54 to 6 votes.</p> + +<p>After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution +constituting a committee<a id="footnotetag342" name="footnotetag342"></a><a href="#footnote342" title="Go to footnote 342"><span class="small">[342]</span></a> to collect funds for the destitute Boers +was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the +decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to +sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.</p> + +<p>Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to +Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on +administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going +on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the +telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the +Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was +just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought +the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner +and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former +British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here, +at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10 +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page573" name="page573"></a>(p. 573)</span> o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender +Agreement was signed.<a id="footnotetag343" name="footnotetag343"></a><a href="#footnote343" title="Go to footnote 343"><span class="small">[343]</span></a></p> + +<span class="sidenote">Admissions of the Boer leaders.</span> + +<p>The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at +Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the +hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer +sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people +abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page574" name="page574"></a>(p. 574)</span> in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of +aggression forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the +enemies of England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the +enemy. Very different is the account of the origin of the war, which +Acting President Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow +countrymen in this day of truth-telling.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he + said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon. + We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we + under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon + our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the + possibility of defeat."</p> + +<p>And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and +one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded +by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war; +I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this +"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts, +State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general +of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as +members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the +war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page575" name="page575"></a>(p. 575)</span> +since in the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies +himself would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The Burgher camps.</span> + +<p>No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now +that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that +the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they +regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of +barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more +Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought +the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General +de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war, +said:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That + is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I + think also we might meet the emergency in this way—a part of the + men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the + women, and then they could take the women with them to the + English in the towns."</p> + +<p>But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any +longer carrying this plan into effect.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of + provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot + without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then + well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too + thankful nowadays to know that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page576" name="page576"></a>(p. 576)</span> our wives are under + English protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our + greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man + answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to + the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women + now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how + can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to + give up liberty for their sakes?"</p> + +<p>And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision + for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every + kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has + caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get + them into the townships, but later on this became impossible, + because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the + idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending + the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable, + because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and + the men still on commando were not so closely related to these + families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."</p> + +<p>Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the +efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected +areas.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">The blockhouse system.</span> + +<p class="quote"> + "A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We + could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the + enemy at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page577" name="page577"></a>(p. 577)</span> every turn. But now things wear a very + different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, + but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our + commandos."</p> + +<p>And again—</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have + managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have + been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the + British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But + things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after + district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. + In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its + forces upon us."</p> + +<p>To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of +again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season + of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed. + How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that + they can only go <span class="italic">op-een-stap</span>?"<a id="footnotetag344" name="footnotetag344"></a><a href="#footnote344" title="Go to footnote 344"><span class="small">[344]</span></a></p> + +<p>Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct +evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers, +and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led +them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May +30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of +the English Government "may not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page578" name="page578"></a>(p. 578)</span> be very advantageous to us, +but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." +And Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the +document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to +stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is +because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a +tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it. +What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and +the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the +continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief +description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,<a id="footnotetag345" name="footnotetag345"></a><a href="#footnote345" title="Go to footnote 345"><span class="small">[345]</span></a> he +writes:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes + or No. It was an ultimatum—this proposal of England. What were + we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Boer claim to independence.</span> + +<p>Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the +question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the +moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the +British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their +minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives +agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the +sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming +their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History <span class="pagenum"><a id="page579" name="page579"></a>(p. 579)</span> may +well ask, On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical +standard,<a id="footnotetag346" name="footnotetag346"></a><a href="#footnote346" title="Go to footnote 346"><span class="small">[346]</span></a> the Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the +administrative autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged +by the laws of war,<a id="footnotetag347" name="footnotetag347"></a><a href="#footnote347" title="Go to footnote 347"><span class="small">[347]</span></a> they had been saved from the alternatives of +physical annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic +generosity of the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant +population. From <span class="pagenum"><a id="page580" name="page580"></a>(p. 580)</span> a constitutional point of view, the +presence of Article IV.<a id="footnotetag348" name="footnotetag348"></a><a href="#footnote348" title="Go to footnote 348"><span class="small">[348]</span></a> in the London Convention was in itself +sufficient to refute the claim of the republic to be a "sovereign +international state."</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Effect of surrender terms.</span> + +<p>Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by +the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question +whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating +at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which, +as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been +deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually +pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms +actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the +British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement +<span class="pagenum"><a id="page581" name="page581"></a>(p. 581)</span> of the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, +and by what stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. +The two respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight +dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess +rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language +in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions +are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound +policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain +districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small +number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated +homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous +and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The +refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves +with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional +Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy +responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an +altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police. +At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in +such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under +the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient +remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system—a +system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition <span class="pagenum"><a id="page582" name="page582"></a>(p. 582)</span> of +arms by the natives in South Africa—the number of rifles possessed by +the Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government; +while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege +of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to +British rule would form an additional safeguard.</p> + +<p>In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of +course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of +English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South +Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have +resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of +the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have +retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these +circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination +of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the +material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was +the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new +administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free +trade in language"—that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond, +the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the +convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of +administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these +concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full +self-government would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page583" name="page583"></a>(p. 583)</span> not be granted to either of the new +colonies until a British or loyalist majority was assured.</p> + +<span class="sidenote">Free initiative secured.</span> + +<p>But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their +immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete +freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for +the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative +reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task—at once more +congenial and more especially his own—was discharged is a matter that +must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of +the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the +review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p> + +<a id="img003" name="img003"></a> +<div class="figcenter"> +<a href="images/fullmap.jpg"> +<img src="images/fullmaptb.jpg" width="500" height="330" alt="Map" title=""></a> +</div> + + +<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page585" name="page585"></a>(p. 585)</span> INDEX</h2> + +<div class="index"> +<p> +<span class="min2em">"Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State,</span> The, his report of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, +<a href="#page431">431</a>, +<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Administrative reconstruction,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>, +<a href="#page458">458</a>, +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page523">523</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Africa.</span> <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#southafrica">South Africa</a>.<br> + +<a id="afrikbond" name="afrikbond"></a> +<span class="min2em">Afrikander Bond, The,</span> +<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">programme of,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its sphere of action,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its power in Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its origin,</span> +<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its purpose,</span> +<a href="#page056">56</a> to +<a href="#page058">58</a>, +<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its first congress,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its "programme of principles,"</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its change of policy,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">members returned to it by the Cape Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>, +<a href="#page483">483</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">adopts the Hofmeyr programme,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its first openly avowed aim,</span> +<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">falls back on the policy of 1881,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its influence in the Cape Legislature,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>, +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page121">121</a>, +<a href="#page122">122</a>, +<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>, +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the parliamentary chief and the real leader of,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page091">91</a>, +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page098">98</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the sum and substance of its policy,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>, +<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch,</span> +<a href="#page108">108</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's reply,</span> +<a href="#page109">109</a> to +<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the funds of,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its domination,</span> +<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page162">162</a>, +<a href="#page169">169</a>, +<a href="#page195">195</a>, +<a href="#page274">274</a>, +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">demonstrations organised by,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the completeness with which it had undermined British power,</span> +<a href="#page223">223</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its view of the Salisbury Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page274">274</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its activity,</span> +<a href="#page348">348</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its attitude at the end of January, 1900,</span> +<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">annual congress at Somerset East,</span> +<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its policy after the occupation of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its attitude in February, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the qualities of its leaders,</span> +<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the Burgher Peace Committee,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its identification with the Boer invaders,</span> +<a href="#page475">475</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the character of the men it sent to Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page483">483</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Afrikanderdom,"</span> the doctrine of, +<a href="#page197">197</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Afrikander nationalists, The,</span> +<a href="#page048">48</a> (note), +<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the creed of,</span> +<a href="#page048">48</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>, +<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their plan of a united S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support,</span> +<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">strength of their forces,</span> +<a href="#page074">74</a>, +<a href="#page096">96</a>, +<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their bitterness against Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">uneasiness of,</span> +<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dominate S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their direct appeal to the Queen,</span> +<a href="#page294">294</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">unmasked,</span> +<a href="#page300">300</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their speech and action during the war,</span> +<a href="#page343">343</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their "peace overtures" on the British Government,</span> +<a href="#page360">360</a>, +<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their "conciliation" meetings,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page382">382</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition,</span> +<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their objects,</span> +<a href="#page382">382</a>, +<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their opposition to the Treason Bill,</span> +<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their references to Boer successes,</span> +<a href="#page396">396</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">they slander the British troops,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their hatred of England,</span> +<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders,</span> +<a href="#page478">478</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span> +<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Afrikander party" The,</span> the friends of in England, +<a href="#page375">375</a>, +<a href="#page379">379</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Agricultural Department,</span> The, formation of in Orange River Colony, +<a href="#page525">525</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Agriculture, The</span> development of in new colonies, +<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Albany" settlers, The,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>, +<a href="#page271">271</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Albert,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Albert Times, The</span>, +<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws,</span> The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for the repeal of, +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">repeal and amendment of,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>, +<a href="#page088">88</a>, +<a href="#page094">94</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Aliwal North,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>, +<a href="#page411">411</a>, +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Amershof, Mr. Justice,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Amery, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>, +<a href="#page300">300</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Amphitheatre Meeting, The,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Anti-British Press, The,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a>, +<a href="#page166">166</a>, +<a href="#page205">205</a> to +<a href="#page207">207</a>, +<a href="#page225">225</a>, +<a href="#page272">272</a>, +<a href="#page349">349</a>, +<a href="#page374">374</a>, +<a href="#page380">380</a>, +<a href="#page391">391</a>, +<a href="#page403">403</a>, +<a href="#page409">409</a>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ardagh, Sir John,</span> +<a href="#page319">319</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Arms, The surrender of,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the possession of,</span> +<a href="#page581">581</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Army Corps, The,</span> the order to mobilise, +<a href="#page244">244</a>, +<a href="#page317">317</a>, +<a href="#page318">318</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">arrival of,</span> +<a href="#page305">305</a>, +<a href="#page321">321</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Arnold-Forster, H. O.,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Asquith, H. H.,</span> his appreciation of Lord Milner, +<a href="#page077">77</a>, +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his utterances,</span> +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Attorney-General, The</span> (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason, +<a href="#page480">480</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Baden-Powell,</span> Colonel, afterwards General, +<a href="#page191">191</a> (note), +<a href="#page329">329</a> (note), +<a href="#page397">397</a>, +<a href="#page530">530</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Balfour, A. J.,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a> (note), +<a href="#page228">228</a>, +<a href="#page302">302</a>, +<a href="#page307">307</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Balfourian Parliament, The</span>, +<a href="#page319">319</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Balliol Scholars,</span> +<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bantu, The,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>, +<a href="#page012">12</a>, +<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Barberton,</span> +<a href="#page452">452</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Barkly East,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Barkly, Sir Henry,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bastards, The,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Basuto incident, The,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Basutoland,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Beaconsfield, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bechuanaland Expedition, The,</span> +<a href="#page350">350</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bechuanaland,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the administration of the European population of,</span> +<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Transvaal's attempt to secure,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>, +<a href="#page074">74</a>, +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Dutch community in,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bechuanas, the employmen</span>t of as indentured labourers, +<a href="#page117">117</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Beechranger Hottentots, The,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a>, +<a href="#page004">4</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Belgrave, Lord</span> (now Duke of Westminster), +<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Berry, Dr.</span> (now Sir) Wm., +<a href="#page124">124</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bethulie Bridge,</span> +<a href="#page411">411</a>, +<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alleged movement of British troops to,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bezuidenhout, the Boer,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Blignaut, J. N., letter from,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Blockhouse system,</span> The, area inclosed by, +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">effect produced by,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>, +<a href="#page457">457</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">efficiency of,</span> +<a href="#page576">576</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">extension of,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its help to the railways,</span> +<a href="#page533">533</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein, Meeting</span> of the Afrikander Bond at, +<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opening of the railway at,</span> +<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">seizure of correspondence at,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>, +<a href="#page162">162</a>, +<a href="#page206">206</a>, +<a href="#page376">376</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the occupation of,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>, +<a href="#page363">363</a>, +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">visit of Lord Milner to,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the effective occupation of the district round,</span> +<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and Kitchener,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">civil administration in,</span> +<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">construction of the railway to Basutoland,</span> +<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein Conference,</span> The, +<a href="#page268">268</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposed,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agreed to by President Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">negotiations leading up to,</span> +<a href="#page151">151</a> to +<a href="#page165">165</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meeting of,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the discussion at a closing of,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>, +<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the result of,</span> +<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the four months which followed,</span> +<a href="#page174">174</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein Convention,</span> The, +<a href="#page017">17</a>, +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">Sir G. Grey's criticism of,</span> +<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Bloemfontein Express, The</span>, +<a href="#page050">50</a>, +<a href="#page054">54</a>, +<a href="#page063">63</a>, +<a href="#page067">67</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Blood, Sir Bindon,</span> +<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bodley, J. E. C.,</span> statement by, +<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer Administration,</span> The, depraved character of, +<a href="#page212">212</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer Army, The,</span> +<a href="#page336">336</a>, +<a href="#page337">337</a>, +<a href="#page340">340</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer aspirations, The,</span> +<a href="#page302">302</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer children,</span> Teaching of during the war, +<a href="#page519">519</a> to +<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer Peace commissioners,</span> The, their tortuous diplomacy, +<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them,</span> +<a href="#page563">563</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their departure from Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page569">569</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer deputation</span> in Europe, The, +<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer emigrants,</span> The, +<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer leaders,</span> The, their decision to continue the struggle, +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page417">417</a>, +<a href="#page418">418</a>, +<a href="#page424">424</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their disingenuousness,</span> +<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">penalties to which they were liable,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">they treat for peace,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page555">555</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer raiders,</span> The, +<a href="#page438">438</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer revolt</span> of 1880-81, The, +<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer Republics,</span> The (<span class="italic">see also</span> <a href="#orangefree">Orange Free State</a> and <a href="#transvaal">Transvaal</a>), creation of, +<a href="#page017">17</a>, +<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">scheme for their union with the British colonies,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer spies,</span> +<a href="#page337">337</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boer, vernacular,</span> The, +<a href="#page547">547</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Boers, The,</span> the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their treatment, +<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their dealings with the natives,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the grant of self-government to,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their resistance to British arms</span> +<a href="#page048">48</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their bitterness against Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their military forces,</span> +<a href="#page181">181</a>, +<a href="#page340">340</a> (note),<br> + without uniform, +<a href="#page336">336</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">personal dealings with,</span> +<a href="#page194">194</a>, +<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their friends in England,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page424">424</a>, +<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">breaches of faith by,</span> +<a href="#page399">399</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their losses up to November, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">final surrender of,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bond, The.</span> <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#afrikbond">Afrikander Bond</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bond Press,</span> The, +<a href="#page209">209</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Booy the Hottentot,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Borckenhagen</span> the German, +<a href="#page049">49</a>, +<a href="#page050">50</a>, +<a href="#page066">66</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Botha, Louis,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dispersal of his army,</span> +<a href="#page322">322</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defeat of at Diamond Hill,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defeat of at Dalmanutha,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in Johannesburg,</span> +<a href="#page337">337</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms,</span> +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page424">424</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his determination to fight on,</span> +<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circular issued by him,</span> +<a href="#page425">425</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla war,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener,</span> +<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">stimulates his followers,</span> +<a href="#page457">457</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treats for peace,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>, +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page554">554</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging,</span> +<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates submission,</span> +<a href="#page571">571</a>, +<a href="#page577">577</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the treaty of peace,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the later stages of the war,</span> +<a href="#page575">575</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,</span> +<a href="#page576">576</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page577">577</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Botha" terms,</span> The, +<a href="#page471">471</a>, +<a href="#page554">554</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bower, Sir Graham,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Brand, President,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>, +<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">discourages the Afrikander Bond,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the rôle played by him in 1881,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Brebner J.,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Breed's Nek,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British Administration,</span> the failure of in S. Africa, +<a href="#page001">1</a>, +<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">distrust of by the British in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Bond and,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its impotency,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">efficiency of impaired by English party politics,</span> +<a href="#page254">254</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British and Dutch factions,</span> The, bitterness of, +<a href="#page244">244</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British Army,</span> The, in Cape Colony and Natal, +<a href="#page189">189</a>, +<a href="#page325">325</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">disadvantage in which it was placed,</span> +<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its performance in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the number of effectives available,</span> +<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its difficulties,</span> +<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the slander of,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>, +<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British colonists,</span> the settlement of on the land, +<a href="#page538">538</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British Government,</span> representatives of at the Cape, +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British Navy,</span> The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of, +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">holds the seas,</span> +<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British party,</span> A, the creation of, +<a href="#page150">150</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British policy</span> in S. Africa, +<a href="#page009">9</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">up to 1897,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British population</span> in Cape Colony, The, +<a href="#page107">107</a>, +<a href="#page115">115</a>, +<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">effect of the Redistribution Bill on,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their approval of Lord Milner's policy,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years' franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their support of Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers which took part in the war,</span> +<a href="#page324">324</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">British settlers</span> in the country, +<a href="#page061">61</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Britstown,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Brunt of The War, The</span>, +<a href="#page462">462</a> (note).<br> + +<a id="bryce" name="bryce"></a> +<span class="min2em">Bryce, James,</span> The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page314">314</a>, +<a href="#page360">360</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">misstatement by,</span> +<a href="#page263">263</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the "settlement" advocated by him,</span> +<a href="#page370">370</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of the Transvaal Government,</span> +<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Buller, General Sir Redvers,</span> +<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defeat of,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the early disasters,</span> +<a href="#page318">318</a>, +<a href="#page319">319</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his misconception of the state of affairs,</span> +<a href="#page319">319</a>, +<a href="#page320">320</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">at Maritzburg,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">forces at his disposal,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">false report of surrender to the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page380">380</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bundy, Thomas Dashwood,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Bunu, the affair of,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Burger, Schalk,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>, +<a href="#page101">101</a>, +<a href="#page159">159</a>, +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">denounced by Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attends the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his determination to fight on,</span> +<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his official notice of June 20th, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps,</span> +<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not,</span> +<a href="#page570">570</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his account of the origin of the war,</span> +<a href="#page574">574</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reasons for treating for peace,</span> +<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br> + +<a id="burghercamps" name="burghercamps"></a> +<span class="min2em">Burgher Camps,</span> deportation of Boer non-combatants to, +<a href="#page459">459</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">high rate of mortality in,</span> +<a href="#page460">460</a> to +<a href="#page463">463</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the camps,</span> +<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">condition of,</span> +<a href="#page503">503</a>, +<a href="#page505">505</a>, +<a href="#page513">513</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">establishment of schools in,</span> +<a href="#page519">519</a> to +<a href="#page523">523</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">views of the Boers on,</span> +<a href="#page575">575</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Burgher meetings,</span> The, the minutes of, +<a href="#page560">560</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Burgher Peace Committee, The,</span> +<a href="#page412">412</a>, +<a href="#page422">422</a>, +<a href="#page423">423</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its efforts,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>, +<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treatment of its agents,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a> to +<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Bond leaders hold aloof from,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Burghersdorp,</span> The theological seminary of, +<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br> + +<a id="burns" name="burns"></a> +<span class="min2em">Burns, John,</span> +<a href="#page315">315</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Burt, Thomas,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Butler, General Sir William,</span> refuses to transmit a petition for protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, +<a href="#page131">131</a>, +<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span> +<a href="#page174">174</a>, +<a href="#page184">184</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views of a war,</span> +<a href="#page174">174</a>, +<a href="#page175">175</a>, +<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of the Uitlander grievances,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the friction between him and Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a>, +<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page177">177</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,</span> +<a href="#page180">180</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">requested to furnish a scheme of defence,</span> +<a href="#page180">180</a>, +<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his scheme,</span> +<a href="#page181">181</a> to +<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his evidence before the War Commission,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a> (note), +<a href="#page181">181</a> to +<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements,</span> +<a href="#page183">183</a>, +<a href="#page319">319</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his withdrawal from the command at the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page184">184</a>, +<a href="#page247">247</a>, +<a href="#page269">269</a>, +<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his only point of agreement with Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements,</span> +<a href="#page190">190</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cambridge, The Duke of,</span> +<a href="#page494">494</a> (note).<br> + +<a id="campbellbannerman" name="campbellbannerman"></a> +<span class="min2em">Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war,</span> +<a href="#page192">192</a>, +<a href="#page252">252</a>, +<a href="#page256">256</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page314">314</a>, +<a href="#page367">367</a>, +<a href="#page368">368</a>, +<a href="#page399">399</a>, +<a href="#page416">416</a>, +<a href="#page418">418</a>, +<a href="#page574">574</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war,</span> +<a href="#page265">265</a>, +<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attitude in Committee of Supply,</span> +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement,</span> +<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener,</span> +<a href="#page460">460</a>, +<a href="#page464">464</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach,</span> +<a href="#page466">466</a>, +<a href="#page467">467</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page467">467</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his declaration at Plymouth,</span> +<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Canadian Precedent," The,</span> +<a href="#page385">385</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co. at,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">isolation of at the end of the 18th century,</span> +<a href="#page006">6</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the task of governing,</span> +<a href="#page006">6</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the old European population in,</span> +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">representatives of the British Government at,</span> +<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">population of at the time of the permanent British occupation,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Franco-Dutch population in,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the "Albany Settlers" in,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the emancipation of slaves in,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">disintegrating influences at work in,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">transfer to the British Government,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898,</span> +<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in,</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">division of parties in,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">aspirations of the Dutch in,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the leaders of Dutch opinion in,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">public meetings in,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">nationalists of,</span> +<a href="#page142">142</a>, +<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the vote for responsible government in,</span> +<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">creation of a British party in,</span> +<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the garrison in,</span> +<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British forces in,</span> +<a href="#page243">243</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Boer aspiration to annex,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">organisation of the defences of,</span> +<a href="#page269">269</a>, +<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British population of,</span> +<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">only in name a British colony,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alarming rumours from,</span> +<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rebellion of the Dutch in,</span> +<a href="#page341">341</a> to +<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proclamation of martial law,</span> +<a href="#page345">345</a>, +<a href="#page411">411</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">disclosure of a new centre of rebellion,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>, +<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the second invasion of,</span> +<a href="#page383">383</a>, +<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">racial relations in,</span> +<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">clearing it of the republican invaders,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the situation in November, 1900,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">De Wet enters,</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is chased out,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the area to be protected,</span> +<a href="#page445">445</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">response of the British population to arms,</span> +<a href="#page446">446</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span> +<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">screened off by blockhouses,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the course of events in,</span> +<a href="#page473">473</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">collapse of the system of responsible government in,</span> +<a href="#page478">478</a> to +<a href="#page480">480</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure of military courts,</span> +<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">number of troops placed by the Government of in the field,</span> +<a href="#page485">485</a>, +<a href="#page486">486</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treatment of rebels in,</span> +<a href="#page563">563</a>, +<a href="#page567">567</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Cape Argus, The</span>, +<a href="#page243">243</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of,</span> +<a href="#page272">272</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Distriks-bestuur, The,</span> +<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape electoral system, The,</span> +<a href="#page115">115</a>, +<a href="#page116">116</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape garrison, The,</span> +<a href="#page191">191</a>, +<a href="#page204">204</a>, +<a href="#page278">278</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape local forces, The,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Ministry, The (<span class="italic">see also</span> <a href="#schreinercabinet">Schreiner Cabinet</a> and <a href="#sprigg">Sprigg</a>), its views as to its duties and powers in case of a war,</span> +<a href="#page164">164</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">and the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">"moral support of,"</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its views upon the settlement of the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page546">546</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape nationalists, The,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page268">268</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>, +<a href="#page070">70</a>, +<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Progressive majority in,</span> +<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">prorogation of,</span> +<a href="#page478">478</a>, +<a href="#page482">482</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cape Parliamentary Reports,</span> +<a href="#page395">395</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Cape Times, The</span>, +<a href="#page048">48</a> (note), +<a href="#page220">220</a>, +<a href="#page379">379</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">report of J. X. Merriman's speech in,</span> +<a href="#page062">62</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes,</span> +<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its views on the Redistribution Bill,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Capetown, mass meeting at,</span> +<a href="#page204">204</a>, +<a href="#page250">250</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alleged plot to seize,</span> +<a href="#page350">350</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2emitalic">Carisbrook Castle, The S.S.</span>, +<a href="#page132">132</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Carnarvon,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Carnival of Mendacity," The,</span> +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cartwright, Albert,</span> +<a href="#page380">380</a>, +<a href="#page381">381</a>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Cecil Rhodes</span>, Vindex's, +<a href="#page068">68</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Century of Wrong, A</span>, Mr. Reitz's, +<a href="#page356">356</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his <span class="italic">impis</span></span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his organisation of the Zulus,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Chaka,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>, +<a href="#page041">41</a>, +<a href="#page045">45</a>, +<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid,</span> +<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his active sympathy with the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his policy,</span> +<a href="#page072">72</a>, +<a href="#page073">73</a>, +<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>, +<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch of March 6th 1897,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">accusation against,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch of May 10th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page155">155</a>, +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page184">184</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page188">188</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his desire to avoid war,</span> +<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the support given by him to Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham,</span> +<a href="#page202">202</a>, +<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">believes the crisis to be at an end,</span> +<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">prepared to accept Krüger's illusory Franchise Law,</span> +<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission,</span> +<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene,</span> +<a href="#page238">238</a>, +<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a sovereign international state,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch of September 8th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a>, +<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at Highbury on August 27th,</span> +<a href="#page249">249</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war,</span> +<a href="#page265">265</a>, +<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety for a peaceful settlement,</span> +<a href="#page293">293</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the forces in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page325">325</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the Government had determined on,</span> +<a href="#page367">367</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of loyalists and punishment of rebels,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions,</span> +<a href="#page386">386</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry + in favour of a general amnesty,</span> +<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to the fighting burghers,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">abandons the proposal,</span> +<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span> +<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">assents to Lord Milner's application for leave,</span> +<a href="#page488">488</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>, +<a href="#page491">491</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agrees to a tax on the mining industry,</span> +<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position,</span> +<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement,</span> +<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the Legislative Councils,</span> +<a href="#page545">545</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the Vereeniging surrender,</span> +<a href="#page562">562</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Channing, M.P., Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Chartered Company, The,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>, +<a href="#page066">66</a>, +<a href="#page083">83</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives" in the "Terms of Surrender,"</span> +<a href="#page568">568</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>, +<a href="#page519">519</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its progress,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page524">524</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page362">362</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy,</span> +<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Closer Union," the policy of,</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>, +<a href="#page070">70</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Coercive measures," Boer,</span> +<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colenso,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>, +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Free State Boers moving on,</span> +<a href="#page305">305</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colesberg,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>, +<a href="#page348">348</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colonial Conference, The, of 1897,</span> +<a href="#page095">95</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colonial Office, The, the administration of,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a leakage from,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colonial questions, the study of,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">necessity of,</span> +<a href="#page254">254</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on,</span> +<a href="#page563">563</a>, +<a href="#page567">567</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">surrenders of,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Colonies, The, offers of military aid from,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>, +<a href="#page324">324</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Commando Nek,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Commissie Van Toezicht, The</span>, +<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Concentration Camps. <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#burghercamps">Burgher Camps</a>.<br></span> + +<span class="min2em">Concessions Commission, The,</span> +<a href="#page376">376</a>, +<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Conciliation," movement, The,</span> +<a href="#page343">343</a>, +<a href="#page359">359</a>, +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page373">373</a> to +<a href="#page412">412</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement,</span> +<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">injurious influence of the movement on the Colony,</span> +<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Englishmen who took part in,</span> +<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the initiation of,</span> +<a href="#page375">375</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Conciliation Committee, The, in England,</span> +<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Conservative Governments,</span> +<a href="#page255">255</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on,</span> +<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner on,</span> +<a href="#page086">86</a>, +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note), +<a href="#page358">358</a>, +<a href="#page360">360</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Cornhill Magazine, The</span>, +<a href="#page263">263</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Coronation of King Edward VII.</span>, J. E. C. Bodley's, +<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br> + +<a id="courtney" name="courtney"></a> +<span class="min2em">Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page251">251</a>, +<a href="#page257">257</a> to +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page360">360</a>, +<a href="#page363">363</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>, +<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates the autonomy of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page370">370</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">letter to him from President Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page372">372</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs.,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>, +<a href="#page501">501</a>, +<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Customs Union, The,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em italic">Daily Chronicle, The</span>, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa, +<a href="#page154">154</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>, +<a href="#page414">414</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Davies, "Karri," Major W. D.,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Aar,</span> +<a href="#page305">305</a>, +<a href="#page354">354</a>, +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Jong, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page402">402</a> (note), +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Kock, Meyer, shot,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appearance of a British squadron at,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">consignment of ammunition to,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">railway communication with Pretoria re-opened,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De la Rey, J. H.,</span> +<a href="#page434">434</a>, +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page556">556</a>, +<a href="#page562">562</a> (note), +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">De Patriot</span>, +<a href="#page048">48</a>, +<a href="#page050">50</a> (note), +<a href="#page056">56</a>, +<a href="#page057">57</a>, +<a href="#page063">63</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">De Rand Post</span>, +<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884,</span> +<a href="#page262">262</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>, +<a href="#page054">54</a>, +<a href="#page057">57</a> (note), +<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Villiers, A. B.,</span> +<a href="#page382">382</a>, +<a href="#page404">404</a>, +<a href="#page406">406</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Villiers, Melius,</span> +<a href="#page160">160</a>, +<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates a cessation of hostilities, </span> +<a href="#page401">401</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Villiers, Sir Henry,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>, +<a href="#page095">95</a> (note), +<a href="#page102">102</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn,</span> +<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his visit to Pretoria in 1899,</span> +<a href="#page159">159</a>, +<a href="#page160">160</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>, +<a href="#page219">219</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krüger's acceptance of the joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page311">311</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war,</span> +<a href="#page292">292</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Development Loan," The,</span> +<a href="#page540">540</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude in Committee of Supply,</span> +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Wet, Christian,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>, +<a href="#page434">434</a>, +<a href="#page562">562</a> (note), +<a href="#page564">564</a>, +<a href="#page575">575</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his blow at Sannah's Post,</span> +<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla war,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>, +<a href="#page428">428</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his laager near Lindley,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">enters Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>, +<a href="#page577">577</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">chased out of it,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his <span class="italic">Three Years' War</span>,</span> +<a href="#page433">433</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">the pursuit of,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page475">475</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">signs the Vereeniging Agreement,</span> +<a href="#page567">567</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates a continuance of the war,</span> +<a href="#page571">571</a>, +<a href="#page578">578</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace Committee,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher Peace Committee,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">De Wet, Sir Jacobus,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand,</span> +<a href="#page086">86</a>, +<a href="#page090">90</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Diamond Mines, The, earnings of,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Merriman's association with,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Diamonds, The discovery of,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Disarmament, The operation of,</span> +<a href="#page413">413</a> to +<a href="#page469">469</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">views of the Natal Ministry on,</span> +<a href="#page549">549</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dodd, Mr., arrest of,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dordrecht affair, The,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from,</span> +<a href="#page001">1</a>, +<a href="#page022">22</a>, +<a href="#page034">34</a>, +<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain and,</span> +<a href="#page047">47</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his <span class="italic">War in South Africa</span>,</span> +<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Duncan, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page515">515</a>, +<a href="#page527">527</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who were in favour of peace,</span> +<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Durban,</span> +<a href="#page271">271</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy,</span> +<a href="#page012">12</a> to +<a href="#page015">15</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Durham, Lord, his report on Canada,</span> +<a href="#page480">480</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page003">3.</a><br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of,</span> +<a href="#page341">341</a> to +<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the aggravation and use of their disaffection,</span> +<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">disarmament of,</span> +<a href="#page413">413</a> to +<a href="#page469">469</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their sympathy with the Boer raiders,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>, +<a href="#page433">433</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their restlessness and embitterment,</span> +<a href="#page443">443</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their general attitude,</span> +<a href="#page444">444</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a century and a half of their government,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the corner stone of their policy,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their instructions to Van Riebeck,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>, +<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch language, The, the use of,</span> +<a href="#page565">565</a>, +<a href="#page581">581</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch party, The, interests of,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>, +<a href="#page106">106</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>, +<a href="#page119">119</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch Reformed Church, The,</span> +<a href="#page120">120</a>, +<a href="#page215">215</a>, +<a href="#page410">410</a>, +<a href="#page411">411</a>, +<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of,</span> +<a href="#page255">255</a>, +<a href="#page356">356</a>, +<a href="#page357">357</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are descended,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their essential unity,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side,</span> +<a href="#page090">90</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">anti-British sentiment of,</span> +<a href="#page091">91</a>, +<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their moral conquest of Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page107">107</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch, The republican,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>, +<a href="#page019">19</a>, +<a href="#page028">28</a>, +<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of British S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page545">545</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dutch vote, The,</span> +<a href="#page150">150</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Du Toit, Rev. S. J.,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a> (note), +<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his articles in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>,</span> +<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">rejected by the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page058">58</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Duxbury, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Dynamite Contract, The,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Ebden, Mr. Alfred,</span> +<a href="#page173">173</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Edgar, Tom Jackson,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>, +<a href="#page131">131</a> (note), +<a href="#page132">132</a>, +<a href="#page175">175</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Educational reconstruction, The work of,</span> +<a href="#page519">519</a> to +<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Eerste Fabriken,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley,</span> +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Eliot, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ellis, M.P., John,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Emigrant Farmers, The,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a> to +<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">England, The military unpreparedness of,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ignorance of the situation in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>, +<a href="#page253">253</a>, +<a href="#page283">283</a>, +<a href="#page316">316</a>, +<a href="#page323">323</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">hatred of,</span> +<a href="#page312">312</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">England in Egypt</span>, +<a href="#page076">76</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">English language, The, war against,</span> +<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">English State Church, The, Afrikander view of,</span> +<a href="#page053">53</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Equal rights for all white men," The policy of,</span> +<a href="#page001">1</a>, +<a href="#page032">32</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Esau, brutal murder of,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a> (note).</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Farelly, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a> (note), +<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Farmer, Canon,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Farmers' Protection Association, The,"</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>, +<a href="#page060">60</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Farrer, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Faure, Pieter (now Sir),</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page105">105</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fiddes, G. V.,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page515">515</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his report on the work of the departments of education, public works, and district administration,</span> +<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fischer, Abraham,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a> (note), +<a href="#page161">161</a>, +<a href="#page203">203</a>, +<a href="#page204">204</a>, +<a href="#page210">210</a>, +<a href="#page239">239</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his advice to Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape nationalists,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recasts the ultimatum,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attempt to influence him to terminate the war,</span> +<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a> to +<a href="#page210">210</a>, +<a href="#page236">236</a>, +<a href="#page275">275</a>, +<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fish River, The, grants of land beyond,</span> +<a href="#page013">13</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">FitzPatrick, Sir Percy,</span> +<a href="#page264">264</a>, +<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers</span>, +<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command,</span> +<a href="#page184">184</a>, +<a href="#page247">247</a>, +<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">military measures of,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fouché,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fowler, Sir Henry,</span> +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years',</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>, +<a href="#page156">156</a>, +<a href="#page157">157</a>, +<a href="#page170">170</a>, +<a href="#page172">172</a>, +<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conditions attached to the proposed new franchise,</span> +<a href="#page238">238</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Franchise Law, The,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Volksraad discussion on,</span> +<a href="#page213">213</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">demonstrations upon,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Krüger recommends a further modification of,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the new law passed,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">obscurity of its provisions,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a> to +<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">flagrant insincerity of,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years' franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>, +<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conditions attached to the proposed new franchise,</span> +<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Home Government kept inactive by,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">France, The attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">secession of part of,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union,"</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">beaten for the Presidential election,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Free State Dutch, The,</span> +<a href="#page018">18</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Frederickstad,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">French, General, his advance on Colesberg,</span> +<a href="#page348">348</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">libel on,</span> +<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">surrenders of rebels to,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">French, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>, +<a href="#page025">25</a>, +<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his diagnosis of the S. African situation,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his recall,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the vindication of his statesmanship,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his knowledge of S. African conditions,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">drafts a scheme of administrative reform,</span> +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">events following his recall,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>, +<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg,</span> +<a href="#page263">263</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley,</span> +<a href="#page261">261</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Friend, The</span> (Bloemfontein), +<a href="#page235">235</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Froneman, Commandant,</span> +<a href="#page428">428</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Gatacre, General, defeat at Stormberg,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>, +<a href="#page348">348</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">German Emperor, The, telegram of,</span> +<a href="#page071">71</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">German General Staff, The, reply to its criticism,</span> +<a href="#page334">334</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">German Government, The, action of,</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>, +<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">German Marines at Delagoa Bay,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Germiston, Lord Milner's speech at,</span> +<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Gill, Sir David, his words,</span> +<a href="#page286">286</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Girouard, Sir Percy,</span> +<a href="#page502">502</a>, +<a href="#page532">532</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Gladstone, Rev. Stephen,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Gladstone, W. E., S. African policy of,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>, +<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Glencoe, British force despatched to,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Glenelg, Lord (<span class="italic">see</span> also <a href="#grant">Grant</a>),</span> Cloete's opinion of his despatch reversing Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, +<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Gold Industry, The, Commissions on,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">resumption of,</span> +<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Goodenough, General, his schemes for the defence of the British colonies,</span> +<a href="#page180">180</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Goold-Adams, Major Sir H.,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a>, +<a href="#page488">488</a>, +<a href="#page515">515</a>, +<a href="#page524">524</a>, +<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Government House, watched by spies,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Governor's warrants,</span> +<a href="#page478">478</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Graaf Reinet, first congress of the Afrikander Bond at,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's speech at,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page091">91</a>, +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page098">98</a>, +<a href="#page099">99</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>, +<a href="#page115">115</a>, +<a href="#page367">367</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opening of the railway at,</span> +<a href="#page108">108</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the people's congress at,</span> +<a href="#page379">379</a>, +<a href="#page381">381</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Grahamstown,</span> +<a href="#page061">61</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Graham, T. Lynedoch,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).<br> + +<a id="grant" name="grant"></a> +<span class="min2em">Grant, Charles (aft. Lord Glenelg),</span> his reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's frontier policy, +<a href="#page012">12</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Greene, Sir Wm. Conyngham,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>, +<a href="#page127">127</a>, +<a href="#page131">131</a> (note), +<a href="#page198">198</a>, +<a href="#page210">210</a>, +<a href="#page226">226</a> (note), +<a href="#page237">237</a>, +<a href="#page238">238</a>, +<a href="#page241">241</a>, +<a href="#page242">242</a>, +<a href="#page252">252</a>, +<a href="#page290">290</a>, +<a href="#page295">295</a>, +<a href="#page299">299</a>, +<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Gregorowski, Chief Justice,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Grey, Sir Edward,</span> +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Grey, Sir George, neglect of his advice by the Home Government</span> +<a href="#page018">18</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his exposure of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions,</span> +<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton,</span> +<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is charged with "direct disobedience,"</span> +<a href="#page020">20</a>, +<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recalled and reinstated,</span> +<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attitude of the Home Government towards,</span> +<a href="#page021">21</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Griqualand West, the discovery of diamonds in,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">an invitation to the Boers to invade,</span> +<a href="#page260">260</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Groebler, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page204">204</a>, +<a href="#page205">205</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Guerilla warfare, commencement of,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Pres. Steyn's responsibility for,</span> +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">methods and conditions of,</span> +<a href="#page417">417</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">responsibility for sufferings of the Boers during,</span> +<a href="#page426">426</a>, +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">increased losses, to the country due to,</span> +<a href="#page437">437</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">methods by which it was brought to a close,</span> +<a href="#page450">450</a>, +<a href="#page575">575</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Haldane, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Handelsblad</span>, The Amsterdam, an article in, +<a href="#page050">50</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Harcourt, Sir William,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>, +<a href="#page076">76</a>, +<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his appreciation of Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page077">77</a>, +<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his misstatement on the Suzerainty question,</span> +<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his manifestation of hostility to the loyalist population of South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page464">464</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his financial miscalculations,</span> +<a href="#page502">502</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hargrove, E. T.,</span> +<a href="#page375">375</a> to +<a href="#page380">380</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Harrison, Frederic,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Harry" the Hottentot chief,</span> +<a href="#page003">3</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Heany, Captain,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>, +<a href="#page042">42</a>, +<a href="#page043">43</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Heidelberg,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">prorogues the Cape Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page478">478</a>, +<a href="#page479">479</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Herholdt, A. J.,</span> +<a href="#page150">150</a>, +<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his mission,</span> +<a href="#page205">205</a> (note), +<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page390">390</a>, +<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Het Oosten</span>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Het Volk,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hertzog, General,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>, +<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>, +<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">crosses the Orange River,</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">High Commissioner for S. Africa, The, decreasing power of,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">severance of the office from the governorship of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page419">419</a>, +<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"High Court Crisis," The,</span> +<a href="#page102">102</a>, +<a href="#page103">103</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">History of the War in South Africa, The Official</span>, vol. i. +<a href="#page309">309</a> (note) <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em italic">History of the War in South Africa, The Times'</span>, +<a href="#page217">217</a> (note), +<a href="#page300">300</a> (note), +<a href="#page309">309</a> (note), +<a href="#page340">340</a> (note), +<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hobhouse, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hobhouse, Miss,</span> +<a href="#page462">462</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Hofmeyr Compromise, The,"</span> +<a href="#page277">277</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hofmeyr, J. H.,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the influence of,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">adoption of his programme by the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his alliance with Rhodes,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dictates Lord Rosmead's policy,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attitude towards the offer of a contribution to the cost of the British Navy,</span> +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the real leader of the Bond party,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>, +<a href="#page116">116</a>, +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his action to prevent the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the petition of the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asks Lord Milner to meet Krüger in conference,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>, +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his methods for paralysing British administration,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>, +<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his motives,</span> +<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">approaches Lord Milner as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a>, +<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety to prevent decisive action of the Imperial Government,</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his absence from the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the pressure of his "mediation,"</span> +<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">in close communication with Abraham Fischer,</span> +<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">confers with Messrs. Fischer and Smuts at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page205">205</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">goes to Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the failure of his mission,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his relations with the republican nationalists,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>, +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page311">311</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of Mr. Schreiner's position as Premier of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his opinion of the result of war,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his telegram of Sept. 14th to Pres. Steyn,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his displeasure at the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>, +<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">at a meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur,</span> +<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hottentots, The,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a> to +<a href="#page005">5</a>, +<a href="#page009">9</a>, +<a href="#page010">10</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">House of Commons, The, debate in on the S. African settlement,</span> +<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Hunter, General, Sir A., Prinsloo surrenders to,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">"Imperial factor, The,"</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the elimination of,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>, +<a href="#page085">85</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Imperial Light Horse, The,</span> +<a href="#page179">179</a>, +<a href="#page447">447</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Imperial military authorities, The, charges brought against,</span> +<a href="#page459">459</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Imperial military railways, The,</span> +<a href="#page502">502</a>, +<a href="#page505">505</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Imperial spirit, The,</span> +<a href="#page021">21</a>, +<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Imperial troops, The, calumnies on,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>, +<a href="#page499">499</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">insufficiency of,</span> +<a href="#page452">452</a>, +<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the task of,</span> +<a href="#page435">435</a>, +<a href="#page452">452</a>, +<a href="#page487">487</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Impossible position, An,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Impressions of South Africa</span>, By J. Bryce, extract from, +<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, The,</span> +<a href="#page396">396</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Independence," the Boer claim to,</span> +<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">India, The feudatory princes of,</span> +<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Indian Army, The, troops from for S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page243">243</a>, +<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Indian military authorities, The, promptitude displayed by,</span> +<a href="#page289">289</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Industrial Commission, The, anticipation of good results from,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">impartiality of,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treatment of its Report,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a> to +<a href="#page101">101</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Industrial corporations, growth of,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Innes, Sir James,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a> (note), +<a href="#page125">125</a>, +<a href="#page271">271</a>, +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">becomes Attorney-General,</span> +<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">notice issued by him as to treason,</span> +<a href="#page480">480</a>, +<a href="#page481">481</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Intelligence Department, The, the work of,</span> +<a href="#page177">177</a>, +<a href="#page180">180</a>, +<a href="#page190">190</a>, +<a href="#page217">217</a> (note), +<a href="#page233">233</a>, +<a href="#page234">234</a> (notes), +<a href="#page257">257</a>, +<a href="#page277">277</a> (note), +<a href="#page292">292</a> (note), +<a href="#page319">319</a> (note), +<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Inter-State Conference, An, proposal of,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Irish Nationalist party, The,</span> +<a href="#page465">465</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Irrigation, report of Sir W. Willcocks on,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a>, +<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Isandlhwana, the military disaster of,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>, +<a href="#page026">26</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Jameson, Dr.,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his disregard of the Reformers' message and of Rhodes's telegram,</span> +<a href="#page043">43</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Jameson Raid,</span> The, +<a href="#page033">33</a>, +<a href="#page037">37</a>, +<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its effect on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">object of,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a> to +<a href="#page044">44</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">political forces set in motion by,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">results of,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>, +<a href="#page071">71</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Janssen, David, the murder of,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a>, +<a href="#page003">3</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Johannesburg,</span> +<a href="#page439">439</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's farewell speech at,</span> +<a href="#page129">129</a>, +<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the second Reform movement at,</span> +<a href="#page132">132</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">enthusiastic meeting at,</span> +<a href="#page198">198</a>, +<a href="#page199">199</a>, +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">march of Lord Roberts on,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">exodus from,</span> +<a href="#page246">246</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">situation in,</span> +<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">occupation of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts's decision to advance on,</span> +<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">arrangements for the civil administration of,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district round,</span> +<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">British population allowed to return to,</span> +<a href="#page459">459</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's reception at,</span> +<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">establishment of a Town Council for,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">abolition of the office of Military Governor,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the public buildings at,</span> +<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">organisation of municipal police in,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Johannesburg insurrection, The,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Johannesburg mines, The, project of wrecking,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Johannesburg Reformers, The,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Johannesburg Star, The</span>, +<a href="#page145">145</a> (note), +<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">extract from,</span> +<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Johannesburgers, The, splendid fighting of,</span> +<a href="#page447">447</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">John Bull & Co.</span>, Max O'Rell's, +<a href="#page043">43</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Joint Inquiry, The, proposed,</span> +<a href="#page229">229</a>, +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refused by the Volksraad,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Joubert, General,</span> +<a href="#page101">101</a>, +<a href="#page235">235</a>, +<a href="#page320">320</a>, +<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Jubilee despatch, Lord Milner's,</span> +<a href="#page090">90</a> to +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page099">99</a>, +<a href="#page104">104</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Kafir, invasion of 1834-5, The,</span> 15.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kafirs, British policy towards,</span> +<a href="#page012">12</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Kafir wars, The,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Karree Siding,</span> +<a href="#page363">363</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kei River, The, the Kafir's line of,</span> +<a href="#page013">13</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kekewich, Colonel, calls for arms,</span> +<a href="#page304">304</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kitchener, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page303">303</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his losses before Paardeberg,</span> +<a href="#page332">332</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">instructed to proceed to De Aar,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reduces to order the north-midland districts of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defamatory libel on,</span> +<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agrees with Lord Milner's views as to the proposed proclamation to the burghers,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>, +<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his address to the Burgher Peace Committee,</span> +<a href="#page422">422</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">failure of his peace negotiations with L. Botha,</span> +<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his accession to the command,</span> +<a href="#page452">452</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the troops at his disposal,</span> +<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">origin of his system of blockhouse defence,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his expectations of the blockhouse lines,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reports the creation of mobile columns,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to the official Boer complaint against the system of Burgher Camps,</span> +<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">discusses with Lord Milner the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures for peace,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">instructions to his officers as to procedure in military courts,</span> +<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">permits the mines to re-open,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">differs from Lord Milner's views of the terms of the surrender,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>, +<a href="#page560">560</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">directed to put forward a copy of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">assures the Boer leaders that no terms will be granted maintaining the independence of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page553">553</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is authorised to refer the leaders to the offer made to General Botha at Middelburg,</span> +<a href="#page554">554</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refuses the terms of the Boer peace commissioners,</span> +<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">announces "peace" to Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">records his appreciation of the energy and tact displayed after the signing of the peace treaty by Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and C. De Wet,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his last words addressed to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary of State for War,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">the efficiency of his blockhouse system,</span> +<a href="#page576">576</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kimberley,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page271">271</a>, +<a href="#page286">286</a> (note), +<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the diamond industry at,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">plans for the defence of,</span> +<a href="#page178">178</a>, +<a href="#page278">278</a>, +<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lancashire Regiment sent to,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is cut off,</span> +<a href="#page304">304</a>, +<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">relief of,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district of,</span> +<a href="#page453">453</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kimberley, The Earl of,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kimberley Volunteers, The,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a>, +<a href="#page282">282</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kipling, Rudyard, on the attitude of the Bond</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>, +<a href="#page434">434</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Klerksdorp,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conference at,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kock, Judge, warlike speech of at Paardekraal,</span> +<a href="#page197">197</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Komati Poort, the occupation of,</span> +<a href="#page322">322</a>, +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kotzé, Chief Justice, the dismissal of,</span> +<a href="#page102">102</a>, +<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">indignation caused by,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Krause, Dr.,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kretschmar, J. Van,</span> +<a href="#page377">377</a>, +<a href="#page533">533</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Krogh, General,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kroonstad entered,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Krüger, Paul,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a> to +<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on Sir Bartle Frere's recall,</span> +<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his allusion to Germany at the German Club at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">supplies arms to adherents of the nationalist cause,</span> +<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">invited to visit England,</span> +<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">calls for the appointment of the Industrial Commission,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>, +<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">uncompromising attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">denounces Schalk Burger,</span> +<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">elected President of the South African Republic for the fourth time,</span> +<a href="#page101">101</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dismisses Chief Justice Kotzé,</span> +<a href="#page102">102</a>, +<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his determination to increase the disabilities of the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">signs a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State,</span> +<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attitude in 1898,</span> +<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">subsidises the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">claims independence for the South African Republic,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">consents to meet Lord Milner at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his retrogressive policy,</span> +<a href="#page160">160</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his appearance at the Conference,</span> +<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his motive in attending it,</span> +<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the possibility of his declaring war,</span> +<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">expresses his intention of introducing his franchise scheme to the Volksraad,</span> +<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the scheme laid before the Volksraad,</span> +<a href="#page194">194</a>, +<a href="#page197">197</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his incapacity to yield,</span> +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">complexity of his franchise proposals,</span> +<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his bid for the "moral support," of the Cape Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">grants a limited franchise,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his object in doing so,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>, +<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">wishes to retain the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recommends to the Volksraad a further modification of the Franchise Bill,</span> +<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">inadequacy of his franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">hastens arrangements for war,</span> +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his secret agents</span> +<a href="#page233">233</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">urged by Afrikander Members of Cape Parliament to accept the offered joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page233">233</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opposition to it,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">strength of his military position,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his note refusing to consider the British offer of September 8th handed to Sir Wm. Greene,</span> +<a href="#page252">252</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his boast,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the illusory concessions embodied in his franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page268">268</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">spies in his pay,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his coarse duplicity,</span> +<a href="#page277">277</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">winning all along the line,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">flees the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his "peace overtures,"</span> +<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. Courtney,</span> +<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his telegram to Pres. Steyn shortly before the Bond Congress at Somerset East was postponed,</span> +<a href="#page375">375</a>, +<a href="#page377">377</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attempt to influence him to terminate the war,</span> +<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Krüger, Tjaart,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note), +<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Krügersdorp, arrival of Dr. Jameson at,</span> +<a href="#page044">44</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Kruitzinger, crosses the Orange River,</span> +<a href="#page430">430</a>, +<a href="#page432">432</a>.</p> + +<a id="labouchere" name="labouchere"></a> +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Labouchere, Henry,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page233">233</a>, +<a href="#page237">237</a>, +<a href="#page256">256</a>, +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ladies' Commission, The,</span> +<a href="#page511">511</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ladysmith, British force entrained at,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Sir G. White shut up in,</span> +<a href="#page320">320</a>, +<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">spies in the camp of the relieving force,</span> +<a href="#page337">337</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lagden, Sir Godfrey,</span> +<a href="#page515">515</a>, +<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Laing's Nek, evacuated by the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lancashire Regiment, The, sent to garrison Kimberley,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Land settlement, proposed loan for,</span> +<a href="#page540">540</a>, +<a href="#page543">543</a>, +<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Land Settlement Commission, The,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a>, +<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Langlaate Estate, The,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lanyon, Sir Owen,</span> +<a href="#page263">263</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lawson, Sir Wilfred,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Leader, The Transvaal</span>, +<a href="#page213">213</a> (note), +<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Legal Adviser's office, The, work of,</span> +<a href="#page527">527</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Legislative Councils of the new colonies, The, enlargement of,</span> +<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Léon, M.,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Leonard, J. W.,</span> +<a href="#page061">61</a>, +<a href="#page093">93</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lewis, Mrs.,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Leyds, Dr.,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a> (note), +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page375">375</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">communication opened with European Powers through,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>, +<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">despatched to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary of the South African Republic,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Liberal Opposition leaders, The, attitude and public utterances of,</span> +<a href="#page143">143</a>, +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page192">192</a>, +<a href="#page203">203</a>, +<a href="#page252">252</a>, +<a href="#page257">257</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page261">261</a>, +<a href="#page264">264</a> to +<a href="#page266">266</a>, +<a href="#page314">314</a>, +<a href="#page367">367</a>, +<a href="#page368">368</a>, +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note), +<a href="#page399">399</a>, +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page424">424</a>, +<a href="#page430">430</a>, +<a href="#page431">431</a>, +<a href="#page460">460</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>, +<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their desire to escape from responsibility,</span> +<a href="#page254">254</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">renewal of their alliance with the Afrikander nationalists,</span> +<a href="#page369">369</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">representations of the delegates of the Worcester Congress to,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Liberal Party, The, mandate to,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">friends of the Boers in the ranks of,</span> +<a href="#page382">382</a>, +<a href="#page417">417</a>, +<a href="#page573">573</a>.<br> + <span class="min1em italic">See also</span> <a href="#bryce">Bryce</a>, <a href="#burns">Burns</a>, <a href="#campbellbannerman">Campbell-Bannerman</a>, <a href="#courtney">Courtney</a>, <a href="#labouchere">Labouchere</a>, <a href="#lloydgeorge">Lloyd-George</a>, <a href="#morley">Morley</a>, etc.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Life of Gordon, The</span>, +<a href="#page497">497</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Lifetime in South Africa, A</span>, +<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Limpopo River, The,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lindley, De Wet's laager at,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>.<br> + +<a id="lloydgeorge" name="lloydgeorge"></a> +<span class="min2em">Lloyd-George, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page315">315</a>, +<a href="#page496">496</a>, +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Loch, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>, +<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">retirement of,</span> +<a href="#page074">74</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lombard, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">London Convention (1884), The,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>, +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note), +<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a violation of,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Article IV. in,</span> +<a href="#page580">580</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Lord Milner and South Africa</span>, +<a href="#page166">166</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Loreburn, Lord, his attitude during the war,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal ammunition despatched from,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Loyalists, The compensation of,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lucas, General,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Lytton, Sir E. B.,</span> +<a href="#page020">20</a>, +<a href="#page021">21</a> (notes).</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">McCallum, Sir Henry E.,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mafeking,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the rôle played by,</span> +<a href="#page179">179</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">capture of an armoured train outside,</span> +<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">relief of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mafeking Volunteers, The,</span> +<a href="#page282">282</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Magaliesberg, The,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Magersfontein,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Majuba Hill, the British defeat at,</span> +<a href="#page043">43</a>, +<a href="#page186">186</a>, +<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">evacuated by the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Malan, Commandant,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Malan, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page349">349</a>, +<a href="#page410">410</a>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Manchester, meeting at,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>, +<a href="#page257">257</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Maritzburg,</span> +<a href="#page271">271</a>, +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">public meeting at,</span> +<a href="#page249">249</a>, +<a href="#page250">250</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Martial law, declaration of in additional districts,</span> +<a href="#page411">411</a>, +<a href="#page478">478</a>, +<a href="#page482">482</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its administration,</span> +<a href="#page484">484</a>, +<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Martial Law Board, The,</span> +<a href="#page484">484</a>, +<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Massingham, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, The</span>, Captain Mahan's, +<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Merriman, J. X.</span> +<a href="#page061">61</a>, +<a href="#page069">69</a>, +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">report of his Grahamstown speech in the <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>,</span> +<a href="#page062">62</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his letter of March 11th, 1898, to President Steyn,</span> +<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page143">143</a>, +<a href="#page144">144</a>, +<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his association with the Diamond Mines at Kimberley,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his partisanship,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his desire to induce President Krüger to grant a "colourable measure of reform,"</span> +<a href="#page151">151</a>, +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span> +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his appeal to Mr. Fischer,</span> +<a href="#page161">161</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his breach with Mr. Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page376">376</a> to +<a href="#page378">378</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove,</span> +<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page391">391</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his denunciation of the policy of the Home Government,</span> +<a href="#page391">391</a>, +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">purpose of his visit to England,</span> +<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">banquet in his honour,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his frankness as to his mission,</span> +<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attack on Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Methuen, Lord, his engagements,</span> +<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">forces at his disposal,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Meyer, J. L., his views on the war,</span> +<a href="#page574">574</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Middelburg,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Middelburg Terms, The,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>, +<a href="#page554">554</a>, +<a href="#page557">557</a> (note), +<a href="#page558">558</a>, +<a href="#page559">559</a>, +<a href="#page561">561</a>, +<a href="#page562">562</a>, +<a href="#page568">568</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Military criticisms on the war,</span> +<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">"Military Notes," estimate in of Boer forces,</span> +<a href="#page181">181</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Military preparations, delay in making,</span> +<a href="#page242">242</a>, +<a href="#page243">243</a>, +<a href="#page246">246</a>, +<a href="#page250">250</a>, +<a href="#page279">279</a>, +<a href="#page288">288</a>, +<a href="#page290">290</a>, +<a href="#page309">309</a> to +<a href="#page311">311</a>, +<a href="#page316">316</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Military railways, The,</span> +<a href="#page502">502</a>, +<a href="#page532">532</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Milner, Viscount, pre-eminence of his administration in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the state of affairs he was called on to deal with,</span> +<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the political situation on his arrival in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the choice of him as High Commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his official career,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his assistance to Sir William Harcourt,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>, +<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">banquet to him,</span> +<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">extract from his speech at the banquet,</span> +<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">affection of those associated with him,</span> +<a href="#page078">78</a>, +<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his resolution,</span> +<a href="#page079">79</a>, +<a href="#page219">219</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">bitterness of Afrikanders and Boers against,</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his profound knowledge of the needs of South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">efforts of the Liberal party to revoke the final arrangements of his administration,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his arrival in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the policy of,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">travels through Cape Colony, etc.,</span> +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at Graaf Reinet,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page091">91</a>, +<a href="#page092">92</a>, +<a href="#page098">98</a>, +<a href="#page099">99</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>, +<a href="#page115">115</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his official duties,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his position in regard to the Transvaal Government,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety to arrange matters by a friendly discussion with President Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page085">85</a>, +<a href="#page086">86</a>, +<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">confidence shown him by the British population,</span> +<a href="#page086">86</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his policy with regard to the Conventions,</span> +<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page090">90</a> to +<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">travels round Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conciliatory utterances of,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to the address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander Bond,</span> +<a href="#page109">109</a> to +<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the position taken up by him towards the Cape Dutch,</span> +<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his impartiality,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">visits England,</span> +<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his grasp of the situation,</span> +<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges the British Government to put an end to an impossible position,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his farewell speech at Johannesburg,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>, +<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">endorses the petition of the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his intention to make public in England his despatch on the position of the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page139">139</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asked to meet Pres. Krüger in conference,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">warns Mr. Schreiner of the gravity of the situation,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">postponement of the publication of his despatch,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">difficulty of his position,</span> +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sounded by Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Merriman as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span> +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch of May 4th, 1899, telegraphed,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">approached by Mr. Hofmeyr as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">issue of his despatch of May 4th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>, +<a href="#page169">169</a>, +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">consults Mr. Chamberlain as to the "line" he should take at the Conference,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>, +<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of Pres. Krüger's acceptance of a conference,</span> +<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his staff,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reception at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his embarrassing position,</span> +<a href="#page169">169</a>, +<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the compromise offered by him,</span> +<a href="#page170">170</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his "inflexibility,"</span> +<a href="#page170">170</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his motive in attending the Conference,</span> +<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">address presented to him on his return from it to Capetown,</span> +<a href="#page172">172</a>, +<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">essence of his reply to the address,</span> +<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">origin of his disagreement with General Butler,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a>, +<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his desire for preparations for war,</span> +<a href="#page178">178</a>, +<a href="#page183">183</a>, +<a href="#page186">186</a>, +<a href="#page269">269</a>, +<a href="#page309">309</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his only point of agreement with General Butler,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reiterated warnings,</span> +<a href="#page189">189</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">inadequate reinforcements sent in response to his appeal,</span> +<a href="#page191">191</a>, +<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">acquiesces in the negotiations after Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page198">198</a> to +<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">support given him by Mr. Chamberlain,</span> +<a href="#page200">200</a>, +<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his interviews with Mr. Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page200">200</a>, +<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">assists the Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission,</span> +<a href="#page207">207</a>, +<a href="#page208">208</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges delay in passing the Franchise Bill through the Volksraad,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">demonstrations of confidence in his statesmanship,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his influence with the Afrikander leaders,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his opinion of the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page219">219</a>, +<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">points out to Mr. Chamberlain defects in the law,</span> +<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">prevents surrender of Home Government,</span> +<a href="#page222">222</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his resolute advocacy of the Uitlanders' cause,</span> +<a href="#page224">224</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">bitter attack on him in <span class="italic">Punch</span>,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch protesting against the readiness of the Government to accept the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page225">225</a> to +<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">further deflection of his policy,</span> +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conveys to the Pretoria Executive the offer of a joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">withdraws the limit placed by Sir Wm. Greene upon the time of the reply from the Boer Government to the British Government's despatch of September 8th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the compromise proposed by him at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety,</span> +<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asks for another military adviser,</span> +<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch explaining his position at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appeals for prompt action,</span> +<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. (now Lord) Courtney's attack on Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page252">252</a>, +<a href="#page257">257</a>, +<a href="#page258">258</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">warns the English people of the advocacy of a Dutch Republic in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">makes known to the Government the state of affairs,</span> +<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his colonial ministers,</span> +<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">support given him by the British population in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">atmosphere of intrigue by which he was surrounded,</span> +<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">abuse of him by the <span class="italic">South African News</span>,</span> +<a href="#page272">272</a>, +<a href="#page380">380</a>, +<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">passage of war material to the Orange Free State brought to his notice accidentally,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his personal charm,</span> +<a href="#page277">277</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his efforts to persuade Mr. Schreiner of the necessity of providing for the defence of Kimberley,</span> +<a href="#page278">278</a>, +<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his advice to the Cape and Home Governments,</span> +<a href="#page282">282</a>, +<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his limited powers,</span> +<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a passage in his speech in the House of Lords on February 26th, 1906,</span> +<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defensive measures devised by him,</span> +<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his use of the time elapsing between the recall of General Butler and the ultimatum</span> +<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">instructed to repudiate the claim of the South African Republic to be a sovereign international state,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his anxiety to attain a peaceful settlement,</span> +<a href="#page293">293</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives the ultimatum,</span> +<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">warns the British authorities in Natal, Rhodesia, and Basutoland,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the call upon his constructive statesmanship,</span> +<a href="#page303">303</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">consults Mr. Schreiner upon the feasibility of carrying out Sir Redvers Buller's suggestion to form local defences out of Dutch farmers,</span> +<a href="#page320">320</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his relationship with the military authorities,</span> +<a href="#page341">341</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alliance against him,</span> +<a href="#page343">343</a>, +<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">scant help afforded him by Mr. Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch telling the story of the rebellion in the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">addresses a memorandum to Lord Roberts on the rebellion in Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page351">351</a>, +<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view as to the defence of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">visits the north-midland districts of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">arrives at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives an appreciative address at Capetown,</span> +<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to the address,</span> +<a href="#page364">364</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement,</span> +<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his representation to Mr. Schreiner as to the proposed Bond congress at Somerset East,</span> +<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch covering the newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet,</span> +<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of racial relations in Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain on the questions of the compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">inquires as to the Home Government's views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">bitter invectives against him of members of the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page391">391</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">wins over Mr. Schreiner to the side of the Empire-State,</span> +<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">indicates to Mr. Chamberlain the nature of the Treason Bill,</span> +<a href="#page394">394</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">pays a brief visit to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,</span> +<a href="#page396">396</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">makes arrangements for the civil administration of Pretoria and Johannesburg,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his journey to Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">inaugurates the South African Constabulary,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives the commissions under which he is appointed to administer the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>, +<a href="#page419">419</a>, +<a href="#page470">470</a>, +<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives a deputation from the Worcester Congress,</span> +<a href="#page404">404</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply,</span> +<a href="#page406">406</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his final departure from the Cape to the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page419">419</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his objection to issuing a proclamation to the fighting burghers at the close of 1900,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">approves of Lord Kitchener's proposals,</span> +<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his account to Mr. Chamberlain of the situation on February 6th, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page436">436</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">leaves Capetown to assume administration of the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">incidents of his journey,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">discusses with Lord Kitchener the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures for peace,</span> +<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the position taken up by him,</span> +<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the sphere of his administrative activity,</span> +<a href="#page473">473</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his second visit to England,</span> +<a href="#page473">473</a>, +<a href="#page487">487</a>, +<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span> +<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">issues a notice as to acts of treason,</span> +<a href="#page480">480</a>, +<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">obtains the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reception on his second return to England,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his audience with the King,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">marks of royal favour shown to him,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>, +<a href="#page491">491</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at a luncheon given in his honour,</span> +<a href="#page492">492</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agitation for his recall,</span> +<a href="#page499">499</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">returns to Johannesburg,</span> +<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch describing affairs in November, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page503">503</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">invites Mr. E. B. Sargant to organise the work of educational reconstruction,</span> +<a href="#page520">520</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appoints commissions on the gold industry,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attention to the reorganisation of the railways,</span> +<a href="#page532">532</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges the settlement of British colonists on the land,</span> +<a href="#page538">538</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposes a loan for land settlement,</span> +<a href="#page540">540</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his tireless energy,</span> +<a href="#page541">541</a>, +<a href="#page545">545</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his proposed tax on the mining industry,</span> +<a href="#page541">541</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his telegram on the immediate financial position,</span> +<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his repatriation scheme,</span> +<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">presses for a decision on the land settlement question,</span> +<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">differs from Lord Kitchener's views upon the terms of the surrender,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>, +<a href="#page560">560</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">drafts the terms of the surrender,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>, +<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refuses the terms of the Boer Peace Commissioners,</span> +<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his care as to the English text of the Vereeniging surrender,</span> +<a href="#page560">560</a>, +<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">England's debt to him,</span> +<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">summoned to Pretoria for the signing of the treaty of peace,</span> +<a href="#page572">572</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mines Department, The, reorganisation of,</span> +<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mines, The, the project of wrecking,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">permitted to re-open,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page507">507</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">native labour for,</span> +<a href="#page509">509</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their prosperity,</span> +<a href="#page518">518</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mining plant, injury to by Boer raiders,</span> +<a href="#page438">438</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mining industry, Lord Milner's proposed 10 per cent, tax on,</span> +<a href="#page541">541</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Missionaries, The, work of,</span> +<a href="#page018">18</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mitchell, Sir Lewis,</span> +<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mobile columns, The creation of,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Modder River, Station,</span> +<a href="#page322">322</a>, +<a href="#page328">328</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Monypenny, Mr., attempt to arrest,</span> +<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Mooi River, The,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Morgendael, J.,</span> +<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br> + +<a id="morley" name="morley"></a> +<span class="min2em">Morley, John, misstatement by,</span> +<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attitude and public utterances on the war,</span> +<a href="#page252">252</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page263">263</a>, +<a href="#page314">314</a>, +<a href="#page360">360</a>, +<a href="#page370">370</a>, +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note), +<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Müller, E. B. Iwan, letter in the possession of,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his <span class="italic">Lord Milner and South Africa</span>,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Müller, G.,</span> +<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Municipal police, Organisation of,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Naauwpoort,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Namaqualand, The election for,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Napier, Sir George, his evidence before the House of Commons on Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy,</span> +<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Natal,</span> +<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a menace to,</span> +<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">public meetings in,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>, +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the invasion of,</span> +<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British forces in,</span> +<a href="#page243">243</a>, +<a href="#page246">246</a>, +<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Boer aspiration to annex,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">mobilisation of the local forces in,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">Transvaal commando sent to the border,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treatment of the rebels in,</span> +<a href="#page563">563</a>, +<a href="#page567">567</a>, +<a href="#page568">568</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Natal Ministry, The, views of on the settlement of the new colonies,</span> +<a href="#page547">547</a> to +<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">views of on disarmament and the treatment of the natives,</span> +<a href="#page549">549</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates "reciprocity" in the learned professions and civil services of the several colonies,</span> +<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">puts forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal,</span> +<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its view as to the treatment of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page568">568</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Nationalist movement, in South Africa, The,</span> +<a href="#page048">48</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">National Union, The,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Native Affairs, The Department of, in the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Natives, The, the question of arming,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the question of the franchise for,</span> +<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the treatment of,</span> +<a href="#page549">549</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Navy Contribution Bill, The,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">second reading of,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Netherlands Government, The,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">offer mediation,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Netherlands Railway, The,</span> +<a href="#page376">376</a> to +<a href="#page381">381</a>, +<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">New South Wales, offers a military contingent,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Nicholls incident, The,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a>, +<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Nicholson, Colonel,</span> +<a href="#page179">179</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Nineteenth Century, The</span>, +<a href="#page261">261</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">article by Sir Bartle Frere in,</span> +<a href="#page029">29</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Non-interference, the principle of,</span> +<a href="#page010">10</a>, +<a href="#page012">12</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Norman, The S.S.</span>, +<a href="#page247">247</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Norval's Pont,</span> +<a href="#page521">521</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Olivier, Commandant,</span> +<a href="#page287">287</a> (note), +<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Ons Land</span>, its pæan of triumph over the surrender of Jameson's troopers, +<a href="#page068">68</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">its reproof of Sir Pieter Faure,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its anti-British policy,</span> +<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its indictment of the Sprigg Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its presentation of the objects of the Afrikander party,</span> +<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its article on the Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt,</span> +<a href="#page205">205</a> to +<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur at the offices of,</span> +<a href="#page348">348</a>, +<a href="#page349">349</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its New Year exhortation,</span> +<a href="#page349">349</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its comment on the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,</span> +<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its approval of the slanders on British troops,</span> +<a href="#page403">403</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its comment on Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester Congress,</span> +<a href="#page409">409</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">libels General French,</span> +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<a id="orangefree" name="orangefree"></a> +<span class="min2em">Orange Free State, The, mineral wealth of,</span> +<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">relations of the Imperial Government to,</span> +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">its treaty of alliance with the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page104">104</a>, +<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">irritation in against British intervention,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ammunition sent to,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>, +<a href="#page247">247</a>, +<a href="#page273">273</a>, +<a href="#page286">286</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alleged movement of British troops to the border of,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the danger of a premature grant of responsible government to,</span> +<a href="#page284">284</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">decides to declare war,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts enters,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">annexation of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">invades south of Orange River,</span> +<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Landdrosts of,</span> +<a href="#page347">347</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">area enclosed by blockhouse lines,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the number of scholars on the school rolls,</span> +<a href="#page523">523</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Orange River, The,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Orange River Colony, Lord Milner arranges for the civil administration of,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.E. of,</span> +<a href="#page441">441</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span> +<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">progress of civil administration in,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>, +<a href="#page501">501</a>, +<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">grant in aid of the revenue of,</span> +<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">number of scholars on the school rolls,</span> +<a href="#page523">523</a>, +<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">revenue of,</span> +<a href="#page528">528</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">farm settlers in,</span> +<a href="#page536">536</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the settlement of,</span> +<a href="#page546">546</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">military administration in,</span> +<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">taxation of landed property in,</span> +<a href="#page566">566</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Oranjie Unie</span>, The, +<a href="#page055">55</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, The</span>, +<a href="#page049">49</a>, +<a href="#page054">54</a> (note), +<a href="#page234">234</a> to +<a href="#page236">236</a> (notes).</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Paardeberg, conduct of the attack on,</span> +<a href="#page332">332</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">surrender of Cronje at,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>, +<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Paardekraal, great assemblage of Boers at,</span> +<a href="#page197">197</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">speeches delivered at,</span> +<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pakeman, Mr., arrest of</span>, +<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Pass" system, The,</span> +<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Paul, H.,</span> +<a href="#page368">368</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Peace, Preparing for,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a> to +<a href="#page535">535</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Peace commissioners, The Boer,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Peace Committee, The,</span> +<a href="#page412">412</a>, +<a href="#page422">422</a>, +<a href="#page423">423</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">treatment of agents of,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a> to +<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its efforts,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a>, +<a href="#page429">429</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Permits, The establishment of,</span> +<a href="#page482">482</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Poplar Grove,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Port Elizabeth, Ammunition landed at,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>, +<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Portland, The (3rd) Duke of, his despatch referring to the treatment of the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pretoria, The British flag hoisted over the Raadzaal of,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a> (note), +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">war preparations at,</span> +<a href="#page234">234</a>, +<a href="#page235">235</a>, +<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ammunition sent to,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">railway communication with Delagoa Bay re-opened,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts's decision to advance on,</span> +<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his occupation of,</span> +<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner makes arrangements for the civil administration,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Burgher Peace Committee formed at,</span> +<a href="#page412">412</a>, +<a href="#page422">422</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district round,</span> +<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Lord Milner at,</span> +<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the public buildings at,</span> +<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meeting between the Boer leaders and Lords Milner and Kitchener at,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>, +<a href="#page556">556</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pretoria Convention, The,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>, +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pretoria Executive, The, attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page082">82</a>, +<a href="#page088">88</a>, +<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain's communication to on the dynamite contract,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its attempt to buy off the capitalists,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>, +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its committal to a policy of defiance,</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its negotiations with the Home Government after the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page196">196</a>, +<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its lack of good faith,</span> +<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">repudiates the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir Wm. Greene,</span> +<a href="#page238">238</a>, +<a href="#page239">239</a>, +<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">charges Sir Wm. Greene with bad faith,</span> +<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its declaration of September 15th, 1899, to Mr. Hofmeyr,</span> +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">brings negotiations to a conclusion,</span> +<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its replies to the British despatches of July 27th and May 10th,</span> +<a href="#page294">294</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pretorius, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page406">406</a>, +<a href="#page421">421</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pretyman, General,</span> +<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Price, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Prieska,</span> +<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Prinsloo, Commandant, surrender of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Pro-Boers, The manufacture of,</span> +<a href="#page434">434</a>, +<a href="#page443">443</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Proclamation to the fighting burghers, The proposed,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Programme of Principles," The Afrikander Bond,</span> +<a href="#page059">59</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Progressive Cabinet, A, formation of,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a> (note), +<a href="#page390">390</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Progressive Party, The,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>, +<a href="#page098">98</a>, +<a href="#page116">116</a>, +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the funds of;</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their strength in the Cape Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>, +<a href="#page122">122</a>, +<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">led by Sir Gordon Sprigg,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their support of Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">resolution presented to the Home Government by,</span> +<a href="#page295">295</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Punch</span>, +<a href="#page225">225</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Queen's Hall, Pro-Boer meeting in,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Queensland, offers a military contingent,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Raad, The, meeting of,</span> +<a href="#page193">193</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Racial fusion, The problem of,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Railway lines, The cutting of,</span> +<a href="#page459">459</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Railways, The, the reorganisation of,</span> +<a href="#page530">530</a>, +<a href="#page535">535</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rand, The,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>, +<a href="#page518">518</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agitation on for reform,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recommencement of the industrial life of,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page507">507</a>, +<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rebels, The, treatment of,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a> to +<a href="#page391">391</a>, +<a href="#page563">563</a>, +<a href="#page567">567</a>, +<a href="#page568">568</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their disfranchisement,</span> +<a href="#page388">388</a>, +<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">surrenders of,</span> +<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Reciprocity" between the civil services of the several colonies,</span> +<a href="#page550">550</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Redistribution Bill, The, introduction of,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">second reading of,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>, +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its effect on the British population,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Reform Committee, The,</span> +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their message to Dr. Jameson,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alteration of their plans,</span> +<a href="#page041">41</a>, +<a href="#page042">42</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Refugees, The return of,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page507">507</a>, +<a href="#page508">508</a>, +<a href="#page512">512</a>, +<a href="#page533">533</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Registration of electors, The, postponed,</span> +<a href="#page476">476</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Reichstag, The S.S.</span>, +<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Reinforcements, The, character of,</span> +<a href="#page330">330</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Reitz, F. W.,</span> +<a href="#page050">50</a>, +<a href="#page144">144</a>, +<a href="#page159">159</a>, +<a href="#page294">294</a>, +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his policy of "closer union,"</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">takes Dr. Leyds's place as State Secretary,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asserts the Sovereignty of the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page127">127</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to Mr. Chamberlain's communication on the dynamite contract,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">instructed to decline Mr. Chamberlain's request for delay in passing the Franchise Bill,</span> +<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch refusing the preferred joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">communicates to the British Government Mr. Smut's new proposals for a five years' franchise,</span> +<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatch repudiating the Smuts-Greene arrangement,</span> +<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his appeal to "Free Staters and Brother Afrikanders,"</span> +<a href="#page297">297</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Amery's meeting with him,</span> +<a href="#page300">300</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his book, <span class="italic">A Century of Wrong</span>,</span> +<a href="#page356">356</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a letter of his published by the Concessions Commission,</span> +<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Repatriation scheme, Lord Milner's,</span> +<a href="#page543">543</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Republican nationalists, The,</span> +<a href="#page259">259</a>, +<a href="#page275">275</a>, +<a href="#page282">282</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their hatred of England,</span> +<a href="#page429">429</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Republican United States of South Africa, The,</span> +<a href="#page258">258</a>, +<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Republics, The, military preparations of,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a>, +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page178">178</a>, +<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">expulsion of British subjects from,</span> +<a href="#page246">246</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">manifestoes issued by upon the outbreak of war,</span> +<a href="#page257">257</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their treatment of British residents on the declaration of war,</span> +<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">fall of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British case against,</span> +<a href="#page357">357</a> to +<a href="#page359">359</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Reserves, Insufficient supply of,</span> +<a href="#page323">323</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Retrocession, The,</span> +<a href="#page255">255</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rhodes, Cecil,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>, +<a href="#page035">35</a>, +<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his scheme of commercial federation,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>, +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his comment on Dr. Jameson's Raid,</span> +<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">actual cause of the failure of his plan,</span> +<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his methods,</span> +<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his alliance with the Afrikander Bond,</span> +<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">an incident in his political career,</span> +<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech of March 12th, 1898,</span> +<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recognised by the Bond as its enemy,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his resignation,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his return to political life,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the actual chief of the Progressives,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opposed at Barkly West,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">returned for both Barkly West and Namaqualand,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his tactics after the election following upon Sir Gordon Sprigg's dissolution of Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page122">122</a>, +<a href="#page123">123</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his interview with Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a> (note); + <span class="min1em">his anger at the impotence of England,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span> +<a href="#page479">479</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rhodesia,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>, +<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">demonstration in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship,</span> +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">organisation of the defences of,</span> +<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">warned by Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ripon, The Marquess of,</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>, +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Roberts, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">a result of his occupation of Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed to the South African command,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">strength of his force,</span> +<a href="#page322">322</a>, +<a href="#page332">332</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his despatches,</span> +<a href="#page326">326</a> to +<a href="#page328">328</a>, +<a href="#page339">339</a>, +<a href="#page341">341</a>, +<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his tactics at Paardeberg,</span> +<a href="#page332">332</a>, +<a href="#page333">333</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his alleged instructions from the Government,</span> +<a href="#page333">333</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a reply to criticism of German General Staff upon his strategy,</span> +<a href="#page334">334</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his campaign,</span> +<a href="#page343">343</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his decision to advance on Johannesburg and Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his qualities as a captain of war,</span> +<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">why he did not carry out Lord Milner's suggestion as to the defence of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his occupation of Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his enforced halt at Bloemfontein,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his approaching return to England,</span> +<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his recognition of the difficulty of the task of disarmament,</span> +<a href="#page413">413</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">relinquishes command of the forces in South Africa,</span> +<a href="#page419">419</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">agrees with Lord Milner's views on the proposed proclamation to the burghers,</span> +<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his proclamation,</span> +<a href="#page424">424</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his victories,</span> +<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sends some of the civilian population to L. Botha,</span> +<a href="#page452">452</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Robertson, Edmund, M.P.,</span> +<a href="#page417">417</a>, +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at Dundee on Oct. 16th, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page467">467</a>, +<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Robinson, J. B.,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Robinson, Sir John, his view of the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's frontier policy,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Roos Senekal, capture of documents at,</span> +<a href="#page425">425</a>, +<a href="#page426">426</a>, +<a href="#page431">431</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circular issued at,</span> +<a href="#page463">463</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rosebery Lord, his appreciation of Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page077">77</a>, +<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his support of the Government,</span> +<a href="#page264">264</a>, +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rosmead,</span> +<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Rosmead, Lord,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>, +<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his action,</span> +<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his response to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels,</span> +<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his policy,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attitude at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">intimates his wish to retire,</span> +<a href="#page074">74</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his resistance to the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize Bechuanaland,</span> +<a href="#page074">74</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">retires,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his promise to obtain reasonable reforms from. President Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Rosslyn Castle, The S.S.</span>, +<a href="#page305">305</a>.<br> + +<span class="min1em">Russia, attitude of,</span> +<a href="#page311">311</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">St. Aldwyn, Lord, his charge against members of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish Nationalists,</span> +<a href="#page465">465</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Salisbury, The (late) Marquess of,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sympathetic speech of on the Transvaal question,</span> +<a href="#page228">228</a>, +<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his answer to the charge of "military unpreparedness,"</span> +<a href="#page265">265</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives "peace overtures,"</span> +<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply,</span> +<a href="#page357">357</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his indignant comment on the attitude of the Liberal leaders,</span> +<a href="#page416">416</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his charge against Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman,</span> +<a href="#page466">466</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Salisbury Cabinet, The, reluctance of to push matters to an extremity,</span> +<a href="#page176">176</a>, +<a href="#page188">188</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its disregard of Lord Wolseley's advice,</span> +<a href="#page177">177</a>, +<a href="#page188">188</a>, +<a href="#page189">189</a>, +<a href="#page190">190</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its decision as to reinforcements,</span> +<a href="#page190">190</a>, +<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the course it decided to adopt,</span> +<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its weakness,</span> +<a href="#page223">223</a>, +<a href="#page224">224</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">determines to make a definite announcement of its South African policy;</span> +<a href="#page228">228</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">position taken up by it,</span> +<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its last effort to come to a friendly understanding,</span> +<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its despatch of Sept, 8th, 1899,</span> +<a href="#page241">241</a>, +<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">decides to raise the strength of the Natal and Cape forces,</span> +<a href="#page242">242</a>, +<a href="#page243">243</a>, +<a href="#page246">246</a>, +<a href="#page250">250</a>, +<a href="#page279">279</a>, +<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its reluctance to make war,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">patriotism of,</span> +<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Afrikander leaders' view of,</span> +<a href="#page274">274</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">decides to mobilise an army corps,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its military action,</span> +<a href="#page309">309</a>, +<a href="#page310">310</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its alleged instructions to Lord Roberts,</span> +<a href="#page333">333</a>, +<a href="#page334">334</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its decision as to the Conventions,</span> +<a href="#page360">360</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sand River Convention, The,</span> +<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Sir George Grey's exposure of,</span> +<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sannah's Post,</span> +<a href="#page363">363</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sargant, E. B., his story of the educational efforts during the war,</span> +<a href="#page520">520</a> to +<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sauer, Hans,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sauer, J. W., joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his sympathy with the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his mission to Dordrecht,</span> +<a href="#page287">287</a> (note), +<a href="#page379">379</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his breach with Mr. Schreiner,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics,</span> +<a href="#page376">376</a>, +<a href="#page377">377</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove,</span> +<a href="#page379">379</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his connection with Mr. Hargrove,</span> +<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his declaration when opposing the second reading of the Treason Bill,</span> +<a href="#page396">396</a>, +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">purpose of his visit to England,</span> +<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">banquet in his honour,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his frankness as to his mission,</span> +<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Scheepers,</span> +<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br> + +<a id="schreinercabinet" name="schreinercabinet"></a> +<span class="min2em">Schreiner Cabinet, The,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>, +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page141">141</a>, +<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Bond Members of,</span> +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its desire to prevent British intervention,</span> +<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its "planks,"</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Te Water correspondence,</span> +<a href="#page162">162</a> to +<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its opinion of Pres. Krüger's franchise proposals,</span> +<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">uses its influence to assist the Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its refusal to call out the local forces,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a> to +<a href="#page283">283</a>, +<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refuses aid to Mafeking and Kimberley,</span> +<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its demise,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>, +<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">individual views of the members on the treatment of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page390">390</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Schreiner-Bond coalition, The,</span> +<a href="#page098">98</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Olive,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Philip, adopted as the parliamentary leader by the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">moves a vote of "no confidence" in the Sprigg Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his electoral utterances,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">forms a ministry,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">warned by Lord Milner of the gravity of the situation,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his blind partisanship for the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page142">142</a>, +<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his relationship to Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his history,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his regard for the British Empire,</span> +<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his reply to a question of Mr. Chamberlain's,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander nationalists,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span> +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives warning telegrams from England,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>, +<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">writes a confidential letter to President Steyn,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the influence which he used with the Transvaal Government,</span> +<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of Krüger's acceptance of a conference,</span> +<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his solicitude to attend the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his partisanship on the question of the franchise,</span> +<a href="#page198">198</a>, +<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">informed of the Home Governments' intention to "complete" the Cape Garrison,</span> +<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view of the grant of a limited franchise to the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>, +<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his position,</span> +<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his declaration as to the attitude he would assume in the event of war,</span> +<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his knowledge of the Port Elizabeth ammunition for the Free State,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his benediction of Pres. Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the Volksraad's proposals,</span> +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his complex political creed,</span> +<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his resistance to Lord Milner's plans of local military preparation,</span> +<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recedes from his standpoint of neutrality,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a>, +<a href="#page344">344</a>, +<a href="#page345">345</a>, +<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is prevailed on to call out the Kimberley volunteers,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his final concession,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">fails to provide Kimberley with arms,</span> +<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">consents to the proclamation of martial law,</span> +<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">scant help afforded by him to Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">uses his influence for the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,</span> +<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is brought into conflict with the Bond members of his Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views upon the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on rebels,</span> +<a href="#page385">385</a>, +<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his sense of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign,</span> +<a href="#page392">392</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his support of the Treason Bill,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Theophilus,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Schutte, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Science of Rebellion, The</span>, +<a href="#page431">431</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Seale-Hayne, M.P., Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Select Committee on British South Africa, The proceedings of, extract from,</span> +<a href="#page146">146</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Settlement after the War, The</span>, +<a href="#page214">214</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Settlement of the new colonies, The, the question of,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page564">564</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em">Seventeen, The Chamber of,</span> +<a href="#page003">3</a>, +<a href="#page004">4</a>, +<a href="#page005">5</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Shaw, M.P., Thomas,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his speech at Galashiels on October 14th, 1901,</span> +<a href="#page467">467</a>, +<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sherman, General,</span> +<a href="#page451">451</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Showers, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Silberbauer, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Simon's Bay,</span> +<a href="#page057">57</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Slaghter's Nek, the "rebellion" of,</span> +<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Slaves, The emancipation of in Cape Colony,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Smalldeel,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Smartt, Dr.,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Smuts, J. C.,</span> +<a href="#page152">152</a>, +<a href="#page159">159</a>, +<a href="#page204">204</a>, +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note), +<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed State Attorney,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attends the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">report in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of a conversation with,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is entrusted with the projected destruction of the mines,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">furnishes an explanatory memorandum of the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">offers Sir William Greene a simplified seven years' franchise in lieu of a joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>, +<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his attempt to disown the arrest of Mr. Pakeman,</span> +<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his words at Vereeniging on May 30th, 1902,</span> +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene through him,</span> +<a href="#page309">309</a>, +<a href="#page310">310</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>, +<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his suggestion as to a "formal clause" in the draft Vereeniging agreement,</span> +<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the origin of the war,</span> +<a href="#page574">574</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Solomon, Saul,</span> +<a href="#page147">147</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Solomon, Sir R.,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">accepts office under the Schreiner Ministry as Attorney-General,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page144">144</a>, +<a href="#page147">147</a>, +<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his distrust of Rhodes,</span> +<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span> +<a href="#page361">361</a>, +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">visits the north-midland districts of the Cape with Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page390">390</a>, +<a href="#page393">393</a>, +<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his support of the Treason Bill,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed Legal Adviser to the New Transvaal administration,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">help afforded by him to Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page515">515</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his energy and capacity,</span> +<a href="#page527">527</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">presides over a commission on the gold industry,</span> +<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">assists Lord Milner in the draft of the terms of the Vereeniging surrender,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>, +<a href="#page558">558</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Somerset East, Annual Congress at,</span> +<a href="#page374">374</a>.<br> + +<a id="southafrica" name="southafrica"></a> +<span class="min2em">South Africa, failure of British administration in,</span> +<a href="#page001">1</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">population of European descent in,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">British treatment of the natives and Dutch in,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the first effort to introduce a large British population,</span> +<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">public interest in,</span> +<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">ultimate control of British policy in,</span> +<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the decision of cardinal questions dealing with its administration,</span> +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Dutch population of,</span> +<a href="#page043">43</a>, +<a href="#page046">46</a>, +<a href="#page049">49</a>, +<a href="#page098">98</a>, +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Dutch view of the nationalist movement in,</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">before and after the Jameson Raid,</span> +<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">as Lord Milner found it,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attempts to secure the reunion of under the British flag,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British cause in,</span> +<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reinforcement of the British garrison in,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">aspirations of the Dutch in,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">despondency of the British population,</span> +<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">result of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference on the British population,</span> +<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">moral weakness of England's position in,</span> +<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">approval of Lord Milner's policy by the British population,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">dismay of the British population as the Imperial Governments' reported acceptance of the franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">performance of the British Army in,</span> +<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers of the British Army in on April 1st, 1900,</span> +<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers of the British population in who served,</span> +<a href="#page324">324</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the task of subduing the entire Dutch population of,</span> +<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">loyalists in,</span> +<a href="#page447">447</a>, +<a href="#page448">448</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist population of,</span> +<a href="#page464">464</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">South Africa: A Study, etc.</span>, +<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Constabulary, inauguration of,</span> +<a href="#page397">397</a>, +<a href="#page530">530</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">expenses of,</span> +<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">composition of,</span> +<a href="#page531">531</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Garrison, The,</span> +<a href="#page178">178</a>, +<a href="#page190">190</a>, +<a href="#page309">309</a>, +<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African League, The,</span> +<a href="#page096">96</a>, +<a href="#page133">133</a>, +<a href="#page212">212</a> (note), +<a href="#page374">374</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Nationality, The, the creation of,</span> +<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">South African News, The</span>, +<a href="#page225">225</a>, +<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its abuse of Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page272">272</a>, +<a href="#page391">391</a>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its charge against British soldiers,</span> +<a href="#page402">402</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Republics, The attempt to bring them into a federal system under the British Crown,</span> +<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their relations with the British Government,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their military preparations,</span> +<a href="#page166">166</a>, +<a href="#page167">167</a>, +<a href="#page178">178</a>, +<a href="#page181">181</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Settlement, The, debate on in the House of Commons,</span> +<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African Unity, The goal of,</span> +<a href="#page065">65</a>, +<a href="#page066">66</a>, +<a href="#page069">69</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South African War, The Great, events which culminated in,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>, +<a href="#page188">188</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">South Central Africa,</span> +<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br> + +<a id="sprigg" name="sprigg"></a> +<span class="min2em">Sprigg, Sir Gordon,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>, +<a href="#page280">280</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page094">94</a>, +<a href="#page096">96</a>, +<a href="#page097">97</a>, +<a href="#page124">124</a>, +<a href="#page217">217</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">his regard for British interests,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his relations with Cecil Rhodes,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the attempt to prevent him from attending the Colonial Conference of 1897,</span> +<a href="#page094">94</a>, +<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">resolves to bring forward a Redistribution Bill,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appeals to the electorate,</span> +<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">defeat of his Ministry,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">leads the Progressives in opposition,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">becomes Premier,</span> +<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">is at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government,</span> +<a href="#page473">473</a>, +<a href="#page485">485</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his view as to the prorogation of Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page482">482</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his loyal co-operations with the Imperial authorities,</span> +<a href="#page485">485</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">replies to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,</span> +<a href="#page500">500</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Springs,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Standerton,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Star, The</span> (Johannesburg), +<a href="#page145">145</a> (note), +<a href="#page245">245</a>, +<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Statham, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Stead, W. T.,</span> +<a href="#page075">75</a>, +<a href="#page357">357</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Steenekamp, Mrs. Anna E.,</span> +<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Steyn, Marthinus,</span> +<a href="#page070">70</a>, +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his agency in the matter of the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Merriman's letter to him with reference to "a colourable measure of reform" in the Transvaal,</span> +<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">accepts the rôle of peace-maker,</span> +<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">asks the Cape Premier to ascertain Lord Milner's willingness to meet Pres. Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page154">154</a>, +<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">formal acceptance of his invitation to the Bloemfontein Conference,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his replies to Dr. Te Water's letters,</span> +<a href="#page162">162</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his willingness to take part in the Conference,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his evening reception on the opening day of the Conference,</span> +<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">inquires as to movements of British troops,</span> +<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his pledge that Cape Colony should not be invaded,</span> +<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his commandos,</span> +<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the ultimatum submitted for his approval,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his misgivings,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">receives an appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers,</span> +<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">declares war,</span> +<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his "peace overtures,"</span> +<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the guerilla war,</span> +<a href="#page414">414</a>, +<a href="#page415">415</a>, +<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circulates utterances of the leaders of the Liberal Opposition,</span> +<a href="#page468">468</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">consults with Schalk Burger as to peace,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span> +<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his negotiations,</span> +<a href="#page553">553</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>, +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his inability to sign the agreement,</span> +<a href="#page567">567</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Stop-the-war Committee, The,</span> +<a href="#page368">368</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Stormberg,</span> +<a href="#page321">321</a>, +<a href="#page348">348</a>, +<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span> +<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Story of an African Farm, The</span>, +<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Strydom, the Boer,</span> +<a href="#page427">427</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Studenten Blad</span>, The, of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, +<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Sud Africaan</span>, The, +<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sunnyside,</span> +<a href="#page472">472</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Swaziland border, The, the question of,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Swaziland Convention, The,</span> +<a href="#page087">87</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Sydney, Public meeting at,</span> +<a href="#page250">250</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Symons, General,</span> +<a href="#page319">319</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">"Taal," The, preservation of,</span> +<a href="#page547">547</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Tembuland border, The, advance of the Boers to,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Schreiner's action with reference to,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>, +<a href="#page282">282</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Tembus, The,</span> +<a href="#page281">281</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">"Terms of Surrender," The, communicated to the Boer Commissioners,</span> +<a href="#page563">563</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the draft agreement of,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Terrorism and deceit, A system of,</span> +<a href="#page425">425</a>, +<a href="#page426">426</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Te Water, Dr.,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>, +<a href="#page094">94</a>, +<a href="#page142">142</a>, +<a href="#page150">150</a>, +<a href="#page154">154</a>, +<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">resignation of,</span> +<a href="#page095">95</a>, +<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his faithfulness to the Bond,</span> +<a href="#page162">162</a>, +<a href="#page163">163</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">advocates amnesty for the rebels,</span> +<a href="#page392">392</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Te Water Correspondence, The,</span> +<a href="#page156">156</a>, +<a href="#page162">162</a> to +<a href="#page166">166</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Theron, T. P.,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">opposes the Redistribution Bill,</span> +<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">declines to meet the peace delegates,</span> +<a href="#page475">475</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Thomas, C. H.,</span> +<a href="#page049">49</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Three Years War, The</span>, +<a href="#page433">433</a> (note), +<a href="#page570">570</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">extract from,</span> +<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Times, The</span>, +<a href="#page261">261</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">report of a conversation with Mr. Smuts,</span> +<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reproduces Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with its correspondent,</span> +<a href="#page221">221</a>, +<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">letter of Sir Wm. Harcourt to,</span> +<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">report of a speech by Mr. Morley,</span> +<a href="#page371">371</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">protest in of "an old Berliner,"</span> +<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Transkei, The,</span> +<a href="#page486">486</a>.<br> + +<a id="transvaal" name="transvaal"></a> +<span class="min2em">Transvaal, The, Sir Bartle Frere's visit to in</span> 1879, +<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">restoration of the Boer Republic in,</span> +<a href="#page030">30</a>, +<a href="#page031">31</a>, +<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the English of,</span> +<a href="#page042">42</a>, +<a href="#page043">43</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">mineral wealth of,</span> +<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Afrikander Bond in,</span> +<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Cape,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">attempts to secure Bechuanaland,</span> +<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">position of the British population in,</span> +<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">race oligarchy in,</span> +<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">more hopeful situation in,</span> +<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the position in Feb., 1898,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the question of reform in,</span> +<a href="#page105">105</a>, +<a href="#page106">106</a>, +<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">unprogressiveness of,</span> +<a href="#page112">112</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">progress of armament in,</span> +<a href="#page125">125</a>, +<a href="#page158">158</a>, +<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its communications with the paramount power,</span> +<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reliance of on the Orange Free State,</span> +<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the position of British residents in,</span> +<a href="#page130">130</a>, +<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">presentation of the petition of the British residents,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">our stand against Dutch tyranny in,</span> +<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">alleged conspiracy against,</span> +<a href="#page212">212</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Morley's statement as to the annexation of,</span> +<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">commandos ordered to take up their position on the Natal border,</span> +<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">flight of the British population from,</span> +<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">entered by the Natal Field Force,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">annexation of,</span> +<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.W. of,</span> +<a href="#page441">441</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span> +<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">area enclosed by blockhouse lines,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">progress of civil administration in,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page525">525</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of,</span> +<a href="#page490">490</a>, +<a href="#page501">501</a>, +<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">grant in aid of the revenues of,</span> +<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">area held,</span> +<a href="#page505">505</a>, +<a href="#page506">506</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">mineral wealth of unaffected by the war,</span> +<a href="#page514">514</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">extent of its mineral wealth,</span> +<a href="#page519">519</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">number of children educated in the camps in,</span> +<a href="#page523">523</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the revenue of,</span> +<a href="#page528">528</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the settlement of,</span> +<a href="#page546">546</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">military administration in,</span> +<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">taxation of landed property in,</span> +<a href="#page566">566</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Transvaal from Within, The</span>, +<a href="#page131">131</a> (note), +<a href="#page264">264</a>, +<a href="#page274">274</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Transvaal question, The, debated in both Houses of Parliament,</span> +<a href="#page228">228</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Treason Bill, The,</span> +<a href="#page394">394</a> to +<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the support given to it by Mr. Schreiner and Sir R. Solomon,</span> +<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the debates on,</span> +<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the lenient penalties of,</span> +<a href="#page480">480</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Tugela, The, General Buller's attempt to force the passage,</span> +<a href="#page306">306</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Uitlander Council, The,</span> +<a href="#page211">211</a>, +<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its view of the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its disappointment with the announcement that the law is acceptable to the Imperial Government,</span> +<a href="#page222">222</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Uitlanders, The, a five years' franchise advocated for,</span> +<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the enfranchisement of,</span> +<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their "admitted grievances,"</span> +<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">confirmation of their complaints,</span> +<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Krüger's determination to increase their disabilities,</span> +<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their petition,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">postponement of the publication of Lord Milner's despatch dealing with their grievances,</span> +<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">formal acceptance of,</span> +<a href="#page155">155</a>, +<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">General Butler's view of their grievances,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their claim for enfranchisement,</span> +<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">granted a limited franchise,</span> +<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their view of the measure,</span> +<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">petitions to the Queen for justice to,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their detailed criticism of the new franchise law,</span> +<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the British Government's view of the concessions made to them,</span> +<a href="#page229">229</a>, +<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">outrageous treatment of,</span> +<a href="#page244">244</a>, +<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">espionage on,</span> +<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">their return,</span> +<a href="#page489">489</a>, +<a href="#page507">507</a>, +<a href="#page508">508</a>, +<a href="#page512">512</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Ultimatum, The,</span> +<a href="#page246">246</a>, +<a href="#page253">253</a> to +<a href="#page299">299</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the day on which it expired,</span> +<a href="#page279">279</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">submitted to Pres. Steyn for his approval,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">recast by Mr. Fischer,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">delay in presenting,</span> +<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">delivered to Sir Wm. Greene,</span> +<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reaches Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reaches the Colonial Office,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">reply of Her Majesty's Government,</span> +<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its effect on Lord Milner,</span> +<a href="#page342">342</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its effect on the British people,</span> +<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Unionist leaders, The, and Lord Milner's administration,</span> +<a href="#page081">81</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Union Jack, The, hissed,</span> +<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">United States of America, The, attitude of towards Great Britain during the war,</span> +<a href="#page264">264</a>, +<a href="#page312">312</a>, +<a href="#page313">313</a>, +<a href="#page314">314</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Upington Ministry, The,</span> +<a href="#page060">60</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Upington, Sir Thomas,</span> +<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">resignation of,</span> +<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Vaal River, The,</span> +<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Valley of Light, The,</span> +<a href="#page340">340</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vandam, Captain,</span> +<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Van Riebeck, Commander, The diary of,</span> +<a href="#page002">2</a>, +<a href="#page003">3</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the Dutch E. India Co's instructions to as to the treatment of natives in S. Africa,</span> +<a href="#page005">5</a>, +<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vereeniging,</span> +<a href="#page555">555</a>, +<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts's words at on May 30th, 1902,</span> +<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the surrender of,</span> +<a href="#page303">303</a>, +<a href="#page359">359</a>, +<a href="#page433">433</a>, +<a href="#page454">454</a> (note), +<a href="#page536">536</a> to +<a href="#page583">583</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">two and a half years after,</span> +<a href="#page449">449</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">signing of the Terms of Surrender,</span> +<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">difference between Lord Milner's and Lord Kitchener's views as to the Terms of Surrender,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">circumstances under which the negotiations originated,</span> +<a href="#page551">551</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the three proposals put forward by the Boer leaders,</span> +<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Article X, of the Terms of Surrender,</span> +<a href="#page559">559</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts's suggestion as to a "formal clause,"</span> +<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the draft agreement telegraphed to England,</span> +<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its wording,</span> +<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the signature of,</span> +<a href="#page567">567</a>, +<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its terms compared with the Middelburg terms,</span> +<a href="#page568">568</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">acceptation of the British terms,</span> +<a href="#page571">571</a>, +<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">generosity of the terms,</span> +<a href="#page580">580</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">leniency of the terms,</span> +<a href="#page581">581</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">immediate effect of the terms,</span> +<a href="#page583">583</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Victoria, offers a military contingent,</span> +<a href="#page251">251</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Victoria, Queen, presentation of the second petition to,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>, +<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">petitions to for justice to the Uitlanders,</span> +<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">proposed letter to from Krüger,</span> +<a href="#page376">376</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">death of,</span> +<a href="#page481">481</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vigilance Committee, The,</span> +<a href="#page500">500</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Viljoen, General, a telegram to,</span> +<a href="#page426">426</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Volksblad</span>, The, +<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Volksraad, The, discusses the question of accepting the joint inquiry,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">refuses it,</span> +<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vosloo, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Vossische Zeitung</span>, The, +<a href="#page399">399</a> (note), +<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vryburg division, the return of representatives for,</span> +<a href="#page121">121</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Vryburg, goes over to the Boers,</span> +<a href="#page280">280</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Walrond, M. S. O.,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Walter, M. P. C.,</span> +<a href="#page213">213</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">War Commission, The,</span> +<a href="#page318">318</a>, +<a href="#page319">319</a> (note), +<a href="#page324">324</a> (note);<br> + <span class="min1em">General Sir Wm. Butler's evidence before,</span> +<a href="#page175">175</a> (note), +<a href="#page181">181</a> to +<a href="#page183">183</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">War, Declaration of,</span> +<a href="#page297">297</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the first days of,</span> +<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the conduct of,</span> +<a href="#page316">316</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">area of the country over which it was waged,</span> +<a href="#page326">326</a>, +<a href="#page339">339</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">difficulties of carrying on,</span> +<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">general conclusions arising from the events, and military criticisms on,</span> +<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the unnecessary prolongation of,</span> +<a href="#page360">360</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">economic consequences of,</span> +<a href="#page439">439</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">moral effect of its recrudescence,</span> +<a href="#page440">440</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">method of waging it,</span> +<a href="#page450">450</a> to +<a href="#page453">453</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">War in South Africa, The Official History of</span>, vol. i. p. 309 (note) <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br> + +<span class="min2em italic">War in South Africa, The</span>, Sir Conan Doyle's, +<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">War Office, The, efficiency of,</span> +<a href="#page339">339</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Watson, Dr. Spence,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Webb, Mr., arrest of,</span> +<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wessels, Andries,</span> +<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wessels, C. J.,</span> +<a href="#page260">260</a>, +<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">White, Montagu,</span> +<a href="#page232">232</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">White, Sir George, shut up in Ladysmith,</span> +<a href="#page320">320</a>, +<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Willcocks, Sir William, his report on irrigation,</span> +<a href="#page516">516</a> to +<a href="#page518">518</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Williams, Colonel Hanbury,</span> +<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Willoughby, Sir John,</span> +<a href="#page044">44</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wilson, H. F. C.,</span> +<a href="#page515">515</a>, +<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wilson, M.P., H. J.,</span> +<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br> + +<span class="min2em">Witwatersrand Gold Mines, The,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>, +<a href="#page031">31</a>, +<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Witwatersrand, The, Krüger raises the Vier-kleur on,</span> +<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wodehouse,</span> +<a href="#page346">346</a>, +<a href="#page379">379</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wodehouse, Sir Philip,</span> +<a href="#page275">275</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wolmarans, A. D.,</span> +<a href="#page168">168</a>, +<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wolseley, Lord, his advice to the Salisbury Cabinet,</span> +<a href="#page177">177</a>, +<a href="#page188">188</a>, +<a href="#page190">190</a>, +<a href="#page309">309</a>, +<a href="#page322">322</a>, +<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">his task,</span> +<a href="#page317">317</a>, +<a href="#page318">318</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Woolls-Sampson, Col. Sir Aubrey,</span> +<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">forms the Imperial Light Horse,</span> +<a href="#page179">179</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Worcester Advertiser, The</span>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">its charge against British soldiers,</span> +<a href="#page400">400</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Worcester Conference, The,</span> +<a href="#page395">395</a>, +<a href="#page403">403</a>, +<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">the resolutions of,</span> +<a href="#page405">405</a>, +<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">a fatal result of,</span> +<a href="#page412">412</a>;<br> + <span class="min1em">representations of its delegates to the Liberal party,</span> +<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wybergh, Mr.,</span> +<a href="#page515">515</a>, +<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Wylant, the 'Sick-Comforter,'</span> +<a href="#page003">3</a>.</p> + +<p class="p2"> +<span class="min2em">Zeerust,</span> +<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em italic">Zuid Africaan</span>, The, articles in, +<a href="#page063">63</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Zulus, The, military power of,</span> +<a href="#page025">25</a>, +<a href="#page026">26</a>.<br> + +<span class="min2em">Zululand, a portion of transferred to Natal,</span> +<a href="#page550">550</a>.</p> +</div> + + + +<p class="p4 italic">Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</p> + +<div class="p4 footnote"> +<p><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1"></a> +<strong>Footnote 1:</strong> The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses had been +wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60 waggons, 5,715 +horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and 161,930 sheep had been +carried off by the Kafirs. And this apart from the remuneration +claimed by the settlers for services in the field, and commandeered +cattle and supplies.<a href="#footnotetag1"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2"></a> +<strong>Footnote 2:</strong> Cloete. See note, p. 16.<a href="#footnotetag2"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3"></a> +<strong>Footnote 3:</strong> For the benefit of those who may desire to read the +passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append the +references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five Lectures on +the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered before the Natal +Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A reprint of this work was +published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir John Robinson's opinion, which +endorses the views of Mrs. Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in +<span class="italic">The Cape Monthly Magazine</span> for September, 1876, is to be found at pp. +46, 47 of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).<a href="#footnotetag3"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4"></a> +<strong>Footnote 4:</strong> Cetewayo.<a href="#footnotetag4"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5"></a> +<strong>Footnote 5:</strong> Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B. Lytton.<a href="#footnotetag5"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6"></a> +<strong>Footnote 6:</strong> Sir E. B. Lytton.<a href="#footnotetag6"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7"></a> +<strong>Footnote 7:</strong> Chaka.<a href="#footnotetag7"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8"></a> +<strong>Footnote 8:</strong> The receipt of the despatch in which these valuable +recommendations were made was not even acknowledged by the Colonial +Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of his proposals in an +article published in <span class="italic">The Nineteenth Century</span> for February, 1881.<a href="#footnotetag8"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9"></a> +<strong>Footnote 9:</strong> The Crown Colony—not the Protectorate—annexed by the +Cape Colony in 1895.<a href="#footnotetag9"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10"></a> +<strong>Footnote 10:</strong> Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> +the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see it taken up in +the House of Commons on one side or the other, not from any real +interest in the question, but simply because of its consequences to +those occupying the Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing +Street in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a +self-governing colony."<a href="#footnotetag10"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11"></a> +<strong>Footnote 11:</strong> June, 1894.<a href="#footnotetag11"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12"></a> +<strong>Footnote 12:</strong> January 28th, 1895.<a href="#footnotetag12"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13"></a> +<strong>Footnote 13:</strong> It is worth noticing that even the presence of the +German Marines at Delagoa Bay was counterbalanced—whether by chance +or design—by the coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship +with time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.<a href="#footnotetag13"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14"></a> +<strong>Footnote 14:</strong> Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.<a href="#footnotetag14"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15"></a> +<strong>Footnote 15:</strong> "John Bull & Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.<a href="#footnotetag15"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16"></a> +<strong>Footnote 16:</strong> "This is our Afrikander character. The descendants of +Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen inter-married, and are only known at +present by their surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and +call themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more Hollanders +than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. They have their own language, +own morals and customs; they are just as much a nation as any +other."—<span class="italic">De Patriot</span>, in the course of an article headed "A Common +but Dangerous Error"—the error in question being the assertion that +"the Cape Colony is an English colony" (translated and reproduced in +<span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, September 3th, 1884).<a href="#footnotetag16"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17"></a> +<strong>Footnote 17:</strong> Quoted by Du Toit in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>: translation from the +English reprint of <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>.<a href="#footnotetag17"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18"></a> +<strong>Footnote 18:</strong> Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free State, and +State-Secretary of the South African Republic in succession to Dr. +Leyds.<a href="#footnotetag18"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19"></a> +<strong>Footnote 19:</strong> P. 64 <span class="italic">et seq.</span> of <span class="italic">The Origin of the Anglo-Boer War +Revealed</span> (Hodder & Stoughton).<a href="#footnotetag19"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20"></a> +<strong>Footnote 20:</strong> Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer +population is organised in the Transvaal into <span class="italic">Het Volk</span>, and in the +Orange River Colony into the <span class="italic">Oranjie Unie</span>; both practically +identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.<a href="#footnotetag20"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21"></a> +<strong>Footnote 21:</strong> Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first leaf torn) +containing an English translation of <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>, p. 8.<a href="#footnotetag21"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22"></a> +<strong>Footnote 22:</strong> <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>, pp. 7 and 8.<a href="#footnotetag22"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23"></a> +<strong>Footnote 23:</strong> <span class="italic">Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches.</span> By +Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.<a href="#footnotetag23"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24"></a> +<strong>Footnote 24:</strong> <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr himself, +and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond, published a pæan of +triumph over the surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at Doornkop. +"Afrikanderdom has awakened to a sense of earnestness which we have +not observed since the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the +Limpopo, as far as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a +new inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South +Africa.... The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had already begun +to dilute and weaken our national blood, gradually turned aside before +the new current that permeated our people.... Now or never the +foundation of a wide-embracing nationalism must be laid.... The +partition wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a +policy of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the +psychological moment has arrived; now our people have awakened all +over South Africa; a new glow illumines our hearts; let us lay the +foundation-stone of a real United South Africa on the soil of a pure +and all-comprehensive national sentiment."<a href="#footnotetag24"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25"></a> +<strong>Footnote 25:</strong> 1896.<a href="#footnotetag25"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26"></a> +<strong>Footnote 26:</strong> Mr. Bodley, in his <span class="italic">Coronation of King Edward VII.</span>, +remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected during the +mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at that time (1902) +"attained eminence in any branch of public life." These three were Mr. +H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord +Milner.<a href="#footnotetag26"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27"></a> +<strong>Footnote 27:</strong> The incident is otherwise interesting as affording the +first sign of that confidence of the British population in Lord +Milner, which, steadily increasing as the final and inevitable +struggle approached, earned for him at length the unfaltering support +of British South Africa. After the Rand celebrations were over, he was +informed that his advice had been put into effect with "very +considerable difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: +"The new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look to +him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we do this, let +us obey him in a matter like this."<a href="#footnotetag27"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28"></a> +<strong>Footnote 28:</strong> Apart from the question of the validity of the preamble +to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two Conventions—the London +Convention (1884), and the Swaziland Convention (1894)—were in force +between the South African Republic and Great Britain. The relations of +the Imperial Government to the Free State were regulated by the +Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand River +Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's time.<a href="#footnotetag28"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29"></a> +<strong>Footnote 29:</strong> These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson and +Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to sign the petition of +appeal—an act of submission which President Krüger required of the +Johannesburg Reformers, before he released them from Pretoria gaol. +They did so on the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself +responsible for their safety; since they and the other Reformers, with +the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their arms on the faith of +Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would obtain reasonable reforms +from President Krüger for the Uitlanders.<a href="#footnotetag29"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30"></a> +<strong>Footnote 30:</strong> In the question of the Swaziland border, the affair of +Bunu, and the continued and increasing ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, +the Boer Government manifested its old spirit of aggression and +duplicity. All these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and +wearisome negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled +firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly +discussion.<a href="#footnotetag30"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote31" name="footnote31"></a> +<strong>Footnote 31:</strong> This short despatch has been given practically <span class="italic">in +extenso</span>. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it was +communicated to the Press some three months after it had been +received.<a href="#footnotetag31"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote32" name="footnote32"></a> +<strong>Footnote 32:</strong> By August the South African garrison had been raised to +the very moderate strength of rather more than 8,000 troops.<a href="#footnotetag32"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote33" name="footnote33"></a> +<strong>Footnote 33:</strong> Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister of the +Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his presence rendered +any the less desirable by the fact that Sir Henry de Villiers, the +Chief Justice, was also attending the Jubilee in England.<a href="#footnotetag33"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote34" name="footnote34"></a> +<strong>Footnote 34:</strong> The Schreiner Ministry.<a href="#footnotetag34"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote35" name="footnote35"></a> +<strong>Footnote 35:</strong> There appears to have been some question as to whether +the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to introduce the +proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or in 1898. Chief Justice +de Villiers held that the latter date was contemplated by the +President. But the point is immaterial, since President Krüger denied +in the Volksraad, after the dismissal of Mr. Kotzé, that he had ever +given an undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody +else.<a href="#footnotetag35"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote36" name="footnote36"></a> +<strong>Footnote 36:</strong> <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>, March 4th, 1898.<a href="#footnotetag36"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote37" name="footnote37"></a> +<strong>Footnote 37:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag37"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote38" name="footnote38"></a> +<strong>Footnote 38:</strong> He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship by Dr. +Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a Progressive, and at the +same time Sir Thomas Upington, who had resigned from ill-health, was +succeeded by Mr. T. Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.<a href="#footnotetag38"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote39" name="footnote39"></a> +<strong>Footnote 39:</strong> These were prisoners taken in the suppression of the +revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.<a href="#footnotetag39"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote40" name="footnote40"></a> +<strong>Footnote 40:</strong> The little group of six, of which Sir James Innes was +the head—including Sir R. Solomon and four others—voted <span class="italic">with</span> the +Ministry for the Redistribution Bill, but <span class="italic">against</span> it on the "no +confidence" motion (with the exception of Sir James himself). Also one +moderate Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the +Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.<a href="#footnotetag40"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote41" name="footnote41"></a> +<strong>Footnote 41:</strong> Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a candidate +financed from Pretoria.<a href="#footnotetag41"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote42" name="footnote42"></a> +<strong>Footnote 42:</strong> As translated in <span class="italic">South Africa</span>, October 15th, 1898.<a href="#footnotetag42"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote43" name="footnote43"></a> +<strong>Footnote 43:</strong> In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39 Progressive +members were returned. A very careful and reliable calculation showed +that, of an aggregate of 82,304 votes polled, 44,403 were cast for +Progressive, and 37,901 for Afrikander candidates. More than this, +while no Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than +137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective majorities, of +two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives, therefore, were entitled, on +their aggregate vote, to a majority of six.<a href="#footnotetag43"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote44" name="footnote44"></a> +<strong>Footnote 44:</strong> Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord Milner +for the purpose of laying his views before him. But, it is said, the +unwonted sternness of the Governor's expression at once convinced him +of the hopelessness of his mission; and he withdrew without any +attempt to argue his case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal +magnetism, the incident is not without significance.<a href="#footnotetag44"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote45" name="footnote45"></a> +<strong>Footnote 45:</strong> Both sides were one short of their full strength, but a +Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was chosen Speaker of the +House.<a href="#footnotetag45"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote46" name="footnote46"></a> +<strong>Footnote 46:</strong> The second reading of the Navy Contribution Bill, giving +effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was carried on December 2nd, +1898, without a division.<a href="#footnotetag46"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote47" name="footnote47"></a> +<strong>Footnote 47:</strong> The State-Secretaryship was offered first to Mr. Abraham +Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was declined (<span class="italic">Memoirs of Paul +Krüger</span>, vol. ii., p. 297). The Cape Afrikanders desired the +appointment of Mr. Smuts.<a href="#footnotetag47"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote48" name="footnote48"></a> +<strong>Footnote 48:</strong> On May 7th, 1897, President Krüger had formally +requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at issue +between the two Governments under the Convention to be submitted to +the arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic. To this +proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on October 10th, that the +relationship of Great Britain to the South African Republic being that +of a suzerain Power, it would be impossible for the Imperial +Government to permit the intervention of a foreign Power. On April +16th, 1898, in a despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly, +President Krüger claims that the South African Republic is an +independent State, and denies the existence of any "suzerainty" on the +part of Great Britain. In forwarding this despatch Lord Milner made +the apposite comment that the propriety of employing the term +suzerainty to express the rights possessed by Great Britain is an +"etymological question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December +15th, accepts President Krüger's declaration that he is willing to +abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim of +suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and demands the +immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch of May 9th, 1899, +Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a sovereign international +State"; and on June 13th Mr. Chamberlain replies that he has no +intention of continuing the discussion.<a href="#footnotetag48"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote49" name="footnote49"></a> +<strong>Footnote 49:</strong> Owing to a slight affection of the eye.<a href="#footnotetag49"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote50" name="footnote50"></a> +<strong>Footnote 50:</strong> "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a British subject +named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his own house by a Boer +policeman. Edgar, who was a man of singularly fine physique, and both +able and accustomed to take care of himself, was returning home at +about midnight, when one of three men standing by, who, as it +afterwards transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive +remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other +insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the police, and +Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few yards off. There was no +attempt at concealment or escape; Edgar was an old resident and +perfectly well known. Four policemen came.... The fact, however, upon +which all witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door, +Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a word of +English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic English, Scotch, +and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped him dead in the arms of +his wife, who was standing in the passage a foot or so behind +him."—<span class="smcap">FitzPatrick's</span> <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>.<a href="#footnotetag50"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote51" name="footnote51"></a> +<strong>Footnote 51:</strong> For particulars of these events the reader is referred +to <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>.<a href="#footnotetag51"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote52" name="footnote52"></a> +<strong>Footnote 52:</strong> The petition, with its 21,684 signatures, reached Lord +Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the British Agent at +Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by the High Commissioner to +England in the mail of March 29th. The same ship, the <span class="italic">Carisbrook +Castle</span>, carried Dr. Leyds, who was returning to Europe after a visit +to Pretoria. Sir W. Greene had returned to South Africa in the same +ship with Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government +Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing Transvaal +matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February 19th.<a href="#footnotetag52"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote53" name="footnote53"></a> +<strong>Footnote 53:</strong> C. 9,345.<a href="#footnotetag53"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote54" name="footnote54"></a> +<strong>Footnote 54:</strong> C. 9,345. See forward, p. <a href="#page155">155</a>.<a href="#footnotetag54"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote55" name="footnote55"></a> +<strong>Footnote 55:</strong> See p. <a href="#page125">125</a>.<a href="#footnotetag55"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote56" name="footnote56"></a> +<strong>Footnote 56:</strong> <span class="italic">The Johannesburg Star</span>, April 1st, 1905.<a href="#footnotetag56"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote57" name="footnote57"></a> +<strong>Footnote 57:</strong> Proceedings of the Select Committee on British South +Africa (Q. 4,385).<a href="#footnotetag57"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote58" name="footnote58"></a> +<strong>Footnote 58:</strong> For the position of Great Britain from the point of view +of international law see some remarks in the note on page <a href="#page580">580</a> (Chapter +XII.).<a href="#footnotetag58"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote59" name="footnote59"></a> +<strong>Footnote 59:</strong> See pp. <a href="#page061">61</a>, <a href="#page069">69</a>, and <a href="#page093">93</a>.<a href="#footnotetag59"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote60" name="footnote60"></a> +<strong>Footnote 60:</strong> Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to Mr. Fischer +at p. <a href="#page161">161</a>.<a href="#footnotetag60"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote61" name="footnote61"></a> +<strong>Footnote 61:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag61"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote62" name="footnote62"></a> +<strong>Footnote 62:</strong> Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p. <a href="#page162">162</a>, where +this letter is given.<a href="#footnotetag62"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote63" name="footnote63"></a> +<strong>Footnote 63:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag63"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote64" name="footnote64"></a> +<strong>Footnote 64:</strong> Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.<a href="#footnotetag64"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote65" name="footnote65"></a> +<strong>Footnote 65:</strong> C. 9,345.<a href="#footnotetag65"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote66" name="footnote66"></a> +<strong>Footnote 66:</strong> All these letters are in Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag66"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote67" name="footnote67"></a> +<strong>Footnote 67:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag67"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote68" name="footnote68"></a> +<strong>Footnote 68:</strong> Mr. Hofmeyr.<a href="#footnotetag68"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote69" name="footnote69"></a> +<strong>Footnote 69:</strong> The original of this letter is now in the possession of +Mr. E. B. Iwan Müller, by whom it was published in his work, <span class="italic">Lord +Milner and South Africa</span>. The translation is that of the Department of +Military Intelligence.<a href="#footnotetag69"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote70" name="footnote70"></a> +<strong>Footnote 70:</strong> 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one year after +the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he (then A.D.C. to Lord +Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up the British flag over the +Raadzaal at Pretoria.<a href="#footnotetag70"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote71" name="footnote71"></a> +<strong>Footnote 71:</strong> Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).<a href="#footnotetag71"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote72" name="footnote72"></a> +<strong>Footnote 72:</strong> Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at 8.30 a.m. +on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein punctually at 5 p.m. on +Tuesday. Here he was met by President Steyn and various officials of +the Free State; and an address of welcome was presented to him by the +Mayor of Bloemfontein upon his arrival at the private house which had +been provided for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven +o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the High +Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was introduced by Mr. +Steyn to President Krüger, Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The +first meeting of the Conference took place in the afternoon at 2.30, +in the new offices of the Railway Department. In the evening a largely +attended reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krüger +was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an hour. The +Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June 5th, and Lord +Milner then paid a farewell visit to President Steyn. The High +Commissioner's special train left Bloemfontein on the following +morning at 10.30, and reached Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of +Wednesday, the 7th, where he was received by a large crowd, including +three of the Cape Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of +Parliament. President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday +morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything possible for +the comfort and convenience of his state guest during the week that he +was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings of the Conference, with the High +Commissioner's report upon them, are published in C. 9,404.<a href="#footnotetag72"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote73" name="footnote73"></a> +<strong>Footnote 73:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag73"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote74" name="footnote74"></a> +<strong>Footnote 74:</strong> Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag74"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote75" name="footnote75"></a> +<strong>Footnote 75:</strong> See p. <a href="#page319">319</a> (note 2).<a href="#footnotetag75"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote76" name="footnote76"></a> +<strong>Footnote 76:</strong> Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag76"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote77" name="footnote77"></a> +<strong>Footnote 77:</strong> War Commission, Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag77"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote78" name="footnote78"></a> +<strong>Footnote 78:</strong> This was precisely the <span class="italic">rôle</span> played by Mafeking, only +defensively, not offensively.<a href="#footnotetag78"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote79" name="footnote79"></a> +<strong>Footnote 79:</strong> Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).<a href="#footnotetag79"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote80" name="footnote80"></a> +<strong>Footnote 80:</strong> These were the figures of the D. M. I. "Military Notes" +of June, 1898; in the revised "Military Notes" of June, 1899, the +estimated total of the Boer force was considerably greater—some +50,000 exclusive of colonial rebels.<a href="#footnotetag80"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote81" name="footnote81"></a> +<strong>Footnote 81:</strong> All of these extracts will be found in Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag81"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote82" name="footnote82"></a> +<strong>Footnote 82:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag82"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote83" name="footnote83"></a> +<strong>Footnote 83:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag83"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote84" name="footnote84"></a> +<strong>Footnote 84:</strong> Three battalions, 6 guns, and a company of Royal +Engineers were all the troops available for the defence of the Cape +frontiers at this time (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> June).<a href="#footnotetag84"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote85" name="footnote85"></a> +<strong>Footnote 85:</strong> Most of these came by mail boats on July 18th and 25th. +Col. Baden-Powell (who was entrusted with the important duty of +organising a force for the defence of Southern Rhodesia, and +subsequently of raising the mounted infantry corps which held +Mafeking) arrived on the latter date.<a href="#footnotetag85"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote86" name="footnote86"></a> +<strong>Footnote 86:</strong> Expressing approval of the position Lord Milner had +taken up at Bloemfontein. See p. <a href="#page173">173</a>.<a href="#footnotetag86"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote87" name="footnote87"></a> +<strong>Footnote 87:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag87"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote88" name="footnote88"></a> +<strong>Footnote 88:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag88"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote89" name="footnote89"></a> +<strong>Footnote 89:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag89"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote90" name="footnote90"></a> +<strong>Footnote 90:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag90"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote91" name="footnote91"></a> +<strong>Footnote 91:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag91"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote92" name="footnote92"></a> +<strong>Footnote 92:</strong> <span class="italic">E.g.</span> Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of Commons +that the object of the despatch of the special service officers, and +the small additions of engineers and artillery was "to complete the +existing garrison." The purchase of transport, he said, had been long +ago decided upon.<a href="#footnotetag92"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote93" name="footnote93"></a> +<strong>Footnote 93:</strong> Under State-Secretary of the Transvaal.<a href="#footnotetag93"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote94" name="footnote94"></a> +<strong>Footnote 94:</strong> Article on "The Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt" +in <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, of July 11th, 1899, as reproduced in the <span class="italic">South African +News</span> of the same date. This account of Mr. Hofmeyr's proceedings is +presumed to have been published with his approval. C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag94"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote95" name="footnote95"></a> +<strong>Footnote 95:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag95"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote96" name="footnote96"></a> +<strong>Footnote 96:</strong> Then Mr. Conyngham Greene.<a href="#footnotetag96"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote97" name="footnote97"></a> +<strong>Footnote 97:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag97"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote98" name="footnote98"></a> +<strong>Footnote 98:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag98"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote99" name="footnote99"></a> +<strong>Footnote 99:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag99"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote100" name="footnote100"></a> +<strong>Footnote 100:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag100"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote101" name="footnote101"></a> +<strong>Footnote 101:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag101"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote102" name="footnote102"></a> +<strong>Footnote 102:</strong> On May 15th, 1899—<span class="italic">i.e.</span> a fortnight before the +Bloemfontein Conference met—five persons alleged to be British +subjects were arrested on a warrant, signed by Mr. Smuts as +State-Attorney, on a charge of high treason. All of them, except one +man—Nicholls, who was innocent—were agents of the secret service. +The statement that the men were ex-British officers, and that one of +them alleged that he was acting under direct instructions from the War +Office, was disseminated through the Press by the Transvaal +Government, with the object of discrediting (1) the South African +League, and (2) the British Government, in the eyes of the civilised +world. The whole of the alleged "conspiracy against the independence +of the Republic," thanks to the endurance of Nicholls and the +persistence of the Imperial authorities in South Africa, was shown to +be the work of the Transvaal police, favoured by the negligence or +political bad faith of certain Government officials. The prosecution +was abandoned on July 25th. Mr. Duxbury, the counsel for the defence +retained by the British Government, in reviewing the case and the +proceedings, wrote (August 9th): "It seems abundantly clear, from all +the facts which have come to light, that the whole of this disgraceful +prosecution found its inception in the minds of Mr. Schutte, the +Commissioner of Police, and Acting Chief Detective Beatty.... I must +direct your attention to the very grave accusation contained in Thomas +Dashwood Bundy's affidavit against Mr. Tjaart Krüger. This gentleman +is the son of President Krüger, and is the Chief of the Secret Service +department of this State." And of Mr. Smuts he writes: "I believe he +was deceived by the detectives, and yet at the same time I fail to +understand why, in a matter of such-magnitude, he allowed himself to +sign warrants for the arrest of persons charged with such a serious +crime as high treason on the strength of an affidavit signed by a +detective, who, on the very day such affidavit was signed, had been +denounced by the Chief Justice from the Bench of the High Court as a +perjurer." C. 9,521 (which contains a full record of the whole +affair).<a href="#footnotetag102"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote103" name="footnote103"></a> +<strong>Footnote 103:</strong> The words are quoted by Mr. M. P. C. Walter, the +editor, in a letter of protest published in the Transvaal <span class="italic">Leader</span> of +July 7th, 1899. C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag103"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote104" name="footnote104"></a> +<strong>Footnote 104:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag104"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote105" name="footnote105"></a> +<strong>Footnote 105:</strong> <span class="italic">The Settlement after the War</span>, p. 218.<a href="#footnotetag105"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote106" name="footnote106"></a> +<strong>Footnote 106:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag106"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote107" name="footnote107"></a> +<strong>Footnote 107:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department. The telegrams +thus referred to, in this and the following chapter, have not been +published in the Blue-Books. They were published, however, in <span class="italic">The +Times History of the War</span>. Their authenticity is undoubted. Sir Gordon +Sprigg had held a conversation with the Governor on the 13th.<a href="#footnotetag107"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote108" name="footnote108"></a> +<strong>Footnote 108:</strong> Mr. Fischer was still at Pretoria. C. 9, 415.<a href="#footnotetag108"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote109" name="footnote109"></a> +<strong>Footnote 109:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag109"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote110" name="footnote110"></a> +<strong>Footnote 110:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag110"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote111" name="footnote111"></a> +<strong>Footnote 111:</strong> On July 31st, Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag111"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote112" name="footnote112"></a> +<strong>Footnote 112:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag112"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote113" name="footnote113"></a> +<strong>Footnote 113:</strong> August 23rd, C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag113"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote114" name="footnote114"></a> +<strong>Footnote 114:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag114"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote115" name="footnote115"></a> +<strong>Footnote 115:</strong> "The Uitlander Council is keenly disappointed at the +<span class="italic">Times</span>' announcement that the seven years' franchise is acceptable to +the Imperial Government. We fear few will accept the franchise on this +condition, so the result is not likely to abate unrest and discontent, +nor redress pressing grievances. Such a settlement would not even +approximate to the conditions obtaining in the Orange Free State and +the [British] colonies, and would fail to secure the recognition of +the principle of racial equality. We earnestly implore you not to +depart from the High Commissioner's five years' compromise, which the +Uitlanders accepted with great reluctance. The absolute necessity for +a satisfactory settlement with an Imperial guarantee is emphasised by +the insincerity and bad faith persistently shown during the Volksraad +discussion of the Franchise Law."—C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag115"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote116" name="footnote116"></a> +<strong>Footnote 116:</strong> The English outward mail-boat arrived on Tuesday, and +the homeward boat left on Wednesday.<a href="#footnotetag116"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote117" name="footnote117"></a> +<strong>Footnote 117:</strong> Sir W. Greene became a K.C.B. after the war had broken +out.<a href="#footnotetag117"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote118" name="footnote118"></a> +<strong>Footnote 118:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag118"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote119" name="footnote119"></a> +<strong>Footnote 119:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag119"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote120" name="footnote120"></a> +<strong>Footnote 120:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag120"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote121" name="footnote121"></a> +<strong>Footnote 121:</strong> See p. <a href="#page218">218</a> for this letter.<a href="#footnotetag121"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote122" name="footnote122"></a> +<strong>Footnote 122:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag122"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote123" name="footnote123"></a> +<strong>Footnote 123:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag123"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote124" name="footnote124"></a> +<strong>Footnote 124:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag124"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote125" name="footnote125"></a> +<strong>Footnote 125:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag125"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote126" name="footnote126"></a> +<strong>Footnote 126:</strong> It was known to the Intelligence Department that +Krüger's secret agents had been in the Cape Colony for two years +before the outbreak of war, and that they had distributed arms in +certain districts of the Colony.<a href="#footnotetag126"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote127" name="footnote127"></a> +<strong>Footnote 127:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag127"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote128" name="footnote128"></a> +<strong>Footnote 128:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag128"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote129" name="footnote129"></a> +<strong>Footnote 129:</strong> The expression "Ons wil nou Engelse schiet" was +actually used. See Thomas's <span class="italic">Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed</span>, +p. 110.<a href="#footnotetag129"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote130" name="footnote130"></a> +<strong>Footnote 130:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag130"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote131" name="footnote131"></a> +<strong>Footnote 131:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag131"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote132" name="footnote132"></a> +<strong>Footnote 132:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag132"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote133" name="footnote133"></a> +<strong>Footnote 133:</strong> Then Mr. Conyngham Greene. C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag133"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote134" name="footnote134"></a> +<strong>Footnote 134:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag134"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote135" name="footnote135"></a> +<strong>Footnote 135:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag135"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote136" name="footnote136"></a> +<strong>Footnote 136:</strong> The despatch was presented to the British Agent, and +telegraphed, through the High Commissioner, to the Home Government. +Its diplomatic ambiguity was due to Mr. Fischer's influence.<a href="#footnotetag136"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote137" name="footnote137"></a> +<strong>Footnote 137:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag137"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote138" name="footnote138"></a> +<strong>Footnote 138:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag138"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote139" name="footnote139"></a> +<strong>Footnote 139:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag139"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote140" name="footnote140"></a> +<strong>Footnote 140:</strong> The despatch of 2,000 additional troops to Natal had +been sanctioned on August 2nd, in response to the earnest appeal of +the Natal Government. Hence at this time there were (roughly) 12,000 +Imperial troops in South Africa. It is noticeable that, although the +despatch only reached Lord Milner on the morning of the 9th, the <span class="italic">Cape +Argus</span> had contained a telegram, giving an account of the troops +warned in India and England, on the evening of the 8th.<a href="#footnotetag140"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote141" name="footnote141"></a> +<strong>Footnote 141:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag141"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote142" name="footnote142"></a> +<strong>Footnote 142:</strong> Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag142"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote143" name="footnote143"></a> +<strong>Footnote 143:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag143"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote144" name="footnote144"></a> +<strong>Footnote 144:</strong> This despatch was received on September 8th. Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag144"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote145" name="footnote145"></a> +<strong>Footnote 145:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag145"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote146" name="footnote146"></a> +<strong>Footnote 146:</strong> Received on September 6th. Cd. 44.<a href="#footnotetag146"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote147" name="footnote147"></a> +<strong>Footnote 147:</strong> Cd. 18.<a href="#footnotetag147"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote148" name="footnote148"></a> +<strong>Footnote 148:</strong> p. 251.<a href="#footnotetag148"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote149" name="footnote149"></a> +<strong>Footnote 149:</strong> Cd. 420. The Blue-book points out that in the original +"a well-known nick-name" is used for Mr. S. J. du Toit.<a href="#footnotetag149"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote150" name="footnote150"></a> +<strong>Footnote 150:</strong> As reported by Reuter.<a href="#footnotetag150"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote151" name="footnote151"></a> +<strong>Footnote 151:</strong> Cd. 420.<a href="#footnotetag151"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote152" name="footnote152"></a> +<strong>Footnote 152:</strong> Published in <span class="italic">The Times</span>, September 30th, 1899.<a href="#footnotetag152"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote153" name="footnote153"></a> +<strong>Footnote 153:</strong> In <span class="italic">The Nineteenth Century</span> for that month.<a href="#footnotetag153"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote154" name="footnote154"></a> +<strong>Footnote 154:</strong> <span class="italic">The Times</span>, December 15th. Mr. Bryce was taking the +chair at the last of a series of six lectures on "England in South +Africa," given by the present writer in the great hall of the (then) +Imperial Institute.<a href="#footnotetag154"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote155" name="footnote155"></a> +<strong>Footnote 155:</strong> <span class="italic">Cornhill Magazine</span>, July, 1900. "The South African +Policy of Sir Bartle Frere." By W. Basil Worsfold.<a href="#footnotetag155"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote156" name="footnote156"></a> +<strong>Footnote 156:</strong> The reader is referred to p. 5 in Chap. I. for the +racial characteristics of the South African Dutch, and to the note on +p. 48 in Chap. II. for the political significance of the word +"Afrikander," as stated by Mr. S. J. du Toit.<a href="#footnotetag156"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote157" name="footnote157"></a> +<strong>Footnote 157:</strong> See letters between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner in +Cd. 43, p. 13.<a href="#footnotetag157"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote158" name="footnote158"></a> +<strong>Footnote 158:</strong> Psalm xxii. 12.<a href="#footnotetag158"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote159" name="footnote159"></a> +<strong>Footnote 159:</strong> <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>, p. 287.<a href="#footnotetag159"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote160" name="footnote160"></a> +<strong>Footnote 160:</strong> This document was among those secured by the +Intelligence Department, and published in <span class="italic">The Times History of the +War</span>.<a href="#footnotetag160"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote161" name="footnote161"></a> +<strong>Footnote 161:</strong> See p. <a href="#page077">77</a>.<a href="#footnotetag161"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote162" name="footnote162"></a> +<strong>Footnote 162:</strong> In the House of Assembly, August 28th.<a href="#footnotetag162"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote163" name="footnote163"></a> +<strong>Footnote 163:</strong> One of the earliest measures of precaution which Lord +Milner desired was a plan for the defence of Kimberley. But when, on +June 12th, the people of Kimberley requested the Government of the +Colony to take steps for the protection of their town, the reply which +they received, through the Civil Commissioner, was this: "There is no +reason whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is, or in any +contemplated event will be, in danger of attack, and Mr. Schreiner is +of opinion that your fears are groundless and your anticipations +without foundation."<a href="#footnotetag163"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote164" name="footnote164"></a> +<strong>Footnote 164:</strong> September 24th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag164"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote165" name="footnote165"></a> +<strong>Footnote 165:</strong> This was on October 11th, 1899—the day on which the +ultimatum expired.<a href="#footnotetag165"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote166" name="footnote166"></a> +<strong>Footnote 166:</strong> Sir Gordon Sprigg—Mr. Schreiner's Ministry was +replaced by a Progressive Ministry in June, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag166"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote167" name="footnote167"></a> +<strong>Footnote 167:</strong> With this may be compared the fact that in Natal the +whole of the local forces were mobilised on September 29th for active +service. The dates upon which further units of the Cape local forces +were called out are as follows: Uitenhage Rifles and Komgha Mounted +Rifles, November 10th; Cape Medical Staff Corps, November 16th; and +Frontier Mounted Rifles, November 24th.<a href="#footnotetag167"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote168" name="footnote168"></a> +<strong>Footnote 168:</strong> The Kimberley and Mafeking Volunteers were called out +at the last moment, but actually before the war broke out; but the +safety of both these places was imperilled by the refusal, or delay, +of the colonial Government to supply them with guns.<a href="#footnotetag168"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote169" name="footnote169"></a> +<strong>Footnote 169:</strong> Mr. Fischer. See forward, p. <a href="#page291">291</a>.<a href="#footnotetag169"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote170" name="footnote170"></a> +<strong>Footnote 170:</strong> Kimberley.<a href="#footnotetag170"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote171" name="footnote171"></a> +<strong>Footnote 171:</strong> <span class="italic">The Times</span>, February 27th, 1906.<a href="#footnotetag171"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote172" name="footnote172"></a> +<strong>Footnote 172:</strong> Mr. J. W. Sauer. The reference is (in Lord Milner's +words) to Mr. Sauer's "well-meant but unsuccessful mission to +Dordrecht, which was immediately followed by rebellion in that +district." The facts, as fully disclosed a year later, are these. On +November 23rd, 1899, Mr. Sauer held a meeting at Dordrecht to dissuade +the Dutch subjects of the Crown in the Wodehouse Division of the +Colony from joining in the rebellion. As the result of this meeting a +deputation was sent to the Commandant of the Boer invading-force, +Olivier, who was at Barkly East, desiring him not to come to +Dordrecht. On November 27th another meeting was held (also addressed +by Mr. Sauer) and a second deputation of the inhabitants waited upon +Olivier. The sequel is revealed in the telegram despatched the +following day (November 28th) by the Boer Commandant to the Secretary, +the War Commission, Bloemfontein: "... To-day already I received the +second deputation from Dordrecht not to come to Dordrecht. This is +asked officially, but privately they say that this is also a blind, +and that we must come at once...." On December 2nd Olivier was +received with open arms at Dordrecht. It was in a district where, in +the Boer Commandant's words, "the Afrikanders were rejoicing, and +joining the commandos was universal."—Cd. 420, p. 108 and p. 96; Cd. +43, p. 221; and Cd. 261, p. 126.<a href="#footnotetag172"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote173" name="footnote173"></a> +<strong>Footnote 173:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag173"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote174" name="footnote174"></a> +<strong>Footnote 174:</strong> <span class="italic">Times</span> correspondent and editor of <span class="italic">The Times History +of the War</span>. Mr. Amery arrived at the Cape in the second week of +September, and was at Pretoria from September 24th to October 13th.<a href="#footnotetag174"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote175" name="footnote175"></a> +<strong>Footnote 175:</strong> Secured by Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag175"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote176" name="footnote176"></a> +<strong>Footnote 176:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag176"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote177" name="footnote177"></a> +<strong>Footnote 177:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag177"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote178" name="footnote178"></a> +<strong>Footnote 178:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag178"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote179" name="footnote179"></a> +<strong>Footnote 179:</strong> Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag179"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote180" name="footnote180"></a> +<strong>Footnote 180:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag180"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote181" name="footnote181"></a> +<strong>Footnote 181:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag181"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote182" name="footnote182"></a> +<strong>Footnote 182:</strong> <span class="italic">Times History of the War in South Africa</span>, vol. i., p. +360. It must be remembered that in the Transvaal all telegrams had +been strictly censored from the end of August.<a href="#footnotetag182"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote183" name="footnote183"></a> +<strong>Footnote 183:</strong> This chapter was in type some weeks before Vol. I. of +the Official History of the War was published. Where, however, the +Official History amends or supplements figures, documents, etc., given +in earlier official publications, the fact is mentioned in a +foot-note.<a href="#footnotetag183"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote184" name="footnote184"></a> +<strong>Footnote 184:</strong> See p. <a href="#page191">191</a>.<a href="#footnotetag184"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote185" name="footnote185"></a> +<strong>Footnote 185:</strong> Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official <span class="italic">History of +the War in South Africa</span> gives the total on August 2nd as "not +exceeding 9,940 men."<a href="#footnotetag185"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote186" name="footnote186"></a> +<strong>Footnote 186:</strong> Cd. 1,789. But the Official History gives the British +total at the outbreak of war as 27,054 men (as against over 50,000 +burghers); of whom 15,811 (including 2,781 local troops) were in +Natal, 5,221 regulars and 4,574 local troops were in the Cape Colony, +and 1,448 men, raised locally by Col. Baden-Powell, were in Mafeking +and Southern Rhodesia.<a href="#footnotetag186"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote187" name="footnote187"></a> +<strong>Footnote 187:</strong> But the Admiralty were given details of the offensive +force on September 20th. (<span class="italic">Official History.</span>)<a href="#footnotetag187"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote188" name="footnote188"></a> +<strong>Footnote 188:</strong> Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.<a href="#footnotetag188"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote189" name="footnote189"></a> +<strong>Footnote 189:</strong> Nor was the Intelligence Department less urgent than +Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899], earlier warnings being +disregarded, a formal communication was made for the consideration of +the Cabinet, advising the despatch of a large force fully equipped, +estimated to be sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the +first onrush of the Boers."—Sir John Ardagh, in <span class="italic">The Balfourian +Parliament</span>, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the evidence +of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes" issued by the D. M. I. +in June (1899).<a href="#footnotetag189"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote190" name="footnote190"></a> +<strong>Footnote 190:</strong> In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to Gen. +Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting for Natal, gives +as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of the situation" the +following remark: "1. Ever since I have been here we have been like +the man, who, with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and +so was late for everything all day." (<span class="italic">Official History</span>, p. 209.)<a href="#footnotetag190"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote191" name="footnote191"></a> +<strong>Footnote 191:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag191"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote192" name="footnote192"></a> +<strong>Footnote 192:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag192"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote193" name="footnote193"></a> +<strong>Footnote 193:</strong> See returns cited by Lord Roberts in House of Lords, +February 27th, 1906. The irregulars <span class="italic">raised</span> in South Africa were +between 50,000 and 60,000, according to the <span class="italic">War Commission Report</span>.<a href="#footnotetag193"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote194" name="footnote194"></a> +<strong>Footnote 194:</strong> November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.<a href="#footnotetag194"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote195" name="footnote195"></a> +<strong>Footnote 195:</strong> November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.<a href="#footnotetag195"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote196" name="footnote196"></a> +<strong>Footnote 196:</strong> February 6th, 1900. Capetown.<a href="#footnotetag196"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote197" name="footnote197"></a> +<strong>Footnote 197:</strong> Lord Roberts had asked Col. Baden-Powell how long he +could hold out at Mafeking, and then promised that the relief of the +town should be effected within the required period.<a href="#footnotetag197"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote198" name="footnote198"></a> +<strong>Footnote 198:</strong> One fighting British general stated that one of the +first stage force was equal to five of the men supplied after the +reserves had been used up in April, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag198"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote199" name="footnote199"></a> +<strong>Footnote 199:</strong> For the direct part played by the Liberal leaders in +the production of this ignorance, see p. <a href="#page256">256</a>.<a href="#footnotetag199"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote200" name="footnote200"></a> +<strong>Footnote 200:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span>, <span class="italic">less</span> troops for lines of communication. Lord +Roberts's force was 36,000, the Army Corps was 47,000.<a href="#footnotetag200"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote201" name="footnote201"></a> +<strong>Footnote 201:</strong> Any reader desiring to learn the particulars of this +struggle is referred to the pages of the writer's <span class="italic">The Valley of +Light: Studies with Pen and Pencil in the Vaudois Valleys of +Piedmont</span>. (Macmillan, 1899). It may be added that Napoleon manifested +a keen interest in the military details of the engagements between the +French and Savoyard troops and the Vaudois. As regards the number of +combatants on the Boer side. Lord Kitchener puts the total (from first +to last) at 95,000 (Cd. 1790, p. 13). The <span class="italic">Official History</span>, however, +gives, as the result of an elaborate calculation, 87,365 (Vol. I. App. +4).<a href="#footnotetag201"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote202" name="footnote202"></a> +<strong>Footnote 202:</strong> Cd. 264 (Despatch of January 16th, 1900).<a href="#footnotetag202"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote203" name="footnote203"></a> +<strong>Footnote 203:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag203"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote204" name="footnote204"></a> +<strong>Footnote 204:</strong> At the time of the Bechuanaland Expedition (1884-5), +when the writer was in South Africa, "a controversy was seriously +maintained between the two moderate Afrikander journals, the <span class="italic">Sud +Africaan</span> and the <span class="italic">Volksblad</span>, on the question whether the Imperial +Government had, or had not, the right to send troops through the +Colony, without the consent of the Colonial Ministry. In commenting +upon this question a correspondent wrote in the <span class="italic">Patriot</span>, the extreme +organ of the Afrikanders: 'I believe the <span class="italic">Volksblad</span> is correct in +maintaining that England has that right. But if England has the right +to send <span class="italic">Rooibaatjes</span> (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> British soldiers) to kill my brethren in +the Transvaal, then I have also the right to try and prevent the same. +My brother is nearer than England. England can send troops, but +whether they will all arrive safely in Stellaland—that stands to be +seen.'"—<span class="italic">A History of South Africa</span>, by the writer. (Dent, 1900.)<a href="#footnotetag204"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote205" name="footnote205"></a> +<strong>Footnote 205:</strong> Despatch dated "Government House, Bloemfontein, March +15th, 1900."<a href="#footnotetag205"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote206" name="footnote206"></a> +<strong>Footnote 206:</strong> Cd. 35.<a href="#footnotetag206"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote207" name="footnote207"></a> +<strong>Footnote 207:</strong> Mr. Reitz's work was translated into English by Mr. W. +T. Stead.<a href="#footnotetag207"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote208" name="footnote208"></a> +<strong>Footnote 208:</strong> Cd. 109.<a href="#footnotetag208"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote209" name="footnote209"></a> +<strong>Footnote 209:</strong> The Unionist party was returned to power with a +slightly decreased majority—130 as against 150. But this loss of +seats was counterbalanced by the consideration that it is unusual for +the same Government to be entrusted with a second period of office by +a democratic electorate.<a href="#footnotetag209"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote210" name="footnote210"></a> +<strong>Footnote 210:</strong> A suburb of Capetown.<a href="#footnotetag210"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote211" name="footnote211"></a> +<strong>Footnote 211:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag211"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote212" name="footnote212"></a> +<strong>Footnote 212:</strong> Mr. Morley has the doubtful merit of consistency. As +recently as April 27th, 1906, he alluded to the South African War as +"that delusive and guilty war," in an address to the Eighty Club. +According to <span class="italic">The Times</span> report this expression was received with +cheers.<a href="#footnotetag212"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote213" name="footnote213"></a> +<strong>Footnote 213:</strong> It may perhaps be objected that some credit should have +been allowed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in view of the fact that +a sum of £41,807,400 was voted in Committee of Supply in the House of +Commons for military requirements, practically without discussion, +within four and a half hours on June 19th, 1900. This objection is +answered by the words used by the Duke of Devonshire on the same day: +"I am afraid I must tell Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that he is not +likely to receive from us any recognition, either effusive or +otherwise, of the patriotism of his party. It is quite true that, as +he took credit to himself and his friends, they have not offered any +opposition to our demands for supplies or to the military measures +which it has been found necessary for the Government to take; but the +reason for that prudent abstinence is not very far to seek. Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman and his friends knew very well that any factious +opposition to the granting of these supplies would have brought down +upon them the almost unanimous condemnation of the whole people; and +Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is much too shrewd and sensible a man to +risk the danger of committing for his party an act of political +suicide."—Address to Women's Liberal Unionist Association.<a href="#footnotetag213"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote214" name="footnote214"></a> +<strong>Footnote 214:</strong> June 26th, 1880, C. 2,655.<a href="#footnotetag214"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote215" name="footnote215"></a> +<strong>Footnote 215:</strong> See p. <a href="#page349">349</a>.<a href="#footnotetag215"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote216" name="footnote216"></a> +<strong>Footnote 216:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag216"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote217" name="footnote217"></a> +<strong>Footnote 217:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag217"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote218" name="footnote218"></a> +<strong>Footnote 218:</strong> Cd. 624. The memorandum also noted that the £1,000 was +"paid at request of F. W. Reitz" (the State Secretary). In the +Concessions Commission the following letter is published:</p> + +<p class="right"> + "<span class="smcap">Government Offices, Pretoria.</span><br> + <span class="italic">7 April, 1899.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">To van Kretschmar van Veen, Esq.</span>,<br> + <span class="add2em smcap">Director of the N.Z.A. Ry. Co.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Hon'd. Sir</span>,—With reference to a letter of his Excellency the +Ambassador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr. Statham and the +latter's request for an assistance of £300 for furniture and such +like, I have the honour to inform you confidentially that the +Executive Council has resolved to grant this gentleman Statham an +amount of £150. As, according to previous agreement, a yearly +allowance is paid to Mr. Statham by your Company, I have the honour to +request you kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted +him. His Excellency the Ambassador is likewise being informed of this +decision of the Executive Council.—I have, etc.,</p> + +<p class="right"> + <span class="smcap">J. W. Reitz</span>, <span class="italic">State Secretary</span>."<br> + (Q. 608.)</p> + +<p>Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor to those +Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer cause. His allowance, +however, had ceased before the war broke out.<a href="#footnotetag218"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote219" name="footnote219"></a> +<strong>Footnote 219:</strong> In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For the +circumstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the occasion +mentioned see note, p. <a href="#page287">287</a>.<a href="#footnotetag219"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote220" name="footnote220"></a> +<strong>Footnote 220:</strong> As reported in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag220"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote221" name="footnote221"></a> +<strong>Footnote 221:</strong> See p. <a href="#page477">477</a>.<a href="#footnotetag221"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote222" name="footnote222"></a> +<strong>Footnote 222:</strong> Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag222"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote223" name="footnote223"></a> +<strong>Footnote 223:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag223"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote224" name="footnote224"></a> +<strong>Footnote 224:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag224"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote225" name="footnote225"></a> +<strong>Footnote 225:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag225"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote226" name="footnote226"></a> +<strong>Footnote 226:</strong> <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>, August 23rd, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag226"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote227" name="footnote227"></a> +<strong>Footnote 227:</strong> June 14th; 1901 (Holborn Restaurant, and elsewhere +later). "Whatever Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may think or say, the +German nation may think or say."—The <span class="italic">Vossische Zeitung.</span><a href="#footnotetag227"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote228" name="footnote228"></a> +<strong>Footnote 228:</strong> As translated in Blue-book, Cd. 547. Mr. de Jong, the +editor of the paper, was prosecuted (and convicted) for the +publication of this and another similar article (December 28th).<a href="#footnotetag228"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote229" name="footnote229"></a> +<strong>Footnote 229:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag229"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote230" name="footnote230"></a> +<strong>Footnote 230:</strong> It is scarcely necessary to point out that this +prophecy of continued racial hatred has been completely falsified by +events. The writer went out to South Africa a second time in January, +1904, when two years had not passed since the surrender of the Boers. +The one thing, above all others, that struck him, and every other +visitor from England, was the profound peace that reigned from end to +end of the land.<a href="#footnotetag230"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote231" name="footnote231"></a> +<strong>Footnote 231:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag231"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote232" name="footnote232"></a> +<strong>Footnote 232:</strong> As stated in a <span class="italic">Central News</span> telegram, published in +London on December 14th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag232"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote233" name="footnote233"></a> +<strong>Footnote 233:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag233"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote234" name="footnote234"></a> +<strong>Footnote 234:</strong> See letter of Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, in +Cd. 547, and correspondence between Steyn and Reitz (captured by +British troops), in Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag234"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote235" name="footnote235"></a> +<strong>Footnote 235:</strong> "This war no longer makes a pretence of being a war of +defence; it is a war for gold-fields, for territory, and for the +suppression of two brave and noble peoples. This wicked war has lost +us the moral leadership of mankind."—Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., June +5th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag235"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote236" name="footnote236"></a> +<strong>Footnote 236:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag236"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote237" name="footnote237"></a> +<strong>Footnote 237:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag237"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote238" name="footnote238"></a> +<strong>Footnote 238:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag238"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote239" name="footnote239"></a> +<strong>Footnote 239:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag239"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote240" name="footnote240"></a> +<strong>Footnote 240:</strong> January 12th, 1901. Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag240"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote241" name="footnote241"></a> +<strong>Footnote 241:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag241"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote242" name="footnote242"></a> +<strong>Footnote 242:</strong> Cd. 663. See also the text of the circular issued on +December 2nd, 1900, by Louis Botha, as Commandant-General of the Boer +forces, to all military officers, landdrosts, etc., giving specific +instructions for the punishment of surrendered burghers who refused to +join the commandos when called upon, and for the evasion of the +neutrality oath.<a href="#footnotetag242"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote243" name="footnote243"></a> +<strong>Footnote 243:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag243"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote244" name="footnote244"></a> +<strong>Footnote 244:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag244"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote245" name="footnote245"></a> +<strong>Footnote 245:</strong> Cd. 663. It was at this time that the utterly +unjustifiable and brutal murder of the coloured man, Esau, took place +in the invasion of the Calvinia district of the Cape Colony. His sole +offence was his known loyalty to the British Government. "He was +flogged on January 15th, 1901, and kept in gaol till February 5th, +when he was flogged through the streets and shot outside the village +by a Boer named Strydom, who stated that he acted according to +orders." Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag245"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote246" name="footnote246"></a> +<strong>Footnote 246:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag246"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote247" name="footnote247"></a> +<strong>Footnote 247:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag247"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote248" name="footnote248"></a> +<strong>Footnote 248:</strong> Cd. 522.<a href="#footnotetag248"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote249" name="footnote249"></a> +<strong>Footnote 249:</strong> The italics are Mr. Kipling's. <span class="italic">The Science of +Rebellion: a Tract for the Times</span>, by Rudyard Kipling.<a href="#footnotetag249"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote250" name="footnote250"></a> +<strong>Footnote 250:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag250"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote251" name="footnote251"></a> +<strong>Footnote 251:</strong> Cd. 605.<a href="#footnotetag251"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote252" name="footnote252"></a> +<strong>Footnote 252:</strong> Cd. 988.<a href="#footnotetag252"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote253" name="footnote253"></a> +<strong>Footnote 253:</strong> "Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me ... no +general rising can be expected in that quarter.... [But] the little +contingent there has been of great help to us: they have kept 50,000 +troops occupied, with which otherwise we should have had to +reckon."—Gen. Christian de Wet at the Vereeniging Conference on May +16th, 1902. App. A. <span class="italic">The Three Years' War</span>, by Christian Rudolf de Wet +(Constable, 1902). But see forward also, p. <a href="#page485">485</a>, for part played by +British loyalists.<a href="#footnotetag253"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote254" name="footnote254"></a> +<strong>Footnote 254:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag254"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote255" name="footnote255"></a> +<strong>Footnote 255:</strong> <span class="italic">E.g.</span> those employed by General Sherman in his march +to the Sea, through Georgia, in the latter part of 1864.<a href="#footnotetag255"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote256" name="footnote256"></a> +<strong>Footnote 256:</strong> This estimate was very much too small: at the +Vereeniging surrender, when many thousands more of Boers had been +captured or killed 21,256 burghers and rebels laid down their arms. +Cd. 988.<a href="#footnotetag256"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote257" name="footnote257"></a> +<strong>Footnote 257:</strong> Cd. 695.<a href="#footnotetag257"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote258" name="footnote258"></a> +<strong>Footnote 258:</strong> Cd. 820.<a href="#footnotetag258"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote259" name="footnote259"></a> +<strong>Footnote 259:</strong> There were 186 killed, 75 wounded, 1,384 prisoners, 529 +voluntary surrenders; while 930 rifles, 90,958 rounds of ammunition, +1,332 waggons and carts, 13,570 horses, and 65,879 cattle were +captured. Cd. 820.<a href="#footnotetag259"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote260" name="footnote260"></a> +<strong>Footnote 260:</strong> See p. <a href="#page420">420</a>.<a href="#footnotetag260"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote261" name="footnote261"></a> +<strong>Footnote 261:</strong> Cd. 820. The September returns were: 170 Boers killed +in action, 114 wounded prisoners, 1,385 unwounded prisoners, and 1,393 +surrenders.<a href="#footnotetag261"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote262" name="footnote262"></a> +<strong>Footnote 262:</strong> In August 648 refugees returned; in November the number +had risen to 2,623.<a href="#footnotetag262"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote263" name="footnote263"></a> +<strong>Footnote 263:</strong> For the grotesque, repulsive, and even fatal remedies +employed by the Boer women in the treatment of their children in +sickness, the reader is referred to the medical reports on the +condition of the refugee camps published in the Blue-book.<a href="#footnotetag263"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote264" name="footnote264"></a> +<strong>Footnote 264:</strong> The figures are those given by Miss Hobhouse, as based +upon the official returns (<span class="italic">The Brunt of the War</span>, pp. 329-31).<a href="#footnotetag264"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote265" name="footnote265"></a> +<strong>Footnote 265:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span> annual per 1,000 on a basis of 25 years +(1874-98).<a href="#footnotetag265"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote266" name="footnote266"></a> +<strong>Footnote 266:</strong> Cd. 1,163, p. 159. See also <span class="italic">ibid.</span>, p. 151, and p. +178. Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the +system of the Burgher Camps (made by Acting President Schalk Burger), +is as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>"Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part of this + year (1901), by surrendered burghers, who stated that after they + laid down their arms their families were ill-treated, and their + stock and property confiscated by order of the + Commandant-Generals of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. These + acts appear to have been taken in consequence of the circular + dated Roos Senekal, 6th November, 1900, in which the + Commandant-General says: 'Do everything in your power to prevent + the burghers laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they + do not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or + immovable, and also to burn their houses.'</p> + +<p>"I took occasion, at my interview with Commandant-General Louis + Botha (February 28th, 1901), to bring this matter before him, and + I told him that if he continued such acts I should be forced to + bring in all women and children, and as much property as + possible, to protect them from the acts of his burghers. I + further inquired if he would agree to spare the farms and + families of neutral or surrendered burghers, in which case I + expressed my willingness to leave undisturbed the farms and + families of burghers who were on commando, provided they did not + actively assist their relatives. The Commandant-General + emphatically refused even to consider any such arrangement. He + said: 'I am entitled by law to force every man to join, and if + they do not do so to confiscate their property, and leave their + families on the veld.' I asked him what course I could pursue to + protect surrendered burghers and their families, and he then + said, 'The only thing you can do, is to send them out of the + country, as if I catch them they must suffer.' After this there + was nothing more to be said, and as military operations do not + permit of the protection of individuals, I had practically no + choice but to continue my system of bringing inhabitants of + certain areas into the protection of our lines. My decision was + conveyed to the Commandant-General in my official letter, dated + Pretoria, 16th April, 1901, from which the following is an + extract:</p> + +<p>"'As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the irregular + manner in which you have conducted and continue to conduct + hostilities, by forcing unwilling and peaceful inhabitants to + join your Commandos, a proceeding totally unauthorised by the + recognised customs of war, I have no other course open to me, and + am forced to take the very unpleasant and repugnant steps of + bringing in the women and children.</p> + +<p>"'I have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of these poor + people, which I have done my best to alleviate, and it is a + matter of surprise to me and to the whole civilised world, that + your Honour considers yourself justified in still causing so much + suffering to the people of the Transvaal, by carrying on a + hopeless and useless struggle.'</p> + +<p>"From the foregoing, it will, I believe, be perfectly clear that + the responsibility for the action complained of by Mr. Burger + (the so-styled Acting State President of the Transvaal), rests + rather with the Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange + Free State, than with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in + South Africa....</p> + +<p>"It is not the case that every area has been cleared of the + families of burghers, although this might be inferred from the + despatch under discussion. On the contrary, very large numbers of + women and children are still out, either in Boer Camps or on + their farms, and my Column Commanders have orders to leave them + alone, unless it is clear that they must starve if they are left + out upon the veld....</p> + +<p>"Finally, I indignantly and entirely deny the accusations of + rough and cruel treatment of women and children who were being + brought in from their farms to the camp. Hardships may have been + sometimes inseparable from the process, but the Boer women in our + hands themselves bear the most eloquent testimony to the kindness + and consideration shown to them by our soldiers on all such + occasions."</p> +</div> + +<p>With this statement it is interesting to compare Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman's words at Bath, November 20th, 1901:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "Is our hypocrisy so great that we actually flatter ourselves + upon our great humanity, because we have saved from starvation + those whose danger of starvation we have caused?... The hypocrisy + of these excuses is almost more loathsome than the cruelty + itself.... We have set ourselves to punish this country, to + reduce it apparently to ruin, because it has ventured to make war + against us."</p> + +<p>Truly an extraordinary attitude for a future Prime Minister of +England!<a href="#footnotetag266"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote267" name="footnote267"></a> +<strong>Footnote 267:</strong> What was even worse than such declarations of sympathy +with the Boers was the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist +population of South Africa. <span class="italic">E.g.</span> Sir William Harcourt (in a letter +in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of December 17th, 1900), wrote: "I sometimes think that +those bellicose gentlemen—especially those who do not fight—must +occasionally cast longing, lingering looks towards the times before +they were subsidised (<span class="italic">sic</span>) by the authors of the Raid to bring about +the position in which they now find themselves."<a href="#footnotetag267"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote268" name="footnote268"></a> +<strong>Footnote 268:</strong> September 26th, 1901. See Cd. 820 for report of this +action.<a href="#footnotetag268"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote269" name="footnote269"></a> +<strong>Footnote 269:</strong> Letter to Miss Milner, November 11th, 1901. See p. +<a href="#page416">416</a>.<a href="#footnotetag269"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote270" name="footnote270"></a> +<strong>Footnote 270:</strong> The facts are stated in a letter published in <span class="italic">The +Times</span> on March 10th, 1902.<a href="#footnotetag270"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote271" name="footnote271"></a> +<strong>Footnote 271:</strong> See also note, p. <a href="#page399">399</a> (Extract from the <span class="italic">Vossische +Zeitung</span>). The baseless and malevolent allegations of specific acts of +inhumanity or outrage on the part of British soldiers, circulated by +Boer sympathisers in England and on the continent of Europe, have been +passed over in silence. For an exposure of these calumnies the reader +is referred to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's <span class="italic">The War in South Africa</span> +(Smith, Elder). A record of the manner in which they were repudiated +by the Boer population in South Africa will be found in Cd. 1, 163, +pp. 99, 106-111, 113-121. Among those who protested were German +subjects, and Germans who had become British subjects, resident in +South Africa. Perhaps the most significant of all these protests is +the resolution passed unanimously by the members of the Natal House of +Assembly, all standing: "That this House desires to repudiate the +false charges of inhumanity brought against His Majesty's Army by a +section of the inhabitants of the continent of Europe and certain +disloyal subjects within the British Isles, and this House places on +record its deliberate conviction that the war in South Africa has been +prosecuted by His Majesty's Government and Army upon lines of humanity +and consideration for the enemy unparalleled in the history of +nations."<a href="#footnotetag271"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote272" name="footnote272"></a> +<strong>Footnote 272:</strong> This telegram is printed in Cd. 528.<a href="#footnotetag272"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote273" name="footnote273"></a> +<strong>Footnote 273:</strong> For the nature of these "Middelburg terms," see forward +in note <a href="#footnote340">2</a> on p. <a href="#page568">568</a>.<a href="#footnotetag273"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote274" name="footnote274"></a> +<strong>Footnote 274:</strong> Sir Richard Solomon was appointed legal adviser to the +new Transvaal Administration.<a href="#footnotetag274"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote275" name="footnote275"></a> +<strong>Footnote 275:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag275"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote276" name="footnote276"></a> +<strong>Footnote 276:</strong> See p. <a href="#page431">431</a>.<a href="#footnotetag276"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote277" name="footnote277"></a> +<strong>Footnote 277:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag277"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote278" name="footnote278"></a> +<strong>Footnote 278:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag278"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote279" name="footnote279"></a> +<strong>Footnote 279:</strong> The action of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson was not without +precedent. See Cd. 903, pp. 57 and 67, and p. 123, <span class="italic">supra</span>.<a href="#footnotetag279"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote280" name="footnote280"></a> +<strong>Footnote 280:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag280"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote281" name="footnote281"></a> +<strong>Footnote 281:</strong> Queen Victoria died January 22nd, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag281"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote282" name="footnote282"></a> +<strong>Footnote 282:</strong> Cd. 983.<a href="#footnotetag282"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote283" name="footnote283"></a> +<strong>Footnote 283:</strong> Cd. 903. These measures were taken upon Lord Milner's +return to the Transvaal (September, 1901) after his visit to England. +The scandal of the almost open co-operation of the Bond with the Boer +leaders had become notorious, and this assistance was recognised as a +contributory cause to the protraction of the guerilla war.<a href="#footnotetag283"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote284" name="footnote284"></a> +<strong>Footnote 284:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag284"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote285" name="footnote285"></a> +<strong>Footnote 285:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag285"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote286" name="footnote286"></a> +<strong>Footnote 286:</strong> Cd. 903. This was, in its essence, the proposal for the +systematic and effective defence of the Colony, which Lord Milner had +consistently advocated both before and during the war—with General +Butler and the Home Government, with Lord Roberts at the time of the +Forward Movement (see p. <a href="#page353">353</a>), and now at the eleventh hour with Lord +Kitchener in support of the Cape Government.<a href="#footnotetag286"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote287" name="footnote287"></a> +<strong>Footnote 287:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag287"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote288" name="footnote288"></a> +<strong>Footnote 288:</strong> See p. <a href="#page459">459</a>.<a href="#footnotetag288"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote289" name="footnote289"></a> +<strong>Footnote 289:</strong> The Letters Patent were not issued until August.<a href="#footnotetag289"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote290" name="footnote290"></a> +<strong>Footnote 290:</strong> It was, in its essence, the "high seriousness of +absolute sincerity" that Arnold, after Aristotle, makes the central +attribute of poetic thought. In commenting upon a speech delivered at +Germiston on March 15th, 1905, the Johannesburg <span class="italic">Star</span> wrote on the +day following: "Did ever a High Commissioner for South Africa speak in +this wise before? But beneath the light words and unstudied diction +there is the weight and sureness of the 'inevitable' thought. A man +who has pursued a single task for eight years with unremitting effort +and unswerving devotion can afford to put his mind into his words. And +in all that Lord Milner says there is an absolute sincerity, born of +high integrity of purpose and an assurance of knowledge, that compels +conviction. Or, rather, should we say, that makes the need of +conviction as unnecessary as a lamp in daylight."<a href="#footnotetag290"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote291" name="footnote291"></a> +<strong>Footnote 291:</strong> The Duke of Cambridge.<a href="#footnotetag291"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote292" name="footnote292"></a> +<strong>Footnote 292:</strong> These two ex-officials, representing the respective +Governments of the late Republics, were living in Holland at this +time.<a href="#footnotetag292"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote293" name="footnote293"></a> +<strong>Footnote 293:</strong> It is only fair to assume that Mr. Bryce was not +acquainted with the details of the Dordrecht and Hargrove affairs, to +which reference has been made respectively at p. 287 and p. 375. And, +still more that he was unaware of the utterly discreditable Basuto +incident, with respect to which General Gordon's biographer writes: +"The consequence was that Mr. Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy +Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his +own policy by an act of treachery which has never been +surpassed."—<span class="italic">The Life of Gordon</span>, vol. ii., p. 83. (Fisher Unwin.)<a href="#footnotetag293"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote294" name="footnote294"></a> +<strong>Footnote 294:</strong> Compare the different and infinitely more instructive +treatment of the question of Dutch allegiance by Lord Milner in his +Johannesburg speech, quoted at p. 145.<a href="#footnotetag294"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote295" name="footnote295"></a> +<strong>Footnote 295:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span>, the Rev. Stephen Gladstone.<a href="#footnotetag295"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote296" name="footnote296"></a> +<strong>Footnote 296:</strong> Apart from those mentioned in the text, the following +attended the Merriman and Sauer banquet: Mr. E. Robertson, M.P. +(chairman), Lord Farrer, Mr. T. Shaw, M.P., Mr. Burt, M.P., Mr. +Channing, M.P., Mr. John Ellis, M.P., Mr. H. J. Wilson, M.P., Sir +Wilfred Lawson, Mr. Frederic Harrison, and others. And among those who +sent letters of regret for their absence were the Marquis of Ripon, +Lord Hobhouse, Dr. Spence Watson, Mr. Seale-Hayne, M.P., and Lord +Loreburn.<a href="#footnotetag296"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote297" name="footnote297"></a> +<strong>Footnote 297:</strong> December 17th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag297"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote298" name="footnote298"></a> +<strong>Footnote 298:</strong> They were read and published by Lord Milner on June +21st, 1902.<a href="#footnotetag298"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote299" name="footnote299"></a> +<strong>Footnote 299:</strong> It is scarcely necessary to say that the entire cost of +the Constabulary has been borne by the new colonies; or that every +penny of this grant-in-aid was paid back out of the development loan +raised in 1902-3.<a href="#footnotetag299"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote300" name="footnote300"></a> +<strong>Footnote 300:</strong> An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth, would +have been nearer the mark. See note, p. <a href="#page454">454</a>.<a href="#footnotetag300"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote301" name="footnote301"></a> +<strong>Footnote 301:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag301"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote302" name="footnote302"></a> +<strong>Footnote 302:</strong> Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company; of the +Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.<a href="#footnotetag302"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote303" name="footnote303"></a> +<strong>Footnote 303:</strong> Cd. 626.<a href="#footnotetag303"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote304" name="footnote304"></a> +<strong>Footnote 304:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag304"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote305" name="footnote305"></a> +<strong>Footnote 305:</strong> This Report was issued (June 14th, 1904) from the +Education Adviser's Office, Johannesburg, on "The Development of +Education in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony." It is one of the +many contributions of permanent value to political and economic +science that mark the second period of Lord Milner's Administration in +South Africa. <span class="italic">E.g.</span>, in Appendix XXX. of this Report, the various +solutions of the much-vexed question of religious instruction in State +Schools, severally adopted by the self-governing colonies of the +empire, are excellently presented in tabular form.<a href="#footnotetag305"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote306" name="footnote306"></a> +<strong>Footnote 306:</strong> Report on "The Development of Education in the +Transvaal and Orange River Colony."<a href="#footnotetag306"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote307" name="footnote307"></a> +<strong>Footnote 307:</strong> These imported teachers worked harmoniously with the +South African teachers, whether of British or Dutch extraction; they +filled the gap left by the Hollander teachers, who had returned to +Europe after the outbreak of the war, and formed a valuable element in +the permanent staff of the Education Departments of the new colonies. +In 1903 there were 475 of these over-sea teachers at work in the two +colonies, as against some 800 teachers appointed in South Africa.<a href="#footnotetag307"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote308" name="footnote308"></a> +<strong>Footnote 308:</strong> Some idea of the significance of these figures may be +gathered from the fact that the highest number of children on the +rolls of the Government schools of the Orange Free State was 8,157 (in +the year 1898). That is to say, the British Administration in the +Orange River Colony was educating one-third more Boer children in the +camp schools alone than the Free State Government had educated in time +of peace. Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag308"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote309" name="footnote309"></a> +<strong>Footnote 309:</strong> Cd. 1,163, p. 145. The accounts were complicated by +expenditure for, and refunds from, the military authorities.<a href="#footnotetag309"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote310" name="footnote310"></a> +<strong>Footnote 310:</strong> This is in the Orange River Colony alone. For the +number of children in the <span class="italic">camp</span> schools of both colonies, as apart +from the <span class="italic">town</span> schools, see above.<a href="#footnotetag310"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote311" name="footnote311"></a> +<strong>Footnote 311:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag311"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote312" name="footnote312"></a> +<strong>Footnote 312:</strong> Dated December 12th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag312"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote313" name="footnote313"></a> +<strong>Footnote 313:</strong> Excluding expenditure on the South African Constabulary +and relief and re-settlement, and certain other charges. Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag313"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote314" name="footnote314"></a> +<strong>Footnote 314:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag314"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote315" name="footnote315"></a> +<strong>Footnote 315:</strong> December 14th, 1901. Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag315"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote316" name="footnote316"></a> +<strong>Footnote 316:</strong> The new rolling-stock was paid for out of the +grant-in-aid voted in August, 1901. The first of the new lines +constructed was that from Bloemfontein to Basutoland, opening up the +rich agricultural land known as the "conquered territory" on the +Basuto border in the Orange River Colony, where many of the new +British settlers had been established.<a href="#footnotetag316"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote317" name="footnote317"></a> +<strong>Footnote 317:</strong> The completeness with which the Netherlands Railway +Company had identified itself with the Government of the South African +Republic is well expressed in the reply of Mr. Van Kretchmar, the +General Manager of the N.Z.A.S.M., to a question put to him by the +Transvaal Concessions Commissioners: "We considered that the interests +of the Republic were our interests" (Q. 612). Many of these railway +employees were, of course, imported Hollanders.<a href="#footnotetag317"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote318" name="footnote318"></a> +<strong>Footnote 318:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag318"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote319" name="footnote319"></a> +<strong>Footnote 319:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag319"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote320" name="footnote320"></a> +<strong>Footnote 320:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag320"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote321" name="footnote321"></a> +<strong>Footnote 321:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag321"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote322" name="footnote322"></a> +<strong>Footnote 322:</strong> At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From <span class="italic">The Star</span> +report.<a href="#footnotetag322"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote323" name="footnote323"></a> +<strong>Footnote 323:</strong> See p. <a href="#page489">489</a>.<a href="#footnotetag323"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote324" name="footnote324"></a> +<strong>Footnote 324:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag324"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote325" name="footnote325"></a> +<strong>Footnote 325:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag325"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote326" name="footnote326"></a> +<strong>Footnote 326:</strong> For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms, see +above, p. <a href="#page471">471</a>, and forward; p. <a href="#page568">568</a>, note 2.<a href="#footnotetag326"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote327" name="footnote327"></a> +<strong>Footnote 327:</strong> Cd. 1,096.<a href="#footnotetag327"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote328" name="footnote328"></a> +<strong>Footnote 328:</strong> This deputation was despatched in March, 1900, to "win +the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.<a href="#footnotetag328"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote329" name="footnote329"></a> +<strong>Footnote 329:</strong> Cd. 986.<a href="#footnotetag329"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote330" name="footnote330"></a> +<strong>Footnote 330:</strong> A full list of the names is to be found in the Draft +Terms of Surrender at p. 564.<a href="#footnotetag330"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote331" name="footnote331"></a> +<strong>Footnote 331:</strong> These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year ago. See +note <a href="#footnote340">2</a>, p. <a href="#page568">568</a>.<a href="#footnotetag331"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote332" name="footnote332"></a> +<strong>Footnote 332:</strong> Cd. 1,096.<a href="#footnotetag332"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote333" name="footnote333"></a> +<strong>Footnote 333:</strong> Smuts.<a href="#footnotetag333"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote334" name="footnote334"></a> +<strong>Footnote 334:</strong> Hertzog.<a href="#footnotetag334"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote335" name="footnote335"></a> +<strong>Footnote 335:</strong> De Wet.<a href="#footnotetag335"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote336" name="footnote336"></a> +<strong>Footnote 336:</strong> Botha.<a href="#footnotetag336"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote337" name="footnote337"></a> +<strong>Footnote 337:</strong> Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la +Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.<a href="#footnotetag337"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote338" name="footnote338"></a> +<strong>Footnote 338:</strong> Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign the +Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State representatives. +He was declared President, in the place of Steyn, at Vereeniging on +the 29th.<a href="#footnotetag338"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote339" name="footnote339"></a> +<strong>Footnote 339:</strong> This was reduced to a period of five years.<a href="#footnotetag339"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote340" name="footnote340"></a> +<strong>Footnote 340:</strong> Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg terms, the +terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less favourable to the +Boers in respect of permission to possess arms, and the use of the +Dutch language; but the monetary assistance promised to the +repatriated burghers was more generous. The free grant was raised from +one million to three millions, and the advances on loan were offered +for the first two years free of interest, and subsequently at only +three per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon +the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance necessary +and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that Lord Milner, alike in +the Middelburg and Vereeniging negotiations, although he was opposed +to any payment of the costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying +on the war, was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government +in the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all other +matters that concerned their material prosperity.</p> + +<p>One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms is +noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of Commons by +the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Winston +Churchill), that the use of the word "natives" in clause viii. of the +Terms of Surrender prevented the introduction of any legislation +affecting the <span class="italic">status</span> of Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new +colonies prior to the establishment of self-government. This assertion +was based upon the contention that the word "natives" is understood by +the Boers to indicate the "native of any country other than those of +the European inhabitants of South Africa." The actual text of the +corresponding clause in the Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's +despatch of March 20th, 1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards +the extension of the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and +Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's +Government to give such franchise before representative government is +granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as +to secure the just predominance of the white races. The legal position +of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold +in Cape Colony." Apart from the fact that the Boers were debarred by +Lord Milner's specific statements either from going behind the English +text of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining [the +Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg proposal," it is +difficult to see how this Middelburg clause could have raised any +presumption in the minds of the Boer commissioners that the English +word "native" was intended to include not only the Kafirs (of which +word it is a loose equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the +Bantu tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal +yellow-skinned natives of South Africa—the Bushmen and Hottentots), +but the "coloured people," or half-castes.</p> + +<p>Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July 31st, 1906) +with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that the question had not +been raised, to the best of his belief, by the Boer commissioners; and +that in any case there was nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to +prevent the Crown Colony administration of the new colonies from +legislating in respect of "coloured persons." [And <span class="italic">a fortiori</span> in +respect of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the +treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I think that +in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was used. I venture to say +that nobody familiar with the common use of language in South Africa +would hold either that 'natives' included coloured people, some of +whom very much more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen' +included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted Dutch word +in South Africa for coloured people."<a href="#footnotetag340"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote341" name="footnote341"></a> +<strong>Footnote 341:</strong> The minutes of the final meetings of the commando +representatives—as also those of the earlier meetings of May 15th to +17th—have been published by General Christian de Wet in <span class="italic">The Three +Years' War</span>.<a href="#footnotetag341"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote342" name="footnote342"></a> +<strong>Footnote 342:</strong> Three of the members of this committee, Generals Botha, +De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to proceed to Europe for the +purposes of this appeal.<a href="#footnotetag342"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote343" name="footnote343"></a> +<strong>Footnote 343:</strong> The actual surrender of the arms in the possession of +the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out with admirable +promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement had been signed Lord +Kitchener was able, in a final despatch from Capetown on June 23rd, to +record his "high appreciation of the unflagging energy and unfailing +tact" with which Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet +had facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed to +receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and Orange +River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in the Cape Colony +less expeditious in surrendering to General French. In all 21,226 +burghers and colonial rebels, of whom 11,166 were in the Transvaal, +6,455 in the Orange River Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down +their arms. Lord Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and +23rd), addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the +Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic +utterances. His message to the former was:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal to + acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South Africa to + the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Cape Colony, + and Natal. I will only say here that no request of mine was ever + refused by any of these Governments, and that their consideration + and generosity were only equalled by the character and quality of + the troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that country."</p> + +<p>And of the troops, which under his command had successfully +accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he wrote:</p> + +<p class="quote"> + "The protracted struggle which has for so long caused suffering + to South Africa has at length terminated, and I should fail to do + justice to my own feelings if at this moment I neglected to bear + testimony to the patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been + displayed by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and + Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing but the + qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops could have + overcome the difficulties of this campaign, or have finally + enabled the empire to reap the fruits of all its sacrifices."<a href="#footnotetag343"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote344" name="footnote344"></a> +<strong>Footnote 344:</strong> An onomatopœic expression for the step of a tired +horse.<a href="#footnotetag344"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote345" name="footnote345"></a> +<strong>Footnote 345:</strong> <span class="italic">The Three Years' War.</span><a href="#footnotetag345"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote346" name="footnote346"></a> +<strong>Footnote 346:</strong> [The Transvaal Government]—"or rather the President +and his advisers—committed the fatal mistake of trying to maintain a +government which was at the same time undemocratic and incompetent.... +An exclusive government may be pardoned if it is efficient; an +inefficient government, if it rests upon the people. But a government +which is both inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under +which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of government +which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They ought, therefore, to +have either extended their franchise or reformed their administration" +(Bryce, <span class="italic">Impressions of South Africa</span>, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is +not likely to have been unduly severe. "The political sin of the +Transvaal against the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of +detail—of less or more—but was fundamental in its denial of +elementary political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed +minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the taxes, +denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the money extorted" +(Captain Mahan, <span class="italic">The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute</span>, 1900 [included +in <span class="italic">The Problem of Asia</span>]). To these, perhaps, I may be permitted to +add the following words spoken by myself in 1894—more than a year +before the Raid—and published in 1895 (<span class="italic">South Africa: a Study, +etc.</span>):—"The Boer has still to justify his possession of these ample +pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and these stores of gold and +of coal. If he can enlarge his mind, if he can reform existing abuses, +if he can expand an archaic system of government and render it +sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of an enlarged +population and important and increasing industries—well and good. If +not, let the Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with +the intelligence and the progress of South Africa. <span class="italic">Then</span> the Boer +system will be condemned by a higher authority than the Colonial +Office or the opinion of England; and from the high court of Nature—a +court from which no appeal lies—the inexorable decree will go forth: +'Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?'"<a href="#footnotetag346"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote347" name="footnote347"></a> +<strong>Footnote 347:</strong> See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted <span class="italic">supra</span>.<a href="#footnotetag347"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> + +<p><a id="footnote348" name="footnote348"></a> +<strong>Footnote 348:</strong> "The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or +engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free State, +nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, +until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain +Mahan writes: "In refusing the Transvaal that independence in foreign +relations which would enable other states to hold it directly +accountable, Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that +foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for +reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate control of +foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose not to permit +interference in the Transvaal by a foreign Power, was responsible for +conditions of wrong to foreign citizens within its borders. She had +surrendered the right to interfere, as suzerain, with internal +affairs; but she had not relieved herself, as by a grant of full +independence and sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility +for injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the United +States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in the case of the +Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by the state sovereignty of +Louisiana" (<span class="italic">Ibid.</span>). And, says the same writer, <span class="italic">a fortiori</span> was +Great Britain justified in interfering on behalf of her own subjects.<a href="#footnotetag348"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by +W. 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