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diff --git a/26490.txt b/26490.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04af0b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/26490.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18963 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by W. Basil Worsfold + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lord Milner's Work in South Africa + From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902 + +Author: W. Basil Worsfold + +Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26490] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA *** + + + + +Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, +all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's +spelling has been maintained.] + + + + +LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA + +FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO +THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902 + + +CONTAINING HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION + + +BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD + + +WITH PORTRAITS AND MAP + + + + + "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if + there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself + responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom + disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never + move?"--LORD GOSCHEN _in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906_ + + + + + LONDON + JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W + 1906 + + +_This Edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne +Convention, as well as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all British +Colonies and Dependencies._ + + +_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._ + + + + +PREFACE + + +In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way +of preface. + +The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside +twice for a considerable period in South Africa--first in the +neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg +(1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long +interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with +many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this +book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy +by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications, +my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these +sources. + +My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this +book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a +body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances +and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration +of peace--an event not yet five years old--a great change has been +wrought in the political and economic framework of this province of +the empire. None the less, with a few conspicuous exceptions, almost +all of the principal actors in these pages are still there; and, +presumably, they are very much the same men now as they were before, +and during, the war. And in this connection it remains to notice an +aspect of the South African struggle which transcends all others in +fruitfulness and importance. It was a struggle to keep South Africa +not a dependency of Great Britain, but a part of the empire. The +over-sea Britains, understanding it in this sense, took their share in +it. They made their voices heard in the settlement. The service which +they thus collectively performed was great. It would have been +infinitely greater if they had been directly represented in an +administration nominally common to them and the mother country. No +political system can be endowed with effective unity--with that +organic unity which is the only effective unity--unless it is +possessed of a single vehicle of thought and action. To create this +vehicle--an administrative body in which all parts of the empire would +be duly represented--is difficult to-day. The forces of disunion, +which are at work both at home and beyond the seas, may make it +impossible to-morrow. + + W. B. W. + + RIDGE, NEAR CAPEL, SURREY, + _October 19th, 1906_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER I Page + + DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT.................. 1 + + +CHAPTER II + + THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS............... 48 + + +CHAPTER III + + A YEAR OF OBSERVATION.................................. 75 + + +CHAPTER IV + + UNDER WHICH FLAG?..................................... 130 + + +CHAPTER V + + PLAYING FOR TIME...................................... 188 + + +CHAPTER VI + + THE ULTIMATUM......................................... 253 + + +CHAPTER VII + + THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS............................. 300 + + +CHAPTER VIII + + THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY...................... 341 + + +CHAPTER IX + + THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT........................... 373 + + +CHAPTER X + + THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION............... 413 + + +CHAPTER XI + + PREPARING FOR PEACE................................... 470 + + +CHAPTER XII + + THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING.......................... 536 + + +INDEX................................................... 585 + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + + + PORTRAIT OF LORD MILNER _Frontispiece_ + _From a photograph by Elliott & Fry (Photogravure)_ + + FACING PAGE + + LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.............................. 473 + + MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA........................... _At the End_ + + + + +LORD MILNER + + + + +CHAPTER I + +DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT + + +The failure of British administration in South Africa during the +nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian +era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could +be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt, +why failure in South Africa? For failure it was. A century of wars, +missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty +administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two +European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social +differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military +resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel +the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all +white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of +failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the +nationality difficulty and the native question. But these are problems +of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in +Canada and the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a +different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging +nature--the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult +for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to +wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material +disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt, +by Anglo-Saxon energy. We might apply the Socratic method throughout, +traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in +every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of +the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa. + +Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to +render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various +in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the +explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the +second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape +of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which +Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his +employers. Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David +Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted +by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his +charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head. The +theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy of a +certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of +friendship with the Dutch--a circumstance which was sufficiently +apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an +hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with +the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled +to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant. It was the first +conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been +bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the +Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man +was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and +so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of +Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must +pursue. + +[Sidenote: Van Riebeck's difficulty.] + +He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if +apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to +the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual +robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at +Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending +Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the +countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era. But unfortunately +it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers +and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent +of Africa, to think of putting it into effect. He replied that he had +no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and that the +institution of private property was unknown among the Hottentots. The +only method by which the individual could be punished was by punishing +the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the tribe and their +cattle. But this was a course of action which was repugnant to the +Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a vision of +reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements quite +disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as an +item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a +large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be +a great addition to the resources of the settlement. The Chamber of +Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as +its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe +escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened +to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers. + +[Sidenote: The Afrikander stock.] + +This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an +obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home +authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local +conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral +judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must +be equally valid in South Africa. By the time that the home authority +had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber of +Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these +misconceptions operated had become enlarged. The natives were there, +as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a +population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose +manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more +intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than +those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir. A +century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government--a +government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things +commercial purely monopolist"--had produced a people unlike any other +European community on the face of the earth. Of the small original +stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter +were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were +German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the +inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood. But this racial change was by no +means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony +from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The +corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the +determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse--social, +intellectual, commercial, and political--with their kinsmen in Europe. +One fact will suffice to show how perfectly this object was attained. +Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of the +eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape +Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means +of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by +which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European +civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it +is significant to the student of South African history. This +phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a +community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards +were those of the seventeenth. + +[Sidenote: The nationality difficulty.] + +Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It +does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration; +but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make +the task of governing the Cape Colony--a task finally undertaken by +England in 1806--one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was +strange, but the European population was even more strange and +abnormal. If we had been left to deal with the native population alone +we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them +harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for +entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of +their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to +modify our native policy to suit the conditions of a preexisting +relationship between the white and black races that was not of our +creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects repugnant to +British ideas of justice. Nor was this all. The old European +population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and +fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed +from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a +political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the +mastership of the native African tribes. + +Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a +man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas, +while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth +century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the +first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than +ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that +his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical +with his own. When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the +other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course +make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to +contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had +grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage. + +Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government, +both Governors and High Commissioners, soon learnt that neither the +natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on the same +footing as a Western European. But the British Government cannot be +said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in almost the +last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive defeats of +Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a knowledge of the +fact that we had been within an ace of losing South Africa. Many, +indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had been thoroughly +learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that throughout the +nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat both the +natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British ideas; and +that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict with its own +local representatives, who knew that the only hope of success lay in +dealing with both alike on a basis of South African ideas. + +As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to +understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner +of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth +century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of +opinion between the home and the local authorities. + +At the very outset of British administration--during the temporary +occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808--we find a theoretically +perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early English +Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier farmers. +It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions for the +treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the Dutch +East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800, the +third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the +Colonies, writes: + +[Sidenote: Non-interference.] + + "Considering the tract of country over which these border + inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in + which they live, and the wild notions of independence which + prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce + civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow + in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution + and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to + occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of + government, than answer the beneficent views with which they + might be undertaken. In fact, it seems to me the proper system of + policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible + in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them + rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than + as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations + established within the precincts of Government. Mutual advantages + arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good + faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to + efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part + of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing + their attachment." + +Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it is +at first sight, contained in itself the germ of a political heresy of +the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle of non-interference, +here for the first time enunciated and subsequently followed with fatal +effect, could not be applied by a nineteenth-century administration to +the case of a seventeenth-century community without its virtually +renouncing the functions of government. Obviously this was not the +intention of the home authority. There remained the difficulty of +knowing when to apply, and when not to apply, the principle; and +directly a specific case arose there was the possibility that, while the +local authority, with a full knowledge of the local conditions, might +think interference necessary, the home authority, without such +knowledge, might take an opposite view. + +[Sidenote: Slaghter's Nek.] + +A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of +the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with +the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects +of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent +occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted +of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657 +Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves. One of the first measures +of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series +of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots, +while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the +expense of the European population. From the British, or even +European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to +which no man could possibly take exception. As applied to the +conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was, +in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and +internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest +known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek. There was no +question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term +of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore +entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to +remove his property. All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came +to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the +Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he +considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and _his_ +Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an +intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority." + +And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their +seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater +when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their +natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of +military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of +mountains--the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is +known to the people of Great Britain. The Boer frontiersman, with his +aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin, +disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the +work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon +learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant +the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date +with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable +spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in +Downing Street and quite another in Capetown. + +[Sidenote: D'Urban's policy.] + +The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which +collectively the history of our South African administration owes its +sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin +D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg) +at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On +Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war, +needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in +the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their +cattle. After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British +settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made +with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban and his local +advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from +further inroads. The Kafirs were to retire to the line of the Kei +River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the European +settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion; while a +belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be +interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads. In +addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the +settlers for the enormous losses[1] which they had incurred; since, as +a contemporary and not unfriendly writer[2] puts it, the British +Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations, +rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must +plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their +protection. + + [Footnote 1: The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses + had been wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60 + waggons, 5,715 horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and + 161,930 sheep had been carried off by the Kafirs. And this + apart from the remuneration claimed by the settlers for + services in the field, and commandeered cattle and supplies.] + + [Footnote 2: Cloete. See note, p. 16.] + +The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of +His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the +result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of +the European settlers. D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate +the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the +treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the +Fish River--the original eastern boundary of the Colony--which the +Colonial Government had made to its European subjects from 1817 +onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether out +of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank for +the enmity of the natives--if, indeed, they had not deliberately +provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory. + +The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked. +To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed +views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts +would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall +two statements, each significant and authentic. Cloete, writing while +the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord +Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting +to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the +inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of +the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban +was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons: +"My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me +that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if +he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing +so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them." + +[Sidenote: The Great Trek.] + +This settlement of a South African question upon a basis of British, +or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as notorious +as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in 1819-20 the +first and only effort to introduce a considerable British population +into South Africa had been successfully carried out when the "Albany" +settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were established in +this and other districts upon the eastern border of the Cape Colony. +The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion of 1834-5 +were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many members of the +new British population, and the divergence of opinion between D'Urban +and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since in this case the +British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It was no longer +merely a divergence of views as between the local and the home +authority, but as between the British in Britain and the British in +South Africa. It must also be remembered that, in the same year as the +Kafir invasion, a social revolution--the emancipation of slaves--had +been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the British +Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of the +railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively +trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the +Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the +safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came +at a bad time. Whether the secession of the Emigrant Farmers would in +any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation of slaves +is a matter which cannot now be decided. But, however this may be, the +fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an opinion on the +subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the first Prime +Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining influence +which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction of the +British Government to the sense of injustice created by the measures +dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his despatch.[3] +And this judgment is supported by the fact that the wealthier Dutch of +the Western Province were much more seriously affected by the +emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern districts of +the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who provided the bulk +of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the years of the +Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an extravagantly +improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement which divided +European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained divergence of +opinion between the home and local authorities--both British. + + [Footnote 3: For the benefit of those who may desire to read + the passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append + the references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five + Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered + before the Natal Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A + reprint of this work was published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir + John Robinson's opinion, which endorses the views of Mrs. + Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in _The Cape Monthly + Magazine_ for September, 1876, is to be found at pp. 46, 47 + of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).] + +[Sidenote: The birth of the republic.] + +[Sidenote: Sir George Grey.] + +The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the +Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered +settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the +Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854 +(Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics, which half a century +later withstood for two years and eight months the whole available +military force of the British Empire. The first effect of the secession +was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power which bid against +the British Government for the territory and allegiance of the natives. +Secession, therefore, made the inevitable task of establishing the +supremacy of the white man in South Africa infinitely more costly both +in blood and treasure. The British nation accepted the task, which fell +to it as paramount power, with the greatest reluctance. The endless and +apparently aimless Kafir wars exhausted the patience of the country, and +the destruction of an entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's[4] _impis_ +created a feeling of deep resentment against the great High +Commissioner, whose policy was held--unreasonably enough--responsible +for the military disaster of Isandlhwana. Two opportunities of +recovering the lost solidarity of the Europeans were presented before +the republican Dutch had set themselves definitely to work for the +supremacy of South Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk. +That both were lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British +people at the excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised +administration over the native population in South Africa. But in both +cases the immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home +Government to listen to the advice of its local representative. Sir +George Grey would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by +taking advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State +Dutch from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and +prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the +Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature, +consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several +states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the +pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in +England. The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and +increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well +aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the +peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing to +contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in which +they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not hopeless, +for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects upon the +tribes of the interior. But the most powerful argument which Grey used +was his ruthless exposure of the futility of the Conventions. By +allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into independent communities the +British Government believed that not only had they relieved themselves +of responsibility for the republican Dutch, but that they had secured, +in addition, the unfaltering allegiance of the larger Dutch population +which remained behind in the Cape Colony. Grey assured the Home +Government that in both respects it was the victim of a delusion bred of +its complete ignorance of South African conditions. The Boer Republics +would give trouble. Apart from the bad draftsmanship of the +conventions--a fertile source of disagreement--these small states would +be centres of intrigue and "internal commotions," while at the same time +their revenues would be too small to provide efficiently for their +protection against the warlike tribes. The policy of _divide et +impera_--or, as Grey called it, the "dismemberment" policy--would fail, +since the political barrier which had been erected was wholly +artificial. + + [Footnote 4: Cetewayo.] + + "Although these European countries are treated as separate + nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names + as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of + the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the + same language--not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part + of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church. + They have the same laws--the Roman Dutch. They have the same + sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently + the same feelings regarding the native races.... + + "I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or + popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of + calling these people different nations would not make them so, + nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them + sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison.... + Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the + south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on + the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of + the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."[5] + + [Footnote 5: Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B. + Lytton.] + +The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was +complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to +the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of +June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt +himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape +Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to +carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch, + + "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption + of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly + expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament, + and in your answers to the address from the State in question." + +Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but +effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the +eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted +economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial +Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing +Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows +that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself. + +[Sidenote: The burden of the empire.] + + "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes + on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more + than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of + the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the + Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to + serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster + will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off + from me. I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in + military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists + will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of + this country has been advantageously laid out." + +These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time +when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir. In the plain language of +the Secretary of State for the Colonies[6] in 1858, it was a time when +ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and +increasing dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large military +establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one more passage +must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a certain grim +humour--although this is a valuable quality in such a context--as +because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in support of +the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to follow the +advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative cause of the +failure of British administration in South Africa. The reply to the +charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in one +leisurely sentence, runs as follows: + + [Footnote 6: Sir E. B. Lytton.] + + "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on + the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of + policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the + general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed + since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at + least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department, + each of whom held different views upon some important points of + policy connected with this country." + +[Sidenote: The discovery of diamonds.] + +Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the +home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from +Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their +representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to +decide by what methods the objects of British policy could be most +effectively advanced. But it was not until some considerable time +after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate +Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on +its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these +protests produced any appreciable effect. What really aroused an +interest in South Africa--that is to say a practical interest, as +distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary +enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare--was the +discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent +establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first +time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast +"hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial +possibilities. The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape +Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its +main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once +established, attracted British capital and British population, and by +so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to +do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South +Africa within the purview of the nation. Thanks to the Kimberley mines +the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were +exclusively pastoral and agricultural. + +The epoch of the next great divergence of opinion was a more hopeful +time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who was the +first statesman to give practical expression to the belief that the +maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare of the +masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen, and +the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to study +Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit. Something +had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South Africa. And +yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most ruinous of +all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing Street +occurred. + +[Sidenote: Sir Bartle Frere.] + +When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a +definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British +colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated +classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty +years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential +unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an +industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of +political power had shifted in England. The extension of the franchise +had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in +the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated +in the political and economic conditions of that country. The +divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became +in this case wider than ever. In short, it was the will of the nation +that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the accomplishment of his +task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal party to administer +South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in contemptuous +indifference of the profoundest convictions and most solemn warnings +of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the Crown. + +The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story +is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from +the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he +foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated, +twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power +which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity +under the British flag was the Zulu people. The whole adult male +population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by +Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military +instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary +career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;[7] and he had +prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South +Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing +supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle. But in doing +so he, or rather the general entrusted with the command of the +military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This +revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete +confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South +African situation. His contention was that England must give evidence +of both her capacity and her intention to control the native +population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the +republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the +British colonies in a federal system under the British flag. A native +power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two +possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not +only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable +obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power, +the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the +reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the +question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's _impis_ had been +exaggerated. To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an +emphatic "No." + + [Footnote 7: Chaka.] + +[Sidenote: The recall of Frere.] + +The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's +cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated +his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the +return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was +allowed to remain in office until August 1st, when he was recalled by +a telegraphic despatch. But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out to him, +there had been "so much divergence" between his views and those of the +Home Government that he would not have been allowed to remain at the +Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there was a +prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of +confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the +failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the +conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial +step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal +union. + +The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the +inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book +arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without +recalling the words which Mr. Krueger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney +on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ... +be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence +to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was +known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal +party of which Mr. Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone +Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before +"the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared. + +[Sidenote: Frere's forecast.] + +But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions +upon the central question of South African administration which Frere +put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most +elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will +suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of +South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took +upon themselves to reverse his policy. What, above all, Frere realised +was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa +must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted +the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the +strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The +annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time +or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he +asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained +at all costs. With this end in view, he urged that every +responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be +fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained +by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and +availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free +State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a +scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate +aspirations of the Boers for self-government without endangering the +permanency of British rule. It included proposals for administrative +and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing the cost of +government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency, for the +reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the proposed +railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of +representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial +Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment +of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to +the Boers at the time of annexation.[8] + + [Footnote 8: The receipt of the despatch in which these + valuable recommendations were made was not even acknowledged + by the Colonial Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of + his proposals in an article published in _The Nineteenth + Century_ for February, 1881.] + +He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the +political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he +earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese +Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all +legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the +danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground" +either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in +due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape +at the end of July, 1879: + + "Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react + dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch + Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the + population as any under the Crown, into dangerous allies of the + small anti-English Republican party, who are for separation, thus + paralysing the efforts of the loyal English party now in power, + who aim at making the country a self-defending integral portion + of the British Empire. Further, any attempt to give back or + restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal must lead to anarchy + and failure, and probably, at no distant period, to a vicious + imitation of some South American Republics, in which the more + uneducated and misguided Boers, dominated and led by better + educated foreign adventurers--Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home + Rulers, and other European Republicans and Socialists--will + become a pest to the whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous + fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval + supremacy, or injuring us in our colonies. + + "There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already + been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the + Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still + arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility.... + If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always + to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object + is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This + will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not + become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on + you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by + postponing the trial if we start with a good cause." + +Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is +impossible to resist the momentum of this thought. + +[Sidenote: The retrocession.] + +The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not +likely to be effaced from the memory of this generation. Frere had +scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by the joint +efforts of Mr. Krueger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before the former, +with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon the still +desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put down by +force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's cabinet +recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might have +been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape Colony. +The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the Pretoria +Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions embodied in the +London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely established as fact that +Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by certain articles contained in +both conventions, to secure to all actual and potential British +residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment of all the political rights +of citizenship possessed by the Boers. But it is equally certain that +the immediate contravention of Article XVI. of the Pretoria +Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence necessary to qualify +for the franchise was raised from two to five years, was allowed to +pass without protest from the Imperial Government. And thus a breach +of the Convention, which the discovery of the Witwatersrand +gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent establishment of a great British +industrial community made a matter of vital importance, was condoned. +A few years more and the country which prided itself upon being the +home of liberty and of free institutions was confounded by the +spectacle of a South Africa of its own making, in which a British +majority denied the franchise in a Dutch Republic, contrasted with a +Dutch minority dominating and controlling the machinery of responsible +government in a British colony. + +This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking +distance of the objective of the present work--the personality and +efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous +years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the +Zambesi to Capetown. + +If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression +upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement, +almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters +that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached +to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local +representative in South Africa. And with this sense of amazement a +generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the +injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon +loyal and capable servants of the Crown--an injustice so notorious +that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from +the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration +is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of +unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals of South +Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of South African +conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home Government, +and who himself was recognised by the Government and people of Great +Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of all loyal +subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire. + +The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal +was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before +in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the +working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to +drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy +in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be +omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean +prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper +understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is +the Jameson Raid. + +[Sidenote: The Jameson raid.] + +[Sidenote: Rhodes.] + +In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not +sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious +events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in relationship +to the no less clearly defined events by which it was preceded. Thus +placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of the Imperial +Government to use the advice of its local representative--or, more +precisely, of the refusal to base its policy on South African instead +of British conditions: and, as such, it convinced the Imperial +Government of the need of reviving the power of its local +representative. In other words, it is a connecting link between the High +Commissionerships of Frere and Milner. The events which followed the +recall of Frere were accepted by the British inhabitants of South Africa +as a practical demonstration of the inherent viciousness of the system +under which the decision of cardinal questions of South African +administration was left in the hands of the House of Commons, a body in +which they were not represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose +judgment was liable to be warped by irrelevant considerations of English +party politics; and one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country +and peoples whose interests were vitally affected by the manner in which +these questions were decided. The lesson of the retrocession was taken +to heart so earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the +British residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for +reform which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while +among those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South +Africa its effect was to make them think, as did Rhodes, that the +machinery of the various local British governments must be dissociated +as much as possible from the principles and methods of the Home +Government. Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination +of the Imperial factor." The expression, as he afterwards explained, +was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British connection. As +read in the context in which it was originally used, it meant merely +that the European population of Bechuanaland,[9] being mainly Boer +immigrants, could be administered more successfully by officers +responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape Colony, was +well versed in South African conditions, than by officers directly +responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a criticism of +Downing Street, and still more of English party government. In short, +Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British administration, based +on South African conditions, was ever to be carried on successfully, the +local British authority, and not the Home Government, must be the +machine employed; and in order to allow it to work freely, its action +must be made as independent as possible of Downing Street. For Downing +Street was an authority which blew hot or cold, in accordance with the +views of the party for the time being in power.[10] + + [Footnote 9: The Crown Colony--not the Protectorate--annexed + by the Cape Colony in 1895.] + + [Footnote 10: Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this + [_i.e._ the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see + it taken up in the House of Commons on one side or the other, + not from any real interest in the question, but simply + because of its consequences to those occupying the + Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing Street in + this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a + self-governing colony."] + +[Sidenote: New forces.] + +And, in point of fact, both parties in England acquiesced in this +judgment of the South African British. During the years between +Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High +Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch +did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they +lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home +Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to +local initiative. On the other hand, the progress which was made in +this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous +discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable. The +highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race, +and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur +beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the +magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch; +and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the +Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral +resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in +South African politics. The comparative decline in the activity of the +High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth +of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a +man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the +Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the +"great houses" of the Rand, to find in private effort an instrument +for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government even more +appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he had +previously relied. For the work of these industrial corporations had +powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British public. +The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous application of an +otherwise meritorious and successful effort to strengthen the British +hold upon South Africa by private enterprise. It was at once the +measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure. + +One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to +which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British +population in South Africa. Only eighteen months[11] before the Raid +the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a +despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated +on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this +despatch, and press upon President Krueger personally the necessity for +giving effect to its recommendations. These instructions were +cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German +Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would +be regarded as an interference with the _status quo_ in South Africa, +and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six +months later[12] President Krueger, in attending a "Kommers" given by +the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm II.'s +birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop +England from "kicking" the child Republic. + + [Footnote 11: June, 1894.] + + [Footnote 12: January 28th, 1895.] + +[Sidenote: Rhodes's Plan.] + +The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and +solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes +the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the +Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial +federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one +only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government +by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification +is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr. Jameson's decision +to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political +and a military point of view. But this opinion overlooks the fact that +the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did +not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's +troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the +Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the +Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual. The +representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in +armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself--so Rhodes +thought--in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution +of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf of +British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this +essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of +unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station +at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news +of Dr. Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once +Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform +Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold +Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could +bring.[13] Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at +Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant. +Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and +the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in +metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines +on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes. + + [Footnote 13: It is worth noticing that even the presence of + the German Marines at Delagoa Bay was + counterbalanced--whether by chance or design--by the + coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship with + time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.] + +If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter +comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed +their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men. +Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact +that Rhodes treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so many pawns +on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for Dr. Jameson's +action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and ruins me," was +Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had "ridden in," in +spite of his own orders to the contrary and the message to the same +effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf of the Reformers. +But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he knew, that Rhodes's +object in forcing the insurrection was not to make the Uitlanders +reduce Krueger, but to compel the Imperial Government to step in? In +this case he may well have thought that what was essential was not +that the rising should be successful, but that there should be a +rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to arrest +the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the Imperial +Government. + +According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial +Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's +visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances. In the +first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated +the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa +the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent +measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if +Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these +obstacles--if, that is to say, the intervention of the Imperial +Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his primary +object--the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially +diminished. Now Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made under date February +4th, 1896, _i.e._ five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent +with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on +the day before the Raid took place. + +[Sidenote: The reformers divided.] + +Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of +Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before--the +26th--nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement, +telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in +Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances +which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by +Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, +at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed +vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said-- + + "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the + movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a _sine qua + non_. This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto + declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete + collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders + would make the best terms they could with President Krueger." + +The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th +contained the same facts, with the further information that Captain +Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message direct +from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that Rhodes at +Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at Johannesburg that +Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however, there was another +point of view from which the situation might present itself to Dr. +Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in reply to the +High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of Rhodes's +statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once[14] inquired of Lord Rosmead, +"Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the collapse?" + + [Footnote 14: Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.] + +Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the +Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for +carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial +Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was +too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely +committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic +under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely +possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who +wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in +December, 1893: + + "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of + the Transvaal, as well as those of Cape Colony and Natal, would + be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves, for they have + never forgiven England for letting herself be beaten by the Boers + at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a proceeding which has + rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the Dutch population of + South Africa.... With me this is not a simple impression, but a + firm conviction."[15] + + [Footnote 15: "John Bull & Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.] + +[Sidenote: Jameson's decision.] + +If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his +decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor +with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the +message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside +his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to +disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram. It was a +momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a +reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived +it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg? +Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the +insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the +answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson +is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption +of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's +stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of +speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of +the expedition. Dr. Jameson reached Kruegersdorp at three o'clock on +Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had brought him +congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal was almost +within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from taking his +little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from Kruegersdorp +to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours' delay caused, +naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force should be met +and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the Rand. He did not +want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a pirate." Sir John +Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and conclusive on the +point. If the force had pushed on by road from Kruegersdorp to +Johannesburg on Wednesday evening--had not, in Willoughby's words, +"messed about" at Kruegersdorp in expectation of the welcoming +escort--Johannesburg would have been reached in safety on Thursday +morning. With Dr. Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead speeding +northwards in his special train, the way would have been prepared for +that decisive and successful action on the part of the Imperial +Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about. + +[Sidenote: Why the raid failed.] + +But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride +in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If +intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's +decision to "ride in" would have gained, at the cost of few lives and +no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four years later +at the cost of twenty thousand lives and L220,000,000. As it was, it +failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not Lord +Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr. Chamberlain at his +back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal of the +greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in the +spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the +Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which +they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led +up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form"; +if he had used "plain language" to President Krueger; and if, above +all, he had remembered--as Mr. Chamberlain reminded him--that "the +people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable +concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and +until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the +President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would +remain,"--might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire +without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword? + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain.] + +It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of +the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any +real sense--that is to say, success which would have strengthened +British supremacy and promoted the union of European South Africa--was +impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead returned to Mr. +Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The question of +concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between President +Krueger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so +questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial +Government to have derived any advantage from them. To have gained the +franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous +action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause +in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been +small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of +the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed +and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this +meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know. The ten +years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the +paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better +than the methods of the Raid was required. _Non tali auxilio, nec +defensoribus istis!_ No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage +and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their +independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and +France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these qualities +to the people of the parent stock. If such a race, embarked upon what +it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to be +overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as strong. +None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders exhibited in Mr. +Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British as evidence that +the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and determined than his +predecessors. For the first time in the history of British +administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown itself more +zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light that broke the +universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by the +catastrophe of the Raid. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS[16] + + [Footnote 16: "This is our Afrikander character. The + descendants of Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen + inter-married, and are only known at present by their + surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and call + themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more + Hollanders than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. They have + their own language, own morals and customs; they are just as + much a nation as any other."--_De Patriot_, in the course of + an article headed "A Common but Dangerous Error"--the error + in question being the assertion that "the Cape Colony is an + English colony" (translated and reproduced in _The Cape + Times_, September 3th, 1884).] + + +In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by +the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may +seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention +that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa +was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability +to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army +Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the +Cape, is still to be met with. This attitude of mind--whether it be a +consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking +at things from any but a British point of view--is still to be +observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny +that any trace of a definite plan of action, or of a concerted +purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy" against +British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population of South +Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war. It is for the +benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a view of +bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a direct +contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I +transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was +expounded by the German, Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free +State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a +word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of +Borckenhagen. + +[Sidenote: Carl Borckenhagen.] + +The passage, which is taken _verbatim_ from a work entitled, "The +Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences +gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland," +and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the +text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a +burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President +Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the +policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by +Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz. The point of view from which the +Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was +succinctly stated in an article published by the Amsterdam +_Handelsblad_ in 1881. + + "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland + in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this + trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from + Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein, + Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative + investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall + universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive + territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us + to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."[17] + + [Footnote 17: Quoted by Du Toit in _De Patriot_: translation + from the English reprint of _De Transvaalse Oorlog_.] + +Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,[18] advocated the +establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name +has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda +in the Free State, because, as editor of _The Bloemfontein Express_ up +to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most +consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist +creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the +Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn. + + [Footnote 18: Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free + State, and State-Secretary of the South African Republic in + succession to Dr. Leyds.] + +[Sidenote: The doctrine of the Bond.] + + "THE BOND PROGRAMME + + "The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its + motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa + belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the + privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute all in his + power towards the expulsion of the English usurper. The States of + South Africa to be federated in one independent Republic. + + The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation. + + Argument in justification:-- + + (_a_) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government + took place by circumstances of _force majeure_ and without the + consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of + the Afrikander or Boer nation. + + (_b_) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the + Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the + consideration agreed for. + + (_c_) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from + Natal by force of arms without just cause. + + The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in: + + (_a_) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every + Afrikander and other real friend of the cause. + + (_b_) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one + or more of the world's Powers. + + The means to accomplish those tasks are: + + Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy. + + The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a + select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause + and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such + measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest + of the members will devolve activities of a general character + under the direction of the selected chiefs. + + One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of + an effective fund, which is to be regularly sustained. Bond + members will aid each other in all relations of public life in + preference to non-members. + + In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of + importance to distinguish three categories of persons: + + (1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated + by assimilative influences with the English race, whose + restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion, + and patience. + + (2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to + relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow. + This class is the most numerous by far. + + (3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with + intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt + to exercise influence over the rest. + + * * * * * + + Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious + scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and + salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our + cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who + work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct + and conclusive arguments accessible to all. + + Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not + the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation. + + In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides + force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and + stratagem. + +[Sidenote: Anti-british methods.] + + The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of + Anglicising the Boer nation--to submerge it by the process of + assimilation. + + A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is + the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that + insidious policy. + + It is only such an attitude that will preserve the nation in its + simple faith and habits of morality, and provide safety against + the dangers of contamination and pernicious examples, with all + their fateful consequences to body and soul. + + Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and + homes. + + Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as + unpatriotic. + + Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with + the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the + rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and + the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid + of English thraldom. + + Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic + sentiments. + + Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring + English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail + link which separates the English State Church from actual + Romanism, and its proselytism _en bloc_ is only a matter of short + time. + + Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the + coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit, + at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with + spiritual authority--a policy which incites coloured people to + rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common + disaster. + + Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood, + relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base. + + As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations + could more than fill the gap left by England, and such + connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards + obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with + it. + + If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free State + becomes established--as appears certain from discoveries already + made--England will not rest until these are also hers. + + The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both + Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that + the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood + and drawers of water for the usurpers. + + There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South + Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer. + + Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is + designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its + rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious + Albion."[19] + + [Footnote 19: P. 64 _et seq._ of _The Origin of the + Anglo-Boer War Revealed_ (Hodder & Stoughton).] + +These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form +arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free +State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through +the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual +intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881 +onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in +detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen +in his paper, _The Bloemfontein Express_, on April 7th, 1881, to which +Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the +pamphlet, _De Transvaalse Oorlog_ (The Transvaal War), which he issued +from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist +creed, as thus formulated, was preached consistently in the Free +State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet the +exigencies of Colonial politics. + +None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political +organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the +Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact +the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics +of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct +organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the +Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And +this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was +sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was +intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal +Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly +inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be +adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without +exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.[20] + + [Footnote 20: Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer + population is organised in the Transvaal into _Het Volk_, and + in the Orange River Colony into the _Oranjie Unie_; both + practically identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.] + +[Sidenote: The origin of the Bond.] + +In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the +predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South +Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced, must +include some account of the origin and methods of this remarkable +organisation. + +The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles +written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in _De Patriot_, +a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du +Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that +in 1881 he claimed that _De Patriot_ had done more than any other +single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from +British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which +drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation, +that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete +"war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the +Transvaal burghers. + + "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish + the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened + through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation + for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of + South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a + confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We + can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one + hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let + them take that away, and the confederation under the free + Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English + flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation. + And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice + is the best for them: they must just have Simon's Bay as a naval + and military station on the road to India, and give over all the + rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."[21] + + [Footnote 21: Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first + leaf torn) containing an English translation of _De + Transvaalse Oorlog_, p. 8.] + +This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by +reiterated appeals to racial passion: + + "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops + and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly + done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us + Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make + war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated, + language and all. And this is well." + +[Sidenote: The objects of the Bond.] + +When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind +of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit +proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His _modus operandi_ is +similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says +_De Patriot_, must boycott all English traders, except only those who +are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements, +shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be +replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The +Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with +cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he +cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000 +cartridges made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have begun to +make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." For the +Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially +necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of +combating the growing use of the English language. "English +education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and +nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against +the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our +family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak +English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope." + +Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being +by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after +life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain, +won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of +Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love +of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the +contemptuous Hollanders whom Krueger had invited to serve the Republic. +Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself +created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance +to an Empire-state. + +The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in _De Transvaalse +Oorlog_, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through +the establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of South +Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing body +(_bestuur_), with provincial, district, and ward _besturen_. The +central _bestuur_ was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape +Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who +were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the +component states." The provincial _besturen_, consisting of one +representative from each of the district _besturen_, were to meet +every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.[22] + + [Footnote 22: _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, pp. 7 and 8.] + +The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in +1882. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its +members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in +South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme +of Principles" was the article: + + In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only + suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government + existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our + national development must be a united South Africa under its own + flag. + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's influence.] + +And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the +earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free +State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet +Congress, however, the "Farmers' Protection Association" was +amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, and the influence of Mr. +J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified +"programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the +undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a +nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the +country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could +hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more +progressive section of the farming class. He also knew that an +organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would +rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the +growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of +the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its +own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were +omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members +were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent +Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond +secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and +it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain +itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main +body of the representatives elected by the British population; and +from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to +control the Legislature of the Colony by making it impossible for any +ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond members, although he +refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen into office. To have +done this latter might have united the British population and their +representatives in a solid phalanx, and endangered the success of the +effort to separate the British settlers in the country districts from +the more recent arrivals from England--mostly townsmen--which remained +a fruitful source of Afrikander influence up to the time of the +Jameson Raid. By representing the new British population, which +followed in the wake of the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers" +and adventurers and not genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not +merely to widen the natural line of cleavage between the townsman and +the countryman, but actually to detach the older British settlers from +sympathy with the mother country, and, by drawing them within the +sphere of Afrikander nationalist aspirations, to make them share its +own antagonism to British supremacy. + +[Sidenote: Merriman and the Bond.] + +But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old +leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw +from Mr. J. X. Merriman--then a strong Imperialist in close +association with Mr. J. W. Leonard--a striking rebuke. The speech in +question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most +"English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with +complete appropriateness, in _The Cape Times_ of July 10th, 1899. The +struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years before was +then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a member of a +ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed purpose of +"combating the British Government." + + "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of + localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a + question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral + part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men + up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind + whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the + British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as + privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the + Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison + began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come + to this--Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in + South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of + loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who + should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the + idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole + teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was + between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent + section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in + the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the + British Government. In any other country such an organisation + could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it + has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes + well for the British Government could have read the leading + articles of the _Zuid Africaan_, and _Express_, and _De Patriot_, + in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that the + maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the + object they have in view are absolutely different things. My + quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its + main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount + power in South Africa." + +This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence +as this--"in any other country such an organisation could not have +grown, but here, _among a scattered population_, it has insidiously +and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of +the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this +diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so +faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great +statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British +Empire,"--these things together make Mr. Merriman's Grahamstown speech +one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of +the period. + +[Sidenote: Change of Bond policy.] + +In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first +and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the +place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the +South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each +represented by two delegates. This meeting revealed the practical +difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from adopting the +definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in the +Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the Cape +Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the +latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5, confirmed the Cape delegates +in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial +rather than inter-state lines. The result of the divergences of aim +manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape +Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond, +delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was +formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to +the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of +the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced. + + "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed + towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and + resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much + depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead + guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be + more cautious and guarded for the future." + +And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when +all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be +merged in the consciousness of a new and common nationality--pointing +out, however, that the advent of that day depended on "you and me, my +fellow Bond members." + +[Sidenote: Rhodes and Hofmeyr.] + +Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured +only by the complete separation of the local governments from the +Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the +manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European +communities of South Africa--the task which the Imperial Government +had abandoned as hopeless. As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr +during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the +Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter +of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance +afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South +Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon +which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance. Hofmeyr probably +never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was +the inevitable _denouement_ to which the administration of South +Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never +wavered in his loyalty to the British connection. But there was a +great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common, +which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished, +would leave each free to choose the path--Republican or Imperial--by +which the last stage was to be traversed and the goal of South +African unity finally attained. + +The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such +peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the +subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts +of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to +attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the +limits of a few pages. None the less, there is one incident in his +political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple +reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to +the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it +developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the +years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true +to the aim which it had at first openly avowed--the aim of +establishing a united South Africa under its own flag. And second, +that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united +South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both +these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the +overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these +overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the +Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance +between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation. The occasion which +led to them was the opening of the railway at Bloemfontein in 1890--a +railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly +arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which +afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a +means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity. +The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the +Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898. + +[Sidenote: Rhodes and Borckenhagen.] + + "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at + Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I + think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many + there, and especially--and I speak of him with the greatest + respect--a gentleman who is dead, Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me + and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I + never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will + tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards + came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my + speech. 'Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said, + 'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South + Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No; + there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,' + he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,' + he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of + course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No; + you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to + forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool, + because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by + yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his + _Express_ towards myself, and I was made full sorry at times by + the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his mind--an + independent South Africa."[23] + + [Footnote 23: _Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and + Speeches._ By Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.] + +The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently +satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly +developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it. +The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had +cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to +see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked +truth.[24] From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its +chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its +bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the +other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own +nationality. From that moment the Bond fell back upon the policy of +1881. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an active +nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the advocacy of +anti-British aims increased in boldness and in definiteness as the +Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing armaments. + + [Footnote 24: _Ons Land_, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr + himself, and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond, + published a paean of triumph over the surrender of Dr. + Jameson's troopers at Doornkop. "Afrikanderdom has awakened + to a sense of earnestness which we have not observed since + the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the Limpopo, as far + as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a new + inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South + Africa.... The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had + already begun to dilute and weaken our national blood, + gradually turned aside before the new current that permeated + our people.... Now or never the foundation of a + wide-embracing nationalism must be laid.... The partition + wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a policy + of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the + psychological moment has arrived; now our people have + awakened all over South Africa; a new glow illumines our + hearts; let us lay the foundation-stone of a real United + South Africa on the soil of a pure and all-comprehensive + national sentiment."] + +[Sidenote: Effects of the raid.] + +We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation +in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration, +controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George +Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial +Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain +the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over +them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the +British Crown. It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military +resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like +resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South +Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts +made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African +unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the +maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts, +prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated +by the Jameson Raid. All attempts to secure the reunion of South +Africa under the British flag having failed alike under Imperial and +local British initiative, the way was open for the Afrikander +nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan of a united +South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated in the year +immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal. + +In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were +discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the +advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and +encouraged. It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the +Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but +Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated +the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the +integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch +subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March +4th, 1896), Mr. J. G. Fraser, the head of the moderate party which +followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr. +Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of +Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the +"closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the +terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th, +1897. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view +of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the +general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krueger, who had +ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened the +lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious and +educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony, commenced +methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to the +adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies. + +[Sidenote: Situation in 1896.] + +But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and +immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to +have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we +recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally +ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the +sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the +long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the +Bond, was revealed. The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for +which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion, +was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at +a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in +South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have +dislodged her. And more important still was the fact that the Raid, +with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all, +the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal +throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and +compelled the Imperial Government to pledge itself to obtain the +redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders. + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's policy.] + +Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain, +for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown +power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at +Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any +satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought +about through the agency of the High Commissioner. He, therefore, +invited President Krueger to visit England in the hope that his own +personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the +weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of +Transvaal unrest. But President Krueger refused to confer with the +Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis +of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such +as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr. Chamberlain, +therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed +conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to +destroy it, proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would +enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great +Britain as paramount Power. His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in +the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial +Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch opinion as +the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was to be +successfully applied to the Transvaal Government. In the speech[25] in +which he sketched the main lines of this policy he declared +emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be maintained +at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be permitted under +any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders were +to be redressed: + + [Footnote 25: 1896.] + + "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able + in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as + it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs + the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population + in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion--the united + opinion--which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no + power in Africa can resist." + +With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that +Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a +policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his +"confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the +paramount Power. But it must be remembered that the evidence of the +real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the +preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated +Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and +politicians in England; and if these men had attempted to impart +their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed from the +sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that "British +subjects" under responsible government could be anything but loyal to +the Imperial tie. + +But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces +of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African +situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success, +unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed +in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity. +When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of +the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship +for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to +dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time +past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in +Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to +the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and +successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize +Bechuanaland. His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime +Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the +ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in +1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and +indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a +third time. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +A YEAR OF OBSERVATION + + +Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so +different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. +Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the +man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in +South Africa--a position always difficult, but now more than ever +arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had +been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner--as he +then was--to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and +pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. His +_metier_ was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing +with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest) +for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to +Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the +Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable +assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, +in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent methods +of raising revenue--the death duties. The principle of the graduated +death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked out the +elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and enabled them +eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, however +ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of +pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was +certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar +of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.[26] Whatever direct +knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the +impression created by his book _England in Egypt_. This was a work +which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English +statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative +system, working in a political society full of intrigue and +international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of +insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an +active association with so accomplished a master of financial and +administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment +for a colonial administrator. + + [Footnote 26: Mr. Bodley, in his _Coronation of King Edward + VII._, remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected + during the mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at + that time (1902) "attained eminence in any branch of public + life." These three were Mr. H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore + (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord Milner.] + +[Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.] + +But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their +view of the appointment from the opinions expressed by the many +prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The +leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of +the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir +Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March +28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained +admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life. +"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount +high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most +grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers," +pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all +affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked +throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of +our time has been received with a larger measure both of the +approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The +office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and +responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only +"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront +the new High Commissioner for South Africa: + + "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an + intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should + arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as + belongs to any man of our acquaintance." + +Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had undertaken +his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies the reasoned +basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his earliest +political convictions was the belief that-- + + "there was no political object comparable in importance with that + of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the + United States]: the severance of another link in the great + Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill + any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed + to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to + render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide + State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had + ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one + absolutely believes, even failure--personal failure, I mean, for + the cause itself is not going to fail--would be preferable to an + easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere." + +[Sidenote: Personal traits.] + +This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the +paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and +already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of +all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was +closest to the life--"worthy of all praise and all affection." The +quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore +witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those +who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in +any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of the +Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in Cairo would +light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman who had once +been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue officials still +hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. Such men had no +claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts of intellect; +but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his nature. "He was +so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining his name and +personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But the other +side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and inflexible +resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be brought +into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his South +African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to be +accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner +became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to +secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon +the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear +mental vision--never more clear than in South Africa--became clouded +by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be +further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the +Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English +ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who +had universally inspired all his former associates, whether equals or +subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever bitterness was +displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer and Afrikander +leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due to their +perception that he was then--as always--a source of strength and an +inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as their +rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated +Bismarck--because he was the strong man on the other side. + +Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception +of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he +believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire, +irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship. +It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an +opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the +cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years +of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs +of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried +him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen +who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war, +when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him. +But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood +the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as +because they were by this time convinced of his complete mastery of +the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is to this +inability to understand the facts of the South African situation, as +he had learnt them, that we must attribute the comparative feebleness +shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the perverse attempt which +was made by the Liberal party, after the General Election of 1906, to +revoke the final arrangements of his administration. The interval that +separated Lord Milner's knowledge of South Africa from that of the +Liberal ministers was profound; but even the Unionist chiefs showed +but slight appreciation of the unassailable validity of the +administrative decisions with which they had identified themselves, +when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these decisions again, and +somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal of the nation. + +[Sidenote: Arrival at Cape Town.] + +Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual +moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and +the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point. +In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded +the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of +1896--the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the +freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the +London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the +appearance of a British squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the despatch +of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident +determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to +repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of +amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during +the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more +conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in +this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir +Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir +William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was +assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a +trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the +Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported +on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than +reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had +been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise +remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon +the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to +assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the +Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes. + +[Sidenote: Milner's thoroughness.] + +Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with +the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he +attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the +problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month of +anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was there +anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, or in +the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from putting +his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the +reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration--a question +in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved--was +a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required +by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of +"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved, +therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country +districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch +population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and +Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible +to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial +Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of +his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and +September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia +(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898). +And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the +Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"--the former in order that he might +read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to +open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most helps a +man to know the character of his neighbour. + +Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the +speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear +and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period +he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of +President Krueger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of +the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in +view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High +Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions +relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which +some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and +custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate +matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of +these questions--questions which he handled with equal insight and +decision--must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by +which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of +which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa +depended--the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in +the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its +allegiance to the British Crown. + +[Sidenote: His friendliness to the Boers.] + +The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the +Transvaal Government was one that was consistent alike with his +personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and +enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival +he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and +through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on +terms of intimacy with President Krueger, that he desired, as it were, +to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new +High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to +retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic +hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the +discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect +friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired, +on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope, +therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic +controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser +matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krueger +and himself. + +This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired +to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first +the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street +and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as +possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid +unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President +Krueger, was manifested in all he did at this time. In the course of +the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee by the +British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was asked to +decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of President +Krueger, should come first upon the list at the public banquet. He +replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President Krueger, as +the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this occasion, of +all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most careful to +avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the South +African Republic or its chief magistrate."[27] + + [Footnote 27: The incident is otherwise interesting as + affording the first sign of that confidence of the British + population in Lord Milner, which, steadily increasing as the + final and inevitable struggle approached, earned for him at + length the unfaltering support of British South Africa. After + the Rand celebrations were over, he was informed that his + advice had been put into effect with "very considerable + difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: "The + new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look + to him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we + do this, let us obey him in a matter like this."] + +[Sidenote: Milner and the Conventions.] + +While to President Krueger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot +arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the +Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform +there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But +before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will +not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make +things as easy as possible for President Krueger." More than this, he +had almost as little belief in the utility of the Conventions[28] as +Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers did, or did not, +call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small matter--an +etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was essential +was that men of British blood should not be kept under the heel of the +Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance of the London +Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a remedy, were +insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, such as the +attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury to +industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration, +and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical +observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord +Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of +the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of +grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the +subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial +Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions, +therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers +denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of the text, the +Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma. +Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon +the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain +for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum +of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in +the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is +essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere +diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British +Government." + + [Footnote 28: Apart from the question of the validity of the + preamble to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two + Conventions--the London Convention (1884), and the Swaziland + Convention (1894)--were in force between the South African + Republic and Great Britain. The relations of the Imperial + Government to the Free State were regulated by the + Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand + River Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's + time.] + +[Sidenote: Transvaal affairs.] + +Lord Milner's hope that President Krueger might meet him half-way, +although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of +foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour. +After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the +attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly +less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri" +Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's +Jubilee,[29] and at the same period the first and only step was taken +that offered a genuine promise of reform from within. The Industrial +Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive at the +request of President Krueger, surprised the Uitlander community by +conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that left +no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the +conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded +a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints +put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr. +Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of +the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the +Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations +of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months +later President Krueger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or +of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there +remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government +being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner +consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the +Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon +began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.[30] + + [Footnote 29: These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey + Woolls-Sampson and Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to + sign the petition of appeal--an act of submission which + President Krueger required of the Johannesburg Reformers, + before he released them from Pretoria gaol. They did so on + the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself + responsible for their safety; since they and the other + Reformers, with the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their + arms on the faith of Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would + obtain reasonable reforms from President Krueger for the + Uitlanders.] + + [Footnote 30: In the question of the Swaziland border, the + affair of Bunu, and the continued and increasing + ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, the Boer Government + manifested its old spirit of aggression and duplicity. All + these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and wearisome + negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled + firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly + discussion.] + +If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krueger and the +Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of the +Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to notice, +the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee +celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which +he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch +in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion +in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses +or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial +Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued: + + "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar + interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware, + have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different + sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am + able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the + loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen. + People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as + well as the African natives, have vied with one another in + demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the + throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of + feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration + of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement + which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the + feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much + stronger than has sometimes been believed. In my opinion, the + impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her Majesty's + Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South Africa, + and is likely to have a permanent value."[31] + + [Footnote 31: This short despatch has been given practically + _in extenso_. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it + was communicated to the Press some three months after it had + been received.] + +[Sidenote: First impressions of the Dutch.] + +It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with +the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord +Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch +itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the +unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech, +and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the +result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support +the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal. +This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to +establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of +the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived +notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an +"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his +first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded +it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be +remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very +limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was +written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in South +Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had been +confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; that is +to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the Cape +Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely +identified, from a social point of view, with the official and +mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs. + +What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was +prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone +of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the +Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June +23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had +happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change +in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr. +Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an +imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? _Nemo repente fuit +turpissimus._ Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was +right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from +ready appreciation to grave remonstrance. + +The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an +element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which +posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in +South Africa to have been a just and necessary, or a needless and +aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the reader must +first be possessed of some more precise information of the political +situation in the Cape Colony at this time. + +[Sidenote: The Sprigg ministry.] + +At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in +motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the +new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape +Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May, +1898. The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg +upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid +(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last +thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander +Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet--Mr. +Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and +Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct +representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington, +who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been +himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon +Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the +intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully +and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It +was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry +of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British interests was +too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more decided advocates +of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his more or less +friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions of the Dutch +extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, offering in +itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by Mr. Hofmeyr +to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be adopted, had +secured for the Government the votes of the majority of the Dutch +members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the subserviency of +the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was afforded upon Lord +Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home Government determined to +reinforce the South African garrison, in order to strengthen its +demand upon the Transvaal Government for the repeal of the Aliens +Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition was offered by the +Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of barrack accommodation +in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for placing obstacles in the +way of its accomplishment. These difficulties were successfully +overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the reinforcements arrived +without giving rise to any political excitement.[32] + + [Footnote 32: By August the South African garrison had been + raised to the very moderate strength of rather more than + 8,000 troops.] + +[Sidenote: Navy contribution bill.] + +A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond +to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, in order that Sir +Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among the other +prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the Colonial +Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee celebrations in +England.[33] This was the beginning of a disagreement between the +Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in seriousness after +Sir Gordon's return from England, until it culminated in the +resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898). The offer of an annual +contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was affirmed in +principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was understood in +England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the British +connection. In point of fact the measure received practically no +support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of Parliament, +on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's action in +the matter was employed as an effective argument to stimulate +disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr. Hofmeyr, +however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an organisation, to +commit itself to any overt opposition to the principle of a +contribution to the British Navy--an attitude which would have been +obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of loyalty--and with +characteristic irony the third reading of the Navy Contribution Bill +was eventually passed, a year later, without a division in the +Legislative Assembly by a Ministry[34] placed in office by Bond votes +for the declared purpose of opposing the policy of the Imperial +Government on the one question--the reform of the Transvaal +Administration--upon the issue of which depended the maintenance of +British supremacy in South Africa. + + [Footnote 33: Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister + of the Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his + presence rendered any the less desirable by the fact that Sir + Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice, was also attending the + Jubilee in England.] + + [Footnote 34: The Schreiner Ministry.] + +[Sidenote: Rhodes's position.] + +But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the +Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to +dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into +the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a +tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir +Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed +for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the +Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist +organisation, called the South African League, was established with +the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa. +Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention +of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of +devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But +upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the +Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much +warmth by the British population at Capetown in July, 1897, that he +had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same +position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was +afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr. +Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the +report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility +against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the +Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of +which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters +to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had +adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as +their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new +combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman +and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898, +found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for +the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually +destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now +almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape +electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution" +into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its +recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with +Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader, +depending in no less a degree upon the Dutch population of the +Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that threatened +to deprive this population of its parliamentary preponderance. And in +a few months' time, as we shall see, the Schreiner-Bond coalition took +for its immediate aim the prevention of British interference in the +Transvaal; while the Progressive party came, no less openly, to avow +its determination to promote and support the action of the Imperial +Government in seeking to obtain redress for the Uitlander grievances. + +The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well +known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at +Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too +authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance +which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources +of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For +the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or +party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and +ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and +circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our +question, which among these facts of personal observation and +experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape +Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of +the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer +of creative literature, to exhibit the working of the human mind. In +the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only what "has" +happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged and ennobled +by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen. But such +satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is at the +disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and running +over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of poetry, we +know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech the +development of the great South African drama reached its +"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner +was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the +"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred. + +[Sidenote: No reform in the Transvaal.] + +The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the +determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a +period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all +prospect of "reform from within." The treatment accorded to the report +of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established +the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints +of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The +Commission was created by President Krueger; it was in effect the +fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the +grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own +officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the +Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their +recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most +serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The +Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all, +but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into +effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no +loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the +Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of +burgher predominance. If what President Krueger was waiting for was a +convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This +reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk +Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krueger in +the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to +set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was +thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to +the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the +industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal +devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on +the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the +recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as +subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report +had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from committee +to Volksraad, until very little of the original recommendations +remained, the Government took action. In addition to an immaterial +reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the Netherlands Railway +Company--a concession subsequently alleged to have been the price paid +by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further inquiry into its +affairs--it was announced that, with the object of lessening the cost +of living on the Rand, the import duties upon certain necessaries in +common use would be reduced, in accordance with the recommendations of +the Commissioners on this point; but that, since it was obviously +inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the Republic, the duties upon +certain other articles of the same class would be raised to an extent +more than counterbalancing the loss upon the reduction. _Parturiunt +montes; nascitur ridiculus mus._ + +[Sidenote: Krueger re-elected president.] + +This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the +closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr. +Krueger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for +the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his +candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal, +had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors. +The figures--Krueger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert +(Commandant-General) 2,001--were additional evidence of the impotency +or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The first act +of President Krueger, on his return to power, was to dismiss Chief +Justice Kotze. Mr. Kotze's struggle for the independence of the law +courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with what +was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President Krueger +had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No. 1 of +1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the +right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their +opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that +extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the +entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were +adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged +through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President +undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the +independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged +themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In +February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotze wrote to remind President Krueger +that his promise remained unfulfilled,[35] withdrawing at the same +time the conditional pledge not to exercise the "testing" right given +by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotze under Law No. 1, +compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had supported the +Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to resign, and +appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, as Chief +Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the Reformers +in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had declared that +"no honourable man could possibly accept the position of a judge so +long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was now rendered +subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were thus deprived of +their last constitutional safeguard against the injustice of the Boer +and Hollander oligarchy. + + [Footnote 35: There appears to have been some question as to + whether the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to + introduce the proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or + in 1898. Chief Justice de Villiers held that the latter date + was contemplated by the President. But the point is + immaterial, since President Krueger denied in the Volksraad, + after the dismissal of Mr. Kotze, that he had ever given an + undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody + else.] + +[Sidenote: His reactionary policy.] + +This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President +Krueger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the +recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of +Chief Justice Kotze, that he was determined not merely to set himself +against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under +which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the +fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority; +he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in +possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in +increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war. +Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from his mission to Europe, he +had opened up communications with European Powers, that placed him in +a position to avail himself to the full of the possible embarrassment +of Great Britain through international rivalries or disagreements. In +South Africa he had carried through a treaty of offensive and +defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had received more than +one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander nationalism had been +kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony. + +These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the +disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal +still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the +complaisance with which President Krueger's reactionary policy was +regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that +Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling +results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee +despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities +for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that +he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may +presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were +lost. + +In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At +every little town and _dorp_--wherever, in fact, he went--he conversed +with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness; +and all the speeches that he made in reply to the addresses of +welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when +there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come +from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech +with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt--a feeling +which his audience must share--that now there was to be peace in South +Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner +were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to +this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was +accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter) +Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit +as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of +Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." The +expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp +reproof from _Ons Land_. From this and many other such incidents it +must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of +the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination. + +[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.] + +[Sidenote: "Hands off" the Transvaal.] + +And so it came about that in the months that President Krueger was busy +shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise +that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the +Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the +Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. It made no +difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was always, +"_Our_ Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened both in +the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) spring +and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord +Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial +Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape +Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch +population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly +friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control +of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than +anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord +Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, _Ons +Land_ presented the most authoritative and significant expression of +the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and +unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of _Ons Land_ rarely +contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence +of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more +subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the +attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than +of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented +and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it +than they were in that of any foreign country. And, in South African +matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, was not +merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action for the +improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, it took +a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum and +substance of Bond policy. + +Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the +Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely +against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state +of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While +there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the +Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the +Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that +Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the +Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and +the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he +have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a +constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there +was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its +stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest +of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete. + +[Sidenote: Milner at Graaf Reinet.] + +It was with this accumulated evidence in his mind that Lord Milner +travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf Reinet, +expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the ordinary sort +at the opening of the railway on the following day. The conventional +expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely veiled hypocrisy +and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at the time when +the whole weight of their influence was thrown against Great Britain +on the only South African question that really mattered, had become +nauseating even to his serene temper and generous disposition. He was +wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or unfriendly reply from the +Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable proposals of the Imperial +Government. Late at night there was brought to him, in the train, a +copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander +Bond, which was to be presented to him on the morrow. It contained, in +more than usually pointed language, a protest against "the charges of +disloyalty made against the Bond," and a request that the High +Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the expression of its +unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine how, in ominous +contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, something +exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, something which +emphasised the inconsistency of these formal professions of attachment +to the throne with the very practical hostility of their authors to +British policy, struck the High Commissioner with peculiar force. The +Dutch, who, under British rule, enjoyed--one might almost say +abused--every privilege of citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite +prepared to see the British excluded, under Dutch rule, from these +same privileges in the Transvaal. More than that, they were determined +to employ all the agencies at their command to prevent any effective +interference with the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt +that the time had come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the +impressions which had been accumulating in his mind, he wrote down +then and there his answer, which was delivered on the following day. + + "Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her + Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be + allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason + could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully + well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its + great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural + disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the + position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her + Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in + material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress + are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means + always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely + free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging + the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of + law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and + secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external + interference. You have--at least as regards the white + races--perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not + been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and + gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government, + justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy. + And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that + gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack + without your being asked to contribute one pound to that + protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of + course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not. + + "And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have + to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may + put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or + less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to + shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the + population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly + believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live + under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and + regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at + the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider; if + political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of + the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard + language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the + usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody + else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously + absurd--that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges + would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered. + +[Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.] + + "What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case, + what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the + fact that the political controversies of this country at present + unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the + relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South African + Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any + difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once + vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality, + espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that + they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the + politician--often the best of men, though singularly + injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another + country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be + in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very + much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his + fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly + opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case + people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy + with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie + of relationship which unites a great portion of the population + here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly + natural--to a point which gives some ground for the assertion + that they seem to care much more for the independence of the + Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to + which they themselves belong. + + "For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in + espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open + rupture between that country and the British Government. They + loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they + think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government + that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great + number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that + is a way to prevent such a calamity. + + "But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the + assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the + independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has + itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order + to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact + opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it + is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes + of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they + are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the + Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the + semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that + country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only + on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly + reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of + the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's + moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is + not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government + which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at + all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the + retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its + deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it + devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every + impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers + which threaten it are internal. + +[Sidenote: Milner's appeal to the Dutch.] + + "Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that + this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all + that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation + that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or + that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that + quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be + instantly rejected because it was British. But the same does not + apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to + those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy + for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of + disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be + suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I + believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African + Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the + British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their + influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the + Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its + Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing + it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even + more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its + administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa, + such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the + direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate + troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than + thirty years, is to be found."[36] + + [Footnote 36: _Cape Times_, March 4th, 1898.] + +Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No +such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High +Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now +eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action +and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect, +and grew uneasy. + +The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is +the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you +refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of +all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the +Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and the tone and +temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of +South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State." + +The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was +the weight of inevitable truth. + +A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to +urge President Krueger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he +says: + + "You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at + Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in _The + Cape Times_. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled + hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble + ahead.... + + "Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the + future lies in the attitude of President Krueger and his vain hope + of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened + minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using + the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true + Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent + discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their + mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs + cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it + will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all + of us. + + "I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in + the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and + good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between + the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37] + + [Footnote 37: Cd. 369.] + +[Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.] + +Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the +British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased +by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had +been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the +essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been +vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had +done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to +do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was +unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the +different sections of the British population were manifesting a +tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this +movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge +the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time +past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population +of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by +any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary +representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the +Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry. The +indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, and the +growing evidence of President Krueger's determination to ride +rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed +to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of +the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the +common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of +British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid +British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The +Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing +to Mr. Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost +united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament, +resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was +approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. +Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38] + + [Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship + by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a + Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who + had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T. + Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.] + +[Sidenote: Redistribution.] + +Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the +parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He +had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his +Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to +throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was +the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the +resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned +on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave notice of a vote of +"no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime +the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous +question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council +of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the +Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution, +wider and more momentous issues were at stake. The counts in the +Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out in _Ons Land_, were (1) +its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a +warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the +South African Republic. Against these crimes it had nothing to place, +except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas, +as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the +Bond journal. _The Cape Times_, on the other hand, declared with equal +frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests +of President Krueger and the South African Republic, or those of the +Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon +the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when, +on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the +House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any +"sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the +"sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the +Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days +later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on +Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circumstances +Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the +electorate--a course justified by constitutional usage--and Parliament +was dissolved. + + [Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression + of the revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.] + + [Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James + Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four + others--voted _with_ the Ministry for the Redistribution + Bill, but _against_ it on the "no confidence" motion (with + the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate + Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the + Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.] + +[Sidenote: The general election, 1898.] + +The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no +little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were +supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and +other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by +President Krueger and his agents from the revenues of the +Transvaal.[41] Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously +moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the +Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained +a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to which they +belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented the +sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The +objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive +form by _Ons Land_, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to +oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in +politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation +of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words, +to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the +diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general +preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The +under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch +population may be understood from the fact that the following frank +appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was +published in the columns of _Ons Land_: + + [Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a + candidate financed from Pretoria.] + + "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it + must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The + majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go + bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two + Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the + stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at + least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape + Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two + Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger + [_i.e._ British] are unable to continue the fight. One day the + question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the + arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon + the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side + we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters. + This is the real point at issue; and in this light every + Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we + expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority + of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on + the sword when God's time comes."[42] + + [Footnote 42: As translated in _South Africa_, October 15th, + 1898.] + +At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become +what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of +rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander +nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from +certain extracts from the _Studenten Blad_ of the Theological Seminary +of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by _The Albert +Times_. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by +November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students +had at that date joined the Boer forces: + +[Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.] + + "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors + of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as + their heart's blood--a people that followed our fathers to the + new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and + snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom? + Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the + land with God's aid and with their blood. But England is not + satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people, + and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our + religion! Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I + cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought + of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand + of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an + unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches + us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be + here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from + personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private + individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however, + I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must + regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf + that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief + reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the + enemies of our religion." + +At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were +over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned. +Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned +both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former +constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus +vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return +of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take +place until the 15th. As all three constituencies were expected to +elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of +the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and +this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes +had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43] + + [Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39 + Progressive members were returned. A very careful and + reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304 + votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901 + for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no + Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than + 137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective + majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives, + therefore, were entitled, on their aggregate vote, to a + majority of six.] + +[Sidenote: Milner's impartiality.] + +These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is +significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner +discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the +Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had +polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a +minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry +should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until +the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in +the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce +one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the +Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution +of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The +partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was +exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided +without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor's +warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to +enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the +unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation +and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the +constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply +is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue +warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the +Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be +completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as +the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was, +no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair +prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to +put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have +failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A +loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with +or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run +the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and +of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might +otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But, +as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of +party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence +his judgment. While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and +criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed +himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his +constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one +side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of +administration was made by Governor's warrants up to September 30th, +and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a +proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued. + + [Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord + Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But, + it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor's + expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his + mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his + case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the + incident is not without significance.] + +[Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.] + +On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no +confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House assembled +with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to +the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members +of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close +association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The +latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided +with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The +Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg. +Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since +he had found himself unable to work in association with a party in +which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not +strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a +measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now +passed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British +population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new +elections held in April, 1899.[46] + + [Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full + strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was + chosen Speaker of the House.] + + [Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution + Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was + carried on December 2nd, 1898, without a division.] + +Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief +that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the +Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in +October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony +pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the +affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and +more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have +seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the +northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal +the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been +despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with +authority and funds calculated to enable him to enlist the active +sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria +Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by +Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the +actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and +even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was +appointed to the office of State Attorney.[47] With the exception of +Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the +control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists +dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in +these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between +the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become +increasingly unsatisfactory.[48] + + [Footnote 47: The State-Secretaryship was offered first to + Mr. Abraham Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was + declined (_Memoirs of Paul Krueger_, vol. ii., p. 297). The + Cape Afrikanders desired the appointment of Mr. Smuts.] + + [Footnote 48: On May 7th, 1897, President Krueger had formally + requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at + issue between the two Governments under the Convention to be + submitted to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss + Republic. To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on + October 10th, that the relationship of Great Britain to the + South African Republic being that of a suzerain Power, it + would be impossible for the Imperial Government to permit the + intervention of a foreign Power. On April 16th, 1898, in a + despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly, + President Krueger claims that the South African Republic is an + independent State, and denies the existence of any + "suzerainty" on the part of Great Britain. In forwarding this + despatch Lord Milner made the apposite comment that the + propriety of employing the term suzerainty to express the + rights possessed by Great Britain is an "etymological + question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December 15th, + accepts President Krueger's declaration that he is willing to + abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim + of suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and + demands the immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch + of May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a + sovereign international State"; and on June 13th Mr. + Chamberlain replies that he has no intention of continuing + the discussion.] + +[Sidenote: Milner's visit to England.] + +In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England. +Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th, +was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due +in part to the necessity for medical treatment;[49] but, in any case, +it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to +Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South +African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the +19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February +14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was +engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody +else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs +was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss +of South Africa. + + [Footnote 49: Owing to a slight affection of the eye.] + +During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient +study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What +he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch +ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in +the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact, +as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was +in a position of distinct inferiority to the Dutch; and this although +the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal and the +Free State were states subject to the authority of Great Britain as +paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord Milner urged +upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of putting an end +to an intolerable state of things which showed no capacity of righting +itself; of pressing for justice to the British population of the +Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain it. That such a +policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he nor any one +else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war actually was. +The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange Free State, now +bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party of the Bond now +in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even the most +moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the British +Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the +Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt +whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And +in any case he felt that there was no option for the British +Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a +shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved +in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the +danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater, +the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting ourselves +be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and indeed +totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the affection of +the South African British or on the respect either of British or +Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger may well have +seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils on both hands, +he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go forward, to make +one supreme effort to save a situation which was rapidly becoming a +hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the forces which were +gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing on every side, +could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the euthanasia of +British dominion in South Africa. + +[Sidenote: His verdict.] + +It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the +magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of +herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of +ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander +ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in +statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of +the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my +might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at +Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing +conviction of the rightness of our cause." + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +UNDER WHICH FLAG? + + +Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered +in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain +had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the +dynamite contract in its new form (_i.e._ as, in effect, a "privileged +importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking") +was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of +the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on +the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's +reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long +after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the +opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to +interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of +the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the +agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at +Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.[50] This event was followed by +the petition for protection, which Sir William Butler (who was +General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High +Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January +4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up +of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the +Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April +14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March +24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which +it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony +and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial +Government.[51] + + [Footnote 50: "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a + British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his + own house by a Boer policeman. Edgar, who was a man of + singularly fine physique, and both able and accustomed to + take care of himself, was returning home at about midnight, + when one of three men standing by, who, as it afterwards + transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive + remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other + insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the + police, and Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few + yards off. There was no attempt at concealment or escape; + Edgar was an old resident and perfectly well known. Four + policemen came.... The fact, however, upon which all + witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door, + Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a + word of English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic + English, Scotch, and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped + him dead in the arms of his wife, who was standing in the + passage a foot or so behind him."--FITZPATRICK'S _The + Transvaal from Within_.] + + [Footnote 51: For particulars of these events the reader is + referred to _The Transvaal from Within_.] + +[Sidenote: The Uitlanders' petition.] + +Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly +statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders[52] with +the memorable words: "The case for intervention is overwhelming." +Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th was written at +white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in no less a +degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully informed upon +every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the fact that all +that is essential for the full comprehension of the second Reform +Movement at Johannesburg--the salient features of which have been +outlined above--is to be found within the limits of this brief and +notable State document: + + [Footnote 52: The petition, with its 21,684 signatures, + reached Lord Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the + British Agent at Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by + the High Commissioner to England in the mail of March 29th. + The same ship, the _Carisbrook Castle_, carried Dr. Leyds, + who was returning to Europe after a visit to Pretoria. Sir W. + Greene had returned to South Africa in the same ship with + Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government + Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing + Transvaal matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February + 19th.] + +[Sidenote: The intervention despatch.] + + "Having regard to the critical character of the South African + situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's + Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under + ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of + importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to + South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with + each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing + the whole position. + + "The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident. + But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was + certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing + of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal + blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It + was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt + with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at the + trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor, in + fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a + particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more + in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of + the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to + deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh + and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen + to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent + ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds + for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused + was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African + League, but the officials of the League were forced into action + by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances + once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the + smouldering but profound discontent of the population who + constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests + disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on + which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence, + should once more break into flame. + + "We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a + similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and + ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders + were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of, + and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied, + and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is + impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which + has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court + of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied + in the new draft Grondwet that any resolution of the Volksraad + is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has always + been one of the most serious grievances. The new Constitution + provides for their permanent instability, the judges being bound + by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as equally + binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with the + provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing this + oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no + self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the + Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly + they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the + Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of + Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same + confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number + of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a + petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my + opinion of its substantial genuineness and the absolute _bona + fides_ of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among + many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population, + who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State." + + "The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by + workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the + Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is + impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size. + Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or + another all large public buildings have been rendered + unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly + along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for + enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and + extent. + +[Sidenote: The movement not artificial.] + + "With regard to the attempt to represent that movement as + artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional + agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The + defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances + are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many + capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of + its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the + lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor + dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform. + Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only + want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly + sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter + which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and + constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds + of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or + to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of + the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country. + They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance. + + "A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political + unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they + constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of + chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic + administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all + these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of + political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for + enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects, + accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply + the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent + subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power + to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal + Republic will never end till the permanent Uitlander population + is admitted to a share in the government, and while that turmoil + lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate progress in Her + Majesty's South African dominions. + + "The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics + are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in + order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically, + they are all one country. The two principal white races are + everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to + dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they + can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all + round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six + Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and + political systems--perfect equality for Dutch and British in the + British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of + the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to + talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs. + + "It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal + Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government. + No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace + of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great + Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders + is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The + majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect. + But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series + of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which + are not less serious because they are not individually + sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means + impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about + this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in + rare cases, and only when we are very emphatic, do we obtain any + redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal Republic is thus + inevitably kept up, while the result in the way of protection to + our subjects is lamentably small. For these reasons it has been, + as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce the number of our + complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when I ought to have + protested from my great dislike of ineffectual nagging. But I + feel that the attempt to remedy the hundred-and-one wrongs + springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases, is + perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to + real improvement." + +[Sidenote: Enfranchisement the remedy.] + + "The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these + injuries--the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic + protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander + representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a + paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of + protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our + subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of + political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic. + But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of + difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely + remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great + Britain which at present dominates its internal and external + policy. + + "The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted + answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But, + in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for + years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not + true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to + worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the + Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The + effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of leaving things + alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences. + + "The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently + in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted + grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for + redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of + Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within + the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the + Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a + republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing + references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with + the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of + war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I + regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a + ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the + British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large + number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used + which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right, + even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth. + Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone, + perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are + being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding + exasperation on the side of the British. + + "I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous + propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her + Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South + Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice + would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair + share in the government of the country which owes everything to + their exertions. It could be made perfectly clear that our + action was not directed against the existence of the Republic. We + should only be demanding the re-establishment of rights which now + exist in the Orange Free State, and which existed in the + Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after, the withdrawal + of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish demand, as other + Uitlanders besides those of British birth would benefit by it. It + is asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves. + And it would certainly go to the root of the political unrest in + South Africa, and, though temporarily it might aggravate, it + would ultimately extinguish the race feud, which is the great + bane of the country."[53] + + [Footnote 53: C. 9,345.] + +It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should +have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the +essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it +exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch +ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal--a +matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that +these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover, +the circumstance that President Krueger knew that they were before the +British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the +strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined +to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to +the Queen. + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's intervention.] + +Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr knew that a despatch of +grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt, a fairly +accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord Milner had +warned some time before of "the gravity of the situation."[54] It is +not going beyond the limits of probability to assume that the Master +of the Bond realised the effect which the publication of these plain +truths, backed by the authority of the High Commissioner, would +produce upon the mind of the English people, and that he thereupon +determined to take steps to prevent a turn of affairs which, as he +conceived, would be most unfavourable to the nationalist cause. +Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five days sufficed to +place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if he would +favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krueger in +conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th) +a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of +President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less +certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take +place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the +publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of +the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of +those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in +all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's statesmanship. Indeed, the +methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British +administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more +subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar +circumstances of the Home Rule campaign. + + [Footnote 54: C. 9,345. See forward, p. 155.] + +The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of +May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt +both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the +incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is +necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which +Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections[55] +had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the +same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to +fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the +"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders. + + [Footnote 55: See p. 125.] + +[Sidenote: The Bond and the ministry.] + +The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist +for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the +Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the +Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the +Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and +its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side +of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by either +party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it followed, +_ex hypothesi_, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was right, and +England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, on behalf of +the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the proposals of +the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he even knew what +those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented themselves as +"mediators." They had as little intention of mediating between the +Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a barrister, heavily +feed and primed with his client's case, has of mediating between his +client and his client's opponent at the hearing of a case in court. + +But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet--T. Nicholas +German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William +Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and +Richard Solomon--had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and +bear true allegiance to Her Majesty." + +[Sidenote: The Schreiner ministry.] + +The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of +so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a +parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High +Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise +of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the +Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, he was bound to administer +the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice tendered by +his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged to give him +was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High +Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his +ministers--the alternative to accepting this advice--would have been +an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they +had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to +the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter +that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be +difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape +ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was +done by the Liberal Opposition--again collectively or individually--in +England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet, +whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened--and +was intended to lessen--the force of an effort on the part of the +Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity +for war. + +And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind +that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be +anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real +standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it +that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) Richard Solomon, +came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their respective +motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of the Bond? + +[Sidenote: The prime minister.] + +Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of +the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and +afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a +sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and +now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner +family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is +the authoress of _The Story of an African Farm_, and a second, Mrs. +Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a +determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at +the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge, +where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and +afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at +the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's +Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was +prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr. +Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the +position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we +have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General +Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of Mr. Schreiner and of +his political position that the only word of sympathy with the British +connection, uttered from first to last during this election by the +Bond candidates or their supporters, was the conventional reference to +the greatness of the British Empire which, as we have noticed, +occurred in his address to the electors of Malmesbury. With these +political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was compelled to be a South +African first and a British subject second. His is precisely the kind +of case where true allegiance can be expected only when a federal +constitution has been created for the Empire. + + "See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg, + "how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone + solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of + South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else + can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great + Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept + allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. + But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity, + without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal + devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South + Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for + the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."[56] + + [Footnote 56: _The Johannesburg Star_, April 1st, 1905.] + +With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the +moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of +policy. All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born of +pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so largely +into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as they drew +his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with the cause of +Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the particular issue +now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an answer which he +gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the +inquiry into the Raid (1897): + + MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I suppose your view is that the Imperial + Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government, + and should refrain from even friendly representations as not + being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders? + + MR. SCHREINER: Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns + are concerned.[57] + + [Footnote 57: Proceedings of the Select Committee on British + South Africa (Q. 4,385).] + +In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent +of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his +motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent +intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the +claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial +Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions; +while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander +nationalists made him blind to the existence of any moral right of +interference that England might possess, as the Power responsible for +the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so, partly by force of +environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the +principles of international law,[58] the Boer and Hollander oligarchy +in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity and administrative +incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing sacrosanct in his eyes. +Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other hand, desired to +prevent intervention because they were perfectly satisfied to see the +British Uitlanders in a position of political inferiority, and +perfectly content with the whole situation, the continuance of which, +as they knew, was directly calculated to bring about the supremacy of +the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore Hofmeyr made no effort to +improve the state of affairs in the Transvaal until he saw the storm +bursting. And when, at a later stage, he set himself to work in +earnest to induce President Krueger to grant reforms, he did so to save +the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not to assist the British +Government in winning justice for the Uitlanders. + + [Footnote 58: For the position of Great Britain from the + point of view of international law see some remarks in the + note on page 580 (Chapter XII.).] + +[Sidenote: Sir Richard Solomon.] + +Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent +radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for +Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of the Cape +Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His presence, +at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such a +ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a supporter +of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the Uitlanders, +he was in direct conflict with the characteristic principles of the +Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his distrust of +Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the British +connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is probably to +be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime Minister. On +the other hand, his ability, detachment from local parties, and the +respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset to Mr. +Schreiner. + +[Sidenote: Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.] + +Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice +held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from +Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the +Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political +career have been already mentioned.[59] Fifteen years ago more +Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman +than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the +separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and +sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in +the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations of "capitalism" +and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his Afrikander allies, had +an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had tried to amalgamate the +Diamond Mines at Kimberley--failing where Rhodes and Beit afterwards +succeeded--and who, attracted by the magnet of gold discovery, for a +short time had acted as manager of the Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B. +Robinson's interests at Johannesburg. With political principles thus +unstable and a mind strangely sensitive to any emotional appeal, it is +not surprising that Mr. Merriman displayed the proverbial enthusiasm +of the convert in his new political creed. His original perception of +the imprudence and administrative incompetency of President Krueger's +_regime_ was rapidly obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in +turn gave place to an unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause, +combined with a bitter antipathy against all who were concerned, +whether in a civil or military capacity, in giving effect to the +intervention of the Imperial Government on behalf of the British +industrial community in the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to +exhibit his political convictions in a manner so demonstrative that +his words and acts, as recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader +in no doubt as to the reality of his sympathy with the Boer and +Afrikander cause. For the moment, therefore, it is sufficient to +notice that, although he shared Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of +"capitalism" and "capitalists," he was for many years of his life a +promoter and director of mining and other companies. + + [Footnote 59: See pp. 61, 69, and 93.] + +Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the +Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good +repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr. +Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the +Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal. + +The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed +hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the +Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister +without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the +sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination +of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the +administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact +that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to +be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of +administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group +of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each +other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the +majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the +attainment of which they were prepared to make a considerable +sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political principles. +The denial of political rights to the British population in the +Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy in +South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in +the Cape Colony--the Progressives--strong enough to act in +independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not +only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a +minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in +Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement +upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British +population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided +into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any +longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to +the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support. + +[Sidenote: Policy of the ministry.] + +Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives +on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to +prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in +Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea +of inducing President Krueger to grant such a "colourable measure of +reform"[60] as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least +deprive it of any justification for interference by force of arms, +was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein Conference +took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to President +Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity," he +said,[61] "of bringing about a _rapprochement_ between us, in which +the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, _i.e._, the +Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway, +apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa +increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the +pretext for outside interference." + + [Footnote 60: Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to + Mr. Fischer at p. 161.] + + [Footnote 61: Cd. 369.] + +And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded +by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise +question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March--when +Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in +the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry +from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them +certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to +discourage the agitation for political rights--the same subject was +brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In +pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry--_i.e._ to +obtain a fictitious concession from President Krueger, instead of the +"fair share in the government of the country" required by the +Imperial Government--it was proposed originally to exclude Lord Milner +altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the Transvaal +Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an inter-State +Conference consisting of representatives of the governments of the two +Republics and the self-governing British Colonies. But Lord Milner +was, happily, High Commissioner as well as Governor of the Cape. As +High Commissioner, he declared that at any such Conference the +Imperial Government must be separately represented. Neither the +Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to enter a Conference on +these terms, although they were acceptable to the Cape Government; and +the plan fell to the ground. + +It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's +despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic +swiftness to accept the role of peace-maker, which his predecessor, +Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the +grudging consent of President Krueger to meet the High Commissioner at +Bloemfontein. + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's _tour de force_.] + +The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's _tour de +force_ are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was +telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon +apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from +the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. Schreiner received +warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including "Hofmeyr's +best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to President Steyn +containing a "proposition" of so confidential a character that it +could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need of haste.[62] On +Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning telegrams, and +Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed his hope that +the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of Saturday, might by +this time "have been accepted, or that something had been done which +would achieve the same purpose."[63] On the same day the Cape papers +published an alarming telegram reproducing from _The Daily +Chronicle_[64] a statement that the South African situation was very +serious, and that the British Government was prepared to "take some +risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present at a dinner +given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr. Hofmeyr, who +was among the guests, in the course of a long conversation with him +after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting President Krueger at +Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner sent for Mr. Hofmeyr +and discussed the subject more at length; and, a little later, when he +had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner came in with a +telegram from President Steyn, in which the Cape Prime Minister was +requested to ascertain formally whether the High Commissioner would be +willing to accept an invitation to meet President Krueger. This +telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr. Chamberlain, adding that the +Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of acceptance, and that +Schreiner himself had declared that the invitation was the result of +the "influence which he (Schreiner) had been using with the Transvaal +Government ever since I had warned him of the gravity of the +situation."[65] Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May 12th), authorised Lord +Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation, and in doing so, to +state that a despatch was already on its way which contained a similar +proposal made by the Imperial Government-- + + [Footnote 62: Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p. + 162, where this letter is given.] + + [Footnote 63: _Ibid._] + + [Footnote 64: Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.] + + [Footnote 65: C. 9,345.] + +[Sidenote: The conference arranged.] + + "in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive + at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept + and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable + concession to their just demands and a settlement of the + difficulties which have threatened the good relations" + +between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th, +in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole +situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and +formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not +published until June 14th, _i.e._, after the Bloemfontein Conference +had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord Milner's +despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete record of +all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord Milner's +appointment. + +In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly +between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President +Krueger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's +invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was +arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was +intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in +the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation +with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master +of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of +Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of +the communications which passed at this time, and during the four +succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican +confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely +found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water +who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way +of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd), +Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr. +Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself +suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground; +since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a +satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been +achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line +indicated by Lord Milner: + + "I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he + telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first + instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time + if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath + modified." + +Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the +Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general +sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had +addressed to the Queen. + +[Sidenote: Motives of Afrikander leaders.] + +There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which +had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort. +They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr. +Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to +avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate +plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which +involved the continuance of the present position--a position which was +one of moral superiority for the Dutch--would unite the whole of the +Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain +within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise question +was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount Power +and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape Dutch +would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican kinsmen. +This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the decisive +action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth of his +estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet speech, +this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the Transvaal was +the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner Ministry; "reform" +was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place of the first only +when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord Milner's resolution +and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry now, no less than +before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British Government in +obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the Transvaal +armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was too +deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back +without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail +himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford. +When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram, +had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on +the part of President Krueger," Lord Milner had replied that he could +"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from +President Krueger himself," and contained no indication of "the basis +or subject of discussion." + +[Sidenote: Krueger's obduracy.] + +The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal +adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President +Krueger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de +Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of +the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on +this very errand of "mediation": + + "On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as + I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on + him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, + would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice + had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with + the President. + + "I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad + with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms. + + "It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily + from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them. + In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the + malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be + felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, + there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as + it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their + discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be + conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made + by the President seems to be simply ridiculous. + + "I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my + fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his + retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever + have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would + have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the + condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other + words, to recommence the war.... + + "I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly, + but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object + in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are, + of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's + position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience + will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can + reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used + your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will + also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace + successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make + his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the + arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide + over immediate difficulties." + +And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief +Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in +allusion to this same visit to Pretoria: + + "From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw, + three months ago, that if President Krueger did not voluntarily + yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the + whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krueger's friends + to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is + war with England; on the other side there are concessions which + will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once + how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years' + franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your + friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority + of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer + I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet + afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing + nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer + the delay, the more they will have to yield." + +[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.] + +This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr. +Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir +Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed +to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a +convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate +of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience +has completely justified: + + "I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost + influence to bear on President Krueger to concede some colourable + measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as + in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is + the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing + off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless + hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should + recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running + out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The + fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is + done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges + would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a + maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against + the swamping of the old population."[66] + + [Footnote 66: All these letters are in Cd. 369.] + +But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative +of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see +that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on +indefinitely--that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord, +unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect +of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of +Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken, +contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both +the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the +nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with +which Dr. Te Water served them. + +The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,[67] consists of three +letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the +Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The +replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the +public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes +heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference has been +accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the advisability of +President Krueger's yielding on the ground, not of justice, but of +temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of the Crown +completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the Afrikander +nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private telegraphic +code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when Schreiner +was obliged to write instead of telegraphing." + + [Footnote 67: Cd. 369.] + + "Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our + friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the + head of the Government here, they have a better chance that + reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they + would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections + and our enemies were advisers. + +[Sidenote: "Play to win time".] + + "Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly + that things are extremely critical. + + "Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such + as J. H.'s[68] best friends, received by him on Saturday and this + morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win + time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present + team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward + before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less + hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded + in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here." + + [Footnote 68: Mr. Hofmeyr.] + +In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share +President Steyn's view that "all the noise about war is bluff." Then +there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had entertained +expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that even Dr. Te +Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial allegiance: + + "But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes, + "as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be + able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we + can be of more use than before?" + +Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the +event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape +Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or +words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous +views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested +during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers, +from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes: + + "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz + and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and + duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of + the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible + assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a + responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of + internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all + the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown; + at least if they did not do so they would be liable to + dismissal." + +Dr. Te Water then continues: + + "I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not + already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible, + to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for + the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully + about this." + +[Sidenote: Te Water and Steyn.] + +The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a +curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed +between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know. +President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore, +reassures him: + + "Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram + also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private: + naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend + Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be + afraid; I shall not give you away." + +It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no +private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private +telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use. + + "To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic + code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and + I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of + weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It + is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and + the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am + afraid that things leak out there in one way or another." + +And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now +the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the +rope." + +One other letter must be given to complete this view of the +circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th, +1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord +Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange +the conference with President Krueger. It is addressed to President +Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows: + + "DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, + "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA. + "_May 9th_, 1899. + + "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,-- + + "I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the + ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the + Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could + consequently not get the desired information earlier. + + "The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser + and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will + be able to supply you with any of either sort. + + "On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest. + + "The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet + officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come + in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will + be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting, + + "Your humble servant and friend, + "P. GROEBLER."[69] + + [Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the + possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Mueller, by whom it was published + in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation + is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.] + +The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time," +because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to +power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their +policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were +"playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until +their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them +to defy the British Government. + +[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.] + +It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President +Krueger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st--June 5th). He was +accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary), +Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams +(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),[70] with Mr. +Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner +had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner, +following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of +the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he +was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the +Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of +"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on +the eve of the Conference.[71] Nor did Lord Milner avail himself of +President Steyn's willingness to take part in the proceedings; but, at +the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer (who was a member of +the Free State Executive) was invited to act as interpreter--a duty +which he discharged to the satisfaction of both parties. With +President Krueger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr. +A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), Mr. J. C. Smuts +(the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of these, the High +Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at the meetings of +the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined to Lord Milner +and President Krueger.[72] As regards the business in hand, the +failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had deprived Lord Milner of +what would have proved a helpful influence. Mr. Hofmeyr's action had +procured an opportunity for "friendly discussion." But the +friendliness was to be all on the side of the Imperial Government. For +the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as we have seen, to secure +a fictitious concession on the part of President Krueger. Lord Milner's +aim was to obtain by friendly discussion a genuine and substantial +measure of reform; and the prospect of his success would have been +greatly increased if this despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it +had been before the public when the Conference took place. It was +written with the object of making the British people and President +Krueger alike aware how grave was the judgment which he had formed of +the existing situation. With England alive to the near danger which +threatened her supremacy in South Africa, and President Krueger brought +to understand that the man with whom he had to deal was one who held +these opinions, Lord Milner could have been "friendly" without the +risk of having his friendliness mistaken for a readiness to accept the +illusory concession which was all that the Afrikander mediation was +intended to secure. + + [Footnote 70: 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one + year after the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he + (then A.D.C. to Lord Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up + the British flag over the Raadzaal at Pretoria.] + + [Footnote 71: Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).] + + [Footnote 72: Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at + 8.30 a.m. on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein + punctually at 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Here he was met by President + Steyn and various officials of the Free State; and an address + of welcome was presented to him by the Mayor of Bloemfontein + upon his arrival at the private house which had been provided + for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven + o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the + High Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was + introduced by Mr. Steyn to President Krueger, Mr. Schalk + Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The first meeting of the Conference + took place in the afternoon at 2.30, in the new offices of + the Railway Department. In the evening a largely attended + reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krueger + was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an + hour. The Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June + 5th, and Lord Milner then paid a farewell visit to President + Steyn. The High Commissioner's special train left + Bloemfontein on the following morning at 10.30, and reached + Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of Wednesday, the 7th, where + he was received by a large crowd, including three of the Cape + Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of Parliament. + President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday + morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything + possible for the comfort and convenience of his state guest + during the week that he was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings + of the Conference, with the High Commissioner's report upon + them, are published in C. 9,404.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's attitude.] + +As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great +embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the +charge of entering upon the discussion in an aggressive spirit, +calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a conciliatory +tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the abortive +protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully filled the +republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It has been +suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better result if he +had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had been willing +to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based upon an +entire misunderstanding of the method which the High Commissioner did, +in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise--the Bloemfontein +minimum--was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner said, in effect, +to President Krueger was this: "I have a whole sheaf of grievances +against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway rates, +interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious police +system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the rest. I +will let all these go in exchange for one thing--a franchise reform +which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander +population some appreciable representation in the government of the +Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise +that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose +from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that +could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing +a permanent settlement of the Uitlander question, he had nothing +further to concede, and said so. + +[Sidenote: President Krueger.] + +No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and +antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented, +could have been found. At the evening reception given by President +Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly +buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and +then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face, +half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth +which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krueger, +_aetat._ 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krueger's large and powerful frame +had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as +the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become +shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his +stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he +retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of +its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources--all +that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the +Temple--to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of +his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of +defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which +the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to +the Conference to make "one big straightforward effort to avert a +great disaster"; Krueger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end was as +Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of reform +seemed to President Krueger, in this mind, "worse than annexation"; and +on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is absolutely at an +end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it." + +The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord +Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President +Krueger to the franchise question he had made the conference the +pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew, +when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting +with President Krueger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the +franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no +turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too, +that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any +subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the +attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift +proposals put forward by President Krueger at Bloemfontein. + +[Sidenote: After the conference.] + +The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect +upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the +address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, and from +his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran colonist, +the British population of the Colony then (June 12th) expressed their +"admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf of the +Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared their +"entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these unhappy +differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord +Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found." +The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality +could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where +inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a +fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great +Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race, +that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of +subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the +Transvaal." And he concludes: + + "I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her + Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any + man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has + been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will + continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one + desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present + period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement + to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of + that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the + South African Republic will yet see its way to adopt a measure + of reform more liberal than that proposed at Bloemfontein. If + not, there may be other means of achieving the desired result. In + any case, it is a source of strength to those who are fighting + the battle of reform, and will, I believe, contribute more than + anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel that they have + behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the unanimous + sympathy of the British people throughout the world."[73] + + [Footnote 73: C. 9,415.] + +In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden +of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have +crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An +Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its +confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond +Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krueger, +would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any +ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only +adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into +collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact +that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces +in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner, +was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and +in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a +war to compel the Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary political +rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr. Gladstone's +Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the "greatest calamity +that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than this, that if the +Home Government did make war, it would be merely playing the game of +"the party of the Raid, the South African League."[74] + + [Footnote 74: Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.] + +[Sidenote: Milner and Butler.] + +It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General +Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High +Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite +untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course, +different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the +Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal +Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund +Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of +course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines +followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of +the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been +discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of +the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means, +therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached +to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this +particular point there was no opportunity for a conflict of opinion. +Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have accepted +the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of General +Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General Butler's +business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's. From a +wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It was one +of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have led the +Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument, or +unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this account. +This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the general +question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of military +precautions in view of the imminence of war. + +[Sidenote: Reinforcements requested.] + +The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command +in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard +of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the +Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the +success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General +Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations +for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that +might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a +peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the +needs of the military situation to those of the political, they acted +in direct opposition to the maxim _si pacem vis, bellum para_. They +carried this policy to such a point that they disregarded the advice +of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and that of the Intelligence +Department,[75] with the result that when the war did break out the +available British forces in South Africa were found to be in a +position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General Butler's +opposition was entirely different. His view was that what made the +situation dangerous was not President Krueger's obduracy, but what he +called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the British +inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the Transvaal. And +he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the Home +Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General Butler) +was endeavouring to reduce by every means."[76] The position in June +and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary as it +was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority, the +Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military +adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority, +the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled +to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the +reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In +these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts +of Lord Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming military +defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to the +interests of the empire. + + [Footnote 75: See p. 319 (note 2).] + + [Footnote 76: Cd. 1,791.] + +When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the +situation was becoming dangerous--and still more after the +Conference--he desired that preparations for war should be made by the +Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st, +1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised +from 5,409 to 9,593 men.[77] It remained at a little under 10,000 up +to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon +the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men +was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased +tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South +African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and +that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful +submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the +garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the +spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance +these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should +be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the +colonial borders, and that all supplies and material of war necessary +to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and, as far as +possible, distributed. + + [Footnote 77: War Commission, Cd. 1,791.] + +[Sidenote: General Butler's objections.] + +General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for +war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered +assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received +by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of +the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in +Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a +volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of +war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the +nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the +Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British +South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an +attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable +as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from +employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said +to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.[78] And +when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home +Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to +send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first +effort to strengthen the British military position in South Africa, +General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that these +additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their being +despatched. + + [Footnote 78: This was precisely the _role_ played by + Mafeking, only defensively, not offensively.] + +General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so +unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some +precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had +submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British +colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be +protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to +the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum +of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st, +1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the +Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the +despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of +supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and +that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what +action under these arrangements would be required of him on the +outbreak of war."[79] On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon +succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at +an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals +for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa +in the event of war. At the same time the latest information as to +the military strength of the two Republics--showing, among other +things, a total of 40,000 burghers[80]--was forwarded to him, and his +attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command +must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose _role_ would be +to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England. +In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was +again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (_i.e._ after the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British +colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in +cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On +June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had +been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in +South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do +you desire to make any observations?" + + [Footnote 79: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).] + + [Footnote 80: These were the figures of the D. M. I. + "Military Notes" of June, 1898; in the revised "Military + Notes" of June, 1899, the estimated total of the Boer force + was considerably greater--some 50,000 exclusive of colonial + rebels.] + +[Sidenote: "Ringing the War Office bell".] + +The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the +one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and +I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on +with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked +upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The +Government did not seem to be aware of that, and this telegram +brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the +opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and +answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office +bell." + +The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was +this: + + "You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here + is highly excited, and doubtless the news _quoting_ preparations + referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely + to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means. + Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my + estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war + between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and + subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity + that ever occurred in South Africa." + +This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government: + + "You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private + opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy + by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and + whom you will, of course, loyally support." + +In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler +gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his +reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It +was never in your contemplation that Mr. Krueger would declare war?" +he replied: + +[Sidenote: General Butler's view.] + + "My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle, + so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute + there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming + in, in front of, or behind, that party [_i.e._ "the party of the + Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state + of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability--no + possibility--of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the + time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions + were arrived at." + +And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before +the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure +to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in +his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands +of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and +render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had +by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."[81] + + [Footnote 81: All of these extracts will be found in Cd. + 1,791.] + +Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of +extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must +be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General +Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their +part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate military +preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General +Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and +that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been +represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the +official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's +alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General +Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape +until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for +him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape +command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which +he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as +military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a +matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the +South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a +grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the +undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the +action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the +High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him +with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain +at the Cape until the latter part of August. + +General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier. +It is interesting, therefore, to know what was his view, and to +compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which +dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August, +1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found +themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the +seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in +the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa. + +[Sidenote: What Lord Milner thought.] + +As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military +unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently +stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to +form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, +it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord +Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his +estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed +from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation +presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military +point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least +for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South +Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be +absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were +prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that +such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one +that admitted of only two alternatives--it must never be made, or, +being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness of our +position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt which the +Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole social and +political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look the Dutch +in the face as equals. If, after all our previous humiliations and +failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were going to commence +a struggle for equality--nothing more, and then not to get it, the +shame would be too grave for any great Power to support, or for those +who sympathised with us in South Africa to endure. We had raised the +British party in South Africa from the dust by the stand which we had +made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. If we were going to +retreat from that position, the discredit of our action would compel +England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, and with the +resignation of that claim England's rights in South Africa would +inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at Simon's +Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was fundamental was +not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of retreat. + +[Sidenote: Retreat impossible.] + +Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if +the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line, +the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something +substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable, +that they would not yield, and that in this case a state of tension +would be created which must end in war. His position was, therefore, +definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing a policy +from which we cannot retreat--a policy that may lead to war--it is +wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, unarmed, without +a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And so far from +thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the Imperial +Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would make war +more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. But even +if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but "retreat" that +must be avoided at all costs. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +PLAYING FOR TIME + + +On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons, +that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new +situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this +remark into action, the South African War would have been less +disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of +considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling +General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the +preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From +the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the +British Government should have an absolutely good case as before the +world--a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of +the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea +British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to +overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which +international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes +its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all, it +had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's South African +policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which would +necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the differences +which had arisen between the South African Republic and the Imperial +Government. + +[Sidenote: Policy of Home Government.] + +Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give +effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it +existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so +far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the +dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of +these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to +raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point +sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional +force--an army corps--for any offensive movement against one or both +of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war +from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious +that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the +offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be +held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services +were required. + +To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was +now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department of +Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th, 1899,[82] and +addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief +advised the mobilisation in England of a force consisting of one +complete army corps, one cavalry division, one battalion mounted +infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of communication; the +collection of transport in South Africa; and the immediate initiation +of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for conveying these +additional troops and their equipment to the seat of war. This advice +was disregarded; but in place of the immediate mobilisation of the +Army Corps the Cabinet decided to increase the efficiency of the +existing force in South Africa, and General Butler was informed of +this decision, as we have seen, on June 21st. On July 7th,[83] Lord +Wolseley recommended, in addition to the mobilisation of the offensive +force--which he still deemed necessary--that "the South African +garrisons should be strengthened by the despatch of 10,000 men at a +very early date." Instead of adopting these measures, the Government +confined itself to doing just the few necessary things, both for +defence and offence, that could be done without creating any belief in +its warlike intentions, and without involving any appreciable +expenditure of the public funds. Undoubtedly this latter +consideration--the desire to avoid any expenditure that might +afterwards prove to have been unnecessary--added weight to the purely +political argument against immediate military preparation. + + [Footnote 82: Cd. 1,789.] + + [Footnote 83: Cd. 1,789.] + +[Sidenote: Preparations delayed.] + +The course actually taken by the Salisbury Cabinet was this. Instead +of the immediate mobilisation of the offensive force, Lord Wolseley +was instructed to prepare a scheme for the "constitution, +organisation, and mobilisation" of such a force; and to do this in +consultation with Sir Redvers Buller, the General Officer commanding +at Aldershot, who had been selected to lead the British forces in +South Africa in the event of war. Instead of the immediate despatch of +additional troops sufficient to render the South African garrisons +capable of repelling invasion--which was what Lord Milner had +especially desired--the actual deficiencies of the existing Cape +garrison[84] were made good by the despatch in July of small additions +of artillery and engineers, and by directing General Butler to provide +the fresh transport without which even this diminutive force was +unable to mobilise. At the same time certain special service +officers,[85] including engineers and officers of the Army Service +Corps, were sent out to organise the materials, locally existing, for +the defence of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and the +southern districts of Rhodesia; and generally to make preliminary +preparations for the provisioning, transport, and distribution of any +British forces that might be despatched subsequently to the Cape +Colony. + + [Footnote 84: Three battalions, 6 guns, and a company of + Royal Engineers were all the troops available for the defence + of the Cape frontiers at this time (_i.e._ June).] + + [Footnote 85: Most of these came by mail boats on July 18th + and 25th. Col. Baden-Powell (who was entrusted with the + important duty of organising a force for the defence of + Southern Rhodesia, and subsequently of raising the mounted + infantry corps which held Mafeking) arrived on the latter + date.] + +These were the utterly inadequate reinforcements sent in response to +Lord Milner's urgent appeal, and in disregard of General Butler's +protest that they were wholly undesirable--an opinion which was +endorsed in England by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, when, on June 17th, +1899, he declared that there was nothing in the South African +situation to justify even preparations for war. + +During the interval between the Bloemfontein Conference and General +Butler's recall in the latter part of August Lord Milner's position +was one of unparalleled difficulty. The Cape and Natal garrisons were +maintained in a state of perilous weakness by the policy of the Home +Government. The measures to be undertaken locally for the defence of +the colonies, which the Cabinet had sanctioned, were wholly +insufficient in Lord Milner's opinion. And the general execution of +these wholly insufficient local measures was left in the hands of a +General Officer who had told the Secretary of State that he absolutely +disapproved of them on political grounds, since the mere announcement +of their being made would "add largely to the ferment," which he "was +[then] endeavouring to reduce by every means." The Cape Ministry, +with whom rested the disposal of the colonial forces, was a ministry +placed in office by the Bond for the especial purpose of opposing +British intervention in the Transvaal. In these circumstances it +needed all Lord Milner's mastery of South African conditions, and all +his tact and address, to make the relations between himself and his +Afrikander Cabinet tolerable; and, above all, in view of the refusal +of the Imperial Government to sanction the military preparations +advised by the Commander-in-Chief, it required ceaseless vigilance on +his part to prevent the acceptance of an illusory settlement which +would have sounded the death-knell of British supremacy in South +Africa. + +[Sidenote: President Krueger's proposals.] + +On the last day of the Conference President Krueger had put in a +memorandum in which he expressed his intention of introducing his +franchise scheme to the Volksraad, and his hope that the High +Commissioner would be able to recommend this, and a further proposal +for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, to the favourable +consideration of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had replied that +any such proposals would be considered on their merits; but that the +President must not expect them to be connected in any way with the +proceedings of the Conference, out of which, as he then declared, no +obligation had arisen on either side. + +The Raad met on Friday, June 9th; and on Monday, the 12th--the day on +which Lord Milner received the Ebden address[86]--President Krueger +laid the draft Franchise law, containing his revised Bloemfontein +scheme, before it. On Tuesday, 13th, Mr. Chamberlain's despatch of May +10th, on the position of the Uitlanders and the petition to the Queen, +was delivered to the Transvaal Government by the British Agent; and on +Wednesday, June 14th, as we have already noticed, the Blue-book +containing this despatch, Lord Milner's despatch of May 4th, and the +whole story of the franchise controversy up to the Bloemfontein +Conference, was published in England. As the conditions under which +Lord Milner's despatch had been telegraphed to England were now +changed, it would have been better if it had remained unpublished, and +the stage of fighting diplomacy, reached through the failure of the +Bloemfontein Conference, had been at once opened--and opened in +another way. What Lord Milner had learnt at Bloemfontein was not +merely that President Krueger was unwilling to yield, but that he was +psychologically incapable of yielding. He had learnt, that is to say, +not that Krueger was determined to refuse the particular reform which +the Imperial Government demanded, but that his whole system of thought +was irreconcilably opposed to that of any English statesman. It is the +knowledge which can be obtained only by personal dealings with the +Boers, and no one who has had such personal dealings can fail to +remember the sense of hopelessness that such an experience brings with +it. The Boer may be faithful to his own canons of morality; but his +whole manner of life and thought is one that makes his notion of the +obligations of truth and justice very different from that of the +ordinary educated European. He is not devoid of the conception of +duty, but he applies this conception in methods adapted to the narrow +and illiberal conditions of his isolated and self-centred life. + + [Footnote 86: Expressing approval of the position Lord Milner + had taken up at Bloemfontein. See p. 173.] + +As for the mediation of the Cape Afrikanders, Lord Milner estimated it +at its real value. The Cape nationalists believed that war would +result in disaster to their cause; the Republican nationalists did +not. They both hated the British in an equal degree. But the +Afrikander leaders at the Cape knew that they had the game in their +own hands. "For goodness' sake," they said, "keep quiet until we have +got rid of this creature, Milner; and the Salisbury Cabinet--the +'present team so unjustly disposed to us'--is replaced by a Liberal +Government." + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's task.] + +That was the meaning of their mediation--nothing more. Lord Milner +acquiesced in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, but what he wanted +was a polite but absolutely inflexible insistence upon the +Bloemfontein minimum, and at the same time such military preparations +as, in view of the clear possibility of a failure of negotiations, +seemed to him absolutely vital. This, however, was not the course +which the Salisbury Cabinet thought right to adopt; and the problem +that now lay before him was to convert the illusory concessions, which +were all that Afrikander mediation was able or even desirous to wring +from President Krueger, into the genuine reform that the British +Government had twice pledged itself to secure. + +But Lord Milner had also grasped the fact that the one issue which +could drive a wedge into Dutch solidarity was the franchise question. +He had determined, therefore, that nothing that transpired at the +Bloemfontein Conference should permit President Krueger to change the +ground of dispute from this central issue. During the negotiations +between the Home Government and the Pretoria Executive that followed +the Conference, and especially during the period of Mr. Hofmeyr's +active intervention, his most necessary and pressing task was to +prevent the Salisbury Cabinet from being "jockeyed" by Boer diplomacy +out of the advantageous position which he had then taken up on its +behalf. The pressure of the Hofmeyr mediation increased the difficulty +of this task by driving President Krueger into a series of franchise +proposals of the utmost complexity. The danger was that Mr. +Chamberlain and his colleagues in the Cabinet, in their earnest desire +to avoid war, might recognise some illusory measures of reform as +satisfactory, and then, after further consideration, finding them to +be worthless, be driven by their previous admission to make war, after +all, not on the single issue of "equality all round," but on an issue +that might be plausibly represented to South Africa and the world as +the independence of the Boers. + +[Sidenote: The Draft Franchise Law.] + +The period is crowded with demonstrations, despatches, mediations, +petitions, and incidents of all kinds. A tithe of these--disentangled +from the Blue-books, but vitalised by a knowledge of the master facts +that lie behind the official pen--will serve, however, to present the +play of the mingling, conflicting, and then frankly opposing forces. +The "formidable personalities" are all in motion. At first it seemed +as though the whole weight of the Schreiner Cabinet, acting in +conjunction with General Butler's political objection to military +preparation on the part of the Imperial Government, was to be thrown +into the scale against Lord Milner's efforts. On June 12th President +Krueger laid the draft of his new Franchise Law before the Raad, which +then (the 15th) adjourned, in order that the feeling of the burghers +might be ascertained. On the 17th a great assemblage of Boers met at +Paardekraal, and, among the warlike speeches then delivered was that +of Judge Kock,[87] a member of the Transvaal Executive, who "dwelt +upon the doctrine of 'what he called Afrikanderdom,' and said that he +'regarded the Afrikanders, from the Cape to the Zambesi as one great +family. If the Republics are lost,' he continued, 'the Afrikanders +would lose. The independence of the country was to them a question of +life and death. The Free State would stand by the Transvaal, even to +the death. Not only the Free State, but also the Cape Colony.'" Nor +was this boast without some foundation. A week before (June 10th), Mr. +Schreiner had requested Lord Milner to inform Mr. Chamberlain that, in +ministers' opinion, President Krueger's franchise proposal was +"practical, reasonable, and a considerable step in the right +direction."[88] Four days later (June 14th) he further informed the +Governor that, in ministers' opinion, there was nothing in the +existing situation to justify "the active interference of the Imperial +Government in what were the internal affairs of the Transvaal."[89] +And this expression of opinion the Prime Minister also desired Lord +Milner, as the only constitutional medium of communication between the +Cape Ministry and the Secretary of State, to convey to Mr. +Chamberlain. On the day (June 10th) on which the first of these +interviews between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner took place, a meeting +of five thousand persons--in Sir William Greene's words, "the largest +and most enthusiastic ever held at Johannesburg"--passed three +resolutions which sufficiently exhibit the extent to which the views +of the Cape Ministry differed from those of the Transvaal British. +After affirming the principle of equal political rights for all white +inhabitants of South Africa, and declaring that President Krueger's +Bloemfontein proposals were "wholly inadequate," this great meeting +proceeded to place on record its "deep sense of obligation" to Lord +Milner for his endeavour to secure the redress of the Uitlander +grievances, and its willingness, in order to "support his Excellency +in his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement," to endorse "his very +moderate proposals on the franchise question as the irreducible +minimum that could be accepted." + + [Footnote 87: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 88: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 89: _Ibid._] + +[Sidenote: Action of Schreiner ministry.] + +In other words, the Schreiner Cabinet, immediately after the failure +of the Conference, used its influence unreservedly to assist the +Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by the +High Commissioner--a reform which, in the opinion of the community +most concerned and most capable of judging of its effect, constituted +an "irreducible minimum" only to be accepted in deference to Lord +Milner's judgment, and in the hope of avoiding war. Mr. Schreiner's +action on this occasion was characteristic of the blind partizanship +of the Cape Ministry. On June 10th, when the Prime Minister pressed +his and his colleagues' favourable view of President Krueger's +proposals upon Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, the draft Franchise +Law, with its intricate provisions, had not been laid before the +Volksraad. Mr. Schreiner, therefore, had made haste to bless before +he knew what he was blessing. And a few weeks later, as we shall +notice, he let his zeal for the Boer oligarchy outrun his discretion +in an even more amazing manner. + +In these difficult circumstances Lord Milner displayed the highest +address in his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet. Thanks to his +mingled tact and firmness, aided by the outspoken support which he +received from Mr. Chamberlain, his intercourse with his ministers +remained outwardly friendly, while at the same time he had the +satisfaction of seeing that during the next few weeks the +considerations of policy, which he laid before them with absolute +frankness, appreciably modified their original attitude. He had at +once availed himself of the one point on which he and they were in +agreement. With reference to the first interview with Mr. Schreiner +(June 10th), he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary: + + "In reply I told him [Mr. Schreiner] I was prepared to + communicate this expression of his opinion, although I strongly + held an opposite view, as he was aware. + + "He admitted, in subsequent conversation, that the President of + the South African Republic's scheme could, in his opinion, be + improved in detail; for instance, by immediately admitting men + who had entered the country previous to 1890, and by making + optional the period of naturalisation.... + + "In reply, I told him that these were points of first-rate + importance and not of detail, especially the latter; and that, + since after all he seemed to agree with me more than with the + President of the South African Republic, he had better address + his advice to the latter, and not to Her Majesty's Government." + +And at the long and rather unpleasant interview of June 14th, +although, as we have seen, Mr. Schreiner desired Lord Milner to inform +Mr. Chamberlain that the Cape Ministry considered the "active +interference" of the British Government unjustified, yet he also said +"that he and his colleagues were agreed that there were two respects +in which the Government of the South African Republic might better +their franchise scheme: (1) By admitting to the full franchise at once +persons who had entered the country before 1890; and (2) By making it +optional to obtain the full franchise without previous naturalisation +after seven years' residence."[90] + + [Footnote 90: C. 9,415.] + +Mr. Chamberlain's reply (June 16th), contained a more direct +admonition. Lord Milner was instructed to inform the Cape Ministers +that the Government trusted that they would "use all the influence +they could to induce the Transvaal Government to take such action as +would relieve Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of +considering the question of being obliged to have recourse to +interference of such a nature."[91] + + [Footnote 91: _Ibid._] + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's speech.] + +This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to +aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and +the Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind. But Mr. +Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility. + +In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations +of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty +years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although +deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put +right in South Africa. + + "We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which + are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty, + not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South + Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part + of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the + Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa, + and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole." + +This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and +effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of +10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on +Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing +circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by +refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief, +had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake +of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of +gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such +speeches were merely food for President Krueger to use in feeding the +enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of the Home +Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible demand for +the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but effective, +military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel will show, +were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal Opposition into +a precisely opposite course in both these respects. Their demand was +vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while their inadequate +defensive preparations were more than neutralised by the loudness with +which, in deference to the views of the Liberal Opposition, they +proclaimed their reluctance to undertake military measures on a scale +that would really have made an impression on the Boers.[92] + + [Footnote 92: _E.g._ Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of + Commons that the object of the despatch of the special + service officers, and the small additions of engineers and + artillery was "to complete the existing garrison." The + purchase of transport, he said, had been long ago decided + upon.] + +[Sidenote: The Fischer-Hofmeyr mission.] + +One result which Mr. Chamberlain's speech produced was to bring Mr. +Hofmeyr once more upon the scene. Before this date (June 26th) Mr. +Fischer, apparently considering that the failure of the Bloemfontein +Conference cast a reflection upon the statesmanship and influence of +the Free State Government, had commenced a second essay in mediation. +Early in June he had paid a visit to Capetown, where he was in close +communication with Mr. Hofmeyr and the Cape Ministers, and had twice +called upon the High Commissioner. He had left Capetown on the 19th +for Bloemfontein; and then proceeded to Pretoria, which he reached on +the 25th. At the Transvaal capital he entered into negotiations with +the Executive, calling upon the British Agent on the 26th, and again +on the 28th, and maintaining communication, through him, with Lord +Milner. From Pretoria Mr. Fischer returned to Bloemfontein in company +with Mr. Smuts and Mr. Groebler,[93] on July 1st. Here he met Mr. +Hofmeyr, who, leaving Capetown with Mr. Herholdt, on the same day +(July 1st), reached Bloemfontein early on the following morning. + + [Footnote 93: Under State-Secretary of the Transvaal.] + +Mr. Hofmeyr was in Bloemfontein, because the events of the last few +days had convinced him that the only hope of saving the +situation--saving it, that is, from the Afrikander nationalist point +of view--lay in prompt and energetic action on his part. On June 23rd +Mr. Schreiner had been informed by the High Commissioner of the +intention of the Home Government to "complete" the Cape garrison; and +shortly afterwards the despatch of the special service officers was +publicly announced in England. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham +on the 26th, cabled almost _in extenso_ to the High Commissioner, was +communicated to the local press on the 28th. On the same evening a +mass meeting, held in the Good Hope Hall at Capetown, declared its +strong approval of the action of the Imperial Government on behalf of +the British population in the Transvaal. With these signs of an +approaching Armageddon before his eyes, Mr. Hofmeyr had overcome his +objection to personal dealings with President Krueger, and had resolved +to go to Pretoria to confer with the leaders of the Boer oligarchy. +But, in order to protect himself from the risk of a useless rebuff, he +had first arranged to meet Mr. Fischer at Bloemfontein, and obtain +through him and President Steyn some definite assurance that his +counsels would be treated with respect, before finally proceeding to +the Transvaal. + +On Sunday, July 2nd, and in these circumstances, a conference was held +between the Master of the Bond and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Smuts--two men +not unworthy to represent the cause of Afrikander nationalism in their +respective republics. As the result of their discussions, carried on +almost uninterruptedly from the early morning until nearly midnight, +Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Groebler, in the words of _Ons Land_, +"knew precisely what had to be done, in the opinion of the Colonial +representatives, to gain the moral support of Colonial Afrikanders and +to lead in the direction of peace."[94] + + [Footnote 94: Article on "The Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and + Herholdt" in _Ons Land_, of July 11th, 1899, as reproduced in + the _South African News_ of the same date. This account of + Mr. Hofmeyr's proceedings is presumed to have been published + with his approval. C. 9,518.] + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr at Bloemfontein.] + +On the following day (Monday, the 3rd) Mr. Fischer and his companions +arrived again in Pretoria; but Mr. Hofmeyr remained at Bloemfontein, +since he had decided not to go to the Transvaal capital, unless "he +was assured of achieving something of importance there." Up to the +afternoon of Tuesday (the 4th) no such assurance had been received; +and, says _Ons Land_, "as it seemed the assurance was almost in a +contrary direction, preparations were already made for the homeward +journey." But a little later on in the day Mr. Hofmeyr and his +companion "received a hint that, although their chances of success at +Pretoria were but slight, they were not altogether hopeless." The +facts thus far provided by _Ons Land_ must now be supplemented by a +reference to the telegrams which fell into the hands of the British +authorities a year later upon the occupation of Bloemfontein. From +these documents we know that President Krueger at first telegraphed to +President Steyn a polite refusal of Mr. Hofmeyr's mediation. This was +followed, on Tuesday morning, by a telegram from Mr. Fischer himself, +informing President Steyn that the Transvaal Government "would be glad +to meet Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, but that he could not say what +chance there was of their mission succeeding until the Volksraad had +been consulted." This, as we have seen, was by no means sufficient for +Mr. Hofmeyr. But later on there came a second telegram--the telegram +which _Ons Land_ delicately calls a "hint"--in which Mr. Fischer said +that President Krueger "was willing to see Mr. Hofmeyr before he +brought the matter before the Raad," and that he himself "hoped to +obtain certain concessions from the Executive Council, with the +members of which he was in consultation." + +Thus encouraged, Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt at once left +Bloemfontein by special train, and, travelling all night, reached +Pretoria on Wednesday, the 5th, at seven o'clock. + +"From the station," says _Ons Land_, "they were escorted by various +officials and friends to the Transvaal Hotel, where rooms had been +engaged for them as guests of the State. Even before they had taken +breakfast they had an audience with President Krueger. On the +invitation of His Honour they accompanied Mr. Fischer to three +meetings of the Executive Council--two on Wednesday and one on +Thursday. They had the opportunity, too, of meeting the greater part +of the Volksraad members, and of conversing with them. What occurred +on this occasion is, of course, private, and not for publication." + +Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt left Pretoria on Friday, the 7th, and +reached Capetown on Monday, the 10th. + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner and the mission.] + +[Sidenote: Bid for "moral support".] + +Lord Milner did everything possible to secure the success of the +Fischer-Hofmeyr mission. Provided President Krueger was induced to give +the Uitlanders an appreciable share in the government of the +Transvaal, it made no difference to the Imperial Government whether he +did so from a desire to secure the "moral support" of the Cape +Afrikander party, or from any other motive of political expediency. +What was essential was that the existing franchise scheme should be so +far improved as to become a genuine, and no longer a fictitious, +measure of reform. On the understanding that the "mission" had no less +an object in view--an understanding which he gained from conversation +with Mr. Fischer himself as well as from Mr. Schreiner and Mr. +Hofmeyr--Lord Milner placed the British Government code at the +disposal of Mr. Fischer and the Prime Minister, and further arranged +with the former to communicate with him (Lord Milner) through the +British Agent at Pretoria. But Lord Milner especially impressed, alike +upon Mr. Fischer, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Schreiner, the necessity of +urging President Krueger to discuss any proposed modifications in the +Draft Law with the Imperial Government or its representatives, before +they were submitted to the Raad. The objection to the adoption of this +course, which, according to Mr. Fischer's statement,[95] the Pretoria +Executive did in fact make, was their inability to "recognise the +right of the British Government to be consulted on the franchise, +which was an internal matter." This objection, however, as Lord Milner +pointed out to the members of the Pretoria Executive, both directly +through Sir William Greene,[96] and indirectly through Mr. Hofmeyr and +Mr. Fischer, was a mere pretext. "The whole world," he said in +effect, "knows that whatever alterations you make in the Draft +Law--and indeed the Law itself--will be the result of the pressure +brought to bear upon you by the British Government. That being so, to +refuse to discuss these alterations with us privately, and in a +friendly manner, because the franchise is an 'internal matter,' is to +strain at a gnat while you are all the while swallowing a camel." But +neither at this time, nor at any other period in the three months' +negotiations, did President Krueger desire to come to an agreement with +the British Government at the price of granting a genuine measure of +reform. As a bid for the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, but +without the slightest attempt to consult with the British Government +or its representatives, he recommended to the Volksraad, on July 7th, +certain amendments, the effect of which was to confer the franchise +upon a very small body of Uitlanders, and that only if they succeeded +in complying with certain cumbersome and protracted formalities.[97] +On the following morning the Bond Press announced, with a great +flourish of trumpets, that Mr. Hofmeyr's mission had been remarkably +successful, and set out the amendments of "The Great Reform Act" as +representing the fruit of his and Mr. Fischer's efforts. This was for +the public. To Mr. Fischer, Hofmeyr himself telegraphed on his return +journey to Capetown, that he "deplored the failure" of his mission, +when he "thought he had reason to expect success." Mr. Schreiner, on +the other hand, was no less ready to bless the "Hofmeyr compromise" +than Krueger's original scheme. Upon receiving by telegram the bare +heads of the proposed amendments, and without waiting to learn what +practical effect they would have upon the position of the Uitlanders, +he hastily authorised _The South African News_ to announce (July 8th) +that the Cape Government considered the proposals of the amended law +"adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a peaceful +settlement."[98] This opinion he subsequently modified; and, at Lord +Milner's request, he advised Mr. Fischer (July 11th) to urge his +friends at Pretoria to delay the passage of the bill through the +Volksraad. And Lord Milner was authorised by Mr. Chamberlain to +instruct Sir William Greene to offer the same advice to the Transvaal +Government, with the more precise intimation that "full particulars of +the new scheme" ought to be furnished officially to the Imperial +Government, if the proposals which it embodied were to form "any +element in the settlement of the differences between the two +Governments."[99] The High Commissioner's object was, of course, to +reduce the area of formal negotiations, and therefore the risk of +official friction, to its narrowest limits. But this was not President +Krueger's object. His principle was the very opposite of that of the +Imperial Government. They abstained from preparations for war in +order to improve the prospect of a peaceable settlement. The force +upon which he relied was the warlike temper of his burghers, and the +answering enthusiasm which the spectacle of the Republic, prepared to +defy the British Empire, would arouse among the whole Dutch population +of South Africa. Mr. Reitz was, therefore, instructed to decline Mr. +Chamberlain's request on the ground that "the whole matter was out of +the hands of the Government";[100] meaning, thereby, that it had +already been submitted to the Volksraad. This, again, was the thinnest +of excuses, since President Krueger had never yet shown any scruple in +modifying or withdrawing proposals already laid before the Volksraad, +when it suited him to do so. + + [Footnote 95: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 96: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene.] + + [Footnote 97: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 98: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 99: _Ibid._] + + [Footnote 100: C. 9,415.] + +[Sidenote: The Bogus Conspiracy.] + +[Sidenote: War fever in the Transvaal.] + +It may be questioned, however, whether, even at this time, the "whole +matter" had not passed, in another and more serious sense, "out of the +hands" both of the Pretoria Executive and the British Government. The +political atmosphere of South Africa had become electric. The +Uitlanders themselves cherished no illusion on the subject of +President Krueger's proposals. Amended and re-amended, the Franchise +Law, as the Uitlander Council then and there declared, left the +granting of the franchise at the discretion of the Boer officials or +the Pretoria Executive, and as such it was "a most dangerous measure, +and apparently framed with the object of defeating the end it was +presumed to have in view."[101] Further and convincing evidence of the +utterly vicious and depraved character of the _personnel_ of the Boer +administration was afforded by the proceedings arising out of the +alleged "conspiracy" against the Republic, of which the unfortunate +Englishman Nicholls was the innocent victim (May 18th to July +25th).[102] In this disgraceful affair the gravest offences against +international comity were committed; high officials, including Mr. +Tjaart Krueger, the President's youngest son, were implicated in a +gross and scandalous prostitution of the machinery of justice; and yet +no apology was offered to the Imperial Government, nor any +compensation awarded to Nicholls for the two months' imprisonment and +continuous persecution by the agents-provocateurs, to which he had +been subjected. The impassioned speeches delivered at the Paardekraal +meeting was only one among many signs of the dangerous hostility to +England and everything English that had taken possession of the +Republic. The British residents who had petitioned the Queen were +denounced as "revolutionaries," and threatened with the vengeance of +the burghers. "If war breaks out," wrote _De Rand Post_,"[103] the +Johannesburg agitators are the real instigators, and to these +ringleaders capital punishment should be meted out." In the Volksraad +discussion of the Franchise Law the same passionate hatred of the +Uitlanders was manifested. "Is it the English only who have the right +to make conditions?" asked Mr. Lombard on July 15th. "If it comes to +be a question of war, there will be a great destruction. And who will +be destroyed if it comes to a collision? Why, the subjects of Her +Majesty in Johannesburg."[104] + + [Footnote 101: C. 9,415.] + + [Footnote 102: On May 15th, 1899--_i.e._ a fortnight before + the Bloemfontein Conference met--five persons alleged to be + British subjects were arrested on a warrant, signed by Mr. + Smuts as State-Attorney, on a charge of high treason. All of + them, except one man--Nicholls, who was innocent--were agents + of the secret service. The statement that the men were + ex-British officers, and that one of them alleged that he was + acting under direct instructions from the War Office, was + disseminated through the Press by the Transvaal Government, + with the object of discrediting (1) the South African League, + and (2) the British Government, in the eyes of the civilised + world. The whole of the alleged "conspiracy against the + independence of the Republic," thanks to the endurance of + Nicholls and the persistence of the Imperial authorities in + South Africa, was shown to be the work of the Transvaal + police, favoured by the negligence or political bad faith of + certain Government officials. The prosecution was abandoned + on July 25th. Mr. Duxbury, the counsel for the defence + retained by the British Government, in reviewing the case and + the proceedings, wrote (August 9th): "It seems abundantly + clear, from all the facts which have come to light, that the + whole of this disgraceful prosecution found its inception in + the minds of Mr. Schutte, the Commissioner of Police, and + Acting Chief Detective Beatty.... I must direct your + attention to the very grave accusation contained in Thomas + Dashwood Bundy's affidavit against Mr. Tjaart Krueger. This + gentleman is the son of President Krueger, and is the Chief of + the Secret Service department of this State." And of Mr. + Smuts he writes: "I believe he was deceived by the + detectives, and yet at the same time I fail to understand + why, in a matter of such-magnitude, he allowed himself to + sign warrants for the arrest of persons charged with such a + serious crime as high treason on the strength of an affidavit + signed by a detective, who, on the very day such affidavit + was signed, had been denounced by the Chief Justice from the + Bench of the High Court as a perjurer." C. 9,521 (which + contains a full record of the whole affair).] + + [Footnote 103: The words are quoted by Mr. M. P. C. Walter, + the editor, in a letter of protest published in the Transvaal + _Leader_ of July 7th, 1899. C. 9,521.] + + [Footnote 104: _Ibid._] + +These expressions scarcely do justice to the spirit of vindictiveness +with which certain of the republican leaders regarded the British +population of the Rand. On May 22nd, 1900, less than a year after the +date of the Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Bill, and when Lord +Roberts was advancing rapidly upon Johannesburg, a conversation took +place with Mr. Smuts in Pretoria, which was reported in _The Times_. +In the course of this conversation the State Attorney said, with +reference to the proposed destruction of the mines, that "he greatly +regretted that Johannesburg should suffer, but that the Government had +no choice in the matter, as the popular pressure upon them was too +great to be resisted." This determination is rightly characterised by +Mr. Farrelly, the late legal adviser to the Government of the South +African Republic, as the "fiendish project of wrecking the mines and +plunging into hopeless misery for years tens of thousands of innocent +men, women, and children." But that is not all. He has put upon +record[105] the sinister fact that the man entrusted with the +execution of this infamous design was Mr. Smuts himself. The mines +were saved, therefore, not by the Boer Government, but in spite of it, +and solely through the independent action of Dr. Krause, the +Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, who "arrested the leader of the +wreckers, sent by Mr. Smuts, the day before the surrender to Lord +Roberts."[106] + + [Footnote 105: _The Settlement after the War_, p. 218.] + + [Footnote 106: _Ibid._] + +[Sidenote: Action of the British.] + +The British population, although it provided no such displays of +racial passion, was in an equally determined mood. Undismayed by the +threats of the Boers, the Uitlander Council continued calmly to +analyse the Franchise Bill in each successive phase--an unostentatious +but very useful service, which materially assisted Lord Milner in +following the windings and doublings of Boer diplomacy. After the +great meeting at Johannesburg (June 10th), the British centres in the +Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia gave similar demonstrations of their +confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, and their conviction of the +justice and necessity of the five years' franchise demanded by the +Imperial Government. On the other hand, the irritation against British +intervention was growing daily in the Free State; and the Dutch +Reformed Church and the Bond had organised a counter-demonstration in +the Cape Colony. The Synod of the former, meeting on June 30th, drew +up an address protesting that the differences between Lord Milner's +franchise proposals and those of President Krueger were not sufficient +to justify the "horrors of war," and requested the Governor to forward +it to the Queen. At Capetown (July 12th) and in the Dutch districts +throughout the Colony, Bond meetings were held at which resolutions +were passed in favour of a "compromise" as between Lord Milner's five +years' franchise and the scheme embodied in President Krueger's law. +More sinister was the circumstance that the information, that a +consignment of 500 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges, landed at Port +Elizabeth on July 8th, had been permitted by the Cape Government to be +forwarded through the Colony to the Free State, only came to the ears +of the High Commissioner by an accident. In the meantime, more +definite evidence of the almost unanimous approval of Lord Milner's +policy by the British population in South Africa was forthcoming. In +all three British colonies petitions to the Queen praying for justice +to the Uitlanders, and affirming absolute confidence in Lord Milner, +were signed. The Natal petition contained the names of three-fourths +of the adult male population of the Colony, while the signatures to +the joint petition of the Cape and Rhodesia had already reached a +total of 40,500 before the end of July. In other respects the +testimony of Natal was clear and unmistakable. In this predominantly +English Colony identical resolutions supporting the action and policy +of the Imperial Government, were carried unanimously in both Chambers +of the Legislature. + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's warning.] + +In the middle of July the situation improved in a slight degree +through the influence which Lord Milner had exercised upon the +Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony. On the 14th the Cape Parliament +met, and on this day Mr. Hofmeyr, chagrined at a suggestion for +further support which he had received from the republican +nationalists at Pretoria, despatched a telegram to Mr. Smuts, in which +he, as the recognised head of the Afrikander Bond, reminded the +members of President Krueger's Executive that the promised co-operation +of the Cape Government with them had been definitely limited to "moral +support." And he plainly hinted that, unless greater deference was +shown to his advice, even this "moral support" might be withdrawn. + + "The most important suggestions sent from here will apparently + not be adopted. The independence of the Republics is in danger. + As to the Colony, the utmost prospect held out was moral support. + The Ministry and the Bond have acted up to that. If Parliament + [_i.e._ the Cape Parliament] goes too strongly in the same + direction, there may be a change of Ministry, with Sprigg or + Rhodes backed by Milner. Would your interests be benefited + thereby? _Verb. sat. sap._"[107] + + [Footnote 107: Secured by the Intelligence Department. The + telegrams thus referred to, in this and the following + chapter, have not been published in the Blue-Books. They were + published, however, in _The Times History of the War_. Their + authenticity is undoubted. Sir Gordon Sprigg had held a + conversation with the Governor on the 13th.] + +As President Krueger wanted to retain the "moral support" of the Cape +Government for a few weeks longer, he listened to Mr. Fischer's +advice[108] to humour their prejudices, and forthwith recommended a +further modification of the Franchise Bill to the Volksraad. This +final amendment, under which a uniform seven years' retrospective +franchise was substituted for a nine years' retrospective franchise, +alternate with a seven years' retrospective franchise taking effect +five years after the passing of the law (_i.e._ in 1904), was accepted +on July 18th, and the new Franchise Law was passed on the 19th and +promulgated on the 26th. Its provisions were so obscure that it was +accompanied by an explanatory memorandum furnished by the State +Attorney, Mr. Smuts. But even assuming that the legal pitfalls could +be removed, and the law, thus simplified, would be worked in the most +liberal spirit by the officials of the Republic, President Krueger's +proposals failed to provide the essential reform which Lord Milner had +pledged himself and the Imperial Government to obtain. That reform was +the immediate endowment of a substantial proportion of the British +residents in the Transvaal with the rights of citizenship. To use his +own words,[109] "the whole point" of his Bloemfontein proposal was "to +put the Uitlanders in a position to fight their own battles, and so to +avoid the necessity of pressing for the redress of specific +grievances." + + [Footnote 108: Mr. Fischer was still at Pretoria. C. 9, 415.] + + [Footnote 109: C. 9,415.] + +No one in South Africa had any doubt as to the entire inadequacy of +the Franchise Bill to fulfil this essential object. In the opinion of +the Uitlander Council it was[110] "expressly designed to exclude +rather than admit the newcomer." Sir Henry de Villiers complained[111] +to Mr. Fischer: + + [Footnote 110: _Ibid._] + + [Footnote 111: On July 31st, Cd. 369.] + + "Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so obscure that the + State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to remove + the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough to speak + for itself, and no Government or court of law will be bound by + the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what those + explanations are, but the very fact that they are required + condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to + carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. + Herholdt." + +[Sidenote: An illusory measure.] + +And Lord Milner, in his final analysis of the law on July 26th, +concludes[112] that "the Bill as it stands leaves it practically in +the hands of the Government to enfranchise, or not to enfranchise, the +Uitlanders as it chooses." And he then draws attention to the very +grave consideration that if the paramount Power once accepts this +illusory measure, it will deprive itself of any future right of +intervention on the franchise question. + + [Footnote 112: C. 9,518.] + + "And the worst of it," he wrote, "is that should the Bill, + through a literal interpretation of its complicated provisions, + fail to secure the object at which it avowedly aims, no one will + be able to protest against the result." + +For one moment it seemed to the anxious warden of British interests in +South Africa as though the Home Government might be caught in +President Krueger's legislative net. The incident is one that well +exhibits the tireless effort and unflinching resolution with which +Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office. + +President Krueger's Bloemfontein scheme was a maze of legal pitfalls. +What these pitfalls were the reader may learn from the analysis of the +scheme which was published in _The Cape Times_ of June 10th, 1899. +When the Franchise Bill was before the Volksraad this complicated +scheme, as we have seen, was amended and re-amended; and each new +provision was as intricate in its working as the parent scheme. It is +obvious that nothing short of a commission of inquiry could have +determined with certainty the manner in which the representation of +the Uitlanders was affected by each successive amendment. While these +changes were in progress in the Raadzaal at Pretoria--changes so +"numerous and so rapid," as Lord Milner said,[113] that it was +"absolutely impossible at any given moment to know what the effect of +the scheme, as existing at that moment, was likely to be"--Lord Milner +himself at Capetown was at one and the same time overwhelmed with +detailed criticisms from Uitlanders, anxious that no legal pitfall or +administrative obstacle should remain undetected, and besieged with +cables from the Colonial Office requesting precise information upon +any point upon which an energetic member of the House of Commons might +have chosen to interrogate the Secretary of State. And, in addition to +this rain of telegrams, people on the spot were constantly calling at +Government House to ask if the High Commissioner had observed this or +that defect or trap in clauses, the text of which he had not yet had +time to receive, still less to read or comprehend. All this, too, was +over and above the heavy administrative and official duties of the +Governor and High Commissioner--duties which Lord Milner was called +upon to perform with more than usual care, in view of the political +ascendancy of the Dutch party in the Cape Colony. + + [Footnote 113: August 23rd, C. 9,521.] + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's assumption.] + +On July 13th, Lord Milner sent warning telegrams to Mr. +Chamberlain,[114] pointing out specific defects in the Franchise Bill, +and showing how seriously President Krueger's proposals fell short of +the Bloemfontein minimum. Five days later the Volksraad accepted the +final amendments. The face value of the Bill, as it now stood to be +converted into law, was a seven years' franchise, prospective and +retrospective. When, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain heard this same day +(July 18th) that the Volksraad had accepted the bill in this form with +only five dissentients, he seems to have assumed that a really +considerable concession had been made by President Krueger at the last +moment, and that, with the President and the Volksraad in this mood, +still further concessions would be forthcoming. Under this impression +he informed the House of Commons lobby correspondent of _The Times_ +that "the crisis might be regarded as at an end." His words were +reproduced in _The Times_ on the day following (July 19th), and at +once cabled to South Africa. + + [Footnote 114: C. 9,415.] + +It is impossible for any one who has not lived in South Africa to +realise the sickening distrust and dread produced in the minds of the +loyal subjects of the Crown by this statement. War they were ready to +face. But to go back to every-day life once again bowed down with the +shame of a moral Majuba, to meet the eyes of the Dutch once more +aflame with the light of victory, to hear their words of insolent +contempt--was ignominy unspeakable and unendurable. The Uitlander +Council at once cabled an emphatic message of protest[115] to Mr. +Chamberlain, and every loyalist that had a friend in England +telegraphed to beg him to use all his influence to prevent the +surrender of the Government. How near the British population in South +Africa were to this ignominy may be gathered from the fact that on +this day Lord Milner received a telegram in which Mr. Chamberlain +congratulated him upon the successful issue of his efforts. Lord +Milner's reply was one that could have left no doubt in Mr. +Chamberlain's mind as to the gravity of the misconception under which +he laboured. It was, of course, beyond the High Commissioner's power +to prevent the Home Government from accepting the Franchise Bill; but +he could at least remove the impression that he was anxious to +participate in an act, which would have made the breach between the +loyalists of South Africa and the mother country final and +irrevocable. + + [Footnote 115: "The Uitlander Council is keenly disappointed + at the _Times_' announcement that the seven years' franchise + is acceptable to the Imperial Government. We fear few will + accept the franchise on this condition, so the result is not + likely to abate unrest and discontent, nor redress pressing + grievances. Such a settlement would not even approximate to + the conditions obtaining in the Orange Free State and the + [British] colonies, and would fail to secure the recognition + of the principle of racial equality. We earnestly implore you + not to depart from the High Commissioner's five years' + compromise, which the Uitlanders accepted with great + reluctance. The absolute necessity for a satisfactory + settlement with an Imperial guarantee is emphasised by the + insincerity and bad faith persistently shown during the + Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Law."--C. 9,415.] + +[Sidenote: The relapse in England.] + +It is scarcely possible to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord +Milner's telegrams before him, was himself prepared to accept +President Krueger's illusory franchise scheme. The source of the +weakness of the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, no less +than in its refusal to make adequate preparations for war, is to be +found in the inability of the mass of the people of England to +understand how completely British power in South Africa had been +undermined by the Afrikander nationalists during the last twenty +years. How could the average elector know that the refusal or +acceptance of the Volksraad Bill, differing only from the Bloemfontein +minimum in an insignificant--as it seemed--particular of two years, +would, in fact, make known to all European South Africa whether +President Krueger or the British Government was master of the +sub-continent? In view of this profound ignorance of South African +conditions, and the consequent uncertainty of any assured support, +even from the members of their own party, the Salisbury Cabinet may +well have argued: "Here is something at last that we can represent as +a genuine concession. Let us take it, and have done with this +troublesome South African question; or leave it to the next Liberal +Government to settle." + +If the Cabinet did so reason to themselves, what English statesman +could have "cast the first stone" at them? But how profound is the +interval between the spirit of the policy of "the man on the spot," +with his eyes upon the object, and the spirit of the policy of the +island statesman with one eye upon the hustings and the other strained +to catch an intermittent glimpse of an unfamiliar and distant Africa! + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's anxiety.] + +This 19th of July was a dark day for the High Commissioner. In the +morning came Mr. Chamberlain's telegram with its ominous suggestion of +a change for the worse in the attitude of the Home Government. And +this change in the Cabinet was, as Lord Milner knew, only the natural +reflection of a wider change, which had manifested itself among the +supporters of the Government and in the country at large since the +publication, on June 14th, of his despatch of May 4th. Private letters +had made him aware that to men to whom Dutch ascendancy at the Cape +and Boer tyranny in the Transvaal, Afrikander nationalism and Boer +armaments, were meaningless expressions, his resolute advocacy of the +Uitlanders' cause and his frank presentation of the weakness of Great +Britain had seemed the work of a disordered imagination or a violent +partisanship. Nor was his knowledge of the relapse in England limited +to the warnings or protests of his private friends. _The South African +News_, the ministerial organ, which of late had filled its columns +with adverse criticisms taken from the London Press, this morning +contained a bitter article on him reprinted from _Punch_, which had +arrived by the yesterday's mail. After all, it seemed, the long +struggle against mis-government in the Transvaal was going to end in +failure; and the British people would once more be befooled. With such +thoughts in his mind, Lord Milner must have found the work of making +up the weekly despatches for the Colonial Office--for it was a +Wednesday[116]--a wearisome and depressing task. The mail was detained +until long past the customary hour. But before it left, in spite of +discouragement and anxiety, Lord Milner had gathered together into a +brief compass all the documents necessary to put Mr. Chamberlain in +possession of every material fact relative to the new law--passed only +on the day before--and to the proceedings of the Transvaal Executive +and the Volksraad between the 12th and the 19th. And, in addition to +this, he had written a fresh estimate of the Franchise Bill in its +latest form, in which he emphasised his former verdict that the +proposals which it contained were not such as the Uitlanders would be +likely to accept. And in particular he pointed out that the fact of +the final amendment being thus readily adopted by the Volksraad +disposed of the contention, upon which President Krueger had laid so +much stress at Bloemfontein, that his "burghers" would not permit him +to make the concessions which the British Government required. He +wrote: + + [Footnote 116: The English outward mail-boat arrived on + Tuesday, and the homeward boat left on Wednesday.] + + "On July 12th Her Majesty's Government requested the Government + of the South African Republic to give them time to consider the + measure and communicate their views before it was proceeded with. + To this the Government of the South African Republic replied, on + July 13th, with a polite negative, saying that 'the whole matter + was out of the hands of the Government, and it was no longer + possible for the Government to satisfy the demands of the + Secretary of State.' The State-Attorney informed Mr. Greene[117] + at the same time that 'the present proposals represented + absolutely the greatest concession that could be got from the + Volksraad, and could not be enlarged. He personally had tried + hard for seven years' retrospective franchise, but the Raad would + not hear of it, and it was only with difficulty that the present + proposals were obtained.' This was on the 12th, but within a week + the seven years' retrospective franchise had been adopted. + Indeed, the statement of the absolute impossibility of obtaining + more than a particular measure of enfranchisement from the + Volksraad or the burghers has been made over and over again in + the history of this question--never more emphatically than by the + President himself at Bloemfontein--and has over and over again + been shown to be a delusion."[118] + + [Footnote 117: Sir W. Greene became a K.C.B. after the war + had broken out.] + + [Footnote 118: C. 9,518.] + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's statement.] + +But this full record of the shifts and doublings of Boer diplomacy +would not reach London for another two weeks and a half. It was +necessary, therefore, to use the cable. Early the next morning Lord +Milner sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he warned +the Home Government of the extreme discouragement produced among all +who were attached to the British connection by _The Times_ statement +of their readiness to accept the Franchise Bill. On that afternoon +(July 20th), Mr. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons +in which he took up a much more satisfactory position. The Government, +he said, were led to hope that the new law "might prove to be a basis +of settlement on the lines laid down" by Lord Milner at the +Bloemfontein Conference. They observed, however, that "a number of +conditions" which might be used "to take away with one hand what had +been given with the other" were still retained. But they-- + + "felt assured that the President, having accepted the principle + for which they had contended, would be prepared to reconsider any + detail of his schemes which could be shown to be a possible + hindrance to the full accomplishment of the objects in view, and + that he would not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value + by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of + administration." + +That is to say, Mr. Chamberlain was no longer willing to take the bill +at its face value, but in accordance with his determination to exhaust +every possible resource of diplomacy before he turned to force, he +gave President Krueger credit for a genuine desire to promote a +peaceable settlement. A week later he formulated the method by which +the President was to be allowed an opportunity of justifying this +generous estimate of his intentions. In the meantime Lord Milner had +sent lengthy telegrams to the Secretary of State on the 23rd, and +again on the 26th, and the Salisbury Cabinet had determined to make a +definite pronouncement of its South African policy, and to endeavour +to arouse the country to a sense of the seriousness of the situation +with which President Krueger's continued obduracy would bring it face +to face. On July 27th Mr. Balfour declared, in addressing the Union of +Conservative Associations, that-- + + "If endless patience, endless desire to prevent matters coming to + extremities, if all the resources of diplomacy, were utterly + ineffectual to untie the knot, other means must inevitably be + found by which that knot must be loosened." + +On the day following (July 28th) the Transvaal question was debated in +both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Lords the Prime Minister, +Lord Salisbury, delivered a moderate and almost sympathetic speech. +After making all allowance for the natural apprehension experienced by +President Krueger at the sudden inrush of population caused by the +discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, he expressed the opinion +that an attempt "to put the two races fairly and honestly on the same +footing" would bring a peaceful solution of the crisis. But, he +added-- + + "How long we are to consider that solution, and what patience we + are bound to show, these things I will not discuss. We have to + consider not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the + Transvaal, but, what is more important, the feelings of our + fellow-subjects.... Whatever happens, when the validity of the + Conventions is impeached, they belong from that time entirely to + history. I am quite sure that if this country has to make + exertions in order to secure the most elementary justice for + British subjects,--I am quite sure [it] will not reinstate a + state of things that will bring back the old difficulties in all + their formidable character at the next turn of the wheel. Without + intruding on his thoughts, I do not think President Krueger has + sufficiently considered this." + +[Sidenote: The Joint Commission.] + +In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had proposed +to the Transvaal Government that a joint commission should be +appointed to test the efficacy of the scheme of electoral reform +embodied in the new Franchise Law. This proposal was set out in detail +in a despatch already addressed to the High Commissioner, the +substance of which had been telegraphed[119] to him on the preceding +day (July 27th). The British Government assumed that "the concessions +now made to the Uitlanders were intended in good faith to secure to +them some approach to the equality which was promised in 1881"; they +proposed that the "complicated details and questions of a technical +nature" involved in the new law should be discussed in the first +instance by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner and by the +South African Republic; and if, and when, a "satisfactory agreement" +had been reached on these points, they further proposed that all +disputes as to the terms of the Convention should be settled by a +"judicial authority, whose independence ... would be above suspicion," +and all remaining matters in respect of the political representation +of the Uitlanders by "another personal Conference" between the High +Commissioner and President Krueger. + + [Footnote 119: C. 9,518.] + +Although the position which the Salisbury Cabinet had now taken up was +one which placed them beyond the danger of accepting an illusory +franchise scheme in lieu of an adequate measure of reform, it was not +the course of action which was best to follow, except from the point +of view of opening the eyes of the British public. In itself further +delay was dangerous. It gave the Boers more time to arm, while we, for +this very reason for which it was necessary to protract the +negotiations, were prevented from arming vigorously. It discouraged +our friends in South Africa, and made them even begin to doubt whether +Great Britain "meant business." It was good policy to offer the Joint +Inquiry, given the truth of the assumption upon which this offer was +based--namely, that the Bill represented an honest desire on the part +of President Krueger to provide a peaceable settlement of the Uitlander +question. Lord Milner knew, within the limits of human intelligence, +that this assumption was wholly unwarranted. The Home Government +apparently did not. As the result of this difference, Lord Milner's +policy was again deflected to the extent that two months of +negotiation were devoted to a purely futile endeavour to persuade the +Pretoria Executive to prove the good faith of a proposal, which was +never intended to be anything more than a pretext for delay. And, as +before, the injury to British interests lay in the fact that, while +the Home Government was prevented from making any adequate use of this +delay by its determination not to make preparations for war until war +was in sight, the period was fully utilised by President Krueger, who +since Bloemfontein had been resolutely hastening the arrangements +necessary for attacking the British colonies at a given moment with +the entire burgher forces of the two Republics. + +[Sidenote: Krueger urged to accept.] + +The offer of the Joint Inquiry was formally communicated to the +Pretoria Executive in an eminently friendly telegram[120] from Lord +Milner on August 1st. Efforts were made on all sides to induce +President Krueger to accept it. Chief Justice de Villiers wrote +strongly in this sense to Mr. Fischer,[121] and to his brother Melius, +the Chief Justice of the Free State. Mr. Schreiner telegraphed to Mr. +Fischer, and Mr. Hofmeyr to President Steyn, both urging that the +influence of the Free State should be used in favour of the proposal. +The Dutch Government advised the Republic "not to refuse the English +proposal";[122] and further informed Dr. Leyds that, in the opinion of +the German Government, "every approach to one of the Great Powers in +this very critical moment will be without any results whatever, and +very dangerous to the Republic."[123] Even the English sympathisers of +the Boers were in favour of acceptance. Mr. Montagu White, the +Transvaal Consul-General in London, cabled that "Courtney, Labouchere, +both our friends, and friendly papers without exception," recommended +this course; and that "refusal meant war and would estrange friends." +The letter which he wrote to Mr. Reitz on the same day (August 4th), +possesses an independent interest, as revealing the degree in which +the friends of the Boers in England had identified themselves with the +policy of the Afrikander party in the Cape Colony. + + [Footnote 120: C. 9,518.] + + [Footnote 121: See p. 218 for this letter.] + + [Footnote 122: Cd. 547.] + + [Footnote 123: _Ibid._] + + "The essence of friendly advice," said Mr. White,[124] "is: + Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will + be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc., + and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the + Commission. In other words: Gain as much time as you can, and + give the public time here to get out of the dangerous frame of + mind which Chamberlain's speeches have created.... Labouchere + said to me this morning: 'Don't, for goodness' sake, let Mr. + Krueger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little skilful + management, and he will give Master Joe another fall.' He further + said: 'You are such past-masters of the art of gaining time; here + is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right hands lose + their cunning, and you ought to spin out the negotiations for + quite two or three months.'" + + [Footnote 124: Cd. 369.] + +A week later (August 11th), President Krueger received a telegram[125] +in which fifty Afrikander members of the Cape Parliament advanced the +same argument. The acceptance of the Joint Commission, they pointed +out, would provide a way out of a crisis "which might prove fatal to +the best interests, not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren, +but also of the Afrikander party." They, therefore, begged his Honour +to "lay their words privately" before the Executive and the Volksraad. + + [Footnote 125: Secured by the Intelligence Department.] + +[Sidenote: Krueger resolved on war.] + +But President Krueger, like Lord Milner, had his eyes fixed upon the +object. He looked beyond the Afrikander leaders to the rank and file +of the Dutch population in the British colonies, with whom he had been +in direct communication through his agents for many months past.[126] +He knew that any such inquiry as Mr. Chamberlain proposed would +expose the flagrant insincerity of the Franchise Bill. On August 2nd +he had telegraphed to President Steyn that compliance with the Joint +Commission was "tantamount to the destruction of the independence of +the Republic."[127] To the Dutch Consul-General[128] he was perfectly +frank: "Defeats such as the English had suffered in the war for +freedom, and later under Jameson, had never been suffered by the +Boers." His burghers were ready to "go on the _battue_ of Englishmen," +when he gave the word.[129] + + [Footnote 126: It was known to the Intelligence Department + that Krueger's secret agents had been in the Cape Colony for + two years before the outbreak of war, and that they had + distributed arms in certain districts of the Colony.] + + [Footnote 127: Secured by the Intelligence Department.] + + [Footnote 128: Cd. 547.] + + [Footnote 129: The expression "Ons wil nou Engelse schiet" + was actually used. See Thomas's _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War + Revealed_, p. 110.] + +[Sidenote: Fischer ceases to "mediate".] + +The burghers of the Free State could be counted upon with almost equal +certainty. Mr. Fischer, a more potent influence than President Steyn, +had by this time openly dissociated himself from the "mediation" +policy of the Cape nationalists, and was again (August 4th to 9th) at +Pretoria. Here he threw himself heart and soul into the work of +completing the military preparations of the two Republics. On the 6th +he telegraphed to President Steyn that the draft reply was prepared; +that it "invited discussion and asked questions to gain time," and +that, therefore, it "was not yet necessary to deliberate as to calling +together the Volksraad" for the final decision of peace or war. +"Military matters, especially artillery," he added, "seem to me very +faulty. Care will be taken to make all necessary preparations."[130] +Nor did he leave the Transvaal capital until he had settled the +details of the invasion of Natal with General Joubert. Indeed, from +this time onwards to the despatch of the ultimatum--a document which +came, in its final form, from his pen--Mr. Fischer's part in the +conduct of the negotiations was second only to that of President +Krueger. In all he did he displayed the same reasoned determination to +oppose British supremacy in South Africa which he has exhibited since +the war in his control of the Bloemfontein _Friend_. Orders for the +inspection of the commando organisation in the Free State had been +given before Mr. Fischer had left Bloemfontein; and on his return from +Pretoria he responded to Mr. Schreiner's urgent and continued +representations of the desirability of inducing President Krueger to +accept Mr. Chamberlain's offer, by a request to be informed of any +probable movements of British forces. Mr. Schreiner's reply, that the +Free State must ask for such information from the High Commissioner, +caused him to apply to Mr. Hofmeyr for an explanation of the Cape +Premier's attitude. The inquiry produced a notable analysis of Mr. +Schreiner's position. + + [Footnote 130: Secured by the Intelligence Department.] + + "Hofmeyr says," Dr. Te Water telegraphed, "that whatever the + Premier's feelings or relations to our people are, he is at the + same time a minister of the Crown. As such he has on him claims + in two directions, of which he is acquitting himself to the best + of his ability. He has no control over the movement of troops. + You had better come and have a quiet talk. Meanwhile the Free + State should surely refrain from an aggressive step."[131] + + [Footnote 131: Secured by the Intelligence Department.] + +This well-meant advice was somewhat belated. In reply to a telegram +from President Steyn, asking whether it was true that the Imperial +Government was going to send 1,000 men to Bethulie Bridge, Lord Milner +replied on August 16th, that, "as a matter of fact, no despatch of +Imperial troops to the borders of the Orange Free State was in +contemplation." But he added that in view of the much more substantial +reports of the "importation of large quantities of munitions of war" +into that State and "the general arming of the burghers," it "would +not have been unnatural, if such military preparations had been +responded to by a defensive movement" on the part of the British +Government.[132] Indeed, the circumstances which had led to Mr. +Fischer's co-operation in Mr. Hofmeyr's "mediation" were rapidly +disappearing. The Port Elizabeth Mausers and ammunition were safely +through the Cape Colony; a further consignment of Mauser ammunition +arrived at Delagoa Bay (August 16th) in the German steamship +_Reichstag_ at the very time that these telegrams were passing; and +both this and other enormous consignments were forwarded to Pretoria a +fortnight later in spite of an abortive attempt on the part of the +British Foreign Office to induce the Portuguese authorities to retain +them. The possession of an adequate supply of ammunition was a matter +of cardinal importance to which, as we have seen, President Steyn had +drawn the attention of the Pretoria Executive nearly a month before +the Bloemfontein Conference. It was these Mauser cartridges that were +wanted especially, since, without them, the new arm--the splendid +Mauser magazine rifle--must have been rejected in place of the +inferior Martini-Henry for which the Boers had long been provided with +an ample reserve of ammunition. + + [Footnote 132: C. 9,521.] + +[Sidenote: Smuts-Greene negotiations.] + +[Sidenote: Boer diplomacy.] + +In the meantime the British Government was still waiting for a reply +to its offer of a Joint Inquiry. On August 7th the Volksraad discussed +the question, and on the 12th a despatch was written by Mr. Reitz +refusing the offer on the ground that such a proposal was inconsistent +with the independence of the Republic. It was held back, however, +until September 1st; that is to say, until the Portuguese authorities +had allowed the Transvaal ammunition to leave Lorenzo Marques. Then, +as we shall see, it was forwarded in conjunction with a second +despatch of September 2nd. The delay was won by a characteristic +display of "the art of gaining time," in which, as Mr. Labouchere +remarked, the Boers were past-masters. On the same day that Mr. Reitz +wrote his despatch (August 12th), Mr. Smuts approached Sir William +Greene[133] with the offer of a still further simplified seven years' +franchise in lieu of the Joint Commission. When, however, Sir William +Greene assured him that the British Government would not accept +anything less than the Bloemfontein minimum, he subsequently agreed to +an arrangement of which the main items were: A five years' franchise; +the workable character of the new law to be secured by the submission +of its provisions to the British Agent with a legal adviser; and +increased representation in the Volksraad, together with the use of +the English language. After communications had passed between Sir +William Greene, Lord Milner, and Mr. Chamberlain, these proposals, +with certain reservations, were formally communicated to the British +Government by Mr. Reitz on August 19th. Two days later a second note +was forwarded in which the offer contained in the previous note +(August 19th) was declared to be subject to the acceptance by the +British Government of two conditions. These conditions--an undertaking +not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic in the future +and a specific withdrawal of the claim of suzerainty--amounted in +effect to a formal renunciation by Great Britain of its position as +paramount Power in South Africa. In other words, the Pretoria +Executive had repudiated the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir +William Greene. Mr. Chamberlain, noticing the material variation +between the original offer as initialled by Mr. Smuts and forwarded by +Sir William Greene, and Mr. Reitz's note of August 19th, instructed +Sir William Greene to obtain an explanation of the discrepancy from +the Transvaal Government. The reply was a curt rejoinder that there +was not "the slightest chance of an alteration or an amplification" of +the terms of the arrangement as set out in the note of the 19th.[134] +In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed a reply on August +28th, in which he accepted the original offer, and rejected the +impossible conditions subsequently attached to it.[135] The terms of +settlement thus proposed were in substance the same as those of the +despatch of July 27th, with the exception that an inquiry by the +British Agent was substituted for the Joint Commission, and the five +years' franchise of the Smuts-Greene arrangement was accepted in lieu +of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad law. The Transvaal +reply was a further essay in the same useful "art of gaining time." It +was dated September 2nd, and contained a definite withdrawal of the +Smuts-Greene offer as embodied in the notes of August 19th and 21st, +and a vague return to the Joint Commission. + + [Footnote 133: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene. C. 9,521.] + + [Footnote 134: C. 9,521.] + + [Footnote 135: _Ibid._] + + "Under certain conditions," wrote Mr. Reitz,[136] "this + Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government + how they propose that the Commission should be constituted, and + what place and time for meeting is suggested."[137] + + [Footnote 136: The despatch was presented to the British + Agent, and telegraphed, through the High Commissioner, to the + Home Government. Its diplomatic ambiguity was due to Mr. + Fischer's influence.] + + [Footnote 137: C. 9,521.] + +And this with the consoling promise of a "further reply" to other +questions arising out of the despatch of July 27th, which the +Transvaal Government had not yet been able to consider. + +The response to this astute document was the last effort of the +Salisbury Cabinet to arrange a settlement upon the basis of the +"friendly discussion" inaugurated at Bloemfontein. The British +Government, Mr. Chamberlain wrote, had "absolutely repudiated" the +claim, made in the notes of April 16th and May 9th, that the South +African Republic was a "sovereign international state," and they could +not, therefore, consider a proposal which was conditional on the +acceptance of this view of the status of the Republic. They "could not +now consent to go back to the proposals for which those of the note of +August 19th were intended as a substitute," since they were "satisfied +that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied, +was insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial +representation" of the Uitlanders. They were "still prepared to accept +the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of August 19th," +provided that an inquiry, joint or unilateral as the Transvaal +Government might prefer, showed that "the new scheme of representation +would not be encumbered by conditions which would nullify the +intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the +Uitlanders." They assumed that "the new members of the Raad would be +permitted to use their own language." They expressed their belief that +"the acceptance of these terms would at once remove the tension +between the two Governments, and would in all probability render +unnecessary any further intervention" on the franchise question, and +their readiness-- + +[Sidenote: A definite demand.] + + "to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between + the President of the South African Republic and the High + Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal + of Arbitration, and the questions ... which were neither + Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation" + +of the Convention. And they added that if the reply of the Republic +was negative or inconclusive, "they would reserve to themselves the +right to reconsider the situation _de novo_, and to formulate their +own proposals for a final settlement."[138] + + [Footnote 138: C. 9,521.] + +The text of this despatch was telegraphed to Lord Milner late at night +on September 8th. It was presented to the Transvaal Government on the +12th, with a request that the reply might reach the British Agent not +later than midday on the 14th. This limit of time was fixed by Sir +William Greene on his own initiative, and it was withdrawn by Lord +Milner's instructions, in order that the Pretoria Executive might not +be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered on the +15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement, re-stated +by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise reform, +coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene. + +It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect +in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written +for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to +write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the +world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the +British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into +war. + + "This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope + that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will + feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals + more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, + and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal + for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of + State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and + subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by + it."[139] + + [Footnote 139: C. 9,530.] + +[Sidenote: Reinforcements sanctioned.] + +The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion +of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South +African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise +the strength of the Natal and Cape forces to the total of 22,000, +estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive purposes, by +the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly 6,000 were to be +provided by the Indian Army.[140] The despatch itself, definite in +contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of communication which, in +Lord Milner's judgment, should have been forwarded to the Transvaal +Government after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference; and the +additional troops now ordered out were nothing more than the +substantial reinforcements for which he had applied in June. The three +months' negotiations had led the Salisbury Cabinet to the precise +conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at Bloemfontein. The only hope +of a peaceable settlement lay in a definite demand, backed by +preparations for war. But to do this in June, and to do it in +September, were two very different things. Assuming that diplomatic +pressure could in any case have availed to secure the necessary +reforms, it is obvious that, whatever prospect of success attached to +this course of action--Policy No. 2, as Lord Milner called it--in +June, was materially diminished in September. During the interval the +British Government had done practically nothing to improve its +military position. That of President Krueger had been conspicuously +improved. He had carried the Free State with him; he had got his +Mauser ammunition and additional artillery, and he had completed his +arrangements for the simultaneous mobilisation of the burghers of the +two Republics. Even now the military action of the British Government +was confined to preparations for defence; for the order to mobilise +the army corps was not given until the next Cabinet Council had been +held on September 22nd. The spirit of Pretoria was very different. The +commandos were on their way to the Natal border before the reply to +this British despatch of September 8th was delivered to the British +Agent. That was President Krueger's real answer--not the diplomatic +fencing of September 15th. + + [Footnote 140: The despatch of 2,000 additional troops to + Natal had been sanctioned on August 2nd, in response to the + earnest appeal of the Natal Government. Hence at this time + there were (roughly) 12,000 Imperial troops in South Africa. + It is noticeable that, although the despatch only reached + Lord Milner on the morning of the 9th, the _Cape Argus_ had + contained a telegram, giving an account of the troops warned + in India and England, on the evening of the 8th.] + +[Sidenote: Violence of the Boers.] + +More than this, the three months' negotiations had embittered the +relations of the British and Dutch factions in every South African +state to such a degree that any compromise of the sort proposed by +Lord Milner at Bloemfontein was no longer sufficient to effect a +settlement. The moderate measure of representation then suggested +would have been rejected now by the Uitlanders as wholly inadequate +for their protection, in view of the violent antipathy to them and the +gold industry which the diplomatic struggle had evoked among all +classes of the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. The particulars of +the outrageous treatment, and still more outrageous threats, to which +the British Uitlanders were subjected from this time onwards up to +the ultimatum are to be found in the Blue-books. As early as the +middle of August, when the Smuts-Greene negotiations had just been +commenced, Mr. Monypenny, the editor of the Johannesburg _Star_, was +warned that the Transvaal Government intended to issue a warrant for +his arrest on a charge of high treason. This intention, postponed +during the fortnight of delay won by these negotiations, was carried +out on September 1st, on which day Mr. Pakeman, the editor of the +_Transvaal Leader_, was secured, while Mr. Monypenny succeeded in +effecting his escape. This indefensible act was followed by a +characteristic attempt to disown it, made by Mr. Smuts, the State +Attorney, the nature of which is sufficiently exhibited in the +following telegram, despatched by the High Commissioner on September +4th to the Secretary of State: + + "The charge against Pakeman has been reduced to one under the + Press Law of 1896, and he has been admitted to bail. There have + been no further arrests. Greene telegraphs as follows: + + "_Begins._--A statement has been published through the Press this + morning by the State Attorney 'that no instructions had ever been + issued from Pretoria for the arrest of the editors of the + _Leader_ or the _Star_.' The facts are as follows: On Friday + morning the Public Prosecutor of Johannesburg and Captain Vandam, + who had come over from Johannesburg to Pretoria, were interviewed + by the State Attorney in his office here. In the afternoon these + two officers returned to Johannesburg, and arrested the editor + of the _Leader_ the same evening, failing to capture the editor + of the _Star_.--_Ends._ + + "There is no doubt that the arrest of both editors was decided by + the Government and other arrests contemplated, intimidation of + Uitlander leaders being the object. The exodus from Johannesburg + is taking formidable proportions. Many refugees of all classes + have come to Capetown. In Natal there are an even larger number. + A good deal of money is being spent on relief."[141] + + [Footnote 141: C. 9,521.] + +The violence of the Boers culminated a week before the Ultimatum +(October 9th-11th) in the wholesale expulsion of the British subjects +still remaining in the two Republics. Assuming that this measure was +justifiable on military grounds, there can be no excuse for the brutal +precipitancy with which it was enforced. It crowded the colonial ports +with homeless and impoverished fugitives; it inflicted unnecessary +suffering and pecuniary loss upon inoffensive and innocent +non-combatants, both European and native; and it was accompanied in +some instances by displays of wanton cruelty and deliberate spite +utterly unworthy of a people of European descent. + +[Sidenote: Anxiety of High Commissioner.] + +Thus it was only when Lord Milner's foresight had been unmistakably +confirmed by the stern logic of facts that the British Government +ordered these 10,000 troops to South Africa, 6,000 of whom--the Indian +contribution--arrived just in time to save Natal from being overrun by +the Boers. The three weeks preceding the Cabinet Council of September +8th, at which this decision was arrived at, had been a period of +intense anxiety for the High Commissioner. With the spectacle of the +increasing activity of England's enemies, and the increasing dismay of +England's friends, before his eyes, his protests against the +inactivity of the Home Government had become more urgent. In the +middle of August he declared that he could no longer be responsible +for the administration of South Africa unless he were provided +immediately with another military adviser. General Forestier-Walker +was then appointed, and after the departure of General Butler the +Imperial Government intervened at length to check the further passage +of munitions of war through the Colony to the Free State.[142] The +_Norman_, the mail-boat of August 23rd in which Sir William Butler +sailed for England, took home the masterly despatch[143] in which Lord +Milner explained the position taken up by him at the Bloemfontein +Conference, and showed how completely the proposals of the Transvaal +Government differed from the spirit of the settlement which he had +then invited President Krueger to accept. In doing so he reviewed the +whole course of the subsequent negotiations, pointed out the insidious +character of the last Transvaal proposal (August 19th and 21st), and +emphatically protested against the suggestion that the Imperial +Government should barter its rights as paramount Power for "another +hastily framed franchise scheme," on account of its "superficial +conformity" with what, after all, was only a single item in the long +list of questions that must be adjusted before the peaceful progress +of South Africa would be assured.[144] On August 28th Mr. Schreiner, +when called to account in the Cape Parliament for having allowed, "in +the usual course," the Mausers and ammunition for the Free State to +pass through the Colony, made the strange declaration that in the +event of war-- + + [Footnote 142: Cd. 43.] + + [Footnote 143: C. 9,521.] + + [Footnote 144: This despatch was received on September 8th. + Cd. 43.] + + "he would do his very best to maintain [for the Cape Colony] the + position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with + regard to its forces and with regard to its people." + +Three days later (August 31st) Lord Milner sent a still more +impressive appeal for "prompt and decisive action" on the part of the +Home Government. The despatch, which was telegraphed, is otherwise +significant for its account of the situation in Johannesburg: + + "I am receiving representations from many quarters," he said, "to + urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense. + Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her + Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound + to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in + various reliable quarters, that the distress is now really + serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. Business + there is at a standstill; many traders have become insolvent, and + others are only kept on their legs by the leniency of their + creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected + hitherto, are now suffering, owing to the withdrawal of workmen, + both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading + centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the + representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action, + not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her + Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for + extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the + vindication of British authority. It is a prolongation of the + negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded. + I fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling + against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag. + Please to understand that I invariably preach confidence and + patience--not without effect. But if I did not inform you of the + increasing difficulty in doing this, and of the unmistakable + growth of uneasiness about the present situation, and of a desire + to see it terminated at any cost, I should be failing in my + duty."[145] + + [Footnote 145: C. 9,521.] + +[Sidenote: The crisis in South Africa.] + +Indeed, while in England Mr. Chamberlain was remarking (at Highbury, +August 27th) that he "could not truly say that the crisis was passed," +and picturesquely complaining of President Krueger "dribbling out +reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," every loyalist in South +Africa knew that the time for words had gone by. On September 6th and +7th public meetings were held respectively at Maritzburg and +Capetown, at which resolutions were passed affirming the uselessness +of continuing the negotiations and the necessity for the prompt action +of the Imperial Government. + +Even this did not exhaust the evidence which was needed to persuade +the Salisbury Cabinet to make effective preparations for the defence +of the British colonies. The Cabinet Council of September 8th had +before it, in addition to the Transvaal note of September 2nd, a +direct and urgent request[146] for immediate reinforcements from the +Government of Natal--the loyal colony which, as Lord Milner had +declared, was to be defended "by the whole force of the empire." + + [Footnote 146: Received on September 6th. Cd. 44.] + +These were the circumstances in which the Salisbury Cabinet did in +September what Lord Milner had advised them to do in June. It is +impossible to maintain that the British Government had gained anything +in the way of political results comparable with the fatal loss of +military strength incurred by the three months' delay. The over-sea +British did not need to be taught either the justice or the necessity +of securing citizen rights for the industrial population of the +Transvaal. Before Lord Milner had been authorised to state that the +petition of the Uitlanders had been favourably received by the Home +Government, the citizens of Sydney had recorded in a public meeting +their "sympathy with their fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal," and +expressed their hope "that Her Majesty might be pleased to grant the +prayer of her subjects." Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales had +all three offered military contingents by July 21st;[147] the other +colonies refrained only from a desire not to embarrass the Home +Government in its negotiations with the Transvaal. Whatever good +effect was produced upon the public opinion of the continent of Europe +and the United States of America by the obvious reluctance of the +British Government to make war upon a puny enemy, was more than +counterbalanced by the spectacle of a great Power prevented from +employing the most elementary military precautions by a nice regard +for the susceptibilities of its political and commercial rivals. The +idea that the sentiment either of the world at large or of the +over-sea British would be favourably impressed by the three months of +futile negotiations was a sheer delusion. It was the people of England +who had to be educated. + + [Footnote 147: Cd. 18.] + +[Sidenote: The Manchester meeting.] + +How little they knew of the actual situation in South Africa, and of +the real character of the Boers may be seen from what happened on +September 15th. On this day a meeting was held at Manchester to +protest against the mere idea of England having to make war upon the +Transvaal. Lord (then Mr.) Courtney "hailed with satisfaction" the +British despatch of September 8th, which, having been published in the +Continental papers on the 13th, had appeared a day later (14th) in +those of Great Britain. "It was a rebuke to the fire-eaters," he +said, "and a rebuke most of all to one whom I must designate as a lost +man, a lost mind--I mean Sir Alfred Milner." And Mr. John Morley, like +Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was convinced that there was no need of +any preparations for war; the Transvaal Government "could not withdraw +from the five years' franchise." The day on which these words were +uttered was the day on which the note containing President Krueger's +determination to "withdraw" from the five years' franchise, and his +refusal even to consider the British offer of September 8th--hailed +with satisfaction by his old ally, Lord Courtney--was handed to Sir +William Greene. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE ULTIMATUM + + +The British people were destined to pay a heavy penalty for the +ignorance and irresolution that caused them to withhold, from June to +September, the mandate without which the Government was unable to +prepare for war. What that penalty was will be made sufficiently clear +when we come to consider the position of grave disadvantage in which +the British forces designated for the South African campaign were +placed at the outbreak of the war. For the moment it is enough to +notice that, just as the real source of the military weakness of +England in the war was the fact that only a very small proportion of +her adult male population had received an elementary training in arms, +so the futility of her peace strategy must be traced to the general +ignorance of the bitter hatred with which British supremacy was +regarded, not only by the Boers, but also by the Dutch subjects of the +Crown in the Cape Colony and Natal. In a world-wide and composite +State such as the British Empire, it is, of course, natural that the +people of one component part should be unfamiliar, in a greater or +lesser degree, with the conditions of any other part. What makes this +mutual unfamiliarity dangerous is the circumstance that the control of +the foreign relations, and of the effective military and naval forces, +of the Empire as a whole, remains exclusively in the hands of the +people of one part--the United Kingdom. In the absence of any +administrative body in which the over-sea Britains are represented, +the power, thus possessed, of moulding the destiny of any one province +of the Empire lays upon the island people the duty of informing +themselves adequately upon the circumstances and conditions of all its +component parts. It is obvious that the likelihood of this duty being +efficiently performed has been diminished greatly by the extension of +the franchise. Fortunately, however, in the case of Canada, Australia, +and New Zealand, questions involving a decision to employ the Army or +Navy which Great Britain maintains for the defence of the Empire have +arisen rarely in recent years. It is in regard to India and South +Africa that these decisions have been constantly required; and for +half a century past each of these two countries in turn has been the +battlefield of English parties. But while the efficiency of British +administration has suffered in both cases by variations of policy due +to party oscillations, infinitely greater injury has been done in +South Africa than in India. + +[Sidenote: Attitude of the island people.] + +In respect of South Africa, while, speaking broadly, Liberal +Governments have sought to escape from existing responsibilities, or +to decline new ones, Conservative Governments have sought to +discharge these responsibilities with the object of making this +country a homogeneous and self-supporting unit of the empire. To +persuade the nation to accept a policy which might, and probably +would, involve it in an immediate sacrifice both of men and money, was +plainly a more difficult task than to persuade it that no need existed +for any such sacrifices. The "long view" of the Imperialist statesmen +was supported in the present instance by past experience and by the +judgment of the great majority of the British population actually +resident in South Africa. The home English, remembering that the +recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been followed by Majuba and the +Retrocession, were anxious to maintain British supremacy unimpaired in +South Africa. What kept them irresolute was the uncertainty as to +whether this supremacy really was, or was not, in danger. Lord Milner +had told them that the establishment of a Dutch Republic, embracing +all South Africa, was being openly advocated, and that nothing but a +striking proof of Great Britain's intention to remain the paramount +Power--such as would be afforded by insisting upon the grant of equal +rights to the British population in the Transvaal--could arrest the +growth of the nationalist movement. He had pointed out also that the +conversion of the Boer Republic into an arsenal of munitions of war, +when, as in the case of Ketshwayo, there was no enemy against whom +these arms could be turned other than Great Britain, was in itself a +definite and unmistakable menace to British supremacy. This, moreover, +was the deliberate and reasoned verdict of a man who had been +commissioned, with almost universal approval, to ascertain the real +state of affairs in South Africa. If the nation had believed Lord +Milner in June, the British Government would have received the +political support that would have enabled it to make the preparations +for war in that month which, as we have seen, it was now making in +September. + +[Sidenote: The Liberal opposition.] + +The agency which, by playing upon the ignorance of the public, +prevented the nation from accepting at once the truth of Lord Milner's +verdict, was the Liberal Opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the +official leader of the Liberal party, maintained throughout the three +months in question that no reason existed for military preparation. +Mr. Labouchere wrote, on the eve of the war: "The Boers invade Natal! +You might just as well talk of their invading England." When Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman maintained that there was no need for the +Government to make any military preparations, we must presume that he +believed one of two things: either that President Krueger would yield, +or that, if President Krueger did not yield, there was nothing in the +condition of South Africa to make it necessary for Great Britain to +give any proof of her ability to maintain her position as paramount +Power by force of arms. The action of the Liberal Opposition resolves +itself, therefore, into a declaration, on its own authority as against +Lord Milner's, that neither the republican nor the colonial Dutch had +any intention of making war upon Great Britain in South Africa, or any +resources which would enable them to carry out such an intention with +any hope of success. Now, apart from the overwhelming testimony to the +utter falsity of this assertion which is afforded by the facts of the +campaign, and apart from such documents as the manifestos issued by +both Republics upon the outbreak of the war, we possess--thanks to the +exertions of the Intelligence Department--a mass of evidence, in the +shape of private and official correspondence, which enables us to +learn what was actually passing in the minds of the Dutch at this +time. On the 15th of this month of September, 1899, the meeting to +which we have referred[148] was held at Manchester, with the object, +not of strengthening the hands of the Government in the military +preparations which they were making thus tardily, but of protesting +against the very idea that there was anything in the attitude of the +Dutch in South Africa to make war necessary. A perusal of two of these +captured documents will enable the reader to judge for himself in what +degree this Liberal view of the situation corresponded with the facts. +The first is a letter written on September 25th--that is to say, ten +days after Lord Courtney was denouncing Lord Milner as "a lost mind" +at Manchester--by Mr. Blignaut, brother to the State Secretary of the +Free State. It is concerned with the safe arrival in the Free State of +a Colonial Afrikander, who has left his home in the Western Province +of the Cape Colony to join the republican forces: + + [Footnote 148: p. 251.] + +[Translation.] + + "KROONSTADT, ORANGE FREE STATE, + "_September 25th_, 1899. + + "Your wire to hand this morning, to which I + replied. ---- has arrived. + + "I never gave the youngster credit for such plans + to dodge Mr. ----, and not to be trapped and + taken back. I think he owes his friend ---- something + for his advice how to proceed. As he is here + now, he can remain. I see myself he will never be + satisfied to stay there [_i.e._ in the colony] while there + is war going on. + + "The only thing we are afraid of now is that + Chamberlain, with his admitted fitfulness of temper, + will cheat us out of the war, and consequently the + opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and + Natal, and forming the Republican United States + of South Africa; for, in spite of [S. J. du Toit], + we have forty-six thousand fighting men who have + pledged themselves to die shoulder to shoulder in + defence of our liberty, and to secure the independence + of South Africa. + + "Please forward ----'s luggage. + "J. N. BLIGNAUT."[149] + + [Footnote 149: Cd. 420. The Blue-book points out that in the + original "a well-known nick-name" is used for Mr. S. J. du + Toit.] + +[Sidenote: Afrikander aspirations.] + +This is not an isolated or exceptional expression of opinion. It is a +typical statement of what was in the mind of ninety-nine out of every +hundred republican nationalists at this time. The aspirations it +contains were proclaimed a fortnight later to the world by President +Krueger himself in the boast that his Republic would "stagger +humanity." They appeared in the nonchalant remarks made a few days +later by Mr. Gregorowski, the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, in +bidding farewell to Canon Farmer,[150] who was preparing to leave his +cure at Pretoria in view of the certainty of war. + + [Footnote 150: As reported by Reuter.] + + "Is it really necessary for you to go? The war will be over in a + fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the + English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace." + +War, then, for the Boer meant "an opportunity of annexing the Cape +Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South +Africa." When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, Lord +Courtney, Mr. James Bryce, and other Liberal leaders saw no reason why +the British Government should make military preparations--did, in +fact, do all in their power to induce the English people to withhold +the support necessary to allow the British Government to make these +preparations--there were, twelve thousand British troops in South +Africa to oppose the "forty-six thousand fighting men who had pledged +themselves to die shoulder to shoulder" to secure the independence, +not of the Transvaal but of "South Africa". + +And what of the Dutch in the Cape Colony? Our second document will +enlighten us on this point. It is an invitation, composed in doggerel +rhyme, to the Boer forces to invade Griqualand West, signed by the +chairman of a district branch of the Afrikander Bond. The date is not +given; but as the proclamation under which Head-Commandant C. J. +Wessels annexed the districts in question is dated November 11th, +1899, it was obviously written during the first three or four weeks of +the war. + +[Translation.] + + "Dear countrymen of the Transvaal: Brothers of our religion and + language: Our hearts are burning for you all: when your brave men + fall, we pray to God night and day to help you with His might; we + are powerless by ourselves--the English are so angry with us that + they have taken away our ammunition, all our powder and + cartridges; if you can provide us each with a packet of ten and a + Mauser, you will see what we can do; Englishmen won't stand + before us, they will go to the devil. There are a few English + here, but we count them amongst the dead; for the rest we are all + Boers, and only wait for you to move us. Englishmen are not our + friends, and we will not serve under their flag; so we all shout + together, as Transvaal subjects, 'God save President Krueger, and + the Transvaal army; God save President Steyn, and all Free + Staters great and small!'"[151] + + [Footnote 151: Cd. 420.] + +[Sidenote: Ignorance of Liberal leaders.] + +But, apart from this profound misconception of the real feeling and +intentions of the Afrikander nationalists in South Africa, manifested +with such disastrous effect during these critical months--June to +September, 1899--the leaders of the Liberal Opposition otherwise +displayed in their public utterances an ignorance of this province of +the Empire that can only be characterised as "wanton." For what +expression other than "wanton ignorance" can be used to describe the +habit of mind which permits public men to make statements in direct +conflict with the facts of South African history, as established by +ascertainable evidence, or to state as facts allegations which proper +inquiry would have shown to be untrue? Here again, from a mass of +material provided by the utterances which came from the Liberal +Opposition leaders on South African affairs, a few instances only can +be brought to the notice of the reader, and these in the briefest form +consistent with precision. On September 5th Mr. John Morley, speaking +at Arbroath, stated that Sir Bartle Frere had "annexed the Transvaal." +The present baronet, the late High Commissioner's son, called him to +account at once; but it required three successive letters[152] to +wring from Mr. John Morley a specific acknowledgement of his error. +The evidence which establishes the fact that Frere did not annex the +Transvaal is the following statement, bearing his signature and +published in February, 1881:[153] + + [Footnote 152: Published in _The Times_, September 30th, + 1899.] + + [Footnote 153: In _The Nineteenth Century_ for that month.] + + "It was an act which in no way originated with me, over which I + had no control, and with which I was only subsequently + incidentally connected.... It was a great question then, as now, + whether the annexation was justifiable." + +This was on the 5th. On the 27th a letter was published in _The Times_ +in which Sir William Harcourt wrote, in respect of the suzerainty +question: + + "All further argument is now superfluous, as the matter is + decisively disposed of by the publication at Pretoria of Lord + Derby's telegram of February 27th, 1884, in which the effect of + the London Convention of that date was stated in the following + words: 'There will be the same complete independence in the + Transvaal as in the Orange Free State.'" + +In a letter written on the day following, and published in _The Times_ +of October 2nd, the writer of the present work pointed out, among +other inaccuracies, that the words actually telegraphed by Lord Derby +were: "same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in +Orange Free State." That is to say, before the word "independence" the +word "internal"--vitally important to the present issue--was inserted +in the original, and omitted in the Boer version, from which Sir +William Harcourt had quoted without referring to the Blue-book, Cd. +4,036. + +[Sidenote: Its injurious effect.] + +The third instance occurred some three months later. Mr. James Bryce, +speaking on December 14th, 1899, stated that Sir Bartle Frere "sent +to govern the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon, an officer unfitted by +training and character for so delicate and difficult a task."[154] The +following passage, which the present writer subsequently published, +affords precise and overwhelming evidence of the absolute untruth of +Mr. Bryce's assertion. It appears in a letter written by Sir Bartle +Frere on December 13th, 1878, to Mr. (now Sir) Gordon Sprigg, then +Premier of Cape Colony. + + [Footnote 154: _The Times_, December 15th. Mr. Bryce was + taking the chair at the last of a series of six lectures on + "England in South Africa," given by the present writer in the + great hall of the (then) Imperial Institute.] + + "The Secretary of State has nominated Lanyon to take Shepstone's + place whenever he leaves [_i.e._ when Lanyon leaves Kimberley, + where he was Administrator of Griqualand West]. This was not my + arrangement, and had it been left to me I think I should have + arranged otherwise, for while I believe Lanyon to be one of the + most right-minded, hardworking, and able men in South Africa, I + know he does not fancy the work in the Transvaal, and I think I + could have done better. However, it does not rest with me, and + all I have to do is to find a man fit to take his place when he + leaves."[155] + + [Footnote 155: _Cornhill Magazine_, July, 1900. "The South + African Policy of Sir Bartle Frere." By W. Basil Worsfold.] + +All of these three men were of Cabinet rank. Two of them, Mr. Morley +and Mr. Bryce, enjoyed a great and deserved reputation as men of +letters; and their public utterances on the South African question, +accepted in large measure on the strength of this literary +reputation, were responsible in an appreciable degree for the distrust +and coldness manifested by the people of the United States of America +towards Great Britain during the first year of the war. But this is a +consideration of secondary importance. The vital point to recognise is +that, so long as the Empire remains without a common representative +council, a knowledge of the conditions of the over-sea Britains must +be considered as necessary a part of the political equipment of any +English statesman as a knowledge of Lancashire or of Kent. After the +war had broken out, Lord Rosebery, almost alone among Liberal +statesmen, did something to support the Government. This distinguished +advocate of Imperial unity and national efficiency then recommended +the English people to educate themselves by reading Sir Percy +FitzPatrick's _The Transvaal from Within_, and encouraged them by +declaring his belief that England would "muddle through" this, as +other wars. It does not seem, however, to have occurred to Lord +Rosebery that, if he had used his undoubted influence in time to +prevent his party from making it impossible for the Salisbury Cabinet +to carry out in June the effective peace strategy long recommended by +Lord Milner, the prospect of a "muddle" would have been materially +diminished, if not altogether removed. + +[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.] + +There is one other fact that cannot be overlooked in estimating the +degree in which the Liberal leaders are answerable to the nation for +the fatal error of postponing effective military preparations from June +to September. After the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference Lord +Milner, as we have seen, asked for immediate and substantial +reinforcements. Mr. Chamberlain then approached Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman +with a proposal that the Government should inform the Opposition leaders +of the circumstances that made military preparations necessary, and of +the precise measures which they might deem advisable to adopt from time +to time, on the understanding that the Opposition, on their part, should +refrain from raising any public discussion as to the expediency of these +measures. The object of this proposal was, of course, to enable the +Government to make effective preparations for war, without lessening the +prospect of achieving a peaceful settlement by the negotiations in +progress. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's reply to this overture was a +refusal to make the Opposition a party to any such arrangement. If the +Government chose to make military preparations they must do so, he said, +entirely on their own responsibility. + +The significance of this refusal of Mr. Chamberlain's offer appears +from the answer which was subsequently put forward by the Prime +Minister, the late Lord Salisbury, to the charge of "military +unpreparedness" brought against the British Government after the early +disasters of the campaign. What prevented the Cabinet, according to +the Premier, from taking the measures required by the military +situation in June was the British system of popular government. Any +preparations on the scale demanded by Lord Milner and Lord Wolseley +could not have been set on foot without provoking the fullest +discussion in Parliament and the Press. The leaders of the Opposition +would have contested fiercely the proposals of the Government, and the +perversion of these opportunities for discussion into an anti-war +propaganda might have exhibited England as a country divided against +itself. It may be questioned whether, in point of fact, the Liberal +leaders could have done anything more calculated to injure the +interests of their country if the Government had mobilised the army +corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in June, than +they did when these measures were postponed until September. But, +however this may be, the circumstance that this proposal was made by +Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, is +noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit of lofty patriotism of +which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its initial error, was +destined to give more than one proof in the course of the war and as +an example of a method of escaping from the injurious results of a +well-recognised defect in the democratic system of government--a +method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be employed with +success should the like occasion arise at any future time. + +This, then, was the state of affairs in England. The Opposition +throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was out of the +question, and that preparations for war were altogether unnecessary. +The people, being ignorant of the progress which the nationalist +movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and withheld from +the Government the support without which it could not make adequate +military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in Parliament and +possible loss of office. + +[Sidenote: Objects of Afrikander policy.] + +What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the +position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and +do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects +of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The +ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the +Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that +the Afrikander nationalist[156] movement had made the moral supremacy +of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to +England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other +members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt +and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep +South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as +he was concerned) in his despatch of May 4th, 1899, which was +withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The Bloemfontein +Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at the Cape to +avert a military conflict between the South African Republic and Great +Britain, which, they believed, would result not merely in the +destruction of the Republics, but in the loss of the prospect--which +they then enjoyed--of achieving through the existence of the Republics +the independence of the Afrikander nation as a whole. All this Lord +Milner made perfectly clear to Mr. Chamberlain. The illusory +concessions embodied in President Krueger's Franchise Law were yielded +by the Republics with the object of securing the "moral support" of +the Cape Afrikanders in the negotiations, and thereby obtaining the +delay which was required to complete their military preparations; +since the Republican nationalists, unlike those of the Cape, believed +that the independence of the Afrikander nation could be wrested from +Great Britain by force of arms. The efforts made by the Cape +nationalists, first to secure these concessions, and then to induce +the republican nationalists to grant the further concessions which +would have satisfied the British Government, were made for the same +purpose as the Bloemfontein Conference had been arranged--namely, to +avert a conflict which, being premature, would be disastrous to the +nationalist cause, not only in the Republics but in the Cape Colony. +The respective objects both of the republican and Cape nationalists +had been divined by Lord Milner, and, therefore, immediately after the +failure of the Conference, he had urged the Home Government to send +reinforcements to South Africa sufficient to defend British territory +from attack, and to check any incipient rebellion in the Cape Colony. +The negotiations might, or might not, result in a peaceful settlement; +but it was futile, nay more, it was dangerous, he said, for Great +Britain to go on as though war were out of the question. + + [Footnote 156: The reader is referred to p. 5 in Chap. I. for + the racial characteristics of the South African Dutch, and to + the note on p. 48 in Chap. II. for the political significance + of the word "Afrikander," as stated by Mr. S. J. du Toit.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's position.] + +This was the view of the South African situation which Lord Milner +laid before the Home Government in June. We have seen what was done by +them in response to these representations. Some special service +officers were sent out to organise locally the defences of the Cape +Colony and Rhodesia. The Cape and Natal garrisons were strengthened by +a few very inadequate reinforcements arriving in the course of the +next two months. General Butler was not recalled until the latter part +of August; his successor, General Forestier-Walker, did not arrive +until September 6th. We have traced the causes which made it +impossible for the Imperial Government, as they conceived, to do more +than this; and when in due course we come to consider the broad phases +of the war, the nature of the penalty which the British Army, and the +British nation, had to pay for the partial paralysis of the Government +will become sufficiently apparent. + +The man who suffered most by all this was Lord Milner. When he asked +for military preparations, he was told that he could not have them. +When he asked for the removal of a military adviser with whom he was +supremely dissatisfied, he was told that he must put up with General +Butler for a little longer. He put up with him for two months. His +Colonial ministers, whose advice on many points he was bound to accept +so long as he did not dismiss them, were men placed in office by the +Dutch subjects of the Crown for the very purpose of frustrating, by +constitutional means, the successful intervention in the Transvaal, by +which alone, in his opinion, British supremacy could be made a +reality. + +Indeed, the odds were heavily against Lord Milner in his task of +saving England, in spite of herself and in spite of the enemies of +whose power she was wholly ignorant, and to whose very existence she +remained contemptuously indifferent. To the great mass of the British +population in South Africa, he stood for England and English justice. +To them he seemed the representative man, for whom they had waited +many a long year. They felt that he was fighting their battle and +doing their work; and, making allowance for local jealousies and +accidental partialities, they never ceased to regard him thus. This +was his one and only source of assured support. But he was far removed +from the active British centres: from the group of towns formed by +the Albany settlers and their descendants in the Eastern Province, and +from Kimberley, Durban and Maritzburg, and Johannesburg. In the Cape +peninsula, of course, there was a considerable British population of +professional and commercial men; but this population had been so +closely related by business and social ties with the preponderant +Dutch population of the Western Province that many among them +hesitated to declare themselves openly against the Dutch party. All +who were members of the Progressive party, from the time of the Graaf +Reinet speech, had given unswerving support to Lord Milner's policy; +but the strength of the influence created by years of alternate +political co-operation with the Bond leaders may be gathered from the +fact that even so staunch a supporter of the British connection as Sir +James (then Mr.) Rose Innes did not publicly declare his adhesion to +the intervention policy until after the failure of the Bloemfontein +Conference. Moreover, the increasing political solidarity of the +British population in the Cape Colony augmented the bitterness with +which the few English politicians, who had remained in alliance with +the Dutch party, regarded the man whose resolution and insight had +penetrated and exposed the designs of the Bond. + +[Sidenote: Intrigues and disaffection.] + +It is difficult to convey any adequate impression of the atmosphere of +suspicion and intrigue by which Lord Milner was surrounded. The Dutch +party was in the ascendant in the Colony. The Cape Civil Service was +tainted throughout with disaffection. Even the _personnel_ of the +Government offices at Capetown, although it contained many excellent +and loyal men, included also many who were disaffected or lukewarm. It +is characteristic of the situation that during the most critical +period of the negotiations with the Transvaal, the ministerial organ, +_The South African News_, permitted itself to indulge, where Lord +Milner, was concerned, not only in the bitterest criticisms but in +outspoken personal abuse. To have abused the representative of the +Sovereign in a British colony of which one-half of the population was +seething with sedition, while a part had been actually armed for +rebellion by the secret emissaries of a state with which Great Britain +was on the verge of war, is an act which admits of only one +interpretation. Lord Milner was to be got rid of at all costs; for the +policy which _The South African News_ was intended to promote was that +not of Great Britain, but of the Transvaal. The paper was directly +inspired--it is indeed not unlikely that the articles themselves were +written--by some of the members of the Ministry, Lord Milner's +"constitutional advisers," whom throughout he himself treated with the +respect to which their position entitled them. + +But nothing, perhaps, shows more vividly how extraordinary was the +position in which Lord Milner found himself than the fact, which we +have already noted, that the passage of the large consignment of 500 +Mauser rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges for the Free State, to which +the Prime Minister's attention was "drawn specially, because it was +large," on July 15th, was not made known to him, the Governor of the +Cape Colony, until August 9th, and then only by accident.[157] There +is only one explanation of this remarkable incident: the interests of +the Dutch party were different from those of the British Government. +The Cape Colony was only in name a British colony. Under the guise of +constitutional forms it had attained independence--virtual, though not +nominal. If Lord Milner had contracted the habit of Biblical quotation +from the Afrikander leaders, he might well have quoted the words of +the psalmist: "Many bulls have compassed me; strong bulls of Bashan +have beset me round."[158] Even the approaches to Government House +were watched by spies in President Krueger's pay, who carefully noted +all who came and went. Members of the Uitlander community were the +special subjects of this system of espionage. + + [Footnote 157: See letters between Lord Milner and Mr. + Schreiner in Cd. 43, p. 13.] + + [Footnote 158: Psalm xxii. 12.] + +[Sidenote: Spies round Government House.] + + "When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I + called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by + private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail + through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred + Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret + agents in British territory and spies round or in Government + House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that those things + should not deter those who wished to call on him, as he was there + as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit of British + subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for himself the facts + of the case."[159] + + [Footnote 159: _The Transvaal from Within_, p. 287.] + +The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with +the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most +unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly, +and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal +Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their +plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it +was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the +justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the +republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that +England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really +earnest in pressing President Krueger to grant a "colourable" measure +of franchise reform--to use Mr. Merriman's adjective--it was for their +own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs +through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly +in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to +15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of +September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr. Hofmeyr to +Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a fatal effect +on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander party." And +when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come in spite of +all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted itself, and he +found consolation for his impotence in an expression of his hatred +against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed to +President Steyn: + + "I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies, + which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the + Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon + this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as + the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip] + Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand + would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krueger will do; + but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example. + Future generations of your and my people will praise you." + +[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's "bitter feelings".] + +And on the 15th: + + "You have no conception of my bitter feelings, which can hardly + be surpassed by that of our and your people, but the stronger my + feelings the more I am determined to repress them, when + considering questions of policy affecting the future weal or woe + of our people. May the Supreme Being help you, me, and them. Have + not seen the High Commissioner for weeks." + +The reply of the republican nationalists, addressed to Mr. Hofmeyr +and forwarded through President Steyn, contains a characteristically +distorted version of the course of the negotiations. They have made +concession after concession, but all in vain. "However much we +recognise and value your kind intentions," they write, "we regret that +it is no longer possible for us to comply with the extravagant and +brutal requests of the British Government." Thus the Pretoria +Executive declared themselves on September 15th, 1899, to the Master +of the Bond, when they were in the act of refusing Mr. Chamberlain's +offer to accept a five years' franchise bill, provided it was shown by +due inquiry to be a genuine measure of reform. Very different was the +account of the same transaction given by Mr. Smuts, when, in urging +the remnant of the burghers of both Republics to surrender, he said, +on May 30th, 1902, at Vereeniging, "I am one of those who, as members +of the Government of the South African Republic, _provoked the war +with England_". But the passage in this document which is most useful +to the historian is that in which the republican nationalists remind +the Afrikander leaders at the Cape of the insincerity of their +original "mediation." In dialectics Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. +Reitz are quite able to hold their own with Mr. Hofmeyr, Dr. Te Water, +and Mr. Schreiner. They have not forgotten the Cape Prime Minister's +precipitate benediction alike of President Krueger's Bloemfontein +scheme and of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad proposals. +They remember also how the "Hofmeyr compromise" was proclaimed in the +Bond and the ministerial press as affording conclusive evidence of the +"sweet reasonableness" of President Krueger and his Executive. And so +they remark, "We are sorry not to be able to follow your advice; but +we point out that you yourself let it be known that we had your whole +approval, if we gave the present franchise as we were doing."[160] +Here we have the kernel of the whole matter. A nine years', seven +years', or a five years' franchise was all one to the Cape +Nationalists, provided only that England was kept a little longer from +claiming her position as paramount Power in South Africa. For these +men knew, or thought they knew, that for England "a little longer" +would be "too late." + + [Footnote 160: This document was among those secured by the + Intelligence Department, and published in _The Times History + of the War_.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner.] + +It was a greater achievement to have frustrated so subtle a +combination, directed by the astute mind of Mr. Hofmeyr--the man who +refused to allow his passions to interfere with his policy--than to +have prevented the British Government from falling a victim to the +coarse duplicity of President Krueger. Tireless effort and consummate +statesmanship alone would not have accomplished this purpose. To these +qualities Lord Milner added a personal charm, elusive, and yet +irresistible; and it was this "union of intellect with fascination," +of which Lord Rosebery had spoken,[161] that enabled him to transcend +the infinite difficulty of his official relationship to Mr. Schreiner. +Even so that relationship must have broken down under the strain of +the negotiations and the war, had not Mr. Schreiner's complex +political creed included the saving clause of allegiance to his +sovereign. When once the British troops had begun to land Mr. +Schreiner accepted the new situation. No longer merely the +parliamentary head of the Dutch party and the agent of the Bond, he +realised also his responsibility as a minister of the Crown. None the +less there were matters of the gravest concern in which, both before +and after the ultimatum, the Prime Minister used all the +constitutional means at his disposal to oppose Lord Milner. When, upon +the arrival (August 5th) of the small additions to the Cape garrison +ordered out in June, Lord Milner determined to draw the attention of +the Ministry to the exposed condition of the Colony, he found that the +Prime Minister's views differed completely from his own. A few days +later he addressed a minute to his ministers on the subject of the +defence of Kimberley and other military questions. From this time +onwards, in almost daily battles, Mr. Schreiner resisted the plans of +local military preparation which Lord Milner deemed necessary for the +protection of the Colony. His object, as he said, was to keep the Cape +Colony out of the struggle.[162] On Friday, September 8th, when in +London the Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided to send +out the 10,000 troops to reinforce the South African garrison, at +Capetown Lord Milner was engaged in a long endeavour to persuade his +Prime Minister that it was necessary to do something for the defence +of Kimberley.[163] Up to the very day on which the Free State +commandos crossed the border, Mr. Schreiner relied upon the definite +pledge given him by President Steyn that the territory of the Cape +Colony would not be invaded; and not until that day was he undeceived. + + [Footnote 161: See p. 77.] + + [Footnote 162: In the House of Assembly, August 28th.] + + [Footnote 163: One of the earliest measures of precaution + which Lord Milner desired was a plan for the defence of + Kimberley. But when, on June 12th, the people of Kimberley + requested the Government of the Colony to take steps for the + protection of their town, the reply which they received, + through the Civil Commissioner, was this: "There is no reason + whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is, or in any + contemplated event will be, in danger of attack, and Mr. + Schreiner is of opinion that your fears are groundless and + your anticipations without foundation."] + +[Sidenote: Schreiner and Steyn.] + + "I said to the President," he declared in the Cape Parliament a + year later,[164] "that I would not believe he would invade south + of the Orange River.[165] President Steyn's reply was, 'Can you + give me a guarantee that no troops will come to the border?' Of + course, I could give no such guarantee, and I did not then + believe that, although such a guarantee could not be given, the + Free State would invade British territory with the object of + endeavouring to promote the establishment of one Republic in + South Africa, as the Prime Minister[166] has said." + + [Footnote 164: September 24th, 1900.] + + [Footnote 165: This was on October 11th, 1899--the day on + which the ultimatum expired.] + + [Footnote 166: Sir Gordon Sprigg--Mr. Schreiner's Ministry + was replaced by a Progressive Ministry in June, 1900.] + +As the Boer invasion spread further into the Colony Mr. Schreiner +receded proportionately from his original standpoint of neutrality. +Indeed, three distinct phases in the Prime Minister's progress can be +distinguished. In the first stage, which lasted until the actual +invasion of the Colony by the Boer commandos, he used all his +constitutional power to prevent the people of the Colony, British and +Dutch alike, from being involved in the war: and it was only after a +severe struggle that Lord Milner prevailed upon him even to call out +the Kimberley Volunteers on October 2nd, _i.e._, a week before the +Ultimatum. This, "the neutrality" stage, lasted up to the invasion. +After the invasion came the second stage, in which Mr. Schreiner seems +to have argued to himself in this manner: "As the Boers have invaded +this colony, I, as Prime Minister, cannot refuse that the local forces +should be called out to protect its territory." And so on October +16th, after Vryburg had gone over to the Boers, after Kimberley had +been cut off, and the whole country from Kimberley to Orange River was +in the hands of the enemy, he consented to the issue of a proclamation +calling out 2,000 volunteers for garrison duty within the Colony.[167] +But in making this tardy concession he was careful to point out to +Lord Milner that the British cause would lose more than it would gain. +"I warn you," he said in effect, "that it is not to your advantage; +because you are the weaker party. In the Cape Colony more men will +fight for the Boers than will fight for you." The third stage in Mr. +Schreiner's conversion was reached when, in November, 1899, the +invading Boers had advanced to the Tembuland border, in the extreme +east of the Colony. Then Mr. Schreiner allowed the natives to be +called out for the defence of their own territory. In making this +final concession the Prime Minister yielded to the logic of facts in a +matter concerning which he had previously offered a most stubborn +resistance to the Governor's arguments. + + [Footnote 167: With this may be compared the fact that in + Natal the whole of the local forces were mobilised on + September 29th for active service. The dates upon which + further units of the Cape local forces were called out are as + follows: Uitenhage Rifles and Komgha Mounted Rifles, November + 10th; Cape Medical Staff Corps, November 16th; and Frontier + Mounted Rifles, November 24th.] + +[Sidenote: Schreiner and local forces.] + +For in the discussion of the measures urged by Lord Milner as +necessary for the protection of the Colony, the question of arming the +natives and coloured people had necessarily arisen. The Bastards in +the west and the Tembus in the east were known to be eager to defend +the Queen's country against invasion. Mr. Schreiner declared that to +arm the natives was to do violence to the central principle upon which +the maintenance of civilisation in South Africa was based--the +principle that the black man must never be used to fight against the +white. Lord Milner did not question the validity of this principle; +but he maintained--and rightly, as Mr. Schreiner admitted subsequently +by his action in the case of the Tembu frontier--that it could not be +applied to the case in question. "If white men," he said, "will go and +invade the territory of the blacks, then the blacks must be armed to +repel the invasion." + +The change which came over Mr. Schreiner's attitude, due, no doubt, +partly to his gradual enlightenment as to the real aims of the +republican nationalists, but also to the skilful use which Lord Milner +made of that enlightenment, may be traced in the following contrasts. +Before the Boer invasion he refused to call out the local forces of +the Colony even for purposes of defence;[168] afterwards he not only +sanctioned the employment of these forces in the Colony, but allowed +them to take part in Lord Roberts' advance upon Bloemfontein and +Pretoria. Before the invading Boers, having already possessed +themselves of the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony, began to +threaten the purely native territories to the south, he would not hear +of the natives being armed for their own protection. But when the +Boers had actually reached the borders of Tembuland he consented. In +his advice to the Cape Government, no less than in that which he gave +to the Home Government, Lord Milner was shown to be in the right. In +both cases he urged an effective preparation for war. In both the +measures which he advised were ultimately taken; but taken only when +they had lost all their power as a means of promoting peace, and half +of their efficacy as a contribution to the rapid and successful +prosecution of the war. In both cases Lord Milner was able, in the +face of unparalleled obstacles, to secure just the minimum preparation +for war which stood between the British Empire and overwhelming +military disaster. + +[Footnote 168: The Kimberley and Mafeking Volunteers were called out +at the last moment, but actually before the war broke out; but the +safety of both these places was imperilled by the refusal, or delay, +of the colonial Government to supply them with guns.] + +We have observed the position in Great Britain, and found that the +root cause of the impotence of the Home Government was the nation's +ignorance of South Africa. In the Cape Colony the evil was of a +different order. Lord Milner, although High Commissioner for South +Africa, had within the Colony only the strictly limited powers of a +constitutional governor. The British population were keenly alive to +the necessity for active preparations for the defence of their +country; were, indeed, indignant at the refusal of the Schreiner +Cabinet to allow the local forces to be called out: but the Dutch +party was in office, the Bond was "loyal," Mr. Schreiner was a +minister of the Crown, and the most that the Governor could do was to +urge upon his ministers the measures upon the execution of which he +had no power to insist. + +[Sidenote: Seven years after.] + +The best comment upon this strange situation is that which is afforded +by a passage in Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords on February +26th, 1906. Seven years have gone by, and the great proconsul has +returned to England. He is drawn from his much-needed rest by a sudden +danger to the country which he has kept a part of the Empire. The +Unionist Government has fallen, and a Liberal Government has been +placed in power. He is warning this Government of the danger of a +premature grant of responsible government to the Orange River Colony. + + "What is going to happen under responsible government? It is more + than probable, it is, humanly speaking, certain, that the persons + to whom I have referred will form a large majority, if not almost + the whole, of that first elected Parliament of the Orange River + Colony to which, from the first hour of its existence, the whole + legislative and executive power in that colony is to be + entrusted. I do not suggest that they will begin by doing + anything sinister. All forms will be duly observed; as why should + they not be? It will be perfectly possible for them, with the + most complete constitutional propriety, little by little to + reverse all that has been done, and gradually to get rid of the + British officials, the British teachers, the bulk of the British + settlers, and any offensive British taint which may cling to the + statute-book or the administration. I can quite understand that, + from the point of view of what are known as the pro-Boers, such a + result is eminently desirable. They thought the war was a crime, + the annexation a blunder, and they think to-day that the sooner + you can get back to the old state of things the better. I say I + quite understand that view, though I do not suppose it is shared + by His Majesty's ministers, or, at any rate, by all of them. What + I cannot understand is how any human being, not being a pro-Boer, + can regard with equanimity the prospect that the very hand which + drafted the ultimatum of October, 1899,[169] may within a year be + drafting 'Ministers' Minutes' for submission to a British + Governor who will have virtually no option but to obey them. What + will be the contents of those minutes, I wonder? As time goes on + it may be a proposal for dispensing with English as an official + language, or a proposal for the distribution to every country + farmer of a military rifle and so many hundred cartridges, in + view of threatened danger from the Basutos." + + [Footnote 169: Mr. Fischer. See forward, p. 291.] + +[Sidenote: "Just reminiscences".] + +So far Lord Milner had dealt with the Orange River Colony. Then he let +his thoughts range back to these months of his great ordeal. + + "I think I can see the Governor just hesitating a little to put + his hand to such a document. In that case I think I can hear the + instant low growl of menace from Press and platform and pulpit, + the hints of the necessity of his recall, and the answering + scream from the pro-Boer Press of Britain against the ruthless + satrap, ignorant of constitutional usage and wholly + misunderstanding his own position, who dared to trample upon the + rights of a free people. I may be told, I know I shall be told, + that such notions are the wild imaginings of a disordered brain, + that these are theoretical possibilities having no relation to + fact or to probability. _My Lords, they are not imaginings. They + are just reminiscences._ + + "I know what it is to be Governor of a self-governing colony, + with the disaffected element in the ascendant. I was bitterly + attacked for not being sufficiently submissive under the + circumstances. Yet, even with the least submissive Governor, the + position is so weak that strange things happen. It was under + responsible government, and in the normal working of responsible + government, that 1,000,000 cartridges were passed through Cape + Colony, on the eve of the war, to arm the people who were just + going to attack us, and that some necessary cannon were stopped + from being sent to a defenceless border town,[170] which directly + afterwards was besieged, and which, from want of these cannon, + was nearly taken."[171] + + [Footnote 170: Kimberley.] + + [Footnote 171: _The Times_, February 27th, 1906.] + +Thus, six and a half years later, Lord Milner spoke of these months of +_Sturm und Drang_ in the calm and passionless atmosphere of the House +of Lords. + +From Bloemfontein to the ultimatum, the British flag in South Africa +was stayed upon the "inflexible resolution" of one man. Two months +later, when the army corps was all but landed, the English at the Cape +gave speech. Then Sir David Gill's words at the St. Andrew's Day +celebration of November 30th, 1890 came as a fresh breeze dispersing +the miasmic humours of some low-lying, ill-drained plain. + +[Sidenote: What the loyalists thought.] + + "In the history of the British colonies," he said, "no Governor + has ever been placed in greater difficulties. In spite of a + support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of + a want of understanding at home, His Excellency has not only had + to originate and carry out a policy, but he has had to instruct + the whole nation in the dangers which threatened; and the means + which were necessary to remove that danger. + + "When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honeycombed + with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the + overthrow of British supremacy in this colony, and not only in + this colony, but in South Africa as well.... There have been a + mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty lot of + mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all, and a + mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and + Scotchmen) in this country--first of all to bring them into + contempt with the native population; secondly, to deprive them of + all political power; and thirdly, to deprive them of all material + power.... We have a minister who has gone to the front,[172] but + it is a remarkable fact that since that minister has gone to the + front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels have + been tenfold greater than they were before he went. It is in the + face of these innumerable difficulties that Sir Alfred Milner has + carried out his work." + + [Footnote 172: Mr. J. W. Sauer. The reference is (in Lord + Milner's words) to Mr. Sauer's "well-meant but unsuccessful + mission to Dordrecht, which was immediately followed by + rebellion in that district." The facts, as fully disclosed a + year later, are these. On November 23rd, 1899, Mr. Sauer held + a meeting at Dordrecht to dissuade the Dutch subjects of the + Crown in the Wodehouse Division of the Colony from joining in + the rebellion. As the result of this meeting a deputation was + sent to the Commandant of the Boer invading-force, Olivier, + who was at Barkly East, desiring him not to come to + Dordrecht. On November 27th another meeting was held (also + addressed by Mr. Sauer) and a second deputation of the + inhabitants waited upon Olivier. The sequel is revealed in + the telegram despatched the following day (November 28th) by + the Boer Commandant to the Secretary, the War Commission, + Bloemfontein: "... To-day already I received the second + deputation from Dordrecht not to come to Dordrecht. This is + asked officially, but privately they say that this is also a + blind, and that we must come at once...." On December 2nd + Olivier was received with open arms at Dordrecht. It was in a + district where, in the Boer Commandant's words, "the + Afrikanders were rejoicing, and joining the commandos was + universal."--Cd. 420, p. 108 and p. 96; Cd. 43, p. 221; and + Cd. 261, p. 126.] + +This is how it struck a distinguished man of science, and one who was +qualified, moreover, by a residence at the Cape which dated back to +the days of the Zulu War, to understand the full significance of what +was going on around him. + +In July and August, President Krueger was winning all along the line. +The Home Government was kept harmless and inactive by the Franchise +Bill; the Cape Government tied the hands of the High Commissioner; +supplies of arms and ammunition were pouring in, the temper of the +burghers in both republics was rising, foreign military officers and +M. Leon of the Creuzot Works had arrived; in short, the military +preparations of four years were consummated without let or hindrance. +September was less exclusively favourable to the republican cause. On +September 8th, as we have seen, the Salisbury Cabinet determined to +send out the defensive forces for which Lord Milner had asked three +months before. Sir William Butler had been recalled; and General +Forestier-Walker did all in his power to carry out the measures urged, +and in most cases actually devised, by Lord Milner for the effective +employment of the few thousand Imperial troops at his disposal. On the +18th and 19th the Lancashire regiment was sent up-country from +Capetown--half to garrison Kimberley, and half to hold the bridge that +carried the main trunk line over the Orange River on its way +northwards to Kimberley and then past the Transvaal border to +Rhodesia. In doing this, however, Lord Milner was careful to point out +to President Steyn that no menace was intended to the Free State, +which, "in case of war with the Transvaal Her Majesty's Government +hoped would remain neutral, and the neutrality of which would be most +strictly respected." Such excellent use was made by Lord Milner of the +six weeks which elapsed between the recall of General Butler and the +ultimatum (October 9th-11th), that the handful of regulars dotted down +before the Free State border of the colony, and skilfully distributed +at strategic points upon the railways, sufficed to keep President +Steyn's commandos from penetrating south of the Orange River, until +the army corps had begun to disembark at the Cape ports. On this, as +on another occasion to be subsequently noted, it is difficult to +withhold a tribute of admiration to the gifted personality of the man +who, himself a civilian, could thus readily apply his unique knowledge +of South African conditions to the uses of the art of war. At the same +time, the promptitude and efficiency displayed by the Indian military +authorities provided Natal, by October 8th, with a force that proved +just--and only just--sufficient to prevent the Boer commandos from +sweeping right through that colony down to Durban. + +[Sidenote: The negotiations closed.] + +In the meantime the negotiations, having served their purpose, were +being brought rapidly to a conclusion by the Pretoria Executive. On +September 15th, as we have seen, the Republic notified its refusal to +accept the terms offered in the British despatch of the 8th; and +before that date, as we have also noted, some of the Transvaal +commandos had been ordered to take up their positions on the Natal +border. On the 22nd a meeting of the Cabinet was held in London, at +which it was decided to mobilise the army corps--a measure advised by +Lord Wolseley in June. At the same time Lord Milner was instructed by +telegraph to communicate to the South African Republic a despatch[173] +in which the British Government "absolutely denied and repudiated" the +claim of the South African Republic to be a "sovereign international +state," and informed the Pretoria Executive that its refusal to +entertain the offer made on September 8th-- + + [Footnote 173: C. 9,530.] + + "coming as it did at the end of nearly four months of protracted + negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending + over a period of more than five years, made it useless to further + pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that Her + Majesty's Government were now compelled to consider the situation + afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final + settlement" + +of the questions at issue. The result of these deliberations was to be +communicated to Lord Milner in a later despatch. + +[Sidenote: The Burghers mobilised.] + +This note of September 22nd, together with a second communication of +the same date, in which Mr. Chamberlain warmly repudiated the charges +of bad faith brought against Sir William Greene, reached the Pretoria +Executive on the 25th, and on the same day it was known that a British +force had entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe. On the 26th intelligence +of so serious a nature reached Lord Milner, that he telegraphed to +warn the Home Government that the Transvaal and Free State were likely +to take the initiative. According to Mr. Amery,[174] an ultimatum had +been drafted upon receipt of the British note, and telegraphed on the +following day to President Steyn for his approval. At Bloemfontein, +however, the document was entirely recast by Mr. Fischer. Even so, in +its amended form, it was ready on the 27th. On that day the Free State +Raad, after six days of secret session, determined to join the sister +Republic in declaring war upon Great Britain, and on the 28th the +Transvaal commandos were mobilised. The ultimatum, according to the +same authority, would have been delivered to Sir William Greene on +Monday, October 2nd, had not deficiencies in the Boer transport and +commissariat arrangements made it impossible for the burgher forces to +advance immediately upon the British troops in Natal. At the last +moment, also, President Steyn seems to have had some misgivings. On +September 26th, together with the draft ultimatum from Pretoria, a +suggestive telegram from Capetown, signed "Micaiah," and bidding him +"Read chapter xxii. 1st Book of Kings, and accept warning," had +reached him;[175] and a few days later he received, through Mr. +Fischer, a powerful appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers. + + [Footnote 174: _Times_ correspondent and editor of _The Times + History of the War_. Mr. Amery arrived at the Cape in the + second week of September, and was at Pretoria from September + 24th to October 13th.] + + [Footnote 175: Secured by Intelligence Department.] + +However this may be, the few administrative acts that remained to be +taken were quickly accomplished in both Republics. In the Transvaal +the remnant of the British population was already in flight; the law +courts were suspended; the control of the railways was assumed by the +Government and, in order to protect colonial recruits from the legal +penalties attached to rebellion, on September 29th the Executive was +empowered by the Volksraad to confer citizen rights on all aliens +serving in the forces of the Republic. Not content with their +barbarous expulsion of the British population, the Governments of both +Republics for a week before the expiry of the ultimatum treated those +of them who still remained as though a state of war had already been +in existence. During these last days telegrams and letters praying for +protection against some act of violence or spoliation were constantly +arriving at Government House. But what could the High Commissioner do? +The Army Corps was 6,000 miles away; the 10,000 defensive troops were +most of them still on the water. The Free State, in Mr. Fischer's +words, "did not recognise international law, and claimed to commandeer +all persons whatsoever" under its own. In the Transvaal, Mr. Reitz +(after consultation with Mr. Smuts) was coolly replying to the +British Agent's protest against the seizure of the property of British +subjects, including L150,000 worth of bar gold, that "the property of +private individuals of whatever nationality could be, and was being, +commandeered to the value of L15 a head."[176] On October 2nd the +Transvaal Raads adjourned, and on the same day President Steyn +informed the High Commissioner that the Free State burghers had been +summoned for commando service. An interchange of telegrams then +ensued, of which one, despatched on October 6th, is important as +showing how earnestly Lord Milner seconded Mr. Chamberlain's endeavour +to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement up to the last moment. + + [Footnote 176: C. 9,530.] + +[Sidenote: Last words.] + + "I have the honour," he said, "to acknowledge Your Honour's long + telegram of yesterday afternoon [the 5th], the substance of which + I have communicated to Her Majesty's Government. There is, I + think, a conclusive reply to Your Honour's accusation against the + policy of Her Majesty's Government, but no good purpose would be + served by recrimination. The present position is that burgher + forces are assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity + to the frontiers of Natal, while the British troops occupy + certain defensive positions well within those borders. The + question is whether the burgher forces will invade British + territory, thus closing the door to any possibility of a pacific + solution. I cannot believe that the South African Republic will + take such aggressive action, or that Your Honour would + countenance such a course, which there is nothing to justify. + Prolonged negotiations have hitherto failed to bring about a + satisfactory understanding, and no doubt such understanding is + more difficult than ever to-day, after the expulsion of British + subjects with great loss and suffering; but until the threatened + act of aggression is committed I shall not despair of peace, and + I feel sure that any reasonable proposal, from whatever quarter + proceeding, would be favourably considered by Her Majesty's + Government if it offered an immediate termination of present + tension and a prospect of permanent tranquillity."[177] + + [Footnote 177: C. 9,530.] + +With this--practically the final communication of the British +Government--it is instructive to compare the "last words" of the two +other protagonists. The Pretoria Executive, true to its policy of +playing for time, sends through Mr. Reitz two long and argumentative +replies to the British despatches of July 27th (the Joint Commission), +and May 10th (Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the petition to the Queen). +The Afrikander nationalists having failed to "mediate" in Pretoria and +Bloemfontein, consoled themselves with a final effort in the shape of +a direct appeal to the Queen. In a petition signed by the fifty-eight +Afrikander members of both Houses of the Cape Parliament, including, +of course, the members of the Schreiner Cabinet, they declare their +earnest belief that the South African Republic "is fully awakened to +the wisdom and discretion of making liberal provision for the +representation of the Uitlanders," and urge Her Majesty's Government +to appoint a Joint Commission--a proposal to which the British +Government had declared that it was impossible to return. The effect +of this somewhat half-hearted effort was, however, on this occasion +appreciably diminished by the fact that the nationalist petition was +accompanied by a resolution presented by fifty-three Progressive +members of the Cape Parliament, embodying their entire disapproval of +the opinion put forward by the petitioners, and containing the +assurance that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon their +strongest support. + +[Sidenote: The ultimatum delivered.] + +The ultimatum was delivered to Sir William Greene on the afternoon of +Monday, October 9th, and forthwith telegraphed to the High +Commissioner at Capetown. Although it was a week behind time at +Pretoria, its arrival was somewhat unexpected at Government House. +Saturday and Sunday had been days of quite unusual calm. The +Secretary, whose business it was to decode the official telegrams, +commenced his task with but languid interest. He had decoded so many +apparently unnecessary and inconclusive despatches of late. At first +this seemed very much like the others. But, as he worked on, he came +upon words that startled him to a sudden attention: + + "This Government ... in the interest not only of this Republic, + but also of all South Africa,... feels itself called upon and + obliged ... to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the + assurance: + + "(_a_) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by + the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way + may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's + Government. + + "(_b_) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be + instantly withdrawn. + + "(_c_) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in + South Africa since June 1st, 1899, shall be removed from South + Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this + Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee upon the + part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities + against any portion of the possessions of the British Government + shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within + a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the + Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, + be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from + the borders. + + "(_d_) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas + shall not be landed in any part of South Africa. + + "This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative + answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her + Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon + Wednesday, October 11th, 1899, not later than five o'clock p.m., + and it desires further to add that, in the event of unexpectedly + no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval, + it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of + Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will + not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and + that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place + within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our + borders, the Government will be compelled to regard that also as + a formal declaration of war. + + "I have, etc., + "F. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."[178] + + [Footnote 178: C. 9,530.] + +[Sidenote: An appeal to Afrikanders.] + +The war had come; and come in the almost incredible form of a naked +assertion of the intention of the South African Republic to oust Great +Britain from its position of paramount Power in South Africa. And the +declaration of war,[179] published two days later by President Steyn, +was no less definite. It referred to Great Britain's "unfounded claim +to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this +State," and exhorted the burghers of the Free State to "stand up as +one man against the oppressor and violator of right." Even greater +frankness characterised the appeal to "Free Staters and Brother +Afrikanders" issued by Mr. Reitz. In this document[180] not only was +the entire Dutch population of South Africa invited to rid themselves, +by force of arms, of British supremacy, but the statement of the Boer +case took the form of an impeachment that covered the whole period of +British administration. Great Britain-- + + [Footnote 179: Cd. 43.] + + [Footnote 180: _Ibid._] + + "has, ever since the birth of our nation, been the oppressor of + the Afrikander and the native alike. + + "From Slagter's Nek to Laing's Nek, from the Pretoria Convention + to the Bloemfontein Conference--they have ever been the + treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and + the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they + want the gold-fields of the Witwatersrand. + + "Where is Waterboer to-day? He who had to be defended against the + Free State is to-day without an inch of ground. Where lies + Lobengula in his unknown grave to-day, and what fillibusters and + fortune-hunters are possessors of his country? + + "Where are the native chiefs of Bechuanaland now, and who owns + their land? + + "Read the history of South Africa, and ask yourselves: Has the + British Government been a blessing or a curse to this + sub-continent? + + "Brother Afrikanders! I repeat, the day is at hand on which great + deeds are expected of us. WAR has broken out. What is it to be? A + wasted and enslaved South Africa, or--a Free, United South + Africa? + + "Come, let us stand shoulder to shoulder and do our holy duty! + The Lord of Hosts will be our Leader. + + "Be of good cheer. + "F. W. REITZ." + +That Monday night, besides repeating the ultimatum to the Home +Government, Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the British authorities in +Natal, Rhodesia, Basutoland, and the frontier towns. + +The ultimatum reached the Colonial Office at 6.45 a.m. on Tuesday. The +reply, which was cabled to Lord Milner at 10.45 p.m. on the same day, +was not unworthy of the occasion: + +[Sidenote: The British reply.] + + "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the + peremptory demands of the Government of the South African + Republic. You will inform the Government of the South African + Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the South + African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it + impossible to discuss."[181] + + [Footnote 181: C. 9,530.] + +The High Commissioner was further desired to instruct Sir William +Greene, in delivering the British reply, to ask for his passports. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS + + +With the presentation of the Boer ultimatum the first and most +difficult part of Lord Milner's task was accomplished. The actual +pretensions of President Krueger and his republican confederates in the +Free State and the Cape Colony were declared in a manner that could +not fail to make them understood by the British people at home. The +nationalists were unmasked. To what assurance of victory their +military preparations had led them may be seen from the story of Mr. +Amery's meeting with Mr. Reitz, two days before October 2nd, the +Monday originally fixed for the delivery of the ultimatum. On the +afternoon of this day, September 30th, Mr. Amery was walking with the +State Secretary in Pretoria. Mr. Reitz, he tells us,[182] "suddenly +turned round and said, 'Have you read _Treasure Island_? 'Yes.' 'Then +you may remember the passage where they "tip the black spot" to Long +John Silver?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I expect it will fall to my lot on Monday +to "tip the black spot" to Long John Greene.' And hereupon the State +Secretary cheerily detailed to his astounded listener the terms of the +ultimatum, compliance with which might yet save the British Empire +from war." + + [Footnote 182: _Times History of the War in South Africa_, + vol. i., p. 360. It must be remembered that in the Transvaal + all telegrams had been strictly censored from the end of + August.] + +[Sidenote: Effect of the ultimatum.] + +Very different was the position at Capetown. Here there was no room +either for levity or the insolence of anticipated triumph. Knowing +what Lord Milner did--what he, of all men, had most cause to +know--both of our unreadiness, and of the preparedness and confidence +of the enemy, he could scarcely have looked forward to the future +without the very gravest apprehension. None the less the ultimatum +brought with it a certain sense of relief. The negotiations, which had +degenerated long since into a diplomatic farce, were terminated. The +situation had become once more clear. It has been the duty of few men +to bear so heavy and so prolonged a burden of responsibility as that +from which Lord Milner was thus set free. The danger that the Home +Government, in its earnest desire for peace, might accept a settlement +that would leave undecided the central issue of Boer or British +supremacy in South Africa had never been wholly absent from his mind +during the harassing negotiations that succeeded the Conference. Up to +the very end there had been a haunting dread lest, in spite of his +ceaseless vigilance and unstinted toil, a manifestation of British +loyalty that would never be repeated should be coldly discouraged, and +the nationalist movement allowed to proceed unchecked, until every +colonist of British blood had surrendered the hope of remaining a +citizen of the Empire for the degrading necessity of securing for +himself and his children a tolerable position in the United States of +South Africa by a timely alliance with the more progressive Dutch. +From the presence of this danger Lord Milner was now relieved, since, +as he instantly foresaw, the whip-lash of this frank appeal to force +brought conviction where marshalled arguments were powerless to move. +He had done what the religious enthusiasm of Livingstone, the +political sagacity of Grey, the splendid devotion and prescience of +Frere, and the Elizabethan statecraft of Rhodes, had failed to do. _He +had made the Boer speak out._ + +England was far from knowing all that these Boer aspirations meant, or +the progress already achieved in the direction of their realisation. +But this ignorance made the demands of the ultimatum seem the more +insolent. To Mr. Balfour it was as though President Krueger had gone +mad. But madness or insolence, the effect was the same. With the mass +of the nation all hesitation, all balancing of arguments, were at an +end. The one thing that was perceived was that any further attempt to +treat with a people so minded would be an admission to the world that +British supremacy had disappeared from South Africa. On this point, +outside the narrow influence of a few professional partisans and +peace-makers, there had never been any doubt: the only question was +whether British supremacy was, or was not, in danger. The Boer +challenge having resolved this question, the mind of the nation was +made up. The army, as the instrument of its will, was called upon to +give effect to its decision. + +[Sidenote: An anxious situation.] + +Two years and eight months elapsed between the expiration of the two +days' grace allowed by the ultimatum and the surrender of Vereeniging. +During the first twelve months of this period Lord Milner's +initiative, though his position remained arduous, anxious, and +responsible, and his activity unceasing, was necessarily subordinated +to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South +Africa. But during the second period of the war--that is to say, from +November 29th, 1900, when Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts--the +constructive statesmanship of the High Commissioner was called forth +in an increasing degree as the area secured for peaceable occupation +became widened, and the problems involved in the settlement and future +administration of the new colonies emerged into increasing prominence +and importance. But even during the first period, when the task of the +army was the comparatively simple one of overcoming the organised +resistance of the Republics and subduing the rebellion in the Cape +Colony, Lord Milner's unshaken confidence and perfect mastery of South +African conditions proved of inestimable value. + +[Sidenote: Results and unpreparedness.] + +Five years later he described himself as an "incorrigible optimist." +Optimist or not, at this time he harboured no illusions. He knew that +the postponement or neglect of military preparations had left +thousands of loyal subjects of the Crown in a position of entire +defencelessness, and made rebellion easy for thousands of the +disaffected Dutch. The first days of war, like the last days of peace, +were punctuated by appeals for the troops that should have been in +South Africa, but were in England; or for guns, rifles, and ammunition +which Mr. Schreiner had kept idle in the colonial armouries until it +was too late. On Friday, October 13th, he held a long and anxious +consultation over the wires with Colonel Kekewich at Kimberley. A +thousand rifles were wanted, and wanted instantly. The Cape Artillery +15-pounders, reluctantly conceded at the last moment by Mr. Schreiner, +had not come. They never came, for the next day Kimberley was cut off, +and by Sunday morning Capetown had lost count of the border districts +from Kimberley southward to Orange River. On this Friday the first +definite piece of bad news reached the High Commissioner. An armoured +train, trying to run back to Mafeking, had been captured by the Boers. +In proportion as Lord Milner had urged the need of preparation for +war, so now he was the first to realise how grave would be the results +of unpreparedness. Fortunately, his comments upon the events of these +first three months of the war have been preserved; and the record of +what was passing in his mind from day to day reveals a burden of +anxiety that contrasts sharply with the easy tolerance with which the +first bad news was received in England. On Wednesday, the 18th, a week +after the ultimatum had expired, he wrote of Natal: "We are being +slowly surrounded, and our force unwisely split up." He was gravely +concerned for the safety of Kimberley, and he "doubted the ability of +Mafeking to hold out." On November 1st, the day after General Buller +had landed at Capetown, he wrote: "Things are going from bad to worse +to-day. In Natal the Orange Free State Boers are making a move on +Colenso, while in the Colony they have crossed in force at Bethulie; +and there is also some suspicion of an attack on the line between +Orange River bridge and De Aar." On November 9th, the arrival of the +_Rosslyn Castle_, the first of the Army Corps transports, brought a +gleam of brightness. She was a little late, as she had been warned to +go out of her course after leaving Las Palmas, to avoid a suspicious +vessel. But Methuen's first engagements seemed to him to be Pyrrhic +victories. It was "the old story of charging positions from which the +enemy simply clears, after having shot a lot of our men." On December +5th "alarming rumours came pouring in from all over the Colony," and +two days later Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the Secretary of State +that the war was now aggravated by rebellion. On Saturday, December +16th, the day after Colenso, he wrote: "This has been a week of +disasters, to-day being the worst of all. News was received this +morning that Buller had been severely defeated yesterday in attempting +to force the passage of the Tugela." + +It was a time when he was receiving the panic outcry for the immediate +relief of Kimberley, in which Rhodes vented his rage at the military +impotence to which for the moment England had allowed herself to be +reduced in South Africa; when his councils with his ministers were +"gloomy functions," and his Prime Minister's arguments against the +measures which he deemed necessary for the defence of the Colony and +the protection of the native territories had become not merely +wearisome but embittered. His main resource lay in his intense +activity. It was his custom, during this critical period, to begin the +day by seeing Mr. Eliot and Mr. Price, the heads of the railways, and +Mr. French, the Postmaster-General. In this way he received +information of every movement of any significance that had occurred +within the range of the railway and post-office systems during the +preceding twenty-four hours--information which was of the highest +utility both to him and to the military authorities. Then followed an +endless succession of visitors, from the Prime Minister to the most +recent newspaper correspondent out from home, and a long afternoon +and evening of concentrated and unbroken labour upon despatches, +proclamations, minutes, and other official documents. A short ride or +walk was sometimes interpolated, but his days were a dead round of +continuous occupation. "One day is so like another--crowded with work; +all hateful, but with no very special feature," he wrote. But of +another he says: "Worked very hard all day; the usual interviews. It +was very difficult to take one's mind off the absorbing subject of the +ill success of our military operations." + +Mr. Balfour called the insolence of the ultimatum "madness." But Lord +Milner knew that it was no madness, but an assured belief in victory; +a confidence founded upon long years of earnest preparation for war; +upon the blood-ties of the most tenacious of European peoples; upon a +Nature that spread her wings over the rough children of the veld and +menaced their enemies with the heat and glamour of her sun, with +famine and drought and weariness, with all the hidden dangers that +lurked in her glittering plains and rock-strewn uplands. + +[Sidenote: Aspects of the war.] + +It is not proposed to give any detailed account of the military +operations which led, first, to the annexation of the Boer Republics, +and then to the actual disarmament of the entire Dutch population of +South Africa. The most that the plan of this work permits of is to +present the broad outlines of the war in such a manner that the +several phases of the military conflict may be seen in true +perspective, and the relationship between them and the administrative +efforts of Lord Milner be correctly indicated. But it will not be +found inconsistent with this restricted treatment to refer to certain +conspicuous features of the war upon which contemporary discussion has +chiefly centred, and in respect of which opinions have been pronounced +that do not seem likely to harmonise in all cases with the results of +a more mature judgment and a less interested inquiry. + +The test by which the success or failure of any given military effort +is to be measured is, of course, the test of results. But the +application of this test must not be embarrassed by the assumption, +which seems to have vitiated so much otherwise admirable criticism on +the conduct of the war in South Africa, that every action in which a +properly equipped and wisely directed force is engaged must +necessarily be successful: or that, if it be not successful, it +follows, as a matter of course, that the officer in command, or one of +his subordinates, must have committed some open and ascertainable +violation of the principles of military science. So far is this from +being the case, that military history is full of examples in which the +highest merit and resolution of a commander have been nullified or +cheated by the wanton interferences of physical nature, or by acts on +the part of subordinates admittedly beyond the control of any human +skill or foresight.[183] + + [Footnote 183: This chapter was in type some weeks before + Vol. I. of the Official History of the War was published. + Where, however, the Official History amends or supplements + figures, documents, etc., given in earlier official + publications, the fact is mentioned in a foot-note.] + +[Sidenote: Delay of operations.] + +Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must +be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the +military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice +given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the +Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already[184] the grave inadequacy +of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa +between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of +General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of +4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with +24 field-guns in all.[185] On August 2nd the Government decided to +send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was +warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for +service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent +representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no +considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until +the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the +definite failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene +through Mr. Smuts. + + [Footnote 184: See p. 191.] + + [Footnote 185: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official + _History of the War in South Africa_ gives the total on + August 2nd as "not exceeding 9,940 men."] + +Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September +8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the +remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons. + +Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104 +British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and +14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.[186] But the Army Corps, the +"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its +determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be +represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British +Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of +the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the +Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to +"formulate its own proposals" was communicated to the Transvaal +Government.[187] It was then calculated that three months must elapse +before this force could be equipped, transported, and placed in the +field in South Africa. + + [Footnote 186: Cd. 1,789. But the Official History gives the + British total at the outbreak of war as 27,054 men (as + against over 50,000 burghers); of whom 15,811 (including + 2,781 local troops) were in Natal, 5,221 regulars and 4,574 + local troops were in the Cape Colony, and 1,448 men, raised + locally by Col. Baden-Powell, were in Mafeking and Southern + Rhodesia.] + + [Footnote 187: But the Admiralty were given details of the + offensive force on September 20th. (_Official History._)] + +[Sidenote: No political gain.] + +Before recording the disastrous effects of the postponement of +effective military preparations, from June to September, it remains to +consider whether any political gains, sufficient to compensate for the +loss of military strength, were secured. The policy of relying upon +Afrikander advice failed; since, as we have seen, the admonitions of +Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr. Hofmeyr came too late to turn President +Krueger from an obduracy founded upon long years of military +preparation. The over-sea British had made up their minds in June; and +nothing occurred in the subsequent negotiations to deepen their +conviction of the essential justice of the British cause. India was +unmoved; indeed, the Hindu masses were slightly sympathetic, while the +feudatory princes came forward with offers of men and treasure to the +Government of the Queen-Empress. The attitude of the respective +governments of France, Germany, and Russia was correct. But what +secured this result was not any perception of the moderation of the +British demands, or any recognition of the genuine reluctance of the +British Government to make war, but the sight of the British Navy +everywhere holding the seas, the rapidity and ease with which large +bodies of troops were transported from every quarter of the British +world, and the manner in which each reverse was met by a display of +new and unexpected reserves of military strength. + +If the British Government thought that it would win the peoples of +Continental Europe to its side by a show of hesitation to make war +upon a weak state, the sequel proved that it had gravely misunderstood +the conditions under which international respect is produced. Hatred +of England rose in inverse ratio to the evidence of the justness of +her cause. When the Boers were victorious, or seemed to be most +capable of defying the efforts of the largest fighting force that +Great Britain had ever put into the field; when, that is to say, it +was most clearly demonstrated that British supremacy in South Africa +could only have been maintained by force of arms against the +formidable rival which had risen against it, then the wave of popular +hatred surged highest. When the British arms prospered, the clamour +sank; but only to rise again until it was finally allayed by the +knowledge that the Boer resistance was at an end, and that the British +Empire had emerged from the conflict a stronger and more united power. + +[Sidenote: Attitude of the United States.] + +The case of the United States was somewhat different. Here was an +industrial nation like our own; and one, moreover, whose people were +qualified alike by constitutional and legal tradition, habits of +thought, and identity of language, to have discerned the reality of +the reluctance displayed by the British Government to employ force +until every resource of diplomacy and every device of statecraft had +been exhausted, and to have drawn the conclusion that the power which +drove the Government into war was a sense of duty, and not greed of +territory. Moreover, there was at this time, at any rate among the +more cultivated classes, a feeling of gratitude for the action of +Great Britain in preventing European intervention during the +Spanish-American war, and a genuine desire, on that ground alone, to +show sympathy with the English people in the conflict in which they +had become involved. In these circumstances it is somewhat strange +that public opinion in the United States was unmistakably inclined to +favour the Boers during almost the entire period of the war. It is +perfectly true that the United States Government was consistently +friendly; but this did not alter the fact that the dominant note in +nearly all public expressions of the sentiment of the United States' +people was one of sympathy with the Boer, and of hostility to the +British cause. It might have been thought that, just as most +Englishmen, in the case of the conflict between the United States and +Spain, were prepared to assume that a nation imbued with the +traditions and principles of the Anglo-Saxon race would not have +undertaken to enforce its will upon a weak Power without having +convinced itself first of the justice of its cause, so the Americans +would have entertained an equally favourable presumption in respect of +the people of Great Britain. That this was not done is due to a cause +which is as significant as it is well ascertained. Making all +allowance for the prejudice against England inevitably aroused in the +minds of the less thoughtful members of a great democratic community, +by the fact that her opponent was both a weak state and a republic, +this very general refusal to accept the political morality of the +English people as a guarantee of the justice of their action in South +Africa suggests the presence of another and more specific influence. +The explanation given by Americans is that the English nation was +itself divided upon the question of the morality of the South African +War--or, at any rate, that the public utterances that reached the +United States were such as to convey this impression. That being so, +they ask, Can you blame us for hesitating to adopt what was at the +most, as we understood it, the opinion of a majority? In support of +this view they point to the public utterances, before and after the +war had broken out, of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, +and Mr. Bryce. Of these, the former was the official head of the +Liberal Party, while the two latter were men whose literary +achievements had made their names and personalities both familiar and +respected in the United States. If the opinions of these public men +were on this occasion wholly unrepresentative, why, they ask, were +their speeches and articles unrefuted; or, at any rate, allowed to go +forth to the world uncondemned by any clear and authoritative +manifestation of the dissent and displeasure of their countrymen? + +[Sidenote: Injurious declarations.] + +That declarations such as these did in fact produce injurious effects +directly calculable in human lives, in money, and in the waste and +devastation of war, is a fact which will claim the attention of the +reader on a subsequent occasion. They came not merely from the mouths of +the Irish Nationalists, and of advanced Radicals such as Mr. +Lloyd-George and Mr. John Burns, but from men of wider repute. That +public opinion should have allowed responsible Englishmen in time of war +to "speak and write as though they belonged to the enemy,"--whether due +to an exaggerated regard for our traditional freedom of speech, or to a +failure to recognise that the altered conditions produced by the +extension and perfection of telegraphic communication, and the +development of the Press throughout the civilised world, gave such +utterances a value in international relations altogether different from +that possessed (say) by similar utterances on the part of the +anti-nationalists during the Napoleonic wars--is a circumstance that +merits the most serious consideration. No one will deny that this +unpatriotic form of opposition, so long as it exists, constitutes an +ever-recurring danger to the most vital interests of the community. The +ultimate remedy lies in the creation of a representative council of the +Empire, and the consequent separation of questions of inter-imperial and +foreign policy from the local and irrelevant issues of party politics. +Until this is done, it remains to establish a mutual understanding +under which such questions would be recognised as being outside the +sphere of party recrimination; and for this purpose it is necessary to +create a force of public opinion strong enough to compel the observance +of this understanding; or, failing this, to visit its non-observance +with political penalties commensurate to the injury inflicted. + +[Sidenote: The Army Corps absorbed.] + +The conflict which followed the expiration of the forty-eight hours +allowed by the Boer ultimatum is in more than one respect the most +extraordinary in the annals of war. The existence of the cable and +telegraph made instant and continuous communication possible between +the army in the field and the nation at home. Public opinion, informed +by the daily records furnished by the Press, became a factor in +determining the conduct of the war. Nor is it strange that a civilian +population, separated by 6,000 miles from the theatre of operations, +should have proved an injurious counsellor. The army was ordered to +conquer a people, but forbidden to employ the methods by which alone +it has been hitherto held that conquest is attainable. But no +influence exercised upon the course of the war by false +humanitarianism or political partisanship produced any results +comparable to the original injury inflicted upon the British Army by +the ignorance and irresolution displayed by the nation. The +postponement of effective military preparations by the Home Government +until the necessity for these preparations had become so plain that +no effort of the Opposition could embarrass its action, was the _fons +et origo_ of all subsequent disaster. The failure to mobilise the Army +Corps in June had placed the Army in a position of disadvantage at the +outbreak of the war, from which it never wholly recovered. The +original striking force--the Army Corps--was not employed in its +proper function, but absorbed, upon its arrival in South Africa, in +the task of supporting the defensive forces. Twenty-two thousand men, +with an Army Corps advancing upon Bloemfontein or Pretoria, would have +sufficed to repel attacks upon the colonial frontiers, and to check +rebellion in the Cape Colony. But twenty-two thousand men defending +one thousand miles of frontier from a mobile force nearly twice as +numerous with the Army Corps six thousand miles away in England, was a +very different thing. Yet this was the situation in which the nation, +by withholding from the Government the support necessary to enable it +to give effect to the advice of Lord Wolseley, had elected to place +the British Army. The plan of mobilisation, long prepared and complete +in all particulars, worked with perfect success. Twenty Companies of +the Army Service Corps sailed on October 6th, a day before the actual +mobilisation order was issued. The rest of the offensive force--one +Cavalry Division, one Army Corps, and eight battalions of lines of +communication troops--began to be embarked on October 20th, and by +November 17th the long succession of transports, bearing the whole of +the men, horses, and guns of which it was composed (with the exception +of one cavalry regiment detained by horse sickness), had sailed for +South Africa. This was Lord Wolseley's task, and it was promptly and +efficiently performed. The War Office was not inefficient; but the +refusal to mobilise in June had thrown the whole scheme of the +offensive and defensive campaign out of gear. + +[Sidenote: General Buller.] + +With the evidence of the War Commission before us, it is impossible to +divest General Buller of a share of responsibility for the disastrous +conditions under which the war was commenced. He was nominated to the +South African command in June, and he was consulted upon the strength +and composition of the force which was to be employed. On July 7th +Lord Wolseley asked the Government, apart from the immediate +mobilisation of the Army Corps which he still urged, to "consider +whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division +and one Cavalry Brigade--say 10,000 men--to South Africa," adding that +he had "no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our +military position." But ten days later the despatch of this +reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since, +according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting +held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General Buller used the +weight of his authority to support General Butler's opposition to Lord +Milner's urgent request for immediate reinforcements. In reply to a +question as to the desirability of strengthening the South African +garrisons, he said on this occasion, that-- + + "he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought, + and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot + did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out + any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our + position against any possible attack by the Boers on our + frontiers." + +This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words," +but the "exact meaning" of what he said.[188] It was the precise +opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home +Government.[189] Indeed the degree in which General Buller had +misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at +once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South +Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite +British army, which was to engage a definite Boer army. When he had +learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually was, he +is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark: "It +seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa." +General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his +fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only +in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at +once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible +to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony. +Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added +that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to +say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the +most emphatic terms.[190] + + [Footnote 188: Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.] + + [Footnote 189: Nor was the Intelligence Department less + urgent than Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899], + earlier warnings being disregarded, a formal communication + was made for the consideration of the Cabinet, advising the + despatch of a large force fully equipped, estimated to be + sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the first + onrush of the Boers."--Sir John Ardagh, in _The Balfourian + Parliament_, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the + evidence of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes" + issued by the D. M. I. in June (1899).] + + [Footnote 190: In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to + Gen. Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting + for Natal, gives as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of + the situation" the following remark: "1. Ever since I have + been here we have been like the man, who, with a long day's + work before him, overslept himself and so was late for + everything all day." (_Official History_, p. 209.)] + +The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to +hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In +the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect, +the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the +day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the +whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by +Joubert. When at length the last units of the Army Corps were landed +(December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg, organising a +force for the relief of White; and practically the entire offensive +force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces, or save +them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army Corps in +Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men for the +relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to +strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the +railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and +checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony. +Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at +Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso +(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that, +however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely +defensive _role_ must for the time be assigned to the troops then in +South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the +arrival of very considerable reinforcements. + +[Sidenote: New striking force necessary.] + +The perception of this fact caused the Government to appoint (December +17th) Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff, to the +South African command, and to prepare and despatch an entirely new +striking force. It was this new force and not the original Army Corps +that "marched to Pretoria," and struck the successive blows which +enabled Lord Roberts to report to the Secretary of State for War +(November 15th, 1900) that; "with the occupation of Komati Poort, and +the dispersal of Commandant-General Louis Botha's army, the organised +resistance of the two Republics might be said to have ceased." It was +not, therefore, until Lord Roberts was able to march from Modder River +Station (February 11th, 1900), after a month spent at the Cape in +reorganising the transport and other preparations essential to the +success of an army destined to advance for many hundreds of miles +through a hostile country, that the British Army in South Africa was +in the position in which the acceptance of Lord Wolseley's advice, +given in June and July, 1899, would have put it upon the outbreak of +war. Nor was the force with which Lord Roberts then advanced, 36,000 +men, more numerous than the striking force which would have been +provided, by Lord Wolseley's scheme, had it been carried out in the +manner in which he desired. For the business with which the scattered +Army Corps was occupied when Lord Roberts arrived at Capetown (January +10th, 1900)--the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley, and the defence of +the eastern districts of the Cape Colony from the Free State commandos +and the colonial rebels--was work directly caused by the absence of +the Army Corps from South Africa when the war broke out. It is not too +much to say that the whole of the serious losses incurred by the +British forces in South Africa from the commencement of the war up to +the date of Lord Roberts's advance into the Free State territory, +would have been avoided if the state of public opinion had permitted +the Salisbury Cabinet in June to make military preparations +commensurate with the gravity of the situation as disclosed by Lord +Milner. + +[Sidenote: The regular army exhausted.] + +In forming an estimate of the performance of the British Army in South +Africa, from a military point of view, it is necessary to remember the +grave initial disadvantage in which it was placed; and that this +initial disadvantage was due, not to the War Office, not to the +Cabinet, but to the nation itself. The manner in which the losses thus +caused were repaired is significant and instructive. By the end of the +year (1899), the troops composing three divisions in excess of the +Army Corps were either landed in South Africa or under orders to +proceed to the seat of war. In addition to the 22,000 defensive troops +in South Africa on October 11th, the War Office had supplied, not +merely the 47,000 men of the Army Corps, but 85,000 men in all. But, +having done this, it had practically reached the limit of troops +available in the regular army for over-sea operations. By April, 1900, +all the reserves had been used up. There remained, it is true, 103,023 +"effectives" of all ranks of the regular army in the United Kingdom on +April 1st; but this total was composed of 37,333 "immature" troops; of +the recruits who had joined since October 1st, 1899; of reservists +unfit for foreign service; and of sick and wounded sent home from +South Africa: that is to say, of men who, for one reason or another, +were all alike unfit for service abroad.[191] Further drafts might +have been made upon the British regulars in India; but this course was +held to be imprudent. In plain words, the exhaustion of the regular +army compelled the Government to avail itself more fully of the offers +of military aid which had reached it from the colonies, and to utilise +the militia and volunteer forces. On December 18th, 1899, the +announcement was made that the War Office would allow twelve militia +battalions to volunteer for service abroad, and that a considerable +force of yeomanry and a contingent of picked men from the volunteers +would be accepted. This appeal to the latent military resources of the +Empire met with a ready and ample response. Throughout the whole +course of the war the United Kingdom sent 45,566 militia, 19,856 +volunteers, and 35,520 yeomanry, with 7,273 South African +Constabulary, and 833 Scottish Horse; the over-sea colonies (including +305 volunteers from India) provided 30,633 men;[192] while of the +small British population in South Africa no less than the astonishing +total of 46,858 took part in the war.[193] In all some 200,000 +men--militia, volunteers, and irregulars--came forward to supplement +the regular army. + + [Footnote 191: Cd. 1,789.] + + [Footnote 192: _Ibid._] + + [Footnote 193: See returns cited by Lord Roberts in House of + Lords, February 27th, 1906. The irregulars _raised_ in South + Africa were between 50,000 and 60,000, according to the _War + Commission Report_.] + +[Sidenote: Auxiliary forces utilised.] + +It was mainly from the auxiliary forces and the colonial contingents, +and not from the regular army, that the reinforcements were supplied +which repaired the critical losses of the defensive campaign, and +enabled the new striking force to be organised. Nor can it be said +that the British Government failed to do all that was possible to +retrieve its original error, when once the defeats inflicted by the +Boer forces had awakened it to a knowledge of the real situation in +South Africa. In his despatch of February 6th, 1900, Lord Roberts was +able to report that, on January 31st, there was an effective fighting +force of nearly 40,000 men in Natal and another of 60,000 in the Cape +Colony. Mr. Chamberlain put the case for the Government at its highest +in speaking at Birmingham on May 11th, 1900: + + "Supposing that twelve months ago any man had said in public that + this country would be able to send out from its own shores and + from its own citizens an army of more than 150,000 men, fully + equipped, and that it would be joined by another force of more + than 30,000 men, voluntarily offered by our self-governing + colonies ... if he had said that this army, together numbering + 200,000 men, or thereabouts, could have been provided with the + best commissariat, with the most admirable medical appliances and + stores that had ever accompanied an army--if he could have said + that at the same time there would have remained behind in this + country something like half a million of men, who although they + may not be equal man to man to the regulars and best-drilled + armies, are nevertheless capable of bearing arms to some + purpose--if he had said all this, he would have been laughed to + scorn." + +Moreover, the army was successful. The work which it was required to +do was done. In order to realise the merit of its success two +circumstances must be borne in mind: first, the enormous area of South +Africa, and, second, the fact that practically the whole of this area, +if we except the few considerable towns, was not only ill-provided +with means of communication and food supplies, but inhabited by a +population which was openly hostile, or, what was worse, secretly +disaffected. Lord Roberts, in the course of his despatches, +endeavoured to bring home both of these circumstances to the public in +England. + +Of the area he wrote:[194] + + [Footnote 194: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.] + + "The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty's Imperial troops + have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised + if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of + communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded, + and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous + extent of the theatre of war, from one end of which to the other + troops have had to be frequently moved. + +[Sidenote: Vastness of South Africa.] + + "The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows: + + Square Miles. + Cape Colony 277,151 + Orange River Colony 48,326 + Transvaal 113,640 + Natal 18,913 + -------- + Total 458,030 + -------- + Rhodesia 750,000 + + "And the distances troops have had to travel are: + + By Land Miles. + Capetown to Pretoria 1,040 + Pretoria to Komati Poort 260 + Capetown to Kimberley 647 + Kimberley to Mafeking 223 + Mafeking to Pretoria 160 + Mafeking to Beira 1,135 + Durban to Pretoria 511 + + "From these tables it will be seen that, after having been + brought by sea 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United + Kingdom, the army in South Africa had to be distributed over an + area of greater extent than France (204,146 square miles) and + Germany (211,168 square miles) put together, and, if we include + that part of Rhodesia with which we had to do, larger than the + combined areas of France, Germany, and Austria (261,649 square + miles)." + +Of the nature of the country and its inhabitants he wrote:[195] + + [Footnote 195: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.] + + "And it should be remembered that over these great distances we + were dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply, + guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital + equipment, in fact, all the requirements of an army in the + field, and that, along these lines, bridges and culverts had + been destroyed in many places, and rails were being constantly + torn up." + +And of the Cape Colony he wrote:[196] + + [Footnote 196: February 6th, 1900. Capetown.] + + "The difficulties of carrying on war in South Africa do not + appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. In + an enemy's country we should know exactly how we stood; but out + here we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern + frontier, but to maintain law and order within the colonial + limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, and no doubt a large + number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the British + rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand, + a considerable section would prefer a republican form of + government, and, influenced by ties of blood and association, + side with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Even the + public service at the Cape is not free from men whose sympathies + with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give valuable + assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways." + +[Sidenote: The offensive campaign.] + +Bearing in mind that the offensive campaign dates, not from the expiry +of the Boer ultimatum on October 11th, 1899, but from Lord Roberts's +advance from Modder River Station on February 11th, 1900, the mere +record of dates and events is sufficiently impressive. On February +12th the Free State border was crossed; on the 15th Kimberley was +relieved, on the 27th Cronje's force surrendered at Paardeberg, on the +28th Ladysmith was relieved, and on March 13th Bloemfontein, the +capital of the Free State, was occupied. The army again advanced +early in May; Kroonstad was entered on the 12th; on May 24th, the +Queen's birthday, the Free State was annexed; the Vaal was crossed on +the 27th, Johannesburg was occupied on the 31st, and on June 5th the +British flag was hoisted on the Raadzaal at Pretoria. In the meantime +Mafeking had been relieved with absolute punctuality on May 17th.[197] +On June 11th the Boers evacuated Laing's Nek and Majuba, and the Natal +Field Force, under Buller, entered the Transvaal from the south-east. +The next day Roberts defeated the Boers under Louis Botha at Diamond +Hill. On July 30th Prinsloo and 4,000 burghers surrendered to Hunter; +on August 27th the main Transvaal army, under Louis Botha, was again +defeated at Dalmanutha, and on September 1st the Transvaal was +annexed. On the 11th President Krueger fled the Transvaal; Komati +Poort, the eastern frontier town on the railway line to Delagoa Bay, +was entered on the 24th, and two days later railway communication was +re-opened between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria. + + [Footnote 197: Lord Roberts had asked Col. Baden-Powell how + long he could hold out at Mafeking, and then promised that + the relief of the town should be effected within the required + period.] + +In spite of the vast area and harassing conditions of the war, in +spite of its own military unpreparedness, and the unexpected strength +of the Boer attack, the Power which created the Republics had +destroyed them within less than a twelvemonth from the day on which +they had defied it. + +At this point it will be convenient to place on record certain general +conclusions which arise out of the events and circumstances of the +South African War, and to consider certain military criticisms which +have been offered upon the conduct of the British Army in the field. + +We have seen that the initial losses of the campaign were due, not to +any defects in the Army as a fighting force, but to the position in +which the Army was placed by the irresolution of the nation. We have +seen also that within less than a year of the ultimatum the capitals +of the two Republics were occupied, and their power of "organised +resistance" was destroyed. During this stage of the war the regular +Army, small as it was, supplemented by selected reinforcements from +the auxiliary services, and by the colonial contingents, sufficed to +do the work required of it. In the second stage, when the work to be +accomplished was nothing less than the disarmament of the entire Dutch +population of South Africa, the character of the reinforcements +supplied had greatly depreciated,[198] and the prolongation of the war +was in part to be attributed to this circumstance. For the present, +however, it will be sufficient to confine our observations to the +period of "organised resistance." + + [Footnote 198: One fighting British general stated that one + of the first stage force was equal to five of the men + supplied after the reserves had been used up in April, + 1900.] + +[Sidenote: General conclusions.] + +The first of these conclusions is the fact that the real evil revealed +by the South African War is not the inefficiency, or unpreparedness of +the War Office, but the ignorance,[199] and therefore unpreparedness, +of the country. From this unreadiness for war on the part of the +nation as a whole there sprang two results: (1) the refusal of the +Salisbury Cabinet to allow the War Office to make adequate military +preparations in June, and the disregard of the advice alike of Lord +Milner and Lord Wolseley; (2) the insufficient supply of reserves for +the forces in the field, arising ultimately from the small percentage +of men in the nation trained to the use of arms. + + [Footnote 199: For the direct part played by the Liberal + leaders in the production of this ignorance, see p. 256.] + +The second conclusion to which we are led is that the specific result +of the absence of effective preparations for War in June was to throw +the War Office scheme of a fighting force out of gear. Twenty-two +thousand defensive troops, with a striking force of fifty thousand in +South Africa, would have proved sufficient to attain the ends of +British policy. As it was, the Army Corps being in England when +hostilities commenced, and not arriving in its entirety until December +4th, the fifty thousand offensive force was absorbed in the work of +extricating the twenty-two thousand defensive force. In other words, +the British Army was not put in the position contemplated by Lord +Wolseley's scheme until an entirely new fighting force had been +organised and advanced from Modder River in the beginning of February, +1900. This new striking force was identical in numbers with the +original striking force, the Army Corps,[200] provided by Lord +Wolseley's scheme. + +[Sidenote: Criticisms examined.] + +Among criticisms on the British Army in the field there are two that +claim attention. The first of these is the allegation that military +efficiency was sacrificed to a desire to spare life. In so far as this +criticism is concerned with the handling of their troops by British +commanders, it is strenuously denied that either Lord Roberts, or any +of his subordinates, allowed a desire to spare the lives of the troops +under their command to interfere with the successful execution of any +military operation. The specific example of the alleged interference +of this motive, usually cited, is the conduct of the attack upon the +Boer position at Paardeberg. In respect of these operations the actual +facts, as they presented themselves to the mind of Lord Roberts, are +these. On reaching the Paardeberg position from Jacobsdal the +Commander-in-Chief found that in the operations of the preceding day +Lord Kitchener had lost a thousand men without gaining a single +advantage. The position held by the Boers, although it was commanded +by rising ground on all sides, was one which afforded admirable cover +in repelling an attacking force. In these circumstances Lord Roberts +decided, as an application of the principles of military science, to +"sap up" to the Boer positions. The correctness of this decision was +proved by the result. The moment that the Boers realised that they +were to be given no further opportunity--such as a repetition of a +direct attack upon their position would have afforded--of inflicting +heavy loss on the British troops, whilst their eventual surrender was +no less inevitable, the white flag was hoisted. + + [Footnote 200: _I.e._, _less_ troops for lines of + communication. Lord Roberts's force was 36,000, the Army + Corps was 47,000.] + +It is denied with equal definiteness that any general feeling of the +kind alleged existed among subordinate officers or the rank and file +of the British troops. Where, however, the allegation of "a desire to +spare life" has regard to the enemy and not to the British troops, the +answer is to be found in the fact that any humanity inconsistent with +military efficiency was apparent and not real. The comparative +immunity enjoyed by the enemy on occasions when he was defeated is due +to physical conditions wholly favourable to the Boers, to the +knowledge of the country possessed by the burghers individually and +collectively, and to the circumstance that the inhabitants of the +country districts were, in almost all cases, ready to give them every +possible assistance in escaping from the British. There is one +particular statement in connection with this criticism which admits of +absolute denial. It has been said that Lord Roberts, the +Commander-in-Chief, received instructions from the Home Government +directing him to spare the enemy as much as possible. This statement, +in spite of its _prima facie_ improbability, has met with very general +acceptance. None the less it is entirely baseless. The only +limitations imposed by the Home Government upon Lord Roberts's +complete freedom of action in the conduct of the military operations +which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced +in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number +and character required. + +[Sidenote: The German general staff.] + +The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff, +forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional +merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British +Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to +"manoeuvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe +losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form, +is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the +occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to +be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine +open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what +military science required of the commander directing the attacking +force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms +with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism, +however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond +Hill in particular, and to the engagements fought in the course of +Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes the form +of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both flanks +was executed successfully, the full result of this initial success was +not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was not pressed +home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught and +destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically true, +and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established their +case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into +consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and +inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the +final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and +gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no +avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring +heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It +would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers. + +Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against +the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until +the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility by cutting +in on their line of retreat. The Boers, however, took every precaution +against such an eventuality; and the result was generally, as stated +by the German critics, that the Boers were "manoeuvred" out of their +positions. But this does not prove that the course adopted by Lord +Roberts was wrong; it merely proves the extreme difficulty of +inflicting a severe defeat upon an enemy who declines to risk a +decisive action, and whose mobility gives him the power to do so. The +course advocated by the critics would have been equally barren of +result, while the cost in lives would have been far greater. + +[Sidenote: The Boers not in uniform.] + +It remains to notice certain definite circumstances which caused the +British Army in South Africa to be confronted by difficulties which no +other army has been required to face. The Boers were accorded all the +privileges of a civilised army, although at the same time they +violated the most essential of the conditions upon the observance of +which these privileges are based. This condition is the wearing, by +the forces of a belligerent, of such a uniform and distinctive dress +as will be sufficient to enable the other belligerent to discriminate +with facility between the combatant and non-combatant population of +his enemy. The fact that the burgher forces were not in uniform and +were yet accorded the privileges claimed by civilised troops, was in +itself a circumstance that increased both the efforts required, and +the losses incurred, by the British Army to an extent which has not as +yet been fully realised. In the operations which Lord Roberts had +conducted in Afghanistan it was not the organised army but the +tribesmen that had proved difficult to overcome. The Afghan army +retreated, or, if it stood its ground, was defeated. But the +tribesmen who "sniped" the British troops from the mountain slopes and +from behind stones and rocks, who assembled from all sides as rapidly +as they melted away, constituted the real difficulty of the campaign. +In South Africa the burgher forces were army and tribesmen alike. +Owing to the absence of any distinctive uniform the combatant Boers +mingled freely with the British soldiers, and went to and fro among +the non-combatant Boer population in the towns and districts occupied +by the British. On one day they were in the British camp as +ox-drivers, or provision-sellers, or what not, and on the next they +were in the burgher fighting line. A single instance will serve to +convey an impression of the complete immunity with which not merely +the rank and file, but commandants and generals, entered and left the +British lines. It is believed that on one night General Louis Botha +slept in Johannesburg close to Lord Roberts, the British +Commander-in-Chief. The next morning he left the town in company with +some of the British troops. And in the Natal campaign it is notorious +that the camps of the Ladysmith relieving force were swarming with +Boer spies whom it was impossible to detect and punish. Even in the +besieged town itself the utmost secrecy at headquarters did not always +avail to prevent a timely intimation of a contemplated attack from +reaching the enemy's lines. Add to this the fact that every Boer +farmhouse throughout South Africa was an Intelligence Depot for the +enemy, and it is easy to understand the facility displayed by the +mobile and ununiformed Boer forces in evading the British columns. + +Whether the humanity displayed by the British Government in thus +recognising the burghers as regular belligerents, and in other +respects, did not tend to bring about the very evil sought to be +avoided is another question. It is quite possible to maintain that the +comparative immunity from punishment and the disproportionate military +success which the Boers enjoyed did in fact, by contributing to the +prolongation of the war, ultimately produce a greater loss of life, +and a greater amount of material suffering, than would have been +incurred by the South African Dutch if the war had been waged with +greater severity on the part of Great Britain. That it increased the +cost of the war both in lives and in treasure to the British nation is +obvious. But this is a consideration which does not affect any +estimate of the merit or demerit displayed by the British Army in the +field that may be formed either by British or foreign critics. In +order to prove competency it is not necessary to show that no single +mistake was made or that nothing that was done might not have been +done better. No war department, no army ever has been or ever will be +created that could come scatheless from the application of such a test +of absolute efficiency. What we require to know is whether the same +standard of efficiency was shown to have been attained in the War +Office and in the Army as is required and obtained in any other branch +of the public service, or in any successful or progressive undertaking +conducted by private enterprise. The circumstances of the war were +abnormal. From one point of view it was a civil war; from another it +was a rebellion, and from a third it was a war between two rival +military powers, each of whom desired to become supreme in South +Africa. What the military critic has to consider is not so much how +these circumstances arose, or whether they could have been changed or +avoided by any political action on the part of Great Britain, but the +degree in which the conditions imposed by them upon the British Army +must be taken into account in applying the ordinary tests of military +efficiency to the work which it accomplished in this particular +campaign. + +[Sidenote: Difficulties of the campaign.] + +The nature of the difficulties presented by the vast extent of the +theatre of war, the deficiency of means of communication, the +imperfect cultivation of the land, the sparseness of the population +and their hostility to the British, and the physical and climatic +aspects of South Africa in general, have been broadly indicated in the +passages taken from Lord Roberts's despatches. To pursue the inquiry +further would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. That, +however, there is nothing unusual in the fact that civilian forces, +inspired by love of country and aided by physical conditions +exceptionally favourable to themselves, should be able to offer a +successful resistance to professional soldiers may be seen by a +reference to one of the little wars of the seventeenth century. In the +year 1690 twenty-two thousand French and Savoyard troops were sent by +Louis XIV. to storm the Balsille--a rocky eminence _mutatis mutandis_ +the equivalent of a South African kopje--held by 350 Piedmontese +Vaudois. Even so the besieged patriots made good their escape, and, +owing to the sudden change in the politics of Europe brought about by +the accession of William of Orange to the crown of England, actually +concluded an honourable peace with their sovereign, Victor Amadeus of +Savoy, a few days after they had been driven from the Balsille. +Assuming that the British troops employed from first to last in the +South African War were five times as numerous as the forces placed in +the field by the Dutch nationalists--say 450,000 as against 90,000--we +have here a numerical superiority which dwindles into insignificance +beside the magnificent disproportion of the professional troops +required to deal with a civilian force in this seventeenth-century +struggle.[201] + + [Footnote 201: Any reader desiring to learn the particulars + of this struggle is referred to the pages of the writer's + _The Valley of Light: Studies with Pen and Pencil in the + Vaudois Valleys of Piedmont_. (Macmillan, 1899). It may be + added that Napoleon manifested a keen interest in the + military details of the engagements between the French and + Savoyard troops and the Vaudois. As regards the number of + combatants on the Boer side. Lord Kitchener puts the total + (from first to last) at 95,000 (Cd. 1790, p. 13). The + _Official History_, however, gives, as the result of an + elaborate calculation, 87,365 (Vol. I. App. 4).] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY + + +The direct share which Lord Milner took in the skilful disposition of +the handful of British troops available at the outbreak of the war for +the defence of the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony has been +mentioned. The part which he played during the first period of the war +in his relationship to the military authorities is sufficiently +indicated by the words which appear in Lord Roberts's final despatch. + + "This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd, + 1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit + I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of + Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high + privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage + never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which + surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of + his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message + or for the tactful solution of a difficult question." + +That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great +a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one +occasion--to be presently noted--Lord Milner's judgment did not +entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief. + +[Sidenote: An unnatural alliance.] + +But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in +comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort +required to keep the machinery of administration available for the +Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of +the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative +Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less +complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it +impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an +elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a +load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and +mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an +end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown, +considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most +dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather +demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty +years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before +the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means, +and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the +Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable +distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was done and +said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the law +constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of the +British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to +themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in +view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would +probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts +stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to +fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the +excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly +Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear +of military humiliation. Just as in the period before the war we found +the Afrikander leaders striving to "mediate" between the Transvaal and +the British Government; so now during the war we find them striving to +"conciliate" the two contending parties. In both cases their aim was +the same--to prevent the destruction of the Republics and the +consequent ruin of the nationalist cause. As in the former case +"mediation" was a euphemism for the diplomatic defeat of the British +Government, so now "conciliation" is synonymous with the restoration +of the independence of the Boers--that is, the renunciation of all +that the British people, whether islander or colonist, had fought to +secure. That any considerable body of Englishmen should have allowed +themselves to become a second time the dupes of so coarse a political +hypocrisy may well arouse surprise to-day; to a future generation it +will seem almost incredible. The fact, however, admits of neither +doubt nor contradiction. It is writ large in Hansard, in the +Blue-books, and in the daily journals. The whole force of this strange +and unnatural alliance between England's most bitter and most skilful +enemies in South Africa and a section of her own sons at home, was +directed against Lord Milner during the remaining years of his High +Commissionership. + +[Sidenote: Mr Schreiners's attitude.] + +For the moment, however, the ultimatum had rendered the British people +practically unanimous in the desire to chastise the insolence of the +Boer, and, in the face of this determination, no opposition was +manifested by the Afrikander Government to the free movement and +disembarkation of the Imperial troops. The employment of the local +forces in the defence of the colony was another matter. The Free State +commandos crossed the Orange River on October 31st, 1899. The delay +was not due to any regard felt by President Steyn for Mr. Schreiner, +but solely to military considerations. On the previous day General +Joubert had shut up Sir George White's force in Ladysmith; and there +was, therefore, no longer any likelihood that these commandos would be +required in Natal. The invasion of the Colony south of the Orange +River produced, as we have noticed, a marked change in Mr. Schreiner's +attitude; causing him finally to abandon the neutrality policy and +recognise the necessity of employing the local volunteer forces in the +defence of the Colony. None the less the injury inflicted upon British +interests by the Prime Minister's attempt to keep the people of the +Cape Colony out of the conflict was unquestionable. The ministers of +the Crown in this British Colony had allowed arms and ammunition to go +through to the Free State, until the Imperial authorities had +interfered; they had refused to supply Mafeking and Kimberley with +much-needed artillery; they had refused to call out the volunteers +until the Colony was about to be invaded by the Free State as well as +by the Transvaal, and even then they had delayed to supply these +forces with Lee-Enfield rifles. These were injuries the effect of +which could not be repaired by any subsequent co-operation with the +representatives of the British Government. In addition to calling out +the volunteers, Mr. Schreiner allowed the Imperial military +authorities to take over the Cape Government railways, and he +consented to the proclamation of martial law in those districts of the +Colony in which the Dutch were in rebellion. But he was far from +yielding, even now, that full and complete assistance to the Governor +which would have been expected, as a matter of course, from the Prime +Minister of any other British colony. On one occasion, at least, +during this period the conflict between his views and those of Lord +Milner became so acute that his resignation seemed to be inevitable. +But this was not to be the end of the Afrikander Ministry. In +proportion as Mr. Schreiner approached gradually to agreement with +Lord Milner, so did he incur the displeasure of Mr. Hofmeyr and the +Dutch, until (in June, 1901) the Ministry perished of internal +dissension. + +A week after Lord Roberts reached Capetown (January 10th, 1900), Lord +Milner sent home a despatch in which he tells the story of the +rebellion in the Cape Colony. The state of the districts on the +western border of the Republics, north of the Orange River, is +described in the words of a reliable and unbiassed witness who has +just arrived at Capetown from Vryburg, where he has been lately +resident: + + "All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts," + says this witness, "have joined the Boers, and I do not believe + that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch + community in the whole of Bechuanaland. The Field Cornets and + Justices of the Peace on the Dutch side have all joined ... the + conduct of the rebels has been unbearable." + +Of the position of that part of the Eastern Province of the Cape +Colony which, lying to the south of the Free State, formed the main +seat of the rebellion, Lord Milner himself writes: + +[Sidenote: Treatment of loyalists.] + + "Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of + Colesberg, no less than five great districts--those of Colesberg, + Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse--had gone over + without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to the enemy. + Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange Free State + had established their authority, and everywhere, in the + expressive words of a magistrate, British loyalists were "being + hunted out of town after town like sheep." In the invaded + districts the method of occupation has always been more or less + the same. The procedure is as follows:--A commando enters, the + Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the + courthouse, or market-place, and a Proclamation is read annexing + the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he + explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws + generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local + Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days + or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their + country. In either case they lose their property to a greater or + less extent. If they elect to quit they are often robbed before + starting or on the journey; if they stay their property and + themselves are commandeered. + + "The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined + the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed + districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I + shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during + November it was a number not less than the total of the invading + commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the + invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists + who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And + the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and + during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee + from the Albert district has estimated the total number of + colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded + districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the + districts north of that river, to which I referred at the + beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding + to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately + before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of + taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion + that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now + fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more, + either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the + Queen."[202] + + [Footnote 202: Cd. 264 (Despatch of January 16th, 1900).] + +As it turned out, this eastern rebellion was kept within limits by +General French's advance upon Colesberg, and by the skilful and +successful cavalry operations which he subsequently carried out upon +the Free State border; but there is abundant evidence to support the +belief that any second reverse in the Eastern Province, such as that +which General Gatacre suffered at Stormberg, would have proved the +signal for a rising in the Western Province. The Bond was active; and +the tone of the meetings held by the various branches throughout the +Colony was as frankly hostile to the Imperial Government as it was +sympathetic to the Republics. + +[Sidenote: State of western province.] + +The extent to which Mr. Schreiner's qualified co-operation with the +Imperial authorities had aroused the hostility of the Bond will be +seen from the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Cape +Distriks-bestuur, held at the office of _Ons Land_ at the end of +January (1900). It was a small meeting, but among those present were +Mr. Hofmeyr himself and Mr. Malan, the editor of _Ons Land_. On the +motion of the latter, it was unanimously determined that the +forthcoming Annual Congress of the Bond should be asked to pass a-- + + "resolution (_a_) giving expression of Congress's entire + disapproval of the policy which led to the present bloody war + instead of to a peaceful solution of the differences with the + South African Republic by means of arbitration; and (_b_) urging + a speedy re-establishment of peace on fair and righteous + conditions, as also a thorough inquiry by our Parliament into the + way in which, during the war, private property, the civil + liberties, and constitutional rights of the subject have been + treated."[203] + + [Footnote 203: Cd. 261.] + +Even more significant--as evidence of the dangerous feeling of +exaltation which possessed the Dutch at this time--was the New Year's +exhortation of _Ons Land_, the journalistic mouthpiece of Mr. Hofmeyr. +And Mr. Hofmeyr, it must be remembered, was not only the head of the +_Commissie van Toezicht_, or Executive of three which controlled the +Afrikander Bond, but the real master of the majority in the Cape +Parliament, upon which the Schreiner Cabinet depended for its +existence. After setting out the "mighty deeds" achieved by the +Afrikander arms during the last three months, this bitter and +relentless opponent of British supremacy in South Africa proceeded to +declare that "still mightier deeds" were to be seen in the coming year +(1900), and that the Afrikander nation, so far from being extinguished +by the conflict with Great Britain, would be welded into one compact +mass, and flourish more and more. + +Nor was this all. In the closing days of the year (1899) information +reached the British military authorities that a plot was on foot to +seize Capetown. The Dutch from the country districts were to assemble +in the capital in the guise of excursionists who had come to town to +enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays. On New Year's Eve, the +night reported to have been fixed for the attempt, all the military +stations in Capetown were kept in frequent communication by telephone; +the streets were paraded by pickets; and, in the drill-shed the +Capetown Highlanders slept under arms. Whether any attempt of the sort +was seriously contemplated or not, there is no question as to the fact +that the utmost necessity for precaution was recognised by the +military authorities at Capetown during this period, in spite of the +security afforded by the reinforcements which the Home Government was +pouring into the Colony. It was an old boast of the militant Dutch in +the Cape Colony that they would find a way to prevent British troops +from using the colonial railways to attack the Boers.[204] And when +at length, a month after Lord Roberts had arrived, the transport +system had been reorganised, the troops concentrated at De Aar and +Modder River, and everything was ready for the forward movement, the +most complete secrecy was observed as to the departure of the +Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener. Instead of leaving for the +front with the final drafts from the Capetown station in Adderley +Street, amid the cheering of the British population, these two +distinguished soldiers were driven in a close carriage, on the evening +of February 6th, from Government House to the Salt River Station, +where they caught the ordinary passenger train for De Aar. + + [Footnote 204: At the time of the Bechuanaland Expedition + (1884-5), when the writer was in South Africa, "a controversy + was seriously maintained between the two moderate Afrikander + journals, the _Sud Africaan_ and the _Volksblad_, on the + question whether the Imperial Government had, or had not, the + right to send troops through the Colony, without the consent + of the Colonial Ministry. In commenting upon this question a + correspondent wrote in the _Patriot_, the extreme organ of + the Afrikanders: 'I believe the _Volksblad_ is correct in + maintaining that England has that right. But if England has + the right to send _Rooibaatjes_ (_i.e._ British soldiers) to + kill my brethren in the Transvaal, then I have also the right + to try and prevent the same. My brother is nearer than + England. England can send troops, but whether they will all + arrive safely in Stellaland--that stands to be seen.'"--_A + History of South Africa_, by the writer. (Dent, 1900.)] + +[Sidenote: Lord Robert's advance.] + +No one was more aware of the reality of the Dutch disaffection in the +Colony than Lord Milner. Before Lord Roberts left Capetown for the +front he addressed a memorandum to him, in which the attention of the +Commander-in-Chief was drawn to certain special elements of danger in +the whole situation in South Africa as affected by the rebellion of +the Dutch in the Cape Colony. With reference to this memorandum Lord +Roberts writes, in the second of his despatches (February 16th, 1900): + + "Before quitting the seat of Government I received a memorandum + from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner reviewed + the political and military situation, and laid stress on the + possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch + population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the + purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free + State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the military + requirements of the case demanded an early advance into the + enemy's country; that such an advance, if successful, would + lessen the hostile pressure both on the northern frontiers of the + Colony and in Natal; that the relief of Kimberley had to be + effected before the end of February, and would set free most of + the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of + considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field + Artillery, by the 19th of February, would enable those points + along the frontier which were weakly held to be materially + strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that His Excellency's + apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt a certain amount + of risk had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to + involve more serious dangers than the bolder course which I have + decided to adopt." + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's proposal.] + +There cannot, of course, be any question as to the general wisdom of +this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance +from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by +taking his risks--risks that would have reduced a lesser man to +inaction--that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of a +great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack. +But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the +real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary +to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually +in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any +course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of +the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated +enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our +rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and +possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly +present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord +Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be +definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there, +whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in +this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made +possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of +the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried +out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second +rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High +Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the +troops at his disposal. In order to carry the war into the enemy's +country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of troops. The +subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and disastrous +influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was destined to +exercise upon the military decisions of the republican leaders--an +influence which would have been lessened materially, if not altogether +removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile force. And, in +point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the rebellion might +even now interfere with the success of the forward movement, unless +adequate provision was made to keep it in check, received almost +immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged in the capture +of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland districts of +Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon, lying to the west of the railway +from De Aar to Orange River, broke out into rebellion. Although Lord +Roberts at once directed certain columns to concentrate upon this new +area of disaffection, the situation had become so serious that on +March 8th--_i.e._, the day after Poplar Grove, and in the course of +the rapid march upon Bloemfontein--Lord Roberts-- + + "desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar with + the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such steps + as might be necessary to punish the rebels and to prevent the + spread of disaffection."[205] + + [Footnote 205: Despatch dated "Government House, + Bloemfontein, March 15th, 1900."] + +That is to say, the disclosure of a new centre of active rebellion in +the Colony deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the services of Lord +Kitchener, his Chief-of-Staff, when he was in the act of executing one +of the most critical movements of the campaign. + +[Sidenote: The Boer peace overtures.] + +The complete revolution in the military situation produced by Lord +Roberts's victorious advance into the Free State elicited from +Presidents Krueger and Steyn the "peace overtures" cabled to Lord +Salisbury on March 5th, 1900. In this characteristic document the two +Presidents remark that-- + + "they consider it [their] duty solemnly to declare that this war + was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the + threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is + only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable + independence of both Republics as sovereign international states, + and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects + who have taken part with [them] in this war shall suffer no harm + whatever in person or property." + +They further declare that "on these conditions, but on these +conditions alone," they are now, as in the past, desirous of seeing +peace re-established in South Africa; and they add considerately that +they have refrained from making this declaration "so long as the +advantage was always on their side," from a fear lest it "might hurt +the feelings of honour of the British people." They conclude: + + "But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be + considered to be assured by the capture of one of our forces by + Her Majesty's troops, and that we are thereby forced to evacuate + other positions which our forces had occupied, that difficulty is + over, and we can no longer hesitate clearly to inform your + Government and people, in the sight of the whole civilised world, + why we are fighting, and on what conditions we are ready to + restore peace."[206] + + [Footnote 206: Cd. 35.] + +The best comment upon this grossly disingenuous document is that which +is afforded by certain passages in Mr. Reitz's book, _A Century of +Wrong_, which was written in anticipation of the outbreak of war and +issued so soon as this anticipation had been realised: + + "The struggle of now nearly a century," he writes in his appeal + to his brother Afrikanders, "hastens to an end; we are + approaching the last act in that great drama which is so + momentous for all South Africa.... The questions which present + themselves for solution in the approaching conflict have their + origin deep in the history of the past.... By its light we are + more clearly enabled to comprehend the truth to which our people + appeal as a final justification for embarking on the war now so + close at hand.... May the hope which glowed in our hearts during + 1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on + steadily! May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly + moving onwards through blood and through tears, until it leads us + to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory + or death, Liberty will assuredly rise on South Africa ... just as + freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more + than a century ago. Then from Zambesi to Simon's Town it will be + Africa for the Afrikander."[207] + + [Footnote 207: Mr. Reitz's work was translated into English + by Mr. W. T. Stead.] + +And to this may be added the following extract from a letter written +by "one of the distinguished members of the Volksraad" who voted for +war against Great Britain, to one of his friends, a member of the +Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony: + + "Our plan is, with God's help, to take all that is English in + South Africa; so, in case you true Afrikanders wish to throw off + the English yoke, now is the time to hoist the Vier-kleur in + Capetown. You can rely on us; we will push through from sea to + sea, and wave one flag over the whole of South Africa, under one + Afrikander Government, if we can reckon on our Afrikander + brethren."[208] + + [Footnote 208: Cd. 109.] + +[Sidenote: The British reply.] + +Lord Salisbury's reply, sent from the Foreign Office on March 11th, is +as follows: + + "I have the honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram dated + the 5th of March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is + principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall + recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African + Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international + states,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a + conclusion. + + "In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her + Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then + were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some + months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African + Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain + very serious grievances under which British residents in the + South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these + negotiations the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of + Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the + latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding + reinforcements to the British garrisons of Capetown and Natal. No + infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had up + to that point taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two + days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an + insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty, and the + Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any + discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were + immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three + towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two + colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and + life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of + extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those + dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In + anticipation of these operations, the South African Republic had + been accumulating for many years past military stores on an + enormous scale, which by their character could only have been + intended for use against Great Britain. + + "Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon + the object with which these preparations were made. I do not + think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But + the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy, + has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront + an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and + the loss of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has + been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in + recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics. + + "In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the + position which was given to them, and the calamities which their + unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her + Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by + saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence + either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free + State." + +[Sidenote: Conventions to be annulled.] + +This reply has been cited at length for two reasons. In the first +place it affords a concise and weighty statement of the British case +against the Republics, and, in the second, it contains a specific and +reasoned declaration of the central decision of the Salisbury Cabinet, +against which the efforts both of the Dutch party in the Cape and of +the friends of the Boers in England continued to be directed, until +the controversy was closed by the surrender of the republican leaders +at Vereeniging. In the Cape Colony the cry of "conciliation" was +raised to cloak the gross appearance of a movement which was, in fact, +a direct co-operation with the enemy. And the same specious word was +adopted in England, so soon as the strain of the war had begun to make +itself felt in the constituencies, as a decent flag under which the +party opponents of the Unionist Government in general could join +forces with the traditional friends of the Boers and other convinced +opponents of Imperial consolidation. The decision of the Salisbury +Cabinet not to restore the system of the Conventions, which was in +fact the decision of the great mass of the British people both at home +and over-sea, was not reversed. It was confirmed in the House of +Commons by 208 votes against 52 on July 25th, 1900, and by the verdict +of the country in the General Election which followed.[209] But the +political agitation by which it was sought to reverse this decision +was none the less injurious alike to the Boer and British peoples, +since it acted as a powerful incentive to the republican leaders to +continued struggle which, except for the illusions created by this +agitation, they would have recognised as hopeless in itself and +unjustified by any prospect of military success. In both cases the +effect of the agitation was the same: the war was unnecessarily +prolonged--intentionally by the Afrikander nationalists, and +unintentionally by Lord (then Mr.) Courtney, Mr. Morley, Mr. Bryce, +and other opponents in England of the annexation of the Republics. + + [Footnote 209: The Unionist party was returned to power with + a slightly decreased majority--130 as against 150. But this + loss of seats was counterbalanced by the consideration that + it is unusual for the same Government to be entrusted with a + second period of office by a democratic electorate.] + +[Sidenote: The 'Conciliation' movement.] + +The Presidents had demanded the recognition of the independence of the +Republics and a free pardon for the Cape rebels as the price of peace. +The Afrikander nationalists at once began to co-operate with the +Republics in the endeavour to wrest these terms from the British +Government. Mr. Schreiner, as we have seen, had already incurred Mr. +Hofmeyr's displeasure by allowing the Cape Government to render +assistance to the Imperial authorities in the prosecution of the war. +The breach thus created between the Prime Minister and Sir Richard +(then Mr.) Solomon, on the one hand, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. Merriman, +and Mr. Sauer, who shared the views of the Bond, on the other, was, +rapidly widened by the "conciliation" meetings held throughout the +Colony by the Afrikander nationalists in support of the "peace +overtures" of the Presidents. The British population at the Cape was +quick to realise the insidious and fatal character of the +"conciliation" movement thus inaugurated by the Afrikander +nationalists. The universal alarm and indignation to which it gave +rise among the loyalists of both nationalities found expression in the +impassioned speech which Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes delivered at +the Municipal Hall of Claremont[210] on March 30th, 1900. The purpose +of the meeting was to allow the British subjects thus assembled to +record their approval of Lord Salisbury's reply to the Republics, and +their conviction that "the incorporation of these States within the +dominions of the Queen could alone secure peace, prosperity, and +public freedom throughout South Africa." In supporting this +resolution, Sir James Rose Innes said: + + [Footnote 210: A suburb of Capetown.] + + "This question of permanent peace is the key-stone of the whole + matter, because, I take it, we none of us want to see another war + of this kind. We do not want to see the misery and the suffering + and the loss which a war of this kind entails. We do not want to + see our sandy plains drenched with the best blood of England + again, fighting against white men in this country. We do not want + to see the flower of colonial manhood shot down on the plains of + the Orange Free State and the Karroo, and neither do we want to + see brave men, born in South Africa, dying in heaps, dying for + what we know is a hopeless ideal. Therefore we say, 'In Heaven's + name give us peace! Have a settlement, but make no settlement + which shall not be calculated, as far as human foresight can + provide, to secure a permanent peace.'" + +These were strong words, and their significance was heightened by the +well-known independence of Sir James Innes's political outlook. + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner at Bloemfontein.] + +A fortnight later Lord Milner declared his mind on the same question. +Both the occasion and the speech are of special interest. The High +Commissioner had just returned from a fortnight at the front. On March +19th he left Capetown in company with Sir Richard Solomon for the +north-eastern districts of the Colony, which, having rebelled in +November, had just been reduced to order by General Brabant and the +"Colonial Division," when the Free State invaders had been drawn off +by Lord Roberts's advance. After a week in the Colony, Lord Milner +travelled on by rail to Bloemfontein, which he reached on the 27th. It +was a stimulating and suggestive moment. He was now the guest of the +British Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency, where, just ten months +ago, as the guest of President Steyn, he had met Paul Krueger for the +first time. The little Free State capital, then wrapped in its +accustomed quietude, was now filled with the tumultuous presence of a +great army. But, complete as was the revolution accomplished by Lord +Roberts's advance, there were signs that the Boer was dying hard, even +if he were not coming to life again. On the 30th a disquieting +engagement was fought at Karree Siding, and on the 31st de Wet dealt +his second shrewd blow at Sannah's Post. + +With this experience of the actualities of war, Lord Milner, leaving +Bloemfontein on April 2nd, had returned to Capetown. On the 12th he +was presented with an appreciative address, signed by all, except one, +of the Nonconformist ministers of religion resident in and around +Capetown, in which personal affection for himself and approval of his +policy were expressed. The action of these men was altogether +exceptional. It was justified by the circumstance that in England Lord +Milner's policy had been subjected to the bitterest criticism in +quarters where Nonconformist influence was predominant. Not only to +Lord Courtney, but to other Liberal friends and associates, the High +Commissioner had become a "lost mind." To the Afrikander nationalists +he was "the enemy"; the efforts which had barely sufficed to keep the +administrative machinery of a British colony at the disposal of the +Imperial Government were represented as the unconstitutional acts of a +tyrannical proconsul; having ruthlessly exposed the aspirations of the +Afrikander nationalists he was now to become the destroyer of the Boer +nation. The personal note in the address was, therefore, both +instructive and welcome, and it elicited a response in which the charm +of a calm and generous nature shines through an unalterable +determination to know and do the right: + + "As regards myself personally, I cannot but feel it is a great + source of strength at a trying time to be assured of the + confidence and approval of the men I see before me, and of all + whom they represent. You refer to my having to encounter + misrepresentation and antagonism. I do not wish to make too much + of that. I have no doubt been exposed to much criticism and some + abuse. There has, I sometimes think, been an exceptional display + of mendacity at my expense. But this is the fate of every public + man who is forced by circumstances into a somewhat prominent + position in a great crisis. And, after all, praise and blame have + a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give them + time. + + "I remember when I left England for South Africa three years ago, + it was amidst a chorus of eulogy so excessive that it made me + feel thoroughly uncomfortable. To protest would have been + useless: it would only have looked like affectation. So I just + placed the surplus praise to my credit, so to speak, as something + to live on in the days which I surely knew must come sooner or + later, if I did my duty, when I would meet with undeserved + censure. And certainly I have had to draw on that account rather + heavily during the last nine months. But there is still a balance + on the right side which, thanks to you and others, is now once + more increasing. So I cannot pose as a martyr, and, what is more + important, I cannot complain of any want of support. No man, + placed as I have been in a position of singular embarrassment, + exposed to bitter attacks to which he could not reply, and unable + to explain his conduct even to his own friends, has ever had more + compensation to be thankful for than I have had in the constant, + devoted, forbearing support and confidence of all those South + Africans, whether in this Colony, in Natal, or in the Republics, + whose sympathy is with the British Empire. + +[Sidenote: Never again.] + + "In the concluding paragraph of your address you refer in weighty + and well-considered language to the conditions which you deem + necessary for the future peace and prosperity of South Africa, + and for the ultimate harmony and fusion of its white races. I can + only say that I entirely agree with the views expressed in that + paragraph. The longer the struggle lasts, the greater the + sacrifices which it involves, the stronger must surely be the + determination of all of us to achieve a settlement which will + render the repetition of this terrible scourge impossible. 'Never + again,' must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. It + is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, not from any + desire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, enemy, that we + desire that the settlement shall be no patchwork and no + compromise; that it shall leave no room for misunderstanding, no + opportunity for intrigue, for the revival of impossible + ambitions, or the accumulation of enormous armaments. President + Krueger has said that he wants no more Conventions, and I + entirely agree with him. A compromise of that sort is unfair to + everybody. If there is one thing of which, after recent + experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital + interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present + enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that + there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political + systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided + must be one country. To agree to a compromise which would leave + any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity: it would be + weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty--ingratitude to the heroic + dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations. + + "But when I say that, do not think that I wish to join in the + outcry, at present so prevalent, against the fine old virtue of + magnanimity. I believe in it as much as ever I did, and there is + plenty of room for it in the South Africa of to-day. We can show + it by a frank recognition of what is great and admirable in the + character of our enemies; by not maligning them as a body because + of the sins of the few, or perhaps even of many, individuals. We + can show it by not crowing excessively over our victories, and by + not thinking evil of every one who, for one reason or another, is + unable to join in our legitimate rejoicings. We can show it by + striving to take care that our treatment of those who have been + guilty of rebellion, while characterised by a just severity + towards the really guilty parties, should be devoid of any spirit + of vindictiveness, or of race-prejudice. We can show it, above + all, when this dire struggle is over, by proving by our acts that + they libelled us who said that we fought for gold or any material + advantage, and that the rights and privileges which we have + resolutely claimed for ourselves we are prepared freely to extend + to others, even to those who have fought against us, whenever + they are prepared loyally to accept them."[211] + + [Footnote 211: Cd. 261.] + +It is the third of three critical utterances of which each is +summarised, as it were, in a single luminous phrase. To the Cape Dutch +he spoke at Graaf Reinet, after their own manner: "Of course you are +loyal!" To England, on the Uitlander's behalf, he wrote: "The case for +intervention is overwhelming." And now he gathered the whole long +lesson of the war into the two words, "never again." + +[Sidenote: British policy.] + +A month later Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham (May 11th), made +a general statement of the nature of the settlement upon which the +British Government had determined. The separate existence of the +Republics, "constantly intriguing as they had done with foreign +nations, constantly promoting agitation and disaffection in our own +colonies," was to be tolerated no longer; but the "individual +liberties" of the Boers were to be preserved. After the war was over a +period of Crown Colony government would be necessary; "but," he added, +"as soon as it is safe and possible it will be the desire and the +intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce these States into +the great circle of self-governing colonies." In making this +pronouncement Mr. Chamberlain referred in terms of just severity to +the injurious influence which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as the +official leader of the Liberal party, had exercised upon the +diplomatic contest of the preceding year. At the precise period when a +word might have been worth anything to the cause of peace, Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, he said-- + + "had again and again declaimed his own opinion that not only was + war out of the question, but that military preparations of any + kind were altogether unnecessary. I do not speak of the wisdom + which dictated such an expression of opinion," Mr. Chamberlain + continued, "although he repeated that statement three days before + the ultimatum was delivered, and a week before the invasion of + Natal took place. I do not speak, therefore, of his foresight. + But what is to be said of the patriotism of a man who is not a + single individual but who represents a great party by virtue of + his position--although he does not represent it by virtue of his + opinion--what is to be said of such a man who, at such a time, + should countermine the endeavours for peace of Her Majesty's + Government?" + +And in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain warned his fellow-countrymen +"against the efforts which would be made by the politicians to snatch +from them the fruits of a victory which would be won by their +soldiers; and in particular against the campaign of misrepresentation +which had been commenced already by Mr. Paul, the Stop-the-War +Committee, and the other bodies which were so lavish with what they +were pleased to call their 'accurate information.'" + +[Sidenote: Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.] + +Had Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seen fit to profit by the experience +of the past, the whole of the suffering and loss of the next year and +a half of wanton hostilities, in all human probability, would have +been avoided. But Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke was disregarded. The +senseless and unnatural alliance between the Afrikander nationalists +and the Liberal Opposition was renewed. It is quite true that the +official leader of the Opposition, in speaking at Glasgow on June 7th, +two days after Lord Roberts had occupied Pretoria, declared that, in +respect of the settlement, "one broad principle" must be laid down-- + + "the British Imperial power, which has hitherto been supreme in + effect in South Africa, must in future be supreme in form as well + as in effect, and this naturally carries with it the point which + is sometimes put in the foreground, namely, that there must be no + possibility that any such outbreak of hostilities as we have been + witnessing shall again occur.... The two conquered States must, + in some form or under some condition, become States of the + British Empire." + +But when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to inform his audience +how this was to be done, he used expressions which not only robbed his +original statement of all significance as an indication of British +unanimity, but conveyed a direct intimation to the Afrikander +nationalists that their endeavours to frustrate the declared objects +of the Unionist Government would receive the support and encouragement +of the Opposition in England. His words were: + + "We need have no doubt how it is to be done. By applying our + Liberal principles, the Liberal principles from which the + strength of the Empire has been derived, and on which it depends. + Let us apply our Liberal principles, and whether our party be in + a majority, or in a minority, I think that it is well in our + power to secure that these principles shall be applied. [The + General Election was imminent.] Let us restore as early as + possible, and let us maintain, those rights of self-government + which give not only life and vigour, but contentment and loyalty + to every colony which enjoys them...." + +"Liberal principles," when applied to a given administrative problem, +as Mr. Chamberlain took occasion to point out (June 19th), meant, for +practical purposes, the opinions which prominent members of the +Liberal party were known to hold upon the matter in question. Lord +(then Mr.) Courtney was for autonomy--"the re-establishment of the +independence of the two Republics." Mr. Bryce advocated "the +establishment of two protected States, which would have a sham +independence of not much advantage to them for any practical or useful +purpose, but very dangerous to us." And then there was Mr. Morley. Now +Mr. Morley, only a week before, at Oxford (June 10th), had condemned +not only the war, but by implication, the rejection of President +Krueger's illusory Franchise Bill. + +[Sidenote: Mr. John Morley.] + + "I assert," said Mr. Morley, "that the evils which have resulted + from the war immeasurably transcend the evils with which it was + proposed to deal.... I abhor the whole transaction of the war. I + think in many ways it is an irreparable situation. We have done + a great wrong--a wrong of which I believe there is scarcely any + Englishman living who will not bitterly repent."[212] + + [Footnote 212: Mr. Morley has the doubtful merit of + consistency. As recently as April 27th, 1906, he alluded to + the South African War as "that delusive and guilty war," in + an address to the Eighty Club. According to _The Times_ + report this expression was received with cheers.] + +With these words fresh in his memory, Mr. Chamberlain continued: + + "Is Mr. Morley a Liberal? I do not know in that case what would + become of the new territories if his principles were applied. But + this I do know--that in that case you would have immediately to + get rid of Sir Alfred Milner, who is the one great official in + South Africa who has shown from the first a true grasp of the + situation; and you would have also to get rid of the Colonial + Secretary, which would not, perhaps, matter."[213] + + [Footnote 213: It may perhaps be objected that some credit + should have been allowed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in + view of the fact that a sum of L41,807,400 was voted in + Committee of Supply in the House of Commons for military + requirements, practically without discussion, within four and + a half hours on June 19th, 1900. This objection is answered + by the words used by the Duke of Devonshire on the same day: + "I am afraid I must tell Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that he + is not likely to receive from us any recognition, either + effusive or otherwise, of the patriotism of his party. It is + quite true that, as he took credit to himself and his + friends, they have not offered any opposition to our demands + for supplies or to the military measures which it has been + found necessary for the Government to take; but the reason + for that prudent abstinence is not very far to seek. Sir + Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his friends knew very well that + any factious opposition to the granting of these supplies + would have brought down upon them the almost unanimous + condemnation of the whole people; and Sir Henry + Campbell-Bannerman is much too shrewd and sensible a man to + risk the danger of committing for his party an act of + political suicide."--Address to Women's Liberal Unionist + Association.] + +And so in 1900--after the Raid, after the long diplomatic conflict, +after the sudden revelation of the military strength of the +Republics, after the ambitions of the Afrikander nationalists had been +unmasked, and after the Dutch subjects of the Queen had risen in +arms--the Liberal friends of the South African Dutch set themselves to +do again what they had done in 1880. Just as then President Krueger +wrote,[214] on behalf of himself and his Afrikander allies, to Lord +(then Mr.) Courtney: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere ... will be +useful.... We have done our duty, and used all legitimate influence to +cause the [Federation] proposals to fail"; so now these Boer +sympathisers prepared to work hand in hand with the Afrikander +nationalists in their endeavour to secure the "fall" of Lord Milner, +and to cause the Annexation proposals to "fail." Happily the analogy +ends here. Upon the "anvil" of Lord Milner the "hammers" of the +enemies of the Empire were worn out--_Tritantur mallei, remanet +incus_. + + [Footnote 214: June 26th, 1880, C. 2,655.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT + + +The correspondence forwarded to the Colonial Office during the first +half of the year 1900 by Lord Milner, and presented to the House of +Commons in time for the Settlement debate of July 25th, furnishes a +complete record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement. The whole +of this interesting and significant collection of documents is worthy of +attention; but all that can be done here is to direct the notice of the +reader to one or two of its more salient features--features which +illustrate the extraordinary condition of the Cape Colony, and explain +how the disaffection of the Dutch subjects of the Crown was to be first +aggravated, and then used as a means of saving the independence of the +Republics. The position taken up by the Bond at the end of January +(1900) in view of Mr. Schreiner's gradual conversion to the side of the +Imperial Government, is sufficiently indicated in the resolution +prepared for submission to the annual Congress, to which reference has +been already[215] made. It was, in effect, a condemnation not only of +the British Government, but of the Cape Government also, in so far as it +had co-operated with the Imperial authorities, and a determination to +prevent the war from being carried to a logical and successful +conclusion by the incorporation of the Boer Republics into the system of +British South Africa. The annual Congress, at which these opinions were +to be affirmed, was announced to be held at Somerset East, on March 8th. +Lord Milner, however, represented to Mr. Schreiner that it was very +undesirable that such a demonstration should take place; and, through +Mr. Schreiner's influence, the Congress was postponed. But the Prime +Minister, in undertaking to use his influence with the Bond to prevent a +denunciation of the policy of the Imperial Government at so critical a +period, expressed the hope that the loyalists on their side would +refrain from any public demonstration of an opposite character. + + [Footnote 215: See p. 349.] + +This abstinence from agitation, which was obviously desirable in the +public interests at a time of intense political excitement, by no +means suited the leaders of the Bond. _Ons Land_, in commenting upon +the postponement of the Congress, incidentally reveals the real +consideration which made it worth while for the Bond to promote an +agitation of this kind. The Bond organ regrets that the Congress has +been postponed. And why? + + "It is said that the [South African] League would have held a + Congress had the Bond Congress been held. We have nothing to do + with what the League does or does not do; as a matter of fact, + its opinion has already been published in the Imperial + Blue-books. We were of opinion that it would have been the duty + of the Afrikander party to express itself at the Congress in + unmistakable terms, and resolutely, in order thereby to maintain + its true position and strengthen the hands of its friends in + England who have courageously and with self-sacrifice striven for + the good and just cause."[216] + + [Footnote 216: Cd. 261.] + +This, then, was the real object of the agitation--to "strengthen the +hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England." The writer +of this article suggests, however, that there is still a prospect that +the "good cause" may be promoted, after all, in the way which he +desires. + +[Sidenote: Origin of the movement.] + +This prospect was speedily realised. With characteristic astuteness, +the Bond leaders discovered a method by which their object could be +achieved without exposing themselves to the reproach of "stirring up +strife." The meetings were to be held, not as Bond meetings, but as +"conciliation" meetings. The manner in which the machinery of the +conciliation movement was originally set in motion will appear from +the following telegram, which President Krueger sent to President +Steyn, on January 20th--that is, a little more than a month before the +Bond Congress was postponed: + + "A certain E. T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom Dr. + Leyds formerly wrote that he had done much in Holland to work up + the peace memorial to Queen Victoria, has come here, as he says, + from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range themselves openly + on our side, to make propaganda in the Cape Colony, provided an + official declaration is given that the Republics only desire to + secure complete independence. He wished that I should write a + letter to Queen Victoria, but this I refused, and thought it + desirable that I should write a letter to him personally, in + which an answer is given to his question. He thinks that a great + propaganda can be made in the Cape Colony, whereby influence can + be brought to bear again on the English people and the world. I + myself do not expect much result, but think that a letter can do + good, and should be glad to have your opinion and observations as + soon as possible."[217] + + [Footnote 217: Cd. 261.] + +This telegram, one of the many documents found at Bloemfontein upon +its occupation by Lord Roberts, is supplemented by the further facts +disclosed by the investigations of the Concessions Commission, that a +sum of L1,000 was advanced to Mr. Hargrove by the manager of the +Netherlands Railway on February 3rd, 1900, and that this loan, paid in +specie, was "debited to the account 'Political Situation,' to be +hereafter arranged with the Government." The purposes for which Mr. +Hargrove secured this large sum are stated in the following question +and answer: + +[Sidenote: Mr. Hargrove's L1,000.] + + Q. 591. "Did he ask for money to carry out this object [_i.e._ to + stop the war on the assurance that the Boers wanted nothing more + than their independence]?" + + MR. J. VAN KRETSCHMAR, General Manager of the Netherlands South + African Railway Company: "Yes; he said he had travelling expenses + to defray, a lot of publications to issue, and books to be + written, and he asked for money for these purposes."[218] + + [Footnote 218: Cd. 624. The memorandum also noted that the + L1,000 was "paid at request of F. W. Reitz" (the State + Secretary). In the Concessions Commission the following + letter is published: + + "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA. + _7 April, 1899._ + + TO VAN KRETSCHMAR VAN VEEN, ESQ., + DIRECTOR OF THE N.Z.A. RY. CO. + + HON'D. SIR,--With reference to a letter of his Excellency the + Ambassador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr. + Statham and the latter's request for an assistance of L300 + for furniture and such like, I have the honour to inform you + confidentially that the Executive Council has resolved to + grant this gentleman Statham an amount of L150. As, according + to previous agreement, a yearly allowance is paid to Mr. + Statham by your Company, I have the honour to request you + kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted + him. His Excellency the Ambassador is likewise being informed + of this decision of the Executive Council.--I have, etc., + + J. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_." + (Q. 608.) + + Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor + to those Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer + cause. His allowance, however, had ceased before the war + broke out.] + +Three months later President Krueger's telegram was laid before the two +ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's +request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating +or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it +contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove +had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner +which he appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr. Merriman +himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To this +letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately: + + "This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask + you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of + mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear + from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of + the cab which waits?..." + +In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and +presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr. +Hargrove wrote: + + "Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to + Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any + shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not + speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your + name in this way: I told President Krueger of a conversation I had + had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his attitude + would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their + forces from colonial territory on the condition that their + independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in + those circumstances he would, in his personal capacity, most + certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although + he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would + do the same." + +Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President +Krueger's telegram is due to the circumstance that it was probably +"dictated in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and contained +a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk" +translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch. + +Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr. +Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more +intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,[219] he had +been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's +"well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was +immediately followed by the rebellion of that district." + + [Footnote 219: In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For + the circumstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the + occasion mentioned see note, p. 287.] + +[Sidenote: The Graaf Reinet congress.] + +This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the +Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that +"the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be +strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May +30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British +Empire," he said,[220] "were not the Boers, but those who had set up +the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to +renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in +their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the +following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to +continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not +propose to rely exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It resolved +to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple truth as +they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland. + + [Footnote 220: As reported in _The Cape Times_, Cd. 261.] + +There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official +correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State +which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated +absolutely President Krueger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come +here [_i.e._ to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In +view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the +letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded +to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be +sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert +Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of +South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of _The South African +News_--that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed +before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views +of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question _The South +African News_ rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but +none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had +surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on +parole; by publishing stories of imaginary Boer victories; by +eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the L1,000 from the +Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent and +vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr. +Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and +condemned to a term of imprisonment.[221] + + [Footnote 221: See p. 477.] + +[Sidenote: Mischievous effects.] + +The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a +passage in the despatch[222] which covers the transmission of the +newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After +stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the +postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the +leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public +demonstration of their opinions, he writes: + + [Footnote 222: Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.] + + "There was a truce of God on both sides. Then came the + 'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to + end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous + than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of + course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would + have been useless--and, as a matter of fact, I did not + attempt--to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side. + Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to + pronounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to + give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government + and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these + meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the + tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of + violent things have been said, and a certain amount of + unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those + [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary + provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been + the case." + +That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence +in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under +martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in +sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the +Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of +promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the +part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in +which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political +co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal +party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew +that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and +sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave +his adherence left him in no doubt on this point. + + "The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress, + "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple + aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in, + Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics + and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged + from generation to generation." + +To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to invite +rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of the +Boers, and to embarrass the British authorities, both civil and +military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the +Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the +Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in +this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same +results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander +nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may +be left to form his own judgment. + +[Sidenote: Comrades or dupes.] + +This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists +the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and +to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa, +was the co-operation of these Englishmen--whether comrades or +dupes--who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense +sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was +natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord +Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to +take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the +Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole. + + "If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are + never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal, + why should they make such furious efforts to keep it up at the + present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations that the + Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor acquiesce, seems + to me to indicate a considerable and well-justified anxiety on + their part lest these terrible things should, after all, happen." + +But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British +soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and +Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and +enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th--May 1st), and +subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal, +considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of +the republican invaders and re-establishing British authority in the +districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of +these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of +the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the +treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr. +Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still +held the opinions of the Bond. + +[Sidenote: The punishment of rebels.] + +In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a +despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home +Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and +the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers +to give formal expression to their views upon the subjects to which +Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later Lord Milner +reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which Mr. Schreiner +and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for persons +indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be +impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a +special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature +of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner +wrote: + + "Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the + selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders, + whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose + punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the + remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound + policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious + Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation + of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their + good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except + those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to + their avocations."[223] + + [Footnote 223: Cd. 264.] + +The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions, +and the arguments by which they were supported--notably an appeal to +the "Canadian precedent"--were telegraphed to the Home Government, and +on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While the +people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling against +"those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's forces, +whether enemies or rebels"--did, in fact, desire that all racial +animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest possible +moment after the war was over--the "sentiments of both sides" must be +taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue from "the +rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels were +actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over than +those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain +"loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than the bad +results to be anticipated from any display of a revengeful policy on +the part of the loyalists. He continued: + + "Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of + Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an + obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two + policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of + future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be + indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful, + it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the + State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present + moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while + efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into + rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing + that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And + if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious + subjects are the mere tools of those who have deceived them, it + is important that these should be made aware individually that, + whatever their leaders may tell them, rebellion is a punishable + offence. + +[Sidenote: Clemency and justice.] + + "Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to + rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and + under martial law, the punishment of death might have been + inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty, + and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to + return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are + many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government + desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing + effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those + who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal + fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to + the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag, + firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not + guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly + waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined + themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information + or furnishing provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily + prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her + Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible, + drawn between these different classes. + + "Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting + for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they + would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the + expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission + which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated + by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to + schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion + under the various heads indicated above. It would be necessary + to decide beforehand how the different categories should then be + dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of course, be + brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by them. Might + not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be thereupon either + sentenced to a fine carrying with it disfranchisement, or + released on recognisances, to come up for judgment when called + upon (this also to involve disfranchisement), while 6 might be + subjected to disfranchisement alone? Her Majesty's Government + offer these as suggestions for the consideration of your + ministers. + + "In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a + general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that + they are of a highly controversial character, and it is + impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication + of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required. + Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which + they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one + not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white + population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and + which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of + justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races + are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the + third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the + action to be taken in such cases depends upon circumstances which + must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada + in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's + authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions + which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the + day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has + been adhesion to the Queen's enemies during war by those who + have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who have for a + generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In Canada the + insurrection was never a formidable one from a military point of + view; in the Cape it has added very largely to the cost and + difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and heavy loss to + Her Majesty's troops."[224] + + [Footnote 224: Cd. 264.] + +[Sidenote: The ministry divided.] + +This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels--moderate in the light +of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the +practice of foreign States--failed to commend itself to the Afrikander +Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers' +minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner +inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the +disfranchisement proposed was for life or for a period only; and +further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the +representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government +were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May +4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June +10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the +policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as +to the period of disfranchisement, he pointed out that-- + + "conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it + disfranchisement for life, and if the offenders were spared the + other and severer penalties of rebellion, justice seemed to + demand that they should suffer the full political penalty. + Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's + Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion." + +[Sidenote: Mr. Schreiner resigns.] + +On June 11th Lord Milner was informed by Mr. Schreiner that ministers +were hopelessly divided on the subject of the treatment of the rebels, +and that their differences could not be composed, and on the following +day he replied that, if he could not receive the support of a +unanimous Cabinet to which he, as Governor, was constitutionally +entitled, he would be compelled, in the discharge of his duty, to seek +it elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner's resignation, which was placed in Lord +Milner's hands on the next day, was followed by the appointment, on +June 18th, of a Progressive Ministry with Sir Gordon Sprigg as Prime +Minister and Sir James Rose Innes as Attorney-General. Mr. Schreiner, +in his memorandum of June 11th, had forwarded to Lord Milner documents +containing particulars of the individual views of the members of his +Cabinet. Mr. Solomon, the Attorney-General, was prepared to adopt a +policy in respect of the treatment of the rebels, and the machinery by +which that policy was to be carried out, which appeared to him to +involve nothing that would prevent "complete accord between Her +Majesty's Government and this Government on the question." And in this +view both Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Herholdt concurred. But the remaining +members of the Cabinet were entirely opposed to any policy other than +that of granting a general amnesty to all rebels except the "principal +offenders," and allowing these latter to be tried by the machinery of +justice already in existence--_i.e._ by Afrikander juries. The minutes +which they respectively addressed to the Prime Minister were bitter +invectives directed alike against the Home Government and Lord Milner. + + "We are asked," Mr. Merriman wrote, on his own and Mr. Sauer's + behalf, with reference to the suggestions of the Home Government, + "to deal with a number of men who have, at worst, taken up arms + in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous + war--a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist + what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly + spoken of as a crime.... These men, irrespective of class, we are + asked to put under a common political proscription, to deprive + them of their civil rights, and by so doing (in fact, this is the + main commendation of the measure to the "loyals") to deprive + their friends and kinsfolk, who have rendered the Colony yeoman + service at the most critical time, of that legitimate influence + which belongs to a majority. We are asked, in fact, to create a + class of political 'helots' in South Africa, where we are now + waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of + putting an end to a similar state of affairs." + +Of course, all this and much more might have been read at any time +since the war began in the columns of _The South African News_, but in +a minister's memorandum to the Prime Minister, and over the signature +"John X. Merriman," its naked hostility arrests the mind. Dr. Te +Water's memorandum, although much shorter than that of Mr. Merriman, +is even more outspoken. To him, the direct representative of the +republican nationalists in the Afrikander Cabinet, amnesty for the +rebels is the "sound and proper policy." And naturally, since in his +eyes the rebels themselves are-- + + "British subjects of Dutch extraction who, after vainly + endeavouring, by all possible constitutional means, to prevent + what they, in common with the rest of the civilised world, + believe to be an unjust and infamous war against their near + kinsmen, aided the Republics in the terrible struggle forced upon + them."[225] + + [Footnote 225: Cd. 264.] + +[Sidenote: A progressive ministry.] + +This is vitriol-throwing, but it is none the less significant. These +three men formed half of the six ministers to whom collectively, Lord +Milner, as Governor of the Cape Colony, had to look for advice during +the two critical years that the Afrikander party was in power. +Fortunately, in his capacity of High Commissioner for South Africa, he +was free to act without their advice, as the representative of the +Queen. Even so, his achievement is little less than marvellous. Aided +by Mr. Schreiner's pathetic sense of loyalty to the person of the +sovereign, he had kept the Cape Government outwardly true to its +allegiance. The long hours of patient remonstrance, the word-battles +from which the Prime Minister had risen sometimes white with +passionate resentment, had not been useless. By tact, by serenity of +disposition, by depth of conviction, and latterly by sheer force of +argument, Lord Milner had won Mr. Schreiner, not indeed to the side of +England, but at least to the side of that Empire-State of which +England was the head. With the Prime Minister went Sir Richard +Solomon, Mr. Herholdt, and one or two of the Afrikander rank and file. +Thus reinforced, the Progressives commanded a working majority in the +Legislative Assembly, and the ascendancy of the Afrikander party was +at an end. + +Apart from the secession of Mr. Schreiner and his immediate followers, +the Parliamentary strength of the Afrikander party was lessened by +another circumstance, to which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman referred +in the debate on the South African Settlement in the House of Commons +on July 25th. Certain members of the Cape Parliament, said the leader +of the Liberal Opposition, had been arrested for high treason, with +the result that the Afrikander party was deprived of their votes, and +the balance of power between that party and the Progressive party was +upset. And he protested against this manner of turning an Afrikander +majority into a minority. The reply which these remarks on the part of +this friend of the Afrikander party in England drew from the +Government is instructive: + + "May I remind the right honourable gentleman," said Mr. Balfour, + "that the balance of parties was disturbed by another and + different cause on which he has made no protest? Some members of + that Parliament, not sharing the views of those who are + imprisoned, are now fighting at the front and risking their lives + in the defence of the Empire. Their party is deprived of their + services in the Cape Parliament, and I should have thought that + this would have affected the right honourable gentleman much more + than the absence of men who, under any circumstances, must be + supposed to be under the darkest suspicion as to their view and + policy respecting the country to which they owe allegiance." + +The Cape Parliament met under the new Ministry in July, and the chief +business of the session, which lasted until the middle of October, was +the passing of the Treason Bill. On July 9th Lord Milner was able to +inform Mr. Chamberlain (by telegram) that the Bill had been prepared, +and to indicate the nature of its main provisions. These were: (1) An +indemnity for acts done under martial law; (2) the establishment of a +Special Court to try cases in which the Attorney-General might decide +to indict any person for high treason, such cases to be tried without +a jury; (3) the establishment of a Special Commission to "deal with +rebels not so indicted and to punish all found guilty with +disfranchisement for five years from the date of conviction"; and (4) +the legalisation of the already existing Compensation Commission. In a +despatch dated July 26th--the day after the Settlement debate in the +House of Commons--Mr. Chamberlain replied at length to the arguments +put forward by the Schreiner Ministry in favour of a general amnesty, +and exposed in particular the historical inaccuracy of the appeal to +the "Canadian precedent." At the same time he stated that Her +Majesty's Government, while they could not be a consenting party to a +policy condoning adhesion to the enemy in the field, had no doubt that +"such a measure of penalty as the mass of loyal opinion in the Colony +considered adequate would meet with their concurrence." That is to +say, the proposal of the Home Government for disfranchisement for life +was not pressed, but was abandoned in favour of the lenient penalty +originally proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, independently of any +consideration of the views of the Colonial Office, and now adopted by +the Progressive Ministry. + +[Sidenote: The treason bill.] + +In spite of its leniency, the Treason Bill met with the violent and +protracted resistance of the Afrikander party in the Legislative +Assembly. The opportunity thus afforded for the delivery of fierce +invectives against the Imperial authorities was utilised to the full, +and the fires of disaffection lighted by the "Conciliation" meetings +were kindled anew into the second and more disastrous conflagration +that culminated in the proceedings of the Worcester Conference +(December 6th). In the Cape Parliamentary Reports the picture of this +nightmare session is to be found faithfully presented in all its ugly +and grotesque details. Two facts will serve to show to what a degree +the members of the Legislative Assembly of this British colony had +identified themselves with the cause of the enemy. The first is the +circumstance that it was a common practice of the Afrikander members +to refer in Parliament to the military successes of the Boers with +pride as "our" victories. The second is the fact that Mr. Sauer, only +three months ago a minister of the Crown, declared, in opposing the +second reading of the Bill, that "a time would come when there would +be very few Dutchmen who would not blush when they told their children +that they had not helped their fellow-countrymen in their hour of +need."[226] Morally, though not legally, the Afrikander members had +gone over to the enemy no less than the rebels who had taken up arms +against their sovereign. This was the "loyalty" of the Bond. + + [Footnote 226: _Cape Times_, August 23rd, 1900.] + +[Sidenote: Milner visits the colonies.] + +The Treason Bill was promulgated, under the title of "The Indemnity +and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," on October 12th. On the same day +Lord Milner left Capetown for a brief visit to the Transvaal and +Orange River Colony. The intention of the Home Government to place the +administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies in his +hands had been made known to him informally; and it was obviously +desirable, therefore, that he should acquaint himself with the actual +state of affairs as soon as possible. After a somewhat adventurous +journey through the Orange River Colony, he reached Pretoria on the +15th, and remained at the capital until the 22nd. He then proceeded to +Johannesburg, where he spent the next three days (October 22nd to +25th). At both places he made provisional arrangements, in +consultation with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, for the early +establishment of so much of the machinery of civil administration as +the exigencies of the military situation permitted. Leaving +Johannesburg on the 25th, the High Commissioner stopped for the night +at Kroonstad, _en route_ for Bloemfontein. On the morning following he +woke up to find the train still motionless, since the line had been +cut by the Boers--an almost daily occurrence at this period of the +war. After a few hours, however, the journey was resumed; but the High +Commissioner's train was preceded by an armoured train as far as +Smalldeel, from which point it ran without escort to Bloemfontein, +where he remained until November 1st. Here, in addition to making the +necessary arrangements for the beginning of civil administration in +the Orange River Colony, Lord Milner had the satisfaction of +inaugurating the career of the South African Constabulary under the +command of Major-General Baden-Powell. The departure from Bloemfontein +was delayed for a few hours by the destruction of the span of a +railway bridge by the Boers; but at 12 o'clock the High +Commissioner's train, again preceded by its armoured companion, was +able to resume its journey southwards. In the course of the following +day (November 2nd) the English mail, going northwards from Capetown, +was met, and among other communications which Lord Milner then +received was the despatch of October 18th enclosing the commissions +under which he was appointed to administer the new colonies upon Lord +Roberts's approaching return to England. + +Lord Milner arrived at Capetown on November 3rd. During his three +weeks' absence the situation in the Cape Colony had changed for the +worse. After the Treason Bill debates the anti-British propaganda, +still carried on under the grotesque pretence of promoting +"conciliation," had taken a different and more sinister form. To their +denunciation of the Home Government and its treatment of the +Republics, the Afrikander nationalists now added slander and abuse of +the British and colonial troops in South Africa. In order to +understand how such calumnies were possible in the face of the +singular humanity with which the military operations of the Imperial +troops had been conducted, a brief reference to the course of the war +is necessary. The change from regular to guerilla warfare initiated by +the Boer leaders in the later months of this year (1900), and the +consequent withdrawal of British garrisons from insecurely held +districts both in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, were +accompanied by the return to arms of many burghers who, on taking the +oath of neutrality, had been allowed to resume their civil +occupations. This breach of faith, whether voluntary or compulsory, +compelled the British military commanders to adopt measures of greater +severity in the operations undertaken for the reconquest of the +revolted areas. The punishment inflicted upon the inhabitants of such +areas, especially those adjoining the colonial border, although +merciful in comparison with the penalties actually incurred under the +laws of war by those who, having surrendered, resumed their arms, was +considerably more rigorous than the treatment to which the republican +Dutch had been originally subjected. This legitimate and necessary +increase of severity, displayed by the British commanders in districts +where the burghers had surrendered, and then taken up arms a second, +or even a third time, was the sole basis of fact upon which the +Afrikander nationalists in the Cape Colony founded the vast volume of +imaginary outrage and inhumanity on the part of the Imperial troops +which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was held subsequently to have +endorsed by accusing the British Government of carrying on the war in +South Africa by "methods of barbarism."[227] + + [Footnote 227: June 14th; 1901 (Holborn Restaurant, and + elsewhere later). "Whatever Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may + think or say, the German nation may think or say."--The + _Vossische Zeitung._] + +[Sidenote: Libels on the British troops.] + +The weapon now adopted for the anti-British campaign was the +circulation through the Bond Press, Dutch and English, of accounts of +cruel or infamous acts alleged to have been committed by British +soldiers, and described with every detail calculated to arouse the +passionate resentment of the colonial Dutch. There is only one way in +which the reader can be brought to understand the wantonly false and +wholly disgraceful character of these libels. It is to place before +his eyes the literal translation of two examples, printed in Dutch in +_The Worcester Advertiser_ of November 23rd, 1900; that is to say, in +anticipation of the People's Congress, which was to be held less than +a fortnight later (December 6th) at the little town in the Western +Province so named. The article is headed: "Dreadful Murders +perpetrated on Farmers, Women, and Children, near Boshoff: + +[Sidenote: Two examples.] + + "... This unfortunate man [a Boer prisoner] left behind him his + dear wife and four children. One or two days after his departure + there came a couple of heroes in the house of the unfortunate + woman, locked the doors and set fire to the curtains. The woman, + awfully frightened by it, was in a cruel way handled by these + ruffians, and compelled to make known where the guns and + ammunition were hidden. The poor woman, surrounded by her dear + children (who were from time to time pushed back by these + soldiers), answered that she could swear before the holy God that + there was not a single gun or cartridge or anything of that sort + hidden on that farm. In the meantime the curtains were destroyed + by the smoke and flames to ashes. The house, at least, was not + attacked by the flames, but the low, mean lot put at the four + corners of the house a certain amount of dynamite, to destroy it + in this way. + + "The heroic warrior and commander over a portion of the civilised + (?) British troops knocked with great force at the door of the + house--where still the poor wife and children were upon their + knees praying to the Heavenly Father for deliverance--saying, 'I + give you ten minutes' time to acquaint me and point out to me + where the weapons and ammunition are hidden, and if you do not + comply I shall make the house and all fly into the air.' The poor + wife fell upon her knees before the cruel man; prayed the cruel + man to spare her and her children, where God was her witness + there was nothing of the kind on the farm, neither was there + anything stowed away in the house. + + "Standing before him, as if deprived of her senses, [was] the + poor wife with her four innocent children, and when the ten + minutes had expired house and all were blown to atoms with + dynamite, and [there were] laid in ruins, the bodies of the + deplorable five. May the good God receive their souls with + Him!... + + "A wife of a Transvaal Boer (who is still in the field, fighting + for his freedom and right) was lodging with one of her relations, + when, two days later, after she had given birth to a baby boy, + she was visited by seven warriors, or so-called Tommy Atkins; the + young urchin was taken away from its mother by its two legs, by + the so-called noble British, and his head battered in against the + bed-post until it had breathed its last, and thereupon thrown out + by the door as if it was the carcase of a cat or dog. Then these + damn wretches began their play with this poor and weak woman, who + only 48 hours before was delivered of a child. The poor wife was + treated so low and debauched by this seven that she, after a few + hours, gave up the spirit, and like her child [was] murdered in + the most dissolute manner.... Can we longer allow that our + fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, relatives, yes, our + children, are murdered by these coward and common murderers? or + has not the time yet arrived to prevent this civilised nation, or + to punish them for their atrocities?"[228] + + [Footnote 228: As translated in Blue-book, Cd. 547. Mr. de + Jong, the editor of the paper, was prosecuted (and convicted) + for the publication of this and another similar article + (December 28th).] + +On November 26th _The South African News_ published the translation of +a letter to the Press, written by a member of the Legislative +Assembly, in view of the same meeting: + + "I am yet glad that another People's Congress will be held. + + "It is our duty to speak now; it is more than time to protest, as + British subjects, against the extermination of defenceless women + and children.... + + "But, in Heaven's name, let the Congress be a People's Congress + in reality. Let no one or other stay away for one or other small + difficulty. Let members of Parliament, clergymen, yes, every man, + old or young, be present at Worcester on the 6th of December + next. Let them turn up in numbers. Let us use our rights as + British subjects in a worthy and decided manner. Let us at least + adopt three petitions or resolutions: (1) Praying Her Majesty, + our Gracious Queen, to make an end to the burning of homes and + the ill-treatment of helpless women and children; if not, that + they may be murdered at once, rather than die slowly by hunger + and torture; (2) a petition in which it be urged that the war + should be ended, and the Republics allowed to retain their + independence; and finally, a pledge that those who do not wish + to sign these petitions will no longer be supported by us in any + way. + + "[No shopkeeper, attorney, doctor, master, or any one--no + victuals, meat, bread, meal, sheep, oxen, horses, vegetables, + fruit whatsoever will he sell to the jingoes until the wrong is + righted and compensated.] + + "The dam is full. Our nation cannot, dare not, say with Cain, 'Am + I my brother's keeper?' There must be a way out for the + overflowing water. Disloyal deeds and talk are wrong. But if we, + as a nation, as one man, earnestly and decisively lay our hands + to the plough in a constitutional manner, and are determined, I + trust, through God's help, we shall--yes, we must--win." + +The passage placed in brackets, in which this member of the Cape +Parliament urges that all who may refuse to sign the two "petitions" +should be rigorously boycotted, was omitted--without any indication of +omission--by _The South African News_. _Ons Land_, on the other hand, +expressed approval of the letter as it stood.[229] + + [Footnote 229: Cd. 547.] + +[Sidenote: The Worcester congress.] + +These were the kind of stories, and the kind of appeals, with which +the mind of the colonial Dutch had been inflamed by the nationalist +leaders when the Worcester Congress met. The gathering is said to have +consisted of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons; and its promoters +claimed that a far larger number--120,000 persons--were represented by +the deputies sent from ninety-seven districts in the Colony. At the +close of the meeting a deputation was appointed to lay the resolutions +passed by the Congress before the High Commissioner, and request him +to bring them officially to the notice of the Home Government. It was +composed of Mr. de Villiers, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church; +a member of the Legislative Council; the member of the Legislative +Assembly for Worcester, and two others. This deputation was received +by Lord Milner at Government House on December 11th, and the +circumstances of the remarkable interview which then took place +present a striking picture of the state of the Colony at this time, +and of the extraordinary attitude which the mass of the Dutch +population had assumed towards the representative of their sovereign. +It is one of those illuminating occasions in which a whole situation +is, as it were, gathered up into a single scene. + +The disloyal purpose of the deputation is heightened rather than +concealed by the disguise of the constitutional forms in which it is +clothed. The scarcely veiled demand for the independence of the Cape +Colony, now put forward by the Afrikander nationalists, is as +magnificently audacious as the ultimatum. Knowing the infamous +character of the methods by which the agitation in favour of the Boers +was being promoted, Lord Milner might have been excused if he had +given way to some strong expressions of indignation. No such note, +however, is heard in his reply. He is as dry and passionless as an +attorney receiving his clients. Yet his words are as frank as his +manner is composed. To these delegates he speaks the most terrible +truths with the same freedom as he would have used, if the business of +their errand had been a pleasant interchange of compliments, instead +of a grim defiance that might, or might not, be converted from words +into deeds. + +[Sidenote: Deputation to Lord Milner.] + +Lord Milner, who is accompanied only by his private secretary, +surprises the deputation at the outset by requesting that the +resolutions may be read forthwith in his presence. They are: + + "1. We, men and women of South Africa assembled and represented + here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to + England, and having taken into earnest consideration the + deplorable condition into which the peoples of South Africa have + been plunged, and the grave dangers threatening our civilisation, + record our solemn conviction that the highest interest of South + Africa demand (1) A termination of the war now raging, with its + untold misery and horror, as well as the burning of houses, the + devastation of the country, the extermination of a white + nationality, and the treatment to which women and children are + subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting legacy of + bitterness and hatred, while seriously endangering the future + relationship between the forces of civilisation and barbarism in + South Africa; and (2) the retention by the Republics of their + independence, whereby alone the peace of South Africa can be + maintained. + + "2. That this meeting desires a full recognition of the right of + the people of this Colony to settle and manage its own affairs, + and expresses its grave disapproval of the policy pursued and + adopted in this matter by the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir + Alfred Milner. + + "3. That this Congress solemnly pledges itself to labour in a + constitutional way unceasingly for the attainment of the objects + contained in the above resolutions, and resolves to send a + deputation to His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner to bring these + resolutions officially to the notice of Her Majesty's + Government." + +These resolutions having been read, Mr. de Villiers proceeds to make +two points. First, there will be no lasting peace in South Africa +until the independence of the Republics is restored; unless this is +done, race feeling will go on prevailing "for generations." And, +second, it is the "devastation of property" and "the treatment of the +women and children" by the British that has roused the colonial Dutch +to assemble at the Congress. Mr. Pretorius, the member of the +Legislative Council, then drives home both of these points by a short +but emphatic speech, delivered in Dutch, in which he asserts that one +of the consequences of the war will be a "never-ending irreconcilable +racial hatred" between the British and Dutch inhabitants.[230] Lord +Milner then rises from his chair and replies to the deputation: + + [Footnote 230: It is scarcely necessary to point out that + this prophecy of continued racial hatred has been completely + falsified by events. The writer went out to South Africa a + second time in January, 1904, when two years had not passed + since the surrender of the Boers. The one thing, above all + others, that struck him, and every other visitor from + England, was the profound peace that reigned from end to end + of the land.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's reply.] + +[Sidenote: War no longer justifiable.] + + "I accede to your request to bring these resolutions to the + notice of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is doubtful + whether I ought to do so, but in view of the prevailing + bitterness and excitement it is better to err, if one must err, + on the side of conciliation and fairness. And, having regard + especially to the fact that one of the resolutions is directed + against myself, I wish to avoid any appearance of a desire to + suppress its companions on account of it. But, having gone thus + far on the road of concession, I take the liberty, in no + unfriendly and polemical spirit, of asking you quite frankly what + good you think can be done by resolutions of this character? I am + not now referring to the resolution against myself. That is a + matter of very minor importance. The pith of the whole business + is in resolution number one, a resolution evidently framed with + great care by the clever men who are engineering the present + agitation in the Colony. Now, that resolution asks for two + things--a termination of the war, and the restoration of the + independence of the Republics. In desiring the termination of the + war we are all agreed, but nothing can be less conducive to the + attainment of that end than to encourage in those who are still + carrying on a hopeless resistance the idea that there is any, + even the remotest chance, of the policy of annexation being + reversed. I am not now speaking for myself. This is not a + question for me. I am simply directing your attention to the + repeatedly declared policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy + just endorsed by an enormous majority of the nation, and not only + by the ordinary supporters of the Government, but by the bulk of + those ordinarily opposed to it. Moreover, that policy is approved + by all the great self-governing colonies of the Empire, except + this one, and in this one by something like half the white + population, and practically the whole of the native. And this + approving half of the white population, be it observed, embraces + all those who, in the recent hour of danger, when this Colony + itself was invaded and partially annexed, fought and suffered + for the cause of Queen and Empire. I ask you, is it reasonable to + suppose that Her Majesty's Government is going back upon a policy + deliberately adopted, repeatedly declared, and having this + overwhelming weight of popular support throughout the whole + Empire behind it? And if it is not, I ask you further: What is + more likely to lead to a termination of the war--a recognition of + the irrevocable nature of this policy, or the reiteration of + menacing protests against it? And there is another respect in + which I fear this resolution is little calculated to promote that + speedy restoration of peace which we have all at heart. I refer + to the tone of aggressive exaggeration which characterises its + allusions to the conduct of the war. No doubt the resolution is + mild compared with some of the speeches by which it was + supported, just as those speeches themselves were mild compared + with much that we are now too well accustomed to hear and to + read, in the way of misrepresentation and abuse of the British + Government, British statesmen, British soldiers, the British + people. But even the resolution, mild in comparison with such + excesses, is greatly lacking in that sobriety and accuracy which + it is so necessary for all of us to cultivate in these days of + bitterly inflamed passions. It really is preposterous to talk, + among other things, about 'the extermination of a white + nationality,' or to give any sort of countenance to the now fully + exploded calumny about the ill-treatment of women and children. + The war, gentlemen, has its horrors--every war has. Those horrors + increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy, + thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial + troops. But, having regard to the conditions, it is one of the + most humane wars that has ever been waged in history. It has + been humane, I contend, on both sides, which does not, of course, + mean that on both sides there have not been isolated acts + deserving of condemnation. Still, the general direction, the + general spirit on both sides, has been humane. But it is another + question whether the war on the side of the enemy is any longer + justifiable. It is certainly not morally justifiable to carry on + a resistance involving the loss of many lives and the destruction + of an immense quantity of property, when the object of that + resistance can no longer, by any possibility, be attained. No + doubt, great allowance must be made for most of the men still + under arms, though it is difficult to defend the conduct of their + leaders in deceiving them. The bulk of the men still in the field + are buoyed up with false hopes. They are incessantly fed with + lies--lies as to their own chance of success, and, still worse, + as to the intention of the British Government with regard to them + should they surrender. And for that very reason it seems all the + more regrettable that anything should be said or done here which + could help still further to mislead them, still further to + encourage a resistance which creates the very evils that these + people are fighting to escape. It is because I am sincerely + convinced that a resolution of this character, like the meeting + at which it was passed, like the whole agitation of which that + meeting is part, is calculated, if it has any effect at all, + still further to mislead the men who are engaged in carrying on + this hopeless struggle, that I feel bound, in sending it to Her + Majesty's Government, to accompany it with this expression of my + strong personal dissent."[231] + + [Footnote 231: Cd. 547.] + +The comment of _Ons Land_ upon Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester +Congress deputation was an open defiance of the Imperial authorities +and a scarcely veiled incitement to rebellion. Mr. Advocate Malan, the +editor, who had been elected for the Malmesbury Division upon the +retirement of Mr. Schreiner--now rejected by the Bond--wrote:[232] + + [Footnote 232: As stated in a _Central News_ telegram, + published in London on December 14th, 1900.] + + "Sir Alfred Milner considers the request of the Afrikanders for + peace and justice unreasonable. The agitation has now reached the + end of the first period--that of pleading and petitioning. A deaf + ear has been turned to the cry of the Afrikanders and their + Church. But the battle for justice will continue from a different + standpoint--by mental and material powers. The path will be hard, + and sacrifices will be required, but the victory will be + glorious!" + +There were, of course, some voices that were raised, among both the +republican and colonial Dutch, in favour of more moderate counsels. In +the preceding month (November) Mr. Melius de Villiers, the late Chief +Justice of the Free State, wrote to a Dutch Reformed minister in the +Cape Colony to beg him to use all his influence against the efforts +being made in the Cape Colony to encourage the Boers to continue the +struggle. "However much I loved and valued the independence of the +Free State," he says, "it is now absolutely certain that the struggle +on the part of the burghers is a hopeless and useless one." And he +then suggests that the Dutch Reformed ministers in the Cape Colony, +instead of petitioning the Queen to grant the independence of the +Republics, should intercede with ex-President Steyn and the Federal +leaders and induce them to discontinue the fight. Women's Congresses +and People's Congresses, held to denounce the barbarities perpetrated +in the war, will avail nothing; but the Dutch Reformed Church could +fulfil no higher mission than this genuine peace-making. "It may go +against their grain to urge our people to yield," he adds, "but it +seems to me a plain duty."[233] But such voices were powerless to +counteract the effect produced upon the Boers by the demonstrations of +hatred against the British Government, manifested by men whose minds +had been inflamed by the infamous slanders of the Imperial troops to +which the "conciliation" movement had given currency. + + [Footnote 233: Cd. 547.] + +[Sidenote: Second invasion of the colony.] + +On the morning of December 16th, five days after he had received the +Worcester Congress deputation, Lord Milner heard that the burgher +forces had again crossed the Orange River between Aliwal North and +Bethulie. Before them lay hundreds of miles of country full of food +and horses, and inhabited by people who were in sympathy with them. On +the 20th martial law was proclaimed in twelve additional districts. On +the 17th of the following month the whole of the Cape Colony, with the +exception of Capetown, Simon's Town, Wynberg, Port Elizabeth, East +London, and the native territories, was placed under the same +military rule. In the words of a protest subsequently addressed by the +Burgher Peace Committee to their Afrikander brethren, the "fatal +result of the Worcester Congress had been that the commandos had again +entered the Cape Colony." The friends of the Boers in England, duped +by the Afrikander nationalists, had involved England and South Africa +in a year and a half of costly, destructive, and unnecessary war. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION + + +The new year (1901) opened with a full revelation of the magnitude of +the task which lay before the Imperial troops. Lord Roberts had +frankly recognised that the destruction of the Governments and +organised armies of the Republics would be followed by the more +difficult and lengthy task of disarming the entire Boer population +within their borders. + + "Recent events have convinced me," he wrote from Pretoria on + October 10th, 1900, "that the permanent tranquillity of the + Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete + disarmament of the inhabitants; and, though the extent of the + country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and + ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one, + its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience." + +That this task proved altogether more lengthy and more arduous than +Lord Roberts at this time expected, was due mainly, though not +exclusively, to the same cause as that which had placed the British +army in a position of such grave disadvantage at the outbreak of the +war--the play of party politics in England. Lord Roberts had foreseen +that the process of disarming the Boers would be slow and difficult; +but he had not anticipated that the Imperial troops would be hindered +in the accomplishment of this task by the political action of the +friends of the Boers in England, or that the public utterances of +prominent members of the Liberal Opposition would re-act with such +dangerous effects upon the Afrikander nationalists that, after more +than a year of successful military operations, the process of +disarmament would have to be applied to the Cape Colony as well as to +the territories of the late Republics. + +Looking back to the year 1900, with the events of the intervening +period before us, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the +decision of the Boer leaders to continue the struggle was determined +by political, and not by military considerations. More than one +circumstance points to the fact that both the Boer generals and the +civilian members of the Executives of the late Republics recognised +that their position was practically hopeless from a military point of +view.[234] And while Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the +Transvaal, urged his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms after the +battle of Dalmanutha, it was President Steyn, a politician, and not a +fighting man, who manifested the stubborn determination that was +directly responsible for the unnecessary devastation and suffering +which the guerilla war entailed upon the Boer people. The remote, but +still carefully cherished possibility of foreign intervention, the +belief that the colonial Dutch would even yet rise _en masse_, and the +reliance upon the traditional sympathy of the Liberal party with the +Boer aspirations for independence, were all considerations that +contributed to the decision. But of these three influences the last +was incomparably the most important; since it not only affected the +disposition of the republican leaders, but, what was more, stimulated +the Afrikander nationalists to make the efforts which brought the +Dutch in the Cape Colony to the condition of passionate resentment +that drew the Boer commandos, in the last month of 1900 and the +opening months of 1901, a second time across the Orange River. + + [Footnote 234: See letter of Piet de Wet to his brother + Christian, in Cd. 547, and correspondence between Steyn and + Reitz (captured by British troops), in Cd. 903.] + +[Sidenote: An injurious influence.] + +We have seen the actual origin of this most injurious influence. The +"conciliation" movement was initiated in the Cape Colony by the +Afrikander nationalists in concert with President Krueger, in order +that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England +might be strengthened." They were strengthened. We have observed the +formation of a Conciliation Committee in England, working in close +connection with the parent organisation, founded by Mr. Hargrove, in +the Cape Colony; and we have noticed the declarations of Mr. Morley, +Lord Courtney, and Mr. Bryce, in favour of the restoration of the +internal independence of the Boers--declarations all made in +opposition to the expressed determination of the British Government to +incorporate the Republics into the system of the British Empire. The +official leader of the Liberal party was less consistent. In June, +1900, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman signified in general terms his +recognition of the necessity of this measure. But he returned in +October to vague expressions of sympathy with the Boers, which, after +the general election had resulted in the return of the Unionist +majority, took the form of a direct condemnation of the South African +policy of the Government. In the course of the year 1901 he reiterated +two charges with increasing vehemence. The conduct of the war was +inhuman; and the Government, by refusing to offer any terms to the +republican leaders inconsistent with the decision to incorporate the +Republics into the Empire, were exacting the unnecessary humiliation +of an unconditional surrender from a gallant foe. These injurious +utterances at length provoked Lord Salisbury's indignant comment: +"England is, I believe, the only country in which, during a great war, +eminent men write and speak publicly as if they belonged to the +enemy;" and elicited from Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, +Mr. Haldane, and Sir Henry Fowler, the assurance that the +determination of the British people to "see the war through" had in no +way weakened. But, in spite of these patriotic utterances on the part +of the Liberal Imperialists, the fact remains that, throughout the +whole period of the guerilla war, the Boer commandos were encouraged +to resist the Imperial troops by the knowledge that prominent members +of the Liberal party in England had declared themselves to be opposed +to what they termed the "suppression" of the Boer people,[235] and +were condemning in unmeasured terms the British military authorities +for employing the sole methods by which the guerilla leaders could be +encountered on equal terms, and the disarmament of the Dutch +population could be accomplished. + +[Sidenote: Peace party among the Boers.] + +There is another element in the attitude of the burgher population at +this critical period, a knowledge of which is essential to a correct +understanding of the methods and conditions of the guerilla war. The +existence among the republican Dutch of a considerable body of opinion +in favour of submission was a circumstance of which the Imperial +authorities were aware, and one of which they desired, naturally +enough, to take the fullest advantage. It was known also to the +militant Boer leaders; and it is obvious that any estimate of the +degree in which these leaders are to be held directly responsible for +the loss and suffering entailed by the decision to continue the war, +will depend largely upon the manner in which they dealt with those +members of their own community who were prepared, after Lord +Roberts's victories, to become peaceable citizens of the British +Empire. + + [Footnote 235: "This war no longer makes a pretence of being + a war of defence; it is a war for gold-fields, for territory, + and for the suppression of two brave and noble peoples. This + wicked war has lost us the moral leadership of mankind."--Mr. + E. Robertson, M.P., June 5th, 1901.] + +The action of the Boer leaders in this respect is established by the +indisputable testimony of the official documents which fell into the +hands of the British authorities in the subsequent progress of the +war. Every endeavour of the peace party to make itself heard was +punished with rigorous, sometimes brutal, severity; fictitious +reports, calculated to raise false hopes of foreign intervention, were +circulated among the burghers in the field; and every effort was made +to prevent a knowledge of the British Government's proposals for the +future administration of the new colonies from reaching the rank and +file of the burgher population. The details of this action on the part +of the Boer leaders constitute collectively a body of evidence +sufficient to have justified the employment of measures infinitely +more severe than those which were in fact adopted by the British +military authorities for the capture of the Boer commandos and the +disarmament of the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; and in the face +of this evidence, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reiterated charges +against the Government, whether of "methods of barbarism" or of +prolonging the war by the neglect to offer reasonable terms to the +Boers, must be held as wanton in their origin as they were injurious +in their results. + +[Sidenote: Administrative changes.] + +The despatch of October 18th, 1900, which, as we have seen, Lord +Milner received as he was returning from his visit to the new +colonies, contained certain new commissions, under the terms of which +the "prospective administration" of the Transvaal and the Orange River +Colony was placed in his hands in succession to Lord Roberts, while at +the same time he remained Governor of the Cape Colony and High +Commissioner for South Africa. This combination of offices was purely +temporary, since Her Majesty's Government (Mr. Chamberlain wrote to +Lord Milner) "were anxious to take advantage of his unique fitness for +the great task of inaugurating the civil government of the two new +colonies." It was proposed therefore, that, as soon as the necessary +legal provision could be made for establishing constitutions for the +two new colonies, Lord Milner should be appointed as their Governor, +with a Lieutenant-Governor for the Orange River Colony, and should +cease to be the Governor of the Cape Colony. This new arrangement, +which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, involved the severance of the +High Commissionership from the Governorship of the Cape Colony to +which it had been attached for so long a period,[236] did not take +effect, however, until the end of February, 1901, when Lord Milner +finally left the Cape Colony for the Transvaal. + + [Footnote 236: Cd. 547.] + +Lord Roberts relinquished the command of the British forces in South +Africa on November 29th, 1900. The Home Government at this time +attached great importance to the issue of a proclamation setting out +clearly the generous terms upon which the Boers would be received into +the empire; and, in connection with this question, Lord Milner, during +his recent visit to Pretoria, had discussed with Lord Kitchener the +methods by which the influence of the surrendered Boers and the more +moderate Afrikanders, who were in favour of submission, could be +brought to bear upon the general mass of the fighting burghers. Lord +Milner, however, upon his return to the Cape Colony, expressed the +opinion that the issue of a proclamation in the then existing +circumstances would be a mistake, since it would only be regarded as a +sign of weakness. And in support of this opinion he states, in a +telegram of December 11th, that the cabled summary of Mr. +Chamberlain's + + "recent speech in the House of Commons, containing virtually the + principal points in the proposed proclamation, has been instantly + seized upon by the Bond leaders [in the Cape Colony] and is + represented by them as a sign that Her Majesty's Government is + wavering in its policy, and that the reaction in British public + opinion, which they have always relied on, is setting in."[237] + + [Footnote 237: Cd. 547.] + +Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener confirmed this judgment at the +time; and on January 28th, 1901--when de Wet was on the point of +breaking through the British troops into the Cape Colony--the latter +telegraphed to Lord Milner: + + "When the Boers are inclined to peace, they will want, I think, + to discuss various questions, and when that time comes a + proclamation which would meet as far as possible the points + raised would, no doubt, be very valuable.... But just now I do + not think they have any idea of making peace whilst the Colony + question is so prominent. I have let it be known that I would be + glad to see an officer or meet Botha at any time if he wished to + do so."[238] + + [Footnote 238: Cd. 547.] + +Three days afterwards Lord Milner received a further telegram from +Lord Kitchener on the same subject, which he also forwarded to the +Colonial Office: + + "Ex-President Pretorius has just returned from seeing L. Botha + and Schalk Burger [the Commandant-General and the Acting + President of the South African Republic]. They stated that they + were fighting for their independence, and meant to continue to do + so to the bitter end, and would not discuss any question of + peace."[239] + + [Footnote 239: _Ibid._] + +[Sidenote: Boer leaders irreconcilable.] + +In view of this irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Boer +leaders, Mr. Chamberlain abandoned the proposal, and the proclamation +was not issued until six months later, when the blockhouse system had +been successfully initiated. + +But, although Lord Milner had recognised the futility of the appeal by +proclamation, he had readily approved of Lord Kitchener's endeavour to +make the British proposals known to the placable but terrorised +section of the fighting burghers, through the agency of those of their +kinsmen and friends who had surrendered. After all advances to the +Boer leaders in the field had totally failed, "it seemed to us," Lord +Milner reported to Mr. Chamberlain,[240] + + [Footnote 240: January 12th, 1901. Cd. 547.] + + "that those who had already surrendered would have means not open + to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under + arms, persuading them of the hopelessness of their resistance, + and removing the misapprehension of our intentions, which some of + the commanders who were still holding out had sedulously + fostered." + +It was in these circumstances and with these objects in view that, +after Lord Roberts's departure, the Burgher Peace Committee was formed +at Pretoria; and it is to the address which Lord Kitchener then +delivered (December 21st, 1900) to this Committee that we must look +for the origin and purpose of the Burgher, or Concentration Camps. + +[Sidenote: Origin of the Burgher camps.] + + "It having been brought to Lord Kitchener's notice," says the + published report, "that the principal difficulty that burghers, + desirous of surrendering, experienced was that they were not + allowed to remain in their own districts, and were afraid of the + penalties attached to not having adhered strictly to the oath of + neutrality, which they had, in most cases, been made to break by + the coercive measures of Boers out on commando, he wished to give + the burghers still in the field every opportunity of becoming + acquainted with the treatment he proposed now to extend to them, + their families, and their property. + + "Instructions had been issued to form laagers for all surrendered + burghers, their wives, families, and stock, on the railway in + their own districts under military protection; and, except where + it was proved that a burgher had voluntarily broken his oath and + gone out on commando, no difference would be made between those + who had not taken the oath. To protect deserted women and + children they would also be brought into these laagers, where + their husbands and sons, who desired to live peacefully, could + freely join them. + + "It was essential that the country should be thus cleared, + because so long as the means of subsistence remained in and on + the farms, so long small commandos were enabled to continue in + the field. In return, Lord Kitchener expected every assistance + from those to whom he gave protection. They must each and all + help to the best of their ability by influencing in every way in + their power those still in the field to surrender. These measures + would be applied gradually, and extended if they proved + successful. Burghers must understand that no responsibility could + be accepted for stock or property, except for that which they + brought in with them, and then only if they kept it within the + limits of the protection he was prepared to afford."[241] + + [Footnote 241: Cd. 547.] + +The report of Lord Kitchener's speech from which these paragraphs are +taken was printed in Dutch and circulated by the Burgher Peace +Committee. It is certainly significant that a measure which was +subsequently held up to the execration of the civilised world by the +official leader of the Liberal party and the friends of the Boers in +England, should have been carefully explained by Lord Kitchener to an +audience of Boers at Pretoria, and accepted by them as a means of +enabling the peaceably disposed burghers to escape from the compulsion +of their leaders. In this, as in many other matters, the English +friends of the Boers were _plus royalistes que le roi meme_. + +[Sidenote: Boer coercive measures.] + +These, then, were the means employed by the British military +authorities to avert a needless protraction of the war. We have now to +observe the methods by which the Boer leaders prevented their efforts +from producing the desired result. In view of the destruction of the +organised resistance of the Republics, Lord Roberts had made known by +proclamation that all burghers who surrendered their arms and took the +oath of neutrality would be allowed to return to their homes, or, if +at home, to remain there undisturbed. This implied an intention on the +part of the British authorities to provide such protection as would +enable the surrendered burghers to remain in peaceable possession of +their property. General Botha, as we have already noted, was +personally in favour of a general surrender after the battle of +Dalmanutha; but, when once the majority of the Boer leaders had +decided to continue to resist the establishment of British authority +by force of arms, it became his business to keep every fighting +burgher in the field. Here, again, the work of the Intelligence +Department provides us with instructive evidence of the purposes and +acts of the enemy. In the course of the subsequent military operations +Sir Bindon Blood captured a number of official documents in the Boer +Government laager at Roos Senekal. One of these, referring to the +period in question, sufficiently indicates the nature of the "coercive +measures" to which Lord Kitchener had alluded. Under date October 6th, +1900, General Botha gives instructions to the Boer commandant at +Bethel to telegraph round to the Boer generals and officers certain +military instructions, and he then adds: + + "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from laying + down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to + this, to confiscate everything moveable or unmoveable, and also + to burn their houses. Get into direct communication with the + Standerton men, and destroy the railway line between Heidelberg + and Standerton, and especially derail and hold up trains. In this + manner we will obtain a large quantity of food."[242] + + [Footnote 242: Cd. 663. See also the text of the circular + issued on December 2nd, 1900, by Louis Botha, as + Commandant-General of the Boer forces, to all military + officers, landdrosts, etc., giving specific instructions for + the punishment of surrendered burghers who refused to join + the commandos when called upon, and for the evasion of the + neutrality oath.] + +And, while the peaceably inclined burghers were prevented from +surrendering by the fear of these penalties, the courage of the +commandos was maintained by the spread of false information. Among +these same papers found at Roos Senekal is a telegram despatched on +November 2nd, 1900, to General Viljoen, containing a number of +encouraging statements bearing upon the political and military +situation, of which the three following may be taken as +characteristic: + + "October, 1900. A Congress of Delegates of the Powers was held at + Parijs [Paris], whereby England asked for an extension of six + months to carry on the war. This was refused by the powers on the + proposal of Holland and Austria. + + "France is ready to land troops in England on the 1st November. + + "Cape Colonial troops to the number of 2,500 have been sent back + by General Roberts, having quarrelled with the regulars. Their + arms were taken away and burnt. This last is official news + received by General Fourie."[243] + + [Footnote 243: Cd. 663.] + +[Sidenote: "Not civilised warfare".] + +It was in order to counteract the effects of this system of terrorism +and deceit, that the endeavour was made to inform the mass of the +Boers still in arms of the actual state of affairs, both in respect of +the hopelessness of foreign intervention and the real intentions of +the British Government, through the agency of the Burgher Peace +Committee. The treatment accorded to these peace emissaries is +justifiable, possibly, by a strict interpretation of the laws of war; +but it fixes inevitably the responsibility for the needless sufferings +of the Boer people in the guerilla war, upon Ex-President Steyn, +Schalk Burger, Louis Botha, Christian de Wet, and the other Boer +leaders. On January 10th, 1901, of three agents of the Peace Committee +taken prisoners to De Wet's laager near Lindley, one--a British +subject--was flogged and then shot, and two, who were burghers, were +flogged.[244] And on February 12th Meyer de Kock, the Secretary of the +Committee, was shot.[245] + + [Footnote 244: Cd. 547.] + + [Footnote 245: Cd. 663. It was at this time that the utterly + unjustifiable and brutal murder of the coloured man, Esau, + took place in the invasion of the Calvinia district of the + Cape Colony. His sole offence was his known loyalty to the + British Government. "He was flogged on January 15th, 1901, + and kept in gaol till February 5th, when he was flogged + through the streets and shot outside the village by a Boer + named Strydom, who stated that he acted according to orders." + Cd. 547.] + +But the efforts of the Peace Committee were not altogether thrown +away. The terrible deaths of these men, true martyrs of the Boer +cause, evoked more than one notable protest against the insensate +determination of Ex-President Steyn and De Wet. + + "Dear Brother, ... From what I hear you are so angry with me," + wrote General Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, "that you + have decided to kill me should you find me. May God not allow it + that you should have the opportunity to shed more innocent blood. + Enough has been shed already.... I beseech you, let us think over + the matter coolly for a moment, and see whether our cause is + really so pure and righteous that we can rely on God's + help."[246] + + [Footnote 246: Cd. 547.] + +And Mr. H. A. Du Plessis, the predikant at Lindley in the Orange River +Colony, addressed an "open letter" to the clergy of the Dutch Reformed +Church in the Cape Colony. + + "It is not civilised warfare any more on the part of the + burghers. They have become desperate, and as fanatics do things + in conflict with a Christian spirit and civilisation.... About a + fortnight ago, G. Mueller, one of my deacons and brother of the + late minister of Burghersdorp, was brutally ill-used. He had to + strip, and received twenty-five lashes with a stirrup leather--he + is not the only one--because he took letters from a member of the + Peace Committee to certain heads of the burgher force, in which + they were strongly advised to give in. At the same time Andries + Wessels and J. Morgendael were taken prisoners. They left + Kroonstad at their own request, and with the sanction of the + military authorities, in order to have an interview with the + leaders of the burgher force. Morgendael was mortally wounded by + Commandant Froneman without a hearing, and at the instigation of + General C. de Wet. He died afterwards.... In such a shameful, in + fact, inhuman, manner were these men treated; and for what + reason? Simply because they had tried to save their country and + people.... + + "The burghers are kept totally in the dark by their leaders as to + what the real state of affairs is. Because I wish to save them + from certain ruin I make this appeal to you.... + + "If [the burghers] knew what the true state of affairs was, a + large portion would long ago have come in and delivered up their + arms.... + + "Therefore, I implore you, stand still for a few moments and + think of the true interests of the Afrikander nation, and see if + you will not alter your opinion, and quench the fire of war + instead of feeding the flame....[247] + + [Footnote 247: Cd. 547.] + +These letters, which were published in _The Cape Times_, formed part +of an attempt made by the Burgher Peace Committee, "to induce some of +the leading men in the colony, who are known to sympathise with the +Boers, to tell the men still in the field that the hope of any +assistance from here is a delusion." But, in thus reporting this new +endeavour to Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner adds that he is not, +himself, "very sanguine" of its success. + +[Sidenote: Policy of the Bond.] + +There was only too good ground for this opinion. The Afrikander +nationalists of the Cape hated England no less than did the republican +nationalists, though they feared her more. The policy which the Bond +had adopted after the occupation of the Republics by the British +forces was perfectly definite. Its object was to avert the final +disaster of the war by securing the maintenance of the Republics as +independent centres of Afrikander nationalism. In order to do this the +Bond resolved to keep the Cape Colony in a state of smouldering +rebellion, to encourage the continued resistance of the Boer +commandos, and to render all the material assistance to the guerilla +leaders and their forces that could be afforded without exposing the +Cape Dutch to the penalties of treason. It may be doubted, however, +whether the Bond leaders, in view of the resolute attitude of the +loyalist population and their consistent and unfaltering support of +Lord Milner, would have embarked upon this policy, unless they had +calculated upon the co-operation of the Liberal Opposition in England. +As it was, their expectations in this respect had been amply +fulfilled, and the policy itself, as we have seen, had been admirably +carried into effect. + +The second invasion of the Cape Colony began, as we have noticed, with +the incursion of the Boers after the Worcester Congress. On December +16th, 1900, Kruitzinger, with seven hundred, and Hertzog with twelve +hundred men, crossed the Orange River; and by February 11th, 1901, De +Wet, who had been "headed back" in December, had succeeded in eluding +the British columns and entered the Colony.[248] At this moment +success seemed to be within measurable distance both to the Bond and +to De Wet. The point of view of the astute Afrikander statesmen is +different from that of the guerilla leader; but each party is equally +hopeful of the ultimate victory of the nationalist cause. Of the +attitude of the Bond in this month of February, 1901, Mr. Kipling +writes from Capetown: + + [Footnote 248: Cd. 522.] + + "Some of the extremists of the Bond are for committing themselves + now, fully, to the Dutch cause, De Wet and all; but some of the + others are hunting for some sort of side-path that will give them + a chance of keeping on the ground-level of the gallows, within + hail of a seat in the next Parliament. If De Wet wins--he is + assumed to be in command of several thousands, all lusting for + real battle, and sure of a welcome among many more thousands + alight with the same desire--the Bond may, of course, come out + flat-footedly on his side. Just at present the apricots are not + quite ripe enough. But the Bond has unshaken faith in the + Opposition, whose every word and action are quoted here, and lead + to more deaths on the veld. _It is assumed that His Majesty's + Opposition will save the Bond, and South Africa for the Bond, if + only the commandos make the war expensive._"[249] + + [Footnote 249: The italics are Mr. Kipling's. _The Science of + Rebellion: a Tract for the Times_, by Rudyard Kipling.] + +[Sidenote: De Wet in the colony.] + +If this account of the attitude of the Bond stood alone, its value +would be merely that of an _ex parte_ statement by a competent +observer on the spot. But it does not stand alone. The accident of the +capture of the Boer official papers at Roos Senekal, to which we have +referred before, has provided us with a record of the thoughts which +were in De Wet's mind at the time when Mr. Kipling's words were +written. In a report dated "On the Veld, February 14th, 1901," +Commandant-General Botha is informed that "De Wet's last news is that +the Cape Colony has risen to a man, and has already taken up arms. +They refused to give up to the British Government. Many more are only +waiting operations on part of De Wet to join him; and General De Wet +concludes this report with the words: 'It is certain that the ways of +the Lord are hidden from us, and that, after all, it seems that the +day of a united South Africa is not far off.'" + +The writer of this despatch is the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the +Orange Free State; and to his report of De Wet's success in the Cape +Colony, he now adds an account of what is happening on the other side +of the Orange River: + + "The burghers in the Orange Free State are hopeful, and expecting + a happy ending. The grudge against the Britisher has now taken + deep root, and the women and girls are encouraging the burghers + to stick up to the bitter end. So that our cause now rests in the + union of the burghers, and, with God's help, we will accomplish + our end.... The enemy's plan is to starve us out, but he will + never do it, now we have an outlet from the Cape Colony, even if + we have to use force."[250] + + [Footnote 250: Cd. 663.] + +De Wet was chased out of the Colony by the British columns on February +28th, but smaller commandos under Kruitzinger, Fouche, Scheepers, and +Malan remained behind. Apart from their mobility, and the persistent +manner in which they clung to rugged and mountainous districts, the +ability of these Boer raiders to keep the field against the Imperial +troops must be attributed to the sympathy and material assistance +which they received from the colonial Dutch. The actual number of +recruits which they secured was small; but, in Lord Kitchener's +words-- + + "the friendly feelings of a considerable portion of the rural + population assured to them at all times not only an ample food + supply, but also timely information of the movements of our + pursuing columns--two points which told heavily in their + favour."[251] + + [Footnote 251: Cd. 605.] + +[Sidenote: Effect of Cape rebellion.] + +In view of the enormous area of the sparsely populated and difficult +country throughout which their movements were thus facilitated, it is +not surprising that these roaming commandos were never completely +suppressed. Of the 21,256 men who surrendered after Vereeniging, 3,635 +were Boers and rebels, who had been, up to that time, at large in the +Cape Colony.[252] The importance of the contribution which the +disloyal majority of the Cape Dutch were enabled, in this manner, to +make to the power of resistance exhibited by the Boers in the guerilla +war has scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. As it was, a large +body of Imperial troops, which would otherwise have been available for +completing the conquest of the new colonies, were kept employed, not +merely in guarding the all-important railway lines, but from time to +time in arduous, costly, and exhausting military operations in the +Cape Colony.[253] + + [Footnote 252: Cd. 988.] + + [Footnote 253: "Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me + ... no general rising can be expected in that quarter.... + [But] the little contingent there has been of great help to + us: they have kept 50,000 troops occupied, with which + otherwise we should have had to reckon."--Gen. Christian de + Wet at the Vereeniging Conference on May 16th, 1902. App. A. + _The Three Years' War_, by Christian Rudolf de Wet + (Constable, 1902). But see forward also, p. 485, for part + played by British loyalists.] + +The value of this contribution was quite well understood by the +Afrikander nationalists of the Cape. In Mr. Kipling's vigorous +English, "north and south they were working for a common object--the +manufacture of pro-Boers in England by doubling the income-tax." And +it is in the extension of the area of the war by the establishment of +the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony that we must find the one valid +military consideration which underlay the failure of the peace +negotiations between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha +(February-April, 1901), and the final rejection of the British terms +of surrender by the Boer leaders in June. The point is made perfectly +plain in the official notice signed by Schalk Burger, as Acting +President of the South African Republic, and Steyn, as President of +the Orange Free State, which was issued to the burghers on June 20th, +1901. After reciting that the British terms had been referred to +"State President Krueger and the deputation in Europe," and that +President Krueger's reply had been considered by a conference of the +Governments of both Republics, at which Chief-Commandant C. De Wet, +Commandant-General L. Botha, and Assistant-Commandant J. H. De la Rey +had presented a full report, the document continues: + + "And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies, + where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the + Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence, + considering further the invaluable personal and material + sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our cause, + which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby the + independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is resolved] + that no peace will be made ... by which our independence and + national existence, or the interests of our colonial brothers, + shall be the price paid, and that the war will be vigorously + prosecuted."[254] + + [Footnote 254: Cd. 663.] + +[Sidenote: Afrikander statesmanship.] + +It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the +Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that +enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the +apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift +and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to +the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the +Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the +Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch +population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent +in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added +the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South +Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an +affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might +still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone +would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the +people, and it was for the people to make use of this instrument, or +to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British claimed a +voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among them. The +"younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South Africa for the +Empire. + +Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military +operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length +accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general +situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain +from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents +which he furnished to his official chief, none affords more convincing +evidence of cool judgment, mastery of South African conditions, and +sureness of statecraft than this. It is a letter, and not a despatch, +and as such it contains some personal details which would not have +found a place in more formal communications. + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's survey.] + +Two reasons, Lord Milner writes, have prevented him from sending for a +long time past any general review of South African affairs. "I am +occupied," he says, "every day that passes from morning till night by +business, all of which is urgent, and the amount and variety of which +you are doubtless able to judge from the communications on a great +variety of subjects which are constantly passing between us." And in +addition to this, he has always hoped that "some definite point would +be reached, at which it might be possible to sum up that chapter of +our history which contained the war, and to forecast the work of +administrative construction which must succeed it." Now, however, it +is useless to wait longer for a "clear and clean-cut" situation. +Although he has not "the slightest doubt of the ultimate result," he +foresees that the work which still lies before the Imperial troops +will be "slower, more difficult, more harassing, and more expensive +than was at one time anticipated." + + "It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of + retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly quiet, + at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the + Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a + considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western + districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority, + and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly + government and the pursuits of peace. To-day the scene is + completely altered." + +The "increased losses to the country," due to the prolongation of the +struggle and to the guerilla methods adopted by the Boer leaders, are +obvious. + + "The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of + small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are + similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual + fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it + would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers + operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over + supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through which + they pass, not only taking all the food they can lay hands upon + on the farms--grain, forage, horses, cattle, etc., but looting + the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, sugar, etc., + of all of which they are in great need. Our forces, on their + side, are compelled to denude the country of everything moveable, + in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No doubt a + considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not wholly lost, + but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are now being + established at many points along the railway lines. But even + under these circumstances the loss is great, through animals + dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live + upon when collected in large numbers at the camps. Indeed, the + loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the + destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard." + +And to this loss incidental to the campaign there has been added +recently "destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character." +This is the injury done to the mining plant in the outlying districts +of the Rand by the Boer raiders, a destruction for which there is no +possible excuse. + + "It has no reason or justification in connection with military + operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of + civilised warfare.... Directly or indirectly, all South Africa, + including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the + mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal. + To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in + agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will + have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after + the ravages of war. + + "Fortunately the damage done to the mines has not been large, + relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital sunk in + them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard against + purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, because it + is, so to speak, 'all length and no breadth'--one long thin line, + stretching across the country from east to west for many miles. + Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only possible + successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids hitherto + made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted + in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the + single mine attacked amounted to L200,000, and it is estimated + that the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is + only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the + most important. These facts may afford some indication of the + ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal + and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that + general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just + before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out. + However serious in some respects may have been the military + consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa + owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash + forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of + all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it." + +[Sidenote: Material destruction.] + +As the result of the last six or seven months of destructive warfare, +"a longer period of recuperation will be required than was originally +anticipated." At the same time, Lord Milner points out that, with +Kimberley and the Rand, the "main engines of prosperity," virtually +undamaged, the economic consequences of the war, "though grave, do not +appear by any means appalling." + + "The country population will need a good deal of help, first to + preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it + with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the + great industry of the country will need some little time before + it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with + great recuperative powers, it will not take many years before the + economic ravages of the war are effaced." + +He then turns to consider the "moral effect" of the recrudescence of +the war, which is, in his opinion, more serious than the mere material +destruction of the last six months. In the middle of 1900 the feeling +in the Orange River Colony and the western districts of the Transvaal +was "undoubtedly pacific." + + "The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly + astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair + and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and + it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in + the new regime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was + better than I have ever known it." + +[Sidenote: Recrudescence of the war.] + +If it had been possible to screen those portions of the conquered +territories which were fast settling down to peaceful pursuits from +the incursions of the enemy still in the field, the worst results of +the guerilla war might have been avoided. But the "vast extent of the +country, and the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long +advance, first to Pretoria and then to Komati Poort," made this +impossible. The Boer leaders raided the country already occupied, but +now left exposed; and, encouraged by the small successes thus easily +obtained, the commandos reappeared first in the south-east of the +Orange River Colony, then in the south-west of the Transvaal, and +finally in every portion of the conquered territory. + +Those among the burgher population who desired to submit to British +rule now found themselves in a position of great difficulty. + + "Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to + remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many + of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the + strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient + appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had + undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions in + arms when these reappeared among them appealing to their + patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very + men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were + up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases + by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from + the temptation to commit it. + + "The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally + led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling + conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own + troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same + leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did + not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same + severity with which I believe any other nation would have + treated them. Entitled as we were by the universally recognised + rules of war to shoot the men who, having once been prisoners in + our hands and having been released on a distinct pledge to + abstain from further part in the war, had once more taken up arms + against us, we never in a single instance availed ourselves of + that right. But as our columns swept through the revolted + country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even with + treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no doubt + in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men who had + actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made + prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because + it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater + number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further + accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was + augmented by the evacuation, necessary for military reasons, of a + number of places, such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and + Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had + actually established a reasonably satisfactory civil + administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the + general demoralisation, and to afford places of refuge for those + willing to submit, by establishing camps along the railway lines + to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their + stock for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate + substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts. + Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children + whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us. + But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no + doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at + any of the numerous commandos roaming about the country, a good + many of their less willing members will find their way to one or + other of these camps in order to avoid further fighting." + +As the guerilla warfare thus swept back over the new colonies, the +Dutch in the Cape Colony, who at one time, about the middle of the +preceding year (1900), had seemed disposed to acquiesce in the union +of all South Africa under the British flag, became once more restless +and embittered. + +[Sidenote: A carnival of mendacity.] + + "Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our + troops, was exaggerated and made the most of, though what + principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged + instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. Never in my + life have I read of, much less experienced, such a carnival of + mendacity as that which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in + this Colony at the end of last year. And these libels still + continue to make themselves felt. It is true that excitement has + subsided somewhat during the last two months, partly because some + of the worst inventions about the conduct of the British troops + have been exposed and utterly discredited, and partly because the + general introduction of martial law has tended greatly to check + seditious writing and speaking. But even now the general feeling + in most of the country districts is very bad, and the commandos + which invaded the Colony in December and have been roaming about + ever since, while they have not gained many adherents among the + colonial farmers, have nevertheless enjoyed the very substantial + aid which the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants was + able to give them, in supporting themselves, obtaining fresh + supplies of food and horses, and evading the forces sent in + pursuit of them." + +Of the general attitude of the Cape Dutch at this time Lord Milner +writes with the lenient judgment of complete understanding: + + "I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch + inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics, + however little they may be able to resist giving active + expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear + amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or + to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of + choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the + men of their own race from beyond the border. There are + extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony + overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial + ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to + stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of + the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps, + secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and + writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of + political firebrands through the country enables them to keep + quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against + the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably + well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that + purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations + too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their + daily lives. + + "That there has been an invasion at all is no doubt due to the + weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or + supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the + enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in + order to meet with general active support. But this was a + miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very pardonable + one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their favour as + shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of public + meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the writings of + the Dutch Press, the very general wearing of the republican + colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth, and they + regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they actually + did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great + proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant + business had slipped away and joined the republican ranks long + ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left + the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the + experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary + measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in + the hands of the country population throughout the greater part + of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually is, + and far smaller than it was a year ago." + +[Sidenote: British population in arms.] + +In these circumstances the object to be aimed at is to screen off as +much of the country as possible from raids. But the Cape Colony is +considerably larger in area than France and the United Kingdom put +together; it has "an immense length of frontier that can be crossed +anywhere," and "exceedingly primitive means of communication." The +exclusion of mobile guerilla bands from across the frontier is, +therefore, "something of an impossibility." There is one method, and +one only, by which "the game of the invaders can be frustrated." It is +to provide each district with the means of defending itself. And so a +local defence force has been formed in all districts, with the +exception of those--happily the least important in the Colony--in +which the population is extremely small and the loyalists are very +few. + + "In the other districts, the response on the part of the British + population to the general call to arms recently made by the + Ministry has been better than the most sanguine expected. It was + always admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk + of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side + of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local + defence. The appeal was, therefore, virtually directed to the + British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no + doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who + have always been loyalists. These classes had been already + immensely drawn on by the Cape police, the regular volunteer + corps, and the numerous irregular mounted corps which had been + called into existence because of the war. There must have been + twelve thousand Cape Colonists under arms before the recent + appeal, and, as things are now going, we shall get as many more + under that appeal--a truly remarkable achievement under a purely + voluntary system. The fact that, if the war continues for a few + months longer, so large a number of the South African British + will be under arms (for, it must be remembered, in addition to + the Cape colonists we have about one thousand Rhodesians, and, I + should say, at least ten thousand Uitlanders) is one that cannot + be left out of account in considering either the present + imbroglio or the settlement after peace is restored. + + "It is, indeed, calculated to exercise a most important and, I + believe, beneficial influence upon the South African politics of + the future. Among the principal causes of the trouble of the + past and present was the contempt felt by the Afrikander + countryman, used to riding and shooting, and generally in + possession of a good rifle and plenty of cartridges, for other + white men less habituated to arms than he was himself. That + feeling can hardly survive the experience of the past twelve + months, and especially of the last six weeks. The splendid + fighting of the despised Johannesburgers of the Imperial Light + Horse, and of the other South African Colonial Corps, has become + a matter of history, and the present _levee en masse_ of the + British people, including the townsmen, of this Colony, is proof + positive that when the necessity is really felt they are equal to + the best in courage and public spirit. In this respect the events + of the past few months, unfortunate as they have been in many + ways, have undoubtedly their brighter side. The mutual respect of + the two principal white races is the first condition of a healthy + political life in the South Africa of the future. It is possible + that if the extreme strain of the most recent developments of the + war had never been felt throughout Cape Colony, the British + inhabitants would never have had the opportunity of showing that + they were inferior to none in their willingness to bear all the + burdens of citizenship, including that of personal service." + +[Sidenote: Remember the loyalists.] + +And Lord Milner urges that in the future England should not forget +that there are loyalists in South Africa as well as Boers; and that +the loyalists are Dutch as well as British. + + "The important part now played, even from the purely military + point of view, by the South African loyalists ought, as it seems + to me, to have a good effect not only in South Africa but in + England. The inherent vice, if I may say so, of almost all + public discussion of our South African difficulties is the + tendency to concentrate attention too exclusively on the Boers. + Say what we will, the controversy always seems to relapse into + the old ruts--it is the British Government on the one hand and + the Boers on the other. The question how a particular policy will + affect not merely our enemies, but our now equally numerous + friends, seems seldom to be adequately considered. And yet it + would seem that justice and policy alike should lead us to be as + eager to consider the feelings and interests, and to retain the + loyalty, of those who are fighting on our side, as to disarm the + present enmity and win the future confidence of those who are + fighting against us. And this principle would seem all the easier + to adhere to because there is really nothing which the great body + of the South African loyalists desire which it is not for the + honour and advantage of the mother country to insist upon. + + "Of vindictiveness, or desire to oppress the Afrikanders, there + is, except in hasty utterances inevitable in the heat of the + conflict, which have no permanent significance, or in tirades + which are wholly devoid of influence, no sign whatever. The + attitude of almost all leading and representative men, and the + general trend of public feeling among the loyalists, even in the + intensity of the struggle, is dead against anything like racial + exclusiveness or domination. If this were not so it would be + impossible for a section of pure-bred Afrikanders, small no doubt + in numbers but weighty in character and position, to take the + strong line which they do in opposition to the views of the + majority of their own people, based as these are, and as they + know them to be, upon a misconception of our policy and + intentions. These men are among the most devoted adherents to the + Imperial cause, and would regard with more disfavour and alarm + than any one the failure of the British nation to carry out its + avowed policy in the most complete manner. They are absolutely + convinced that the unquestioned establishment of British + supremacy, and the creation of one political system from Capetown + to the Zambesi, is, after all that has happened, the only + salvation for men of their own race, as well as for others." + +[Sidenote: "One Country, One Flag."] + +And, in conclusion, he writes of the "predominant, indeed the almost +unanimous, feeling of those South Africans who sympathise with the +Imperial Government," that-- + + "they are sick to death of the war, which has brought ruin to + many of them, and imposed considerable sacrifices on almost all. + But they would rather see the war continue for an indefinite time + than run the risk of any compromise which would leave even the + remotest chance of the recurrence of so terrible a scourge in the + future. They are prepared to fight and suffer on in order to make + South Africa, indisputably and for ever, one country under one + flag, with one system of government, and that system the British, + which they believe to ensure the highest possible degree of + justice and freedom to men of all races." + +In this luminous review of what Lord Milner terms "if by no means the +most critical, possibly the most puzzling" state of affairs since the +outbreak of the war, it will be observed that he puts the time +required by South Africa to recover from the economic ravages of the +war at "not many years." In point of fact, two and a half years after +the surrender of Vereeniging nothing remained but the scattered +graveyards upon the veld, the empty tins still tinkling upon the wire +fences by the railways, and an occasional blockhouse, to remind the +traveller of the devastating struggle from which the country had so +recently emerged. This estimate of the period of recuperation affords +a measure of the magnitude of Lord Milner's achievement in the three +concluding years of his administration. For the rest, we look in vain +for any trace of bitterness, or even of partisanship, in his frank and +penetrating analysis. It is the survey of a man who is completely +master of the situation; who is absolutely convinced of the justice of +the British cause; who has no illusions and no fears. + +[Sidenote: Feeding the enemy.] + +With the circumstances in which the burghers were induced by their +leaders to continue, or renew, their resistance to the Imperial troops +before us, both the long duration of the guerilla war, and the methods +by which it was finally brought to a close, become easily +intelligible. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, from a +purely military point of view, the relapse of the conquered +territories into war was due to the insufficiency of British troops. +By the end of April, 1900, as we have noticed before, all the reserves +of the regular army had been exhausted; and, in addition to this, at +the end of twelve months' service a considerable proportion of the +Home and over-sea auxiliaries left South Africa to return to civil +life. Had there been a sufficient number of trained soldiers to +occupy effectively the Boer Republics, the war would not have swept +back through them and over their borders into the Colony. Even so, the +actual number of British troops in South Africa under Lord Roberts's +command would have sufficed to subjugate the Boers, had the British +military authorities employed the severe methods of warfare to which +any other belligerent would have had recourse under the like +conditions--methods of merciful severity which were employed, in fact, +by the Union forces in the civil war in America.[255] But, by the +irony of fate, the humane methods of the British, in the absence of a +practically unlimited supply of trained troops, made the revival of +hostilities possible on the part of the Boers, and thereby created the +necessity for the employment of those more rigorous, but, by +comparison, still humane and generous methods, in respect of which the +charge of inhumanity was brought against Great Britain by the friends +of the Boers in England and on the continent of Europe. No one will +maintain that it is a part of the duty of a belligerent to support the +non-combatant population of the enemy. Yet this duty was voluntarily +assumed throughout the war by the British military authorities, who, +from the occupation of Bloemfontein onwards, fed the non-combatant +Boer population as well as they fed their own troops. + + [Footnote 255: _E.g._ those employed by General Sherman in + his march to the Sea, through Georgia, in the latter part of + 1864.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Kitchener's task.] + +An incident that happened after the occupation of Pretoria exhibits +the remarkable generosity of the British attitude. At a time when, +owing to the Boer attacks upon the railway, the utmost difficulty was +experienced in getting supplies from the thousand-miles'-distant base +at the coast, Lord Roberts was compelled to send away a part of the +civilian population to General Botha, and they were removed by the +Boer Commandant-General to Barberton. That is to say, while the +British, on the one hand, were giving part of the supplies on which +the existence of their troops depended, to the non-combatant +population of the enemy, the enemy, on the other hand, was doing his +utmost to destroy the single line of railway which alone stood between +the British Army and starvation. When, therefore, Lord Kitchener +succeeded to the command of the British forces in South Africa +(November 29th, 1900), he found the task of disarmament complicated by +two factors. There was the desire of the Home Government that the war +should be conducted upon the humane lines hitherto adopted, and there +was also the fact that the Imperial troops were not numerous enough to +occupy effectively the whole territory of the Republics, or, in other +words, to do the one thing of all others necessary to make this humane +conduct of the war consistent with military success. It was +impossible, with the troops at his disposal, for Lord Kitchener to +hold the enormous territory of the conquered Republics. It was +impossible, perhaps, to support a larger force in a country so poorly +provided with food supplies and means of communication. An +alternative plan had to be found. This plan was to remove the horses, +cattle, and food supplies from the areas which he was unable to +occupy, and to transport the non-combatant inhabitants to places where +they could be both fed and protected. And, when this had been +done--or, more correctly, while it was in process of being done--he +had to capture the small, mobile bodies of burghers operating over the +whole of the unprotected area of the late Republics and the Cape +Colony, and to collect gradually the fighting Boers, captured or +surrendered, into the colonial or over-sea prisoners' camps. + +Certain districts, of which those surrounding the towns of Kimberley, +Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were the more important, had +from the first been effectively occupied and securely held. All the +troops at Lord Kitchener's disposal, that were not absorbed in the +work of garrisoning these districts and maintaining the lines of +communication, were organised into mobile columns, which were +distributed among General Officers respectively attached to a +particular area. In a despatch of July 8th, 1901, Lord Kitchener was +able to report that, as the result of the recent work of these mobile +columns, the Boers, although "still able, in case of emergency, to +concentrate a considerable number of men," were, in his opinion, +"unable to undertake any large scheme of operations." Apart from the +heavy drain from prisoners captured and deaths in the field, the loss +of their ox-waggons had seriously affected their mobility and supply +arrangements. + + "Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men," he + writes, "they are scattered all over the country without plans + and without hope, and on the approach of our troops they + disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men + pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance + without retaining anything, or defending the smallest portion of + this vast country." + +He estimates that there are not more than 13,500[256] Boers in the +field in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony. +But he adds that-- + + [Footnote 256: This estimate was very much too small: at the + Vereeniging surrender, when many thousands more of Boers had + been captured or killed 21,256 burghers and rebels laid down + their arms. Cd. 988.] + + "with long lines of railway to hold, every yard of which has to + be defended, both to secure our own civil and military supplies, + and, what is more important, to prevent the enemy from obtaining + necessaries from the capture of our trains, the employment of + large numbers of troops continues to be a necessity.... The Boer + party who declared war have quitted the field, and are now urging + those whom they deserted to continue a useless struggle by giving + lying assurances to the ignorant burghers of outside assistance, + and by raising absurdly deceitful hopes that Great Britain has + not sufficient endurance to see the matter through."[257] + + [Footnote 257: Cd. 695.] + +But it had become evident that some more systematic effort was +required for the capture of the commandos, unless the slow task of +wearing down the Boer resistance was to be almost indefinitely +protracted; and this same month of July, 1901, witnessed the extension +of the blockhouse lines, which proved the turning-point in the +guerilla war. The origin of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouse +defence is described by him in his despatch of August 8th, 1901. + +[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.] + + "Experience had shown," he writes, "that the line of defensible + posts, extending across the Orange River Colony, from Jacobsdal + to Ladybrand, constituted a considerable obstacle to the free + movement of the enemies' roving bands, and that the gradual + completion of chains of blockhouses placed at intervals of a + mile, sometimes less, along the Transvaal and Orange River Colony + railways, had obtained for our traffic a comparative security + which it had not previously enjoyed."[258] + + [Footnote 258: Cd. 820.] + +In July, therefore, Lord Kitchener made arrangements for the +construction of three additional lines of blockhouses. The first ran +from Aliwal North westward, following the course of the Orange River, to +Bethulie, and was continued thence alongside the railway through +Stormberg, Rosmead, Naauwpoort, and De Aar, northward to Kimberley. The +second commenced at Frederickstad and ran northward by the source of the +Mooi River to Breed's Nek in the Magaliesberg, from which point it was +connected with the British garrison at Commando Nek, and thus screened +the western side of the Pretoria and Johannesburg area. The third, +running from Eerste Fabriken in the north, by Springs and Heidelberg, +southward to the Vaal River, protected the same district from attack +upon the east. These new blockhouse lines, Lord Kitchener wrote, +promised to be of much assistance in the future. Not only did they +protect the British communications, and render inter-communication +between the different portions of the Boer forces difficult, but, in the +absence of frontiers, natural or artificial, they served as barriers +against which the British mobile columns were able to drive bands of the +enemy and force them to surrender. Indeed, the blockhouse lines proved +the chief instrument of success; for with the gradual extension of the +system, the area of active hostilities was confined in an increasing +degree to the vast half-deserted regions through which the commandos +roamed, and the British columns swept at intervals in pursuit of them. + +A month later, August 8th, Lord Kitchener reported a further step in +advance. He had formed "some specially mobile columns for independent +and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some +distance from the operations of other troops." The commanders of these +new mobile columns had a free hand in respect of their movements, +since they were guided by the special intelligence, which they +themselves collected, and not solely by information from headquarters. +The effect produced by the development of the blockhouse system, +combined with the greater freedom of initiative allowed to the new +mobile columns, became apparent in the increasing number of Boers +captured or voluntarily surrendering themselves in the month of +August, when altogether more than two thousand of the enemy were +accounted for.[259] On the 7th of this month the delayed[260] +proclamation was issued, and a date--September 15th--was fixed as the +limit within which the guerilla leaders might, by voluntarily +surrendering, avoid certain penalties which were duly set out. In +order to counteract the effect of this action on the part of the +British Government, General Botha stimulated his followers to +increased military enterprise. + + [Footnote 259: There were 186 killed, 75 wounded, 1,384 + prisoners, 529 voluntary surrenders; while 930 rifles, 90,958 + rounds of ammunition, 1,332 waggons and carts, 13,570 horses, + and 65,879 cattle were captured. Cd. 820.] + + [Footnote 260: See p. 420.] + + "But," says Lord Kitchener, "though there has been no general + surrender, the device to which the Commandant-General resorted + for turning the thoughts of his burghers in another direction has + probably cost him and his cause [a heavier loss] than a simple + pursuance of the usual evasive tactics would have even entailed." + +[Sidenote: Large captures of Boers.] + +The precise extent of this loss is shown in the returns for September, +which record captures and surrenders almost as numerous as those of +the preceding month. + + "It cannot be expected," Lord Kitchener adds, "even under the + most favourable conditions, that in the presence of the + ever-diminishing numbers opposing us in the field, these figures + can be maintained, but I feel confident that so long as any + resistance is continued, no exertion will be spared either by + officers or men of this force to carry out the task they still + have before them."[261] + + [Footnote 261: Cd. 820. The September returns were: 170 Boers + killed in action, 114 wounded prisoners, 1,385 unwounded + prisoners, and 1,393 surrenders.] + +[Sidenote: The railway lines secured.] + +In another month a position had been reached in which it was possible for +the work of administrative reconstruction--interrupted a year ago by the +development of the guerilla warfare--to be resumed. At this date +(November, 1901), the resistance of the Dutch population had been weakened +by the loss of 53,000 fighting Boers, of whom 42,000 were in British +custody, while the rest had been killed, wounded, or otherwise put out of +action. In the Transvaal 14,700 square miles, and in the Orange River +Colony 17,000 square miles of territory had been enclosed by blockhouse +lines. A square formed roughly by lines running respectively from +Klerksdorp to Zeerust on the west, from Zeerust to Middelburg on the +north, from Middelburg to Standerton on the east, and from Standerton to +Klerksdorp on the south, enclosing Pretoria and the Rand, was the +protected area of the Transvaal. The whole of the Orange River Colony +south of the blockhouse line, Kimberley-Winberg-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand, +was also a protected area; and the Cape Colony, south of the main railway +lines, was similarly screened off. But an application of what may be +termed "the railway-cutting test" yields, perhaps, the most eloquent +testimony both to the magnitude of the original task undertaken by the +Imperial troops, and to the degree of success which had been obtained. In +October, 1900, the railway lines, upon which the British troops depended +for supplies of food and ammunition, were cut thirty-two times, or more +than once a day. The number of times in which they were cut in the +succeeding November was thirty; in December twenty-one; in January, 1901, +sixteen; in February, as the result of De Wet's invasion of the Cape +Colony, they were cut thirty times; in March eighteen; in April eighteen; +in May twelve; in June eight; in July four; in August four; in September +twice; and in October not at all. Still more significant of the approach +of peace was the fact that now, for the first time, the British population +was allowed to return to Johannesburg in any considerable numbers.[262] + + [Footnote 262: In August 648 refugees returned; in November + the number had risen to 2,623.] + +It remains to consider two questions which cannot be omitted from any +account; however brief, of the manner in which the disarmament of the +Dutch in South Africa was effected. The first of these is the charge +of inhumanity brought against the Imperial military authorities in +respect of the deportation of the Boer non-combatants to the Burgher +Camps; and the second is the actual effect produced upon the burghers +in the field by the public denunciations of the war by members of the +Liberal Opposition in England. + +[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.] + +In charging the British Government and Lord Kitchener with inhumanity +in the conduct of the war, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and other friends +of the Boer cause relied in the main upon the circumstance that a +certain proportion of the Boer population was removed compulsorily +from districts which the British troops were unable to occupy +effectively, and upon the further fact that the Burgher Camps +exhibited an unusually high rate of mortality. The necessity for the +removal of this non-combatant population will scarcely be disputed in +view of the methods adopted by the Boer leaders to compel the burghers +to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops, and the fact that +nearly every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, inhabited +by the Dutch, served as an intelligence office, a recruiting depot, +and a base of supplies for the roving commandos. Nor will it be denied +that the responsibility for the unnecessary suffering incurred by the +Boer people in the guerilla war rests upon those of the Boer leaders +who formed and enforced the decision to continue the struggle, and not +upon the British Government. The alleged "inhumanity," therefore, of +the Imperial military authorities consists in the circumstance that, +instead of leaving these helpless non-combatants to be supported by +the Boer leaders, they removed them to places of security, where they +were fed, housed, and generally maintained, in as little discomfort as +circumstances permitted. If the lesser suffering of the Burgher Camps +was the only alternative to greater suffering, and possibly +starvation, on the veld, the Boers had only their own leaders to thank +for the position in which they found themselves. The death-rate of the +Burgher Camps was exceptionally high as compared with that of any +ordinary European community. But the population of the camps was no +less exceptional. It consisted of women and children, with a small +proportion of adult males; and of all these the majority had come to +the camps as refugees, insufficiently clothed, weakened by exposure +and often by starvation. Obviously the death-rate of such a refugee +community would be much higher, under the most favourable conditions, +than that of an ordinary European town; and, in order to find a valid +point of comparison, we must seek statistics provided by similar +collections of refugees, brought together under the like exceptional +circumstances. We are unable to find any such parallel case, for the +sufficient reason that history records no other example of a nation at +war which, at the risk of impairing the efficiency of its own forces +in the field, has endeavoured, not merely to feed and clothe, but to +house, nurse, and even educate the non-combatant population of its +enemy. + +[Sidenote: Reduction of the death-rate.] + +What we do know, however, is that, of the total deaths in these camps +of refuge, the great majority were those of infants and children. +This is a circumstance which in itself goes far to make the excess of +the camp death-rate apparent rather than real; since, in the first +place, the Boer mothers, owing to their insanitary habits and +ignorance,[263] are not accustomed to bring more than one out of every +two children to maturity; and in the second, the rate of infant +mortality is abnormally high, as compared with that of a given +community as a whole, even in the most highly developed countries. The +highest monthly death-rate was that of October, 1901, when, out of a +population of 112,109 in all camps, there were 3,205 deaths, or 344 +per thousand per annum.[264] But of these deaths, 500 only (in round +numbers) were those of adults, and 2,700 were those of children. That +is to say, in this worst month we have in the refugee camps an adult +death-rate of (roughly) 50 per thousand, as compared with a European +death-rate varying from 16.7 in Norway to 33.2 in Hungary,[265] and a +children's death-rate of 300 per thousand, as compared with the 208 +per thousand of the contemporary rate of infant mortality in +thirty-three great towns of the United Kingdom, or in Birkenhead alone +of 362 per thousand. And from this time forward the death-rate of the +refugee camps was rapidly reduced. The reason for this reduction is +significant. By the development of the blockhouse lines the British +military authorities had been enabled to protect their supplies from +the attacks of the guerilla leaders. In other words, Lord Kitchener +was now able to defend the Boer non-combatants against the efforts +made by their own leaders to deprive them of food and other +necessaries of life. And ultimately the mortality in the Burgher Camps +was reduced to a point "much below the normal rates under ordinary +local circumstances."[266] + + [Footnote 263: For the grotesque, repulsive, and even fatal + remedies employed by the Boer women in the treatment of their + children in sickness, the reader is referred to the medical + reports on the condition of the refugee camps published in + the Blue-book.] + + [Footnote 264: The figures are those given by Miss Hobhouse, + as based upon the official returns (_The Brunt of the War_, + pp. 329-31).] + + [Footnote 265: _I.e._ annual per 1,000 on a basis of 25 years + (1874-98).] + + [Footnote 266: Cd. 1,163, p. 159. See also _ibid._, p. 151, + and p. 178. Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer + complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps (made by + Acting President Schalk Burger), is as follows: + + "Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part + of this year (1901), by surrendered burghers, who stated + that after they laid down their arms their families were + ill-treated, and their stock and property confiscated by + order of the Commandant-Generals of the Transvaal and + Orange Free State. These acts appear to have been taken + in consequence of the circular dated Roos Senekal, 6th + November, 1900, in which the Commandant-General says: + 'Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers + laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do + not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or + immovable, and also to burn their houses.' + + "I took occasion, at my interview with + Commandant-General Louis Botha (February 28th, 1901), to + bring this matter before him, and I told him that if he + continued such acts I should be forced to bring in all + women and children, and as much property as possible, to + protect them from the acts of his burghers. I further + inquired if he would agree to spare the farms and + families of neutral or surrendered burghers, in which + case I expressed my willingness to leave undisturbed the + farms and families of burghers who were on commando, + provided they did not actively assist their relatives. + The Commandant-General emphatically refused even to + consider any such arrangement. He said: 'I am entitled + by law to force every man to join, and if they do not do + so to confiscate their property, and leave their + families on the veld.' I asked him what course I could + pursue to protect surrendered burghers and their + families, and he then said, 'The only thing you can do, + is to send them out of the country, as if I catch them + they must suffer.' After this there was nothing more to + be said, and as military operations do not permit of the + protection of individuals, I had practically no choice + but to continue my system of bringing inhabitants of + certain areas into the protection of our lines. My + decision was conveyed to the Commandant-General in my + official letter, dated Pretoria, 16th April, 1901, from + which the following is an extract: + + "'As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the + irregular manner in which you have conducted and + continue to conduct hostilities, by forcing unwilling + and peaceful inhabitants to join your Commandos, a + proceeding totally unauthorised by the recognised + customs of war, I have no other course open to me, and + am forced to take the very unpleasant and repugnant + steps of bringing in the women and children. + + "'I have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of + these poor people, which I have done my best to + alleviate, and it is a matter of surprise to me and to + the whole civilised world, that your Honour considers + yourself justified in still causing so much suffering to + the people of the Transvaal, by carrying on a hopeless + and useless struggle.' + + "From the foregoing, it will, I believe, be perfectly + clear that the responsibility for the action complained + of by Mr. Burger (the so-styled Acting State President + of the Transvaal), rests rather with the + Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange Free + State, than with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in + South Africa.... + + "It is not the case that every area has been cleared of + the families of burghers, although this might be + inferred from the despatch under discussion. On the + contrary, very large numbers of women and children are + still out, either in Boer Camps or on their farms, and + my Column Commanders have orders to leave them alone, + unless it is clear that they must starve if they are + left out upon the veld.... + + "Finally, I indignantly and entirely deny the + accusations of rough and cruel treatment of women and + children who were being brought in from their farms to + the camp. Hardships may have been sometimes inseparable + from the process, but the Boer women in our hands + themselves bear the most eloquent testimony to the + kindness and consideration shown to them by our soldiers + on all such occasions." + + With this statement it is interesting to compare Sir Henry + Campbell-Bannerman's words at Bath, November 20th, 1901: + + "Is our hypocrisy so great that we actually flatter + ourselves upon our great humanity, because we have saved + from starvation those whose danger of starvation we have + caused?... The hypocrisy of these excuses is almost more + loathsome than the cruelty itself.... We have set + ourselves to punish this country, to reduce it + apparently to ruin, because it has ventured to make war + against us." + + Truly an extraordinary attitude for a future Prime Minister + of England!] + +The charge of prolonging the war by public declarations of sympathy +with the enemy[267] was definitely formulated against certain members +of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish Nationalist party by Lord St. +Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), at Oldham on October 10th, 1901. + + [Footnote 267: What was even worse than such declarations of + sympathy with the Boers was the manifestation of hostility + against the loyalist population of South Africa. _E.g._ Sir + William Harcourt (in a letter in _The Times_ of December + 17th, 1900), wrote: "I sometimes think that those bellicose + gentlemen--especially those who do not fight--must + occasionally cast longing, lingering looks towards the times + before they were subsidised (_sic_) by the authors of the + Raid to bring about the position in which they now find + themselves."] + +[Sidenote: Why the war was prolonged.] + + "The real cause of the prolongation of this war has been + something which, on my word, I believe could never have been seen + in any other country in the world. It has been the speeches in + Parliament of British members of the House of Commons, doing + everything they could against their country and in favour of her + enemies. It has been articles in certain journals taking + absolutely the same lines--I am not talking of mere attacks on + his Majesty's Government, or even calumnies of individual + ministers, that is part of the ordinary machinery of political + warfare, and one of the advantages of an absolutely free Press. + No, what I am talking of is the prominence given to the opinions + and sentiments of men who were called Pro-Boers, as if they + represented the feelings of a large section of their + fellow-countrymen. The invention of lies, like the alleged + quarrel between Lord Kitchener and the War Office, was intended + to damage this country in the conduct of the war, as was also the + wicked charges made against the humanity of our generals and our + soldiers in the Concentration Camps and in the field, the + attempts, such as I saw only the other day in one of these + papers, to prove that in those gallant contests at Fort + Itala[268] and on the borders of Natal our soldiers had not + repulsed their enemies, but were themselves the defeated party. + We here do not attach any importance to those things. We rate + them at their true value because we know something about their + authors--but what do you think is thought of them when they go + out to South Africa? What do the Boers and their leaders think + when they read the newspapers written in England which are full + of these things? The Boers have many faults, but they are a + simple and patriotic people. They never can imagine that English + newspapers would print these things, that English members of + Parliament would speak them, taking always the side of their + country's enemies, unless these things were true. They are + deceived. They greedily swallow all this as representing the + opinion of a great section of the public in this country, and + those who have said these things and those who have circulated + them are the parties who are guilty before God of prolonging this + war. There are the Irish Nationalists. Let me read to you words + which I heard with the greatest pain in the last session of + Parliament from the leader of the Irish Nationalists, a man of + consummate eloquence and perfect self-control. What did Mr. John + Redmond say? He prayed God that the resistance of the Boers might + be strengthened, and that South Africa might take vengeance for + its wrongs by separating itself from the Empire which had deluged + it with blood, and become a free and independent nation. We in + England pass over words of that sort, though I believe they would + not have been uttered with impunity by a member of the + Legislative Assembly of any other country in the world." + + [Footnote 268: September 26th, 1901. See Cd. 820 for report + of this action.] + +[Sidenote: Campbell-Bannerman's reply.] + +Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reply to the charge brought against him +by Lord St. Aldwyn, and subsequently by Lord Salisbury,[269] is +contained in the words following, which were spoken by him at +Plymouth, on November 19th: + + [Footnote 269: Letter to Miss Milner, November 11th, 1901. + See p. 416.] + + "Now I declare, ladies and gentlemen, for myself, that from first + to last I have never uttered one syllable that could be twisted + by any ingenuity into encouragement by the Boers. No, I have + never even expressed ordinary pity for, or sympathy with them, + because I did not wish to run the risk of being misunderstood. + What I have done, and what I hope I shall continue to do, is to + denounce the stupidity of the way in which the Government were + dealing with the Boers." + +There is only one method by which the amazing effrontery of this +denial can be sufficiently exhibited. It is to place underneath it +quotations from speeches delivered by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman +himself at Stirling on October 25th, by Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P., at +Galashiels on October 14th, and by Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., at Dundee +on October 16th, as printed in the "Official Organ of the Orange Free +State Government," dated September 21st, 1901, a copy of which was +found in a Boer laager on the veld. The extracts selected are these: + +Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman: + + "The whole country in the two belligerent States, outside the + mining towns, is a howling wilderness. The farms are burned, the + country is wasted. The flocks and herds are either butchered or + driven off; the mills are destroyed, furniture and instruments of + agriculture smashed. These things are what I have termed methods + of barbarism. I adhere to the phrase. I cannot improve upon it. + If these are not the methods of barbarism, what methods did + barbarism employ?... My belief is that the mass of the British + people ... do not desire to see a brave people subjugated or + annihilated." + +Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P.: + + "The war was unnecessary, and therefore unjust.... He wished he + could agree that we were fighting in a just cause, that we had + always fought according to acknowledged civilised methods; but as + an honest man he could not do so." + +Mr. Edmund Robertson, M.P.: + + "The victory of the Government (at the last General Election) had + been the main cause of the prolongation of the war. If they had + been defeated their successors would have been men with a free + hand, and the Boers themselves might have been ready to make + concessions, which they would not make, and had not made, to + those whom they believed to be their enemies and persecutors. If + the Empire was to be saved, the Government must be + destroyed."[270] + + [Footnote 270: The facts are stated in a letter published in + _The Times_ on March 10th, 1902.] + +Can any human being of ordinary intelligence believe that these +passages, containing denunciations of the war, were circulated by +Ex-President Steyn for any other purpose than that of encouraging the +burghers to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops? + +And to this evidence may be added the protest made by "An Old +Berliner" in _The Times_ of November 27th, 1901: + +[Sidenote: "Methods of barbarism".] + + "What I want to impress upon your readers is the much more + serious and, indeed, incalculable mischief done by the public + utterances of responsible politicians, and, to take the most + pernicious example of all, by the reckless language of Sir Henry + Campbell-Bannerman. The words he uttered about England's methods + of barbarism have been used ever since as the watchwords of + England's detractors throughout the length and breadth of + Germany."[271] + + [Footnote 271: See also note, p. 399 (Extract from the + _Vossische Zeitung_). The baseless and malevolent allegations + of specific acts of inhumanity or outrage on the part of + British soldiers, circulated by Boer sympathisers in England + and on the continent of Europe, have been passed over in + silence. For an exposure of these calumnies the reader is + referred to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's _The War in South + Africa_ (Smith, Elder). A record of the manner in which they + were repudiated by the Boer population in South Africa will + be found in Cd. 1, 163, pp. 99, 106-111, 113-121. Among those + who protested were German subjects, and Germans who had + become British subjects, resident in South Africa. Perhaps + the most significant of all these protests is the resolution + passed unanimously by the members of the Natal House of + Assembly, all standing: "That this House desires to repudiate + the false charges of inhumanity brought against His Majesty's + Army by a section of the inhabitants of the continent of + Europe and certain disloyal subjects within the British + Isles, and this House places on record its deliberate + conviction that the war in South Africa has been prosecuted + by His Majesty's Government and Army upon lines of humanity + and consideration for the enemy unparalleled in the history + of nations."] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +PREPARING FOR PEACE + + +We have already noticed that arrangements were made in October, 1900, +under which the High Commissionership was to be separated from the +Governorship of the Cape Colony in order that Lord Milner might be +free to undertake the work of administrative reconstruction in the new +colonies. In pursuance of this decision of the Home Government, Lord +Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony +upon the departure of Lord Roberts (November 29th, 1900); but +circumstances did not permit him to resign the governorship of the +Cape Colony and remove to the Transvaal until three months later. The +new Governor of the Cape Colony was Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who +was himself succeeded, as Governor of Natal, by Sir Henry E. McCallum; +and at the same time (March 1st, 1901), Sir H. (then Major) +Goold-Adams was appointed Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River +Colony, where he took over the duties hitherto discharged by General +Pretyman as Military Governor. + +[Sidenote: Milner in the Transvaal.] + +Lord Milner left Capetown to assume the administration of the new +colonies on February 28th, 1901. The incidents of his journey +northwards are illustrative alike of the state of South Africa at this +time, and of the varied responsibilities of the High Commissioner. +After three months of continuous and successful conflict with the +forces of rebellion in the south, he was suddenly confronted with a +situation in the north even more pregnant with the possibilities of +disaster. This was the day on which Commandant-General Louis Botha +entered the British lines at Middelburg to treat for peace with +General Lord Kitchener; and many counsels of precaution sped +northwards upon the wires as the High Commissioner's train crossed the +plains and wound slowly up through the mountain passes that led to the +higher levels of the Karroo plateau. March 1st, which was spent in the +train, was the most idle day that Lord Milner had passed for many +months. The respite was of short duration. At midnight, directly after +the train had left De Aar junction, a long telegram from Lord +Kitchener, giving the substance of his interview with Botha, caught +the High Commissioner. But if peace was in the air in the north, war +held the field in the south. From De Aar to Bloemfontein the railway +line was astir with British troops, concentrating or dispersing, in +pursuit of De Wet. At Bloemfontein station Lord Milner was met (March +2nd) by Lord Kitchener, and the nature of the reply to be given to +Botha was discussed between them. On the next morning Lord Milner's +saloon car was attached to the Commander-in-Chief's train, and a long +telegram was drafted and despatched to London.[272] The position which +Lord Milner took up on this occasion, and afterwards at the final +negotiations of Vereeniging, was that which he had himself condensed +in the two words "never again." He was anxious for peace; no man more +than he; but a peace upon terms that would leave South Africa with the +remotest prospect of a return to the abnormal political conditions +which had made the war inevitable, he regarded as a disaster to be +avoided at all costs. This telegram despatched, the train left +Bloemfontein, and, in spite of more than one sign of the proximity of +the Boer raiders, it reached Pretoria without delay at 9 a.m. on March +4th. The next ten days Lord Milner remained at the capital of the +Transvaal, in constant communication with the Home Government on the +subject of the peace negotiations[273] with the Boers, which +ultimately proved abortive; but on the 9th he went over to +Johannesburg for the day to see the house which was being prepared for +his occupation. On the 15th he left Pretoria finally for Johannesburg. +He was received at the station by a guard of honour furnished by the +Rand Rifles, and, thus escorted, drove to Sunnyside, a pleasant house +in what is now the suburb of Parktown, commanding an unbroken view +over the veld to the Magaliesberg range beyond Pretoria; and here +he continued to reside until he left South Africa on April 2nd, 1905. + + [Footnote 272: This telegram is printed in Cd. 528.] + + [Footnote 273: For the nature of these "Middelburg terms," + see forward in note 2 on p. 568.] + +[Illustration: _By permission of the Argus Printing and Publishing +Co., Ltd., Johannesburg._ + +Lord Milner at Sunnyside.] + +[Sidenote: Affairs in the Cape colony.] + +From this time forward (March 15th, 1901), Lord Milner's +administrative activity is primarily concerned with the Transvaal and +Orange River Colony. Owing, however, to the continued resistance of +the Boers and the extension of the area of hostilities by the second +invasion of the Cape Colony, the administrative development of the new +colonies was confined within the narrowest limits, until six months of +strenuous military operations had enabled Lord Kitchener to render the +protected areas and the railways virtually secure against the raids of +the Boer commandos. Four out of these six months were occupied by Lord +Milner's second visit to England (May-August, 1901). But before we +approach this episode, and thereby resume the main current of the +narrative, it is necessary to trace the course of events in the Cape +Colony. With the government of the Colony once more in the hands of +the British party, Lord Milner had been relieved of the acute and +constant anxieties that marked his official relationship to the +Afrikander Ministry. On the vital question of the necessity of +establishing British authority upon terms that would make any +repetition of the war impossible, Sir Gordon Sprigg and his ministers +were absolutely at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government. +Whatever differences of opinion arose subsequently between the Cape +ministers and the Imperial authorities were differences not of +principle but of detail. For the most part they were such as would +have manifested themselves in any circumstances in a country where the +civil government was compelled, by the exigencies of war, to surrender +some of its powers to the military authority. + +[Sidenote: The Bond and peace.] + +By supporting the Treason Bill, Mr. Schreiner and Sir Richard Solomon +had dissociated themselves from the Afrikander nationalists; and +henceforward their influence was used unreservedly on the side of +British supremacy.[274] On the other hand, Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, +as we have seen, had openly denounced the policy of the Imperial +Government, and no less openly advocated the aims, and defended the +methods, of the Afrikander Bond. The Bond's determination to do all in +its power to secure the independence of the Boers, and thereby defeat +the policy of the Imperial Government, was manifested by the abrupt +refusal of its leaders to associate themselves with the efforts of the +Burgher Peace Committee. Mr. P. de Wet and the other peace delegates +who had visited the Colony in the circumstances already mentioned, +desired the Bond to co-operate with them by informing the republican +leaders that they must expect no military assistance from the +Afrikander party, and by formally advising them to end the war in the +interests of the Afrikander population. The details of the incident, +as recorded in the Blue-book,[275] show that Mr. Theron, the President +of the Provincial Bestuur of the Bond and a member of the Legislative +Assembly, was at first disposed to regard the proposal of the peace +delegates with favour. But, after expressing himself to this effect at +Wellington, on February 15th, 1901, he went to Capetown to consult the +Bond leaders on the matter, and, as the result of this consultation, +he wrote to Mr. de Wet, five days later, declining to meet the peace +delegates again, or negotiate with them, on the ground that the +"principles of the Afrikander Bond" would be prejudiced by his +entering into official negotiations with the deputation, whose +official status he was unable, after inquiry, to recognise. It is +difficult not to connect this summary treatment of the peace delegates +by the Bond with the fact that, just at this time, General C. de Wet +was reporting to General Louis Botha that the "Cape Colony had risen +to a man."[276] However this may be, the wholesale manner in which the +Afrikander Bond had identified itself in the country districts with +the Boer invaders is sufficiently displayed by a return published six +months later, from which it appears that, out of a total of +thirty-three men holding official positions in the Bond organisation +in three districts in the Cape Colony, twenty-seven were accused of +high treason, of whom twenty-four were convicted, two absconded, and +one was acquitted.[277] + + [Footnote 274: Sir Richard Solomon was appointed legal + adviser to the new Transvaal Administration.] + + [Footnote 275: Cd. 903.] + + [Footnote 276: See p. 431.] + + [Footnote 277: Cd. 903.] + +With the Bond in this mood, with certain districts practically +maintaining the enemy and certain other districts constantly exposed +to the incursions of the guerilla leaders, with a large proportion of +the loyalist population fighting at the front, and a still larger +number organised for local defence, and with the whole of the Colony, +except the ports, under martial law, it was obviously impossible for +the machinery of representative government to continue in its normal +course. + +[Sidenote: Anti-British libels.] + +The registration of electors, which, under the provisions of the +colonial law, was directed to take place not later than the last day +of February, 1901, was postponed to a more convenient season. The +existing register, while it contained the names of--it was +estimated--ten thousand persons disfranchised, or about to be +disfranchised, for rebellion, and of some thousands of others then in +arms against their sovereign, failed to include persons who had +acquired the necessary qualifications since the date of the last +registration (1899). Apart from the unsatisfactory condition of the +voters' lists, there were other circumstances that made it undesirable +as well as difficult not merely to hold the elections necessary to +fill up the nine or ten vacant seats in the Legislative Assembly, but +even to summon Parliament. Locomotion in many parts of the Colony was +inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous. So large a proportion of the +members of both chambers were absent in Europe, or engaged either in +repelling the invaders or in repressing rebellion, that the remainder, +if assembled, would present a mere simulacrum of the actual +legislature of the Colony. Moreover, it was necessary that no fresh +opportunities for promoting disaffection should be provided by +discussions in Parliament or contested elections. The "carnival of +mendacity" which, culminating in the Worcester Congress, was mainly +responsible for the second invasion of the Colony, had been +inaugurated by the inflammatory speeches delivered in the last session +of Parliament by the Afrikander members during the debates on the +Treason Bill. The spirit of malevolence displayed at this period by +the anti-British Press, whether printed in Dutch or in English, may be +inferred from the list of convictions reported on April 19th by Sir W. +Hely-Hutchinson to the Colonial Office. Mr. Albert Cartwright, editor +of _The South African News_ (the reputed organ of Mr. Merriman and Mr. +Sauer), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and +sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment without hard labour. Mr. +Advocate Malan, editor of _Ons Land_ (the reputed organ of Mr. +Hofmeyr), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on General French, +and sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. Mr. de Jong, editor +of _The Worcester Advertiser_, and Mr. Vosloo, editor of _Het Oosten_, +were both convicted of the same offence as Mr. Malan, and sentenced to +six months' imprisonment without hard labour, while the former was +further charged with a seditious libel attributing atrocities to the +British troops, in respect of which he was convicted and sentenced to +a fine of L100 or two months' imprisonment.[278] + + [Footnote 278: Cd. 903.] + +The extension of martial law in January (1901) had made such excesses, +whether on the platform or in the Press, no longer possible. But the +Afrikander nationalists in the ports, and especially in Capetown, +continued to render assistance to the guerilla leaders, both by +providing intelligence of the plans of the British military +authorities, and by forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition, until +the time (October 9th) when these towns were placed, like the rest of +the Colony, under martial law. + +In these circumstances Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, acting on the advice of +his ministers, prorogued the Cape Parliament from time to time, until +the actual termination of hostilities made it possible for the +inhabitants of the Colony to return to the normal conditions of their +political life. As, however, the provision for the ordinary cost of +administration made by the Colonial Parliament in its last session did +not extend beyond June 30th, 1901, it became necessary to provide for +the expenditure of the Colony after this date by the issue of +Governor's warrants, under which the Treasurer-General was authorised +to pay out funds in anticipation of legislative authority. This +technically illegal procedure, by which the authority of the Governor +was substituted temporarily for that of Parliament, was advised by the +Cape ministers and sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain. In this way +provision was made for the financial needs of the Government; and +when, after the war, the Cape Parliament was able to meet again, the +necessary bills of indemnity, legalising these acts of the Governor +and acts committed by the military authorities in the administration +of martial law, were passed in due course.[279] + + [Footnote 279: The action of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson was not + without precedent. See Cd. 903, pp. 57 and 67, and p. 123, + _supra_.] + +[Sidenote: Breakdown of government.] + +The only alternative course was the suspension, or abrogation, of the +Cape constitution by the Home Government. In view of the appeal for +the suspension of the constitution made to Mr. Chamberlain a year +later, and refused by him--an appeal which was endorsed by the +judgment both of Lord Milner and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and supported by +the majority of the loyalists of both nationalities--it is interesting +to observe that petitions addressed to the Governor in June, 1901, +reveal a considerable body of opinion in favour of the proposal at +this date. These petitions came from the British inhabitants of the +small towns in the Eastern Province, since, in the vigorous language +of one of the petitioners, "it's those who live in small towns that +feel the Bond's iron heel." And the same correspondent asserts that a +great number of persons have been prevented from signing the petition, +although they approve of it, by fear of the "Bond boycott," adding, +"Some of the Bond members have already remarked, 'Now martial law is +on we are not in it; but wait until it's removed, then it will be our +turn.'"[280] + + [Footnote 280: Cd. 903.] + +The collapse of the system of responsible government in the Cape +Colony was complete. The truth upon which Lord Durham insisted in his +famous Report on Canada, that responsible government is only possible +where an effective majority of the inhabitants are British, was once +more demonstrated. In the granting of supplies, the characteristic +function of the lower chamber, the authority of the Governor was now +substituted for that of Parliament. The endeavour to check the +rebellion by the agency of the civil courts had been already +abandoned. The lenient penalties of the Treason Bill had produced a +large increase of disaffection. On April 6th, 1901, a notice was +issued by the Attorney-General warning the public that "any act of +treason or rebellion and any crime of a political character" committed +after the 12th instant would be brought no longer before the Special +Tribunals, with their mitigated penalties created by the Act of 1900, +but dealt with by the ordinary courts, and punishable by the severe +penalties of the common law of the Colony. But this warning of the +Attorney-General was superseded a fortnight later (April 22nd), by a +notice, issued by Lord Kitchener and published by the Cape +Government, under which it was declared that-- + +[Sidenote: The military courts.] + + "All subjects of His[281] Majesty and all persons residing in the + Cape Colony who shall, in districts thereof in which martial law + prevails, be actively in arms against His Majesty, or who shall + directly invite others to take up arms against him, or who shall + actively aid or assist the enemy or commit any overt act by which + the safety of His Majesty's forces or subjects is endangered, + shall immediately on arrest be tried by court martial, convened + by my authority, and shall on conviction be liable to the + severest penalties of the law." + + [Footnote 281: Queen Victoria died January 22nd, 1901.] + +The decision to deal with such cases by military courts was taken by +Lord Kitchener, after consultation with Lord Milner, on the ground +that the state of the midland and north-western districts was such +that "only prompt and severe punishment could stop the spread of +rebellion and prevent general anarchy."[282] The Cape Government, +however, in assenting to the measure, stipulated that certain +conditions should be laid down for the constitution and procedure of +the military courts, sufficient to check the more obvious abuses to +which such tribunals are liable. These conditions, as expressed in a +minute of Sir James Innes, the Attorney-General, were embodied in a +set of instructions issued by Lord Kitchener to his officers +concurrently with the publication of the notice of April 22nd. Nor was +this all. In view of the continued assistance known to be rendered to +the Boer and rebel commandos by the Afrikander nationalists, martial +law was extended, on October 9th, to the Cape ports; and on December +2nd the British Government announced that, as the result of the +establishment of martial law at the South African ports, no persons +would be allowed to land in South Africa from January 1st, 1902, +onwards without a permit, except under certain special circumstances.[283] + + [Footnote 282: Cd. 983.] + + [Footnote 283: Cd. 903. These measures were taken upon Lord + Milner's return to the Transvaal (September, 1901) after his + visit to England. The scandal of the almost open co-operation + of the Bond with the Boer leaders had become notorious, and + this assistance was recognised as a contributory cause to the + protraction of the guerilla war.] + +Ample evidence alike of the necessity of these measures, and of the +_de facto_ suspension of the constitution, is provided by a Minister's +minute of September 12th, 1901. The immediate object of the minute is +to advise the Governor that it is impossible, in the opinion of the +Cape Ministry, to avoid the further prorogation of Parliament; and +this, although the Constitution Ordinance requires the Cape Parliament +to meet "once at least every year," and cannot, therefore, be complied +with, unless Parliament is summoned "for the despatch of business on +or before Saturday, 12th October." In support of this decision Sir +Gordon Sprigg and his colleagues referred to the Military Intelligence +Report for the current month, which showed that, south of the Orange +River, there were a dozen or more commandos, with a total of from +1,800 to 2,000 men; while in the portion of the Colony north of the +river there were "numerous commandos also roaming about." Then follows +a startling revelation of the character of the men whom the Bond +organisation had sent to Parliament: + +[Sidenote: Condition of Cape parliament.] + + "One member of the House of Assembly," ministers write, "is + undergoing a term of imprisonment for seditious libel, three + members are awaiting their trial on the charge of high treason, + two seats are practically vacant by reason of the absence of the + members without leave during the whole of last session. Those two + members are alleged to have welcomed the invaders of the Colony, + and encouraged rebellion, and then fled to Holland, where they + are now living. One seat is vacant by the resignation of the + member, who has accepted an appointment in the Transvaal Colony. + Another seat is vacant on account of the death of the member, + another member is sending in his resignation owing to ill health, + which compels him to reside in Europe. In all these cases the + divisions concerned are either under martial law or in a state of + disturbance, which makes new elections impracticable. + + "Besides the cases enumerated there are members who have been + deported from their homes on account of the seditious influences + which the military authorities allege they were exercising, and + others who are under military observation, with respect to whom + their attendance in Parliament must be regarded as uncertain. + Several members also are engaged in military operations, whose + attendance could not, in the present condition of the country, be + relied on. There are also some members who would be unable to + attend owing to the state of war and rebellion prevailing in the + districts where they reside, whose personal presence is + necessary for the protection of their families and property." + +Such a legislature, they concluded, could not be regarded as "fairly +representing the people." Moreover-- + + "There is also the further consideration that the probability of + good resulting from the meeting of Parliament now is but small, + while the likelihood of evil consequences accruing from the + publication of speeches of a character similar to many that were + delivered last session is strong. The tendency of such speeches + would be to encourage the spirit of rebellion which unhappily + prevails in the Colony over a large area, and ministers regard it + as an imperative duty to do everything in their power to subdue + that rebellious spirit, and restore peace and good-will to the + distracted country."[284] + + [Footnote 284: Cd. 903.] + +The necessity for the more stringent action now taken by the Imperial +authorities was, therefore, undoubted. But here again, in placing the +ports, the centres of commercial life, under martial law, an endeavour +was made to render the restraints of military rule as little onerous +as possible. A Board, consisting of three persons nominated +respectively by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General +Commanding in the Cape Colony, was created for the consideration and, +where necessary, the redress of all complaints or grievances arising +out of martial law in the Colony, other than pecuniary claims against +the Government. The fact that, on the whole, martial law was +judiciously administered is indicated by the Report of the proceedings +of this Board, presented on December 3rd by Mr. (now Sir Lewis) +Mitchell, who, as Manager of the Standard Bank, had been appointed +chairman by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. Out of 199 cases brought before +the Board, Mr. Mitchell writes: + + "A fair number of substantial grievances have been redressed, but + in a majority of instances the Board have held that complainants + suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported, + imprisoned, or otherwise punished on reasonable grounds of + suspicion."[285] + + [Footnote 285: Cd. 903.] + +[Sidenote: Loyalists defend the colony.] + +In all this Sir Gordon Sprigg loyally co-operated with the Imperial +military authorities. His attitude, and that of the loyalist +inhabitants of the Colony, may be gathered from the speech which he +delivered at Capetown on December 1st, 1901. In this striking and +inspiring utterance we have the companion picture to that presented in +the minute of September 12th. Throughout there runs a note of +justifiable pride in the military efforts of the Cape Government, and +in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist +population. First there was the number of troops provided. The Cape +Government had placed, he said, 18,000 men in the field against the +invaders and rebels; they had a defensive force of 18,000 town guards, +of whom 3,000 were natives; and, in addition, 7,000 natives were +under arms in the Transkei for the defence of those territories. In +respect of this force of 18,000 men in the field, Sir Gordon Sprigg +pointed out that such a number of men, coming from a population of +500,000, was equivalent to a force of 1,450,000 men from the United +Kingdom, with its population of over 40,000,000. He might have added +that, since half of the 500,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony were +"either actually in rebellion against the Crown or in positive +sympathy with rebellion," the more correct equivalent force from the +United Kingdom would have been 3,000,000 men. And as for the cost of +maintenance, the colony provided three-fourths of the expenditure upon +the 18,000 men in the field, while it wholly supported the town guards +and other purely defensive forces. He then dwelt with satisfaction +upon the fact that these local forces were now entirely controlled by +the Cape Government, which had made itself responsible for the defence +of no less than thirty-one districts of the Colony. + + "Months ago," he said, "we pressed strongly upon the + Commander-in-Chief to hand over to us the colonial forces then + under his direction. We thought that if we got them into our + possession, not only defraying the cost of their maintenance, but + taking charge of certain parts of the Colony, we could keep those + districts clear of the enemy. We were continually putting that + view before the Commander-in-Chief, and also before the High + Commissioner, Lord Milner, but still the matter hung, and we had + communications going backwards and forwards till at last the High + Commissioner communicated with me, and he said, 'I think the only + way to come to an understanding in this matter is, if we have a + conference. If you could manage to meet Lord Kitchener and + myself, I have great hopes we should be able to arrange what you + desire.' I asked then if Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner could + come to meet me half-way, but Lord Kitchener said it was not + possible for him to leave Pretoria at that time, but he would be + only too delighted if I could come up and meet him and Lord + Milner upon the question. The result of that was that I went up + with two of my colleagues. It has been put about all over the + country that we were ordered by Lord Kitchener to proceed to + Pretoria, but, so far from that being the case, it was our + suggestion that we should take over the command of certain + portions of the country, and we went up to Pretoria to secure + that object. And in that we were successful, and the result of it + has been published very lately."[286] + + [Footnote 286: Cd. 903. This was, in its essence, the + proposal for the systematic and effective defence of the + Colony, which Lord Milner had consistently advocated both + before and during the war--with General Butler and the Home + Government, with Lord Roberts at the time of the Forward + Movement (see p. 353), and now at the eleventh hour with Lord + Kitchener in support of the Cape Government.] + +[Sidenote: Second visit to England.] + +These events, revealing the slow and laborious progress of the +Imperial troops in a South Africa rent by war from end to end, account +sufficiently for the postponement of the work of active administrative +reconstruction in the new colonies, to which Lord Milner owed the +opportunity for his second visit to England. On April 3rd, 1901, he +telegraphed a request that he might be allowed to return home at an +early date, on leave, since he feared that, unless he had a short +rest, he would approach the onerous duty of superintending the work of +reconstruction with lessened efficiency. "I have now been continuously +in harness," he said, "without a day's holiday, for more than two +years ... and it is, undoubtedly, better for the public service, if I +am to get such a rest at all, that I should take leave immediately +while military operations still continue and the work of civil +administration is necessarily curtailed, rather than when it will be +possible to organise civil government in a more complete fashion, and +when many important problems which are for the moment in abeyance will +have to be dealt with." To this request Mr. Chamberlain replied that, +although His Majesty's Government greatly regretted that it was +necessary for Lord Milner to leave South Africa at present, they quite +recognised that it was unavoidable that he should take the rest which +the severe strain of the last two years had made imperative.[287] He +was, therefore, to take leave as soon as he found it possible to do +so. + + [Footnote 287: Cd. 547.] + +[Sidenote: Civil affairs in new colonies.] + +None the less the little that could be done to develop the inchoate +machinery of administration which marked the transition from military +to civil order in the new colonies, was done, and done well, before +Lord Milner left Johannesburg. On May 4th, 1901, Sir H. Gould-Adams +was able to report that the chief departments of the administration +of the Orange River Colony had been transferred from military to +civil officials, and reorganised on a permanent basis. In the +Transvaal the departments of finance, law, mines, and that of the +Secretary to the Administration, had been organised, and were +gradually taking over an increasing volume of administrative work from +the military officials. Even more significant was the establishment by +proclamation (May 8th), of a nominated Town Council for the management +of the municipal affairs of Johannesburg, and the consequent abolition +of the office of Military Governor, with the transfer of the +departments hitherto controlled by him to a Government Commissioner +and other officials of the civil administration. This step was +rendered possible by the circumstance that a certain number of the +principal residents, of whom twelve were nominated for service on the +Council, had now returned to their homes. It marked the recommencement +of the industrial life of the Rand, which had followed the permission, +given by Lord Kitchener in April, for three mines to resume work. From +this time forward the Uitlander refugees began to return; although, as +we have seen,[288] it was not possible to allow the general mass of +the inhabitants to leave the coast towns until the following November. +And, in addition to this, Lord Milner had obtained statements of the +views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the +settlement of the new colonies. Mr. Chamberlain had attached great +importance to this interchange of opinions; rightly holding that, in +determining the conditions and methods of the settlement of the +conquered territories, the British South African colonies should be +taken into the counsels of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had, +therefore, submitted to the colonial Governments the draft of the +Letters Patent, under which the system of Crown Colony government was +to be established in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, before +they were issued.[289] As the result of these consultations the terms +of surrender granted to the Boers at Vereeniging, and the consequent +administrative arrangements arising out of them, embodied decisions +based not merely on the judgment of the Imperial Government, but on +what was virtually the unanimous opinion of the loyal population of +South Africa. In this, as in the crisis of the negotiations before the +war, the loyalists found in Lord Milner their "representative man." + + [Footnote 288: See p. 459.] + + [Footnote 289: The Letters Patent were not issued until + August.] + +[Sidenote: Milner in England.] + +Lord Milner--then Sir Alfred Milner--left Capetown on May 8th, and +reached England on the 24th. On his arrival in London he was met at +the station by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and immediately +conducted to the King, who was at that time still residing at +Marlborough House. At the end of a long audience His Majesty announced +his intention of raising him to the peerage, the first of many marks +of royal favour, including his elevation to the Privy Council, which +were shown to the High Commissioner during his stay in England. The +warm demonstrations of popular regard with which he had been welcomed +upon his arrival in London, were followed by a luncheon given on the +next day (Saturday, May 25th) in his honour by Mr. Chamberlain, his +official chief. The speech elicited by this notable occasion is one in +which a graceful humour is characteristically blended with deep +emotion. Those who have had the good fortune to hear many of Lord +Milner's speeches--speeches sometimes turning a page of history, +sometimes mere incidents of official or administrative routine--know +that they are all alike distinguished by the high quality of +sincerity.[290] But this was an occasion upon which even adroitness of +intellect and integrity of purpose might well have sought the shelter +of conventional expressions. Lord Milner dispenses with any such +protection. "In a rational world," he said, it would have seemed +better to everybody that he, "with a big unfinished job awaiting +him," and many of his fellow workmen unable to take the rest which +they both deserved and needed, "should have arrived, and stayed, and +returned in the quietest possible manner." But it was an age in which +it "seemed impossible for many people to put a simple and natural +interpretation on anything; and his arrival in this quiet manner would +have been misconstrued to a degree, which would have been injurious to +the public interests." If his "hard-begged holiday" could have been +represented as a "veiled recall," then of course it was obvious that, +having taken the proverbial hansom from Waterloo to his own chambers, +this very harmless action would have been "trumpeted over two +continents as evidence of his disgrace." + + [Footnote 290: It was, in its essence, the "high seriousness + of absolute sincerity" that Arnold, after Aristotle, makes + the central attribute of poetic thought. In commenting upon a + speech delivered at Germiston on March 15th, 1905, the + Johannesburg _Star_ wrote on the day following: "Did ever a + High Commissioner for South Africa speak in this wise before? + But beneath the light words and unstudied diction there is + the weight and sureness of the 'inevitable' thought. A man + who has pursued a single task for eight years with + unremitting effort and unswerving devotion can afford to put + his mind into his words. And in all that Lord Milner says + there is an absolute sincerity, born of high integrity of + purpose and an assurance of knowledge, that compels + conviction. Or, rather, should we say, that makes the need of + conviction as unnecessary as a lamp in daylight."] + + "It is hard, it is ludicrous," he continued, "that some of the + busiest men in the world should be obliged to occupy their time, + and that so many of my friends and well wishers should be put to + inconvenience--and on a day, too, when it would be so nice to be + in the country--merely in order to prove to persons with an + ingrained habit of self-delusion that the British Government will + not give up its agents in the face of the enemy, or that the + people of this country will not allow themselves to be bored into + abandoning what they have spent millions of treasure and so many + precious lives to obtain. All I can say is, that if it was + necessary (I apologise for it: I am sorry to be the centre of a + commotion from which no man could be constitutionally more averse + than myself), I can only thank you heartily for the kindness and + the cordiality with which the thing has been done. I feel indeed + that the praises which have been bestowed, the honours which + have been heaped on me, are beyond my deserts. But the simplest + thing to do under these circumstances is to try to deserve them + in the future. In any case I am under endless obligations. It is + difficult to say these things in the face of the persons + principally concerned, but I feel bound to take this opportunity, + especially in view of the remarks which have been made in certain + quarters, to express my deep sense of gratitude for the manner in + which His Majesty's Government, and especially my immediate + chief, have shown me great forbearance, and given me support most + prompt at the moment when it was most needed, without which I + should have been helpless indeed. And I have also to thank many + friends, not a few of them here present, and some not present, + for messages of encouragement, for kindly words of suggestion and + advice received at critical moments, some of which have been of + invaluable assistance to me, and have made an indelible + impression on my heart. I am afraid, if I were to refer to all my + benefactors, it would be like the bidding prayer--and you would + all lose your trains. + +[Sidenote: Hint from the bidding prayer.] + + "But there is one hint I may take from the bidding prayer. Not + only in this place, but at all times and in all places, I am + specially bound to remember the devotion of the loyalists--the + Dutch loyalists, if you please, and not only the British--the + loyalists of South Africa. They responded to all my appeals to + act, and, harder still, to wait. They never lost their cheery + confidence in the darkest days of our misfortunes, they never + faltered in their fidelity to a man of whose errors and failings + they were necessarily more conscious than anybody else, but of + whose honesty of purpose they were long ago, and once for all, + convinced. If there is anything most gratifying to me on this + memorable occasion it is the encouragement which I know the + events of yesterday and of to-day will give to thousands of our + South African fellow-countrymen, like minded with us, in the + homes and in the camps of South Africa. + + "Your Royal Highness,[291] Mr. Chamberlain, ladies, and + gentlemen--I am sure you will not desire me to enter into any + political questions to-day. More than that, I really have nothing + to add to what I have already said and written, I fear with + wearisome reiteration. It seems to me we are slowly progressing + towards the predestined end; latterly it has appeared as if the + pace was somewhat quickening, but I do not wish to make too much + of that or to speak with any too great confidence. However long + the road, it seems to me the only one to the object which we were + bound to pursue, and which seems now fairly in sight. What has + sustained me personally--if your kindness will allow me to make a + personal reference--what has sustained me personally on the weary + road is my absolute, unshakable conviction that it was the only + one which we could travel. + + [Footnote 291: The Duke of Cambridge.] + + "Peace we could have had by self-effacement. We could have had it + easily and comfortably on those terms. But we could not have held + our own by any other methods than those which we have been + obliged to adopt. I do not know whether I feel more inclined to + laugh or to cry when I have to listen for the hundredth time to + these dear delusions, this Utopian dogmatising that it only + required a little more time, a little more patience, a little + more tact, a little more meekness, a little more of all those + gentle virtues of which I know I am so conspicuously devoid, in + order to conciliate--to conciliate what? Panoplied hatred, + insensate ambition, invincible ignorance. I fully believe that + the time is coming--Heaven knows how we desire it to come + quickly--when all the qualities of the most gentle and forbearing + statesmanship which are possessed by any of our people will be + called for, and ought to be applied, in South Africa. I do not + say for a moment there is not great scope for them even to-day, + but always provided they do not mar what is essential for success + in the future--the conclusiveness of the final scenes of the + present drama." + +[Sidenote: Merriman and Sauer mission.] + +[Sidenote: Liberals and Afrikanders.] + +As a declaration to the British world that Lord Milner "possessed the +unabated confidence of his sovereign and of his fellow countrymen," +Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon was amply justified. The protraction of the +war was beginning to try the endurance of the nation. Mr. Sauer and +Mr. Merriman were in England for the express purpose of discrediting +Lord Milner, and behind these fierce political freelances was the +astute brain of the Bond Master, Hofmeyr. They had been commissioned +early in the year by the Afrikander nationalists to give effect to the +resolutions of the Worcester Congress by co-operating with their +friends in England in an agitation for the recall of the High +Commissioner. It was said that these two ex-ministers of the Crown +were authorised to offer an undertaking that the Bond would use its +influence with ex-President Krueger and Mr. Fischer[292] to terminate +the war, in exchange for the promise of "autonomy" for the Boers and +a general armistice for the Cape rebels. However this may be, the +delegates of the Worcester Congress made it their chief business to +represent to the members of the Liberal party who favoured their +cause, that the recall of Lord Milner would remove the chief obstacle +to peace. This attempt never came within a measurable distance of +success; but its failure was not due to any want of effort on the part +of that section of the Liberal opposition which had been opposed to +the annexation of the Republics, and now denounced the British +Government and the Imperial troops for their "methods of barbarism." +The completeness with which Lord Courtney, Mr. Bryce, Mr. +Lloyd-George, Lord Loreburn (Sir Robert Reid), Mr. Burns, and other +prominent members of the Liberal party identified themselves with the +policy and action of the Afrikander Bond, is disclosed by the +proceedings which marked the banquet given on June 5th in honour of +Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. Mr. Bryce, in a letter expressing his +approbation of the object of the banquet and his regret at his +inability to attend it, wrote: "Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer have not +only distinguished public records, but did excellent service, for +which the Government ought to have been grateful, in allaying passion +and averting disturbances in Cape Colony."[293] Lord (then Mr.) +Courtney, in proposing a vote of thanks to the guests of the evening, +declared that the annexation of the Republics was "a wrong and a +blunder"; adding that the Liberal policy would some day be "to temper +annexation, if not to abrogate it." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer +revealed the aims of their mission with perfect frankness. The former, +after alluding to Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon as a display of the +"Imperial spirit of the servile senate who decreed ovations and +triumphs to Caligula and Domitian, when they had received rebuffs from +the ancestors both of ourselves and the heroic Dutch now struggling in +South Africa," and characterising Lord Milner's High Commissionership +as "a career of unmitigated and hopeless failure," proceeded to demand +his immediate recall. To employ Lord Milner in the settlement of the +new colonies, said Mr. Merriman, would be "a suicidal and ruinous +policy. He was a violent partizan; his predictions never came true; +the bursts of fustian and the frivolous utterances of his despatches +showed an ill-balanced and ill-regulated mind, which was utterly +unable to cope with the problem." While, as for the prospect of a +British army ever conquering the South African Dutch, he reasserted +the opinion which he held before the war--"Our friends they might be, +but our subjects never."[294] Mr. Sauer, who "felt honoured by seeing +such a gathering, and seeing in it a Gladstone[295] and a Leonard +Courtney," was no less explicit: + + [Footnote 292: These two ex-officials, representing the + respective Governments of the late Republics, were living in + Holland at this time.] + + [Footnote 293: It is only fair to assume that Mr. Bryce was + not acquainted with the details of the Dordrecht and Hargrove + affairs, to which reference has been made respectively at p. + 287 and p. 375. And, still more that he was unaware of the + utterly discreditable Basuto incident, with respect to which + General Gordon's biographer writes: "The consequence was that + Mr. Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy Gordon's + reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his + own policy by an act of treachery which has never been + surpassed."--_The Life of Gordon_, vol. ii., p. 83. (Fisher + Unwin.)] + + [Footnote 294: Compare the different and infinitely more + instructive treatment of the question of Dutch allegiance by + Lord Milner in his Johannesburg speech, quoted at p. 145.] + + [Footnote 295: _I.e._, the Rev. Stephen Gladstone.] + + "I stand here," he said, "as a representative of the Dutch + people, and declare that they never mean to be a subject race. If + they cannot get their rights by justice they will get them by + other means.... I am glad to go back and tell my own people how + many there are in this country who appreciate their devotion to + an ideal, and are prepared to befriend them in the hour of + trial."[296] + + [Footnote 296: Apart from those mentioned in the text, the + following attended the Merriman and Sauer banquet: Mr. E. + Robertson, M.P. (chairman), Lord Farrer, Mr. T. Shaw, M.P., + Mr. Burt, M.P., Mr. Channing, M.P., Mr. John Ellis, M.P., Mr. + H. J. Wilson, M.P., Sir Wilfred Lawson, Mr. Frederic + Harrison, and others. And among those who sent letters of + regret for their absence were the Marquis of Ripon, Lord + Hobhouse, Dr. Spence Watson, Mr. Seale-Hayne, M.P., and Lord + Loreburn.] + +A fortnight later a meeting of those who sympathised with the Boer +cause was held in the Queen's Hall, Langham Place. The spirit of this +notorious gathering, presided over by Mr. Labouchere, M.P., and +attended by Mr. Merriman. Mr. Sauer, Mr. Lloyd-George, M.P., and other +Radical members of Parliament, is sufficiently revealed by certain +characteristic incidents which marked the proceedings. The agents of +the meeting wore the Transvaal colours; a member of the audience who +uncovered at the mention of King Edward was ejected; the Union Jack +was hissed and hooted; and, while a printed form was handed round +inviting the signatures of persons prepared to pay eight and-a-half +guineas for a tour in Holland and the privilege of seeing ex-President +Krueger, the name of the British sovereign was received by the audience +with marks of evident disapprobation. + +[Sidenote: Agitation for Milner's recall.] + +The agitation for Lord Milner's recall was continued throughout the +year. It was accompanied by a repetition, in England and on the +continent of Europe, of the shameless calumnies upon the Imperial +troops, which had marked the "carnival of mendacity" that led to the +second invasion of Cape Colony. The injurious effect produced upon the +Boers in the field by the support thus given by public men in England +to the "continued resistance" policy of the Afrikander nationalists, +has been already noticed, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to say +more on this aspect of the subject. The attempt to discredit Lord +Milner culminated in the declaration made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, +then recognised as the official leader of the Liberal party, at +Plymouth, on November 19th, 1901, that, unless the British Government +changed its methods, "the whole of the Dutch population in our colonies, +as well as in the two territories, would in all probability be +permanently and violently alienated from us" when the war was ended. "I +am ready to speak out to-night," he continued, "and to say what I have +never yet said, that for my part I despair of this peril being conjured +away so long as the present Colonial Secretary is in Downing Street and +the present High Commissioner is at Pretoria." When the full report of +this speech had reached the Cape, the Vigilance Committee, a body +representing the loyalists of both nationalities, met[297] under the +presidency of Sir Gordon Sprigg, and resolved: + + [Footnote 297: December 17th, 1901.] + + "That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the + statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the + effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in + South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained + their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms + that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by + the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a + settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the + honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and, + further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry + Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial + to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be + entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa." + +With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an +attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is +as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of +those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their +co-operation to the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa the +issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts to +rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the +loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to +the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a +nation in which gratitude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to +sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself +yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent +terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation." + +[Sidenote: Finances of the new colonies.] + +In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His +"hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a +respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made +known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant +administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for +their immediate wants. The Letters Patent constituting him Governor +and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had +been passed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments +creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and +Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in +readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring +them into operation."[298] And on August 6th the House of Commons had +voted L6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the Transvaal +and Orange River Colony. Of this sum L1,000,000 was required for the +purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military Railways, +still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel) Girouard, +and L500,000 was assigned to "relief and re-settlement," an item which +included the purchase of land and other arrangements for the +establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both colonies. +The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of the spirit +of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal Opposition +approached every aspect of the South African question. The idea of the +Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out of the +"hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir William +Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, +"was not the money required for the South African Constabulary put +forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of being proposed in +this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to future repayment by +the Transvaal, in which nobody believed?"[299] + + [Footnote 298: They were read and published by Lord Milner on + June 21st, 1902.] + + [Footnote 299: It is scarcely necessary to say that the + entire cost of the Constabulary has been borne by the new + colonies; or that every penny of this grant-in-aid was paid + back out of the development loan raised in 1902-3.] + +This temporary financial assistance was of the utmost importance. Just +as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and +Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed +invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so +in the new colonies he proposed to beat the guerilla leaders at their +game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a new +prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions +under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa +when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has +himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High +Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only +has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the +new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision +the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited +solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns +and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as +the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and +the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and +surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to +their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened +danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and +problems of repatriation--all these subjects are touched as by a +master of statecraft. + +[Sidenote: Improved situation.] + + "Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible + not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the + military situation] since the time when I first took up my + residence in the Transvaal--just eight months ago. These are the + now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the + railways and the complete pacification of certain central + districts. As regards the railways, I cannot illustrate the + contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of last + year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make + several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria, + and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful + preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was + frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been + blown up--not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but + in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were + always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to + say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line. + Since my return from England I have again traversed the country + from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from + Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant + journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion + has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm. + The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time. + They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful + country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is + typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of + it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown + to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then + it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common + event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need + not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement + which these instances illustrate. Not only have the derailments, + often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one + time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more + regular running, and especially the resumption of night running, + the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly increased. + Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves to meet the + enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements resulting from + the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not any interference + from the enemy, which causes us whatever difficulties--and they + are still considerable--we now labour under in the matter of + transport. When the large amount of additional rolling-stock + ordered for the Imperial Military Railways last summer is + received--and the first instalment will arrive very + shortly--there will be a further great and progressive + improvement in the conveyance of supplies and materials for the + troops, the civil population of the towns, and the concentration + camps. + +[Sidenote: Contraction of area of war.] + + "The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six + months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal + towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever + they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made + little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they + almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure + was over. It looked as though the process might go on + indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during + the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in + the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer + strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria + and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us + for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy + seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there.... + + "To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now + firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest + is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of + both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except, in some + cases, for the native population. This is especially true of the + northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a native + district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some other + positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost the only + inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of the latest + stage of the war than the contraction of Boer resistance within + certain wide but fairly well-defined districts, separated from + one another by considerable spaces. Instead of ranging + indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics, the enemy + show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to certain + neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief, though till + recently by no means their exclusive, centres of strength.... + From time to time the commandos try to break out of these + districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the failure + of the latest of these raids--Botha's bold attempt to invade + Natal--shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now labour + in attempting to undertake distant expeditions. + + "The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the + increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and + supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their + numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the + field--not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of + burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the + war[300]--may take a considerable time yet, and will almost + certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast + either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the + concentration of the Boers, and the substitution of several + fairly well-defined small campaigns for that sort of running + fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the whole + an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the struggle + within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it seems to + me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of their main + strength, even if such concentration makes the commandos + individually more dangerous and involves more desperate fighting, + and meanwhile to push on with might and main the settlement of + those parts of the country out of which they have been driven. No + doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual, process. The + full extent of the difficulty will appear from the sequel. But it + is the point to which the main efforts, of the civil authorities + at any rate, should be continually directed. + + [Footnote 300: An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth, + would have been nearer the mark. See note, p. 454.] + +[Sidenote: The return to the Rand.] + + "If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained, + _i.e._, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back + into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can + see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a + greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent + point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always + provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive + there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and + commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining + operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed + very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is + about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when + the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to + open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has + been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have + actually been started. This is slow work, but even this + beginning, modest as it is, has made an immense difference in + the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here in March last. + + "The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for + other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of + stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for + business generally can only expand _pari passu_ with the + resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000 + people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them + being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil + servants and civilians in the employ of the military. Assuming + that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about + one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders + registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.' + + "The best that can be said on the thorny subject of the return of + the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been + steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed + us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above + permits given to officials or persons specially required for + particular services to the Army or the Government). This month + the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the + selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that + number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply + rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of + permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made, + there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a + certain number of people--not a large number--have not slipped + through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great + bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central + Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative + body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they + have been allotted on well-defined principles, and with great + impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials, even + if our officials were not already over-worked in other + directions, could have done the business so well. + +[Sidenote: Labour and transport.] + + "There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of + return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may + in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends + entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether + the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The + obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of + native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the + increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but + also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the + material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say, + is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in + the case of all those other industries, building, for instance, + which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity + in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of + everything--dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting, + water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for + every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting + at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the + dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work + with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the + carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is, + gives no promise of an early importation of quantities of bulky + material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of + transport are to be satisfied. + + "As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development + of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the + difficulty is that, while natives can be found in abundance to + do surface work, the number of those who are willing to go + underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among whom + underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and these + reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware, + difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese + natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations + between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having + regard to the friendly attitude of the Governor-General, I have + every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even + then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx + of labourers from Portuguese territory.... + +[Sidenote: The concentration camps.] + + "The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it + were not for the existence of that other and still greater + obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have + already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this + latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by + the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration + camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps + increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never + contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state + of destitution in which many of the people arrived, and the + deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among + them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary + necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the + camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The + amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young + children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not, + indeed, agree with those who think--or assert--that the mortality + among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and + children had been allowed to live on isolated farms in a + devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the + commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far + greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of + starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived + at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack + of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the + ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport + had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only + with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were, + as a matter of fact, supplied with great promptitude), but with + the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so + essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the + prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it + was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of + transport (especially at the time when the camps were first + started, and when railways were subject to continual + interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was + the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors, + nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be + found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to + find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look + after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material + has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the + carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best + to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in + visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too + highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government), + have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have + been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently + these requirements enter into competition, and most serious + competition, with the supply of food and materials necessary for + the revival even of our central industry, not to say of + industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new + colonies, of which, under the circumstances, it is, for the + moment, unfortunately impossible to think. + + "To decide between the competing demands upon the still very + limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after + the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is + indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done + all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of + conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands, + to grappling with the problem, I can confidently assert. And I am + equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may + yet be done, the amount of hardship must have been and must still + be very great. It would be amusing, if amusement were possible in + the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by + side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally + vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is + the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in + not making better provision for the people in the concentration + camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our + injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty + at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration + camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even + frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people + in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil + anybody, however much we might desire to do so.... + + "The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees + and the maintenance of the Boers at present in the concentration + camps are, it is evident, only the first of a series of problems + of the most complicated character, which have to be solved before + the country can resume its normal life.... + +[Sidenote: Re-settlement problems.] + + "Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not + be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back + at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The + country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be + generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the + way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the + absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs. + + "Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the + prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the + whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not + only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately + wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the + railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work, + whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to + receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the + prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures + which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to + deal with the matter when the time comes. + + "Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced + under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already + upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets + down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the + tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far + returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the + Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many grievances, and with + much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only to be + expected, and is of very small importance as long as people are + prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of + them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness, + in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the + immediate outlook. + + "Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of + agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well + complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an + amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which + will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty + years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural, + which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly + speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a + very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches + of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent + sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will + maintain a European population twenty times as large as the + present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not + economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social + change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood, + of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the + land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too + few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to + the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most + part, they have done little more than squat. But then the + introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though + it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task + beyond the powers of statesmanship to grapple with. + +[Sidenote: The land settlement report.] + + "This despatch has dealt so largely with questions of immediate + urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to the work + which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to build up + the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly claim for + myself that I have been able to give to that work anything more + than the most general supervision, as my time is more than fully + occupied in dealing with matters of present urgency. But, thanks + to the great energy displayed by the principal officers of the + Administration--by Major Goold-Adams and Mr. Wilson at + Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard Solomon, and Mr. Duncan, + at Pretoria, and by Sir Godfrey Lagden and Mr. Wybergh here--a + really surprising amount of ground has been covered. Despite all + the difficulties and discouragements of the present time, the + machinery of the Government is getting rapidly into working + order, and, as soon as normal conditions are restored, the new + colonies will find themselves provided with an Administration + capable of dealing with the needs of a great and progressive + community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts of law. A + number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and will shortly + be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River Colony they + do not involve any great change of system, but, in the Transvaal, + some most important reforms are at once necessary, while an + immense amount of useless rubbish, which encumbered the Statute + Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been + repealed."[301] + + [Footnote 301: Cd. 903.] + +In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent +inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal +importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded before the +second year of the war had run its course. From the report addressed +to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of which Mr. +Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord Milner by +Sir William (then Mr.) Willcocks[302] on Irrigation in South Africa, +there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or the +ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found in +the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by +side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common +pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful +introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto +neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the +enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and +the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material +agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Witwatersrand +gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political, +irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa--this was the +essence of these two Reports. + + [Footnote 302: Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company; + of the Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.] + + "We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land + Settlement Commissioners,[303] "that a well-considered scheme of + settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the + most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South + Africa. We find among those who wish to see British rule in + South Africa maintained and its influence for good extended, but + one opinion upon this subject. There even seems reason to fear + lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked + the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some strenuous effort + be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a + thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence + of division and disorder impossible." + + [Footnote 303: Cd. 626.] + +[Sidenote: The irrigation report.] + +Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willcocks points +out,[304] South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years +ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and +even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century +ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent +comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single +family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid, +or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is +deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted. +What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the +water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of +the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical +revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great +intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India +and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, in spite of the +latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been "attempted"; +for, with the exception of the extreme south-western corner of the +Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange River Colony, and +the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural development of South +Africa "depends entirely on irrigation." + + [Footnote 304: Cd. 1,163.] + +But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold +industry was at once more immediate and more imperative. + + "Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William + Willcocks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for + gold-washing at the Rand mines." + +And again: + + "The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the + Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the + prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years. + Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation + projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel + that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa, + the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first + putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water + supply is concerned, would have constituted me a bigot. Ten acres + of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with + Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a + rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay." + +And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present: +it is to be the instrument for the development of the permanent +resources of the Transvaal: + +[Sidenote: Economic importance of Rand.] + + "The mineral wealth of the Transvaal is extra-ordinarily great, + but it is exhaustible, some say within a space of fifty years, + others within a space of one hundred years. It would be a + disaster indeed for the country if none of this wealth were + devoted to the development of its agriculture. Agricultural + development is slow, but it is permanent, and knows of no + exhaustion. If the companies working the gold, coal, and diamond + mines were by decree compelled to devote a percentage of their + gains to the execution of irrigation works on lines laid down by + the Government, they would assist in the permanent development of + the country and would be investing in works which, though slow to + give a remuneration, would, at any rate, be absolutely permanent. + It would thus happen, that when the mineral wealth of the country + had disappeared, its agricultural wealth would have been put on + such a solid basis that the country would not have to fall from + the height of prosperity to the depth of poverty." + +These were conclusions of so fundamental a nature that no statesman +could afford to overlook them; and, in point of fact, Lord Milner kept +them steadily in sight from first to last in all that he did for the +administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies. + +Another effort of the civil administration which was carried on +successfully during the war was the teaching of the Boer children in +the refugee camps. The narrative of the circumstances in which the +camp schools were first organised, of the manner in which teachers +came forward from all parts of the empire to offer their services, and +of the complete success which attended their efforts, was told three +years later by Mr. E. B. Sargant, the Education Adviser to the +Administration. The report in which the story appears not only affords +a record unique in the annals of educational effort, but adds a +pleasing and significant page to what is otherwise a gloomy chapter of +the war.[305] Mr. Sargant was invited by Lord Milner to organise the +work of educational reconstruction in the new colonies in the autumn +of 1900. He was then travelling in Canada, in the course of a journey +through the empire undertaken for the purpose of investigating the +methods and conditions of education in the several British colonies; +and he reached Capetown on November 6th, 1900. At that time the +headquarters of the new Transvaal Administration had not been +established in Pretoria; but in the Orange River Colony certain +schools along the railway line and elsewhere had been opened under the +military Government. From observations made in December in the two new +colonies, Mr. Sargant had begun to fear that the work of educational +reorganisation would have to be indefinitely postponed, when a visit +to the Boer prisoners' camp at Seapoint, Capetown, gave him the idea +from which the whole system of the camp schools was subsequently +evolved. Here he found that a school for boys and young men had been +provided by the prisoners themselves, but that it was destitute of +books and of almost all the necessary appliances. Mr. Sargant's appeal +on behalf of this school met with a ready response from the Cape +Government. What could be done here, he thought, could be done +elsewhere. The nearest refugee camp to Capetown was at Norval's Pont, +on the borders of the Orange River Colony; and it was here that Mr. +Sargant determined to make his first experiment. + + [Footnote 305: This Report was issued (June 14th, 1904) from + the Education Adviser's Office, Johannesburg, on "The + Development of Education in the Transvaal and Orange River + Colony." It is one of the many contributions of permanent + value to political and economic science that mark the second + period of Lord Milner's Administration in South Africa. + _E.g._, in Appendix XXX. of this Report, the various + solutions of the much-vexed question of religious instruction + in State Schools, severally adopted by the self-governing + colonies of the empire, are excellently presented in tabular + form.] + +[Sidenote: Origin of the camp schools.] + + "Having provided myself," Mr. Sargant says, "with several boxes + of school books, I left Capetown on the last day of January and + took up my quarters in the camp already named. The Military + Commandant threw himself heartily into the experiment, although + at that time the provision of food and shelter for each new + influx of refugees was a matter of great difficulty. Fortunately + Norval's Pont, being nearer the base of supplies than the other + camps, had a few marquees to spare. In two of these I opened the + first camp school, remaining for a fortnight as its headmaster. + The rest of the teachers were found in the camp itself. It was + apparent from the first that the school would be a success. The + children flocked to it, and the mothers who brought them were + well content with the arrangement that the religious instruction + should be given in Dutch and other lessons in English. Here, as + in several other camps which were visited later, I found that a + school, taught through the medium of Dutch, had already been + opened by some of the more serious-minded of the people. In this + case, an offer was made to me by the Commandant to suppress this + school and to send the children to my marquees. This I refused, + and in less than two months I had the gratification of knowing + that teachers and children had come voluntarily to the Government + school, and that the tents in which they had been taught formed + one of a row of six which were needed to accommodate the rapidly + increasing number of scholars."[306] + + [Footnote 306: Report on "The Development of Education in the + Transvaal and Orange River Colony."] + +[Sidenote: Over-sea teachers.] + +After this initial success Mr. Sargant made arrangements, first from +Bloemfontein, and afterwards from Pretoria, for the establishment of +such schools in all the refugee camps; and by the end of May, 1901, +there were 4,000 children in the camp schools, as against 3,500 in the +town schools of the two colonies. In the following month it became +evident that the local supply of teachers would be insufficient to +meet the demands of the rapidly increasing schools; and Lord Milner +devoted much of his time during his leave of absence to making +arrangements for the introduction of a number of well-trained teachers +from England, and subsequently from the over-sea colonies. Before +these welcome reinforcements could arrive, however, the number of +children in the camp schools, apart from the Government schools in the +towns, had risen to 17,500, and the supply of South African teachers +was exhausted. "In many cases," says Mr. Sargant, "the services of +young men and women who had passed the sixth, fifth, and even fourth +standard were utilised temporarily." With the new year, 1902, drafts +of carefully chosen and well-qualified teachers from England began to +arrive. Both the Board of Education for England and Wales and the +Scotch Education Department took up the work of selection and +appointment, and the co-operation of the Canadian, Australian, and New +Zealand Governments was obtained.[307] From this time forward the +system of the camp schools was steadily extended; and on May 31st, +1902, the date of the Vereeniging surrender, when the attendance +reached its highest point, more than 17,000 Boer children were being +thus educated in the Transvaal camps, and more than 12,000 in those of +the Orange River Colony.[308] + + [Footnote 307: These imported teachers worked harmoniously + with the South African teachers, whether of British or Dutch + extraction; they filled the gap left by the Hollander + teachers, who had returned to Europe after the outbreak of + the war, and formed a valuable element in the permanent staff + of the Education Departments of the new colonies. In 1903 + there were 475 of these over-sea teachers at work in the two + colonies, as against some 800 teachers appointed in South + Africa.] + + [Footnote 308: Some idea of the significance of these figures + may be gathered from the fact that the highest number of + children on the rolls of the Government schools of the Orange + Free State was 8,157 (in the year 1898). That is to say, the + British Administration in the Orange River Colony was + educating one-third more Boer children in the camp schools + alone than the Free State Government had educated in time of + peace. Cd. 903.] + +[Sidenote: Administrative progress, 1901.] + +Apart from this unique and significant effort, the reports furnished +by the various departmental heads to Lord Milner in December afford +striking and sufficient evidence of the progress of the civil +administration in both the new colonies during the year 1901. In the +Orange River Colony the sphere of operations of the departments +existing at the time when Sir H. Gould-Adams was appointed +Deputy-administrator (March, 1901), had been increased, and new +departments were being organised. A statement issued by the financial +adviser on August 29th showed that for the period March 13th, 1900 +(the occupation of Bloemfontein) to June 30th, 1901, the "real" +revenue and expenditure of the colony were respectively L301,800 8_s._ +and L217,974 18_s._; an excess of revenue over expenditure of L83,825 +10_s._ And during the half-year July 1st-December 31st the revenue +collected was about one-third in excess of the actual civil +expenditure.[309] The progress in education was remarkable. At the end +of February, 1902, there were 13,384 children on the roll of the +Government schools, camp and town,[310] or nearly 5,000 more than the +greatest number at school at any one time under the Republic, and the +reorganisation of both higher and technical instruction had been taken +in hand. A system of local self-government had been commenced by the +establishment of Boards of Health at Bloemfontein and in all +districts in the protected area, while in the capital itself the Town +Council was again at work. The Agricultural Department formed on July +1st, 1901, had taken over a large number of sheep and cattle from the +military authorities, and a commencement of tree-planting under an +experienced forester had been made. The Land Board was created in +October, with two branches concerned respectively with Settlement and +Repatriation. The Settlement branch was occupied especially in +procuring land suitable for agricultural purposes, and its efforts +were so successful that by the end of April, 1902, 150 British +settlers had been placed on farms. The Repatriation branch was engaged +in collecting information as to the whereabouts of the absentee Boer +landowners and their families, and the condition of their lands and +houses; in investigating the possibility of importing fresh stock, and +in collecting vehicles, implements, seed-corn, and the other +necessaries which would be required to enable the Boer population, +when repatriated, to resume their normal pursuits. Also temporary +courts, pending the re-opening of the ordinary civil courts, had been +established. + + [Footnote 309: Cd. 1,163, p. 145. The accounts were + complicated by expenditure for, and refunds from, the + military authorities.] + + [Footnote 310: This is in the Orange River Colony alone. For + the number of children in the _camp_ schools of both + colonies, as apart from the _town_ schools, see above.] + +In the Transvaal the work was on a larger scale. Five departments, +those of the Secretary to the Administration (afterwards Colonial +Secretary), the Legal Adviser (afterwards Attorney-General), the +Controller of the Treasury (afterwards Treasurer), the Mining +Commissioner and of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, were already +organised. The progress achieved by the heads of these departments in +the Transvaal, and by Sir H. Gould-Adams and Mr. Wilson in the Orange +River Colony, formed collectively a record the merit of which was +acknowledged by "an expression of the high appreciation of His +Majesty's Government of the services which they had rendered in +circumstances of exceptional difficulty."[311] + + [Footnote 311: Cd. 1,163.] + +It is difficult to present an account of the work already done in the +Transvaal in a form at once brief and representative. The report of +Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration,[312] recorded the +progress made in education, public works, and district administration. +Since July twenty-four new schools, of which seven were camp schools, +eight fee-paying schools, and nine free town schools, had been opened, +and 169 teachers were employed in the town schools, and 173 in the +camp schools, opened by the Administration. The public buildings, +including the hospitals and asylums at Johannesburg and Pretoria, the +post offices and the seventeen prisons administered by the department, +were being maintained and, where necessary, restored. In Johannesburg, +as we have seen, a Town Council had been established, but Pretoria was +still administered by a Military Governor, who controlled a temporary +Town Board and the police. The Administration, however, was empowered +by proclamation No. 28 of 1901 to appoint Boards of Health in places +where no municipality existed, and it was expected that Pretoria would +be endowed, before long, with the same municipal privileges as +Johannesburg. + + [Footnote 312: Dated December 12th, 1901.] + +[Sidenote: Legislative reforms.] + +The volume of work handled in the Legal Adviser's office formed a +remarkable testimony to the energy and capacity of Sir Richard +Solomon. Resident magistrates' courts had been established in twelve +districts; temporary courts were being held in Pretoria and +Johannesburg; the offices of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Orphan +Master, and the Patent Office, were reorganised; and an ordinance +creating a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and five +Puisne Judges, was drafted ready to be brought into operation so soon +as circumstances permitted. The chaotic Statute Book of the late +Republic had been overhauled. A large number of laws, some obsolete, +some impliedly repealed, but still appearing on the Statute Book, and +others unsuited to the new _regime_, had been repealed by +proclamation; and at the same time many ordinances dealing with +matters of fundamental importance had been prepared for submission to +the future Legislative Council at the first opportunity. + +The report of Mr. Duncan, the Controller of the Treasury, showed that +the revenue actually being collected, mainly from the customs, the +Post Office, mining and trading licences, and native passes, would +provide for the ordinary expenditure of the civil administration. And, +in point of fact, when the accounts were made up at the end of the +first financial year of the new colonies (July 1st, 1901-June 30th, +1902) it was found that the Orange River Colony had a balance in hand +of L231,000, while in the Transvaal the expenditure on civil +administration[313] had been covered by the revenue, which had assumed +already the respectable figure of L1,393,000. + +The Departments of Mines and Native Affairs had been reorganised, and +the work done by Mr. Wybergh and Sir Godfrey Lagden respectively in +these departments, in co-operation with Sir Richard Solomon, had +produced the administrative reforms immediately required to regulate +the employment of native labourers in the mines. By proclamations +amending or repealing existing laws and making fresh provisions where +necessary the native had been protected against oppression and robbery +at the hands of unscrupulous labour-agents, and the liquor traffic, +the chief cause of his insubordination and incapacity, had been +effectively repressed. Considerations of public security made the +maintenance of the "pass" system necessary, but modifications were +introduced into the working of the system sufficient to protect the +educated native from unnecessary humiliation and the native labourer +from excessive punishment. In addition to this departmental work two +commissions had been appointed by Lord Milner to investigate two +matters of direct and immediate concern to the gold industry. The +first of these, over which Sir Richard Solomon presided, was engaged +in reviewing the existing gold laws, with a view to the introduction +of new legislation embodying such modifications as the best local +experience and the financial interests of the colony might require. +The second was employed in formulating measures necessary to provide +both the mines and the community of the Rand with a water-supply that +would be at once permanent and economic. + + [Footnote 313: Excluding expenditure on the South African + Constabulary and relief and re-settlement, and certain other + charges. Cd. 1,163.] + +[Sidenote: The Johannesburg police.] + +There remain certain special features of the administrative +reconstruction accomplished in 1901 that merit attention, as showing +the degree in which Lord Milner kept in view the fundamental +necessities of the situation revealed by the Land Settlement and +Irrigation Reports to which reference has been made above. As part of +the work of the Law Department, the Johannesburg Municipal Police had +been organised and placed under the control of Mr. Showers, the late +head of the Calcutta Police. + + "This fine body," Lord Milner wrote, "consists mainly of picked + men from the Army Reserve, including many old soldiers of the + Guards, and others who have fought in the war. The men are + dressed like London policemen, but carry rifles. This odd-looking + equipment is characteristic of the double nature of their duties. + On the one hand they do the work of ordinary town police, and + exhibit in that characteristic the same efficiency and civility + as their London prototypes. On the other hand, they have played + an important part in assisting the military and the Rand Rifles + in the defence of the long line, fifty miles in extent of towns + and mining villages which constitute the Rand district. Latterly, + since the enemy have been quite driven out of this part of the + country, the military portion of their duties is diminishing in + importance, though the danger of small raids on outlying portions + of the Rand by parties coming from a distance is not yet wholly + removed. On the other hand, with the return of the civil + population, their work as police proper is greatly on the + increase. In their struggle with the illicit liquor dealers, one + of the most difficult of their duties, they have so far met with + a great measure of success."[314] + + [Footnote 314: Cd. 903.] + +[Sidenote: South African constabulary.] + +Just as here, in the case of the Johannesburg police, so in the +formation of the South African Constabulary and in the reorganisation +of the railways, Lord Milner had determined that no opportunity of +adding to the permanent British population of the two colonies should +be lost. The South African Constabulary was formed in October, 1900, +by General Baden-Powell, mainly on the lines of the Canadian +North-West police, for the protection of the settled population in the +new colonies. Since July, 1901, however, when it had been called out +for military service, this force, at the time some 9,000 strong, had +been employed as part of the army under the direction of the +Commander-in-Chief, although its organisation, finance, and internal +discipline were dealt with by the High Commissioner. The men recruited +for the Constabulary were of British birth, and every endeavour was +made in the selection of recruits to secure persons who were adapted +by pursuits and character to become permanent and useful colonists. It +is interesting to note that a body of 500 burgher police, consisting +of former burghers of the Orange Free State, and placed under the +colonel commanding the Orange Colony division, had been associated +with the Constabulary during the time that they were thus serving with +the troops. Nor is it necessary to point out that the military +experience, the knowledge of the country, and acquaintance with the +life of the veld which the Constabulary gained at this period, largely +contributed to the efficiency which they displayed afterwards in the +discharge of their regular duties. + +But of all the reconstructive work accomplished in this year of +continuous and harassing warfare, the reorganisation of the railways +was perhaps the most essential and the most successful in its +immediate results. Although the railways of the two new colonies +remained entirely under the control of the military authorities, their +future importance to the civil administration was so great that, as +Lord Milner wrote,[315] "questions affecting their organisation and +development naturally claimed his constant attention." And this all +the more, since Sir Percy Girouard, the Director of Military +Railways, had been chosen by the Home Government to undertake the +management of the joint railway system of the two colonies so soon as +it was handed over to the civil authorities. The work accomplished +included the repair of the damage inflicted by the enemy, the increase +and improvement of the rolling-stock, the reorganisation of the staff +of European employees, and the construction of new lines required for +the industrial development of the country. Apart from 102 engines and +984 trucks, the Boers had destroyed many pumping-stations and station +buildings, 385 spans of bridges and culverts, and 25 miles of line. +These injuries to the "plant" of the railways were repaired "in an +absolutely permanent manner," and orders had been placed in August for +60 engines and 1,200 trucks over and above those required to replace +the rolling-stock destroyed by the enemy.[316] As the staff employed +in the time of the Republics had been "actively engaged on the side of +the enemy, and were animated by an exceedingly anti-British +spirit,"[317] they had to be almost entirely replaced. + + [Footnote 315: December 14th, 1901. Cd. 903.] + + [Footnote 316: The new rolling-stock was paid for out of the + grant-in-aid voted in August, 1901. The first of the new + lines constructed was that from Bloemfontein to Basutoland, + opening up the rich agricultural land known as the "conquered + territory" on the Basuto border in the Orange River Colony, + where many of the new British settlers had been established.] + + [Footnote 317: The completeness with which the Netherlands + Railway Company had identified itself with the Government of + the South African Republic is well expressed in the reply of + Mr. Van Kretchmar, the General Manager of the N.Z.A.S.M., to + a question put to him by the Transvaal Concessions + Commissioners: "We considered that the interests of the + Republic were our interests" (Q. 612). Many of these railway + employees were, of course, imported Hollanders.] + +[Sidenote: Reorganisation of railways.] + + "But," Lord Milner continues, "the many difficulties incidental + to the organisation of a large new staff, unaccustomed to work + with one another, are being successfully overcome, and business + is carried on with a smoothness which gives no indication of the + internal revolution so recently effected. The new railway staff + comprises some 4,000 men of British race, including 1,500 + Reservists or Irregulars who had fought in the war, and who, with + other newcomers, form a permanent addition to the British + population of South Africa." + +Thanks to the blockhouse system, supplemented where necessary by +armoured trains, the mail trains from the ports to Johannesburg were +running almost as rapidly and as safely as in time of peace. But the +demands of the military traffic were so enormous that opportunities +for ordinary traffic were still rigorously restricted. + + "Military requirements in food supplies, remounts and munitions + of war," Lord Milner wrote, "represented 29,000 tons weekly from + the ports; while the movements of men and horses to and fro over + the [then] huge theatre of war were as constant as they were + sudden." + +None the less the civil traffic was increasing. While in August only +684 refugees had returned, in November the number had risen to 2,623; +and while in August the tonnage of civil supplies forwarded to +Bloemfontein and the Transvaal was 4,612, in November it was 8,522. +This result, moreover, had been obtained with the old rolling-stock, +and a much more rapid progress was anticipated in the future, since +the additional rolling-stock had already begun to arrive. And in +anticipation of this increased rate of progress, the Commander-in-Chief +had + + "now seen his way to allow the mines to start 400 fresh stamps + per month, as against an average of under 100 in previous months, + and had also consented to the grant of 1,600 permits a month + (representing about 4,000 persons) for return to the Transvaal." + +In addition to the repair and reorganisation of the lines running to +the coast, the Transvaal collieries had been re-opened and the coal +traffic had been resumed. Not only had progress been made in stocking +the mines with coal, timber, and machinery, preparatory to the full +resumption of working activity, but the large unemployed native +population found in Johannesburg at the time of Lord Milner's arrival +had been utilised for the construction of a new and much-needed coal +line, which ran for thirteen miles along the Rand. + + "This short line," Lord Milner wrote, "would have no less than + thirty to forty miles of sidings leading from it to every + important mine, and securing direct delivery of about 1,000,000 + tons of coal per annum, as well as of a large tonnage of general + stores." + +[Sidenote: Development by railways.] + +And then follows a statement of the part to be played by railway +construction in the policy of material development, which was pursued +with such determination by Lord Milner after the restoration of peace. + + "It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further + railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new + colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are + far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the + great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to + stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of + commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently + required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of + these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they + pass are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers + of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on + Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be + a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is + one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the + old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will + thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest + land into touch with the best markets. And the British population + will be equally in favour of such a course."[318] + + [Footnote 318: Cd. 903.] + +Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after +Lord Milner's return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well +in hand. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING + + +[Sidenote: The gold industry re-started.] + +With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate +submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks. +The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of +the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably +inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists, +and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the +most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River +Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great +industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not +only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles +within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange +River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms +before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story +of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly +records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold +industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission +to set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to +November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first +time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress +was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round +numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953, +and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and +sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May, +1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output +to 138,600 oz., of the value of L600,000, and 30,000 additional +British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in +view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the +expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces +in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the +Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that +its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate +attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that +during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were +being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was +ultimately reduced below the normal. + +The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle +precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far +as his efforts could avail, it should not be unprepared for the +economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a despatch +of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. Chamberlain the +importance of settling British colonists upon the land, and pressed +for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this question. + +[Sidenote: Land settlement.] + + "This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote, + "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have + reached a point where little more progress can be made without a + decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British + colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale, + under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be + left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and + sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with + no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give + it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a + sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of + the population between the country districts and the towns. If we + do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an + industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost + wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural + population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not + possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave + misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners + upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting + life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new + element we may be simply laying up the material for further + trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the + rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy + with British ideas as ever.... To satisfy these demands, it is + clear that no small and makeshift scheme will suffice. Land + settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise, + however useful, it will be _politically_ unimportant. + + "The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely + necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses + arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my + profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we + provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the + settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity + will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which + will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and + prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these + first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be + required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I + contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this + line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty + in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do + fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize + every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to + our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want + to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game, + and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command + of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away + opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards. + + "What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these + two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good + land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily, + if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the + affirmative, (2) what amount shall we be able to dispose of for + this purpose in the immediate future?"[319] + + [Footnote 319: Cd. 1,163.] + +It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that +the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic +reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be +provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The +purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were +the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new +lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the +compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and +in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home +Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus +raised, a sum of L3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum +L2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and L1,000,000 in the +Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not +issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the +(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was +approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited +resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable +for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies. + +Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme +importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa, +the preparation of the administrative machinery, the _materiel_ of +transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for the repatriation +of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing activity. At the same +time certain other administrative questions were brought by him to the +consideration of the Home Government during these months (January to +May, 1902), with the result that the ink was scarcely dry upon the +Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask for, and obtain, +decisions upon them. + +[Sidenote: On the eve of peace.] + +The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office +on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following +the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of +Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep +pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On +April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent. +tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining +industry. The rate is high--twice as high as the gold tax under the +Republic--and will yield an annual revenue of L500,000 or L600,000 on +a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes +that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed +while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope +that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to +show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the +decision on this matter of such general economic importance at once. +Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further information; and we find +Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I trust you will now agree to +the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am anxious to publish the +Proclamation in next Friday's _Gazette_." And to this Mr. Chamberlain +replies on June 4th, "I agree to the imposition of a 10 per cent. tax +on the profits of gold mines." On June 2nd, that is, two days after +the terms of surrender have been signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends +a "most urgent" telegram on the immediate financial position: + + "The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the + new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year, + but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good. + We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African + Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing + provided for the various extraordinary items which have been + hitherto financed out of the L500,000 grant for relief and + re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for + this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the L500,000 is + nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement, + which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped, + especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority + to spend another L500,000 on these purposes. This is independent + of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of + the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you + immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in + acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the + immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the + fundamental questions of finance settled promptly, a breakdown + is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to feel that + services already started and working well were provided for at + least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new and + heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will require + all my attention in the immediate future."[320] + + [Footnote 320: Cd. 1,163.] + +Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th: + + "You may incur expenditure up to L500,000 more for relief and + re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan." + +On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating +the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these +lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval." +The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally. +Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the +persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for +a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch +on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is +proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs, +on June 20th: + +[Sidenote: "It is vital to make a start".] + + "If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I + would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on + those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it + is vital to make a start." + +There is land available, and there are men available--over-sea +colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of agriculture, who have fought +in the war, and have, therefore, a first claim to be considered. But +these desirable settlers cannot afford to wait in a country like South +Africa, where the cost of living is abnormally high, without a +definite prospect of employment. + + "Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be + bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being + severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay." + +This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which +he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him +"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is +not possible to criticise effectively" in London. + +In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal +initiation of Crown Colony government: + + "I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord + Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and + my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath." + +And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at +once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the +Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a +non-official element: + +[Sidenote: Colonists and the settlement.] + + "I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would + be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to + the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present + improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new + colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of + public business." + +To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief +telegram of July 7th.[321] + + [Footnote 321: Cd. 1,163.] + +Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the +spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous +wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of +the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of +Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the +tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after +the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new +colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever +previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with +its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved +for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part +which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the +republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South +Africa. + + [Footnote 322: At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From _The + Star_ report.] + +Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the +surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall +the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new +colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the +Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding +year (1901). In these communications--the origin of which has been +mentioned previously[323]--the significance attached by loyalist +opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left +undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general policy +of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers, +while recognising that full representative self-government should be +conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of +maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it +was certain that representative institutions could be established, due +regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and +strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as, +in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately assured and +materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably +disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would +be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large +scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of +the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony +before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British +immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a +portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for +this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony. + + [Footnote 323: See p. 489.] + +[Sidenote: The language question.] + +In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the +settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in +particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion +of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of +British government in the former Republics would afford. The +settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated +as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal +administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before +intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to +crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore, +insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the +predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support +of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the +"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so +called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from +"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No +one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth +of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education +sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a +professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second +language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less +difficult--probably more difficult--to him than to learn English, the +desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English +becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical +convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making +English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority +to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the +language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a +matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South +Africa. + + "The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa + generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance + of the English language. The language question has done more, + probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke + racial animosity." + +They, therefore, recommend that-- + + "English should be the official and predominant language in the + higher courts, and in the public service--combined with such + concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and + circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached + to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their + services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as + in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in + all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools + situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all + other primary schools. Dutch should be the medium of instruction + meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, and it + should be taught in all schools where there is a reasonable + demand for it."[324] + + [Footnote 324: Cd. 1,163.] + +On the question of disarmament they wrote: + + "In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is + necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new + colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then + the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be + contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance." + +[Sidenote: The native question.] + +On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies, +the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent. + + "For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given + political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect + of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would + materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and + be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives + should be taught habits of steady industry. + + "Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with + their language and customs. + + "The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal + to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English + have suffered from its influence. + + "A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely, + owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a + feeling that even the just rights of natives would be + disregarded. It is essential, in the interests of the natives + themselves, generally, that the Home Government should work in + accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great + influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will + secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local + feeling."[325] + + [Footnote 325: Cd. 1,163.] + +As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of +South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the +learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To +effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of +professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa, +and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil +service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of +service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They +also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of +the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this +claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully +annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial +Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on +the termination of the war. + +As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of +any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of +British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a +cost. As the representative man of the British in South Africa, he +was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender contained no +concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer people +calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative union of +the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility laid +upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might be +conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be conceded, +was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. That the +Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more favourable +terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, is apparent +from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively with the +former. In this object, however, they were entirely unsuccessful, +since the Home Government indicated from the first their desire that +Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for negotiation; and in +the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him with the assistance +of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the Transvaal +Administration. + +[Sidenote: The peace negotiations.] + +The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations +originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen, +the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord +Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their +readiness to mediate between the British Government and the +Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, +with a view to the termination of hostilities. To this offer the +British Government replied that, while they were sincerely desirous of +terminating the war, the only persons whom they could recognise as +competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the Boer forces +in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to forward a copy +of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments +to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this communication Mr. Schalk +Burger, as acting President of the South African Republic, informed +Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to treat for peace, but that +before doing so he wished to see President Steyn. He, therefore, asked +for a safe-conduct through the British lines and back to effect this +purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home Government authorised Lord +Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and Lord Milner agreed in +thinking it desirable." As the result of the consultation between +Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free State and Transvaal +leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was decided, on April +10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to receive +representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be +appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals." +The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President +Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey +met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The +proposals which the Boer representatives then put forward were wholly +inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed them to London +with the remark: + + "I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's + Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the + independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they + must expect a refusal." + +[Sidenote: Independence refused.] + +On the day following the British Government replied that they could +not + + "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former + independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to + the British Crown." + +Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up +the position that they were not competent to surrender the +independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning +thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked, +therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers. +This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had, +as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the +British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to +grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on +their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any +expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal +Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the +offer made by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve months +before. + + "We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April + 16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer + leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April. + + "The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have + been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not + entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the + two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume + that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of + independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces + still in the field. + + "They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to + discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence, + but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted + if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to + relinquish the demand for independence. + + "This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of + proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest + moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the + loss of so much life and treasure. + + "We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to + spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the + restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by + the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to + refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha + more than twelve months ago,[326] and to inform them that, + although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the + forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us + by the refusal of that offer would justify us in imposing far + more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a + permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender + on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications in detail + as may be agreed upon mutually. + + "You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them, + and to submit the result for our approval. + + "Communicate this to the High Commissioner."[327] + + [Footnote 326: For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms, + see above, p. 471, and forward; p. 568, note 2.] + + [Footnote 327: Cd. 1,096.] + +[Sidenote: Consulting the Burghers.] + +Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives +put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham +Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,[328] might be +allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations, +and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation +and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both +these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener +was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the +burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two +days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in +the field--exclusive of those in the Cape Colony--to be elected, and +meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the +two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed, +every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to +the Boer leaders with the object of enabling them to carry out these +arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and passes for +their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the localities +chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of which had +been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer representatives left +Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the British troops. In spite, +however, of the restrictions imposed upon the activity of the forces +under his command, Lord Kitchener was able to report, on June 1st, +that "good progress" had been made in the work of the campaign up to +the actual cessation of hostilities.[329] + + [Footnote 328: This deputation was despatched in March, 1900, + to "win the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.] + + [Footnote 329: Cd. 986.] + +The sixty Boer representatives--two for each commando--thus assembled +at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat +for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis +Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and +President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other +civilians,[330] proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th, +they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward +the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation: + + [Footnote 330: A full list of the names is to be found in the + Draft Terms of Surrender at p. 564.] + +[Sidenote: The terms drafted.] + + "(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards + foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under + British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of + our territory." + +What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's +telegram to the Secretary for War: + + "Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for + negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid + down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion, + nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the + afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner + proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the + burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of + objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner + should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as + possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They + will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for + the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the + draft document."[332] + + [Footnote 331: These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year + ago. See note 2, p. 568.] + + [Footnote 332: Cd. 1,096.] + +The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is +to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between +May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness +on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they +allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction +to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental +difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be +accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally +maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg +terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord +Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your +proposal into consideration." + + [Footnote 333: Smuts.] + + [Footnote 334: Hertzog.] + + [Footnote 335: De Wet.] + + [Footnote 336: Botha.] + +[Sidenote: Payment of Boer war debts.] + +On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in +consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the +Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State +High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the +negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur; +but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the +the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military +and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The +Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by +their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be +recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments +for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner, +on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very +unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets +of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time +when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for +expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war +against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly +indefensible. The British people, he said-- + + "would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of + hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the + people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much + smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during + the war." + +As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and +receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing, +with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home +Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the +Middelburg terms. + +This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the +clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately +became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a +compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite +sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course +of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make +a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government +followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant--L3,000,000--and in +rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be +devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by +them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be +submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to +be appointed to distribute the L3,000,000 grant. + +The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in +the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the +Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful +general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and +anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and +arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping +military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army +or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted +statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South +Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and +interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are +being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is +exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the +actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once +accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of +surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to +an agreement, it will be the _English_ document which will be wired to +England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which +will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to +place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British +Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular +matter, he replies: + + "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain + promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to + which a reference may be made later should appear in it. + Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should + appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to + clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible + misunderstanding." + +[Sidenote: Lord Milner's vigilance.] + +And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You +must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid +before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible +misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that +the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly +considered," he says: + + "Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am + convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this + document must contain everything about which there is anything in + the form of a pledge." + +And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he +draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language +to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely +annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be +signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, or its +terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal." + +The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord +Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated, +unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer +commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months +of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of +their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion +and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new +agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the +whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home +Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer +"delegates." + + "It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr. + Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of + this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at + Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those + occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by + His Majesty's Government." + + [Footnote 337: Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and + De la Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.] + +[Sidenote: Approval of Home Government.] + +At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement +was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain +informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the +submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and with +the new clause dealing with the grant of L3,000,000, to the Assembly +at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted +upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in +private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and +Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been +settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner and Mr. +Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for +this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they +objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of +the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite +willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it +was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of +Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the +statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their +respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on +May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His +Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of +further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to +the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The +Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day +for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were +submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives. +One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and +the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901, +certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of +confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that +in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly +dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could +not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government +concurred. + +The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at +Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows: + + "_Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces + in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government._ + + "His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord + Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T. + Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and + Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange + Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis + Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the + Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their + respective burghers desirous to terminate the present + hostilities, agree on the following articles: + +[Sidenote: The surrender agreement.] + + "1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their + arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in + their possession or under their control, and desist from any + further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward + VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner + and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord + Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant + Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet. + + "2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal + or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present + outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring + their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King + Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as + transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence + ensured. + + "3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be + deprived of their personal liberty or their property. + + "4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any + of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in + connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this + clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of + war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the + Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial + immediately after the close of hostilities. + + "5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the + Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the + children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when + necessary for the better and more effectual administration of + justice. + + "6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and + Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their + protection, on taking out a licence according to law. + + "7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River + Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil + government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative + institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced. + + "8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will + not be decided until after the introduction of self-government. + + "9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the + Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the + war. + + "10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the + local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each + district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the + presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of + assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and + supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide + themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, + stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their + normal occupation. + + "His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these + Commissions a sum of L3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will + allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African + Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the + late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a + Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government, + and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to + have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they + will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of + war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally + given. + + "In addition to the above-named free grant of L3,000,000, His + Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances on loan + for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and + afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent. + interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit + of this clause."[338] + + [Footnote 338: Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign + the Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State + representatives. He was declared President, in the place of + Steyn, at Vereeniging on the 29th.] + +[Sidenote: Punishment of rebels.] + +To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of +the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer +commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of +Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner. + + "His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the + treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion + and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be + determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the + laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have + joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that + part of the British Empire to which they belong. + + "His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government + that the following are their views as to the terms which should + be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the + field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th + April, 1901: + + "With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon + surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the + resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes + place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the + punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have + been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of + civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for + life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any + Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With + reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape + Colony and all other persons holding an official position under + the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of + commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for + high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such + special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the + punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the + court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of + death be inflicted. + + "The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt + with according to the law of the Colony."[340] + + [Footnote 339: This was reduced to a period of five years.] + + [Footnote 340: Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg + terms, the terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less + favourable to the Boers in respect of permission to possess + arms, and the use of the Dutch language; but the monetary + assistance promised to the repatriated burghers was more + generous. The free grant was raised from one million to three + millions, and the advances on loan were offered for the first + two years free of interest, and subsequently at only three + per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon + the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance + necessary and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that + Lord Milner, alike in the Middelburg and Vereeniging + negotiations, although he was opposed to any payment of the + costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on the war, + was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government in + the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all + other matters that concerned their material prosperity. + + One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms + is noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of + Commons by the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the + Colonies (Mr. Winston Churchill), that the use of the word + "natives" in clause viii. of the Terms of Surrender prevented + the introduction of any legislation affecting the _status_ of + Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new colonies prior to + the establishment of self-government. This assertion was + based upon the contention that the word "natives" is + understood by the Boers to indicate the "native of any + country other than those of the European inhabitants of South + Africa." The actual text of the corresponding clause in the + Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's despatch of March 20th, + 1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards the extension of + the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and Orange River + Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government + to give such franchise before representative government is + granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so + limited as to secure the just predominance of the white + races. The legal position of coloured persons will, however, + be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony." Apart + from the fact that the Boers were debarred by Lord Milner's + specific statements either from going behind the English text + of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining + [the Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg + proposal," it is difficult to see how this Middelburg clause + could have raised any presumption in the minds of the Boer + commissioners that the English word "native" was intended to + include not only the Kafirs (of which word it is a loose + equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the Bantu + tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal + yellow-skinned natives of South Africa--the Bushmen and + Hottentots), but the "coloured people," or half-castes. + + Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July + 31st, 1906) with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that + the question had not been raised, to the best of his belief, + by the Boer commissioners; and that in any case there was + nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to prevent the Crown + Colony administration of the new colonies from legislating in + respect of "coloured persons." [And _a fortiori_ in respect + of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the + treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I + think that in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was + used. I venture to say that nobody familiar with the common + use of language in South Africa would hold either that + 'natives' included coloured people, some of whom very much + more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen' + included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted + Dutch word in South Africa for coloured people."] + +[Sidenote: The last debates.] + +[Sidenote: Accepting the inevitable.] + +With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final +stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still +required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly +at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the +morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by +the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of +the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners +on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting +President of the South African Republic, then announced that the +meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses +should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or +to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting, +and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in +questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various +Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding +between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the +Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the +delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually +proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on +the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so +much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in +the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria +convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of +accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually, +to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the +surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible +from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour +should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the +question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the +delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the +Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted +discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the +afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the +limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long +debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke +more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments +used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering +that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he +said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of +indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be +continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the +form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the +substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice +the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From +this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words +of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was +preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then +a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the +commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6 +votes. + + [Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the + commando representatives--as also those of the earlier + meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General + Christian de Wet in _The Three Years' War_.] + +After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution +constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers +was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the +decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to +sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria. + + [Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee, + Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to + proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.] + +Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to +Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on +administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going +on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the +telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the +Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was +just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought +the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner +and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former +British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here, +at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10 +o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement +was signed.[343] + + [Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the + possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out + with admirable promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement + had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch + from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation + of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which + Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had + facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed + to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and + Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in + the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General + French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom + 11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River + Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord + Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd), + addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the + Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic + utterances. His message to the former was: + + "I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal + to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South + Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, + Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here + that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these + Governments, and that their consideration and generosity + were only equalled by the character and quality of the + troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that + country." + + And of the troops, which under his command had successfully + accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he + wrote: + + "The protracted struggle which has for so long caused + suffering to South Africa has at length terminated, and + I should fail to do justice to my own feelings if at + this moment I neglected to bear testimony to the + patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been displayed + by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and + Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing + but the qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops + could have overcome the difficulties of this campaign, + or have finally enabled the empire to reap the fruits of + all its sacrifices."] + +[Sidenote: Admissions of the Boer leaders.] + +The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at +Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the +hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer +sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people +abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war +in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression +forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of +England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, +wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different +is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President +Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day +of truth-telling. + + "Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he + said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon. + We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we + under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon + our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the + possibility of defeat." + +And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and +one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded +by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war; +I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this +"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts, +State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general +of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as +members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the +war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in +the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself +would have found no occasion for departing from the truth. + +[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.] + +No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now +that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that +the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they +regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of +barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more +Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought +the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General +de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war, +said: + + "I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That + is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I + think also we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the + men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the + women, and then they could take the women with them to the + English in the towns." + +But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any +longer carrying this plan into effect. + + "When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of + provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot + without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then + well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too + thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English + protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our + greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man + answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to + the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women + now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how + can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to + give up liberty for their sakes?" + +And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said: + + "If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision + for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every + kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has + caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get + them into the townships, but later on this became impossible, + because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the + idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending + the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable, + because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and + the men still on commando were not so closely related to these + families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them." + +Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the +efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected +areas. + +[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.] + + "A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We + could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the + enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different + aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by + day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos." + +And again-- + + "There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have + managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have + been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the + British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But + things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after + district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. + In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its + forces upon us." + +To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of +again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony. + + "Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season + of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed. + How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that + they can only go _op-een-stap_?"[344] + + [Footnote 344: An onomatopoeic expression for the step of a + tired horse.] + +Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct +evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers, +and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led +them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May +30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of +the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but +nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And +Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the +document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to +stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is +because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a +tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it. +What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and +the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the +continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief +description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he +writes: + + [Footnote 345: _The Three Years' War._] + + "There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes + or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England. What were + we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination." + +[Sidenote: Boer claim to independence.] + +Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the +question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the +moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the +British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their +minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives +agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the +sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming +their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask, +On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the +Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative +autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of +war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical +annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of +the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a +constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the +London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the +republic to be a "sovereign international state." + + [Footnote 346: [The Transvaal Government]--"or rather the + President and his advisers--committed the fatal mistake of + trying to maintain a government which was at the same time + undemocratic and incompetent.... An exclusive government may + be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if + it rests upon the people. But a government which is both + inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under + which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of + government which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They + ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or + reformed their administration" (Bryce, _Impressions of South + Africa_, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is not likely to have been + unduly severe. "The political sin of the Transvaal against + the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail--of + less or more--but was fundamental in its denial of elementary + political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed + minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the + taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the + money extorted" (Captain Mahan, _The Merits of the Transvaal + Dispute_, 1900 [included in _The Problem of Asia_]). To + these, perhaps, I may be permitted to add the following words + spoken by myself in 1894--more than a year before the + Raid--and published in 1895 (_South Africa: a Study, + etc._):--"The Boer has still to justify his possession of + these ample pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and + these stores of gold and of coal. If he can enlarge his mind, + if he can reform existing abuses, if he can expand an archaic + system of government and render it sufficiently elastic to + meet the requirements of an enlarged population and important + and increasing industries--well and good. If not, let the + Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with the + intelligence and the progress of South Africa. _Then_ the + Boer system will be condemned by a higher authority than the + Colonial Office or the opinion of England; and from the high + court of Nature--a court from which no appeal lies--the + inexorable decree will go forth: 'Cut it down; why cumbereth + it the ground?'"] + + [Footnote 347: See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted + _supra_.] + + [Footnote 348: "The South African Republic will conclude no + treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the + Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward + or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved + by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain Mahan writes: "In refusing + the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which + would enable other states to hold it directly accountable, + Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that + foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for + reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate + control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose + not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign + Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign + citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to + interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had + not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and + sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for + injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the + United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in + the case of the Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by + the state sovereignty of Louisiana" (_Ibid._). And, says the + same writer, _a fortiori_ was Great Britain justified in + interfering on behalf of her own subjects.] + +[Sidenote: Effect of surrender terms.] + +Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by +the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question +whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating +at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which, +as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been +deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually +pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms +actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the +British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of +the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what +stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two +respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight +dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess +rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language +in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions +are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound +policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain +districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small +number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated +homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous +and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The +refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves +with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional +Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy +responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an +altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police. +At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in +such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under +the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient +remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system--a +system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by +the natives in South Africa--the number of rifles possessed by the +Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government; +while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege +of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to +British rule would form an additional safeguard. + +In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of +course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of +English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South +Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have +resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of +the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have +retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these +circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination +of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the +material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was +the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new +administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free +trade in language"--that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond, +the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the +convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of +administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these +concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full +self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies +until a British or loyalist majority was assured. + +[Sidenote: Free initiative secured.] + +But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their +immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete +freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for +the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative +reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task--at once more +congenial and more especially his own--was discharged is a matter that +must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of +the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the +review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close. + + + + +INDEX + + + "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State, The, his report + of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, 431, 432. + Administrative reconstruction, 397, 458, 489, 523 _et seq._ + Africa. _See_ South Africa. + Afrikander Bond, The, 46; + programme of, 50 _et seq._; + its sphere of action, 55; + its power in Cape Colony, 55; + its origin, 56; + its purpose, 56 to 58, 106; + its first congress, 59; + its "programme of principles," 59; + its change of policy, 60; + members returned to it by the Cape Parliament, 60, 483; + meets at Bloemfontein, 63; + adopts the Hofmeyr programme, 64; + its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa, 65; + its first openly avowed aim, 66; + falls back on the policy of 1881, 69; + its influence in the Cape Legislature, 70, 93, 121, 122, 141; + its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, 94, 95; + the parliamentary chief and the real leader of, 97; + Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony, 84, 91, 92, 98; + the sum and substance of its policy, 106, 107, 119; + address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch, 108; + Lord Milner's reply, 109 to 113; + Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of, 116; + the funds of, 118; + its domination, 150; + nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krueger, 162, 169, 195, 274, 276; + demonstrations organised by, 215; + the completeness with which it had undermined British power, 223; + its view of the Salisbury Cabinet, 274; + its activity, 348; + its attitude at the end of January, 1900, 373; + annual congress at Somerset East, 374; + its policy after the occupation of the Republics, 429; + its attitude in February, 1901, 430; + the qualities of its leaders, 435; + its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the + Burgher Peace Committee, 474; + its identification with the Boer invaders, 475; + the character of the men it sent to Parliament, 483. + "Afrikanderdom," the doctrine of, 197. + Afrikander nationalists, The, 48 (note), 267; + the creed of, 48 _et seq._, 119; + their plan of a united S. Africa, 70; + Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support, 73; + strength of their forces, 74, 96, 104; + their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80; + uneasiness of, 113; + dominate S. Africa, 126; + their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference, 157; + their direct appeal to the Queen, 294; + unmasked, 300; + their speech and action during the war, 343; + they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their + "peace overtures" on the British Government, 360, 361; + their "conciliation" meetings, 361, 382; + renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition, 369; + their objects, 382, 383; + their opposition to the Treason Bill, 395; + their references to Boer successes, 396; + they slander the British troops, 398; + their hatred of England, 429; + assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders, 478; + their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 495. + "Afrikander party" The, the friends of in England, 375, 379. + Agricultural Department, The, formation of in Orange River Colony, 525. + Agriculture, The development of in new colonies, 536. + "Albany" settlers, The, 15, 271. + Albert, 346. + _Albert Times, The_, 120. + Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws, The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for + the repeal of, 81; + repeal and amendment of, 82, 88, 94. + Aliwal North, 346, 411, 455. + Amershof, Mr. Justice, 103. + Amery, Mr., 291, 300. + Amphitheatre Meeting, The, 131. + Anti-British Press, The, 68, 166, 205 to 207, 225, 272, 349, 374, 380, + 391, 403, 409, 477. + Ardagh, Sir John, 319 (note). + Arms, The surrender of, 573; + the possession of, 581. + Army Corps, The, the order to mobilise, 244, 317, 318; + arrival of, 305, 321, 331. + Arnold-Forster, H. O., 516. + Asquith, H. H., his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 92, 99; + his utterances, 416. + Attorney-General, The (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason, + 480. + + + Baden-Powell, Colonel, afterwards General, 191 (note), 329 (note), 397, + 530. + Balfour, A. J., 203 (note), 228, 302, 307. + _Balfourian Parliament, The_, 319 (note). + Balliol Scholars, 76 (note). + Bantu, The, 11, 12, 25. + Barberton, 452. + Barkly East, 346. + Barkly, Sir Henry, 275. + Bastards, The, 281. + Basuto incident, The, 496 (note). + Basutoland, 83; + British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298; + construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein, 532 (note). + Beaconsfield, Lord, 24. + Bechuanaland Expedition, The, 350 (note). + Bechuanaland, 83; + the administration of the European population of, 35; + the Transvaal's attempt to secure, 64, 74, 93; + the Dutch community in, 346. + Bechuanas, the employment of as indentured labourers, 117. + Beechranger Hottentots, The, 2, 4. + Belgrave, Lord (now Duke of Westminster), 167. + Berry, Dr. (now Sir) Wm., 124 (note). + Bethulie Bridge, 411, 455; + alleged movement of British troops to, 236. + Bezuidenhout, the Boer, 11. + Blignaut, J. N., letter from, 258. + Blockhouse system, The, area inclosed by, 458; + effect produced by, 456, 457; + efficiency of, 576; + extension of, 455; + its help to the railways, 533. + Bloemfontein, Meeting of the Afrikander Bond at, 63; + opening of the railway at, 67; + seizure of correspondence at, 156, 162, 206, 376; + the occupation of, 328, 363, 384; + visit of Lord Milner to, 397; + the effective occupation of the district round, 453; + discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and + Kitchener, 471; + civil administration in, 524; + construction of the railway to Basutoland, 532 (note). + Bloemfontein Conference, The, 268; + proposed, 140; + agreed to by President Krueger, 153; + negotiations leading up to, 151 to 165; + meeting of, 167, 168; + the discussion at a closing of, 168, 172; + the result of, 172; + the four months which followed, 174. + Bloemfontein Convention, The, 17, 87 (note); + Sir G. Grey's criticism of, 19. + _Bloemfontein Express, The_, 50, 54, 63, 67. + Blood, Sir Bindon, 425. + Bodley, J. E. C., statement by, 76 (note). + Boer Administration, The, depraved character of, 212. + Boer Army, The, 336, 337, 340 (note). + Boer aspirations, The, 302. + Boer children, Teaching of during the war, 519 to 523. + Boer Peace commissioners, The, their tortuous diplomacy, 526; + the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them, 563; + their departure from Pretoria, 569. + Boer deputation in Europe, The, 555. + Boer emigrants, The, 19. + Boer leaders, The, their decision to continue the struggle, 414, 417, + 418, 424 _et seq._; + their disingenuousness, 557; + penalties to which they were liable, 564; + they treat for peace, 552, 555 _et seq._ + Boer raiders, The, 438. + Boer revolt of 1880-81, The, 31. + Boer Republics, The (_see also_ Orange Free State and Transvaal), + creation of, 17, 19; + scheme for their union with the British colonies, 24. + Boer spies, 337. + Boer, vernacular, The, 547. + Boers, The, the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their + treatment, 9; + their dealings with the natives, 11; + the grant of self-government to, 29; + their resistance to British arms 48; + their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80; + their military forces, 181, 340 (note), + without uniform, 336; + personal dealings with, 194, 195; + their friends in England, 232, 414, 424, 573; + breaches of faith by, 399; + their losses up to November, 1901, 458; + final surrender of, 573 (note). + Bond, The. _See_ Afrikander Bond. + Bond Press, The, 209. + Booy the Hottentot, 11. + Borckenhagen the German, 49, 50, 66. + Botha, Louis, 564; + dispersal of his army, 322; + defeat of at Diamond Hill, 329; + defeat of at Dalmanutha, 329; + in Johannesburg, 337; + urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms, 414, 424; + his determination to fight on, 421; + circular issued by him, 425 (note); + his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla + war, 427; + failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener, 434; + stimulates his followers, 457; + treats for peace, 471, 552, 554; + meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556; + letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the + discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging, 562; + advocates submission, 571, 577; + Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the + treaty of peace, 573 (note); + his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the + later stages of the war, 575; + his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system, + 576; + his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape + Colony, 577. + "Botha" terms, The, 471, 554. + Bower, Sir Graham, 41. + Brand, President, 28, 275; + discourages the Afrikander Bond, 55; + the role played by him in 1881, 153. + Brebner J., 564. + Breed's Nek, 455. + British Administration, the failure of in S. Africa, 1, 22; + distrust of by the British in S. Africa, 37; + the Bond and, 65; + its impotency, 69; + efficiency of impaired by English party politics, 254. + British and Dutch factions, The, bitterness of, 244. + British Army, The, in Cape Colony and Natal, 189, 325; + disadvantage in which it was placed, 253; + its performance in S. Africa, 323; + the number of effectives available, 323; + its difficulties, 330 _et seq._; + the slander of, 398, 499. + British colonists, the settlement of on the land, 538. + British Government, representatives of at the Cape, 7; + its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa, 8. + British Navy, The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of, + 95; + holds the seas, 311. + British party, A, the creation of, 150. + British policy in S. Africa, 9 _et seq._; + up to 1897, 69. + British population in Cape Colony, The, 107, 115, 127; + effect of the Redistribution Bill on, 125; + their approval of Lord Milner's policy, 216; + their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years' + franchise law, 222; + their support of Lord Milner, 270; + numbers which took part in the war, 324. + British settlers in the country, 61. + Britstown, 354. + _Brunt of The War, The_, 462 (note). + Bryce, James, The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, 259, + 314, 360, 415, 496; + misstatement by, 263; + the "settlement" advocated by him, 370; + his view of the Transvaal Government, 579 (note). + Buller, General Sir Redvers, 191; + defeat of, 306; + his responsibility for the early disasters, 318, 319; + his misconception of the state of affairs, 319, 320; + at Maritzburg, 321; + forces at his disposal, 321; + false report of surrender to the Boers, 380. + Bundy, Thomas Dashwood, 212 (note). + Bunu, the affair of, 89 (note). + Burger, Schalk, 89, 101, 159, 564; + denounced by Krueger, 100; + attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168; + his determination to fight on, 421; + his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war, + 427; + his official notice of June 20th, 1901, 434; + his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps, 463 (note); + announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace, + 552; + granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn, + 552; + meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552; + appointed a peace commissioner, 556; + calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not, 570; + his account of the origin of the war, 574; + his reasons for treating for peace, 578. + Burgher Camps, deportation of Boer non-combatants to, 459; + high rate of mortality in, 460 to 463; + Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the + camps, 463 (note); + condition of, 503, 505, 513; + establishment of schools in, 519 to 523; + views of the Boers on, 575. + Burgher meetings, The, the minutes of, 560 _et seq._ + Burgher Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423; + its efforts, 427, 429; + treatment of its agents, 427 to 429; + Bond leaders hold aloof from, 474. + Burghersdorp, The theological seminary of, 120. + Burns, John, 315, 496. + Burt, Thomas, 498 (note). + Butler, General Sir William, refuses to transmit a petition for + protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, 131, 176; + his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 174, 184; + his views of a war, 174, 175, 179; + his view of the Uitlander grievances, 175; + the friction between him and Lord Milner, 175, 176; + his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa, 177; + his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war, + 180; + requested to furnish a scheme of defence, 180, 181; + his scheme, 181 to 183; + his evidence before the War Commission, 175 (note), 181 to 183; + his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate + reinforcements, 183, 319; + his withdrawal from the command at the Cape, 184, 247, 269, 289; + his only point of agreement with Lord Milner, 185; + his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, 185; + is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements, 190. + + + Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape, 10. + Cambridge, The Duke of, 494 (note). + Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war, 192, + 252, 256, 259, 314, 367, 368, 399, 416, 418, 574; + his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war, + 265, 266; + his attitude in Committee of Supply, 371 (note); + his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement, 393; + his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener, + 460, 464 (note); + his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, 466, + 467; + his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901, 467; + his declaration at Plymouth, 499. + "Canadian Precedent," The, 385. + Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co. + at, 2; + isolation of at the end of the 18th century, 6; + the task of governing, 6; + the old European population in, 7; + representatives of the British Government at, 7; + the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803, 8; + population of at the time of the permanent British occupation, 10; + Franco-Dutch population in, 11; + the "Albany Settlers" in, 15; + the emancipation of slaves in, 15; + disintegrating influences at work in, 28; + transfer to the British Government, 51; + the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond, 55; + conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal, 64; + speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898, 67; + anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in, 91; + the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival, 93; + division of parties in, 97; + aspirations of the Dutch in, 105; + the leaders of Dutch opinion in, 106; + public meetings in, 131; + nationalists of, 142, 195; + the vote for responsible government in, 147; + creation of a British party in, 151; + the garrison in, 191; + demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215; + petition from to the Queen, 216; + the British forces in, 243; + the Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259; + organisation of the defences of, 269, 278; + the British population of, 271; + only in name a British colony, 273; + alarming rumours from, 305; + rebellion of the Dutch in, 341 to 372; + proclamation of martial law, 345, 411; + Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion, 346; + disclosure of a new centre of rebellion, 354, 355; + the second invasion of, 383, 430; + racial relations in, 383; + clearing it of the republican invaders, 384; + the situation in November, 1900, 398; + De Wet enters, 430; + is chased out, 432; + the area to be protected, 445; + response of the British population to arms, 446; + numbers of Boers in the field in, 454; + screened off by blockhouses, 458; + the course of events in, 473; + collapse of the system of responsible government in, 478 to 480; + the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure + of military courts, 481; + number of troops placed by the Government of in the field, 485, 486; + treatment of rebels in, 563, 567. + _Cape Argus, The_, 243 (note). + Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of, 89 (note). + Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of, 272. + Cape Distriks-bestuur, The, 349. + Cape electoral system, The, 115, 116. + Cape garrison, The, 191, 204, 278. + Cape local forces, The, 281 (note). + Cape Ministry, The (_see also_ Schreiner Cabinet and Sprigg), its views + as to its duties and powers in case of a war, 164; + and the Bond, 193; + attitude of, 198; + "moral support of," 217; + its views upon the settlement of the new colonies, 546. + Cape nationalists, The, 167, 268. + Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in, 60, 70, 393; + Progressive majority in, 393; + prorogation of, 478, 482. + Cape Parliamentary Reports, 395. + _Cape Times, The_, 48 (note), 220, 379 (note); + report of J. X. Merriman's speech in, 62; + its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes, 114; + its views on the Redistribution Bill, 117. + Capetown, mass meeting at, 204, 250; + alleged plot to seize, 350. + _Carisbrook Castle, The S.S._, 132 (note). + Carnarvon, 354. + Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union, 27. + "Carnival of Mendacity," The, 477. + Cartwright, Albert, 380, 381, 477. + _Cecil Rhodes_, Vindex's, 68 (note). + _Century of Wrong, A_, Mr. Reitz's, 356. + Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his _impis_ 17; + his organisation of the Zulus, 25. + Chaka, 25. + Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, 40, 41, 45, 72; + his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid, 42; + his active sympathy with the Uitlanders, 47; + his policy, 72, 73, 125; + his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner, 75, 77; + his despatch of March 6th 1897, 81; + accusation against, 82; + asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal, 126 (note); + his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract, + 130; + accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides + to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the + Uitlanders, 140; + a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner, 146; + authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 155; + his despatch of May 10th, 1899, 155, 194; + agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the + Bloemfontein Conference, 157; + his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal, 184; + his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the + Bloemfontein Conference, 188; + his desire to avoid war, 196; + the support given by him to Lord Milner, 200; + his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham, 202, 204; + urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill, 210; + believes the crisis to be at an end, 221; + prepared to accept Krueger's illusory Franchise Law, 222; + statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law, 227; + proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission, 229; + his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the + arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene, 238, 239; + he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a + sovereign international state, 240; + his despatch of September 8th, 1899, 240, 241; + his speech at Highbury on August 27th, 249; + his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war, + 265, 266; + repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene, + 290; + his anxiety for a peaceful settlement, 293; + his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the + forces in S. Africa, 325; + his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the + Government had determined on, 367; + sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of + loyalists and punishment of rebels, 384; + his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions, 386; + his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels, 389; + replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry + in favour of a general amnesty, 395; + his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to + the fighting burghers, 420; + abandons the proposal, 421; + sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape, 479; + refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479; + assents to Lord Milner's application for leave, 488; + importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal + Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies, + 489, 490; + receives Lord Milner, 490, 491; + report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission, 516; + agrees to a tax on the mining industry, 542; + his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position, 543; + concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement, 544; + approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the + Legislative Councils, 545; + declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the + Vereeniging surrender, 562. + Channing, M.P., Mr., 489 (note). + Chartered Company, The, 36, 66, 83. + Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives" + in the "Terms of Surrender," 568 (note). + Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies, 397, + 519; + its progress, 489, 524. + Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at, 361, 362. + Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's + frontier policy, 14. + "Closer Union," the policy of, 49, 70. + "Coercive measures," Boer, 425. + Colenso, 306, 321; + a result of the defeat at, 8; + the Free State Boers moving on, 305. + Colesberg, 346, 348. + Colonial Conference, The, of 1897, 95. + Colonial Office, The, the administration of, 23; + a leakage from, 153. + Colonial questions, the study of, 24; + necessity of, 254. + Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on, 563, 567; + surrenders of, 573 (note). + Colonies, The, offers of military aid from, 251, 324. + Commando Nek, 455. + _Commissie Van Toezicht, The_, 349. + Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of, 97. + Concentration Camps. _See_ Burgher Camps. + Concessions Commission, The, 376, 377 (note). + "Conciliation," movement, The, 343, 359, 361, 373 to 412; + Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement, 373; + injurious influence of the movement on the Colony, 381; + the Englishmen who took part in, 383; + the initiation of, 375, 415. + Conciliation Committee, The, in England, 415. + Conservative Governments, 255. + Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on, 19; + Lord Milner on, 86, 87 (note), 358, 360. + _Cornhill Magazine, The_, 263 (note). + _Coronation of King Edward VII._, J. E. C. Bodley's, 76 (note). + Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war, 232, + 251, 257 to 259, 360, 363, 496, 497; + advocates the autonomy of the Republics, 370, 415; + letter to him from President Krueger, 372. + Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg, 328. + Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs., 146. + Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of, 490, 501, 544. + Customs Union, The, 36. + + + _Daily Chronicle, The_, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa, + 154. + Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at, 329, 414. + Davies, "Karri," Major W. D., 88. + De Aar, 305, 354, 455. + De Jong, Mr., 402 (note), 477. + De Kock, Meyer, shot, 427. + Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to, 29; + its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere, 29; + appearance of a British squadron at, 82; + consignment of ammunition to, 236; + railway communication with Pretoria re-opened, 329. + De la Rey, J. H., 434, 552, 556, 562 (note), 564; + Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note). + _De Patriot_, 48, 50 (note), 56, 57, 63. + _De Rand Post_, 213. + Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884, 262. + _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, 54, 57 (note), 58. + De Villiers, A. B., 382, 404, 406. + De Villiers, Melius, 160, 232; + advocates a cessation of hostilities, 401. + De Villiers, Sir Henry, 28, 95 (note), 102; + his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn, 159; + his visit to Pretoria in 1899, 159, 160; + his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law, 218, 219; + his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krueger's acceptance of the joint + inquiry, 232, 311; + his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war, 292. + "Development Loan," The, 540. + Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude + in Committee of Supply, 371 (note). + De Wet, Christian, 420, 434, 562 (note), 564, 575; + his blow at Sannah's Post, 363; + his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla + war, 427, 428; + his laager near Lindley, 427; + enters Cape Colony, 430, 577; + chased out of it, 432; + his _Three Years' War_, 433 (note); + the pursuit of, 471; + his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape, 475; + meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556; + signs the Vereeniging Agreement, 567 (note); + advocates a continuance of the war, 571, 578; + Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note). + De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace + Committee, 427; + desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher + Peace Committee, 474. + De Wet, Sir Jacobus, 82. + Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at, 329. + Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand, 86, 90. + Diamond Mines, The, earnings of, 23; + Mr. Merriman's association with, 149. + Diamonds, The discovery of, 23. + Disarmament, The operation of, 413 to 469; + views of the Natal Ministry on, 549. + Dodd, Mr., arrest of, 131. + Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at, 68 (note). + Dordrecht affair, The, 496 (note). + Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from, 1, 22, + 34, 35; + Mr. Chamberlain and, 47. + Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his _War in South Africa_, 469 (note). + Duncan, Mr., 515, 527. + Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who + were in favour of peace, 428. + Durban, 271. + D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy, 12 to 15. + Durham, Lord, his report on Canada, 480. + Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa, 3. + Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of, 341 to 372; + the aggravation and use of their disaffection, 373; + disarmament of, 413 to 469; + their sympathy with the Boer raiders, 432, 433; + their restlessness and embitterment, 443; + their general attitude, 444. + Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the + Cape, 2; + a century and a half of their government, 5; + the corner stone of their policy, 5; + their instructions to Van Riebeck, 5, 9. + Dutch language, The, the use of, 565, 581. + Dutch party, The, interests of, 273. + Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of, 69, 106, 107, 119. + Dutch Reformed Church, The, 120, 215, 410, 411, 428. + Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of, 255, 356, 357. + Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are + descended, 5; + their essential unity, 24; + Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side, 90; + anti-British sentiment of, 91, 104; + their moral conquest of Cape Colony, 107. + Dutch, The republican, 17, 19, 28, 36; + conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of + British S. Africa, 545. + Dutch vote, The, 150. + Du Toit, Rev. S. J., 50 (note), 54; + his articles in _De Patriot_, 56; + rejected by the Bond, 58; + reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter, 258. + Duxbury, Mr., 212 (note). + Dynamite Contract, The, 130. + + + Ebden, Mr. Alfred, 173. + Edgar, Tom Jackson, 130, 131 (note), 132, 175. + Educational reconstruction, The work of, 519 to 523. + Eerste Fabriken, 456. + Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley, 371 (note). + Eliot, Mr., 306. + Ellis, M.P., John, 498 (note). + Emigrant Farmers, The, 15 to 17. + England, The military unpreparedness of, 185; + ignorance of the situation in S. Africa, 251, 253, 283, 316, 323, 331; + hatred of, 312. + _England in Egypt_, 76. + English language, The, war against, 58. + English State Church, The, Afrikander view of, 53. + "Equal rights for all white men," The policy of, 1, 32. + Esau, brutal murder of, 427 (note). + + + Farelly, Mr., 126 (note), 214. + Farmer, Canon, 259. + "Farmers' Protection Association, The," 59, 60. + Farrer, Lord, 498 (note). + Faure, Pieter (now Sir), 93, 105. + Fiddes, G. V., 167, 515; + his report on the work of the departments of education, public works, + and district administration, 526. + Fischer, Abraham, 126 (note), 161, 203, 204, 210, 239 (note); + acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference, 168; + his advice to Krueger, 217; + in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner, 217 (note); + dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape + nationalists, 234; + works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics, + 234; + revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899, 242; + recasts the ultimatum, 291; + attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495. + Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The, 203 to 210, 236, 275, 555. + Fish River, The, grants of land beyond, 13. + FitzPatrick, Sir Percy, 264, 273. + _Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers_, 16 (note). + Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command, 184, + 247, 269; + military measures of, 288. + Fouche, 432. + Fowler, Sir Henry, 416. + Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years', 37, 156, 157, 170, 172, + 238; + conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238. + Franchise Law, The, 209 _et seq._; + the Volksraad discussion on, 213; + demonstrations upon, 215; + Krueger recommends a further modification of, 217; + the new law passed, 218; + obscurity of its provisions, 218 to 220; + flagrant insincerity of, 234; + Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years' + franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry, 237, 238; + conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238; + the Home Government kept inactive by, 288. + France, The attitude of, 311. + Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The, 11; + secession of part of, 17. + Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of, 175. + Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union," 49; + beaten for the Presidential election, 70. + Free State Dutch, The, 18. + Frederickstad, 455. + French, General, his advance on Colesberg, 348; + libel on, 477; + surrenders of rebels to, 573 (note). + French, Mr., 306. + Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle, 24, 25, 261; + his diagnosis of the S. African situation, 26; + his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet, 26; + his recall, 27; + the vindication of his statesmanship, 27; + his knowledge of S. African conditions, 28; + drafts a scheme of administrative reform, 28; + his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879, 29; + events following his recall, 34, 255; + letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg, 263. + Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley, 261. + _Friend, The_ (Bloemfontein), 235. + Froneman, Commandant, 428. + + + Gatacre, General, defeat at Stormberg, 321, 348. + German Emperor, The, telegram of, 71. + German General Staff, The, reply to its criticism, 334. + German Government, The, action of, 37, 232; + attitude of, 311. + German Marines at Delagoa Bay, 39 (note). + Germiston, Lord Milner's speech at, 491 (note). + Gill, Sir David, his words, 286. + Girouard, Sir Percy, 502, 532. + Gladstone, Rev. Stephen, 498. + Gladstone, W. E., S. African policy of, 26, 31. + Glencoe, British force despatched to, 291. + Glenelg, Lord (_see_ also Grant), Cloete's opinion of his despatch + reversing Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14. + Gold Industry, The, Commissions on, 529; + resumption of, 536. + Goodenough, General, his schemes for the defence of the British + colonies, 180. + Goold-Adams, Major Sir H., 470, 488, 515, 524, 526. + Government House, watched by spies, 273. + Governor's warrants, 478. + Graaf Reinet, first congress of the Afrikander Bond at, 59; + Lord Milner's speech at, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115, 367; + opening of the railway at, 108; + the people's congress at, 379, 381. + Grahamstown, 61. + Graham, T. Lynedoch, 116 (note). + Grant, Charles (aft. Lord Glenelg), his reversal of Sir Benjamin + D'Urban's frontier policy, 12 _et seq._ + Greene, Sir Wm. Conyngham, 82, 127, 131 (note), 198, 210, 226 (note), + 237, 238, 241, 242, 252, 290, 295, 299, 310. + Gregorowski, Chief Justice, 103, 259. + Grey, Sir Edward, 416. + Grey, Sir George, neglect of his advice by the Home Government 18; + his exposure of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions, 19; + his despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton, 19; + is charged with "direct disobedience," 20, 22; + recalled and reinstated, 20; + attitude of the Home Government towards, 21. + Griqualand West, the discovery of diamonds in, 23; + an invitation to the Boers to invade, 260. + Groebler, Mr., 204, 205. + Guerilla warfare, commencement of, 398; + Pres. Steyn's responsibility for, 414, 415; + methods and conditions of, 417; + responsibility for sufferings of the Boers during, 426, 427; + increased losses, to the country due to, 437; + methods by which it was brought to a close, 450, 575. + + + Haldane, Mr., 416. + _Handelsblad_, The Amsterdam, an article in, 50. + Harcourt, Sir William, 75, 76, 502; + his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 78; + his misstatement on the Suzerainty question, 262; + his manifestation of hostility to the loyalist population of South + Africa, 464 (note); + his financial miscalculations, 502. + Hargrove, E. T., 375 to 380, 415, 496 (note). + Harrison, Frederic, 498 (note). + "Harry" the Hottentot chief, 3. + Heany, Captain, 40, 42, 43. + Heidelberg, 456. + Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter, 470; + prorogues the Cape Parliament, 478, 479 (note). + Herholdt, A. J., 150, 204; + joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142; + his mission, 205 (note), 207; + his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393. + _Het Oosten_, 477. + Het Volk, 55 (note). + Hertzog, General, 564, 572; + appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558; + crosses the Orange River, 430. + High Commissioner for S. Africa, The, decreasing power of, 36; + severance of the office from the governorship of the Cape, 419, 470. + "High Court Crisis," The, 102, 103. + _History of the War in South Africa, The Official_, vol. i. 309 (note) + _et seq._ + _History of the War in South Africa, The Times'_, 217 (note), 300 (note), + 309 (note), 340 (note), 351 (note). + Hobhouse, Lord, 498 (note). + Hobhouse, Miss, 462 (note). + "Hofmeyr Compromise, The," 277. + Hofmeyr, J. H., 55; + the influence of, 60; + adoption of his programme by the Bond, 64; + his alliance with Rhodes, 65; + dictates Lord Rosmead's policy, 70; + his attitude towards the offer of a contribution to the cost of the + British Navy, 95; + the real leader of the Bond party, 97, 116, 117; + his action to prevent the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the + petition of the Uitlanders, 140; + asks Lord Milner to meet Krueger in conference, 140, 153; + his methods for paralysing British administration, 140, 141; + his motives, 147; + approaches Lord Milner as to meeting Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein, 154, + 156; + his anxiety to prevent decisive action of the Imperial Government, 158; + his absence from the Bloemfontein Conference, 167; + the pressure of his "mediation," 196; + in close communication with Abraham Fischer, 203; + confers with Messrs. Fischer and Smuts at Bloemfontein, 205; + goes to Pretoria, 207; + the failure of his mission, 209; + his relations with the republican nationalists, 216, 217; + urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 311; + his view of Mr. Schreiner's position as Premier of the Cape, 235; + his opinion of the result of war, 275; + his telegram of Sept. 14th to Pres. Steyn, 275; + his displeasure at the Schreiner Cabinet, 346, 361; + at a meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur, 349. + Hottentots, The, 2 to 5, 9, 10. + House of Commons, The, debate in on the S. African settlement, 393. + Hunter, General, Sir A., Prinsloo surrenders to, 329. + + + "Imperial factor, The," 40; + the elimination of, 34, 85. + Imperial Light Horse, The, 179, 447. + Imperial military authorities, The, charges brought against, 459. + Imperial military railways, The, 502, 505. + Imperial spirit, The, 21, 24. + Imperial troops, The, calumnies on, 398, 499; + insufficiency of, 452, 453; + the task of, 435, 452, 487. + Impossible position, An, 128. + _Impressions of South Africa_, By J. Bryce, extract from, 579 (note). + Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, The, 396. + "Independence," the Boer claim to, 578. + India, The feudatory princes of, 311. + Indian Army, The, troops from for S. Africa, 243, 310. + Indian military authorities, The, promptitude displayed by, 289. + Industrial Commission, The, anticipation of good results from, 105; + impartiality of, 89; + treatment of its Report, 99 to 101. + Industrial corporations, growth of, 36. + Innes, Sir James, 118 (note), 125, 271, 361, 362; + becomes Attorney-General, 390; + notice issued by him as to treason, 480, 481. + Intelligence Department, The, the work of, 177, 180, 190, 217 (note), + 233, 234 (notes), 257, 277 (note), 292 (note), 319 (note), 425. + Inter-State Conference, An, proposal of, 153. + Irish Nationalist party, The, 465. + Irrigation, report of Sir W. Willcocks on, 516, 529. + Isandlhwana, the military disaster of, 17, 26. + + + Jameson, Dr., 38 _et seq._; + his disregard of the Reformers' message and of Rhodes's telegram, 43. + Jameson Raid, The, 33, 37, 41; + its effect on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, 68; + object of, 38 to 44; + Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into, 82; + political forces set in motion by, 93; + results of, 69, 71. + Janssen, David, the murder of, 2, 3. + Johannesburg, 439; + Lord Milner's farewell speech at, 129, 145; + the second Reform movement at, 132; + enthusiastic meeting at, 198, 199, 215; + march of Lord Roberts on, 214; + exodus from, 246; + situation in, 248; + occupation of, 329; + Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352; + arrangements for the civil administration of, 397; + effective occupation of the district round, 453; + British population allowed to return to, 459; + Lord Milner's reception at, 472; + establishment of a Town Council for, 489; + abolition of the office of Military Governor, 489; + the public buildings at, 526; + organisation of municipal police in, 529. + Johannesburg insurrection, The, 41. + Johannesburg mines, The, project of wrecking, 214. + Johannesburg Reformers, The, 88 (note). + _Johannesburg Star, The_, 145 (note), 245; + extract from, 491 (note). + Johannesburgers, The, splendid fighting of, 447. + _John Bull & Co._, Max O'Rell's, 43 (note). + Joint Inquiry, The, proposed, 229, 231; + refused by the Volksraad, 237. + Joubert, General, 101, 235, 320, 344. + Jubilee despatch, Lord Milner's, 90 to 92, 99, 104, 107. + + + Kafir, invasion of 1834-5, The, 15. + Kafirs, British policy towards, 12 _et seq._ + Kafir wars, The, 17. + Karree Siding, 363. + Kei River, The, the Kafir's line of, 13. + Kekewich, Colonel, calls for arms, 304. + Kitchener, Lord, 303; + appointed Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts, 321; + his losses before Paardeberg, 332; + instructed to proceed to De Aar, 354; + reduces to order the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362; + defamatory libel on, 381; + agrees with Lord Milner's views as to the proposed proclamation to + the burghers, 420, 421; + his address to the Burgher Peace Committee, 422; + failure of his peace negotiations with L. Botha, 434; + his accession to the command, 452; + the troops at his disposal, 453; + origin of his system of blockhouse defence, 455; + his expectations of the blockhouse lines, 456; + reports the creation of mobile columns, 456; + his reply to the official Boer complaint against the system of Burgher + Camps, 463 (note); + discusses with Lord Milner the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures + for peace, 471; + instructions to his officers as to procedure in military courts, 481; + permits the mines to re-open, 489; + differs from Lord Milner's views of the terms of the surrender, 551, + 560; + directed to put forward a copy of the correspondence between the + British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders, 552; + assures the Boer leaders that no terms will be granted maintaining the + independence of the Republics, 553; + is authorised to refer the leaders to the offer made to General Botha + at Middelburg, 554; + refuses the terms of the Boer peace commissioners, 557; + announces "peace" to Lord Milner, 572; + records his appreciation of the energy and tact displayed after the + signing of the peace treaty by Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and + C. De Wet, 573; + his last words addressed to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary + of State for War, 573 (note); + the efficiency of his blockhouse system, 576. + Kimberley, 259, 271, 286 (note), 455; + the diamond industry at, 23; + plans for the defence of, 178, 278, 279; + Lancashire Regiment sent to, 288; + is cut off, 304, 305; + relief of, 328; + effective occupation of the district of, 453. + Kimberley, The Earl of, 27. + Kimberley Volunteers, The, 280, 282 (note). + Kipling, Rudyard, on the attitude of the Bond 430, 434. + Klerksdorp, 458; + conference at, 552. + Kock, Judge, warlike speech of at Paardekraal, 197. + Komati Poort, the occupation of, 322, 329. + Kotze, Chief Justice, the dismissal of, 102, 103; + indignation caused by, 116. + Krause, Dr., 214. + Kretschmar, J. Van, 377, 533 (note). + Krogh, General, 564. + Kroonstad entered, 329. + Krueger, Paul, 84 to 86; + his letter to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on Sir Bartle Frere's recall, 27; + his allusion to Germany at the German Club at Pretoria, 38; + supplies arms to adherents of the nationalist cause, 71; + invited to visit England, 72; + calls for the appointment of the Industrial Commission, 89, 99; + uncompromising attitude of, 89; + denounces Schalk Burger, 100; + elected President of the South African Republic for the fourth time, + 101; + dismisses Chief Justice Kotze, 102, 103; + his determination to increase the disabilities of the Uitlanders, 103; + signs a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State, 104; + his attitude in 1898, 114; + subsidises the Bond, 118; + claims independence for the South African Republic, 126 (note); + consents to meet Lord Milner at Bloemfontein, 153; + his retrogressive policy, 160; + meets Lord Milner, 168; + his appearance at the Conference, 171; + his motive in attending it, 172; + the possibility of his declaring war, 183; + expresses his intention of introducing his franchise scheme to the + Volksraad, 193; + the scheme laid before the Volksraad, 194, 197; + his incapacity to yield, 194; + complexity of his franchise proposals, 196; + his bid for the "moral support," of the Cape Ministry, 209; + grants a limited franchise, 209; + his object in doing so, 210, 211; + wishes to retain the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, 217; + recommends to the Volksraad a further modification of the Franchise + Bill, 217; + inadequacy of his franchise law, 218; + hastens arrangements for war, 231; + his secret agents 233 (note); + urged by Afrikander Members of Cape Parliament to accept the offered + joint inquiry, 233; + opposition to it, 234; + strength of his military position, 244; + his note refusing to consider the British offer of September 8th handed + to Sir Wm. Greene, 252; + his boast, 259; + the illusory concessions embodied in his franchise law, 268; + spies in his pay, 273; + his coarse duplicity, 277; + winning all along the line, 288; + flees the Transvaal, 329; + his "peace overtures," 355; + his letter to Mr. Courtney, 372; + his telegram to Pres. Steyn shortly before the Bond Congress at + Somerset East was postponed, 375, 377; + attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495. + Krueger, Tjaart, 212 (note), 213. + Kruegersdorp, arrival of Dr. Jameson at, 44. + Kruitzinger, crosses the Orange River, 430, 432. + + + Labouchere, Henry, 232, 233, 237, 256, 498. + Ladies' Commission, The, 511. + Ladysmith, British force entrained at, 291; + Sir G. White shut up in, 320, 344; + spies in the camp of the relieving force, 337. + Lagden, Sir Godfrey, 515, 528. + Laing's Nek, evacuated by the Boers, 329. + Lancashire Regiment, The, sent to garrison Kimberley, 288. + Land settlement, proposed loan for, 540, 543, 544. + Land Settlement Commission, The, 516, 529. + Langlaate Estate, The, 149. + Lanyon, Sir Owen, 263. + Lawson, Sir Wilfred, 498 (note). + _Leader, The Transvaal_, 213 (note), 245. + Legal Adviser's office, The, work of, 527. + Legislative Councils of the new colonies, The, enlargement of, 544. + Leon, M., 288. + Leonard, J. W., 61, 93. + Lewis, Mrs., 144. + Leyds, Dr., 50 (note), 232, 375; + communication opened with European Powers through, 103, 104; + despatched to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary of the South African + Republic, 125. + Liberal Opposition leaders, The, attitude and public utterances of, 143, + 167, 192, 203, 252, 257, 259, 261, 264 to 266, 314, 367, 368, 371 + (note), 399, 414, 424, 430, 431, 460, 496, 502; + their desire to escape from responsibility, 254; + renewal of their alliance with the Afrikander nationalists, 369, 496; + representations of the delegates of the Worcester Congress to, 496. + Liberal Party, The, mandate to, 25; + friends of the Boers in the ranks of, 382, 417, 573. + _See also_ Bryce, Burns, Campbell-Bannerman, Courtney, Labouchere, + Lloyd-George, Morley, etc. + _Life of Gordon, The_, 497 (note). + _Lifetime in South Africa, A_, 16 (note). + Limpopo River, The, 36. + Lindley, De Wet's laager at, 427. + Lloyd-George, Mr., 315, 496, 498. + Loch, Lord, 36, 37; + retirement of, 74. + Lombard, Mr., 213. + London Convention (1884), The, 31, 87 (note), 262; + a violation of, 81; + Article IV. in, 580. + _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note). + Loreburn, Lord, his attitude during the war, 496. + Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal ammunition despatched from, 237. + Loyalists, The compensation of, 384. + Lucas, General, 564. + Lytton, Sir E. B., 20, 21 (notes). + + + McCallum, Sir Henry E., 470. + Mafeking, 259; + the role played by, 179 (note); + capture of an armoured train outside, 304; + relief of, 329. + Mafeking Volunteers, The, 282 (note). + Magaliesberg, The, 455. + Magersfontein, 321; + a result of the defeat at, 8. + Majuba Hill, the British defeat at, 43, 186, 255; + evacuated by the Boers, 329. + Malan, Commandant, 432. + Malan, Mr., 349, 410, 477. + Manchester, meeting at, 251, 257. + Maritzburg, 271, 321; + public meeting at, 249, 250. + Martial law, declaration of in additional districts, 411, 478, 482; + its administration, 484, 485. + Martial Law Board, The, 484, 485. + Massingham, Mr., 154 (note). + _Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, The_, Captain Mahan's, 579 (note). + Merriman, J. X. 61, 69, 93, 97; + report of his Grahamstown speech in the _Cape Times_, 62; + his letter of March 11th, 1898, to President Steyn, 114; + joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142; + his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 143, + 144, 148; + his association with the Diamond Mines at Kimberley, 149; + his partisanship, 149; + his desire to induce President Krueger to grant a "colourable measure + of reform," 151, 152; + sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference, + 152; + his appeal to Mr. Fischer, 161; + his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361; + his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376 to 378; + repudiation of Pres. Krueger's statement as to his intimacy with Mr. + Hargrove, 380; his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 391; + his denunciation of the policy of the Home Government, 391, 474; + purpose of his visit to England, 495; + banquet in his honour, 496; + his frankness as to his mission, 497; + his attack on Lord Milner, 497; + attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498. + Methuen, Lord, his engagements, 305; forces at his disposal, 321. + Meyer, J. L., his views on the war, 574. + Middelburg, 458. + Middelburg Terms, The, 471, 554, 557 (note), 558, 559, 561, 562, 568 + (note). + Military criticisms on the war, 330 _et seq._ + "Military Notes," estimate in of Boer forces, 181 (note). + Military preparations, delay in making, 242, 243, 246, 250, 279, 288, + 290, 309 to 311, 316. + Military railways, The, 502, 532. + Milner, Viscount, pre-eminence of his administration in South Africa, 32; + the state of affairs he was called on to deal with, 33; + the political situation on his arrival in South Africa, 69; + the choice of him as High Commissioner, 75; + his official career, 75; + his assistance to Sir William Harcourt, 75, 76; + banquet to him, 77; + extract from his speech at the banquet, 78; + affection of those associated with him, 78, 79; + his resolution, 79, 219; + bitterness of Afrikanders and Boers against, 80; + his profound knowledge of the needs of South Africa, 80; + efforts of the Liberal party to revoke the final arrangements of his + administration, 81; + his arrival in South Africa, 81; + the policy of, 82; + travels through Cape Colony, etc., 83; + his speech at Graaf Reinet, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115; + his official duties, 84; + his position in regard to the Transvaal Government, 84, 85; + his anxiety to arrange matters by a friendly discussion with President + Krueger, 85, 86, 88; + confidence shown him by the British population, 86 (note); + his policy with regard to the Conventions, 87; + his anxiety to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape, 90 to 92; + travels round Cape Colony, 104; + conciliatory utterances of, 105; + his reply to the address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander + Bond, 109 to 113; + the position taken up by him towards the Cape Dutch, 114; + his impartiality, 122; + visits England, 127; + his grasp of the situation, 127; + urges the British Government to put an end to an impossible position, + 128; + his farewell speech at Johannesburg, 128, 145; + endorses the petition of the Uitlanders, 131; + his intention to make public in England his despatch on the position of + the Uitlanders, 139; + asked to meet Pres. Krueger in conference, 140; + warns Mr. Schreiner of the gravity of the situation, 140; + postponement of the publication of his despatch, 140; + difficulty of his position, 142; + sounded by Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Merriman as to the possibility of an + inter-state Conference, 152; + his despatch of May 4th, 1899, telegraphed, 153; + approached by Mr. Hofmeyr as to meeting Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein, + 154; + issue of his despatch of May 4th, 1899, 156, 169, 194; + consults Mr. Chamberlain as to the "line" he should take at the + Conference, 156, 157; + his view of Pres. Krueger's acceptance of a conference, 159; + meets Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein, 167; + his staff, 167; + his reception at Bloemfontein, 168 (note); + his embarrassing position, 169, 192; + the compromise offered by him, 170; + his "inflexibility," 170; + his motive in attending the Conference, 171; + address presented to him on his return from it to Capetown, 172, 173; + essence of his reply to the address, 173; + origin of his disagreement with General Butler, 175, 176; + his desire for preparations for war, 178, 183, 186, 269, 309, 331; + his only point of agreement with General Butler, 185; + his reiterated warnings, 189; + inadequate reinforcements sent in response to his appeal, 191, 192; + acquiesces in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, 195; + his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet, 198 to 201; + support given him by Mr. Chamberlain, 200, 201; + his interviews with Mr. Schreiner, 200, 201; + assists the Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, 207, 208; + urges delay in passing the Franchise Bill through the Volksraad, 210; + demonstrations of confidence in his statesmanship, 215; + his influence with the Afrikander leaders, 216; + his opinion of the new franchise law, 219, 220; + points out to Mr. Chamberlain defects in the law, 221; + prevents surrender of Home Government, 222 _et seq._; + his resolute advocacy of the Uitlanders' cause, 224; + bitter attack on him in _Punch_, 225; + his despatch protesting against the readiness of the Government to + accept the new franchise law, 225 to 229; + further deflection of his policy, 231; + conveys to the Pretoria Executive the offer of a joint inquiry, 231; + withdraws the limit placed by Sir Wm. Greene upon the time of the reply + from the Boer Government to the British Government's despatch of + September 8th, 1899, 241; + the compromise proposed by him at Bloemfontein, 244; + his anxiety, 247; + asks for another military adviser, 247; + his despatch explaining his position at the Bloemfontein Conference, + 247; + appeals for prompt action, 248; + Mr. (now Lord) Courtney's attack on Lord Milner, 252, 257, 258; + warns the English people of the advocacy of a Dutch Republic in South + Africa, 255; + makes known to the Government the state of affairs, 267; + his colonial ministers, 270; + support given him by the British population in South Africa, 270; + atmosphere of intrigue by which he was surrounded, 271; + abuse of him by the _South African News_, 272, 380, 381; + passage of war material to the Orange Free State brought to his notice + accidentally, 273; + his personal charm, 277; + his efforts to persuade Mr. Schreiner of the necessity of providing for + the defence of Kimberley, 278, 279; + his advice to the Cape and Home Governments, 282, 283; + his limited powers, 283; + a passage in his speech in the House of Lords on February 26th, 1906, + 283; + defensive measures devised by him, 288; + his use of the time elapsing between the recall of General Butler and + the ultimatum 289; + instructed to repudiate the claim of the South African Republic to be + a sovereign international state, 290; + his anxiety to attain a peaceful settlement, 293; + receives the ultimatum, 295; + warns the British authorities in Natal, Rhodesia, and Basutoland, 298; + the call upon his constructive statesmanship, 303; + consults Mr. Schreiner upon the feasibility of carrying out Sir Redvers + Buller's suggestion to form local defences out of Dutch farmers, 320; + his relationship with the military authorities, 341; + alliance against him, 343, 344; + scant help afforded him by Mr. Schreiner, 345; + his despatch telling the story of the rebellion in the Cape, 346; + addresses a memorandum to Lord Roberts on the rebellion in Cape Colony, + 351, 352; + his view as to the defence of the Cape, 353; + visits the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362; + arrives at Bloemfontein, 363; + receives an appreciative address at Capetown, 363; + his reply to the address, 364; + his record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement, 373; + his representation to Mr. Schreiner as to the proposed Bond congress at + Somerset East, 374; + his despatch covering the newspaper report of the People's Congress at + Graaf Reinet, 381; + his view of racial relations in Cape Colony, 383; + receives a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain on the questions of the + compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels, 384; + inquires as to the Home Government's views upon the disfranchisement + of the rebels, 389; + bitter invectives against him of members of the Schreiner Cabinet, 391; + wins over Mr. Schreiner to the side of the Empire-State, 393; + indicates to Mr. Chamberlain the nature of the Treason Bill, 394; + pays a brief visit to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 396; + makes arrangements for the civil administration of Pretoria and + Johannesburg, 397; + his journey to Bloemfontein, 397; + inaugurates the South African Constabulary, 397; + receives the commissions under which he is appointed to administer + the new colonies, 398, 419, 470, 501; + receives a deputation from the Worcester Congress, 404; + his reply, 406; + his final departure from the Cape to the Transvaal, 419; + his objection to issuing a proclamation to the fighting burghers at + the close of 1900, 420; + approves of Lord Kitchener's proposals, 421; + his account to Mr. Chamberlain of the situation on February 6th, 1901, + 436; + leaves Capetown to assume administration of the new colonies, 470; + incidents of his journey, 471; + discusses with Lord Kitchener the nature of the reply to Botha's + overtures for peace, 471; + the position taken up by him, 472; + at Pretoria, 472; + the sphere of his administrative activity, 473; + his second visit to England, 473, 487, 490; + endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479; + issues a notice as to acts of treason, 480, 481; + obtains the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question + of the settlement of the new colonies, 489; + his reception on his second return to England, 490; + his audience with the King, 490; + marks of royal favour shown to him, 490, 491; + his speech at a luncheon given in his honour, 492; + agitation for his recall, 499; + returns to Johannesburg, 501; + his despatch describing affairs in November, 1901, 503; + invites Mr. E. B. Sargant to organise the work of educational + reconstruction, 520; + appoints commissions on the gold industry, 529; + his attention to the reorganisation of the railways, 532; + urges the settlement of British colonists on the land, 538; + proposes a loan for land settlement, 540; + his tireless energy, 541, 545; + his proposed tax on the mining industry, 541; + his telegram on the immediate financial position, 542; + his repatriation scheme, 543; + presses for a decision on the land settlement question, 543; + differs from Lord Kitchener's views upon the terms of the surrender, + 551, 560; + drafts the terms of the surrender, 551, 558; + refuses the terms of the Boer Peace Commissioners, 557; + his care as to the English text of the Vereeniging surrender, 560, 561; + England's debt to him, 562; + summoned to Pretoria for the signing of the treaty of peace, 572. + Mines Department, The, reorganisation of, 528. + Mines, The, the project of wrecking, 214; + permitted to re-open, 489, 507; + native labour for, 509; + their prosperity, 518. + Mining plant, injury to by Boer raiders, 438. + Mining industry, Lord Milner's proposed 10 per cent, tax on, 541. + Missionaries, The, work of, 18. + Mitchell, Sir Lewis, 485. + Mobile columns, The creation of, 456. + Modder River, Station, 322, 328. + Monypenny, Mr., attempt to arrest, 245. + Mooi River, The, 455. + Morgendael, J., 428. + Morley, John, misstatement by, 261; + his attitude and public utterances on the war, 252, 259, 263, 314, + 360, 370, 371 (note), 415. + Mueller, E. B. Iwan, letter in the possession of, 166; + his _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note). + Mueller, G., 428. + Municipal police, Organisation of, 529. + + + Naauwpoort, 455. + Namaqualand, The election for, 121. + Napier, Sir George, his evidence before the House of Commons on Lord + Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14. + Natal, 51; + a menace to, 26; + public meetings in, 131, 215; + petition from to the Queen, 216; + the invasion of, 235; + the British forces in, 243, 246, 269; + Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259; + mobilisation of the local forces in, 280 (note); + Transvaal commando sent to the border, 290; + the British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298; + treatment of the rebels in, 563, 567, 568. + Natal Ministry, The, views of on the settlement of the new colonies, + 547 to 550; + views of on disarmament and the treatment of the natives, 549; + advocates "reciprocity" in the learned professions and civil services + of the several colonies, 550; + puts forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of + the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal, 550; + its view as to the treatment of the rebels, 568. + Nationalist movement, in South Africa, The, 48 _et seq._ + National Union, The, 41. + Native Affairs, The Department of, in the Transvaal, 528. + Natives, The, the question of arming, 281; + the question of the franchise for, 566; + the treatment of, 549. + Navy Contribution Bill, The, 96; + second reading of, 125 (note). + Netherlands Government, The, 232; + offer mediation, 551. + Netherlands Railway, The, 376 to 381, 532 (note). + New South Wales, offers a military contingent, 251. + Nicholls incident, The, 212, 213. + Nicholson, Colonel, 179. + _Nineteenth Century, The_, 261 (note); + article by Sir Bartle Frere in, 29 (note). + Non-interference, the principle of, 10, 12. + _Norman, The S.S._, 247. + Norval's Pont, 521. + + + Olivier, Commandant, 287 (note), 564. + _Ons Land_, its paean of triumph over the surrender of Jameson's troopers, + 68 (note); + its reproof of Sir Pieter Faure, 105; + its anti-British policy, 106; + its indictment of the Sprigg Ministry, 117; + its presentation of the objects of the Afrikander party, 119; + its article on the Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt, 205 to 207; + meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur at the offices of, 348, 349; + its New Year exhortation, 349; + its comment on the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East, + 374; + its approval of the slanders on British troops, 403; + its comment on Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester Congress, 409; + libels General French, 477. + Orange Free State, The, mineral wealth of, 54; + relations of the Imperial Government to, 87 (note); + its treaty of alliance with the Transvaal, 104, 125; + irritation in against British intervention, 215; + ammunition sent to, 216, 247, 273, 286; + alleged movement of British troops to the border of, 236; + the danger of a premature grant of responsible government to, 284; + decides to declare war, 291; + Lord Roberts enters, 328; + annexation of, 329; + invades south of Orange River, 344; + the Landdrosts of, 347; + the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of, 432; + area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458; + the number of scholars on the school rolls, 523 (note). + Orange River, The, 455. + Orange River Colony, Lord Milner arranges for the civil administration + of, 397; + reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.E. of, 441; + numbers of Boers in the field in, 454; + progress of civil administration in, 489, 524; + issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501, + 544; + grant in aid of the revenue of, 501; + number of scholars on the school rolls, 523, 524; + revenue of, 528; + farm settlers in, 536; + the settlement of, 546; + military administration in, 566; + taxation of landed property in, 566. + _Oranjie Unie_, The, 55 (note). + _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, The_, 49, 54 (note), 234 to + 236 (notes). + + + Paardeberg, conduct of the attack on, 332; + surrender of Cronje at, 328, 354. + Paardekraal, great assemblage of Boers at, 197; + speeches delivered at, 213. + Pakeman, Mr., arrest of, 245. + "Pass" system, The, 528. + Paul, H., 368. + Peace, Preparing for, 470 to 535. + Peace commissioners, The Boer, 556. + Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423; + treatment of agents of, 427 to 429; + its efforts, 427, 429. + Permits, The establishment of, 482. + Poplar Grove, 354. + Port Elizabeth, Ammunition landed at, 216, 236. + Portland, The (3rd) Duke of, his despatch referring to the treatment of + the Boers, 9 + Pretoria, The British flag hoisted over the Raadzaal of, 167 (note), 329; + war preparations at, 234, 235, 244; + ammunition sent to, 236; + railway communication with Delagoa Bay re-opened, 329; + Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352; + his occupation of, 369; + Lord Milner makes arrangements for the civil administration, 397; + Burgher Peace Committee formed at, 412, 422; + effective occupation of the district round, 453; + Lord Milner at, 472; + the public buildings at, 526; + meeting between the Boer leaders and Lords Milner and Kitchener at, + 552, 556. + Pretoria Convention, The, 31, 87 (note). + Pretoria Executive, The, attitude of, 82, 88, 89; + Mr. Chamberlain's communication to on the dynamite contract, 130; + its attempt to buy off the capitalists, 131, 152; + its committal to a policy of defiance, 158; + its negotiations with the Home Government after the Bloemfontein + Conference, 196, 199; + its lack of good faith, 231; + repudiates the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir Wm. Greene, 238, + 239, 242; + charges Sir Wm. Greene with bad faith, 242; + its declaration of September 15th, 1899, to Mr. Hofmeyr, 276; + brings negotiations to a conclusion, 289; + its replies to the British despatches of July 27th and May 10th, 294. + Pretorius, Mr., 406, 421. + Pretyman, General, 470. + Price, Mr., 306. + Prieska, 354. + Prinsloo, Commandant, surrender of, 329. + Pro-Boers, The manufacture of, 434, 443. + Proclamation to the fighting burghers, The proposed, 420. + "Programme of Principles," The Afrikander Bond, 59. + Progressive Cabinet, A, formation of, 280 (note), 390. + Progressive Party, The, 97, 98, 116, 118; + the funds of; 118; + their strength in the Cape Parliament, 121, 122, 393; + led by Sir Gordon Sprigg, 125; + their support of Lord Milner, 271; + resolution presented to the Home Government by, 295. + _Punch_, 225. + + + Queen's Hall, Pro-Boer meeting in, 498. + Queensland, offers a military contingent, 251. + + + Raad, The, meeting of, 193. + Racial fusion, The problem of, 516. + Railway lines, The cutting of, 459. + Railways, The, the reorganisation of, 530, 535. + Rand, The, 36, 518; + agitation on for reform, 131; + recommencement of the industrial life of, 489, 507, 536. + Rebels, The, treatment of, 384 to 391, 563, 567, 568; + their disfranchisement, 388, 389; + surrenders of, 573 (note). + "Reciprocity" between the civil services of the several colonies, 550. + Redistribution Bill, The, introduction of, 116; + second reading of, 117, 118; + its effect on the British population, 125. + Reform Committee, The, 39; + their message to Dr. Jameson, 40; + alteration of their plans, 41, 42. + Refugees, The return of, 489, 507, 508, 512, 533. + Registration of electors, The, postponed, 476. + _Reichstag, The S.S._, 236. + Reinforcements, The, character of, 330. + Reitz, F. W., 50, 144, 159, 294, 564; + his policy of "closer union," 49; + takes Dr. Leyds's place as State Secretary, 126; + asserts the Sovereignty of the Transvaal, 127 (note); + his reply to Mr. Chamberlain's communication on the dynamite contract, + 130; + instructed to decline Mr. Chamberlain's request for delay in passing + the Franchise Bill, 211; + his despatch refusing the preferred joint inquiry, 237; + communicates to the British Government Mr. Smut's new proposals for + a five years' franchise, 238; + his despatch repudiating the Smuts-Greene arrangement, 239; + his appeal to "Free Staters and Brother Afrikanders," 297; + Mr. Amery's meeting with him, 300; + his book, _A Century of Wrong_, 356; + a letter of his published by the Concessions Commission, 377 (note). + Repatriation scheme, Lord Milner's, 543. + Republican nationalists, The, 259, 275, 282; + their hatred of England, 429. + Republican United States of South Africa, The, 258, 259. + Republics, The, military preparations of, 166, 167, 178, 234; + expulsion of British subjects from, 246; + manifestoes issued by upon the outbreak of war, 257; + their treatment of British residents on the declaration of war, 292; + fall of, 329; + the British case against, 357 to 359. + Reserves, Insufficient supply of, 323, 331. + Retrocession, The, 255. + Rhodes, Cecil, 34, 35, 83; + his scheme of commercial federation, 38, 39; + his comment on Dr. Jameson's Raid, 40; + actual cause of the failure of his plan, 45; + his methods, 46; + his alliance with the Afrikander Bond, 46; + his alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr, 65; + an incident in his political career, 66; + his speech of March 12th, 1898, 67; + recognised by the Bond as its enemy, 68; + his resignation, 93, 96; + his return to political life, 97; + the actual chief of the Progressives, 117; + opposed at Barkly West, 118 (note); + returned for both Barkly West and Namaqualand, 121; + his tactics after the election following upon Sir Gordon Sprigg's + dissolution of Parliament, 122, 123; + his interview with Lord Milner, 124 (note); his anger at the impotence + of England, 306; + endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479. + Rhodesia, 84, 192; + demonstration in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215; + petition from to the Queen, 216; + organisation of the defences of, 269; + warned by Lord Milner, 298. + Ripon, The Marquess of, 37, 498 (note). + Roberts, Lord, 329 (note); + a result of his occupation of Bloemfontein, 156; + appointed to the South African command, 321; + strength of his force, 322, 332 (note); + his despatches, 326 to 328, 339, 341, 352; + his tactics at Paardeberg, 332, 333; + his alleged instructions from the Government, 333; + a reply to criticism of German General Staff upon his strategy, 334; + his campaign, 343; + his decision to advance on Johannesburg and Pretoria, 352; + his qualities as a captain of war, 353; + why he did not carry out Lord Milner's suggestion as to the defence of + the Cape, 353; + his occupation of Pretoria, 369; + his enforced halt at Bloemfontein, 384; + his approaching return to England, 398; + his recognition of the difficulty of the task of disarmament, 413; + relinquishes command of the forces in South Africa, 419; + agrees with Lord Milner's views on the proposed proclamation to the + burghers, 420; + his proclamation, 424; + his victories, 435; + sends some of the civilian population to L. Botha, 452. + Robertson, Edmund, M.P., 417, 498 (note); + his speech at Dundee on Oct. 16th, 1901, 467, 468. + Robinson, J. B., 149. + Robinson, Sir John, his view of the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's + frontier policy, 16. + Roos Senekal, capture of documents at, 425, 426, 431; + circular issued at, 463 (note). + Rosebery Lord, his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 278; + his support of the Government, 264, 416. + Rosmead, 455. + Rosmead, Lord, 36, 39; + his action, 45; + his response to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels, 46; + his policy, 70; + his attitude at Pretoria, 72; + intimates his wish to retire, 74; + his resistance to the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize + Bechuanaland, 74; + retires, 75; + his promise to obtain reasonable reforms from. President Krueger, + 88 (note). + _Rosslyn Castle, The S.S._, 305. + Russia, attitude of, 311. + + + St. Aldwyn, Lord, his charge against members of the Liberal Opposition + and the Irish Nationalists, 465. + Salisbury, The (late) Marquess of, 75; + sympathetic speech of on the Transvaal question, 228, 229; + his answer to the charge of "military unpreparedness," 265; + receives "peace overtures," 355; + his reply, 357; + his indignant comment on the attitude of the Liberal leaders, 416; + his charge against Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, 466; + receives Lord Milner, 490. + Salisbury Cabinet, The, reluctance of to push matters to an extremity, + 176, 188; + its disregard of Lord Wolseley's advice, 177, 188, 189, 190; + its decision as to reinforcements, 190, 191; + the course it decided to adopt, 196; + its weakness, 223, 224; + determines to make a definite announcement of its South African + policy; 228; + position taken up by it, 230; + its last effort to come to a friendly understanding, 240; + its despatch of Sept, 8th, 1899, 241, 242; + decides to raise the strength of the Natal and Cape forces, 242, + 243, 246, 250, 279, 288; + its reluctance to make war, 251; + patriotism of, 266; + Afrikander leaders' view of, 274; + decides to mobilise an army corps, 290; + its military action, 309, 310, 331; + its alleged instructions to Lord Roberts, 333, 334; + its decision as to the Conventions, 360. + Sand River Convention, The, 17; + Sir George Grey's exposure of, 19. + Sannah's Post, 363. + Sargant, E. B., his story of the educational efforts during the war, + 520 to 523. + Sauer, Hans, 97. + Sauer, J. W., joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142; + his sympathy with the Boers, 149; + his mission to Dordrecht, 287 (note), 379 (note); + his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361; + his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376, 377; + his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove, 379; + his repudiation of Pres. Krueger's statement as to his connection with + Mr. Hargrove, 380; + his declaration when opposing the second reading of the Treason Bill, + 396, 474; + purpose of his visit to England, 495; + banquet in his honour, 496; + his frankness as to his mission, 497; + attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498. + Scheepers, 432. + Schreiner Cabinet, The, 96, 124, 141, 150; + the Bond Members of, 142; + its desire to prevent British intervention, 150; + its "planks," 158; + the Te Water correspondence, 162 to 166; + its opinion of Pres. Krueger's franchise proposals, 198; + uses its influence to assist the Pretoria Executive in refusing the + franchise reform put forward by Lord Milner, 199; + its refusal to call out the local forces, 280 to 283, 345; + refuses aid to Mafeking and Kimberley, 345; + its demise, 346, 390; + individual views of the members on the treatment of the rebels, 390. + Schreiner-Bond coalition, The, 98. + Schreiner, Olive, 144. + Schreiner, Philip, adopted as the parliamentary leader by the Bond, 97; + moves a vote of "no confidence" in the Sprigg Ministry, 118; + his electoral utterances, 118; + forms a ministry, 124; + warned by Lord Milner of the gravity of the situation, 140; + his blind partisanship for the Transvaal, 142, 147; + his relationship to Lord Milner, 143; + his history, 144; + his regard for the British Empire, 145; + his reply to a question of Mr. Chamberlain's, 146; + his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander nationalists, 146; + sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference, + 152; + receives warning telegrams from England, 153, 154; + writes a confidential letter to President Steyn, 154; + the influence which he used with the Transvaal Government, 155; + his view of Krueger's acceptance of a conference, 158; + his solicitude to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 167; + his partisanship on the question of the franchise, 198, 199; + informed of the Home Governments' intention to "complete" the Cape + Garrison, 204; + his view of the grant of a limited franchise to the Uitlanders, 210; + urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 235; + his position, 235; + his declaration as to the attitude he would assume in the event of + war, 248; + his knowledge of the Port Elizabeth ammunition for the Free State, + 273; + his benediction of Pres. Krueger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the + Volksraad's proposals, 276; + his complex political creed, 278; + his resistance to Lord Milner's plans of local military preparation, + 278; + recedes from his standpoint of neutrality, 280, 344, 345, 373; + is prevailed on to call out the Kimberley volunteers, 280; + his final concession, 281; + fails to provide Kimberley with arms, 304; + consents to the proclamation of martial law, 345; + scant help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 345; + his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474; + uses his influence for the postponement of the Bond Congress at + Somerset East, 374; + is brought into conflict with the Bond members of his Cabinet, 384; + his views upon the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on rebels, + 385, 390; + his sense of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign, 392; + his support of the Treason Bill, 474. + Schreiner, Theophilus, 144. + Schutte, Mr., 212 (note). + _Science of Rebellion, The_, 431 (note). + Seale-Hayne, M.P., Mr., 498 (note). + Select Committee on British South Africa, The proceedings of, extract + from, 146. + _Settlement after the War, The_, 214 (note). + Settlement of the new colonies, The, the question of, 489, 564 _et seq._ + Seventeen, The Chamber of, 3, 4, 5. + Shaw, M.P., Thomas, 498 (note); + his speech at Galashiels on October 14th, 1901, 467, 468. + Sherman, General, 451 (note). + Showers, Mr., 529. + Silberbauer, Mr., 167. + Simon's Bay, 57. + Slaghter's Nek, the "rebellion" of, 11. + Slaves, The emancipation of in Cape Colony, 15. + Smalldeel, 397. + Smartt, Dr., 116 (note). + Smuts, J. C., 152, 159, 204, 212 (note), 572; + appointed State Attorney, 126; + attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168; + report in _The Times_ of a conversation with, 214; + is entrusted with the projected destruction of the mines, 214; + furnishes an explanatory memorandum of the new franchise law, 218; + offers Sir William Greene a simplified seven years' franchise in lieu + of a joint inquiry, 237, 238; + his attempt to disown the arrest of Mr. Pakeman, 245; + his words at Vereeniging on May 30th, 1902, 276; + failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene through + him, 309, 310; + appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558; + his suggestion as to a "formal clause" in the draft Vereeniging + agreement, 561; + his responsibility for the origin of the war, 574. + Solomon, Saul, 147. + Solomon, Sir R., 118 (note); + accepts office under the Schreiner Ministry as Attorney-General, 124, + 142; + his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 144, + 147, 148; + his distrust of Rhodes, 148; + his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474; + visits the north-midland districts of the Cape with Lord Milner, 362; + his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393, 395; + his support of the Treason Bill, 474; + appointed Legal Adviser to the New Transvaal administration, 474 + (note); + help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 515; + his energy and capacity, 527; + presides over a commission on the gold industry, 529; + assists Lord Milner in the draft of the terms of the Vereeniging + surrender, 551, 558. + Somerset East, Annual Congress at, 374. + South Africa, failure of British administration in, 1; + population of European descent in, 5; + British treatment of the natives and Dutch in, 8 _et seq._; + the first effort to introduce a large British population, 15; + public interest in, 23; + ultimate control of British policy in, 24; + the decision of cardinal questions dealing with its administration, 34; + the Dutch population of, 43, 46, 49, 98, 105; + Dutch view of the nationalist movement in, 49; + before and after the Jameson Raid, 68; + as Lord Milner found it, 69; + attempts to secure the reunion of under the British flag, 69; + the British cause in, 71; + reinforcement of the British garrison in, 94; + aspirations of the Dutch in, 105; + despondency of the British population, 107; + result of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference on the British + population, 172; + moral weakness of England's position in, 186; + approval of Lord Milner's policy by the British population, 216; + dismay of the British population as the Imperial Governments' reported + acceptance of the franchise law, 222; + performance of the British Army in, 323; + numbers of the British Army in on April 1st, 1900, 323; + numbers of the British population in who served, 324; + the task of subduing the entire Dutch population of, 435; + loyalists in, 447, 448; + the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist population of, + 464 (note). + _South Africa: A Study, etc._, 579 (note). + South African Constabulary, inauguration of, 397, 530; + expenses of, 502; + composition of, 531. + South African Garrison, The, 178, 190, 309, 310. + South African League, The, 96, 133, 212 (note), 374. + South African Nationality, The, the creation of, 58. + _South African News, The_, 225, 380; + its abuse of Lord Milner, 272, 391, 477; + its charge against British soldiers, 402. + South African Republics, The attempt to bring them into a federal system + under the British Crown, 69; + their relations with the British Government, 81; + their military preparations, 166, 167, 178, 181. + South African Settlement, The, debate on in the House of Commons, 393. + South African Unity, The goal of, 65, 66, 69. + South African War, The Great, events which culminated in, 25, 188. + South Central Africa, 36. + Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 70, 280 (note); + his Ministry, 93, 94, 96, 97, 124, 217 (note); + his regard for British interests, 94; + his relations with Cecil Rhodes, 94; + the attempt to prevent him from attending the Colonial Conference of + 1897, 94, 95; + resolves to bring forward a Redistribution Bill, 116; + appeals to the electorate, 118; + defeat of his Ministry, 124; + leads the Progressives in opposition, 125; + becomes Premier, 390; + is at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government, 473, 485; + his view as to the prorogation of Parliament, 482; + his loyal co-operations with the Imperial authorities, 485; + replies to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 500. + Springs, 456. + Standerton, 458. + _Star, The_ (Johannesburg), 145 (note), 245, 491 (note). + Statham, Mr., 377 (note). + Stead, W. T., 75, 357 (note). + Steenekamp, Mrs. Anna E., 16 (note). + Steyn, Marthinus, 70, 564; + his agency in the matter of the Bloemfontein Conference, 140; + Mr. Merriman's letter to him with reference to "a colourable measure + of reform" in the Transvaal, 152; + accepts the role of peace-maker, 153; + asks the Cape Premier to ascertain Lord Milner's willingness to meet + Pres. Krueger, 154, 155; + formal acceptance of his invitation to the Bloemfontein Conference, + 156; + his replies to Dr. Te Water's letters, 162; + his willingness to take part in the Conference, 168; + his evening reception on the opening day of the Conference, 171; + inquires as to movements of British troops, 236; + his pledge that Cape Colony should not be invaded, 279; + his commandos, 289; + the ultimatum submitted for his approval, 291; + his misgivings, 291; + receives an appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers, 292; + declares war, 295; + his "peace overtures," 355; + his responsibility for the guerilla war, 414, 415, 427; + circulates utterances of the leaders of the Liberal Opposition, 468; + consults with Schalk Burger as to peace, 552; + meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552; + his negotiations, 553; + appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 564; + his inability to sign the agreement, 567 (note). + Stop-the-war Committee, The, 368. + Stormberg, 321, 348, 455; + a result of the defeat at, 8. + _Story of an African Farm, The_, 144. + Strydom, the Boer, 427 (note). + _Studenten Blad_, The, of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, 120. + _Sud Africaan_, The, 351 (note). + Sunnyside, 472. + Swaziland border, The, the question of, 89 (note). + Swaziland Convention, The, 87 (note). + Sydney, Public meeting at, 250. + Symons, General, 319. + + + "Taal," The, preservation of, 547. + Tembuland border, The, advance of the Boers to, 281; + Mr. Schreiner's action with reference to, 281, 282. + Tembus, The, 281. + "Terms of Surrender," The, communicated to the Boer Commissioners, 563; + the draft agreement of, 564. + Terrorism and deceit, A system of, 425, 426. + Te Water, Dr., 93, 94, 142, 150, 154, 235; + resignation of, 95, 116; + joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124; + his faithfulness to the Bond, 162, 163; + advocates amnesty for the rebels, 392. + Te Water Correspondence, The, 156, 162 to 166. + Theron, T. P., 64; + opposes the Redistribution Bill, 117; + declines to meet the peace delegates, 475. + Thomas, C. H., 49. + _Three Years War, The_, 433 (note), 570 (note); + extract from, 578. + _Times, The_, 261 (note); + report of a conversation with Mr. Smuts, 214; + reproduces Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with its correspondent, 221, + 227; + letter of Sir Wm. Harcourt to, 262; + report of a speech by Mr. Morley, 371 (note); + protest in of "an old Berliner," 468. + Transkei, The, 486. + Transvaal, The, Sir Bartle Frere's visit to in 1879, 28; + restoration of the Boer Republic in, 30, 31, 34; + the English of, 42, 43; + mineral wealth of, 54; + the Afrikander Bond in, 55; + conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Cape, 64; + attempts to secure Bechuanaland, 64; + position of the British population in, 71; + race oligarchy in, 84; + more hopeful situation in, 99; + the position in Feb., 1898, 103; + the question of reform in, 105, 106, 107; + unprogressiveness of, 112; + progress of armament in, 125, 158, 255; + its communications with the paramount power, 126; + reliance of on the Orange Free State, 128; + the position of British residents in, 130, 173; + presentation of the petition of the British residents, 131; + our stand against Dutch tyranny in, 186; + alleged conspiracy against, 212; + Mr. Morley's statement as to the annexation of, 261; + commandos ordered to take up their position on the Natal border, 290; + flight of the British population from, 292; + entered by the Natal Field Force, 329; + annexation of, 329; + reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.W. of, 441; + numbers of Boers in the field in, 454; + area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458; + progress of civil administration in, 489, 525; + issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501, + 544; + grant in aid of the revenues of, 501; + area held, 505, 506; + mineral wealth of unaffected by the war, 514; + extent of its mineral wealth, 519; + number of children educated in the camps in, 523; + the revenue of, 528; + the settlement of, 546; + military administration in, 566; + taxation of landed property in, 566. + _Transvaal from Within, The_, 131 (note), 264, 274 (note). + Transvaal question, The, debated in both Houses of Parliament, 228. + Treason Bill, The, 394 to 398; + the support given to it by Mr. Schreiner and Sir R. Solomon, 474; + the debates on, 477; + the lenient penalties of, 480. + Tugela, The, General Buller's attempt to force the passage, 306. + + + Uitlander Council, The, 211, 215; + its view of the new franchise law, 218; + its disappointment with the announcement that the law is acceptable to + the Imperial Government, 222 (note). + Uitlanders, The, a five years' franchise advocated for, 37; + the enfranchisement of, 38; + their "admitted grievances," 72; + confirmation of their complaints, 89; + Krueger's determination to increase their disabilities, 103; + their petition, 131; + postponement of the publication of Lord Milner's despatch dealing with + their grievances, 140; + formal acceptance of, 155, 157; + General Butler's view of their grievances, 175; + their claim for enfranchisement, 185; + granted a limited franchise, 209; + their view of the measure, 211; + petitions to the Queen for justice to, 216; + their detailed criticism of the new franchise law, 220; + the British Government's view of the concessions made to them, 229, + 230; + outrageous treatment of, 244, 245; + espionage on, 273; + their return, 489, 507, 508, 512. + Ultimatum, The, 246, 253 to 299; + the day on which it expired, 279 (note); + submitted to Pres. Steyn for his approval, 291; + recast by Mr. Fischer, 291; + delay in presenting, 291; + delivered to Sir Wm. Greene, 295; + reaches Lord Milner, 295; + reaches the Colonial Office, 298; + reply of Her Majesty's Government, 298; + its effect on Lord Milner, 342; + its effect on the British people, 344. + Unionist leaders, The, and Lord Milner's administration, 81. + Union Jack, The, hissed, 499. + United States of America, The, attitude of towards Great Britain during + the war, 264, 312, 313, 314. + Upington Ministry, The, 60. + Upington, Sir Thomas, 93; + resignation of, 116 (note). + + + Vaal River, The, 456. + Valley of Light, The, 340 (note). + Vandam, Captain, 245. + Van Riebeck, Commander, The diary of, 2, 3; + the Dutch E. India Co's instructions to as to the treatment of natives + in S. Africa, 5, 9. + Vereeniging, 555, 556; + Mr. Smuts's words at on May 30th, 1902, 276; + the surrender of, 303, 359, 433, 454 (note), 536 to 583; + two and a half years after, 449; + signing of the Terms of Surrender, 542; + difference between Lord Milner's and Lord Kitchener's views as to the + Terms of Surrender, 551; + circumstances under which the negotiations originated, 551 _et seq._; + the three proposals put forward by the Boer leaders, 556; + Article X, of the Terms of Surrender, 559; + Mr. Smuts's suggestion as to a "formal clause," 561; + the draft agreement telegraphed to England, 562; + its wording, 564; + the signature of, 567, 573; + its terms compared with the Middelburg terms, 568 (note); + acceptation of the British terms, 571, 572; + generosity of the terms, 580; + leniency of the terms, 581; + immediate effect of the terms, 583. + Victoria, offers a military contingent, 251. + Victoria, Queen, presentation of the second petition to, 131, 194; + petitions to for justice to the Uitlanders, 216; + proposed letter to from Krueger, 376; + death of, 481 (note). + Vigilance Committee, The, 500. + Viljoen, General, a telegram to, 426. + _Volksblad_, The, 351 (note). + Volksraad, The, discusses the question of accepting the joint inquiry, + 237; + refuses it, 237. + Vosloo, Mr., 477. + _Vossische Zeitung_, The, 399 (note), 469 (note). + Vryburg division, the return of representatives for, 121. + Vryburg, goes over to the Boers, 280. + + + Walrond, M. S. O., 167. + Walter, M. P. C., 213 (note). + War Commission, The, 318, 319 (note), 324 (note); + General Sir Wm. Butler's evidence before, 175 (note), 181 to 183. + War, Declaration of, 297; + the first days of, 304; + the conduct of, 316; + area of the country over which it was waged, 326, 339; + difficulties of carrying on, 328; + general conclusions arising from the events, and military criticisms + on, 330 _et seq._; + the unnecessary prolongation of, 360; + economic consequences of, 439; + moral effect of its recrudescence, 440; + method of waging it, 450 to 453. + _War in South Africa, The Official History of_, vol. i. p. 309 (note) + _et seq._ + _War in South Africa, The_, Sir Conan Doyle's, 469 (note). + War Office, The, efficiency of, 339. + Watson, Dr. Spence, 498 (note). + Webb, Mr., arrest of, 131. + Wessels, Andries, 428. + Wessels, C. J., 260, 555. + White, Montagu, 232. + White, Sir George, shut up in Ladysmith, 320, 344. + Willcocks, Sir William, his report on irrigation, 516 to 518. + Williams, Colonel Hanbury, 167. + Willoughby, Sir John, 44. + Wilson, H. F. C., 515, 526. + Wilson, M.P., H. J., 498 (note). + Witwatersrand Gold Mines, The, 25, 31, 36. + Witwatersrand, The, Krueger raises the Vier-kleur on, 31. + Wodehouse, 346, 379. + Wodehouse, Sir Philip, 275. + Wolmarans, A. D., 168, 555. + Wolseley, Lord, his advice to the Salisbury Cabinet, 177, 188, 190, 309, + 322, 331; + his task, 317, 318. + Woolls-Sampson, Col. Sir Aubrey, 88; + forms the Imperial Light Horse, 179. + _Worcester Advertiser, The_, 477; + its charge against British soldiers, 400. + Worcester Conference, The, 395, 403, 477; + the resolutions of, 405, 495; + a fatal result of, 412; + representations of its delegates to the Liberal party, 496. + Wybergh, Mr., 515, 528. + Wylant, the 'Sick-Comforter,' 3. + + + Zeerust, 458. + _Zuid Africaan_, The, articles in, 63. + Zulus, The, military power of, 25, 26. + Zululand, a portion of transferred to Natal, 550. + + +_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by +W. Basil Worsfold + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA *** + +***** This file should be named 26490.txt or 26490.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/6/4/9/26490/ + +Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. 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