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diff --git a/27571-8.txt b/27571-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3078020 --- /dev/null +++ b/27571-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,21088 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Christianity and Greek Philosophy, by +Benjamin Franklin Cocker + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Christianity and Greek Philosophy + or, the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought + in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and His + Apostles + +Author: Benjamin Franklin Cocker + +Release Date: December 20, 2008 [EBook #27571] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Rénald Lévesque and the +Online Distributed Proofreaders Europe at +http://dp.rastko.net + + + + + + + + +CHRISTIANITY + +AND + +GREEK PHILOSOPHY; + +OR, THE RELATION BETWEEN +SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT IN GREECE +AND THE POSITIVE TEACHING OF +CHRIST AND HIS APOSTLES. + + +BY B.F. COCKER, D.D., + +PROFESSOR OF MORAL AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN + +"Plato made me know the true God, Jesus Christ showed me the way to +him." + ST. AUGUSTINE + + + + +NEW YORK: CARLTON & LANAHAN. +SAN FRANCISCO: E. THOMAS. +CINCINNATI: HITCHCOCK & WALDEN. + +1870. + + + +Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by HARPER & +BROTHERS, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United +States for the Southern District of New York. + + + + +TO + +D.D. WHEDON, D.D., + +MY EARLIEST LITERARY FRIEND, WHOSE VIGOROUS WRITINGS HAVE +STIMULATED MY INQUIRIES, WHOSE COUNSELS HAVE GUIDED +MY STUDIES, AND WHOSE KIND AND GENEROUS WORDS +HAVE ENCOURAGED ME TO PERSEVERANCE +AMID NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES, +I DEDICATE THIS VOLUME AS A TOKEN OF MY MORE THAN ORDINARY AFFECTION + +_THE AUTHOR_. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +In preparing the present volume, the writer has been actuated by a +conscientious desire to deepen and vivify our faith in the Christian +system of truth, by showing that it does not rest _solely_ on a special +class of facts, but upon all the facts of nature and humanity; that its +authority does not repose _alone_ on the peculiar and supernatural +events which transpired in Palestine, but also on the still broader +foundations of the ideas and laws of the reason, and the common wants +and instinctive yearnings of the human heart. It is his conviction that +the course and constitution of nature, the whole current of history, and +the entire development of human thought in the ages anterior to the +advent of the Redeemer centre in, and can only be interpreted by, the +purpose of redemption. + +The method hitherto most prevalent, of treating the history of human +thought as a series of isolated, disconnected, and lawless movements, +without unity and purpose; and the practice of denouncing the religions +and philosophies of the ancient world as inventions of satanic mischief, +or as the capricious and wicked efforts of humanity to relegate itself +from the bonds of allegiance to the One Supreme Lord and Lawgiver, have, +in his judgment, been prejudicial to the interests of all truth, and +especially injurious to the cause of Christianity. They betray an utter +insensibility to the grand unities of nature and of thought, and a +strange forgetfulness of that universal Providence which comprehends all +nature and all history, and is yet so minute in its regards that it +numbers the hairs on every human head, and takes note of every sparrow's +fall, A juster method will lead us to regard the entire history of human +thought as a development towards a specific end, and the providence of +God as an all-embracing plan, which sweeps over all ages and all +nations, and which, in its final consummation, will, through Christ, +"gather together all things in one, both things which are in heaven and +things which are on earth." + +The central and unifying thought of this volume is _that the necessary +ideas and laws of the reason, and the native instincts of the human +heart, originally implanted by God, are the primal and germinal forces +of history; and that these have been developed under conditions which +were first ordained, and have been continually supervised by the +providence of God_. God is the Father of humanity, and he is also the +Guide and Educator of our race. As "the offspring of God," humanity is +not a bare, indeterminate potentiality, but a living energy, an active +reason, having definite qualities, and inheriting fundamental principles +and necessary ideas which constitute it "the image and likeness of God." +And though it has suffered a moral lapse, and, in the exercise of its +freedom, has become alienated from the life of God, yet God has never +abandoned the human race. He still "magnifies man, and sets his heart +upon him." "He visits him every morning, and tries him every moment." +"The inspiration of the Almighty still gives him understanding." The +illumination of the Divine Logos still "teacheth man knowledge." The +Spirit of God still comes near to and touches with strong emotion every +human heart. "God has never left himself without a witness" in any +nation, or in any age. The providence of God has always guided the +dispersions and migrations of the families of the earth, and presided +over and directed the education of the race. "He has foreordained the +times of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundaries +of their habitations, _in order that they should seek the Lord_, and +feel after and find Him who is not far from any one of us." The +religions of the ancient world were the painful effort of the human +spirit to return to its true rest and centre--the struggle to "find Him" +who is so intimately near to every human heart, and who has never ceased +to be the want of the human race. The philosophies of the ancient world +were the earnest effort of human reason to reconcile the finite and the +infinite, the human and the Divine, the subject and God. An overruling +Providence, which makes even the wrath of man to praise Him, took up all +these sincere, though often mistaken, efforts into his own plan, and +made them sub-serve the purpose of redemption. They aided in developing +among the nations "the desire of salvation," and in preparing the world +for the advent of the Son of God. The entire course and history of +Divine providence, in every nation, and in every age, has been directed +towards the one grand purpose of "reconciling all things to Himself." +Christianity, as a comprehensive scheme of reconciliation, embracing +"all things," can not, therefore, be properly studied apart from the +ages of earnest thought, of profound inquiry, and of intense religious +feeling which preceded it. To despise the religions of the ancient +world, to sneer at the efforts and achievements of the old philosophers, +or even to cut them off in thought from all relation to the plans and +movements of that Providence which has cared for, and watched over, and +pitied, and guided all the nations of the earth, is to refuse to +comprehend Christianity itself. + +The author is not indifferent to the possibility that his purpose may be +misconceived. The effort may be regarded by many conscientious and +esteemed theologians with suspicion and mistrust. They can not easily +emancipate themselves from the ancient prejudice against speculative +thought. Philosophy has always been regarded by them as antagonistic to +Christian faith. They are inspired by a commendable zeal for the honor +of dogmatic theology. Every essay towards a profounder conviction, a +broader faith in the unity of all truth, is branded with the opprobrious +name of "rationalism." Let us not be terrified by a harmless word. +Surely religion and right reason must be found in harmony. The author +believes, with Bacon, that "the foundation of all religion is right +reason." The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but the +confession of despair. Sustained by these convictions, he submits this +humble contribution to theological science to the thoughtful +consideration of all lovers of Truth, and of Christ, the fountain of +Truth. He can sincerely ask upon it the blessing of Him in whose fear it +has been written, and whose cause it is the purpose of his life to +serve. + +The second series, on "Christianity and Modern Thought," is in an +advanced state of preparation for the press. + + NOTE.--It has been the aim of the writer, as far as the + nature of the subject would permit, to adapt this work to + general readers. The references to classic authors are, + therefore, in all cases made to accessible English + translations (in Bohn's Classical Library); such changes, + however, have been made in the rendering as shall present + the doctrine of the writers in a clearer and more forcible + manner. For valuable services rendered in this department of + the work, by Martin L. D'Ooge, M. A., Acting Professor of + Greek Language and Literature in the University of Michigan, + the author would here express his grateful acknowledgment. + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER I. + ATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS. + + CHAPTER II. + THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. + + CHAPTER III. + THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS. + + CHAPTER IV. + THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL + ASPECTS. + + CHAPTER V. + THE UNKNOWN GOD. + + CHAPTER VI. + THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). + IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? + + CHAPTER VII. + THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). + IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_). + + CHAPTER VIII. + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS. + PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + _Sensational_: THALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER + LEOCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS. + + CHAPTER IX. + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_) + _Idealist_: Pythagoras--Xenophanes--Parmenides--Zeno. _Natural + Realist_: Anaxagoras. + THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + Socrates. + + CHAPTER X + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + Plato. + + CHAPTER XI. + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + Plato. + + CHAPTER XII. + + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + Aristotle. + + CHAPTER XIII. + THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + Epicurus and Zeno. + + CHAPTER XIV. + The Propædeutic Office of Greek Philosophy. + + CHAPTER XV. + The Propædeutic Office of Greek Philosophy (_continued_). + + + + +"_Ye men of Athens_, all things which I behold bear witness to your +carefulness in religion; for, as I passed through your city and beheld +the objects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with this +inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD; whom, therefore, ye worship, though ye +know; Him not, Him declare I unto you. God who made the world and all +things therein, seeing He is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in +temples made with hands; neither is He served by the hands of men, as +though he needed any thing; for He giveth unto all life, and breath, and +all things. And He made of one blood all the nations of mankind to dwell +upon the face of the whole earth; and ordained to each the appointed +seasons of their existence, and the bounds of their habitation, that +they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, +though he be not far from every one of us: for in Him we live, and move, +and have our being; as certain of your own poets have said, _For we are +also His offspring_. Forasmuch, then, as we are the offspring of God, we +ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or +stone, graven by the art and device of man. Howbeit, those past times of +ignorance God hath overlooked; but now He commandeth all men everywhere +to repent, because He hath appointed a day wherein He will judge the +world in righteousness by that Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He +hath given assurance unto all, in that He hath raised Him from the +dead."--Acts xvii. 22-31. + + + + +CHRISTIANITY +AND +GREEK PHILOSOPHY + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +ATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS. + + +"Is it not worth while, for the sake of the history of men and nations, +to study the surface of the globe in its relation to the inhabitants +thereof?"--Goethe. + +There is no event recorded in the annals of the early church so replete +with interest to the Christian student, or which takes so deep a hold on +the imagination, and the sympathies of him who is at all familiar with +the history of Ancient Greece, as the one recited above. Here we see the +Apostle Paul standing on the Areopagus at Athens, surrounded by the +temples, statues, and altars, which Grecian art had consecrated to Pagan +worship, and proclaiming to the inquisitive Athenians, "the strangers" +who had come to Athens for business or for pleasure, and the +philosophers and students of the Lyceum, the Academy, the Stoa, and the +Garden, "_the unknown God_." + +Whether we dwell in our imagination on the artistic grandeur and +imposing magnificence of the city in which Paul found himself a solitary +stranger, or recall the illustrious names which by their achievements in +arts and philosophy have shed around the city of Athens an immortal +glory,--or whether, fixing our attention on the lonely wanderer amid the +porticoes, and groves, and temples of this classic city, we attempt to +conceive the emotion which stirred his heart as he beheld it "wholly +given to idolatry;" or whether we contrast the sublime, majestic theism +proclaimed by Paul with the degrading polytheism and degenerate +philosophy which then prevailed in Athens, or consider the prudent and +sagacious manner in which the apostle conducts his argument in view of +the religious opinions and prejudices of his audience, we can not but +feel that this event is fraught with lessons of instruction to the +Church in every age. + +That the objects which met the eye of Paul on every hand, and the +opinions he heard everywhere expressed in Athens, must have exerted a +powerful influence upon the current of his thoughts, as well as upon the +state of his emotions, is a legitimate and natural presumption. Not only +was "his spirit stirred within him"--his heart deeply moved and agitated +when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry--but his thoughtful, +philosophic mind would be engaged in pondering those deeply interesting +questions which underlie the whole system of Grecian polytheism. The +circumstances of the hour would, no doubt, in a large degree determine +the line of argument, the form of his discourse, and the peculiarities +of his phraseology. The more vividly, therefore, we can represent the +scenes and realize the surrounding incidents; the more thoroughly we can +enter into sympathy with the modes of thought and feeling peculiar to +the Athenians; the more perfectly we can comprehend the spirit and +tendency of the age; the more immediate our acquaintance with the +religious opinions and philosophical ideas then prevalent in Athens, the +more perfect will be our comprehension of the apostle's argument, the +deeper our interest in his theme. Some preliminary notices of Athens and +"the Men of Athens" will therefore be appropriate as introductory to a +series of discourses on Paul's sermon on Mars' Hill. + +The peculiar connection that subsists between Geography and History, +between a people and the country they inhabit, will justify the +extension of our survey beyond the mere topography of Athens. The people +of the entire province of Attica were called Athenians (_Athênaioi_) in +their relation to the state, and Attics _(Attikoi_) in regard to their +manners, customs, and dialect.[1] The climate and the scenery, the forms +of contour and relief, the geographical position and relations of +Attica, and, indeed, of the whole peninsula of Greece, must be taken +into our account if we would form a comprehensive judgment of the +character of the Athenian people. + +The soil on which a people dwell, the air they breathe, the mountains +and seas by which they are surrounded, the skies that overshadow +them,--all these exert a powerful influence on their pursuits, their +habits, their institutions, their sentiments, and their ideas. So that +could we clearly group, and fully grasp all the characteristics of a +region--its position, configuration, climate, scenery, and natural +products, we could, with tolerable accuracy, determine what are the +characteristics of the people who inhabit it. A comprehensive knowledge +of the physical geography of any country will therefore aid us +materially in elucidating the natural history, and, to some extent, the +moral history of its population. "History does not stand _outside_ of +nature, but in her very heart, so that the historian only grasps a +people's character with true precision when he keeps in full view its +geographical position, and the influences which its surroundings have +wrought upon it."[2] + +[Footnote 1: Niebuhr's "Lectures on Ethnography and Geography," p. 91.] + +[Footnote 2: Ritter's "Geographical Studies," p. 34.] + +It is, however, of the utmost consequence the reader should understand +that there are two widely different methods of treating this deeply +interesting subject--methods which proceed on fundamentally opposite +views of man and of nature. One method is that pursued by Buckle in his +"History of Civilization in England." The tendency of his work is the +assertion of the supremacy of material conditions over the development +of human history, and indeed of every individual mind. Here man is +purely passive in the hands of nature. Exterior conditions are the +chief, if not the _only_ causes of man's intellectual and social +development. So that, such a climate and soil, such aspects of nature +and local circumstances being given, such a nation necessarily +follows.[3] The other method is that of Carl Ritter, Arnold Guyot, and +Cousin.[4] These take account of the freedom of the human will, and the +power of man to control and modify the forces of nature. They also take +account of the original constitution of man, and the primitive type of +nations; and they allow for results arising from the mutual conflict of +geographical conditions. And they, especially, recognize the agency of a +Divine Providence controlling those forces in nature by which the +configuration of the earth's surface is determined, and the distribution +of its oceans, continents, and islands is secured; and a providence, +also, directing the dispersions and migrations of nations--determining +the times of each nation's existence, and fixing the geographical bounds +of their habitation, all in view of the _moral_ history and spiritual +development of the race,--"that they may feel after, and find the living +God." The relation of man and nature is not, in their estimation, a +relation of cause and effect. It is a relation of adjustment, of +harmony, and of reciprocal action and reaction. "Man is not"--says +Cousin--"an effect, and nature the cause, but there is between man and +nature a manifest harmony of general laws."... "Man and nature are two +great effects which, coming from the same cause, bear the same +characteristics; so that the earth, and he who inhabits it, man and +nature, are in perfect harmony."[5] God has created both man and the +universe, and he has established between them a striking harmony. The +earth was made for man; not simply to supply his physical wants, but +also to minister to his intellectual and moral development. The earth is +not a mere dwelling-place of nations, but a school-house, in which God +himself is superintending the education of the race. Hence we must not +only study the _events_ of history in their chronological order, but we +must study the earth itself as the _theatre_ of history. A knowledge of +all the circumstances, both physical and moral, in the midst of which +events take place, is absolutely necessary to a right judgment of the +events themselves. And we can only elucidate properly the character of +the actors by a careful study of all their geographical and ethological +conditions. + +[Footnote 3: See chap. ii. "History of Civilization."] + +[Footnote 4: Ritter's "Geographical Studies;" Guyot's "Earth and Man;" +Cousin's "History of Philosophy," lec. vii., viii., ix.] + +[Footnote 5: Lectures, vol. i. pp. 162, 169.] + +It will be readily perceived that, in attempting to estimate the +influence which exterior conditions exert in the determination of +national character, we encounter peculiar difficulties. We can not in +these studies expect the precision and accuracy which is attained in the +mathematical, or the purely physical sciences. We possess no control +over the "materiel" of our inquiry; we have no power of placing it in +new conditions, and submitting it to the test of new experiments, as in +the physical sciences. National character is a _complex_ result--a +product of the action and reaction of primary and secondary causes. It +is a conjoint effect of the action of the primitive elements and laws +originally implanted in humanity by the Creator, of the free causality +and self-determining power of man, and of all the conditions, permanent +and accidental, within which the national life has been developed. And +in cases where _physical_ and _moral_ causes are blended, and +reciprocally conditioned and modified in their operation;--where primary +results undergo endless modifications from the influence of surrounding +circumstances, and the reaction of social and political +institutions;--and where each individual of the great aggregate wields a +causal power that obeys no specific law, and by his own inherent power +sets in motion new trains of causes which can not be reduced to +statistics, we grant that we are in possession of no instrument of exact +analysis by which the complex phenomena of national character may be +reduced to primitive elements. All that we can hope is, to ascertain, by +psychological analysis, what are the fundamental ideas and laws of +humanity; to grasp the exterior conditions which are, on all hands, +recognized as exerting a powerful influence upon national character; to +watch, under these lights, the manifestations of human nature on the +theatre of history, and then apply the principles of a sound historic +criticism to the recorded opinions of contemporaneous historians and +their immediate successors. In this manner we may expect, at least, to +approximate to a true judgment of history. + +There are unquestionably fundamental powers and laws in human nature +which have their development in the course of history. There are certain +primitive ideas, imbedded in the constitution of each individual mind, +which are revealed in the universal consciousness of our race, under the +conditions of experience--the exterior conditions of physical nature and +human society. Such are the ideas of cause and substance; of unity and +infinity, which govern all the processes of discursive thought, and lead +us to the recognition of Being _in se_;--such the ideas of right, of +duty, of accountability, and of retribution, which regulate all the +conceptions we form of our relations to all other moral beings, and +constitute _morality_;--such the ideas of order, of proportion, and of +harmony, which preside in the realms of art, and constitute the +beau-ideal of _esthetics_;--such the ideas of God, the soul, and +immortality, which rule in the domains of _religion_, and determine man +a religious being. These constitute the identity of human nature under +all circumstances; these characterize humanity in all conditions. Like +permanent germs in vegetable life, always producing the same species of +plants; or like fundamental types in the animal kingdom, securing the +same homologous structures in all classes and orders; so these +fundamental ideas in human nature constitute its sameness and unity, +under all the varying conditions of life and society. The acorn must +produce an oak, and nothing else. The grain of wheat must always produce +its kind. The offspring of man must always bear his image, and always +exhibit the same fundamental characteristics, not only in his corporeal +nature, but also in his mental constitution. + +But the germination of every seed depends on conditions _ab extra_, and +all germs are modified, in their development, by geographical and +climatal surroundings. The development of the acorn into a mature and +perfect oak greatly depends on the exterior conditions of soil, and +moisture, light, and heat. By these it may be rendered luxuriant in its +growth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under +one class of conditions, or it may perish under another. The Brassica +oleracea, in its native habitat on the shore of the sea, is a bitter +plant with wavy sea-green leaves; in the cultivated garden it is the +cauliflower. The single rose, under altered conditions, becomes a double +rose; and creepers rear their stalks and stand erect. Plants, which in a +cold climate are annuals, become perennial when transported to the +torrid zone.[6] And so human nature, fundamentally the same under all +circumstances, may be greatly modified, both physically and mentally, by +geographical, social, and political conditions. The corporeal nature of +man--his complexion, his physiognomy, his stature; the intellectual +nature of man--his religious, ethical, and esthetical ideas are all +modified by his surroundings. These modifications, of which all men +dwelling in the same geographical regions, and under the same social and +political institutions, partake, constitute the _individuality_ of +nations. Thus, whilst there is a fundamental basis of unity in the +corporeal and spiritual nature of man, the causes of diversity are to be +sought in the circumstances in which tribes and nations are placed in +the overruling providence of God. + +[Footnote 6: See Carpenter's "Compar. Physiology," p. 625; Lyell's +"Principles of Geology," pp. 588, 589.] + +The power which man exerts over material conditions, by virtue of his +intelligence and freedom, is also an important element which, in these +studies, we should not depreciate or ignore. We must accept, with all +its consequences, the dictum of universal consciousness that man is +_free_. He is not absolutely subject to, and moulded by nature. He has +the power to control the circumstances by which he is surrounded--to +originate new social and physical conditions--to determine his own +individual and responsible character--and he can wield a mighty +influence over the character of his fellow-men. Individual men, as +Lycurgus, Solon, Pericles, Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon have left the +impress of their own mind and character upon the political institutions +of nations, and, in indirect manner, upon the character of succeeding +generations of men. Homer, Plato, Cicero, Bacon, Kant, Locke, Newton, +Shakspeare, Milton have left a deep and permanent impression upon the +forms of thought and speech, the language and literature, the science +and philosophy of nations. And inasmuch as a nation is the aggregate of +individual beings endowed with spontaneity and freedom, we must grant +that exterior conditions are not omnipotent in the formation of national +character. Still the free causality of man is exercised within a narrow +field. "There is a strictly necessitative limitation drawing an +impassable boundary-line around the area of volitional freedom." The +human will "however subjectively free" is often "objectively unfree;" +thus a large "uniformity of volitions" is the natural consequence.[7] +The child born in the heart of China, whilst he may, in his personal +freedom, develop such traits of character as constitute his +individuality, must necessarily be conformed in his language, habits, +modes of thought, and religious sentiments to the spirit of his country +and age. We no more expect a development of Christian thought and +character in the centre of Africa, unvisited by Christian teaching, than +we expect to find the climate and vegetation of New England. And we no +more expect that a New England child shall be a Mohammedan, a Parsee, or +a Buddhist, than that he shall have an Oriental physiognomy, and speak +an Oriental language. Indeed it is impossible for a man to exist in +human society without partaking in the spirit and manners of his country +and his age. Thus all the individuals of a nation represent, in a +greater or less degree, the spirit of the nation. They who do this most +perfectly are the _great_ men of that nation, because they are at once +both the product and the impersonation of their country and their age. +"We allow ourselves to think of Shakspeare, or of Raphael, or of Phidias +as having accomplished their work by the power of their individual +genius, but greatness like theirs is never more than the highest degree +of perfection which prevails widely around it, and forms the environment +in which it grows. No such single mind in single contact with the facts +of nature could have created a Pallas, a Madonna, or a Lear; such vast +conceptions are the growth of ages, the creation of a nation's spirit; +and the artist and poet, filled full with the power of that spirit, but +gave it form, and nothing but form. Nor would the form itself have been +attained by any isolated talent. No genius can dispense with +experience.... Noble conceptions already existing, and a noble school of +execution which will launch mind and hand upon their true courses, are +indispensable to transcendent excellence. Shakspeare's plays were as +much the offspring of the long generations who had pioneered the road +for him, as the discoveries of Newton were the offspring of those of +Copernicus."[8] The principles here enounced apply with equal force to +philosophers and men of science. The philosophy of Plato was but the +ripened fruit of the pregnant thoughts and seminal utterances of his +predecessors,--Socrates, Anaxagoras, and Pythagoras; whilst all of them +do but represent the general tendency and spirit of their country and +their times. The principles of Lord Bacon's "Instauratio Magna" were +incipient in the "Opus Majus" of Roger Bacon, the Franciscan friar. The +sixteenth century matured the thought of the thirteenth century. The +inductive method in scientific inquiry was immanent in the British mind, +and the latter Bacon only gave to it a permanent form. It is true that +great men have occasionally appeared on the stage of history who, like +the reformers Luther and Wesley, have seemed to be in conflict with the +prevailing spirit of their age and nation, but these men were the +creations of a providence--that providence which, from time to time, has +_supernaturally_ interposed in the moral history of our race by +corrective and remedial measures. These men were inspired and led by a +spirit which descended from on high. And yet even they had their +precursors and harbingers. Wyckliffe and John Huss, and Jerome of Prague +are but the representatives of numbers whose names do not grace the +historic page, who pioneered the way for Luther and the Reformation. And +no one can read the history of that great movement of the sixteenth +century without being persuaded there were thousands of Luther's +predecessors and contemporaries who, like Staupitz and Erasmus, lamented +the corruptions of the Church of Rome, and only needed the heroic +courage of Luther to make them reformers also. Whilst, therefore, we +recognize a free causal power in man, by which he determines his +individual and responsible character, we are compelled to recognize the +general law, that national character is mainly the result of those +geographical and ethological, and political and religious conditions in +which the nations have been placed in the providence of God. + +[Footnote 7: See Dr. Wheedon's "Freedom of the Will," pp. 164, 165.] + +[Footnote 8: Froude, "Hist. of England," pp. 73, 74.] + +Nations, like persons, have an _Individuality_. They present certain +characteristic marks which constitute their proper identity, and +separate them from the surrounding nations of the earth; such, for +example, as complexion, physiognomy, language, pursuits, customs, +institutions, sentiments, ideas. The individuality of a nation is +determined mainly from _without_, and not, like human individuality, +from within. The laws of a man's personal character have their home in +the soul; and the peculiarities and habits, and that conduct of life, +which constitute his responsible character are, in a great degree, the +consequence of his own free choice. But dwelling, as he does, in +society, where he is continually influenced by the example and opinions +of his neighbors; subject, as he is, to the ceaseless influence of +climate, scenery, and other terrestrial conditions, the characteristics +which result from these relations, and which are common to all who dwell +in the same regions, and under the same institutions, constitute a +national individuality. Individual character is _variable_ under the +same general conditions, national character is _uniform_, because it +results from causes which operate alike upon all individuals. + +Now, that man's complexion, his pursuits, his habits, his ideas are +greatly modified by his geographical surroundings, is the most obvious +of truths. No one doubts that the complexion of man is greatly affected +by climatic conditions. The appearance, habits, pursuits of the man who +lives within the tropics must, necessarily, differ from those of the man +who dwells within the temperate zone. No one expects that the dweller on +the mountain will have the same characteristics as the man who resides +on the plains; or that he whose home is in the interior of a continent +will have the same habits as the man whose home is on the islands of the +sea. The denizen of the primeval forest will most naturally become a +huntsman. The dweller on the extended plain, or fertile mountain slope, +will lead a pastoral, or an agricultural life. Those who live on the +margin of great rivers, or the borders of the sea, will "do business on +the great waters." Commerce and navigation will be their chief pursuits. +The people whose home is on the margin of the lake, or bay, or inland +sea, or the thickly studded archipelago, are mostly fishermen. And then +it is a no less obvious truth that men's pursuits exert a moulding +influence on their habits, their forms of speech, their sentiments, and +their ideas. Let any one take pains to observe the peculiarities which +characterize the huntsman, the shepherd, the agriculturist, or the +fisherman, and he will be convinced that their occupations stamp the +whole of their thoughts and feelings; color all their conceptions of +things outside their own peculiar field; direct their simple philosophy +of life; and give a tone, even, to their religious emotions. + +The general aspects of nature, the climate and the scenery, exert an +appreciable and an acknowledged influence on the _mental_ +characteristics of a people. The sprightliness and vivacity of the +Frank, the impetuosity of the Arab, the immobility of the Russ, the +rugged sternness of the Scot, the repose and dreaminess of the Hindoo +are largely due to the country in which they dwell, the air they +breathe, the food they eat, and the landscapes and skies they daily look +upon. The nomadic Arab is not only indebted to the country in which he +dwells for his habit of hunting for daily food, but for that love of a +free, untrammelled life, and for those soaring dreams of fancy in which +he so ardently delights. Not only is the Swiss determined by the +peculiarities of his geographical position to lead a pastoral life, but +the climate, and mountain scenery, and bracing atmosphere inspire him +with the love of liberty. The reserved and meditative Hindoo, accustomed +to the profuse luxuriance of nature, borrows the fantastic ideas of his +mythology from plants, and flowers, and trees. The vastness and infinite +diversity of nature, the colossal magnitude of all the forms of animal +and vegetable life, the broad and massive features of the landscape, the +aspects of beauty and of terror which surround him, and daily pour their +silent influences upon his soul, give vividness, grotesqueness, even, to +his imagination, and repress his active powers. His mental character +bears a peculiar and obvious relation to his geographical +surroundings.[9] + +[Footnote 9: Ritter, "Geograph. Studies," p. 287.] + +The influence of external nature on the imagination--the _creative_ +faculty in man--is obvious and remarkable. It reveals itself in all the +productions of man--his architecture, his sculpture, his painting, and +his poetry. Oriental architecture is characterized by the boldness and +massiveness of all its parts, and the monotonous uniformity of all its +features. This is but the expression, in a material form, of that +shadowy feeling of infinity, and unity, and immobility which an unbroken +continent of vast deserts and continuous lofty mountain chains would +naturally inspire. The simple grandeur and perfect harmony and graceful +blending of light and shade so peculiar to Grecian architecture are the +product of a country whose area is diversified by the harmonious +blending of land and water, mountain and plain, all bathed in purest +light, and canopied with skies of serenest blue. And they are also the +product of a country where man is released from the imprisonment within +the magic circle of surrounding nature, and made conscious of his power +and freedom. In Grecian architecture, therefore, there is less of the +massiveness and immobility of nature, and more of the grace and dignity +of man. It adds to the idea of permanence a _vital_ expression. "The +Doric column," says Vitruvius, "has the proportion, strength, and beauty +of man." The Gothic architecture had its birthplace among a people who +had lived and worshipped for ages amidst the dense forests of the north, +and was no doubt an imitation of the interlacing of the overshadowing +trees. The clustered shaft, and lancet arch, and flowing tracery, +reflect the impression which the surrounding scenery had woven into the +texture of the Teutonic mind. + +The history of painting and of sculpture will also show that the varied +"styles of art" are largely the result of the aspects which external +nature presented to the eye of man. Oriental sculpture, like its +architecture, was characterized by massiveness of form and tranquillity +of expression; and its painting was, at best, but colored sculpture. The +most striking objects are colossal figures, in which the human form is +strangely combined with the brute, as in the winged bulls of Nineveh and +the sphinxes of Egypt. Man is regarded simply as a part of nature, he +does not rise above the plane of animal life. The soul has its +immortality only in an eternal metempsychosis--a cycle of life which +sweeps through all the brute creation. But in Grecian sculpture we have +less of nature, more of man; less of massiveness, more of grace and +elegance; less repose, and more of action. Now the connection between +these styles of art, and the countries in which they were developed, is +at once suggested to the thoughtful mind. + +And then, finally, the literature of a people equally reveals the +impress of surrounding cosmical conditions. "The poems of Ossian are but +the echo of the wild, rough, cloudy highlands of his Scottish home." The +forest songs of the wild Indian, the negro's plaintive melodies in the +rice-fields of Carolina, the refrains in which the hunter of Kamtchatka +relates his adventures with the polar bear, and in which the South Sea +Islander celebrates his feats and dangers on the deep, all betoken the +influence which the scenes of daily life exert upon the thoughts and +feelings of our race. "To what an extent nature can express herself in, +and modify the culture of the individual, as well as of an entire +people, can be seen on Ionian soil in the verse of Homer, which, called +forth under the most favorable sky, and on the most luxuriant shore of +the Grecian archipelago, not only charms us to-day, but bearing this +impress, has determined what shall be the classic form throughout all +coming time."[10] + +[Footnote 10: See Ritter, pp. 288, 289. Poetic art has unquestionably +its _geographical_ distributions like the fauna and flora of the globe. +"If you love the images, not merely of a rich, but of a luxuriant fancy; +if you are pleased with the most daring flights; if you would see a +poetic creation full of wonders, then turn your eye to the poetry of the +_orient_, where all forms appear in purple; where each flower glows like +the morning ray resting on the earth. But if, on the contrary, you +prefer depth of thought, and earnestness of reflection; if you delight +in the colossal, yet pale forms, which float about in mist, and whisper +of the mysteries of the spirit-land, and of the vanity of all things, +except honor, then I must point you to the hoary _north_.... Or if you +sympathize with that deep feeling, that longing of the soul, which does +not linger on the earth, but evermore looks up to the azure tent of the +stars, where happiness dwells, where the unquiet of the beating heart is +still, then you must resort to the romantic poetry of the +_west_."--"_Study of Greek Literature_," Bishop Esaias Tegnér, p. 38.] + +In seeking, therefore, to determine correctly what are the +characteristics of a nation, we must endeavor to trace how far the +physical constitution of that people, their temperament, their habits, +their sentiments, and their ideas have been formed, or modified, under +the surrounding geographical conditions, which, as we have seen, greatly +determine a nation's individuality. Guided by these lights, let us +approach the study of "_the men of Athens_." + +_Attica_, of which Athens was the capital, and whose entire populations +were called "Athenians," was the most important of all the Hellenic +states. It is a triangular peninsula, the base of which is defined by +the high mountain ranges of Cithæron and Parnes, whilst the two other +sides are washed by the sea, having their vertex at the promontory of +Sunium, or Cape Colonna. The prolongation of the south-western line +towards the north until it reaches the base at the foot of Mount +Cithæron, served as the line of demarkation between the Athenian +territory and the State of Megara. Thus Attica may be generally +described as bounded on the north-east by the channel of the Negropont; +on the south-west by the gulf of Ægina and part of Megara; and on the +north-west by the territory which formed the ancient Boeotia, including +within its limits an area of about 750 miles.[11] + +Hills of inferior elevation connect the mountain ranges of Cithæron and +Parnes with the mountainous surface of the south-east of the peninsula. +These hills, commencing with the promontory of Sunium itself, which +forms the vertex of the triangle, rise gradually on the south-east to +the round summit of Hymettus, and onward to the higher peak of +Pentelicus, near Marathon, on the east. The rest of Attica is all a +plain, one reach of which comes down to the sea on the south, at the +very base of Hymettus. Here, about five miles from the shore, an abrupt +rock rises from the plain, about 200 feet high, bordered on the south by +lower eminences. That rock is the Acropolis. Those lower eminences are +the Areopagus, the Pmyx, and the Museum. In the valley formed by these +four hills we have the Agora, and the varied undulations of these hills +determine the features of the city of Athens.[12] + +[Footnote 11: See art. "Attica," _Encyc. Brit._] + +[Footnote 12: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. +Paul," vol. i. p. 346.] + +Nearly all writers on the topography of Athens derive their materials +from Pausanias, who visited the city in the early part of the second +century, and whose "Itinerary of Greece" is still extant.[13] He entered +the city by the Peiraic gate, the same gate at which Paul entered some +sixty years before. We shall place ourselves under his guidance, and, so +far as we are able, follow the same course, supplying some omissions, as +we go along, from other sources. On entering the city, the first +building which arrested the attention of Pausanias was the Pompeium, so +called because it was the depository of the sacred vessels, and also of +the garments used in the annual procession in honor of Athena (Minerva), +the tutelary deity of Athens, from whom the city derived its name. Near +this edifice stood a temple of Demeter (Ceres), containing statues of +that goddess, of her daughter Persephone, and of Iacchus, all executed +by Praxiteles; and beyond were several porticoes leading from the city +gates to the outer Ceramicus, while the intervening space was occupied +by various temples, the Gymnasium of Hermes, and the house of Polytion, +the most magnificent private residence in Athens. + +[Footnote 13: The account here given of the topography of Athens is +derived mainly from the article on "Athens" in the _Encyc. Brit._] + +There were two places in Athens known by the name of Ceramicus, one +without the walls, forming part of the suburbs; and the other within the +walls, embracing a very important section of the city. The outer +Ceramicus was covered with the sepulchres of the Athenians who had been +slain in battle, and buried at the public expense; it communicated with +the inner Ceramicus by the gate Dipylum. The Ceramicus within the city +probably included the Agora, the Stoa Basileios, and the Stoa Poecile, +besides various other temples and public buildings. + +Having fairly passed the city gates, a long street is before us with a +colonnade or cloister on either hand; and at the end of this street, by +turning to the left, we might go through the whole Ceramicus to the open +country, and the groves of the Academy. But we turn to the right, and +enter the Agora,--the market-place, as it is called in the English +translation of the sacred narrative. + +We are not, however, to conceive of the market-place at Athens as +bearing any resemblance to the bare, undecorated spaces appropriated to +business in our modern towns; but rather as a magnificent public square, +closed in by grand historic buildings, of the highest style of +architecture; planted with palm-trees in graceful distribution, and +adorned with statues of the great men of Athens and the deified heroes +of her mythology, from the hands of the immortal masters of the plastic +art. This "market-place" was the great centre of the public life of the +Athenians,--the meeting-place of poets, orators, statesmen, warriors, +and philosophers,--a grand resort for leisure, for conversation, for +business, and for news. Standing in the Agora, and looking towards the +south, is the _Museum,_ so called because it was believed that _Musæus_, +the father of poetry, was buried there. Towards the north-west is the +_Pnyx,_ a sloping hill, partially levelled into an open area for +political assemblies. To the north is seen the craggy eminence of the +_Areopagus_, and on the north-east is the _Acropolis_ towering high +above the scene, "the crown and glory of the whole." + +The most important buildings of the Agora are the Porticoes or +cloisters, the most remarkable of which are the Stoa Basileios, or +Portico of the king; the Stoa Eleutherius, or Portico of the Jupiter of +Freedom; and the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch. These Porticoes were +covered walks, the roof being supported by columns, at least on one +side, and by solid masonry on the other. Such shaded walks are almost +indispensable in the south of Europe, where the people live much in the +open air, and they afford a grateful protection from the heat of the +sun, as well as a shelter from the rain. Seats were also provided where +the loungers might rest, and the philosophers and rhetoricians sit down +for intellectual conversation. The "Stoic" school of philosophy derived +its name from the circumstance that its founder, Zeno, used to meet and +converse with his disciples under one of these porticoes,--the Stoa +Poecile. These porticoes were not only built in the most magnificent +style of architecture, but adorned with paintings and statuary by the +best masters. On the roof of the Stoa Basileios were statues of Theseus +and the Day. In front of the Stoa Eleutherius was placed the divinity to +whom it was dedicated; and within were allegorical paintings, +celebrating the rise of "the fierce democracy." The Stoa Poecile derived +its name from the celebrated paintings which adorned its walls, and +which were almost exclusively devoted to the representation of national +subjects, as the contest of Theseus with the Amazons, the more glorious +struggle at Marathon, and the other achievements of the Athenians; here +also were suspended the shields of the Scionæans of Thrace, together +with those of the Lacedemonians, taken at the island of Sphacteria. + +It is beyond our purpose to describe all the public edifices,--the +temples, gymnasia, and theatres which crowd the Ceramic area, and that +portion of the city lying to the west and south of the Acropolis. Our +object is, if possible, to convey to the reader some conception of the +ancient splendor and magnificence of Athens; to revive the scenes amidst +which the Athenians daily moved, and which may be presumed to have +exerted a powerful influence upon the manners, the taste, the habits of +thought, and the entire character of the Athenian people. To secure this +object we need only direct attention to the Acropolis, which was crowded +with the monuments of Athenian glory, and exhibited an amazing +concentration of all that was most perfect in art, unsurpassed in +excellence, and unrivalled in richness and splendor. It was "the +peerless gem of Greece, the glory and pride of art, the wonder and envy +of the world." + +The western side of the Acropolis, which furnished the only access to +the summit of the hill, was about 168 feet in breadth; an opening so +narrow that, to the artists of Pericles, it appeared practicable to fill +up the space with a single building, which, in serving the purpose of a +gateway to the Acropolis, should also contribute to adorn, as well as +fortify the citadel. This work, the greatest achievement of civil +architecture in Athens, which rivalled the Parthenon in felicity of +execution, and surpassed it in boldness and originality of design, +consisted of a grand central colonnade closed by projecting wings. This +incomparable edifice, built of Pentelic marble, received the name of +Propylæa from its forming the vestibule to the five-fold gates by which +the citadel was entered. In front of the right wing there stood a small +Ionic temple of pure white marble, dedicated to Niké Apteros (Wingless +Victory). + +A gigantic flight of steps conducted from the five-fold gates to the +platform of the Acropolis, which was, in fact, one vast composition of +architecture and sculpture dedicated to the national glory. Here stood +the Parthenon, or temple of the Virgin Goddess, the glorious temple +which rose in the proudest period of Athenian history to the honor of +Minerva, and which ages have only partially effaced. This magnificent +temple, "by its united excellences of materials, design, and decoration, +internal as well as external, has been universally considered the most +perfect which human genius ever planned and executed. Its dimensions +were sufficiently large to produce an impression of grandeur and +sublimity, which was not disturbed by any obtrusive subdivision of +parts; and, whether viewed at a small or greater distance, there was +nothing to divert the mind of the spectator from contemplating the unity +as well as majesty of mass and outline; circumstances which form the +first and most remarkable characteristic of every Greek temple erected +during the purer ages of Grecian taste and genius."[14] + +[Footnote 14: Leake's "Topography of Athens," p. 209 et seq.] + +It would be impossible to convey any just and adequate conception of the +artistic decorations of this wonderful edifice. The two pediments of the +temple were decorated with magnificent compositions of statuary, each +consisting of about twenty entire figures of colossal size; the one on +the western pediment representing the birth of Minerva, and the other, +on the eastern pediment, the contest between that goddess and Neptune +for the possession of Attica. Under the outer cornice were ninety-two +groups, raised in high relief from tablets about four feet square, +representing the victories achieved by her companions. Round the inner +frieze was presented the procession of the Parthenon on the grand +quinquennial festival of the Panathenæa. The procession is represented +as advancing in two parallel columns from west to east; one proceeding +along the northern, the other along the southern side of the temple; +part facing inward after turning the angle of the eastern front, and +part meeting towards the centre of that front. + +The statue of the virgin goddess, the work of Phidias, stood in the +eastern chamber of the cella, and was composed of ivory and gold. It had +but one rival in the world, the Jupiter Olympus of the same famous +artist. On the summit or apex of the helmet was placed a sphinx, with +griffins on either side. The figure of the goddess was represented in an +erect martial attitude, and clothed in a robe reaching to the feet. On +the breast was a head of Medusa, wrought in ivory, and a figure of +Victory about four cubits high. The goddess held a spear in her hand, +and an ægis lay at her feet, while on her right, and near the spear, was +a figure of a serpent, believed to represent that of Erichthonius. + +According to Pliny, the entire height of the statue was twenty-six +cubits (about forty feet), and the artist, Phidias, had ingeniously +contrived that the gold with which the statue was encrusted might be +removed at pleasure. The battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ was carved +upon the sandals; the battle of the Amazons was represented on the ægis +which lay at her feet, and on the pedestal was sculptured the birth of +Pandora. + +The temple of Erechtheus, the most ancient structure in Athens, stood on +the northern side of the Acropolis. The statue of Zeus Polieus stood +between the Propylæa and the Parthenon. The brazen colossus of Minerva, +cast from the spoils of Marathon, appears to have occupied the space +between the Erechtheium and the Propylæa, near the Pelasgic or northern +wall. This statue of the tutelary divinity of Athens and Attica rose in +gigantic proportions above all the buildings of the Acropolis, the +flashing of whose helmet plumes met the sailor's eye as he approached +from the Sunian promontory. And the remaining space of the wide area was +literally crowded with statuary, amongst which were Theseus contending +with the Minotaur; Hercules strangling the serpents; the Earth imploring +showers from Jupiter; and Minerva causing the olive to sprout, while +Neptune raises the waves. After these works of art, it is needless to +speak of others. It may be sufficient to state that Pausanias mentions +by name towards three hundred remarkable statues which adorned this part +of the city even after it had been robbed and despoiled by its several +conquerors. + +The Areopagus, or hill of Ares (Mars), so called, it is said, in +consequence of that god having been the first person tried there for the +crime of murder, was, beyond all doubt, the rocky height which is +separated from the western end of the Acropolis by a hollow, forming a +communication between the northern and southern divisions of the city. +The court of the Areopagus was simply an open space on the highest +summit of the hill, the judges sitting in the open air, on rude seats of +stone, hewn out of the solid rock. Near to the spot on which the court +was held was the sanctuary of the Furies, the avenging deities of +Grecian mythology, whose presence gave additional solemnity to the +scene. The place and the court were regarded by the people with +superstitious reverence. + +This completes, our survey of the principal buildings, monuments, and +localities within the city of Athens. We do not imagine we have +succeeded in conveying any adequate idea of the ancient splendor and +glory of this city, which was not only the capital of Attica, but also + + "The eye of Greece, mother of art and eloquence." + +We trust, however, that we have contributed somewhat towards awakening +in the reader's mind a deeper interest in these classic scenes, and +enabling him to appreciate, more vividly, the allusions we may hereafter +make to them. + +The mere dry recital of geographical details, and topographical notices +is, however, of little interest in itself, and by itself. A tract of +country derives its chief interest from its historic _associations_--its +immediate relations to man. The events which have transpired therein, +the noble or ignoble deeds, the grand achievements, or the great +disasters of which it has been the theatre, these constitute the living +heart of its geography. Palestine has been rendered forever memorable, +not by any remarkable peculiarities in its climate or scenery, but by +the fact that it was the home of God's ancient people--the Hebrews and +still more, because the ardent imagination of the modern traveller still +sees upon its mountains and plains the lingering footprints of the Son +of God. And so Attica will always be regarded as a classic land, because +it was the theatre of the most illustrious period of ancient +history--_the period of youthful vigor in the life of humanity, when +viewed as a grand organic whole_. + +Here on a narrow spot of less superficies than the little State of Rhode +Island there flourished a republic which, in the grandeur of her +military and naval achievements, at Marathon, Thermopylæ, Platæa, and +Salamis, in the sublime creations of her painters, sculptors, and +architects, and the unrivalled productions of her poets, orators, and +philosophers, has left a lingering glory on the historic page, which +twenty centuries have not been able to eclipse or dim. The names of +Solon and Pericles; of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; of Isocrates and +Demosthenes; of Myron, Phidias, and Praxiteles; of Herodotus, Xenophon, +and Thucydides; of Sophocles and Euripides, have shed an undying lustre +on Athens and Attica. + +How much of this universal renown, this imperishable glory attained by +the Athenian people, is to be ascribed to their geographical position +and surroundings, and to the elastic, bracing air, the enchanting +scenery, the glorious skies, which poured their daily inspiration on the +Athenian mind, is a problem we may scarcely hope to solve. + +Of this, at least, we may be sure, that all these geographical and +cosmical conditions were ordained by God, and ordained, also, for some +noble and worthy end. That God, "the Father of all the families of the +earth," cared for the Athenian people as much as for Jewish and +Christian nations, we can not doubt. That they were the subjects of a +Providence, and that, in God's great plan of human history, they had an +important part to fulfill, we must believe. That God "determined the +time of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical bounds of +its habitation," is affirmed by Paul. And that the _specific_ end for +which the nation had its existence was fulfilled, we have the fullest +confidence. _So far, therefore, as we can trace the relation that +subsists between the geographical position and surroundings of that +nation, and its national characteristics and actual history, so far are +we able to solve the problem of its destiny; and by so much do we +enlarge our comprehension of the plan of God in the history of our +race_. + +The geographical position of Greece was favorable to the freest +commercial and maritime intercourse with the great historic +nations--those nations most advanced in science, literature, and art. +Bounded on the west by the Adriatic and Ionian seas, by the +Mediterranean on the south, and on the east by the Ægean Sea, her +populations enjoyed a free intercommunication with the Egyptians, +Hebrews, Persians, Phoenicians, Romans, and Carthaginians. This +peculiarity in the geographical position of the Grecian peninsula could +not fail to awaken in its people a taste for navigation, and lead them +to active commercial intercourse with foreign nations.[15] The boundless +oceans on the south and east, the almost impassable mountains on the +west and north of Asia, presented insurmountable obstacles to commercial +intercourse. But the extended border-lands and narrow inland seas of +Southern Europe allured man, in presence of their opposite shores, to +the perpetual exchange of his productions. An arm of the sea is not a +barrier, but rather a tie between the nations. Appearing to separate, it +in reality draws them together without confounding them.[16] On such a +theatre we may expect that commerce will be developed on an extensive +scale.[17] And, along with commerce, there will be increased activity in +all departments of productive industry, and an enlarged diffusion of +knowledge. "Commerce," says Ritter, "is the great mover and combiner of +the world's activities." And it also furnishes the channels through +which flow the world's ideas. Commerce, both in a material and moral +point of view, is the life of nations. Along with the ivory and ebony, +the fabrics and purple dyes, the wines and spices of the Syrian +merchant, there flowed into Greece the science of numbers and of +navigation, and the art of alphabetical writing from Phoenicia. Along +with the fine wheat, and embroidered linen, and riches of the farther +Indias which came from Egypt, there came, also, into Greece some +knowledge of the sciences of astronomy and geometry, of architecture and +mechanics, of medicine and chemistry; together with the mystic wisdom of +the distant Orient. The scattered rays of light which gleamed in the +eastern skies were thus converged in Greece, as on a focal point, to be +rendered more brilliant by contact with the powerful Grecian intellect, +and then diffused throughout the western world. Thus intercourse with +surrounding nations, by commerce and travel, contact therewith by +immigrations and colonizations, even collisions and invasions also, +became, in the hands of a presiding Providence, the means of diffusing +knowledge, of quickening and enlarging the active powers of man, and +thus, ultimately, of a higher civilization. + +[Footnote 15: Humboldt's "Cosmos," vol. ii. p. 143.] + +[Footnote 16: Cousin, vol. i. pp. 169, 170.] + +[Footnote 17: The advantageous situation of Britain for commerce, and +the nature of the climate have powerfully contributed to the perfection +of industry among her population. Had she occupied a central, internal +station, like that of Switzerland, the facilities of her people for +dealing with others being so much the less, their progress would have +been comparatively slow, and, instead of being highly improved, their +manufactures would have been still in infancy. But being surrounded on +all sides by the sea, that "great highway of nations," they have been +able to maintain an intercourse with the most remote as well as the +nearest countries, to supply them on the easiest terms with their +manufactures, and to profit by the peculiar products and capacities of +production possessed by other nations. To the geographical position and +climate of Great Britain, her people are mainly indebted for their +position as the first commercial nation on earth.--See art. +"Manufactrues," p. 277, _Encyc. Brit_.] + +Then further, the peculiar configuration of Greece, the wonderful +complexity of its coast-line, its peninsular forms, the number of its +islands, and the singular distribution of its mountains, all seem to +mark it as the theatre of activity, of movement, of individuality, and +of freedom. An extensive continent, unbroken by lakes and inland seas, +as Asia, where vast deserts and high mountain chains separate the +populations, is the seat of immobility.[18] Commerce is limited to the +bare necessities of life, and there are no inducements to movement, to +travel, and to enterprise. There are no conditions prompting man to +attempt the conquest of nature. Society is therefore stationary as in +China and India. Enfolded and imprisoned within the overpowering +vastness and illimitable sweep of nature, man is almost unconscious of +his freedom and his personality. He surrenders himself to the disposal +of a mysterious "_fate_" and yields readily to the despotic sway of +superhuman powers. The State is consequently the reign of a single +despotic will. The laws of the Medes and Persians are unalterable. But +in Greece we have extended border-lands on the coast of navigable seas; +peninsulas elaborately articulated, and easy of access. We have +mountains sufficiently elevated to shade the land and diversify the +scenery, and yet of such a form as not to impede communication. They are +usually placed neither in parallel chains nor in massive groups, but are +so disposed as to inclose extensive tracts of land admirably adapted to +become the seats of small and independent communities, separated by +natural boundaries, sometimes impossible to overleap. The face of the +interior country,--its forms of relief, seemed as though Providence +designed, from the beginning, to keep its populations socially and +politically disunited. These difficulties of internal transit by land +were, however, counteracted by the large proportion of coast, and the +accessibility of the country by sea. The promontories and indentations +in the line of the Grecian coast are hardly less remarkable than the +peculiar elevations and depressions of the surface. "The shape of +Peloponnesus, with its three southern gulfs, the Argolic, Laconian, and +Messenian, was compared by the ancient geographers to the leaf of a +plane-tree: the Pagasæan gulf on the eastern side of Greece, and the +Ambrakian gulf on the western, with their narrow entrances and +considerable area, are equivalent to internal lakes: Xenophon boasts of +the double sea which embraces so large a portion of Attica; Ephorus, of +the triple sea by which Boeotia was accessible from west, north, and +south--the Euboean strait, opening a long line of country on both sides +to coasting navigation. But the most important of all Grecian gulfs are +the Corinthian and Saronic, washing the northern and north-eastern +shores of Peloponnesus, and separated by the narrow barrier of the +Isthmus of Corinth. The former, especially, lays open Ætolia, Phokis, +and Boeotia, as the whole northern coast of Peloponnesus, to water +approach.... It will thus appear that there was no part of Greece proper +which could be considered as out of the reach of the sea, whilst most +parts of it were easy of access. The sea was thus the sole channel for +transmitting improvements and ideas as well as for maintaining +sympathies" between the Hellenic tribes.[19] The sea is not only the +grand highway of commercial intercourse, but the empire of movement, of +progress, and of freedom. Here man is set free from the bondage imposed +by the overpowering magnitude and vastness of continental and oceanic +forms. The boisterous and, apparently, lawless winds are made to obey +his will. He mounts the sea as on a fiery steed and "lays his hand upon +her mane." And whilst thus he succeeds, in any measure, to triumph over +nature, he wakes to conscious power and freedom. It is in this region of +contact and commingling of sea and land where man attains the highest +superiority. Refreshing our historic recollections, and casting our eyes +upon the map of the world, we can not fail to see that all the most +highly civilized nations have lived, or still live, on the margin of the +sea. + +[Footnote 18: Cousin, vol. i. pp. 151, 170.] + +[Footnote 19: Grote's "Hist, of Greece," vol. ii. pp. 221, 225.] + +The peculiar configuration of the territory of Greece, its forms of +relief, "so like, in many respects, to Switzerland," could not fail to +exert a powerful influence on the character and destiny of its people. +Its inclosing mountains materially increased their defensive power, and, +at the same time, inspired them with the love of liberty. Those +mountains, as we have seen, so unique in their distribution, were +natural barriers against the invasion of foreign nations, and they +rendered each separate community secure against the encroachments of the +rest. The pass of Thermopylæ, between Thessaly and Phocis, that of +Cithæron, between Boeotia and Attica; and the mountain ranges of Oneion +and Geraneia, along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which could +be defended against any force of invaders. This signal peculiarity in +the forms of relief protected each section of the Greeks from being +conquered, and at the same time maintained their separate autonomy. The +separate states of Greece lived, as it were, in the presence of each +other, and at the same time resisted all influences and all efforts +towards a coalescence with each other, until the time of Alexander. +Their country, a word of indefinite meaning to the Asiatic, conveyed to +them as definite an idea as that of their own homes. Its whole +landscape, with all its historic associations, its glorious monuments of +heroic deeds, were perpetually present to their eyes. Thus their +patriotism, concentrated within a narrow sphere, and kept alive by the +sense of their individual importance, their democratic spirit, and their +struggles with surrounding communities to maintain their independence, +became a strong and ruling passion. Their geographical surroundings had, +therefore, a powerful influence upon their political institutions. +Conquest, which forces nations of different habits, characters, and +languages into unity, is at last the parent of degrading servitude. +These nations are only held together, as in the Roman empire, by the +iron hand of military power. The despot, surrounded by a foreign +soldiery, appears in the conquered provinces, simply to enforce tribute, +and compel obedience to his arbitrary will. But the small Greek +communities, protected by the barriers of their seas and gulfs and +mountains, escaped, for centuries, this evil destiny. The people, united +by identity of language and manners and religion, by common interest and +facile intercommunication, could readily combine to resist the invasions +of foreign nations, as well as the encroachments of their own rulers. +And they were able to easily model their own government according to +their own necessities and circumstances and common interests, and to +make the end for which it existed the sole measure of the powers it was +permitted to wield.[20] + +[Footnote 20: _Encyc. Brit_, art. "Greece."] + +The soil of Attica was not the most favorable to agricultural pursuits. +In many places it was stony and uneven, and a considerable proportion +was bare rock, on which nothing could be grown. Not half the surface was +capable of cultivation. In this respect it may be fitly compared to some +of the New England States. The light, dry soil produced excellent +barley, but not enough of wheat for their own consumption. Demosthenes +informs us that Athens brought every year, from Byzantium, four hundred +thousand _medimni_ of wheat. The alluvial plains, under industrious +cultivation, would furnish a frugal subsistence for a large population, +and the mildness of the climate allowed all the more valuable products +to ripen early, and go out of season last. Such conditions, of course, +would furnish motives for skill and industry, and demand of the people +frugal and temperate habits. The luxuriance of a tropical climate tends +to improvidence and indolence. Where nature pours her fullness into the +lap of ease, forethought and providence are little needed. There is none +of that struggle for existence which awakens sagacity, and calls into +exercise the active powers of man. But in a country where nature only +yields her fruits as the reward of toil, and yet enough to the +intelligent culture of the soil, there habits of patient industry must +be formed. The alternations of summer and winter excite to forethought +and providence, and the comparative poverty of the soil will prompt to +frugality. Man naturally aspires to improve his condition by all the +means within his power. He becomes a careful observer of nature, he +treasures up the results of observation, he compares one fact with +another and notes their relations, and he makes new experiments to test +his conclusions, and thus he awakes to the vigorous exercise of all his +powers. These physical conditions must develop a hardy, vigorous, +prudent, and temperate race; and such, unquestionably, were the Greeks. +"Theophrastus, and other authors, amply attest the observant and +industrious agriculture prevalent in Greece. The culture of the vine and +olive appears to have been particularly elaborate and the many different +accidents of soil, level, and exposure which were to be found, afforded +to observant planters materials for study and comparison."[21] The +Greeks were frugal in their habits and simple in their modes of life. +The barley loaf seems to have been more generally eaten than the wheaten +loaf; this, with salt fish and vegetables, was the common food of the +population. Economy in domestic life was universal. In their manners, +their dress, their private dwellings, they were little disposed to +ostentation or display. + +[Footnote 21: Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. ii. p. 230.] + +The climate of Attica is what, in physical geography, would be called +_maritime_. "Here are allied the continental vigor and oceanic softness, +in a fortunate union, mutually tempering each other."[22] The climate of +the whole peninsula of Greece seems to be distinguished from that of +Spain and Italy, by having more of the character of an inland region. +The diversity of local temperature is greater; the extremes of summer +and winter more severe. In Arcadia the snow has been found eighteen +inches thick in January, with the thermometer at 16° Fahrenheit, and it +sometimes lies on the ground for six weeks. The summits of the central +chains of Pindus and most of the Albanian mountains are covered with +snow from the beginning of November to the end of March. In Attica, +which, being freely exposed to the sea, has in some measure an insular +climate, the winter sets in about the beginning of January. About the +middle of that month the snow begins to fall, but seldom remains upon +the plain for more than a few days, though it lies on the summit of the +mountain for a month.[23] And then, whilst Boeotia, which joins to +Attica, is higher and colder, and often covered with dense fogs, Attica +is remarkable for the wonderful transparency, dryness, and elasticity of +its atmosphere. All these climatal conditions exerted, no doubt, a +modifying influence upon the character of the inhabitants.[24] In a +tropical climate man is enfeebled by excessive heat. His natural +tendency is to inaction and repose. His life is passed in a "strenuous +idleness." His intellectual, his reflective faculties are overmastered +by his physical instincts. Passion, sentiment, imagination prevail over +the sober exercises of his reasoning powers. Poetry universally +predominates over philosophy. The whole character of Oriental language, +religion, literature is intensely imaginative. In the frozen regions of +the frigid zone, where a perpetual winter reigns, and where lichens and +mosses are the only forms of vegetable life, man is condemned to the +life of a huntsman, and depends mainly for his subsistence on the +precarious chances of the chase. He is consequently nomadic in his +habits, and barbarous withal. His whole life is spent in the bare +process of procuring a living. He consumes a large amount of oleaginous +food, and breathes a damp heavy atmosphere, and is, consequently, of a +dull phlegmatic temperament. Notwithstanding his uncertain supplies of +food, he is recklessly improvident, and indifferent to all the lessons +of experience. Intellectual pursuits are all precluded. There is no +motive, no opportunity, and indeed no disposition for mental culture. +But in a temperate climate man is stimulated to high mental activity. +The alternations of heat and cold, of summer and of winter, an elastic, +fresh, and bracing atmosphere, a diversity in the aspects of nature, +these develop a vivacity of temperament, a quickness of sensibility as +well as apprehension, and a versatility of feeling as well as genius. +History marks out the temperate zone as the seat of the refined and +cultivated nations. + +[Footnote 22: Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 181.] + +[Footnote 23: _Encyc. Brit._, art. "Greece."] + +[Footnote 24: The influence of climatic conditions did not escape the +attention of the Greeks. Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Aristotle speak of +the climate of Asia as more enervating than that of Greece. They +regarded the changeful character and diversity of local temperature in +Greece as highly stimulating to the energies of the populations. The +marked contrast between the Athenians and the Boeotians was supposed to +be represented in the light and heavy atmosphere which they respectively +breathed.--_Grote_, vol. ii. pp. 232-3.] + +The natural scenery of Greece was of unrivalled grandeur--surpassing +Italy, perhaps every country in the world. It combined in the highest +degree every feature essential to the highest beauty of a landscape +except, perhaps, large rivers. But this was more than compensated for by +the proximity of the sea, which, by its numerous arms, seemed to embrace +the land on nearly every side. Its mountains, encircled with zones of +wood, and capped with snow, though much lower than the Alps, are as +imposing by the suddenness of their elevation--"pillars of heaven, the +fosterers of enduring snows."[25] Rich sheltered plains lie at their +feet, covered with an unequally woven mantle of trees, and shrubs, and +flowers,--"the verdant gloom of the thickly-mantling ivy, the narcissus +steeped in heavenly dew, the golden-beaming crocus, the hardy and +ever-fresh-sprouting olive-tree,"[26] and the luxuriant palm, which +nourishes amid its branches the grape swelling with juice. But it is the +combination of these features, in the most diversified manner, with +beautiful inland bays and seas, broken by headlands, inclosed by +mountains, and studded with islands of every form and magnitude, which +gives to the scenery of Greece its proud pre-eminence. "Greek scenery," +says Humboldt, "presents the peculiar charm of an intimate blending of +sea and land, of shores adorned with vegetation, or picturesquely girt +with rocks gleaming in the light of aerial tints, and an ocean beautiful +in the play of the ever-changing brightness of its deep-toned wave."[27] +And over all the serene, deep azure skies, occasionally veiled by light +fleecy clouds, with vapory purple mists resting on the distant mountain +tops. This glorious scenery of Greece is evermore the admiration of the +modern traveller. "In wandering about Athens on a sunny day in March, +when the asphodels are blooming on Colones, when the immortal mountains +are folded in a transparent haze, and the Ægean slumbers afar among his +isles," he is reminded of the lines of Byron penned amid these scenes-- + +[Footnote 25: Pindar.] + +[Footnote 26: Sophocles, "oedipus at Colonna."] + +[Footnote 27: "Cosmos," vol. ii. p. 25.] + + "Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild; + Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields, + Thine olives ripe as when Minerva smiled, + And still his honeyed wealth Hymettus yields; + There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds, + The freeborn wanderer of the mountain air; + Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds, + Still in his beams Mendeli's marbles glare; + Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but nature still is fair."[28] + +[Footnote 28: Canto ii., v. lxxxvi., "Childe Harold."] + +The effect of this scenery upon the character, the imagination, the +taste of the Athenians must have been immense. Under the influence of +such sublime objects, the human mind becomes gifted as with inspiration, +and is by nature filled with poetic images. "Greece became the +birth-place of taste, of art, and eloquence, the chosen sanctuary of the +muses, the prototype of all that is graceful, and dignified, and grand +in sentiment and action." + +And now, if we have succeeded in clearly presenting and properly +grouping the facts, and in estimating the influence of geographical +position and surroundings on national character, we have secured the +natural _criteria_ by which we examine, and even correct the portraiture +of the Athenian character usually presented by the historian. + +The character of the Athenians has been sketched by Plutarch[29] with +considerable minuteness, and his representations have been permitted, +until of late years, to pass unchallenged. He has described them as at +once passionate and placable, easily moved to anger, and as easily +appeased; fond of pleasantry and repartee, and heartily enjoying a +laugh; pleased to hear themselves praised, and yet not annoyed by +criticism and censure; naturally generous towards those who were poor +and in humble circumstances, and humane even towards their enemies; +jealous of their liberties, and keeping even their rulers in awe. In +regard to their intellectual traits, he affirms their minds were not +formed for laborious research, and though they seized a subject as it +were by intuition, yet wanted patience and perseverance for a thorough +examination of all its bearings. "An observation," says the writer of +the article on "_Attica_," in the Encyclopædia Britannica, "more +superficial in itself, and arguing a greater ignorance of the Athenians, +can not easily be imagined." Plutarch lived more than three hundred +years after the palmy days of the Athenian Demos had passed away. He was +a Boeotian by birth, not an Attic, and more of a Roman than a Greek in +all his sympathies. We are tempted to regard him as writing under the +influence of prejudice, if not of envy. He was scarcely reliable as a +biographer, and as materials for history his "Parallel Lives" have been +pronounced "not altogether trustworthy."[30] + +[Footnote 29: "De Præcept."] + +[Footnote 30: _Encyc. of Biography_, art. "Plutarch."] + +That the Athenians were remarkable for the ardor and vivacity of their +temperament,--that they were liable to sudden gusts of passion,--that +they were inconstant in their affections, intolerant of dictation, +impatient of control, and hasty to resent every assumption of +superiority,--that they were pleased with flattery, and too ready to +lend a willing ear to the adulation of the demagogue,--and that they +were impetuous and brave, yet liable to be excessively elated by +success, and depressed by misfortune, we may readily believe, because +such traits of character are in perfect harmony with all the facts and +conclusions already presented. Such characteristics were the natural +product of the warm and genial sunlight, the elastic bracing air, the +ethereal skies, the glorious mountain scenery, and the elaborate +blending of sea and land, so peculiar to Greece and the whole of +Southern Europe.[31] These characteristics were shared in a greater or +less degree by all the nations of Southern Europe in ancient times, and +they are still distinctive traits in the Frenchman, the Italian, and the +modern Greek.[32] + +[Footnote 31: "As the skies of Hellas surpassed nearly all other +climates in brightness and elasticity, so, also, had nature dealt most +lovingly with the inhabitants of this land. Throughout the whole being +of the Greek there reigned supreme a quick susceptibility, out of which +sprang a gladsome serenity of temper, and a keen enjoyment of life; +acute sense, and nimbleness of apprehension; a guileless and child-like +feeling, full of trust and faith, combined with prudence and forecast. +These peculiarities lay so deeply imbedded in the inmost nature of the +Greeks that no revolutions of time and circumstances have yet been able +to destroy them; nay, it may be asserted that even now, after centuries +of degradation, they have not been wholly extinguished in the +inhabitants of ancient Hellas."--"_Education of the Moral Sentiment +amongst the Ancient Greeks_." By FREDERICK JACOBS, p. 320.] + +[Footnote 32: These are described by the modern historian and traveller +as lively, versatile, and witty. "The love of liberty and independence +does not seem to be rooted out of the national character by centuries of +subjugation. They love to command; but though they are loyal to a good +government, they are apt readily to rise when their rights and liberties +are infringed. As there is little love of obedience among them, so +neither is there any toleration of aristocratic pretensions."--_Encyc. +Brit._, art. "Greece."] + +The consciousness of power, the feeling of independence, the ardent love +of freedom induced in the Athenian mind by the objective freedom of +movement which his geographical position afforded, and that +subordination and subserviency of physical nature to man so peculiar to +Greece, determined the democratic character of all their political +institutions. And these institutions reacted upon the character of the +people and intensified their love of liberty. This passionate love of +personal freedom, amounting almost to disease, excited them to a +constant and almost distressing vigilance. And it is not to be wondered +at if it displayed itself in an extreme jealousy of their rulers, an +incessant supervision and criticism of all their proceedings, and an +intense and passionate hatred of tyrants and of tyranny. The popular +legislator or the successful soldier might dare to encroach upon their +liberties in the moment when the nation was intoxicated and dazzled with +their genius, their prowess, and success; but a sudden revulsion of +popular feeling, and an explosion of popular indignation, would overturn +the one, and ostracism expel the other. Thus while inconstancy, and +turbulence, and faction seem to have been inseparable from the +democratic spirit, the Athenians were certainly constant in their love +of liberty, faithful in their affection for their country,[33] and +invariable in their sympathy and admiration for that genius which shed +glory upon their native land. And then they were ever ready to repair +the errors, and make amends for the injustice committed under the +influence of passionate excitement, or the headlong impetuosity of their +too ardent temperament. The history of Greece supplies numerous +illustrations of this spirit. The sentence of death which had been +hastily passed on the inhabitants of Mytilene was, on sober reflection, +revoked the following day. The immediate repentance and general sorrow +which followed the condemnation of the ten generals, as also of +Socrates, are notable instances. + +[Footnote 33: When immense bribes were offered by the king of Persia to +induce the Athenians to detach themselves from the alliance with the +rest of the Hellenic States, she answered by the mouth of Aristides +"that it was impossible for all the gold in the world to tempt the +Republic of Athens, or prevail with it to sell its liberty and that of +Greece!"] + +In their private life the Athenians were courteous, generous, and +humane. Whilst bold and free in the expression of their opinions, they +paid the greatest attention to rules of politeness, and were nicely +delicate on points of decorum. They had a natural sense of what was +becoming and appropriate, and an innate aversion to all extravagance. A +graceful demeanor and a quiet dignity were distinguishing traits of +Athenian character. They were temperate and frugal[34] in their habits, +and little addicted to ostentation and display. Even after their +victories had brought them into contact with Oriental luxury and +extravagance, and their wealth enabled them to rival, in costliness and +splendor, the nations they had conquered, they still maintained a +republican simplicity. The private dwellings of the principal citizens +were small, and usually built of clay; their interior embellishments +also were insignificant--the house of Polytion alone formed an +exception.[35] All their sumptuousness and magnificence were reserved +for and lavished on their public edifices and monuments of art, which +made Athens the pride of Greece and the wonder of the world. +Intellectually, the Athenians were remarkable for their quickness of +apprehension, their nice and delicate perception, their intuitional +power, and their versatile genius. Nor were they at all incapable of +pursuing laborious researches, or wanting in persevering application and +industry, notwithstanding Plutarch's assertion to the contrary. The +circumstances of every-day life in Attica, the conditions which +surrounded the Athenian from childhood to age, were such as to call for +the exercise of these qualities of mind in the highest degree. Habits of +patient industry were induced in the Athenian character by the poverty +and comparative barrenness of the soil, demanding greater exertion to +supply their natural wants. And an annual period of dormancy, though +unaccompanied by the rigors of a northern winter, called for prudence in +husbanding, and forethought and skill in endeavoring to increase their +natural resources. The aspects of nature were less massive and +awe-inspiring, her features more subdued, and her areas more +circumscribed and broken, inviting and emboldening man to attempt her +conquest. The whole tendency of natural phenomena in Greece was to +restrain the imagination, and discipline the observing and reasoning +faculties in man. Thus was man inspired with confidence in his own +resources, and allured to cherish an inquisitive, analytic, and +scientific spirit. "The French, in point of national character, hold +nearly the same relative place amongst the nations of Europe that the +Athenians held amongst the States of Ancient Greece." And whilst it is +admitted the French are quick, sprightly, vivacious, perhaps sometimes +light even to frivolity, it must be conceded they have cultivated the +natural and exact sciences with a patience, and perseverance, and +success unsurpassed by any of the nations of Europe. And so the +Athenians were the Frenchmen of Greece. Whilst they spent their "leisure +time"[36] in the place of public resort, the porticoes and groves, +"hearing and telling the latest news" (no undignified or improper mode +of recreation in a city where newspapers were unknown), whilst they are +condemned as "garrulous," "frivolous," "full of curiosity," and +"restlessly fond of novelties," we must insist that a love of study, of +patient thought and profound research, was congenial to their natural +temperament, and that an inquisitive and analytic spirit, as well as a +taste for subtile and abstract speculation, were inherent in the +national character. The affluence, and fullness, and flexibility, and +sculpture-like finish of the language of the Attics, which leaves far +behind not only the languages of antiquity, but also the most cultivated +of modern times, is an enduring monument of the patient industry of the +Athenians.[37] Language is unquestionably the highest creation of +reason, and in the language of a nation we can see reflected as in a +mirror the amount of culture to which it has attained. The rare balance +of the imagination and the reasoning powers, in which the perfection of +the human intellect is regarded as consisting, the exact correspondence +between the thought and the expression, "the free music of prosaic +numbers in the most diversified forms of style," the calmness, and +perspicuity, and order, even in the stormiest moments of inspiration, +revealed in every department of Greek literature, were not a mere happy +stroke of chance, but a product of unwearied effort--and effort too +which was directed by the criteria which reason supplied. The plastic +art of Greece, which after the lapse of ages still stands forth in +unrivalled beauty, so that, in presence of the eternal models it +created, the modern artist feels the painful lack of progress was not a +spontaneous outburst of genius, but the result of intense application +and unwearied discipline. The achievements of the philosophic spirit, +the ethical and political systems of the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, +and the Garden, the anticipations, scattered here and there like +prophetic hints, of some of the profoundest discoveries of "inductive +science" in more modern days,--all these are an enduring protest against +the strange misrepresentations of Plutarch. + +[Footnote 34: These are still characteristics of the Greeks. "They are +an exceedingly temperate people; drunkenness is a vice remarkably rare +amongst them; their food also is spare and simple; even the richest are +content with a dish of vegetables for each meal, and the poor with a +handful of olives or a piece of salt fish.... All other pleasures are +indulged with similar propriety; their passions are moderate, and +insanity is almost unknown amongst them."--_Encyc. Brit._, art. +"Greece."] + +[Footnote 35: Niebuhr's Lectures, vol. i. p. 101.] + +[Footnote 36: Eukaireô corresponds exactly to the Latin _vacare_, "to be +at leisure."] + +[Footnote 37: Frederick Jacobs, on "Study of Classic Antiquity," p. 57.] + +In Athens there existed a providential collocation of the most favorable +conditions in which humanity can be placed for securing its highest +natural development. Athenian civilization is the solution, on the +theatre of history, of the problem--What degree of perfection can +humanity, under the most favorable conditions, attain, without the +supernatural light, and guidance, and grace of Christianity?[38] "Like +their own goddess Athene the people of Athens seem to spring full-armed +into the arena of history, and we look in vain to Egypt, Syria, and +India, for more than a few seeds that burst into such marvellous growth +on the soil of Attica."[39] + +[Footnote 38: It has been asserted by some theological writers, Watson +for example, that no society of civilized men has been, or can be +constituted without the aid of a religion directly communicated by +revelation, and transmitted by oral tradition;--"that it is possible to +raise a body of men into that degree of civil improvement which would +excite the passion for philosophic investigation, without the aid of +religion... can have no proof, and is contradicted by every fact and +analogy with which we are acquainted." (_Institutes_, vol. i. p. 271; +see also Archbishop Whately, "Dissertation," etc., vol. i. _Encyc. +Brit._, p. 449-455). + +The fallacy of the reasoning by which this doctrine is sought to be +sustained is found in the assumption "that to all our race the existence +of a First Cause is a question of philosophy," and that the idea of God +lies at the end of "a gradual process of inquiry" and induction, for +which a high degree of "scientific culture" is needed. Whereas the idea +of a First Cause lies at the beginning, not at the end of philosophy; +and philosophy is simply the analysis of our natural consciousness of +God, and the presentation of the idea in a logical form. Faith in the +existence of God is not the result of a conscious process of reflection; +it is the spontaneous and instinctive logic of the human mind, which, in +view of phenomena presented to sense, by a necessary law of thought +immediately and intuitively affirms a personal Power, an intelligent +Mind as the author. In this regard, there is no difference between men +except the clearness with which they apprehend, and the logical account +they can render to themselves, of this instinctive belief. Spontaneous +intuition, says Cousin, is the genius of all men; reflection the genius +of few men. "But Leibnitz had no more confidence in the principle of +causality, and even in his favorite principle of sufficient reason, than +the most ignorant of men;" the latter have this principle within them, +as a law of thought, controlling their conception of the universe, and +doing this almost unconsciously; the former, by an analysis of thought, +succeeded in defining and formulating the ideas and laws which +necessitate the cognition of a God. The function of philosophy is simply +to transform alêthês doxa into itistêmê--right opinion into science,--to +elucidate and logically present the immanent thought which lies in the +universal consciousness of man. + +That the possession of the idea of God is essential to the social and +moral elevation of man,--that is, to the civilization of our race, is +most cheerfully conceded. That humanity has an end and destination which +can only be secured by the true knowledge of God, and by a participation +of the nature of God, is equally the doctrine of Plato and of Christ. +Now, if humanity has a special end and destination, it must have some +instinctive tendings, some spermatic ideas, some original forces or +laws, which determine it towards that end. All development supposes some +original elements to be unfolded or developed. Civilization is but the +development of humanity according to its primal idea and law, and under +the best exterior conditions. That the original elements of humanity +were unfolded in some noble degree under the influence of philosophy is +clear from the history of Greece; there the most favorable natural +conditions for that development existed, and Christianity alone was +needed to crown the result with ideal perfection.] + +[Footnote 39: Max Muller, "Science of Language," p. 404, 2d series.] + +Here the most perfect ideals of beauty and excellence in physical +development, in manners, in plastic art, in literary creations, were +realized. The songs of Homer, the dialogues of Plato, the speeches of +Demosthenes, and the statues of Phidias, if not unrivalled, are at least +unsurpassed by any thing that has been achieved by their successors. +Literature in its most flourishing periods has rekindled its torch at +her altars, and art has looked back to the age of Pericles for her +purest models. Here the ideas of personal liberty, of individual rights, +of freedom in thought and action, had a wonderful expansion. Here the +lasting foundations of the principal arts and sciences were laid, and in +some of them triumphs were achieved which have not been eclipsed. Here +the sun of human reason attained a meridian splendor, and illuminated +every field in the domain of moral truth. And here humanity reached the +highest degree of civilization of which it is capable under purely +_natural_ conditions. + +And now, the question with which we are more immediately concerned is, +what were the specific and valuable results attained by the Athenian +mind in _religion_ and _philosophy_, the two momenta of the human mind? +This will be the subject of discussion in subsequent chapters. + +The order in which the discussion shall proceed is determined for us by +the natural development of thought. The two fundamental momenta of +thought and its development are spontaneity and reflection, and the two +essential forms they assume are religion and philosophy. In the natural +order of thought spontaneity is first, and reflection succeeds +spontaneous thought. And so religion is first developed, and +subsequently comes philosophy. As religion supposes spontaneous +intuition, so philosophy has religion for its basis, but upon this basis +it is developed in an original manner. "Turn your attention to history, +that living image of thought: everywhere you perceive religions and +philosophies: everywhere you see them produced in an invariable order. +Everywhere religion appears with new societies, and everywhere, just so +far as societies advance, from religion springs philosophy."[40] This +was pre-eminently the case in Athens, and we shall therefore direct our +attention first to the Religion of the Athenians. + +[Footnote 40: Cousin, "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 302.] + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. + + + All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness + in religion deisidaimonesterois.--ST. PAUL. + +As a prelude and preparation for the study of the religion of the +Athenians, it may be well to consider religion in its more abstract and +universal form; and inquire in what does religion essentially consist; +how far is it grounded in the nature of man; and especially, what is +there in the mental constitution of man, or in his exterior conditions, +which determines him to a mode of life which may be denominated +_religious?_ As a preliminary inquiry, this may materially aid us in +understanding the nature, and estimating the value of the religious +conceptions and sentiments which were developed by the Greek mind. + +Religion, in its most generic conception, may be defined as a form of +thought, feeling, and action, which has the _Divine_ for its object, +basis, and end. Or, in other words, it is a mode of life determined by +the recognition of some relation to, and consciousness of dependence +upon, a _Supreme Being_. This general conception of religion underlies +all the specific forms of religion which have appeared in the world, +whether heathen, Jewish, Mohammedan, or Christian. + +That a religious destination appertains to man as man, whether he has +been raised to a full religious consciousness, or is simply considered +as capable of being so raised, can not be denied. In all ages man has +revealed an instinctive tendency, or natural aptitude for religion, and +he has developed feelings and emotions which have always characterized +him as a religious being. Religious ideas and sentiments have prevailed +among all nations, and have exerted a powerful influence on the entire +course of human history. Religious worship, addressed to a Supreme Being +believed to control the destiny of man, has been coeval and coextensive +with the race. Every nation has had its mythology, and each mythologic +system has been simply an effort of humanity to realize and embody in +some visible form the relations in which it feels itself to be connected +with an external, overshadowing, and all-controlling Power and Presence. +The voice of all ancient, and all contemporaneous history, clearly +attests that the _religious principle_ is deeply seated in the nature of +man; and that it has occupied the thought, and stirred the feelings of +every rational man, in every age. It has interwoven itself with the +entire framework of human society, and ramified into all the relations +of human life. By its agency, nations have been revolutionized, and +empires have been overthrown; and it has formed a mighty element in all +the changes which have marked the history of man. + +This universality of religious sentiment and religious worship must be +conceded as a fact of human nature, and, as a universal fact, it demands +an explanation. Every event must have a cause. Every phenomenon must +have its ground, and reason, and law. The facts of religious history, +the past and present religious phenomena of the world can be no +exception to this fundamental principle; they press their imperious +demand to be studied and explained, as much as the phenomena of the +material or the events of the moral world. The phenomena of religion, +being universally revealed wherever man is found, must be grounded in +some universal principle, on some original law, which is connate with, +and natural to man. At any rate, there must be something in the nature +of man, or in the exterior conditions of humanity, which invariably +leads man to worship, and which determines him, as by the force of an +original instinct, or an outward, conditioning necessity, to recognize +and bow down before a Superior Power. The full recognition and adequate +explanation of the facts of religious history will constitute a +_philosophy of religion_. + +The hypotheses which have been offered in explanation of the religious +phenomena of the world are widely divergent, and most of them are, in +our judgment, eminently inadequate and unsatisfactory. The following +enumeration may be regarded as embracing all that are deemed worthy of +consideration. + +I. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in SUPERSTITION, that is, +in a _fear_ of invisible and supernatural powers, generated by ignorance +of nature. + +II. The phenomenon of religion is part of that PROCESS or EVOLUTION OF +THE ABSOLUTE (i.e., the Deity), which gradually unfolding itself in +nature, mind, history, and _religion_, attains to perfect +self-consciousness in philosophy. + +III. The phenomenon of religion has its foundation in FEELING--_the +feeling of dependence and of obligation_; and that to which the mind, by +spontaneous intuition or instinctive faith, traces this dependence and +obligation we call God. + +IV. The phenomenon of religion had its outbirth in the spontaneous +apperceptions of REASON, that is, the necessary _à priori ideas of the +Infinite, the Perfect, the Unconditioned Cause, the Eternal Being_, +which are evoked into consciousness in presence of the changeful and +contingent phenomena of the world. + +V. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in EXTERNAL REVELATION, to +which _reason_ is related as a purely passive organ, and _heathenism_ as +a feeble relic. + +As a philosophy of religion--an attempt to supply the rationale of the +religious phenomena of the world, the first hypothesis is a skeptical +philosophy, which necessarily leads to _Atheism_. The second is an +idealistic philosophy (absolute idealism), which inevitably lands in +_Pantheism_. The third is an intuitional or "faith-philosophy," which +finally ends in _Mysticism_. The fourth is a rationalistic or +"spiritualistic" philosophy, which yields pure _Theism_. The last is an +empirical philosophy, which derives all religion from instruction, and +culminates in _Dogmatic Theology_. + +In view of these diverse and conflicting theories, the question which +now presents itself for our consideration is,--does any one of these +hypotheses meet and satisfy the demands of the problem? does it fully +account for and adequately explain all the facts of religious history? +The answer to this question must not be hastily or dogmatically given. +The arbitrary rejection of any theory that may be offered, without a +fair and candid examination, will leave our minds in uncertainty and +doubt as to the validity of our own position. A blind faith is only one +remove from a pusillanimous skepticism. We can not render our own +position secure except by comprehending, assaulting, and capturing the +position of our foe. It is, therefore, due to ourselves and to the cause +of truth, that we shall examine the evidence upon which each separate +theory is based, and the arguments which are marshalled in its support, +before we pronounce it inadequate and unphilosophical. Such a criticism +of opposite theories will prepare the way for the presentation of a +philosophy of religion which we flatter ourselves will be found most in +harmony with all the facts of the case. + +I. _It is affirmed that the religious phenomena of the world had their +origin in_ SUPERSTITION, _that is, in a fear of unseen and supernatural +powers, generated from ignorance of nature_. + +This explanation was first offered by Epicurus. He felt that the +universality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a cause; +and he found it, or presumed he found it not in a spiritual God, which +he claims can not exist, nor in corporeal god which no one has seen, but +in "phantoms of the mind generated by fear." When man has been unable to +explain any natural phenomenon, to assign a cause within the sphere of +nature, he has had recourse to supernatural powers, or living +personalities behind nature, which move and control nature in an +arbitrary and capricious manner. These imaginary powers are supposed to +be continually interfering in the affairs of individuals and nations. +They bestow blessings or inflict calamities. They reward virtue and +punish vice. They are, therefore, the objects of "sacred awe" and +"superstitious fear." + + Whate'er in heaven, + In earth, man sees mysterious, shakes his mind + With sacred awe o'erwhelms him, and his soul + Bows to the dust; the cause of things conceal + Once from his vision, instant to the gods + All empire he transfers, all rule supreme, + And doubtful whence they spring, with headlong haste + Calls them the workmanship of power divine. + For he who, justly, deems the Immortals live + Safe, and at ease, yet fluctuates in his mind + How things are swayed; how, chiefly, those discerned + In heaven sublime--to SUPERSTITION back + Lapses, and fears a tyrant host, and then + Conceives, dull reasoner, they can all things do, + While yet himself nor knows what may be done, + Nor what may never, nature powers defined + Stamping on all, and bounds that none can pass: + Hence wide, and wider errs he as he walks.[41] + +[Footnote 41: Lucretius, "De Natura Rerum," book vi. vs. 50-70.] + +In order to rid men of all superstitious fear, and, consequently, of all +religion, Epicurus endeavors to show that "nature" alone is adequate to +the production of all things, and there is no need to drag in a "divine +power" to explain the phenomena of the world. + +This theory has been wrought into a somewhat plausible form by the +brilliant and imposing generalizations of Aug. Comte. The religious +phenomena of the world are simply one stage in the necessary development +of mind, whether in the individual or the race. He claims to have been +the first to discover the great law of the three successive stages or +phases of human evolution. That law is thus enounced. Both in the +individual mind, and in the history of humanity, thought, in dealing +with its problems, passes, of necessity, through, first, a +_Theological_, second, a _Metaphysical_, and finally reaches a third, or +_Positive_ stage. + +In attempting an explanation of the universe, human thought, in its +earliest stages of development, resorts to the idea of living personal +agents enshrined in and moving every object, whether organic or +inorganic, natural or artificial. In an advanced stage, it conceives a +number of personal beings distinct from, and superior to nature, which +preside over the different provinces of nature--the sea, the air, the +winds, the rivers, the heavenly bodies, and assume the guardianship of +individuals, tribes, and nations. As a further, and still higher stage, +it asserts the unity of the Supreme Power which moves and vitalizes the +universe, and guides and governs in the affairs of men and nations. The +_Theological_ stage is thus subdivided into three epochs, and +represented as commencing in _Fetichism_, then advancing to +_Polytheism_, and, finally, consummating in _Monotheism_. + +The next stage, the _Metaphysical_, is a transitional stage, in which +man substitutes abstract entities, as substance, force, Being _in se_, +the Infinite, the Absolute, in the place of theological conceptions. +During this period all theological opinions undergo a process of +disintegration, and lose their hold on the mind of man. Metaphysical +speculation is a powerful solvent, which decomposes and dissipates +theology. + +It is only in the last--the _Positive_ stage--that man becomes willing +to relinquish all theological ideas and metaphysical notions, and +confine his attention to the study of phenomena in their relation to +time and space; discarding all inquiries as to causes, whether efficient +or final, and denying the existence of all entities and powers beyond +nature. + +The first stage, in its religious phase, is _Theistic_, the second is +_Pantheistic_, the last is _Atheistic_. + +The proofs offered by Comte in support of this theory are derived: + +I. _From Cerebral Organization_. There are three grand divisions of the +Brain, the Medulla Oblongata, the Cerebellum, and the Cerebrum; the +first represents the merely animal instincts the second, the more +elevated sentiments, the third, the intellectual powers. Human nature +must, therefore, both in the individual and in the race, be developed in +the following order: (1.) in animal instincts; (2.) in social affections +and communal tendencies; (3.) in intellectual pursuits. Infant life is a +merely animal existence, shared in common with the brute; in childhood +the individual being realizes his relation to external nature and human +society; in youth and manhood he compares, generalizes, and classifies +the objects of knowledge, and attains to science. And so the infancy of +our race was a mere animal or savage state, the childhood of our race +the organization of society, the youth and manhood of our race the +development of science. + +Now, without offering any opinion as to the merits of the phrenological +theories of Gall and Spurzheim, we may ask, what relation has this order +to the law of development presented by Comte? Is there any imaginable +connection between animal propensities and theological ideas; between +social affections and metaphysical speculations? Are not the +intellectual powers as much concerned with theological ideas and +metaphysical speculations as with positive science? And is it not more +probable, more in accordance with facts, that all the powers of the +mind, instinct, feeling, and thought, enter into action simultaneously, +and condition each other? The very first act of perception, the first +distinct cognition of an object, involves _thought_ as much as the last +generalization of science. We know nothing of _mind_ except as the +development of thought, and the first unfolding, even of the infant +mind, reveals an intellectual act, a discrimination between a self and +an object which is not self, and a recognition of resemblance, or +difference between _this_ object and _that_. And what does Positive +science, in its most mature and perfect form, claim to do more than "to +study actual phenomena in their orders of resemblance, coexistence, and +succession." + +Cerebral organization may furnish plausible analogies in favor of some +theory of human development, but certainly not the one proposed by Aug. +Comte. The attempt, however, to construct a chart of human history on +such an _à priori_ method,--to construct an ideal framework into which +human nature must necessarily grow, is a violation of the first and most +fundamental principle of the Positive science, which demands that we +shall confine ourselves strictly to the study of actual phenomena in +their orders of resemblance, coexistence, and succession. The history of +the human race must be based on facts, not on hypotheses, and the facts +must be ascertained by the study of ancient records and existing +monuments of the past. Mere plausible analogies and _à priori_ theories +based upon them, are only fitted to mislead the mind; they insert a +prism between the perceiving mind and the course of events which +decomposes the pure white light of fact, and throws a false light over +the entire field of history. + +2. _The second order of proof is attempted to be drawn from the +analogies of individual experience_. + +It is claimed that the history of the race is the same as that of each +individual mind; and it is affirmed that man is _religious_ in infancy, +_metaphysical_ in youth, and _positive_, that is, scientific without +being religious, in mature manhood; the history of the race must +therefore have followed the same order. + +We are under no necessity of denying that there is some analogy between +the development of mind in the individual man, and in humanity as a +whole, in order to refute the theory of Comte. Still, it must not be +overlooked that the development of mind, in all cases and in all ages, +is materially affected by exterior conditions. The influence of +geographical and climatic conditions, of social and national +institutions, and especially of education, however difficult to be +estimated, can not be utterly disregarded. And whether all these +influences have not been controlled, and collocated, and adjusted by a +Supreme Mind in the education of humanity, is also a question which can +not be pushed aside as of no consequence. Now, unless it can be shown +that the same outward conditions which have accompanied the individual +and modified his mental development, have been repealed in the history +of the race, and repeated in the same order of succession, the argument +has no value. + +But, even supposing it could be shown that the development of mind in +humanity has followed the same order as that of the individual, we +confidently affirm that Comte has not given the true history of the +development of the individual mind. The account he has given may perhaps +be the history of his own mental progress, but it certainly is not the +history of every individual mind, nor indeed, of a majority even, of +educated minds that have arrived at maturity. It would be much more in +harmony with facts to say childhood is the period of pure receptivity, +youth of doubt and skepticism, and maturity of well-grounded and +rational belief. In the ripeness and maturity of the nineteenth century +the number of scientific men of the Comtean model is exceedingly small +compared with the number of religious men. There are minds in every part +of Europe and America as thoroughly scientific as that of Comte, and as +deeply imbued with the spirit of the Inductive Philosophy, which are not +conscious of any discordance between the facts of science and the +fundamental principles of theology. It may be that, in his own immediate +circle at Paris there may be a tendency to Atheism, but certainly no +such tendency exists in the most scientific minds of Europe and America. +The faith of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and +Pascal, in regard to the fundamental principles of theology, is still +the faith of Sedgwick, Whewell, Herschel, Brewster, Owen, Agassiz, +Silliman, Mitchell, Hitchcock, Dana, and, indeed of the leading +scientific minds of the world--the men who, as Comte would say, "belong +to the élite of humanity." The mature mind, whether of the individual or +the race, is not Atheistical. + +3. _The third proof is drawn from a survey of the history of certain +portions of our race._ + +Comte is far from being assured that the progress of humanity, under the +operation of his grand law of development, has been uniform and +invariable. The majority of the human race, the vast populations of +India, China, and Japan, have remained stationary; they are still in the +Theological stage, and consequently furnish no evidence in support of +his theory. For this reason he confines himself to the "élite" or +advance-guard of humanity, and in this way makes the history of humanity +a very "abstract history" indeed. Starting with Greece as the +representative of ancient civilization, passing thence to Roman +civilization, and onward to Western Europe, he attempts to show that the +actual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with +his law. To secure, however, even this semblance of harmony between the +facts of history and his hypothetical law, he has to treat the facts +very much as Procrustes treated his victims,--he must stretch some, and +mutilate others, so as to make their forms fit the iron bed. The natural +organization of European civilization is distorted and torn asunder. "As +the third or positive stage had accomplished its advent in his own +person, it was necessary to find the metaphysical period just before; +and so the whole life of the Reformed Christianity, in embryo and in +manifest existence, is stripped of its garb of _faith_, and turned out +of view as a naked metaphysical phenomenon. But metaphysics, again, have +to be ushered in by theology; and of the three stages of theology +Monotheism is the last, necessarily following on Polytheism, as that, +again, on Fetichism. There is nothing for it, therefore, but to let the +mediæval Catholic Christianity stand as the world's first monotheism, +and to treat it as the legitimate offspring and necessary development of +the Greek and Roman polytheism. This, accordingly, Comte actually does. +Protestantism he illegitimates, and outlaws from religion altogether, +and the genuine Christianity he fathers upon the faith of Homer and the +Scipios! Once or twice, indeed, it seems to cross him that there was +such a people as the Hebrews, and that they were not the polytheists +they ought to have been. He sees the fact, but pushes it out of his way +with the remark that the Jewish monotheism was 'premature.'"[42] + +[Footnote 42: Martineau's Essays, pp. 61, 62.] + +The signal defect of Comte's historical survey, however, is, that it +furnishes no evidence of the general prevalence of Fetichism in +primitive times. The writings of Moses are certainly entitled to as much +consideration and credence as the writings of Berosus, Manetho, and +Herodotus; and, it will not be denied, they teach that the faith of the +earliest families and races of men was _monotheistic_. The early Vedas, +the Institutes of Menu, the writings of Confucius, the Zendavesta, all +bear testimony that the ancient faith of India, China, and Persia, was, +at any rate, pantheistic; and learned and trustworthy critics, Asiatic +as well as European, confidently affirm that the ground of the +Brahminical, Buddhist, and Parsist faith is _monotheistic_; and that +_one_ Being is assumed, in the earliest books, to be the origin of all +things.[43] Without evidence, Comte assumes that the savage state is the +original condition of man; and instead of going to Asia, the cradle of +the race, for some light as to the early condition and opinions of the +remotest families of men, he turns to Africa, the _soudan_ of the earth, +for his illustration of the habit of man, in the infancy of our race, to +endow every object in nature, whether organic or inorganic, with life +and intelligence. The theory of a primitive state of ignorance and +barbarism is a mere assumption--an hypothesis in conflict with the +traditionary legends of all nations, the earliest records of our race, +and the unanimous voice of antiquity, which attest the general belief in +a primitive state of light and innocence. + +[Footnote 43: "The Religions of the World in their Relation to +Christianity" (Maurice, ch. ii., iii., iv.).] + +The three stages of development which Comte describes as necessarily +successive, have, for centuries past, been simultaneous. The +theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific elements coexist now, +and there is no real, radical, or necessary conflict between them. +Theological and metaphysical ideas hold their ground as securely under +the influence of enlarged scientific discovery as before; and there is +no reason to suppose they ever had more power over the mind of man than +they have to-day. The notion that God is dethroned by the wonderful +discoveries of modern science, and theology is dead, is the dream of the +"_profond orage cérébral_" which interrupted the course of Comte's +lectures in 1826. As easily may the hand of Positivism arrest the course +of the sun, as prevent the instinctive thought of human reason +recognizing and affirming the existence of a God. And so long as ever +the human mind is governed by necessary laws of thought, so long will it +seek... + +[Transcriber's note: In the original document, page 64 is a duplication +of page 63. The real page 64 seems to be missing.] + +....eur, and consequently to develop its true philosophy. Its +fundamental error is the assumption that all our knowledge is confined +to the observation and classification of sensible phenomena--that is, to +changes perceptible by the senses. Psychology, based, as it is, upon +self-observation and self-reflection, is a "mere illusion; and logic and +ethics, so far as they are built upon it as their foundation, are +altogether baseless." Spiritual entities, forces, causes, efficient or +final, are unknown and unknowable; all inquiry regarding them must be +inhibited, "for Theology is inevitable if we permit the inquiry into +causes at all." + +II. The second hypothesis offered in explanation of the facts of +religious history is, _that religion is part of that_ PROCESS OR +EVOLUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE (_i.e._, the Deity) _which, gradually +unfolding itself in nature, mind, history, and religion, attains to the +fullest self-consciousness in philosophy_. + +This is the theory of Hegel, in whose system of philosophy the +subjective idealism of Kant culminates in the doctrine of "_Absolute +Identity_." Its fundamental position is that thought and being, subject +and object, the perceiving mind and the thing perceived, are ultimately +and essentially _one_, and that the only actual reality is that which +results from their mutual relation. The outward thing is nothing, the +inward perception is nothing, for neither could exist alone; the only +reality is the relation, or rather synthesis of the two; the essence or +nature of being in itself accordingly consists in the coexistence of two +contrarieties. Ideas, arising from the union or synthesis of two +opposites, are therefore the _concrete realities_ of Hegel; and the +_process_ of the evolution of ideas, in the human mind, is the process +of all existence--_the Absolute Idea_. + +_The Absolute_(die Idée) thus forms the beginning, middle, and end of +the system of Hegel. It is the one infinite existence or thought, of +which nature, mind, history, religion, and philosophy, are the +manifestation. "The absolute is, with him, not the infinite _substance_, +as with Spinoza; nor the infinite _subject_, as with Fichte; nor the +infinite _mind_, as with Schelling; it is a perpetual _process_, an +eternal thinking, without beginning and without end."[44] This _living, +eternal process of absolute existence is the God of Hegel_. + +It will thus be seen that the _Absolute_ is, with Hegel, the sum of all +actual and possible existence; "nothing is true and real except so far +as it forms an element of the Absolute Spirit."[45] "What kind of an +Absolute Being," he asks, "is that which does not contain in itself all +that is actual, even evil included?"[46] The Absolute, therefore, in +Hegel's conception, does not allow of any existence out of itself. It is +the _unity_ of the finite and the infinite, the eternal and the +temporal, the ideal and the real, the subject and the object. And it is +not only the unity of these opposites so as to exclude all difference, +but it contains in itself, all the differences and opposites as elements +of its being; otherwise the distinctions would stand over against +absolute as a limit, and the absolute would cease to be absolute. + +God is, therefore, according to Hegel, "no motionless, eternally +self-identical and unchangeable being, but a living, eternal _process_ +of absolute self-existence. This process consists in the eternal +self-distinction, or antithesis, and equally self-reconciliation or +synthesis of those opposites which enter, as necessary elements, into +the constitution of the Divine Being. This _self-evolution_, whereby the +absolute enters into antithesis, and returns to itself again, is the +eternal _self-actualization_ of its being, and which at once constitutes +the beginning, middle, and end, as in the circle, where the beginning is +at the same time the end, and the end the beginning."[47] + +[Footnote 44: Morell, "Hist, of Philos., p. 461."] + +[Footnote 45: "Philos. of Religion," p. 204.] + +[Footnote 46: Ibid., chap. xi. p. 24.] + +[Footnote 47: Herzog's _Real-Encyc._, art. "Hegelian Philos.," by +Ulrici.] + +The whole philosophy of Hegel consists in the development of this idea +of God by means of his, so-called, dialectic method, which reflects the +objective life-process of the Absolute, and is, in fact, identical with +it; for God, says he, "is only the Absolute Intelligence in so far as he +knows himself to be the Absolute Intelligence, _and this he knows only +in science_ [dialectics], _and this knowledge alone constitutes his true +existence._"[48] This life-process of the Absolute has three "moments." +It may be considered as the idea _in itself_--bare, naked, undetermined, +unconscious idea; as the idea _out of itself_, in its objective form, or +in its differentiation; and, finally, as the idea _in itself_, and _for +itself_, in its regressive or reflective form. This movement of thought +gives, _first_, bare, naked, indeterminate thought, or thought in the +mere antithesis of Being and non-Being; _secondly_, thought +externalizing itself in nature; and, _thirdly_, thought returning to +itself, and knowing itself in mind, or consciousness. Philosophy has, +accordingly, three corresponding divisions:--1. LOGIC, which here is +identical with metaphysics; 2. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE; 3. PHILOSOPHY OF +MIND. + +[Footnote 48: "Hist, of Philos.," iii. p. 399.] + +It is beyond our design to present an expanded view of the entire +philosophy of Hegel. But as he has given to the world a _new_ logic, it +may be needful to glance at its general features as a help to the +comprehension of his philosophy of religion. The fundamental law of his +logic is the _identity of contraries or contradictions_. All thought is +a synthesis of contraries or opposites. This antithesis not only exists +in all ideas, but constitutes them. In every idea we form, there must be +_two_ things opposed and distinguished, in order to afford a clear +conception. Light can not be conceived but as the opposite of darkness; +good can not be thought except in opposition to evil. All life, all +reality is thus, essentially, the union of two elements, which, +together, are mutually opposed to, and yet imply each other. + +The identity of Being and Nothing is one of the consequences of this +law. + +1. _The Absolute is the Being_ (das Absolute ist das Seyn), and "the +Being" is here, according to Hegel, bare, naked, abstract, +undistinguished, indeterminate, unconscious idea. + +2. _The Absolute is the Nothing_ (das Absolute ist das Nichts). "Pure +being is pure abstraction, and consequently the absolute-negative, which +in like manner, directly taken, is _nothing_." Being and Nothing are the +positive and negative poles of the Idea, that is, the Absolute. They +both alike exist, they are both pure abstractions, both absolutely +unconditioned, without attributes, and without consciousness. Hence +follows the conclusion-- + +3. _Being and Nothing are identical_ (das Seyn und das Nichts ist +dasselbe), Being is non-Being. Non-Being _is_ Being--the +Anders-seyn--which becomes _as_ Being to the Seyn. Nothing is, in some +sense, an actual thing. + +_Being_ and _Nothing_ are thus the two elements which enter into the one +Absolute Idea as contradictories, and both together combine to form a +complete notion of bare production, or the _becoming_ of something out +of nothing,--the unfolding of real existence in its lowest form, that +is, of _nature_. + +The "_Philosophy of Nature_" exhibits a series of necessary movements +which carry the idea forward in the ascending scale of sensible +existence. The laws of mechanics, chemistry, and physiology are resolved +into a series of oppositions. But the law which governs this development +requires the self-reconciliation of these opposites. The idea, +therefore, which in nature was unconscious and ignorant of itself, +returns upon itself, and becomes conscious of itself, that is, becomes +_mind_. The science of the regression or self-reflection of the idea, is +the "_Philosophy of Mind_." + +The "_Philosophy of Mind_" is subdivided by Hegel into three parts. +There is, first, the subjective or individual mind (_psychology_); then +the objective or universal mind, as represented in society, the state, +and in history (_ethics, political philosophy,_ or _jurisprudence_, and +_philosophy of history_); and, finally, the union of the subjective and +objective mind, or _the absolute mind_. This last manifests itself again +under three forms, representing the three degrees of the +self-consciousness of the Spirit, as the eternal truth. These are, +first, _art_, or the representation of beauty (æsthetics); secondly, +_religion_, in the general acceptation of the term (philosophy of +religion); and, thirdly, _philosophy_ itself, as the purest and most +perfect form of the scientific knowledge of truth. All historical +religions, the Oriental, the Jewish, the Greek, the Roman, and the +Christian, are _the successive stages in the development or +self-actualization of God_.[49] + +It is unnecessary to indicate to the reader that the philosophy of Hegel +is essentially pantheistic. "God is not a _person_, but personality +itself, _i.e._, the universal personality, which realizes itself in +every human consciousness, as so many separate thoughts of one eternal +mind. The idea we form of the absolute is, to Hegel, the absolute +itself, its essential existence being identical with our conception of +it. Apart from, and out of the world, there is no God; and so also, +apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no Divine +consciousness or personality."[50] + +[Footnote 49: See art. "Hegelian Philosophy," in Herzog's _Real-Encyc._, +from whence our materials are chiefly drawn.] + +[Footnote 50: Morell, "Hist. of Philos.," p. 473.] + +This whole conception of religion, however, is false, and conflicts with +the actual facts of man's religious nature and religious history. If the +word "religion" has any meaning at all, it is "a mode of life determined +by the consciousness of dependence upon, and obligation to God." It is +reverence for, gratitude to, and worship of God as a being distinct from +humanity. But in the philosophy of Hegel religion is a part of God--a +stage in the development or self-actualization of God. Viewed under one +aspect, religion is the self-adoration of God--the worship of God by +God; under another aspect it is the worship of humanity, since God only +becomes conscious of himself in humanity. The fundamental fallacy is +that upon which his entire method proceeds, viz., "the identity of +subject and object, being and thought." Against this false position the +consciousness of each individual man, and the universal consciousness of +our race, as revealed in history, alike protest. If thought and being +are identical, then whatever is true of ideas is also true of objects, +and then, as Kant had before remarked, there is no difference between +_thinking_ we possess a hundred dollars, and actually _possessing_ them. +Such absurdities may be rendered plausible by a logic which asserts the +"identity of contradictions," but against such logic common sense +rebels. "The law of non-contradiction" has been accepted by all +logicians, from the days of Aristotle, as a fundamental law of thought. +"Whatever is contradictory is unthinkable. A=not A=O, or A--A=O."[51] +Non-existence can not exist. Being can not be nothing. + +[Footnote 51: Hamilton's Logic, p. 58.] + +III. The third hypothesis affirms _that the phenomenon of religion has +its foundation in_ FEELING--_the feeling of dependence and of +obligation_; and that to which the mind, by spontaneous intuition of +instinctive faith, traces that dependence and obligation we call God. + +This, with some slight modification in each case, consequent upon the +differences in their philosophic systems, is the theory of Jacobi, +Schleiermacher, Nitzsch, Mansel, and probably Hamilton. Its fundamental +position is, that we can not gain truth with absolute certainty either +from sense or reason, and, consequently, the only valid source of real +knowledge is _feeling--faith, intuition_, or, as it is called by some, +_inspiration_. + +There have been those, in all ages, who have made all knowledge of +invisible, supersensuous, divine things, to rest upon an internal +_feeling_, or immediate, inward vision. The Oriental Mystics, the +Neo-Platonists, the Mystics of the Greek and Latin Church, the German +Mystics of the 14th century, the Theosophists of the Reformation, the +Quietists of France, the Quakers, have all appealed to some _special_ +faculty, distinct from the understanding and reason, for the immediate +cognition of invisible and spiritual existences. By some, that special +faculty was regarded as an "interior eye" which was illuminated by the +"Universal Light;" by others, as a peculiar sensibility of the soul--a +_feeling_ in whose perfect calm and utter quiescence the Divinity was +mirrored; or which, in an ecstatic state, rose to a communion with, and +final absorption in the Infinite. + +Jacobi was the first, in modern times, to give the "faith-philosophy," +as it is now designated, a definite form. He assumes the position that +all knowledge, of whatever kind, must ultimately rest upon intuition or +faith. As it regards sensible objects, the understanding finds the +impression from which all our knowledge of the external flows, ready +formed. The process of sensation is a mystery; we know nothing of it +until it is past, and the feeling it produces is present. Our knowledge +of matter, therefore, rests upon faith in these intuitions. We can not +doubt that the feeling has an objective cause. In every act of +perception there is something actual and present, which can not be +referred to a mere subjective law of thought. We are also conscious of +another class of feelings which correlate us with a supersensuous world, +and these feelings, also, must have their cause in some objective +reality. Just as sensation gives us an immediate knowledge of an +external world, so there is an internal sense which gives us an +immediate knowledge of a spiritual world--God, the soul, freedom, +immortality. Our knowledge of the invisible world, like our knowledge of +the visible world, is grounded upon faith in our intuitions. All +philosophic knowledge is thus based upon _belief_, which Jacobi regards +as a fact of our inward sensibility--a sort of knowledge produced by an +immediate _feeling_ of the soul--a direct apprehension, without proof, +of the True, the Supersensuous, the Eternal. + +Jacobi prepared the way for, and was soon eclipsed by the deservedly +greater name of Schleiermacher. His fundamental position was that truth +in Theology could not be obtained by reason, but by a feeling, +_insight_, or intuition, which in its lowest form he called +_God-consciousness_, and in its highest form, _Christian-consciousness._ +The God-consciousness, in its original form, is the _feeling of +dependence_ on the Infinite. The Christian consciousness is the perfect +union of the human consciousness with the Divine, through the mediation +of Christ, or what we would call a Christian experience of communion +with God. + +Rightly to understand the position of Schleiermacher we must take +account of his doctrine of _self_-consciousness. "In all +self-consciousness," says he, "there are two elements, a Being ein Seyn, +and a Somehow-having-become (Irgendweigewordenseyn). The last, however, +presupposes, for every self-consciousness, besides the ego, yet +something else from whence the certainty of the same +[self-consciousness] exists, and without which self-consciousness would +not be just this."[52] Every determinate mode of the sensibility +supposes an _object_, and a _relation_ between the subject and the +object, the subjective feeling deriving its determinations from the +object. External sensation, the feeling, say of extension and +resistance, gives world-consciousness. Internal sensation, the _feeling +of dependence_, gives God consciousness. And it is only by the presence +of world consciousness and God-consciousness that self consciousness can +be what it is. + +We have, then, in our self-consciousness a _feeling of direct +dependence_, and that to which our minds instinctively trace that +dependence we call God. "By means of the religious feeling, the Primal +Cause is revealed in us, as in perception, the things external, are +revealed in us."[53] The _felt_, therefore, is not only the first +religious sense, but the ruling, abiding, and perfect form of the +religious spirit; whatever lays any claim to religion must maintain its +ground and principle in _feeling_, upon which it depends for its +development; and the sum-total of the forces constituting religious +life, inasmuch as it is a _life_, is based upon immediate +self-consciousness.[54] + +[Footnote 52: Glaubenslehre, ch. i. § 4.] + +[Footnote 53: Dialectic, p. 430.] + +[Footnote 54: Nitzsch, "System of Doctrine," p. 23.] + +The doctrine of Schleiermacher is somewhat modified by Mansel, in his +"_Limits of Religious Thought_." He maintains, with Schleiermacher, that +religion is grounded in _feeling_, and that the _felt_ is the first +intimation or presentiment of the Divine. Man "_feels_ within him the +consciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct to worship, before he +can argue from effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and +benevolence scattered through the creation."[55] He also agrees with +Schleiermacher in regarding the _feeling of dependence_ as _a_ state of +the sensibility, out of which reflection builds up the edifice of +Religious Consciousness, but he does not, with Schleiermacher, regard it +as pre-eminently _the_ basis of religious consciousness. "The mere +consciousness of dependence does not, of itself, exhibit the character +of the Being on whom we depend. It is as consistent with superstition as +with religion; with the belief in a malevolent, as in a benevolent +Deity."[56] To the feeling of dependence he has added the _consciousness +of moral obligation_, which he imagines supplies the deficiency. By this +consciousness of moral obligation "we are compelled to assume the +existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right +and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity."[57] "To these two +facts of the inner consciousness the feeling of dependence, and +consciousness of moral obligation may be traced, as to their sources, +the two great outward acts by which religion, in its various forms, has +been manifested among men--_Prayer_, by which they seek to win God's +blessing upon the future, and _Expiation_, by which they strive to atone +for the offenses of the past. The feeling of dependence is the instinct +which urges us to pray. It is the feeling that our existence and welfare +are in the hands of a superior power; not an inexorable fate, not an +immutable law; but a Being having at least so far the attribute of +personality that he can show favor or severity to those who are +dependent upon Him, and can be regarded by them with feelings of hope +and fear, and reverence and gratitude."[58] The feeling of moral +obligation--"the law written in the heart"--leads man to recognize a +Lawgiver. "Man can be a law unto himself only on the supposition that he +reflects in himself the law of God."[59] The conclusion from the whole +is, there must be an _object_ answering to this consciousness: there +must be a God to explain these facts of the soul. + +[Footnote 55: Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 115.] + +[Footnote 56: Id., ib., p. 120.] + +[Footnote 57: Id., ib., p. 122.] + +[Footnote 58: Id., ib., pp. 119, 120.] + +[Footnote 59: Id., ib., p. 122.] + +This "philosophy of feeling," or of faith generated by feeling, has an +interest and a significance which has not been adequately recognized by +writers on natural theology. Feeling, sentiment, enthusiasm, have always +played an important part in the history of religion. Indeed it must be +conceded that religion is a _right state of feeling towards +God_--religion is _piety_. A philosophy of the religious emotion is, +therefore, demanded in order to the full interpretation of the religious +phenomena of the world. + +But the notion that internal feeling, a peculiar determination of the +sensibility, is the source of religious ideas:--that God can be known +immediately by feeling without the mediation of the truth that manifests +God; that he can be _felt_ as the qualities of matter can be felt; and +that this affection of the inward sense can reveal the character and +perfections of God, is an unphilosophical and groundless assumption. To +assert, with Nitzsch, that "feeling has reason, and is reason, and that +the sensible and felt God-consciousness generates out of itself +fundamental conceptions," is to confound the most fundamental +psychological distinctions, and arbitrarily bend the recognized +classifications of mental science to the necessities of a theory. +Indeed, we are informed that it is "by means of an _independent_ +psychology, and conformably to it," that Schleiermacher illustrates his +"philosophy of feeling."[60] But all psychology must be based upon the +observation and classification of mental phenomena, as revealed in +consciousness, and not constructed in an "independent" and à priori +method. The most careful psychological analysis has resolved the whole +complex phenomena of mind into thought, feeling, and volition.[61] These +orders of phenomena are radically and essentially distinct. They differ +not simply in degree but in kind, and it is only by an utter disregard +of the facts of consciousness that they can be confounded. Feeling is +not reason, nor can it by any logical dexterity be transformed into +reason. + +[Footnote 60: Nitzsch, "System of Doctrine," p. 21.] + +[Footnote 61: Kant, "Critique of Judg.," ch. xxii.; Cousin, "Hist, of +Philos.," vol. ii. p. 399; Hamilton, vol. i. p. 183, Eng. ed.] + +The question as to the relative order of cognition and feeling, that is, +as to whether feeling is the first or original form of the religious +consciousness, or whether feeling be not consequent upon some idea or +cognition of God, is one which can not be determined on empirical +grounds. We are precluded from all scrutiny of the incipient stages of +mental development in the individual mind and in collective humanity. If +we attempt to trace the early history of the soul, its beginnings are +lost in a period of blank unconsciousness, beyond all scrutiny of memory +or imagination. If we attempt the inquiry on the wider field of +universal consciousness, the first unfoldings of mind in humanity are +lost in the border-land of mystery, of which history furnishes no +authentic records. All dogmatic affirmation must, therefore, be +unjustifiable. The assertion that religious feeling precedes all +cognition,--that "the consciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being, +and the instinct of worship" are developed _first_ in the mind, before +the reason is exercised, is utterly groundless. The more probable +doctrine is that all the primary faculties enter into spontaneous action +_simultaneously_--the reason with the senses, the feelings with the +reason, the judgment with both the senses and the reason, and that from +their primary and simultaneous action arises the complex result, called +consciousness, or conjoint knowledge.[62] There can be no clear and +distinct consciousness without the cognition of a _self_ and a +_not-self_ in mutual relation and opposition. Now the knowledge of the +self--the personal ego--is an intuition of reason; the knowledge of the +not-self is an intuition of sense. All knowledge is possible only under +condition of plurality, difference, and relation.[63] Now the judgment +is "the Faculty of Relations," or of comparison; and the affirmation +"_this_ is not _that_" is an act of judgment; to know is, consequently, +to judge.[64] Self-consciousness must, therefore, be regarded as a +synthesis of sense, reason, and judgment, and not a mere self-feeling +(coenæsthesis). + +[Footnote 62: Cousin, "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 357; vol. ii. p. +337.] + +[Footnote 63: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 88.] + +[Footnote 64: Hamilton, "Metaphys.," p. 277] + +A profound analysis will further lead to the conclusion that if ideas of +reason are not chronologically antecedent to sensation, they are, at +least, the logical antecedents of all cognition. The mere feeling of +resistance can not give the notion of without the à priori idea of +space. The feeling of movement of change, can not give the cognition of +event without the rational idea of time or duration. Simple +consciousness can not generate the idea of personality, or selfhood, +without the rational idea of identity or unity. And so the mere "feeling +of dependence," of finiteness and imperfection, can not give the idea of +God, without the rational à priori idea of the Infinite, the Perfect, +the Unconditioned Cause. Sensation is not knowledge, and never can +become knowledge, without the intervention of reason, and a concentrated +self feeling can not rise essentially above animal life until it has, +through the mediation of reason, attained the idea of the existence of a +Supreme Being ruling over nature and man. + +Mere feeling is essentially blind. In its _pathological_ form, it may +indicate a want, and even develop an unconscious appetency, but it can +not, itself, reveal an _object_, any more than the feeling of hunger can +reveal the actual presence, or determine the character and fitness, of +any food. An undefinable fear, a mysterious presentiment, an instinctive +yearning, a hunger of the soul, these are all irrational emotions which +can never rise to the dignity of knowledge. An object must be conjured +by the imagination, or conceived by the understanding, or intuitively +apprehended by the reason, before the feeling can have any significance. + +Regarded in its _moral_ form, as "the feeling of obligation," it can +have no real meaning unless a "law of duty" be known and recognized. +Feeling, alone, can not reveal what duty is. When that which is right, +and just, and good is revealed to the mind, then the sense of obligation +may urge man to the performance of duty. But the right, the just, the +good, are ideas which are apprehended by the reason, and, consequently, +our moral sentiments are the result of the harmonious and living +relation between the reason and the sensibilities. + +Mr. Mansel asserts the inadequacy of Schleiermacher's "feeling of +dependence" to reveal the character of the Being on whom we depend. He +has therefore supplemented his doctrine by the "feeling of moral +obligation," which he thinks "compels us to _assume_ the existence of a +moral Deity." We think his "fact of religious intuition" is as +inadequate as Schleiermacher's to explain the whole phenomena of +religion. In neither instance does feeling supply the actual knowledge +of God. The feeling of dependence may indicate that there is a Power or +Being upon whom we depend for existence and well-being, and which Power +or Being "we call God." The feeling of obligation certainly indicates +the existence of a Being to whom we are accountable, and which Being Mr. +Mansel calls a "moral Deity." But in both instances the character, and +even the existence of God is "_assumed_" and we are entitled to ask on +what ground it is assumed. It will not be asserted that feeling alone +generates the idea, or that the feeling is transformed into idea without +the intervention of thought and reflection. Is there, then, a _logical_ +connection between the feeling of dependence and of obligation, and the +idea of the Uncreated Mind, the Infinite First Cause, the Righteous +Governor of the world. Or is there a fixed and changeless co-relation +between _the feeling_ and the _idea_, so that when the feeling is +present, the idea also necessarily arises in the mind? This latter +opinion seems to be the doctrine of Mansel. We accept it as the +statement of a fact of consciousness, but we can not regard it as an +account of the genesis of the idea of God in the human mind. The idea of +God as the First Cause, the Infinite Mind, the Perfect Being, the +personal Lord and Lawgiver, the creator, sustainer, and ruler of the +world, is not a simple, primitive intuition of the mind. It is +manifestly a complex, concrete idea, and, as such, can not be developed +in consciousness, by the operation of a single faculty of the mind, in a +simple, undivided act. It originates in the spontaneous operation of the +whole mind. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the universe, +and the primitive intuitions of the reason,--a logical inference from +the facts of sense, consciousness, and reason. A philosophy of religion +which regards the feelings as supreme, and which brands the decisions of +reason as uncertain, and well-nigh valueless, necessarily degenerates +into mysticism--a mysticism "which pretends to elevate man directly to +God, and does not see that, in depriving reason of its power, it really +deprives man of that which enables him to know God, and puts him in a +just communication with God by the intermediary of eternal and infinite +truth."[65] + +[Footnote 65: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 110.] + +The religious sentiments in all minds, and in all ages, have resulted +from the union of _thought_ and _feeling_--the living and harmonious +relation of reason and sensibility; and a philosophy which disregards +either is inadequate to the explanation of the phenomena. + +IV. The fourth hypothesis is, _that religion has had its outbirth in the +spontaneous apperceptions of_ REASON; that is, in the necessary, à +priori ideas of the infinite, the perfect, the unconditioned Cause, the +Eternal Being, which are evoked into consciousness in presence of the +changeful, contingent phenomena of the world. + +This will at once be recognized by the intelligent reader as the +doctrine of Cousin, by whom _pure reason_ is regarded as the grand +faculty or organ of religion. + +Religion, in the estimation of Cousin, is grounded on _cognition_ rather +than upon feeling. It is the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of duty +in its relation to God and to human happiness; and as reason is the +general faculty of all knowing, it must be the faculty of religion. "In +its most elevated point of view, religion is the relation of absolute +truth to absolute Being," and as absolute truth is apprehended by the +reason alone, reason "is the veridical and religious part of the nature +of man."[66] By "reason," however, as we shall see presently, Cousin +does not mean the discursive or reflective reason, but the spontaneous +or intuitive reason. That act of the mind by which we attain to +religious knowledge is not a _process of reasoning_, but a pure +appreciation, an instinctive and involuntary movement of the soul. + +[Footnote 66: Henry's Cousin, p. 510.] + +The especial function of reason, therefore, is to reveal to us the +invisible, the supersensuous, the Divine. "It was bestowed upon us for +this very purpose of going, without any circuit of reasoning, from the +visible to the invisible, from the finite to the infinite, from the +imperfect to the perfect, and from necessary and eternal truths, to the +eternal and necessary principle" that is God.[67] Reason is thus, as it +were, the bridge between consciousness and being; it rests, at the same +time, on both; it descends from God, and approaches man; it makes its +appearance in consciousness as a guest which brings intelligence of +another world of real Being which lies beyond the world of sense. + +Reason does not, however, attain to the Absolute Being directly and +immediately, without any intervening medium. To assert this would be to +fall into the error of Plotinus, and the Alexandrian Mystics. Reason is +the offspring of God, a ray of the Eternal Reason, but it is not to be +identified with God. Reason attains to the Absolute Being indirectly, +and by the interposition of truth. Absolute truth is an attribute and a +manifestation of God. "Truth is incomprehensible without God, and God is +incomprehensible without truth. Truth is placed between human +intelligence, and the supreme intelligence as a kind of mediator."[68] +Incapable of contemplating God face to face, reason adores God in the +truth which represents and manifests Him. + +[Footnote 67: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 103.] + +[Footnote 68: Id., ib., p. 99.] + +Absolute truth is thus a revelation of God, made by God to the reason of +man, and as it is a light which illuminates every man, and is +perpetually perceived by all men, it is a universal and perpetual +revelation of God to man. The mind of man is "the offspring of God," +and, as such, must have some resemblance to, and some correlation with +God. Now that which constitutes the image of God in man must be found in +the reason which is correlated with, and capable of perceiving the truth +which manifests God, just as the eye is correlated to the light which +manifests the external world. Absolute truth is, therefore, the sole +medium of bringing the human mind into communion with God; and human +reason, in becoming united to absolute truth, becomes united to God in +his manifestation in spirit and in truth. The supreme law, and highest +destination of man, is to become united to God by seeking a full +consciousness of, and loving and practising the Truth.[69] + +[Footnote 69: Henry's Cousin, p. 511, 512.] + +It will at once be obvious that the grand crucial questions by which +this philosophy of religion is to be tested are-- + +1st. _How will Cousin prove to us that human reason is in possession of +universal and necessary principles or absolute truths?_ and, + +2d. _How are these principles shown to be absolute? how far do these +principles of reason possess absolute authority?_ + +The answer of Cousin to the first question is that we prove reason to be +in possession of universal and necessary principles by the analysis of +the contents of consciousness, that is, by psychological analysis. The +phenomena of consciousness, in their primitive condition, are +necessarily complex, concrete, and particular. All our primary ideas are +complex ideas, for the evident reason that all, or nearly all, our +faculties enter at once into exercise; their simultaneous action giving +us, at the same time, a certain number of ideas connected with each +other, and forming a whole. For example, the idea of the exterior world, +which is given us so quickly, is a complex idea, which contains a number +of ideas. There is the idea of the secondary qualities of exterior +objects; there is the idea of the primary qualities; there is the idea +of the permanent reality of something to which you refer these +qualities, to wit, matter; there is the idea of space which contains +bodies; there is the idea of time in which movements are effected. All +these ideas are acquired simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, and +together form one complex idea. + +The application of analysis to this complex phenomenon clearly reveals +that there are simple ideas, beliefs, principles in the mind which can +not have been derived from sense and experience, which sense and +experience do not account for, and which are the suggestions of reason +alone: the idea of the _Infinite_, the _Perfect_, the _Eternal_; the +true, the beautiful, the good; the principle of causality, of substance, +of unity, of intentionality; the principle of duty, of obligation, of +accountability, of retribution. These principles, in their natural and +regular development, carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and +reveal to us a world of real being beyond the world of sense. They carry +us up to an absolute Being, the fountain of all existence--a living, +personal, righteous God--the author, the sustainer, and ruler of the +universe. + +The proof that these principles are absolute, and possessed of absolute +authority, is drawn, first, from the _impersonality of reason_, or, +rather, the impersonality of the ideas, principles, or truths of reason. + +It is not we who create these ideas, neither can we change them at our +pleasure. We are conscious that the will, in all its various efforts, is +enstamped with the impress of our personality. Our volitions are our +own. So, also, our desires are our own, our emotions are our own. But +this is not the same with our rational ideas or principles. The ideas of +substance, of cause, of unity, of intentionality do not belong to one +person any more than to another; they belong to mind as mind, they are +revealed in the universal intelligence of the race. Absolute truth has +no element of personality about it. Man may say "my reason," but give +him credit for never having dared to say "_my_ truth." So far from +rational ideas being individual, their peculiar characteristic is that +they are opposed to individuality, that is, they are universal and +necessary. Instead of being circumscribed within the limits of +experience, they surpass and govern it; they are universal in the midst +of particular phenomena; necessary, although mingled with things +contingent; and absolute, even when appearing within us the relative and +finite beings that we are.[70] Necessary, universal, absolute truth is a +direct emanation from God. "Such being the case, the decision of reason +within its own peculiar province possesses an authority almost divine. +If we are led astray by it, we must be led astray by a light from +heaven."[71] + +[Footnote 70: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 40.] + +[Footnote 71: Id., "Lectures," vol. ii. p. 32.] + +The second proof is derived from _the distinction between the +spontaneous and reflective movements of reason_. + +Reflection is voluntary, spontaneity is involuntary; reflection is +personal, spontaneity is impersonal; reflection is analytic, spontaneity +is synthetic; reflection begins with doubt, spontaneity with +affirmation; reflection belongs to certain ones, spontaneity belongs to +all; reflection produces science, spontaneity gives truth. Reflection is +a process, more or less tardy, in the individual and in the race. It +sometimes engenders error and skepticism, sometimes convictions that, +from being rational, are only the more profound. It constructs systems, +it creates artificial logic, and all those formulas which we now use by +the force of habit, as if they were natural to us. But spontaneous +intuition is the true logic of nature,--instant, direct, and infallible. +It is a primitive affirmation which implies no negation, and therefore +yields positive knowledge. To reflect is to return to that which was. It +is, by the aid of memory, to return to the past, and to render it +present to the eye of consciousness. Reflection, therefore, creates +nothing; it supposes an anterior operation of the mind in which there +necessarily must be as many terms as are discovered by reflection. +Before all reflection there comes spontaneity--a spontaneity of the +intellect, which seizes truth at once, without traversing doubt and +error. "We thus attain to a judgment free from all reflection, to an +affirmation without any mixture of negation, to an immediate intuition, +the legitimate daughter of the natural energy of thought, like the +inspiration of the poet, the instinct of the hero, the enthusiasm of the +prophet." Such is the first act of knowing, and in this first act the +mind passes from _idea to being_ without ever suspecting the depth of +the chasm it has passed. It passes by means of the power which is in it, +and is not astonished at what it has done. It is subsequently astonished +when by reflection it returns to the analysis of the results, and, by +the aid of the liberty with which it is endowed, to do the opposite of +what it has done, to deny what it has affirmed. "Hence comes the strife +between sophism and common sense, between false science and natural +truth, between good and bad philosophy, both of which come from free +reflection."[72] + +It is this spontaneity of thought which gives birth to _religion._ The +instinctive thought which darts through the world, even to God, is +natural religion. "All thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, and +there is no such thing as natural atheism. Doubt and skepticism may +mingle with reflective thought, but beneath reflection there is still +spontaneity. When the scholar has denied the existence of God, listen to +the man, interrogate him, take him unawares, and you will see that all +his words envelop the idea of God, and that faith in God is, without his +recognition, at the bottom, in his heart."[73] + +Religion, then, in the system of Cousin, does not begin with reflection, +with science, but with _faith_. There is, however, this difference to be +noted between the theory of the "faith-philosophers" (Jacobi, +Schleiermacher, etc.) and the theory of Cousin. With them, faith is +grounded on sensation or _feeling_; with him, it is grounded on +_reason_. "Faith, whatever may be its form, whatever may be its object, +common or sublime, can be nothing else than the _consent of reason_. +That is the foundation of faith."[74] + +[Footnote 72: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 106.] + +[Footnote 73: "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 137.] + +[Footnote 74: Ibid., vol. i. p. 90.] + +Religion is, therefore, with Cousin, at bottom, pure Theism. He thinks, +however, that "true theism is not a dead religion that forgets precisely +the fundamental attributes of God." It recognizes God as creator, +preserver, and governor; it celebrates a providence; it adores a +perfect, holy, righteous, benevolent God. It holds the principle of +duty, of obligation, of moral desert. It not only perceives the divine +character, but feels its relation to God. The revelation of the +Infinite, by reason, moves the feelings, and passes into sentiment, +producing reverence, and love, and gratitude. And it creates worship, +which recalls man to God a thousand times more forcibly than the order, +harmony, and beauty of the universe can do. + +The spontaneous action of reason, in its greatest energy, is +_inspiration_. "Inspiration, daughter of the soul and heaven, speaks +from on high with an absolute authority. It commands faith; so all its +words are hymns, and its natural language is poetry." "Thus, in the +cradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his +fellows the gift of inspiration, passed for the confidant and the +interpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself; +and he is so, in fact, in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin +of prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship."[75] + +[Footnote 75: "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 129.] + +As an account of the genesis of the idea of God in the human +intelligence, the doctrine of Cousin must be regarded as eminently +logical, adequate, and satisfactory. As a theory of the origin of +religion, as a philosophy which shall explain all the phenomena of +religion, it must be pronounced defective, and, in some of its aspects, +erroneous. + +First, it does not take proper account of that _living force_ which has +in all ages developed so much energy, and wrought such vast results in +the history of religion, viz., the _power of the heart_. Cousin +discourses eloquently on the spontaneous, instinctive movements of the +reason, but he overlooks, in a great measure, the instinctive movements +of the heart. He does not duly estimate the feeling of reverence and awe +which rises spontaneously in presence of the vastness and grandeur of +the universe, and of the power and glory of which the created universe +is a symbol and shadow. He disregards that sense of an overshadowing +Presence which, at least in seasons of tenderness and deep sensibility, +seems to compass us about, and lay its hand upon us. He scarcely +recognizes the deep consciousness of imperfection and weakness, and +utter dependence, which prompts man to seek for and implore the aid of a +Superior Being; and, above all, he takes no proper account of the sense +of guilt and the conscious need of expiation. His theory, therefore, can +not adequately explain the universal prevalence of sacrifices, penances, +and prayers. In short, it does not meet and answer to the deep longings +of the human heart, the wants, sufferings, fears, and hopes of man. + +Cousin claims that the universal reason of man is illuminated by the +light of God. It is quite pertinent to ask, Why may not the universal +heart of humanity be touched and moved by the spirit of God? If the +ideas of reason be a revelation from God, may not the instinctive +feelings of the heart be an inspiration of God? May not God come near to +the heart of man and awaken a mysterious presentiment of an invisible +Presence, and an instinctive longing to come nearer to Him? May he not +draw men towards himself by sweet, persuasive influences, and raise man +to a conscious fellowship? Is not God indeed the _great want_ of the +human heart? + +Secondly, Cousin does not give due importance to the influence of +revealed truth as given in the sacred Scriptures, and of the positive +institutions of religion, as a divine economy, supernaturally originated +in the world. He grants, indeed, that "a primitive revelation throws +light upon the cradle of human civilization," and that "all antique +traditions refer to an age in which man, at his departure from the hand +of God, received from him immediately all lights, and all truths."[76] +He also believes that "the Mosaic religion, by its developments, is +mingled with the history of all the surrounding people of Egypt, of +Assyria, of Persia, and of Greece and Rome."[77] Christianity, however, +is regarded as "the summing and crown of the two great religious systems +which reigned by turn in the East and in Greece"--the maturity of +Ethnicism and Judaism; a development rather than a new creation. The +explanation which he offers of the phenomena of inspiration opens the +door to religious skepticism. Those who were termed seers, prophets, +inspired teachers of ancient times, were simply men who resigned +themselves wholly to their intellectual instincts, and thus gazed upon +truth in its pure and perfect form. They did not reason, they did not +reflect, they made no pretensions to philosophy they received truth +spontaneously as it flowed in upon them from heaven.[78] This immediate +reception of Divine light was nothing more than the _natural_ play of +spontaneous reason nothing more than what has existed to a greater or +less degree in every man of great genius; nothing more than may now +exist in any mind which resigns itself to its own unreflective +apperceptions. Thus revelation, in its proper sense, loses all its +peculiar value, and Christianity is robbed of its pre-eminent authority. +The extremes of Mysticism and Rationalism here meet on the same ground, +and Plotinus and Cousin are at one. + +[Footnote 76: "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 148.] + +[Footnote 77: Ibid., vol. i. p. 216.] + +[Footnote 78: Morell, "Hist. of Philos.," p. 661.] + +V. The fifth hypothesis offered in explanation of the religious +phenomena of the world is that they had their origin _in_ EXTERNAL +REVELATION, _to which reason is related as a purely passive organ, and +Ethnicism as a feeble relic_. + +This is the theory of the school of "dogmatic theologians," of which the +ablest and most familiar presentation is found in the "Theological +Institutes" of R. Watson.[79] He claims that all our religious knowledge +is derived from _oral revelation alone_, and that all the forms of +religion and modes of worship which have prevailed in the heathen world +have been perversions and corruptions of the one true religion first +taught to the earliest families of men by God himself. All the ideas of +God, duty, immortality, and future retribution which are now possessed, +or have ever been possessed by the heathen nations, are only broken and +scattered rays of the primitive traditions descending from the family of +Noah, and revived by subsequent intercourses with the Hebrew race; and +all the modes of religious worship--prayers, lustrations, +sacrifices--that have obtained in the world, are but feeble relics, +faint reminiscences of the primitive worship divinely instituted among +the first families of men. "The first man received the knowledge of God +by sensible converse with him, and that doctrine was transmitted, with +the confirmation of successive manifestations, to the early ancestors of +all nations."[80] This belief in the existence of a Supreme Being was +preserved among the Jews by continual manifestations of the presence of +Jehovah. "The intercourses between the Jews and the states of Syria and +Babylon, on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, powers which rose to +great eminence and influence in the ancient world, was maintained for +ages. Their frequent dispersions and captivities would tend to preserve +in part, and in part to revive, the knowledge of the once common and +universal faith."[81] And the Greek sages who resorted for instruction +to the Chaldean philosophic schools derived from thence their knowledge +of the theological system of the Jews.[82] Among the heathen nations +this primitive revelation was corrupted by philosophic speculation, as +in India and China, Greece and Rome; and in some cases it was entirely +obliterated by ignorance, superstition, and vice, as among the +Hottentots of Africa and the aboriginal tribes of New South Wales, who +"have no idea of one Supreme Creator."[83] + +[Footnote 79: We might have referred the reader to Ellis's "Knowledge of +Divine Things from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature;" Leland's +"Necessity of Revelation;" and Horsley's "Dissertations," etc.; but as +we are not aware of their having been reprinted in this country, we +select the "Institutes" of Watson as the best presentation of the views +of "the dogmatic theologians" accessible to American readers.] + +[Footnote 80: Watson, "Theol. Inst," vol. i. p. 270.] + +[Footnote 81: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 31.] + +[Footnote 82: See ch. v. and vi., "On the Origin of those Truths which +are found in the Writings and Religious Systems of the Heathen."] + +[Footnote 83: Ibid., vol. i. p. 274.] + +The same course of reasoning is pursued in regard to the idea of duty, +and the knowledge of right and wrong. "A direct communication of the +Divine Will was made to the primogenitors of our race," and to this +source _alone_ we are indebted for all correct ideas of right and wrong. +"Whatever is found pure in morals, in ancient or modern writers, may be +traced to _indirect_ revelation."[84] Verbal instruction--tradition or +scripture--thus becomes the source of all our moral ideas. The doctrine +of immortality, and of a future retribution,[85] the practice of +sacrifice--precatory and expiatory, are also ascribed to the same +source.[86] Thus the only medium by which religious truth can possibly +become known to the masses of mankind is _tradition_. The ultimate +foundation on which the religious faith and the religious practices of +universal humanity have rested, with the exception of the Jews, and the +favored few to whom the Gospel has come, is uncertain, precarious, and +easily corrupted tradition. + +[Footnote 84: Watson, "Theol. Inst.," vol. ii. p. 470.] + +[Footnote 85: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 11.] + +[Footnote 86: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 26.] + +The improbability, inadequacy, and incompleteness of this theory will be +obvious from the following considerations: + +1. It is highly improbable that truths so important and vital to man, so +essential to the well-being of the human race, so necessary to the +perfect development of humanity as are the ideas of God, duty, and +immortality, should rest on so precarious and uncertain a basis as +tradition is admitted, even by Mr. Watson, to be. + +The human mind needs the idea of God to satisfy its deep moral +necessities, and to harmonize all its powers. The perfection of humanity +can never be secured, the destination of humanity can never be achieved, +the purpose of God in the existence of humanity can never be +accomplished, without the idea of God, and of the relation of man to +God, being present to the human mind. Society needs the idea of a +Supreme Ruler as the foundation of law and government, and as the basis +of social order. Without it, these can not be, or be conserved. +Intellectual creatureship, social order, human progress, are +inconceivable and impossible without the idea of God, and of +accountability to God. Now that truths so fundamental should, to the +masses of men, rest on tradition _alone_, is incredible. Is there no +known and accessible God to the outlying millions of our race who, in +consequence of the circumstances of birth and education, which are +beyond their control, have had no access to an oral revelation, and +among whom the dim shadowy rays of an ancient tradition have long ago +expired? Are the eight hundred millions of our race upon whom the light +of Christianity has not shone unvisited by the common Father of our +race? Has the universal Father left his "own offspring" without a single +native power of recognizing the existence of the Divine Parent, and +abandoned them to solitary and dreary orphanage? Could not he who gave +to matter its properties and laws,--the properties and laws through +whose operation he is working out his own purposes in the realm of +nature,--could not he have also given to mind ideas and principles +which, logically developed, would lead to recognition of a God, and of +our duty to God, and, by these ideas and principles, have wrought out +his sublime purposes in the realm of mind? Could not he who gave to man +the appetency for food, and implanted in his nature the social instincts +to preserve his physical being, have implanted in his heart a "feeling +after God," and an instinct to worship God in order to the conservation +of his spiritual being? How otherwise can we affirm the responsibility +and accountability of all the race before God? Those theologians who are +so earnest in the assertion that God has not endowed man with the native +power of attaining the knowledge of God can not, on any principle of +equity, show how the heathen are "without excuse" when, in involuntary +ignorance of God, they "worship the creature instead of the Creator," +and violate a law of duty of which they have no possible means to attain +the barest knowledge. + +2. This theory is utterly inadequate to the explanation of the +_universality_ of religious rites, and especially of religious ideas. + +Take, for example, the idea of God. As a matter of fact we affirm, in +opposition to Watson, the universality of this idea. The idea of God is +connatural to the human mind. Wherever human reason has had its normal +and healthy development[87], this idea has arisen spontaneously and +necessarily. There has not been found a race of men who were utterly +destitute of some knowledge of a Supreme Being. All the instances +alleged have, on further and more accurate inquiry, been found +incorrect. The tendency of the last century, arbitrarily to quadrate all +the facts of religious history with the prevalent sensational +philosophy, had its influence upon the minds of the first missionaries +to India, China, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific. They +_expected_ to find that the heathen had no knowledge of a Supreme Being, +and before they had mastered the idioms of their language, or become +familiar with their mythological and cosmological systems, they reported +them as _utterly ignorant of God_, destitute of the idea and even the +name of a Supreme Being. These mistaken and hasty conclusions have, +however, been corrected by a more intimate acquaintance with the people, +their languages and religions. Even in the absence of any better +information, we should be constrained to doubt the accuracy of the +authorities quoted by Mr. Watson in relation to Hindooism, when by one +(Ward) we are told that the Hindoo "believes in a God destitute of +_intelligence_" and by another (Moore) that "Brahm is the one eternal +_Mind_, the self-existent, incomprehensible Spirit". Learned and +trustworthy critics, Asiatic as well as European, however, confidently +affirm that "the ground of the Brahminical faith is Monotheistic;" it +recognizes "an Absolute and Supreme Being" as the source of all that +exists.[88] Eugene Burnouf, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Koeppen, and +indeed nearly all who have written on the subject of Buddhism, have +shown that the metaphysical doctrines of Buddha were borrowed from the +earlier systems of the Brahminic philosophy. "Buddha." we are told, is +"_pure intelligence_" "_clear light_", "_perfect wisdom_;" the same as +Brahm. This is surely Theism in its highest conception.[89] In regard to +the peoples of South Africa, Dr. Livingstone assures us "there is no +need for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of the +existence of a God, or of a future state--the facts being universally +admitted.... On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to +their former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of a future state, +they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a +tolerably clear conception on all these subjects."[90] And so far from +the New Hollanders having no idea of a Supreme Being, we are assured by +E. Stone Parker, the protector of the aborigines of New Holland, they +have a clear and well-defined idea of a "_Great Spirit_," the maker of +all things. + +[Footnote 87: Watson, "Theol. Inst.," vol. i. p. 46.] + +[Footnote 88: Maurice, "Religions of the World," p. 59: _Edin. +Review_,1862, art "Recent Researches on Buddhism." See also Müller's +"Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. ch. i. to vi.] + +[Footnote 89: "It has been said that Buddha and Kapila were both +atheists, and that Buddha borrowed his atheism from Kapila. But atheism +is an indefinite term, and may mean very different things. In one sense +every Indian philosopher was an atheist, for they all perceived that the +gods of the populace could not claim the attributes that belong to a +Supreme Being. But all the important philosophical systems of the +Brahmans admit, in some form or another, the existence of an Absolute +and Supreme Being, the source of all that exists, or seems to +exist."--Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. pp. 224,5. + +Buddha, which means "intelligence," "clear light," "perfect wisdom," was +not only the name of the founder of the religion of Eastern Asia, but +Adi Buddha was the name of the Absolute, Eternal Intelligence.--Maurice, +"Religions of the World," p. 102.] + +[Footnote 90: "Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa," p. +158.] + +Now had the idea of God rested _solely_ on tradition, it were the most +natural probability that it might be lost, nay, _must_ be lost, amongst +those races of men who were geographically and chronologically far +removed from the primitive cradle of humanity in the East. The people +who, in their migrations, had wandered to the remotest parts of the +earth, and had become isolated from the rest of mankind, might, after +the lapse of ages, be expected to lose the idea of God, if it were not a +spontaneous and native intuition of the mind,--a necessity of thought. A +fact of history must be presumed to stick to the mind with much greater +tenacity than a purely rational idea which has no visible symbol in the +sensible world, and yet, even in regard to the events of history, the +persistence and pertinacity of tradition is exceedingly feeble. The +South Sea Islanders know not from whence, or at what time, their +ancestors came. There are monuments in Tonga and Fiji of which the +present inhabitants can give no account. How, then, can a pure, abstract +idea which can have no sensible representation, no visible image, retain +its hold upon the memory of humanity for thousands of years? The Fijian +may not remember whence his immediate ancestors came, but he knows that +the race came originally from the hands of the Creator. He can not tell +who built the monuments of solid masonry which are found in his +island-home, but he can tell who reared the everlasting hills and built +the universe. He may not know who reigned in Vewa a hundred years ago, +but he knows who now reigns, and has always reigned, over the whole +earth. "The idea of a God is familiar to the Fijian, and the existence +of an invisible superhuman power controlling and influencing nature, and +all earthly things, is fully recognized by him."[91] The idea of God is +a common fact of human consciousness, and tradition alone is manifestly +inadequate to account for its _universality_. + +[Footnote 91: "Fiji and the Fijians," p. 215.] + +3. A verbal revelation would be inadequate to convey the knowledge of +God to an intelligence "_purely passive_" and utterly unfurnished with +any _à priori_ ideas or necessary laws of cognition and thought. + +Of course it is not denied that important verbal communications relating +to the character of God, and the duties we owe to God, were given to the +first human pair, more clear and definite, it may be, than any knowledge +attained by Socrates and Plato through their dialectic processes, and +that these oral revelations were successively repeated and enlarged to +the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament church. And +furthermore, that some rays of light proceeding from this pure fountain +of truth were diffused, and are still lingering among the heathen +nations, we have no desire, and no need to deny. + +All this, however, supposes, at least, a natural power and aptitude for +the knowledge of God, and some configuration and correlation of the +human intelligence to the Divine. "We have no knowledge of a dynamic +influence, spiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction." Matter can +not be moved and controlled by forces and laws, unless it have +properties which correlate it with those forces and laws. And mind can +not be determined from without to any specific form of cognition, unless +it have active powers of apprehension and conception which are governed +by uniform laws. The "material" of thought may be supplied from without, +but the "form" is determined by the necessary laws of our inward being. +All our cognition of the external world is conditioned by the _à priori_ +ideas of time and space, and all our thinking is governed by the +principles of causality and substance, and the law of "sufficient +reason." The mind itself supplies an element of knowledge in all our +cognitions. Man can not be taught the knowledge of God if he be not +naturally possessed of a presentiment, or an apperception of a God, as +the cause and reason of the universe. "If education be not already +preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative +predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to act +upon."[92] A mere verbal revelation can not communicate the knowledge of +God, if man have not already the idea of a God in his mind. A name is a +mere empty sign, a meaningless symbol, without a mental image of the +object which it represents, or an innate perception, or an abstract +conception of the mind, of which the word is the sign. The mental image +or the abstract conception must, therefore, precede the name; cognition +must be anterior to, and give the meaning of language.[93] The child +knows a thing even before it can speak its name. And, universally, we +must know the _thing_ in itself, or image it by analogies and +resemblances to some other thing we do know, before the name can have +any meaning for us. As to purely rational ideas and abstract +conceptions,--as space, cause, the infinite, the perfect,--language can +never convey these to the mind, nor can the mind ever attain them by +experience if they are not an original, connate part of our mental +equipment and furniture. The mere verbal affirmation "there is a God" +made to one who has no idea of a God, would be meaningless and +unintelligible. What notion can a man form of "the First Cause" if the +principle of causality is not inherent in his mind? What conception can +he form of "the Infinite Mind" if the infinite be not a primitive +intuition? How can he conceive of "a Righteous Governor" if he have no +idea of right, no sense of obligation, no apprehension of a retribution? +Words are empty sounds without ideas, and God is a mere name if the mind +has no apperception of a God. + +[Footnote 92: Nitzsch, "System of Christian Doctrine," p. 10.] + +[Footnote 93: "Ideas must pre-exist their sensible signs." See De +Boismont on "Hallucination," etc., p. iii.] + +It may be affirmed that, preceding or accompanying the announcement of +the Divine Name, there was given to the first human pair, and to the +early fathers of our race, some visible manifestation of the presence of +God, and some supernatural display of divine power. What, then, was the +character of these early manifestations, and were they adequate to +convey the proper idea of God? Did God first reveal himself in human +form, and if so, how could their conception of God advance beyond a rude +anthropomorphism? Did he reveal his presence in a vast columnar cloud or +a pillar of fire? How could such an image convey any conception of the +intelligence, the omnipresence, the eternity of God? Nay, can the +infinite and eternal Mind be represented by any visible manifestation? +Can the human mind conceive an image of God? The knowledge of God, it is +clear, can not be conveyed by any sensible sign or symbol if man has no +prior rational idea of God as the Infinite and the Perfect Being. + +If the facts of order, and design, and special adaptation which crowd +the universe, and the _à priori_ ideas of an unconditioned Cause and an +infinite Intelligence which arise in the mind in presence of these +facts, are inadequate to produce the logical conviction that it is the +work of an intelligent mind, how can any preternatural display of +_power_ produce a rational conviction that God exists? "If the universe +could come by chance or fate, surely all the lesser phenomena, termed +miraculous, might occur so too."[94] If we find ourselves standing amid +an eternal series of events, may not miracles be a part of that series? +Or if all things are the result of necessary and unchangeable laws, may +not miracles also result from some natural or psychological law of which +we are yet in ignorance? Let it be granted that man is _not_ so +constituted that, by the necessary laws of his intelligence, he must +affirm that facts of order having a commencement in time prove mind; let +it be granted that man has _no_ intuitive belief in the Infinite and +Perfect--in short, no idea of God; how, then, could a marvellous display +of _power_, a new, peculiar, and startling phenomenon which even seemed +to transcend nature, prove to him the existence of an infinite +_intelligence_--a personal God? The proof would be simply inadequate, +because not the right kind of proof. Power does not indicate +intelligence, force does not imply personality. + +[Footnote 94: Morell, "Hist. of Philos." p. 737.] + +Miracles, in short, were never intended to prove the existence of God. +The foundation of this truth had already been laid in the constitution +and laws of the human mind, and miracles were designed to convince us +that He of whose existence we had a prior certainty, spoke to us by His +Messenger, and in this way attested his credentials. To the man who has +a rational belief in the existence of God this evidence of a divine +mission is at once appropriate and conclusive. "Master, we know thou art +a teacher sent from God; for no man can do the works which thou doest, +except God be with him." The Christian missionary does not commence his +instruction to the heathen, who have an imperfect, or even erroneous +conception of "the Great Spirit," by narrating the miracles of Christ, +or quoting the testimony of the Divine Book he carries along with him. +He points to the heavens and the earth, and says, "There is a Being who +made all these things, and Jehovah is his name; I have come to you with +a message from Him!" Or he need scarce do even so much; for already the +heathen, in view of the order and beauty which pervades the universe, +has been constrained, by the laws of his own intelligence, to believe in +and offer worship to the "Agnostos Theos"--the unseen and +incomprehensible God; and pointing to their altars, he may announce with +Paul, "this God _whom ye worship_, though ignorantly, him declare I unto +you!" + +The results of our study of the various hypotheses which have been +offered in explanation of the religious phenomena of the world may be +summed up as follows: The first and second theories we have rejected as +utterly false. Instead of being faithful to and adequately explaining +the facts, they pervert, and maltreat, and distort the facts of +religious history. The last three each contain a precious element of +truth which must not be undervalued, and which can not be omitted in an +explanation which can be pronounced complete. Each theory, taken by +itself, is incomplete and inadequate. The third hypothesis overrates +_feeling_; the fourth, _reason_; the fifth, _verbal instruction_. The +first extreme is Mysticism, the second is Rationalism, the last is +Dogmatism. Reason, feeling, and faith in testimony must be combined, and +mutually condition each other. No purely rationalistic hypothesis will +meet and satisfy the wants and yearnings of the heart. No theory based +on feeling alone can satisfy the demands of the human intellect. And, +finally, an hypothesis which bases all religion upon historical +testimony and outward fact, and despises and tramples upon the +intuitions of the reason and the instincts of the heart can never +command the general faith of mankind. Religion embraces and +conditionates the whole sphere of life--thought, feeling, faith, and +action; it must therefore be grounded in the entire spiritual nature of +man. + +Our criticism of opposite theories has thus prepared the way for, and +obviated the necessity of an extended discussion of the hypothesis we +now advance. + +_The universal phenomenon of religion has originated in the à priori +apperceptions of reason, and the natural instinctive feelings of the +heart, which, from age to age, have been vitalized, unfolded, and +perfected by supernatural communications and testamentary revelations_. + +There are universal facts of religious history which can only be +explained on the first principle of this hypothesis; there are special +facts which can only be explained on the latter principle. The universal +prevalence of the idea of God, and the feeling of obligation to obey and +worship God, belong to the first order of facts; the general prevalence +of expiatory sacrifices, of the rite of circumcision, and the observance +of sacred and holy days, belong to the latter. To the last class of +facts the observance of the Christian Sabbath, and the rites of Baptism +and the Lord's Supper may be added. + +The history of all religions clearly attests that there are two orders +of principles--the _natural_ and the _positive_, and, in some measure, +two authorities of religious life which are intimately related without +negativing each other. The characteristic of the natural is that it is +_intrinsic_, of the positive, that it is _extrinsic_. In all ages men +have sought the authority of the positive in that which is immediately +_beyond_ and above man--in some "voice of the Divinity" toning down the +stream of ages, or speaking through a prophet or oracle, or written in +some inspired and sacred book. They have sought for the authority of the +natural in that which is immediately _within_ man--the voice of the +Divinity speaking in the conscience and heart of man. A careful study of +the history of religion will show a reciprocal relation between the two, +and indicate their common source. + +We expect to find that our hypothesis will be abundantly sustained by +the study of the _Religion of the Athenians_. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS. + + +"All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion +(deisidaimonesterous). For as I passed through your city, and beheld the +objects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with this +inscription--'TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.' Whom therefore ye worship...."--ST. +PAUL. + +Through one of those remarkable counter-strokes of Divine Providence by +which the evil designs of men are overruled, and made to subserve the +purposes of God, the Apostle Paul was brought to Athens. He walked +beneath its stately porticoes, he entered its solemn temples, he stood +before its glorious statuary, he viewed its beautiful altars--all +devoted to pagan worship. And "his spirit was stirred within him," he +was moved with indignation "when he saw the city full of images of the +gods."[95] At the very entrance of the city he met the evidence of this +peculiar tendency of the Athenians to multiply the objects of their +devotion; for here at the gateway stands an image of Neptune, seated on +horseback, and brandishing the trident. Passing through the gate, his +attention would be immediately arrested by the sculptured forms of +Minerva, Jupiter, Apollo, Mercury, and the Muses, standing near a +sanctuary of Bacchus. A long street is now before him, with temples, +statues, and altars crowded on either hand. Walking to the end of this +street, and turning to the right, he entered the Agora, a public square +surrounded with porticoes and temples, which were adorned with statuary +and paintings in honor of the gods of Grecian mythology. Amid the +plane-trees planted by the hand of Cimon are the statues of the deified +heroes of Athens, Hercules and Theseus, and the whole series of the +Eponymi, together with the memorials of the older divinities; Mercuries +which gave the name to the streets on which they were placed; statues +dedicated to Apollo as patron of the city and her deliverer from the +plague; and in the centre of all the altar of the Twelve Gods. + +[Footnote 95: Lange's Commentary, Acts xvii. 16.] + +Standing in the market-place, and looking up to the Areopagus, Paul +would see the temple of Mars, from whom the hill derived its name. And +turning toward the Acropolis, he would behold, closing the long +perspective, a series of little sanctuaries on the very ledges of the +rocks, shrines of Bacchus and Æsculapius, Venus, Earth, and Ceres, +ending with the lovely form of the Temple of Unwinged Victory, which +glittered in front of the Propylæa. + +If the apostle entered the "fivefold gates," and ascended the flight of +stone steps to the platform of the Acropolis, he would find the whole +area one grand composition of architecture and statuary dedicated to the +worship of the gods. Here stood the Parthenon, the Virgin House, the +glorious temple which was erected during the proudest days of Athenian +glory, an entire offering to Minerva, the tutelary divinity of Athens. +Within was the colossal statue of the goddess wrought in ivory and gold. +Outside the temple there stood another statue of Minerva, cast from the +brazen spoils of Marathon; and near by yet another brazen Pallas, which +was called by pre-eminence "the Beautiful." + +Indeed, to whatever part of Athens the apostle wandered, he would meet +the evidences of their "carefulness in religion," for every public place +and every public building was a sanctuary of some god. The Metroum, or +record-house, was a temple to the mother of the gods. The council-house +held statues of Apollo and Jupiter, with an altar to Vesta. The theatre +at the base of the Acropolis was consecrated to Bacchus. The Pnyx was +dedicated to Jupiter on high. And as if, in this direction, the Attic +imagination knew no bounds, abstractions were deified; altars were +erected to Fame, to Energy, to Modesty, and even to Pity, and these +abstractions were honored and worshipped as gods. + +The impression made upon the mind of Paul was, that the city was +literally "full of idols," or images of the gods. This impression is +sustained by the testimony of numerous Greek and Roman writers. +Pausanias declares that Athens "had more images than all the rest of +Greece;" and Petronius, the Roman satirist, says, "it was easier to find +a god in Athens than a man."[96] + +[Footnote 96: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. +Paul;" also, art. "Athens," in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, whence our +account of the "sacred objects" in Athens is chiefly gathered.] + +No wonder, then, that as Paul wandered amid these scenes "his spirit was +stirred in him." He burned with holy zeal to maintain the honor of the +true and only God, whom now he saw dishonored on every side. He was +filled with compassion for those Athenians who, notwithstanding their +intellectual greatness, had changed the glory of God into an image made +in the likeness of corruptible man, and who really worshipped the +creature _more_ than the Creator. The images intended to symbolize the +invisible perfections of God were usurping the place of God, and +receiving the worship due alone to him. We may presume the apostle was +not insensible to the beauties of Grecian art. The sublime architecture +of the Propylæa and the Parthenon, the magnificent sculpture of Phidias +and Praxiteles, could not fail to excite his wonder. But he remembered +that those superb temples and this glorious statuary were the creation +of the pagan spirit, and devoted to polytheistic worship. The glory of +the supreme God was obscured by all this symbolism. The creatures formed +by God, the symbols of his power and presence in nature, the ministers +of his providence and moral government, were receiving the honor due to +him. Over all this scene of material beauty and æsthetic perfection +there rose in dark and hideous proportions the errors and delusions and +sins against the living God which Polytheism nurtured, and unable any +longer to restrain himself, he commenced to "reason" with the crowds of +Athenians who stood beneath the shadows of the plane-trees, or lounged +beneath the porticoes that surrounded the Agora. Among these groups of +idlers were mingled the disciples of Zeno and Epicurus, who +"encountered" Paul. The nature of these "disputations" may be easily +conjectured, The opinions of these philosophers are even now familiarly +known: they are, in one form or another, current in the literature of +modern times. Materialism and Pantheism still "encounter" Christianity. +The apostle asserted the personal being and spirituality of one supreme +and only God, who has in divers ways revealed himself to man, and +therefore may be "known." He proclaimed that Jesus is the fullest and +most perfect revelation of God--the _only_ "manifestation of God in the +flesh." He pointed to his "resurrection" as the proof of his superhuman +character and mission to the world. Some of his hearers were disposed to +treat him with contempt; they represented him as an ignorant "babbler," +who had picked up a few scraps of learning, and who now sought to palm +them off as a "new" philosophy. But most of them regarded him with that +peculiar Attic curiosity which was always anxious to be hearing some +"new thing." So they led him away from the tumult of the market-place to +the top of Mars' Hill, where, in its serene atmosphere, they might hear +him more carefully, and said, "May we hear what this new doctrine is +whereof thou speakest?" + +Surrounded by these men of thoughtful, philosophic mind--men who had +deeply pondered the great problem of existence, who had earnestly +inquired after the "first principles of things;" men who had reasoned +high of creation, fate, and providence; of right and wrong; of +conscience, law, and retribution; and had formed strong and decided +opinions on all these questions--he delivered his discourse on the +_being_, the _providence_, the _spirituality_, and the _moral +government_ of God. + +This grand theme was suggested by an inscription he had observed on one +of the altars of the city, which was dedicated "To the Unknown God." "Ye +men of Athens! every thing which I behold bears witness to your +_carefulness in religion_. For as I passed by and beheld your sacred +objects I found an altar with this inscription, 'To the Unknown God;' +whom, therefore, ye worship, though ye know him not [adequately], Him +declare I unto you." Starting from this point, the manifest carefulness +of the Athenians in religion, and accepting this inscription as the +evidence that they had some presentiment, some native intuition, some +dim conception of the one true and living God, he strives to lead them +to a deeper knowledge of Him. It is here conceded by the apostle that +the Athenians were a _religious people_. The observations he had made +during his short stay in Athens enabled him to bear witness that the +Athenians were "a God-fearing people,"[97] and he felt that fairness and +candor demanded that this trait should receive from him an ample +recognition and a full acknowledgment. Accordingly he commences by +saying in gentle terms, well fitted to conciliate his audience, "All +things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion." I +recognize you as most devout; ye appear to me to be a God-fearing +people,[98] for as I passed by and beheld your sacred objects I found an +altar with this inscription, "To the Unknown God," whom therefore ye +worship. + +[Footnote 97: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_.] + +[Footnote 98: "Ôs before deisid.--so imports. I recognize you as +such."--Lange's Commentary.] + +The assertion that the Athenians were "a religious people" will, to many +of our readers, appear a strange and startling utterance, which has in +it more of novelty than truth. Nay, some will be shocked to hear the +Apostle Paul described as complimenting these Athenians--these pagan +worshippers--on their "carefulness in religion." We have been so long +accustomed to use the word "heathen" as an opprobrious +epithet--expressing, indeed, the utmost extremes of ignorance, and +barbarism, and cruelty, that it has become difficult for us to believe +that in a heathen there can be any good. + +From our childhood we have read in our English Bibles, Ye men of Athens, +I perceive in all things ye are _too superstitious_ and we can scarcely +tolerate another version, even if it can be shown that it approaches +nearer to the actual language employed by Paul. We must, therefore, ask +the patience and candor of the reader, while we endeavor to show, on the +authority of Paul's words, that the Athenians were a "religious people," +and that all our notions to the contrary are founded on prejudice and +misapprehension. + +First, then, let us commence even with our English version: "Ye men of +Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are _too superstitious_." And +what now is the meaning of the word "superstition?" It is true, we now +use it only in an evil sense, to express a belief in the agency of +invisible, capricious, malignant powers, which fills the mind with fear +and terror, and sees in every unexplained phenomenon of nature an omen, +or prognostic, of some future evil. But this is not its proper and +original meaning. Superstition is from the Latin _superstitio_, which +means a superabundance of religion,[99] an extreme exactitude in +religious observance. And this is precisely the sense in which the +corresponding Greek term is used by the Apostle Paul. Deisidaimonia +properly means "reverence for the gods." "It is used," says Barnes, "in +the classic writers, in a good sense, to denote piety towards the gods, +or suitable fear and reverence for them." "The word," says Lechler, "is, +without doubt, to be understood here in a good sense; although it seems +to have been intentionally chosen, in order to indicate the conception +of _fear_(deidô), which predominated in the religion of the apostle's +hearers."[100] This reading is sustained by the ablest critics and +scholars of modern times. Bengel reads the sentence, "I perceive that ye +are _very religious_"[101] Cudworth translates it thus: "Ye are every +way _more than ordinarily religious."[102]_ Conybeare and Howson read +the text as we have already given it, "All things which I behold bear +witness to your _carefulness in religion_."[103] Lechler reads "very +devout;"[104] Alford, "carrying your _religious reverence very +far_;"[105] and Albert Barnes,[106] "I perceive ye are greatly devoted +to _reverence for religion_."[107] Whoever, therefore, will give +attention to the actual words of the apostle, and search for their real +meaning, must be convinced he opens his address by complimenting the +Athenians on their being more than ordinarily religious. + +[Footnote 99: Nitzsch, "System of Christ. Doctrine," p. 33.] + +[Footnote 100: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_.] + +[Footnote 101: "Gnomon of the New Testament."] + +[Footnote 102: "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 626.] + +[Footnote 103: "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," vol. i. p. 378.] + +[Footnote 104: Lange's Commentary.] + +[Footnote 105: Greek Test.] + +[Footnote 106: Notes on Acts.] + +[Footnote 107: Also Clarke's Comment., _in loco_.] + +Nor are we for a moment to suppose the apostle is here dealing in hollow +compliments, or having recourse to a "pious fraud." Such a course would +have been altogether out of character with Paul, and to suppose him +capable of pursuing such a course is to do him great injustice. If "to +the Jews he became as a Jew," it was because he recognized in Judaism +the same fundamental truths which underlie the Christian system. And if +here he seems to become, in any sense, at one with "heathenism," that he +might gain the heathen to the faith of Christ, it was because he found +in heathenism some elements of truth akin to Christianity, and a state +of feeling favorable to an inquiry into the truths he had to present. He +beheld in Athens an altar reared to the God _he_ worshipped, and it +afforded him some pleasure to find that God was not totally forgotten, +and his worship totally neglected, by the Athenians. The God whom they +knew imperfectly, "_Him_" said he, "I declare unto you;" I now desire to +make him more fully known. The worship of "the Unknown God" was a +recognition of the being of a God whose nature transcends all human +thought, a God who is ineffable; who, as Plato said, "is hard to be +discovered, and having discovered him, to make him known to all, +impossible."[108] It is the confession of a _want_ of knowledge, the +expression of a _desire_ to know, the acknowledgment of the _duty_ of +worshipping him. Underlying all the forms of idol-worship the eye of +Paul recognized an influential Theism. Deep down in the pagan heart he +discovered a "feeling after God"--a yearning for a deeper knowledge of +the "unknown," the invisible, the incomprehensible, which he could not +despise or disregard. The mysterious _sentiments_ of fear, of reverence, +of conscious dependence on a supernatural power and presence +overshadowing man, which were expressed in the symbolism of the "sacred +objects" which Paul saw everywhere in Athens, commanded his respect. And +he alludes to their "devotions," not in the language of reproach or +censure, but as furnishing to his own mind the evidence of the strength +of their _religious instincts_, and the proof of the existence in their +hearts of that _native apprehension_ of the supernatural, the divine, +which dwells alike in all human souls. + +[Footnote 108: Timæus, ch. ix.] + +The case of the Athenians has, therefore, a peculiar interest to every +thoughtful mind. It confirms the belief that religion is a necessity to +every human mind, a want of every human heart.[109] Without religion, +the nature of man can never be properly developed; the noblest part of +man--the divine, the spiritual element which dwells in man, as "the +offspring of God"--must remain utterly dwarfed. The spirit, the personal +being, the rational nature, is religious, and Atheism is the vain and +the wicked attempt to be something less than man. If the spiritual +nature of man has its normal and healthy development, he must become a +worshipper. This is attested by the universal history of man. We look +down the long-drawn aisles of antiquity, and everywhere we behold the +smoking altar, the ascending incense, the prostrate form, the attitude +of devotion. Athens, with her four thousand deities--Rome, with her +crowded Pantheon of gods--Egypt, with her degrading +superstitions--Hindostan, with her horrid and revolting rites--all +attest that the religious principle is deeply seated in the nature of +man. And we are sure religion can never be robbed of her supremacy, she +can never be dethroned in the hearts of men. It were easier to satisfy +the cravings of hunger by logical syllogisms, than to satisfy the +yearnings of the human heart without religion. The attempt of Xerxes to +bind the rushing floods of the Hellespont in chains was not more futile +nor more impotent than the attempt of skepticism to repress the +universal tendency to worship, so peculiar and so natural to man in +every age and clime. + +[Footnote 109: The indispensable necessity for a religion of some kind +to satisfy the emotional nature of man is tacitly confessed by the +atheist Comte in the publication of his "Catechism of Positive +Religion."] + +The unwillingness of many to recognize a religious element in the +Athenian mind is further accounted for by their misconception of the +meaning of the word "religion." We are all too much accustomed to regard +religion as a mere system of dogmatic teaching. We use the terms +"Christian religion," "Jewish religion," "Mohammedan religion," as +comprehending simply the characteristic doctrines by which each is +distinguished; whereas religion is a mode of thought, and feeling, and +action, determined by the consciousness of our relation to and our +dependence upon God. It does not appropriate to itself any specific +department of our mental powers and susceptibilities, but it conditions +the entire functions and circle of our spiritual life. It is not simply +a mode of conceiving God in thought, nor simply a mode of venerating God +in the affections, nor yet simply a mode of worshipping God in outward +and formal acts, but it comprehends the whole. Religion (_religere_, +respect, awe, reverence) regulates our thoughts, feelings, and acts +towards God. "It is a reference and a relationship of our finite +consciousness to the Creator and Sustainer and Governor of the +universe." It is such a consciousness of the Divine as shall awaken in +the heart of man the sentiments of reverence, fear, and gratitude +towards God; such a sense of dependence as shall prompt man to pray, and +lead him to perform external acts of worship. + +Religion does not, therefore, consist exclusively in knowledge, however +correct; and yet it must be preceded and accompanied by some intuitive +cognition of a Supreme Being, and some conception of him as a free moral +personality. But the religious sentiments, which belong rather to the +heart than to the understanding of man--the consciousness of dependence, +the sense of obligation, the feeling of reverence, the instinct to pray, +the appetency to worship--these may all exist and be largely developed +in a human mind even when, as in the case of the Athenians, there is a +very imperfect knowledge of the real character of God. + +Regarding this, then, as the generic conception of religion, namely, +_that it is a mode of thought and feeling and action determined by our +consciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being_, we claim that the +apostle was perfectly right in complimenting the Athenians on their +"more than ordinary religiousness," for, + +1. They had, in some degree at least, that faith in the being and +providence of God which precedes and accompanies all religion. + +They had erected an altar to the unseen, the unsearchable, the +incomprehensible, the unknown God. And this "unknown God" whom the +Athenians "worshipped" was the true God, the God whom Paul worshipped, +and whom he desired more fully to reveal to them; "_Him_ declare I unto +you." The Athenians had, therefore, some knowledge of the true God, some +dim recognition, at least, of his being, and some conception, however +imperfect, of his character. The Deity to whom the Athenians reared this +altar is called "the unknown God," because he is unseen by all human +eyes and incomprehensible to human thought. There is a sense in which to +Paul, as well as to the Athenians--to the Christian as well as to the +pagan--to the philosopher as well as to the peasant--God is "_the +unknown_," and in which he must forever remain the incomprehensible. +This has been confessed by all thoughtful minds in every age. It was +confessed by Plato. To his mind God is "the ineffable," the unspeakable. +Zophar, the friend of Job, asks, "Canst thou by searching find out God? +Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" This knowledge is "high +as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" +Does not Wesley teach us to sing, + + "Hail, Father, whose creating call + Unnumbered worlds attend; + Jehovah, comprehending all, + Whom none can comprehend?" + +To his mind, as well as to the mind of the Athenian, God was "the great +unseen, unknown." "Beyond the universe and man," says Cousin, "there +remains in God something unknown, impenetrable, incomprehensible. Hence, +in the immeasurable spaces of the universe, and beneath all the +profundities of the human soul, God escapes us in this inexhaustible +infinitude, whence he is able to draw without limit new worlds, new +beings, new manifestations. God is therefore to us +_incomprehensible_."[110] And without making ourselves in the least +responsible for Hamilton's "negative" doctrine of the Infinite, or even +responsible for the full import of his words, we may quote his +remarkable utterances on this subject: "The Divinity is in part +concealed and in part revealed. He is at once known and unknown. But the +last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar 'to +the unknown God.' In this consummation nature and religion, Paganism and +Christianity, are at one."[111] + +[Footnote 110: "Lectures," vol. i. p. 104.] + +[Footnote 111: "Discussions on Philosophy," p. 23.] + +When, therefore, the apostle affirms that while the Athenians worshipped +the God whom he proclaimed they "knew him not," we can not understand +him as saying they were destitute of all faith in the being of God, and +of all ideas of his real character. Because for him to have asserted +they had _no_ knowledge of God would not only have been contrary to all +the facts of the case, but also an utter contradiction of all his +settled convictions and his recorded opinions. There is not in modern +times a more earnest asserter of the doctrine that the human mind has an +intuitive cognition of God, and that the external world reveals God to +man. There is a passage in his letter to the Romans which is justly +entitled to stand at the head of all discourses on "natural theology," +Rom. i. 19-21. Speaking of the heathen world, who had not been favored, +as the Jews, with a verbal revelation, he says, "That which may be known +of God is manifest _in_ them," that is, in the constitution and laws of +their spiritual nature, "for God hath showed it unto them" in the voice +of reason and of conscience, so that in the instincts of our hearts, in +the elements of our moral nature, in the ideas and laws of our reason, +we are taught the being of a God. These are the subjective teachings of +the human soul. + +Not only is the being of God revealed to man in the constitution and +laws of his rational and moral nature, but God is also manifested to us +objectively in the realm of things around us; therefore Paul adds, "The +invisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead, from the +creation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are +made." The world of sense, therefore, discloses the being and +perfections of God. The invisible attributes of God are made apparent by +the things that are visible. Forth out of nature, as the product of the +Divine Mind, the supernatural shines. The forces, laws, and harmonies of +the universe are indices of the presence of a presiding and informing +Intelligence. The creation itself is an example of God's coming forth +out of the mysterious depths of his own eternal and invisible being, and +making himself apparent to man. There, on the pages of the volume of +nature, we may read, in the marvellous language of symbol, the grand +conceptions, the glorious thoughts, the ideals of beauty which dwell in +the uncreated Mind, These two sources of knowledge--the subjective +teachings of God in the human soul, and the objective manifestations of +God in the visible universe--harmonize, and, together, fill up the +complement of our natural idea of God. They are two hemispheres of +thought, which together form one full-orbed fountain of light, and ought +never to be separated in our philosophy. And, inasmuch as this divine +light shines on all human minds, and these works of God are seen by all +human eyes, the apostle argues that the heathen world "is without +excuse, because, knowing God (gnontes ton Theon) they did not glorify +him as God, neither were thankful; but in their reasonings they went +astray after vanities, and their hearts, being void of wisdom, were +filled with darkness. Calling themselves wise, they were turned into +fools, and changed the glory of the imperishable God for idols graven in +the likeness of perishable man, or of birds, and beasts, and creeping +things,...and they bartered the truth of God for lies, and reverenced +and worshipped the things made rather than the Maker, who is blessed +forever. Amen."[112] + +[Footnote 112: Rom. i. 21-25, Conybeare and Howson's translation.] + +The brief and elliptical report of Paul's address on Mars' Hill must +therefore, in all fairness, be interpreted in the light of his more +carefully elaborated statements in the Epistle to the Romans. And when +Paul intimates that the Athenians "knew not God," we can not understand +him as saying they had _no_ knowledge, but that their knowledge was +imperfect. They did not know God as Creator, Father, and Ruler; above +all, they did not know him as a pardoning God and a sanctifying Spirit. +They had not that knowledge of God which purifies the heart, and changes +the character, and gives its possessor eternal life. + +The apostle clearly and unequivocally recognizes this truth, that the +idea of God is connatural to the human mind; that in fact there is not +to be found a race of men upon the face of the globe utterly destitute +of some idea of a Supreme Being. Wherever human reason has had its +normal and healthful development, it has spontaneously and necessarily +led the human mind to the recognition of a God. The Athenians were no +exception to this general law. They believed in the existence of one +supreme and eternal Mind, invisible, incomprehensible, infeffable--"the +unknown God." + +2. The Athenians had also that consciousness of dependence upon God +which is the foundation of all the primary religious emotions. + +When the apostle affirmed that "in God we live, and move, and have our +being," he uttered the sentiments of many, if not all, of his hearers, +and in support of that affirmation he could quote the words of their own +poets, for we are also his offspring; [113] and, as his offspring, we +have a derived and a dependent being. Indeed, this consciousness of +dependence is analogous to the feeling which is awakened in the heart of +a child when its parent is first manifested to its opening mind as the +giver of those things which it immediately needs, as its continual +protector, and as the preserver of its life. The moment a man becomes +conscious of his own personality, that moment he becomes conscious of +some relation to another personality, to which he is subject, and on +which he depends.[114] + +[Footnote 113: + + "Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball; + All need his aid; his power sustains us all, + _For we his offspring are_." + Aratus, "The Phænomena," book v. p. 5. + +Aratus was a poet of Cilicia, Paul's native province. He flourished B.C. +277. + + "Great and divine Father, whose names are many, + But who art one and the same unchangeable, almighty power; + O thou supreme Author of nature! + That governest by a single unerring law! + Hail King! + For thou art able, to enforce obedience from all frail mortals, + _Because we are all thine offspring,_ + The image and the echo only of thy eternal voice." + Cleanthes, "Hymn to Jupiter." + +Cleanthes was the pupil of Zeno, and his successor as chief of the Stoic +philosophers.] + +[Footnote 114: "As soon as a man becomes conscious of himself, as soon +as he perceives himself as distinct from other persons and things, he at +the same moment becomes conscious of a higher self, a higher power, +without which he feels that neither he nor any thing else would have any +life or reality. We are so fashioned that as soon as we awake we feel on +all sides our dependence on something else; and all nations join in some +way or another in the words of the Psalmist, 'It is He that made us, not +we ourselves.' This is the first _sense_ of the Godhead, the _sensus +numinis_, as it has well been called; for it is a _sensus_, an immediate +perception, not the result of reasoning or generalization, but an +intuition as irresistible as the impressions of our senses.... This +_sensus numinis_, or, as we may call it in more homely language, +_faith_, is the source of all religion; it is that without which no +religion, whether true or false, is possible."--Max Müller, "Science of +Language," Second Series, p. 455.] + +A little reflection will convince us that this is the necessary order in +which human consciousness is developed. + +There are at least two fundamental and radical tendencies in human +personality, namely, to _know_ and to _act_. If we would conceive of +them as they exist in the innermost sphere of selfhood, we must +distinguish the first as _self-consciousness_, and the second as +_self-determination_. These are unquestionably the two factors of human +personality. + +If we consider the first of these factors more closely, we shall +discover that self-consciousness exists under limitations and +conditions. Man can not become clearly conscious of _self_ without +distinguishing himself from the outer world of sensation, nor without +distinguishing self and the world from another being upon whom they +depend as the ultimate substance and cause. Mere _coenoeesthesis_ is not +consciousness. Common feeling is unquestionably found among the lowest +forms of animal life, the protozoa; but it can never rise to a clear +consciousness of personality until it can distinguish itself from +sensation, and acquire a presentiment of a divine power, on which self +and the outer world depend. The _Ego_ does not exist for itself, can not +perceive itself, but by distinguishing itself from the ceaseless flow +and change of sensation, and by this act of distinguishing, the _Ego_ +takes place in consciousness. And the _Ego_ can not perceive itself, nor +cognize sensation as a state or affection of the _Ego_ except by the +intervention of the reason, which supplies the two great fundamental +laws of causality and substance. The facts of consciousness thus +comprehend three elements--self, nature, and God. The determinate being, +the _Ego_, is never an absolutely independent being, but is always in +some way or other codetermined by another; it can not, therefore, be an +absolutely original and independent, but must in some way or another be +a _derived_ and _conditioned_ existence. + +Now that which limits and conditions human self-consciousness can not be +mere _nature_, because nature can not give what it does not possess; it +can not produce what is _toto genere_ different from itself. +Self-consciousness can not arise out of unconsciousness. This new +beginning is beyond the power of nature. Personal power, the creative +principle of all new beginnings, is alone adequate to its production. +If, then, self-consciousness exists in man, it necessarily presupposes +an absolutely _original_, therefore _unconditioned, self-consciousness_. +Human self-consciousness, in its temporal actualization, of course +presupposes a nature-basis upon which it elevates itself; but it is only +possible on the ground that an eternal self-conscious Mind ordained and +rules over all the processes of nature, and implants the divine spark of +the personal spirit with the corporeal frame, to realize itself in the +light-flame of human self-consciousness. The original light of the +divine self-consciousness is eternally and absolutely first and before +all. "Thus, in the depths of our own self-consciousness, as its +concealed background, the God-consciousness reveals itself to us. This +descent into our inmost being is at the same time an ascent to God. +Every deep reflection on ourselves breaks through the mere crust of +world-consciousness, which separates us from the inmost truth of our +existence, and leads us up to Him in whom we live and move and +are."[115] + +[Footnote 115: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 81.] + +Self-determination, equally with self-consciousness, exists in us under +manifold _limitations_. Self-determination is limited by physical, +corporeal, and mental conditions, so that there is "an impassable +boundary line drawn around the area of volitional freedom." But the most +fundamental and original limitation is that of _duty_. The +self-determining power of man is not only circumscribed by necessary +conditions, but also by the _moral law_ in the consciousness of man. +Self-determination alone does not suffice for the full conception of +responsible freedom; it only becomes, _will_, properly by its being an +intelligent and conscious determination; that is, the rational subject +is able previously to recognize "the right," and present before his mind +that which he _ought_ to do, that which he is morally bound to realize +and actualize by his own self-determination and choice. Accordingly we +find in our inmost being a _sense of obligation_ to obey the moral law +as revealed in the conscience. As we can not become conscious of self +without also becoming conscious of God, so we can not become properly +conscious of self-determination until we have recognized in the +conscience a law for the movements of the will. + +Now this moral law, as revealed in the conscience, is not a mere +autonomy--a simple subjective law having no relation to a personal +lawgiver out of and above man. Every admonition of conscience directly +excites the consciousness of a God to whom man is accountable. The +universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in history, has always +associated the phenomena of conscience with the idea of a personal Power +above man, to whom he is subject and upon whom he depends. In every age, +the voice of conscience has been regarded as the voice of God, so that +when it has filled man with guilty apprehensions, he has had recourse to +sacrifices, and penances, and prayers to expatiate his wrath. + +It is clear, then, that if man has _duties_ there must he a +self-conscious Will by whom these duties are imposed, for only a real +will can be legislative. If man has a _sense of obligation_, there must +be a supreme authority by which he is obliged. If he is _responsible_, +there must be a being to whom he is accountable.[116] It can not be said +that he is accountable to himself, for by that supposition the idea of +duty is obliterated, and "right" becomes identical with mere interest or +pleasure. It can not be said that he is simply responsible to +society--to mere conventions of human opinions and human +governments--for then "_right_" becomes a mere creature of human +legislation, and "_justice_" is nothing but the arbitrary will of the +strong who tyrannize over the weak. Might constitutes right. Against +such hypotheses the human mind, however, instinctively revolts. Mankind +feel, universally, that there is an authority beyond all human +governments, and a higher law above all human laws, from whence all +their powers are derived. That higher law is the Law of God, that +supreme authority is the God of Justice. To this eternally just God, +innocence, under oppression and wrong, has made its proud appeal, like +that of Prometheus to the elements, to the witnessing clouds, to coming +ages, and has been sustained and comforted. And to that higher law the +weak have confidently appealed against the unrighteous enactments of the +strong, and have finally conquered. The last and inmost ground of all +obligation is thus the conscious relation of the moral creature to God. +The sense of absolute dependence upon a Supreme Being compels man, even +while conscious of subjective freedom, to recognize at the same time his +obligation to determine himself in harmony with the will of Him "in whom +we live, and move, and are." + +[Footnote 116: "The thought of God will wake up a terrible monitor whose +name is Judge."--Kant.] + +This feeling of dependence, and this consequent sense of obligation, lie +at the very foundation of all religion. They lead the mind towards God, +and anchor it in the Divine. They prompt man to pray, and inspire him +with an instinctive confidence in the efficacy of prayer. So that prayer +is natural to man, and necessary to man. Never yet has the traveller +found a people on earth without prayer. Races of men have been found +without houses, without raiment, without arts and sciences, but never +without prayer any more than without speech. Plutarch wrote, eighteen +centuries ago, If you go through all the world, you may find cities +without walls, without letters, without rulers, without money, without +theatres, but never without temples and gods, or without _prayers_, +oaths, prophecies, and sacrifices, used to obtain blessings and +benefits, or to avert curses and calamities.[117] The naturalness of +prayer is admitted even by the modern unbeliever. Gerrit Smith says, +"Let us who believe that the religion of reason calls for the religion +of nature, remember that the flow of prayer is just as natural as the +flow of water; the prayerless man has become an unnatural man."[118] Is +man in sorrow or in danger, his most natural and spontaneous refuge is +in prayer. The suffering, bewildered, terror-stricken soul turns towards +God. "Nature in an agony is no atheist; the soul that knows not where to +fly, flies to God." And in the hour of deliverance and joy, a feeling of +gratitude pervades the soul--and gratitude, too, not to some blind +nature-force, to some unconscious and impersonal power, but gratitude to +God. The soul's natural and appropriate language in the hour of +deliverance is thanksgiving and praise. + +[Footnote 117: "Against Kalotes," ch. xxxi.] + +[Footnote 118: "Religion of Reason."] + +This universal tendency to recognize a superior Power upon whom we are +dependent, and by whose hand our well-being and our destinies are +absolutely controlled, has revealed itself even amid the most +complicated forms of polytheistic worship. Amid the even and undisturbed +flow of every-day life they might be satisfied with the worship of +subordinate deities, but in the midst of sudden and unexpected +calamities, and of terrible catastrophes, then they cried to the Supreme +God.[119] "When alarmed by an earthquake," says Aulus Gellius, "the +ancient Romans were accustomed to pray, not to some one of the gods +individually, but to God in general, _as to the Unknown_."[120] + +[Footnote 119: "At critical moments, when the deepest feelings of the +human heart are stirred, the old Greeks and Romans seem suddenly to have +dropped all mythological ideas, and to have fallen back on the universal +language of true religion."--Max Müller, "Science of Language." p. 436.] + +[Footnote 120: Tholuck, "Nature and Influence of Heathenism," p. 23.] + +"Thus also Minutius Felix says, 'When they stretch out their hands to +heaven they mention only God; and these forms of speech, _He is great_, +and _God is true_, and _If God grant_(which are the natural language of +the vulgar), are a plain confession of the truth of Christianity.' And +also Lactantius testifies, 'When they swear, and when they wish, and +when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, +by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them whether they +will or no;' and again he says, 'They fly to God; aid is desired of God; +they pray that God would help them; and when one is reduced to extreme +necessity, he begs for God's sake, and by his divine power alone +implores the mercy of men.'"[121] The account which is given by Diogenes +Laertius[122] of the erection of altars bearing the inscription "to the +unknown God," clearly shows that they had their origin in this general +sentiment of dependence on a higher Power. "The Athenians being +afflicted with pestilence invited Epimenides to lustrate their city. The +method adopted by him was to carry several sheep to the Areopagus, +whence they were left to wander as they pleased, under the observation +of persons sent to attend them. As each sheep lay down it was sacrificed +to _the propitious God_. By this ceremony it is said the city was +relieved; but as it was still unknown what deity was propitious, an +altar was erected _to the unknown God_ on every spot where a sheep had +been sacrificed."[123] + +[Footnote 121: Cudworth, vol. i. p. 300.] + +[Footnote 122: "Lives of Philosophers," book i., Epimenides.] + +[Footnote 123: See Townsend's "Chronological Arrangement of New +Testament," note 19, part xii.; Doddridge's "Exposition;" and Barnes's +"Notes on Acts."] + +"The unknown God" was their deliverer from the plague. And the erection +of an altar to him was a confession of their absolute dependence upon +him, of their obligation to worship him, as well as of their need of a +deeper knowledge of him. The gods who were known and named were not able +to deliver them in times of calamity, and they were compelled to look +beyond the existing forms of Grecian mythology for relief. Beyond all +the gods of the Olympus there was "one God over all," the Father of gods +and men, the Creator of all the subordinate local deities, upon whom +even these created gods were dependent, upon whom man was absolutely +dependent, and therefore in times of deepest need, of severest +suffering, of extremest peril, then they cried to the living, supreme, +eternal God.[124] + +[Footnote 124: "The men and women of the Iliad and Odyssey are +habitually religious. The language of religion is often on their +tongues, as it is ever on the lips of every body in the East at this +day. The thought of the gods, and of their providence and government of +the world, is a familiar thought. They seem to have an abiding +conviction of their _dependence_ on the gods. The results of all actions +depend on the will of the gods; _it lies on their knees_ (Theôn ev +gounasi keitai, Od. i. 267), is the often repeated and significant +expression of their feeling of dependence."--Tyler, "Theology of Greek +Poets," p. 165.] + +3. The Athenians developed in a high degree those religious emotions +which always accompany the consciousness of dependence on a Supreme +Being. + +The first emotional element of all religion is _fear_. This is +unquestionably true, whether religion be considered from a Christian or +a heathen stand-point. "The _fear_ of the Lord is the beginning of +wisdom." Associated with, perhaps preceding, all definite ideas of God, +there exists in the human mind certain feelings of _awe_, and +_reverence_, and _fear_ which arise spontaneously in presence of the +vastness, and grandeur, and magnificence of the universe, and of the +power and glory of which the created universe is but the symbol and +shadow. There is the felt apprehension that, beyond and back of the +visible and the tangible, there is a _personal, living Power_, which is +the foundation of all, and which fashions all, and fills all with its +light and life; that "the universe is the living vesture in which the +Invisible has robed his mysterious loveliness." There is the feeling of +an _overshadowing Presence_ which "compasseth man behind and before, and +lays its hand upon him." + +This wonderful presentiment of an invisible power and presence pervading +and informing all nature is beautifully described by Wordsworth in his +history of the development of the Scottish herdsman's mind: + + So the foundations of his mind were laid + In such communion, not from terror free. + While yet a child, and long before his time, + Had he perceived the presence and the power + Of greatness; and deep feelings had impressed + So vividly great objects, that they lay + Upon his mind like substances, whose presence + Perplexed the bodily sense. + ... In the after-day + Of boyhood, many an hour in caves forlorn, + And 'mid the hollow depths of naked crags, + He sat, and even in their fixed lineaments, + Or from the power of a peculiar eye, + Or by creative feeling overborne, + Or by predominance of thought oppressed, + Even in their fixed and steady lineaments + He traced an ebbing and a flowing mind.... + Such was the Boy,--but for the growing Youth, + What soul was his, when, from the naked top + Of some bold headland, he beheld the sun + Rise up, and bathe the world in light! He looked: + Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth + And ocean's liquid mass, in gladness lay + Beneath him; far and wide the clouds were touched. + And in their silent faces could he read + Unutterable love. Sound needed none, + Nor any voice of joy; his spirit drank + The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form + All melted into him; they swallowed up + His animal being; in them did he live, + And by them did he live; they were his life, + In such access of mind, in such high hour + Of visitation from the living God.[125] + +But it may be said this is all mere poetry; to which we answer, in the +words of Aristotle, "Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightier +than history."[126] The true poet is the interpreter of nature. His soul +is in the fullest sympathy with the grand ideas which nature symbolizes, +and he "deciphers the universe as the autobiography of the Infinite +Spirit." Spontaneous feeling is a kind of inspiration. + +It is true that all minds may not be developed in precisely the same +manner as Wordsworth's herdsman's, because the development of every +individual mind is modified in some measure by exterior conditions. Men +may contemplate nature from different points of view. Some may be +impressed with one aspect of nature, some with another. But none will +fail to recognize a mysterious _presence_ and invisible _power_ beneath +all the fleeting and changeful phenomena of the universe. "And sometimes +there are moments of tenderness, of sorrow, and of vague mystery which +bring the feeling of the Infinite Presence close to the human +heart."[127] + +[Footnote 125: "The Wanderer."] + +[Footnote 126: Poet, ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 127: Robertson.] + +Now we hold that _this feeling and sentiment of the Divine_--the +supernatural--exists in every mind. It may be, it undoubtedly is, +somewhat modified in its manifestations by the circumstances in which +men are placed, and the degree of culture they have enjoyed. The African +Fetichist, in his moral and intellectual debasement, conceives a +supernatural power enshrined in every object of nature. The rude Fijian +regards with dread, and even terror, the Being who darts the lightnings +and wields the thunderbolts. The Indian "sees God in clouds, and hears +him in the wind." The Scottish "herdsman" on the lonely mountain-top +"feels the presence and the power of greatness," and "in its fixed and +steady lineaments he sees an ebbing and a flowing mind." The +philosopher[128] lifts his eyes to "the starry heavens" in all the depth +of their concave, and with all their constellations of glory moving on +in solemn grandeur, and, to his mind, these immeasurable regions seem +"filled with the splendors of the Deity, and crowded with the monuments +of his power;" or he turns his eye to "the Moral Law within," and he +hears the voice of an intelligent and a righteous God. In all these +cases we have a revelation of the sentiment of the Divine, which dwells +alike in all human minds. In the Athenians this sentiment was developed +in a high degree. The serene heaven which Greece enjoyed, and which was +the best-loved roof of its inhabitants, the brilliant sun, the mountain +scenery of unsurpassed grandeur, the deep blue sea, an image of the +infinite, these poured all their fullness on the Athenian mind, and +furnished the most favorable conditions for the development of the +religious sentiments. The people of Athens spent most of their time in +the open air in communion with nature, and in the cheerful and temperate +enjoyment of existence. To recognize the Deity in the living powers of +nature, and especially in man, as the highest sensible manifestation of +the Divine, was the peculiar prerogative of the Grecian mind. And here +in Athens, art also vied with nature to deepen the religious sentiments. +It raised the mind to ideal conceptions of a beauty and a sublimity +which transcended all mere nature-forms, and by images, of supernatural +grandeur and loveliness presented to the Athenians symbolic +representations of the separate attributes and operations of the +invisible God. The plastic art of Greece was designed to express +religious ideas, and was consecrated by religious feeling. Thus the +facts of the case are strikingly in harmony with the words of the +Apostle: "All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in +religion," your "reverence for the Deity," your "fear of God."[129] "The +sacred objects" in Athens, and especially "the altar to the Unknown +God," were all regarded by Paul as evidences of their instinctive faith +in the invisible, the supernatural, the divine. + +[Footnote 128: Kant, in "Critique of Practical Reason."] + +[Footnote 129: See Parkhurst's Lexicon, under _Deisidaimonia_, which +Suidas explains by eulabeia peri to Theion--_reverence for the Divine_, +and Hesychius by Phubutheia--_fear of God_. Also, Josephus, Antiq., book +x. ch. iii, § 2: "Manasseh, after his repentance and reformation, strove +to behave himself (tê deisidaimonia chrêstheia) in the _most religious +manner_ towards God." Also see A. Clarke on Acts xvii.] + +Along with this sentiment of the Divine there is also associated, in all +human minds, an _instinctive yearning_ after the Invisible; not a mere +feeling of curiosity to pierce the mystery of being and of life, but +what Paul designates "a feeling after God," which prompts man to seek +after a deeper knowledge, and a more immediate consciousness. To attain +this deeper knowledge--this more conscious realization of the being and +the presence of God, has been the effort of all philosophy and all +religion in all ages. The Hindoo Yogis proposes to withdraw into his +inmost self, and by a complete suspension of all his active powers to +become absorbed and swallowed up in the Infinite.[130] Plato and his +followers sought by an immediate abstraction to apprehend "the +unchangeable and permanent Being," and, by a loving contemplation, to +become "assimilated to the Deity," and in this way to attain the +immediate consciousness of God. The Neo-Platonic mystic sought by +asceticism and self-mortification to prepare himself for divine +communings. He would contemplate the divine perfections in himself; and +in an _ecstatic_ state, wherein all individuality vanishes, he would +realize a union, or identity, with the Divine Essence.[131] While the +universal Church of God, indeed, has in her purest days always taught +that man may, by inward purity and a believing love, be rendered capable +of spiritually apprehending, and consciously feeling, the presence of +God. Some may be disposed to pronounce this as all mere mysticism. We +answer, The living internal energy of religion is always _mystical_, it +is grounded in _feeling_--a "_sensus numinis_" common to humanity. It is +the mysterious sentiment of the Divine; it is the prolepsis of the human +spirit reaching out towards the Infinite; the living susceptibility of +our spiritual nature stretching after the powers and influences of the +higher world. It is upon this inner instinct of the supernatural that +all religion rests. I do not say every religious idea, but whatever is +positive, practical, powerful, durable, and popular. Everywhere, in all +climates, in all epochs of history, and in all degrees of civilization, +man is animated by the sentiment--I would rather say, the +presentiment--that the world in which he lives, the order of things in +the midst of which he moves, the facts which regularly and constantly +succeed each other, are not _all_. In vain he daily makes discoveries +and conquests in this vast universe; in vain he observes and learnedly +verifies the general laws which govern it; _his thought is not inclosed +in the world surrendered to his science_; the spectacle of it does not +suffice his soul, it is raised beyond it; it searches after and catches +glimpses of something beyond it; it aspires higher both for the universe +and itself; it aims at another destiny, another master. + +[Footnote 130: Vaughan, "Hours with the Mystics," vol. i. p. 44.] + +[Footnote 131: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 65.] + + "'Par delà tous ces cieux le Dieu des cieux réside.'"[132] + +So Voltaire has said, and the God who is beyond the skies is not nature +personified, but a supernatural Personality. It is to this highest +Personality that all religions address themselves. It is to bring man +into communion with Him that they exist.[133] + +[Footnote 132: "Beyond all these heavens the God of the heavens +resides."] + +[Footnote 133: Guizot, "L'Eglise et la Societé Chretiennes" en 1861.] + +4. The Athenians had that deep consciousness of sin and guilt, and of +consequent liability to punishment, which confesses the need of +expiation by piacular sacrifices. + +Every man feels himself to be an accountable being, and he is conscious +that in wrong-doing he is deserving of blame and of punishment. Deep +within the soul of the transgressor is the consciousness that he is a +guilty man, and he is haunted with the perpetual apprehension of a +retribution which, like the spectre of evil omen, crosses his every +path, and meets him at every turn. + + "'Tis guilt alone, + Like brain-sick frenzy in its feverish mode, + Fills the light air with visionary terrors, + And shapeless forms of fear." + +Man does not possess this consciousness of guilt so much as it holds +possession of him. It pursues the fugitive from justice, and it lays +hold on the man who has resisted or escaped the hand of the executioner. +The sense of guilt is a power over and above man; a power so wonderful +that it often compels the most reckless criminal to deliver himself up, +with the confession of his deed, to the sword of justice, when a +falsehood would have easily protected him. Man is only able by +persevering, ever-repeated efforts at self-induration, against the +remonstrances of conscience, to withdraw himself from its power. His +success is, however, but very partial; for sometimes, in the moments of +his greatest security, the reproaches of conscience break in upon him +like a flood, and sweep away all his refuge of lies. "The evil +conscience is the divine bond which binds the created spirit, even in +deep apostasy, to its Original. In the consciousness of guilt there is +revealed the essential relation of our spirit to God, although +misunderstood by man until he has something higher than his evil +conscience. The trouble and anguish which the remonstrances of this +consciousness excite--the inward unrest which sometimes seizes the slave +of sin--are proofs that he has not quite broken away from God."[134] + +[Footnote 134: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. pp. 225, +226.] + +In Grecian mythology there was a very distinct recognition of the power +of conscience, and a reference of its authority to the Divinity, +together with the idea of retribution. Nemesis was regarded as the +impersonation of the upbraidings of conscience, of the natural dread of +punishment that springs up in the human heart after the commission of +sin. And as the feeling of remorse may be considered as the consequence +of the displeasure and vengeance of an offended God, Nemesis came to be +regarded as the goddess of retribution, relentlessly pursuing the guilty +until she has driven them into irretrievable woe and ruin. The Erinyes +or Eumenides are the deities whose business it is to punish, in hades, +the crimes committed upon earth. When an aggravated crime has excited +their displeasure they manifest their greatest power in the disquietude +of conscience. + +Along with this deep consciousness of guilt, and this fear of +retribution which haunts the guilty mind, there has also rested upon the +heart of universal humanity a deep and abiding conviction that +_something must be done to expiate the guilt of sin_--some restitution +must be made, some suffering must be endured,[135] some sacrifice +offered to atone for past misdeeds. Hence it is that men in all ages +have had recourse to penances and prayers, to self-inflicted tortures +and costly sacrifices to appease a righteous anger which their sins had +excited, and avert an impending punishment. That sacrifice to atone for +sin has prevailed universally--that it has been practised "_sem-per, +ubique, et ab omnibus,_" always, in all places, and by all men--will not +be denied by the candid and competent inquirer. The evidence which has +been collected from ancient history by Grotius and Magee, and the +additional evidence from contemporaneous history, which is being now +furnished by the researches of ethnologists and Christian missionaries, +is conclusive. No intelligent man can doubt the fact. Sacrificial +offerings have prevailed in every nation and in every age. "Almost the +entire worship of the pagan nations consisted in rites of deprecation. +Fear of the Divine displeasure seems to have been the leading feature of +their religious impressions; and in the diversity, the costliness, the +cruelty of their sacrifices they sought to appease gods to whose wrath +they felt themselves exposed, from a consciousness of sin, unrelieved by +any information as to the means of escaping its effects."[136] + +[Footnote 135: Punishment is the penalty due to sin; or, to use the +favorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it is +the payment of a debt incurred by sin. When he is punished, the criminal +is said to pay off or pay back (apotinein) his crimes; in other words, +to expiate or atone for them (Iliad, iv. 161,162), + + syn te megalô apetisan syn sphêsin kephalêsi gynaixi te kai + tekeessin. + +that is, they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc., for their treachery +with a great price, with their lives, and their wives and +children.--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," p. 194.] + +[Footnote 136: Magee, "On the Atonement," No. V. p. 30.] + +It must be known to every one at all acquainted with Greek mythology +that the idea of _expiation_--atonement--was a fundamental idea of their +religion. Independent of any historical research, a very slight glance +at the Greek and Roman classics, especially the poets, who were the +theologians of that age, can leave little doubt upon this head.[137] +Their language everywhere announces the notion of _propitiation_, and, +particularly the Latin, furnishes the terms which are still employed in +theology. We need only mention the words ilasmos, ilaskomai, lytron, +peripsêma, as examples from the Greek, and _placare, propitiare, +expiare, piaculum_, from the Latin. All these indicate that the notion +of expiation was interwoven into the very modes of thought and framework +of the language of the ancient Greeks. + +[Footnote 137: In Homer the doctrine is expressly taught that the gods +may, and sometimes do, remit the penalty, when duly propitiated by +prayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparations ("Iliad," ix. +497 sqq.). "We have a practical illustration of this doctrine in the +first book of the Iliad, where Apollo averts the pestilence from the +army, when the daughter of his priest is returned without ransom, and a +_sacrifice_ (elatombê) is sent to the altar of the god at sacred +Chrysa.... Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, accepts +the sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs and +libations, and sends back the embassy with a favoring breeze, and a +favorable answer to the army, who meanwhile had been _purifying_ +(apelymainonto) themselves, and offering unblemished hecatombs of bulls +and goats on the shore of the sea which washes the place of their +encampment." + +"The object of the propitiatory embassy to Apollo is thus stated by +Ulysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring back thy daughter +Chryses, and to offer a sacred hecatomb for (yper) the Greeks, that we +may _propitiate_ (ilasomestha) the king, who now sends woes and many +groans upon the Argives" (442 sqq.).--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," +pp. 196, 197.] + +We do not deem it needful to discuss at length the question which has +been so earnestly debated among theologians, as to whether the idea of +expiation be a primitive and necessary idea of the human mind, or +whether the practice of piacular sacrifices came into the post-diluvian +world with Noah, as a positive institution of a primitive religion then +first directly instituted by God. On either hypothesis the practice of +expiatory rites derives its authority from God; in the latter case, by +an outward and verbal revelation, in the former by an inward and +intuitive revelation. + +This much, however, must be conceded on all hands, that there are +certain fundamental intuitions, universal and necessary, which underlie +the almost universal practice of expiatory sacrifice, namely, _the +universal consciousness of guilt, and the universal conviction that +something must be done to expiate guilt_, to compensate for wrong, and +to atone for past misdeeds. But _how_ that expiation can be effected, +how that atonement can be made, is a question which reason does not seem +competent to answer. That personal sin can be atoned for by vicarious +suffering, that national guilt can be expiated and national punishment +averted by animal sacrifices, or even by human sacrifices, is repugnant +to rather than conformable with natural reason. There exists no +discernible connection between the one and the other. We may suppose +that eucharistic, penitential, and even deprecatory sacrifices may have +originated in the light of nature and reason, but we are unable to +account for the practice of piacular sacrifices for substitutional +atonement, on the same principle. The ethical principle, that one's own +sins are not transferable either in their guilt or punishment, is so +obviously just that we feel it must have been as clear to the mind of +the Greek who brought his victim to be offered to Zeus, as it is to the +philosophic mind of to-day.[138] The knowledge that the Divine +displeasure can be averted by sacrifice is not, by Plato, grounded upon +any intuition of reason, as is the existence of God, the idea of the +true, the just, and good, but on "tradition,"[139] and the +"interpretations" of Apollo. "To the Delphian Apollo there remains the +greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions--the +erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods,... and +what other services should be gone through with a view to their +_propitiation_. Such things as these, indeed, _we neither know +ourselves, nor in founding the State would we intrust them to others_, +if we be wise;... the god of the country is the natural interpreter to +all men about such matters."[140] + +[Footnote 138: "He that hath done the deed, to suffer for it--thus cries +a proverb thrice hallowed by age."--Æschylus, "Choëph," 311.] + +[Footnote 139: "Laws," book vi. ch. xv.] + +[Footnote 140: "Republic," book iv. ch. v.] + +The origin of expiatory sacrifices can not, we think, be explained +except on the principle of a primitive revelation and a positive +appointment of God. They can not be understood except as a +divinely-appointed symbolism, in which there is exhibited a confession +of personal guilt and desert of punishment; an intimation and a hope +that God will be propitious and merciful; and a typical promise and +prophecy of a future Redeemer from sin, who shall "put away sin by the +sacrifice of himself." This sacred rite was instituted in connection +with the _protevangelium_ given to our first parents; it was diffused +among the nations by tradition, and has been kept alive as a general, +and, indeed, almost universal observance, by that deep sense of sin, and +consciousness of guilt, and personal urgency of the need of a +reconciliation, which are so clearly displayed in Grecian mythology. + +The legitimate inference we find ourselves entitled to draw from the +words of Paul, when fairly interpreted in the light of the past +religious history of the world, is, that the Athenians were a religious +people; that is, _they were, however unknowing, believers in and +worshippers of the One Supreme God_. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL ASPECTS. + + +"That there is one Supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even +the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves frequently acknowledge; +which because the assertors of gods well understood, they affirm these +gods of theirs to preside over the several parts of the world, yet so +that there is only one chief governor. Whence it follows, that all their +other gods can be no other than ministers and officers which one +greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed, and +constituted so as to serve his command."--LACTANTIUS. + +The conclusion reached in the previous chapter that the Athenians were +believers in and worshippers of the One Supreme God, has been challenged +with some considerable show of reason and force, on the ground that they +were _Polytheists_ and _Idolaters_. + +An objection which presents itself so immediately on the very face of +the sacred narrative, and which is sustained by the unanimous voice of +history, is entitled to the fullest consideration. And as the interests +of truth are infinitely more precious than the maintenance of any +theory, however plausible, we are constrained to accord to this +objection the fullest weight, and give to it the most impartial +consideration. We can not do otherwise than at once admit that the +Athenians were _Polytheists_--they worshipped "many gods" besides "the +unknown God." It is equally true that they were _Idolaters_--they +worshipped images or statues of the gods, which images were also, by an +easy metonymy, called "gods." + +But surely no one supposes that this is all that can be said upon the +subject, and that, after such admissions, the discussion must be closed. +On the contrary, we have, as yet, scarce caught a glimpse of the real +character and genius of Grecian polytheistic worship, and we have not +made the first approach towards a philosophy of Grecian mythology. + +The assumption that the heathen regarded the images "graven by art and +device of man" as the real creators of the world and man, or as having +any control over the destinies of men, sinks at once under the weight of +its own absurdity. Such hypothesis is repudiated with scorn and +indignation by the heathens themselves. Cotta, in _Cicero_, declares +explicitly: "though it be common and familiar language amongst us to +call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one so mad as +to take that to be really a god that he feeds upon?"[141] And _Plutarch_ +condemns the whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to +inanimate objects, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: "they who give +the names of gods to senseless matter and inanimate things, and such as +are destroyed by men in the using, beget most wicked and atheistical +opinions in the minds of men, since it can not be conceived how these +things should be gods, for nothing that is inanimate is a god."[142] And +so also the Hindoo, the Buddhist, the American Indian, the Fijian of +to-day, repel the notion that their visible images are real gods, or +that they worship them instead of the unseen God. + +[Footnote 141: Cudworth's "Intell. System," vol. ii. p. 257, Eng. ed.] + +[Footnote 142: Quoted in Cudworth's "Intell. System," vol. ii. p. 258, +Eng. ed.] + +And furthermore, that even the invisible divinities which these images +were designed to represent, were each independent, self-existent beings, +and that the stories which are told concerning them by Homer and Hesiod +were received in a literal sense, is equally improbable. The earliest +philosophers knew as well as we know, that the Deity, in order to be +Deity, must be either _perfect_ or nothing--that he must be _one_, not +many--without parts and passions; and they were scandalized and shocked +by the religious fables of the ancient mythology as much as we are. +_Xenophanes_, who lived, as we know, before Pythagoras, accuses Homer +and Hesiod of having ascribed to the gods every thing that is +disgraceful amongst men, as stealing, adultery, and deceit. He remarks +"that men seem to have created their gods, and to have given them their +own mind, and voice, and figure." He himself declares that "God is +_one,_ the greatest amongst gods and men, neither in form nor in thought +like unto men." He calls the battles of the Titans and the Giants, and +the Centaurs, "the inventions of former generations," and he demands +that God shall be praised in holy songs and nobler strains.[143] +Diogenes Laertius relates the following of _Pythagoras_, "that when he +descended to the shades below, he saw the soul of Hesiod bound to a +pillar of brass and gnashing his teeth; and that of Homer, as suspended +on a tree, and surrounded by serpents; as a punishment for the things +they had said of the gods."[144] These poets, who had corrupted +theology, _Plato_ proposes to exclude from his ideal Republic; or if +permitted at all, they must be subjected to a rigid expurgation. "We +shall," says he, "have to repudiate a large part of those fables which +are now in vogue; and, especially, of what I call the greater +fables,--the stories which Hesiod and Homer tell us. In these stories +there is a fault which deserves the gravest condemnation; namely, when +an author gives a _bad representation of gods and heroes_. We must +condemn such a poet, as we should condemn a painter, whose pictures bear +no resemblance to the objects which he tries to imitate. For instance, +the poet Hesiod related an ugly story when he told how Uranus acted, and +how Kronos had his revenge upon him. They are offensive stories, and +must not be repeated in our cities. Not yet is it proper to say, in any +case,--what is indeed untrue--that gods wage war against gods, and +intrigue and fight among themselves. Stories like the chaining of Juno +by her son Vulcan, and the flinging of Vulcan out of heaven for trying +to take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all other +battles of the gods which are found in Homer, must be refused admission +into our state, _whether they are allegorical or not_. For a child can +not discriminate between what is allegorical and what is not; and +whatever is adopted, as a matter of belief, in childhood, has a tendency +to become fixed and indelible; and therefore we ought to esteem it as of +the greatest importance that the fables which children first hear should +be adapted, as far as possible, to promote virtue."[145] + +[Footnote 143: Max Muller, "Science of Language," pp. 405, 406.] + +[Footnote 144: "Lives," bk. viii. ch. xix. p. 347.] + +[Footnote 145: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xvii.] + +If, then, poetic and allegorical representations of divine things are to +be permitted in the ideal republic, then the founders of the state are +to prescribe "the moulds in which the poets are to cast their fictions." + +"Now what are these moulds to be in the case of _Theology?_ They may be +described as follows: It is right always to represent God as he really +is, whether the poet describe him in an epic, or a lyric, or a dramatic +poem. Now God is, beyond all else, _good in reality_, and therefore so +to be represented. But nothing that is good is hurtful. That which is +good hurts not; does no evil; is the cause of no evil. That which is +good is beneficial; is the cause of good. And, therefore, that which is +good is not the cause of _all_ which is and happens, but only of that +which is as it should be.... The good things we must ascribe to God, +whilst we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evil +things." + +We must, then, express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet, +who is guilty of such a foolish blunder as to tell us (Iliad, xxiv. 660) +that: + + 'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed + Two casks--one stored with evil, one with good:' + +and that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both-- + + 'He leads a life checkered with good and ill.' + +But as for the man to whom he gives the bitter cup unmixed-- + + 'He walks + The blessed earth unbless'd, go where he will.' + +And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties by the +act of Pandarus was brought about by Athené and Zeus (Iliad, ii. 60), we +should refuse our approbation. Nor can we allow it to be said that the +strife and trial of strength between tween the gods (Iliad, xx.) was +instigated by Themis and Zeus.... Such language can not be used without +irreverence; it is both injurious to us, and contradictory in +itself.[146] + +Inasmuch as God is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, _he +abides ever the same_, and without any variation in his form. Then let +no poet tell us that (Odyss. xvii. 582) + + 'In similitude of strangers oft + The Gods, who can with ease all shapes assume, + Repair to populous cities.' + +And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies, or +any other poems, Hera transformed into the guise of a princess +collecting + + 'Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos,' + +not to mention many other falsehoods which we must interdict.[147] + +"When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angry +with him, and refuse him a chorus. Neither shall we allow our teachers +to use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have +our guards grow up to be as god-like and god-fearing as it is possible +for men to be."[148] + +We are thus constrained by the statements of the heathens themselves, as +well as by the dictates of common sense, to look beyond the external +drapery and the material forms of Polytheism for some deeper and truer +meaning that shall be more in harmony with the facts of the universal +religious consciousness of our race. The religion of ancient Greece +consisted in something more than the fables of Jupiter and Juno, of +Apollo and Minerva, of Venus and Bacchus. "Through the rank and +poisonous vegetation of mythic phraseology, we may always catch a +glimpse of an original stem round which it creeps and winds itself, and +without which it can not enjoy that parasitical existence which has been +mistaken for independent vitality."[149] + +[Footnote 146: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix.] + +[Footnote 147: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xx. Much more to the same effect +may be seen in ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 148: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xxi.] + +[Footnote 149: Max Müller, "Science of Language," 2d series, p. 433.] + +It is an obvious truth, attested by the voice of universal consciousness +as revealed in history, that the human mind can never rest satisfied +within the sphere of sensible phenomena. Man is impelled by an inward +necessity to pass, in thought, beyond the boundary-line of sense, and +inquire after causes and entities which his reason assures him must lie +beneath all sensible appearances. He must and will interpret nature +according to the forms of his own personality, or according to the +fundamental ideas of his own reason. In the childlike subjectivity of +the undisciplined mind he will either transfer to nature the phenomena +of his own personality, regarding the world as a living organism which +has within it an informing soul, and thus attain a _pantheistic_ +conception of the universe; or else he will fix upon some extraordinary +and inexplicable phenomenon of nature, and, investing it with +_super-natural_ significance, will rise from thence to a religious and +_theocratic_ conception of nature as a whole. An intelligence--a mind +_within_ nature, and inseparable from nature, or else _above_ nature and +governing nature, is, for man, an inevitable thought. + +It is equally obvious that humanity can never relegate itself from a +supernatural origin, neither can it ever absolve itself from a permanent +correlation with the Divine. Man feels within him an instinctive +nobility. He did not arise out of the bosom of nature; in some +mysterious way he has descended from an eternal mind, he is "the +offspring of God." And furthermore, a theocratic conception of nature, +associated with a pre-eminent regard for certain apparently supernatural +experiences in the history of humanity, becomes the foundation of +governments, of civil authority, and of laws. Society can not be founded +without the aid of the Deity, and a commonwealth can only be organized +by Divine interposition. "A Ceres must appear and sow the fields with +corn." And a Numa or a Lycurgus must be heralded by the oracle as + + "Dear to Jove, and all who sit in the halls of the Olympus." + +He must be a "descendant of Zeus," appointed by the gods to rule, and +one who will "prove himself a god." These divinely-appointed rulers were +regarded as the ministers of God, the visible representatives of the +unseen Power which really governs all. The divine government must also +have its invisible agents--its Nemesis, and Themis, and Diké, the +ministers of law, of justice, and of retribution; and its Jupiter, and +Juno, and Neptune, and Pluto, ruling, with delegated powers, in the +heavens, the air, the sea, and the nethermost regions. So that, in fact, +there exists no nation, no commonwealth, no history without a Theophany, +and along with it certain sacred legends detailing the origin of the +people, the government, the country itself, and the world at large. This +is especially true of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Their primitive +history is eminently _mythological_. + +Grecian polytheism can not be otherwise regarded than as a +poetico-historical religion of _myth_ and _symbol_ which is under-laid +by a natural Theism; a parasitical growth which winds itself around the +original stem of instinctive faith in a supernatural Power and Presence +which pervades the universe. The myths are oral traditions, floating +down from that dim; twilight of _poetic_ history, which separates real +history, with its fixed chronology, from the unmeasured and unrecorded +eternity--faint echoes from that mystic border-land which divides the +natural from the supernatural, and in which they seem to have been +marvellously commingled. They are the lingering memories of those +manifestations of God to men, in which he or his celestial ministers +came into visible intercourse with our race; the reality of which is +attested by sacred history. In all these myths there is a theogonic and +cosmogonic element. They tell of the generation of the celestial and +aërial divinities--the subordinate agents and ministers of the Divine +government. They attempt an explanation of the genesis of the visible +universe, the origin of humanity, and the development of human society. +In the presence of history, the substance of these myths is preserved by +_symbols_, that is, by means of natural or artificial, real or striking +objects, which, by some analogy or arbitrary association, shall suggest +the _idea_ to the mind. These symbols were designed to represent the +invisible attributes and operations of the Deity; the powers that +vitalize nature, that control the elements, that preside over cities, +that protect the nations: indeed, all the agencies of the physical and +moral government of God. Beneath all the pagan legends of gods, and +underlying all the elaborate mechanism of pagan worship, there are +unquestionably philosophical ideas, and theological conceptions, and +religious sentiments, which give as meaning, and even a mournful +grandeur to the whole. + +Whilst the pagan polytheistic worship is, under one aspect, to be +regarded as a departure from God, inasmuch as it takes away the honor +due to God alone, and transfers it to the creature; still, under another +aspect, we can not fail to recognize in it the effort of the human mind +to fill up the chasm that seemed, to the undisciplined mind, to separate +God and man--and to bridge the gulf between the visible and the +invisible, the finite and the infinite. It was unquestionably an attempt +to bring God nearer to the sense and comprehension of man. It had its +origin in that instinctive yearning after the supernatural, the Divine, +which dwells in all human hearts, and which has revealed itself in all +philosophies, mysticisms, and religions.[150] This longing was +stimulated by the contemplation of the living beauty and grandeur of the +visible universe, which, to the lively fancy and deep feeling of the +Greeks, seemed as the living vesture of the Infinite Mind,--the temple +of the eternal Deity. In this visible universe the Divinity was partly +revealed, and partly concealed. The unity of the all-pervading +Intelligence was veiled beneath an apparent diversity of power, and a +manifoldness of operations. They caught some glimpses of this universal +presence in nature, but were more immediately and vividly impressed by +the several manifestations of the divine perfections and divine +operations, as so many separate rays of the Divinity, or so many +subordinate agents and functionaries employed to execute the will and +carry out the purposes of the Supreme Mind.[151] That unseen, +incomprehensible Power and Presence was perceived in the sublimity of +the deep blue sky, the energy of the vitalizing sun, the surging of the +sea, the rushing wind, the roaring thunder, the ripening corn, and the +clustering vine. To these separate manifestations of the Deity they gave +_personal names_, as Jupiter to the heavens, Juno to the air, Neptune to +the sea, Ceres to the corn, and Bacchus to the vine. These personals +denoted, not the things themselves, but the invisible, divine powers +supposed to preside over those several departments of nature. By a kind +of prosopopoeia "they spake of the things in nature, and parts of the +world, as persons--and consequently as so many gods and goddesses--yet +so as the intelligent might easily understand their meaning, _that these +were in reality nothing else but so many names and notions of that one +Numen,--divine force and power which runs through all the world, +multiformly displaying itself._"[152] "Their various deities were but +different names, different conceptions, of that Incomprehensible Being +which no _thought_ can reach, and no _language_ express."[153] Having +given to these several manifestations of the Divinity personal names, +they now sought to represent them to the eye of sense by _visible +forms_, as the symbols or images of the perfections of the unseen, the +incomprehensible, the unknown God. And as the Greeks regarded man as the +first and noblest among the phenomena of nature, they selected the human +form as the highest sensible manifestation of God, the purest symbol of +the Divinity. Grecian polytheism was thus a species of _mythical +anthropomorphism_. + +[Footnote 150: The original constitution of man is such that he "seeks +after" God Acts xvii. 27. "All men yearn after the gods" (Homer, +"Odyss." iii. 48).] + +[Footnote 151: "Heathenism springs directly from this, that the mind +lays undue stress upon the bare letter in the book of creation; that it +separates and individualizes its objects as far as possible; that it +places the sense of the individual part, in opposition to the sense of +the whole,--to the _analogia fidei_ or _spiritus_ which alone gives +unity to the book of nature, while it dilutes and renders as transitory +as possible the sense of the universal in the whole.... And as it laid +great stress upon the letter in the book of nature, it fell into +polytheism. The particular symbol of the divine, or of the Godhead, +became a myth of some special deity."--Lange's "Bible-work," Genesis, p. +23.] + +[Footnote 152: Cudworth, "Intellect. System," vol. i. p. 308.] + +[Footnote 153: Max Müller, "Science of Language," p. 431.] + +A philosophy of Grecian mythology, such as we have outlined in the +preceding paragraphs, is, in our judgment, perfectly consistent with the +views announced by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He intimates +that the Athenians "thought that the Godhead was _like unto_ (e nai +omoion)--to be imaged or represented by human art--by gold, and silver, +and precious stone graven by art, and device of man;" that is, they +thought the perfections of God could be represented to the eye by an +image, or symbol. The views of Paul are still more articulately +expressed in Romans, i. 23, 25: "They changed the glory of the +incorruptible God into the _similitude of an image_ of corruptible +man,.... and they worshipped and served the thing made, para--_rather_ +than, or _more_ than the Creator." Here, then, the apostle intimates, +first, that the heathen _knew_ God,[154] and that they worshipped God. +They worshipped the creature besides or even more than God, but still +they also worshipped God. And, secondly, they represented the +perfections of God by an image, and under this, as a "_likeness_" or +symbol, they indirectly worshipped God. Their religious system was, +then, even to the eye of Paul, a _symbolic_ worship--that is, the +objects of their devotion were the _omoiômata_--the similitudes, the +likenesses, the images of the perfections of the invisible God. + +[Footnote 154: Verse 21.] + +It is at once conceded by us, that the "sensus numinis," the natural +intuition of a Supreme Mind, whose power and presence are revealed in +nature, can not maintain itself, as an influential, and vivifying, and +regulative belief amongst men, without the continual supernatural +interposition of God; that is, without a succession of Divine +revelations. And further, we grant that, instead of this symbolic mode +of worship deepening and vitalizing the sense of God as a living power +and presence, there is great danger that the symbol shall at length +unconsciously take the place of God, and be worshipped instead of Him. +From the purest form of symbolism which prevailed in the earliest ages, +there may be an inevitable descent to the rudest form of false worship, +with its accompanying darkness, and abominations, and crimes; but, at +the same time, let us do justice to the religions of the ancient +world--the childhood stammerings of religious life--which were something +more than the inventions of designing men, or the mere creations of +human fancy; they were, in the words of Paul, "a _seeking after God_, if +haply they might feel after him, and find him, who is not far from any +one of us." It can not be denied that the more thoughtful and +intelligent Greeks regarded the visible objects of their devotion as +mere symbols of the perfections and operations of the unseen God, and of +the invisible powers and subordinate agencies which are employed by him +in his providential and moral government of the world. And whatever +there was of misapprehension and of "ignorance" in the popular mind, we +have the assurance of Paul that it was "_overlooked_" by God. + +The views here presented will, we venture to believe, be found most in +harmony with a true philosophy of the human mind; with the religious +phenomena of the world; and, as we shall subsequently see, with the +writings of those poets and philosophers who may be fairly regarded as +representing the sentiments and opinions of the ancient world. At the +same time, we have no desire to conceal the fact that this whole +question as to the origin, and character, and philosophy of the +mythology and symbolism of the religions of the ancient world has been a +subject of earnest controversy from Patristic times down to the present +hour, and that even to-day there exists a wide diversity of opinion +among philosophers, as well as theologians. + +The principal theories offered may be classed as the _ethical_, the +_physical_, and the _historical_, according to the different objects the +framers of the myths are supposed to have had in view. Some have +regarded the myths as invented by the priests and wise men of old for +the improvement and government of society, as designed to give authority +to laws, and maintain social order.[155] Others have regarded them as +intended to be allegorical interpretations of physical phenomena--the +poetic embodiment of the natural philosophy of the primitive races of +men;[156] whilst others have looked upon them as historical legends, +having a substratum of fact, and, when stripped of the supernatural and +miraculous drapery which accompanies fable, as containing the history of +primitive times.[157] Some of the latter class have imagined they could +recognize in Grecian mythology traces of sacred personages, as well as +profane; in fact, a dimmed image of the patriarchal traditions which are +preserved in the Old Testament scriptures.[158] + +It is beyond our design to discuss all the various theories presented, +or even to give a history of opinions entertained.[159] We are fully +convinced that the hypothesis we have presented in the preceding pages, +viz., _that Grecian mythology was a grand symbolic representation of the +Divine as manifested in nature and providence_, is the only hypothesis +which meets and harmonizes all the facts of the case. This is the theory +of Plato, of Cudworth, Baumgarten, Max Müller, and many other +distinguished scholars. + +[Footnote 155: Empedocles, Metrodorus.] + +[Footnote 156: Aristotle.] + +[Footnote 157: Hecatæus, Herodotus, some of the early Fathers, Niebuhr, +J.H. Voss, Arnold.] + +[Footnote 158: Bochart, G.J. Vossius, Faber, Gladstone.] + +[Footnote 159: To the English reader who desires an extended and +accurate acquaintance with the classic and patristic literature of this +deeply interesting subject, we commend the careful study of Cudworth's +"Intellectual System of the Universe," especially ch. iv. The style of +Cudworth is perplexingly involved, and his great work is unmethodical in +its arrangement and discussion. Nevertheless, the patient and +persevering student will be amply rewarded for his pains. A work of more +profound research into the doctrine of antiquity concerning God, and +into the real import of the religious systems of the ancient world, is, +probably, not extant in any language.] + +There are two fundamental propositions laid down by Cudworth which +constitute the basis of this hypothesis. + +1. _No well-authenticated instance can be furnished from among the Greek +Polytheists of one who taught the existence of a multiplicity of +independenty uncreated, self-existent deities; they almost universally_ +_believed in the existence of_ ONE SUPREME, UNCREATED, ETERNAL GOD, +"_The Maker of all things_"--"_the Father of gods and men_,"--"_the +sole Monarch and Ruler of the world_." + +2. _The Greek Polytheists taught a plurality of_"GENERATED DEITIES," +_who owe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, who +are by Him invested with delegated powers, and who, as the agents of his +universal providence, preside over different departments of the created +universe_. + +The evidence presented by Cudworth in support of his theses is so varied +and so voluminous, that it defies all attempts at condensation. His +volumes exhibit an extent of reading, of patient research, and of varied +learning, which is truly amazing. The discussion of these propositions +involves, in fact, nothing less than a complete and exhaustive survey of +the entire field of ancient literature, a careful study of the Greek and +Latin poets, of the Oriental, Greek, and Alexandrian philosophers, and a +review of the statements and criticisms of Rabbinical and Patristic +writers in regard to the religions of the pagan world. An adequate +conception of the varied and weighty evidence which is collected by our +author from these fields, in support of his views, could only be +conveyed by transcribing to our pages the larger portion of his +memorable _fourth_ chapter. But inasmuch as Grecian polytheism is, in +fact, the culmination of all the mythological systems of the ancient +world, the fully-developed flower and ripened fruit of the cosmical and +theological conceptions of the childhood-condition of humanity, we +propose to epitomize the results of his inquiry as to the _theological_, +opinions of the Greeks, supplying additional confirmation of his views +from other sources. + +And first, he proves most conclusively that Orpheus, Homer, and +Hesiod,[160] who are usually designated "the theologians" of Greece, but +who were in fact the depravers and corrupters of pagan theology, do not +teach the existence of a multitude of _unmade, self-existent, and +independent deities_. Even they believed in the existence of _one_ +uncreated and eternal mind, _one Supreme God_, anterior and superior to +all the gods of their mythology. They had some intuition, some +apperception of the _Divine_, even before they had attached to it a +sacred name. The gods of their mythology had all, save one, a temporal +origin; they were generated of Chaos and Night, by an active principle +called _Love_. "One might suspect," says Aristotle, that Hesiod, and if +there be any other who made _love_ or _desire_ a principle of things, +aimed at these very things (viz., the designation of the efficient cause +of the world); for Parmenides, describing the generation of the +universe, says: + + 'First of all the gods planned he _love_;' + +and further, Hesiod: + + 'First of all was Chaos, afterwards Earth, + With her spacious bosom, + And _Love_, who is pre-eminent among all the immortals;' + +as intimating here that in entities there should exist some _cause_ that +will impart motion, and hold bodies in union together. But how, in +regard to these, one ought to distribute them, as to the order of +priority, can be decided afterwards.[161] + +[Footnote 160: We do not concern ourselves with the chronological +antecedence of these ancient Greek poets. It is of little consequence to +us whether Homer preceded Orpheus, or Orpheus Homer. They were not the +real creators of the mythology of ancient Greece. The myths were a +spontaneous growth of the earliest human thought even before the +separation of the Aryan family into its varied branches. + +The study of Comparative Mythology, as well as of Comparative Language, +assures us that the myths had an origin much earlier than the times of +Homer and Orpheus. They floated down from ages on the tide of oral +tradition before they were systematized, embellished, and committed to +writing by Homer, and Orpheus, and Hesiod. And between the systems of +these three poets a perceptible difference is recognizable, which +reflects the changes that verbal recitations necessarily and +imperceptibly undergo.] + +[Footnote 161: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iv.] + +Now whether this "first principle," called "_Love_," "the cause of +motion and of union" in the universe, was regarded as a personal Being, +and whether, as the ancient scholiast taught, Hesiod's love was "the +heavenly Love, which is also God, that other love that was born of Venus +being junior," is just now of no moment to the argument. The more +important inference is, that amongst the gods of Pagan theology but +_one_ is self-existent, or else none are. Because the Hesiodian gods, +which are, in fact, all the gods of the Greek mythology, "were either +all of them derived from chaos, love itself likewise being generated out +of it; or else love was supposed to be distinct from chaos, and the +active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all +the theogony and cosmogony was derived."[162] Hence it is evident the +poets did not teach the existence of a multiplicity of unmade, +self-existent, independent deities. + +[Footnote 162: "Cudworth," vol. i. p. 287.] + +The careful reader of Cudworth will also learn another truth of the +utmost importance in this connection, viz., _that the theogony of the +Greek poets was, in fact, a cosmogony_, the generation of the gods +being, in reality, the generation of the heavens, the sun, the moon, the +stars, and all the various powers and phenomena of nature. This is dimly +shadowed forth in the very names which are given to some of these +divinities. Thus Helios is the sun, Selena is the moon, Zeus the +sky--the deep blue heaven, Eos the dawn, and Ersê the dew. It is +rendered still more evident by the opening lines of Hesiod's +"Theogonia," in which he invokes the muses: + + "Hail ye daughters of Jupiter! Grant a delightsome song. + Tell of the race of immortal gods, always existing, + Who are the offspring of the earth, of the starry sky, + And of the gloomy night, whom also the ocean nourisheth. + Tell how the gods and the earth at first were made, + And the rivers, and the mighty deep, boiling with waves, + And the glowing stars, and the broad heavens above, + And the gods, givers of good, born of these." + +Where we see plainly that the generation of the gods is the generation +of the earth, the heaven, the stars, the seas, the rivers, and other +things produced by them. "But immediately after invocation of the Muses +the poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first +principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth and of +night out of chaos; of the ether and of day, from night; of the starry +heavens, mountains, and seas. All which generation of gods is really +nothing but a poetic description of the cosmogonia; as through the +sequel of the poem all seems to be physiology veiled under fiction and +allegory.... Hesiod's gods are thus not only the animated parts of the +world, but also the other things of nature personified and deified, or +abusively called gods and goddesses."[163] The same is true both of the +Orphic and Homeric gods. "Their generation of the gods is the same with +the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all +probability, derived it from the Mosaic cabala, or tradition."[164] + +But in spite of all this mythological obscuration, the belief in one +Supreme God is here and there most clearly recognizable. "That Zeus was +originally to the Greeks the Supreme God, the true God--nay, at some +time their only God--can be perceived in spite of the haze which +mythology has raised around his name."[165] True, they sometimes used +the word "Zeus" in a physical sense to denote the deep expanse of +heaven, and sometimes in a historic sense, to designate a hero or +deified man said to have been born in Crete. It is also true that the +Homeric Zeus is full of contradictions. He is "all-seeing," yet he is +cheated; he is "omnipotent," yet he is defied; he is "eternal," yet he +has a father; he is "just," yet he is guilty of crime. Now, as Müller +very justly remarks, these contradictions may teach us a lesson. If all +the conceptions of Zeus had sprung from one origin, these contradictions +could not have existed. If Zeus had simply and only meant the Supreme +God, he could not have been the son of Kronos (Time). If, on the other +hand, Zeus had been a mere mythological personage, as Eos, the dawn, and +Helios, the sun, he could never have been addressed as he is addressed +in the famous prayer of Achilles (Iliad, bk. xxi.).[166] + +[Footnote 163: Cudworth, vol. i. pp. 321, 332.] + +[Footnote 164: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 478.] + +[Footnote 165: Max Müller, "Science of Language," p. 457.] + +[Footnote 166: Id., ib., p. 458.] + +In Homer there is a perpetual blending of the natural and the +supernatural, the human and divine. The _Iliad_ is an incongruous medley +of theology, physics, and history. In its gorgeous scenic +representations, nature, humanity, and deity are mingled in inextricable +confusion. The gods are sometimes supernatural and superhuman +personages; sometimes the things and powers of nature personified; and +sometimes they are deified men. And yet there are passages, even in +Homer, which clearly distinguish Zeus from all the other divinities, and +mark him out as the Supreme. He is "the highest, first of Gods" (bk. +xix. 284); "most great, most glorious Jove" (bk. ii. 474). He is "the +universal Lord" (bk. xi. 229); "of mortals and immortals king supreme," +(bk. xii. 263); "over all the immortal gods he reigns in unapproached +pre-eminence of power" (bk. xv. 125). He is "the King of kings" (bk. +viii. 35), whose "will is sovereign" (bk. iv. 65), and his "power +invincible" (bk. viii. 35). He is the "eternal Father" (bk. viii. 77). +He "excels in wisdom gods and men; all human things from him proceed" +(bk. xiii. 708-10); "the Lord of counsel" (bk. i. 208), "the all-seeing +Jove" (bk. xiii. 824). Indeed the mere expression "Father of gods and +men" (bk. i. 639), so often applied to Zeus, and him _alone_, is proof +sufficient that, in spite of all the legendary stories of gods and +heroes, the idea of Zeus as the Supreme God, the maker of the world, the +Father of gods and men, the monarch and ruler of the world, was not +obliterated from the Greek mind.[167] + +[Footnote 167: "In the order of legendary chronology Zeus comes after +Kronos and Uranos, but in the order of Grecian conception Zeus is the +prominent person, and Kronos and Uranos are inferior and introductory +precursors, set up in order to be overthrown, and to serve as mementos +of the powers of their conqueror. To Homer and Hesiod, as well as to the +Greeks universally, Zeus is the great, the predominant God, 'the Father +of gods and men,' whose power none of the gods can hope to resist, or +even deliberately think of questioning. All the other gods have their +specific potency, and peculiar sphere of action and duty, with which +Zeus does not usually interfere; but it is he who maintains the +lineaments of a providential government, as well over the phenomena of +Olympus as over the earth."--Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. i. p. 3. + +Zeus is not only lord of heaven but likewise the ruler of the lower +world, and the master of the sea.--Welcher, "Griechische Götterlehre," +vol. i. p. 164. The Zeus of the Greek poets is unquestionably the god of +whom Paul declared: In him we live and move, and have our being, as +certain of your own poets have also said-- + + "'For we are his offspring.'" + +Now whether this be a quotation from Aratus or Cleanthes, the language +of the poets is, "We are the offspring of Zeus;" consequently the Zeus +of the poets and the God of Christianity are the same God. + +"The father of gods and men in Homer is, of course, the Universal Father +of the Scriptures."--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," p. 171.] + +"When Homer introduces Eumaios, the swineherd, speaking of this life and +the higher powers that rule it, he knows only of just gods 'who hate +cruel deeds, but honor justice and the righteous works of men' (Od. xiv. +83). His whole life is built up on a complete trust in the divine +government of the world without any artificial helps, as the Erinys, the +Nemesis, or Moira. 'Eat,' says the swineherd, 'and enjoy what is here, +for _God_[168] will grant one thing, but another he will refuse, +whatever he will in his mind, for he can do all things' (Od. xiv. 444; +x. 306). This surely is religion, and it is religion untainted by +mythology. Again, the prayer of the female slave, grinding corn in the +house of Ulysses is religious in the truest sense--'Father Zeus, thou +who rulest over gods and men, surely thou hast just thundered in the +starry sky, and there is no cloud anywhere. Thou showest this as a sign +to some one. Fulfill now, even to me, miserable wretch, the prayer which +I now offer'" (Od. xx. 141-150).[169] + +[Footnote 168: No sound reason can be assigned for translating _Theos_ +by "_a_ god" as some have proposed, rather than "_God_." But even if it +were translated "a god," this god must certainly be understood as Zeus. +Plato tells us that Zeus is the most appropriate name for God. "For in +reality the name Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividing +it in two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another; +for some call him Zên, and some Dis. But these parts, collected together +into one, exhibit the nature of the God;... for there is no one who is +more the cause of living, both to us and everything else, than he who is +the ruler and king of all. It follows, therefore, that this god is +rightly named, through whom _life_ is present in all living +beings."--Cratylus, § 28. + +Theos was usually employed, says Cudworth, to designate _God_ by way of +pre-eminence, Theoi to designate inferior divinities.] + +[Footnote 169: Müller, "Science of Language," p. 434.] + +The Greek tragedians were the great religious instructors of the +Athenian people. "Greek tragedy grew up in connection with religious +worship, and constituted not only a popular but a sacred element in the +festivals of the gods.... In short, strange as it may sound to modern +ears, the Greek stage was, more nearly than any thing else, the Greek +pulpit.[170] With a priesthood that offered sacrifice, but did not +preach, with few books of any kind, the people were, in a great measure, +dependent on oral instruction for knowledge; and as they learned their +rights and duties as citizens from their orators, so they hung on the +lips of the 'lofty, grave tragedians' for instruction touching their +origin, duty, and destiny as mortal and immortal beings.... Greek +tragedy is essentially didactic, ethical, mythological, and +religious."[171] + +[Footnote 170: Pulpitum, a stage.] + +[Footnote 171: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," pp. 205, 206.] + +Now it is unquestionable that, with the tragedians, Zeus is the Supreme +God. Æschylus is pre-eminently the theological poet of Greece. The great +problems which lie at the foundation of religious faith and practice are +the main staple of nearly all his tragedies. Homer, Hesiod, the sacred +poets, had looked at these questions in their purely poetic aspects. The +subsequent philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, developed them more fully +by their didactic method. Æschylus stands on the dividing-line between +them, no less poetic than the former, scarcely less philosophical than +the latter, but more intensely practical, personal, and _theological_ +than either. The character of the Supreme Divinity, as represented in +his tragedies, approaches more nearly to the Christian idea of God. He +is the Universal Father--Father of gods and men; the Universal Cause +(panaitios, Agamem. 1485); the All-seer and All-doer (pantopiês, +panergetês, ibid, and Sup. 139); the All-wise and All-controlling +(pankratês, Sup. 813); the Just and the Executor of justice (dikêphoros, +Agamem. 525); true and incapable of falsehood (Prom. 1031); + + pseudêgorein gar ouk epistatai stoma + to dion, alla pan epos telei,-- + +holy (agnos, Sup. 650); merciful (preumenês, ibid. 139); the God +especially of the suppliant and the stranger (Supplices, passim); the +most high and perfect One (teleion upsiston, Eumen. 28); King of kings, +of the happy, most happy, of the perfect, most perfect power, blessed +Zeus (Sup. 522).[172] Such are some of the titles by which Zeus is most +frequently addressed; such the attributes commonly ascribed to him in +Æschylus. + +Sophocles was the great master who carried Greek tragedy to its highest +perfection. Only seven out of more than a hundred of his tragedies have +come down to us. There are passages cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens +Alexandrinus, and others which are not found in those tragedies now +extant. The most famous and extensively quoted passage is given by +Cudworth.[173] + + Eis tais alêtheiaisin, eis estin Theos, + Os ouranon t' eteuxe kai gaian makran, + Poniou te karapon oidma, kanêmôn bian, k. t. l.[174] + +This "one only God" is Zeus, who is the God of justice, and reigns +supreme: + + "Still in yon starry heaven supreme, + Jove, all-beholding, all-directing, dwells-- + To him commit thy vengeance."--"Electra," p. 174 sqq. + +This description of the unsleeping, undecaying power and dominion of +Zeus is worthy of some Hebrew prophet-- + + "Spurning the power of age, enthroned in might, + Thou dwell'st mid heaven's broad light; + This was in ages past thy firm decree, + Is now, and shall forever be: + That none of mortal race on earth shall know + A life of joy serene, a course unmarked by woe." + + "Antigone," pp. 606-614.[175] + +[Footnote 172: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," pp. 213, 214.] + +[Footnote 173: "Intellectual Syst.," vol. i. p. 483.] + +[Footnote 174: "There is, in truth, one only God, who made heaven and +earth, the sea, air, and winds," etc.] + +[Footnote 175: "Theology of Greek Poets," p. 322.] + +Whether we regard the poets as the principal theological teachers of the +ancient Greeks, or as the compilers, systematizers, and artistic +embellishers of the theological traditions and myths which were afloat +in the primitive Hellenic families, we can not resist the conclusion +that, for the masses of the people Zeus was the Supreme God, "the God of +gods" as Plato calls him. Whilst all other deities in Greece are more or +less local and tribal gods, Zeus was known in every village and to every +clan. "He is at home on Ida,[176] on Olympus, at Dodona.[177] While +Poseidon drew to himself the Æolian family, Apollo the Dorian, Athene +the Ionian, there was one powerful God for all the sons of +Hellen--Dorians, Æolians, Ionians, Achæans, viz., the Panhellenic +Zeus."[178] Zeus was the name invoked in their solemn nuncupations of +vows-- + + "O Zeus, father, O Zeus, king." + +In moments of deepest sorrow, of immediate urgency and need, of greatest +stress and danger, they had recourse to Zeus. + + "Courage, courage, my child! + There is still in heaven the great Zeus; + He watches over all things, and he rules. + Commit thy exceeding bitter griefs to him, + And be not angry against thine enemies, + Nor forget them."[179] + +[Footnote 176: "Iliad," bk. iii. 324.] + +[Footnote 177: Bk. xvi. 268.] + +[Footnote 178: Müller, p. 452.] + +[Footnote 179: Sophocles, "Electra," v. 188.] + +He was supplicated, as the God who reigns on high, in the prayer of the +Athenian-- + + "Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, on the land of the Athenians and on their + fields." + +It has been urged that, as Zeus means the sky, therefore he is no more +than the deep concave of heaven personified and deified, and that +consequently Zeus is not the true, the only God. This argument is only +equalled in feebleness by that of the materialist, who argues that +"spiritus" means simply breath, therefore the breath is the soul. Even +if the Greeks remembered that, originally, Zeus meant the sky, that +would have no more perplexed their minds than the remembrance that +"thymos"--mind--meant originally blast. "The fathers of Greek theology +gave to that Supreme Intelligence, which they instinctively recognized +as above and ruling over the universe, the name of Zeus; but in doing +so, they knew well that by Zeus they meant more than the sky. The +unfathomable depth, the everlasting calm of the ethereal sky was to +their minds an image of that Infinite Presence which overshadows all, +and looks down on all. As the question perpetually recurred to their +minds, 'Where is he who abideth forever?' they lifted up their eyes, and +saw, as they thought, beyond sun, and moon, and stars, and all which +changes, and will change, the clear blue sky, the boundless firmament of +heaven. That never changed, that was always the same. The clouds and +storms rolled far below it, and all the bustle of this noisy world; but +there the sky was still, as bright and calm as ever. The Almighty Father +must be there, unchangeable in the unchangeable heaven; bright, and +pure, and boundless like the heavens, and like the heavens, too, afar +off."[180] So they named him after the sky, _Zeus_, the God who lives in +the clear heaven--the heavenly Father. + +[Footnote 180: Kingsley, "Good News from God," p. 237, Am. ed.] + +The high and brilliant sky has, in many languages and many religions, +been regarded as the dwelling-place of God. Indeed, to all of us in +Christian times "God is above;" he is "the God of heaven;" "his throne +is in the heavens;" "he reigns on high." Now, without doing any violence +to thought, the name of the abode might be transferred to him who dwells +in heaven. So that in our own language "heaven" may still be used as a +synonym for "God." The prodigal son is still represented as saying, I +have sinned against "_heaven_." And a Christian poet has taught us to +sing-- + + "High _heaven_, that heard my solemn vow, + That vow renewed shall daily hear," etc. + +Whenever, therefore, we find the name of heaven thus used to designate +also the Deity, we must bear in mind that those by whom it was +originally employed were simply transferring that name from an object +visible to the eye of sense to another object perceived by the eye of +reason. They who at first called God "_Heaven_" had some conception +within them they wished to name--the growing image of a God, and they +fixed upon the vastest, grandest, purest object in nature, the deep blue +concave of heaven, overshadowing all, and embracing all, as the symbol +of the Deity. Those who at a later period called heaven "_God_" had +forgotten that they were predicating of heaven something more which was +vastly higher than the heaven.[181] + +[Footnote 181: See "Science of Language," p. 457.] + +Notwithstanding, then, that the instinctive, native faith of humanity in +the existence of one supreme God was overlaid and almost buried beneath +the rank and luxuriant vegetation of Grecian mythology, we can still +catch glimpses here and there of the solid trunk of native faith, around +which this parasitic growth of fancy is entwined. Above all the +phantasmata of gods and goddesses who descended to the plains of Troy, +and mingled in the din and strife of battle, we can recognize an +overshadowing, all-embracing Power and Providence that dwells on high, +which never descends into the battle-field, and is never seen by mortal +eyes--_the Universal King and Father,--the "God of gods_." + +Besides the direct evidence, which is furnished by the poets and +mythologists, of the presence of this universal faith in "_the heavenly +Father_," there is also a large amount of collateral testimony that this +idea of one Supreme God was generally entertained by the Greek pagans, +whether learned or unlearned.[182] Dio Chrysostomus says that "all the +poets call the first and greatest God the Father, universally, of all +rational kind, as also the King thereof. Agreeably with which doctrine +of the poets do mankind erect altars to Jupiter-King (Dios Basileôs) and +hesitate not to call him Father in their devotions" (Orat. xxxvi.). And +Maximus Tyrius declares that both the learned and the unlearned +throughout the pagan world universally agree in this; that there is one +Supreme God, the Father of gods and men. "If," says he, "there were a +meeting called of all the several trades and professions,... and all +were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think that +the painter would say one thing, the sculptor another, the poet another, +and the philosopher another? No; nor the Scythian neither, nor the +Greek, nor the hyperborean. In regard to other things, we find men +speaking discordantly one to another, all men, as it were, differing +from all men... Nevertheless, on this subject, you may find universally +throughout the world one agreeing law and opinion; _that there is one +God, the King and Father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, +co-reigners together with God_"(Diss. i. p. 450). + +[Footnote 182: Cudworth, vol. i. pp. 593, 594.] + +From the poets we now pass to the philosophers. The former we have +regarded as reflecting the traditional beliefs of the unreasoning +multitude. The philosophers unquestionably represent the reflective +spirit, the speculative thought, of the educated classes of Greek +society. Turning to the writings of the philosophers, we may therefore +reasonably expect that, instead of the dim, undefined, and nebulous form +in which the religious sentiment revealed itself amongst the +unreflecting portions of the Greek populations, we shall find their +theological ideas distinctly and articulately expressed, and that we +shall consequently be able to determine their religious opinions with +considerable accuracy. + +Now that Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, +Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all believers in the existence of +one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, has been, we think, clearly shown +by Cudworth.[183] + +[Footnote 183: Vol. i. pp. 491-554.] + +In subsequent chapters on "_the Philosophers of Athens_," we shall enter +more fully into the discussion of this question. Meantime we assume +that, with few exceptions, the Greek philosophers were "genuine +Theists." + +The point, however, with which we are now concerned is, _that whilst +they believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, they at the same +time recognized the existence of a plurality of generated deities who +owe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, and who, +as the agents and ministers of His universal providence, preside over +different departments of the created universe_. They are at once +Monotheists and Polytheists--believers in "one God" and "many gods." +This is a peculiarity, an anomaly which challenges our attention, and +demands an explanation, if we would vindicate for these philosophers a +rational Theism. + +Now that there can be but one infinite and absolutely perfect Being--one +supreme, uncreated, eternal God--is self-evident; therefore a +multiplicity of such gods is a contradiction and an impossibility. The +early philosophers knew this as well as the modern. The Deity, in order +to be Deity, must be one and not many: must be perfect or nothing. If, +therefore, we would do justice to these old Greeks, we must inquire what +explanations they have offered in regard to "the many gods" of which +they speak. We must ascertain whether they regarded these "gods" as +created or uncreated beings, dependent or independent, temporal or +eternal We must inquire in what sense the term "god" is applied to these +lesser divinities,--whether it is not applied in an accommodated and +therefore allowable sense, as in the sacred Scriptures it is applied to +kings and magistrates, and those who are appointed by God as the +teachers and rulers of men. "_They are called gods_ to whom the word of +God came."[184] And if it shall be found that all the gods of which they +speak, save _one_, are "generated deities"--dependent beings--creatures +and subjects of the one eternal King and Father, and that the name of +"god" is applied to them in an accommodated sense, then we have +vindicated for the old Greek philosophers a consistent and rational +Theism. In what relation, then, do the philosophers place "_the gods_" +to the one Supreme Being? + +_Thales_, one of the most ancient of the Greek philosophers, taught the +existence of a plurality of gods, as is evident from that saying of his, +preserved by Diogenes Laertius, "The world has life, and is full of +gods."[185] At the same time he asserts his belief in one supreme, +uncreated Deity; "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade, +or ungenerated."[186] All the other gods must therefore have been +"generated deities," since there is but one unmade God, one only that +had "no beginning."[187] + +[Footnote 184: See John x. 35.] + +[Footnote 185: "Lives," bk. i.; see also Aristotle's "De Anima," bk. i. +ch. viii. panta Thiôn plêrê.] + +[Footnote 186: "Lives," bk. i.] + +[Footnote 187: "Lives," bk. i.] + +_Xenophanes_ was also an assertor of many gods, and one God; but his one +God is unquestionably supreme. "There is one God, the greatest amongst +gods and men;" or, "God is one, the greatest amongst gods and men."[188] + +_Empedocles_ also believed in one Supreme God, who "is wholly and +perfectly mind, ineffable, holy, with rapid and swift-glancing thought +pervading the whole world," and from whom all things else are +derived,--"all things that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, +may be truly called the works of God, who ruleth over the world, out of +whom, according to Empedocles, proceed all things, plants, men, beasts, +and _gods_."[189] The minor deities are therefore _made_ by God. It will +not be denied that _Socrates_ was a devout and earnest Theist. He taught +that "there is a Being whose eye pierces throughout all nature, and +whose ear is open to every sound; extending through all time, extended +to all places; and whose bounty and care can know no other bounds than +those fixed by his own creation."[190] And yet he also recognized the +existence of a plurality of gods, and in his last moments expressed his +belief that "it is lawful and right to pray to the gods that his +departure hence may be happy."[191] We see, however, in his words +addressed to Euthydemus, a marked distinction between these subordinate +deities and "Him who raised this whole universe, and still upholds the +mighty frame, who perfected every part of it in beauty and in goodness, +suffering none of these parts to decay through age, but renewing them +daily with unfading vigor;... even he, _the Supreme God_, still holds +himself invisible, and it is only in his works that we are capable of +admiring him."[192] + +[Footnote 188: Clem. Alex., "Stromat." bk. v.] + +[Footnote 189: Aristotle, "De Mundo," ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 190: Xenophon's "Memorabilia," i. 4.] + +[Footnote 191: "Phædo," § 152.] + +[Footnote 192: "Memorabilia," iv. 3.] + +It were needless to attempt the proof that _Plato_ believed in one +Supreme God, and _only_ one. This one Being is, with him, "the first +God;" "the greatest of the gods;" "the God over all;" "the sole +Principle of the universe." He is "the Immutable;" "the All-perfect;" +"the eternal Being." He is "the Architect of the world; "the Maker of +the universe; the Father of gods and men; the sovereign Mind which +orders all things, and passes through all things; the sole Monarch and +Ruler of the world.[193] + +And yet remarkable as these expressions are, sounding, as they do, so +like the language of inspiration,[194] there can be no doubt that Plato +was also a sincere believer in a plurality of gods, of which, indeed, +any one may assure himself by reading the _tenth_ book of "the Laws." + +[Footnote 193: See chap. xi.] + +[Footnote 194: Some writers have supposed that Plato must have had +access through some medium to "the Oracles of God." See Butler, vol. ii. +p. 41.] + +And, now that we have in Plato the culmination of Grecian speculative +thought, we may learn from him the mature and final judgment of the +ancients in regard to the gods of pagan mythology. We open the _Timæus_, +and here we find his views most definitely expressed. After giving an +account of the "generation" of the sun, and moon, and planets, which are +by him designated as "visible gods," he then proceeds "to speak +concerning the other divinities:" "We must on this subject assent to +those who in former times have spoken thereon; who were, as they said, +the offspring of the gods, and who doubtless were well acquainted with +their own ancestors..... Let then the genealogy of the gods be, and be +acknowledged to be, that which they deliver. Of Earth and Heaven the +children were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these the children were +Phorcys, and Kronos, and Rhea, and all that followed these; and from +these were born Zeus and Hera, and those who are regarded as brothers +and sisters of these, and others their offspring. + +"When, then, _all the gods were brought into existence_, both those +which move around in manifest courses [the stars and planets], and those +which appear when it pleases them [the mythological deities], the +Creator of the Universe thus addressed them: 'Gods, and sons of gods, of +whom I am the father and the author, produced by me, ye are +indestructible because I will.... Now inasmuch as you have been +_generated_, you are hence _not_ immortal, nor wholly indissoluble; yet +you shall never be dissolved nor become subject to the fatality of +death, because _so I have willed_.... Learn, therefore, my commands. +Three races of mortals yet remain to be created. Unless these be +created, the universe will be imperfect, for it will not contain within +it every kind of animal.... In order that these mortal creatures may be, +and that this world may be really a cosmos, do you apply yourselves to +the creation of animals, imitating the exercises of my power in +_creating_ you.'"[195] + +[Footnote 195: "Timæus," ch. xv.] + +Here, then, we see that Plato carefully distinguishes between the sole +Eternal Author of the universe, on one hand, and the "souls," vital and +intelligent, which he attaches to the heavenly orbs, and diffuses +through all nature, on the other. These subordinate powers or agents are +all created, "_generated_ deities," who owe their continued existence to +the _will_ of God; and though intrusted with a sort of deputed creation, +and a subsequent direction and government of created things, they are +still only the _servants_ and the _deputies_ of the Supreme Creator, and +Director, and Ruler of all things. These subordinate agents and +ministers employed in the creation and providential government of the +world appear, in the estimation of Plato, to have been needed-- + +1. _To satisfy the demands of the popular faith_, which presented its +facts to be explained no less than those of external nature. Plato had +evidently a great veneration for antiquity, a peculiar regard for +"tradition venerable through ancient report," and "doctrines hoary with +years."[196] He aspired after supernatural light and guidance; he longed +for some intercourse with, some communication from, the Deity. And +whilst he found many things in the ancient legends which revolted his +moral sense, and which his reason rejected, yet the sentiment and the +lesson which pervades the whole of Grecian mythology, viz., that the +gods are in ceaseless intercourse with the human race, and if men will +do right the gods will protect and help them, was one which commended +itself to his heart. + +[Footnote 196: Ibid., ch. v.] + +2. These intermediate agents seem to have been demanded to _satisfy the +disposition and tendency which has revealed itself in all systems, of +interposing some scale of ascent between the material creation and the +infinite Creator_. + +The mechanical theory of the universe has interposed its long series of +secondary causes--the qualities, properties, laws, forces of nature; the +vital theory which attaches a separate "soul" to the various parts of +nature as the cause and intelligent director of its movements. Of these +"souls" or gods, there were different orders and degrees--deified men or +heroes, aërial, terrestrial, and celestial divinities, ascending from +nature up to God. And this tendency to supply some scale of ascent +towards the Deity, or at least to people the vast territory which seems +to swell between the world and God, finds some countenance in "the +angels and archangels," "the thrones, and dominions, and principalities, +and powers" of the Christian scriptures.[197] + +3. These inferior ministers also seemed to Plato to _increase the +stately grandeur and imperial majesty of the Divine government._ They +swell the retinue of the Deity in his grand "circuit through the highest +arch of heaven."[198] They wait to execute the Divine commands. They are +the agents of Divine providence, "the messengers of God" to men. + +[Footnote 197: "The gods of the Platonic system answer, in office and +conception, to the angels of Christian Theology."--Butler, vol. i. p. +225.] + +[Footnote 198: "Phædrus," § 56,7.] + +4. And, finally, the host of inferior deities interposed between the +material sensible world and God seemed to Plato as _needful in order to +explain the apparent defects and disorders of sublunary affairs_. Plato +was jealous of the Divine honor. "All good must be ascribed to God, and +nothing but good. We must find evil, disorder, suffering, in some other +cause."[199] He therefore commits to the junior deities the task of +creating animals, and of forming "the mortal part of man," because the +mortal part is "possessed of certain dire and necessary passions."[200] + +[Footnote 199: "Republic," bk. ii. p.18.] + +[Footnote 200: "Timæus," xliv.] + +Aristotle seems to have regarded the popular polytheism of Greece as a +perverted relic of a deeper and purer "Theology" which he conceives to +have been, in all probability, perfected in the distant past, and then +comparatively lost. He says--"The tradition has come down from very +ancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations, +that these (the heavenly bodies) are gods, and that the Divinity +_encompasses the whole of nature_. There have been made, however, to +these certain fabulous additions for the purpose of winning the belief +of the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, and +their co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state. +These additions have been to the effect that these gods were of the same +form as men, and even that some of them were in appearance similar to +certain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course, +however, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditions +the false element, and to embrace that which is true; and the truth lies +in that portion of this ancient doctrine which regards the first and +deepest ground of all existence to be the _Divine_, and this he may +regard as a divine utterance. In all probability, every art, and +science, and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the +farthest extent possible, and then again lost; and we may conceive these +opinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of these +lost philosophers. We see, then, to some extent the relation of the +popular belief to these ancient opinions."[201] This conception of a +deep Divine ground of all existence (for the immateriality and unity of +which he elsewhere earnestly contends)[202] is thus regarded by +Aristotle as underlying the popular polytheism of Greece. + +[Footnote 201: "Metaph.," xi. 8.] + +[Footnote 202: Bk. xi. ch. ii. § 4.] + +The views of the educated and philosophic mind of Greece in regard to +the mythological deities may, in conclusion, be thus briefly stated-- + +I. _They are all created beings_--"GENERATED DEITIES," _who are +dependent on, and subject to, the will of one supreme God_. + +II. _They are the_ AGENTS _employed by God in the creation of, at least +some parts of, the universe, and in the movement and direction of the +entire cosmos; and they are also the_ MINISTERS _and_ MESSENGERS _of +that universal providence which he exercises over the human race_. + +These subordinate deities are, 1. the greater parts of the visible +mundane system animated by intelligent souls, and called "_sensible +gods_"--the sun, the moon, the stars, and even the earth itself, and +known by the names Helios, Selena, Kronos, Hermes, etc. + +2. Some are _invisible powers_, having peculiar offices and functions +and presiding over special places provinces and departments of the +universe;--one ruling in the heavens (Zeus), another in the air (Juno), +another in the sea (Neptune), another in the subterranean regions +(Pluto); one god presiding over learning and wisdom (Minerva), another +over poetry, music, and religion (Apollo), another over justice and +political order (Themis), another over war (Mars), another over corn +(Ceres), and another the vine (Bacchus). + +3. Others, again, are _ethereal_ and _aërial_ beings, who have the +guardianship of individual persons and things, and are called _demons, +genii_, and _lares_; superior indeed to men, but inferior to the gods +above named. + +"Wherefore, since there were no other gods among the Pagans besides +those above enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols should +be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called +'gods'), which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or +without beginning, they being the workmanship of their own hands, we +conclude, universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods which +make so great a show and noise was really either nothing but several +names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to his different +manifestations, gifts, and effects upon the world personated, or else +many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one supreme: +so that one unmade, self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged +by the more intelligent Pagans, and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism +(or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade +minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and +independent upon one Supreme, but in mingling and blending some way or +other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator."[203] + +[Footnote 203: Cudworth, "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 311.] + +That the heathen regard the one Supreme Being as the first and chief +object of worship is evident from the apologies which they offered for +worshipping, besides Him, many inferior divinities. + +1. They claimed to worship them _only_ as inferior beings, and that +therefore they were not guilty of giving them that honor which belonged +to the Supreme. They claimed to worship the supreme God incomparably +above all. 2. That this honor which is bestowed upon the inferior +divinities does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize +his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 3. +That as demons are mediators between the celestial gods and men, so +those celestial gods are also mediators between men and the supreme God, +and, as it were, convenient steps by which we ought with reverence to +approach him. 4. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over +kingdoms, cities, and persons, and being many ways benefactors to us, +thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 5. Lastly, that it can +not be thought that the Supreme Being will envy those inferior beings +that worship or honor which is bestowed upon them; nor suspect that any +of these inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves +against the Supreme God. + +The Pagans, furthermore, apologized for worshipping God in images, +statues, and symbols, on the ground that these were only schetically +worshipped by them, the honor passing from them to the prototype. And +since we live in bodies, and can scarcely, conceive of any thing without +having some image or phantasm, we may therefore be indulged in this +infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to worship God under +a corporeal image, as a means of preventing men from falling into +Atheism. + +To the Christian conscience the above reasons assigned furnish no real +justification of Polytheism and Idolatry; but they are certainly a tacit +confession of their belief in the one Supreme God, and their conviction +that, notwithstanding their idolatry, He only ought to be worshipped. +The heathen polytheists are therefore justly condemned in Scripture, and +pronounced to be "_inexcusable_." They had the knowledge of the true +God--" they _knew God_" and yet "they glorified him not as God." "They +changed the glory of the incorruptible God into a likeness of +corruptible man." And, finally, they ended in "worshipping and serving +the creature _more_ than the Creator."[204] + +[Footnote 204: Romans i. 21, 25.] + +It can not, then, with justice be denied that the Athenians had some +knowledge of the true God, and some just and worthy conceptions of his +character. It is equally certain that a powerful and influential +religious sentiment pervaded the Athenian mind. Their extreme +"carefulness in religion" must be conceded by us, and, in some sense, +commended by us, as it was by Paul in his address on Mars' Hill. At the +same time it must also be admitted and deplored that the purer theology +of primitive times was corrupted by offensive legends, and encrusted by +polluting myths, though not utterly defaced.[205] The Homeric gods were +for the most part idealized, human personalities, with all the passions +and weaknesses of humanity. They had their favorites and their enemies; +sometimes they fought in one camp, sometimes in another. They were +susceptible of hatred, jealousy, sensual passion. It would be strange +indeed if their worshippers were not like unto them. The conduct of the +Homeric heroes was, however, better than their creed. And there is this +strange incongruity and inconsistency in the conduct of the Homeric +gods,--they punish mortals for crimes of which they themselves are +guilty, and reward virtues in men which they do not themselves always +practise. "They punish with especial severity social and political +crimes, such as perjury (Iliad, iii. 279), oppression of the poor (Od. +xvii. 475), and unjust judgment in courts of justice (Iliad, xvi. 386)." +Jupiter is the god of justice, and of the domestic hearth; he is the +protector of the exile, the avenger of the poor, and the vigilant +guardian of hospitality. "And with all the imperfections of society, +government, and religion, the poem presents a remarkable picture of +primitive simplicity, chastity, justice, and practical piety, under the +three-fold influence of moral feeling, mutual respect, and fear of the +divine displeasure; such, at least, are the motives to which Telemachus +makes his appeal when he endeavors to rouse the assembled people of +Ithaca to the performance of their duty (Od. ii. 64)."[206] + +[Footnote 205: "There was always a double current of religious ideas in +Greece; one spiritualist, the other tainted with impure +legends."--Pressensé.] + +[Footnote 206: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," pp. 167, 168; +Pressensé, "Religion before Christ," p. 77.] + +The influence of the religious dramas of Æschylus and Sophocles on the +Athenian mind must not be overlooked. No writer of pagan antiquity made +the voice of conscience speak with the same power and authority that +Æschylus did. "Crime," he says, "never dies without posterity." "Blood +that has been shed congeals on the ground, crying out for an avenger." +The old poet made himself the echo of what he called "the lyreless hymn +of the Furies," who, with him, represented severe Justice striking the +guilty when his hour comes, and giving warning beforehand by the terrors +which haunt him. His dramas are characterized by deep religious feeling. +Reverence for the gods, the recognition of an inflexible moral order, +resignation to the decisions of Heaven, an abiding presentiment of a +future state of reward and punishment, are strikingly predominant. + +Whilst Æschylus reveals to us the sombre, terror-stricken side of +conscience, Sophocles shows us the divine and luminous side. No one has +ever spoken with nobler eloquence than he of moral obligation--of this +immortal, inflexible law, in which dwells a God that never grows old-- + + "Oh be the lot forever mine + Unsullied to maintain, + In act and word, with awe divine, + What potent laws ordain. + + "Laws spring from purer realms above: + Their father is the Olympian Jove. + Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime, + Th' indwelling god is great, nor fears the wastes of time."[207] + +The religious inspiration that animates Sophocles breaks out with +incomparable beauty in the last words of oedipus, when the old banished +king sees through the darkness of death a mysterious light dawn, which +illumines his blind eyes, and which brings to him the assurance of a +blessed immortality.[208] + +[Footnote 207: "oedipus Tyran.," pp. 863-872.] + +[Footnote 208: Pressensé, "Religion before Christ," pp. 85-87.] + +Such a theology could not have been utterly powerless. The influence of +truth, in every measure and degree, must be salutary, and especially of +truth in relation to God, to duty, and to immortality. The religion of +the Athenians must have had some wholesome and conserving influence of +the social and political life of Athens.[209] Those who resign the +government of this lower world almost exclusively to Satan, may see, in +the religion of the Greeks, a simple creation of Satanic powers. But he +who believes that the entire progress of humanity has been under the +control and direction of a benignant Providence, must suppose that, in +the purposes of God, even Ethnicism has fulfilled some end, or it would +not have been permitted to live. God has "_never left himself without a +witness_" in any nation under heaven. And some preparatory office has +been fulfilled by Heathenism which, at least, repealed the _want_, and +prepared the mind for, the advent of Christianity. + +[Footnote 209: The practice, so common with some theological writers, of +drawing dark pictures of heathenism, in which not one luminous spot is +visible, in order to exalt the revelations given to the Jews, is +exceedingly unfortunate, and highly reprehensible. It is unfortunate, +because the skeptical scholar knows that there were some elements of +truth and excellence, and even of grandeur, in the religion and +civilization of the republics of Greece and Rome; and it is +reprehensible, because it is a one-sided and unjust procedure, in so far +as it withholds part of the truth. This species of argument is a +two-edged sword which cuts both ways. The prevalence of murder, and +slavery, and treachery, and polygamy, in Greece and Rome, is no more a +proof that "the religions of the pagan nations were destructive of +morality" (Watson, vol. i. p. 59), than the polygamy of the Hebrews, the +falsehoods and impositions of Mediaeval Christianity, the persecutions +and martyrdoms of Catholic Christianity, the oppressions and wrongs of +Christian England, and the slavery of Protestant America, are proofs +that the Christian religion is "destructive of morality." What a fearful +picture of the history of Christian nations might be drawn to-day, if +all the lines of light, and goodness, and charity were left out, and the +crimes, and wrongs, and cruelties of the Christian nations were alone +exhibited! + +How much more convincing a proof of the truth of Christianity to find in +the religions of the ancient world a latent sympathy with, and an +unconscious preparation for, the religion of Christ. "The history of +religions of human origin is the most striking evidence of the agreement +of revealed religion with the soul of man--for each of these forms of +worship is the expression of the wants of conscience, its eternal thirst +for pardon and restoration--rather let us say, its thirst for +God."--Pressensé, p. 6.] + +The religion of the Athenians was unable to deliver them from the guilt +of sin, redeem them from its power, and make them pure and holy. It gave +the Athenian no victory over himself, and, practically, brought him no +nearer to the living God. But it awakened and educated the conscience, +it developed more fully the sense of sin and guilt, and it made man +conscious of his inability to save himself from sin and guilt; and "the +day that humanity awakens to the want of something more than mere +embellishment and culture, that day it feels the need of being saved and +restored from the consequences of sin" by a higher power. Æsthetic taste +had found its fullest gratification in Athens; poetry, sculpture, +architecture, had been carried to the highest perfection; a noble +civilization had been reached; but "the need of something deeper and +truer was written on the very stones." The highest consummation of +Paganism was an altar to "the unknown God," the knowledge of whom it +needed, as the source of purity and peace. + +The strength and the weakness of Grecian mythology consisted in the +contradictory character of its divinities. It was a strange blending of +the natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine. Zeus, the +eternal Father,--the immortal King, whose will is sovereign, and whose +power is invincible,--the All-seeing Jove, has some of the weaknesses +and passions of humanity. God and man are thus, in some mysterious way, +united. And here that deepest longing of the human heart is met--the +unconquerable desire to bring God nearer to the human apprehension, and +closer to the human heart. Hence the hold which Polytheism had upon the +Grecian mind. But in this human aspect was also found its weakness, for +when philosophic thought is brought into contact with, and permitted +critically to test mythology, it dethrones the false gods. The age of +spontaneous religious sentiment must necessarily be succeeded by the age +of reflective thought. Popular theological faiths must be placed in the +hot crucible of dialectic analysis, that the false and the frivolous may +be separated from the pure and the true. The reason of man demands to be +satisfied, as well as the heart. Faith in God must have a logical basis, +it must be grounded on demonstration and proof. Or, at any rate, the +question must be answered, _whether God is cognizable by human reason_? +If this can be achieved, then a deeper foundation is laid in the mind of +humanity, upon which Christianity can rear its higher and nobler truths. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE UNKNOWN GOD. + + +"As I passed by, and beheld your sacred objects, I found an altar with +this inscription, _To the Unknown God_."--ST. PAUL. + +"That which can be _known_ of God is manifested in their hearts, God +himself having shown it to them" [the heathen nations].--ST. PAUL. + +Having now reached our first landing-place, from whence we may survey +the fields that we have traversed, it may be well to set down in +definite propositions the results we have attained. We may then carry +them forward, as torches, to illuminate the path of future and still +profounder inquiries. + +The principles we have assumed as the only adequate and legitimate +interpretation of the facts of religious history, and which an extended +study of the most fully-developed religious system of the ancient world +confirms, may be thus announced: + +I. A religious nature and destination appertain to man, so that the +purposes of his existence and the perfection of his being can only be +secured in and through religion. + +II. The idea of God as the unconditioned Cause, the infinite Mind, the +personal Lord and Lawgiver, and the consciousness of dependence upon and +obligation to God, are the fundamental principles of all religion. + +III. Inasmuch as man is a religious being, the instincts and emotions of +his nature constraining him to worship, there must also be implanted in +his rational nature some original _à priori_ ideas or laws of thought +which furnish the necessary cognition of the object of worship; that is, +some native, spontaneous cognition of God. + +A mere blind impulse would not be adequate to guide man to the true end +and perfection of his being without rational ideas; a tendency or +appetency, without a revealed object, would be the mockery and misery of +his nature--an "ignis fatuus" perpetually alluring and forever deceiving +man. + +That man has a native, spontaneous apperception of a God, in the true +import of that sacred name, has been denied by men of totally opposite +schools and tendencies of thought--by the Idealist and the Materialist; +by the Theologian and the Atheist. Though differing essentially in their +general principles and method, they are agreed in asserting that God is +absolutely "_the unknown_;" and that, so far as reason and logic are +concerned, man can not attain to any knowledge of the first principles +and causes of the universe, and, consequently, can not determine whether +the first principle or principles be intelligent or unintelligent, +personal or impersonal, finite or infinite, one or many righteous or +non-righteous, evil or good. + +The various opponents of the doctrine that God can be cognized by human +reason may be classified as follows: I. _Those who assert that all human +knowledge is necessarily confined to the observation and classification +of phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and +resemblance_. Man has no faculty for cognizing substances, causes, +forces, reasons, first principles--no power by which he can _know_ God. +This class may be again subdivided into-- + +1. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification +of _mental_ phenomena (_e. g_., Idealists like J. S. Mill). + +2. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification +of _material_ phenomena (_e. g_., Materialists like Comte). + +II. _The second class comprises all who admit that philosophic knowledge +is the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, and of qualities as +inherent in substances; but at the same time assert that "all knowledge +is of the phenomenal_." Philosophy can never attain to a positive +knowledge of the First Cause. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, we +know nothing. The infinite can not by us be comprehended, conceived, or +thought. _Faith_ is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond +knowledge. We believe in the existence of God, but we can not _know_ +God. This class, also, may be again subdivided into-- + +1. Those who affirm that our idea of the Infinite First Cause is +grounded on an _intuitional_ or subjective faith, necessitated by an +"impotence of thought"--that is, by a mental inability to conceive an +absolute limitation or an infinite illimitation, an absolute +commencement or an infinite non-commencement. Both contradictory +opposites are equally incomprehensible and inconceivable to us; and yet, +though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher +law--the "Law of Excluded Middle"--to admit that one, and only one, is +necessary (_e. g_., Hamilton and Mansel). + +2. Those who assert that our idea of God rests solely on an _historical_ +or objective faith in testimony--the testimony of Scripture, which +assures us that, in the course of history, God has manifested his +existence in an objective manner to the senses, and given verbal +communications of his character and will to men; human reason being +utterly incapacitated by the fall, and the consequent depravity of man, +to attain any knowledge of the unity, spirituality, and righteousness of +God (_e. g_., Watson, and Dogmatic Theologians generally). + +It will thus be manifest that the great question, the central and vital +question which demands a thorough and searching consideration, is the +following, to wit: _Is God cognizable by human reason_? Can man attain +to a positive cognition of God--can he _know_ God; or is all our +supposed knowledge "a learned ignorance,"[210] an unreasoning faith? We +venture to answer this question in the affirmative. Human reason is now +adequate to the cognition of God; it is able, with the fullest +confidence, to affirm the being of a God, and, in some degree, to +determine his character. The parties and schools above referred to +answer this question in the negative form. Whether Theologians or +Atheists, they are singularly agreed in denying to human reason all +possibility of _knowing_ God. + +[Footnote 210: Hamilton's "Philosophy," p. 512.] + +Before entering upon the discussion of the negative positions enumerated +in the above classification, it may be important we should state our own +position explicitly, and exhibit what we regard as the true doctrine of +the genesis of the idea of God in the human intelligence. The real +question at issue will then stand out in clear relief, and precision +will be given to the entire discussion. + +(i.) _We hold that the idea of God is a common phenomenon of the +universal human intelligence_. It is found in all minds where reason has +had its normal and healthy development; and no race of men has ever been +found utterly destitute of the idea of God. The proof of this position +has already been furnished in chap, ii.,[211] and needs not be re-stated +here. We have simply to remark that the appeal which is made by Locke +and others of the sensational school to the experiences of infants, +idiots, the deaf and dumb, or, indeed, any cases wherein the proper +conditions for the normal development of reason are wanting, are utterly +irrelevant to the question. The acorn contains within itself the +rudimental germ of the future oak, but its mature and perfect +development depends on the exterior conditions of moisture, light, and +heat. By these exterior conditions it may be rendered luxuriant in its +growth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under +one class of conditions; it may be distorted and perverted, or it may +perish utterly under another. And so in the idiotic mind the ideas of +reason may be wanting, or they may be imprisoned by impervious walls of +cerebral malformation. In the infant mind the development of reason is +yet in an incipient stage. The idea of God is immanent to the infant +thought, but the infant thought is not yet matured. The deaf and dumb +are certainly not in that full and normal correlation to the world of +sense which is a necessary condition of the development of reason. +Language, the great vehiculum and instrument of thought, is wanting, and +reason can not develop itself without words. "Words without thought are +dead sounds, _thoughts without words are nothing_. The word is the +thought incarnate."[212] Under proper and normal conditions, the idea of +God is the natural and necessary form in which human thought must be +developed. And, with these explanations, we repeat our affirmation that +the idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal human +intelligence. + +[Footnote 211: Pp. 89,90.] + +[Footnote 212: Müller, "Science of Language," p. 384.] + +(ii.) _We do not hold that the idea of God, in its completeness, is a +simple, direct, and immediate intuition of the reason alone, independent +of all experience, and all knowledge of the external world_. The idea of +God is a complex idea, and not a simple idea. The affirmation, "God +exists," is a _synthetic_ and _primitive_ judgment spontaneously +developed in the mind, and developed, too, independent of all reflective +reasoning. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the outer world +of nature and the primary intuitions of the inner world of reason--a +logical deduction from the self-evident truths given in sense, +consciousness, and reason. "We do not _perceive_ God, but we _conceive_ +Him upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to view, and upon the +other world, more admirable still, which we bear in ourselves."[213] +Therefore we do not say that man is born with an "innate idea" of God, +nor with the definite proposition, "there is a God," written upon his +soul; but we do say that the mind is pregnant with certain natural +principles, and governed, in its development, by certain necessary laws +of thought, which determine it, by a _spontaneous logic_, to affirm the +being of a God; and, furthermore, that this judgment may be called +_innate_ in the sense, that it is the primitive, universal, and +necessary development of the human understanding which "is innate to +itself and equal to itself in all men."[214] + +[Footnote 213: Cousin, "True, Beautiful and Good," p.102.] + +[Footnote 214: Leibnitz.] + +As the vital and rudimentary germ of the oak is contained in the acorn; +as it is quickened and excited to activity by the external conditions of +moisture, light, and heat, and is fully de developed under the fixed and +determinative laws of vegetable life--so the germs of the idea of God +are present in the human mind as the intuitions of pure reason +(_Rational Psychology_); these intuitions are excited to energy by our +experiential and historical knowledge of the facts and laws of the +universe (_Phenomenology_); and these facts and intuitions are developed +into form by the necessary laws of the intellect (_Nomology_, or +_Primordial Logic_). + +The _logical demonstration_ of the being of God commences with the +analysis of thought. It asks, What are the ideas which exist in the +human intelligence? What are their actual characteristics, and what +their primitive characteristics? What is their origin, and what their +validity? Having, by this process, found that some of our ideas are +subjective, and some objective that some are derived from experience, +and that some can not be derived from experience, but are inherent in +the very constitution of the mind itself, as _à priori_ ideas of reason; +that these are characterized as self-evident, universal, and necessary +and that, as laws of thought, they govern the mind in all its +conceptions of the universe; it has formulated these necessary +judgments, and presented them as distinct and articulate propositions. +These _à priori_, necessary judgments constitute the major premise of +the Theistic syllogism, and, in view of the facts of the universe, +necessitate the affirmation of the existence of a God as the only valid +explanation of the facts. + +The _natural_ or _chronological order_ in which the idea of God is +developed in the human intelligence, is the reverse process of the +scientific or logical order, in which the demonstration of the being of +God is presented by philosophy; the latter is _reflective_ and +_analytic_, the former is _spontaneous_ and _synthetic._ The natural +order commences with the knowledge of the facts of the universe, +material and mental, as revealed by sensation and experience. In +presence of these facts of the universe, the _à priori_ ideas of power, +cause, reason, and end are evoked into consciousness with greater or +less distinctness; and the judgment, by a natural and spontaneous logic, +free from all reflection, and consequently from all possibility of +error, affirms a necessary relation between the facts of experience and +the _à priori_ ideas of the reason. The result of this involuntary and +almost unconscious process of thought is that natural cognition of a God +found, with greater or less clearness and definiteness, in all rational +minds. The _à posteriori_, or empirical knowledge of the phenomena of +the universe, in their relations to time and space, constitute the minor +premise of the Theistic syllogism. + +The Theistic argument is, therefore, necessarily composed of both +experiential and _à priori_ elements. An _à posteriori_ element exists +as a condition of the logical demonstration The rational _à priori_ +element is, however, the logical basis, the only valid foundation of the +Theistic demonstration. The facts of the universe alone would never lead +man to the recognition of a God, if the reason, in presence of these +facts, did not enounce certain necessary and universal principles which +are the logical antecedents, and adequate explanation of the facts. Of +what use would it be to point to the events and changes of the material +universe as proofs of the existence of a _First Cause,_ unless we take +account of the universal and necessary truth that "every change must +have an efficient cause;" that all phenomena are an indication of +_power_; and that "there is an ultimate and sufficient reason why all +things exist, and are as they are, and not otherwise." There would be no +logical force in enumerating the facts of order and special adaptation +which literally crowd the universe, as proofs of the existence of an +_Intelligent Creator_, if the mind did not affirm the necessary +principle that "facts of order, having a commencement in time, suppose +mind as their source and exponent." There is no logical conclusiveness +in the assertion of Paley, "that _experience_ teaches us that a designer +must be a person," because, as Hume justly remarks, our "experience" is +narrowed down to a mere point, "and can not be a rule for a universe;" +but there is an infinitude of force in that dictum of reason, that +"intelligence, self-consciousness, and self-determination necessarily +constitute personality." A multiplicity of different effects, of which +experience does not always reveal the connection, would not conduct to a +single cause and to _one_ God, but rather to a plurality of causes and a +plurality of gods, did not reason teach us that "all plurality implies +an ultimate indivisible unity," and therefore there must be a _First +Cause_ of all causes, a _First Principle_ of all principles, _the +Substance_ of all substances, _the Being_ of all beings--_a God_ "of +whom, in whom, and to whom are all things" (panta ek tou Theou, en tô +Theô eis ton Theon). + +The conclusion, therefore, is, that, as the idea of God is a complex +idea, so there are necessarily a number of simple _à priori_ principles, +and a variety of experiential facts conspiring to its development in the +human intelligence. + +(iii.) _The universe presents to the human mind an aggregation and +history of phenomena which demands the idea of a God--a self-existent, +intelligent, personal, righteous First Cause--as its adequate +explanation._ + +The attempt of Positivism to confine all human knowledge to the +observation and classification of phenomena, and arrest and foreclose +all inquiry as to causes, efficient, final, and ultimate, is simply +futile and absurd. It were just as easy to arrest the course of the sun +in mid-heaven as to prevent the human mind from seeking to pass beyond +phenomena, and ascertain the ground, and reason, and cause of all +phenomena. The history of speculative thought clearly attests that, in +all ages, the inquiry after the Ultimate Cause and Reason of all +existence--the archê, or First Principle of all things--has been the +inevitable and necessary tendency of the human mind; to resist which, +skepticism and positivism have been utterly impotent. The first +philosophers, of the Ionian school, had just as strong a faith in the +existence of a Supreme Reality--an Ultimate Cause--as Leibnitz and +Cousin. But when, by reflective thought, they attempted to render an +account to themselves of this instinctive faith, they imagined that its +object must be in some way appreciable to sense, and they sought it in +some physical element, or under some visible and tangible shrine. Still, +however imperfect and inadequate the method, and however unsatisfactory +the results, humanity has never lost its positive and ineradicable +confidence that the problem of existence could be solved. The resistless +tide of spontaneous and necessary thought has always borne the race +onward towards the recognition of a great First Cause; and though +philosophy may have erred, again and again, in tracing the logical order +of this inevitable thought, and exhibiting the necessary nexus between +the premises and conclusion, yet the human mind has never wavered in the +confidence which it has reposed in the natural logic of thought, and man +has never ceased to believe in a God. + +We readily grant that all our empirical knowledge is confined to +phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance. +"To our objective perception and comparison nothing is given but +qualities and changes; to our inductive generalization nothing but the +shifting and grouping of these in time and space." Were it, however, our +immediate concern to discuss the question, we could easily show that +sensationalism has never succeeded in tracing the genetic origin of our +ideas of space and time to observation and experience; and, without the +_à priori_ idea of _space_, as the place of bodies, and of _time_, as +the condition of succession, we can not conceive of phenomena at all. +If, therefore, we know any thing beyond phenomena and their mutual +relations; if we have any cognition of realities underlying phenomena, +and of the relations of phenomena to their objective ground, it must be +given by some faculty distinct from sense-perception, and in some +process distinct from inductive generalization. The knowledge of real +Being and real Power, of an ultimate Reason and a personal Will, is +derived from the apperception of pure reason, which affirms the +necessary existence of a Supreme Reality--an Uncreated Being beyond all +phenomena, which is the ground and reason of the existence--the +contemporaneousness and succession--the likeness and unlikeness, of all +phenomena. + +The immediate presentation of phenomena to sensation is the _occasion_ +of the development in consciousness of these _à priori_ ideas of reason: +the possession of these ideas or the immanence of these ideas, in the +human intellect, constitutes the original _power_ to know external +phenomena. The ideas of space, time, power, law, reason, and end, are +the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, event, +consecution, order, and adaptation. The latter can not be conceived as +distinct notions without the former. The former will not be revealed in +thought without the presentation to sense, of resistance, movement, +change, uniformity, etc. All actual knowledge must, therefore, be +impure; that is, it must involve both _à priori_ and _à posteriori_ +elements; and between these elements there must be a necessary relation. + +This necessary relation between the _à priori_ and _à posteriori_ +elements of knowledge is not a mere subjective law of thought. It is +both a law of thought and a law of things. Between the _à posteriori_ +facts of the universe and the _à priori_ ideas of the reason there is an +absolute nexus, a universal and necessary correlation; so that the +cognition of the latter is possible only on the cognition of the former; +and the objective existence of the realities, represented by the ideas +of reason, is the condition, _sine qua non_, of the existence of the +phenomena presented to sense. If, in one indivisible act of +consciousness, we immediately perceive extended matter exterior to our +percipient mind, then Extension exists objectively; and if Extension +exists objectively, then Space, its _conditio sine qua non_, also exists +objectively. And if a definite body reveals to us the _Space_ in which +it is contained, if a succession of pulsations or movements exhibit the +uniform _Time_ beneath, so do the changeful phenomena of the universe +demand a living _Power_ behind, and the existing order and regular +evolution of the universe presuppose _Thought_--prevision, and +predetermination, by an intelligent mind. + +If, then, the universe is a created effect, it must furnish some +indications of the character of its cause. If, as Plato taught, the +world is a "created image" of the eternal archetypes which dwell in the +uncreated Mind, and if the subjective ideas which dwell in the human +reason, as the offspring of God, are "copies" of the ideas of the +Infinite Reason--if the universe be "the autobiography of the Infinite +Spirit which has also repeated itself in miniature within our finite +spirit," then may we decipher its symbols, and read its lessons straight +off. Then every approach towards a scientific comprehension and +generalization of the facts of the universe must carry us upward towards +the higher realities of reason. The more we can understand of Nature--of +her comprehensive laws, of her archetypal forms, of her far-reaching +plan spread through the almost infinite ages, and stretching through +illimitable space--the more do we comprehend the divine Thought. The +inductive generalization of science gradually _ascends_ towards the +universal; the pure, essential, _à priori_ reason, with its universal +and necessary ideas, _descends_ from above to meet it. The general +conceptions of science are thus a kind of _ideoe umbratiles_--shadowy +assimilations to those immutable ideas which dwell in essential reason, +as possessed by the Supreme Intelligence, and which are participated in +by rational man as the offspring and image of God. + +Without making any pretension to profound scientific accuracy, we offer +the following tentative classification of the facts of the universe, +material and mental, which may be regarded as hints and adumbrations of +the ultimate ground, and reason, and cause, of the universe. We shall +venture to classify these facts as indicative of some fundamental +relation; (i.) to Permanent Being or Reality; (ii.) to Reason and +Thought; (iii.) to Moral Ideas and Ends. + +(i.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to +Permanent Being or Reality_. + +1. _Qualitative_ Phenomena (properties, attributes, qualities)--the +predicates of a _subject_; which phenomena, being characterized by +likeness and unlikeness, are capable of comparison and classification, +and thus of revealing something as to the nature of the _subject_. + +2. _Dynamical_ Phenomena (protension, movement, succession)--events +transpiring in _time_, having beginning, succession, and end, which +present themselves to us as the expression of _power_, and throw back +their distinctive characteristics on their _dynamic_ source. + +3. _Quantitative_ Phenomena (totality, multiplicity, relative unity)--a +multiplicity of objects having relative and composite unity, which +suggests some relation to an absolute and indivisible _unity_. + +4. _Statical_ Phenomena (extension, magnitude, divisibility)--bodies +co-existing in _space_ which are limited, conditioned, relative, +dependent, and indicate some relation to that which is self-existent, +unconditioned, and absolute. + +(ii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to +Reason or Thought_. + +1. _Numerical and Geometrical Proportion_.--Definite proportion of +elements (Chemistry), symmetrical arrangement of parts +(Crystallography), numerical and geometrical relation of the forms and +movements of the heavenly bodies (Spherical Astronomy), all of which are +capable of exact mathematical expression. + +2. _Archetypal Forms_.--The uniform succession of new existences, and +the progressive evolution of new orders and species, conformable to +fixed and definite ideal archetypes, the indication of a comprehensive +_plan_(Morphological Botany, Comparative Anatomy). + +3. _Teleology of Organs_.--The adaptation of organs to the fulfillment +of special functions, indicating _design_(Comparative Physiology). + +4. _Combination of Homotypes and Analogues_.--Diversified homologous +forms made to fulfill analogous functions, or special purposes fulfilled +whilst maintaining a general plan, indicating _choice_ and +_alternativity_. + +(iii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation +to Moral Ideas and Ends_. + +1. _Ethical Distinctions_.--The universal tendency to discriminate +between voluntary acts as right or wrong, indicating some relation to an +_immutable moral standard of right_. + +2. _Sense of Obligation_.--The universal consciousness of dependence and +obligation, indicating some relation to Supreme _Power_, an Absolute +_Authority_. + +3. _Feeling of Responsibility_.--The universal consciousness of +liability to be required to give account for, and endure the +consequences of our action, indicating some relation to a Supreme +_Judge_. + +4. _Retributive Issues_.--The pleasure and pain resulting from moral +action in this life, and the universal anticipation of pleasure or pain +in the future, as the consequence of present conduct, indicate an +_absolute Justice_ ruling the world and man. + +Now, if the universe be a _created effect_, it must, in some degree at +least, reveal the character of its Author and cause. We are entitled to +regard it as a created symbol and image of the Deity; it must bear the +impress of his _power_; it must reveal his infinite _presence_; it must +express his _thoughts_; it must embody and realize his _ideals_, so far, +at least, as material symbols will permit. Just as we see the power and +thought of man revealed in his works, his energy and skill, his ideal +and his taste expressed in his mechanical, artistic, and literary +creations, so we may see the mind and character of God displayed in his +works. The skill and contrivance of Watts, and Fulton, and Stephenson +were exhibited in their mechanical productions. The pure, the intense, +the visionary impersonation of the soul which the artist had conjured in +his own imagination was wrought out in Psyché. The colossal grandeur of +Michael Angelo's ideals, the ethereal and saintly elegance of Raphael's +were realized upon the canvas. So he who is familiar with the ideal of +the sculptor or the painter can identify his creations even when the +author's name is not affixed. And so the "eternal Power" of God is +"clearly seen" in the mighty orbs which float in the illimitable space. +The vastness of the universe shadows forth the infinity of God. The +indivisible unity of space and the ideal unity of the universe reflect +the unity of God. The material forms around us are symbols of divine +ideas, and the successive history of the universe is an expression of +the divine thought; whilst the ethical ideas and sentiments inherent in +the human mind are a reflection of the moral character of God. + +The reader can not have failed to observe the form in which the Theistic +argument is stated; "_if_ the finite universe is a created effect, it +must reveal something as to the nature of its cause: _if_ the existing +order and arrangement of the universe had a commencement in time, it +must have an ultimate and adequate cause." The question, therefore, +presents itself in a definite form: "_Is the universe finite or +infinite; had the order of the universe a beginning, or is it eternal_?" + +It will be seen at a glance that this is the central and vital question +in the Theistic argument. If the order and arrangement of the universe +is _eternal_, then that order is an inherent law of nature, and, as +eternal, does not imply a cause _ab extra:_ if it is not eternal, then +the ultimate cause of that order must be a power above and beyond +nature. In the former case the minor premise of the Theistic syllogism +is utterly invalidated; in the latter case it is abundantly sustained. + +Some Theistic writers--as Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Saisset--have +made the fatal admission that the universe is, in some sense, _infinite_ +and _eternal_. In making this admission they have unwittingly +surrendered the citadel of strength, and deprived the argument by which +they would prove the being of a God of all its logical force. That +argument is thus presented by Saisset: "The finite supposes the +infinite. Extension supposes first space, then immensity: duration +supposes first time, then eternity. A sudden and irresistible judgment +refers this to the necessary, infinite, perfect being."[215] But if "the +world is infinite and eternal,"[216] may not nature, or the totality of +all existence (to pan), be the necessary, infinite, and perfect Being? +An infinite and eternal universe has the reason of its existence in +itself, and the existence of such a universe can never prove to us the +existence of an infinite and eternal God. + +[Footnote 215: "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 205.] + +[Footnote 216: Ibid, p. 123.] + +A closer examination of the statements and reasonings of Descartes, +Pascal, and Leibnitz, as furnished by Saisset, will show that these +distinguished mathematicans were misled by the false notion of +"_mathematical_ infinitude." Their infinite universe, after all, is not +an "absolute," but a "relative" infinite; that is, the indefinite. "The +universe must extend _indefinitely_ in time and space, in the infinite +greatness, and in the infinite littleness of its parts--in the infinite +variety of its species, of its forms, and of its degrees of existence. +The finite can not express the infinite but by being _multiplied_ +infinitely. The finite, so far as it is finite, is not in any reasonable +relation, or in any intelligible proportion to the infinite. But the +finite, as _multiplied_ infinitely,[217] ages upon ages, spaces upon +spaces, stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, is a true expression +of the Infinite Being. Does it follow, because the universe has no +limits,--that it must therefore be eternal, immense, infinite as God +himself? No; that is but a vain scruple, which springs from the +imagination, and not from the reason. The imagination is always +confounding what reason should ever distinguish, eternity and time, +immensity and space, _relative_ infinity and _absolute_ infinity. The +Creator alone is eternal, immense, absolutely infinite."[218] + +[Footnote 217: "The infinite is distinct from the finite, and +consequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself; that is, +from the _indefinite_. That which is not infinite, added as many times +as you please to itself, will not become infinite."--Cousin, "Hist, of +Philos.," vol. ii. p. 231.] + +[Footnote 218: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. pp. 127, 128.] + +The introduction of the idea of "the mathematical infinite" into +metaphysical speculation, especially by Kant and Hamilton, with the +design, it would seem, of transforming the idea of infinity into a +sensuous conception, has generated innumerable paralogisms which +disfigure the pages of their philosophical writings. This procedure is +grounded in the common fallacy of supposing that _infinity_ and +_quantity_ are compatible attributes, and susceptible of mathematical +synthesis. This insidious and plausible error is ably refuted by a +writer in the "North American Review."[219] We can not do better than +transfer his argument to our pages in an abridged form. + +[Footnote 219: "The Conditioned and the Unconditioned," No. CCV. art. +iii. (1864).] + +Mathematics is conversant with quantities and quantitative relations. +The conception of quantity, therefore, if rigorously analyzed, will +indicate _à priori_ the natural and impassable boundaries of the +science; while a subsequent examination of the quantities called +infinite in the mathematical sense, and of the algebraic symbol of +infinity, will be seen to verify the results of this _à priori_ +analysis. + +Quantity is that attribute of things in virtue of which they are +susceptible of exact mensuration. The question _how much_, or _how many_ +(_quantus_), implies the answer, _so much_, or _so many_ (_tantus_); but +the answer is possible only through reference to some standard of +magnitude or multitude arbitrarily assumed. Every object, therefore, of +which quantity, in the mathematical sense, is predicable, must be by its +essential nature _mensurable._ Now mensurability implies the existence +of actual, definite limits, since without them there could be no fixed +relation between the given object and the standard of measurement, and, +consequently, no possibility of exact mensuration. In fact, since +quantification is the object of all mathematical operations, mathematics +may be not inaptly defined as _the science of the determinations of +limits_. It is evident, therefore, that the terms _quantity_ and +_finitude_ express the same attribute, namely, _limitation_--the former +relatively, the latter absolutely; for quantity is limitation considered +with relation to some standard of measurement, and finitude is +limitation considered simply in itself. The sphere of quantity, +therefore, is absolutely identical with the sphere of the finite; and +the phrase _infinite quantity_, if strictly construed, is a +contradiction in terms. + +The result thus attained by considering abstract quantity is +corroborated by considering concrete and discrete quantities. Such +expressions as _infinite sphere, radius, parallelogram, line,_ and so +forth, are self-contradictory. A sphere is limited by its own periphery, +and a radius by the centre and circumference of its circle. A +parallelogram of infinite altitude is impossible, because the limit of +its altitude is assigned in the side which must be parallel to its base +in order to constitute it a parallelogram. In brief, all figuration is +limitation. The contradiction in the term _infinite line_ is not quite +so obvious, but can readily be made apparent. Objectively, a line is +only the termination of a surface, and a surface the termination of a +solid; hence a line can not exist apart from an extended quantity, nor +an infinite line apart from an infinite quantity. But as this term has +just been shown to be self-contradictory, an infinite line can not exist +objectively at all. Again, every line is extension in one dimension; +hence a mathematical quantity, hence mensurable, hence finite; you must +therefore, deny that a line is a quantity, or else affirm that it is +finite. + +The same conclusion is forced upon us, if from geometry we turn to +arithmetic. The phrases _infinite number, infinite series, infinite +process_, and so forth, are all contradictory when literally construed. +Number is a relation among separate unities or integers, which, +considered objectively as independent of our cognitive powers, must +constitute an exact sum; and this exactitude, or synthetic totality, is +limitation. If considered subjectively in the mode of its cognition, a +number is infinite only in the sense that it is beyond the power of our +imagination or conception, which is an abuse of the term. In either case +the totality is fixed; that is, finite. So, too, of _series_ and +_process_. Since every series involves a succession of terms or numbers, +and every process a succession of steps or stages, the notion of series +and process plainly involves that of _number_, and must be rigorously +dissociated from the idea of infinity. At any one step, at any one term, +the number attained is determinate, hence finite. The fact that, by the +law of the series or of the process, _we_ may continue the operation _as +long as we please_, does not justify the application of the term +infinite to the operation itself; if any thing is infinite, it is the +will which continues the operation, which is absurd if said of human +wills. + +Consequently, the attribute of infinity is not predicable either of +'diminution without limit,' 'augmentation without limit,' or 'endless +approximation to a fixed limit,' for these mathematical processes +continue only as we continue them, consist of steps successively +accomplished, and are limited by the very fact of this serial +incompletion. + +"We can not forbear pointing out an important application of these +results to the Critical Philosophy. Kant bases each of his famous four +antinomies on the demand of pure reason for unconditioned totality in a +regressive series of conditions. This, he says, must be realized either +in an absolute first of the series, conditioning all the other members, +but itself unconditioned, or else in the absolute infinity of the series +without a first; but reason is utterly unable, on account of mutual +contradiction, to decide in which of the two alternatives the +unconditioned is found. By the principles we have laid down, however, +the problem is solved. The absolute infinity of a series is a +contradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably and +inconceivably great, is impossible unless _unity_ is given as its basis, +so every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a _first +term_ is given as a commencement. Through a first term alone is the +unconditioned possible; that is, if it does not exist in a first term, +it can not exist at all; of the two alternatives, therefore, one +altogether disappears, and reason is freed from the dilemma of a +compulsory yet impossible decision. Even if it should be allowed that +the series has no first term, but has originated _ab æterno_, it must +always at each instant have a _last term_; the series, as a whole, can +not be infinite, and hence can not, as Kant claims it can, realize in +its wholeness unconditioned totality. Since countless terms forever +remain unreached, the series is forever limited by them. Kant himself +admits that it _can never be completed_, and is only potentially +infinite; actually, therefore, by his own admission, it is finite. But a +last term implies a first, as absolutely as one end of a string implies +the other; the only possibility of an unconditioned lies in Kant's first +alternative, and if, as he maintains Reason must demand it, she can not +hesitate in her decisions. That _number is a limitation_ is no new +truth, and that every series involves number is self-evident; and it is +surprising that so radical a criticism on Kant's system should never +have suggested itself to his opponents. Even the so-called _moments_ of +time can not be regarded as constituting a real series, for a series can +not be real except through its divisibility into members whereas time is +indivisible, and its partition into moments is a conventional fiction. +Exterior limitability and interior divisibility result equally from the +possibility of discontinuity. Exterior illimitability and interior +indivisibility are simple phases of the same attribute of _necessary +continuity_ contemplated under different aspects. From this principle +flows another upon which it is impossible to lay too much stress, +namely; _illimitability and indivisibility, infinity and unity, +reciprocally necessitate each other_. Hence the Quantitative Infinites +must be also Units, and the division of space and time, implying +absolute contradiction, is not even cogitable as an hypothesis.[220] + +"The word _infinite_, therefore, in mathematical usage, as applied to +_process_ and to _quantity_, has a two-fold signification. An infinite +process is one which we can continue _as long as we please_, but which +exists solely in our continuance of it.[221] An infinite quantity is one +which exceeds our powers of mensuration or of conception, but which, +nevertheless, has bounds and limits in itself.[222] Hence the +possibility of relation among infinite quantities, and of different +orders of infinities. If the words _infinite, infinity, infinitesimal_, +should be banished from mathematical treatises and replaced by the words +_indefinite, indefinity,_ and _indefinitesimal_, mathematics would +suffer no loss, while, by removing a perpetual source of confusion, +metaphysics would get great gain." + +[Footnote 220: By the application of these principles the writer in the +"North American Review" completely dissolves the antinomies by which +Hamilton seeks to sustain his "Philosophy of the Conditioned." See +"North American Review," 1864, pp. 432-437.] + +[Footnote 221: De Morgan, "Diff. and Integ. Calc." p. 9.] + +[Footnote 222: Id., ib., p. 25.] + +The above must be regarded as a complete refutation of the position +taken by _Hume_, to wit, that the idea of nature eternally existing in a +state of order, without a cause other than the eternally inherent laws +of nature, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of an +eternally-existing and infinite mind, who originated this order--a God +existing without a cause. The eternal and infinite Mind is indivisible +and illimitable; nature, in its totality, as well as in its individual +parts, has interior divisibility, and exterior limitability. The +infinity of God is not a _quantitative_, but a _qualitative_ infinity. +The miscalled eternity and infinity of nature is an _indefinite_ +extension and protension in time and space, and, as _quantitative_, must +necessarily be limited and measurable, therefore _finite_. + +The universe of sense-perception and sensuous imagination is a +phenomenal universe, a genesis, a perpetual becoming, an entrance into +existence, and an exit thence; the Theist is, therefore, perfectly +justified in regarding it as disqualified for _self-existence_, and in +passing behind it for the Supreme Entity that needs no cause. Phenomena +demand causation, entities dispense with it. No one asks for a cause of +the _space_ which contains the universe, or of the Eternity on the bosom +of which it floats. Everywhere the line is necessarily drawn upon the +same principle; that entities _may_ have self-existence, phenomena +_must_ have a cause.[223] + +[Footnote 223: "Science, Nescience, and Faith," in Martineau's "Essays," +p. 206.] + +IV. _Psychological analysis clearly attests that in the phenomena of +consciousness there are found elements or principles which, in their +regular and normal development, transcend the limits of consciousness, +and attain to the knowledge of Absolute Being, Absolute Reason, Absolute +Good_, i.e., GOD. + +The analysis of thought clearly reveals that the mind of man is in +possession of ideas, notions, beliefs, principles (as _e.g._, the idea +of space, duration, cause, substance, unity, infinity), which are not +derived from sensation and experience, and which can not be drawn out of +sensation and experience by any process of generalization. These ideas +have this incontestable peculiarity, as distinguished from all the +phenomena of sensation, that, whilst the latter are particular, +contingent, and relative, the former are _universal_, _necessary_, and +_absolute_. As an example, and a proof of the reality and validity of +this distinction, take the ideas of _body_ and of _space_, the former +unquestionably derived from experience, the latter supplied by reason +alone. "I ask you, can not you conceive this book to be destroyed? +Without doubt you can. And can not you conceive the whole world to be +destroyed, and no matter whatever in existence? You can. For you, +constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies +implies no contradiction. And what do we call the idea of a thing which +we can conceive of as non-existing? We call it a _contingent_ and +_relative_ idea. But if you can conceive this book to be destroyed, all +bodies destroyed, can you suppose space to be destroyed? You can not. It +is in the power of man's thought to conceive the non-existence of +bodies; it is not in the power of man's thought to conceive the +non-existence of space. The idea of space is thus a _necessary_ and +_absolute_ idea."[224] + +[Footnote 224: Cousin's "Hist. of Philos.," vol. ii. p. 214.] + +Take, again, the ideas of _event_ and _cause_. The idea of an event is a +_contingent_ idea; it is the idea of something which might or might not +have happened. There is no impossibility or contradiction in either +supposition. The idea of cause is a _necessary_ idea. An event being +given, the idea of cause is necessarily implied. An uncaused event is an +impossible conception. The idea of cause is also a _universal_ idea +extending to all events, actual or conceivable, and affirmed by all +minds. It is a rational fact, attested by universal consciousness, that +we can not think of an event transpiring without a cause; of a thing +being the author of its own existence; of something generated by and out +of nothing. _Ex nihilo nihil_ is a universal law of thought and of +things. This universal "law of causality" is clearly distinguishable +from a _general_ truth reached by induction. For example, it is a very +general truth that, during twenty-four hours, day is succeeded by night. +But this is not a necessary truth, neither is it a universal truth. It +does not extend to all known lands, as, for example, to Nova Zembla. It +does not hold true of the other planets. Nor does it extend to all +possible lands. We can easily conceive of lands plunged in eternal +night, or rolling in eternal day. With another system of worlds, one can +conceive other physics, but one can not conceive other metaphysics. It +is impossible to imagine a world in which the law of causality does not +reign. Here, then, we have one absolute principle (among others which +may be enumerated), the existence and reality of which is revealed, not +by sensation, but by reason--a principle which transcends the limits of +experience, and which, in its regular and logical development, attains +the knowledge of the Absolute Cause--the First Cause of all causes--God. + +Thus it is evident that the human mind is in possession of two distinct +orders of primitive cognitions,--one, contingent, relative, and +phenomenal; the other universal, necessary, and absolute. These two +distinct orders of cognition presuppose the existence in man of two +distinct faculties or organs of knowledge--_sensation_, external and +internal, which perceives the contingent, relative, and phenomenal, and +_reason_, which apprehends the universal, necessary, and absolute. The +knowledge which is derived from sensation and experience is called +_empirical_ knowledge, or knowledge _à posteriori_, because subsequent +to, and consequent upon, the exercise of the faculties of observation. +The knowledge derived from reason is called _transcendental_ knowledge, +or knowledge _à priori_, because it furnishes laws to, and governs the +exercise of the faculties of observation and thought, and is not the +result of their exercise. The sensibility brings the mind into relation +with the _physical_ world, the reason puts mind in communication with +the _intelligible_ world--the sphere of _à priori_ principles, of +necessary and absolute truths, which depend upon neither the world nor +the conscious self, and which reveal to man the existence of the soul, +nature, and God. Every distinct fact of consciousness is thus at once +_psychological_ and _ontological_, and contains these three fundamental +ideas, which we can not go beyond, or cancel by any possible +analysis--the _soul_, with its faculties; _matter_, with its qualities; +_God_, with his perfections. + +We do not profess to be able to give a clear explication and complete +enumeration of all the ideas of reason, and of the necessary and +universal principles or axioms which are grounded on these ideas. This +is still the grand desideratum of metaphysical science. Its achievement +will give us a primordial logic, which shall be as exact in its +procedure and as certain in its conclusions as the mathematical +sciences. Meantime, it may be affirmed that philosophic analysis, in the +person of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Cousin, has succeeded in +disengaging such _à priori_ ideas, and formulating such principles and +laws of thought, as lead infallibly to the cognition of the _Absolute +Being_, the _Absolute Reason_, the _Absolute Good_, that is, GOD. + +It would carry us too far beyond our present design were we to exhibit, +in each instance, the process of _immediate abstraction_ by which the +contingent and relative element of knowledge is eliminated, and the +necessary and absolute principle is disengaged. We shall simply state +the method, and show its application by a single illustration. + +There are unquestionably _two_ sorts of abstraction: 1. "_Comparative_ +abstraction, operating upon several real objects, and seizing their +resemblances in order to form an abstract idea, which is collective and +mediate; collective, because different individuals concur in its +formation; mediate, because it requires several intermediate +operations." This is the method of the physical sciences, which +comprises comparison, abstraction, and generalization. The result in +this process is the attainment of a _general_ truth. 2. "_Immediate_ +abstraction, not comparative; operating not upon several concretes, but +upon a single one, eliminating and neglecting its individual and +variable part, and disengaging the absolute part, which it raises at +once to its pure form." The parts to be eliminated in a concrete +cognition are, first, the quality of the object, and the circumstances +under which the absolute unfolds itself; and secondly, the quality of +the subject, which perceives but does not constitute it. The phenomena +of the me and the not-me being eliminated, the absolute remains. This is +the process of rational psychology, and the result obtained is a +_universal_ and _necessary_ truth. + +"Let us take, as an example, the principle of cause. To be able to say +that the event I see must have a cause, it is not indispensable to have +seen several events succeed each other. The principle which compels me +to pronounce this judgment is already complete in the first as in the +last event; it can not change in respect to its object, it can not +change in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or +less number of applications. The only difference that it is subject to +in regard to us is that we apply it, whether we remark it or not, +whether we disengage it or not from its particular application. The +question is not to eliminate the particularity of the phenomenon wherein +it appears to us, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the murder of a +man, in order immediately to conceive, in a general and abstract manner, +the necessity of a cause for every event that begins to exist. Here it +is not because I am the same, or have been affected in the same manner +in several different cases, that I have come to this general and +abstract conception. A leaf falls; at the same moment I think, I +believe, I declare that this falling of the leaf must have a cause. A +man has been killed; at the same instant I believe, I proclaim that this +death must have a cause. Each one of these facts contains particular and +variable circumstances, and something universal and necessary, to wit, +both of them can not but have a cause. Now I am perfectly able to +disengage the universal from the particular in regard to the first fact +as well as in regard to the second fact, for the universal is in the +first quite as well as in the second. In fact, if the principle of +causality is not universal in the first fact, neither will it be in the +second, nor in the third, nor in the thousandth; for a thousandth is not +nearer than the first to the infinite--to absolute universality. It is +the same, and still more evidently, with _necessity_. Pay particular +attention to this point; if necessity is not in the first fact, it can +not be in any; for necessity can not be formed little by little, and by +successive increments. If, on the first murder I see, I do not exclaim +that this murder had necessarily a cause, at the thousandth murder, +although it shall be proved that all the others had causes, I shall have +the right to think that this murder has, very probably, also a cause, +but I shall never have the right to say that it _necessarily_ had a +cause. But when universality and necessity are already in a single case, +that case is sufficient to entitle me to deduce them from it,"[225] and +we may add, also, to affirm them of every other event that may +transpire. + +[Footnote 225: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," pp. 57, 58.] + +The following _schema_ will exhibit the generally accepted results of +this method of analysis applied to the phenomena of thought: + +(i.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments from +whence is derived the cognition of Absolute Being_. + +1. _The principle of Substance_; thus enounced--"every quality supposes +a _subject_ or real being." + +2. _The principle of Causality_; "every thing that begins to be supposes +a _power_ adequate to its production, _i.e._, an efficient cause." + +3. _The principle of Unity_; "all differentiation and plurality supposes +an incomposite unity; all diversity, an ultimate and indivisible +identity." + +4. _The principle of the Unconditioned_; "the finite supposes the +infinite, the dependent supposes the self-existent, the temporal +supposes the eternal." + +(ii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from +which is derived the cognition of the Absolute Reason_. + +1. _The principle of Ideality_; thus enounced, "facts of order--definite +proportion, symmetrical arrangement, numerical relation, geometrical +form--having a commencement in time, present themselves to us as the +expression of _Ideas_, and refer us to _Mind_ as their analogon, and +exponent, and source." + +2. _The principle of Consecution_; "the uniform succession and +progressive evolution of new existences, according to fixed definite +archetypes, suppose a unity of _thought_--a comprehensive _plan_ +embracing all existence." + +3. _The principle of Intentionality or Final Cause_; "every means +supposes an _end_ contemplated, and a choice and adaptation of means to +secure the _end_." + +4. _The principle of Personality_; "intelligent purpose and voluntary +choice imply a personal agent." + +(iii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from +whence is derived the cognition of the Absolute Good_. + +1. _The principle of Moral Law_; thus enounced, "the action of a +voluntary agent necessarily characterized as _right_ or _wrong_, +supposes an immutable and universal standard of right--an absolute moral +Law." + +2. _The principle of Moral Obligation_; "the feeling of obligation to +obey a law of duty supposes a _Lawgiver_ by whose authority we are +obliged." + +3. _The principle of Moral Desert_; "the feeling of personal +accountability and of moral desert supposes a _judge_ to whom we must +give account, and who shall determine our award." + +4. _The pnnciple of Retribution_; "retributive issues in this life, and +the existence in all minds of an impersonal justice which demands that, +in the final issue, every being shall receive his just deserts, suppose +a being of _absolute justice_ who shall render to every man according to +his works." + +A more profound and exhaustive analysis may perhaps resolve all these +primitive judgments into one universal principle or law, which Leibnitz +has designated "_The principle or law of sufficient reason_," and which +is thus enounced--there must be an ultimate and sufficient reason why +any thing exists, and why it is, rather than otherwise; that is, if any +thing begins to be, something else must be supposed as the adequate +ground, and reason, and cause of its existence; or again, to state the +law in view of our present discussion, "_if the finite universe, with +its existing order and arrangement, had a beginning, there must be an +ultimate and sufficient reason why it exists, and why it is as it is, +rather than otherwise_." In view of one particular class of phenomena, +or special order of facts, this "principle of sufficient reason" may be +varied in the form of its statement, and denominated "the principle of +substance," "the principle of causality," "the principle of +intentionality," etc.; and, it may be, these are but specific judgments +under the one fundamental and generic law of thought which constitutes +the _major_ premise of every Theistic syllogism. + +These fundamental principles, primitive judgments, axioms, or necessary +and determinate forms of thought, exist potentially or germinally in all +human minds; they are spontaneously developed in presence of the +phenomena of the universe, material and mental; they govern the original +movement of the mind, even when not appearing in consciousness in their +pure and abstract form; and they compel us to affirm _a permanent being_ +or _reality_ behind all phenomena--a _power_ adequate to the production +of change, back of all events; a _personal Mind_, as the explanation of +all the facts of order, and uniform succession, and regular evolution; +and a _personal Lawgiver_ and _Righteous Judge_ as the ultimate ground +and reason of all the phenomena of the moral world; in short, to affirm +_an Unconditioned Cause of all finite and secondary causes; a First +Principle of all principles; an Ultimate Reason of all reasons; an +immutable Uncreated Justice, the living light of conscience; a King +immortal, eternal, invisible, the only wise God, the ruler of the world +and man_. + +Our position, then, is, that the idea of God is revealed to man in the +natural and spontaneous development of his intelligence, and that the +existence of a Supreme Reality corresponding to, and represented by this +idea, is rationally and logically demonstrable, and therefore justly +entitled to take rank as part of our legitimate, valid, and positive +_knowledge_. + +And now from this position, which we regard as impregnable, we shall be +prepared more deliberately and intelligibly to contemplate the various +assaults which are openly or covertly made upon the doctrine that _God +is cognizable by human reason_. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). + +IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? + + +"The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but the +confession of despair."--LIGHTFOOT. + +At the outset of this inquiry we attempted a hasty grouping of the +various parties and schools which are arrayed against the doctrine that +God is cognizable by human reason, and in general terms we sought to +indicate the ground they occupy. + +Viewed from a philosophical stand-point, we found one party marshalled +under the standard of Idealism; another of Materialism and, again, +another of Natural Realism. Regarded in their theological aspects, some +are positive Atheists; others, strange to say, are earnest Theists; +whilst others occupy a position of mere Indifferentism. Yet, +notwithstanding the remarkable diversity, and even antagonism of their +philosophical and theological opinions, they are all agreed in denying +to reason any valid cognition of God. + +The survey of Natural Theism we have completed in the previous chapter +will enable us still further to indicate the exact points against which +their attacks are directed, and also to estimate the character and force +of the weapons employed. With or without design, they are, each in their +way, assailing one or other of the principles upon which we rest our +demonstration of the being of God. As we proceed, we shall find that +Mill and the Constructive Idealists are really engaged in undermining +"the _principle of substance_;" their doctrine is a virtual denial of +all objective realities answering to our subjective ideas of matter, +mind, and God. The assaults of Comte and the Materialists of his school +are mainly directed against "_the principle of causality_" and "_the +principle of intentionality_;" they would deny to man all knowledge of +causes, efficient and final. The attacks of Hamilton and his school are +directed against "the _principle of the unconditioned_," his philosophy +of the conditioned is a plausible attempt to deprive man of all power to +think the Infinite and Perfect, to conceive the Unconditioned and +Ultimate Cause; whilst the Dogmatic Theologians are borrowing, and +recklessly brandishing, the weapons of all these antagonists, and, in +addition to all this, are endeavoring to show the insufficiency of "_the +principle of unity_" and the weakness and invalidity of "the _moral +principles_," which are regarded by us as relating man to a Moral +Personality, and as indicating to him the existence of a righteous God, +the ruler of the world. It is necessary, therefore, that we should +concentrate our attention yet more specifically on these separate lines +of attack, and attempt a minuter examination of the positions assumed by +each, and of the arguments by which they are seeking, directly or +indirectly, to invalidate the fundamental principles of Natural Theism. + +(i.) _We commence with the Idealistic School_, of which John Stuart Mill +must be regarded as the ablest living representative. + +The doctrine of this school is that all our knowledge is necessarily +confined to _mental_ phenomena; that is, "to _feelings_ or states of +consciousness," and "the succession and co-existence, the likeness and +unlikeness between these feelings or states of consciousness."[226] All +our general notions, all our abstract ideas, are generated out of these +feelings[227] by "_inseparable association_," which registers their +inter-relations of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The +results of this inseparable association constitute at once the sum total +and the absolute limit of all possible cognition. + +[Footnote 226: J. S. Mill, "Logic," vol. i. p. 83 (English edition).] + +[Footnote 227: In the language of Mill, every thing of which we are +conscious is called "feeling." "Feeling, in the proper sense of the +term, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought are the +subordinate species."--"Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. § 3.] + +It is admitted by Mill that one _apparent_ element in this total result +is the general conviction that our own existence is really distinct from +the external world, and that the personal _ego_ has an essential +identity distinct from the fleeting phenomena of sensation. But this +persuasion is treated by him as a mere illusion--a leap beyond the +original datum for which we have no authority. Of a real substance or +substratum called Mind, of a real substance or substratum called Matter, +underlying the series of feelings--"the thread of consciousness"--we do +know and can know nothing; and in affirming the existence of such +substrata we are making a supposition we can not possibly verify. The +ultimate datum of speculative philosophy is not "_I think_," but simply +"_Thoughts or feelings are_." The belief in a permanent subject or +substance, called matter, as the ground and plexus of physical +phenomena, and of a permanent subject or substance, called mind, as the +ground and plexus of mental phenomena, is not a primitive and original +intuition of reason. It is simply through the action of the principle of +association among the ultimate phenomena, called feelings, that this +(erroneous) separation of the phenomena into two orders or +aggregates--one called mind or self; the other matter, or not +self--takes place; and without this curdling or associating process no +such notion or belief could have been generated. "The principle of +substance," as an ultimate law of thought, is, therefore, to be regarded +as a transcendental dream. + +But now that the notion of _mind_ or _self_, and of _matter_ or not +_self_, do exist as common convictions of our race, what is philosophy +to make of them? After a great many qualifications and explanations, Mr. +Mill has, in his "Logic," summed up his doctrine of Constructive +Idealism in the following words: "As body is the mysterious _something_ +which excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious _something_ +which feels and thinks."[228] But what is this "mysterious something?" +Is it a reality, an entity, a subject; or is it a shadow, an illusion, a +dream? In his "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," where it +may be presumed, we have his maturest opinions, Mr. Mill, in still more +abstract and idealistic phraseology, attempts an answer. Here he defines +matter as "_a permanent possibility of sensation_,"[229] and mind as "_a +permanent possibility of feeling_."[230] And "the belief in these +permanent possibilities," he assures us, "includes all that is essential +or characteristic in the belief in substance."[231] "If I am asked," +says he, "whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner +accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: and so +do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm +with confidence that this conception of matter includes the whole +meaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical, +and sometimes from theological theories. The reliance of mankind on the +real existence of visible and tangible objects, means reliance on the +reality and permanence of possibilities of visual and tactual +sensations, when no sensations are actually experienced."[232] +"Sensations," however, let it be borne in mind, are but a subordinate +species of the genus feeling.[233] They are "states of +consciousness"--phenomena of mind, not of matter; and we are still +within the impassable boundary of ideal phenomena; we have yet no +cognition of an external world. The sole cosmical conception, for us, is +still a succession of sensations, or states of consciousness. This is +the one phenomenon which we can not transcend in knowledge, do what we +will; all else is hypothesis and illusion. The _non-ego_, after all, +then, may be but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the +possible modifications of the _ego_. + +[Footnote 228: "Logic," bk. i, ch. iii. § 8.] + +[Footnote 229: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 243.] + +[Footnote 230: Ibid., vol. i. p. 253.] + +[Footnote 231: Ibid., vol. i. p. 246.] + +[Footnote 232: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 243, 244.] + +[Footnote 233: "Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. § 3.] + +And now that matter, as a real existence, has disappeared under Mr. +Mill's analysis, what shall be said of mind or self? Is there any +permanent subject or real entity underlying the phenomena of feeling? In +feeling, is there a personal self that feels, thinks, and wills? It +would seem not. Mind, as well as matter, resolves itself into a "series +of feelings," varying and fugitive from moment to moment, in a sea of +possibilities of feeling. "My mind," says Mill, "is but a series of +feelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, however +supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness, which are not, +though they might be, realized."[234] + +[Footnote 234: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 254.] + +The ultimate fact of the phenomenal world, then, in the philosophy of +Mill, is neither matter nor mind, but feelings or states of +consciousness associated together by the relations, amongst themselves, +of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The existence of self, +except as "a series of feelings;" the existence of any thing other than +self, except as a feigned unknown cause of sensation, is rigorously +denied. Mr. Mill does not content himself with saying that we are +ignorant of the _nature_ of matter and mind, but he asserts we are +ignorant of the _existence_ of matter and mind as real entities. + +The bearing of this doctrine of Idealism upon Theism and Theology will +be instantly apparent to the reader. If I am necessarily ignorant of the +existence of the external world, and of the personal _ego_, or real +self, I must be equally ignorant of the existence of God. If one is a +mere supposition, an illusion, so the other must be. Mr. Mill, however, +is one of those courteous and affable writers who are always conscious, +as it were, of the presence of their readers, and extremely careful not +to shock their feelings or prejudices; besides, he has too much +conscious self-respect to avow himself an atheist. As a speculative +philosopher, he would rather regard Theism and Theology as "open +questions," and he satisfies himself with saying, if you believe in the +existence of God, or in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. "As a +theory," he tells us that his doctrine leaves the evidence of the +existence of God exactly as it was before. Supposing me to believe that +the Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings +prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God's +existence to be _as real as my own_[235]. And as for evidence, the +argument of Paley's 'Natural Theology,' or, for that matter, of his +'Evidences of Christianity,' would stand exactly as it does. + +The design argument is drawn from the analogies of human experience. +From the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings, +it infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar, +but superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings. _If_ it prove +these, nobody but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves a +mysterious _substratum_ for them.[236] The argument from design, it +seems to us, however, would have no validity if there be no external +world offering marks of design. If the external world is only a mode of +feeling, a series of mental states, then our notion of the Divine +Existence may be only "an association of feelings"--a mode of Self. And +if we have no positive knowledge of a real self as existing, and God's +existence is no more "real than our own," then the Divine existence +stands on a very dubious and uncertain foundation. It can have no very +secure hold upon the human mind, and certainly has no claim to be +regarded as a fundamental and necessary belief. That it has a very +precarious hold upon the mind of Mr. Mill, is evident from the following +passage in his article on "_Later Speculations of A. Comte_."[237] "We +venture to think that a religion may exist without a belief in a God, +and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an +instructive and profitable object of contemplation." + +And now let us close Mr. Mill's book, and, introverting our mental gaze, +interrogate _consciousness_, the verdict of which, even Mr. Mill assures +us, is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal.[238] + +[Footnote 235: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 254.] + +[Footnote 236: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 259.] + +[Footnote 237: Westminster Review, July, 1835 (American edition), p. 3.] + +[Footnote 238: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 161.] + +1. We have an ineradicable, and, as it would seem, an intuitive faith in +the real existence of an external world distinct from our sensations, +and also of a personal self, which we call "I," "myself," as distinct +from "my sensations," and "my feelings." We find, also, that this is +confessedly the common belief of mankind. There have been a few +philosophers who have affected to treat this belief as a "mere +prejudice," an "illusion;" but they have never been able, practically, +so to regard and treat it. Their language, just as plainly as the +language of the common people, betrays their instinctive faith in an +outer world, and proves their utter inability to emancipate themselves +from this "prejudice," if such it may please them to call it. In view of +this acknowledged fact, we ask--Does the term "_permanent possibility of +sensations_" exhaust all that is contained in this conception of an +external world? This evening I _remember_ that at noonday I beheld the +sun, and experienced a sensation of warmth whilst exposing myself to his +rays; and I _expect_ that to-morrow, under the same conditions, I shall +experience the same sensations. I now _remember_ that last evening I +extinguished my light and attempted to leave my study, but, coming in +contact with the closed door, experienced a sense of resistance to my +muscular effort, by a solid and extended body exterior to myself; and I +_expect_ that this evening, under the same circumstances, I shall +experience the same sensations. Now, does a belief in "a permanent +possibility of sensations" explain all these experiences? does it +account for that immediate knowledge of an _external_ object which I had +on looking at the sun, or that presentative knowledge of _resistance_ +and _extension_, and of an extended, resisting _substance_, I had when +in contact with the door of my study? Mr. Mill very confidently affirms +that this belief includes all; and this phrase expresses all the meaning +attached to extended "matter" and resisting "substance" by the common +world.[239] We as confidently affirm that it does no such thing; and as +"the common world" must be supposed to understand the language of +consciousness as well as the philosopher, we are perfectly willing to +leave the decision of that question to the common consciousness of our +race. If all men do not believe in a permanent _reality_--a substance +which is external to themselves, a substance which offers resistance to +their muscular effort, and which produces in them the sensations of +solidity, extension, resistance, etc.--they believe nothing and know +nothing at all about the matter. + +[Footnote 239: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 243.] + +Still less does the phrase "_a permanent possibility of feelings"_ +exhaust all our conception of a personal self. Recurring to the +experiences of yesterday, I _remember_ the feelings I experienced on +beholding the sun, and also on pressing against the closed door, and I +confidently _expect_ the recurrence, under the same circumstances, of +the same feelings. Does the belief in "a permanent possibility of +feelings" explain the act of memory by which I recall the past event, +and the act of prevision by which I anticipate the recurrence of the +like experience in the future? Who or what is the "I" that remembers and +the "I" that anticipates? The "ego," the personal mind, is, according to +Mill, a mere "series of feelings," or, more correctly, a flash of +"_present_ feelings" on "a background of possibilities of present +feelings."[240] If, then, there be no permanent substance or reality +which is the subject of the present feeling, which receives and retains +the impress of the past feeling, and which anticipates the recurrence of +like feelings in the future, how can the _past_ be recalled, how +distinguished from the present? and how, without a knowledge of the past +as distinguished from the present, can the _future_ be forecast? Mr. +Mill feels the pressure of this difficulty, and frankly acknowledges it. +He admits that, on the hypothesis that mind is simply "a series of +feelings," the phenomena of memory and expectation are "inexplicable" +and "incomprehensible."[241] He is, therefore, under the necessity of +completing his definition of mind by adding that it is a series of +feelings which "_is aware of itself as a series_;" and, still further, +of supplementing this definition by the conjecture that "_something +which has ceased to exist, or is not yet in existence, can still, in a +manner, be present_."[242] Now he who can understand how a series of +feelings can flow on in time, and from moment to moment drop out of the +present into non-existence, and yet be _present_ and _conscious of +itself as a series_, may be accorded the honor of understanding Mr. +Mill's definition of mind or self, and may be permitted to rank himself +as a distinguished disciple of the Idealist school; for ourselves, we +acknowledge we are destitute of the capacity to do the one, and of all +ambition to be the other. And he who can conceive how the _past_ feeling +of yesterday and the _possible_ feeling of to-morrow can be in any +manner _present_ to-day; or, in other words, how any thing which has +ceased to exist, or which never had an existence, can _now_ exist, may +be permitted to believe that a thing can be and not be at the same +moment, that a part is greater than the whole, and that two and two make +five; but we are not ashamed to confess our inability to believe a +contradiction. To our understanding, "possibilities of feeling" are not +actualities. They may or may not be realized, and until realized in +consciousness, they have no real being. If there be no other background +of mental phenomena save mere "possibilities of feeling," then present +feelings are the only existences, the only reality, and a loss of +immediate consciousness, as in narcosis and coma, is the loss of all +personality, all self-hood, and of all real being. + +[Footnote 240: "Exam. of Hamilton," vol. i. p. 260.] + +[Footnote 241: Ibid, p. 262.] + +[Footnote 242: Ibid.] + +2. What, then, is the verdict of consciousness as to the existence of a +permanent substance, an abiding existence which is the subject of all +the varying phenomena? Of what are we really conscious when we say "I +think," "I feel," "I will?" Are we simply conscious of thought, feeling, +and volition, or of a self, a person, which thinks, feels, and wills? +The man who honestly and unreservedly accepts the testimony of +consciousness in all its integrity must answer at once, _we have an +immediate consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of a +personal self as passively or actively related to the phenomena_. We are +conscious not merely of the act of volition, but of a self, a power, +producing the volition. We are conscious not merely of feeling, but of a +being who is the subject of the feeling. We are conscious not simply of +thought, but of a real entity that thinks. "It is clearly a flat +contradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of myself, +but only of my sensations or volitions. Who, then, is that _I_ that is +conscious, and how can I be conscious of such states as _mine?_"[243] + +[Footnote 243: Mansel, "Prolegomena Logica," p. 122, and note E, p. +281.] + +The testimony of consciousness, then, is indubitable that we have a +direct, immediate cognition of _self_--I know myself as a distinctly +existing being. This permanent self, to which I refer the earlier and +later stages of consciousness, the past as well as the present feeling, +and which I know abides the same under all phenomenal changes, +constitutes my personal identity. It is this abiding self which unites +the past and the present, and, from the present stretches onward to the +future. We know self immediately, as existing, as in active operation, +and as having permanence--or, in other words, as a "_substance_." This +one immediately presented substance, myself, may be regarded as +furnishing a positive basis for that other notion of substance, which is +representatively thought, as the subject of all sensible qualities. + +3. We may now inquire what is the testimony of consciousness as to the +existence of the extra-mental world? Are we conscious of perceiving +external objects immediately and in themselves, or only mediately +through some vicarious image or representative idea to which we +fictitiously ascribe an objective reality? + +The answer of common sense is that we are immediately conscious, in +perception, of an _ego_ and a _non-ego_ known together, and known in +contrast to each other; we are conscious of a perceiving subject, and of +an external reality, as the object perceived.[244] To state this +doctrine of natural realism still more explicitly we add, that we are +conscious of the immediate perception of certain essential attributes of +matter objectively existing. Of these primary qualities, which are +immediately perceived as real and objectively existing, we mention +_extension_ in space and _resistance_ to muscular effort, with which is +indissolubly associated the idea of _externality_. It is true that +extension and resistance are only qualities, but it is equally true that +they are qualities of something, and of something which is external to +ourselves. Let any one attempt to conceive of extension without +something which is extended, or of resistance apart from something which +offers resistance, and he will be convinced that we can never know +qualities without knowing substance, just as we can not know substance +without knowing qualities. This, indeed, is admitted by Mr. Mill.[245] +And if this be admitted, it must certainly be absurd to speak of +substance as something "unknown." Substance is known just as much as +quality is known, no less and no more. + +[Footnote 244: Hamilton, "Lectures," vol. 1. p. 288.] + +[Footnote 245: "Logic," bk. i. ch. iii. § 6.] + +We remark, in conclusion, that if the testimony of consciousness is not +accepted in all its integrity, we are necessarily involved in the +Nihilism of Hume and Fichte; the phenomena of mind and matter are, on +analysis, resolved into an absolute nothingness--"a play of phantasms in +a void."[246] + +(ii.) We turn, secondly, to the _Materialistic School_ as represented by +Aug. Comte. + +The doctrine of this school is that all knowledge is limited to +_material_ phenomena--that is, to appearances _perceptible to sense_. We +do not know the essence of any object, nor the real mode of procedure of +any event, but simply its relations to other events, as similar or +dissimilar, co-existent or successive. These relations are constant; +under the same conditions, they are always the same. The constant +resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences +which unite them, as antecedent and consequent, are termed _laws_. The +laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential +nature and their ultimate causes, _efficient_ or _final_, are unknown +and inscrutable to us.[247] + +[Footnote 246: Masson, "Recent British Philos.," p. 62.] + +[Footnote 247: See art. "Positive Philos. of A. Comte," _Westminster +Review_, April, 1865, p. 162, Am. ed.] + +It is not our intention to review the system of philosophy propounded by +Aug. Comte; we are now chiefly concerned with his denial of all +causation. + +1. _As to Efficient Causes_.--Had Comte contented himself with the +assertion that causes lie beyond the field of sensible observation, and +that inductive science can not carry us beyond the relations of +co-existence and succession among phenomena, he would have stated an +important truth, but certainly not a new truth. It had already been +announced by distinguished mental philosophers, as, for example, M. de +Biran and Victor Cousin.[248] The senses give us only the succession of +one phenomenon to another. I hold a piece of wax to the fire and it +melts. Here my senses inform me of two successive phenomena--the +proximity of fire and the melting of wax. It is now agreed among all +schools of philosophy that this is all the knowledge the senses can +possibly supply. The observation of a great number of like cases assures +us that this relation is uniform. The highest scientific generalization +does not carry us one step beyond this fact. Induction, therefore, gives +us no access to causes beyond phenomena. Still, this does not justify +Comte in the assertion that causes are to us absolutely _unknown_. The +question would still arise whether we have not some faculty of +knowledge, distinct from sensation, which is adequate to furnish a valid +cognition of cause. It does not by any means follow that, because the +idea of causation is not given as a "physical quæsitum" at the end of a +process of scientific generalization, it should not be a "metaphysical +datum" posited at the very beginning of scientific inquiry, as the +indispensable condition of our being able to cognize phenomena at all, +and as the law under which all thought, and all conception of the system +of nature, is alone possible. + +[Footnote 248: "It is now universally admitted that we have no +perception of the causal nexus in the material world."--Hamilton, +"Discussions," p. 522.] + +Now we affirm that the human mind has just as direct, immediate, and +positive knowledge of _cause_ as it has of _effect._ The idea of cause, +the intuition _power_, is given in the immediate consciousness of _mind +as determining its own_ operations. Our first, and, in fact, our only +presentation of power or cause, is that of _self as willing_. In every +act of volition I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form a +resolution or to refrain from it, to determine on this course of action +or that; and this constitutes the immediate presentative knowledge of +power.[249] The will is a power, a power in action, a productive power, +and, consequently, a cause. This doctrine is stated with remarkable +clearness and accuracy by Cousin: "If we seek the notion of cause in the +action of one ball upon another, as was previously done by Hume, or in +the action of the hand upon the ball, or the primary muscles upon the +extremities, or even in the action of the will upon the muscles, as was +done by M. Maine de Biran, we shall find it in none of these cases, not +even in the last; for it is possible there should be a paralysis of the +muscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes it +unproductive, incapable of being a cause, and, consequently, of +suggesting the notion of one. But what no paralysis can prevent is the +action of the will upon itself, the production of a resolution; that is +to say, the act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of all +causality, of which all external movements are only symbols more or less +imperfect. The first cause for us, is, therefore, the _will_, of which +the first effect is volition. This is at once the highest and the purest +source of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that of +personality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause, +as revealed in will and personality, which is the condition for us of +the ulterior or simultaneous conception of external, impersonal +causes."[250] + +[Footnote 249: "It is our _immediate consciousness of effort_, when we +exert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralize force, +which gives us this internal conviction of _power_ and _causation_, so +far as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe that +whenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, or +deflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocities +if already in motion, it is in consequence of such an _effort_ somehow +exerted."--Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 234; see Mansel's +"Prolegomena," p. 133.] + +[Footnote 250: "Philosophical Fragments," Preface to first edition.] + +Thus much for the origin of the idea of cause. We have the same direct +intuitive knowledge of cause that we have of effect; but we have not yet +rendered a full and adequate account of the _principle of causality_. We +have simply attained the notion of our personal causality, and we can +not arbitrarily substitute our personal causality for all the causes of +the universe, and erect our own experience as a law of the entire +universe. We have, however, already seen (Chap. V.) that the belief in +exterior causation is _necessary_ and _universal_. When a change takes +place, when a new phenomenon presents itself to our senses, we can not +avoid the conviction that it must have a cause. We can not even express +in language the relations of phenomena in time and space, without +speaking of causes. And there is not a rational being on the face of the +globe--a child, a savage, or a philosopher--who does not instinctively +and spontaneously affirm that every movement, every change, every new +existence, _must_ have a cause. Now what account can philosophy render +of this universal belief? One answer, and only one, is possible. The +_reason_ of man (that power of which Comte takes no account) is in fixed +and changeless relation to the principle of causation, just as _sense_ +is in fixed and changeless relation to exterior phenomena, so that we +can not know the external world, can not think or speak of phenomenal +existence, except as _effects_. In the expressive and forcible language +of Jas. Martineau: "By an irresistible law of thought _all phenomena +present themselves to us as the expression of power_, and refer us to a +causal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, nor +hear, nor feel; it is given in _thought_, supplied by the spontaneous +activity of mind as the correlative prefix to the phenomena +observed."[251] Unless, then, we are prepared to deny the validity of +all our rational intuitions, we can not avoid accepting "this subjective +postulate as a valid law for objective nature." If the intuitions of our +reason are pronounced deceptive and mendacious, so also must the +intuitions of the senses be pronounced illusory and false. Our whole +intellectual constitution is built up on false and erroneous principles, +and all knowledge of whatever kind must perish by "the contagion of +uncertainty." + +[Footnote 251: "Essays," p. 47.] + +Comte, however, is determined to treat the idea of causation as an +illusion, whether under its psychological form, as _will_, or under its +scientific form, as _force_. He feels that Theology is inevitable if we +permit the inquiry into causes;[252] and he is more anxious that +theology should perish than that truth should prevail. The human will +must, therefore, be robbed of all semblance of freedom, lest it should +suggest the idea of a Supreme Will governing nature; and human action, +like all other phenomena, must be reduced to uniform and necessary law. +All feelings, ideas, and principles guaranteed to us by consciousness +are to be cast out of the account. Psychology, resting on +self-observation, is pronounced a delusion. The immediate consciousness +of freedom is a dream. Such a procedure, to say the least of it, is +highly unphilosophical; to say the truth about it, it is obviously +dishonest. Every fact of human nature, just as much as every fact of +physical nature, must be accepted in all its integrity, or all must be +alike rejected. The phenomena of mind can no more be disregarded than +the phenomena of matter. Rational intuitions, necessary and universal +beliefs, can no more be ignored than the uniform facts of +sense-perception, without rendering a system of knowledge necessarily +incomplete, and a system of truth utterly impossible. Every one truth is +connected with every other truth in the universe. And yet Comte demands +that a large class of facts, the most immediate and direct of all our +cognitions, shall be rejected because they are not in harmony with the +fundamental assumption of the positive philosophy that all knowledge is +confined to _phenomena perceptible to sense_. Now it were just as easy +to cast the Alps into the Mediterranean as to obliterate from the human +intelligence the primary cognitions of immediate consciousness, or to +relegate the human reason from the necessary laws of thought. Comte +himself can not emancipate his own mind from a belief in the validity of +the testimony of consciousness. How can he know himself as distinct from +nature, as a living person, as the same being he was ten years ago, or +even yesterday, except by an appeal to consciousness? Despite his +earnestly-avowed opinions as to the inutility and fallaciousness of all +psychological inquiries, he is compelled to admit that "the phenomena of +life" are "_known by immediate consciousness_."[253] Now the knowledge +of our personal freedom rests on precisely the same grounds as the +knowledge of our personal existence. The same "immediate consciousness" +which attests that I exist, attests also, with equal distinctness and +directness, that I am self-determined and free. + +[Footnote 252: "The _inevitable tendency_ of our intelligence is towards +a philosophy radically theological, so often as we seek to penetrate, on +whatever pretext, into the intimate nature of phenomena" (vol. iv. p. +664).] + +[Footnote 253: "Positive Philos," vol. ii. p. 648.] + +In common with most atheistical writers, Comte is involved in the fatal +contradiction of at one time assuming, and at another of denying the +freedom of the will, to serve the exigencies of his theory. To prove +that the order of the universe can not be the product of a Supreme +Intelligence, he assumes that the products of mind must be characterized +by freedom and variety--the phenomena of mind must not be subject to +uniform and necessary laws; and inasmuch as the phenomena presented by +external nature are subject to uniform and changeless laws, they can not +be the product of mind. "Look at the whole frame of things," says he; +"how can it be the product of mind--of a supernatural Will? Is it not +subject to regular laws, and do we not actually obtain _prevision_ of +its phenomena? If it were the product of mind, its order would be +variable and free." Here, then, it is admitted that _freedom is an +essential characteristic of mind_. And this admission is no doubt a +thoughtless, unconscious betrayal of the innate belief of all minds in +the freedom of the will. But when Comte comes to deal with this freedom +as an objective question of philosophy, when he directs his attention to +the only will of which we have a direct and immediate knowledge, he +denies freedom and variety, and asserts in the most arbitrary manner +that the movements of the mind, like all the phenomena of nature, must +be subject to uniform, changeless, and necessary laws. And if we have +not yet been able to reduce the movements of mind, like the movements of +the planets, to statistics, and have not already obtained accurate +prevision of its successions or sequences as we have of physical +phenomena, it is simply the consequence of our inattention to, or +ignorance of, all the facts. We answer, there are no facts so directly +and intuitively known as the facts of consciousness; and, therefore, an +argument based upon our supposed ignorance of these facts is not likely +to have much weight against our immediate consciousness of personal +freedom. There is not any thing we know so immediately, so certainly, so +positively, as this fact--_we are free_. + +The word "force," representing as it does a subtile menial conception, +and not a phenomenon of sense, must also be banished from the domains of +Positive Science as an intruder, lest its presence should lend any +countenance to the idea of causation. "Forces in mechanics are only +_movements_, produced, or tending to be produced." In order to "cancel +altogether the old metaphysical notion of force," another form of +expression is demanded. It is claimed that all we do know or can +possibly know is the successions of phenomena in time. What, then, is +the term which henceforth, in our dynamics, shall take the place of +"force?" Is it "Time-succession?" Then let any one attempt to express +the various forms and intensities of movement and change presented to +the senses (as _e.g._, the phenomena of heat, electricity, galvanism, +magnetism, muscular and nervous action, etc.) in terms of +Time-succession, and he will at once become conscious of the utter +hopelessness of physics, without the hyperphysical idea of force, to +render itself intelligible.[254] What account can be rendered of +planetary motion if the terms "centrifugal force" and "centripetal +force" are abandoned? "From the two great conditions of every Newtonian +solution, viz., projectile impulse and centripetal tendency, eject the +idea of _force_, and what remains? The entire conception is simply made +up of this, and has not the faintest existence without it. It is useless +to give it notice to quit, and pretend that it is gone when you have +only put a new name upon the door. We must not call it 'attraction,' +lest there should seem to be a _power_ within; we are to speak of it +only as 'gravitation,' because that is only 'weight,' which is nothing +but a 'fact,' as if it were not a fact that holds a power, a true +dynamic affair, which no imagination can chop into incoherent +successions.[255] Nor is the evasion more successful when we try the +phrase, 'tendency of bodies to mutual approach.' The approach itself may +be called a phenomenon; but the 'tendency' is no phenomenon, and can not +be attributed by us to the bodies without regarding them as the +residence of force. And what are we to say of the _projectile impulse_ +in the case of the planets? Is that also a phenomenon? Who witnessed and +reported it? Is it not evident that the whole scheme of physical +astronomy is a resolution of observed facts into dynamic equivalents, +and that the hypothesis posits for its calculations not phenomena, but +proper forces? Its logic is this: _If_ an impulse of certain intensity +were given, and _if_ such and such mutual attractions were constantly +present, then the sort of motions which we observe in the bodies of our +system _would follow_. So, however, they also would _if_ willed by an +Omnipotent Intelligence."[256] It is thus clearly evident that human +science is unable to offer any explanation of the existing order of the +universe except in terms expressive of Power or Force; that, in fact, +all explanations are utterly unintelligible without the idea of +causation. The language of universal rational intuition is, "all +phenomena are the expression of power;" the language of science is, +"every law implies a force." + +[Footnote 254: See Grote's "Essay on Correlation of Physical Forces," +pp. 18-20; and Martineau's "Essays," p. 135.] + +[Footnote 255: "Gravity is a real _power_ of whose agency we have daily +experience."--Herschel, "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 236.] + +[Footnote 256: Martineau's "Essays," p. 56.] + +It is furthermore worthy of being noted that, in the modern doctrine of +the Correlation and Conservation of Forces, science is inevitably +approaching the idea that all kinds of force are but forms or +manifestations of some _one_ central force issuing from some _one_ +fountain-head of power. Dr. Carpenter, perhaps the greatest living +physiologist, teaches that "the form of force _which may be taken as the +type of all the rest_" is the consciousness of living effort in +volition.[257] All force, then, is of one type, and that type is mind; +in its last analysis external causation may be resolved into Divine +energy. Sir John Herschel does not hesitate to say that "it is +reasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect +result of a consciousness or will exerted somewhere."[258] The humble +Christian may, therefore, feel himself amply justified in still +believing that "power belongs to God;" that it is through the Divine +energy "all things are, and are upheld;" and that "in God we live, and +move, and have our being;" he is the Great First Cause, the +Fountain-head of all power. + +[Footnote 257: "Human Physiology," p. 542.] + +[Footnote 258: "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 234.] + +2. _As to Final Causes_--that is, reasons, purposes, or ends _for_ which +things exist--these, we are told by Comte, are all "disproved" by +Positive Science, which rigidly limits us to "the history of _what is_," +and forbids all inquiry into reasons _why it is_. The question whether +there be any intelligent purpose in the order and arrangement of the +universe, is not a subject of scientific inquiry at all; and whenever it +has been permitted to obtrude itself, it has thrown a false light over +the facts, and led the inquirer astray. + +The discoveries of modern astronomy are specially instanced by Comte as +completely overthrowing the notion of any conscious design or +intelligent purpose in the universe. The order and stability of the +solar system are found to be the _necessary_ consequences of +gravitation, and are adequately explained without any reference to +purposes or ends to be fulfilled in the disposition and arrangement of +the heavenly bodies. "With persons unused to the study of the celestial +bodies, though very likely informed on other parts of natural +philosophy, astronomy has still the reputation of being a science +eminently religious, as if the famous words, 'The heavens declare the +glory of God, had lost none of their truth... No science has given more +terrible shocks to the doctrine of _final causes_ than astronomy.[259] +The simple knowledge of the movement of the earth must have destroyed +the original and real foundation of this doctrine--the idea of the +universe subordinated to the earth, and consequently to man. Besides, +the accurate exploration of the solar system could not fail to dispel +that blind and unlimited admiration which the general order of nature +inspires, by showing in the most sensible manner, and in a great number +of different respects, that the orbs were certainly not disposed in the +most advantageous manner, and that science permits us easily to conceive +a better arrangement, by the development of true celestial mechanism, +since Newton. All the theological philosophy, even the most perfect, has +been henceforth deprived of its principal intellectual function, the +most regular order being thus consigned as necessarily established and +maintained in our world, and even in the whole universe, _by the simple +mutual gravity of its several parts_."[260] + +The task of "conceiving a better arrangement" of the celestial orbs, and +improving the system of the universe generally, we shall leave to those +who imagine themselves possessed of that omniscience which comprehends +all the facts and relations of the actual universe, and foreknows all +the details and relations of all possible universes so accurately as to +be able to pronounce upon their relative "advantages." The arrogance of +these critics is certainly in startling and ludicrous contrast with the +affected modesty which, on other occasions, restrains them from +"imputing any intentions to nature." It is quite enough for our purpose +to know that the tracing of evidences of _design_ in those parts of +nature accessible to our observation is an essentially different thing +from the construction of a scheme of _optimism_ on _à priori_ grounds +which shall embrace a universe the larger portion of which is virtually +beyond the field of observation. We are conscious of possessing some +rational data and some mental equipment for the former task, but for the +latter we feel utterly incompetent.[261] + +[Footnote 259: In a foot-note Comte adds: "Nowadays, to minds +familiarized betimes with the true astronomical philosophy, the heavens +declare no other glory than that of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all +those who have contributed to the ascertainment of their laws." It seems +remarkable that the great men who _ascertained_ these laws did not see +that the saying of the Psalmist was emptied of all meaning by their +discoveries. No persons seem to have been more willing than these very +men named to ascribe all the glory to Him who _established_ these laws. +Kepler says: "The astronomer, to whom God has given to see more clearly +with his inward eye, from what he has discovered, both can and will +glorify God;" and Newton says: "This beautiful system of sun, planets, +comets could have its origin in no other way than by the purpose and +command of an intelligent and powerful Being. We admire him on account +of his perfections, we venerate and worship him on account of his +government."--Whewell's "Astronomy and Physics," pp. 197, 198.] + +[Footnote 260: "Positive Philosophy," vol. ii. pp. 36-38; Tulloch, +"Theism," p. 115.] + +[Footnote 261: Chalmers's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. pp. 117, +118.] + +The only plausible argument in the above quotation from Comte is, that +the whole phenomena of the solar system are adequately explained by the +law of gravitation, without the intervention of any intelligent purpose. +Let it be borne in mind that it is a fundamental principle of the +Positive philosophy that all human knowledge is necessarily confined to +phenomena _perceptible to sense_, and that the fast and highest +achievement of human science is to observe and record "the invariable +relations of resemblance and succession among phenomena." We can not +possibly know any thing of even the existence of "causes" or "forces" +lying back of phenomena, nor of "reasons" or "purposes" determining the +relations of phenomena. The "law of gravitation" must, therefore, be +simply the statement of a fact, the expression of an observed order of +phenomena. But the simple statement of a fact is no _explanation_ of the +fact. The formal expression of an observed order of succession among +phenomena is no _explanation_ of that order. For what do we mean by an +explanation? Is it not a "making plain" to the understanding? It is, in +short, a complete answer to the questions _how_ is it so? and _why_ is +it so? Now, if Comte denies to himself and to us all knowledge of +efficient and final causation, if we are in utter ignorance of "forces" +operating in nature, and of "reasons" for which things exist in nature, +he can not answer either question, and consequently nothing is +explained. + +Practically, however, Comte regards gravitation as a force. The order of +the solar system has been established and is still maintained by the +mutual gravity of its several parts. We shall not stop here to note the +inconsistency of his denying to us the knowledge of, even the existence +of, force, and yet at the same time assuming to treat gravitation as a +force really adequate to the explanation of the _how_ and _why_ of the +phenomena of the universe, without any reference to a supernatural will +or an intelligent mind. The question with which we are immediately +concerned is whether gravitation _alone_ is adequate to the explanation +of the phenomena of the heavens? A review _in extenso_ of Comte's answer +to this question would lead us into all the inextricable mazes of the +nebular hypothesis, and involve us in a more extended discussion than +our space permits and our limited scientific knowledge justifies. For +the masses of the people the whole question of cosmical development +resolves itself into "a balancing of authorities;" they are not in a +position to verify the reasonings for and against this theory by actual +observation of astral phenomena, and the application of mathematical +calculus; they are, therefore, guided by balancing in their own minds +the statements of the distinguished astronomers who, by the united +suffrages of the scientific world, are regarded as "authorities." For +us, at present, it is enough that the nebular hypothesis is rejected by +some of the greatest astronomers that have lived. We need only mention +the names of Sir William Herschel, Sir John Herschel, Prof. Nichol, Earl +Rosse, Sir David Brewster, and Prof. Whewell. + +But if we grant that the nebular hypothesis is entitled to take rank as +an established theory of the development of the solar system, it by no +means proves that the solar system was formed without the intervention +of intelligence and design. On this point we shall content ourselves +with quoting the words of one whose encyclopædian knowledge was +confessedly equal to that of Comte, and who in candor and accuracy was +certainly his superior. Prof. Whewell, in his "Astronomy and Physics," +says: "This hypothesis by no means proves that the solar system was +formed without the intervention of intelligence and design. It only +transfers our view of the skill exercised and the means employed to +another part of the work; for how came the sun and its atmosphere to +have such materials, such motions, such a constitution, and these +consequences followed from their primordial condition? How came the +parent vapor thus to be capable of coherence, separation, contraction, +solidification? How came the laws of its motion, attraction, repulsion, +condensation, to be so fixed as to lead to a beautiful and harmonious +system in the end? How came it to be neither too fluid nor too +tenacious, to contract neither too quickly nor too slowly for the +successive formation of the several planetary bodies? How came that +substance, which at one time was a luminous vapor, to be at a subsequent +period solids and fluids of many various kinds? What but design and +intelligence prepared and tempered this previously-existing element, so +that it should, by its natural changes, produce such an orderly +system"?[262] "_The laws of motion alone will not produce the regularity +which we admire in the motion of the heavenly bodies_. There must be an +original adjustment of the system on which these laws are to act; a +selection of the arbitrary quantities which they are to involve; a +primitive cause which shall dispose the elements in due relation to each +other, in order that regular recurrence may accompany constant change, +and that perpetual motion may be combined with perpetual +stability."[263] + +[Footnote 262: "Astronomy and Physics," p. 109.] + +[Footnote 263: Chalmers's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 119.] + +The harmony of the solar system in all its phenomena does not depend +upon the operation of any _one_ law, but from the special adjustment of +several laws. There are certain agents operating throughout the entire +system which have different properties, and which require special +adjustment to each other, in order to their beneficial operation. 1st. +There is _Gravitation,_ prevailing apparently through all space. But it +does not prevail alone. It is a force whose function is to balance other +forces of which we know little, except that these, again, are needed to +balance the force of gravitation. Each force, if left to itself, would +be the destruction of the universe. Were it not for the force of +gravitation, the centrifugal forces which impel the planets would fling +them off into space. Were it not for these centrifugal forces, the force +of gravitation would dash them against the sun. The ultimate fact of +astronomical science, therefore, is not the law of gravitation, but the +_adjustment_ between this law and other laws, so as to produce and +maintain the existing order.[264] 2d. There is _Light_, flowing from +numberless luminaries; and _Heat_, radiating everywhere from the warmer +to the colder regions; and there are a number of adjustments needed in +order to the beneficial operation of these agents. Suppose we grant that +by merely mechanical causes the sun became the centre of our system, how +did it become also the _source of its vivifying influences_? "How was +the fire deposited on this hearth? How was the candle placed on this +candlestick?" 3d. There is an all-pervading _Ether_, through which light +is transmitted, which offers resistance to the movement of the planetary +and cometary bodies, and tends to a dissipation of mechanical energy, +and which needs to be counter-balanced by well-adjusted arrangements to +secure the stability of the solar system. All this balancing of opposite +properties and forces carries our minds upward towards Him who holds the +balances in his hands, and to a Supreme Intelligence on whose +adjustments and collocations the harmony and stability of the universe +depends.[265] + +[Footnote 264: Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law," pp. 91, 92.] + +[Footnote 265: M'Cosh, "Typical Forms and Special Ends," ch. xiii.] + +The recognition of all teleology of organs in vegetable and animal +physiology is also persistently repudiated by this school. When Cuvier +speaks of the combination of organs in such order as to adapt the animal +to the part which it has to play in nature, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire +replies, "I know nothing of animals which have to play a part in +nature." "I have read, concerning fishes, that, because they live in a +medium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculated +so as to give them the power of progression under these circumstances. +By this mode of reasoning, you would say of a man who makes use of +crutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having a +leg paralyzed or amputated.[266] "With a modesty which savors of +affectation, he says, "I ascribe no intentions to God, for I mistrust +the feeble powers of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go no +farther. I only pretend to the character of the historian of _what is_." +"I can not make Nature an intelligent being who does nothing in vain, +who acts by the shortest mode, who does all for the best."[267] All the +supposed consorting of means to ends which has hitherto been regarded as +evidencing Intelligence is simply the result of "the elective affinities +of organic elements" and "the differentiation of organs" consequent +mainly upon exterior conditions. "_Functions are a result, not an end_. +The animal undergoes the kind of life that his organs impose, and +submits to the imperfections of his organization. The naturalist studies +the play of his apparatus, and if he has the right of admiring most of +its parts, he has likewise that of showing the imperfection of other +parts, and the practical uselessness of those which fulfill no +functions."[268] And it is further claimed that there are a great many +structures which are clearly useless; that is, they fulfill no purpose +at all. Thus there are monkeys, which have no thumbs for use, but only +rudimental thumb-bones hid beneath the skin; the wingless bird of New +Zealand (Apteryx) has wing-bones similarly developed, which serve no +purpose; young whalebone whales are born with teeth that never cut the +gums, and are afterwards absorbed; and some sheep have horns turned +about their ears which fulfill no end. And inasmuch as there are some +organisms in nature which serve no purpose of utility, it is argued +there is no design in nature; things are _used_ because there are +antecedent conditions favorable for _use_, but that use is not the _end_ +for which the organ exists. The true naturalist will never say, "Birds +have wings given them _in order_ to fly;" he will rather say, "Birds fly +_because_ they have wings." The doctrine of final causes must, +therefore, be abandoned. + +[Footnote 266: Whewell, "History of Inductive Sciences," vol. ii. p. +486.] + +[Footnote 267: Id., ib., vol. ii. p. 490.] + +[Footnote 268: Martin's "Organic Unity in Animals and Vegetables," in M. +Q. Review, January, 1863.] + +It is hardly worth while to reply to the lame argument of Geoffroy, +which needs a "crutch" for its support. The very illustration, +undignified and irrelevant as it is, tells altogether against its +author. For, first, the crutch is certainly a _contrivance_ designed for +locomotion; secondly, the length and strength and lightness of the +crutch are all matters of calculation and _adjustment_; and, thirdly, +all the adaptations of the crutch are well-considered, in order to +enable the lame man to walk; the function of the crutch is the final +cause of its creation. This crutch is clearly out of place in Geoffroy's +argument, and utterly breaks down. It is in its place in the +teleological argument, and stands well, though it may not behave as well +as the living limb. The understanding of a child can perceive that the +design-argument does not assert that men were intended to have amputated +limbs, but that crutches are designed for those whose limbs are +paralyzed or amputated. + +The existence of useless members, of rudimentary and abortive limbs, +does seem, at first sight, to be unfavorable to the idea of supremacy of +purpose and all-pervading design. It should be remarked, however, that +this is an argument based upon our ignorance, and not upon our +knowledge. It does not by any means follow that because we have +discovered no reasons for their existence, therefore there are no +reasons. Science, in enlarging its conquests of nature, is perpetually +discovering the usefulness of arrangements of which our fathers were +ignorant, and the reasons of things which to their minds, were +concealed; and it ill becomes the men who so far "mistrust their own +feeble powers" as to be afraid of ascribing any intention to God or +nature, to dogmatically affirm there is no purpose in the existence of +any thing. And then we may ask, what right have these men to set up the +idea of "utility" as the only standard to which the Creator must +conform? How came they to know that God is a mere "utilitarian;" or, if +they do not believe in God, that nature is a miserable "Benthamite?" Why +may not the idea of beauty, of symmetry, of order, be a standard for the +universe, as much as the idea of utility, or mere subordination to some +practical end? May not conformity to one grand and comprehensive plan, +sweeping over all nature, be perfectly compatible with the adaptation of +individual existences to the fulfillment of special ends? In civil +architecture we have conformity to a general plan; we have embellishment +and ornament, and we have adaptation to a special purpose, all combined; +why may not these all be combined in the architecture of the universe? +The presence of any one of these is sufficient to prove design, for mere +ornament or beauty is itself a purpose, an object, and an end. The +concurrence of all these is an overwhelming evidence of design. Wherever +found, they are universally recognized as the product of intelligence; +they address themselves at once to the intelligence of man, and they +place him in immediate relation to and in deepest sympathy with the +Intelligence which gave them birth. He that formed the eye of man to +see, and the heart of man to admire beauty, shall He not delight in it? +He that gave the hand of man its cunning to create beauty, shall He not +himself work for it? And if man can and does combine both "ornament" and +"use" in one and the same implement or machine, why should not the +Creator of the world do the same? "When the savage carves the handle of +his war-club, the immediate purpose of his carving is to give his own +hand a firmer hold. But any shapeless scratches would be enough for +this. When he carves it in an elaborate pattern, he does so for the love +of ornament, and to satisfy the sense of beauty." And so "the harmonies, +on which all beauty depends, are so connected in nature that _use_ and +_ornament_ may often both arise out of the same conditions."[269] + +[Footnote 269: Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 203.] + +The "true naturalist," therefore, recognizes two great principles +pervading the universe--_a principle of order_--a unity of plan, and _a +principle of special adaptation_, by which each object, though +constructed upon a general plan, is at the same time accommodated to the +place it has to occupy and the purpose it has to serve. In other words, +there is _homology of structure_ and _analogy of function_, conformity +to _archetypal forms_ and _Teleology of organs_, in wonderful +combination. Now, in the Materialistic school, it has been the prevalent +practice to set up the unity of plan in animal structures, in opposition +to the principle of Final Causes: Morphology has been opposed to +Teleology. But in nature there is no such opposition; on the contrary, +there is a beautiful co-ordination. The same bones, in different +animals, are made subservient to the widest possible diversity of +functions. The same limbs are converted into fins, paddles, wings, legs, +and arms. "No comparative anatomist has the slightest hesitation in +admitting that the pectoral fin of a fish, the wing of a bird, the +paddle of the dolphin, the fore-leg of a deer, the wing of a bat, and +the arm of a man, are the same organs, notwithstanding that their forms +are so varied, and the uses to which they are applied so unlike each +other."[270] All these are homologous in structure--they are formed +after an ideal archetype or model, but that model or type is variously +modified to adapt the animal to the sphere of life in which it is +destined to move, and the organ itself to the functions it has to +perform, whether swimming, flying, walking, or burrowing, or that varied +manipulation of which the human hand is capable. These varied +modifications of the vertebrated type, for special purposes, are +unmistakable examples of final causation. Whilst the silent members, the +rudimental limbs instanced by Oken, Martins, and others--as fulfilling +no purpose, and serving no end, exist in conformity to an ideal +archetype on which the bony skeletons of all vertebrated animals are +formed,[271] and which has never been departed from since time began. +This type, or model, or plan, is, however, itself an evidence of +_design_ as much as the plan of a house. For to what standard are we +referring when we say that two limbs are morphologically the same? Is it +not an _ideal_ plan, a _mental_ pattern, a metaphysical conception? Now +an _ideal_ implies a mind which preconceived the idea, and in which +alone it really exists. It is only as "an _order of Divine thought_" +that the doctrine of animal homologies is at all intelligible; and +Homology is, therefore, the science which traces the outward embodiment +of a Divine Idea.[272] The principle of intentionality or final +causation, then, is not in any sense invalidated by the discovery of "a +unity of plan" sweeping through the entire universe. + +[Footnote 270: Carpenter's "Comparative Physiology," p. 37.] + +[Footnote 271: Agassiz, "Essay on Classification," p. 10.] + +[Footnote 272: Whewell's "History of Inductive Sciences," vol. i. p. +644; "The Reign of Law," p. 208; Agassiz, "Essay on Classification," pp. +9-11.] + +We conclude that we are justly entitled to regard "the principle of +intentionality" as a primary and necessary law of thought, under which +we can not avoid conceiving and describing the facts of the +universe--_the special adaptation of means to ends necessarily implies +mind_. Whenever and wherever we observe the adaptation of an organism to +the fulfillment of a special end, we can not avoid conceiving of that +_end_ as foreseen and premeditated, the _means_ as selected and adjusted +with a view to that end, and creative energy put forth to secure the +end--all which is the work of intelligence and will.[273] And we can not +describe these facts of nature, so as to render that account +intelligible to other minds, without using such terms as "contrivance," +"purpose," "adaptation," "design." A striking illustration of this may +be found in Darwin's volume "On the Fertilization of Orchids." We select +from his volume with all the more pleasure because he is one of the +writers who enjoins "caution in ascribing intentions to nature." In one +sentence he says: "The _Labellum_ is developed into a long nectary, _in +order_ to attract _Lepidoptera_; and we shall presently give reasons for +suspecting the nectar is _purposely_ so lodged that it can be sucked +only slowly, _in order_ to give time for the curious chemical quality of +the viscid matter settling hard and dry" (p. 29). Of one particular +structure he says: "This _contrivance_ of the guiding ridges may be +compared to the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a thread +into the eye of a needle." The notion that every organism has a use or +purpose seems to have guided him in his discoveries. "The strange +position of the _Labellum_, perched on the summit of the column, ought +to have shown me that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have +scorned the notion that the _Labellum_ was thus placed _for no good +purpose_. I neglected this plain guide, and for a long time completely +failed to understand the flower" (p. 262).[274] + +[Footnote 273: Carpenter's "Principles of Comparative Physiology," p. +723.] + +[Footnote 274: Edinburgh Review, October, 1862; article, "The +Supernatural."] + +So that the assumption of final causes has not, as Bacon affirms, "led +men astray" and "prejudiced further discovery;" on the contrary, it has +had a large share in every discovery in anatomy and physiology, zoology +and botany. The use of every organ has been discovered by starting from +the assumption _that it must have some use_. The belief in a creative +purpose led Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood. He says: +"When I took notice that the valves in the veins of so many parts of the +body were so placed that they gave a free passage to the blood towards +the heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the contrary way, +I was incited to imagine that so provident a cause as Nature has not +placed so many valves _without design_, and no design seemed more +probable than the circulation of the blood."[275] The wonderful +discoveries in Zoology which have immortalized the name of Cuvier were +made under the guidance of this principle. He proceeds on the +supposition not only that animal forms have _some_ plan, _some_ purpose, +but that they have an intelligible plan, a discoverable purpose. At the +outset of his "_Règne Animal_" he says: "Zoology has a principle of +reasoning which is peculiar to it, and which it employs to advantage on +many occasions; that is, the principle of the conditions of existence, +commonly called final causes."[276] The application of this principle +enabled him to understand and arrange the structures of animals with +astonishing clearness and completeness of order; and to restore the +forms of extinct animals which are found in the rocks, in a manner which +excited universal admiration, and has commanded universal assent. +Indeed, as Professor Whewell remarks, at the conclusion of his "History +of the Inductive Sciences," "those who have been discoverers in science +have generally had minds, the disposition of which was to believe in an +_intelligent Maker_ of the universe, and that the scientific +speculations which produced an opposite tendency were generally those +which, though they might deal familiarly with known physical truths, and +conjecture boldly with regard to unknown, do not add to the number of +solid generalizations."[277] + +[Footnote 275: "History of Inductive Science," vol. ii. p. 449.] + +[Footnote 276: "History of Inductive Science," vol. ii. p. 2, Eng. ed.] + +[Footnote 277: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 491. A list of the "great discoverers" +is given in his "Astronomy and Physics," bk. iii. ch. v.] + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_). + +IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_). + + + "The faith which can not stand unless buttressed by + contradictions is built upon the sand. The profoundest faith + is faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any + conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to + practical interests, or traditionary authority, or + intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of + skepticism."--ABBOT. + +In the previous chapter we have considered the answers to this question +which are given by the Idealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolves +upon us now to review (iii.) the position of the school of _Natural +Realism_ or _Natural Dualism_, at the head of which stands Sir William +Hamilton. + +It is admitted by this school that philosophic knowledge is "the +knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes,"[278] and "of +qualities as inherent in substances."[279] + +[Footnote 278: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.] + +[Footnote 279: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.] + +1. _As to Events and Causes_.--"Events do not occur isolated, apart, by +themselves; they occur and are conceived by us only in connection. Our +observation affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not an +effect; nay, our thought can not even realize to itself the possibility +of a phenomenon without a cause. By the necessity we are under of +thinking some cause for every phenomenon, and by our original ignorance +of what particular causes belong to what particular effects, it is +rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of the +fact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we are +necessitated to regard each phenomenon as _only partially known until we +discover the causes_ on which it depends for its existence.[280] +Philosophic knowledge is thus, in its widest acceptation, the knowledge +of effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In the +first place, as every cause to which we can ascend is only an effect, it +follows that it is the scope, that is, the aim, of philosophy to trace +up the series of effects and causes until we arrive at _causes which are +not in themselves effects_,"[281]--that is, to ultimate and final +causes. And then, finally, "Philosophy, as the knowledge of effects in +their causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or +final causes, but towards _one_ alone."[282] + +[Footnote 280: Ibid., vol. i. p. 56.] + +[Footnote 281: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.] + +[Footnote 282: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.] + +2. _As to Qualities and Substance, or Phenomena and Reality_.--As +phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled, by the +constitution of our nature, to think them conjoined in and by something; +and as they are phenomena, we can not think them phenomena of nothing, +but must regard them as properties or qualities of something.[283] Now +that which manifests its qualities--in other words, that in which the +appearing causes inhere, that to which they belong--is called their +_subject_, or _substance_, or _substratum_.[284] The subject of one +grand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, extension, solidity, figure, +etc.) is called _matter_, or _material substance_. The subject of the +other grand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, thought, feeling, volition, +etc.) is termed _mind_, or _mental substance_. We may, therefore, lay it +down as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate +fact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the _ego_ in relation and +contrast to the _non-ego_, and a knowledge of the _non-ego_ in relation +and contrast to the _ego_[285] Natural Dualism thus establishes the +existence of two worlds of _mind_ and _matter_ on the immediate +knowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the Cosmothetic +Idealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediate +knowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our _immediate +knowledge of the existence of matter_.[286] + +[Footnote 283: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.] + +[Footnote 284: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.] + +[Footnote 285: Ibid., vol. i. p. 292.] + +[Footnote 286: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 292, 295.] + +The obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that we have an +immediate knowledge of the "_existence_ of matter" as well as of "the +_phenomena_ of matter;" that is, we know "_substance_" as immediately +and directly as we know "_qualities_." Phenomena are known only as +inherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting its +qualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we can +never know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in one +concrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality is +known no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate, +presentative "face to face" knowledge of matter and mind in every act of +consciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his +"Philosophy of Perception."[287] In the course of the discussion he +starts the question, "_Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally +immediate?_" His answer to this question may be condensed in the +following sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of _mind_ +there is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The +problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the +qualities of _matter_. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogate +consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is +categorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am conscious +of _myself_ as a perceiving _subject_, and of an external _reality_ as +the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same +indivisible amount of intuition."[288] Again he says, "I have frequently +asserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object, +immediately and _in itself_." "If, then, the veracity of consciousness +be unconditionally admitted--_if the intuitive knowledge of matter and +mind_, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken as +truths," the doctrine of Natural Realism is established, and, "without +any hypothesis or demonstration, the _reality of mind_ and the _reality +of matter_."[289] + +[Footnote 287: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, part ii.] + +[Footnote 288: Ibid., p. 181.] + +[Footnote 289: Ibid., pp. 34, 182.] + +Now, after these explicit statements that we have an intuitive knowledge +of matter and mind--a direct and immediate consciousness of self as a +real, "self-subsisting entity," and a knowledge of "an external reality, +immediately and _in itself_," it seems unaccountably strange that +Hamilton should assert "_that all human knowledge, consequently all +human philosophy, is only of the Relative or Phenomenal_;"[290] and that +"_of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing_."[291] Whilst +teaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to trace +secondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that it +_necessarily tends_ towards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the same +time asserts that "first causes do not lie within the reach of +philosophy,"[292] and that it can never attain to the knowledge of the +First Cause.[293] "The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended, +conceived, or thought."[294] God, as First Cause, as infinite, as +unconditioned, as eternal, is to us absolutely "_The Unknown_." The +science of Real Being--of Being _in se_--of self-subsisting entities, is +declared to be impossible. All science is only of the phenomenal, the +conditioned, the relative. Ontology is a delusive dream. Thus, after +pages of explanations and qualifications, of affirmations and denials, +we find Hamilton virtually assuming the same position as Comte and +Mill--_all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena_. + +[Footnote 290: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 136] + +[Footnote 291: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.] + +[Footnote 292: Ibid., vol. i. p. 58.] + +[Footnote 293: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.] + +[Footnote 294: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 375.] + +It has been supposed that the chief glory of Sir William Hamilton rested +upon his able exposition and defense of the doctrine of Natural Realism. +There are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "the +Philosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of the +Conditioned had "not been generalized by any previous philosopher;" and, +in laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and important +contribution to speculative thought. + +The principles upon which this philosophy is based are: + +1. _The Relativity of all Human Knowledge._--Existence is not cognized +absolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are related +to our faculties, and, in fact, determined by these faculties +themselves. All knowledge, therefore, is _relative_--that is, it is of +phenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determined by our +own faculties." Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of all +relation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it can +not possibly be _known_. + +2. _The Conditionality of all Thinking_.--Thought necessarily supposes +conditions. "To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the +fundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can not +out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is +supported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within +and through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is +only of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is to +condition."[295] Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned, +and as such can not possibly be _thought_. + +3. _The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, is +a mere "negation of thought._"--By this Hamilton does not mean that the +idea of the Infinite is a negative idea. "The Infinite and the Absolute +are _only_ the names of two counter _imbecilities_ of the human +mind"[296]--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute +limitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or an +infinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinite +we have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge.[297] + +The grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, "_that the +conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable_." Or, +again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or +poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each +of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the +other."[298] This is the celebrated "Law of the Conditioned." + +[Footnote 295: "Discussions," p. 21.] + +[Footnote 296: Ibid., p. 28.] + +[Footnote 297: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 373.] + +[Footnote 298: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 373.] + +In attempting a brief criticism of "the Philosophy of the Conditioned," +we may commence by inquiring: + +I. _What is the real import and significance of the doctrine "that all +human knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal_?" + +Hamilton calls this "the great axiom" of philosophy. That we may +distinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on the +subject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he uses +the words "_phenomenal_" and "_relative._" The importance of an exact +terminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, in +three Lectures (VIII., IX., X.), he has given a full explication of the +terms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word +"_phenomenon_" is set down as the necessary "_correlative_" of the word +"_subject_" or "_substance_." "These terms can not be explained apart, +for each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in +and through its correlative. The term '_subject_' is used to denote the +unknown (?) basis which lies under the various _phenomena_ or properties +of which we become aware, whether in our external or internal +experience."[299] "The term '_relative_' is _opposed_ to the term +'_absolute_;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I +virtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, _in and for +itself, and without relation to us and our faculties_."[300] Now, in the +philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "that +which is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation."[301] +The _absolute_ can not, therefore, be "_the correlative_" of the +conditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. The +_subject,_ however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and, +consequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical. +Furthermore, Hamilton tells us the subject _may be comprehended_ in and +through its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being aloof +from all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. "The +subject" and "the absolute" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and, +if they are not synonymous, then their antithetical terms, "phenomenal" +and "relative," can not be synonymous. + +[Footnote 299: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.] + +[Footnote 300: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.] + +[Footnote 301: "Discussions," p. 21.] + +It is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms as +synonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in his +philosophy of the conditioned. "All our knowledge is of the relative +_or_ phenomenal." Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. and IX., in +which he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, +these terms are used as precisely analogous. Now, in opposition to this, +we maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing may +be "in relation" and yet not be a phenomenon. "The subject or substance" +may be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself, +_correlated_ to the phenomenon. The ego, "the conscious _subject_"[302] +as a "_self-subsisting entity_" is necessarily related to the phenomena +of thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the +conscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena," with +more indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory +assertion, "that the _subject_ is unknown," he still teaches, with equal +positiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self, +as a perceiving _subject."_ And still more explicitly he says: "As +clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at +every moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a +mere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications +[phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications, +and a _self-subsisting entity_."[303] Again: "Thought is possible only +in and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized +in every act of intelligence as the _subject_ to which the act belongs. +It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc.; these +special modes are all only the phenomena of the I."[304] We are, +therefore, conscious of the _subject_ in the most immediate, and direct, +and intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can not +be "_unknown_." We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should deal +in such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence of +violating that fundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton so +frequently and earnestly insists, viz., "that the testimony of +consciousness must be accepted in all its integrity". + +[Footnote 302: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O.W. +Wight), p. 181.] + +[Footnote 303: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 373.] + +[Footnote 304: Ibid., vol. i. p. 166.] + +It is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admit _the +relativity of human knowledge_, and yet at the same time reject the +doctrine of Hamilton, _that all human knowledge is only of the +phenomenal_. + +"The relativity of human knowledge," like most other phrases into which +the word "relative" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety of +meanings. If by this phrase is meant "that we can not know objects +except as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related to +them," we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leading +to no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simply +another way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it must +come within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can only +know as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase is +meant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they +present," we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart +from their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the +substances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and +through their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no +longer any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from +matter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself," apart from its +qualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is +meant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative," we accept this +statement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal with +difference and relation; the relation of subject and object; the +relation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena to +reality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionably +correlated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehend +the necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and space, +succession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. We +may thus admit the _relative character of human thought_, and at the +same time deny that it is an ontological disqualification.[305] + +It is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holds +the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He assumes a middle place +between Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism of +the latter with the realism of the former. "He identifies the +_phenomenon_ of the German with the _quality_ of the British +philosophy,"[306] and asserts, as a regulative law of thought, that the +quality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, but +makes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and +unknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentially +different from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant, +_phenomenon_ means an object as we envisage or represent it to +ourselves, in opposition to the _noumenon_, or a thing as it is in +itself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements +supplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of space +and time; as regards thought, the categories of Quantity, Quality, +Relation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be to +perceive it neither in space nor in time. To think a thing in itself +would be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal is +thus the product of the inherent laws of our own constitution, and, as +such, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge.[307] + +[Footnote 305: Martineau's "Essays," p. 234.] + +[Footnote 306: M'Cosh's "Defense of Fundamental Truth," p. 106.] + +[Footnote 307: Mansel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant," pp. 21, +22.] + +This, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded by +Hamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable" are +presented to, and known by, the mind _under modifications determined by +the faculties themselves_."[308] This doctrine he illustrates by the +following supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness in +perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, +the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some +rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception."[309] The +conclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are not +known to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our minds +are capable of perceiving them. + +[Footnote 308: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.] + +[Footnote 309: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129; +and also vol. i. p. 147.] + +Let us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man is +justified in making this assertion unless, 1. He knows things as they +exist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3. +He is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as they +appear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not know +things as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know that +there is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear? +What is this "_thing in itself_" about which Hamilton has so much to +say, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily +understand what is meant by the _thing_; it is the object as existing--a +substance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is +meant by _in itself_? There can be no _in itself_ besides or beyond the +_thing_. If Hamilton means that "the thing itself" is the thing apart +from all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do not +acknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoid +of all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may be +permitted. With such a definition of Being _in se_, the logic of Hegel +is invincible, "Being and Nothing are identical." + +And now, if "the thing in itself" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutely +_unknown_, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By what +right does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse its +predicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, in +relation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plain +that, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to be +inscrutable, it is assumed to be partially _known_? And it is obvious, +notwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, that +Hamilton does regard "the thing in itself" as partially known. "The +external reality" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the "total +object of consciousness."[310] The primary qualities of matter are known +as in the things themselves; "they develop themselves with rigid +necessity out of the simple datum of _substance occupying space_."[311] +"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they are +the attributes of _body as body_," and as such "are known immediately in +themselves,"[312] as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that +we not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as +they exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an _à +priori_ manner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary +Qualities may be deduced _à priori_; they being, in fact, only +evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies." If, +then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves," +"the things themselves" must also be, at least, partially known; and +Hamilton can not consistently assert the relativity of _all_ knowledge. +Even if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in part +dependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded +by our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the assertion that +all our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. "The +admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the +absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is +right) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him, +is not inextricable. It is for us 'to analyze and distinguish what +elements,' in an 'act of knowledge,' are contributed by the object, and +what by the organs or by the mind."[313] + +[Footnote 310: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129.] + +[Footnote 311: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357] + +[Footnote 312: Ibid., pp. 377, 378.] + +[Footnote 313: Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p. +44.] + +Admitting the relative character of human thought as a psychological +fact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead of +visiting us with disability to transcend phenomena, _operates as a +revelation of what exists beyond_. "The finite body cut out before our +visual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the +emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be +represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object +gives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearance +and the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude and +clearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use +in predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance, +the strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us as +dotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we +should have no apprehension, but which as their condition, is +unreservedly known."[314] + +"What we have said with regard to space and time applies equally to the +case of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perception +introduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body +reveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits +the uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for +itself a power beneath. The space, and time, and power, not being part +of the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us, +therefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect."[315] + +"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of Space, and Time, and +Causation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixed +entities belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of +phenomenal disposition and succession."[316] In these instances of +relation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as a +logical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality of +intellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought is +not an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power. + +[Footnote 314: "Essays," pp. 193,194.] + +[Footnote 315: Ibid., p. 197.] + +[Footnote 316: Ibid., p. 195.] + +There is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton's +reasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at the +outset. The Absolute is defined as _that which exists in and by itself, +aloof from and out of all relation_. An absolute, as thus defined, does +not and can not exist; it is a pure abstraction, and, in fact, a pure +non-entity. "The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being +and in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent."[317] It may +mean the absence of all _necessary_ relation, but it does not mean the +absence of _all_ relation. If God can not _voluntarily_ call a finite +existence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is +certainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit +which substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out of +all relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created +universe, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A God without +attributes, and out of all relations, is for us no God at all. God as a +being of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as the +unconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, as +voluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this is +the living and true God. The God of a false philosophy is not the true +God; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and not +realities. + +2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton's +philosophy of the conditioned, viz., that "conditional limitation is the +fundamental law of the possibility of thought," and that thought +necessarily imposes conditions on its object. + +"Thought," says Hamilton, "can not transcend consciousness: +consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an +object known only in correlation, and _mutually limiting each +other_"[318] Thought necessarily supposes conditions; "to think is +simply to condition," that is, to predicate limits; and as the infinite +is the unlimited, it can not be thought. The very attempt to think the +infinite renders it finite; therefore there can be no infinite _in +thought_, and, consequently, the infinite can not be known. + +[Footnote 317: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 179.] + +[Footnote 318: "Discussions," p. 21.] + +If by "the infinite in thought" is here meant the infinite compassed or +contained in thought, we readily grant that the finite can not contain +the infinite; it is a simple truism which no one has ever been so +foolish as to deny. Even Cousin is not so unwise as to assert the +absolutely comprehensibility of God. "In order absolutely to comprehend +the Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power of +comprehension, and this is not granted to us."[319] A finite mind can +not have "an infinite thought." But it by no means follows that, because +we can not have infinite thought, we can have no clear and definite +thought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definite +idea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart without +danger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerning +it. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than that +space is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within the +compass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form an _image_ of +infinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it by +any combination of numbers; but we can have the _thought_ of it as an +idea of Reason, and can argue concerning it with precision and +accuracy.[320] Hamilton has an idea of the Infinite; he defines it; he +reasons concerning it; he says "we must believe in the infinity of God." +But how can he define the Infinite unless he possesses some knowledge, +however limited, of the infinite Being? How can he believe in the +infinity of God if he has no definite idea of infinitude? He can not +reason about, can not affirm or deny any thing concerning, that of which +he knows absolutely nothing. + +[Footnote 319: "Lectures on History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 104.] + +[Footnote 320: "To form an _image_ of any infinitude--be it of time or +space [or power]; to go mentally through it by successive steps of +representation--is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in +our finite perception and experience. But to have the _thought_ of it as +an idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, and assign that thought a +constituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasonings, appears to +us as not only possible, but inevitable."--Martineau's "Essays," p. +205.] + +The grand logical barrier which Hamilton perpetually interposes to all +possible cognition of God _as infinite_ is, that to think is to +condition--to limit; and as the Infinite is the unconditioned, the +unlimited, therefore "the Infinite can not be _thought_." We grant at +once that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the same +time, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposes +any conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirmation +can be consistently made, except on the Hegelian hypothesis that +"Thought and Being are identical;" and this is a maxim which Hamilton +himself repudiates. Our thought does not create, neither does it impose +conditions upon, any thing. + +There is a lurking sophism in the whole phraseology of Hamilton in +regard to this subject. He is perpetually talking about "thinking a +thing"--"thinking the Infinite." Now we do not think a thing, but we +think _of_ or _concerning_ a thing. We do not think a man, neither does +our thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be as +our thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man, +concerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as it +conforms to the objective reality. And so we do not "think the +Infinite;" that is, our thought neither contains nor conditions the +Infinite Being, but our thoughts are _about_ the Infinite One; and if we +do not think of Him as a being of infinite perfection, our thought is +neither worthy, nor just, nor true.[321] + +[Footnote 321: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," pp. 255, 256.] + +But we are told the law of all thought and of all being is +determination; consequently, negation of some quality or some +potentiality; whereas the Infinite is "_the One and the All_" (ti En kai +Pyn),[322] or, as Dr. Mansel, the disciple and annotator of Hamilton, +affirms, "the sum of all reality," and "the sum of all possible modes of +being."[323] The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself all +being, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even excepting +evil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood to +affirm. "If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of human +conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception +required."[324] "The Infinite Whole," as thus defined, can not be +thought, and therefore it is argued the Infinite God can not be known. +Such a doctrine shocks our moral sense, and we shrink from the thought +of an Infinite which includes evil. There is certainly a moral +impropriety, if not a logical impossibility, in such a conception of +God. + +[Footnote 322: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," Appendix, vol. ii. +p. 531.] + +[Footnote 323: "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 76.] + +[Footnote 324: Ibid.] + +The fallacy of this reasoning consists in confounding a _supposed_ +Quantitative Infinite with _the_ Qualitative Infinite--the totality of +existence with the infinitely perfect One. "Qualitative infinity is a +secondary predicate; that is, the attribute of an attribute, and is +expressed by the adverb _infinitely_ rather than the adjective +_infinite_. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say, that +space is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say, God +is infinite. Precision of language would require us to say, God is +infinitely good, wise, and great; or God is good, and his goodness is +infinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based upon an +important difference between the infinity of space and time on the one +hand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor +theology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinity +is illimitation by _quantity_. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by +_degree_. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories +of the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of +infinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possesses +Qualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous with _absolute +perfection_; and the neglect of the distinction between this and +Quantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic and +materialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of +'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel +Clarke's identification of God's immensity with space has been shown by +Martin to ultimate in Pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning the +incomprehensibility of infinite space and time, Hamilton and Mansel pass +at once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. The +inconsequence of all such arguments is absolute; and if philosophy +tolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to the +nature of God, she must reconcile herself to the negation of his +personality and spirituality."[325] An Infinite Being, quite remote from +the notion of _quantity_, may and does exist; which, on the one hand, +does not include finite existence, and, on the other hand, does not +render the finite impossible to thought. Without contradiction they may +coexist, and be correlated. + +The thought will have already suggested itself to the mind of the reader +that for Hamilton to assert that the Infinite, as thus defined (the One +and the All), is absolutely unknown, is certainly the greatest +absurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must be +at least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. To +the all-inclusive Infinite every thing affirmative belongs, not only to +be, but to be known. To claim it for being, yet deny it to thought, is +thus impossible. The Infinite, which includes all real existence, is +certainly possible to cognition. + +The whole argument as regards the conditionating nature of all thought +is condensed into four words by Spinoza--"_Omnis determinatio est +negatio_;" all determination is negation. Nothing can be more arbitrary +or more fallacious than this principle. It arises from the confusion of +two things essentially different--_the limits of a being_, and _its +determinate and distinguishing characteristics_. The limit of a being is +its imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. The +less a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; the +most determinate being is the most perfect being. "In this sense God is +the only being absolutely determined. For there must be something +indetermined in all finite beings, since they have all imperfect powers +which tend towards their development after an indefinite manner. God +alone, the complete Being in whom all powers are actualized, escapes by +His own perfection from all progress, and development, and +indetermination."[326] + +[Footnote 325: North American Review, October, 1864, article, "The +Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 422, 423. See also Young's +"Province of Reason," p. 72; and Calderwood's "Philosophy of the +Infinite," p. 183.] + +[Footnote 326: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 71.] + +All real being must be determined; only pure Nothing can be +undetermined. _Determination_ is, however, one thing; and _limitation_ +is essentially another thing. "Even space and time, though cognized +solely by negative characteristics, are determined in so far as +differentiated from the existences they contain; but this +differentiation involves no limitation of their infinity." If all +distinction is determination, and if all determination is negation, that +is (as here used), limitation, then the infinite, as distinguished from +the finite, loses its own infinity, and either becomes identical with +the finite, or else vanishes into pure nothing. If Hamilton will persist +in affirming that all determination is limitation, he has no other +alternatives but to accept the doctrine of Absolute Nihilism, or of +Absolute Identity. If the Absolute is the indeterminate--that is, no +attributes, no consciousness, no relations--it is pure non-being. If the +Infinite is "the One and All," then there is but one substance, one +absolute entity. + +Herbert Spencer professes to be carrying out, a step farther, the +doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel, viz., "the philosophy of +the Unconditioned." In other words, he carries that doctrine forward to +its rigidly logical consequences, and utters the last word which +Hamilton and Mansel dare not utter--"Apprehensible by us there is no +God." The Ultimate Reality is absolutely unknown; it can not be +apprehended by the human intellect, and it can not present itself to the +intellect at all. This Ultimate Reality can not be _intelligent_, +because to think is to condition, and the Absolute is the unconditioned; +can not be _conscious_, because all consciousness is of plurality and +difference, and the Absolute is one; can not be _personal_, because +personality is determination or limitation, and the Infinite is the +illimitable. It is "audacious," "irreverent," "impious," to apply any of +these predicates to it; to regard it as Mind, or speak of it as +Righteous.[327] The ultimate goal of the philosophy of the Unconditioned +is a purely subjective Atheism. + +[Footnote 327: "First Principles," pp. 111, 112.] + +And yet of this Primary Existence--inscrutable, and absolutely +unknown--Spencer knows something; knows as much as he pleases to know. +He knows that this "ultimate of ultimates is _Force_,"[328] an +"_Omnipresent Power_,"[329] is "_One_" and "_Eternal_."[330] He knows +also that it can not be intelligent, self-conscious, and a +personality.[331] This is a great deal to affirm and deny of an +existence "absolutely unknown." May we not be permitted to affirm of +this hidden and unknown something that it is _conscious Mind_, +especially as Mind is admitted to be the only analogon of Power; and +"the _force_ by which we produce change, and which serves to symbolize +the causes of changes in general, is the final disclosure of +analysis."[332] + +[Footnote 328: "First Principles," p. 235.] + +[Footnote 329: Ibid., p. 99.] + +[Footnote 330: Ibid., p. 81.] + +[Footnote 331: Ibid., pp. 108-112.] + +[Footnote 332: Ibid., p. 235.] + +3. We advance to the review of the third fundamental principle of +Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned, viz., that the terms +infinite and absolute are names for a "mere negation of thought"--a +"mental impotence" to think, or, in other words, the absence of all the +conditions under which thought is possible. + +This principle is based upon a distinction between "positive" and +"negative" thought, which is made with an air of wonderful precision and +accuracy in "the Alphabet of Human Thought."[333] "Thinking is +_positive_ when existence is predicated of an object." "Thinking is +_negative_ when existence is not attributed to an object." "Negative +thinking," therefore, is not the thinking of an object as devoid of this +or that particular attribute, but as devoid of all attributes, and thus +of all existence; that is, it is "the negation of all +thought"--_nothing_. "When we think a thing, that is done by conceiving +it as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, _and the sum of +these qualities constitutes its concept or notion_." "When we perform an +act of negative thought, this is done by thinking _something_ as _not_ +existing in this or that determinate mode; and when we think it as +existing in no determinate mode, _we cease to think at all--it becomes a +nothing_."[334] Now the Infinite, according to Hamilton, can not be +thought in any determinate mode; therefore we do not think it at all, +and therefore it is for us "a logical Non-entity." + +[Footnote 333: "Discussions," Appendix I. p. 567.] + +[Footnote 334: "Logic," pp. 54, 55.] + +It is barely conceivable that Hamilton might imagine himself possessed +of this singular power of "performing an act of negative thought"--that +is, of thinking and not thinking at once, or of "thinking something" +that "becomes nothing;" we are not conscious of any such power. To think +without an object of thought, or to think of something without any +qualities, or to think "something" which in the act of thought melts +away into "nothing," is an absurdity and a contradiction. We can not +think about nothing. All thought must have an object, and every object +must have some predicate. Even space has some predicates--as +receptivity, unity, and infinity. Thought can only be realized by +thinking something existing, and existing in a determinate manner; and +when we cease to think something having predicates, we cease to think at +all. This is emphatically asserted by Hamilton himself.[335] "Negative +thinking" is, therefore, a meaningless phrase, a contradiction in terms; +it is no thought at all. We are cautioned, however, against regarding +"the negation of thought" as "a negation of all mental ability." It is, +we are told, "an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt." An +attempt to think about _what_? Surely it must be about some object, and +an object which is _known_ by some sign, else there can be no thought. +Let any one make the attempt to think without something to think about, +and he will find that both the process and the result are blank +nothingness. All thought, therefore, as Calderwood has amply shown, is, +must be, _positive_. "Thought is nothing else than the comparison of +objects known; and as knowledge is always positive, so must our thought +be. All knowledge implies an object _known_; and so all thought involves +an object about which we think, and must, therefore, be positive--that +is, it must embrace within itself the conception of certain qualities as +belonging to the object."[336] + +[Footnote 335: "Logic," p. 55.] + +[Footnote 336: "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 272.] + +The conclusion of Hamilton's reasoning in regard to "negative thinking" +is, that we can form no notion of the Infinite Being. We have no +positive idea of such a Being. We can think of him only by "the thinking +away of every characteristic" which can be conceived, and thus "ceasing +to think at all." We can only form a "negative concept," which, we are +told, "is in fact no concept at all." We can form only a "negative +notion," which, we are informed, "is only the negation of a notion." +This is the impenetrable abyss of total gloom and emptiness into which +the philosophy of the conditions leads us at last.[337] + +[Footnote 337: Whilst Spencer accepts the general doctrine of Hamilton, +that the Ultimate Reality is inscrutable, he argues earnestly against +his assertion that the Absolute is a "mere negation of thought." + +"Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is +demonstrated distinctly postulates the _positive existence_ of something +beyond the relative. To say we can not know the Absolute is, by +implication, to affirm there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of our +power to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption +_that_ it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute +has been present to the mind, not as nothing, but as _something_. And so +with every step in the reasoning by which the doctrine is upheld, the +Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is +throughout thought as actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive +that our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without, at the +same time, conceiving a Reality of which these are appearances, for +appearances without reality are unthinkable. + +"Truly to represent or realize in thought any one of the propositions of +which the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as +_positive_, and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate +conclusion from the argument that our consciousness of it is negative? +An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a +certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no +meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very +demonstration that a definite consciousness [comprehension] of the +Absolute is impossible, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite +consciousness of it [an apprehension]."--"First Principles," p. 88.] + +Still we have the word _infinite_, and we have _the notion_ which the +word expresses. This, at least, is spared to us by Sir William Hamilton. +He who says we have no such notion asks the question _how we have it?_ +Here it may be asked, how have we, then, the word infinite? How have we +the notion which this word expresses? The answer to this question is +contained in the distinction of positive and negative thought. + +We have a positive concept of a thing when we think of it by the +qualities of which it is the complement. But as the attribution of +qualities is an affirmation, as affirmation and negation are relatives, +and as relatives _are known only in and through each other_, we can not, +therefore, have a _consciousness_ of the affirmation of any quality +without having, at the same time, the _correlative consciousness_ of its +negation. Now the one consciousness is a positive, the other +consciousness is a negative notion; and as all language is the reflex of +thought, the positive and negative notions are expressed by positive and +negative names. Thus it is with the Infinite.[338] Now let us carefully +scrutinize the above deliverance. We are told that "relatives are known +only in and through each other;" that is, such relatives as _finite_ and +_infinite_ are known necessarily in the same act of thought. The +knowledge of one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. We can +not have a consciousness of the one without the correlative +consciousness of the other. "For," says Hamilton, "a relation is, in +truth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation +_necessarily involves the thought of its two terms,_, so it is, with +equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either." If, then, we +are _conscious_ of the two terms of the relation in the same "one and +indivisible" mental act--if we can not have "the consciousness of the +one without the consciousness of the other"--if space and position, time +and succession, substance and quality, infinite and finite, are given to +us in pairs, then 'the _knowledge of one is as necessary as the +knowledge of the other,_' and they must stand or fall together. The +finite is known no more positively than the infinite; the infinite is +known as positively as the finite. The one can not be taken and the +other left. The infinite, discharged from all relation to the finite, +could never come into apprehension; and the finite, discharged of all +relation to the infinite, is incognizable too. "There can be no +objection to call the one 'positive' and the other 'negative,' provided +it be understood that _each_ is so with regard to the other, and that +the relation is convertible; the finite, for instance, being the +negative of the infinite, not less than the infinite of the +finite."[339] + +[Footnote 338: _Logic,_ p. 73.] + +[Footnote 339: Martineau's "Essays," p. 237.] + +To say that the finite is comprehensible in and by itself, and the +infinite is incomprehensible in and by itself, is to make an assertion +utterly at variance both with psychology and logic. The finite is no +more comprehensible _in itself_ than the infinite. "Relatives are known +only in and through each other."[340] "The conception of one term of a +relation necessarily implies that of the other, it being the very nature +of a relative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its +correlative." We comprehend nothing more completely than the infinite; +"for the idea of illimitation is as clear, precise, and intelligible as +the idea of limitability, which is its basis. The propositions "A is X" +"A is not X," are equally comprehensible; the conceptions A and X are in +both cases positive data of experience, while the affirmation and +negation consist solely in the copulative or disjunctive nature of the +predication. Consequently, if X is comprehensible, so is not--X; if the +finite is comprehensible, so is the infinite."[341] + +Whilst denying that the infinite can by us be _known_, Hamilton tells us +he is "far from denying that it is, must, and ought to be +_believed_."[342] "We must believe in the infinity of God." +"Faith--belief--is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond +knowledge."[343] We heartily assent to the doctrine that the Infinite +Being is the object of faith, but we earnestly deny that the Infinite +Being is not an object of knowledge. May not knowledge be grounded upon +faith, and does not faith imply knowledge? Can we not obtain knowledge +through faith? Is not the belief in the Infinite Being implied in our +knowledge of finite existence? If so, then God as the infinite and +perfect, God as the unconditioned Cause, is not absolutely "the +unknown." + +[Footnote 340: Hamilton's "Logic," p. 73.] + +[Footnote 341: North American Review, October, 1864, article +"Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 441, 442.] + +[Footnote 342: Letter to Calderwood, Appendix, vol. ii. p. 530.] + +[Footnote 343: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 374.] + +A full exposition of Sir William Hamilton's views of _Faith_ in its +connection with Philosophy would have been deeply interesting to us, and +it would have filled up a gap in the interpretation of his system. The +question naturally presents itself, how would he have discriminated +between faith and knowledge, so as to assign to each its province? If +our notion of the Infinite Being rests entirely upon faith, then upon +what ultimate ground does faith itself rest? On the authority of +Scripture, of the Church, or of reason? The only explicit statement of +his view which has fallen in our way is a note in his edition of +Reid.[344] "We _know_ what rests upon reason; we _believe_ what rests +upon authority. But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for +the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily +accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data +are, therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is that, +in the last resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit that +belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate +ground of belief." + +[Footnote 344: P. 760; also Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 61.] + +Here we have, first, an attempted distinction between faith and +knowledge. "We _know_ what rests upon reason;" that is, whatever we +obtain by deduction or induction, whatever is capable of explication and +proof, is _knowledge_. "We _believe_ what rests upon authority;" that +is, whatever we obtain by intellectual intuition or pure apperception, +and is incapable of explication and of proof, is "a _belief or trust_." +These instinctive beliefs, which are, as it were, the first principles +upon which all knowledge rests, are, however, indiscriminately called by +Hamilton "cognitions," "beliefs," "judgments." He declares most +explicitly "that the principles of our knowledge must themselves be +_knowledges_;"[345] and these first principles, which are "the primary +condition of reason," are elsewhere called "_à priori cognitions_;" also +"native, pure, or transcendental _knowledge_," in contradistinction to +"_à posteriori cognitions_," or that knowledge which is obtained in the +exercise of reason.[346] All this confusion results from an attempt to +put asunder what God has joined together. As Clemens of Alexandria has +said, "Neither is faith without knowledge, nor knowledge without faith." +All faith implies knowledge, and all knowledge implies faith. They are +mingled in the one operation of the human mind, by which we apprehend +first principles or ultimate truths. These have their light and dark +side, as Hamilton has remarked. They afford enough light to show _that_ +they are and must be, and thus communicate knowledge; they furnish no +light to show _how_ they are and _why_ they are, and under that aspect +demand the exercise of faith. There must, therefore, first be something +_known_ before there can be any _faith_.[347] + +[Footnote 345: Ibid., p. 69.] + +[Footnote 346: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 26.] + +[Footnote 347: M'Cosh, "Intuitions," pp. 197, 198; Calderwood, +"Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 24.] + +And now we seem to have penetrated to the centre of Hamilton's +philosophy, and the vital point may be touched by one crucial question, +_Upon what ultimate ground does faith itself rest?_ Hamilton says, "we +believe what rests upon _authority_." But what is that authority? I. It +is not the authority of Divine Revelation, because beliefs are called +"instinctive," "native," "innate," "common," "catholic,"[348] all which +terms seem to indicate that this "authority" lies within the sphere of +the human mind; at any rate, this faith does not rest on the authority +of Scripture. Neither is it the authority of Reason. "The original data +of reason [the first principles of knowledge] do not rest upon the +authority of reason, but _on the authority of what is beyond itself_." +The question thus recurs, what is this ultimate ground beyond reason +upon which faith rests? Does it rest upon any thing, or nothing? + +[Footnote 348: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, pp. 68, 69.] + +The answer to this question is given in the so-called "Law of the +Conditioned," which is thus laid down: "_All that is conceivable in +thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each +other, can not both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, +one must_." For example, we conceive _space_, but we can not conceive it +as absolutely bounded or infinitely unbounded. We can conceive _time_, +but we can not conceive it as having an absolute commencement or an +infinite non-commencement. We can conceive of _degree_, but we can not +conceive it as absolutely limited or as infinitely unlimited. We can +conceive of _existence_, but not as an absolute part or an infinite +whole. Therefore, "the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or +cogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or +incogitable. The conditioned, or the thinkable, lies between two +extremes or poles; and each of these extremes or poles are +unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or +contradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is +that of Unconditional or Absolute Limitation; the other that of +Unconditional or Infinite Illimitation, or, more simply, the Absolute +and the Infinite; the term _absolute_ expressing that which is finished +or complete, the term _infinite_ that which can not be terminated or +concluded."[349] + +"The conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, +exclusive of each other, neither of which _can be conceived as +possible_, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excluded +middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. We are thus warned from +recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with +the horizon of our faith. And by a _wonderful revelation_, we are thus, +in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the +relative and the finite, _inspired with a belief in_ the existence of +something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible +reality."[350] Here, then, we have found the ultimate ground of our +faith in the Infinite God. It is built upon a "mental imbecility," and +buttressed up by "contradictions!"[351] + +[Footnote 349: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 374. With +Hamilton, the Unconditioned is a genus, of which the Infinite and +Absolute are species.] + +[Footnote 350: "Discussions on Philosophy," p. 22.] + +[Footnote 351: The warmest admirers of Sir William Hamilton hesitate to +apply the doctrine of the unconditioned to Cause and Free-will. See +"Mansel's Prolegom.," Note C, p. 265.] + +Such a faith, however, is built upon the clouds, and the whole structure +of this philosophy is "a castle in the air"--an attempt to organize +Nescience into Science, and evoke something out of nothing. To pretend +to believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is in reality +not to believe at all. The nature which compels me to believe in the +Infinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold. +We can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rational +belief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in the +veracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, above +all, a faith in the veracity of God, who is the author and illuminator +of our mental constitution. "We can not suppose that we are created +capable of intelligence in order to be made victims of delusion--that +God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie."[352] We close our +review of Hamilton by remarking: + +[Footnote 352: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 21.] + +1. "The Law of the Conditioned," as enounced by Hamilton, is +contradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which are +asserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they are +utterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they are +contradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known, +but the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we know +any relation except by an act of comparison, and how can we compare two +objects so as to affirm their relation, if the objects are absolutely +unknown? "The Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation; the +Absolute as Conditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we are +told that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of +thought. On the one hand, we are told they _differ_; on the other, we +are told they do _not differ_. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he +insist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable +difference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist upon +the inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage, +devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this +dilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradiction +is the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials +can not conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, its +contradictory, is positive, whether conditional or unconditional. In +brief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, they +are not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are not +wholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to us +identical; and identity precludes contradiction. But if they are +distinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involves +positive cognition; hence one, at least, must be conceivable. It +follows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradiction +or the inconceivability must be abandoned."[353] + +[Footnote 353: North American Review, October, 1864, pp. 407, 408.] + +2. "The Law of the Conditioned," as a ground of faith in the Infinite +Being, is utterly void, meaningless, and ineffectual. Let us re-state it +in Hamilton's own words: "The conditioned is the _mean_ between two +extremes, two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which +_can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principle of +Contradiction and Excluded Middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_." +It is scarcely needful to explain to the intelligent reader the above +logical principles; that they may, however, be clearly before the mind +in this connection, we state that the principle of Contradiction is +this: "A thing can not at the same time be and not be; _A is_, _A is +not_, are propositions which can not both be true at once." The +principle of Excluded Middle is this: "A thing either is or is not--_A +either is or is not B_; there is no _medium_."[354] Now, to mention the +law of Excluded Middle and two contradictories with a _mean_ between +them, in the same sentence, is really astounding. "If the two +contradictory extremes are equally incogitable, yet include a cogitable +mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme? This +necessity of accepting one of the contradictories is wholly based upon +the supposed impossibility of a _mean_; if a mean exists, _that_ may be +true, and both contradictories together false. But if a mean between two +contradictories be both impossible and absurd, Hamilton's 'conditioned' +entirely vanishes."[355] If both contradictories are equally unknown and +equally unthinkable, we can not discover _why_, on his principles, we +are bound to believe _either_. + +[Footnote 354: Hamilton's "Logic," pp. 58, 59; "Metaphysics," vol. ii. +p. 368.] + +[Footnote 355: North British Review, October, 1864, pp. 415, 416.] + +3. The whole of this confusion in thought and expression results from +the habit of confounding the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuous +reason, and the consequent co-ordination of an imageable conception with +an abstract idea. The objects of sense and the sensuous imagination may +be characterized as extension, limitation, figure, position, etc.; the +objects of the non-sensuous reason may be characterized as universality, +eternity, infinity. I can form an _image_ of an extended and figured +object, but I can not form an _image_ of space, time, or God; neither, +indeed, can I form an image of Goodness, Justice, or Truth. But I can +have a clear and precise idea of space, and time, and God, as I can of +Justice, Goodness, and Truth. There are many things which I can most +surely _know_ that I can not possibly _comprehend_, if to comprehend is +to form a mental image of a thing. There is nothing which I more +certainly know than that space is infinite, and eternity unbeginning and +endless; but I can not comprehend the infinity of space or the +illimitability of eternity. I know that God is, that he is a being of +infinite perfection, but I can not throw my thoughts around and +comprehend the infinity of God. + +(iv.) We come, lastly, to consider the position of the _Dogmatic +Theologians_.[356] In their zeal to demonstrate the necessity of Divine +Revelation, and to vindicate for it the honor of supplying to us all our +knowledge of God, they assail every fundamental principle of reason, +often by the very weapons which are supplied by an Atheistical +philosophy. As a succinct presentation of the views of this school, we +select the "_Theological Institutes_" of R. Watson. + +[Footnote 356: Ellis, Leland, Locke, and Horsley, whose writings are +extensively quoted in Watson's "Institutes of Theology" (reprinted by +Carlton & Lanahan, New York).] + +1st. The invalidity of "_the principle of causality_" is asserted by +this author. "We allow that the argument which proves that the _effects_ +with which we are surrounded have been _caused_, and thus leads us up +through a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has a +simplicity, an obviousness, and a force which, when we are previously +furnished with the idea of God, makes it, at first sight, difficult to +conceive that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate +to it; yet if ever the human mind commenced such an inquiry at all, it +is highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an _eternal +succession of causes and effects_, rather than acquire the ideas of +creation, in the proper sense, and of a Supreme Creator."[357] "We feel +that our reason rests with full satisfaction in the doctrine that all +things are created by one eternal and self-existent Being; but the Greek +philosophers held that matter was eternally co-existent with God. This +was the opinion of Plato, who has been called the Moses of +philosophy."[358] + +For a defense of "the principle of causality" we must refer the reader +to our remarks on the philosophy of Comte. We shall now only remark on +one or two peculiarities in the above statement which betray an utter +misapprehension of the nature of the argument. We need scarcely direct +attention to the unfortunate and, indeed, absurd phrase, "an eternal +succession of causes and effects." An "eternal succession" is a +_contradictio in adjecto_, and as such inconceivable and unthinkable. No +human mind can "rest" in any such thing, because an eternal succession +is no rest at all. All "succession" is finite and temporal, capable of +numeration, and therefore can not be eternal.[359] Again, in attaining +the conception of a First Cause the human mind does not pass up "through +a chain of subordinate causes," either definite or indefinite, "to one +First Cause." + +[Footnote 357: Watson's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 273.] + +[Footnote 358: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 21.] + +[Footnote 359: See _ante_, pp. 181, 182, ch. v.] + +Let us re-state the principle of causality as a universal and necessary +law of thought. "_All phenomena present themselves to us as the +expression of_ POWER, and refer us to a causal ground whence they +issue." That "power" is intuitively and spontaneously apprehended by the +human mind as Supreme and Ultimate--"the causal ground" is a personal +God. All the phenomena of nature present themselves to us as "effects," +and we know nothing of "subordinate causes" except as modes of the +Divine Efficiency.[360] The principle of causality compels us to think +causation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition. +"Other forces we have no sort of ground for believing; or, except by +artifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea is +either this or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is that +nature is either a mere Time-march of phenomena or an expression of +Mind."[361] The true doctrine of philosophy, of science, and of +revelation is not simply that God did create "in the beginning," but +that he still creates. All the operations of Nature are the operations +of the Divine Mind. "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return +to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou +renewest the face of the earth."[362] + +[Footnote 360: The modern doctrine of the Correlation and Homogenity of +all Forces clearly proves that they are not many, but _one_--"a dynamic +self-identity masked by transmigration."--Martineau's "Essays," pp. +134-144.] + +[Footnote 361: Martineau's "Essays," pp. 140, 141.] + +[Footnote 362: Psalm civ.] + +The assertion that Plato taught "the eternity of matter," and that +consequently he did not arrive at the idea of a Supreme and Ultimate +Cause, is incapable of proof. The term ylê=matter does not occur in the +writings of Plato, or, indeed, of any of his predecessors, and is +peculiarly Aristotelian. The ground of the world of sense is called by +Plato "the receptacle" (ypodochê), "the nurse" (tithênê) of all that is +produced, and was apparently identified, in his mind, with _pure +space_--a logical rather than a physical entity--the mere negative +condition and medium of Divine manifestation. He never regards it as a +"cause," or ascribes to it any efficiency. We grant that he places this +very indefinite something (opoionoun ti) out of the sphere of temporal +origination; but it must be borne in mind that he speaks of "creation in +eternity" as well as of "creation in time;" and of time itself, though +created, as "an eternal image of the generating Father."[363] This one +thing, at any rate, can not be denied, that Plato recognizes creation in +its fullest sense as the act of God. + +The admission that something has always existed besides the Deity, as a +mere logical condition of the exercise of divine power (_e.g._, space), +would not invalidate the argument for the existence of God. The proof of +the Divine Existence, as Chalmers has shown, does not rest on the +existence of matter, but on the orderly arrangement of matter; and the +grand question of Theism is not whether the _matter of the world_, but +whether the _present order of the world_ had a commencement.[364] + +2d. Doubt is cast by our author upon the validity of "_the principle of +the Unconditioned or the Infinite_." "Supposing it were conceded that +some faint glimmering of this great truth [the existence of a First +Cause] might, by induction, have been discovered by contemplative minds, +by what means could they have _demonstrated_ to themselves that he is +eternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent?"[365] "Between things +visible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings +infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, _the connection is not +perceptible_ to human observation. Though we push our researches, +therefore, to the extreme point whither the light of nature can carry +us, they will in the end be abruptly terminated, and we must stop short +at an immeasurable distance between the creature and the Creator."[366] + +[Footnote 363: Plato, "Timæus," § xiv.] + +[Footnote 364: Chalmers's "Natural Theology," bk. i. ch. v.; also +Mahan's "Natural Theology," pp. 21-23.] + +[Footnote 365: Watson's "Institutes of Theol.," vol. i. p. 274.] + +[Footnote 366: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 273.] + +To this assertion that the connection of things visible and things +invisible, finite and infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, +is utterly imperceptible to human thought, we might reply by quoting the +words of that Sacred Book whose supreme authority our author is seeking, +by this argument, to establish. "The _invisible_ things of God, even his +eternal power and god-head, from the creation, are clearly _seen_, being +_understood by the things which are made_." We may also point to the +fact that in every age and in every land the human mind has +spontaneously and instinctively recognized the existence of an invisible +Power and Presence pervading nature and controlling the destinies of +man, and that religious worship--prayer, and praise, and +sacrifice--offered to that unseen yet omnipresent Power is an universal +fact of human nature. The recognition of an _immediate_ and a +_necessary_ "connection" between the visible and the invisible, the +objects of sense and the objects of faith, is one of the most obvious +facts of consciousness--of universal consciousness as revealed in +history, and of individual consciousness as developed in every rational +mind. + +That this connection is "not perceptible to human observation," if by +this our author means "not perceptible to sense," we readily admit. No +one ever asserted it was perceptible to human observation. We say that +this connection is perceptible to human _reason_, and is revealed in +every attempt to think about, and seek an explanation of, the phenomenal +world. The Phenomenal and the Real, Genesis and Being, Space and +Extension, Succession and Duration, Time and Eternity, the Finite and +the Infinite, are correlatives which are given in one and the same +indivisible act of thought. "The conception of one term of a relation +necessarily implies that of the other; it being the very nature of a +correlative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its +correlative; for a relation is, in truth, a thought one and indivisible; +and whilst the thinking of one relation necessarily involves the thought +of its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the +thought of either."[367] Finite, dependent, contingent, temporal +existence, therefore, necessarily supposes infinite, self-existent, +independent, eternal Being; the Conditioned and Relative implies the +Unconditioned and Absolute--one is known only in and through the other. +But inasmuch as the unconditioned is cognized solely _à priori_, and the +conditioned solely _à posteriori_, the recognition by the human mind of +their necessary correlation becomes the bridge whereby the chasm between +the subjective and the objective may be spanned, and whereby Thought may +be brought face to face with Existence. + +[Footnote 367: Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 536, 537.] + +The reverence which, from boyhood, we have entertained for the +distinguished author of the "Institutes" restrains us from speaking in +adequate terms of reprobation of the statement that "the _First Cause_" +may be known, and yet not conceived "as eternal, self-existent, +immortal, and independent". Surely that which is the ground and reason +of all existence must have the ground and reason of its own existence in +itself. That which is _first_ in the order of existence, and in the +logical order of thought, can have nothing prior to itself. If the +supposed First Cause is not necessarily self-existent and independent, +it is not the _first_; if it has a dependent existence, there must be a +prior being on which it depends. If the First Cause is not eternal, then +prior to this Ultimate Cause there was nothingness and vacuity, and pure +nothing, by its own act, became something. But "_Ex nihilo nihil_" is a +universal law of thought. To ask the question whether the First Cause be +self-existent and eternal, is, in effect, to ask the question "who made +God?" and this is not the question of an adult theologian, but of a +little child. Surely Mr. Watson must have penned the above passage +without any reflection on its real import[368]. + +[Footnote 368: In an article on "the Impending Revolution in Anglo-Saxon +Theology" Methodist Quarterly Review, (July, 1863), Dr. Warren seems to +take it for granted that the "aiteological" and "teleological" arguments +for the existence of God are utterly invalidated by the Dynamical theory +of matter. "Once admit that _real power_ can and does reside in matter, +and all these reasonings fail. If inherent forces of matter are +competent to the production of all the innumerable miracles of movement +in the natural world, what is there in the natural world which they can +not produce. If all _the exertions of power_ in the universe can be +accounted for without resort to something back of, and superior to, +nature, what is there which can force the mind to such a resort?" (p. +463). "Having granted that _power_, or _self-activity_, is a natural +attribute of all matter, what right have we to deny it _intelligence_?" +(p. 465). "_Self-moving matter must have thought and design_" (p. 469). + +It is not our intention to offer an extended criticism of the above +positions in this note. We shall discuss "the Dynamical theory" more +fully in a subsequent work. If the theory apparently accepted by Dr. +Warren be true, that "_the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly +efficient as minds_, and that we have the same ground to regard the +force exerted by the one _innate_ and _natural_ as that exerted by the +other" (p. 464), then we grant that the conclusions of Dr. Warren, as +above stated, are unavoidable. We proceed one step farther, and boldly +assert that the existence of God is, on this hypothesis, incapable of +proof, and the only logical position Dr. Warren can occupy is that of +spiritualistic Pantheism. + +Dr. Warren asserts that "the Dynamical theory of matter" is now +generally accepted by "Anglo-Saxon _naturalists_." "One can scarcely +open a scientific treatise without observing the altered stand-point" +(p. 160). We confess that we are disappointed with Dr. Warren's +treatment of this simple question of fact. On so fundamental an issue, +the Doctor ought to have given the name of at least _one_ "naturalist" +who asserts that "the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly +efficient as minds." Leibnitz, Morrell, Ulrici, Hickok, the authorities +quoted by him, are metaphysicians and idealists of the extremest school. +At present we shall, therefore, content ourselves with a general denial +of this wholesale statement of Dr. Warren; and we shall sustain that +denial by a selection from the many authorities we shall hereafter +present. "No particle of matter possesses within itself the power of +changing its existing state of motion or of rest. Matter has no +spontaneous power either of rest or motion, but is equally susceptible +to each as it may be acted on by _external_ causes" (Silliman's +"Principles of Physics," p. 13). The above proposition is "a truth on +which the whole science of mechanical philosophy ultimately depends" +(Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Dynamics," vol. viii. p. 326). "A +material substance existing alone in the universe could not produce any +effects. There is not, so far as we know, a self-acting material +substance in the universe" (M'Cosh, "Divine Government, Physical and +Moral," p. 78). "Perhaps the only true indication of matter is +_inertia_." "The cause of gravitation is _not resident_ in the particles +of matter merely," but also "_in all space_" (Dr. Faraday on +"Conservation of Force," in "Correlation and Conservation of Force." (p. +368). He also quotes with approbation the words of Newton, "That gravity +should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, is so great an +absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophic matters a +competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it" p. 368). "The +'force of gravity' is an improper expression" (p. 340). "Forces are +transformable, indestructible, and, _in contradistinction from matter_, +imponderable" (p. 346). "The first cause of things is Deity" (Dr. Mayer, +in "Correlation and Conservation of Force," p. 341). "Although the word +_cause_ may be used in a secondary and subordinate sense, as meaning +antecedent forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable; +we can not predicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly the +cause of another" (p. 15). "Causation is the _will_," "creation is the +act, of God" Grove on "Correlation of Physical Forces," (p. 199). +"Between gravity and motion it is impossible to establish the equation +required for a rightly-conceived _causal_ relation" ("Correlation and +Conservation of Force," p. 253). See also Herschel's "Outlines of +Astronomy," p. 234. + +It certainly must have required a wonderful effort of imagination on the +part of Dr. Warren to transform "weight" and "density," mere passive +affections of matter, into self-activity, intelligence, thought, and +design. Weight or density are merely relative terms. Supposing one +particle or mass of matter to exist alone, and there can be no +attractive or gravitating force. There must be a cause of gravity which +is distinct from matter.] + +3d. The validity of "_the principle of unity_" is also discredited by +Watson. "If, however, it were conceded that some glimmerings of this +great truth, the existence of a First Cause, might, by induction, have +been discovered, by what means could they have demonstrated to +themselves that the great collection of bodies which we call the world +had but _one_ Creator."[369] + +[Footnote 369: "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 275.] + +We might answer directly, and at once, that the oneness or unity of God +is necessarily contained in "the very notion of a First Cause"--a +_first_ cause is not many causes, but _one_. By a First Cause we do not, +however, understand the first of a numerical series, but an archê--a +principle, itself unbeginning, which is the source of all beginning. Our +categorical answer, therefore, must be that the unity of God is a +sublime deliverance of reason--God is one God. It is a first principle +of reason that all differentiation and plurality supposes an incomposite +unity, all diversity implies an indivisible identity. The sensuous +perception of a plurality of parts supposes the rational idea of an +absolute unity, which has no parts, as its necessary correlative. For +example, extension is a congeries of indefinitesimal parts; the +continuity of matter, as _empirically_ known by us, is never absolute. +Space is absolutely continuous, incapable of division into integral +parts, illimitable, and, as _rationally_ known by us, an absolute unity. +The cognition of limited extension, which is the subject of quantitative +measurement, involves the conception of unlimited space, which is the +negation of all plurality and complexity of parts. And so the cognition +of a phenomenal universe in which we see only difference, plurality, and +change, implies the existence of a Being who is absolutely unchangeable, +identical, and one. + +This law of thought lies at the basis of that universal desire of unity, +and that universal effort to reduce all our knowledge to unity, which +has revealed itself in the history of philosophy, and also of inductive +science. "Reason, intellect, nous, concatenating thoughts and objects +into system, and tending upward from particular facts to general laws, +from general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its +ascent till it comprehends all laws in a single formula, and consummates +all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence." "The +history of philosophy is only the history of this tendency, and +philosophers have borne ample testimony to its reality. 'The mind,' says +Anaxagoras, 'only knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces the +many to the one.' 'The end of philosophy,' says Plato, 'is the intuition +of unity.' 'All knowledge,' say the Platonists, 'is the gathering up +into one, and the indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowing +mind.'"[370] + +[Footnote 370: Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. pp. 68, 69.] + +This law has been the guiding principle of the Inductive Sciences, and +has led to some of its most important discoveries. The unity which has +been attained in physical science is not, however, the absolute unity of +a material substratum, but a unity of _Will_ and of _Thought_. The late +discovery of the monogenesis, reciprocal convertibility, and +indestructibility of all Forces in nature, leads us upward towards the +recognition of one Omnipresent and Omnipotent Will, which, like a mighty +tide, sweeps through the universe and effects all its changes. The +universal prevalence of the same physical laws and numerical relations +throughout all space, and of the same archetypal forms and teleology of +organs throughout all past time, reveals to us a Unity of Thought which +grasps the entire details of the universe in one comprehensive +plan.[371] The positive _à priori_ intuitions of reason and the _à +posteriori_ inductions of science equally attest _that God is one_. + +[Footnote 371: We refer with pleasure to the articles of Dr. Winchell, +in the North-western Christian Advocate, in which the _à posteriori_ +proof of "the Unity of God" is forcibly exhibited, and take occasion to +express the hope they will soon be presented to the public in a more +permanent form.] + +4th. By denying that man has any intuitive cognitions of right and +wrong, or any native and original feeling of obligation, Mr. Watson +invalidates "the moral argument" for the existence of a Righteous God. + +"As far as man's reason has applied itself to the discovery of truth or +_duty_ it has generally gone astray."[372] "Questions of morals do not, +for the most part, lie level to the minds of the populace."[373] "Their +conclusions have no _authority_, and place them under no +_obligation_."[374] And, indeed, man without a revelation "is without +_moral control_, without _principles of justice_, except such as may be +slowly elaborated from those relations which concern the grosser +interests of life, without _conscience_, without hope or fear in another +life."[375] + +[Footnote 372: "Institutes of Theology," vol. ii. p. 470.] + +[Footnote 373: Ibid., vol. i. p. 15.] + +[Footnote 374: Ibid., vol. i. p. 228.] + +[Footnote 375: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 271.] + +Now we shall not occupy our space in the elaboration of the proposition +that the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in human +history, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony to the +fact that the ideas of right, duty, and responsibility are native to the +human mind; we shall simply make our appeal to those Sacred Writings +whose verdict must be final with all theologians. That the fundamental +principles of the moral law do exist, subjectively, in all human minds +is distinctly affirmed by Paul, in a passage which deserves to be +regarded as the chief corner-stone of moral science. "The Gentiles +(ephnê, heathen), which have not the written law, do by the guidance of +nature (reason or conscience) the works enjoined by the revealed law; +these, having no written law, are a law unto themselves; who show +plainly the works of the law written on their hearts, their conscience +bearing witness, and also their reasonings one with another, when they +accuse, or else excuse, each other."[376] To deny this is to relegate +the heathen from all responsibility. For Mr. Watson admits "that the +will of a superior is not in justice binding unless it be in some mode +sufficiently declared." Now in the righteous adjudgments of revelation +the heathen are "without excuse." The will of God must, therefore, be +"sufficiently declared" to constitute them accountable. Who will presume +to say that the shadowy, uncertain, variable, easily and unavoidably +corrupted medium of tradition running through forty muddy centuries is a +"sufficient declaration of the will of God?" The law is "written on the +heart" of every man, or all men are not accountable. + +[Footnote 376: Romans, ch. ii. ver. 14-15.] + +Now this "law written within the heart" immediately and naturally +suggests the idea of a Lawgiver who is over us. This felt presence of +Conscience, approving or condemning our conduct, suggests, as with the +speed of the lightning-flash, the notion of a Judge who will finally +call us to account. This "accusing or excusing of each other," this +recognition of good or ill desert, points us to, and constrains us to +recognize, a future Retribution; so that some hope or fear of another +life has been in all ages a universal phenomenon of humanity. + +It is affirmed, however, that whilst this capacity to know God may have +been an original endowment of human nature, yet, in consequence of the +fall, "the understanding and reason are weakened by the deterioration of +his whole intellectual nature."[377] "Without some degree of education, +man is _wholly_ the creature of appetite. Labor, feasting, and sleeping +divide his time, and wholly occupy his thoughts."[378] + +[Footnote 377: "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 15.] + +[Footnote 378: Ibid., vol. i. p. 271.] + +We reverently and believingly accept the teaching of Scripture as to the +depravity of man. We acknowledge that "the understanding is darkened" by +sin. At the same time, we earnestly maintain that the Scriptures do not +teach that the fundamental laws of mind, the first principles of reason, +are utterly traversed and obliterated by sin, so that man is not able to +recognize the existence of God, and feel his obligation to Him. "_Though +they_(the heathen) _knew God_ (dioti gnontes), they did not glorify him +as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagination, and +their foolish hearts were darkened. They changed the truth of God into a +lie, and worshipped and served the creature _more_ than the Creator." +"And as they did not _approve of holding God with acknowledgment_, God +delivered them over to an unapproving mind, to work those things which +are not suitable." After drawing a fearful picture of the darkness and +depravity of the heathen, the Apostle adds, "Who, _though they_ KNOW +_the law of God_, that they who practise such things are worthy of +death, not only do them, but even are well pleased with those who +practise them."[379] The obvious and direct teaching of this passage is +that the heathen, in the midst of their depravity and idolatry, are not +utterly ignorant of God; "they _know_ God"--"they _know_ the law of God +"--"they worship Him," though they worship the creature _more than_ Him. +They know God, and are unwilling to "acknowledge God." "They know the +righteousness of God," and are "haters of God" on account of his purity; +and their worshipping of idols does not proceed from ignorance of God, +from an intellectual inability to know God, but from "corruption of +heart," and a voluntary choice of, and a "pleasure" in, the sinful +practices accompanying idol worship. Therefore, argues the Apostle, they +are "without excuse." The whole drift and aim of the argument of Paul +is, not to show that the heathen were, by their depravity, incapacitated +to know God, but that because they knew God and knew his righteous law, +therefore their depravity and licentiousness was "inexcusable." + +[Footnote 379: Romans, ch. i. ver. 23-32.] + +We conclude our review of opposing schools by the re-affirmation of our +position, _that God is cognizable by human reason._ The human mind, +under the guidance of necessary laws of thought, is able, from the facts +of the universe, to affirm the existence of God, and to attain some +valid knowledge of his character and will. Every attempt to solve the +great problem of existence, to offer an explanation of the phenomenal +world, or to explore the fundamental idea of reason, when fairly and +fully conducted, has resulted in the recognition of a Supreme +_Intelligence_, a personal _Mind_ and _Will_, as the ground, and reason, +and cause of all existence. A survey of the history of Greek Philosophy +will abundantly sustain this position, and to this we shall, in +subsequent chapters, invite the reader's attention. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS. + +PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + +SENSATIONAL: +THALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER--LEUCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS. + + + "Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the + Stoics encountered Paul."--Acts xvii. 18. + + "Plato affirms that this is the most just cause of the + creation of the world, that works which are good should be + wrought by the God who is good; whether he had read these + things in the Bible, or whether by his penetrating genius he + beheld _the invisible things of God as understood by the + things which are made_"--ST. AUGUSTINE, "De Civ. Dei," lib. + xi. ch. 21. + +Of all the monuments of the greatness of Athens which have survived the +changes and the wastes of time, the most perfect and the most enduring +is her philosophy. The Propylæa, the Parthenon, and the Erechtheum, +those peerless gems of Grecian architecture, are now in ruins. The +magnificent sculpture of Phidias, which adorned the pediment, and outer +cornice, and inner frieze of these temples, and the unrivalled statuary +of gods and heroes which crowded the platform of the Acropolis, making +it an earthly Olympus, are now no more, save a few broken fragments +which have been carried to other lands, and, in their exile, tell the +mournful story of the departed grandeur of their ancient home. The +brazen statue of Minerva, cast from the spoils of Marathon, which rose +in giant grandeur above the buildings of the Acropolis, and the flashing +of whose helmet plumes was seen by the mariner as soon as he had rounded +the Sunian promontory; and that other brazen Pallas, called, by +pre-eminence, "the Beautiful;" and the enormous Colossus of ivory and of +gold, "the Immortal Maid"--the protecting goddess of the +Parthenon--these have perished. But whilst the fingers of time have +crumbled the Pentelic marble, and the glorious statuary has been broken +to pieces by vandal hands, and the gold and brass have been melted in +the crucibles of needy monarchs and converted into vulgar money, the +philosophic _thought_ of Athens, which culminated in the dialectic of +Plato, still survives. Not one of all the vessels, freighted with +immortal thought, which Plato launched upon the stream of time, has +foundered. And after the vast critical movement of European thought +during the past two centuries, in which all philosophic systems have +been subjected to the severest scrutiny, the _method_ of Plato still +preserves, if not its exclusive authority unquestioned, at least its +intellectual pre-eminence unshaken. "Platonism is immortal, because its +principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."[380] + +[Footnote 380: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +9.] + +Philosophy is, then, the world-enduring monument of the greatness and +the glory of Athens. Whilst Greece will be forever memorable as "the +country of wisdom and of wise men," Athens will always be pre-eminently +memorable as the University of Greece. This was the home of Socrates, +and Plato, and Aristotle--the three imperial names which, for twenty +centuries, reigned supreme in the world of philosophic thought. Here +schools of philosophy were founded to which students were attracted from +every part of the civilized world, and by which an impulse and a +direction was given to human thought in every land and in every age. +Standing on the Acropolis at Athens, and looking over the city and the +open country, the Apostle would see these _places_ which are inseparably +associated with the names of the men who have always been recognized as +the great teachers of the pagan world, and who have also exerted a +powerful influence upon Christian minds of every age. "In opposite +directions he would see the suburbs where Plato and Aristotle, the two +pupils of Socrates, held their illustrious schools. The streamless bed +of the Ilissus passes between the Acropolis and Hymettus in a +south-westerly direction, until it vanishes in the low ground which +separates the city from the Piræus." Looking towards the upper part of +this channel, Paul would see gardens of plane-trees and thickets of +angus-castus, "with other torrent-loving shrubs of Greece." Near the +base of Lycabettus was a sacred inclosure which Pericles had ornamented +with fountains. Here stood a statue of Apollo Lycius, which gave the +name to the _Lyceum_. Here, among the plane-trees, Aristotle _walked_, +and, as he walked, taught his disciples. Hence the name Peripatetics +(the Walkers), which has always designated the disciples of the +Stagirite philosopher. + +On the opposite side of the city, the most beautiful of the Athenian +suburbs, we have the scene of Plato's teaching. Beyond the outer +Ceramicus, which was crowded with the sepulchres of those Athenians who +had fallen in battle, and were buried at the public expense, the eye of +Paul would rest on the favored stream of the Cephisus, flowing towards +the west. On the banks of this stream the _Academy_ was situated. A +wall, built at great expense by Hipparchus, surrounded it, and Cimon +planted long avenues of trees and erected fountains. Beneath the +plane-trees which shaded the numerous walks there assembled the +master-spirits of the age. This was the favorite resort of poets and +philosophers. Here the divine spirit of Plato poured forth its sublimest +speculations in streams of matchless eloquence; and here he founded a +school which was destined to exert a powerful and perennial influence on +human minds and hearts in all coming time. + +Looking down from the Acropolis upon the Agora, Paul would distinguish a +cloister or colonnade. This is the Stoa Poecile, or "Painted Porch," so +called because its walls were decorated with fresco paintings of the +legendary wars of Greece, and the more glorious struggle at Marathon. It +was here that Zeno first opened that celebrated school which thence +received the name of _Stoic_. The site of the _garden_ where Epicurus +taught is now unknown. It was no doubt within the city walls, and not +far distant from the Agora. It was well known in the time of Cicero, who +visited Athens as a student little more than a century before the +Apostle. It could not have been forgotten in the time of Paul. In this +"tranquil garden," in the society of his friends, Epicurus passed a life +of speculation and of pleasure. His disciples were called, after him, +the Epicureans.[381] + +[Footnote 381: See Conybeare and Howson's "Life and Epistles of St. +Paul," vol. i., Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy;" and +Encyclopædia Britannica, article, "Athens," from whence our materials +for the description of these "places" are mainly derived.] + +Here, then, in Athens the Apostle was brought into immediate contact +with all the phases of philosophic thought which had appeared in the +ancient world. "Amongst those who sauntered beneath the cool shadows of +the plane-trees in the Agora, and gathered in knots under the porticoes, +eagerly discussing the questions of the day, were the philosophers, in +the garb of their several sects, ready for any new question on which +they might exercise their subtlety or display their rhetoric." If there +were any in that motley group who cherished the principles and retained +the spirit of the true Platonic school, we may presume they felt an +inward intellectual sympathy with the doctrine enounced by Paul. With +Plato, "philosophy was only another name for _religion_: philosophy is +the love of perfect Wisdom; perfect Wisdom and perfect Goodness are +identical: the perfect Good is God himself; philosophy is the love of +God."[382] He confessed the need of divine assistance to attain "the +good," and of divine interposition to deliver men from moral ruin.[383] +Like Socrates, he longed for a supernatural--a divine light to guide +him, and he acknowledged his need thereof continually.[384] He was one +of those who, in heathen lands, waited for "the desire of nations;" and, +had he lived in Christian times, no doubt his "spirit of faith" would +have joyfully "embraced the Saviour in all the completeness of his +revelation and advent."[385] And in so far as the spirit of Plato +survived among his disciples, we may be sure they were not among the +number who "mocked," and ridiculed, and opposed the "new doctrine" +proclaimed by Paul. It was "the philosophers of the Epicureans and of +the Stoics who _encountered_ Paul." The leading tenets of both these +sects were diametrically opposed to the doctrines of Christianity. The +ruling spirit of each was alien from the spirit of Christ. The haughty +_pride_ of the Stoic, the Epicurean abandonment to _pleasure_, placed +them in direct antagonism to him who proclaimed the crucified and risen +Christ to be "_the wisdom_ of God." + +[Footnote 382: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +61.] + +[Footnote 383: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vi. vii.] + +[Footnote 384: Butler's "Lectures," vol. i. p. 362.] + +[Footnote 385: Wheedon on "The Will," p. 352; also Butler's "Lectures," +vol. ii. p. 252] + +If, however, we would justly appreciate the relation of pagan philosophy +to Christian truth, we must note that, when Paul arrived in Athens, the +age of Athenian glory had passed away. Not only had her national +greatness waned, and her national spirit degenerated, but her +intellectual power exhibited unmistakable signs of exhaustion, and +weakness, and decay. If philosophy had borne any fruit, of course that +fruit remained. If, in the palmy days of Athenian greatness, any field +of human inquiry had been successfully explored; if human reason had +achieved any conquests; if any thing true and good had been obtained, +that must endure as an heir-loom for all coming time; and if those +centuries of agonizing wrestlings with nature, and of ceaseless +questioning of the human heart, had yielded no results, then, at least, +the _lesson_ of their failure and defeat remained for the instruction of +future generations. Either the problems they sought to solve were proved +to be insoluble, or their methods of solution were found to be +inadequate; for here the mightiest minds had grappled with the great +problems of being and of destiny. Here vigorous intellects had struggled +to pierce the darkness which hangs alike over the beginning and the end +of human existence. Here profoundly earnest men had questioned nature, +reason, antiquity, oracles, in the hope they might learn something of +that invisible world of _real_ being which they instinctively felt must +lie beneath the world of fleeting forms and ever-changing appearances. +Here philosophy had directed her course towards every point in the +compass of thought, and touched every _accessible_ point. The sun of +human reason had reached its zenith, and illuminated every field that +lay within the reach of human ken. And this sublime era of Greek +philosophy is of inestimable value to us who live in Christian times, +because _it is an exhaustive effort of human reason to solve the problem +of being_, and in its history we have a record of the power and weakness +of the human mind, at once on the grandest scale and in the fairest +characters.[386] + +[Footnote 386: See article "Philosophy," in Smith's "Dictionary of the +Bible."] + +These preliminary considerations will have prepared the way for, and +awakened in our minds a profound interest in, the inquiry--1st. What +permanent _results_ has Greek philosophy bequeathed to the world? 2d. In +what manner did Greek philosophy fulfill for Christianity a +_propoedeutic_ office? + +It will at once be obvious, even to those who are least conversant with +our theme, that it would be fruitless to attempt the answer to these +important questions before we have made a careful survey of the entire +history of philosophic thought in Greece. We must have a clear and +definite conception of the problems they sought to solve, and we must +comprehend their methods of inquiry, before we can hope to appreciate +the results they reached, or determine whether they did arrive at any +definite and valuable conclusions. It will, therefore, devolve upon us +to present a brief and yet comprehensive epitome of the history of +Grecian speculative thought. + +"_Philosophy_," says Cousin, "_is reflection_, and nothing else than +reflection, in a vast form"--"Reflection elevated to the rank and +authority of a _method_." It is the mind looking back upon its own +sensations, perceptions, cognitions, ideas, and from thence to the +_causes_ of these sensations, cognitions, and ideas. It is thought +passing beyond the simple perceptions of things, beyond the mere +spontaneous operations of the mind in the cognition of things to seek +the _ground_, and _reason_, and _law_ of things. It is the effort of +reason to solve the great problem of "Being and Becoming," of appearance +and reality, of the changeful and the permanent. Beneath the endless +diversity of the universe, of existence and action, there must be a +principle of unity; below all fleeting appearances there must be a +permanent substance; beyond this everlasting flow and change, this +beginning and ending of finite existence, there must be an _eternal +being_, the source and cause of all we see and know, _What is that +principle of unity, that permanent substance_, or principle, or being? + +This fundamental question has assumed three separate forms or aspects in +the history of philosophy. These forms have been determined by the +objective phenomena which most immediately arrested and engaged the +attention of men. If external nature has been the chief object of +attention, then the problem of philosophy has been, _What is the +archê--_the beginning; what are the first principles_--the elements from +which, the ideas or laws according to which, the efficient cause or +energy by which, and the reason or end for which the universe exists?_ +During this period reflective thought was a PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. If the +phenomena of mind--the opinions, beliefs, judgments of men--are the +chief object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been, +_What are the fundamental Ideas which are unchangeable and permanent +amid all the diversities of human opinions, connecting appearance with +reality, and constituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute +truth?_ Reflective thought is now a PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS. Then, lastly, +if the practical activities of life and the means of well-being be the +grand object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been, +_What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of +human conduct, we may determine what is right and good in individual, +social, and political life?_ And now reflective thought is a PHILOSOPHY +OF LIFE. These are the grand problems with which philosophy has grappled +ever since the dawn of reflection. They all appear in Greek philosophy, +and have a marked chronology. As systems they succeed each other, just +as rigorously as the phenomena of Greek civilization. + +The Greek schools of philosophy have been classified from various points +of view. In view of their geographical relations, they have been divided +into the _Ionian_, the _Italian_, the _Eleatic_, the _Athenian_, and the +_Alexandrian_. In view of their prevailing spirit and tendency, they +have been classified by Cousin as the Sensational, the Idealistic, the +Skeptical, and the Mystical. The most natural and obvious method is that +which (regarding Socrates as the father of Greek philosophy in the +truest sense) arranges all schools from the Socratic stand point, and +therefore in the chronological order of development: + + I. THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. + II. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. + III. THE POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. + +The history of philosophy is thus divided into three grand epochs. The +first reaching from Thales to the time of Socrates (B.C. 639-469): the +second from the birth of Socrates to the death of Aristotle (B.C. +469-322); the third from the death of Aristotle to the Christian era +(B.C. 322, A.D. 1). Greek philosophy during the first period was almost +exclusively a philosophy of nature; during the second period, a +philosophy of mind; during the last period, a philosophy of life. +Nature, man, and society complete the circle of thought. Successive +systems, of course, overlap each other, both in the order of time and as +subjects of human speculation; and the results of one epoch of thought +are transmitted to and appropriated by another; but, in a general sense, +the order of succession has been very much as here indicated. Setting +aside minor schools and merely incidental discussions, and fixing our +attention on the general aspects of each historic period, we shall +discover that the first period was eminently _Physical_, the second +_Psychological_, the last _Ethical_. Every stage of progress which +reason, on _à priori_ grounds, would suggest as the natural order of +thought, or of which the development of an individual mind would furnish +an analogy, had a corresponding realization in the development of +Grecian thought from the time of Thales to the Christian era. "Thought," +says Cousin, "in the first trial of its strength is drawn without." The +first object which engages the attention of the child is the outer +world. He asks the "_how_" and "_why_" of all he sees. His reason urges +him to seek an explanation of the universe. So it was in the _childhood_ +of philosophy. The first essays of human thought were, almost without +exception, discourses peri physeôs (De rerum natura), of the nature of +things. Then the rebound of baffled reason from the impenetrable +bulwarks of the universe drove the mind back upon itself. If the youth +can not interpret nature, he can at least "know himself," and find +within himself the ground and reason of all existence. There are +"_ideas_" in the human mind which are copies of those "_archetypal +ideas_" which dwell in the Creative Mind, and after which the universe +was built. If by "analysis" and "definition" these universal notions can +be distinguished from that which is particular and contingent in the +aggregate of human knowledge, then so much of eternal truth has been +attained. The achievements of philosophic thought in this direction, +during the Socratic age, have marked it as the most brilliant period in +the history of philosophy--the period of its _youthful_ vigor. Deeply +immersed in the practical concerns and conflicts of public life, +_manhood_ is mainly occupied with questions of personal duty, and +individual and social well-being. And so, during the hopeless turmoil of +civil disturbance which marked the decline of national greatness in +Grecian history, philosophy was chiefly occupied with questions of +personal interest and personal happiness. The poetic enthusiasm with +which a nobler age had longed for _truth_, and sought it as the highest +good, has all disappeared, and now one sect seeks refuge from the storms +and agitations of the age in Stoical indifference, the other in +Epicurean effeminacy. + +If now we have succeeded in presenting the real problem of philosophy, +it will at once be obvious that the inquiry was not, in any proper +sense, _theological_. Speculative thought, during the period we have +marked as the era of Greek philosophy, was not an inquiry concerning the +existence or nature of God, or concerning the relations of man to God, +or the duties which man owes to God. These questions were all remitted +to the _theologian_. There was a clear line of demarkation separating +the domains of religion and philosophy. Religion rested solely on +authority, and appealed to the instinctive faith of the human heart. She +permitted no encroachment upon her settled usages, and no questioning of +her ancient beliefs. Philosophy rested on reason alone. It was an +independent effort of thought to interpret nature, and attain the +fundamental grounds of human knowledge--to find an archê--a first +principle, which, being assumed, should furnish a rational explanation +of all existence. If philosophy reach the conclusion that the archë was +water, or air, or fire, or a chaotic mixture of all the elements or +atoms, extended and self-moved, or monads, or to pan, or uncreated mind, +and that conclusion harmonized with the ancient standards of religious +faith--well; if not, philosophy must present some method of +conciliation. The conflicts of faith and reason; the stragglings of +traditional authority to maintain supremacy; the accommodations and +conciliations attempted in those primitive times, would furnish a +chapter of peculiar interest, could it now be written. + +The poets who appeared in the dim twilight of Grecian +civilization--Orpheus, Musæus, Homer, Hesiod--seem to have occupied the +same relation to the popular mind in Greece which the Bible now sustains +to Christian communities.[387] Not that we regard them as standing on +equal ground of authority, or in any sense a revelation. But, in the eye +of the wondering Greek, they were invested with the highest sacredness +and the supremest authority. The high poetic inspiration which pervaded +them was a supernatural gift. Their sublime utterances were accepted as +proceeding from a divine afflatus. They were the product of an age in +which it was believed by all that the gods assumed a human form,[388] +and held a real intercourse with gifted men. This universal faith is +regarded by some as being a relic of still more distant times, a faint +remembrance of the glory of patriarchal days. The more natural opinion +is, that it was begotten of that universal longing of the human heart +for some knowledge of that unseen world of real being, which man +instinctively felt must lie beyond the world of fleeting change and +delusive appearances. It was a prolepsis of the soul, reaching upward +towards its source and goal. The poet felt within him some native +affinities therewith, and longed for some stirring breath of heaven to +sweep the harp-strings of the soul. He invoked the inspiration of the +Goddess of Song, and waited for, no doubt believed in, some "deific +impulse" descending on him. And the people eagerly accepted his +utterance as the teaching of the gods. They were too eager for some +knowledge from that unseen world to question their credentials. Orpheus, +Hesiod, Homer, were the theologoi--the theologians of that age.[389] + +[Footnote 387: "Homer was, in a certain sense, the Bible of the +Greeks."--Whewell, "Platonic Dialogues," p. 283.] + +[Footnote 388: The universality of this belief is asserted by Cicero: +"Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et +populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandem inter +homines divinationem."--Cicero, "De Divin." bk. i. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 389: Cicero.] + +These ancient poems, then, were the public documents of the religion of +Greece--the repositories of the national faith. And it is deserving of +especial note that the philosopher was just as anxious to sustain his +speculations by quoting the high traditional authority of the ancient +theologian, as the propounder of modern novelties is to sustain his +notions by the authority of the Sacred Scriptures. Numerous examples of +this solicitude will recur at once to the remembrance of the student of +Plato. All encroachments of philosophy upon the domains of religion were +watched as jealously in Athens in the sixth century before Christ, as +the encroachments of science upon the fields of theology were watched in +Rome in the seventeenth century after Christ. The court of the Areopagus +was as earnest, though not as fanatical and cruel, in the defense of the +ancient faith, as the court of the Inquisition was in the defense of the +dogmas of the Romish Church. The people, also, as "the sacred wars" of +Greece attest, were ready quickly to repel every assault upon the +majesty of their religion. And so philosophy even had its martyrs. The +tears of Pericles were needed to save Aspasia, because she was suspected +of philosophy. But neither his eloquence nor his tears could save his +friend Anaxagoras, and he was ostracized. Aristotle had the greatest +difficulty to save his life. And Plato was twice imprisoned, and once +sold into slavery.[390] + +[Footnote 390: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 305.] + +It is unnecessary that we should, in this place, again attempt the +delineation of the theological opinions of the earlier periods of +Grecian civilization. That the ancient Greeks believed in _one Supreme +God_ has been conclusively proved by Cudworth. The argument of his +fourth chapter is incontrovertible.[391] However great the number of +"generated gods" who crowded the Olympus, and composed the ghostly array +of Greek mythology, they were all subordinate agents, "demiurges," +employed in the framing of the world and all material things, or else +the ministers of the moral and providential government of the eis Theos +agentos--the one uncreated God. Beneath, or beyond the whole system of +pagan polytheism, we recognize a faith in an _Uncreated Mind_, the +Source of all the intelligence, and order, and harmony which pervades +the universe the Fountain of law and justice; the Ruler of the world; +the Avenger of injured innocence; and the final Judge of men. The +immortality of the soul and a state of future retribution were necessary +corollaries of this sublime faith. This primitive theology was +unquestionably the people's faith; the faith, also, of the philosopher, +in his inmost heart, however far he might wander in speculative thought. +The instinctive feeling of the human heart, the spontaneous intuitions +of the human reason, have led man, in every age, to recognize a God. It +is within the fields of speculative thought that skepticism has had its +birth. Any thing like atheism has only made its appearance amid the +efforts of human reason to explain the universe. The native sentiments +of the heart and the spontaneous movements of the reason have always +been towards faith, that is, towards "a religious movement of the +soul."[392] Unbridled speculative thought, which turns towards the outer +world alone, and disregards "the voices of the soul," tends towards +_doubt_ and irreligion. But, as Cousin has said, "a complete +extravagance, a total delusion (except in case of real derangement), is +impossible." "Beneath reflection there is still spontaneity, when the +scholar has denied the existence of a God; listen to the man, +interrogate him unawares, and you will see that all his words betray the +idea of a God, and that faith in a God is, without his recognition, at +the bottom of his heart."[393] + +[Footnote 391: "Intellectual System of the Universe;" see also ch. iii., +"On the Religion of the Athenians."] + +[Footnote 392: Cousin's "Hist. of Philos.," vol. i. p. 22.] + +[Footnote 393: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 137.] + +Let us not, therefore, be too hasty in representing the early +philosophers as destitute of the idea of a God, because in the imperfect +and fragmentary representations which are given us of the philosophical +opinions of Thales, and Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, and Diogenes of +Apollonia, we find no explicit allusions to the _Uncreated Mind_ as the +first principle and cause of all. A few sentences will comprehend the +whole of what remains of the opinions of the earliest philosophers, and +these were transmitted for ages by _oral_ tradition. To Plato and +Aristotle we are chiefly indebted for a stereotype of those scattered, +fragmentary sentences which came to their hands through the dim and +distorting medium of more than two centuries. Surely no one imagines +these few sentences contain and sum up the results of a lifetime of +earnest thought, or represent all the opinions and beliefs of the +earliest philosophers! And should we find therein no recognition of a +personal God, would it not be most unfair and illogical to assert that +they were utterly ignorant of a God, or wickedly denied his being? If +they say "there is no God," then they are foolish Atheists; if they are +silent on that subject, we have a right to assume they were Theists, for +it is most natural to believe in God. And yet it has been quite +customary for Christian teachers, after the manner of some Patristic +writers, to deny to those early sages the smallest glimpse of underived +and independent knowledge of a Divine Being, in their zeal to assert for +the Sacred Scriptures the exclusive prerogative of revealing Him. + +Now in regard to the theological opinions of the Greek philosophers, we +shall venture this general _lemma_--_the majority of them recognized an +"incorporeal substance"_[394]_ an uncreated Intelligence, an ordering, +governing Mind_. Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, who were +Materialists, are perhaps the only exceptions. Many of them were +Pantheists, in the higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associates +the universe with its framer and mover, still makes "the moving +principle" superior to that which is moved. The world was a living +organism, + + "Whose body nature is, and God the soul." + +Unquestionably most on them recognized the existence of _two_ first +principles, substances essentially distinct, which had co-existed from +eternity--an incorporeal Deity and matter.[395] We grant that the free +production of a universe by a creative fiat--the calling of matter into +being by a simple act of omnipotence--is not elementary to human reason. +The famous physical axiom of antiquity, "_De nihilo nihil, in nihilum +posse reverti"_ under one aspect, may be regarded as the expression of +the universal consciousness of a mental inability to conceive a creation +out of nothing, or an annihilation.[396] "We can not conceive, either, +on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or something becoming +nothing, on the other hand. When God is said to create the universe out +of nothing, we think this by supposing that he evolves the universe out +of himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation only by +conceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into +power."[397] "It is by _faith_ we understand the worlds were framed by +the _word of God_, so that things which are were not made from things +which do appear"--that is, from pre-existent matter. + +[Footnote 394: "Ousian asômaton."--Plato.] + +[Footnote 395: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 269.] + +[Footnote 396: Mansell's "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 100.] + +[Footnote 397: Sir William Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy," p. +575.] + +Those writers[398] are, therefore, clearly in error who assert that the +earliest question of Greek philosophy was, What is God? and that various +and discordant answers were given, Thales saying, water is God, +Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire; Pythagoras, numbers; and so on. The +idea of God is a native intuition of the mind. It springs up +spontaneously from the depths of the human soul. The human mind +naturally recognizes God as an uncreated Mind, and recognizes itself as +"the offspring of God." And, therefore, it is simply impossible for it +to acknowledge water, or air, or fire, or any material thing to be its +God. Now they who reject this fundamental principle evidently +misapprehend the real problem of early Grecian philosophic thought. The +external world, the material universe, was the first object of their +inquiry, and the method of their inquiry was, at the first stage, purely +physical. Every object of sense had a beginning and an end; it rose out +of something, and it fell back into something. Beneath this ceaseless +flow and change there must be some permanent principle. What is that +stoicheon--that first element? The changes in the universe seem to obey +some principle of law--they have an orderly succession. What is that +morphê--that form, or ideal, or archetype, proper to each thing, and +according to which all things are produced? These changes must be +produced by some efficient cause, some power or being which is itself +immobile, and permanent, and eternal, and adequate to their production. +What is that archê tês kinêseôs--that first principle of movement Then, +lastly, there must be an end for which all things exist--a good reason +why things are as they are, and not otherwise. What is that to ou eneken +kai to agathon--that reason and good of all things? Now these are all +archai or first principles of the universe. "Common to all first +principles," says Aristotle, "is the being, the original, from which a +thing is, or is produced, or is known."[399] First principles, +therefore, include both elements and causes, and, under certain aspects, +elements are also causes, in so far as they are that without which a +thing can not be produced. Hence that highest generalization by +Aristotle of all first principles; as--1. The Material Cause; 2. The +Formal Cause; 3. The Efficient Cause; 4. The Final Cause. The grand +subject of inquiry in ancient philosophy was not alone what is the final +_element_ from which all things have been produced? nor yet what is the +_efficient cause_ of the movement and the order of the universe? _but +what are those First Principles which, being assumed, shall furnish a +rational explanation of all phenomena, of all becoming?_ + +[Footnote 398: As the writer of the article "Attica," in the +Encyclopædia Britannica.] + +[Footnote 399: "Metaphysics," bk. iv. ch. i. p. 112 (Bohn's edition).] + +So much being premised, we proceed to consider the efforts and the +results of philosophic thought in + + + +THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. + +"The first act in the drama of Grecian speculation was performed on the +varied theatre of the Grecian colonies--Asiatic, insular, and Italian, +verging at length (in Anaxagoras) towards Athens." During the progress +of this drama two distinct schools of philosophy were developed, having +distinct geographical provinces, one on the east, the other on the west, +of the peninsula of Greece, and deriving their names from the localities +in which they flourished. The earliest was the _Ionian;_ the latter was +the _Italian_ school. + +It would be extremely difficult, at this remote period, to estimate the +influence which geographical conditions and ethnical relations exerted +in determining the course of philosophic thought in these schools. +Unquestionably those conditions contributed somewhat towards fixing +their individuality. At the same time, it must be granted that the +distinction in these two schools of philosophy is of a deeper character +than can be represented or explained by geographical surroundings; it is +a distinction reaching to the very foundation of their habits of +thought. These schools represent two distinct aspects of philosophic +thought, two distinct methods in which the human mind has essayed to +solve the problem of the universe. + +The ante-Socratic schools were chiefly occupied with the study of +external nature. "Greek philosophy was, at its first appearance, a +philosophy of nature." It was an effort of the reason to reach a "first +principle" which should explain the universe. This early attempt was +purely speculative. It sought to interpret all phenomena by +_hypotheses_, that is, by suppositions, more or less plausible, +suggested by physical analogies or by _à priori_ rational conceptions. + +Now there are two distinct aspects under which nature presents itself to +the observant mind. The first and most obvious is the _simple phenomena_ +as perceived by the senses. The second is the _relations_ of +_phenomena_, cognized by the reason alone. Let phenomena, which are +indeed the first objects of perception, continue to be the chief and +almost exclusive object of thought, and philosophy is on the highway of +pure physics. On the other hand, instead of stopping at phenomena, let +their relations become the sole object of thought, and philosophy is now +on the road of purely mathematical or metaphysical abstraction. Thus two +schools of philosophy are developed, the one SENSATIONAL, the other +IDEALIST. Now these, it will be found, are the leading and +characteristic tendencies of the two grand divisions of the pre-Socratic +schools; the Ionian is _sensational_, the Italian is _idealist_. + +These two schools have again been the subject of a further subdivision +based upon diverse habits of thought. The Ionian school sought to +explain the universe by _physical analogies._ Of these there are two +clear and obvious divisions--analogies suggested by living organisms, +and analogies suggested by mechanical arrangements. One class of +philosophers in the Ionian school laid hold on the first analogy. They +regarded the world as a living being, spontaneously evolving itself--a +vital organism whose successive developments and transformations +constitute all visible phenomena. A second class laid hold on the +analogy suggested by mechanical arrangements. For them the universe was +a grand superstructure, built up from elemental particles, arranged and +united by some ab-extra power or force, or else aggregated by some +inherent mutual affinity. Thus we have two sects of the Ionian school; +the first, _Dynamical_ or vital; the second, _Mechanical_.[400] + +[Footnote 400: Ritter's "Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. 191, 192.] + +The Italian school sought to explain the universe by rational +conceptions and _à priori_ ideas. Now to those who seek, by simple +reflection, to investigate the relations of the external world this +marked distinction will present itself: some are relations _between_ +sensible phenomena--relations of time, of place, of number, of +proportion, and of harmony; others are relations _of_ phenomena to +essential being--relations of qualities to substance, of becoming to +being, of the finite to the infinite. The former constituted the field +of Pythagorean the latter of Eleatic contemplation. The Pythagoreans +sought to explain the universe by numbers, forms, and harmonies; the +Eleatics by the _à priori_ ideas of unity, substance, Being _in se_, the +Infinite. Thus were constituted a _Mathematical_ and a _Metaphysical_ +sect in the Italian school. The pre-Socratic schools may, therefore, be +tabulated in the following order: + + I. IONIAN (Sensational), (1.) PHYSICAL {Dynamical or Vital. + {Mechanical. + + II. Italian (Idealist), {(2.) MATHEMATICAL Pythagoreans. + {(3.) METAPHYSICAL Eleatics. + +I. _The Ionian or Physical School._--We have premised that the +philosophers of this school attempted the explanation of the universe by +physical analogies. + +One class of these early speculators, the _Dynamical_, or vital +theorists, proceeded on the supposition of a living energy infolded in +nature, which in its spontaneous development continuously undergoes +alteration both of quality and form. This imperfect analogy is the first +hypothesis of childhood. The child personifies the stone that hurts him, +and his first impulse is to resent the injury as though he imagined it +to be endowed with consciousness, and to be acting with design. The +childhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifies +each individual existence--a rude Fetichism, which imagines a +supernatural power and presence enshrined in every object of nature, in +every plant, and stock, and stone. The childhood of philosophy (whose +genius is unity) personifies the universe. It regards the earth as one +vast organism, animated by one soul, and this soul of the world as a +"created god."[401] The first efforts of philosophy were, therefore, +simply an attempt to explain the universe in harmony with the popular +theological beliefs. The cosmogonies of the early speculators in the +Ionian school were an elaboration of the ancient theogonies, but still +an elaboration conducted under the guidance of that law of thought which +constrains man to seek for _unity_, and reduce the many to the one. + +Therefore, in attempting to construct a theory of the universe they +commenced by postulating an archê--a first principle or element out of +which, by a _vital_ process, all else should be produced. "Accordingly, +whatever seemed the most subtle or pliable, as well as _universal_ +element in the mass of the visible world, was marked as the seminal +principle whose successive developments and transformations produced all +the rest."[402] With this seminal principle the living, _animating_ +principle seems to have been associated--in some instances perhaps +confounded, and in most instances called by the same name. And having +pursued this analogy so far, we shall find the _most decided and +conclusive_ evidence of a tendency to regard the soul of man as similar, +in its nature, to the soul which animates the world. + +[Footnote 401: Plato's "Laws," bk. x. ch. i.; "Timæus," ch. xii.] + +[Footnote 402: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. 1. p. +292.] + +_Thales of Miletus_(B.C. 636-542) was the first to lead the way in the +perilous inquiry after an archê, or first principle, which should +furnish a rational explanation of the universe. Following, as it would +seem, the genealogy of Hesiod, he supposed _water_ to be the primal +element out of which all material things were produced. Aristotle +supposes he was impressed with this idea from observing that all things +are nourished by moisture; warmth itself, he declared, proceeded from +moisture; the seeds of all things are moist; water, when condensed, +becomes earth. + +Thus convinced of the universal presence of water, he declared it to be +the first principle of things.[403] + +And now, from this brief statement of the Thalean physics, are we to +conclude that he recognized only a _material_ cause of the universe? +Such is the impression we receive from the reading of the First Book of +Aristotle's Metaphysics. His evident purpose is to prove that the first +philosophers of the Ionian school did not recognize an _efficient_ +cause. In his opinion, they were decidedly materialistic. Now to +question the authority of Aristotle may appear to many an act of +presumption. But Aristotle was not infallible; and nothing is more +certain than that in more than one instance he does great injustice to +his predecessors.[404] To him, unquestionably, belongs the honor of +having made a complete and exhaustive classification of causes, but +there certainly does appear something more than vanity in the assumption +that he, of all the Greek philosophers, was the only one who recognized +them all. His sagacious classification was simply a resumè of the labors +of his predecessors. His "principles" or "causes" were incipient in the +thought of the first speculators in philosophy. Their accurate +definition and clearer presentation was the work of ages of analytic +thought. The phrases "efficient," "formal," "final" cause, are, we +grant, peculiar to Aristotle; the ideas were equally the possession of +his predecessors. + +[Footnote 403: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 404: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 77; +Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," p. 77.] + +The evidence, we think, is conclusive that, with this primal element +(water), Thales associated a formative principle of motion; to the +"material" he added the "efficient" cause. A strong presumption in favor +of this opinion is grounded on the psychological views of Thales. The +author of "De Placitis Philosophorum" associates him with Pythagoras and +Plato, in teaching that the soul is incorporeal, making it naturally +self-active, and an intelligent substance.[405] And it is admitted by +Aristotle (rather unwillingly, we grant, but his testimony is all the +more valuable on that account) that, in his time, the opinion that the +soul is a principle, aeikinêton--ever moving, or essentially +self-active, was currently ascribed to Thales. "If we may rely on the +notices of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a +_moving principle_."[406] Extending this idea, that the soul is a moving +principle, he held that all motion in the universe was due to the +presence of a living soul. "He is reported to have said that the +loadstone possessed a soul because it could move iron."[407] And he +taught that "the world itself is _animated_, and full of gods."[408] +"Some think that _soul_ and _life_ is mingled with the whole universe; +and thence, perhaps, was that [opinion] of Thales that all things are +full of gods,"[409] portions, as Aristotle said, of the universal soul. +These views are quite in harmony with the theology which makes the Deity +the moving energy of the universe--the energy which wrought the +successive transformations of the primitive aqueous element. They also +furnish a strong corroboration of the positive statement of +Cicero--"Aquam, dixit Thales, esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem +quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret." Thales said that water is the first +principle of things, but God was that mind which formed all things out +of water;[410] as also that still more remarkable saying of Thales, +recorded by Diogenes Laertius; "God is the most ancient of all things, +for he had no birth; the world is the most beautiful of all things, for +it is the workmanship of God."[411] We are aware that some historians of +philosophy reject the statement of Cicero, because, say they, "it does +violence to the chronology of speculation."[412] Following Hegel, they +assert that Thales could have no conception of God as Intelligence, +since that is a conception of a more advanced philosophy. Such an +opinion may be naturally expected from the philosopher who places God, +not at the commencement, but at the _end_ of things, God becoming +conscious and intelligent in humanity. If, then, Hegel teaches that God +himself has had a progressive development, it is no wonder he should +assert that the idea of God has also had an historic development, the +_last_ term of which is an _intelligent God_. But he who believes that +the idea of God as the infinite and the perfect is native to the human +mind, and that God stands at the beginning of the entire system of +things, will feel there is a strong _à priori_ ground for the belief +that Thales recognized the existence of an _intelligent God who +fashioned the universe_. + +[Footnote 405: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 71.] + +[Footnote 406: Aristotle, "De Anima," i. 2, 17.] + +[Footnote 407: Id., ib., i. 2, 17.] + +[Footnote 408: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," p. 18 +(Bohn's ed.).] + +[Footnote 409: Aristotle, "De Anima," i. 17.] + +[Footnote 410: "De Natura Deor.," bk. i. ch. x.] + +[Footnote 411: "Lives," etc., p. 19.] + +[Footnote 412: Lewes's "Hist. Philos.," p. 4.] + +_Anaximenes of Miletus_ (B.C. 529-480) we place next to Thales in the +consecutive history of thought. It has been usual to rank Anaximander +next to the founder of the Ionian School. The entire complexion of his +system is, however, unlike that of a pupil of Thales. And we think a +careful consideration of his views will justify our placing him at the +head of the Mechanical or Atomic division of the Ionian school. +Anaximenes is the historical successor of Thales; he was unquestionably +a vitalist. He took up the speculation where Thales had left it, and he +carried it a step forward in its development.[413] + +Pursuing the same method as Thales, he was not, however, satisfied with +the conclusion he had reached. Water was not to Anaximenes the most +significant, neither was it the most universal element. But air seemed +universally present. "The earth was a broad leaf resting upon it. All +things were produced from it; all things were resolved into it. When he +breathed he drew in a part of this universal life. All things are +nourished by air."[414] Was not, therefore, _air_ the archê, or primal +element of things? + +[Footnote 413: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. +203.] + +[Footnote 414: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 7.] + +This brief notice of the physical speculations of Anaximenes is all that +has survived of his opinions. We search in vain for some intimations of +his theological views. On this merely negative ground, some writers have +unjustly charged him with Atheism. Were we to venture a conjecture, we +would rather say that there are indications of a tendency to Pantheism +in that form of it which associates God necessarily with the universe, +but does not utterly confound them. His fixing upon "_air_" as the +primal element, seems an effort to reconcile, in some apparently +intermediate substance, the opposite qualities of corporeal and +spiritual natures. Air is invisible, impalpable, all-penetrating, and +yet in some manner appreciable to sense. May not the vital +transformations of this element have produced all the rest? The writer +of the Article on Anaximenes in the Encyclopædia Britannica tells us (on +what ancient authorities he saith not) that "he asserted this air was +God, since the divine power resides in it and agitates it." + +Some indications of the views of Anaximenes may perhaps be gathered from +the teachings of Diogenes of Apollonia (B.C. 520-490,) who was the +disciple, and is generally regarded as the commentator and expounder of +the views of Anaximenes. The air of Diogenes was a soul; therefore it +was _living_, and not only living, but conscious and _intelligent_. "It +knows much," says he; "for without _reason_ it would be impossible for +all to be arranged duly and proportionately; and whatever objects we +consider will be found to be so arranged and ordered in the best and +most beautiful manner."[415] Here we have a distinct recognition of the +fundamental axiom that _mind is the only valid explanation of the order +and harmony which pervades the universe_. With Diogenes the first +principle is a "divine air," which is vital, conscious, and intelligent, +which spontaneously evolves itself, and which, by its ceaseless +transformations, produces all phenomena. The soul of man is a detached +portion of this divine element; his body is developed or evolved +therefrom. The theology of Diogenes, and, as we believe, of his master, +Anaximenes also, was a species of Materialistic Pantheism. + +[Footnote 415: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 8; +Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 214.] + +_Heraclitus of Ephesus_(B.C. 503-420) comes next in the order of +speculative thought. In his philosophy, _fire_ is the archê, or first +principle; but not fire in the usual acceptation of that term. The +Heraclitean "fire" is not flame, which is only an intensity of fire, but +a warm, dry vapor--an _ether_, which may be illustrated, perhaps, by the +"caloric" of modern chemistry. This "_ether_" was the primal element out +of which the universe was formed; it was also a vital power or principle +which animated the universe, and, in fact, the _cause_ of all its +successive phenomenal changes. "The world," he said, "was neither made +by the gods nor men, and it was, and is, and ever shall be, an +_ever-living fire_, in due proportion self-enkindled, and in due measure +self-extinguished."[416] The universe is thus reduced to "an eternal +fire," whose ceaseless energy is manifested openly in the work of +dissolution, and yet secretly, but universally, in the work of +renovation. The phenomena of the universe are explained by Heraclitus as +"the concurrence of opposite tendencies and efforts in the motions of +this ever-living fire, out of which results the most beautiful harmony. +This harmony of the world is one of conflicting impulses, like the lyre +and the bow. The strife between opposite tendencies is the parent of all +things. All life is change, and change is strife."[417] + +[Footnote 416: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. +235.] + +[Footnote 417: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 70; +Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 244.] + +Heraclitus was the first to proclaim the doctrine of the perpetual +fluxion of the universe (to reon, to gignomenon--Unrest and +Development), the endless changes of matter, and the mutability and +perishability of all individual things. This restless, changing flow of +things, which never _are_, but always are _becoming_, he pronounced to +be the _One_ and the _All_. + +From this statement of the physical theory of Heraclitus we might +naturally infer that he was a Hylopathean Atheist. Such an hypothesis +would not, however, be truthful or legitimate. On a more careful +examination, his system will be found to stand half-way between the +materialistic and the spiritual conception of the Author of the +universe, and marks, indeed, a transition from the one to the other. +Heraclitus unquestionably held that all substance is material, for a +philosopher who proclaims, as he did, that the senses are the only +source of knowledge, must necessarily attach himself to a material +element as the primary one. And yet he seems to have _spiritualized_ +matter. "The moving unit of Heraclitus--the Becoming--is as immaterial +as the resting unit of the Eleatics--the Being."[418] The Heraclitean +"_fire_" is endowed with _spiritual_ attributes. "Aristotle calls it +psychê--soul, and says that it is asômatôtaton, or absolutely +incorporeal ("De Anima," i. 2. 16). It is, in effect, the common ground +of the phenomena both of mind and matter it is not only the animating, +but also the intelligent and regulating principle of the universe; the +Zynos Logos, or universal Word or Reason, which it behooves all men to +follow."[419] The psychology of Heraclitus throws additional light upon +his theological opinions. With him human intelligence is a detached +portion of the Universal Reason. "Inhaling," said he, "through the +breath the Universal Ether, which is Divine Reason, we become +conscious." The errors and imperfections of humanity are consequently to +be ascribed to a deficiency of the Divine Reason in man. Whilst, +therefore, the theory of Heraclitus seems to materialize mind, it may, +with equal fairness, be said to spiritualize matter. + +[Footnote 418: Zeller's "History of Greek Philosophy," vol. i. p. 57.] + +[Footnote 419: Butler's "Lectures," vol. i. p. 297, note.] + +The general inference, therefore, from all that remains of the doctrine +of Heraclitus is that he was a Materialistic Pantheist. His God was a +living, rational, intelligent Ether--a soul pervading the universe. The +form of the universe, its ever-changing phenomena, were a necessary +emanation from, or a perpetual transformation of, this universal soul. + +With Heraclitus we close our survey of that sect of the physical school +which regarded the world as a living organism. + +The second subdivision of the physical school, _the Mechanical_ or +_Atomist theorists_, attempted the explanation of the universe by +analogies derived from mechanical collocations, arrangements, and +movements. The universe was regarded by them as a vast superstructure +built up from elemental particles, aggregated by some inherent force or +mutual affinity. + +_Anaximander of Miletus_ (born B.C. 610) we place at the head of the +Mechanical sect of the Ionian school; first, on the authority of +Aristotle, who intimates that the philosophic dogmata of Anaximander +"resemble those of Democritus," who was certainly an Atomist; and, +secondly, because we can clearly trace a genetic connection between the +opinions of Democritus and Leucippus and those of Anaximander. + +The archê, or first principle of Anaximander, was to apeiron, _the +boundless, the illimitable, the infinite_. Some historians of philosophy +have imagined that the infinite of Anaximander was the "unlimited all," +and have therefore placed him at the head of the Italian or "idealistic +school." These writers are manifestly in error. Anaximander was +unquestionably a sensationalist. Whatever his "infinite" may be found to +be, one thing is clear, it was not a "metaphysical infinite"--it did not +include infinite power, much less infinite mind. + +The testimony of Aristotle is conclusive that by "the infinite" +Anaximander understood the multitude of primary, material particles. He +calls it "a migma, or mixture of elements."[420] It was, in fact, a +_chaos_--an original state in which the primary elements existed in a +chaotic combination without _limitation_ or division. He assumed a +certain "_prima materia_," which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, +but a "mixture" of all, to be the first principle of the universe. The +account of the opinions of Anaximander which is given by Plutarch ("De +Placita," etc.) is a further confirmation of our interpretation of his +infinite. "Anaximander, the Milesian, affirmed the infinite to be the +first principle, and that all things are generated out of it, and +corrupted again into it. _His infinite is nothing else but matter._" +"Whence," says Cudworth, "we conclude that Anaximander's infinite was +nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were actually or +potentially contained all manner of qualities, by the fortuitous +secretion and segregation of which he supposed infinite worlds to be +successively generated and corrupted. So that we may easily guess whence +Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how +near akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were."[421] The reader, whose +curiosity may lead him to consult the authorities collected by Cudworth +(pp. 185-188), will find in the doctrine of Anaximander a rude +anticipation of the modern theories of "spontaneous generation" and "the +transmutation of species." In the fragments of Anaximander that remain +we find no recognition of an ordering Mind, and his philosophy is the +dawn of a Materialistic school. + +[Footnote 420: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 421: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. pp. 186, 187.] + +_Leucippus of Miletus_ (B.C. 500-400) appears, in the order of +speculation, as the successor of Anaximander. _Atoms_ and _space_ are, +in his philosophy, the archai, or first principles of all things. +"Leucippus (and his companion, Democritus) assert that the plenum and +the vacuum [_i.e._, body and space] are the first principles, whereof +one is the Ens, the other Non-ens; the differences of the body, which +are only figure, order, and position, are the causes of all +others."[422] + +[Footnote 422: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," p. 21 (Bohn's edition).] + +He also taught that the elements, and the worlds derived from them, are +_infinite_. He describes the manner in which the worlds are produced as +follows: "Many bodies of various kinds and shapes are borne by +amputation from the infinite [_i.e._, the chaotic migma of Anaximander] +into a vast vacuum, and then they, being collected together, produce a +vortex; according to which, they, dashing against each other, and +whirling about in every direction, are separated in such a way that like +attaches itself to like; bodies are thus, without ceasing, united +according to the impulse given by the vortex, and in this way the earth +was produced."[423] Thus, through a boundless void, atoms infinite in +number and endlessly diversified in form are eternally wandering; and, +by their aggregation, infinite worlds are successively produced. These +atoms are governed in their movements by a dark negation of +intelligence, designated "Fate," and all traces of a Supreme Mind +disappear in his philosophy. It is a system of pure materialism, which, +in fact, is Atheism. + +[Footnote 423: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," p. 389.] + +_Democritus of Abdera_ (B.C. 460-357), the companion of Leucippus, also +taught "that _atoms_ and the _vacuum_ were the beginning of the +universe."[424] These atoms, he taught, were infinite in number, +homogeneous, extended, and possessed of those primary qualities of +matter which are necessarily involved in extension in space--as size, +figure, situation, divisibility, and mobility. From the combination of +these atoms all other existences are produced; fire, air, earth, and +water; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; the soul itself +is an aggregation of round, moving atoms. And "motion, which is the +cause of the production of every thing, he calls _necessity_."[425] +Atoms are thus the only real existences; these, without any pre-existent +mind, or intelligence, were the original of all things. + +[Footnote 424: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," p. 395.] + +[Footnote 425: Id, ib., p. 394.] + +The psychological opinions of Democritus were as decidedly materialistic +as his physical theories. All knowledge is derived from sensation. It is +only by material impact that we can know the external world, and every +sense is, in reality, a kind of touch. Material images are being +continually thrown off from the surface of external objects which come +into actual contact with the organs of sense. The primary qualities of +matter, that is, those which are involved in extension in space, are the +only objects of real knowledge; the secondary qualities of matter, as +softness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, and the like, are but +modifications of the human sensibilities. "The sweet exists only in +form--the bitter in form, hot in form, color in form; but in causal +reality only atoms and space exist. The sensible things which are +supposed by opinion to exist have no real existence, but atoms and space +alone exist."[426] + +[Footnote 426: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 96. The +words of Democritus, as reported by Sextus Empiricus.] + +Thus by Democritus was laid the basis of a system of absolute +materialism, which was elaborated and completed by Epicurus, and has +been transmitted to our times. It has undergone some slight +modifications, adapting it to the progress of physical science; but it +is to-day substantially the theory of Democritus. In Democritus we have +the culmination of the mechanical theory of the Ionian or Physical +school. In physics and psychology it terminated in pure materialism. In +theology it ends in positive Atheism. + +The fundamental error of all the philosophers of the physical school was +the assumption, tacitly or avowedly, that sense-perception is the only +source of knowledge. This was the fruitful source of all their erroneous +conclusions, the parent of all their materialistic tendencies. This led +them continually to seek an archê, or first principle of the universe, +which should, under some form, be appreciable to _sense_; and +consequently the course of thought tended naturally towards materialism. + +Thales was unquestionably a dualist. Instructed by traditional +intimations, or more probably guided by the spontaneous apperceptions of +reason, he recognized, with more or less distinctness, an incorporeal +Deity as the moving, animating, and organizing cause of the universe. +The idea of God is a truth so self-evident as to need no demonstration. +The human mind does not attain to the idea of a God as the last +consequence of a series of antecedent principles. It comes at once, by +an inherent and necessary movement of thought, to the recognition of God +as the First Principle of all principles. But when, instead of +hearkening to the simple and spontaneous intuitions of the mind, man +turns to the world of sense, and loses himself in discursive thought, +the conviction of a personal God becomes obscured. Then, amid the +endlessly diversified phenomena of the universe, he seeks for a cause or +origin which in some form shall be appreciable to sense. The mere study +of material phenomena, scientifically or unscientifically conducted, +will never yield the sense of the living God. Nature must be +interpreted, can only be interpreted in the light of certain _à priori_ +principles of reason, or we can never "ascend from nature up to nature's +God." Within the circle of mere sense-perception, the dim and +undeveloped consciousness of God will be confounded with the universe. +Thus, in Anaximenes, God is partially confounded with "air," which +becomes a symbol; then a vehicle of the informing mind; and the result +is a semi-pantheism. In Heraclitus, the "ether" is, at first, a +semi-symbol of the Deity; at length, God is utterly confounded with this +ether, or "rational fire," and the result is a definite _materialistic +pantheism_. And, finally, when this feeling or dim consciousness of God, +which dwells in all human souls, is not only disregarded, but pronounced +to be an illusion--a phantasy; when all the analogies which intelligence +suggests are disregarded, and a purely mechanical theory of the universe +is adopted, the result is the utter negation of an Intelligent Cause, +that is, _absolute Atheism_, as in Leucippus and Democritus. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued_). + +PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL _(continued_). + +IDEALIST: PYTHAGORAS--XENOPHANES--PARMENIDES--ZENO. NATURAL REALIST: +ANAXAGORAS. + + +SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + +SOCRATES. + + +In the previous chapter we commenced our inquiry with the assumption +that, in the absence of the true inductive method of philosophy which +observes, and classifies, and generalizes facts, and thence attains a +general principle or law, two only methods were possible to the early +speculators who sought an explanation of the universe--1st, That of +reasoning from physical analogies; or, 2d, That of deduction from +rational conceptions, or _à priori_ ideas. + +Accordingly we found that one class of speculators fixed their attention +solely on the mere phenomena of nature, and endeavored, amid sensible +things, to find a _single_ element which, being more subtile, and +pliable, and universally diffused, could be regarded as the ground and +original of all the rest, and from which, by a vital transformation, or +by a mechanical combination and arrangement of parts, all the rest +should be evolved. The other class passed beyond the simple phenomena, +and considered only the abstract _relations_ of phenomena among +themselves, or the relations of phenomena to the necessary and universal +ideas of the reason, and supposed that, in these relations, they had +found an explanation of the universe. The former was the Ionian or +Sensation school; the latter was the Italian or Idealist school. + +We have traced the method according to which the Ionian school +proceeded, and estimated the results attained. We now come to consider +the method and results of + +THE ITALIAN OR IDEALIST SCHOOL. + +This school we have found to be naturally subdivided into--1st, The +_Mathematical_ sect, which attempted the explanation of the universe by +the abstract conceptions of number, proportion, order, and harmony; and, +2d, The _Metaphysical_ school, which attempted the interpretation of the +universe according to the _à priori_ ideas of unity, of Being _in se_, +of the Infinite, and the Absolute. + +_Pythagoras of Samos_(born B.C. 605) was the founder of the Mathematical +school. + +We are conscious of the difficulties which are to be encountered by the +student who seeks to attain a definite comprehension of the real +opinions of Pythagoras. The genuineness of many of those writings which +were once supposed to represent his views, is now questioned. "Modern +criticism has clearly shown that the works ascribed to Timæus and +Archytas are spurious; and the treatise of Ocellus Lucanus on 'The +Nature of the All' can not have been written by a Pythagorean."[427] The +only writers who can be regarded as at all reliable are Plato and +Aristotle; and the opinions they represent are not so much those of +Pythagoras as "the Pythagoreans." This is at once accounted for by the +fact that Pythagoras taught in secret, and did not commit his opinions +to writing. His disciples, therefore, represent the _tendency_ rather +than the actual tenets of his system; these were no doubt modified by +the mental habits and tastes of his successors. + +[Footnote 427: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 24.] + +We may safely assume that the proposition from which Pythagoras started +was the fundamental idea of all Greek speculation--_that beneath the +fleeting forms and successive changes of the universe there is some +permanent principle of unity_[428] The Ionian school sought that +principle in some common physical element; Pythagoras sought, not for +"elements," but for "relations," and through these relations for +ultimate laws indicating primal forces. + +[Footnote 428: See Plato, "Timæus," ch. ix. p. 331 (Bohn's edition); +Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. v. ch. iii.] + +Aristotle affirms that Pythagoras taught "that _numbers_ are the first +principles of all entities," and, "as it were, a _material_ cause of +things,"[429] or, in other words, "that numbers are substances that +involve a separate subsistence, and are primary causes of +entities."[430] + +[Footnote 429: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. v.] + +[Footnote 430: Id., ib., bk. xii. ch. vi.] + +Are we then required to accept the dictum of Aristotle as final and +decisive? Did Pythagoras really teach that numbers are real +entities--the _substance_ and cause of all other existences? The reader +may be aware that this is a point upon which the historians of +philosophy are not agreed. Ritter is decidedly of opinion that the +Pythagorean formula "can only be taken symbolically."[431] Lewes insists +it must be understood literally.[432] On a careful review of all the +arguments, we are constrained to regard the conclusion of Ritter as most +reasonable. The hypothesis "that numbers are real entities" does +violence to every principle of common sense. This alone constitutes a +strong _à priori_ presumption that Pythagoras did not entertain so +glaring an absurdity. The man who contributed so much towards perfecting +the mathematical sciences, who played so conspicuous a part in the +development of ancient philosophy, and who exerted so powerful a +determining influence on the entire current of speculative thought, did +not obtain his ascendency over the intellectual manhood of Greece by the +utterance of such enigmas. And further, in interpreting the philosophic +opinions of the ancients, we must be guided by this fundamental +canon--"The human mind has, under the necessary operation of its own +laws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, and the +human heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages." Now if a careful +philosophic criticism can not render the _reported_ opinions of an +ancient teacher into the universal language of the reason and heart of +humanity, we must conclude either that his opinions were misunderstood +and misrepresented by some of his successors, or else that he stands in +utter isolation, both from the present and the past. His doctrine has, +then, no relation to the successions of thought, and no place in the +history of philosophy. Nay, more, such a doctrine has in it no element +of vitality, no germ of eternal truth, and must speedily perish. Now it +is well known that the teaching of Pythagoras awakened the deepest +intellectual sympathy of his age; that his doctrine exerted a powerful +influence on the mind of Plato, and, through him, upon succeeding ages; +and that, in some of its aspects, it now survives, and is more +influential to-day than in any previous age; but this element of +immutable and eternal truth was certainly not contained in the inane and +empty formula, "that numbers are real existences, the causes of all +other existences!" If the fame of Pythagoras had rested on such "airy +nothings," it would have melted away before the time of Plato. + +[Footnote 431: "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 359.] + +[Footnote 432: "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 38.] + +We grant there is considerable force in the argument of Lewes. He urges, +with some pertinence, the unquestionable fact that Aristotle asserts, +again and again, that the Pythagoreans taught "that numbers are the +principles and substance of things as well as the causes of their +modifications;" and he argues that we are not justified in rejecting the +authority of Aristotle, unless better evidence can be produced. + +So far, however, as the authority of Aristotle is concerned, even Lewes +himself charges him, in more than one instance, with strangely +misrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors.[433] Aristotle is +evidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize the +historian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to question +his integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits the +egotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has +the full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly +associates the "_numbers_" of Pythagoras with the "_forms_" and +"_ideas_" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies "forms" and +"numbers," and regards them as real entities--substances, and causes of +all other things. "_Forms are numbers_[434]... so Plato affirmed, +similar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes to +other things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, asserted with +them_."[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments in +refuting the doctrines of both. + +[Footnote 433: "Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras" +(Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy"). He represents him as +employing mind (nous) simply as "a _machine_" for the production of the +world;--"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of its +being necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by force +to his assistance" "Metaphysics," (bk. i. ch. iv.). But he is evidently +inconsistent with himself, for in "De Anima" (bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells +us that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ in +the whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_." We may further ask, +is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final +cause, even according to Aristotle? + +He also totally misrepresents Plato's doctrine of "Ideas." "Plato's +Ideas," he says, "are substantial existences--real beings" +("Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ix.). Whereas, as we shall subsequently show, +"they are objects of pure conception for human reason, and they are +attributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially exist." +(Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 415). It is also pertinent +to inquire, what is the difference between the "formal cause" of +Aristotle and the archetypal ideas of Plato? and is not Plato's to +agathon the "final cause?" Yet Aristotle is forever congratulating +himself that he alone has properly treated the "formal" and the "final +cause!"] + +[Footnote 434: This, however, was not the doctrine of Plato. He does not +say "forms are numbers." He says: "God formed things as they first arose +according to forms _and_ numbers." See "Timaeus," ch. xiv. and xxvii.] + +[Footnote 435: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +Now the writings of Plato are all extant to-day, and accessible in an +excellent English translation to any of our readers. Cousin has +shown,[436] most conclusively (and we can verify his conclusions for +ourselves), that Aristotle has totally misrepresented Plato. And if, in +the same connection, and in the course of the same argument, and in +regard to the same subjects, he misrepresents Plato, it is most probable +he also misrepresents Pythagoras. + +[Footnote 436: "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," pp. 77-81.] + +It is, however, a matter of the deepest interest for us to find the +evidence gleaming out here and there, on the pages of Aristotle, that he +had some knowledge of the fact that the Pythagorean numbers were +regarded as _symbols_. The "numbers" of Pythagoras are, in the mind of +Aristotle, clearly identified with the "forms" of Plato. Now, in Chapter +VI. of the First Book he says that Plato taught that these "forms" were +paradeigmata--models, patterns, exemplars after which created things +were framed. The numbers of Pythagoras, then, are also models and +exemplars. This also is admitted by Aristotle. The Pythagoreans indeed +affirm that entities subsist by an _imitation_ (mimêsis) of +numbers.[437] Now if ideas, forms, numbers, were the models or paradigms +after which "the Operator" formed all things, surely it can not be +logical to say they were the "material" out of which all things were +framed, much less the "efficient cause" of things. The most legitimate +conclusion we can draw, even from the statements of Aristotle, is that +the Pythagoreans regarded numbers as the best expression or +representation of those laws of proportion, and order, and harmony, +which seemed, to their eyes, to pervade the universe. Their doctrine was +a faint glimpse of that grand discovery of modern science--that all the +higher laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitative +statement. + +[Footnote 437: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +The fact seems to be this, the Pythagoreans busied themselves chiefly +with what Aristotle designates "the _formal_ cause," and gave little +attention to the inquiry concerning "the _material_ cause." This is +admitted by Aristotle. Concerning fire, or earth, or the other bodies of +such kind, they have declared nothing whatsoever, inasmuch as affirming, +in my opinion, nothing that is peculiar concerning _sensible_ +natures.[438] They looked, as we have previously remarked, to the +relations of phenomena, and having discovered certain "numerical +similitudes," they imagined they had attained an universal principle, or +law. "If all the essential properties and attributes of things were +fully represented by the relations of numbers, the philosophy which +supplied such an explanation of the universe might well be excused from +explaining, also, that existence of objects, which is distinct from the +existence of all their qualities and properties. The Pythagorean +doctrine of numbers might have been combined with the doctrine of atoms, +and the combination might have led to results worthy of notice. But, so +far as we are aware, no such combination was attempted, and perhaps we +of the present day are only just beginning to perceive, through the +disclosures of chemistry and crystallography, the importance of such an +inquiry."[439] + +[Footnote 4398: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 439: Whewell's "History of Inductive Sciences," vol. i. p. +78.] + +These preliminary considerations will have cleared and prepared the way +for a fuller presentation of the philosophic system of Pythagoras. The +most comprehensive and satisfactory exposition of his "method" is that +given by Wm Archer Butler in his "_Lectures on Ancient Philosophy_," and +we feel we can not do better than condense his pages.[440] + +[Footnote 440: Lecture VI. vol. i.] + +Pythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty idea +of _order_, which seemed to reveal itself to his mind, as the presiding +genius of the serene and silent world. He had, from his youth, dwelt +with delight upon the eternal relations of space, and determinate form, +and number, in which the very idea of _proportion_ seems to find its +first and immediate development, and without the latter of which +(number), all proportion is absolutely inconceivable. To this ardent +genius, whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprising +contributions to the sum of discoverable relations, it at length began +to appear as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in these +mysterious correspondences. + +In making this extensive generalization, Pythagoras may, on his known +principles, be supposed to have reasoned as follows: The mind of man +perceives the relations of an eternal _order_ in the proportions of +space, and form, and number. That mind is, no doubt, a portion of the +soul which animates and governs the universe; for on what other +supposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity--the +very principle which characterizes the prime mover, and can scarce be +ascribed to an inferior nature? And on what other supposition are we to +explain the identity which subsists between the principles of order, +authenticated by the reason and the facts of order which are found to +exist in the forms and multiplicities around us, and independent of us? +Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the internal and +external principles of a common nature? The proportions of the universe +inhere in its divine soul; they are indeed its very essence, or at +least, its attributes. The ideas or principles of Order which are +implanted in the human reason, must inhere in the Divine Reason, and +must be reflected in the visible world, which is its product. Man, then, +can boldly affirm the necessary harmony of the world, because he has in +his own mind a revelation which declares that the world, in its real +structure, must be the image and copy of that divine _proportion_ which +he inwardly adores.[441] + +[Footnote 441: It is an opinion which goes as far back as the time of +Plato, and even Pythagoras, and has ever since been widely entertained, +that beauty of _form_ consists in some sort of _proportion_ or _harmony_ +which may admit of a mathematical expression; and later and more +scientific research is altogether in its favor. It is now established +that complementary colors, that is, colors which when combined make up +the full beam, are felt to be beautiful when seen simultaneously; that +is, the mind is made to delight in the unities of nature. At the basis +of music there are certain fixed ratios; and in poetry, of every +description, there are measures, and correspondencies. Pythagoras has +often been ridiculed for his doctrine of "the music of the spheres;" and +probably his doctrine was somewhat fanciful, but later science shows +that there is a harmony in all nature--in its forms, in its forces, and +in its motions. The highest unorganized and all organized objects take +definite forms which are regulated by mathematical laws. The forces of +nature can be estimated in numbers, and light and heat go in +undulations, whilst the movements of the great bodies in nature admit of +a precise quantitative expression. The harmonies of nature in respect of +color, of number, of form, and of time are forcibly exhibited in +"Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation," by M'Cosh.] + +Again, the world is assuredly _perfect_, as being the sensible image and +copy of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of the +Eternal Unity. It must, therefore, when thoroughly known and properly +interpreted, answer to all which we can conceive as perfect; that is, it +must be regulated by laws, of which we have the highest principles in +those first and elementary properties of numbers which stand next to +_unity_. "The world is then, through all its departments, _a living +arithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose_." It +is a kosmos (for the word is purely Pythagorean)--the expression of +_harmony_, the manifestation, to sense, of everlasting _order_. + +Though Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting initiative for abstract +speculation, it is remarkable that he himself preferred to constitute +the science of Numbers as the true representative of the laws of the +universe. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks +indeed of eternal truths, yet when the notion of symmetry and proportion +is introduced, it is often necessary to insist, in preference, upon the +properties of numbers. Hence, though the universe displays the geometry +of its Constructor or Animator, yet nature was eminently defined as the +mimêsis tôn arithmôn--the imitation of numbers. + +The key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the general +formula of _unity in multiplicity_:--unity either evolving itself into +multiplicity, or unity discovered as pervading multiplicity. The +principle of all things, the same principle which in this philosophy, as +in others, was customarily called _Deity_, is the primitive unit from +which all proceeds in the accordant relations of the universal scheme. +Into the sensible world of multitude, the all-pervading Unity has +infused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his own image upon +that world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. +What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and +diversified--which we perceive as the combination of a thousand +elements, yet as the expression of a single spirit--which is a chaos to +the sense, a cosmos to the reason? What is it but +harmony--proportion--the one governing the many, the many lost in the +one? The world is therefore a _harmony_ in innumerable degrees, from the +most complicated to the most simple: it is now a Triad, combining the +Monad and the Duad, and partaking of the nature of both; now a Tetrad, +the form of perfection; now a Decad, which, in combining the four +former, involves, in its mystic nature, all the possible accordances of +the universe.[442] + +The psychology of the Pythagoreans was greatly modified by their +physical, and still more, by their moral tenets. The soul was arithmos +eauton kinôn--a self-moving number or Monad, the copy (as we have seen) +of that Infinite Monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensible +essence all the relations of the universe. This soul has three elements, +Reason (nous), Intelligence (phrên), and Passion (Thymos). The two last, +man has in common with brutes, the first is his grand and peculiar +characteristic. It has, hence, been argued that Pythagoras could not +have held the doctrine of "transmigration." This clear separation of man +from the brute, by this signal endowment of reason, which is +sempiternal, seems a refutation of those who charge him with the +doctrine. + +In the department of morals, the legislator of Crotona found his +appropriate sphere. In his use of numerical notation, moral good was +essential unity--evil, essential plurality and division. In the fixed +truths of mathematical abstractions he found the exemplars of social and +personal virtue. The rule or law of all morality is resemblance to God; +that is, the return of number to its root, to unity,[443] and virtue is +thus a harmony. + +[Footnote 442: That is, 1+2+3+4=10. There are intimations that the +Pythagoreans regarded the Monad as God, the Duad as matter, the Triad as +the complex phenomena of the world, the Tetrad as the completeness of +all its relations, the Decad as the cosmos, or harmonious whole.] + +[Footnote 443: Aristotle, "Nichomachian Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +Thus have we, in Pythagoras, the dawn of an _Idealist_ school; for +mathematics are founded upon abstractions, and there is consequently an +intimate connection between mathematics and idealism. The relations of +space, and number, and determinate form, are, like the relations of +cause and effect, of phenomena and substance, perceptible _only in +thought_; and the mind which has been disciplined to abstract thought by +the study of mathematics, is prepared and disposed for purely +metaphysical studies. "The looking into mathematical learning is a kind +of prelude to the contemplation of real being."[444] Therefore Plato +inscribed over the door of his academy, "Let none but Geometricians +enter here." To the mind thus disciplined in abstract thinking, the +conceptions and ideas of reason have equal authority, sometimes even +superior authority, to the perceptions of sense. + +[Footnote 444: Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," ch. +vii.] + +Now if the testimony of both reason and sense, as given in +consciousness, is accepted as of equal authority, and each faculty is +regarded as, within its own sphere, a source of real, valid knowledge, +then a consistent and harmonious system of _Natural Realism_ or _Natural +Dualism_ will be the result. If the testimony of sense is questioned and +distrusted, and the mind is denied any immediate knowledge of the +sensible world, and yet the existence of an external world is maintained +by various hypotheses and reasonings, the consequence will be a species +of _Hypothetical Dualism_ or _Cosmothetic Idealism_. But if the +affirmations of reason, as to the unity of the cosmos, are alone +accepted, and the evidence of the senses, as to the variety and +multiplicity of the world, is entirely disregarded, then we have a +system of _Absolute Idealism_. Pythagoras regarded the harmony which +pervades the diversified phenomena of the outer world as a manifestation +of the unity of its eternal principle, or as the perpetual evolution of +that unity, and the consequent _tendency_ of his system was to +depreciate the _sensible_. Following out this tendency, the Eleatics +first neglected, and finally denied the variety of the universe--denied +the real existence of the external world, and asserted an absolute +_metaphysical_ unity. + +_Xenophanes of Colophon_, in Ionia (B.C. 616-516), was the founder of +this celebrated school of Elea. He left Ionia, and arrived in Italy +about the same time as Pythagoras, bringing with him to Italy his Ionian +tendencies; he there amalgamated them with Pythagorean speculations. + +Pythagoras had succeeded in fixing the attention of his countrymen on +the harmony which pervades the material world, and had taught them to +regard that harmony as the manifestation of the intelligence, and unity, +and perfection of its eternal principle. Struck with this idea of +harmony and of unity, Xenophanes, who was a poet, a rhapsodist, and +therefore by native tendency, rather than by intellectual discipline, an +Idealist, begins already to attach more importance to _unity_ than +multiplicity in his philosophy of nature. He regards the testimony of +reason as of more authority than the testimony of sense; "and he holds +badly enough the balance between the unity of the Pythagoreans and the +variety which Heraclitus and the Ionians had alone considered."[445] + +We are not, however, to suppose that Xenophanes denied entirely the +existence of _plurality_. "The great Rhapsodist of Truth" was guided by +the spontaneous intuitions of his mind (which seemed to partake of the +character of an inspiration), to a clearer vision of the truth than were +his successors of the same school by their discursive reasonings. "The +One" of Xenophanes was clearly distinguished from the outward universe +(ta polla) on the one hand, and from the "_non-ens_" on the other. It +was his disciple, Parmenides, who imagined the logical necessity of +identifying plurality with the "_non-ens_" and thus denying all +immediate cognition of the phenomenal world. The compactness and logical +coherence of the system of Parmenides seems to have had a peculiar charm +for the Grecian mind, and to have diverted the eyes of antiquity from +the views of the more earnest and devout Xenophanes, whose opinions were +too often confounded with those of his successors of the Eleatic school. +"Accordingly we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much that +is, exclusively, the property of Parmenides and Zeno, in particular for +denying plurality, and for identifying God with the universe."[446] + +[Footnote 445: Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 440.] + +[Footnote 446: See note by editor, W.H. Thompson, M.A., on pages 331, +332 of Butler's "Lectures," vol. i. His authorities are "Fragments of +Xenophanes" and the treatise "De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia," by +Aristotle.] + +In theology, Xenophanes was unquestionably a _Theist_. He had a profound +and earnest conviction of the existence of a God, and he ridiculed with +sarcastic force, the anthropomorphic absurdities of the popular +religion. This one God, he taught, was self-existent, eternal, and +infinite; supreme in power, in goodness, and intelligence.[447] These +characteristics are ascribed to the Deity in the sublime words with +which he opens his philosophic poem-- + + "There is one God, of all beings, divine and human, the greatest: + Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in mind." + +He has no parts, no organs, as men have, being + + "All sight, all ear, all intelligence; + Wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by _thought_ and + _will_."[448] + +Xenophanes also taught that God is "uncreated" or "uncaused," and that +he is "excellent" as well as "all-powerful."[449] And yet, regardless of +these explicit utterances, Lewes cautions his readers against supposing +that, by the "one God," Xenophanes meant a Personal God; and he asserts +that his Monotheism was Pantheism. A doctrine, however, which ascribes +to the Divine Being moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which +acknowledges an outward world distinct from Him, and which represents +Him as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of an +intelligent volition, can only by a strange perversion of language be +called pantheism. + +[Footnote 447: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 38; +Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. 428, 429.] + +[Footnote 448: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. +432, 434.] + +[Footnote 449: Butler's "Lectures," vol. i. p. 331, note; Ritter's +"History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 428.] + +_Parmenides of Elea_ (born B.C. 536) was the philosopher who framed the +psychological opinions of the Idealist school into a precise and +comprehensive system. He was the first carefully to distinguish between +_Truth_ (alêtheian) and _Opinion_ (doxan)--between ideas obtained +through the reason and the simple perceptions of sense. Assuming that +reason and sense are the only sources of knowledge, he held that they +furnish the mind with two distinct classes of cognitions--one variable, +fleeting, and uncertain; the other immutable, necessary, and eternal. +Sense is dependent on the variable organization of the individual, and +therefore its evidence is changeable, uncertain, and nothing but a mere +"_seeming_." Reason is the same in all individuals, and therefore its +evidence is constant, real, and true. Philosophy is, therefore, divided +into two branches--_Physics_ and _Metaphysics_; one, a science of +absolute knowledge; the other, a science of mere appearances. The first +science, Physics, is pronounced illusory and uncertain; the latter, +Metaphysics, is infallible and immutable.[450] + +Proceeding on these principles, he rejects the dualistic system of the +universe, and boldly declared that all essences are fundamentally +_one_--that, in fact, there is no real plurality, and that all the +diversity which "appears" is merely presented under a peculiar aesthetic +or sensible law. The senses, it is true, teach us that there are "many +things," but reason affirms that, at bottom, there exists only "the +one." Whatever, therefore, manifests itself in the field of sense is +merely illusory--the mental representation of a phenomenal world, which +to experience seems diversified, but which reason can not possibly admit +to be other than "immovable" and "one." There is but one Being in the +universe, eternal, immovable, absolute; and of this unconditioned being +all phenomenal existences, whether material or mental, are but the +attributes and modes. Hence the two great maxims of the Eleatic school, +derived from Parmenides--ta panta en, "_The All is One_" and to auto +noein te kai einai (Idem est cogitare atque esse), "_Thought and Being +are identical._" The last remarkable dictum is the fundamental principle +of the modern pantheistic doctrine of "absolute identity" as taught by +Schelling and Hegel.[451] + +[Footnote 450: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. +447, 451.] + +[Footnote 451: Id., ib., vol. i. pp. 450, 455.] + +Lewes asserts that "Parmenides did not, with Xenophanes, call 'the One' +God; he called it Being.[452] In support of this statement he, however, +cites no ancient authorities. We are therefore justified in rejecting +his opinion, and receiving the testimony of Simplicius, "the only +authority for the fragments of the Eleatics,"[453] and who had a copy of +the philosophic poems of Parmenides. He assures us that Parmenides and +Xenophanes "affirmed that '_the One,_' or unity, was the first Principle +of all,....they meaning by this One _that highest or supreme God_, as +being the cause of unity to all things.... It remaineth, therefore, that +that _Intelligence_ which is the cause of all things, and therefore of +mind and understanding also, in which all things are comprehended in +unity, was Parmenides' one Ens or Being.[454] Parmenides was, therefore, +a spiritualistic or idealistic Pantheist. + +_Zeno of Elea_ (born B.C. 500) was the logician of the Eleatic school. +He was, says Diogenes Laertius, "the inventor of Dialectics."[455] Logic +henceforth becomes the organon[456]--organon of the Eleatics. + +[Footnote 452: "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 50.] + +[Footnote 453: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Simplicius."] + +[Footnote 454: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 511.] + +[Footnote 455: "Lives," p. 387 (Bohn's edition).] + +[Footnote 456: Plato in "Parmen."] + +This organon, however, Zeno used very imperfectly. In his hands it was +simply the "reductio ad absurdum" of opposing opinions as the means of +sustaining the tenets of his own sect. Parmenides had asserted, on _à +priori_ grounds, the existence of "the One." Zeno would prove by his +dialectic the non-existence of "the many." His grand position was that +all phenomena, all that appears to sense, is but a _modification_ of the +absolute One. And he displays a vast amount of dialectic subtilty in the +effort to prove that all "appearances" are unreal, and that all movement +and change is a mere "seeming"--not a reality. What men call motion is +only a name given to a series of conditions, each of which, considered +separately, is rest. "Rest is force resistant; motion is force +triumphant."[457] The famous puzzle of "Achilles and the Tortoise," by +which he endeavored to prove the unreality of motion, has been rendered +familiar to the English reader.[458] + +[Footnote 457: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 60.] + +[Footnote 458: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. +475, 476.] + +Aristotle assures us that Zeno, "by his one Ens, which neither was moved +nor movable, meaneth God." And he also informs us that "Zeno endeavored +to demonstrate that there is but one God, from the idea which all men +have of him, as that which is the best, supremest, most powerful of all, +or an absolutely perfect being" ("De Xenophane, Zenone, et +Gorgia").[459] + +With Zeno we close our survey of the second grand line of independent +inquiry by which philosophy sought to solve the problem of the universe. +The reader will be struck with the resemblance which subsists between +the history of its development and that of the modern Idealist school. +Pythagoras was the Descartes, Parmenides the Spinoza, and Zeno the Hegel +of the Italian school. + +In this survey of the speculations of the pre-Socratic schools of +philosophy, we have followed the course of two opposite streams of +thought which had their common origin in one fundamental principle or +law of the human mind--the _intuition of unity_--"or the desire to +comprehend all the facts of the universe in a single formula, and +consummate all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditioned +existence." The history of this tendency is, in fact, the history of all +philosophy. "The end of all philosophy," says Plato, "is the intuition +of unity." "All knowledge," said the Platonists, "is the gathering up +into one."[460] + +[Footnote 459: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 518.] + +[Footnote 460: Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. pp. 67-70 (English +edition).] + +Starting from this fundamental idea, _that, beneath the endless flux and +change of the visible universe, there must be a permanent principle of +unity_, we have seen developed two opposite schools of speculative +thought. As the traveller, standing on the ridges of the Andes, may see +the head-waters of the great South American rivers mingling in one, so +the student of philosophy, standing on the elevated plane of analytic +thought, may discover, in this fundamental principle, the common source +of the two great systems of speculative thought which divided the +ancient world. Here are the head-waters of the sensational and the +idealist schools. The Ionian school started its course of inquiry in the +direction of _sense_; it occupied itself solely with the phenomena of +the external world, and it sought this principle of unity in a +_physical_ element. The Italian school started its course of inquiry in +the direction of _reason_; it occupied itself chiefly with rational +conceptions or _à priori_ ideas, and it sought this principle of unity +in purely _metaphysical_ being. And just as the Amazon and La Plata +sweep on, in opposite directions, until they reach the extremities of +the continent, so these two opposite streams of thought rush onward, by +the force of a logical necessity, until they terminate in the two +Unitarian systems of _Absolute Materialism_ and _Absolute Idealism_, +and, in their theological aspects, in a pantheism which, on the one +hand, identifies God with matter, or, on the other hand, swallows up the +universe in God. + +The radical error of both these systems is at once apparent. The +testimony of the primary faculties of the mind was not regarded as each, +within its sphere, final and decisive. The duality of consciousness was +not accepted in all its integrity; one school rejected the testimony of +reason, the other denied the veracity of the senses, and both prepared +the way for the _skepticism_ of the Sophists. + +We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that there were some +philosophers of the pre-Socratic school, as Anaxagoras and Empedocles, +who recognized the partial and exclusive character of both these +systems, and sought, by a method which Cousin would designate as +Eclecticism, to combine the element of truth contained in each. + +_Anaxagoras of Clazomencoe_ (B.C. 500-428) added to the Ionian +philosophy of a material element or elements the Italian idea of a +_spirit_ distinct from, and independent of the world, which has within +itself the principle of a spontaneous activity--Nous autocratês, and +which is the first cause of motion in the universe--archê tês +kinêseôs.[461] + +[Footnote 461: Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 411.] + +In his physical theory, Anaxagoras was an Atomist. Instead of one +element, he declared that the elements or first principles were +numerous, or even infinite. No point in space is unoccupied by these +atoms, which are infinitely divisible. He imagined that, in nature, +there are as many kinds of principles as there are species of compound +bodies, and that the peculiar form of the primary particles of which any +body is composed is the same with the qualities of the compound body +itself. This was the celebrated doctrine of _Homoeomeria_, of which +Lucretius furnishes a luminous account in his philosophic poem "De +Natura Rerum"-- + + "That bone from bones + Minute, and embryon; nerve from nerves arise; + And blood from blood, by countless drops increased. + Gold, too, from golden atoms, earths concrete, + From earths extreme; from fiery matters, fire; + And lymph from limpen dews. And thus throughout + From primal kinds that kinds perpetual spring."[462] + +These primary particles were regarded by Anaxagoras as eternal; because +he held the dogma, peculiar to all the Ionians, that nothing can be +really created or annihilated (de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse +reverti). But he saw, nevertheless, that the simple existence of +"_inert_" matter, even from eternity, could not explain the motion and +the harmony of the material world. Hence he saw the necessity of another +power--_the power of Intelligence_. "All things were in chaos; then came +Intelligence and introduced Order."[463] + +Anaxagoras, unlike the pantheistic speculators of the Ionian school, +rigidly separated the Supreme Intelligence from the material universe. +The Nous of Anaxagoras is a principle, infinite, independent +(autocratês), omnipresent (en panti pantos moioa enon), the subtilest +and purest of things (lepitotaton paniôn chrêmatôn kaikai katharôtaton); +and incapable of mixture with aught besides; it is also omniscient +(panta egnô), and unchangeable (pas omoios esti).--Simplicius, in +"Arist. Phys." i. 33.[464] + +[Footnote 462: Good's translation, bk. i. p. 325.] + +[Footnote 463: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," p. 59.] + +[Footnote 464: Butler's "Lectures on Philosophy," vol. i. p. 305, note.] + +Thus did Anaxagoras bridge the chasm between the Ionian and the Italian +schools. He accepted both doctrines with some modifications. He believed +in the real existence of the phenomenal world, and he also believed in +the real existence of "The Infinite Mind," whose Intelligence and +Omnipotence were manifested in the laws and relations which pervade the +world. He proclaimed the existence of the Infinite Intelligence ("the +ONE"), who was the Architect and Governor of the Infinite Matter ("the +MANY"). + +On the question as to the origin and certainty of human knowledge, +Anaxagoras differed both from the Ionians and the Eleatics. Neither the +sense alone, nor the reason alone, were for him a ground of certitude. +He held that reason (logos) was the regulative faculty of the mind, as +the Nous, or Supreme Intelligence, was the regulative power of the +universe. And he admitted that the senses were veracious in their +reports; but they reported only in regard to phenomena. The senses, +then, perceive _phenomena_, but it is the reason alone which recognizes +_noumena_, that is, the reason perceives being in and through phenomena, +substance in and through qualities; an anticipation of the fundamental +principle of modern psychology--"_that every power or substance in +existence is knowable to us, so far only, as we know its phenomena_." +Thus, again, does he bridge the chasm that separates between the +Sensationalist and the Idealist. The Ionians relied solely on the +intuitions of sense; the Eleatics accepted only the apperceptions of +pure reason; he accepted the testimony of both, and in the synthesis of +subject and object--the union of an element supplied by sensation, and +an element supplied by reason, he found real, certain knowledge. + +The harmony which the doctrine of Anaxagoras introduced into the +philosophy of Athens, soon attracted attention and multiplied disciples. +He was teaching when Socrates arrived in Athens, and the latter attended +his school. The influence which the doctrine of Anaxagoras exerted upon +the mind of Socrates (leading him to recognize Intelligence as the cause +of order and special adaptation in the universe),[465] and also upon the +course of philosophy in the Socratic schools, is the most enduring +memorial of his name.[466] + +[Footnote 465: "Phaedo," § 105.] + +[Footnote 466: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iii.] + +We have devoted a much larger space than we originally designed to the +ante-Socratic schools--quite out of proportion, indeed, with that we +shall be able to appropriate to their successors. But inasmuch as all +the great primary problems of thought, which are subsequently discussed +by Plato and Aristotle, were started, and received, at least, typical +answers in those schools, we can not hope to understand Plato, or +Aristotle, or even Epicurus, or Zeno of Cittium, unless we have first +mastered the doctrines of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, and +Anaxagoras.[467] The attention we have bestowed on these early thinkers +will, therefore, have been a valuable preparatory discipline for the +study of + +II. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + +The first cycle of philosophy was now complete. That form of Grecian +speculative thought which, during the first period of its development, +was a philosophy of nature, had reached its maturity; it had sought "the +first principles of all things" in the study of external nature, and had +signally failed. In this pursuit of first principles as the basis of a +true and certain knowledge of the system of the universe, the two +leading schools had been carried to opposite poles of thought. One had +asserted that _experience_ alone, the other, that _reason_ alone was the +sole criterion of truth. As the last consequence of this imperfect +method, Leucippus had denied the existence of "the one," and Zeno had +denied the existence of "the many." The Ionian school, in Democritus, +had landed in Materialism; the Italian, in Parmenides, had ended in +Pantheism; and, as the necessary result of this partial and defective +method of inquiry, which ended in doubt and contradiction, a spirit of +general skepticism was generated in the Athenian mind. If doubt be cast +upon the veracity of the primary cognitive faculties of the mind, the +flood-gates of universal skepticism are opened. If the senses are +pronounced to be mendacious and illusory in their reports regarding +external phenomena, and if the intuitions of the reason, in regard to +the ground and cause of phenomena, are delusive, then we have no ground +of certitude. If one faculty is unveracious and unreliable, how can we +determine that the other is not equally so? There is, then, no such +thing as universal and necessary truth. Truth is variable and uncertain, +as the variable opinion of each individual. + +[Footnote 467: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 114; Butler's +"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. pp. 87, 88.] + +The Sophists, who belonged to no particular school, laid hold on the +elements of skepticism contained in both the pre-Socratic schools of +philosophy, and they declared that "the sophia" was not only +unattainable, but that no relative degree of it was possible for the +human faculties.[468] Protagoras of Abdera accepted the doctrine of +Heraclitus, that thought is identical with sensation, and limited by it; +he therefore declared that there is no criterion of truth, and _Man is +the measure of all things_.[469] Sextus Empiricus gives the +psychological opinions of Protagoras with remarkable explicitness. +"Matter is in a perpetual flux, whilst it undergoes augmentations and +losses; the senses also are modified according to the age and +disposition of the body. He said, also, that the reason of all phenomena +resides in matter as substrata, so that matter, in itself, might be +whatever it appeared to each. But men have different perceptions at +different periods, according to the changes in the things perceived.... +Man is, therefore, the criterion of that which exists; all that is +perceived by him exists; _that which is perceived by no man does not +exist_."[470] These conclusions were rigidly and fearlessly applied to +ethics and political science. If there is no Eternal Truth, there can be +no Immutable Right. The distinction of right and wrong is solely a +matter of human opinion and conventional usage.[471] "That which +_appears_ just and honorable to each city, is so for _that city_, so +long as the opinion prevails."[472] + +[Footnote 468: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Sophist."] + +[Footnote 469: Plato's "Theætetus" (anthropos--"the individual is the +measure of all things"), vol. i. p. 381 (Bohn's edition).] + +[Footnote 470: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 117.] + +[Footnote 471: "Gorgias," § 85-89.] + +[Footnote 472: Plato's "Theætetus," § 65-75.] + +There were others who laid hold on the weapons which Zeno had prepared +to their hands. He had asserted that all the objects of sense were mere +phantoms--delusive and transitory. By the subtilties of dialectic +quibbling, he had attempted to prove that "change" meant "permanence," +and "motion" meant "rest."[473] Words may, therefore, have the most +opposite and contradictory meanings; and all language and all opinion +may, by such a process, be rendered uncertain. One opinion is, +consequently, for the individual, just as good as another; and all +opinions are equally true and untrue. It was nevertheless desirable, for +the good of society, that there should be some agreement, and that, for +a time at least, certain opinions should prevail; and if philosophy had +failed to secure this agreement, rhetoric, at least, was effectual; and, +with the Sophist, rhetoric was "the art of making the worst appear the +better reason." All wisdom was now confined to a species of "word +jugglery," which in Athens was dignified as "the art of disputation." + +[Footnote 473: "And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) +spoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to be +similar and dissimilar, one and many, at rest and in +motion?"--"Phædrus," § 97.] + +SOCRATES (B.C. 469-399), the grand central figure in the group of +ancient philosophers, arrived in Athens in the midst of this general +skepticism. He had an invincible faith in truth. "He made her the +mistress of his soul, and with patient labor, and unwearied energy, did +his great and noble soul toil after perfect communion with her." He was +disappointed and dissatisfied with the results that had been reached by +the methods of his predecessors, and he was convinced that by these +methods the problem of the universe could not be solved. He therefore +turned away from physical inquiries, and devoted his whole attention to +the study of the human mind, its fundamental beliefs, ideas, and laws. +If he can not penetrate the mysteries of the outer world, he will turn +his attention to the world within. He will "know himself," and find +within himself the reason, and ground, and law of all existence. There +he discovered certain truths which can not possibly be questioned. He +felt he had within his own heart a faithful monitor--a _conscience_, +which he regarded as the voice of God.[474] He believed "he had a divine +teacher with him at all times. Though he did not possess wisdom, this +teacher could put him on the road to seek it, could preserve him from +delusions which might turn him out of the way, could keep his mind fixed +upon the end for which he ought to act and live."[475] In himself, +therefore, he sought that ground of certitude which should save him from +the prevailing skepticism of his times. The Delphic inscription, Gnôti +seauton, "_know thyself_" becomes henceforth the fundamental maxim of +philosophy. + +[Footnote 474: The Dæmon of Socrates has been the subject of much +discussion among learned men. The notion, once generally received, that +his _daimôn_ was "a familiar genius," is now regarded as an exploded +error. "Nowhere does Socrates, in Plato or Xenophon, speak of _a_ genius +or demon, but always of a _doemoniac something (to daimonion_, or +_daimonin ti_), or of a _sign_, a _voice_, a _divine sign_, a _divine +voice_" (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 166). +"Socrates always speaks of a _divine or supernatural somewhat_ ('divinum +quiddam,' as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to +divine, and to which he never attributes personality" (Butler's +"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 357). The scholar need not +to be informed that _to daimonion_, in classic literature, means the +divine Essence (Lat. _numen_), to which are attributed events beyond +man's power, yet not to be assigned to any special god.] + +[Footnote 475: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 124.] + +Truth has a rational, _à priori_ foundation in the constitution of the +human mind. There are _ideas_ connatural to the human reason which are +the copies of those archetypal ideas which belong to the Eternal Reason. +The grand problem of philosophy, therefore, now is--_What are these +fundamental_ IDEAS _which are unchangeable and permanent, amid all the +diversifies of human opinion, connecting appearance with reality, and +constituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute truth_? Socrates +may not have held the doctrine of ideas as exhibited by Plato, but he +certainly believed that there were germs of truth latent in the human +mind--principles which governed, unconsciously, the processes of +thought, and that these could be developed by reflection and by +questioning. These were embryonate in the womb of reason, coming to the +birth, but needing the "maieutic" or "obstetric" art, that they might be +brought forth.[476] He would, therefore, become the accoucheur of ideas, +and deliver minds of that secret truth which lay in their mental +constitution. And thus _Psychology_ becomes the basis of all legitimate +metaphysics. + +[Footnote 476: Plato's "Theætetus," § 22.] + +By the general consent of antiquity, as well as by the concurrent +judgment of all modern historians of philosophy, Socrates is regarded as +having effected a complete revolution in philosophic thought, and, by +universal consent, he is placed at the commencement of a new era in +philosophy. Schleiermacher has said, "the service which Socrates +rendered to philosophy consisted not so much in the truths arrived at +_as in the_ METHOD _by which truth is sought_." As Bacon inaugurated a +new method in physical inquiry, so Socrates inaugurated a new method in +metaphysical inquiry. + +What, then, was this _new method_? It was no other than the _inductive_ +method applied to the facts of consciousness. This method is thus +defined by Aristotle: "Induction is the process from particulars to +generals;" that is, it is the process of discovering laws from facts, +causes from effects, being from phenomena. But how is this process of +induction conducted? By observing and enumerating the real facts which +are presented in consciousness, by noting their relations of resemblance +or difference, and by classifying these facts by the aid of these +relations. In other words, it is _analysis_ applied to the phenomena of +mind.[477] Now Socrates gave this method of psychological analysis to +Greek philosophy. There are two things of which Socrates must justly be +regarded as the author,--the _inductive reasoning_ and _abstract +definition_.[478] We readily grant that Socrates employed this method +imperfectly, for methods are the last things perfected in science; but +still, the Socratic movement was a vast movement in the right direction. + +[Footnote 477: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 30.] + +[Footnote 478: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," vol. xii. ch. iv. p. 359 +(Bohn's edition).] + +In what are usually regarded as the purely Socratic dialogues,[479] +Plato evidently designs to exhibit this method of Socrates. They proceed +continually on the firm conviction that there is a standard or criterion +of truth in the reason of man, and that, by _reflection_, man can +apprehend and recognize the truth. To awaken this power of reflection; +to compel men to analyze their language and their thoughts; to lead them +from the particular and the contingent, to the universal and the +necessary; and to teach them to test their opinions by the inward +standard of truth, was the aim of Socrates. These dialogues are a +picture of the conversations of Socrates. They are literally an +education of the thinking faculty. Their purpose is to discipline men to +think for themselves, rather than to furnish opinions for them. In many +of these dialogues Socrates affirms nothing. After producing many +arguments, and examining a question on all sides, he leaves it +undetermined. At the close of the dialogue he is as far from a +declaration of opinions as at the commencement. His grand effort, like +that of Bacon's, is to furnish men a correct method of inquiry, rather +than to apply that method and give them results. + +[Footnote 479: "Laches," "Charmides," "Lysis," "The Rivals," "First and +Second Alcibiades," "Theages," "Clitophon." See Whewell's translation, +vol. i.] + +We must not, however, from thence conclude that Socrates did not himself +attain any definite conclusions, or reach any specific and valuable +results. When, in reply to his friends who reported the answer of the +oracle of Delphi, that "Socrates was the wisest of men," he said, "he +supposed the oracle declared him wise _because he knew nothing_," he did +not mean that true knowledge was unattainable, for his whole life had +been spent in efforts to attain it. He simply indicates the disposition +of mind which is most befitting and most helpful to the seeker after +truth. He must be conscious of his own ignorance. He must not exalt +himself. He must not put his own conceits in the way of the thing he +would know. He must have an open eye, a single purpose, an honest mind, +to prepare him to receive light when it comes. And that there is light, +that there is a source whence light comes, he avowed in every word and +act. + +Socrates unquestionably believed in one Supreme God, the immaterial, +infinite Governor of all. He cherished that instinctive, spontaneous +faith in God and his Providence which is the universal faith of the +human heart. He saw this faith revealed in the religious sentiments of +all nations, and in the tendency to worship so universally +characteristic of humanity.[480] He appealed to the consciousness of +absolute dependence--the persuasion, wrought by God in the minds of all +men, that "He is able to make men happy or miserable," and the +consequent sense of obligation which teaches man he ought to obey God. +And he regarded with some degree of affectionate tenderness the common +sentiment of his countrymen, that the Divine Government was conducted +through the ministry of subordinate deities or generated gods. But he +sought earnestly to prevent the presence of these subordinate agents +from intercepting the clear view of the Supreme God. + +The faith of Socrates was not, however, grounded on mere feeling and +sentiment. He endeavored to place the knowledge of God on a rational +basis. We can not read the arguments he employed without being convinced +that he anticipated all the subsequent writers on Natural Theology in +his treatment of the argument from _special ends_ or _final causes_. We +venture to abridge the account which is given by Xenophon of the +conversation with Aristodemus:[481] + +[Footnote 480: "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. iv. § 16.] + +[Footnote 481: Ibid., bk. i. ch. iv.] + +"I will now relate the manner in which I once heard Socrates discoursing +with Aristodemus concerning the Deity; for, observing that he never +prayed nor sacrificed to the gods, but, on the contrary, ridiculed those +who did, he said to him: + +"'Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man you admire on account of his +merits? Aristodemus having answered, 'Many,--'Name some of them, I pray +you,' said Socrates. 'I admire,' said Aristodemus, 'Homer for his Epic +poetry, Melanippides for his dithyrambics, Sophocles for his tragedy, +Polycletus for statuary, and Zeuxis for painting.' + +"'But which seemed to you most worthy of admiration, Aristodemus--the +artist who forms images void of motion and intelligence, or one who has +skill to produce animals that are endued, not only with activity, but +understanding?' + +"'The latter, there can be no doubt,' replied Aristodemus, 'provided the +production was not the effect of chance, but of wisdom and contrivance.' + +"'But since there are many things, some of which we can easily see the +use of, while we can not say of others to what purpose they are +produced, which of these, Aristodemus, do you suppose the work of +wisdom?' + +"'It would seem the most reasonable to affirm it of those whose fitness +and utility are so evidently apparent,' answered Aristodemus. + +"'But it is evidently apparent that He who, at the beginning, made man, +endued him with senses because they were good for him; eyes wherewith to +behold what is visible, and ears to hear whatever was heard; for, say, +Aristodemus, to what purpose should odor be prepared, if the sense of +smelling had been denied or why the distinction of bitter or sweet, of +savory or unsavory, unless a palate had been likewise given, +conveniently placed to arbitrate between them and proclaim the +difference? Is not that Providence, Aristodemus, in a most eminent +manner conspicuous, which, because the eye of a man is so delicate in +its contexture, hath therefore prepared eyelids like doors whereby to +secure it, which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again +close when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, +with a fence on the edge of them to keep off the wind and guard the eye? +Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse, +is prepared to turn off the sweat, which falling from the forehead might +enter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us. Is it +not to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and +yet are not too much filled with them? That the fore teeth of the animal +should be formed in such a manner as is evidently best for cutting, and +those on the side for grinding it to pieces? That the mouth, through +which this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and eyes +as to prevent the passing unnoticed whatever is unfit for +nourishment?... And canst thou still doubt, Aristodemus, whether a +_disposition of parts like this should be a work of chance, or of wisdom +and contrivance_?' + +"'I have no longer any doubt,' replied Aristodemus; 'and, indeed, the +more I consider it, the more evident it appears to me that man must be +the masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with it infinite +marks of the love and favor of Him who hath thus formed it.' + +"'But, further (unless thou desirest to ask me questions), seeing, +Aristodemus, thou thyself art conscious of reason and intelligence, +supposest thou there is no intelligence elsewhere? Thou knowest thy body +to be a small part of that wide-extended earth thou everywhere +beholdest; the moisture contained in it thou also knowest to be a +portion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a +part, while the rest of the elements contribute out of their abundance +to thy formation. It is the _soul_, then, alone, that intellectual part +of us, which is come to thee by some lucky chance, from I know not +where. If so, there is no intelligence elsewhere; and we must be forced +to confess that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodies +contained therein--equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitude +or number, whatever their use, whatever their order--all have been +produced by chance, not by intelligence!' + +"'It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise,' returned +Aristodemus; 'for I behold none of those gods whom you speak of as +framing and governing the world; whereas I see the artists when at their +work here among us.' + +"'Neither yet seest thou thy soul, Aristodemus, which, however, most +assuredly governs thy body; although it may well seem, by thy manner of +talking, that it is chance and not reason which governs thee.' + +"'I do not despise the gods,' said Aristodemus; 'on the contrary, I +conceive so highly of their excellency, as to suppose they stand in no +need of me or of my services.' + +"'Thou mistakest the matter,' Aristodemus, 'the great magnificence they +have shown in their care of thee, so much the more honor and service +thou owest them.' + +"'Be assured,' said Aristodemus, 'if I once could persuade myself the +gods take care of man, I should want no monitor to remind me of my +duty.' + +"'And canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, if the gods take care of man? Hath +not the glorious privilege of walking upright been alone bestowed on +him, whereby he may with the better advantage survey what is around him, +contemplate with more ease those splendid objects which are above, and +avoid the numerous ills and inconveniences which would otherwise befall +him? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet; but to man +they have also given hands, with which he can form many things for use, +and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hath +been bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, hath +the power of forming words with it whereby to explain his thoughts and +make them intelligible to others? But it is not with respect to the body +alone that the gods have shown themselves bountiful to man. Their most +excellent gift is that of a soul they have infused into him, which so +far surpasses what is elsewhere to be found; for by what animal except +man is even the existence of the gods discovered, who have produced and +still uphold in such regular order this beautiful and stupendous frame +of the universe? What other creature is to be found that can serve and +adore them?... In thee, Aristodemus, has been joined to a wonderful soul +a body no less wonderful; and sayest thou, after this, the gods take no +thought for me? What wouldst thou, then, more to convince thee of their +care?' + +"'I would they should send and inform me,' said Aristodemus, 'what +things I ought or ought not to do, in like manner as thou sayest they +frequently do to thee.'" + +In reply, Socrates shows that the revelations of God which are made in +nature, in history, in consciousness, and by oracles, are made _for_ all +men and _to_ all men. He then concludes with these remarkable words: +"As, therefore, amongst men we make best trial of the affection and +gratitude of our neighbor by showing him kindness, and make discovery of +his wisdom by consulting him in our distress, do thou, in like manner, +behave towards the gods; and if thou wouldst experience what their +wisdom and their love, render thyself deserving of some of those divine +secrets which may not be penetrated by man, and are imparted to those +alone who consult, who adore, and who obey the Deity. Then shalt thou, +my Aristodemus, understand _there is a Being whose eye passes through +all nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; extended to all +places, extending through all time; and whose bounty and care can know +no other bounds than those fixed by his own creation_".[482] + +[Footnote 482: Lewes's translation, in "Biog. History of Philosophy," +pp. 160-165.] + +Socrates was no less earnest in his belief in the immortality of the +soul, and a state of future retribution. He had reverently listened to +the intuitions of his own soul--the instinctive longings and aspirations +of his own heart, as a revelation from God. He felt that all the powers +and susceptibilities of his inward nature were in conscious adaptation +to the idea of immortality, and that its realization was the appropriate +destiny of man. He was convinced that a future life was needed to avenge +the wrongs and reverse the unjust judgments of the present life;[483] +needed that virtue may receive its meet reward, and the course of +Providence may have its amplest vindication. He saw this faith reflected +in the universal convictions of mankind, and the "common traditions" of +all ages.[484] No one refers more frequently than Socrates to the grand +old mythologic stories which express this faith; to Minos, and +Rhadamanthus, and Æacus, and Triptolemus, who are "real judges," and +who, in "the Place of Departed Spirits, administer _justice_."[485] He +believed that in that future state the pursuit of wisdom would be his +chief employment, and he anticipated the pleasure of mingling in the +society of the wise, and good, and great of every age. + +[Footnote 483: "Apology," § 32, p. 329 (Whewell's edition).] + +[Footnote 484: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 485: "Apology," p. 330.] + +Whilst, then, Socrates was not the first to teach the doctrine of +immortality, because no one could be said to have first _discovered_ it +any more than to have first discovered the existence of a God, he was +certainly the first to place it upon a philosophic basis. The Phædo +presents the doctrine and the _reasoning_ by which Socrates had elevated +his mind above the fear of death. Some of the arguments may be purely +Platonic, the argument especially grounded on "ideas;" still, as a +whole, it must be regarded as a tolerably correct presentation of the +manner in which Socrates would prove the immortality of the soul. + +In _Ethics_, Socrates was pre-eminently himself. The systematic +resolution of the whole theory of society into the elementary principle +of natural law, was peculiar to him. _Justice_ was the cardinal +principle which must lie at the foundation of all good government. The +word sophia--_wisdom_--included all excellency in personal morals, +whether as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or +(socially) towards others. And _Happiness_, in its purity and +perfection, can only be found in virtuous action.[486] + +[Footnote 486: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. +360, 361.] + +Socrates left nothing behind him that could with propriety be called a +_school_. His chief glory is that he inaugurated a new _method_ of +inquiry, which, in Plato and Aristotle, we shall see applied. He gave a +new and vital impulse to human thought, which endured for ages; "and he +left, as an inheritance for humanity, the example of a heroic life +devoted wholly to the pursuit of truth, and crowned with martyrdom." + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + +THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + +PLATO. + + +We have seen that the advent of Socrates marks a new era in the history +of speculative thought. Greek philosophy, which at first was a +philosophy of nature, now changes its direction, its character, and its +method, and becomes a philosophy of mind. This, of course, does not mean +that now it had mind alone for its object; on the contrary, it tended, +as indeed philosophy must always tend, to the conception of a rational +ideal or _intellectual system of the universe_. It started from the +phenomena of mind, began with the study of human thought, and it made +the knowledge of mind, of its ideas and laws, the basis of a higher +philosophy, which should interpret all nature. In other words, it +proceeded from psychology, through dialectics, to ontology.[487] + +[Footnote 487: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 413.] + +This new movement we have designated in general terms as the _Socratic +School_. Not that we are to suppose that, in any technical sense, +Socrates founded _a_ school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and the +Garden, were each the chosen resort of distinct philosophic sects, the +locality of separate schools; but Athens itself, the whole city, was the +scene of the studies, the conversations, and the labors of Socrates. He +wandered through the streets absorbed in thought. Sometimes he stood +still for hours lost in profoundest meditation; at other times he might +be seen in the market-place, surrounded by a crowd of Athenians, eagerly +discussing the great questions of the day. + +Socrates, then, was not, in the usual sense of the word, a teacher. He +is not to be found in the Stoa or the Grove, with official aspect, +expounding a system of doctrine. He is "the garrulous oddity" of the +streets, putting the most searching and perplexing questions to every +bystander, and making every man conscious of his ignorance. He delivered +no lectures; he simply talked. He wrote no books; he only argued: and +what is usually styled his school must be understood as embracing those +who attended him in public as listeners and admirers, and who caught his +spirit, adopted his philosophic _method_, and, in after life, elaborated +and systematized the ideas they had gathered from him. + +Among the regular or the occasional hearers of Socrates were many who +were little addicted to philosophic speculation. Some were warriors, as +Nicias and Laches; some statesmen, as Critias and Critobulus; some were +politicians, in the worst sense of that word, as Glaucon; and some were +young men of fashion, as Euthydemus and Alcibiades. These were all alike +delighted with his inimitable irony, his versatility of genius, his +charming modes of conversation, his adroitness of reply; and they were +compelled to confess the wisdom and justness of his opinions, and to +admire the purity and goodness of his life. The magic power which he +wielded, even over men of dissolute character, is strikingly depicted by +Alcibiades in his speech at "the Banquet."[488] Of these listeners, +however, we can not now speak. Our business is with those only who +imbibed his philosophic spirit, and became the future teachers of +philosophy. And even of those who, as Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes +the Cynic, and Aristippus of Cyrenaica, borrowed somewhat from the +dialectic of Socrates, we shall say nothing. They left no lasting +impression upon the current of philosophic thought, because their +systems were too partial, and narrow, and fragmentary. It is in Plato +and Aristotle that the true development of the Socratic philosophy is to +be sought, and in Plato chiefly, as the disciple and friend of Socrates. + +[Footnote 488: "Banquet," §§ 39, 40.] + +Plato (B.C. 430-347) was pre-eminently the pupil of Socrates. He came to +Socrates when he was but twenty years of age, and remained with him to +the day of his death. + +Diogenes Laertius reports the story of Socrates having dreamed he found +an unfledged cygnet on his knee. In a few moments it became winged and +flew away, uttering a sweet sound. The next day a young man came to him +who was said to reckon Solon among his near ancestors, and who looked, +through him, to Codrus and the god Poseidon. That young man was Plato, +and Socrates pronounced him to be the bird he had seen in his +dream.[489] + +[Footnote 489: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. iii. +ch. vii.] + +Some have supposed that this old tradition intimates that Plato departed +from the method of his master--he became fledged and flew away into the +air. But we know that Plato did not desert his master whilst he was +living, and there is no evidence that he abandoned his method after he +was dead. He was the best expounder and the most rigid observer of the +Socratic "organon." The influence of Socrates upon the philosophy of +Plato is everywhere discernible. Plato had been taught by Socrates, that +beyond the world of sense there is a world of eternal truth, seen by the +eye of reason alone. He had also learned from him that the eye of reason +is purified and strengthened by _reflection_, and that to reflect is to +observe, and analyze, and define, and classify the facts of +consciousness. Self-reflection, then, he had been taught to regard as +the key of real knowledge. By a completer induction, a more careful and +exact analysis, and a more accurate definition, he carried this +philosophic method forward towards maturity. He sought to solve the +problem of _being_ by the principles revealed in his own consciousness, +and in the _ultimate ideas of the reason_ to find the foundation of all +real knowledge, of all truth, and of all certitude. + +Plato was admirably fitted for these sublime investigations by the +possession of those moral qualities which were so prominent in the +character of his master. He had that same deep seriousness of spirit, +that earnestness and rectitude of purpose, that longing after truth, +that inward sympathy with, and reverence for justice, and purity, and +goodness, which dwelt in the heart of Socrates, and which constrained +him to believe in their reality and permanence. He could not endure the +thought that all ideas of right were arbitrary and factitious, that all +knowledge was unreal, that truth was a delusion, and certainty a dream. +The world of sense might be fleeting and delusive, but the voice of +reason and conscience would not mislead the upright man. The opinions of +individual men might vary, but the universal consciousness of the race +could not prevaricate. However conflicting the opinions of men +concerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments, Plato +was persuaded there are ideas of Order, and Right, and Good, which are +universal, unchangeable, and eternal. Untruth, injustice, and wrong may +endure for a day or two, perhaps for a century or two, but they can not +always last; they must perish. The _just_ thing and the _true_ thing are +the only enduring things; these are eternal. Plato had a sublime +conviction that his mission was to draw the Athenian mind away from the +fleeting, the transitory, and the uncertain, and lead them to the +contemplation of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Justice, an Eternal +Beauty, all proceeding from and united in an Eternal Being--the ultimate +agathon--_the Supremely Good_. The knowledge of this "Supreme Good" he +regarded as the highest science.[490] + +[Footnote 490: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xvi. p. 193.] + +Added to these moral qualifications, Plato had the further qualification +of a comprehensive knowledge of all that had been achieved by his +predecessors. In this regard he had enjoyed advantages superior to those +of Socrates. Socrates was deficient in erudition, properly so called. He +had studied men rather than books. His wisdom consisted in an extensive +_observation_, the results of which he had generalized with more or less +accuracy. A complete philosophic method demands not only a knowledge of +contemporaneous opinions and modes of thought, but also a knowledge of +the succession and development of thought in past ages. Its instrument +is not simply psychological analysis, but also historical analysis as a +counterproof.[491] And this erudition Plato supplied. He studied +carefully the doctrines of the Ionian, Italian, and Eleatic schools. +Cratylus gave him special instruction in the theories of +Heraclitus.[492] He secured an intimate acquaintance with the lofty +speculations of Pythagoras, under Archytas of Tarentum, and in the +writings of Philolaus, whose books he is said to have purchased. He +studied the principles of Parmenides under Hermogenes,[493] and he more +than once speaks of Parmenides in terms of admiration, as one whom he +had early learned to reverence.[494] He studied mathematics under +Theodoras, the most eminent geometrician of his day. He travelled in +Southern Italy, in Sicily, and, in search of a deeper wisdom, he pursued +his course to Egypt.[495] Enriched by the fruits of all previous +speculations, he returned to Athens, and devoted the remainder of his +life to the development of a comprehensive system "which was to combine, +to conciliate, and to supersede them all."[496] The knowledge he had +derived from travel, from books, from oral instruction, he fused and +blended with his own speculations, whilst the Socratic spirit mellowed +the whole, and gave to it a unity and scientific completeness which has +excited the admiration and wonder of succeeding ages.[497] + +[Footnote 491: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 31.] + +[Footnote 492: Aristotle's "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 493: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. iii. +ch. viii. p. 115.] + +[Footnote 494: See especially "Theætetus," § 101.] + +[Footnote 495: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +147.] + +[Footnote 496: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +22.] + +[Footnote 497: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Plato."] + +The question as to _the nature, the sources, and the validity of human +knowledge_ had attracted general attention previous to the time of +Socrates and Plato. As the results of this protracted controversy, the +opinions of philosophers had finally crystallized in two well-defined +and opposite theories of knowledge. + +1. That which reduced all knowledge to the accidental and passively +receptive quality of the organs of sense and which asserted, as its +fundamental maxim, that "_Science consists in_ +aisthêsis--_sensation_."[498] + +This doctrine had its foundation in the physical philosophy of +Heraclitus. He had taught that all things are in a perpetual flux and +change. "Motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation." +"Nothing _is_, but is always a _becoming"_[499] Material substances are +perpetually losing their identity, and there is no permanent essence or +being to be found. Hence Protagoras inferred that truth must vary with +the ever-varying sensations of the individual. "Man (the individual) is +the measure of all things." Knowledge is a purely relative thing, and +every man's opinion is truth for him.[500] The law of right, as +exemplified in the dominion of a party, is the law of the strongest; +fluctuating with the accidents of power, and never attaining a permanent +being. "Whatever a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also is +just to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force."[501] +"The just, then, is nothing else but that which is expedient for the +strongest."[502] + +[Footnote 498: "Theætetus," § 23.] + +[Footnote 499: Ibid., §§ 25, 26.] + +[Footnote 500: Ibid., §§ 39, 87.] + +[Footnote 501: Ibid., § 87.] + +[Footnote 502: "Republic," bk. i. ch. xii.] + +2. The second theory is that which denies the existence (except as +phantasms, images, or mere illusions of the mind) of the whole of +sensible phenomena, and refers all knowledge to the _rational +apperception of unity_ (to en) _or the One_. + +This was the doctrine of the later Eleatics. The world of sense was, to +Parmenides and Zeno, a blank negation, the _non ens_. The identity of +thought and existence was the fundamental principle of their philosophy. + + "Thought is the same thing as the cause of thought; For + without the thing in which it is announced, You can not find + the thought; for there is nothing, nor shall be, Except the + existing."[503] + +[Footnote 503: Parmenides, quoted in Lewes's "Biog. History of +Philosophy," p. 54.] + +This theory, therefore, denied to man any valid knowledge of the +external world. + +It will at once be apparent to the intelligent reader that the direct +and natural result of both these theories[504] of knowledge was a +tendency to universal skepticism. A spirit of utter indifference to +truth and righteousness was the prevailing spirit of Athenian society. +That spirit is strikingly exhibited in the speech of Callicles, "the +shrewd man of the world," in "Gorgias" (§85, 86). Is this new to our +ears?" My dear Socrates, you talk of _law_. Now the laws, in my +judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous; in framing +them they never thought but of themselves and their own interests; they +never approve or censure except in reference to _this._ Hence it is that +the cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for +eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to +preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the +stronger.... We surround our children from their infancy with +preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense +tramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature's justice is.... I +confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation, +and for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your +philosopher is a complete novice in the life _comme il faut_.... I like +very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about +it when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the +child, is absurd. Just so with your philosophy." The consequence of this +prevalent spirit of universal skepticism was a general laxity of morals. +The Aleibiades, of the "_Symposium_," is the ideal representative of the +young aristocracy of Athens. Such was the condition of society +generally, and such the degeneracy of even the Government itself, that +Plato impressively declares "that God alone could save the young men of +his age from ruin."[505] + +[Footnote 504: Between these two extreme theories there were offered +two, apparently less extravagant, accounts of the nature and limits of +human knowledge--one declaring that "_Science_(real knowledge) _consists +in right opinion_" (doxa alêthês), but having no further basis in the +reason of man ("Theæstetus," § 108); and the other affirming that +"_Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition_" +(meta loxou, "Theætetus," § 139). A close examination will, however, +convince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory. +The latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke, who adds +"reflection" to "sensation," but still maintains that all on "simple +ideas" are obtained from without, and that these are the only material +upon which reflection can be exercised. Thus the human mind has no +criterion of truth within itself, no elements of knowledge which are +connatural and inborn.] + +[Footnote 505: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vii.] + +Therefore the grand, the vital, the most urgent question for his times, +as indeed for all times, was, _What is Truth? What is Right_? In the +midst of all this variableness and uncertainty of human opinion, is +there no ground of certainty? Amid all the fluctuations and changes +around us and within us, is there nothing that is immutable and +permanent? Have we no ultimate standard of Right? Is there no criterion +of Truth? Plato believed most confidently there was such a criterion and +standard. He had learned from Socrates, his master, to cherish an +unwavering faith in the existence of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Order, +an Eternal Good, the knowledge of which is essential to the perfection +and happiness of man, and which knowledge must therefore be presumed to +be attainable by man. Henceforth, therefore, the ceaseless effort of +Plato's life is to attain a standard (kritêrion)[506]--a CRITERION OF +TRUTH. + +[Footnote 506: "Theætetus," § 89.] + +At the outset of his philosophic studies, Plato had derived from +Socrates an important principle, which became the guide of all his +subsequent inquiries. He had learned from him that the criterion of +truth must be no longer sought amid the ever-changing phenomena of the +"sensible world." This had been attempted by the philosophers of the +Ionian school, and ended in failure and defeat. It must therefore be +sought in the metaphenomenal--the "intelligible world;" that is, it must +be sought in the apperceptions of the reason, and not in opinions +founded on sensation. In other words, he must look _within_. Here, by +reflection, he could recognize, dimly and imperfectly at first, but +increasing gradually in clearness and distinctness, two classes of +cognitions, having essentially distinct and opposite characteristics. He +found one class that was complex (synkegumenon), changeable (thateron), +contingent and relative (ta pros ti schesin echonta); the other, simple +(kexôrismenon), unchangeable (akinêton), constant (tauton), permanent +(to on aei), and absolute (anypotheton = aploun). One class that may be +questioned, the other admitting of no question, because self-evident and +necessary, and therefore compelling belief. One class grounded on +sense-perception, the other conceived by reason alone. But whilst the +reason recognizes, it does not create them. They are not particular and +individual, but universal. They belong not to the man, but to the race. + +He found, then, that there are in all minds certain "principles" which +are fundamental--principles which lie at the basis of all our cognitions +of the objective world, and which, as "mental laws," determine all our +forms of thought; and principles, too, which have this marvellous and +undeniable character, that they are encountered in the most common +experiences, and, at the same time, instead of being circumscribed +within the limits of experience, transcend and govern it--principles +which are _universal_ in the midst of particular phenomena--_necessary,_ +though mingled with things contingent--to our eyes _infinite_ and +_absolute_, even when appearing in us the relative and finite beings +that we are.[507] These first or fundamental principles Plato called +IDEAS (ideai). + +[Footnote 507: Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," p. 40.] + +In attempting to present to the reader an adequate representation of the +Platonic Ideas, we shall be under the necessity of anticipating some of +the results of his Dialectical method before we have expounded that +method. And, further, in order that it may be properly appreciated by +the modern student, we shall avail ourselves of the lights which modern +psychology, faithful to the method of Plato, has thrown upon the +subject. Whilst, however, we admit that modern psychology has succeeded +in giving more definiteness and precision to the "doctrine of Ideas," we +shall find that all that is fundamentally valuable and true was present +to the mind of Plato. Whatever superiority the "Spiritual" philosophy of +to-day may have over the philosophy of past ages, it has attained that +superiority by its adherence to the principles and method of Plato. + +In order to the completeness of our preliminary exposition of the +Platonic doctrine of Ideas, we shall conditionally assume, as a natural +and legitimate hypothesis, the doctrine so earnestly asserted by Plato, +that the visible universe, at least in its present form, is an _effect_ +which must have had a _cause_,[508] and that the Order, and Beauty, and +Excellence of the universe are the result of the presence and operation +of a "regulating Intelligence"--a _Supreme Mind_.[509] Now that, +anterior to the creation of the universe, there must have existed in the +Eternal Mind certain fundamental principles of Order, Right, and Good, +will not be denied. Every conceivable _form_, every possible _relation_, +every principle of _right_, must have been eternally present to the +Divine thought. As pure intelligence, the Deity must have always been +self-conscious--must have known himself as substance and cause, as the +Infinite and Perfect. If then the Divine Energy is put forth in creative +acts, that energy must obey those eternal principles of Order, Right, +and Good. If the Deity operate at all, he must operate rightly, wisely, +and well. The created universe must be an _image_, in the sphere of +sense, of the ideas which inhere in the reason of the great First Cause. + +[Footnote 508: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 509: "Phædo," § 105.] + +"Let us declare," says Plato, "with what _motive_ the Creator hath +formed nature and the universe. He was _good_, and in the good no manner +of envy can, on any subject, possibly subsist. Exempt from envy, he had +wished that all things should, as far as possible, _resemble +himself_.... It was not, and is not to be allowed for the Supremely Good +to do any thing except what is most _excellent_ (kalliston)--most +_fair_, most _beautiful_."[510] Therefore, argues Plato, "inasmuch as +the world is the most beautiful of things, and its artificer the best of +causes, it is evident that the Creator and Father of the universe looked +to the _Eternal Model_(paradeigma), pattern, or plan,"[511] which lay in +his own mind. And thus this one, only-generated universe, is the _image_ +(eikôn) of that God who is the object of the intellect, the greatest, +the best, and the most perfect Being.[512] + +[Footnote 510: "Timæus," ch. x.] + +[Footnote 511: Ibid., ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 512: "Timæus," ch. lxxiii.] + +And then, furthermore, if this Supreme Intelligence, this Eternal Mind, +shall create another _mind_, it must, in a still higher degree, resemble +him. Inasmuch as it is a rational nature, it must, in a peculiar sense, +partake of the Divine characteristics. "The soul," says Plato, "is that +which most partakes of the _Divine_"[513] The soul must, therefore, have +native _ideas_ and sentiments which correlate it with the Divine +original. The ideas of substance and cause, of unity and identity, of +the infinite and perfect, must be mirrored there. As it is the +"offspring of God,"[514] it must bear some traces and lineaments of its +Divine parentage. That soul must be configured and correlated to those +principles of Order, Right, and Good which dwell in the Eternal Mind. +And because it has within itself the same ideas and laws, according to +which the great Architect built the universe, therefore it is capable of +knowing, and, in some degree, of comprehending, the intellectual system +of the universe. It apprehends the external world by a light which the +reason supplies. It interprets nature according to principles and laws +which God has inwrought within the very essence of the soul. "That which +imparts truth to knowable things, and gives the knower his power of +knowing truth, is the _idea of the good_, and you are to conceive of +this as the source of knowledge and of truth."[515] + +[Footnote 513: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 514: Ibid., bk. x.] + +[Footnote 515: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xviii.] + +And now we are prepared to form a clear conception of the Platonic +doctrine of Ideas. Viewed in their relation to the Eternal Reason, as +giving the primordial thought and law of all being, these principles are +simply eidê auta kath auta--_ideas in themselves_--the essential +qualities or attributes of Him who is the supreme and ultimate Cause of +all existence. When regarded as before the Divine imagination, giving +definite forms and relations, they are the tupoi, the paradeigmata--_the +types_, _models, patterns, ideals_ according to which the universe was +fashioned. Contemplated in their actual embodiment in the laws, and +typical forms of the material world, they are eikones--_images_ of the +eternal perfections of God. The world of sense pictures the world of +reason by a participation (methexis) of the ideas. And viewed as +interwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul, they are +omoiômata--copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws of +knowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the nexus of relation +between God and the visible universe, and between the human and the +Divine reason.[516] There is something divine in the world, and in the +human soul, namely, _the eternal laws and reasons of things_, mingled +with the endless diversity and change of sensible phenomena. These ideas +are "the light of the intelligible world;" they render the invisible +world of real Being perceptible to the reason of man. "Light is the +offspring of the Good, which the Good has produced in his own likeness. +Light in the visible world is what the _idea of the Good_ is in the +intelligible world. And this offspring of the Good--light--has the same +relation to vision and visible things which the Good has to intellect +and intelligible things."[517] + +[Footnote 516: "Now, Idea is, as regards God, a mental operation by him +(the notions of God, eternal and perfect in themselves); as regards us, +the first things perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; but +as regards the world, perceptible by sense, a pattern; but as considered +with reference to itself, an existence."--Alcinous, "Introduction to the +Doctrines of Plato," p. 261. + +"What general notions are to our minds, he (Plato) held, ideas are to +the Supreme Reason (nous basileus); they are the eternal thoughts of the +Divine Intellect, and we attain truth when our thoughts conform with +His--when our general notions are in conformity with the +ideas."--Thompson, "Laws of Thought," p. 119.] + +[Footnote 517: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix.] + +_Science_ is, then, according to Plato, _the knowledge of universal, +necessary, unchangeable, and eternal ideas_. The simple cognition of the +concrete phenomena of the universe is not regarded by him as _real_ +knowledge. "Science, or real knowledge, belongs to _Being_, and +ignorance to _non_-Being." Whilst that which is conversant only "with +that which partakes of both--of being and non-being--and which can not +be said either to be or not to be"--that which is perpetually +"becoming," but never "really is," is "simply _opinion_, and not real +knowledge."[518] And those only are "philosophers" who have a knowledge +of the _really-existing_, in opposition to the mere seeming; of the +_always-existing_, in opposition to the transitory; and of that which +exists _permanently_, in opposition to that which waxes and wanes--is +developed and destroyed alternately. "Those who recognize many beautiful +things, but who can not see the Beautiful itself, and can not even +follow those who would lead them to it, they _opine_, but do not _know_. +And the same may be said of those who recognize right actions, but do +not recognize an absolute righteousness. And so of other ideas. But they +who look at these ideas--permanent and unchangeable ideas--these men +_really know_."[519] Those are the true philosophers alone who love the +sight of truth, and who have attained to the vision of the eternal +order, and righteousness, and beauty, and goodness in the Eternal Being. +And the means by which the soul is raised to this vision of real Being +(to ontôs on) is THE SCIENCE OF REAL KNOWLEDGE. + +Plato, in the "Theætetus," puts this question by the interlocutor +Socrates, "What is Science (Epistêmê) or positive knowledge?"[520] +Theætetus essays a variety of answers, such as, "Science is sensation," +"Science is right judgment or opinion," "Science is right opinion with +logical definition." These, in the estimation of the Platonic Socrates, +are all unsatisfactory and inadequate. But after you have toiled to the +end of this remarkable discussion, in which Socrates demolishes all the +then received theories of knowledge, he gives you no answer of his own. +He abruptly closes the discussion by naïvely remarking that, at any +rate, Theætetus will learn that he does not understand the subject; and +the ground is now cleared for an original investigation. + +[Footnote 518: "Republic," bk. v. ch. xx.] + +[Footnote 519: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.] + +[Footnote 520: "Theætetus," § 10.] + +This investigation is resumed in the "Republic." This greatest work of +Plato's was designed not only to exhibit a scheme of Polity, and present +a system of Ethics, but also, at least in its digressions, to propound a +system of Metaphysics more complete and solid than had yet appeared. The +discussion as to the _powers_ or _faculties_ by which we obtain +knowledge, the _method_ or _process_ by which real knowledge is +attained, and the ultimate _objects_ or _ontological grounds_ of all +real knowledge, commences at § 18, book v., and extends to the end of +book vii. + +That we may reach a comprehensive view of this "sublimest of sciences," +we shall find it necessary to consider-- + +1st. _What are the powers or faculties by which we obtain knowledge, and +what are the limits and degrees of human knowledge?_ + +2d. _What is the method in which, or the processes and laws according to +which, the mind operates in obtaining knowledge?_ + +3d. _What are the ultimate results attained by this method? what are the +objective and ontological grounds of all real knowledge?_ + +The answer to the first question will give the PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY; the +answer to the second will exhibit the PLATONIC DIALECTIC; the answer to +the last will reveal the PLATONIC ONTOLOGY. + +I. PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY. + +Every successful inquiry as to the reality and validity of human +knowledge must commence by clearly determining, by rigid analysis, what +are the actual phenomena presented in consciousness, what are the powers +or faculties supposed by these phenomena, and what reliance are we to +place upon the testimony of these faculties? And, especially, if it be +asserted that there is a science of absolute Reality, of ultimate and +essential Being, then the most important and vital question is, By what +power do we cognize real Being? through what faculty do we obtain the +knowledge of that which absolutely _is_? If by sensation we only obtain +the knowledge of the fleeting and the transitory, "_the becoming_" how +do we attain to the knowledge of the unchangeable and permanent, "the +_Being_?" Have we a faculty of universal, necessary, and eternal +principles? Have we a faculty, an interior eye which beholds "_the +intelligible_," ideal, spiritual world, as the eye of sense beholds the +visible or "_sensible world_?"[521] + +Plato commences this inquiry by first defining his understanding of the +word dynamis--_power_ or _faculty_. "We will say _faculties_ (dynameis) +are a certain kind of real existences by which we can do whatever we are +able (_e.g._, to know), as there are powers by which every thing does +what it does: the eye has a _power_ of seeing; the ear has a _power_ of +hearing. But these powers (of which I now speak) have no color or figure +to which I can so refer that I can distinguish one power from another. +_In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, and +see what it is, and what it does. In that way I discern the power of +each thing, and that is the same power which produces the same effect, +and that is a different power which produces a different effect_."[522] +That which is employed about, and accomplishes one and the same purpose, +this Plato calls a _faculty_. + +[Footnote 521: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xviii.] + +[Footnote 522: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi.] + +We have seen that our first conceptions (_i.e._, first in the order of +time) are of the mingled, the concrete (to synkechymenon), "the +multiplicity of things to which the multitude ascribe beauty, etc.[523] +The mind "contemplates what is great and small, not as distinct from +each other, but as confused.[524] Prior to the discipline of +_reflection_, men are curious about mere sights and sounds, love +beautiful voices, beautiful colors, beautiful forms, but their +intelligence can not see, can not embrace, the essential nature of the +Beautiful itself.[525] Man's condition previous to the education of +philosophy is vividly presented in Plato's simile of the cave.[526] He +beholds only the images and shadows of the ectypal world, which are but +dim and distant adumbrations of the real and archetypal world. + +Primarily nothing is given in the abstract (to kegôrismenon), but every +thing in the concrete. The primary faculties of the mind enter into +action spontaneously and simultaneously; all our primary notions are +consequently synthetic. When reflection is applied to this primary +totality of consciousness, that is, when we analyze our notions, we find +them composed of diverse and opposite elements, some of which are +variable, contingent, individual, and relative, others are permanent, +unchangeable, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now these elements, so +diverse, so opposite, can not have been obtained from the same source; +they must be supplied by separate powers. "Can any man with common sense +reduce under one what _is infallible_, and what is _not +infallible?_"[527] Can that which is "_perpetually becoming_" be +apprehended by the same faculty as that which "_always is?_"[528] Most +assuredly not. + +[Footnote 523: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.] + +[Footnote 524: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 525: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xx.] + +[Footnote 526: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. i., ii.] + +[Footnote 527: "Republic," bk. v. ch. xxi.] + +[Footnote 528: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.; also "Timæus," § 9.] + +These primitive intuitions--the simple perceptions of sense, and the _à +priori_ intuitions of the reason, which constitute the elements of all +our complex notions, have essentially _diverse objects_--the sensible or +ectypal world, seen by the eye and touched by the hand, which Plato +calls doxastên--_the subject of opinion_; and the noetic or archetypal +world, perceived by reason, and which he calls dianontikên--_the subject +of rational intuition or science_. "It is plain," therefore, argues +Plato, "that _opinion_ is a different thing from _science_. They must, +therefore, have a different _faculty_ in reference to a different +object--science as regards that which _is_, so as to know the nature of +real _being_--opinion as regards that which can not be said absolutely +to be, or not to be. That which is known and that which is opined can +not possibly be the same,... since they are naturally faculties of +different things, and both of them are faculties--_opinion_ and +_science_, and each of them different from the other."[529] Here then +are two grand divisions of the mental powers--a faculty of apprehending +universal and necessary Truth, of intuitively beholding absolute +Reality, and a faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and of judging +according to appearance. + +[Footnote 529: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi., xxii.] + +According to the scheme of Plato, these two general divisions of the +mental powers are capable of a further subdivision. He says: Consider +that there are two kinds of things, the _intelligible_ and the +_visible_; two different regions, the intelligible world and the +sensible world. Now take a line divided into two equal segments to +represent these two regions, and again divide each segment in the same +ratio--both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species. +The parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness and +indistinctness. In the visible world the parts are _things_ and +_images_. By _images_ I mean shadows,[530] reflections in water and in +polished bodies, and all such like representations; and by _things_ I +mean that of which images are resemblances, as animals, plants, and +things made by man. + +You allow that this difference corresponds to the difference of +_knowledge_ and _opinion_; and the _opinionable_ is to the _knowable_ as +the _image_ to the _reality_.[531] + +[Footnote 530: As in the simile of the cave ("Republic," bk. vii. ch. i. +and ii.).] + +[Footnote 531: The analogy between the "images produced by reflections +in water and on polished surfaces" and "the images of external objects +produced in the mind by sensation" is more fully presented in the +"Timæus," ch. 19. + +The eye is a light-bearer, "made of that part of elemental fire which +does not burn, but sheds a mild light, like the light of day.... When +the light of the day meets the light which beams from the eye, then +light meets like, and make a homogeneous body; the external light +meeting the internal light, in the direction in which the eye looks. And +by this homogeneity like feels like; and if this beam touches any +object, or any object touches it, it transmits the motions through the +body to the soul, and produces that sensation which we call _seeing_.... +And if (in sleep) some of the strong motions remain in some part of the +frame, they produce within us likenesses of external objects,... and +thus give rise to dreams.... As to the images produced by mirrors and by +smooth surfaces, they are now easily explained, for all such phenomena +result from the mutual affinity of the external and internal fires. The +light that proceeds from the face (as an object of vision), and the +light that proceeds from the eye, become one continuous ray on the +smooth surface."] + +Now we have to divide the segment which represents intelligible things +in this way: The one part represents the knowledge which the mind gets +by using things as images--the other; that which it has by dealing with +the ideas themselves; the one part that which it gets by reasoning +downward from principles--the other, the principles themselves; the one +part, truth which depends on hypotheses--the other, unhypothetical or +absolute truth. + +Thus, to explain a problem in geometry, the geometers make certain +hypotheses (namely, definitions and postulates) about numbers and +angles, and the like, and reason from them--giving no reason for their +assumptions, but taking them as evident to all; and, reasoning from +them, they prove the propositions which they have in view. And in such +reasonings, they use visible figures or diagrams--to reason about a +square, for instance, with its diagonals; but these reasonings are not +really about these visible figures, but about the mental figures, and +which they conceive in thought. + +The diagrams which they draw, being visible, are the images of thoughts +which the geometer has in his mind, and these images he uses in his +reasoning. There may be images of these images--shadows and reflections +in water, as of other visible things; but still these diagrams are only +images of conceptions. + +This, then, is _one_ kind of intelligible things: _conceptions_--for +instance, geometrical conceptions of figures. But in dealing with these +the mind depends upon assumptions, and does not ascend to first +principles. It does not ascend above these assumptions, but uses images +borrowed from a lower region (the visible world), these images being +chosen so as to be as distinct as may be. + +Now the _other_ kind of intelligible things is this: that which the +_Reason_ includes, in virtue of its power of reasoning, when it regards +the assumptions of the sciences as (what they are) assumptions only, and +uses them as occasions and starting-points, that from these it may +ascend to the _Absolute_, which does not depend upon assumption, the +origin of scientific truth. + +_The reason takes hold of this first principle of truth_, and availing +itself of all the connections and relations of this principle, it +proceeds to the conclusion--using no sensible image in doing this, but +contemplates the _idea alone_; and with these ideas the process begins, +goes on, and terminates. + +"I apprehend," said Glaucon, "but not very clearly, for the matter is +somewhat abstruse. _You wish to prove that the knowledge which by the +reason, in an intuitive manner, we may acquire of real existence and +intelligible things is of a higher degree of certainty than the +knowledge which belongs to what are commonly called the Sciences_. Such +sciences, you say, have certain assumptions for their basis; and these +assumptions are by the student of such sciences apprehended not by +sense, but by a mental operation--by conception. + +"But inasmuch as such students ascend no higher than assumptions, and do +not go to the first principles of truth, they do not seem to have true +knowledge, intellectual insight, intuitive reason, on the subjects of +their reasonings, though the subjects are intelligible things. And you +call this habit and practice of the geometers and others by the name of +JUDGMENT (dianoia), not reason, or insight, or intuition--taking +judgment to be something between opinion, on the one side, and intuitive +reason, on the other. + +"You have explained it well," said I. "And now consider these four kinds +of things we have spoken of, as corresponding to four affections (or +faculties) of the mind. INTUITIVE REASON (noêsis), the highest; JUDGMENT +(dianoia)(or _discursive reason_), the next; the third, BELIEF (pistis); +and the fourth, CONJECTURE, or _guess_ (eikasia); and arrange them in +order, so that they may be held to have more or less certainty, as their +objects have more or less truth."[532] The completeness, and even +accuracy of this classification of all the objects of human cognition, +and of the corresponding mental powers, will be seen at once by studying +the diagram proposed by Plato, as figured on the opposite page. + +[Footnote 532: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.] + +PLATONIC SCHEME OF THE OBJECTS OF COGNITION, AND THE RELATIVE MENTAL POWERS +___________________________________________________________________________ + | | + | VISIBLE WORLD | INTELLIGIBLE WORLD + | (the object of Opinion--doxa). |(the object of Knowledge or + | | Science--ipyttêmê). + |_________________________________|____________________________ + | | | | + | Things. | Images. | Intuitions. | Conceptions. +____________|________________|________________|______________|_____________ + +And may be thus further expanded: +___________________________________________________________________________ + | | + | VISIBLE WORLD. | INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. +____________|_________________________________|____________________________ + | | | | + | Things | Images | Ideas | Conceptions +OBJECT | | | | + | zoa. k. t. l. | icones. | ideai. | duenoêmata. +____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ + | | | | + | Belief. | Conjecture. | Intuition. |Demonstration. +PROCESS | | | | + | piotis. | eikasia. | noêsis. | ipisiêiê. +____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ + | | | | + | SENSATION. | PHANTASY. | INTUITIVE | DISCURSIVE +FACULTY | | | REASON. | REASON. + | aisthêsis. | phantasia. | nous. | logos. +____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ + | | | | +MODERN | SENSE. | IMAGINATION. | REASON. | JUDGMENT. +NOMENCLATURE|Presentative |Representative |Regulative | Logical + | Faculty. | Faculty | Faculty. | Faculty. +____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________ + | | + | MEMORY. | REMINISCENCE + | mnêmê. | anamêsis. + | The Conservative Faculty-- | The Reproductive Faculty-- + | "the preserver of sensation" |"the recollection of the + | (sotêria aisin, seôs.) [533] | things which the soul + | | saw (in Eternity) when + | | journeying in the train of + | | the Deity."[534] + |[Footnote 533: "Philebus," § 67] | [Footnote 534: Phædrus, + | | § 62.] +____________|_________________________________|____________________________ + + +The foregoing diagram, borrowed from Whewell, with some modifications +and additions we have ventured to make, exhibits a perfect view of the +Platonic scheme of the _cognitive powers_--the faculties by which the +mind attains to different degrees of knowledge, "having more or less +certainty, as their objects have more or less truth."[535] + +1st. SENSATION (aisthêsis).--This term is employed by Plato to denote +the passive mental states or affections which are produced within us by +external objects through the medium of the vital organization, and also +the cognition or vital perception or consciousness[536] which the mind +has of these mental states. + +2d. PHANTASY (phantasia).--This term is employed to describe the power +which the mind possesses of imagining or representing whatever has once +been the object of sensation. This may be done involuntarily as "in +dreams, disease, and hallucination,"[537] or voluntarily, as in +reminiscence. Phantasmata are the images, the life-pictures (zographêna) +of sensible things which are present to the mind, even when no external +object is present to the sense. + +[Footnote 535: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xix.] + +[Footnote 536: "In Greek philosophy there was no term for +'consciousness' until the decline of philosophy, and in the latter ages +of the language. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other +philosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which the +mind has of the operation of its own faculties, though this, of course, +was necessarily a frequent matter of consideration. Intellect was +supposed by them to be cognizant of its own operations.... In his +'Theætetus' Plato accords to sense the power of perceiving that it +perceives."--Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 198 (Eng. ed.).] + +[Footnote 537: "Theætetus," § 39.] + +The conjoint action of these two powers results in what Plato calls +_opinion_ (doxa). "Opinion is the complication of memory and sensation. +For when we meet for the first time with a thing perceptible by a sense, +and a sensation is produced by it, and from this sensation a memory, and +we subsequently meet again with the same thing perceived by a sense, we +combine the memory previously brought into action with the sensation +produced a second time, and we say within ourselves [this is] Socrates, +or a horse, or fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Now +this is called _opinion_, through our combining the recollection brought +previously into action with the sensation recently produced. And when +these, placed along each other, agree, a true opinion is produced; but +when they swerve from each other, a false one."[538] The dixa of Plato, +therefore answers to the experience, or the _empirical knowledge_ of +modern philosophy, which is concerned only with appearances (phenomena), +and not with absolute realities, and can not be elevated to the dignity +of _science_ or real knowledge. + +We are not from hence to infer that Plato intended to deny all reality +whatever to the objects of sensible experience. These transitory +phenomena were not real existences, but they were _images_ of real +existences. The world itself is but the image, in the sphere of sense, +of those ideas of Order, and Proportion, and Harmony, which dwell in the +Divine Intellect, and are mirrored in the soul of man. "Time itself is a +moving image of Eternity."[539] But inasmuch as the immediate object of +sense-perception is a representative image generated in the vital +organism, and all empirical cognitions are mere "conjectures" (eikasiai) +founded on representative images, they need to be certified by a higher +faculty, which immediately apprehends real Being (to on). Of things, as +they are in themselves, the senses give us no knowledge; all that in +sensation we are conscious of is certain affections of the mind +(pathos); the existence of self, or the perceiving subject, and a +something external to self, a perceived object, are revealed to us, not +by the senses, but by the reason. + +[Footnote 538: Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrine of Plato," p. +247.] + +[Footnote 539: "Timæus," § 14.] + +3d. JUDGMENT (dianoia, logos), _the Discursive Faculty, or the Faculty +of Relations_.--According to Plato, this faculty proceeds on the +assumption of certain principles as true, without inquiring into their +validity, and reasons, by deduction, to the conclusions which +necessarily flow from these principles. These assumptions Plato calls +hypotheses (ypotheseis). But by hypotheses he does not mean baseless +assumptions--"mere theories--"but things self-evident and "obvious to +all;"[540] as for example, the postulates and definitions of Geometry. +"After laying down hypotheses of the odd and even, and three kinds of +angles [right, acute, and obtuse], and figures [as the triangle, square, +circle, and the like], he _proceeds on them as known, and gives no +further reason about them_, and reasons downward from these +principles,"[541] affirming certain judgments as consequences deducible +therefrom. + +[Footnote 540: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx.] + +[Footnote 541: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xx.] + +All judgments are therefore founded on _relations_. To judge is to +compare two terms. "Every judgment has three parts: the subject, or +notion about which the judgment is; the predicate, or notion with which +the subject is compared; and the copula, or nexus, which expresses the +connection or relation between them.[542] Every act of affirmative +judgment asserts the agreement of the predicate and subject; every act +of negative judgment asserts the predicate and subject do not agree. All +judgment is thus an attempt to reduce to unity two cognitions, and +reasoning (logizesthai) is simply the extension of this process. When we +look at two straight lines of equal length, we do not merely think of +them separately as _this_ straight line, and _that_ straight line, but +they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes +place in the mind. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are +of equal length, and they are both straight; and the connection which is +perceived as existing between them is a _relation of sameness or +identity._[543] When we observe any change occurring in nature, as, for +example, the melting of wax in the presence of heat, the mind recognizes +a causal efficiency in the fire to produce that change, and the relation +now apprehended is a _relation of cause and effect_[544] But the +fundamental principles, the necessary ideas which lie at the basis of +all the judgments (as the ideas of space and time, of unity and +identity, of substance and cause, of the infinite and perfect) are not +given by the judgment, but by the "highest faculty"--"the _Intuitive +Reason_,[545] which is, for us, the source of all unhypothetical and +absolute knowledge. + +[Footnote 542: Thompson's "Laws of Thought," p. 134.] + +[Footnote 543: "Phædo," §§ 50-57, 62.] + +[Footnote 544: "Timæus," ch. ix.; "Sophocles," § 109.] + +[Footnote 545: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xxi.] + +The knowledge, therefore, which is furnished by the Discursive Reason, +Plato does not regard as "real Science." "It is something between +Opinion on the one hand, and Intuition on the other."[546] + +[Footnote 546: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xxi.] + +4th. REASON (nous)--_Intuitive Reason_, is the organ of self-evident, +necessary, and universal Truth. In an immediate, direct, and intuitive +manner, it takes hold on truth with absolute certainty. The reason, +through the medium of _ideas_, holds communion with the world of real +Being. These ideas are the _light_ which reveals the world of unseen +realities, as the sun reveals the world of sensible forms. "_The idea of +the good_ is the _sun_ of the Intelligible World; it sheds on objects +the light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows, the power of +knowing."[547] Under this light, the eye of reason apprehends the +eternal world of being as truly, yes more truly, than the eye of sense +apprehends the world of phenomena. This power the rational soul +possesses by virtue of its having a nature kindred, or even homogeneous +with the Divinity. It was "generated by the Divine Father," and, like +him, it is in a certain sense "_eternal_."[548] Not that we are to +understand Plato as teaching that the rational soul had an independent +and underived existence; it was created or "generated" in eternity,[549] +and even now, in its incorporate state, is not amenable to the +conditions of time and space, but, in a peculiar sense, dwells in +eternity; and therefore is capable of beholding eternal realities, and +coming into communion with absolute beauty, and goodness, and +truth--that is, with God, the _Absolute Being_. + +[Footnote 547: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xix.; see also ch. xviii.] + +[Footnote 548: The reader must familiarize himself with the Platonic +notion of _"eternity" as a fixed state out of time existing +contemporaneous with one in time_, to appreciate the doctrine of Plato +as stated above. If we regard his idea of eternity as merely an +indefinite extension of time, with a past, a present, and a future, we +can offer no rational interpretation of his doctrine of the eternal +nature of the rational essence of the soul. An eternal nature +"generated" in a "past" or "present" time is a contradiction. But that +was not Plato's conception of "eternity," as the reader will discover on +perusing the "Timæus" (ch. xiv.). "God resolved to create a moving image +of eternity, and out of that eternity which reposes in its own +_unchangeable unity_ he framed an eternal image moving according to +numerical succession, which we call _Time_. Nothing can be more +inaccurate than to apply the terms, _past, present, future_, to real +Being, which is immovable. Past and future are expressions only suitable +to generation which proceeds through time." Time reposes on the bosom of +eternity, as all bodies are in space.] + +[Footnote 549: "Timæus," ch. xvi., and "Phædrus," where the soul is +pronounced archê de agenêton.] + +Thus the soul (psychê) as a composite nature is on one side linked to +the eternal world, its essence being generated of that ineffable element +which constitutes the real, the immutable, and the permanent. It is a +beam of the eternal Sun, a spark of the Divinity, an emanation from God. +On the other side it is linked to the phenomenal or sensible world, its +emotive part[550] being formed of that which is relative and phenomenal. +The soul of man thus stands midway between the eternal and the +contingent, the real and the phenomenal, and as such, it is the mediator +between, and the interpreter of, both. + +[Footnote 550: thymeides, the seat of the nobler--epithymêtikon, the +seat of the baser passions.] + +In the allegory of the "Chariot and Winged Steeds"[551] Plato represents +the lower or inferior part of man's nature as dragging the soul down to +the earth, and subjecting it to the slavery and debasement of corporeal +conditions. Out of these conditions there arise numerous evils that +disorder the mind and becloud the reason, for evil is inherent to the +condition of finite and multiform being into which we have "fallen by +our own fault." The present earthly life is a fall and a punishment. The +soul is now dwelling in "the grave we call the body." In its incorporate +state, and previous to the discipline of education, the rational element +is "asleep." "Life is more of a dream than a reality." Men are utterly +the slaves of sense, the sport of phantoms and illusions. We now +resemble those "captives chained in a subterraneous cave," so poetically +described in the seventh book of the "Republic;" their backs are turned +to the light, and consequently they see but the shadows of the objects +which pass behind them, and they "attribute to these shadows a perfect +reality." Their sojourn upon earth is thus a dark imprisonment in the +body, a dreamy exile from their proper home. "Nevertheless these pale +fugitive shadows suffice to revive in us the reminiscence of that higher +world we once inhabited, if we have not absolutely given the reins to +the impetuous untamed horse which in Platonic symbolism represents the +emotive sensuous nature of man." The soul has some dim and shadowy +recollection of its ante-natal state of bliss, and some instinctive and +proleptic yearnings for its return. + +[Footnote 551: "Phædrus," § 54-62.] + + "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting; + The soul that rises with us, our life's star, + Has had elsewhere its setting, + And cometh from afar, + Not in entire forgetfulness, + And not in utter nakedness, + But trailing clouds of glory, do we come + From God, who is our home."[552] + +[Footnote 552: Wordsworth, "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality," vol. +v.] + +Exiled from the true home of the spirit, imprisoned in the body, +disordered by passion, and beclouded by sense, the soul has yet longings +after that state of perfect knowledge, and purity, and bliss, in which +it was first created. Its affinities are still on high. It yearns for a +higher and nobler form of life. It essays to rise, but its eye is +darkened by sense, its wings are besmeared by passion and lust; it is +"borne downward, until at length it falls upon and attaches itself to +that which is material and sensual," and it flounders and grovels still +amid the objects of sense. + +And now, with all that seriousness and earnestness of spirit which is +peculiarly Christian, Plato asks how the soul may be delivered from the +illusions of sense, the distempering influence of the body, and the +disturbances of passion, which becloud its vision of the real, the good, +and the true? + +Plato believed and hoped this could be accomplished by _philosophy_. +This he regarded as a grand intellectual discipline for the purification +of the soul. By this it was to be disenthralled from the bondage of +sense[553] and raised into the empyrean of pure thought "where truth and +reality shine forth." All souls have the faculty of knowing, but it is +only by reflection, and self-knowledge, and intellectual discipline, +that the soul can be raised to the vision of eternal truth, goodness, +and beauty--that is, to the vision of God. And this intellectual +discipline was the _Platonic Dialectic_. + +[Footnote 553: Not, however, fully in this life. The consummation of the +intellectual struggle into "the intelligible world" is death. The +intellectual discipline was therefore meletê thanatou, _a preparation +for death_.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_.) + +THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + +PLATO. + + +II. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC. + +The Platonic Dialectic is the Science of Eternal and Immutable +Principles, and the _method_ (organon) by which these first principles +are brought forward into the clear light of consciousness. The student +of Plato will have discovered that he makes no distinction between logic +and metaphysics. These are closely united in the one science to which he +gives the name of "_Dialectic_" and which was at once the science of the +ideas and laws of the Reason, and of the mental process by which the +knowledge of Real Being is attained, and a ground of absolute certainty +is found. This science has, in modern times, been called _Primordial_ or +_Transcendental Logic_. + +We have seen that Plato taught that the human reason is originally in +possession of fundamental and necessary ideas--the copies of the +archetypal ideas which dwell in the eternal Reason; and that these ideas +are the primordial laws of thought--that is, they are the laws under +which we conceive of all objective things, and reason concerning all +existence. These ideas, he held, are not derived from sensation, neither +are they generalizations from experience, but they are inborn and +connatural. And, further, he entertained the belief, more, however, as a +reasonable hypothesis[554] than as a demonstrable truth, that these +standard principles were acquired by the soul in a pre-existent state in +which it stood face to face with ideas of eternal order, beauty, +goodness, and truth.[555] "Journeying with the Deity," the soul +contemplated justice, wisdom, science--not that science which is +concerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestation +in different objects, which we choose to call beings; but such science +as is in that which alone is indeed _being_.[556] Ideas, therefore, +belong to, and inhere in, that portion of the soul which is properly +ousia--_essence_ or _being_; which had an existence anterior to time, +and even now has no relation to time, because it is now in +eternity--that is, in a sphere of being to which past, present, and +future can have no relation.[557] + +[Footnote 554: Within "the eikotôn mythôn idea--the category of +probability."--"Phædo."] + +[Footnote 555: "Phædo," § 50-56.] + +[Footnote 556: "Phædrus," § 58.] + +[Footnote 557: See note on p. 349.] + +All knowledge of truth and reality is, therefore, according to Plato, a +REMINISCENCE (anamnêsis)--a recovery of partially forgotten ideas which +the soul possessed in another state of existence; and the _dialectic_ of +Plato is simply the effort, by apt _interrogation_, to lead the mind to +"_recollect_"[558] the truth which has been formerly perceived by it, +and is even now in the memory though not in consciousness. An +illustration of this method is attempted in the "_Meno_" where Plato +introduces Socrates as making an experiment on the mind of an uneducated +person. Socrates puts a series of questions to a slave of Meno, and at +length elicits from the youth a right enunciation of a geometrical +truth. Socrates then points triumphantly to this instance, and bids Meno +observe that he had not taught the youth any thing, but simply +interrogated him as to his opinions, whilst the youth had recalled the +knowledge previously existing in his own mind.[559] + +[Footnote 558: "To learn is to recover our own previous knowledge, and +this is properly to _recollect._"--"Phædo" § 55.] + +[Footnote 559: "Meno," § 16-20. "Now for a person to recover knowledge +himself through himself, is not this to _recollect_."] + +Now whilst we readily grant that the instance given in the "_Meno_" does +not sustain the inference of Plato that "the boy" had learnt these +geometrical truths "in eternity," and that they had simply been brought +forward into the view of his consciousness by the "questioning" of +Socrates, yet it certainly does prove that _there are ideas or +principles in the human reason which are not derived from without--which +are anterior to all experience, and for the development of which, +experience furnishes the occasion, but is not the origin and source_. By +a kind of lofty inspiration, he caught sight of that most important +doctrine of modern philosophy, so clearly and logically presented by +Kant, _that the Reason is the source of a pure_ à priori _knowledge_--a +knowledge native to, and potentially in the mind, antecedent to all +experience, and which is simply brought out into the field of +consciousness by experience conditions. Around this greatest of all +metaphysical truths Plato threw a gorgeous mythic dress, and presented +it under the most picturesque imagery.[560] But, when divested of the +rich coloring which the glowing imagination of Plato threw over it, it +is but a vivid presentation of the cardinal truth that _there are ideas +in the mind which have not been derived from without_, and which, +therefore, the mind brought with it into the present sphere of being. +The validity and value of this fundamental doctrine, even as presented +by Plato, is unaffected by any speculations in which he may have +indulged, as to the pre-existence of the soul. He simply regarded this +doctrine of pre-existence as highly probable--a plausible explanation of +the facts. That there are ideas, innate and connatural to the human +mind, he clung to as the most vital, most precious, most certain of all +truths; and to lead man to the recognitions of these ideas, to bring +them within the field of consciousness, was, in his judgment, the great +business of philosophy. + +And this was the grand aim of his _Dialectic_--to elicit, to bring to +light the truths which are already in the mind--"a maieusis" a kind of +intellectual midwifery[561]--a delivering of the mind of the ideas with +which it was pregnant. + +[Footnote 560: As in the "Phædo," §§ 48-57; "Phædrus," §§ 52-64; +"Republic," bk. x.] + +[Footnote 561: "Theætetus," §§ 17-20.] + +It is thus, at first sight, obvious that it was a higher and more +comprehensive science than the art of deduction. For it was directed to +the discovery and establishment of First Principles. Its sole object was +the discovery of truth. His dialectic was an _analytical_ and _inductive +method_. "In Dialectic Science," says _Alcinous_, "there is a dividing +and a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductive +and syllogistic."[562] Even _Bacon_, who is usually styled "the Father +of the Inductive method," and who, too often, speaks disparagingly of +Plato, is constrained to admit that he followed the inductive method. +"An induction such as will be of advantage for the invention and +demonstration of Arts and Sciences must distinguish the essential nature +of things (naturam) by proper rejections and exclusions, and then after +as many of these negatives as are sufficient, by comprising, above all +(super), the positives. Up to this time this had not been done, nor even +attempted, _except by Plato alone, who, in order to attain his +definitions and ideas, has used, to a certain extent, the method of +Induction_."[563] + +[Footnote 562: "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," vol. vi. p. +249. "The Platonic Method was the method of induction."--Cousin's +"History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 307.] + +[Footnote 563: "Novum Organum," vol. i. p. 105.] + +The process of investigation adopted by Plato thus corresponds with the +inductive method of modern times, with this simple difference, that +Bacon conducted science into the world of _matter_, whilst Plato +directed it to the world of _mind_. The dialectic of Plato aimed at the +discovery of the "laws of thought;" the modern inductive philosophy aims +at the discovery of the "laws of nature." The latter concerns itself +chiefly with the inquiry after the "causes" of material phenomena; the +former concerned itself with the inquiry after the "first principles" of +all knowledge and of all existence. Both processes are, therefore, +carried on by _interrogation_. The analysis which seeks for a law of +nature proceeds by the interrogation of nature. The analysis of Plato +proceeds by the interrogation of mind, in order to discover the +fundamental _ideas_ which lie at the basis of all cognition, which +determine all our processes of thought, and which, in their final +analysis, reveal the REAL BEING, which is the ground and explanation of +all existence. + +Now the fact that such an inquiry has originated in the human mind, and +that it can not rest satisfied without some solution, is conclusive +evidence that the mind has an instinctive belief, a proleptic +anticipation, that such knowledge can be attained. There must +unquestionably be some mental initiative which is the _motive_ and +_guide_ to all philosophical inquiry. We must have some well-grounded +conviction, some _à priori_ belief, some pre-cognition "ad intentionem +ejus quod quæritur,"[564] which determines the direction of our +thinking. The mind does not go to work aimlessly; it asks a specific +question; it demands the "_whence_" and the "_why_" of that which is. +Neither does it go to work unfurnished with any guiding principles. That +which impels the mind to a determinate act of thinking is the possession +of a _knowledge_ which is different from, and independent of, the +process of thinking itself. "A rational anticipation is, then, the +ground of the _prudens quæstio_--"the forethought query, which, in +fact, is the prior half of the knowledge sought."[565] If the mind +inquire after "laws," and "causes," and "reasons," and "grounds,"--the +first principles of all knowledge and of all existence,--"it must have +the _à priori_ ideas of "law," and "cause," and "reason," and "being _in +se"_ which, though dimly revealed to the mind previous to the discipline +of reflection, are yet unconsciously governing its spontaneous modes of +thought. The whole process of induction has, then, some rational ground +to proceed upon--some principles deeper than science, and more certain +than demonstration, which reason contains within itself, and which +induction "draws out" into clearer light. + +[Footnote 564: Bacon.] + +[Footnote 565: Coleridge, vol. ii. p. 413.] + +Now this mental initiative of every process of induction is the +intuitive and necessary conviction _that there must be a sufficient +reason why every thing exists, and why it is as it is, and not +otherwise_;[566] or in other words, if any thing begins to be, some +thing else must be supposed[567] as the ground, and reason, and cause, +and law of its existence. This "_law of sufficient_ (or _determinant) +reason_"[568] is the fundamental principle of all metaphysical inquiry. +It is contained, at least in a negative form, in that famous maxim of +ancient philosophy, "_De nihilo nihil_"--"Adynaton ginestai ti ek +mêdenos prouparxontos." "It is impossible for a real entity to be made +or generated from nothing pre-existing;" or in other words, "nothing can +be made or produced without an efficient cause."[569] This principle is +also distinctly announced by Plato: "Whatever is generated, is +necessarily generated from a certain aitian"--_ground, reason_, or +_cause_; "for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be generated +without a cause."[570] + +[Footnote 566: "Phædo," § 103.] + +[Footnote 567: _Suppono_, to place under as a support, to take as a +ground.] + +[Footnote 568: This generic principle, viewed under different relations, +gives-- + + 1st. _The principle of Substance_--every quality supposes a subject + or real being. + + 2d. _The principle of Causality_--every thing which begins to be + must have a cause. + + 3d. _The principle of Law_--every phenomenon must obey some uniform + law. + + 4th. _The principle of Final Cause_--every means supposes an end, + every existence has a purpose or reason why. + + 5th. _The principle of Unity_--all plurality supposes a unity as + its basis and ground.] + +[Footnote 569: Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. ii. p. 161.] + +[Footnote 570: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +The first business of Plato's dialectic is to demonstrate that the +ground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objects +of sense, nor in any opinions or judgments founded upon sensation. +Principles are only so far "first principles" as they are permanent and +unchangeable, depending on neither time, nor place, nor circumstances. +But the objects of sense are in ceaseless flux and change; they are +"_always becoming_;" they can not be said to have any "_real being_." +They are not to-day what they were yesterday, and they will never again +be what they are now; consequently all opinions founded on mere +phenomena are equally fluctuating and uncertain. Setting out, therefore, +from the assumption of the fallaciousness of "_opinion_" it examined the +various hypotheses which had been bequeathed by previous schools of +philosophy, or were now offered by contemporaneous speculators, and +showed they were utterly inadequate to the solution of the problem. This +scrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of "contradiction"[571] +with regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing that +opposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground these +opinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and it +showed that the grounds upon which "opinion" was founded, and the +conclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, and +consequently untrue.[572] "They," the Dialecticians, "examined the +opinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by a +reasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side of +each other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at one +and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with +reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same +premises_."[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the same +time, be affirmed and denied of the same subject,[574] therefore a thing +can not be at once "changeable" and "unchangeable," "movable" and +"immovable," "generated" and "eternal."[575] The objects of sense, +however generalized and classified, can only give the contingent, the +relative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficient +reason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions and +judgments founded upon sensation. + +[Footnote 571: "The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers the +contradictions implied in popular opinions."--Aristotle, "Sophist," §§ +1, 2.] + +[Footnote 572: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.] + +[Footnote 573: "Sophist," § 33; "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xii.] + +[Footnote 574: See the "Phædo," § 119, and "Republic," bk. iv. ch. +xiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.] + +[Footnote 575 "Parmenides," § 3.] + +The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of +_refutation_,[576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_ +(elenchos)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given +proposition is inferred. "When refutation had done its utmost, and all +the points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the +dialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation which +remained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the +truth of the question under consideration;"[577] or in other words, +_when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictory +opposite principle, with its logical developments, must be accepted as +an established truth_. + +[Footnote 576: Confutation is the greatest and chiefest of +purification.--"Sophist," § 34.] + +[Footnote 577: Article "Plato," Encyclopædia Britannica.] + +By the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed the +insufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere +_à posteriori_ generalization of the simple facts of experience, but he +demonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of some +elements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; that +there are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, which +have been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that these +notions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, and +reveal the knowledge of _real being_--to ontôs on--_Being in se_. + +To determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresses +himself to the _analysis of thought_. "It is the glory of Plato to have +borne the light of analysis into the most obscure and inmost region; he +searched out what, in this totality which forms consciousness, is the +province of reason; what comes from it, and not from the imagination and +the senses--from within, and not from without."[578] Now to analyze is +to decompose, that is, to divide, and to define, in order to see better +that which really is. The chief logical instruments of the dialectic +method are, therefore, _Division_ and _Definition_. "The being able to +_divide_ according to genera, and not to consider the same species as +different, nor a different as the same,"[579] and "to see under one +aspect, and bring together under one general idea, many things scattered +in various places, that, by _defining_ each, a person may make it clear +what the subject is," is, according to Plato, "dialectical."[580] + +[Footnote 578: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 328.] + +[Footnote 579: "Sophist," § 83.] + +[Footnote 580: "Phædrus," §§ 109, 111.] + +We have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflection +to the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized two +distinct classes of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentially +opposite;--one of "_sensible_" objects having a definite outline, limit, +and figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in a +determinate form--the other of "_intelligible_" objects, which can not +be outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by any +figures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rational +conception. He found, also, that we arrive at one class of cognitions +"_mediately_" through images generated in the vital organism, or by some +testimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at the +other class "_immediately_" by simple intuition, or rational +apperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazes +directly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its own +light, and we find it impossible to refuse our assent--that is, it is +_self-evident_. One class consisted of _contingent_ ideas--that is, +their objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, without +any contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the other +consisted of _necessary_ ideas--their objects are conceived as existing +with the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence. +Thus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as not +existing, but we can not conceive the non-existence of space. We can +conceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, in +thought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particular +thing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction of +Being in itself. He further observed, that one class of our cognitions +are _conditional_ ideas; the existence of their objects is conceived +only on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example, +the idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other class of +cognitions are _unconditional_ and _absolute_--we can conceive of their +objects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whether +any thing else does or does not exist, as space, duration, the infinite, +Being _in se_. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as +_particular_ and _individual_, determined and modified by our own +personality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullest +sense, _universal_. They are not the creations of our own minds, and +they can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neither +times, nor places, nor circumstances; they are common to all minds, in +all times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in our +inmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyond +and above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneath +all changes there is a _permanent_ being. Beyond all finite and +conditional existance there is something _unconditional_ and _absolute_. +Having determined that there are truths which are independent of our own +minds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths which +would be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are led +onward to a _super-sensual_ and super-natural ground, on which they +rest. + +To reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, is +the grand effort of Plato's dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid analysis, +clearly to _separate_, and accurately to _define_ the _à priori_ +conceptions of reason. And it was only when he had eliminated every +element which is particular, contingent, and relative, and had defined +the results in precise and accurate language, that he regarded the +process as complete. The ideas which are self-evident, universal, and +necessary, were then clearly disengaged, and raised to their pure and +absolute form. "You call the man dialectical who requires a reason of +the essence or being of each thing. As the dialectical man can define +the essence of every thing, so can he of the good. He can _define_ the +idea of the good, _separating_ it from all others--follow it through all +windings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion, +but according to science."[581] + +[Footnote 581: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.] + +_Abstraction_ is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonic +dialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between +the method of _comparative_ abstraction, as employed in physical +inquiry, and that _immediate_ abstraction, which is the special +instrument of philosophy. The former proceeds by comparison and +generalization, the latter by simple separation. The one yields a +contingent general principle as the result of the comparison of a number +of individual cases, the other gives an universal and necessary +principle by the analysis of a single concrete fact. As an illustration +we may instance "the principle of causality." To enable us to affirm +"that every event must have a cause," we do not need to compare and +generalize a great number of events. "The principle which compels us to +pronounce the judgment is already complete in the first as in the last +event; it can change in regard to its object, it can not change in +itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less +number of applications."[582] In the presence of a single event, the +universality and necessity of this principle of causality is recognized +with just as much clearness and certainty as in the presence of a +million events, however carefully generalized. + +[Footnote 582: Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," pp. 57, +58.] + +Abstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it add +any new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed by +all human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and more +definite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as part +of its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has always +unconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process of +rational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible and +conscious communion with the world of _Ideas_. These ideas are partially +revealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Plato +believed, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensible +objects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in the +constitution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred nature +with the original essence or being, must know them intuitively and +immediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process, +which disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, and +sets them forth in their pure and absolute form. + +But whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method of +investigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from all +concrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempted +a complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such an +enumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can not +fail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize the +grand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has so +fully exhibited, viz., the _True_, the _Beautiful_, and the _Good_. + +PLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS + +I. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (to alêthes--to on)--the +ground and efficient cause of all existence, and by participating in +which all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensible +things being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea is +developed in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenal +world; as, + +1. _The idea of_ SUBSTANCE (ousia)--the ground of all phenomena, "the +being or essence of all things," the permanent reality.--"Timæeus," ch. +ix. and xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.; "Phædo,"§§ 63-67, 73. + +2. _The idea of_ CAUSE (aitia)--the power or efficiency by which things +that "become," or begin to be, are generated or produced.--"Timæus," ch. +ix.; "Sophist," § 109; "Philebus," §§ 45, 46. + +3. _The idea of_ IDENTITY (auto to ison)--that which "does not change," +"is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite and +indissoluble,"--that which constitutes personality or +self-hood.--"Phædo," §§ 61-75; "Timæus," ch. ix.; "Republic," bk. ii. +ch. xix. and xx. + +4. _The idea of_ UNITY (to en)--one _mind_ or intelligence pervading the +universe, the comprehensive conscious _thought_ or _plan_ which binds +all parts of the universe in one great whole (to pan)--the principle of +_order_.--"Timæus," ch. xi. and xv.; "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.; +"Philebus," §§ 50-51. + +5. _The idea of the_ INFINITE (to apeiron)--that which is unlimited and +unconditioned, "has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, nor +end."--"Parmenides," §§ 22, 23. + +II. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (to kalon)--the formal cause of the +universe, and by participation in which all created things have only so +far a real beauty.--"Timæus," ch. xi, "Greater Hippias," §§ 17, 18; +"Republic," bk. v. ch. 22. + +This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the +organic world; as, + + 1. _The Idea of_ PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (symmetria)--the + proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a + harmony (cosmos), and which relation admits of mathematical + expression.--"Timæus," ch. lxix.; "Philebus," § 155 + ("Timæus," ch. xi. and xii., where the relation of numerical + proportions to material elements is expounded). + + 2. _The idea of_ DETERMINATE FORM (paradeigma + archetypos)--the eternal models or archetypes according to + which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical + representation.--"Timæus," ch. ix.; "Phædo," §112 ("Timæus," + ch. xxviii.-xxxi., where the relation of geometrical forms + to material elements is exhibited). + + 3. _The idea of_ RHYTHM (rythmos)--measured movement in time + and space, resulting in melody and grace.--"Republic," bk. + iii. ch. xi. and xii.; "Philebus," § 21. + + 4. _The idea of_ FITNESS or ADAPTATION + (chrêsimon)--effectiveness to some purpose or end.--"Greater + Hippias," § 35. + + 5. _The idea of_ PERFECTION (teleiotês)--that which is + complete, "a structure which is whole and finished--of whole + and perfect parts."--"Timæus," ch. xi., xii., and xliii. + + +III. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE GOOD (to agathon)--the final _cause_ or +_reason_ of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that pours +upon all things the revealing light of truth. + +The first Good[583] (_summum bonum_) is God the highest, and Mind or +Intelligence (nous), which renders man capable of knowing and resembling +God. The second flows from the first, and are virtues of mind. They are +good by a participation of the chief good, and constitute in man a +likeness or _resemblance_ to God.--"Phædo," §§110-114; "Laws," bk. i. +ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Theætetus," §§ 84, 85; "Republic," bk. vi. +ch. xix., bk. vii. ch. iii., bk. x. ch. xii.[584] + +[Footnote 583: "Let us declare, then, on what account the framing +Artificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;" and being +good, "he desired that all things should as much as possible resemble +himself."--"Timæus," ch. x.] + +[Footnote 584: "At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the +_idea of the Good_, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen, +makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which +in the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; and +which in the invisible world directly produces Truth and +Intelligence."--"Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.] + +This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the +world of moral order; as, + +1. _The idea of_ WISDOM or PRUDENCE (phronêsis)--thoughtfulness, +rightness of intention, following the guidance of reason, the right +direction of the energy or will.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. vii., bk. vi. +ch. ii. + +2. _The idea of_ COURAGE or FORTITUDE (andria)--zeal, energy, firmness +in the maintenance of honor and right, virtuous indignation against +wrong.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Laches;" "Meno," § 24. + +3. _The idea of_ SELF-CONTROL or TEMPERANCE +(sophrosynê)--sound-mindedness, moderation, dignity.--"Republic," bk. +iv. ch. ix.; "Meno," § 24; "Phædo," § 35. + +4. _The idea of_ JUSTICE (dikalosynê)--the harmony or perfect +proportional action of all the powers of the soul.--"Republic," bk. i. +ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. x.-xii., bk. vi. ch. ii. and xvi.; "Philebus," § +155; "Phædo," § 54; "Theætetus," §§ 84, 85. + +Plato's idea of Justice comprehends-- + +(1) EQUITY (isotês)--the rendering to every man his due.--"Republic," +bk. i. ch. vi. + +(2.) VERACITY (alêpheia)--the utterance of what is true.--"Republic," +bk. i. ch. v., bk. ii. ch. xx., bk. vi. ch. ii. + +(3.) FAITHFULNESS (pistotês)--the strict performance of a +trust.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. v., bk. vi. ch. ii. + +(4.) USEFULNESS (ôpheltmon)--the answering of some valuable +end.--"Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii., bk. iv. ch. xviii.; "Meno," § 22. + +(5.) BENEVOLENCE (eunoia)--seeking the well-being of +others.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. xvii., bk. ii. ch. xviii. + +(6.) HOLINESS (osiotês)--purity of mind, piety.--"Protagoras," §§ 52-54; +"Phædo," § 32; "Theætetus," § 84. + +The final effort of Plato's Dialectic was to ascend from these ideas of +Absolute Truth, and Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Goodness to the +_Absolute Being_, in whom they are all united, and from whom they all +proceed. "He who possesses the true love of science is naturally carried +in his aspirations to the _real Being_; and his love, so far from +suffering itself to be retarded by the multitude of things whose reality +is only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union with +the _essence_ of each object, by the part of the soul which is akin to +the permanent and essential; so that this divine conjunction having +produced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of _being_ is won."[585] + +[Footnote 585: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. v.] + +To the mind of Plato, there was in every thing, even the smallest and +most insignificant of sensible objects, a _reality_ just in so far as it +participates in some archetypal form or idea. These archetypal forms or +ideas are the "_thoughts of God_"[586]--they are the plan according to +which he framed the universe. "The Creator and Father of the universe +looked to an _eternal model_.... Being thus generated, the universe is +framed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and +reflection."[587] Plato, also, regarded all individual conceptions of +the mind as hypothetical notions which have in them an _à priori_ +element--an idea which is unchangeable, universal, and necessary. These +unchangeable, universal, and necessary ideas are copies of the Divine +Ideas, which are, for man, the primordial laws of all cognition, and all +reasoning. They are possessed by the soul "in virtue of its kindred +nature to that which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal." He also +believed that every archetypal form, and every _à priori_ idea, has its +ground and root in a higher idea, which is _unhypothetical_ and +_absolute_--an idea which needs no other supposition for its +explanation, and which is, itself, needful to the explanation of all +existence--even the idea of an _absolute_ and _perfect Being_, in whose +mind the ideas of absolute truth, and beauty, and goodness inhere, and +in whose eternity they can only be regarded as eternal.[588] Thus do the +"ideas of reason" not only cast a bridge across the abyss that separates +the sensible and the ideal world, but they also carry us beyond the +limits of our personal consciousness, and discover to us a realm of real +Being, which is the foundation, and cause, and explanation of the +phenomenal world that appears around us and within us. + +[Footnote 586: Alcinous, "Doctrines of Plato," p. 262.] + +[Footnote 587: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 588: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 149.] + +This passage from psychology to ontology is not achieved _per saltum_, +or effected by any arbitrary or unwarrantable assumption. There are +principles revealed in the centre of our consciousness, whose regular +development carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and attain to +the knowledge of actual being. The absolute principles of _causality_ +and _substance_, of _intentionality_ and _unity_, unquestionably give us +the absolute Being. Indeed the absolute truth _that every idea supposes +a being in which it resides_, and which is but another form of the law +or principle of substance, viz., _that every quality supposes a +substance or being in which it inheres_, is adequate to carry us from +Idea to Being. "There is not a single cognition which does not suggest +to us the notion of existence, and there is not an unconditional and +absolute truth which does not necessarily imply an absolute and +unconditional Being."[589] + +[Footnote 589: Cousin's "Elements of Psychology," p. 506.] + +This, then, is the dialectic of Plato. Instead of losing himself amid +the endless variety of particular phenomena, he would search for +principles and laws, and from thence ascend to the great Legislator, the +_First Principle of all Principles_. Instead of stopping at the +relations of sensible objects to the general ideas with which they are +commingled, he will pass to their _eternal Paradigms_--from the just +thing to the idea of absolute justice, from the particular good to the +absolute good, from beautiful things to the absolute beauty, and thence +to the ultimate reality--_the absolute Being_. By the realization of the +lower idea, embodied in the forms of the visible universe and in the +necessary laws of thought, he sought to rise to the higher idea, in its +pure and abstract form--the _Supreme Idea_, containing in itself all +other ideas--the _One Intelligence_ which unites the universe in a +harmonious whole. "The Dialectic faculty proceeds from hypothesis to an +unhypothetical principle.... It uses hypotheses as steps, and +starting-points, in order to proceed from thence to the _absolute_. The +Intuitive Reason takes hold of the First Principle of the Universe, and +avails itself of all the connections and relations of that principle. It +ascends from idea to idea, until it has reached the Supreme Idea"--the +_Absolute Good_--that is, _God_.[590] + +[Footnote 590: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.] + +We are thus brought, in the course of our examination of the Platonic +method, to the _results_ obtained by this method--or, in other words, to + +III. THE PLATONIC ONTOLOGY. + +The grand object of all philosophic inquiry in ancient Greece was to +attain to the knowledge of real Being--that Being which is permanent, +unchangeable, and eternal. It had proceeded on the intuitive conviction, +that beneath all the endless diversity of the universe there must be a +principle of _unity_--below all fleeting appearances there must be a +permanent _substance_--beyond all this everlasting flow and change, this +beginning and end of finite existence, there must be an eternal Being, +which is the _cause_, and which contains, in itself, the _reason_ of the +order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency which pervades the +universe. And it had perpetually asked what is this permanent, +unchangeable, and eternal substance or being? + +Plato had assiduously labored at the solution of this problem. The +object of his dialectic was "to lead upward the soul to the knowledge of +real being,"[591] and the conclusions to which he attained may be summed +up as follows: + +1st. _Beneath all_ SENSIBLE _phenomena there is an unchangeable +subject-matter, the mysterious substratum of the world of sense, which +he calls the receptacle (ipodochê) the nurse (tithênê) of all that is +produced_.[592] + +It is this "substratum or physical groundwork" which gives a reality and +definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for, in their +ceaseless change, _they_ can not justify any title whatever. It alone +can be styled "_this_" or "_that_" (tode or touto); they rise no higher +than "_of such kind_" or "_of what kind or quality" (toiouton or +opoionoun ti).[593] It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but "an +invisible _species_ and formless universal receiver, which, in the most +obscure way, receives the immanence of the intelligible."[594] And in +relation to the other two principles (_i.e._, ideas and objects of +sense), "it is _the mother_" to the father and the offspring.[595] But +perhaps the most remarkable passage is that in which he seems to +identify it with _pure space_, which, "itself imperishable, furnishes a +_seat_ (edran) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by direct +perception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcely +admissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgment +which pronounces it necessary that all which is, be _somewhere_, and +occupy a _certain space_."[596] This, it will be seen, approaches the +Cartesian doctrine, which resolves matter into _simple extension.[597] + +[Footnote 591: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xii. and xiii.] + +[Footnote 592: "Timæus," ch. xxii.] + +[Footnote 593: "Timæus," ch. xxiii.] + +[Footnote 594: Ibid., ch. xxiv.] + +[Footnote 595: Ibid., ch. xxiv.] + +[Footnote 596: Ibid., ch. xxvi.] + +[Footnote 597: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +171.] + +It should, however, be distinctly noted that Plato does not use the word +ylê--matter. This term is first employed by Aristotle to express "the +substance which is the subject of all changes."[598] The subject or +substratum of which Plato speaks, would seem to be rather a logical than +a material entity. It is the _condition or supposition_ necessary for +the production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the +_transition-element_ between the real and the apparent, the eternal and +the contingent; and, lying thus on the border of both territories, we +must not be surprised that it can hardly be characterized by any +definite attribute.[599] Still, this unknown recipient of forms or ideas +has a _reality_; it has "an abiding nature," "a constancy of existence;" +and we are forbidden to call it by any name denoting quality, but +permitted to style it "_this_" and "_that_" (tode kai touto).[600] +Beneath the perpetual changes of sensible phenomena there is, then, an +unchangeable subject, which yet is neither the Deity, nor ideas, nor the +soul of man, which exists as the means and occasion of the manifestation +of Divine Intelligence in the organization of the world.[601] + +[Footnote 598: "Metaphysics," bk. vii. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 599: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +178.] + +[Footnote 600: "Timæus," ch. xxiii.] + +[Footnote 601: Ibid., ch. xiiii] + +There has been much discussion as to whether Plato held that this +"_Receptacle_" and "_Nurse_" of forms and ideas was eternal, or +generated in time. Perhaps no one has more carefully studied the +writings of Plato than William Archer Butler, and his conclusions in +regard to this subject are presented in the following words: "As, on the +one hand, he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided, without +a single deviation, that seduction of pantheism to which so many +abstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims; so, on the +other hand, it appears to me that he did not scruple to place this +principle, the opposite of the Divine intelligence, in a sphere +independent of temporal origination.... But we can scarcely enter into +his views, unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of _Time_ +itself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of the +sensible world, to finish with it, if it ever finished--to be altogether +related to this phenomenal scene.[602] 'The generating Father determined +to create a moving image of eternity (aiônos); and in disposing the +heavens, he framed of this eternity, reposing in its own unchangeable +unity, an eternal _image_, moving according to numerical succession, +which he called _Time_. With the world arose days, nights, months, +years, which all had no previous existence. The past and future are but +forms of time, which we most erroneously transfer to the eternal +substance (aidion ousian); we say it was, and is, and will be, whereas +we can only fitly say _it is_. Past and future are appropriate to the +successive nature of generated beings, for they bespeak motion; but the +Being eternally and immovably the same is subject neither to youth nor +age, nor to any accident of time; it neither was, nor hath been, nor +will be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense--the circumstances +of time, imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor can +any thing be more inaccurate than to apply the term _real being_ to +past, or present, or future, or even to non-existence. Of this, however, +we can not now speak fully. _Time_, then, was formed with the heavens, +that, together created, they may together end, _if indeed an end be in +the purpose of the Creator_; and it is designed as closely as possible +to resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists through +all eternity; the world has been, is, and will be through all +_time_.'[603] In this ineffable eternity Plato places the Supreme Being, +and the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time partakes. +Whether he also includes under the same mode of existence the +_subject-matter_ of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce; and +it appears to me evident that he did not himself undertake to speak with +assurance on this obscure problem."[604] The creation of matter "out of +nothing" is an idea which, in all probability, did not occur to the mind +of Plato. But that he regarded it as, in some sense, a _dependent_ +existence--as existing, like time, by "the purpose or will of the +Creator"--perhaps as an eternal "generation" from the "eternal +substance," is also highly probable; for in the last analysis he +evidently desires to embrace all things in some ultimate _unity_--a +tendency which it seems impossible for human reason to avoid. + +[Footnote 602: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349.] + +[Footnote 603: "Timæus," ch. xiv.] + +[Footnote 604: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +171-175.] + +2d. _Beneath all mental phenomena there is a permanent subject or +substratum which he designates_ THE IDENTICAL (to auto)--_the rational +element of the soul--"the principle of self-activity" or +self-determination_.[605] + +There are three principles into which Plato analyzes the soul--the +principle of the _Identical_, the _Diverse_, and the _Intermediate +Essence_.[606] The first is indivisible and eternal, always existing in +_sameness_, the very substance of _Intelligence_ itself, and of the same +nature with the Divine.[607] The second is divisible and corporeal, +answering to our notion of the passive _sensibilities_, and placing the +soul in relation with the visible world. The third is an intermediate +essence, partaking of the natures of both, and constituting a medium +between the eternal and the mutable--the conscious _energy_ of the soul +developed in the contingent world of time. Thus the soul is, on one +side, linked to the unchangeable and the eternal, being formed of that +ineffable element which constitutes the _real_ or _immutable Being_, and +on the other side, linked to the sensible and the contingent, being +formed of that element which is purely _relative_ and _contingent_. This +last element of the soul is regarded by Plato as "mortal" and +"corruptible," the former element as "immortal" and "indestructible," +having its foundations laid in eternity. + +[Footnote 605: "Laws," bk. x. ch. vi. and vii.; "Phædrus," § 51; "archê +kinêseôs."] + +[Footnote 606: "Timæus," ch. xii.; tauton, thateron, and ousia or to +symmisgomenon.] + +[Footnote 607: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.] + +This doctrine of the eternity of the free and rational element of the +soul must, of course, appear strange and even repulsive to those who are +unacquainted with the Platonic notion of eternity as a fixed state out +of time, which has no past, present, or future, and is simply that which +"always _is_"--an everlasting _now_. The soul, in its elements of +rationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it now +exists in eternity.[608] In its actual manifestations and personal +history it is to be contemplated as a "generated being," having a +commencement in time. + +Now, that the human soul, like the uncreated Deity, has always had a +distinct, conscious, personal, independent being, does not appear to be +the doctrine of Plato. He teaches, most distinctly, that the "divine," +the immortal part, was created, or rather "generated," in eternity. "The +Deity himself _formed the divine_, and he delivered over to his +celestial offspring [the subordinate and generated gods] the task of +_forming the mortal_. These subordinate deities, copying the example of +their parent, and receiving from his hands the _immortal principle_ of +the human soul, fashioned subsequently to this the mortal body, which +they consigned to the soul as a vehicle, and in which they placed +another kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatal +affections."[609] He also regarded the soul as having a derived and +dependent existence. He draws a marked distinction between the divine +and human forms of the "self-moving principle," and makes its +continuance dependent upon the will and wisdom of the Almighty Disposer +and Parent, of whom it is "the first-born offspring."[610] + +[Footnote 608: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349, as to the Platonic notions of +"Time" and "Eternity."] + +[Footnote 609: "Timaeus," ch. xliv.] + +[Footnote 610: See the elaborate exposition in "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii. +and xiii.] + +That portion of the soul which Plato regarded as "immortal" and "to be +entitled divine," is thus the "_offspring of God_"--a ray of the +Divinity "generated" by, or emanating from, the Deity. He seems to have +conceived it as co-eternal with its ideal objects, in some mysterious +ultimate _unity_. "The true foundation of the Platonic theory of the +constitution of the soul is this fundamental principle of his +philosophy--the _oneness of truth and knowledge_.[611] This led him +naturally to derive the _rational_ element of the soul (that element +that _knows_), that possesses the power of noêsis from the _real_ +element in things (the element that _is_)--the nooumenon; and in the +original, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present state of that +rational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object in +an eternal conjunction, or even identity. But though intelligence and +its correlative intelligibles were and are thus combined, the soul is +_more_ than pure intelligence; it possesses an element of personality +and consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have no +reason to suppose, from any thing his writings contain, Plato ever meant +to deprive it."[612] On the contrary, he not only regarded it as having +now, under temporal conditions, a distinct personal existence, but he +also claimed for it a conscious, personal existence after death. He is +most earnest, and unequivocal, and consistent in his assertion of the +doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The arguments which human +reason can supply are exhibited with peculiar force and beauty in the +"Phædo," the "Phædrus," and the tenth book of the "Republic." The most +important of these arguments may be presented in a few words. + +[Footnote 611: See Grant's "Aristotle," vol. i. pp. 150, 151.] + +[Footnote 612: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +209, note.] + +1. _The soul is immortal, because it is incorporeal_. There are two +kinds of existences, one compounded, the other simple; the former +subject to change, the latter unchangeable; one perceptible to sense, +the other comprehended by mind alone. The one is visible, the other is +invisible. When the soul employs the bodily senses, it wanders and is +confused; but when it abstracts itself from the body, it attains to +knowledge which is stable, unchangeable, and immortal. The soul, +therefore, being uncompounded, incorporeal, invisible, must be +indissoluble--that is to say, immortal.[613] + +[Footnote 613: "Phædo," §§ 61-75.] + +2. _The soul is immortal, because it has an independent power of +self-motion_--that is, it has self-activity and self-determination. No +arrangement of matter, no configuration of body, can be conceived as the +originator of free and voluntary movement. + +Now that which can not move itself, but derives its motion from +something else, may cease to move, and perish. "But that which is +self-moved, never ceases to be active, and is also the cause of motion +to all other things that are moved." And "whatever is continually active +is immortal." This "self-activity is," says Plato, "the very essence and +true notion of the soul."[614] Being thus essentially _causative_, it +therefore partakes of the nature of a "principle," and it is the nature +of a principle to exclude its _contrary_. That which is essentially +self-active can never cease to be active; that which is the cause of +motion and of change, can not be extinguished by the change called +death.[615] + +3. _The soul is immortal, because it possesses universal, necessary, and +absolute ideas_, which transcend all material conditions, and bespeak an +origin immeasurably above the body. No modifications of matter, however +refined, however elaborated, can give the Absolute, the Necessary, the +Eternal. But the soul has the ideas of absolute beauty, goodness, +perfection, identity, and duration, and it possesses these ideas in +virtue of its having a nature which is one, simple, identical, and in +some sense, eternal.[616] If the soul can conceive an immortality, it +can not be less than immortal. If, by its very nature, "it has hopes +that will not be bounded by the grave, and desires and longings that +grasp eternity," its nature and its destiny must correspond. + +In the concluding sections of the "Phædo" he urges the doctrine with +earnestness and feeling as the grand motive to a virtuous life, for "the +reward is noble and the hope is great."[617] And in the "Laws" he +insists upon the doctrine of a future state, in which men are to be +rewarded or punished as the most conclusive evidence that we are under +the moral government of God.[618] + +[Footnote 614: "Phædrus," §§ 51-53.] + +[Footnote 615: "Phædo," §§ 112-128.] + +[Footnote 616: Ibid., §§ 48-57, 110-115.] + +[Footnote 617: Ibid., §§ 129-145.] + +[Footnote 618: The doctrine of Metempsychosis, or transmigration of +souls, can scarcely be regarded as part of the philosophic system of +Plato. He seems to have accepted it as a venerable tradition, coming +within the range of probability, rather than as a philosophic truth, and +it is always presented by him in a highly mythical dress. Now of these +mythical representations he remarks in the "Phædo" (§ 145) that "no man +in his senses would dream of insisting _that they correspond to the +reality_, but that, the soul having been shown to be immortal, this, or +something like this, is true of individual souls or their habitations." +If, as in the opinions of the ablest critics, "the Laws" is to be placed +amongst the last and maturest of Plato's writings, the evidence is +conclusive that whatever may have been his earlier opinions, he did not +entertain the doctrine of "Metempsychosis" in his riper years. But when, +on the one hand, the soul shall remain having an intercourse with divine +virtue, it becomes divine pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after having +been conveyed to a _place_ entirely holy, it is changed for the better; +but when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrary +circumstances, placed its existence in some _unholy spot_. + + _This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus._ + +"O thou young man," [know] "that the person who has become more wicked, +_departs to the more wicked souls;_ but he who has become better, to the +better both in life and in all deaths, to do and suffer what is fitting +for the like."--"Laws," bk. x. ch. xii. and xiii.] + +4. _Beyond all finite existences and secondary causes, all laws, ideas, +and principles, there is an_ INTELLIGENCE _or_ MIND, _the First +Principle of all Principles, the Supreme Idea on which all other ideas +are grounded; the Monarch and Lawgiver of the universe, the ultimate +Substance from which all other things derive their being and essence, +the First and efficient Cause of all the order, and harmony, and beauty, +and excellency, and goodness, which pervades the universe, who is called +by way of pre-eminence and excellence the Supreme Good_, THE GOD (o +Theos), "_the God over all_," (o epi pasi Theos). + +_This_ SUPREME MIND,[619] Plato taught, is incorporeal,[620] +unchangeable,[621] infinite,[622] absolutely perfect,[623] essentially +good,[624] unoriginated,[625] and eternal.[626] He is "the Father, and +Architect, and Maker of the Universe,"[627] "the efficient Cause of all +things."[628] "the Monarch and Ruler of the world,"[629] "the sovereign +Mind that orders all things, and pervades all things,"[630] "the sole +Principle of all things,"[631] and "the Measure of all things,"[632] He +is "the Beginning of all truth,"[633] "the Fountain of all law and +justice,"[634] "the Source of all order and beauty,"[635] "the Cause of +all good;"[636] in short, "he is the Beginning, the Middle, and End of +all things."[637] + +[Footnote 619: "Phædo," §§ 105-107.] + +[Footnote 620: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. iii. ch. 77.] + +[Footnote 621: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix.; "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 622: "Apeleius," bk. i. ch. v.] + +[Footnote 623: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xx.] + +[Footnote 624: "Timæus," ch. x.; "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.] + +[Footnote 625: "Timæus," ch. ix.-x.] + +[Footnote 626: Ibid., ch. xii.] + +[Footnote 627: Ibid., ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 628: "Phædo," § 105.] + +[Footnote 629: "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.; +"Philebus," § 50.] + +[Footnote 630: "Philebus," §51.] + +[Footnote 631: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix.] + +[Footnote 632: "Laws," bk. iv. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 633: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xxi.] + +[Footnote 634: "Laws," bk. iv. ch. vii.] + +[Footnote 635: "Philebus," § 51; "Timæus," ch. x.] + +[Footnote 636: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.; "Timæus," ch. x.] + +[Footnote 637: "Laws," bk. iv, ch. vii.] + +Beyond the sensible world, Plato conceived another world of +intelligibles or _ideas_. These ideas are not, however, distinct and +independent existences. "What general notions are to our own minds, +ideas are to the Supreme Reason (nous basileus); they are the _eternal +thoughts_ of the Divine Intellect."[638] Ideas are not substances, they +are qualities, and there must, therefore, be some ultimate substance or +being to whom, as attributes, they belong. "It must not be believed, as +has been taught, that Plato gave to ideas a substantial existence. When +they are not objects of pure conception for human reason, they are +attributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially +exist."[639] These eternal laws and reasons of things indicate to us the +character of that Supreme Essence of essences, the Being of beings. He +is not the simple aggregate of all laws, but he is the Author, and +Sustainer, and Substance of all laws. At the utmost summit of the +intellectual world of Ideas blazes, with an eternal splendor, the idea +of the _Supreme Good_ from which all others emanate.[640] This Supreme +Good is "far beyond all existence in dignity and power, and it is that +from which all things else derive their being and essence."[641] The +Supreme Good is not the truth, nor the intelligence; "it is the Father +of it." In the same manner as the sun, which is the visible image of the +good, reigns over the world, in that it illumes and vivifies it; so the +Supreme Good, of which the sun is only the work, reigns over the +intelligible world, in that it gives birth to it by virtue of its +inexhaustible fruitfulness.[642] _The Supreme Good is_ GOD _himself_, +and he is designated "the good" because this term seems most fittingly +to express his essential character and essence.[643] It is towards this +superlative perfection that the reason lifts itself; it is towards this +infinite beauty the heart aspires. "Marvellous Beauty!" exclaims Plato; +"eternal, uncreated, imperishable beauty, free from increase and +diminution... beauty which has nothing sensible, nothing corporeal, as +hands or face: which does not reside in any being different from itself, +in the earth, or the heavens, or in any other thing, but which exists +_eternally and absolutely in itself, and by itself;_ beauty of which +every other beauty partakes, without their birth or destruction bringing +to it the least increase or diminution."[644] The absolute being--God, +is the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the complete ideal of all +beauty. God is, _par excellent_, the Beautiful. + +[Footnote 638: Thompson's "Laws of Thought," p. 119.] + +[Footnote 639: Cousin, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 415. "There is no quintessential metaphysics which can prevail +against common sense, and if such be the Platonic theory of ideas, +Aristotle was right in opposing it. But such a theory is only a chimera +which Aristotle created for the purpose of combating it."--"The True, +the Beautiful, and the Good," p. 77.] + +[Footnote 640: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 641: "Ibid.," bk. vi. ch. xviii. and xix.] + +[Footnote 642: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 642: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +275.] + +[Footnote 644: "Banquet," § 35. See Cousin, "The True, the Beautiful, +and the Good," Lecture IV., also Lecture VII. pp. 150-153; Denis, +"Histoire des Théories et Ideés Morales dans l'Antiquité," vol. i. p. +149.] + +God is therefore, with Plato, _the First Principle of all Principles;_ +the Divine energy or power is the _efficient cause_, the Divine beauty +the _formal cause_, and the Divine goodness the _final cause_ of all +existence. + +_The eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and Truth, in +an ultimate reality--the_ ETERNAL MIND, is thus the fundamental +principle which pervades the whole of the Platonic philosophy. And now, +having attained this sublime elevation, he looks down from thence upon +the _sensible, the phenomenal world_, and upon _the temporal life of +man;_ and in the light of this great principle he attempts to explain +their meaning and purpose. The results he attained in the former case +constitute the Platonic _Physics_, in the latter, the Platonic _Ethics_. + +I. PLATONIC PHYSICS. + +Firmly believing in the absolute excellence of the Deity, and regarding +the Divine Goodness as the Final Cause of the universe, he pronounces +the physical world to be an _image_ of the perfection of God. +Anaxagoras, no doubt, prepared the way for this theory. Every one who +has read the "Phædo," will remember the remarkable passage in which +Socrates gives utterance to the disappointment which he had experienced +when expecting from physical science an explanation of the universe. +"When I was young," he said--"it is not to be told how eager I was about +physical inquiries, and curious to know _how the universe came to be as +it is_; and when I heard that Anaxagoras was teaching that all was +arranged by _mind_, I was delighted with the prospect of hearing such a +doctrine unfolded; I thought to myself, if he teaches that mind made +every thing to be as it is, he will explain _how it is_ BEST _for it to +be_, and show that so it is." But Anaxagoras, it appears, lost sight of +this principle, and descended to the explanation of the universe by +material causes. "Great was my hope," says Socrates, "and equally great +my disappointment."[645] + +[Footnote 645: "Phædo," §§ 105, 106.] + +Plato accepted this suggestion of Anaxagoras with all his peculiar +earnestness, and devoted himself to its fuller development. It were a +vain and profitless theory, which, whilst it assumed the existence of a +Supreme Mind, did not represent that mind as operating in the universe +by _design_, and as exhibiting his intelligence, and justice, and +goodness, as well as his power, in every thing. If it be granted that +there is a Supreme Mind, then, argued Plato, he must be regarded as "the +measure of all things," and all things must have been framed according +to a plan or "model" which that mind supplied. Intelligence must be +regarded as having a _purpose_, and as working towards an _end_, for it +is this alone which distinguishes reason from unreason, and mind from +mere unintelligent force. The only proper model which could be presented +to the Supreme Intelligence is "the eternal and unchangeable model"[646] +which his own perfection supplies, "for he is the most excellent of +causes."[647] Thus God is not simply the maker of the universe, but the +model of the universe, because he designed that it should be an IMAGE, +in the sphere of sense, of his own perfections--a revelation of his +eternal beauty, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth. "God was _good_, +and being good, he desired that the universe should, as far as possible, +_resemble_ himself.... Desiring that all things should be _good_, and, +as far as might be, nothing evil, he took the fluctuating mass of things +visible, which had been in orderless confusion, and reduced it to +_order_, considering this to be the _better_ state. Now it was and is +utterly impossible for the supremely good to form any thing except that +which is _most excellent_ (kalliston--most fair, most beautiful").[648] +The object at which the supreme mind aimed being that which is "_best_," +we must, in tracing his operations in the universe, always look for +"_the best_" in every thing.[649] Starting out thus, upon the assumption +that the goodness of God is the final cause of the universe, Plato +evolved a system of _optimism_. + +The physical system of Plato being thus intended to illustrate a +principle of optimism, the following results may be expected: + +1. That it will mainly concern itself with _final causes_. The universe +being regarded chiefly, as indeed it is, an indication of the Divine +Intelligence--every phenomenon will be contemplated in that light. +Nature is the volume in which the Deity reveals his own perfections; it +is therefore to be studied solely with this motive, that we may learn +from thence the perfection of God. The _Timæus_ is a series of ingenious +hypotheses designed to deepen and vivify our sense of the harmony, and +symmetry, and beauty of the universe, and, as a consequence, of the +wisdom, and excellence, and goodness, of its Author.[650] + +[Footnote 646: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 647: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 648: Ibid., ch. x.] + +[Footnote 649: Ibid., ch. xix.] + +[Footnote 650: "Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to the +Contingent) as Truth is to Belief; consequently we must not marvel +should we find it impossible to arrive at any certain and conclusive +results in our speculations upon the creation of the visible universe +and its authors; it should be enough for us if the account we have to +give be as probable as any other, remembering that we are but men, and +therefore bound to acquiesce in merely probable results, without looking +for a higher degree of certainty than the subject admits of"--"Timæus," +ch. ix.] + +Whatever physical truths were within the author's reach, took their +place in the general array: the vacancies were filled up with the best +suppositions admitted by the limited science of the time.[651] And it is +worthy of remark that, whilst proceeding by this "high _à priori_ road," +he made some startling guesses at the truth, and anticipated some of the +discoveries of the modern inductive method, which proceeds simply by the +observation, comparison, and generalization of facts. Of these prophetic +anticipations we may instance that of the definite proportions of +chemistry,[652] the geometrical forms of crystallography,[653] the +doctrine of complementary colors,[654] and that grand principle that all +the highest laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitative +statement.[655] + +2. It may be expected that a system of physics raised on optimistic +principles will be _mathematical_ rather than experimental. "Intended to +embody conceptions of proportion and harmony, it will have recourse to +that department of science which deals with the proportions in space and +number. Such applications of mathematical truths, not being raised on +ascertained facts, can only accidentally represent the real laws of the +physical system; they will, however, vivify the student's apprehension +of harmony in the same manner as a happy parable, though not founded in +real history, will enliven his perceptions of moral truth."[656] + +[Footnote 651: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +157.] + +[Footnote 652: "Timæus," ch. xxxi.] + +[Footnote 653: Ibid., ch. xxvii.] + +[Footnote 654: Ibid., ch. xlii.] + +[Footnote 655: "It is Plato's merit to have discovered that the laws of +the physical universe are resolvable into numerical relations, and +therefore capable of being represented by mathematical +formulæ."--Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 163.] + +[Footnote 656: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +163.] + +3. Another peculiarity of such a system will be an impatience of every +merely _mechanical_ theory of the operations of nature. + +"The psychology of Plato led him to recognize mind wherever there was +motion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of the +universe, but also to conceive the propriety of separate and subordinate +agents attached to each of its parts, as principles of motion, no less +than intelligent directors. These agents were entitled '_gods_' by an +easy figure, discernible even in the sacred language,[657] and which +served, besides, to accommodate philosophical hypotheses to the popular +religion. Plato, however, carefully distinguished between the sole, +Eternal Author of the Universe, on the one hand, and that 'soul,' vital +and intelligent, which he attaches to the world, as well as the spheral +intelligences, on the other. These 'subordinate deities,' though +intrusted with a sort of deputed creation, were still only the deputies +of the Supreme Framer and Director of all."[658] The "gods" of the +Platonic system are "subordinate divinities," "generated gods," brought +into existence by the will and wisdom of the Eternal Father and Maker of +the universe.[659] Even Jupiter, the governing divinity of the popular +mythology, is a descendant from powers which are included in the +creation.[660] The offices they fulfill, and the relations they sustain +to the Supreme Being, correspond to those of the "angels" of Christian +theology. They are the ministers of his providential government of the +world.[661] + +[Footnote 657: Psalm lxxxii. I; John x. 34.] + +[Footnote 658: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +164.] + +[Footnote 659: "Timæus," ch. xv.] + +[Footnote 660: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 661: "Laws," bk. x.] + +The application of this fundamental conception of the Platonic +system--_the eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and +Truth in an ultimate reality, the Eternal Mind_--to the elucidation of +the _temporal life_ of man, yields, as a result-- + +II. THE PLATONIC ETHICS. + +Believing firmly that there are unchangeable, necessary, and absolute +principles, which are the perfections of the Eternal Mind, Plato must, +of course, have been a believer in an _immutable morality_. He held that +there is a rightness, a justice, an equity, not arbitrarily constituted +by the Divine will or legislation, but founded in the nature of God, and +therefore eternal. The independence of the principles of morality upon +the mere will of the Supreme Governor is proclaimed in all his +writings.[662] The Divine will is the fountain of efficiency, the Divine +reason, the fountain of law. God is no more the creator of _virtue_ than +he is the creator of _truth_. + +And inasmuch as man is a partaker of the Divine essence, and as the +ideas which dwell in the human reason are "copies" of those which dwell +in the Divine reason, man may rise to the apprehension and recognition +of the immutable and eternal principles of righteousness, and "by +communion with that which is Divine, and subject to the law of order, +may become himself a subject of order, and divine, so far as it is +possible for man."[663] + +[Footnote 662: In "Euthyphron" especially.] + +[Footnote 663: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.] + +The attainment of this consummation is the grand purpose of the Platonic +philosophy. Its ultimate object is "_the purification of the soul_," and +its pervading spirit is the aspiration after perfection. The whole +system of Plato has therefore an eminently _ethical_ character. It is a +speculative philosophy directed to a practical purpose. + +Philosophy is the _love of wisdom_. Now wisdom (sophia) is expressly +declared by Plato to belong alone to the Supreme Divinity,[664] who +alone can contemplate reality in a direct and immediate manner, and in +whom, as Plato seems often to intimate, knowledge and being coincide. +Philosophy is the aspiration of the soul after this wisdom, this perfect +and immutable truth, and in its realization it is a union with the +Perfect Wisdom through the medium of a divine affection, the _love_ of +which Plato so often speaks. The eternal and unchangeable Essence which +is the proper object of philosophy is also endowed with _moral_ +attributes. He is not only "the Being," but "the Good" (to agathon), and +all in the system of the universe which can be the object of rational +contemplation, is an emanation from that goodness. The love of truth is +therefore the love of God, and the love of Good is the love of truth. +Philosophy and morality are thus coincident. Philosophy is the love of +Perfect Wisdom; Perfect Wisdom and Perfect Goodness are identical; the +Perfect Good is God; philosophy is the "_Love of God_."[665] Ethically +viewed, it is this one motive of _love_ for the Supreme Wisdom and +Goodness, predominating over and purifying and assimilating every desire +of the soul, and governing every movement of the man, raising man to a +participation of and communion with Divinity, and restoring him to "the +_likeness_ of God." "This flight," says Plato, "consists in resembling +God (omoiôsis Theo), and this resemblance is the becoming just and holy +with wisdom."[666] "This assimilation to God is the enfranchisement of +the divine element of the soul. To approach to God as the substance of +truth is _Science_; as the substance of goodness in truth is _Wisdom_, +and as the substance of Beauty in goodness and truth is _Love_."[667] + +The two great principles which can be clearly traced as pervading the +ethical system of Plato are-- + +1. _That no man is willingly evil_.[668] + +2. _That every man is endued with the power of producing changes in his +moral character_[669] + +[Footnote 664: "Phædrus," § 145.] + +[Footnote 665: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +61.] + +[Footnote 666: "Theætetus," § 84.] + +[Footnote 667: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +277.] + +[Footnote 668: "Timæsus," ch. xlviii.] + +[Footnote 669: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i., bk. ix. ch. vi., bk. x. ch. xii.] + +The first of these principles is the counterpart ethical expression of +his theory of _immutable Being_. The second is the counterpart of his +theory of phenomenal change, or _mere Becoming_. + +The soul of man is framed after the pattern of the immutable ideas of +the _just_, and the _true_, and the _good_, which dwell in the Eternal +Mind--that is, it is made in the image of God. The soul in its ultimate +essence is formed of "the immutable" and "the permanent." The presence +of the ideas of the just, and the true, and the good in the reason of +man, constitute him a moral nature; and it is impossible that he can +cease to be a moral being, for these ideas, having a permanent and +immutable being, can not be changed. All the passions and affections of +the soul are merely phenomenal. They belong to the mortal, the +transitory life of man; they are in endless flow and change, and they +have no permanent reality. As phenomena, they must, however, have some +ground; and Plato found that ground in the mysterious, instinctive +longing for the _good_ and the _true_ which dwells in the very essence +of the soul. These are the realities after which it strives, even when +pursuing pleasure, and honor, and wealth, and fame. All the restlessness +of human life is prompted by a longing for the _good_. But man does not +clearly perceive what the _good_ really is. The rational element of the +soul has become clouded by passion and ignorance, and suffered an +eclipse of its powers. Still, man longs for the good, and bears witness, +by his restlessness and disquietude, that he instinctively desires it, +and that he can find no rest and no satisfaction in any thing apart from +the knowledge and the participation of the Supreme, the Absolute Good. + +This, then, is the meaning of the oft-repeated assertion of Plato "_that +no man is willingly evil_;" viz., that no man deliberately chooses evil +as evil. And Plato is, at the same time, careful to guard the doctrine +from misconception. He readily grants that acts of wrong are +distinguished as voluntary and involuntary, without which there could be +neither merit nor demerit, reward nor punishment.[670] But still he +insists that no man chooses evil in and by itself. He may choose it +voluntarily as a means, but he does not choose it as an end. Every +volition, by its essential nature, pursues, at least, an _apparent_ +good; because the end of volition is not the immediate act, but the +object for the sake of which the act is undertaken.[671] + +[Footnote 670: "Laws," bk. ix. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 671: "Gorgias," §§ 52, 53.] + +How is it, then, it may be asked, that men become evil? The answer of +Plato is, that the soul has in it a principle of change, in the power of +regulating the desires--in indulging them to excess, or moderating them +according to the demands of reason. The circumstances in which the soul +is placed, as connected with the sensible world by means of the body, +present an occasion for the exercise of that power, the end of this +temporal connection being to establish a state of moral discipline and +probation. The humors and distempers of the body likewise deprave, +disorder, and discompose the soul.[672] "Pleasures and pains are unduly +magnified; the democracy of the passions prevails; and the ascendency of +reason is cast down." Bad forms of civil government corrupt social +manners, evil education effects the ruin of the soul. Thus the soul is +changed--is fallen from what it was when first it came from the +Creator's hand. But the eternal Ideas are not utterly effaced, the image +of God is not entirely lost. The soul may yet be restored by remedial +measures. It may be purified by knowledge, by truth, by expiations, by +sufferings, and by prayers. The utmost, however, that man can hope to do +in this life is insufficient to fully restore the image of God, and +death must complete the final emancipation of the rational element from +the bondage of the flesh. Life is thus a discipline and a preparation +for another state of being, and death the final entrance there.[673] + +[Footnote 672: "Gorgias," §§ 74-76.] + +[Footnote 673: "Phædo," §§ 130, 131.] + +Independent of all other considerations, virtue is, therefore, to be +pursued as the true good of the soul. Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, +Justice, the four cardinal virtues of the Platonic system, are to be +cultivated as the means of securing the purification and perfection of +the inner man. And the ordinary pleasures, "the lesser goods" of life, +are only to be so far pursued as they are subservient to, and compatible +with, the higher and holier duty of striving after "the resemblance to +God." + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_). + +THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_). + +ARISTOTLE. + + +Aristotle was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, B.C. 384. His +father, Nicomachus, was a physician in the Court of Amyntas II., King of +Macedonia, and is reported to have written several works on Medicine and +Natural History. From his father, Aristotle seems to have inherited a +love for the natural sciences, which was fostered by the circumstances +which surrounded him in early life, and which exerted a determining +influence upon the studies of his riper years. + +Impelled by an insatiate desire for knowledge, he, at seventeen years of +age, repaired to Athens, the city of Plato and the university of the +world. Plato was then absent in Sicily; on his return Aristotle entered +his school, became an ardent student of philosophy, and remained until +the death of Plato, B.C. 348. He therefore listened to the instructions +of Plato for twenty years. + +The mental characteristics of the pupil and the teacher were strikingly +dissimilar. Plato was poetic, ideal, and in some degree mystical. +Aristotle was prosaic, systematic, and practical. Plato was intuitive +and synthetical. Aristotle was logical and analytical. It was therefore +but natural that, to the mind of Aristotle, there should appear +something confused, irregular, and incomplete in the discourses of his +master. There was a strange commingling of questions concerning the +grounds of morality, and statements concerning the nature of science; of +inquiries concerning "real being," and speculations on the ordering of a +model Republic, in the same discourse. Ethics, politics, ontology, and +theology, are all comprised in his Dialectic, which is, in fact, the one +grand "science of the idea of the good." Now to the mind of Aristotle it +seemed better, and much more systematic, that these questions should be +separated, and referred to particular heads; and, above all, that they +should be thoroughly discussed in an exact and settled terminology. To +arrange and classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss them +systematically and, as far as possible, exhaustively, was evidently the +ambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He would +survey the entire field of human knowledge; he would study nature as +well as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought; +he would define the proper limits of each department of study, and +present a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science. +And, in fact, he was the first who really separated the different +sciences and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon its +own proper principles. He distributed philosophy into three +branches:--(i.) _Theoretic_; (ii.) _Efficient_; (iii.) _Practical_. The +Theoretic he divided into--1. _Physics_; _2. Mathematics_; 3. +_Theology_, or the Prime Philosophy--the science known in modern times +as Metaphysics. The Efficient embraces what we now term the arts,--1. +_Logic; 2. Rhetoric_; 3. _Poetics_. The Practical comprises--_1. +Ethics_; 2. _Politics_. On all these subjects he wrote separate +treatises. Thus, whilst Plato is the genius of abstraction, Aristotle is +eminently the genius of classification. + +Such being the mental characteristics of the two men--their type of mind +so opposite--we are prepared to expect that, in pursuing his inquiries, +Aristotle would develop a different _Organon_ from that of Plato, and +that the teachings of Aristotle will give a new direction to philosophic +thought. + +ARISTOTELIAN ORGANON. + +Plato made use of psychological and logical analysis in order to draw +from the depth of consciousness certain fundamental ideas which are +inherent in the mind--born with it, and not derived from sense or +experience. These ideas he designates "the intelligible species" (ta +nooumena genê) as opposed to "the visible species"--the objects of +sense. Such ideas or principles being found, he uses them as +"starting-points" from which he may pass beyond the sensible world and +ascend to "the absolute," that is, to God.[674] Having thus, by +immediate abstraction, attained to universal and necessary ideas, he +descends to the outer world, and attempts by these ideas to construct an +intellectual theory of the universe.[675] + +Aristotle will reverse this process. He will commence with _sensation_, +and proceed, by induction, from the known to the unknown. + +The repetition of sensations produces _recollection_, recollection +_experience_, and experience produces _science_.[676] "Science and art +result unto men by means of experience...." "Art comes into being when, +from a number of experiences, one universal opinion is evolved, which +will embrace all similar cases. For example, if you know that a certain +remedy has cured Callias of a certain disease, and that the same remedy +has produced the same effect on Socrates and on several other persons, +that is _Experience_; but to know that a certain remedy will cure all +persons attacked with that disease, is _Art_. Experience is a knowledge +of individual things (tôn kathekasta); art is that of universals (tôn +katholou)."[677] + +[Footnote 674: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx.] + +[Footnote 675: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 676: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 677: Ibid.] + +Disregarding the Platonic notion of the unity of all Being in the +absolute idea, he fixed his immediate attention on the manifoldness of +the phenomenal, and by a classification of all the objects of experience +he sought to attain to "general notions." Concentrating all his +attention on the individual, the contingent, the particular, he ascends, +by induction, from the particular to the _general_; and then, by a +strange paralogism, "the _universal_" is confounded with "the _general_" +or, by a species of logical sleight-of-hand, the general is transmuted +into the universal. Thus "induction is the pathway from particulars to +universals."[678] But how universal and necessary principles can be +obtained by a generalization of limited experiences is not explained by +Aristotle. The experiences of a lifetime, the experiences of the whole +race, are finite and limited, and a generalization of these can only +give the finite, the limited, and at most, the general, but not the +universal. + +[Footnote 679: "Topics," bk. i. ch. xii.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.] + +Aristotle admits, however, that there are ideas or principles in the +mind which can not be explained by experience, and we are therefore +entitled to an answer to the question--how are these obtained? "Sensible +experience gives us what is _here_, _there_, _now_, in such and such a +manner, but it is impossible for it to give what is _everywhere_ and _at +all times_."[680] He tells us further, that "science is a conception of +the mind engaged in universals, and in those things which exist of +necessity, and since there are _principles of things demonstrable and of +every science_ (for science is joined with reason), it will be neither +science, nor art, nor prudence, which discovers the principles of +science;... it must therefore be (nous) pure intellect," or the +intuitive reason.[681] He also characterizes these principles as +_self-evident_. "First truths are those which obtain belief, not through +others, but through themselves, as there is no necessity to investigate +the '_why_' in scientific principles, but each principle ought to be +credible by itself."[682] They are also _necessary_ and _eternal_. +"Demonstrative science is from necessary principles, and those which are +_per se_ inherent, are necessarily so in things."[683] "We have all a +conception of that which can not subsist otherwise than it does.... The +object of science has a necessary existence, therefore it is _eternal_. +For those things which exist in themselves, by necessity, are all +eternal."[684] But whilst Aristotle admits that there are "immutable and +first principles,"[685] which are not derived from sense and +experience--"principles which are the foundation of all science and +demonstration, but which are themselves indemonstrable,"[686] because +self-evident, necessary, and eternal; yet he furnishes no proper account +of their genesis and development in the human mind, neither does he +attempt their enumeration. At one time he makes the intellect itself +their source, at another he derives them from sense, experience, and +induction. This is the defect, if not the inconsistency, of his +method.[687] + +[Footnote 680: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xxxi.] + +[Footnote 681: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 682: "Topics," bk. i. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 683: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 684: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 685: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xi.] + +[Footnote 686: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 687: Hamilton attempts the following mode of reconciling the +contradictory positions of Aristotle: + +"On the supposition of the mind virtually containing, antecedent to all +experience, certain universal principles of knowledge, in the form of +certain necessities of thinking; still it is only by repeated and +comparative experiments that we compass the certainty; on the one hand, +that such and such cognitions can not but be thought as necessary, +native generalities; and, on the other, that such and such cognitions +may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitious +generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, and +classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of +principles, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improperly, applies +the term _Induction_."--"Philosophy," p. 88.] + +The human mind, he tells us, has two kinds of intelligence--the +_passive_ intelligence (nous pathêtikos), which is the receptacle of +forms (dectikon tou eidous); and the _active_ intelligence (nous +poiêtikos), which impresses the seal of thought upon the data furnished +by experience, and combines them into the unity of a single judgment, +thus attaining "general notions."[688] The passive intelligence (the +"external perception" of modern psychology) perceives the individual +forms which appear in the external world, and the active intelligence +(the intellect proper) classifies and generalizes according to fixed +laws or principles inherent in itself; but of these fixed laws--prôta +noêmata--first thoughts, or _à priori_ ideas, he offers no proper +account; they are, at most, purely subjective. This, it would seem, was, +in effect, a return to the doctrine of Protagoras and his school, "that +man--the individual--is the measure of all things." The aspects under +which objects present themselves in consciousness, constitute our only +ground of knowledge; we have no direct, intuitive knowledge of Being _in +se_. The noetic faculty is simply a _regulative_ faculty; it furnishes +the laws under which we compare and judge, but it does not supply any +original elements of knowledge. Individual things are the only real +entities,[689] and "universals" have no separate existence apart from +individuals in which they inhere as attributes or properties. They are +consequently pure mental conceptions, which are fixed and recalled by +general names. He thus substitutes a species of conceptual-nominalism in +place of the realism of Plato. It is true that "real being" (to on) is +with Aristotle a subject of metaphysical inquiry, but the proper, if not +the only subsistence, or ouaia, is the form or abstract nature of +things. "The essence or very nature of a thing is inherent in the _form_ +and _energy_"[690] The science of Metaphysics is strictly conversant +about these abstract intellectual forms just as Natural Philosophy is +conversant about external objects, of which the senses give us +information. Our knowledge of these intellectual forms is, however, +founded upon "beliefs" rather than upon immediate intuition, and the +objective certainty of science, upon the subjective necessity of +believing, and not upon direct apperception. + +[Footnote 688: "On the Soul," ch. vi.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 689: "Metaphysics," bk. vi. ch. xiii.] + +[Footnote 690: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. iii.] + +The points of contrast between the two methods may now be presented in a +few sentences. Plato held that all our cognitions are reducible to two +elements--one derived from _sense_, the other from _pure reason_; one +element particular, contingent, and relative, the other universal, +necessary, and absolute. By an act of _immediate abstraction_ Plato will +eliminate the particular, contingent, and relative phenomena, and +disengage the universal, necessary, and absolute _ideas_ which underlie +and determine all phenomena. These ideas are the thoughts of the Divine +Mind, according to which all particular and individual existences are +generated, and, as divine thoughts, they are real and permanent +existences. Thus by a process of immediate abstraction, he will rise +from particular and contingent phenomena to universal and necessary +principles, and from these to the First Principle of all principles, the +First Cause of all causes--that is, to _God_. + +Aristotle, on the contrary, held that all of our knowledge begins with +"the singular," that is, with the particular and the relative, and is +derived from sensation and experience. The "sensible object," taken as +it is without any sifting and probing, is the basis of science, and +reason is simply the architect constructing science according to certain +"forms" or laws inherent in mind. The object, then, of metaphysical +science is to investigate those "universal notions" under which the mind +conceives of and represents to itself external objects, and speculates +concerning them. Aristotle, therefore, agrees with Plato in teaching +"that science can only be a science of universals,"[691] and "that +sensation alone can not furnish us with scientific knowledge."[692] How, +then, does he propose to attain the knowledge of universal principles? +How will he perform that feat which he calls "passing from the known to +the unknown?" The answer is, by _comparative abstraction_. The universal +being constituted by a relation of the object to the thinking subject, +that is, by a property recognized by the intelligence alone, in virtue +of which it can be retained as an object of thought, and compared with +other objects, he proposes to _compare, analyze, define,_ and _classify_ +the primary cognitions, and thus evoke into energy, and clearly present +those principles or forms of the intelligence which he denominate +"universals." As yet, however, he has only attained to "general +notions," which are purely subjective, that is, to logical definitions, +and these logical definitions are subsequently elevated to the dignity +of "universal principles and causes" by a species of philosophic +legerdemain. Philosophy is thus stripped of its metaphysical character, +and assumes a strictly _logical_ aspect. The key of the Aristotelian +method is therefore the + +ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC. + +Pure Logic is the science of the formal laws of thought. Its office is +to ascertain the rules or conditions under which the mind, by its own +constitution, reasons and discourses. The office of Applied Logic--of +logic as an art--is "to form and judge of conclusions, and, through +conclusions, to establish proof. The conclusions, however, arise from +propositions, and the propositions from conceptions." It is chiefly +under the latter aspect that logic is treated by Aristotle. According to +this natural point of view he has divided the contents of the logical +and dialectic teaching in the different treatises of the _Organon_. + +[Footnote 691: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 692: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xxxi.] + +The first treatise is the "_Categories_" or "Predicaments"--a work which +treats of the universal determinations of Being. It is a classification +of all our mental conceptions. As a matter of fact, the mind forms +notions or conceptions about those natures and essences of things which +present an outward image to the senses, or those, equally real, which +utter themselves to the mind. These may be defined and classified; there +may be general conceptions to which all particular conceptions are +referable. This classification has been attempted by Aristotle, and as +the result we have the ten "Categories" of _Substance, Quantity, +Quality, Relation, Time, Place, Position, Possession, Action, Passion_. +He does not pretend that this classification is complete, but he held +these "Predicaments" to be the most universal expressions for the +various relations of things, under some one of which every thing might +be reduced. + +The second treatise, "_On Interpretation_," investigates language as the +expression of thought; and inasmuch as a true or false thought must be +expressed by the union or separation of a subject and a predicate, he +deems it necessary to discuss the parts of speech--the general term and +the verb--and the modes of affirmation and denial. In this treatise he +develops the nature and limitations of propositions, the meaning of +contraries and contradictions, and the force of affirmations and denials +in _possible, contingent_, and _necessary_ matter. + +The third are the "_Analytics_," which show how conclusions are to be +referred back to their principles, and arranged in the order of their +precedence. + +The First or Prior Analytic presents the universal doctrine of the +Syllogism, its principles and forms, and teaches how must reason, if we +would not violate the laws of our own mind. The theory of reasoning, +generally, with a view to accurate demonstration, depends upon the +construction of a perfect syllogism, which is defined as "a discourse in +which, certain things being laid down, something else different from the +premises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence."[693] +Conclusions are, according to their own contents and end, either +_Apodeictic_, which deal with necessary and demonstrable matter, or +_Dialectic_, which deal with probable matter, or _Sophistical_, which +are imperfect in matter or form, and announced, deceptively, as correct +conclusions, when they are not. The doctrine of Apodeictic conclusions +is given in the "_Posterior Analytic_," that of Dialectic conclusions in +the "_Topics_," and that of the Sophistical in the "_Sophistical +Elenchi_." + +Now, if Logic is of any value as an instrument for the discovery of +truth, the attainment of certitude, it must teach us not only how to +deduce conclusions from premises, but it must certify to us the validity +of the principles from whence we reason and this is attempted by +Aristotle in the Posterior Analytic. This treatise opens with the +following statement: All doctrine, and all intellectual discipline, +arises from a prior or pre-existent knowledge. This is evident, if we +survey them all; for both mathematical sciences, and also each of the +arts, are obtained in this manner. The same holds true in the case of +reasonings, whether through [deductive] _Syllogism_ or through +_Induction_, for both accomplish the instruction they afford from +information previously known--the former (syllogistic reasoning) +receiving it, as it were, from the traditions of the intelligent, the +latter (inductive reasoning) manifesting the universal through the light +of the singular.[694] Induction and Syllogism are thus the grand +instruments of logic.[695] + +[Footnote 693: "Prior Analytic," bk. i. ch. i.; "Topics," bk. i. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 694: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 695: "We believe all things through syllogism, or from +induction."--"Prior Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xxiii.] + +Both these processes are based upon an _anterior_ knowledge. +Demonstrative science must be from things true, first, immediate, more +known than, prior to, and the causes of, the conclusion, for thus there +will be the appropriate first principles of whatever is +demonstrated.[696] The first principles of demonstration, the material +of thought, must, consequently, be supplied by some power or faculty of +the mind other than that which is engaged in generalization and +deductive reasoning. Whence, then, is this "anterior knowledge" derived, +and what tests or criteria have we of its validity? + +1. In regard to deductive or syllogistic reasoning, the views of +Aristotle are very distinctly expressed. + +Syllogistic reasoning "proceeds from generals to particulars."[697] The +general must therefore be supplied as the foundation of the deductive +reasoning. Whence, then, is this knowledge of "the general" derived? The +answer of Aristotle is that the universal major proposition, out of +which the conclusion of the syllogism is drawn, _is itself necessarily +the conclusion of a previous induction, and mediately or immediately an +inference_--a collection from individual objects of sensation or of +self-consciousness. "Now," says he, "demonstration is from universals, +but induction from particulars. It is impossible, however, to +investigate universals except through induction, since things which are +said to be from abstraction will be known only by induction."[698] It is +thus clear that Aristotle makes _deduction necessarily dependent upon +induction_. He maintains that the highest or most universal principles +which constitute the primary and immediate propositions of the former +are furnished by the latter. + +[Footnote 696: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 697: Ibid., bk. i. ch. xviii.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 698: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xviii.] + +2. General principles being thus furnished by induction, we may now +inquire whence, according to Aristotle, are the materials for induction +derived? What is the character of that "anterior knowledge" which is the +basis of the inductive process? + +Induction, says Aristotle, is "the progression from singulars to +universals."[699] It is an illation of the universal from the singular +as legitimated by the laws of thought. All knowledge, therefore, begins +with singulars--that is, with individual objects. And inasmuch as all +knowledge begins with "individual objects," and as the individual is +constantly regarded by Aristotle as the "object of sense," it is claimed +that his doctrine is that all knowledge is derived from _sensation_, and +that science and art result to man (_solely_) by means of _experience._ +He is thus placed at the head of the empirical school of philosophy, as +Plato is placed at the head of the ideal school. + +[Footnote 699: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xviii.] + +This classification, however, is based upon a very superficial +acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle as a whole. The practice, +so commonly resorted to, of determining the character of the +Aristotelian philosophy by the light of one or two passages quoted from +his "Metaphysics," is unjust both to Aristotle and to the history of +philosophic thought. We can not expect to attain a correct understanding +of the views of Aristotle concerning the sources and grounds of all +knowledge without some attention to his psychology. A careful study of +his writings will show that the terms "sensation" (aisthêsis) and +"experience" (empeira) are employed in a much more comprehensive sense +than is usual in modern philosophic writings. + +"Sensation," in its lowest form, is defined by Aristotle as "an +excitation of the soul through the body,"[700] and, in its higher form, +as the excitation of the soul by any object of knowledge. In this latter +form it is used by him as synonymous with "intuition," and embraces all +immediate intuitive perceptions, whether of sense, consciousness, or +reason. "The universe is derived from particulars, therefore we ought to +have a sensible perception (aisthêsis) of these; and this is intellect +(nous)."[701] Intelligence proper, the faculty of first principles, is, +in certain respects, a sense, because it is the source of a class of +truths which, like the perceptions of the senses, are immediately +revealed as facts to be received upon their own evidence. It thus +answers to the "sensus communis" of Cicero, and the "Common Sense" of +the Scottish school. Under this aspect, "Sense is equal to or has the +force of Science."[702] The term "Experience" is also used to denote, +not merely the perception and remembrance of the impressions which +external objects make upon the mind, but as co-extensive with the whole +contents of consciousness--all that the mind _does_ of its own native +energy, as well as all that it _suffers_ from without. It is evidently +used in the Posterior Analytic (bk. ii. ch. xix.) to describe the whole +process by which the knowledge of universals is obtained. "From +experience, or from every universal remaining in the soul, the +principles of art and science arise." The office of experience is "to +furnish the principles of every science"[703]--that is, to evoke them +into energy in the mind. 'Experience thus seems to be a thing almost +similar to science and art.[704] In the most general sense, "sensation" +would thus appear to be the immediate perception or intuition of facts +and principles, and "experience" the operation of the mind upon these +facts and principles, elaborating them into scientific form according to +its own inherent laws. The "experience" of Aristotle is analogous to the +"reflection" of Locke. + +[Footnote 700: "De Somn.," bk. i.] + +[Footnote 701: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. xi.; see also ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 702: "De Cen. Anim."] + +[Footnote 703: "Prior Analytic," bk. i. ch. xix.] + +[Footnote 704: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. i.] + +So much being premised, we proceed to remark that there is a distinction +perpetually recurring in the writings of Aristotle between the elements +or first principles of knowledge which are "clearest in their own +nature" and those which "are clearest to our perception."[705] The +causes or principles of knowledge "are _prior_ and _more known_ to us in +two ways, for what is prior in nature is not the same as that which is +prior to us, nor that which is more known (simply in itself) the same as +that which is more known to us. Now I call things prior and more known +to us, those which are _nearer to sense_; and things prior and more +known simply in themselves, those which are _remote from sense_; and +those things are most remote which are especially _universal_, and those +nearest which are _singular_; and these are mutually opposed."[706] Here +we have a distribution of the first or prior elements of knowledge into +two fundamentally opposite classes. + +(i.) _The immediate or intuitive perceptions of sense,_ + +(ii.) _The immediate or intuitive apperceptions of pure reason,_ + +[Footnote 705: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. iv.; "Metaphysics," bk. ii. ch. i.; +"Rhetoric," bk. i. ch. ii.; "Prior Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xxiii.] + +[Footnote 706: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. ii.] + +The objects of sense-perception are external, individual, "nearest to +sense," and occasionally or contingently present to sense. The objects +of the intellect are inward, universal, and the essential property of +the soul. They are "remote from sense," "prior by nature;" they are +"forms" essentially inherent in the soul previous to experience; and it +is the office of experience to bring them forward into the light of +consciousness, or, in the language of Aristotle, "to evoke them from +potentiality into actuality." And further, from the "prior" and +immediate intuitions of sense and intellect, all our secondary, our +scientific and practical knowledge is drawn by logical processes. + +The Aristotelian distribution of the intellectual faculties corresponds +fully to this division of the objects of knowledge. The human intellect +is divided by Aristotle into, + +1. The Passive or Receptive Intellect (nous paphêtikos).--Its office is +the reception of sensible impressions or images (Phantasmata) and their +retention in the mind (myêmê). These sensible forms or images are +essentially immaterial. "Each sensoriurn (aisthêtêrôn) is receptive of +the sensible quality _without the matter_, and hence when the sensibles +themselves are absent, sensations and phantasikos remain."[707] + +[Footnote 707: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. ii.] + +2. The Active or Creative Intellect (nous pointikos).--This is the power +or faculty which, by its own inherent power, impresses "form" upon the +material of thought supplied by sense-perception, exactly as the First +Cause combines it, in the universe, with the recipient matter. + +"It is necessary," says Aristotle, "that these two modes should be +opposed to each other, as matter is opposed to form, and to all that +gives form. The receptive reason, which is as matter, becomes all things +by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all +things, as light calls color into being. The creative reason transcends +the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it +is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or +affected by it; prior, and subsequent to the individual mind. The +receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is +perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is +lost to the higher and immortal reason."[708] + +This "Active or Creative Intellect" is again further subdivided, by +Aristotle-- + +1. The _Scientific_ (epistêmonikon) part--the "virtue," faculty, or +"habit of principles." He also designates it as the "place of +principles," and further defines it as the power "which apprehends those +existences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are"--that +is, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitive +reason_. + +2. The _Reasoning_ (logistikon) part--the power by which we draw +conclusions from premises, and "contemplate contingent matter"[710]--the +_discursive reason_. + +The correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would afford +the best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledge +attained by the former is an "intuitive principle"--a truth at first +hand; that obtained by the latter is a "demonstrative proposition"--a +truth at second hand. + +The preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid us +materially in interpreting his remarks "_Upon the Method and Habits +necessary to the ascertainment of Principles_."[711] + +[Footnote 708: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. v.] + +[Footnote 709: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.] + +[Footnote 710: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 711: "Post. Analytic," bk. ii, ch. xix., the concluding +chapter of the Organon.] + +"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge through +demonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, has +been elucidated before." This being established, he proceeds to explain +how that "knowledge of first, immediate principles" is developed in the +mind. + +1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of +sense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_ +or _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind. + +"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called +_sensible perception_ (aisthêsis); but sense being inherent, in some +animals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others +it is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object does +not remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others, +when they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul,... with some, +_reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression), +[as in man], but in others it is not [as in the brute]. From sense, +therefore, as we say, memory is produced, and from the repeated +remembrance of the same thing we get experience.... From experience, or +_from every universal remaining in the soul_--the one besides the many +which in all of them is _one_ and the _same_--the principles of art and +science arise. If experience is conversant with generation, the +principles of art; if with being, the principles of science.... Let us +again explain: When one thing without difference abides, there is then +the first universal (notion) [developed] in the soul; for the singular +indeed is perceived by sense, _but sense is [also] of the +universal_"--that is, the universal is immanent in the sensible object +as a property giving it "form." "It is manifest, then, that primary +things become necessarily known by induction, for thus sensible +perception produces [develops or evokes] the _universal_." 2. The +knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of pure +intellect_ (nous)--that is, "_intellect itself is the principle of +science_" or, in other words, intellect is the _efficient, essential +cause_ of the knowledge of first principles. + +"Of those habits which are about intellect by which we ascertain truth, +_some[712] are always true_, but others[713] admit the false, as opinion +and reasoning. But science and (pure) intellect are always true, and no +other kind of knowledge, except intellect [intellectual intuition], is +more accurate than science. And since the principles of demonstration +are more known, and all science is connected with reason, there could +not be a science of principles. But since nothing can be more true than +science, except intellect, intellect will belong to principles. From +these [considerations] it is evident that, as demonstration is not the +principle of demonstration, so neither is science the principle of +science. If, then, we have no other true genus (of habit) besides +science, _intellect will be the principle of science_; it will also be +the principle (or cause of the knowledge) of the principle." + +[Footnote 712: The "noetic."] + +[Footnote 713: The "dianætic."] + +The doctrine of Aristotle regarding "first principles" may perhaps be +summed up as follows: All demonstrative science is based upon +_universals_ "prior in nature"--that is, upon _à priori_, self-evident, +necessary, and immutable principles. Our knowledge of these "first and +immediate principles" is dependent primarily on _intellect_ (nous) or +intuitive reason, and secondarily on sense, experience, and induction. +Prior to experience, the intellect contains these principles in itself +potentially, as "forms," "laws," "habitudes," or "predicaments" of +thought; but they can not be "evoked into energy," can not be revealed +in consciousness, except on condition of experience, and they can only +be scientifically developed by logical abstraction and definition. The +ultimate ground of all truth and certainty is thus a mode of our own +mind, a subjective necessity of thinking, and truth is not in things, +but in our own minds.[714] "Ultimate knowledge, as well as primary +knowledge, the most perfect knowledge which the philosopher can attain, +as well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. All +knowledge seems to be included under two forms--knowledge _that_ it is +so; knowledge _why_ it is so. Neither of these can, of course, include +the knowledge at which Plato is aiming--knowledge which is correlated +with Being--a knowledge, not _about_ things or persons, but _of_ +them."[715] + +[Footnote 714: "Metaphysics," bk. v. ch. iv.] + +[Footnote 715: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 190.] + +ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY + +Theoretical philosophy, "the science which has truth for its end," is +divided by Aristotle into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, or the +First Philosophy, now commonly known as "Metaphysics," because it is +beyond or above physics, and is concerned with the primitive ground and +cause of all things.[716] + +In the former two we have now no immediate interest, but with Theology, +as "the science of the Divine,"[717] the _First Moving Cause_, which is +the source of all other causes, and the original ground of all other +things, we are specially concerned, inasmuch as our object is to +determine, if possible, whether Greek philosophy exerted any influence +upon Christian thought, and has bequeathed any valuable results to the +Theology of modern times. + +"The Metaphysics" of Aristotle opens by an enumeration of "the +principles or causes"[718] into which all existences can be resolved by +philosophical analysis. This enumeration is at present to be regarded as +provisional, and in part hypothetical--a verbal generalization of the +different principles which seem to be demanded to explain the existence +of a thing, or constitute it what it is. These he sets down as-- + +[Footnote 716: "Physics are concerned with things which have a principle +of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not +transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science +separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and +transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall +endeavor to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent +substance, if it exist at all, must surely be the sphere of the +_divine_--it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows +that there are three kinds of speculative science--Physics, Mathematics, +and Theology."--"Metaphysics," bk. x. ch. vii.] + +[Footnote 717: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 718: Aition--cause--is here used by Aristotle in the sense of +"account of" or "reason why."] + +1. The Material Cause (tên ylên kai to ypokeimenon)--the matter and +subject--that _out of_ which a given thing has been originated. "From +the analogy which this principle has to wood or stone, or any actual +matter out of which a work of nature or of art is produced, the name +'material' is assigned to this class." It does not always necessarily +mean "matter" in the now common use of the term, but "antecedents--that +is, principles whose inherence and priority is implied in any existing +thing, as, for example, the premises of a syllogism, which are the +material cause of the conclusion."[719] With Aristotle there is, +therefore, "matter as an object of sense," and "matter as an object of +thought." + +2. The Formal Cause (Tên ausian kai to ti einai)--the being or abstract +essence of a thing--that primary nature on which all its properties +depend. To this Aristotle gave the name of eidos--the form or exemplar +_according to_ which a thing is produced. + +3. The Moving or Efficient Cause (othen ê archê tês kinêseôs)--the +origin and principle of motion--that _by which_ a thing is produced. + +4. The Final Cause (to ou eneken kai to agathon)--the good end answered +by the existence of any thing--that for the sake of which_ any thing is +produced--the eneka tou, or reason for it.[720] Thus, for instance, in a +house, the wood out of which it is produced is the _matter (ylê), the +idea or conception according to which it is produced is _the form_ +(eidos morphê), the builder who erects the house is the _efficient_ +cause, and the reason for its production, or the end of its existence is +the _final_ cause. + +[Footnote 719: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle;" "Post. +Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xi.] + +[Footnote 720: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iii.] + +Causes are, therefore, the elements into which the mind resolves its +first rough conception of an object. That object is what it is, by +reason of the matter out of which it sprang, the moving cause which gave +it birth, the idea or form which it realizes, and the end or object +which it attains. The knowledge of a thing implies knowing it from these +four points of view--that is, knowing its four causes or principles. + +These four determinations of being are, on a further and closer +analysis, resolved into the fundamental antithesis of MATTER and FORM. + +"All things that are produced," says Aristotle,[721] "are produced from +something (that is, from _matter_), by something (that is, _form_), and +become something (the totality--to synolon);" as, for example, a statue, +a plant, a man. To every subject there belongs, therefore, first, +_matter_ (ylê); secondly, _form_ (morphê). The synthesis of these two +produces and constitutes _substance_, or ousia. Matter and form are thus +the two grand causes or principles whence proceed all things. The +formative cause is, at the same time, the moving cause and the final +cause; for it is evidently the element of determination which impresses +movement upon matter whilst determining it; and it is also the end of +being, since being only really exists when it has passed from an +indeterminate to a determinate state. + +[Footnote 721: "Metaphysics," bk. vi. ch. vii.] + +In proof that the eidos or form is an _efficient_ principle operating in +every object, which makes it, to our conception, what it is, Aristotle +brings forward the subject of generation or production.[722] There are +three modes of production--natural, artificial, and automatic. In +natural production we discern at once a matter; indeed Nature, in the +largest sense, may be defined as "that out of which things are +produced." Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is a given +substance--a vegetable, a beast, or a man. But what is the _producing_ +cause in each case? Clearly something akin to the result. A man +generates a man, a plant produces another plant like to itself. There +is, therefore, implied in the resulting thing a _productive force_ +distinct from matter, upon which it works. And this is the eidos, or +form. Let us now consider artificial production. Here again the form is +the producing power. And this is in the soul. The art of the physician +is the eidos, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect is +the conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, a +distinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed a +noêsis and a poiêsis. The noêsis is the previous conception which the +architect forms in his own mind; the poiêsis is the actual creation of +the house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is the +moving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind of +the artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue is +produced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before it +can become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which is +true of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneous +production. For example, a cure may take place by the application of +warmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. This +warmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is +consequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health. +Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an +artificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generating +influence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be a +productive power, and there must be something out of which it is +produced. In this case, then, there will be a ylê and an eidos.[723] + +[Footnote 722: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 723: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," pp. 205, 206.] + +From the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded by +Aristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_ +cause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly be +separated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from its +conception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse of +motion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with the +good of that thing. "The moving cause of the house is the builder, but +the moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, the +house." From such examples as these it would seem that the +determinations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in so +far as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regarded +the end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfect +realization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations, +therefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matter +and form_.[724] + +[Footnote 724: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," pp. 120, 123.] + +The opposition of matter and form, with Aristotle, corresponds to the +opposition between the element of _generality_ and the element of +_particularity_. Matter is indeterminate; form is determinate. Matter, +abstracted from form, in thought, is entirely without predicate and +distinction; form is that which enters into the definition of every +subject, and without which it could not be defined. Matter is capable of +the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without form. Pure form is, +in fact, that which is without matter, or, in other words, it is the +pure conception of being. Matter is the necessary condition of the +existence of a thing; form is the essence of each thing, that in virtue +of which substance is possible, and without which it is inconceivable. +On the one side is passivity, possibility of existence, capacity of +action; on the other side is activity, actuality, thought. The unity of +these two in the realm of determined being constitutes every individual +substance. The relation of matter and form, logically apprehended, is +thus the relation of POTENTIALITY and ACTUALITY. + +This is a further and indeed a most important step in the Aristotelian +theology. Matter, as we have seen, after all, amounts to merely capacity +for action, and if we can not discover some productive power to develop +potentiality into actuality, we look in vain for some explanation of the +phenomena around us. The discovery, however, of energy (energeia), as a +principle of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a +momentary glance at the actual phenomena will show its perfect identity +with the eidos, or form.[725] "For instance, what is a calm? It is +evenness in the surface of the sea. Here the sea is the subject, that +is, the matter in _capacity_, but the evenness is the _energy_ or +actuality;... energy is thus as form."[726] The form (or idea) is thus +an energy or actuality (energeia); the matter is a capacity or +potentiality (dynamis), requiring the co-operation of the energy to +produce a result. + +These terms, which are first employed by Aristotle in their +philosophical signification, are characteristic of his whole system. It +is, therefore, important we should grasp their precise philosophical +import; and this can only be done by considering them in the strictest +relation to each other. It is in this relation they are defined by +Aristotle. "Now energeia is the existence of a thing not in the sense of +its potentially existing. The term _potentially_ we use, for instance, +of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it may +be subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not +thinking of it, but might be so; whereas energeia is the opposite. By +applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must +not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of +the analogy as a whole,--that it is as that which builds to that which +has a capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that +which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the +definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the +unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the energeia be set off as forming +the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said +to be in energeia not always in like manner (except so far as there is +an analogy, that as this thing is in this, and related to this, so is +that in that, or related to that); for sometimes it implies _motion_ as +opposed to the _capacity of motion_, and sometimes _complete existence_ +opposed to _undeveloped matter_".[727] As the term dynamis has the +double meaning of "_possibility of existence_" as well as "_capacity of +action_" so there is the double contrast of "_action_" as opposed to the +capacity of action; and "_actual existence_" opposed to possible +existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter antithesis, +Aristotle introduced the term entelecheia[728]--entelechy, of which the +most natural account is that it is a compound of en telei echein--"being +in a state of perfection."[729] This term, however, rarely occurs in the +"Metaphysics," whilst energeia is everywhere employed, not only to +express activity as opposed to passivity, but complete existence as +opposed to undeveloped matter. + +[Footnote 725: "That which Aristotle calls 'form' is not to be +confounded with what we may perhaps call shape [or figure]; a hand +severed from the arm, for instance, has still the outward shape of a +hand, but, according to Aristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand now +as to matter, and not as to form; an actual hand, a hand as to form, is +only that which can do the proper work of a hand."--Schwegler's "History +of Philosophy," p. 122.] + +[Footnote 726: "Metaphysics," bk. vii. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 727: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 728: "Entelechy indicates the perfected act, the completely +actual."--Schw.] + +[Footnote 729: Grant's Aristotle's "Ethics," vol. i. p. 184.] + +"In Physics dynamis answers to the necessary conditions for the +existence of any thing before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to +ylê, both to the protê ylê--the first matter, or matter devoid of all +qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for +example, marble; and also to the eschatê ylê--or matter capable of +receiving form, as marble the form of the statue." Marble then exists +potentially in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue +exists potentially in the marble before it is carved. All objects of +thought exist, either purely in potentiality, or purely in actuality, or +both in potentiality and in actuality. This division makes an entire +chain of all existence. At the one end is matter, the protê ylê which +has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but +which having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of being +realized by the mind. At the other end of the chain is pure form, which +is not at all matter, the absolute and the unconditioned, the eternal +substance and energy without matter (ousia aldios kai energeia aneu +dynameôs), who can not be thought as non-existing--the self-existent +God. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out +of potentiality evermore spring into actual being.[730] + +[Footnote 730: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 185.] + +The relation of actuality to potentiality is the subject of an extended +and elaborate discussion in book viii., the general results of which may +be summed up in the following propositions: + +1. _The relation of Actuality to Potentiality is as the Perfect to the +Imperfect_.--The progress from potentiality to actuality is motion or +production (kinêsis or genesis). But this motion is transitional, and in +itself imperfect--it tends towards an end, but does not include the end +in itself. But actuality, if it implies motion, has an end in itself and +for itself; it is a motion desirable for its own sake.[731] The relation +of the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the +unfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed builder to the one at +work upon his building, of the seed-corn to the tree, of the man who has +the capacity to think, to the man actually engaged in thought.[732] +Potentially the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is the +actuality; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment in +a philosophic condition; indeed, every thing is potential which +possesses a principle of development, or of change. Actuality or +entelechy, on the other hand, indicates the _perfect act_, the end +gained, the completed actual; that activity in which the act and the +completeness of the act fall together--as, for example, to see, to +think, where the acting and the completed act are one and the same. + +2. _The Relation of Actuality to Potentiality is a causal Relation_.--A +thing which is endued with a simple capacity of being may nevertheless +not actually exist, and a thing may have a capacity of being and really +exist. Since this is the case, there must ensue between non-being and +real being some such principle as _energy_, in order to account for the +transition or change.[733] Energy has here some analogy to motion, +though it must not be confounded with motion. Now you can not predicate +either motion or energy of things which are not. The moment energy is +added to them they are. This transition from potentiality to actuality +must be through the medium of such principles as propension or _free +will_, because propension or free will possess in themselves the power +of originating motion in other things.[734] + +[Footnote 731: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 732: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 733: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 734: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. v.] + +3. _The Relation of Actuality and Potentiality is a Relation of +Priority_.--Actuality, says Aristotle, is prior to potentiality in the +order of reason, in the order of substance, and also (though not +invariably) in the order of time. The first of all capacities is a +capacity of energizing or assuming a state of activity; for example, a +man who has the capacity of building is one who is skilled in building, +and thus able to use his energy in the art of building.[735] The primary +energizing power must precede that which receives the impression of it, +Form being older than Matter. But if you take the case of any particular +person or thing, we say that its capacity of being that particular +person or thing precedes its being so actually. Yet, though this is the +case in each particular thing, there is always a foregone energy +presumed in some other thing (as a prior seed, plant, man) to which it +owes its existence. One pregnant thought presents itself in the course +of the discussion which has a direct bearing upon our subject. [Dynamis] +has been previously defined as "a principle of motion or change in +another thing in so far forth as it is another thing"[736]--that is, it +is fitted by nature to have motion imparted to it, and to communicate +motion to something else. But this motion wants a resting-place. There +can be no infinite regression of causes. There is some primary [dynamis] +presupposed in all others, which is the beginning of change. This is +[Greek: physis], or nature. But the first and original cause of all +motion and change still precedes and surpasses nature. The final cause +of all potentiality is energy or _actuality_. The one proposed is prior +to the means through which the end is accomplished. A process of +actualization, a tendency towards completeness or perfection ([Greek: +telos]) presupposes an absolute actuality which is at once its beginning +and end. "One energy is invariably antecedent to another in time, up to +that which is primarily and eternally the Moving Cause."[737] + +[Footnote 735: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 736: Ibid., bk. iv. ch. xii.] + +[Footnote 737: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. viii.] + +And now having laid down these fundamental principles of metaphysical +science, as preparatory to Theology, Aristotle proceeds to establish the +conception of the Absolute or Divine Spirit _as the eternal, immutable +Substance, the immaterial Energy, the unchangeable Form of Forms, the +first moving Cause_. + +I. _The Ontological Form of Proof_.--It is necessary to conceive an +eternal and immutable substance--an actuality which is absolute and +prior, both logically and chronologically, to all potentiality; for that +which is potential is simply contingent, it may just as easily not be as +be; that which exists only in capacity is temporal and corruptible, and +may cease to be. Matter we know subsists merely in capacity and +passivity, and without the operation of Energy,(energeia), or the +formative cause, would be to us as non-entity. The phenomena of the +world exhibits to us the presence of Energy, and energy presupposes the +existence of an eternal substance. Furthermore, matter and potentiality +are convertible terms, therefore the primal Energy or Actuality must be +_immaterial_.[738] + +2. _The Cosmological Form of Proof_.--It is impossible that there should +be _motion_, genesis, or a chain of causes, except on the assumption of +a first Moving Cause, since that which exists only in capacity can not, +of itself energize, and consequently without a principle of motion which +is essentially active, we have only a principle of immobility. The +principle "ex nihilo nihil" forbids us to assume that motion can arise +out of immobility, being out of non-being. "How can matter be put in +motion if nothing that subsists in energy exist, and is its cause?" All +becoming, therefore, necessarily supposes that which has not become, +that which is eternally self-active as the principle and cause of all +motion. There is no refuge from the notion that all things are "born of +night and nothingness" except in this belief.[739] + +[Footnote 738: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vi.] + +[Footnote 739: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii., viii.] + +The existence of an eternal principle subsisting in energy is also +demanded to explain the _order_ of the world. "For how, let me ask, will +there prevail _order_ on the supposition that there is no subsistence of +that which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and is +permanent."[740] "All things in nature are constituted in the best +possible manner."[741] All things strive after "the good." "The +appearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design."[742] Now +an end or final cause presupposes intelligence,--implies a _mind_ to see +and desire it. That which is "fair," "beautiful," "good," an "object of +desire," can only be perceived by Mind. The "final cause" must therefore +subsist in that which is prior and immovable and eternal; and _Mind_ is +"that substance which subsists absolutely, and according to +energy."[743] "The First Mover of all things, moves all things without +being moved, being an eternal substance and energy; and he moves all +things as the object of reason and of desire, or love."[744] + +[Footnote 740: Ibid., bk. x. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 741: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 742: "Nat. Ausc.," bk. ii. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 743: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.] + +[Footnote 744: Ibid.] + +3. _The Moral Form of Proof_.--So far as the relation of potentiality +and actuality is identical with the relation of matter and form, the +argument for the existence of God may be thus presented: The conception +of an absolute matter without form, involves the supposition of an +absolute form without matter. And since the conception of form resolves +itself into _motion_, _conception_, _purpose_ or _end_, so the Eternal +One is the absolute principle of motion (the prôton kinoun), the +absolute conception or pure intelligence (the pure ti ên einai), and the +absolute ground, reason, or end of all being. All the other predicates +of the First Cause follow from the above principles with logical +necessity. + +(i.) _He is, of course, pure intellect_, because he is absolutely +immaterial and free from nature. He is active intelligence, because his +essence is pure actuality. He is self-contemplating and self-conscious +intelligence, because the divine thought can not attain its actuality in +any thing extrinsic; it would depend on something else than self--some +potential existence for its actualization. Hence the famous definition +of the absolute as "the thought of thought" (noêsis noêseôs).[745] "And +therefore the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself, doth +subsist in this way throughout all eternity."[746] + +[Footnote 745: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 125.] + +[Footnote 746: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. ix.] + +(ii.) _He is also essential life_. "The principle of life is inherent in +the Deity, for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life, +and God constitutes this energy; and essential energy belongs to God as +his best and everlasting life. Now our statement is this--that the Deity +is a living being that is everlasting and most excellent in nature, so +that with the Deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal; for +this constitutes the essence of God."[747] + +(iii.) _Unity belongs to him_, since multiplicity implies matter; and +the highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely +immaterial.[748] The Divine nature is "devoid of parts and indivisible, +for magnitude can not in any way involve this Divine nature; for God +imparts motion through infinite duration, and nothing finite--as +magnitude is--can be possessed of an infinite capacity."[749] + +(iv.) _He is immovable and ever abideth the same_; since otherwise he +could not be the absolute mover, and the cause of all becoming, if he +were subject to change.[750] God is impassive and unalterable ([Greek: +apathês kai analloiôton]); for all such notions as are involved in +passion or alteration are outside the sphere of the Divine +existence.[751] + +[Footnote 747: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.] + +[Footnote 748: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 749: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 750: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 751: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii.] + +(v.) _He is the ever-blessed God_.--"The life of God is of a kind with +those highest moods which, with us, last a brief space, it being +impossible they should be permanent; whereas, with Him they are +permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And +it is because they are vivid states of consciousness, that waking, and +perception, and thought, are the sweetest of all things. Now essential +perception is the perception of that which is most excellent,... and the +mind perceives itself by participating of its own object of perception; +but it is a sort of coalescence of both that, in the Divine Mind, +creates a regular identity between the two, so that with God both (the +thinker and the thought, the subject and object) are the same. In +possession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy; +and the contemplation of his own perfections is what, to God, must be +most agreeable and excellent. This condition of existence, after so +excellent a manner, is what is "so astonishing to us when we examine +God's nature, and the more we do so the more wonderful that nature +appears to us. The mood of the Divine existence is essential energy, +and, as such, it is a life that is most excellent, blessed, and +everlasting.[752] + +[Footnote 752: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.] + +The theology of Aristotle may be summed up in the following sentences +selected from book xi. of his "Metaphysics:" + +"This motionless cause of motion is a necessary being; and, by virtue of +such necessity, is the all-perfect being. This all-pervading principle +penetrates heaven and all nature. It eternally possesses perfect +happiness; and its happiness is in action. This primal mover is +immaterial; for its essence is in energy. It is pure thought--thought +thinking itself--the thought of thought. The activity of pure +intelligence--such is the perfect, eternal life of God. This primal +cause of change, this absolute perfection, moves the world by the +universal desire for the absolute good, by the attraction exercised upon +it by the Eternal Mind--the serene energy of Divine Intelligence." + +It can not be denied that, so far as it goes, this conception of the +Deity is admirable, worthy, and just. Viewed from a Christian +stand-point, we at once concede that it is essentially defective. There +is no clear and distinct recognition of God as Creator and Governor of +the universe; he is chiefly regarded as the Life of the universe--the +Intellect, the Energy--that which gives excellence, and perfection, and +gladness to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, in +fact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate the +Deity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of "being made like God +through becoming just and holy," Aristotle asserts that "all moral +virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God."[753] He is not +the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human +cares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individual +men, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not a +being that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, however +well it may meet the demands of the reason. + +[Footnote 753: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.] + +Morality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in the +perfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above. +The theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the + +ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS. + +We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and +immutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the +nature of God. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, above +and beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "the +cause of all existence and all knowledge," and which is God; that all +other things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absolute +Good;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble God." But with +this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato +in the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all these +manifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is the +cause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise that +idea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea at +present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or +transcendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor +possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are +inquiring after." He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhaps +the knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a +pattern (paradeigma) by which to judge of relative good." Against this +he argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any such +conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, +all pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, nor +is it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it."[754] +The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relative +good_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be +realized. + +[Footnote 754: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.] + +Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendental and +absolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a +paradigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself +solely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the good +attainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the +final and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_ +is, "_What is the end of human action?_" (ti esti to tôn praktôn +teloa).[755] + +[Footnote 755: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. xiii.] + +Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to +perceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The +question, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a +higher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an +ideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then +consciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim +at fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered +that Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government of +the world. "Moral government," in the now common acceptation of the +term, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" is +scarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to the +constitution and natural condition of man. "_It is_" says he, "_the end +towards which nature tends_." As physical things strive unconsciously +after the end of their existence, so man strives after the good +attainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had +taught that "virtue is a Science." Aristotle contended that virtue is an +art, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It +is not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has +become ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its +organization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar +perfection, so there is an instinctive desire (orexis) in the soul which +at first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good +is sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that the +desires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of +this end (telos).[756] And he asserts that man can only realize it in +the sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws +of his own proper nature and its harmonious development.[757] It is not, +then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that +man is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ephos). By +practice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of +building and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the +habit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of +oft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature, +habit, reason--that men become good. + +[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 757: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vii.] + +Aristotle's question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man as +man_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being? +or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God? +And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolute +satisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling +_happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The +brute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitute +the happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of +rational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity, +as the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness of +man can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore, +consist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially in +contemplative thought,[758] or as Aristotle defines it--"_It is a +perfect practical activity in a perfect life_."[759] His conception of +the chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in +and for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life," the other +external and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former. +That complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction and +perfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the +crown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and +constitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.[760] A good +action is thus an End-in-itself (teleion telos) inasmuch as it secures +the _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which our +moral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and +satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fully +acquiesce; something which can be pronounced beautiful, fitting, +honorable, and perfect. + +[Footnote 758: "If it be true to say that happiness consists in doing +well, a life of action must be best both for the state and the +individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action +implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which +are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must +consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their _end +in themselves_, and which are for their own sake."--"Politics," bk. vii. +ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 759: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. x.] + +[Footnote 760: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.] + +From what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelian +conception of _Virtue_ is not conformity to an absolute and immutable +standard of right. It is defined by him as _the observation of the right +mean (mesotês) in action_--that is, the right mean relatively to +ourselves. "Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean +(meson) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudent +man would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the one +consisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, in +that one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is right +both in passions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses the +mean."[761] The perfection of an action thus consists in its containing +the right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. The +law of the mesotês is illustrated by the following examples: Man has a +fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true mean +is found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this is _fortitude_. +In relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness and +indifference; this is _temperance_. The true mean between prodigality +and narrowness is _liberality_; between simplicity and cunning is +_prudence_; between suffering wrong and doing wrong is _justice_. +Extending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and +manners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtue +is thus _proportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action_. + +[Footnote 761: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. vi.] + +It will at once be seen that this classification has no stable +foundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. The _mean_ is a +wavering line. It differs under different circumstances and relations, +and in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for one +individual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave, +and of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues as +there are circumstances in life; and as men are ever entering into new +relations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method of +action, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number. + +Imperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who live +in Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound with +just and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is a _discipline of +human character in order to human happiness_. And whilst it must be +admitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in the +present life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and noble +principles, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of which +he could conceive. "And no greater praise can be given to a work of +heathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings of +Aristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense +with, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character; +and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects +which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal."[762] + +[Footnote 762: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle."] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued)_ + +POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL. + +EPICURUS AND ZENO. + + +Philosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In the +pre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature; +in the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; and +now in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--a +moral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--of +the permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie all +phenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness. +The primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is, +What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of +human conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good in +individual and social life? + +This remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainly +due-- + +1st. _To the altered circumstances of the times_. An age of civil +disturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. The +different states of Greece lost their independence, and became gradually +subject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another, +in the struggles of Alexander's lieutenants, they endeavored to +reconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations, +but were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Achæan +and Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was in +vain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties. + +Divided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid of +dangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt. +In this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which was +destined to be extinguished by Rome.[763] + +[Footnote 763: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," pp. 136-140.] + +During this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all lofty +pursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. The +philosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and men +became chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. The +wars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, and +philosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; it +became, in fact, "the art of making one's self happy." The sad reverses +to which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling of +exhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in the +philosophy of the age. + +2d. In connection with the altered circumstances of the age, we must +also take account of _the apparent failure of the Socratic method to +solve the problem of Being_. + +The teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialectic +method was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return to +sensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence, +and that the "essence" of things is not to be sought in the elements of +unity and generality, or in the _idea_, as Plato taught, but in the +elements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition to +Plato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, as +the source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching, +we find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberately +setting aside "the god of philosophy," affirming "that a _divinity_ was +unnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of the +universe." Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, the +characteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. As +the skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period of +philosophy, so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of the +second. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as the +earlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics. +They naturally said: "We have been seeking a long time; what have we +gained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato says +we have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be as +good as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented during +the past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they may +be all alike untrue!" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, it +might be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we should +cease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain an _absolute calm_, which +they dignified with the name of _ataraxie_. Beholding the overthrow and +disgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity and +corruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, they +wrote this maxim: "Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; laws +and customs alone constitute what is justice and what is iniquity." +Having reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap the +climax by saying, "We assert nothing; no, not even that we assert +nothing!" + +And yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the "wise man" +(sophos). + +Reason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. And +inasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be to +determine practical questions. May it not teach men to _act_ rather than +to _think_? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive the +darkening flood of skepticism. + +Three centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools are +succeeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, and +which, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputes +of the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics. +With Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature, +humanity, and God; but now, in the systems of Epicurus and "Zeno", moral +philosophy is placed in the foreground, and assumes the chief, the +overshadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now the +grand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse. + +In dealing with _morals_ two opposite methods of inquiry were possible: + +1. _To judge of the quality of actions by their_ RESULTS. + +2. _To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves_. + +Utility, which in its last analysis is _Pleasure_, is the test of right, +in the first method; an assumed or discovered _Law of Nature_, in the +second. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the human +faculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would give +identical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side, +which is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans and +Stoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the mass of educated +men until the coming of Christ. + +EPICUREANS. + +Epicurus was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 270. He purchased a Garden +within the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teach +philosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelians +walked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans had +their Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had a +community of goods. + +There is not one of all the various founders of the ancient +philosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much veneration +by his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after his +death, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacred +relic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung up +in their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their private +chambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and other +religious observances, and a special festival in his honor was held +every month. + +So much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturally +expect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. He +was one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenes +calls him "a most voluminous writer," and estimates the number of works +composed by him at no less than three hundred, the principal of which he +enumerates.[764] But out of all this prodigious collection, not a single +book has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form. +Three letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, are +preserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his "Fundamental +Maxims"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethical +system. These, with part of his work "On Nature," found during the last +century among the Greek MSS. recovered at Herculaneum, constitute all +that has survived the general wreck. + +[Footnote 764: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xvi., xvii.] + +We are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors for +any general account of his system. And of the earliest and most +immediate of these the writings have perished.[765] Our sole original +authority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. The +sketch of Epicurus which is given in his "Lives" is evidently a "labor +of love." Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him, +there is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and so +elaborate an analysis. And even as regards the particulars of the +system, nothing could be more complete than Laertius's account of his +physical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by the +philosophic poem of Lucretius "On the Nature of Things," which was +written to advocate the physical theory of Epicurus. These are the chief +sources of our information. + +[Footnote 765: Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Phædrus, +Polystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the Herculanean +Papyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additional +light on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on "Herculanean Papyri," +in Edinburgh Review, October, 1862.] + +It is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of the +indifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, he +aspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic; +on the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showed +so little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so much +confidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his own +philosophy--_he_ was a "self-taught" man! Now "Epicurus might be +perfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked out +the conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; few +men more entirely so."[766] His psychology was certainly borrowed from +the Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim, +that "sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of all +truth." His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, "atoms are +the first principle of all things." And in Ethics he had learned from +Aristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life, +_happiness_ must be its end.[767] All that is fundamental in the system +of Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little that +can be called new in his teaching. + +[Footnote 766: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.] + +[Footnote 767: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi] + +The grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus, _is the +attainment of a happy life_. "Philosophy," says he, "is the power by +which reason conducts men to happiness." Truth is a merely relative +thing, a variable quantity; and therefore the pursuit of truth for its +own sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute, +unchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. "We +choose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake of +pleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of +health."[768] That which is nominally right in morals, that which is +relatively good in human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by the +effects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right; +that which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. "The virtues are connate +with living pleasantly."[769] Pleasure (êdonê), then, is the great end +to be sought in human action. "Pleasure is the chief good, the beginning +and end of living happily."[770] + +[Footnote 768: "Fundamental Maxims," preserved in Diogenes Laertius, +"Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxx.] + +[Footnote 769: "Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of +the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxvii.] + +[Footnote 770: Id., ib.] + +The proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, "that +pleasure is the chief good," is truly characteristic. "All animals from +the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended with +pain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason. +Therefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain."[771] "All +men like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter and +pursue the former." "If happiness is present, we have every thing, and +when it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it."[772] +Virtue thus consists in man's doing deliberately what the animals do +instinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain. + +[Footnote 771: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxix.] + +[Footnote 772: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxvii.] + +"Every kind of pleasure" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, "alike +good," and alike proper. "If those things which make the pleasures of +debauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which +arise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and +pain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote +themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is +the chief evil) from any quarter."[773] Whilst, however, all pleasures +of the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good, +they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their +consequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and in +this, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his +philosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are: + +1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (êdonê en +kinêsei).[774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the +greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness +are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring +pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by +uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some +bitter fruits. + +[Footnote 773: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives +of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.] + +[Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxviii.] + +2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, +impassibility_ (êdonê katastêmatikê). This is a state, a "condition," +rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the +soul from confusion."[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the +happiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men." +"The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected." + +Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad,"[776] prudence +(phronêsis), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest +and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of +reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of +reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of +pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness +of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without +wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow +after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will +consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says +Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and +justly."[777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and the +ordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows +how to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation +hereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment. +Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a +means to an end, namely, the securing of happiness.[778] + +[Footnote 775: Id., ib.] + +[Footnote 776: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 7.] + +[Footnote 777: Ibid., No. 5.] + +[Footnote 778: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 141.] + +Social morality is, like private morality, founded upon _utility._ As +nothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing is +intrinsically just or unjust in social life. "Justice has no independent +existence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself +wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or +sustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this +character only because there is joined with it the fear of not escaping +those who are appointed to punish actions marked with this +character."[779] Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promote +each other's happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individual +depends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of his +ethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating +"the greatest happiness of the greatest number." + +If you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediate +interest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if your +general interest is secured by always observing it, you must make +momentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But "when, in +consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just +does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was +just... ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful."[780] So +that self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by the +performance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especially +to death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and all +contracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus. + +With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would +inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose +temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would +develop a refined selfishness--a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has +adorned with the name "tranquillity of mind--impassibility," +(ataraxia).[781] + +[Footnote 779: "Fundamental Maxims," Nos. 35, 36.] + +[Footnote 780: Ibid., No. 41.] + +[Footnote 781: It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether, +by making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encourage +what is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against any +such unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--"When we say that +pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the +debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think +who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else +interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from +pain, and the soul from confusion" ("Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes +Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxvii.). The most obvious tendency of this +doctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--a +selfishness which prefers one's own comfort and case to every other +consideration. + +As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided +both in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a +"sty." Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name +"Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of +sensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast +upon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to +the malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticism +seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him, +rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some +French and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are +inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal +man, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and +even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual +gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally +preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the +more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us, +would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make +the stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of +his philosophy."--Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.] + +To secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impassivity, it was +necessary to get rid of all superstitious fears of death, of +supernatural beings, and of a future retribution.[782] The chief causes +of man's misery are his illusions, his superstitions, and his +prejudices. "That which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of +men, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings +imperishable and happy (_i.e.,_ that they are gods), and that then our +thoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings; +they also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of +evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affect +them...." "The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being +emancipated from all these things."[783] And this emancipation is to be +secured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy which +explains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes all +supernatural powers. + +[Footnote 782: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. 1. 100-118.] + +[Footnote 783: Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of +the Philosophers," p. 453 (Bohn's edition).] + +That ignorance which occasions man's misery is two-fold, (i.) _Ignorance +of the external world, which leads to superstition._ All unexplained +phenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often to +malignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to a +Supreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for their +good or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly the +physics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from false +hopes and false fears.[784] (ii.) _Ignorance of the nature of man, of +his faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge_, +from whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need of +Psychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explain +the origin of man's illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of his +fears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of his +existence. + +[Footnote 784: "The study of physics contributes more than any thing +else to the tranquillity and happiness of life."--Diogenes Laertius, +"Lives," bk. x. ch. xxiv. "For thus it is that _fear_ restrains all men, +because they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, of +which effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore think +that they are wrought by a _divine_ power. For which reasons, when we +have clearly seen that _nothing can be produced from nothing_, we shall +have a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, and +shall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how all +things are done without the agency of the gods."--Lucretius, "On the +Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 145-150.] + +Physics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus would +tolerate as "conducive to the happiness of man." The pursuit of truth +for its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the true +from the false, the good from the bad, on _à priori_ grounds, must be +banished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theology +must be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superstitious fears. The +idea of God's taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishing +the evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics and +Psychology are the most useful, because the most "agreeable," the most +"comfortable" sciences. + +EPICUREAN PHYSICS. + +In his physical theories Epicurus followed Leucippus and Democritus. He +expounds these theories in his letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, which +are preserved in Diogenes Laertius.[785] We shall be guided mainly by +his own statements, and when his meaning is obscure, or his exposition +is incomplete, we shall avail ourselves of the more elaborate statements +of Lucretius,[786] who is uniformly faithful to the doctrine of +Epicurus, and universally regarded as its best expounder. + +The fundamental principle of his philosophy is the ancient maxim--"_de +nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil fosse reverti_;" but instead of employing +this maxim in the sense in which it is used by Parmenides, Anaxagoras, +Empedocles, and others, to prove there must be something self-existent +and eternal, or in other words, "that nothing which once was not can +ever of itself come into being," he uses it to disprove a divine +creation, and even presents the maxim in an altered form--viz., "nothing +is ever _divinely_ generated from nothing;"[787] and he thence concludes +that the world was by no means made for us by _divine_ power.[788] +Nature is eternal. "The universal whole always was such as it now is, +and always will be such." "The universe also is infinite, for that which +is finite has a limit, but the universe has no limit."[789] + +[Footnote 785: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.] + +[Footnote 786: "De Natura Rerum."] + +[Footnote 787: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i.] + +[Footnote 788: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 789: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxiv.] + +The two great principles of nature are a _vacuum_, and a _plenum._ The +plenum is _body_, or tangible nature; the vacuum is _space_, or +intangible nature. "We know by the evidences of the senses (which are +our only rule of reasoning) that _bodies_ have a real existence, and we +infer from the evidence of the senses that the vacuum has a real +existence; for if space have no real existence, there would be nothing +in which bodies can move, as we see they really do move. Let us add to +this reflection that one can not conceive, either in virtue of +perception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality +peculiar to all beings, which is not either an attribute, or an +accident, of the body or of the vacuum."[790] + +Of bodies some are "combinations"--concrete bodies--and some are +primordial "elements," out of which combinations are formed. These +primordial elements, out of which the universe is generated, are +"_atoms_" (atomoi). These atoms are "the first principles" and "seeds" +of all things.[791] They are "_infinite_ in number," and, as their name +implies, they are "_infrangible" "unchangeable_" and +"_indestructible."_[792] Matter is, therefore, not infinitely divisible; +there must be a point at which division ends.[793] + +The only qualities of atoms are _form_, _magnitude_, and _density._ All +the other sensible qualities of matter--the secondary qualities--as +color, odor, sweetness, bitterness, etc.--are necessarily inherent in +form. All secondary qualities are changeable, but the primary atoms are +unchangeable; "for in the dissolution of combined bodies there must be +something _solid_ and _indestructible,_ of such a kind that it will not +change, either into what does not exist, or out of what does not exist, +but the change results from a simple displacement of parts, which is the +most usual case, or from an addition or subtraction of particles."[794] + +[Footnote 790: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxiv.] + +[Footnote 791: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxv.] + +[Footnote 792: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxiv.] + +[Footnote 793: Id., ib.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. +616-620.] + +[Footnote 794: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxiv.] + +The atoms are not all of one _form_, but of different forms suited to +the production of different substances by combination; some are square, +some triangular, some smooth and spherical, some are hooked with points. +They are also diversified in _magnitude_ and _density_. The number of +original forms is "incalculably varied," but not infinite. "Every +variety of forms contains an infinitude of atoms, but there is not, for +that reason, an infinitude of forms; it is only the number of them which +is beyond computation."[795] To assert that atoms are of every kind of +form, magnitude, and density, would be "to contradict the phenomena; +"for experience teaches us that objects have a finite magnitude, and +form necessarily supposes limitation. + +[Footnote 795: Id., ib.] + +A variety of these primordial forms enter into the composition of all +sensible objects, because sensible objects possess different qualities, +and these diversified qualities can only result from the combination of +different original forms. "The earth has, in itself, primary atoms from +which springs, rolling forth cool _water_, incessantly recruit the +immense sea; it has also atoms from which _fire_ arises.... Moreover, +the earth contains atoms from which it can raise up rich _corn_ and +cheerful _groves_ for the tribes of men...." So that "no object in +nature is constituted of one kind of elements, and whatever possesses in +itself must numerous powers and energies, thus demonstrates that it +contains more numerous kinds of primary particles,"[796] or primordial +"seeds of things." + +"The atoms are in a continual state of _motion_" and "have moved with +_equal rapidity_ from all eternity, since it is evident the vacuum can +offer no resistance to the heaviest, any more than the lightest." The +primary and original movement of all atoms is _in straight lines, by +virtue of their own weight_. The vacuum separates all atoms one from +another, at greater or less distances, and they preserve their own +peculiar motion in the densest substances.[797] + +[Footnote 796: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 582-600.] + +[Footnote 797: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxiv.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 80-92.] + +And now the grand crucial question arises--_How do atoms combine so as +to form concrete bodies?_ If they move in straight lines, and with equal +rapidity from all eternity, then they can never unite so as to form +concrete substances. They can only coalesce by deviating from a straight +line.[798] How are they made to deviate from a straight line? This +deviation must be introduced _arbitrarily_, or by some _external cause_. +And inasmuch as Epicurus admits of no causes "but space and matter," and +rejects all divine or supernatural interposition, the _new_ movement +must be purely arbitrary. They deviate _spontaneously,_ and of their own +accord. "The system of nature immediately appears _as a free agent_, +released from tyrant masters, to do every thing of itself spontaneously, +without the help of the gods."[799] The manner in which Lucretius proves +this doctrine is a good example of the petitio principii. He assumes, in +opposition to the whole spirit and tendency of the Epicurean philosophy, +that man has "a free will," and then argues that if man who is nothing +but an aggregation of atoms, can "turn aside and alter his own +movements," the primary elements, of which his soul is composed, must +have some original spontaneity. "If all motion is connected and +dependent, and a new movement perpetually arises from a former one in a +certain order, and if the primary elements do not produce any +commencement of motion by deviating from the straight line to break the +laws of fate, so that cause may not follow cause in infinite succession, +_whence comes this freedom of will_ to all animals in the world? whence, +I say, is this liberty of action wrested from the fates, by means of +which we go wheresoever inclination leads each of us? whence is it that +we ourselves turn aside, and alter our motions, not at any fixed time, +nor in any fixed part of space, but just as our own minds prompt?.... +Wherefore we must necessarily confess that the same is the case with the +seeds of matter, and there is some other cause besides strokes and +weight [resistance and density] from which this power [of free movement] +is innate in them, since we see that _nothing is produced from +nothing_."[800] Besides form, extension, and density, Epicurus has found +another inherent or essential quality of matter or atoms, namely, +"_spontaneous" motion._ + +[Footnote 798: "At some time, though at no fixed and determinate time, +and at some point, though at no fixed and determinate point, they turn +aside from the right line, but only so far as you can call the least +possible deviation."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. ii. l. +216-222.] + +[Footnote 799: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things" bk. ii. 1. +1092-1096.] + +[Footnote 800: Id., ib., bk. ii. l. 250-290.] + +By a slight "voluntary" deflection from the straight line, atoms are now +brought into contact with each other; "they strike against each other, +and by the percussion new movements and new complications +arise"--"movements from high to low, from low to high, and horizontal +movements to and fro, in virtue of this reciprocal percussion." The +atoms "jostling about, _of their own accord_, in infinite modes, were +often brought together confusedly, irregularly, and to no purpose, but +at length they _successfully coalesced_; at least, such of them as were +thrown together suddenly became, in succession, the beginnings of great +things--as earth, and air, and sea, and heaven."[801] + +[Footnote 801: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. ii. l. +1051-1065.] + +And now Lucretius shall describe the formation of the different parts of +the world according to the cosmogony of Epicurus. We quote from Good's +translation: + + But from this boundless mass of matter first + How heaven, and earth, and ocean, sun, and moon, + Rose in nice order, now the muse shall tell. + For never, doubtless, from result of thought, + Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds + First harmonize, or move with powers precise. + But countless crowds in countless manners urged, + From time eternal, by intrinsic weight + And ceaseless repercussion, to combine + In all the possibilities of forms, + Of actions, and connections, and exert + In every change some effort to create-- + Reared the rude frame at length, abruptly reared, + Which, when once gendered, must the basis prove + Of things sublime; and whence eventual rose + Heaven, earth, and ocean, and the tribes of sense. + + Yet now nor sun on fiery wheel was seen + Riding sublime, nor stars adorned the pole, + Nor heaven, nor earth, nor air, nor ocean lived, + Nor aught of prospect mortal sight surveyed; + But one vast chaos, boisterous and confused. + Yet order hence began; congenial parts + Parts joined congenial; and the rising world + Gradual evolved: its mighty members each + From each divided, and matured complete + From seeds appropriate; whose wild discortderst, + Reared by their strange diversities of form, + With ruthless war so broke their proper paths, + Their motions, intervals, conjunctions, weights, + And repercussions, nought of genial act + Till now could follow, nor the seeds themselves + E'en though conjoined in mutual bonds, co + Thus air, secreted, rose o'er laboring earth; + Secreted ocean flowed; and the pure fire, + Secreted too, toward ether sprang sublime. + + But first the seeds terrene, since ponderous most + And most perplext, in close embraces clung, + And towards the centre conglobating sunk. + And as the bond grew firmer, ampler forth + Pressed they the fluid essences that reared + Sun, moon, and stars, and main, and heaven's high wall. + For those of atoms lighter far consist, + Subtiler, and more rotund than those of earth. + Whence, from the pores terrene, with foremost haste + Rushed the bright ether, towering high, and swift + Streams of fire attracting as it flowed. + + Then mounted, next, the base of sun and moon, + 'Twixt earth and ether, in the midway air + Rolling their orbs; for into neither these + Could blend harmonious, since too light with earth + To sink deprest, while yet too ponderous far + To fly with ether toward the realms extreme: + So 'twixt the two they hovered; _vital_ there + Moving forever, parts of the vast whole; + As move forever in the frame of man + Some active organs, while some oft repose.[802] + +[Footnote 802: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," b. v. l. 431-498] + +After explaining the origin and causes of the varied celestial +phenomena, he proceeds to give an account of the production of plants, +animals, and man: + + Once more return we to the world's pure prime, + Her fields yet liquid, and the tribes survey + First she put forth, and trusted to the winds. + + And first the race she reared of verdant herbs, + Glistening o'er every hill; the fields at large + Shone with the verdant tincture, and the trees + Felt the deep impulse, and with outstretched arms + Broke from their bonds rejoicing. As the down + Shoots from the winged nations, or from beasts + Bristles or hair, so poured the new-born earth + Plants, fruits, and herbage. Then, in order next, + Raised she the sentient tribes, in various modes, + By various powers distinguished: for not heaven + Down dropped them, nor from ocean's briny waves + Sprang they, terrestrial sole; whence, justly _Earth_ + Claims the dear name of mother, since alone + Flowed from herself whate'er the sight surveys. + + E'en now oft rears she many a sentient tribe + By showers and sunshine ushered into day.[803] + Whence less stupendous tribes should then have risen + More, and of ampler make, herself new-formed, + In flower of youth, and _Ether_ all mature.[804] + + Of these birds first, of wing and plume diverse, + Broke their light shells in spring-time: as in spring + Still breaks the grasshopper his curious web, + And seeks, spontaneous, foods and vital air. + + Then rushed the ranks of mortals; for the soil, + Exuberant then, with warmth and moisture teemed. + So, o'er each scene appropriate, myriad wombs + Shot, and expanded, to the genial sward + By fibres fixt; and as, in ripened hour, + Their liquid orbs the daring foetus broke + Of breath impatient, nature here transformed + Th' assenting earth, and taught her opening veins + With juice to flow lacteal; as the fair + Now with sweet milk o'erflows, whose raptured breast + First hails the stranger-babe, since all absorbed + Of nurture, to the genial tide converts. + Earth fed the nursling, the warm ether clothed, + And the soft downy grass his couch compressed.[805] + +[Footnote 803: The doctrine of "spontaneous generations" is still more +explicitly announced in book ii. "Manifest appearances compel us to +believe that animals, though possessed of sense, are generated from +senseless atoms. For you may observe living worms proceed from foul +dung, when the earth, moistened with immoderate showers, has contracted +a kind of putrescence; and you may see all other things change +themselves, similarly, into other things."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of +Things," bk. i. l. 867-880.] + +[Footnote 804: Ether is the father, earth the mother of all organized +being.--Id., ib., bk. i. l. 250-255.] + +[Footnote 805: Id., ib., bk. v. l. 795-836.] + +A state of pure savagism, or rather of mere animalism, was the primitive +condition of man. He wandered naked in the woods, feeding on acorns and +wild fruits, and quenched his thirst at the "echoing waterfalls," in +company with the wild beast. + +Through the remaining part of book v. Lucretius describes how speech was +invented; how society originated, and governments were instituted; how +civilization commenced; and how religion arose out of ignorance of +natural causes; how the arts of life were discovered, and how science +sprang up. And all this, as he is careful to tell us, without any divine +instruction, or any assistance from the gods. + +Such are the physical theories of the Epicureans. The primordial +elements of matter are infinite, eternal, and self-moved. After ages +upon ages of chaotic strife, the universe at length arose out of an +_infinite_ number of atoms, and a _finite_ number of forms, by a +fortuitous combination. Plants, animals, and man were spontaneously +generated from ether and earth. Languages, society, governments, arts +were gradually developed. And all was achieved simply by blind, +unconscious nature-forces, without any designing, presiding, and +governing Intelligence--that is, without a God. + +The evil genius which presided over the method of Epicurus, and +perverted all his processes of thought, is clearly apparent. The end of +his philosophy was not the discovery of truth. He does not commence his +inquiry into the principles or causes which are adequate to the +explanation of the universe, with an unprejudiced mind. He everywhere +develops a malignant hostility to religion, and the avowed object of his +physical theories is to rid the human mind of all fear of supernatural +powers--that is, of all fear of God.[806] "The phenomena which men +observe to occur in the earth and the heavens, when, as often happens, +they are perplexed with fearful thoughts, overawe their minds with a +dread of the gods, and humble and depress them to the earth. For +ignorance of natural causes obliges them to refer all things to the +power of the divinities, and to resign the dominion of the world to +them; because of those effects they can by no means see the origin, and +accordingly suppose that they are produced by divine influence."[807] + +[Footnote 806: "Let us trample religion underfoot, that the victory +gained over it may place us on an equality with heaven" (book i.). See +Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxiv. pp. +453,454 (Bohn's edition); Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. +l. 54-120.] + +[Footnote 807: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. vi. l. 51-60.] + +To "expel these fancies from the mind" as "inconsistent with its +tranquillity and opposed to human happiness," is the end, and, as +Lucretius believes, the glory of the Epicurean philosophy. To accomplish +this, God must be placed at an infinite distance from the universe, and +must be represented as indifferent to every thing that transpires within +it. We "must beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that Being +we ought to suppose _exempt from all occupation_, and perfectly +happy,"[808]--that is, absolutely impassible. God did not make the +world, and he does not govern the world. There is no evidence of design +or intelligence in its structure, and "such is the faultiness with which +it stands affected, that it can not be the work of a Divine power."[809] + +Epicurus is, then, an unmistakable Atheist. He did not admit a God in +any rational sense. True, he _professed_ to believe in gods, but +evidently in a very equivocal manner, and solely to escape the popular +condemnation. "They are not pure spirits, for there is no spirit in the +atomic theory; they are not bodies, for where are the bodies that we may +call gods? In this embarrassment, Epicurus, compelled to acknowledge +that the human race believes in the existence of gods, addresses himself +to an old theory of Democritus--that is, he appeals to dreams. As in +dreams there are images that act upon and determine in us agreeable or +painful sensations, without proceeding from exterior bodies, so the gods +are images similar to those of dreams, but greater, having the human +form; images which are not precisely bodies, and yet not deprived of +materiality which are whatever you please, but which, in short, must be +admitted, since the human race believes in gods, and since the +universality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a +cause."[810] + +[Footnote 808: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. +ch. xxv.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 55-60.] + +[Footnote 809: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. v. l. 195-200.] + +[Footnote 810: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 431.] + +It is needless to offer any criticism on the reasoning of Epicurus. One +fact will have obviously presented itself to the mind of the reflecting +reader. He starts with atoms having form, magnitude, and density, and +essays to construct a universe; but he is obliged to be continually +introducing, in addition, a "_nameless something_" which "remains in +secret," to help him out in the explanation of the phenomena.[811] He +makes life to arise out of dead matter, sense out of senseless atoms, +consciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, without an +adequate cause, and thus violates the fundamental principle from which +he starts, "_that nothing can arise from nothing_." + +EPICUREAN PSYCHOLOGY. + +In the system of Epicurus, the soul is regarded as corporeal or +material, like the body; they form, together, one nature or substance. +The soul is composed of atoms exceedingly diminutive, smooth, and round, +and connected with or diffused through the veins, viscera, and nerves. +The substance of the soul is not to be regarded as simple and +uncompounded; its constituent parts are _aura_, heat, and air. These are +not sufficient, however, even in the judgment of Epicurus, to account +for _sensation_; they are not adequate to generate sensible motives such +as revolve any thoughts in the mind. "A certain fourth nature, or +substance, must, therefore, necessarily be added to these, _that is +wholly without a name_; it is a substance, however, than which nothing +exists more active or more subtile, nor is any thing more essentially +composed of small and smooth elementary particles; and it is this +substance which first distributes sensible motions through the +members."[812] + +[Footnote 811: As, _e.g._, Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. +iii. l. 260-290.] + +[Footnote 812: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 237-250.] + +Epicurus is at great pains to prove that the soul is material; and it +can not be denied that he marshals his arguments with great skill. +Modern materialism may have added additional illustrations, but it has +contributed no new lines of proof. The weapons are borrowed from the old +arsenal, and they are not wielded with any greater skill than they were +by Epicurus himself, I. The soul and the body act and react upon each +other; and mutual reaction can only take place between substances of +similar nature. "Such effects can only be produced by _touch_, and touch +can not take place without _body_."[813] 2. The mind is produced +together with the body, it grows up along with it, and waxes old at the +same time with it.[814] 3. The mind is diseased along with the body, "it +loses its faculties by material causes, as intoxication, or by severe +blows; and is sometimes, by a heavy lethargy, borne down into a deep +eternal sleep."[815] 4. The mind, like the body, is healed by medicines, +which proves that it exists only as a mortal substance.[816] 5. The mind +does not always, and at the same time, continue _entire_ and +_unimpaired_, some faculties decay before the others, "the substance of +the soul is therefore divided." On all these grounds the soul must be +deemed mortal; it is dissolved along with the body, and has no conscious +existence after death. + +[Footnote 813: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l. +138-168.] + +[Footnote 814: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 444-460.] + +[Footnote 815: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 438-490.] + +[Footnote 816: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 500-520.] + +Such being the nature of the soul, inasmuch as it is material, all its +knowledge must be derived from sensation. The famous doctrine of +perception, as taught by Epicurus, is grounded upon this pre-supposition +that the soul is corporeal. "The eidôla aporroiai--_imagines, simulacra +rerum, etc_., are, like pellicles, continually flying off from objects; +and these material 'likenesses,' diffusing themselves everywhere in the +air, are propelled to the perceptive organs." These images of things +coming in contact with the senses produce _sensation_ (aisthêsis). A +sensation may be considered either as regards its object, or as regards +him who experiences it. As regards him who experiences it, it is simply +a passive affection, an agreeable or disagreeable feeling, passion, or +sentiment (to pathos). But along with sensation there is inseparably +associated some knowledge of the object which excites sensation; and it +is for this reason that Epicurus marked the intimate relation of these +two phenomena by giving them analogous names. Because the second +phenomenon is joined to the first, he calls it +epaisthêsis--_perception_. It is sensation viewed especially in regard +to its object--_representative sensation_, or the "sensible idea" of +modern philosophy. It is from perception that we draw our general ideas +by a kind of prolepsis (prolêpsis) an anticipation or laying hold by +reason of that which is implied in sensation. Now all sensations are +alike true in so far as they are sensations, and error arises from false +reasoning about the testimony of sense. All knowledge is purely relative +and contingent, and there is no such thing as necessary and absolute +truth. + +The system of Epicurus is thus a system of pure materialism, but not a +system of materialism drawn, as a logical consequence, from a careful +and unprejudiced study of the whole phenomena of mind. His openly avowed +design is to deliver men from the fear of death, and rid them of all +apprehension of a future retribution. "Did men but know that there was a +fixed limit to their woes, they would be able, in some measure, to defy +the religious fictions and menaces of the poets; but now, since we must +fear eternal punishment at death, there is no mode, no means of +resisting them."[817] To emancipate men from "these terrors of the +mind," they must be taught "that the soul is mortal, and dissolves with +the body"--that "death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is +devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to +us."[818] Starting with the fixed determination to prove that + + "Death is nothing, and naught after death," + +he will not permit any mental phenomena to suggest to him the idea of an +incorporeal spiritual substance. Matter, under any form known to +Epicurus, is confessedly insufficient to explain sensation and thought; +a "nameless something" must be _supposed_. But may not "that principle +which _lies entirely hid, and remains in secret_"[819]--and about which +even Epicurus does not know any thing--be a spiritual, an _immaterial_ +principle? For aught that he knows it may as properly be called +"_spirit_" as matter. May not _sensation_ and _cognition_ be the result +of the union of matter and spirit; and if so, may not their mutual +affections, their common sympathies, be the necessary conditions of +sensation and cognition in the present life? A reciprocal relation +between body and mind appears in all mental phenomena. A certain +proportion in this relation is called mental health. A deviation from it +is termed disease. This proportion is by no means an equilibrium, but +the perfect adaptation of the body, without injury to its integrity, to +the purposes of the mind. And if this be so, all the arguments of +materialism fall to the ground. + +[Footnote 817: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 100-118.] + +[Footnote 818: Diogenes Laertius, Maxim 2, in "Lives of the +Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.] + +[Footnote 819: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l. +275-280.] + +The concluding portion of the third book, in which Lucretius discourses +on _death_, is a mournful picture of the condition of the heathen mind +before Christianity "brought life and immortality fully to light." It +comes to us, like a voice from the grave of two thousand years, to prove +they were "without hope." To be delivered from the fear of future +retribution, they would sacrifice the hope of an immortal life. To +extintinguish guilt they would annihilate the soul. The only way in +which Lucretius can console man in prospect of death is, by reminding +him that he will _escape the ills of life_. + + "'But thy dear home shall never greet thee more! + No more the best of wives!--thy babes beloved, + Whose haste half-met thee, emulous to snatch + The dulcet kiss that roused thy secret soul, + Again shall never hasten!--nor thine arm, + With deeds heroic, guard thy country's weal!-- + Oh mournful, mournful fate!' thy friends exclaim! + 'One envious hour of these invalued joys + Robs thee forever!--But they add not here, + '_It robs thee, too, of all desire of joy_'-- + A truth, once uttered, that the mind would free + From every dread and trouble. 'Thou art safe + The sleep of death protects thee, _and secures + From all the unnumbered woes of mortal life!_ + While we, alas! the sacred urn around + That holds thine ashes, shall insatiate weep, + Nor time destroy the eternal grief we feel!' + What, then, has death, if death be mere repose, + And quiet only in a peaceful grave,-- + What has it thus to mar this life of man?"[820] + +[Footnote 820: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l. +906-926.] + +This is all the comfort that Epicureanism can offer; and if "the wretch +still laments the approach of death," she addresses him "with voice +severe"-- + + "Vile coward! dry thine eyes-- + Hence with thy snivelling sorrows, and depart!" + +It is evident that such a system of philosophy outrages the purest and +noblest sentiments of humanity, and, in fact, condemns itself. It was +born of selfishness and social degeneracy, and could perpetuate itself +only in an age of corruption, because it inculcated the lawfulness of +sensuality and the impunity of injustice. Its existence at this precise +period in Grecian history forcibly illustrates the truth, that Atheism +is a disease of the heart rather than the head. It seeks to set man free +to follow his own inclinations, by ridding him of all faith in a +Divinity and in an immortal life, and thus exonerating him from all +accountability and all future retribution. But it failed to perceive +that, in the most effectual manner, it annihilated all real liberty, all +true nobleness, and made of man an abject slave. + +STOICISM. + +The Stoical school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who flourished B.C. +290. He taught in the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch; and his disciples +thence derived the name of Stoics. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes (B.C. +260); and Cleanthes by Chrysippus (B.C. 240), whose vigorous intellect +gave unity and completeness to the Stoical philosophy. He is reported to +have said to Cleanthes,--"Give me your doctrines, and I will find the +demonstrations."[821] + +[Footnote 821: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. vii.] + +None of the writings of the early Stoics, save a "Hymn to Jupiter," by +Cleanthes, have survived. We are chiefly indebted to Diogenes +Laertius[822] and Cicero[823] for an insight into their system. The Hymn +of Cleanthes sheds some light on their Theology, and their moral +principles are exhibited in "The Fragments" of Epictetus, and "The Life +and Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius. + +[Footnote 822: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.] + +[Footnote 823: "De Fm.," and "De Natura Deorum."] + +The philosophy of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was mainly a +philosophy of life--that is, a _moral_ philosophy. The manner in which +they approached the study of morals, and the principles upon which they +grounded morality, were, however, essentially different. + +The grand object of Epicurus was to make the current of life flow on as +comfortably as possible, without any distracting thoughts of the past or +any disturbing visions of the future. He therefore starts with this +fundamental principle, that the true philosophy of life is to enjoy +one's self--the aim of existence is to be happy. Whatever in a man's +beliefs or conduct tends to secure happiness is _right_; whatever +awakens uneasiness, apprehension, or fear, is _wrong_. And inasmuch as +the idea of a Divine Creator and Governor of the universe, and the +belief in a future life and retribution, are uncomfortable thoughts, +exciting superstitious fears, they ought to be rejected. The Physics and +the Psychology of Epicurus are thus the natural outgrowth of his +Morality. + +Zeno was evidently a more earnest, serious, and thoughtful man. He +cherished a nobler ideal of life than to suppose "man must do +voluntarily, what the brute does instinctively--eschew pain, and seek +pleasure." He therefore seeks to ascertain whether there be not some +"principle of nature," or some law of nature, which determines what is +right in human action--whether there be not some light under which, on +contemplating an action, we may at once pronounce upon its intrinsic +_rightness_, or otherwise. This he believes he has found in the +_universal reason_ which fashioned, and permeates, and vivifies the +universe, and is the light and life of the human soul. The chief good +is, confessedly, to live according to nature; which is to live according +to virtue, for nature leads us to that point.... For our individual +natures are all part of the universal nature; on which account, the +chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to one's own nature, and +to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of +mankind (the universal conscience of our race) forbids. _That common law +is identical with_ RIGHT REASON _which pervades every thing, being the +same with Jupiter_ (Zeus), _who is the regulator and chief manager of +all existing things_.[824] The foundation of the ethical system of the +Stoics is thus laid in their philosophy of nature--their Physiology and +Psychology. If, therefore, we would apprehend the logical connection and +unity of Stoicism, we must follow their order of thought--that is, we +must commence with their + +PHYSIOLOGY. + +Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics held "that there are two +general principles in the universe--the _passive_ principle (to +naschon), which is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality, +and the _active_ principle (to poioun), which is the reason existing in +the passive, that is to say, God. For that He, being eternal, and +existing throughout all matter, makes every thing."[825] This Divine +Reason, acting upon matter, originates the necessary and unchangeable +laws which govern matter--laws which the Stoics called logoi +spermatikoi--generating reasons or causes of things. The laws of the +world are, like eternal reason, necessary and immutable; hence the +eimarmenê--the _Destiny_ of the Stoics, which is also one of the names +of the Deity.[826] But by Destiny the Stoics could not understand a +blind unconscious necessity; it is rather the highest reason in the +universe. "Destiny (eimarmenê) is a connected (eiromenê) cause of +things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated."[827] + +[Footnote 824: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. liii.] + +[Footnote 825: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.] + +[Footnote 826: "They teach that God is unity, and that he is called +Mind, and _Fate_, and Jupiter."--Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.] + +[Footnote 827: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. lxxiv.] + +These two principles are not, however, regarded by the Stoics as having +a distinct, separate, and independent existence. One is substance +(ousia); the other is quality (poios). The primordial matter is the +passive ground of all existence--the original substratum for the Divine +activity. The Divine Reason is the active or formative energy which +dwells within, and is essentially united to, the primary substance. The +Stoics, therefore, regarded all existence as reducible, in its last +analysis, to _one substance_, which on the side of its passivity and +capacity of change, they called _hyle_ (ylê);[828] and on the side of +its changeless energy and immutable order, they called God. The +corporeal world--physical nature--is "a peculiar manifestation" of God, +generated from his own substance, and, after certain periods, absorbed +in himself. Thus God, considered in the evolution of His power, is +nature. And nature, as attached to its immanent principle, is called +God.[829] The fundamental doctrine of the Stoics was a spiritual, ideal, +intellectual pantheism, of which the proper formula is, _All things are +God, but God is not all things_. + +[Footnote 828: Or "matter." A good deal of misapprehension has arisen +from confounding the intellectual ylê of Aristotle and the Stoics with +the gross physical "matter" of the modern physicist. By "matter" we now +understand that which is corporeal, tangible, sensible; whereas by ylê, +Aristotle and the Stoics (who borrowed the term from him) understood +that which is incorporeal, intangible, and inapprehensible to sense,--an +"unknown something" which must necessarily be _supposed_ as the +condition of the existence of things. The _formal_ cause of Aristotle is +"the substance and essence"--the primary nature of things, on which all +their properties depend. The _material_ cause is "the matter or subject" +through which the primary nature manifests itself. Unfortunately the +term "material" misleads the modern thinker. He is in danger of +supposing the _hyle_ of Aristotle to be something sensible and physical, +whereas it is an intellectual principle whose inherence is implied in +any physical thing. It is something distinct from _body_, and has none +of those properties we are now accustomed to ascribe to matter. Body, +corporeity, is the result of the union of "hyle" and "form." Stobaeus +thus expounds the doctrine of Aristotle: Form alone, separate from +matter (ylê) is _incorporeal_; so matter alone, separated from form, is +not _body_. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both +these--matter and form--to make the substance of body. Every individual +substance is thus a totality of matter and form--a sinolon. + +The Stoics taught that God is _oneliness_ (Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of +the Philosophers," bk. vii. ch. lxviii.); that he is _eternal_ and +_immortal_ (bk. vii. ch. lxxii.); he could not, therefore, be corporeal, +for "body _infinite, divisible,_ and _perishable_" (bk. vii. ch. +lxxvii.). "All the parts of the world are perishable, for they change +one into another; therefore the world is perishable" (bk. vii. ch. +lxx.). The Deity is not, therefore, absolutely identified with the world +by the Stoics. He permeates all things, creates and dissolves all +things, and is, therefore, _more_ than all things. The world is finite; +God is infinite.] + +[Footnote 829: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. lxx.] + +Schwegler affirms that, in physics, the Stoics, for the most part, +followed Heraclitus, and especially "carried out the proposition that +nothing incorporeal exists; every thing is essentially _corporeal_." The +pantheism of Zeno is therefore "_materialistic._"[830] This is not a +just representation of the views of the early Stoics, and can not be +sustained by a fair interpretation of their teaching. They say that +principles and elements differ from each other. Principles have no +generation or beginning, and will have no end; but elements may be +destroyed. Also, that elements have bodies, and have forms, _but +principles have no bodies, and no forms_.[831] Principles are, +therefore, _incorporeal._ Furthermore, Cicero tells us that they taught +that the universal harmony of the world resulted from all things being +"contained by one _Divine_ SPIRIT;"[832] and also, that reason in man is +"nothing else but part of the _Divine_ SPIRIT merged into a human +body."[833] It thus seems evident that the Stoics made a distinction +between corruptible _elements_ (fire, air, earth, water) and +incorruptible _principles_, by which and out of which elements were +generated, and also between corporeal and incorporeal substances. + +[Footnote 830: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 140.] + +[Footnote 831: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. lxviii.] + +[Footnote 832: "De Natura Deorum," bk. ii. ch. xiii.] + +[Footnote 833: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. xxxi.] + +On a careful collation of the fragmentary remains of the early Stoics, +we fancy we catch glimpses of the theory held by some modern pantheists, +that the material elements, "having body and form," are a vital +transformation of the Divine substance; and that the forces of +nature--"the generating causes or reasons of things" (logoi +spermatikoi)--are a conscious transmutation of the Divine energy. This +theory is more than hinted in the following passages, which we slightly +transpose from the order in which they stand in Diogenes Laertius, +without altering their meaning. "They teach that the Deity was in the +beginning by _himself_".... that "first of all, he made the four +elements, fire, water, air, and earth." "The fire is the highest, and +that is called æther, in which, first of all, the sphere was generated +in which the fixed stars are set...; after that the air; then the water; +and the sediment, as it were, of all, is the earth, which is placed in +the centre of the rest." "He turned into water the whole substance which +pervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the product, so, too, +He, being the seminal principle of the world, remained still in +moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production +of things which were to come after."[834] The Deity thus draws the +universe out of himself, transmuting the divine substance into body and +form. "God is a being of a certain quality, having for his peculiar +manifestation universal substance. He is a being imperishable, and who +never had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and order +that we see; and who at certain periods of time _absorbs all substance +in himself and then reproduces it from himself_."[835] And now, in the +last analysis, it would seem as though every thing is resolved into +_force_. God and the world are _power, and its manifestation_, and these +are ultimately one. "This identification of God and the world, according +to which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the universe as but +a period in the development of God, renders their remaining doctrine +concerning the world very simple. Every thing in the world seemed to be +permeated by the Divine life, and was regarded as the flowing out of +this most perfect life through certain channels, until it returns, in a +necessary circle, back to itself."[836] + +[Footnote 834: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. lxviii., lxix.] + +[Footnote 835: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxx.] + +[Footnote 836: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 141.] + +The God of the Stoics is not, however, a mere principle of life +vitalizing nature, but an _intelligent_ principle directing nature; and, +above all, a _moral_ principle, governing the human race. "God is a +living being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his +happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil; having a foreknowledge of +the world, and of all that is in the world."[837] He is also the +gracious Providence which cares for the individual as well as for the +whole; and he is the author of that natural law which commands the good +and prohibits the bad. "He made men to this end that they might be +happy; as becomes his fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil +in those things which are in our own power."[838] The Providence and +Fatherhood of God are strikingly presented in the "Hymn of Cleanthes" to +Jupiter-- + +[Footnote 837: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. lxxii.] + +[Footnote 838: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. ch. xxiv.] + + Most glorious of the immortal Powers above! + O thou of many names! mysterious Jove: + For evermore almighty! Nature's source! + Thou governest all things in their order'd course! + All hail to thee! since, innocent of blame, + E'en mortal creatures may address thy name; + For all that breathe, and creep the lowly earth, + Echo thy being with reflected birth-- + Thee will I sing, thy strength for aye resound: + The universe, that rolls this globe around, + Moves wheresoe'er thy plastic influence guides, + And, ductile, owns the god whose arm presides. + The lightnings are thy ministers of ire; + The double-forked and ever-living fire; + In thy unconquerable hands they glow, + And at the flash all nature quakes below. + Thus, thunder-armed, thou dost creation draw + To one immense, inevitable law: + And, with the various mass of breathing souls, + Thy power is mingled, and thy spirit rolls. + Dread genius of creation! all things bow + To thee: the universal monarch thou! + + Nor aught is done without thy wise control, + On earth, or sea, or round the ethereal pole, + Save when the wicked, in their frenzy blind, + Act o'er the follies of a senseless mind, + Thou curb'st th' excess; confusion, to thy sight, + Moves regular; th' unlovely scene is bright. + Thy hand, educing good from evil, brings + To one apt harmony the strife of things. + One ever-during law still binds the whole, + Though shunned, resisted, by the sinner's soul. + Wretches! while still they course the glittering prize + The law of God eludes their ears and eyes. + Life, then, were virtue, did they thus obey; + But wide from life's chief good they headlong stray. + Now glory's arduous toils the breast inflame; + Now avarice thirsts, insensible of shame; + Now sloth unnerves them in voluptuous ease, + And the sweet pleasures of the body please. + With eager haste they rush the gulf within, + And their whole souls are centred in their sin. + But, oh, great Jove! by whom all good is given! + Dweller with lightnings and the clouds of heaven! + Save from their dreadful error lost mankind! + Father! disperse these shadows of the mind! + Give them thy pure and righteous law to know; + Wherewith thy justice governs all below. + Thus honored by the knowledge of thy way, + Shall men that honor to thyself repay; + And bid thy mighty works in praises ring, + As well befits a mortal's lips to sing: + More blest, nor men, nor heavenly powers can be, + Than when their songs are of thy law and thee.[839] + +[Footnote 839: Sir C. A. Elton's version, published in "Specimens of +Ancient Poets," edited by William Peters, A. M., Christ Church, Oxford.] + +PSYCHOLOGY. + +As in the world there are two principles, the passive and the active, so +in the understanding there are two elements: a passive +element--_sensation_, and an active element--_reason_. + +All knowledge commences with the phenomena of sensation (aisthêsis). +This produces in the soul an image (phantasia), which corresponds to the +exterior object, and which Chrysippus regarded as a modification of the +mind (alloiôsis).[840] + +Associate with sensibility is thought--the faculty of general ideas--the +orthos logos, or right reason, as the supreme power and the guiding +light of humanity. This active principle is of divine origin, "a part or +shred of the Divinity." + +[Footnote 840: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. xxxiv.] + +This "right reason," or "common reason," is the source and criterion of +all truth; "for our individual natures are all parts of the universal +nature," and, therefore, all the dictates of "common reason" are +"identical with that right reason which pervades every thing, being the +same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all +things." + +The fundamental canon of the logic of the Stoics, therefore, was that +"what appears to all, that is to be believed, for it is apprehended by +the reason, which is common and Divine." + +It is needless to remark that the Stoics were compelled by their +physiological theory to deny the proper immortality of the soul. Some of +them seem to have supposed that it might, for a season, survive the +death of the body, but its ultimate destination was absorption into the +Divine essence. It must return to its original source. + +ETHICS. + +If reason be the great organizing and controlling law of the universe, +then, to live conformable to reason is the great practical law of life. +Accordingly, the fundamental ethical maxim of the Stoics is, "Live +conformably with nature--that is, with reason, or the will of the +universal governor and manager of all things."[841] Thus the chief good +(eudaimonia) is the conformity of man's actions to reason--that is, to +the will of God, "for nothing is well done without a reference to +God."[842] + +[Footnote 841: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. liii.] + +[Footnote 842: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. § II.] + +It is obvious that this doctrine must lead to a social morality and a +jurisprudence the very opposite of the Epicurean. If we must do that +which is good--that is, that which is reasonable, regardless of all +consequences, then it is not for the pleasurable or useful results which +flow from it that justice should be practised, but because of its +intrinsic excellence. Justice is constituted good, not by the law of +man, but by the law of God. The highest pleasure is to do right; "this +very thing is the virtue of the happy man, and the perfect happiness of +life, when every thing is done according to a harmony of the genius of +each individual to the will of the Universal Governor and Manager of all +things."[843] Every thing which interferes with a purely rational +existence is to be eschewed; the pleasures and pains of the body are to +be despised. To triumph over emotion, over suffering, over passion; to +give the fullest ascendency to reason; to attain courage, moral energy, +magnanimity, constancy, was to realize true manhood, nay, "to be +godlike; for they have something in them which is, as it were, a +god"[844] + +The sublime heroism of the Stoic school is well expressed in the manly +precept, "Anechou"--_sustine_--endure. "Endure the sorrows engendered by +the bitter struggle between the passions support all the evils which +fortune shall send thee--calumny, betrayal, poverty, exile, irons, death +itself." In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this spirit seems to rise +almost to the grandeur of Christian resignation. "Dare to lift up thine +eyes to God and say, 'Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I +agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. +Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of +a public or a private person, of a rich man or a beggar.'"[845] "Show +those qualities," says Marcus Aurelius, "which God hath put in thy +power--sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, +contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence, +frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, +magnanimity."[846] + +[Footnote 843: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii. +ch. liii.] + +[Footnote 844: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. xliv.] + +[Footnote 845: Arrian, "Diss. Epict.," bk. ii. ch. xviii.] + +[Footnote 846: "I read to-day part of the 'Meditations of Marcus +Antonius' [Aurelius]. What a strange emperor! And what a strange +heathen! Giving thanks to God for all the good things he enjoyed! In +particular for his good inspirations, and for twice revealing to him, in +dreams, things wherby he was cured of (otherwise) incurable distempers. +I make no doubt but this is one of the 'many' who shall come from the +east and the west, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,' while +the 'children of the kingdom'--nominal Christians--are 'shut +out.'"--Wesley's "Journal," vol. i, p. 353.] + +Amid the fearful moral degeneracy of imperial Rome, Stoicism became the +refuge of all noble spirits. But, in spite of its severity, and its +apparent triumph over the feelings, it brought no real freedom and +peace. "Stoical morality, strictly speaking, is, at bottom, only a +slavish morality, excellent in Epictetus; admirable still, but useless +to the world, in Marcus Aurelius." Pride takes the place of real +disinterestedness. It stands alone in haughty grandeur and solitary +isolation, tainted with an incurable egoism. Disheartened by its +metaphysical impotence, which robs God of all personality, and man of +all hope of immortality; defeated in its struggle to obtain purity of +soul, it sinks into despair, and often terminates, as in the case of its +two first leaders, Zeno and Cleanthes, and the two Romans, Cato and +Seneca, in self-murder. "Thus philosophy is only an apprenticeship of +death, and not of life; it tends to death by its image, _apathy_ and +_ataraxy._"[847] + +[Footnote 847: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 439.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +THE PROPÆDEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. + + +"Philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary to the Greeks +for righteousness, and it now proved useful for godliness, being in some +part a preliminary discipline (propaideia tis ousa) for those who reap +the fruits of faith through demonstration. Perhaps we may say it was +given to the Greeks with this special object; for philosophy was to the +Greeks what the Law was to the Jews, 'a schoolmaster to bring them to +Christ.'"--CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS. + +Philosophy, says Cousin, is the effort of _reflection_--the attempt of +the human mind to develop in systematic and logical form that which has +dimly revealed itself in the spontaneous thought of ages, and to account +to itself in some manner for its native and instinctive beliefs. We may +further add, it is the effort of the human mind to attain to truth and +certitude on purely rational grounds, uncontrolled by traditional +authorities. The sublime era of Greek philosophy was, in fact, an +independent effort of human reason to solve the great problems of +existence, of knowledge, and of duty. It was an attempt to explain the +phenomenal history of the universe, to interpret the fundamental ideas +and laws of human reason, to comprehend the utterances of conscience, +and to ascertain what Ultimate and Supreme Reality underlies the world +of phenomena, of thought, and of moral feeling.[848] And it is this +which, for us, constitutes its especial value; that it was, as far as +possible, a result of simple reason; or, if at any time Faith asserted +its authority, the distinction is clearly marked: If this inquiry was +fully, and honestly, and logically conducted, we are entitled to presume +that the results attain by this effort of speculative thought must +harmonize with the positive utterances of the Divine Logos--the Eternal +Reason, whose revelations are embalmed and transmitted to us in the Word +of God. If the great truth that man is "the _offspring of God"_ and as +such "_the image and glory of God_" which is asserted, alike, by Paul +and the poet-philosophers of Tarsus and Mysia, be admitted, then we may +expect that the reason of man shall have some correlation with the +Divine reason. The mind of man is the _chef-d'oeuvre_ of Divine art. It +is fashioned after the model which the Divine nature supplies. "Let us +make man in _our_ image after _our_ likeness." That image consists in +epignôsis--_knowledge;_ dikalosynê--_justice_; and +osiotês--_benevolence._ It is not merely the _capacity_ to know, to be +just, and to be beneficent; it is _actual_ knowledge, justice, and +benevolence. It supposes, first, that the fundamental ideas of the true, +the just, and the good, are connate to the human mind; second, that the +native determination of the mind is towards the realization of these +ideas in every mental state and every form of human activity; third, +that there is a constitutional sympathy of reason with the ideas of +truth, and righteousness, and goodness, as they dwell in the reason of +God. And though man be now fallen, there is still within his heart some +vestige of his primal nature. There is still a sense of the divine, a +religious aptitude, "a feeling after God," and some longing to return to +Him. There are still ideas in the reason, which, in their natural and +logical development compel him to recognize a God. There is within his +conscience a sense of duty, of obligation, and accountability to a +Superior Power--"a law of the mind," thought opposed and antagonized by +depraved passions and appetites--"the law in the members." There is yet +a natural, constitutional sympathy of reason with the law of God--"it +delights in that law," and consents "that it is good," but it is +overborne and obstructed by passion. Man, even as unregenerate, "wills +to do that which is good," but "how to perform that which is good he +finds not," and in the agony of his soul he exclaims, "Oh, wretched man +that I am, who shall deliver me!"[849] + +[Footnote 848: Plato sought also to attain to the Ultimate Reality +underlying all æsthetic feeling--the Supreme Beauty as well as the +Supreme Good.] + +[Footnote 849: Romans, ch. vii.] + +The Author of nature is also the Author of revelation. The Eternal +Father of the Eternal Son, who is the grand medium of all God's direct +communications to our race--the revealer of God, is also "the Father of +the spirits of all flesh." That divine inbreathing which first +constituted man "a living soul"--that "inspiration of the Almighty +which giveth man understanding," and still "teacheth him knowledge," +proceeds from the same Spirit as that which inspires the prophets and +seers of the Old Testament Church, and the Apostles and teachers of the +new. That "true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the +world" shone on the mind of Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and Plato, as well +as on the mind of Abraham and Rahab, Cornelius and the Syro-Phoenician +woman, and, in a higher form, and with a clearer and richer effulgence, +on the mind of Moses, Isaiah, Paul and John. It is not to be wondered +at, then, if, in the teaching of Socrates and Plato, we should find a +striking _harmony_ of sentiment, and even form of expression, with some +parts of the Christian revelation. No short-sighted jealousy ought to +impugn the honesty of our judgment, if, in the speculations of Plato, we +catch glimpses of a world of ideas not unlike that which Christianity +discloses, and hear words not unfamiliar to those who spake as they were +moved by the Holy Ghost. + +If, then, there exists some correlation between Divine and human reason, +and if the light which illuminates all minds in Christian and in heathen +lands is the _same_ "true light," though differing in degrees of +brightness, it is most natural and reasonable to expect some connection +and some correspondence between the discoveries of philosophy and the +revelations of the Sacred Oracles. + +Although Christianity is confessedly something which is above reason and +nature--something communicated from above, and therefore in the fullest +sense supernatural and superhuman, yet it must stand in _relation_ to +reason and nature, and to their historic development; otherwise it could +not operate on man at all. "We have no knowledge of a dynamic influence, +spiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction." Matter can only be +moved by forces, and according to laws, as it has properties which +correlate it with these forces and laws. And mind can not be determined +from without to any specific form of cognition, unless it have powers of +apprehension and conception which are governed by uniform laws. If man +is to be instructed by a verbal revelation, he must, at least, be +capacitated for the reception of divine communication--must have a power +of forming supersensuous conceptions, and there must be some original +community of thought and idea between the mind that teaches and the mind +that is taught. A revelation from an invisible God--a being "whom no man +has ever seen or ever can see" with the eye of sense--would have no +affinity for, and no power to affect and enlighten, a being who had no +presentiment of an invisible Power to which he is in some way related. A +revealed law promulgated from an unseen and utterly unknown Power would +have no constraining authority, if man had no idea of right, no sense of +duty, no feeling of obligation to a Supreme Being. If, therefore, +religious instruction be not already preceded by an innate consciousness +of God, and of obligation to God, as an operative predisposition, there +would be nothing for revelation to act upon. Some relation between the +reason which planned the universe, and which has expressed its thoughts +in the numerical relations and archetypal forms which are displayed +therein, and the reason of man, with its ideas of form and number, +proportion and harmony, is necessarily supposed in the statement of Paul +that "the invisible things of God from the creation are seen." Nature to +us could be no symbol of the Divine Thought, if there were no +correlation between the reason of man and the reason of God. All +revelation, indeed, supposes some community of nature, some affinities +of thought, some correlation of ideas, between the mind communicating +spiritual knowledge, and the mind to which the communication is made. In +approaching man, it must traverse ground already occupied by man; it +must employ phrases already employed, and assume forms of thought +already familiar to man. It must address itself to some ideas, +sentiments, and feelings already possessed by man. If religion is the +great end and destination of man, then the nature of man must be +constituted for religion. Now religion, in its inmost nature, is a +communion, a fellowship with God. But no creature can be brought into +this communion "save one that is constitutionally related to God in +terms that admit of correspondence." There must be intelligence offered +to his intelligence, sentiment to his sentiment, reason to his reason, +thought to his thought. There must be implanted in the human mind some +fundamental ideas and determinations grounded upon this fact, that the +real end and destination of man is for religion, so that when that +higher sphere of life and action is presented to man, by an outward +verbal revelation, there shall be a recognized harmony between the inner +idea and determination, and the outer revelation. We can not doubt that +such a relation between human nature and reason, and Christianity, +exists. We see evidences of this in the perpetual strivings of humanity +to attain to some fuller and clearer apprehension of that Supreme Power +which is consciously near to human thought, and in the historic +development of humanity towards those higher forms of thought and +existence which demand a revelation in order to their completion. This +original capacity, and this historical development, have unquestionably +prepared the way for the reception of Christianity. + +Christianity, then, must have some connection with the reason of man, +and it must also have some relation to the progressive developments of +human thought in the ages which preceded the advent of Christ. +Christianity did not break suddenly upon the world as a new commencement +altogether unconnected with the past, and wanting in all points of +sympathy and contact with the then present. It proceeded along lines of +thought which had been laid through ages of preparation; it clothed +itself in forms of speech which had been moulded by centuries of +education, and it appropriated to itself a moral and intellectual +culture which had been effected by long periods of severest discipline. +It was, in fact, the consummation of the whole moral and religious +history of the world. + +A revelation of new truths, presented in entirely new forms of thought +and speech, would have defeated its own ends, and, practically, would +have been no revelation at all. The divine light, in passing through +such a medium, would have been darkened and obscured. The lens through +which the heavenly rays are to be transmitted must first be prepared and +polished. The intellectual eye itself must be gradually accustomed to +the light. Hence it is that all revelation has been _progressive_, +commencing, in the infancy of our race, with images and symbols +addressed to sense, and advancing, with the education of the race, to +abstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. The first communications to +the patriarchs were always accompanied by some external, sensible +appearance; they were often made through some preternatural personage in +human form. Subsequently, as human thought becomes assimilated to the +Divine idea, God uses man as his organ, and communicates divine +knowledge as an internal and spiritual gift. The theistic conception of +the earliest times was therefore more or less anthropomorphic, in the +prophetic age it was unquestionably more spiritual. The education of +Hebraic, Mosaic, and prophetic ages had gradually developed a purer +theism, and prepared the Jewish mind for that sublime announcement of +our Lord's--"God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in +spirit." For ages the Jews had worshipped in Samaria and Jerusalem, and +the inevitable tendency of thought was to localize the divine presence; +but the gradual withdrawment from these localities of all visible tokens +of Jehovah's presence, prepared the way for the Saviour's explicit +declaration that "neither in this mountain of Samaria, nor yet at +Jerusalem, shall men worship the Father," to the exclusion of any other +spot on earth; the real temple of the living God is now the heart of +man. The _Holiness_ of God was an idea too lofty for human thought to +grasp at once. The light of God's ineffable purity was too bright and +dazzling to burst at once on human eyes. Therefore it was gradually +displayed. The election of a chosen seed in Abraham's race to a nearer +approach to God than the rest of pagan humanity; the announcement of the +Decalogue at Sinai amidst awe-inspiring wonders; the separation of a +single tribe to the priestly office, who were dedicated to, and purified +in an especial manner for the service of the tabernacle; the +sanctification of the High-priest by sacrifice and lustration before he +dared to enter "the holiest place"--the presence-chamber of Jehovah: and +then the direct and explicit teaching of the prophets--were all +advancing steps by which the Jewish mind was lifted up to the clearer +apprehension of the holiness of God, the impurity of man, the distance +of man from God, and the need of Mediation. + +The ideas of _Redemption_ and _Salvation_--of atonement, expiation, +pardon, adoption, and regeneration--are unique and _sui-generis_. Before +these conceptions could be presented in the fullness and maturity of the +Christian system, there was needed the culture and education of the ages +of Mosaic ritualism, with its sacrificial system, its rights of +purification, its priestly absolution, and its family of God.[850] +Redemption itself, as an economy, is a development, and has +consequently, a history--a history which had its commencement in the +first Eden, and which shall have its consummation in the second Eden of +a regenerated world. It was germinally infolded in the first promise, +gradually unfolded in successive types and prophecies, more fully +developed in the life, and sayings, and sufferings of the Son of God, +and its ripened fruit is presented to the eye of faith in the closing +scenic representations of the grand Apocalypse of John. "Judaism was not +given as a perfect religion. Whatever may have been its superiority over +surrounding forms of worship, it was, notwithstanding, a provisional +form only. The consciousness that it was a preparatory, and not a +definite dispensation, is evident throughout. It points to an end beyond +itself, suggests a grander thought than any in itself; its glory +precisely consists in its constant looking forward to a glorious future +destined to surpass it."[851] + +[Footnote 850: Romans, IX 4-6.] + +[Footnote 851: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 202.] + +Thus the determinations which, through Redemption, fall to the lot of +history, as Nitzsch justly remarks, obey the emancipating law of +_gradual progress_.[852] Christianity was preceded by ages of +preparation, in which we have a gradual development of religious phrases +and ideas, of forms of social life and intellectual culture, and of +national and political institutions most favorable to its advent and its +promulgation; and "in the fullness of time"--the maturity and fitness of +the age--"God sent his own Son into the world." + +[Footnote 852: "System of Doctrine," p. 73.] + +This work of preparation was not confined alone to Judaism. The divine +plan of redemption comprehended all the race; its provisions are made in +view of the wants of all the race; and we must therefore believe that +the entire history of the race, previous to the coming of the Redeemer, +was under a divine supervision, and directed towards the grand centre of +our world's history. Greek philosophy and Grecian civilization must +therefore have a place in the divine plan of history, and they must +stand in an important relation to Christianity. He who "determined the +time of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundaries +of their habitation in order that they may seek the Lord," can not have +been unmindful of the Greek nation, and of its grandest age of +philosophy. "The Father of the spirits of all flesh" could not be +unconcerned in the moral and spiritual welfare of any of his children. +He was as deeply interested in the Athenian as in the Hebrew. He is the +God of the Gentile as well as the Jew. His tender mercies are over all +his works. If the Hebrew race was selected to be the agent of his +providence in one special field, and if the Jewish theocracy was one +grand instrument of preparatory discipline, it was simply because, +through these, God designed to bless all the nations of the earth. And +surely no one will presume to say that a civilization and an +intellectual culture which was second only to the Hebrew, and, in some +of its aspects, even in advance of the Hebrew, was not determined and +supervised by Divine Providence, and made subservient to the education +and development of the whole race. The grand results of Hebrew +civilization were appropriated and assimilated by Christianity, and +remain to this day. And no one can deny that the same is true of Greek +civilization. Through a kind of historic preparation the heathen world +was made ready for Christ, as a soil is prepared to receive the seed, +and some precious fruits of knowledge, of truth, and of righteousness, +even, were largely matured, which have been reaped, and appropriated, +and vitalized by the heaven-descended life of Christianity. + +The chief points of excellence in the civilization of the Greeks are +strikingly obvious, and may be readily presented. High perfection of the +intellect and the imagination displaying itself in the various forms of +art, poetry, literature, and philosophy. A wonderful freedom and +activity of body and of mind, developed in trade, and colonization, in +military achievement, and in subtile dialectics. A striking love of the +beautiful, revealing itself in their sculpture and architecture, in the +free music of prosaic numbers, and the graceful movement and measure of +their poetry. A quickness of perception, a dignity of demeanor, a +refinement of taste, a delicacy of moral sense, and a high degree of +reverence for the divine in nature and humanity. And, in general, a ripe +and all-pervading culture, which has made Athens a synonym for all that +is greatest and best in the genius of man; so that literature, in its +most flourishing periods has rekindled its torch at her altars, and art +has looked back to the age of Pericles for her purest models.[853] All +these enter into the very idea of Greek civilization. We can not resist +the conviction that, by a Divine Providence, it was made subservient to +the purpose of Redemption; it prepared the way for, and contributed to, +the spread of the Gospel. + +[Footnote 853: In Lord Brougham's celebrated letter to the father of the +historian Macaulay in regard to the education of the latter, we read: +"If he would be a great orator, he must go at once to the fountain-head, +and be familiar with every one of the great orations of Demosthenes.... +I know from experience that nothing is half so successful in these times +(bad though they be) as what has been formed on the Greek models. I use +poor illustrations in giving my own experience, but I do assure you that +both in courts and Parliament, and even to mobs, I have never made so +much play (to use a very modern phrase) as when I was almost translating +from the Greek. I composed the peroration of my speech for the Queen, in +the Lords, after reading and repeating Demosthenes for three or four +weeks."] + +Its subserviency to this grand purpose is seen in the Greek tendency to +trade and colonization. Their mental activity was accompanied by great +physical freedom of movement. They displayed an inherent disposition to +extensive emigration. "Without aiming at universal conquest, they +developed (if we may use the word) a remarkable catholicity of +character, and a singular power of adaptation to those whom they called +Barbarians. In this respect they were strongly contrasted with the +Egyptians, whose immemorial civilization was confined to the long valley +which extended from the cataracts to the mouth of the Nile. The Hellenic +tribes, on the other hand, though they despised the foreigners, were +never unwilling to visit them and to cultivate their acquaintance. At +the earliest period at which history enables us to discover them, we see +them moving about in their ships on the shores and among the islands of +their native seas; and, three or four centuries before the Christian +era, Asia Minor, beyond which the Persians had not been permitted to +advance, was bordered by a fringe of Greek colonies; and lower Italy, +when the Roman Republic was just becoming conscious of its strength, had +received the name of Greece itself. To all these places they carried +their arts and literature, their philosophy, their mythology, and their +amusements.... They were gradually taking the place of the Phoenicians +in the empire of the Mediterranean. They were, indeed, less exclusively +mercantile than those old discoverers. Their voyages were not so long. +But their influence on general civilization was greater and more +permanent. The earliest ideas of scientific navigation and geography are +due to the Greeks. The later Greek travellers, Pausanias and Strabo, are +our best sources of information on the topography of St. Paul's +journeys. + +"With this view of the Hellenic character before us, we are prepared to +appreciate the vast results of Alexander's conquests. He took the meshes +of the net of Greek civilization which were lying in disorder on the +edge of the Asiatic shore, and spread them over all the countries he +traversed in his wonderful campaigns. The East and the West were +suddenly brought together. Separate tribes were united under a common +government. New cities were built as the centres of political life. New +lines of communication were opened as the channels of commercial +activity. The new culture penetrated the mountain ranges of Pisidia and +Lycaonia. The Tigris and Euphrates became Greek rivers. The language of +Athens was heard among the Jewish colonies of Babylonia, and a Grecian +Babylon was built by the conqueror in Egypt, and called by his name. + +"The empire of Alexander was divided, but the effects of his campaigns +and policy did not cease. The influence of these fresh elements of +social life was rather increased by being brought into independent +action within the sphere of distinct kingdoms. Our attention is +particularly directed to two of the monarchical lines which descended +from Alexander's generals--the Ptolemies, or the Greek kings of Egypt, +and the Seleucidæ, or the Greek kings of Syria. Their respective +capitals, Alexandria and Antioch, became the metropolitan centres of +commercial and civilized life in the East."[854] Antioch was for ages +the home of science and philosophy. Here the religious opinions of the +East and the West were blended and mutually modified. Here it was +discovered by the heathen mind that a new religion had appeared, and a +new revelation had been given.[855] In Alexandria all nations were +invited to exchange their commodities and, with equal freedom, their +opinions. The representatives of all religions met here. "Beside the +Temple of Jupiter there rose the white marble Temple of Serapis, and +close at hand stood the synagogue of the Jews." The Alexandrian library +contained all the treasures of ancient culture, and even a copy of the +Hebrew Scriptures. + +[Footnote 854: Conybeare and Howson, "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," +vol. i. pp. 8-10.] + +[Footnote 855: Acts, xi. 26.] + +The spread of the Greek _language_ was one of the most important +services which the cities of Antioch and Alexandria rendered to +Christianity. The Greek tongue is intimately connected with the whole +system of Christian doctrine. + +This language, which, in symmetry of structure, in flexibility and +compass of expression, in exactness and precision, in grace and +elegance, exceeds every other language, became the language of theology. +Next in importance to the inspiration which communicates the superhuman +thought, must be the gradual development of the language in which the +thought can clothe itself. That development by which the Greek language +became the adequate vehicle of Divine thought, the perfect medium of the +mature revelation of truth contained in the Christian Scriptures, must +be regarded as the subject of a Divine providence. Christianity waited +for that development, and it awaited Christianity. "The Greek tongue +became to the Christian more than it had been to the Roman or the Jew. +The mother-tongue of Ignatius at Antioch was that in which Philo +composed his treatises at Alexandria, and which Cicero spoke at Athens. +It is difficult to state in a few words the important relation which +Alexandria, more especially, was destined to bear to the whole Christian +Church." In that city, the Old Testament was translated into Greek; +there the writings of Plato were diligently studied; there Philo, the +Platonizing Jew, had sought to blend into one system the teachings of +the Old Testament theology and the dialectic speculations of Plato. +Numenius learns of Philo, and Plotinus of Numenius, and the ecstasy of +Plotinus is the development of Philo's intuitions. A _theological +language_ by this means was developed, rich in the phrases of various +schools, and suited to convey the spiritual revelation of Christian +ideas to all the world. "It was not an accident that the New Testament +was written in Greek, the language which can best express the highest +thoughts and worthiest feelings of the intellect and heart, and which is +adapted to be the instrument of education for all nations; nor was it an +accident that the composition of these books and the promulgation of the +Gospels were delayed till the instruction of our Lord, and the writings +of his Apostles could be expressed in the dialect [of Athens and] of +Alexandria."[856] This must be ascribed to the foreordination of Him +who, in the history of nations and of civilizations, "worketh all things +according to the counsel of his own will." + +[Footnote 856: Conybeare and Howson, "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," +vol. i. p. 10.] + +Now it is the doctrine of the best philologists that language is a +_growth_. Gradually, and by combined efforts of successive generations, +it has been brought to the perfection which we so much admire in the +idioms of the Bible, the poetry of Homer, Dante, and Shakspeare, and the +prose compositions of Demosthenes, Cicero, Johnson, and Macaulay. The +material or root-element of language may have been the product of mental +instinct, or perhaps the immediate gift of God by revelation; but the +formal element must have been the creation of thought, and the result of +rational combination. Language is really the incarnation of thought; +consequently the growth of a language, its affluence, comprehension, and +fullness must depend on the vigor and activity of thought, and the +acquisition of general ideas. Language is thus the best index of +intellectual progress, the best standard of the intellectual attainment +of an age or nation. The language of barbaric tribes is exceedingly +simple and meagre; the paucity of general terms clearly indicating the +absence of all attempts at classification and all speculative thought. +Whilst the language of educated peoples is characterized by great +fullness and affluence of terms, especially such as are expressive of +general notions and abstract ideas. All grammar, all philology, all +scientific nomenclature are thus, in fact, _psychological deposits_, +which register the progressive advancement of human thought and +knowledge in the world of mind, as the geological strata bear testimony +to the progressive development of the material world. "Language," says +Trench, "is fossil poetry, fossil history," and, we will add, fossil +philosophy. Many a single word is a concentrated poem. The record of +great social and national revolutions is embalmed in a single term.[857] +And the history of an age of philosophic thought is sometimes condensed +and deposited in one imperishable word.[858] + +[Footnote 857: See Trench "On the Study of Words," p. 20, where the word +"frank" is given as an illustration.] + +[Footnote 858: For example, the cosmos of the Pythagoreans, the eidê of +the Platonists, and the ataraxia of the Stoics.] + +If, then, language is the creation of thought, the sensible vesture with +which it clothes itself, and becomes, as it were, incarnate--if the +perfection and efficiency of language depends on the maturity and +clearness of thought, we conclude that the wonderful adequacy and +fitness of the Greek language to be the vehicle of the Divine thought, +the medium of the most perfect revelation of God to men, can only be +explained on the assumption that the ages of philosophic thought which, +in Greece, preceded the advent of Christianity, were under the immediate +supervision of a providence, and, in some degree, illuminated by the +Spirit of God. + +Greek philosophy must therefore have fulfilled a propædeutic office for +Christianity. "As it had been intrusted to the Hebrews to preserve and +transmit the heaven-derived element of the Monotheistic religion, so it +was ordained that, among the Greeks, all seeds of human culture should +unfold themselves in beautiful harmony, and then Christianity, taking up +the opposition between the divine and human, was to unite both in one, +and show how it was necessary that both should co-operate to prepare for +the appearance of itself and the unfolding of what it contains."[859] +During the period of Greek philosophy which preceded the coming of +Christ, human reason, unfolding itself from beneath, had aspired after +that knowledge of divine things which is from above. It had felt within +itself the deep-seated consciousness of God--the sporadic revelation of +Him "who is not far from any one of us"--the immanent thought of that +Being "in whom we live and move and are," and it had striven by analysis +and definition to attain a more distinct and logical apprehension. The +heart of man had been stirred with "the feeling after God"--the longing +for a clearer sense of the divine, and had struggled to attain, by +abstraction or by ecstasy, a more immediate communion with God. Man had +been conscious of an imperative obligation to conform to the will of the +great Supreme, and he sought to interpret more clearly the utterances of +conscience as to what duty was. He had felt the sense of sin and guilt, +and had endeavored to appease his conscience by expiatory offerings, and +to deliver himself from the power of sin by intellectual culture and +moral discipline. And surely no one, at all familiar with the history of +that interesting epoch in the development of humanity, will have the +hardihood to assert that no steps were taken in the right direction, and +no progress made towards the distant goal of human desire and hope. The +language, the philosophy, the ideals of moral beauty and excellence, the +noble lives and nobler utterances of the men who stand forth in history +as the representatives of Greek civilization, all attest that their +noble aspiration and effort did not end in ignominious failure and utter +defeat. It is true they fell greatly beneath the realization of even +their own moral ideals, and they became painfully conscious of their +moral weakness, as men do even in Christian times. They learned that, +neither by intellectual abstraction, nor by ecstasy of feeling, could +they lift themselves to a living, conscious fellowship with God. The +sense of guilt was unrelieved by expiations, penances, and prayers. And +whilst some cultivated a proud indifference, a Stoical apathy, and +others sank down to Epicurean ease and pleasure, there was a noble few +who longed and hoped with increasing ardor for a living Redeemer, a +personal Mediator, who should "stand between God and man and lay his +hand on both." Christ became in some dim consciousness "the Desire of +Nations," and the Moral Law became even to the Greek as well as the Jew +"a school-master to lead them to Him." + +[Footnote 859: Neander's "Church History," vol. i. p. 4.] + +The arrival of Paul at Athens, in the close of this brilliant period of +Greek philosophy, now assumes an aspect of deeper interest and +profounder significance. It was a grand climacteric in the life of +humanity--an epoch in the moral and religious history of the world. It +marked the consummation of a periodic dispensation, and it opened a new +era in that wonderful progression through which an overruling Providence +is carrying the human race. As the coming of the Son of God to Judea in +the ripeness of events--"the fullness of time"--was the consummation of +the Jewish dispensation, and the event for which the Jewish age had been +a preparatory discipline, so the coming of a Christian teacher to +Athens, in the person of "the Apostle of the Gentiles," was the +_terminus ad quem_ towards which all the phases in the past history of +philosophic thought had looked, and for which they had prepared. +Christianity was brought to Athens--brought into contact with Grecian +philosophy at the moment of its exhaustion--at the moment when, after +ages of unwearied effort, it had become conscious of its weakness, and +its comparative failure, and had abandoned many questions in despair. +Greek philosophy had therefore its place in the plan of Divine +Providence. It had a mission to the world; that mission was now +fulfilled. If it had laid any foundation in the Athenian mind on which +the Christian system could plant its higher truths--if it had raised up +into the clearer light of consciousness any of those _ideas_ imbedded in +the human reason which are germane to Christian truth--if it had +revealed more fully the wants and instincts of the human heart, or if it +had attained the least knowledge of eternal truth and immutable right, +upon this Christianity placed its _imprimatur_. And at those points +where human reason had been made conscious of its own inefficiency, and +compelled to own its weakness and its failure, Christianity shed an +effulgent and convincing light. + +Therefore the preparatory office of Greek religion and Greek philosophy +is fully recognized by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He begins +by saying that the observations he had made enabled him to bear witness +that the Athenians were indeed, in every respect, "a God-fearing +people;"--that the God whom they knew so imperfectly as to designate Him +"the Unknown," but whom "they worshipped," was the God he worshipped, +and would now more fully declare to them. He assures them that their +past history, and their present geographical position, had been the +object of Divine foreknowledge and determination. "He hath determined +beforehand the times of each nation's existence, and fixed the +geographical boundaries of their habitation," all with this specific +design, that they might "seek after," "feel after," and "find the Lord," +who had never been far from any one of them. He admits that their +poet-philosophers had risen to a lofty apprehension of "the Fatherhood +of God," for they had taught that "we are all his offspring;" and he +seems to have felt that in asserting the common brotherhood of our race, +he would strike a chord of sympathy in the loftiest school of Gentile +philosophy. He thus "recognized the Spirit of God brooding over the face +of heathenism, and fructifying the spiritual element in the heart even +of the natural man. He feels that in these human principles there were +some faint adumbrations of the divine, and he looked for their firmer +delineation to the figure of that gracious Master, higher and holier +than man, whom he contemplated in his own imagination, and whom he was +about to present to them."[860] + +[Footnote 860: Merivale's "Conversion of the Roman Empire," p. 78.] + +This function of ancient philosophy is distinctly recognized by many of +the greatest of the Fathers, as Justin, Clement, Origen, Augustine, and +Theodoret. Justin Martyr believed that a ray of the Divine Logos shone +on the mind of the heathen, and that the human soul instinctively turned +towards God as the plant turns towards the sun. "Every race of men +participated in the Word. And they who lived with the Word were +Christians, even if they were held to be godless; as, for example, among +the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and those like them."[861] Clement +taught that "philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary to +the Greeks for righteousness; and now it proved useful for godliness, +being a sort of preliminary discipline for those who reap the fruits of +faith through demonstration.... Perhaps we may say that it was given to +the Greeks with this special object, for it brought the Greek nation to +Christ as the Law brought the Hebrews."[862] "Philosophy was given as a +peculiar testament to the Greeks, as forming the basis of the Christian +philosophy."[863] Referring to the words of Paul, Origen says, the +truths which philosophers taught were from God, for "God manifested +these to them, and all things that have been nobly said."[864] And +Augustine, whilst deprecating the extravagant claims made for the great +Gentile teachers, allows "that some of them made great discoveries, so +far as they received help from heaven; whilst they erred as far as they +were hindered by human frailty."[865] They had, as he elsewhere +observes, "a distant vision of the truth, and learnt, from the teaching +of nature, what prophets learnt from the spirit."[866] In addressing the +Greeks, Theodoret says, "Obey your own philosophers; let them be your +initiators; for they announced beforehand our doctrines." He held that +"in the depths of human nature there are characters inscribed by the +hand of God." And that "if the race of Abraham received the divine law, +and the gift of prophecy, the God of the universe led other nations to +piety by natural revelation, and the spectacle of nature."[867] + +[Footnote 861: "First Apology," ch. xlvi.] + +[Footnote 862: "Stromata," bk. i. ch. v.] + +[Footnote 863: "Stromata," bk. vi. ch. viii.] + +[Footnote 864: "Contra Celsum," bk. vi. ch. iii.] + +[Footnote 865: "De Civitate Dei," bk. ii. ch. vii.] + +[Footnote 866: Sermon lxviii. 3.] + +[Footnote 867: See Smith's "Bible Dictionary," article "Philosophy;" +Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. II; Butler's "Lectures on +Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. pp. 28-40.] + +In attempting to account for this partial harmony between Philosophy and +Revelation, we find the Patristic writers adopting different theories. +They are generally agreed in maintaining some original connection, but +they differ as to its immediate source. Some of them maintained that the +ancient philosophers derived their purest light from the fountain of +Divine Revelation. The doctrines of the Old Testament Scriptures were +traditionally diffused throughout the West before the rise of +philosophic speculation. If the theistic conceptions of Plato are +superior to those of Homer it is accounted for by his (hypothetical) +tour of inquiry among the Hebrew nation, as well as his Egyptian +investigations. Others maintained that the similarity of views on the +character of the Supreme Being and the ultimate destination of humanity +which is found in the writings of Plato and the teachings of the Bible +is the consequence of _immediate_ inspiration. Origen, Jerome, Eusebius, +Clement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his own +high prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however, +the facts of the case compel them to make some abatements. In the +mid-current of this divine revelation are found many acknowledged +errors, which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator. +Plato, then, was _partially_ inspired, and clouded the heavenly beam +with the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense.[868] Whilst a +third, and more reasonable, hypothesis was maintained by others. They +regarded man as "the offspring and image of the Deity," and maintained +there must be a correlation of the human and divine reason, and, +consequently, of all discovered truth to God. Therefore they expected to +find some traces of connection and correspondence between Divine and +human thought, and some kindred ideas in Philosophy and Revelation. +"Ideas," says St. Augustine, "are the primordial forms, as it were, the +immutable reason of things; they are not created, they are eternal, and +always the same: they are contained in the Divine intelligence and +without being subject to birth and death, they are _types_ according to +which is formed every thing that is born and dies." The copies of these +archetypes are seen in nature, and are participated in by the reason of +man; and there may therefore be some community of idea between man and +God, and some relation between Philosophy and Christianity. + +[Footnote 868: Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +41.] + +The various attempts which have been made to trace the elevated theism +and morality of Socrates and Plato to Jewish sources have signally +failed. Justin Martyr and Tertullian claim that the ancient philosophers +"borrowed from the Jewish prophets." Pythagoras and Plato are supposed +to have travelled in the East in quest of knowledge.[869] The latter is +imagined to have had access to an existing Greek version of the Old +Testament in Egypt, and a strange oversight in chronology brings him +into personal intercourse with the prophet Jeremiah. A sober and +enlightened criticism is compelled to pronounce all these statements as +mere exaggerations of later times.[870] They are obviously mere +suppositions by which over-zealous Christians sought to maintain the +supremacy and authority of Scripture. The travels of Pythagoras are +altogether mythical, the mere invention of Alexandrian writers, who +believed that all wisdom flowed from the East.[871] That Plato visited +Egypt at all, rests on the single authority of Strabo, who lived at +least four centuries after Plato; there is no trace in his own works of +Egyptian research. His pretended travels in Phoenicia, where he gained +from the Jews a knowledge of the true God, are more unreliable still. +Plato lived in the fourth century before Christ (born B.C. 430), and +there is no good evidence of the existence of a Greek version of the Old +Testament before that of "the Seventy" (Septuagint), made by order of +Ptolemy Philadelphus, B.C. 270. Jeremiah, the prophet of Israel, lived +two centuries before Plato; consequently any personal intercourse +between the two was simply impossible. Greek philosophy was +unquestionably a development of Reason alone.[872] + +[Footnote 869: Mr. Watson adopts this hypothesis to account for the +theistic opinions of the ancient philosophers of Greece. See "Institutes +of Theology," vol. i. pp. 26-34.] + +[Footnote 870: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. +147.] + +[Footnote 871: Max Muller, "Science of Language," p. 94.] + +[Footnote 872: See on this subject, Ritter's "History of Ancient +Philosophy," vol. i. pp. 147, 148; Encyclopædia Britannica, article +"Plato," vol. xvii. p. 787; Smith's "Bible Dictionary," article +"Philosophy;" and Thompson's "Laws of Thought," p. 326.] + +Some of the ablest Christian scholars and divines of modern times, as +Cudworth, Neander, Trench, Pressensé, Merivale, Schaff, after the most +careful and conscientious investigation, have come to this conclusion, +that Greek philosophy fulfilled a preparatory mission for Christianity. +The general conclusions they reached are forcibly presented in the words +of Pressensé: + +It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Greek philosophy +when viewed as a preparation to Christianity. Disinterested pursuit of +truth is always a great and noble task. The imperishable want of the +human mind to go back to first principles, suffices to prove that this +principle is divine. We may abuse speculation; we may turn it into one +of the most powerful dissolvents of moral truths; and the defenders of +positive creeds, alarmed by the attitude too often assumed by +speculation in the presence of religion, have condemned it as +mischievous in itself, confounding in their unjust prejudice its use and +its abuse. But, for all serious thinkers, philosophy is one of the +highest titles of nobility that humanity possesses: and when we consider +its mission previous to Christianity, we feel convinced that it had its +place in the Divine plan. It was not religion in itself that philosophy, +through its noblest representatives, combated, but polytheism. It +dethroned the false gods. Adopting what was best in paganism, philosophy +employed it as an instrument to destroy paganism, and thus clear the way +for definite religion. Above all, it effectually contributed to purify +the idea of Divinity, though this purification was but an approximation. +If at times it caught glimpses of the highest spiritualism, yet it was +unable to protect itself against the return and reaction of Oriental +dualism. In spite of this imperfection, which in its way served the +cause of Christianity by demonstrating the necessity of revelation, men +like Socrates and Plato fulfilled amongst their people a really sublime +mission. + +They were to the heathen world the great prophets of the human +conscience, which woke up at their call. And the awakening of the moral +sense was at once the glory and ruin of philosophy; for conscience, once +aroused, could only be satisfied by One greater than they, and must +necessarily reject all systems which proved themselves insufficient to +realize the moral idea they had evoked. + +"But to perish thus, and for such a cause, is a high honor to a +philosophy. It was this made the philosophy of Greece, like the Hebrew +laws, though in an inferior sense, a schoolmaster that led to Jesus +Christ, according to the expression of Clement of Alexandria. Viewed in +this light, it was a true gift of God, and had, too, the shadow of good +things to come, awakening the presentiment and desire of them, though it +could not communicate them. Nor can we conceive a better way to prepare +for the advent of Him who was to be 'the Desire of Nations' before +becoming their Saviour."[873] + +[Footnote 873: "Religions before Christ," pp. 101, 102.] + +In previous chapters we have endeavored to sketch the history of the +development of metaphysical thought, of moral feeling and idea, and of +religious sentiment and want, which characterized Grecian civilization. +In now offering a brief _résumé_ of the history of that development, +with the design of more fully exhibiting the preparatory office it +fulfilled for Christianity, we shall assume that the mind of the reader +has already been furnished and disciplined by preparatory principles. He +can scarce have failed to recognize that this development obeyed a +_general law_, however modified by exterior and geographical conditions; +the same law, in fact, which governs the development of all individual +finite minds, and which law may be formulated thus:--_All finite mind +develops itself, first, in instinctive determinations and spontaneous +faiths; then in rising doubt, and earnest questioning, and ill-directed +inquiry; and, finally, in systematic philosophic thought, and rational +belief_. These different stages succeed each other in the individual +mind. There is, first, the simplicity and trust of childhood; secondly, +the undirected and unsettled force of youth; and, thirdly, the wisdom of +mature age. And these different stages have also succeeded each other in +the universal mind of humanity. There has been, 1st. _The era of +spontaneous beliefs_--of popular and semi-conscious theism, morality, +and religion, 2d. _The transitional age_--the age of doubt, of inquiry, +and of ill-directed mental effort, ending in fruitless sophism, or in +skepticism. 3d. _The philosophic or conscious age_--the age of +reflective consciousness, in which, by the analysis of thought, the +first principles of knowledge are attained, the necessary laws of +thought are discovered, and man arrives at positive convictions, and +rational beliefs. In the history of Grecian civilization, the first is +the Homeric age; the second is the pre-Socratic age, ending with the +Sophists; and the third is the grand Socratic period. History is thus +the development of the fundamental elements of humanity, according to an +established law, and under conditions which are ordained and supervised +by the providence of God. "The unity of civilization is in the unity of +human nature; its varieties, in the variety of the elements of +humanity," which elements have been successively developed in the course +of history. All that is fundamental in human nature passes into the +movement of civilization. "I say all that is fundamental; for it is the +excellency of history to take out, and throw away all that is not +necessary and essential. That which is individual shines for a day, and +is extinguished forever, or stops at biography." Nothing endures, except +that which is fundamental and true--that which is vital, and organizes +itself, develops itself, and arrives at an historical existence. +"Therefore as human nature is the matter and basis of history, history +is, so to speak, the judge of human nature, and historical analysis is +the counter-proof of psychological analysis."[874] + +[Footnote 874: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. +p. 31.] Nature, individual mind, and collective humanity, all obey the +law of progressive development; otherwise there could be no history, for +history is only of that which has movement and progress. Now, all +progress is from the indefinite to the definite, from the inorganic to +the organic and vital, from the instinctive to the rational, from a dim, +nebulous self-feeling to a high reflective consciousness, from sensuous +images to abstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. This progressive +development of nature and humanity has not been a series of creations +_de novo_, without any relation, in matter or form, to that which +preceded. All of the present was contained in embryonic infoldment in +the past, and the past has contributed its results to the present.[875] +The present, both in nature, and history, and civilization, is, so to +speak, the aggregate and sum-total of the past. As the natural history +of the earth may now be read in the successive strata and deposits which +form its crust, so the history of humanity may be read in the successive +deposits of thought and language, of philosophy and art, which register +its gradual progression. As the paleontological remains imbedded in the +rocks present a succession of organic types which gradually improve in +form and function, from the first sea-weed to the palm-tree, and from +the protozoa to the highest vertebrate, so the history of ancient +philosophy presents a gradual progress in metaphysical, ethical, and +theistic conceptions, from the unreflective consciousness of the Homeric +age, to the high reflective consciousness of the Platonic period. And as +all the successive forms of life in pre-Adamic ages were a preparation +for and a prophecy of the coming of man, so the advancing forms of +philosophic thought, during the grand ages of Grecian civilization, were +a preparation and a prophecy of the coming of the Son of God. + +[Footnote 875: The writer would not be understood as favoring the idea +that this development is simply the result of "natural law." The +connection between the past and the present is not a material, but a +_mental_ connection. It is the bond of Creative Thought and Will giving +to organic forces a foreseen direction towards the working out of a +grand plan. See Agassiz, "Contributions to Natural History," vol. i. pp. +9, 10; Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law," ch. v.] + +We shall now endeavor to trace this process of gradual preparation for +Christianity in the Greek mind-- + +(i.) _In the field of_ THEISTIC _conceptions_. + +(ii.) _In the department of_ ETHICAL _ideas and principles_. + +(iii.) _In the region of_ RELIGIOUS _sentiment_. + +In the field of theistic conception the propædeutic office of Grecian +philosophy is seen-- + +I. _In the release of the popular mind from Polytheistic notion, and the +purifying and spiritualizing of the Theistic idea_. + +The idea of a Supreme Power, a living Personality, energizing in nature, +and presiding over the affairs of men, is not the product of philosophy. +It is the immanent, spontaneous thought of humanity. It has, therefore, +existed in all ages, and revealed itself in all minds, even when it has +not been presented to the understanding as a definite conception, and +expressed by human language in a logical form. It is the thought which +instinctively arises in the opening reason of childhood, as the dim and +shadowy consciousness of a living mind behind all the movement and +change of the universe. Then comes the period of doubt, of anxious +questioning, and independent inquiry. The youth seeks to account to +himself for this peculiar sentiment. He turns his earnest gaze towards +nature, and through this living vesture of the infinite he seeks to +catch some glimpses of the living Soul. In some fact appreciable to +sense, in some phenomenon he can see, or hear, or touch, he would fain +grasp the cause and reason of all that is. But in this field of inquiry +and by this method he finds only a "receding God," who falls back as he +approaches, and is ever still beyond; and he sinks down in exhaustion +and feebleness, the victim of doubt, perhaps despair. Still the +sentiment of the Divine remains, a living force, in the centre of his +moral being. He turns his scrutinizing gaze within, and by +self-reflection seeks for some rational ground for his instinctive +faith. There he finds some convictions he can not doubt, some ideas he +can not call in question, some thoughts he is compelled to think, some +necessary and universal principles which in their natural and logical +development ally him to an unseen world, and correlate and bind him fast +to an invisible, but real God. The more his mind is disciplined by +abstract thought, the clearer do these necessary and universal +principles become, and the purer and more spiritual his ideas of God. +God is now for him the First Principle of all principles, the First +Truth of all truths; the Eternal Reason, the Immutable Righteousness, +the Supreme Good. The normal and healthy development of reason, the +maturity of thought, conduct to the recognition of the true God. + +And so it has been in the universal consciousness of our race as +revealed in history. There was first a period of spontaneous and +unreflective Theism, in which man felt the consciousness of God, but +could not or did not attempt a rational explanation of his instinctive +faith. He saw God in clouds and heard Him in the wind. His smile +nourished the corn, and cheered the vine. The lightnings were the +flashes of his vengeful ire, and the thunder was his angry voice. But +the unity of God was feebly grasped, the rays of the Divinity seemed +divided and scattered amidst the separate manifestations of power, and +wisdom, and goodness, and retribution, which nature presented. Then +plastic art, to aid and impress the imagination, created its symbols of +these separate powers and principles, chiefly in human form, and gods +were multiplied. But all this polytheism still rested on a dim +monotheistic background, and all the gods were subordinated to +Zeus--"the Father of gods and men." Humanity had still the sense of the +dependence of all finite being on one great fountain-head of +Intelligence and Power, and all the "generated gods" were the subjects +and ministers of that One Supreme. This was the childhood of humanity so +vividly represented in Homeric poetry. + +Then came a period of incipient reflection, and speculative thought, in +which the attention of man is drawn outward to the study of nature, of +which he can yet only recognize himself as an integral part. He searches +for some archê--some first principle, appreciable to sense, which in its +evolution shall furnish an explanation of the problem of existence. He +tries the hypothesis of "_water_" then of "_air_" then of "_fire_" as +the primal element, which either is itself, or in some way infolds +within itself an informing Soul, and out of which, by vital +transformation, all things else are produced. But here he failed to find +an adequate explanation; his reason was not satisfied. Then he sought +his first principle in "_numbers_" as symbols, and, in some sense, as +the embodiment of the rational conceptions of order, proportion, and +harmony,--God is the original _monas_--unity--One;--or else he sought it +in purely abstract "_ideas_" as unity, infinity, identity, and all +things are the evolution of an eternal thought, one and identical, which +is God. And here again he fails. Then he supposes an unlimited +_migma_--a chaotic mixture of elements existing from eternity, which was +separated, combined, and organized by the energy of a Supreme Mind, the +_nous_ of Anaxagoras. But he holds not firmly to this great principle; +"he recurs again to air, and ether, and water, as _causes_ for the +ordering of all things."[876] And after repeated attempts and failures, +he is disappointed in his inquiry, and falls a prey to doubt and +skepticism. This was the early youth of our humanity, the period that +opens with Thales and ends with the Sophists. + +[Footnote 876: Thus Socrates complains of Anaxagoras. See "Phædo," § +108.] + +The problem of existence still waits for and demands a solution. The +heart of man, also, still cries out for the living God. The Socratic +maxim, "know thyself," introverts the mental gaze, and self-reflection +now becomes the method of philosophy. The Platonic analysis of thought +reveals elements of knowledge which are not derived from the outer +world. There are universal and necessary principles revealed in +consciousness which, in their natural and logical development, transcend +consciousness, and furnish the cognition of a world of Real Being, +beyond the world of sense. There are absolute truths which bridge the +chasm between the seen and the unseen, the fleeting and the permanent, +the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. There are +necessary laws of thought which are also found to be laws of things, and +which correlate man to a living, personal, righteous Lord and Lawgiver. +From absolute ideas Plato ascends to an _absolute Being_, the author of +all finite existence. From absolute truths to an _absolute Reason_, the +foundation and essence of all truth. From the principle of immutable +right to an _absolutely righteous Being_. From the necessary idea of the +good to a being of _absolute Goodness_--that is, to _God_. This is the +maturity of humanity, the ripening manhood of our race which was +attained in the Socratic age. + +The inevitable tendency of this effort of speculative thought, spread +over ages, and of the intellectual culture which necessarily resulted, +was to undermine the old polytheistic religion, and to purify and +elevate the theistic conception. The school of Elea rejected the gross +anthropomorphism of the Homeric theology. Xenophanes, the founder of the +school, was a believer in + + "_ One God_, of all beings divine and human the greatest, + Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in ideas." + +And he repels with indignation the anthropomorphic representations of +the Deity. + +"But men foolishly think that gods are born as men are, +And have, too, a dress like their own, and their voice, and their figure: +But if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and fingers, +Then would horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen, +Paint and fashion their god-forms, and give to them bodies +Of like shape to their own, as they themselves too are fashioned."[877] + +Empedocles also wages uncompromising war against all representations of +the Deity in human form-- + + "For neither with head adjusted to limbs, like the human, + Nor yet with two branches down from the shoulders outstretching, + Neither with feet, nor swift-moving limbs,.... + He is, wholly and perfectly, _mind_, ineffable, holy, + With rapid and swift-glancing thought pervading the world."[878] + +[Footnote 877: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. pp. +431, 432.] + +[Footnote 878: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 495, 496.] + +When speaking of the mythology of the older Greeks, Socrates maintains a +becoming prudence; he is evidently desirous to avoid every thing which +would tend to loosen the popular reverence for divine things.[879] But +he was opposed to all anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity. His +fundamental position was that the Deity is the Supreme Reason, which is +to be honored by men as the source of all existence and the end of all +human endeavor. Notwithstanding his recognition of a number of +subordinate divinities, he held that the Divine is one, because Reason +is one. He taught that the Supreme Being is the immaterial, infinite +Governor of all;[880] that the world bears the stamp of his +intelligence, and attests it by irrefragable evidence;[881] and that he +is the author and vindicator of all moral laws.[882] So that, in +reality, he did more to overthrow polytheism than any of his +predecessors, and on that account was doomed to death. + +[Footnote 879: Xenophon, "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. iii. § 3.] + +[Footnote 880: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. iv. §§ 17, 18.] + +[Footnote 881: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. i. § 19.] + +[Footnote 882: Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 63; +Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 359.] + +It was, however, the matured dialectic of Plato which gave the +death-blow to polytheism. "Plato, the poet-philosopher, sacrificed Homer +himself to monotheism. We may measure the energy of his conviction by +the greatness of the sacrifice. He could not pardon the syren whose +songs had fascinated Greece, the fresh brilliant poetry that had +inspired its religion. He crowned it with flowers, but banished it, +because it had lowered the religious ideal of conscience." He was +sensible of the beauty of the Homeric fables, but he was also keenly +alive to their religious falsehood, and therefore he excluded the poets +from his ideal republic. In the education of youth, he would forbid +parents and teachers repeating "the stories which Hesiod and Homer and +the other poets told us." And after instancing a number of these stories +"which deserve the gravest condemnation," he enjoins that God must be +represented as he is in reality. "God," says he, "is, beyond all else, +good in reality, and therefore so to be represented;" "he can not do +evil, or be the cause of evil;" "he is of simple essence, and can not +change, or be the subject of change;" "there is no imperfection in the +beauty or goodness of God;" "he is a God of truth, and can not lie;" "he +is a being of perfect simplicity and truth in deed and word."[883] The +reader can not fail to recognize the close resemblance between the +language of Plato and the language of inspiration. + +The theistic conception, in Plato, reaches the highest purity and +spirituality. God is "_the Supreme Mind_," "incorporeal," +"unchangeable," "infinite," "absolutely perfect," "essentially good," +"unoriginated and eternal." He is "the Father and Maker of the world," +"the efficient Cause of all things," "the Monarch and Ruler of the +world," "the Sovereign Mind that orders all things," and "pervades all +things." He is "the sole principle of all things," "the beginning of all +truth," "the fountain of all law and justice," "the source of all order +and beauty;" in short, He is "the beginning, middle, and end of all +things."[884] + +[Footnote 883: "Republic," bk. ii. §§ 18-21.] + +[Footnote 884: See _ante_, ch. xi. pp. 377, 378, where the references to +Plato's writings are given.] + +Aristotle continued the work of undermining polytheism. He defines God +as "the Eternal Reason"--the Supreme Mind. "He is the immovable cause of +all movement in the universe, the all-perfect principle. This principle +or essence pervades all things. It eternally possesses perfect +happiness, and its happiness consists in energy. This primeval mover is +immaterial, for its essence is energy--it is pure thought, thought +thinking itself--the thought of thought."[885] Polytheism is thus swept +away from the higher regions of the intelligence. "For several to +command," says he, "is not good, there should be but one chief. A +tradition, handed down from the remotest antiguity, and transmitted +under the veil of fable, says that all the stars are gods, and that the +Divinity embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea other +mythical statements have been agglomerated, with a view to influencing +the vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as for instance, +they feigned that these gods have human shape, and are like certain of +the animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if any one +will separate from all this the first point alone, namely, that they +thought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be Divine, he may +consider it a divine utterance."[886] The popular polytheism, then, was +but a perverted fragment of a deeper and purer "Theology." This passage +is a sort of obituary of polytheism. The ancient glory of paganism had +passed away. Philosophy had exploded the old theology. Man had learned +enough to make him renounce the ancient religion, but not enough to +found a new faith that could satisfy both the intellect and the heart. +"Wherefore we are not to be surprised that the grand philosophic period +should be followed by one of incredulity and moral collapse, +inaugurating the long and universal _decadence_ which was, perhaps, as +necessary to the work of preparation, as was the period of religious and +philosophic development." + +[Footnote 885: "Metaphysics," bk. xii.] + +[Footnote 886: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. viii. § 19.] + +The preparatory office of Greek philosophy in the region of speculative +thought is seen-- + +2. _In the development of the Theistic argument in a logical +form._--Every form of the theistic proof which is now employed by +writers on natural theology to demonstrate the being of God was +apprehended, and logically presented, by one or other of the ancient +philosophers, excepting, perhaps, the "moral argument" drawn from the +facts of conscience. + +(I.) _The_ ÆTIOLOGICAL _proof_, or the argument based upon the principle +of causality, which may be presented in the following form: + + All genesis or becoming supposes a permanent and uncaused + Being, adequate to the production of all phenomena. + + The sensible universe is a perpetual genesis, a succession + of appearances: it is "always becoming, and never really + is." + + Therefore, it must have its cause and origin in a permanent + and unoriginated Being, adequate to its production. + +The major premise of this syllogism is a fundamental principle of +reason--a self-evident truth, an axiom of common sense, and as such has +been recognized from the very dawn of philosophy. [Greek: Adounaton +ginesthai ti ek mêdenos prouparxonios]--_Ex nihilo nihil_--_Nothing +which once was not, could ever of itself come into being_. Nothing can +be made or produced without an efficient cause, is the oldest maxim of +philosophy. It is true that this maxim was abusively employed by +Democritus and Epicurus to disprove a Divine creation of any thing out +of nothing, yet the great body of ancient philosophers, as Pythagoras, +Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and +Aristotle, regarded it as the announcement of an universal conviction, +that nothing can be produced without an efficient cause;--order can not +be generated out of chaos, life out of dead matter, consciousness out of +unconsciousness, reason out of unreason. A first principle of life, of +order, of reason, must have existed anterior to all manifestions of +order, of life, of intelligence, in the visible universe. It was clearly +in this sense that Cicero understood this great maxim of the ancient +philosophers of Greece. With him "_De nihilo nihil fit"_ is equivalent +to "_Nihil sine causa_"--nothing exists without a cause. This is +unquestionably the form in which that fundamental law of thought is +stated by Plato: "Whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a +certain cause, for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be +generated without a cause."[887] And the efficient cause is defined as +"a power whereby that which did not previously exist was afterwards made +to be."[888] It is scarcely needful to remark that Aristotle, the +scholar of Plato, frequently lays it down as a postulate of reason, +"that we admit nothing without a cause."[889] By an irresistible law of +thought, "_all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of +power_, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue." + +[Footnote 887: "Timæus," ch. ix.; also "Philebus," § 45.] + +[Footnote 888: "Sophist," § 109.] + +[Footnote 889: "Post. Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xvi.; "Metaphysics," bk. i. +ch. i. § 3.] + +The major premise of this syllogism is a fact of observation. + +To the eye of sense and sensible observation, to scientific induction +even in its highest generalizations, the visible universe presents +nothing but a history and aggregation of phenomena--a succession of +appearances or effects having more or less resemblance. It is a +ceaseless flow and change, "a generation and corruption," "a becoming, +but never really _is_;" it is never in two successive moments the +_same_.[890] All our cognitions of sameness, uniformity, causal +connection, permanent Being, real Power, are purely rational conceptions +_given in thought_, supplied by the spontaneous intuition of reason as +the correlative prefix to the phenomena observed.[891] + +[Footnote 890: "Timæus," ch. ix.] + +[Footnote 891: Ibid.] + +Therefore the ancient philosophers concluded justly, there must be +something [Greek: agênnêton]--something which was never generated, +something [Greek: autophyês] and [Greek: authypostaton]--self-originated +and self-existing, something [Greek: tauton] and [Greek: +aiônion]--immutable and eternal, the object of rational +apperception--which is the real ground and efficient cause of all that +appears. + +(2.) The COSMOLOGICAL proof, or the argument based upon the principle of +order, and thus presented: + + Order, proportion, harmony, are the product and expression + of Mind. + + The created universe reveals order, proportion, and harmony. + + Therefore, the created universe is the product of Mind. + +The fundamental law of thought which underlies this mode of proof was +clearly recognized by Pythagoras. All harmony and proportion and +symmetry is the result of _unity_ evolving itself in and pervading +_multiplicity_. Mind or reason is unity and indivisibility; matter is +diverse and multiple. Mind is the determinating principle; matter is +indeterminate and indefinite. Confused matter receives form, and +proportion, and order, and symmetry, by the action and interpenetration +of the spiritual and indivisible element. In presence of facts of order, +the human reason instinctively and necessarily affirms the presence and +action of Mind. + +"Pythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty +idea of Order. To his mind it seemed as the presiding genius of the +serene and silent world. He had from his youth dwelt with delight upon +the eternal relations of space and number, in which the very idea of +proportion seems to find its first and immediate development, until at +length it seemed as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in +these mysterious correspondences. The world, in all its departments, +moral and material, is a living arithmetic in its development, a +realized geometry in its repose; it is a '_cosmos_' (for the word is +Pythagorean), the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense of +everlasting order; and the science of _numbers_ is the truest +representation of its eternal laws." Therefore, argued Pythagoras and +the Pythagoreans, as the reason of man can perceive the relations of an +eternal order in the proportions of extension and number, the laws of +proportion, and symmetry, and harmony must inhere in a Divine reason, an +intelligent soul, which moves and animates the universe. The harmonies +of the world which address themselves to the human mind must be the +product of a Divine mind. The world, in its real structure, must be the +image and copy of that divine proportion which the mind of man adores. +It is the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multiple +development of the Eternal Unity, the Eternal One--that is, God. + +The same argument is elaborated by Plato in his philosophy of beauty. +God is with him the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the perfect +ideal of all beauty--of all the order, proportion, harmony, sublimity, +and excellence which reigns in the physical, the intellectual, and the +moral world. He is the "Eternal Beauty, unbegotten and imperishable, +exempt from all decay as well as increase--the perfect--the Divine +Beauty"[892] which is beheld by the pure mind in the celestial world. + +[Footnote 892: "Banquet," § 35.] + +(3.) The Teleological proof, or the argument based upon the principle of +intentionality or Final Cause, and is presented in the following form: + + The choice and adaptation of means to the accomplishment of + special ends supposes an intelligent purpose, a Designing + Mind. + + In the universe we see such choice and adaptation of means + to ends. + + Therefore, the universe is the product of an intelligent, + personal Cause. + +This is peculiarly the Socratic proof. He recognized the necessity and +the irresistibility of the conviction that the choice and adaptation of +means to ends is the effect of Purpose, the expression of Will.[893] +There is an obviousness and a directness in this mode of argument which +is felt by every human mind. In the "Memorabilia" Xenophon has preserved +a conversation of Socrates with Aristodemus in which he develops this +proof at great length. In reading the dialogue[894] in which Socrates +instances the adaptation of our organization to the external world, and +the examples of design in the human frame, we are forcibly reminded of +the chapters of Paley, Whewell, and M'Cosh. Well might Aristodemus +exclaim: "The more I consider it, the more it is evident to me that man +must be the masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with it +infinite marks of the love and favor of Him who has thus formed it." The +argument from Final Causes is pursued by Plato in the "Timæus;" and in +Aristotle, God is the Final Cause of all things.[895] + +[Footnote 893: "Canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, whether a disposition of +parts like this (in the human body) should be the work of chance, or of +wisdom and contrivance?"--"Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. iv.] + +[Footnote 894: "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. iv.] + +[Footnote 895: Aristotle clearly recognizes that an end or final cause +implies Intelligence. "The appearance of ends and means is a proof of +Design."--"Nat. Ausc.," bk. ii. ch. viii.] + +(4.) The Ontological or Ideological proof, or the argument grounded on +necessary and absolute ideas, which may be thrown into the following +syllogism: + + Every attribute or quality implies a subject, and absolute + modes necessarily suppose an Absolute Being. Necessary and + absolute truths or ideas are revealed in human reason as + absolute modes. + + Therefore universal, necessary, and absolute ideas are modes + of the absolute subject--that is, God, the foundation and + source of all truth. + +This is the Platonic proof. Plato recognized the principle of substance +([Greek: ousia ypokeimenon]), and therefore he proceeds in the "Timæus" +to inquire for the real ground of all existence; and in the "Republic," +for the real ground of all truth and certitude. + +The universe consists of two parts, permanent existences and transient +phenomena--being and genesis; the one eternally constant, the other +mutable and subject to change; the former apprehended by the reason, the +latter perceived by sense. For each of these there must be a principle, +subject, or substratum--a principle or subject-matter, which is the +ground or condition of the sensible world, and a principle or substance, +which is the ground and reason of the intelligible world or world of +ideas. The subject-matter, or ground of the sensible world, is "the +receptacle" and "nurse" of forms, an "invisible species and formless +receiver (which is not earth, or air, or fire, or water) which receives +the immanence of the intelligible."[896] The subject or ground of the +intelligible world is that in which ideal forms, or eternal archetypes +inhere, and which impresses form upon the transitional element, and +fashions the world after its own eternal models. This eternal and +immutable substance is God, who created the universe as a copy of the +eternal archetypes--the everlasting thoughts which dwell in his infinite +mind. + +[Footnote 896: "Timæus," ch. xxiv.] + +These copies of the eternal archetypes or models are perceived by the +reason of man in virtue of its participation in the Ultimate Reason. The +reason of man is the organ of truth; by an innate and inalienable right, +it grasps unseen and eternal realities. The essence of the soul is akin +to that which is real, permanent, and eternal;--_It is the offspring and +image of God_; therefore it has a true communion with the realities of +things, by virtue of this kindred and homogeneous nature. It can, +therefore, ascend from the universal and necessary ideas, which are +apprehended by the reason, to the absolute and supreme Idea, which is +the attribute and perfection of God. When the human mind has +contemplated any object of beauty, any fact of order, proportion, +harmony, and excellency, it may rise to the notion of a quality common +to all objects of beauty--from a single beautiful body to two, from two +to all others; from beautiful bodies to beautiful sentiments, from +beautiful sentiments to beautiful thoughts, until, from thought to +thought, we arrive at the highest thought, which has no other object +than the perfect, absolute, _Divine Beauty_.[897] When a man has, from +the contemplation of instances of virtue, risen to the notion of a +quality common to all these instances, this quality becomes the +representative of an ineffable something which, in the sphere of +immutable reality, answers to the conception in his soul. "At the +extreme limits of the intellectual world is the _Idea of the Good_, +which is perceived with difficulty, but, in fine, can not be perceived +without concluding that it is the source of all that is beautiful and +good; that in the visible world it produces light, and the star whence +light directly comes; that in the invisible world it directly produces +truth and intelligence."[898] This _absolute Good is God_. + +[Footnote 897: "Banquet," § 34.] + +[Footnote 898: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.] + +The order in which these several methods of proof were developed, will +at once present itself to the mind of the reader as the natural order of +thought. The first and most obvious aspect which nature presents to the +opening mind is that of movement and change--a succession of phenomena +suggesting the idea of _power_. Secondly, a closer attention reveals a +resemblance of phenomena among themselves, a uniformity of nature--an +order, proportion, and harmony pervading the _cosmos_, which suggest an +_identity and unity of power and of reason_, pervading and controlling +all things. Thirdly, a still closer inspection of nature reveals a +wonderful adaptation of means to the fulfillment of special ends, of +organs designed to fulfill specific functions, suggesting the idea of +_purpose_, _contrivance_, and _choice_, and indicating that the power +which moves and determines the universe is a _personal_, _thinking_, and +_voluntary_ agent. And fourthly, a profounder study of the nature of +thought, an analysis of personal consciousness, reveals that there are +necessary principles, ideas, and laws, which universally govern and +determine thought to definite and immovable conceptions--as, for +example, the principles of causality, of substance, of identity or +unity, of order, of intentionality; and that it is only under these laws +that we can conceive the universe. By the law of substance we are +compelled to regard these ideas, which are not only laws of thought but +also of things, as inherent in a subject, or Being, who made all things, +and whose ideas are reflected in the reason of man. Thus from universal +and necessary ideas we rise to the _absolute Idea_, from immutable +principles to a _First Principle of all principles_, a _First Thought_ +of all thoughts--that is, to _God_. This is the history of the +development of thought in the individual, and in the race--_cause_, +_order_, _design_, _idea_, _being_, GOD. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +THE PROPÆDEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY _(continued)_. + + + "If we regard this sublime philosophy as a preparation for + Christianity instead of seeking in it a substitute for the + Gospel, we shall not need to overstate its grandeur in order + to estimate its real value."--Pressensé. + + "Plato made me to know the true God. Jesus Christ showed me + the way to Him."--St. Augustine. + +The preparatory office of Grecian philosophy is also seen in _the +department of morals_. + +I. _In the awakening and enthronement of Conscience as a law of duty, +and the elevation and purification of the Moral Idea_. + +The same law of evolution, which we have seen governing the history of +speculative thought, may also be traced as determining the progress of +ethical inquiry. In this department there are successive stages marked, +both in the individual and the national mind. There is, first, the +simplicity and trust of childhood, submitting with unquestioning faith +to prescribed and arbitrary laws; then the unsettled and ill-directed +force of youth, questioning the authority of laws, and asking reasons +why this or that is obligatory; then the philosophic wisdom of riper +years, recognizing an inherent law of duty, which has an absolute +rightness and an imperative obligation. There is first a dim and shadowy +apprehension of some lines of moral distinction, and some consciousness +of obligation, but these rest mainly upon an outward law--the observed +practice of others, or the command of the parent as, in some sense, the +command of God. Then, to attain to personal convictions, man passes +through a stage of doubt; he asks for a ground of obligation, for an +authority that shall approve itself to his own judgment and reason. At +last he arrives at some ultimate principles of right, some immutable +standard of duty; he recognizes an inward law of conscience, and it +becomes to him as the voice of God. He extends his analysis to history, +and he finds that the universal conscience of the race has, in all ages, +uttered the same behest. Should he live in Christian times, he discovers +a wondrous harmony between the voice of God within the heart, and the +voice of God within the pages of inspiration. And now the convention of +public opinion, and the laws of the state, are revered and upheld by +him, just so far as they bear the imprimatur of reason and of +conscience--that is, of God. + +This history of the normal development of the individual mind has its +counterpart in the history of humanity. There is (1.) _The age of +popular and unconscious morality_; (2.) _The transitional, skeptical, or +sophistical age_; and (3.) _The philosophic or conscious age of +morality_.[899] In the "Republic" of Plato, we have these three eras +represented by different persons, through the course of the dialogue. +The question is started--what is Justice? and an answer is given from +the stand-point of popular morality, by Polemarchus, who quotes the +words of the poet Simonides, + + "To give to each his due is just;"[900] + +that is, justice is paying your debts. This doctrine being proved +inadequate, an answer is given from the Sophistical point of view by +Thrasymachus, who defines justice as "the advantage of the +strongest"--that is, might is right, and right is might.[901] This +answer being sharply refuted, the way is opened for a more philosophic +account, which is gradually evolved in book iv., Glaucon and Adimantus +personifying the practical understanding, which is gradually brought +into harmony with philosophy, and Socrates the higher reason, as the +purely philosophic conception. Justice is found to be the right +proportion and harmonious development of all the elements of the soul, +and the equal balance of all the interests of society, so as to secure a +well-regulated and harmonious whole. + +[Footnote 899: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics," vol. i. p. 46.] + +[Footnote 900: "Republic," bk. i. § 6.] + +[Footnote 901: Ibid., bk. i. § 12.] + +The era of _popular and unconscious morality_ is represented by the +times of Homer, Hesiod, the Gnomic poets, and "the Seven Wise Men of +Greece." + +This was an age of instinctive action, rather than reflection--of poetry +and feeling, rather than analytic thought. The rules of life were +presented in maxims and proverbs, which do not rise above prudential +counsels or empirical deductions. Morality was immediately associated +with the religion of the state, and the will of the gods was the highest +law for men. "Homer and Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, constituted the +educational course," to which may be added the saws and aphorisms of the +Seven Wise Men, and we have before us the main sources of Greek views of +duty. When the question was asked--"What is right?" the answer was given +by a quotation from Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, and the like. The morality +of Homer "is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a +heroic life, rather than a philosophic theory. It is mixed up with a +religion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of nature, +and in a deification of the strong and brilliant qualities of human +nature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard for a future life. It +clings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the +state after death looms up in the distance as a cold and repugnant +shadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The +distinction between a noble and ignoble life is strongly marked in +Homer, and yet a sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems +fluctuating" and confused.[902] A sensuous conception of happiness is +the chief good, and mere temporal advantage the principal reward of +virtue. We hear nothing of the approving smile of conscience, of inward +self-satisfaction, and peace, and harmony, resulting from the practice +of virtue. Justice, energy, temperance, chastity, are enjoined, because +they secure temporal good. And yet, with all this imperfection, the +poets present "a remarkable picture of primitive simplicity, chastity, +justice, and practical piety, under the three-fold influence of right +moral feeling, mutual and fear of the divine displeasure."[903] + +[Footnote 902: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics," vol. i. p. 51.] + +[Footnote 903: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," p. 167.] + +The _transitional, skeptical_, or _sophistical era_ begins with +Protagoras. Poetry and proverbs had ceased to satisfy the reason of man. +The awakening intellect had begun to call in question the old maxims and +"wise saws," to dispute the arbitrary authority of the poets, and even +to arraign the institutions of society. It had already begun to seek for +some reasonable foundation of authority for the opinions, customs, laws, +and institutions which had descended to them from the past, and to ask +why men were obliged to do this or that? The question whether there is +at bottom any real difference between truth and error, right and wrong, +was now fairly before the human mind. The ultimate standard of all truth +and all right, was now the grand object of pursuit. These inquiries were +not, however, conducted by the Sophists with the best motives. They were +not always prompted by an earnest desire to know the truth, and an +earnest purpose to embrace and do the right. They talked and argued for +mere effect--to display their dialectic subtilty, or their rhetorical +power. They taught virtue for mere emolument and pay. They delighted, as +Cicero tells us, to plead the opposite sides of a cause with equal +effect. And they found exquisite pleasure in raising difficulties, +maintaining paradoxes, and passing off mere tricks of oratory for solid +proofs. This is the uniform representation of the sophistical spirit +which is given by all the best writers who lived nearest to their times, +and who are, therefore, to be presumed to have known them best. +Grote[904] has made an elaborate defense of the Sophists; he charges +Plato with gross misrepresentation. His portraits of them are denounced +as mere caricatures, prompted by a spirit of antagonism; all antiquity +is presumed to have been misled by him. No one, however, can read +Grant's "Essay on the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece"[905] +without feeling that his vindication of Plato is complete and +unanswerable: "Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching a lax +morality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in +holding wicked opinions; he represents them as only too orthodox in +general,[906] but capable of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for +the sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with the moral +convictions than directly attacks them." The Sophists were wanting in +deep conviction, in moral earnestness, in sincere love of truth, in +reverence for goodness and purity, and therefore their trifling, +insincere, and paradoxical teaching was unfavorable to goodness of life. +The tendency of their method is forcibly depicted in the words of Plato: +"There are certain dogmas relating to what is _just_ and _good_ in which +we have been brought up from childhood--obeying and reverencing them. +Other opinions recommending pleasure and license we resist, out of +respect for the old hereditary maxims. Well, then, a question comes up +concerning what is right? He gives some answer such as he has been +taught, and straightway is refuted. He tries again, and is again +refuted. And, when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the +opinion that _nothing is either right or wrong_; and in the same way it +happens about the just and the good, and all that before we have held in +reverence. On this, he naturally abandons his allegiance to the old +principles and takes up with those he before resisted, and so, from +being a good citizen, he becomes lawless."[907] And, in point of fact, +this was the theoretical landing-place of the Sophists. We do not say +they became practically "lawless" and antinomian, but they did arrive at +the settled opinion that right and wrong, truth and error, are solely +matter of private opinion and conventional usage. Man's own fluctuating +opinion is the measure and standard of all things.[908] They who "make +the laws, make them for their own advantage."[909] There is no such +thing as Eternal Right. "That which _appears_ just and honorable to each +city is so for that city, as long as the opinion prevails."[910] + +[Footnote 904: "History of Greece."] + +[Footnote 905: Aristotle's "Ethics," vol. i. ch. ii.] + +[Footnote 906: "His teachings will be good counsels about a man's own +affairs, how best to govern his family; and also about the affairs of +the state, how most ably to administer and speak of state +affairs."--"Protag.," § 26.] + +[Footnote 907: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xvii.] + +[Footnote 908: "Theætetus," § 23.] + +[Footnote 909: "Gorgias," §§ 85-89.] + +[Footnote 910: "Theætetus," §§ 65-75.] + +The age of the Sophists was a transitional period--a necessary, though, +in itself considered, an unhappy stage in the progress of the human +mind; but it opened the way for, _The Socratic, philosophic_, or +_conscious age of morals_. It has been said that "before Socrates there +was no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct." If by this is +meant that prior to Socrates men simply followed the maxims of "the +Theologians,"[911] and obeyed the laws of the state, without reflection +and inquiry as to the intrinsic character of the acts, and without any +analysis and exact definition, so as to attain to principles of ultimate +and absolute right, it must be accepted as true--there was no philosophy +of morals. Socrates is therefore justly regarded as "the father of moral +philosophy." Aristotle says that he confined himself chiefly to ethical +inquiries. He sought a determinate conception and an exact definition of +virtue. As Xenophon has said of him, "he never ceased asking, What is +piety? what is impiety? what is noble? what is base? what is just? what +is unjust? what is temperance? what is madness?"[912] And these +questions were not asked in the Sophistic spirit, as a dialectic +exercise, or from idle curiosity. He was a perfect contrast to the +Sophists. They had slighted Truth, he made her the mistress of his soul. +They had turned away from her, he longed for more perfect communion with +her. They had deserted her for money and renown, he was faithful to her +in poverty.[913] He wanted to know what piety was, that he might be +pious. He desired to know what justice, temperance, nobility, courage +were, that he might cultivate and practise them. He wrote no books, +delivered no lectures; he instituted no school; he simply conversed in +the shop, the market-place, the banquet-hall, and the prison. This +philosophy was not so much a _doctrine_ as a _life_. "What is remarkable +in him is not the _system_ but the _man_. The memory he left behind him +amongst his disciples, though idealized--the affection, blended with +reverence, which they never ceased to feel for his person, bear +testimony to the elevation of his character and his moral purity. We +recognize in him a Greek of Athens--one who had imbibed many dangerous +errors, and on whom the yoke of pagan custom still weighed; but his life +was nevertheless a noble life; and it is to calumny we must have +recourse if we are to tarnish its beauty by odious insinuations, as +Lucian did, and as has been too frequently done, after him, by +unskillful defenders of Christianity,[914] who imagine it is the gainer +by all that degrades human nature. Born in a humble position, destitute +of all the temporal advantages which the Greeks so passionately loved, +Socrates exerted a kingship over minds. His dominion was the more real +for being less apparent.... His power consisted of three things: his +devoted affection for his disciples, his disinterested love of truth, +and the perfect harmony of his life and doctrine.... If he recommended +temperance and sobriety, he also set the example; poorly clad, satisfied +with little, he disdained all the delicacies of life. He possessed every +species of courage. On the field of battle he was intrepid, and still +more intrepid when he resisted the caprices of the multitude who +demanded of him, when he was a senator, to commit the injustice of +summoning ten generals before the tribunals. He also infringed the +iniquitous orders of the thirty tyrants of Athens. The satires of +Aristophanes neither moved nor irritated him. The same dauntless +firmness he displayed when brought before his judges, charged with +impiety. 'If it is your wish to absolve me on condition that I +henceforth be silent, I reply I love and honor you, but I ought rather +to obey the gods than you. Neither in the presence of judges nor of the +enemy is it permitted me, or any other man, to use every sort of means +to escape death. It is not death but crime that it is difficult to +avoid; crime moves faster than death. So I, old and heavy as I am, have +allowed myself to be overtaken by death, while my accusers, light and +vigorous, have allowed themselves to be overtaken by the light-footed +crime. I go, then, to suffer death; they to suffer shame and iniquity. I +abide by my punishment, as they by theirs. All is according to order.' +It was the same fidelity to duty that made Socrates refuse to escape +from prison, in order not to violate the laws of his country, to which, +even though irritated, more respect is due than to a father. 'Let us +walk in the path,' he says 'that God has traced for us.' These last +words show the profound religious sentiment which animated Socrates.... +It is impossible not to feel that there was something divine in such a +life crowned with such a death."[914] + +[Footnote 911: Homer, Hesiod, etc.] + +[Footnote 912: "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. i. p. 16.] + +[Footnote 913: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 122.] + +[Footnote 914: Watson's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 374.] + +[Footnote 915: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," pp. 109-111.] + +Socrates laid the foundation for conscious morality by placing the +ground of right and wrong in an eternal and unchangeable reason which +illuminates the reason and conscience of every man. He often asserted +that morality is a science which can not be taught. It depends mainly +upon principles which are discovered by an inward light. Accordingly he +regarded it as the main business of education to "draw out" into the +light of consciousness the principles of right and justice which are +infolded within the conscience of man--to deliver the mind of the secret +truth which was striving towards the light of day. Therefore he called +his method the "maieutic" or "obstetric" art. He felt there was +something divine in all men (answering to his _to daimonion_ or +_daimonion ti_--a divine and supernatural something--a warning +"voice"--a gnomic "sign"--a "law of God written on the heart"), which by +a system of skillful interrogations he sought to elicit, so that each +might hear for himself the voice of God, and, hearing, might obey. Thus +was he the "great prophet of the human conscience," and a messenger of +God to the heathen world, to prepare the way of the Lord. + +The morality of conscience was carried to its highest point by Plato. +From the moment he became the disciple of Socrates he sympathized deeply +with the spirit and the method of his master. He had the same deep +seriousness of spirit, that same earnestness of purpose, that same +inward reverence for justice, and purity, and goodness, which dwelt in +the heart of Socrates. A naturally noble nature, he loved truth with all +the glow and fervor of his young heart. He felt that if any thing gave +meaning and value to life, it must be the contemplation of absolute +truth, absolute beauty, and absolute Good. This absolute Good is God, +who is the first principle of all ideas, the fountain of all the order +and proportion and beauty of the universe, the source of all the good +which exists in nature and in man. To practise goodness--to conform the +character to the eternal models of order, proportion, and excellence, is +to resemble God. To aspire after perfection of moral being, to secure +assimilation to God ([Greek: omoiosis Theô]) is the noble aspiration of +Plato's soul. + +When we read the "Gorgias," the "Philebus," and especially the +"Republic," with what noble joy are we filled on hearing the voice of +conscience, like a harp swept by a seraph's hand, uttering such +deep-toned melodies! How does he drown the clamors of passion, the +calculations of mere expediency, the sophism of mere personal interest +and utility. If he calls us to witness the triumph of the wicked in the +first part of the "Republic," it is in order that we may at the end of +the book see the deceitfulness of their triumph. "As to the wicked," he +says, "I maintain that even if they succeed at first in concealing what +they are, most of them betray themselves at the end of their career. +They are covered with opprobrium, and present evils are nothing compared +with those that _await them in the other life_. As to the just man, +whether in sickness or in poverty, these imaginary evils will turn to +his advantage in this life, _and after his death_; because the +providence of the gods is necessarily attentive to the interests of him +who labors to become just, and to attain, by the practice of virtue, to +the most perfect resemblance to God which is possible to man."[916] He +rises above all "greatest happiness principles," and asserts distinctly +in the "Gorgias" that it is better to suffer wrong than to do +wrong.[917] "I maintain," says he, "that what is most shameful is not to +be struck unjustly on the cheek, or to be wounded in the body; but that +to strike and wound me unjustly, to rob me, or reduce me to slavery--to +commit, in a word, any kind of injustice towards me, or what is mine--is +a thing far worse and more odious for him who commits the injustice, +than for me who suffer it."[918] It is a great combat, he says, greater +than we think, that wherein the issue is whether we shall be virtuous or +wicked. Neither glory, nor riches, nor dignities, nor poetry, deserves +that we should neglect justice for them. The moral idea in Plato has +such intense truth and force, that it has at times a striking analogy +with the language of the Holy Scriptures.[919] + +[Footnote 916: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xii.] + +[Footnote 917: "Gorgias," §§ 59-80.] + +[Footnote 918: Ibid., § 137.] + +[Footnote 919: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 129.] + +The obligation of moral rectitude is, by Plato, derived from the +authoritative utterances of conscience as the voice of God. We must do +right because reason and conscience say it is right. In the "Euthyphron" +he maintains that the moral quality of actions is not dependent on the +arbitrary will of a Supreme Governor;--"an act is not holy because the +gods love it, but the gods love it because it is holy." The eternal law +of right dwells in the Eternal Reason of God, the idea of right in all +human minds is a ray of that Eternal Reason; and the requirement of the +divine law that we shall do right is, and must be, in harmony with both. + +The present life is regarded by Plato as a state of probation and +discipline, the future life as one of reward and punishment.[920] + +[Footnote 920: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xv., xvi.; "Laws," bk. x. ch. +xiii.] + +Plato was thus to the heathen world "the great apostle of the moral +idea;" he followed up and completed the work of Socrates. "The voice of +God, that still found a profound echo in man's heart, possessed in him +an organ to which all Greece gave ear; and the austere revelation of +conscience this time embodied in language too harmonious not to entice +by the beauty of form, a nation of artists, they received it. The tables +of the eternal law, carved in purest marble and marvellously sculptured, +were read by them." + +In Plato both the theistic conception and the moral idea seem to have +touched the zenith. The philosophy of Aristotle, considered as a whole, +appears on one side to have passed the line of the great Hellenic +period. If it did not inaugurate, it at least prepared the way for the +decline. It perfected logic, as the instrument of ratiocination, and +gave it exactness and precision, Yet taken all in all, it was greatly +inferior to its predecessor. From the moral point of view it is a +decided retrogression. The god of Aristotle is indifferent to virtue. He +is pure thought rather than moral perfection. He takes no cognizance of +man. Morality has no eternal basis, no divine type, and no future +reward. Therefore Aristotle's philosophy had little power over the +conscience and heart. + +During the grand Platonic period human reason made its loftiest flight, +it rose aloft and soared towards heaven, but alas! its wings, like those +of Icarus, melted in the sun and it fell to earth again. Instead of wax +it needed the strong "eagle pinions of faith" which revelation only can +supply. The decadence is strongly marked both in the Epicurean and Stoic +schools. They both express the feeling of exhaustion, disappointment, +and despair. The popular theology had lost its hold upon the public +mind. The gods no longer visited the earth. "The mysterious voice which, +according to the poetic legend related by Plutarch, was heard out at +sea--'Great Pan is dead'--rose up from every heart; the voice of an +incredulous age proclaimed the coming end of paganism. The oracles were +dumb." There was no vision in the land. All faith in a beneficent +overruling Providence was lost, and the hope of immortality was +well-nigh gone. The doctrines of a resurrection and a judgment to come, +were objects of derisive mockery.[921] Philosophy directed her attention +solely to the problem of individual well-being on earth; it became +simply a philosophy of life, and not, as with Plato, "a preparation for +death." The grosser minds sought refuge in the doctrines of Epicurus. +They said, "Pleasure is the chief good, the end of life is to enjoy +yourself;" to this end "dismiss the fear of gods, and, above all, the +fear of death." The nobler souls found an asylum with the Stoics. They +said, "Fata nos ducunt--The Fates lead us! Live conformable to reason. +Endure and abstain!" Notwithstanding numerous and serious errors, the +ethical system of the Stoics was wonderfully pure. This must be +confessed by any one who reads the "Enchiridion" of Epictetus, and the +"Meditations" of Aurelius. "The highest end of life is to contemplate +truth and to obey the Eternal Reason. God is to be reverenced above all +things, and universally submitted to. The noblest office of reason is to +subjugate passion and conduct to virtue. Virtue is the supreme good, +which is to be pursued for its own sake, and not from fear or hope. That +is sufficient for happiness which is seated only in the mind, and +therefore independent of external things. The consciousness of +well-doing is reward enough without the applause of others. And no fear +of loss, or pain, or even death, must be suffered to turn us aside from +truth and virtue."[922] + +[Footnote 921: Acts xvii. 32.] + +[Footnote 922: Marcus Aurelius.] + +The preparatory office of Christianity in the field of ethics is further +seen, + +II. _In the fact that, by an experiment conducted on the largest scale, +it demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect ideal +of moral excellence, and develop the moral forces necessary to secure +its realization_. + +We have seen that the moral idea in Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, Marcus +Aurelius, and Seneca rose to a sublime height, and that, under its +influence, they developed a noble and heroic character. At the same time +it must be conceded that their ethical system was marked by signal +blemishes and radical defects. After all its excellence, it did not give +roundness, completeness, and symmetry to moral life. The elements which +really purify and ennoble man, and lend grace and beauty to life, were +utterly wanting. Their systems were rather a discipline of the reason +than a culture of the heart. The reason held in check the lower passions +and propensities of the nature but it did not evoke the softer, gentler, +purer emotions of the soul. The cardinal virtues of the ancient ethical +systems are Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Courage, all which are in +the last analysis reduced to Wisdom. Humility, Meekness, Forgiveness of +injuries, Love of even enemies, Universal Benevolence, Real +Philanthropy, the graces which give beauty to character and bless +society, are scarcely known. It is true that in Epictetus and Seneca we +have some counsels to humility, to forbearance, and forgiveness; but it +must be borne in mind that Christianity was now in the air, exerting an +indirect influence beyond the limits of the labors of the indefatigable +missionaries of the Cross.[923] By their predecessors, these qualities +were disparaged rather than upheld. Resentment of injuries was applauded +as a virtue, and meekness was proclaimed a defect and a weakness. They +knew nothing of a forgiving spirit, and were strangers to the charity +"which endureth all things, hopeth all things, and never fails." The +enlarged philanthrophy which overleaps the bounds of kindred and +nationality, and embraces a common humanity in its compassionate regards +and benevolent efforts, was unknown. Socrates, the noblest of all the +Grecians, was in no sense cosmopolitan in his feeling. His whole nature +and character wore a Greek impress. He could scarce be tempted to go +beyond the gates of Athens, and his care was all for the Athenian +people. He could not conceive an universal philanthropy. Plato, in his +solicitude to reduce his ideal state to a harmonious whole, answering to +his idea of Justice, sacrificed the individual. He superseded private +property, broke up the sacred relations of family and home, degraded +woman, and tolerated slavery. Selfishness was to be overcome, and +political order maintained, by a rigid communism. To harmonize +individual rights and national interests, was the wisdom reserved for +the fishermen of Galilee. The whole method of Plato's "Politeia," +breathes the spirit of legalism in all its severity, untempered by the +spirit of Love. This was the living force which was wanting to give +energy to the ideals of the reason and conscience, to furnish high +motive to virtue, to prompt to deeds of heroic sacrifice and suffering +for the good of others; and this could not be inspired by philosophy, +nor constrained by legislation. This love must descend from above. "The +Platonic love" was a mere intellectual appreciation of beauty, and +order, and proportion, and excellence. It was not the love of man as the +offspring and image of God, as the partaker of a common nature, and the +heir of a common immortality. Such love was first revealed on earth by +the incarnate Son of God, and can only be attained by human hearts under +the inspiration of his teaching and life, and the renewing influence of +the Holy Spirit. "Love is of God, and every one that loveth is born of +God and knoweth God." To "love our neighbor as ourself" is the golden +precept of the Son of God, who is incarnate Love. The equality of all +men as "the offspring of God" had been nominally recognized by the Stoic +philosophers; its realization had been rendered possible to the popular +thought by Roman conquest, law, and jurisprudence; these had prepared +the way for its fullest announcement and practical recognition by the +world. At this providential juncture St. Paul appears on Mars' Hill, and +in the presence of the assembled philosophers proclaims, "_God hath made +of one blood all nations of men_." A lofty ideal of moral excellence had +been attained by Plato--the conception of a high and inflexible +morality, which contrasted most vividly with the depravity which +prevailed in Athenian society. The education "of the public assemblies, +the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gathered" was +unfavorable to virtue. And the inadequacy of all mere human teaching to +resist this current of evil, and save the young men of the age from +ruin, is touchingly and mournfully confessed by Plato. "There is not, +there never was, there never will be a moral education possible that can +countervail the education of which these are the dispensers; that is, +_human_ education: I except, with the proverb, that which is Divine. +And, truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck, +can only escape _by the special favor of heaven."_[924] He affirms again +and again that man can not by himself rise to purity and goodness. +"Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but it comes +to us by a divine influence. Virtue is the gift of God in those who +possess it."[925] That "gift of God" was about to be bestowed, in all +its fullness of power and blessing, "_through Jesus Christ our Lord_." + +[Footnote 923: Seneca lived in the second century; Epictetus, in the +latter part of the first century.] + +[Footnote 924: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.] + +[Footnote 925: "Meno;" see conclusion.] + +In the department of _religious feeling_ and _sentiment_, the +propædeutic office of Greek philosophy is seen, in general, in the +revealing of the immediate spiritual wants of the soul, and the distinct +presentation of the problem which Christianity alone can solve. + +I. _It awakened in man the sense of distance and estrangement from God, +and the need of a Mediator--"a daysman betwixt us, that might lay his +hand upon us both_"[926] + +[Footnote 926: Job ix. 33.] + +During the period of unconscious and unreflective theism, the sentiment +of the Divine was one of objective nearness and personal intimacy. The +gods interposed directly in the affairs of men, and held frequent and +familiar intercourse with our race. They descend to the battle-field of +Troy, and mingle in the bloody strife. They grace the wedding-feast by +their presence, and heighten the gladness with celestial music. They +visit the poor and the stranger, and sometimes clothe the old and +shrivelled beggar with celestial beauty. They inspire their favorites +with strength and courage, and fill their mouths with wisdom and +eloquence. They manifest their presence by signs and wonders, by visions +and dreams, by auguries and prophetic voices. But more frequently than +all, they are seen in the ordinary phenomena of nature, the sunshine and +storm, the winds and tempests, the hail and rain. The natural is, in +fact, the supernatural, and all the changes of nature are the movement +and action of the Divine. The feeling of dependence is immediate and +universal, and worship is the natural and spontaneous act of man. + +But the period of reflection is inevitable. Man turns his inquiring gaze +towards nature and desires, by an imperfect effort of physical +induction, to reach "the first principle and cause of things." Soon he +discovers the prevalence of uniformity in nature, the actions of +physical properties and agencies, and he catches some glimpses of the +reign of universal law. The natural tendency of this discovery is +obvious in the weakening of his sense of dependence on the immediate +agency of God. The Egyptians told Herodotus that, as their fields were +regularly irrigated by the waters of the Nile, they were less dependent +on God than the Greeks, whose lands were watered by rains, and who must +perish if Jupiter did not send them showers.[927] As man advances in the +field of mere physical inquiry, God recedes; from the region of +explained phenomena, he retires into the region of unexplained +phenomena--the border-land of mystery. The gods are driven from the +woods and streams, the winds and waves. Neptune does not absolutely +control the seas, nor Æolus the winds. The Divine becomes, no more a +physical archê--a nature-power, but a Supreme Mind, an ineffable Spirit, +an invisible God, the Supreme Essence of Essences, the Supreme Idea of +Ideas (eidos auto kath auto) apprehended by human reason alone, but +having an independent, eternal, substantial, personal being. Through the +instrumentality of Platonism, the idea of God becomes clearer and purer. +Man had learned that communion with the Divinity was something more than +an apotheosis of humanity, or a pantheistic absorption. He caught +glimpses of a higher and holier union. He had surrendered the ideal of a +national communion with God, and of personal protection through a +federal religion, and now was thrown back upon himself to find some +channel of personal approach to God. But alas! he could not find it. A +God so vastly elevated beyond human comprehension, who could only be +apprehended by the most painful effort of abstract thought; a God so +infinitely removed from man by the purity and rectitude of his +character; a God who was all pure reason, seemed alien to all the +yearnings and sympathies of the human heart; and such a God, dwelling in +pure light, seemed inapproachable and inacessible to man.[928] The +purifying of the religious idea had evoked a new ideal, and this ideal +was painfully remote. By the energy of abstract thought man had striven +to pierce the veil, and press into "the Holy of Holies," to come into +the presence of God, and he had failed. And he had sought by moral +discipline, by self-mortification, by inward purification, to raise +himself to that lofty plane of purity, where he might catch some +glimpses of the vision of a holy God, and still he failed. Nay, more, he +had tried the power of prayer. Socrates, and Plato, and Cleanthes had +bowed the knee and moved the lips in prayer. The emperor Aurelius, and +the slave Epictetus had prayed, and prayer, no doubt, intensified their +longing, and sharpened and agonized their desire, but it did not raise +them to a satisfying and holy _koinonia_ in the divine life. "It seems +to me"--said Plato--as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist +from before the eyes of Diomede, + + 'That he might clearly see 'twixt Gods and men.' + +so must he, in the first place, remove from your soul the mist that now +dwells there, and then apply those things through which you will be able +to know[929] and rightly pray to God. + +[Footnote 927: Herodotus, vol. ii. bk. ii. ch. xiii. p. 14 (Rawlinson's +edition).] + +[Footnote 928: "To discover the Maker and Father of the universe is a +hard task;.... to make him known to all is impossible."--"Timæus," ch. +ix.] + +[Footnote 929: "Second Alcibiades," § 23.] + +To develop this innate desire and "feeling after God" was the grand +design of providence in "fixing the times" of the Greek nation, and "the +boundaries of their habitation."[930] Man was brought, through a period +of discipline, to feel his need of a personal relation to God. He was +made to long for a realizing sense of his presence--to desire above all +things a Father, a Counsellor, and a Friend--a living ear into which he +might groan his anguish, or hymn his joy; and a living heart that could +beat towards him in compassion, and prompt immediate succor and aid. The +idea of a pure Spiritual Essence without form, and without emotion, +pervading all, and transcending all, is too vague and abstract to yield +us comfort, and to exert over us any persuasive power. "Our moral +weakness shrinks from it in trembling awe. The heart can not feed on +sublimities. We can not make a home of cold magnificence; we can not +take immensity by the hand."[931] Hence the need and the desire that God +shall condescendingly approach to man, and by some manifestation of +himself in human form, and through the sensibilities of the human heart, +commend himself to the heart of man--in other words, the need of an +_Incarnation_. Thus did the education of our race, by the dispensation +of philosophy, prepare the way for him who was consciously or +unconsciously "_the Desire of Nations_," and the deepening earnestness +and spiritual solicitude of the heathen world heralded the near approach +of Him who was not only "the Hope of Israel" but "the Saviour of the +world." + +[Footnote 930: Acts xvii. 26, 27.] + +[Footnote 931: Caird.] + +The idea of an _Incarnation_ was not unfamiliar to human thought, it was +no new or strange idea to the heathen mind. The numberless metamorphoses +of Grecian mythology, the incarnations of Brahm, the avatars of Vishnu, +and the human form of Krishna had naturalized the thought.[932] So that +when the people of Lystra saw the apostles Paul and Barnabas exercising +supernatural powers of healing, they said, "The gods have come down to +us in the likeness of men!" and they called Barnabas Jupiter, and Paul, +Mercurius. The idea in its more definite form may have been, and indeed +was, communicated to the world through the agency of the dispersed Jews. +So that Virgil, the Roman poet, who was contemporary with Christ, seems +to re-echo the prophecy of Isaiah-- + + The last age decreëd by the Fates is come, + And a new frame of all things does begin; + A holy progeny from heaven descends + Auspicious in his birth, which puts an end + To the iron age, and from which shall arise + A golden age, most glorious to behold. + +[Footnote 932: Young's "Christ of History," p. 248.] + +II. _Finally, Greek philosophy prepared the way for Christianity by +awakening and deepening the consciousness of guilt, and the desire for +Redemption_. + +The consciousness of sin, and the consequent need of expiation for sin, +were gradually unfolded in the Greek mind. The idea of sin was at first +revealed in a confused and indefinite feeling of some external, +supernatural, and bewildering influence which man can not successfully +resist; but yet so in harmony with the sinner's inclination, that he can +not divest himself of all responsibility. "Homer has no word answering +in comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word _sin_, as it is +used in the Bible..... The noun _amartia_ which is appropriated to +express this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur in +the Homeric poems..... The word which is most frequently employed to +express wrong-doing of every kind is _atê_, with its corresponding +verb..... The radical signification of the word seems to be a +befooling--a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as by +unseasonable sleep, and excess of wine, joined with the influence of +evil companions, and the power of destiny, or the deity. Hence, the +Greek imagination, which impersonated every great power, very naturally +conceived of Atê as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal cause +of folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter of +Jupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth, +cast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads of +men, and makes all things go wrong. Hence, too, when men come to their +senses, and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they cast +the blame on Atê, and so, ultimately, on Jupiter and the gods."[933] + +[Footnote 933: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," pp. 174, 175.] + + "Oft hath this matter been by Greeks discussed, + And I their frequent censure have incurred: + Yet was not I the cause; but Jove, and Fate, + And gloomy Erinnys, who combined to throw + A strong delusion o'er my mind, that day + I robb'd Achilles of his lawful prize. + What could I do? a Goddess all o'erruled, + Daughter of Jove, dread Até, baleful power + Misleading all; with light step she moves, + Not on the earth, but o'er the heads of men. + With blighting touch, and many hath caused to err."[934] + +And yet, though Agamemnon here attempts to shuffle off the guilt of his +transgression upon Até, Jove, and Fate, yet at other times he confesses +his folly and wrong, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility on +the gods.[935] Though misled by a "baleful power," he was not compelled. +Though tempted by an evil goddess, he yet followed his own sinful +passions, and therefore he owns himself responsible. + +To satisfy the demands of divine justice, to show its hatred of sin, and +to deter others from transgression, sin is punished. Punishment is the +penalty due to sin; in the language of Homer, it is the payment of a +debt incurred by sin. When the transgressor is punished he is said to +"pay off," or "pay back" his crimes; in other words, to expatiate or +atone for them. + + "If not at once, + Yet soon or late will Jove assert their claim, + And heavy penalty the perjured pay + With their own blood, their children's, and their wives'."[936] + +At the same time the belief is expressed that the gods may be, and often +are, propitiated by prayers and sacrifices, and thus the penalty is +remitted. + + "The Gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength, + Excelling thee, may yet be mollified; + For they when mortals have transgressed, or fail'd + To do aright, by sacrifice and pray'r, + Libations and burnt-off'rings, may be sooth'd."[937] + +[Footnote 934: "Iliad," bk. xix. l. 91-101 (Lord Derby's translation).] + +[Footnote 935: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 132-136.] + +[Footnote 936: Ibid., bk. iv. l. 185-188.] + +[Footnote 937: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 581-585.] + +Polytheism, then, as Dr. Schaff has remarked, had the voice of +conscience, and a sense, however obscure, of sin. It felt the need of +reconciliation with deity, and sought that reconciliation by prayer, +penance, and sacrifice.[938] + +The sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the absolute need of +expiation, is determined with increasing clearness and definiteness in +the tragic poets. + +The first great law which the Tragedians recognize, as a law written on +the heart, is "that the sinner must suffer for his sins." The connection +between sin and suffering is constantly recognized as a natural and +necessary connection, like that between sowing and reaping. + + A haughty spirit, blossoming, bears a crop + Of woe, and reaps a harvest of despair.[939] + +"Lust and violence beget lust and violence, and vengeance too, at the +appointed time."[940] "Impiety multiplies and perpetuates itself."[941] +"The sinner pays the debt he contracted, ends the career that he +begins,"[942] "and drinks to the dregs the cup of cursing which he +himself had filled."[943] Conscience is the instrument in the hands of +Justice and Vengeance by which the Most High inflicts punishment. The +retributions of sin are "wrought out by God." + +The consequences of great crimes, especially in high places, extend to +every person and every thing connected with them. "The country and the +country's gods are polluted."[944] "The army and the people share in the +curse."[945] "The earth itself is polluted with the shedding of +blood,"[946] "and even the innocent and the virtuous who share the +enterprises of the wicked may be involved in their ruin, as the pious +man must sink with the ungodly when he embarks in the same ship."[947] + +[Footnote 938: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," p. 258.] + +[Footnote 938: Æschylus, "Persæ," l. 821.] + +[Footnote 940: "Agamemnon," l. 763.] + +[Footnote 941: Ibid., l. 788.] + +[Footnote 942: Ibid., l. 1529.] + +[Footnote 943: Ibid., l. 1397.] + +[Footnote 944: Ibid., l. 1645.] + +[Footnote 945: "Persæ," _passim._] + +[Footnote 946: "Sup.," 265.] + +[Footnote 947: "Theb.," p. 602.] + +The pollution and curse of sin, when once contracted by an individual, +or entailed upon a family, will rest upon them and pursue them till the +polluted individual or the hated and accursed race is extinct, unless in +some way the sin can be expiated, or some god interpose to arrest the +penalty. The criminal must die by the hand of justice, and even in Hades +vengeance will still pursue him.[948] Others may in time be washed away +by ablutions, worn away by exile and pilgrimage, and expiated by +offerings of blood.[949] But great crimes can not be washed away; "For +what expiation is there for blood when once it has fallen on the +ground."[950] Thus the law (_[Greek: nomos]_)--for so it is expressly +called--as from an Attic Sinai, rolls its reverberating thunders, and +pronounces its curses upon sin, from act to act and from chorus to +chorus of that grand trilogy--the "Agamemnon," the "Choephoroe," and the +"Eumenides." + +[Footnote 948: "Sup.," l. 227.] + +[Footnote 949: "Eum.," l. 445 seq.] + +[Footnote 950: "Choeph.," l. 47.] + +But after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, then the +reconciliation. A dim consciousness of sin and retribution as a fact, +and of reconciliation as a _want_, seems to have revealed itself even in +the darkest periods of history. This consciousness underlies not a few +of the Greek tragedies. "The 'Prometheus Bound' was followed by the +'Prometheus Unbound,' reconciled and restored through the intervention +of Jove's son. The 'oedipus Tyrannus' of Sophocles was completed by the +'oedipus Colonus,' where he dies in peace amid tokens of divine favor. +And so the 'Agamemnon' and 'Choephoroe' reach their consummation only in +the 'Eumenides,' where the Erinyes themselves are appeased, and the +Furies become the gracious ones. This is not, however, without a special +divine interposition, and then only after a severe struggle between the +powers that cry for justice and those that plead for mercy." + +The office and work which, in this trilogy, is assigned to Jove's son, +Apollo, must strike every reader as at least a remarkable resemblance, +if not a foreshadowing of the Christian doctrine of _reconciliation_. +"This becomes yet more striking when we bring into view the relation in +which this reconciling work stands to [Greek: Zeus Sôtêr], Jupiter +Saviour--[Greek: Zeus tritos], Jupiter the third, who, in connection +with Apollo and Athena, consummates the reconciliation. Not only is +Apollo a [Greek: Sôtêr], a Saviour, who, having himself been exiled from +heaven among men, will pity the poor and needy;[951] not only does +Athena sympathize with the defendant at her tribunal, and, uniting the +office of advocate and judge, persuade the avenging deities to be +appeased;[952] but Zeus is the beginning and end of the whole process. +Apollo appears as the advocate of Orestes only at her bidding;[953] +Athena inclines to the side of the accused, as the offspring of the +brain of Zeus, and of like mind with him."[954] Orestes, after his +acquittal, says that he obtained it + + "By means of Pallas and of Loxias + And the third Saviour who doth all things sway."[955] + +Platonism reveals a still closer affinity with Christianity in its +doctrine of sin, and its sense of the need of salvation. Plato is +sacredly jealous for the honor and purity of the divine character, and +rejects with indignation every hypothesis which would make God the +author of sin. "God, inasmuch as he is good, can not be the cause of all +things, as the common doctrine represents him to be. On the contrary, he +is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part +he is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things. +The good things we must ascribe to God, whilst we must seek elsewhere, +and not in him, the causes of evil."[956] The doctrine of the poets, +which would in some way charge on the gods the errors of men, he sternly +resists. We must express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet, +if guilty of such foolish blunders about the gods as to tell us[957] + + 'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed + Two casks, one stored with evil, one with good,' + +And that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both + + 'He leads a life checker'd with good and ill.' + +[Footnote 951: "Sup.," l. 214.] + +[Footnote 952: "Eum.," l. 970.] + +[Footnote 953: Ibid., l. 616.] + +[Footnote 954: Ibid., l. 664, 737.] + +[Footnote 955: Tyler's "Theology of the Greek Poets," especially ch. v., +from which the above materials are drawn.] + +[Footnote 956: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.] + +[Footnote 957: "Iliad," xxiv., l. 660.] + +Nor can we let our young people know that, in the words of Æschylus-- + + "'When to destruction God will plague a house + He plants among the members guilt and sin.'"[958] + +Whatever in the writings of Homer and the tragic poets give countenance +to the notion that God is, in the remotest sense the author of sin, must +be expunged. Here is clearly a great advance in ethical conceptions. + +The great defect in the ethical system of Plato was the identification +of evil with the inferior or corporeal nature of man--"the irascible and +concupiscible elements," fashioned by the junior divinities. The +rational and immortal part of man's nature, which is derived immediately +from God--the Supreme Good, naturally chooses the good as its supreme +end and destination. Hence he adopted the Socratic maxim "that no man is +willingly evil," that is, no man deliberately chooses evil as evil, but +only as a _seeming_ good--he does not choose evil as an end, though he +may choose it voluntarily as a means. Plato manifests great solicitude +to guard this maxim from misconception and abuse. Man has, in his +judgment, the power to act in harmony with his higher reason, or +contrary to reason; to obey the voice of conscience or the clamors of +passion, and consequently he is the object of praise or blame, reward or +punishment. "When a man does not consider himself, but others, as the +cause of his own sins,.... and even seeks to excuse himself from blame, +he dishonors and injures his own soul; so, also, when contrary to +reason.... he indulges in pleasure, he dishonors it by filling it with +vice and remorse."[959] The work and effort of life, the end of this +probationary economy, is to make reason triumphant over passion, and +discipline ourselves to a purer and nobler life. + +[Footnote 958: "Republic," bk. ii. ch, xviii., xix.] + +[Footnote 959: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.] + +The obstacles to a virtuous life are, however, confessedly numberless, +and, humanly speaking, insurmountable. To raise one's self above the +clamor of passion, the power of evil, the bondage of the flesh, is +acknowledged, in mournful language, to be a hopeless task. A cloud of +sadness shades the brow of Plato as he contemplates the fallen state of +man. In the "Phædrus" he describes, in gorgeous imagery, the purity, and +beauty, and felicity of the soul in its anterior and primeval state, +when, charioteering through the highest arch of heaven in company with +the Deity, it contemplated the divine justice and beauty; but "this +happy life," says he, "we forfeited by our transgression." Allured by +strange affections, our souls forgot the sacred things that we were made +to contemplate and love--we _fell_. And now, in our fallen state, the +soul has lost its pristine beauty and excellence. It has become more +disfigured than was Glaucus, the seaman "whose primitive form was not +recognizable, so disfigured had he become by his long dwelling in the +sea."[960] To restore this lost image of the good,--to regain "this +primitive form," is not the work of man, but God. Man can not save +himself. "Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but +it comes by a divine influence. _Virtue, is the gift of God_."[961] He +needs a discipline, "an education which is divine." If he is saved from +the common wreck, it must be "by the special favor of Heaven."[962] He +must be delivered from sin, if ever delivered, by the interposition of +God. + +[Footnote 960: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xi.] + +[Footnote 961: "Meno."] + +[Footnote 962: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.] + +Plato was, in some way, able to discover the need of a Saviour, to +desire a Saviour, but he could not predict his appearing. Hints are +obscurely given of a Conqueror of sin, an Assuager of pain, an Averter +of evil in this life, and of the impending retributions of the future +life; but they are exceedingly indefinite and shadowy. In all instances +they are rather the language of _desire_, than of hope. Platonism +awakened in the heart of humanity a consciousness of sin and a profound +feeling of want--the want of a Redeemer from sin, a spiritual, a divine +Remedy for its moral malady--and it strove after some remedial power. +But it was equally conscious of failure and defeat. It could enlighten +the reason, but it could only act imperfectly on the will. Platonic was +a striking counterpart to Pauline experience prior to the apostle's +deliverance by the power and grace of Christ. It discovered that "the +Law is holy, and the commandment is holy, and just, and good." It +recognized that "it is spiritual, but man is carnal, the slave of sin." +It could say, "What I do I approve not; for I do not what I would, but +what I hate. But if my will [my better judgment] is against what I do, I +consent unto the Law that it is good. And now it is no more I that do +it, but sin, that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my +flesh, good abideth not, for to will is present with me, but the power +to do the right is absent: the good that I would, I do not; but the evil +that I would not, that I do. I consent gladly to the law of God in my +inner man ['the rational and immortal nature'[963]]; but I behold a law +in my members ['the irascible and concupiscible nature'[964]] warring +against the law of my mind (or reason), and bringing me into captivity +to the law of sin which is in my members. _Oh wretched man that I am! +who shall deliver me from the body of this death_?"[965] Paul was able +to say, "I thank God (that he hath now delivered me), through Jesus +Christ our Lord!" Platonism could only desire, and hope, and wait for +the coming of a Deliverer. + +[Footnote 963: Plato.] + +[Footnote 964: Ibid.] + +[Footnote 965: Romans, vii.] + +This consciousness of the need of supernatural light and help, and this +aspiration after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited +from Socrates, constrained him to regard with toleration, and even +reverence, every apparent approach, every pretension, even, to a divine +inspiration and guidance in the age in which he lived. "'The greatest +blessings which men receive come through the operation of _phrensy_ +([Greek: mania]--inspired exaltation), when phrensy is the gift of God. +The prophetess of Delphi, and the priestess of Dodona, many are the +benefits which in their phrensies (moments of inspiration) they have +bestowed upon Greece; but in their hours of self-possession, few or +none. And too long were it to speak of the Sibyl, and others, who, +inspired and prophetic, have delivered utterances beneficial to the +hearers. Indeed, this word phrenetic or maniac is no reproach; it is +identical with mantic--prophetic.[966] And often when diseases and +plagues have fallen upon men for the sins of their forefathers, some +phrensy too has broken forth, and in prophetic strain has pointed out a +remedy, _showing how the sin might be expiated, and the gods appeased_ +(by prayers, and purifications, and atoning rites).... So many and yet +more great effects could I tell you of the phrensy which comes from the +gods."[967] Some have discerned in all this merely the food for a feeble +ridicule. They regard these sentiments as simply an evidence of the +power and prevalence of superstition clouding the loftiest intellects in +ancient times. By the more thoughtful and philosophic mind, however, +they will be accepted as an indication of the imperishable and universal +faith of humanity in a supernatural and supersensuous world, and in the +possibility of some communication between heaven and earth.[968] And +above all, it is a conclusive proof that Plato believed that the +knowledge of _salvation_--of a remedy for sin, a method of expiation for +sin, a means of deliverance from the power and punishment of sin, must +be revealed from Heaven. + +[Footnote 966: [Greek: Mania], phrensy; _[Greek: pantis]_, a +prophet--one who utters oracles in a state of divine phrensy; _[Greek: +pantikê]_, the prophetic art.] + +[Footnote 967: "Phædrus," § 47-50 (Whewell's translation).] + +[Footnote 968: "_Vetus opinio est_, jam usque ab heroicis ducta +temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et _omnium gentium_ firmata consensu, +versari quandem inter homines divinationem."--Cicero, "De Divin.," i. +I.] + +Paul, then, found, even in that focus of Paganism, the city of Athens, +religious aspirations tending towards Jesus Christ. A true philosophic +method, notwithstanding its shortcomings and imperfections, concluded by +desiring and seeking "the Unknown God," by demanding him from all forms +of worship, from all schools of philosophy. The great work of +preparation in the heathen world consisted in the developing of the +_desire_ for salvation. It proved that God is the great want of every +human soul; that there is a profound affinity between conscience and the +living God; and that Tertullian was right when he wrote the "Testimonium +Animæ naturaliter Christianæ."[969] And when it was sufficiently +demonstrated that "the world by philosophy knew not God (as a Redeeming +God and Saviour), then it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to +save them that believe." This was all a dispensation of divine +providence, which was determined by, or "in, the wisdom of God."[970] + +The history of the religions and philosophies of human origin thus +becomes to us a striking confirmation of the truth of Christianity. It +shows there is a wondrous harmony between the instinctive wants and +yearnings of the human heart, as well as the necessary ideas and laws of +the reason, and the fundamental principles of revealed religion. There +is "a law written on the heart"--written by the finger of God, which +corresponds to the laws written by the same finger on "tables of stone." +There are certain necessary and immutable principles and ideas infolded +in the reason of man, which harmonize with the revelations of the +Eternal Logos in the written word.[971] There are instinctive longings, +mysterious yearnings of the human heart, to which that unveiling of the +heart of God which is made in the teaching and life of the incarnate God +most satisfyingly answers. Within the depths of the human spirit there +is an "oracle" which responds to the voice of "the living oracles of +God." + +[Footnote 969: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ" (Introduction); +Neander, "Church History," vol. i. (Introduction).] + +[Footnote 970: I Corinthians, i. 21.] + +[Footnote 971: "The surmise of Plato, that the world of appearance +subsists in and by a higher world of Divine Thought, is confirmed by +Christianity when it tells us of a Divine subsistence--that Eternal Word +by whom and in whom all things consist."--Vaughan, "Hours with the +Mystics," vol. i. p. 213.] + +Here, then, are two distinct and independent revelations--the unwritten +revelation which God has made to all men in the constitution of the +human mind, and the external written revelation which he has made in the +person and teaching of his Son. And these two are perfectly harmonious. +We have here two great volumes--the volume of conscience, and the volume +of the New Testament. We open them, and find they announce the _same_ +truths--one in dim outline, the other in a full portraiture. There are +the same fundamental principles underlying both revelations. They both +bear the impress of _divinity_. The history of philosophy may have been +marked by many errors of interpretation; so, also, has the history of +dogmatic theology. Men may have often misunderstood and misinterpreted +the dictates of conscience; so have theologians misunderstood and +misinterpreted the dictates of revelation. The perversions of conscience +and reason have been plead in defense of error and sin; and so, for +ages, have the perversions of Scripture been urged in defense of +slavery, oppression, falsehood, and wrong. Sometimes the misunderstood +utterances of conscience, of philosophy, and of science have been +arrayed against the incorrect interpretations of the Word of God. But +when both are better understood, and more justly conceived, they are +found in wondrous harmony. When the New Testament speaks to man of God, +of duty, of immortality, and of retribution, man feels that its +teachings "commend themselves to his conscience" and reason. When it +speaks to him of redemption, of salvation, of eternal life and +blessedness, he feels that it meets and answers all the wants and +longings of his heart. Thus does Christianity throw light upon the +original revelations of God in the human conscience, and answers all the +yearnings of the human soul. So it is found in individual experiences, +so it has been found in the history of humanity. As Leverrier and Adams +were enabled to affirm, from purely mathematical reasoning, that another +planet must exist beyond _Uranus_ which had never yet been seen by human +eyes, and then, afterwards, that affirmation was gloriously verified in +the discovery of _Neptune_ by the telescope of Galle; so the reasonings +of ancient philosophy, based on certain necessary laws of mind, enabled +man to affirm the existence of a God, of the soul, of a future +retribution, and an eternal life beyond the grave; and, then, +subsequently, these were brought fully into light, and verified by the +Gospel. + +We conclude in the words of Pressensé: "To isolate it from the past, +would be to refuse to comprehend the nature of Christianity itself, and +the extent of its triumphs. Although the Gospel is not, as has been +affirmed, the product of anterior civilizations--a mere compound of +Greek and Oriental elements--it is not the less certain that it brings +to the human mind the satisfaction vainly sought by it in the East as in +the West. _Omnia subito_ is not its device, but that of the Gnostic +heresy. Better to say, with Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that the +night of paganism had its stars to light it, but that they called to the +Morning-star which stood over Bethlehem." + +"If we regard philosophy as a preparation for Christianity, instead of +seeking in it a substitute for the Gospel, we shall not need to +overstate its grandeur in order to estimate its real value." + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +A. + + Abstraction, comparative and immediate, 187-189; 362-364. + + Æschylus, his conception of the Supreme Divinity, 146; + his recognition of human guilt, and need of expiation, 515-517. + + Ætiological proof of the existence of God, 487-489. + + Anaxagoras, an Eclectic, 311; + in his physical theory an Atomist, 312; + taught that the Order of the universe can only be explained by + Intelligence, 312; + his psychology, 313; + the teacher of Socrates, 313. + + Anaximander, his first principle _the infinite_, 290; + his infinite a chaos of primary elements, 290. + + Anaximenes, a vitalist, 286; + his first principle _air_, 287. + + Aristotle, his opinion of the popular polytheism of Greece, 157; + his classification of causes, 280, 404, 405; + his misrepresentations of Pythagoras, 299; + his classification of the sciences, 389; + his Organon, 389-394; + his Logic, 394-403; + his Theology, 404-417; + his Ethics, 417-421; + his Categories, 395; + his logical treatises, 396; + on induction and deduction, 396-398; + his psychology, 398, 401; + on how the knowledge of first principles is attained, 394, 402, + 403; + on Matter and Form, 405-408; + on Potentiality and Actuality, 408-412; + his proof of the Divine existence, 412-415; + on the chief good of man, 419, 420; + his doctrine of the Mean, 420, 421; + defect of his ethical system, 505. + + [Archai], or first principles, the grand object of + investigation in Greek Philosophy, 271, 274, 279, 280. + + Athenians, criticism on Plutarch's sketch of their character, 45; + their vivacity, 45; + love of freedom, 46--and of country, 46; + private life of, 47; + intellectual character of, 48; + inquisitive and analytic, 48; + rare combinations of imagination and reasoning powers, 49; + religion of, 98; + the Athenians a religious people, 102; + their faith in the being and providence of God, 107; + their consciousness of dependence on God, 110, 116; + their religious emotions, 117; + their deep consciousness of sin and guilt, 122-124; + their sense of the need of expiation, 124, 125; + their religion exerted some wholesome moral influence, 162, 163. + + Athens, topography of 27; + the Agora, 28; + its porticoes, 29; + the Acropolis, 30; + its temples, 31; + the Areopagus, 33; + sacred objects in, 98, 99; + images of the gods, 99; + localities of schools of philosophy in, 266-268. + + Attica, geographical boundaries of, 26; + a classic land, 34; + its geographical and cosmical conditions providentially ordained + for great moral ends, 34, 35; soil of, not favorable to + agriculture, 40--necessitated industry and frugality, 41; the + climate of, 41--its influence on the mental character of the + people, 42. + + +B. + + Bacon, his assertion that the search after final causes had misled + scientific inquirers, 222. + + +C. + + Categories of Aristotle, 395. + + Causality, principle of, 189; + assailed by the Materialists, 194--especially by Comte, 203-209; + the intuition of _power_ a fact of immediate consciousness, 204; + consciousness of _effort_ the type of all force, 211; + Aristotle on Causality, 413; + ætiological proof of existence of God, 487-489. + + Cause, origin of the idea of, 204, 205. + + Causes, Aristotle's classification of, 280, 404, 405. + + Chief good of man, Aristotle on, 419, 420. + + Cleanthes, his hymn to Jupiter, 452, 453. + + Comte, his theory of the origin of religion, 57-65; + his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to material + phenomena, 203; denies all causation, both efficient and final, + 203-214. + + Conditioned, law of the, 227, 228; + is contradictory, 250; + as a ground of faith, meaningless and void, 251. + + Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490. + + Cousin, his theory that religion had its outbirth in the + spontaneous apperceptions + of reason, 78-84; + criticism thereon, 84-86. + + Criterion of truth, Plato's search after, 333, 334. + + Cudworth, his interpretation of Grecian mythology, 139, 143. + + Cuvier, on final causes, 216, 222. + +D. + + Darwin, his inability to explain the facts of nature without + recognizing design, 221, 222. + + Democritus, taught that atoms and the vacuum are the beginning of + all things, 292; an absolute materialist, 293. + + Dependence, consciousness of, the foundation of primary religious + emotions, 110-113. + + Development, law of mental, 478; three successive stages clearly + marked, in the individual, 478--in the universal mind of + humanity, 479, 480; + (1) in the field of Theistic conceptions, 481-494; + (2) in the department of morals, 495-509; + (3) in the department of religious sentiment, 509-522. + + Dialectic of Plato, 353-369. + + Dogmatic Theologians, assert that all our knowledge of God is + derived from the teaching of the Scriptures, 86,167; cast doubt + upon the principle of causality, 253-255--upon the principle of + the unconditioned, 255-257--upon the principle of unity, + 258-261--and upon the immutable principles of morality, 261-263. + + Dynamical or Vital school of ancient philosophers, 282-289. + +E. + + Eclecticism of Anaxagoras, 311. + + Emotions, the religious, 117-122; + sentiment of the Divine exists in all minds, 119-121; + also instinctive yearning after the Invisible, 121, 122. + + Empedocles, a believer in one Supreme God, 153. + + Epicurus, his theory of the origin of religion, 56, 57; + his Ethics, 427-432; + his Physics, 433-438; + taught that pleasure is the chief end of life, 428--that + ignorance of nature is the sole cause of unhappiness, 432--that + Physics and Psychology are the only studies conducive to + happiness, 432--that the universe is eternal and infinite, + 433--that concrete bodies are combinations of atoms, 434--that + atoms have spontaneity, 436, and some degree of freedom, 436, + 437; the parts of the world self-formed, 437, 438; plants, + animals, and man are spontaneously generated, 438; a state of + savagism the primitive condition of man, 439; his Atheism, 441; + his Psychology, 442-444; the soul material and mortal, 445, 446. + + Eternity, Platonic notion of, 349 (_note_), 372, 373. + + Eternity of Matter, how taught by Plato, 371-373; + distinctly affirmed by Epicurus, 433. + + Eternity of the Soul, Plato's doctrine of, 373-375. + + Ethical ideas and principles, gradual development of, 495, 496; + (1) the age of popular and unconscious morals, 497, 498; + (2) the transitional or sophistical age, 498-500; + (3) the philosophic or conscious age, 500-506. + + Ethics of Plato, 383-387, 502-505; + of Aristotle, 417-42l; + of Epicurus, 427-432; + of the Stoics, 454, 456. + + Expiation for sin, the need of, 124; + universally acknowledged, 124--especially in Grecian mythology, + 125--and in the language of Greece and Rome, 125. + +F. + + Facts of the universe, classification of, 175-177. + + Fathers, the early, recognized the propædeutic office of Greek + philosophy, 473-475. + + Feeling, theories which ground all religion on, 70-74; + its inadequacy, 74-78. + + Final Causes, impossibility of interpreting nature without + recognizing, 221, 222; + the assumption of final causes a means of discovery, 222, 223; + Cuvier on, 216, 222; + argument of Socrates from, 320-324; + Plato on, 380-382; + Aristotle on, 405, 413, 414; + teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491. + + Force, the idea of, rejected by Comte, 207. + + Forces, all of one type, and that type mind, 211. + + Freedom, human, 19; + exists under limitations, 20; + both admitted and denied by Comte, 208, 209; + of Will, as taught by Plato, 386, 387; + admitted by Epicurus, 486. + +G. + + Geoffrey St. Hilaire, his pretense of not ascribing any intentions + to nature, 216, 217. + + Geography and History, relations between, 14; + opposite theories concerning, 15; + theory of Buckle, 16--of Ritter, Guyot, and Coubin, 16; + the relation one of adjustment and harmony, 16. + + God, universality of idea of, 89; + Athenians believed in one God, 107, 147, 148; + idea of God a common phenomenon of human intelligence, 168, 169; + the development of this idea dependent on experience conditions, + 169-172; the phenomena of the universe demand a God for their + explanation, 172-175: there are principles revealed in + consciousness which necessitate the idea of God, 184-189; proofs + of the existence of God employed by Aristotle, 412-416--by + Socrates, 320-324; views of God entertained by the Stoics, 452, + 453; logical proofs of the existence of God developed by Greek + philosophy, 487-494; gradual development of Theistic conception, + 481-487. + + Gods of Grecian Mythology, how regarded by the philosophers, + 151-157; views of Plato regarding them, 383. + + Great men, represent the spirit of their age, 20; + the creation of a providence interposing in history, 21. + + Greece, its geographical relations favorable to free intercourse + with the great historic nations, 35--to commerce, 36--to the + diffusion of knowledge, 36--and to a high degree of civilization, + 36; peculiar configuration of Greece conducive to activity and + freedom, 36-38--and independence, 38; natural scenery, 43--its + influence on imagination and taste, 44. + + Greek Civilization, a preparation for Christianity, 465-468. + + Greek Language, a providentially prepared vehicle for the perfect + revelation of Christianity, 468-470. + + Greek Philosophy, first a philosophy of Nature, 271, 281, 282; + next a philosophy of Mind, 271, 316-318; + lastly a philosophy of Life, 271, 422; + prepared the way for Christianity, 457-522. + + Greeks, the masses of the people believed in one Supreme God, 147, + 148. + + Guilt, consciousness of, a universal fact, 122, 123; + recognized in Grecian mythology, 123, 124; + awakened and deepened by philosophy, 513-518. + +H. + + Hamilton, Sir W., teaches that philosophic knowledge is the + knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, 224, 225; + and of qualities as inherent in substances, 225, 226; + and yet asserts all human knowledge is necessarily confined to + phenomena, 227; + his doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge, 227, 229-236; + his philosophy of the conditioned, 228; + conditional limitation the law of all thought, 236-242; + the Infinite a mere negation of thought, 242-246; + asserts we must believe in the infinity of God, 246; + takes refuge in faith, 247; + faith grounded on the law of the conditioned, 243, 249--that is, + on contradiction, 249, 250. + + Hegel, his philosophy of religion, 65-70. + + Heraclitus, his first principle _ether_, 288; + change, the universal law of all existence, 288; + a Materialistic Pantheist, 289. + + Hesiod, on the generation of the gods, 142. + + Homer, his conception of Zeus, 144, 145. + + Homeric doctrine of sin, 513,514. + + Homeric theology, 143-145, 509, 510. + + Humanity, fundamental ideas and laws of, 18; + developed and modified by exterior conditions, 19; + the most favorable conditions existed in Athens. + +I. + + Idealism, furnishes no adequate explanation of the common belief + in an external world, 193,199--and of a personal self, 200-202; + Cosmothetic Idealism, 305; + absolute Idealism, 305. + + Ideas, Platonic doctrine of, 334-337; + Platonic scheme of, 364-367. + + Images of the gods, how regarded by Cicero, 129--by Plutarch, 129; + the heathens apologized for the use of images, 159. + + Immortality of the soul, taught by Socrates, 324--and by Plato, + 375, 376; denied by Epicurus, 444-446. + + Incarnation, the idea of, not unfamiliar to heathen thought, 512. + + Induction, the psychological method of Plato, 356, 357. + + Induction and Deduction, Aristotle on, 397, 398. + + Infinite, the, not a mere negation of thought, 242-244; + known as the necessary correlative of the finite, 245; + as comprehensible in itself, as the finite is comprehensible in + itself, 246; + in what sense known, 252. + + Infinite Series, the phrase, when literally construed, a + contradiction, 181,182. + + Infinity, qualitative and quantitative, 239; + qualitative infinity possessed by God alone, 184, 239. + + Intentionality, principle of, 190; + denied by Materialists, 194; + a first law of thought, 221-223; recognized by Socrates, 320-324. + + Ionian School of Philosophy, a physical and sensational school, + 281; subdivided into Mechanical and Dynamical, 282, 283. + + Italian School of Philosophy, an Idealist school, 281; + subdivided into the Mathematical and Metaphysical, 282, 296. + +J. + + Jacobi, his faith-philosophy, 71. + +K. + + Knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of relativity of, 229-236; + opposite theories of knowledge among ancient philosophers, 330, + 331; the tendency of these theories, 332; + Plato's theory of, 333, 334; + Plato's science of real knowledge, 337, 338. + + + L. + + Language, inadequate to convey the idea of God, 92-94; + Greek language the best medium for the Christian revelation, + 468-470. + + Leucippus, his first principles _atoms_ and _space_, 291; + a pure Materialist, 292. + + Logic of Aristotle, 394-403. + + Logical Treatises of Aristotle, 395, 396. + + Lucretius, the expounder of the doctrines of Epicurus, 426,427; + his account of the origin of worlds, 437, 438; + of plants, animals, and man, 438. + +M. + + Mansel, bases religion on feeling of dependence, 72--and sense of + obligation, 73. + + Materialists deny the principle of causality, 194, 203--and of + intentionality or final cause, 211-225; + Anaximander, Leucippus, and Democritus belong to the + materialistic school, 286-293: + Epicurus a materialist, 442-446. + + Mathematical Infinite, not absolute, 179, 180; + capable of exact measurement, therefore limited, 180; + infinite sphere, radius, line, etc., self-contradictory, 180, + 181. + + Matter, did Plato teach the eternity of? 371-373; + the doctrine of the Stoics concerning matter, 449 (_note_). + + Matter and Form, Aristotle on, 405-408. + + Mean, Aristotle's doctrine of the, 420. + + Mediator, consciousness of the need of a, awakened by Greek + philosophy, 509-513. + + Metaphysical thought, law of its development, 478-480; + three different stages in the individual mind, 478, 479; + and in the universal consciousness of our race, 479. + + Metempsychosis regarded by Plato as a mere hypothesis, 376 + (_note_). + + Mill, J. S., his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to mental + phenomena, 193; + his definition of matter, 196; + his views of personal identity, 196, 197; + his theological opinions, 197. + + Miracles, not designed to prove the existence of God, 95. + + Moral principles, universal and immutable, which lead to the + recognition of a God, 190; + the Dogmatic Theologians seek to invalidate the argument + therefrom, 261-263. + + Mystics, base all religious knowledge on internal feeling, 70. + + Mythology, philosophy of Greek, 134-139; + Cudworth's interpretation of, 139-143; + recognized the consciousness of guilt and need of expiation, + 123-125. + + N. + + National Character, a complex result, 17; + conjoint effect of moral and physical influences, 17; + human freedom not to be disregarded in the study of, 20; + influence of geographical surroundings, 23--of climate and + natural scenery, on the pursuits and mental character of nations, + 23--on creative art, 24--and literature of nations, 25. + + Nations, individuality of, 22; + determined mainly from without, 22. + + Natural Realism, 305; + Anaxagoras a natural realist, 311-313. + + Nature, interpreted by man according to fundamental laws of his + reason, 133. + +O. + + Obligation, the sense of, lies at the foundation of religion, 115. + + Ontological proof of the existence of God, 491-493. + + Ontology, of Plato, 369-379; + the subject-matter of the world of sense, 370-373; + the permanent substratum of mental phenomena, 373-376; + the first Principle of all principles--God, 377-379, 491-493. + + Optimism of Plato, 382. + + Order of the Universe, had it a beginning, or is it eternal? + 178-184. + + Order, principle of, pervades the universe, 220, 221; + recognized by Pythagoras, 301; + Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490. + + P. + + Parmenides, his theory of knowledge, 307-308; + a spiritualistic Pantheist, 308, 309. + + Paul, St., at Athens, 14; + his emotion when he saw the city full of idols, 100; + the subject of his discourse, 101; + brought into contact with all the phases of philosophic thought, + 268, 269; + his arrival at Athens an epoch in the moral history of the world, + 472; + he recognized the preparatory office of Greek philosophy, 473. + + Philosophers of Athens, 101; + believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, 151-157; + their views of the mythological deities, 158, 159; + their apologies for images and image-worship, 159, 160. + + Philosophic Schools, classification of, 271-273; + Pre-Socratic 280-314; + Socratic, 314-421; + Post-Socratic, 422-456. + + Philosophy, the world-enduring monument of the glory of Athens, + 265, 260; + defined, 270, 271; + an inquiry after first causes and principles, 271, 457; + not in any proper sense a theological inquiry, 273-277, 279; + the love of wisdom, 384, 385. + + Philosophy in its relation to Christianity, 268-270; + sympathy of Platonism, 268; + antagonism of Epicureanism and Stoicism, 269; + the Propædeutic office of philosophy, 457-524--recognized by St. + Paul, 473--and many of the early Fathers, 473-475; + philosophy undermined Polytheism, and purified the Theistic idea, + 481-487; + developed the Theistic argument in a logical form, 487-494; + it awakened Conscience and purified the Ethical idea, 495-506; + demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect + ideal of moral excellence, 506-509; + awakened in man the sense of distance from God, and the need of + a Mediator, 509-513; + deepened the consciousness of sin, and the desire for a Redeemer, + 513-522; + the history of philosophy a confirmation of the truth of + Christianity, 522-524. + + Philosophy of Religion, 53; + based on the correlation between Divine and human reason, + 458-462. + + Plato, condemns the poets for their unworthy representations of + the gods, 130-132; + his views of the gods of Grecian mythology, 154-157: + the sympathy of his philosophy with Christianity, 268: + followed the philosophic method of Socrates, 328; + his moral qualifications for the study of philosophy, 328, 329; + his literary qualifications, 329, 330; + his search after a criterion of truth, 333, 334; + his doctrine of Ideas, 334-337; + his science of real knowledge, 337, 338; + his answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339; + his Psychology 339-352; + his scheme of the intellectual powers, 345; + on the nature of the soul, 350; + his dialectic, 353-369; + his grand scheme of ideas, 364-367; + his Ontology, 369-379; + on the creation of time, 372; + did he teach that matter is eternal? 371, 372; + on the eternity of the rational element of the soul, 373-375; + on the immortality of the soul, 375, 376; + on God as the First Principle of all principles, 377-379; + his Physics, 380-383; + his Ethics, 383-387, 502-505; + defects of his + ethical system, 518; + his philosophy not derived from Jewish sources, 476; + felt the need of a superhuman deliverer from sin and guilt, + 519-521. + + Plutarch, his sketches of Athenian character, 44; + criticism on, 45; + on the universality of prayer and sacrifice, 115. + + Poets, the Greek, believed in the existence of one uncreated Mind, + 141; + their theogony was a cosmogony, 142; + the theologians of Greece, 274, 275. + + Polytheism, Greek, a poetico-historical religion of myth and + symbol, 134; + its immoralities, 160, 161; + undermined by Philosophy, 484-487. + + Post-Socratic Schools, classification of, 425; + a philosophy of life, 422-424. + + Potentiality and Actuality, Aristotle on, 408-412. + + Prayer, natural to man, 115. + + Preparation for Christianity, not confined to Judaism alone, + 464, 465; + Greek civilization also prepared the way for Christ, 465-468; + Greek language a providential development as the vehicle of a + more perfect revelation, 468-470; + Greek philosophy fulfilled a propædeutic office, 470-472. + + Pre-Socratic Schools, classification of, 280-282; 295, 296. + + Principles, _universal and necessary_, how attained by the method + of Plato, 361-364, 390; + how, by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403. + + Psychological analysis, logical demonstration of the existence of + God begins with, 170; + reveals principles which in their logical development attain to + the knowledge of God, 184-189. + + Psychology of Heraclitus, 289; + of Pythagoras, 304; + of Parmenides, 307, 308; + of Anaxagoras, 313; + of Protagoras, 315; + of Socrates, 317, 318; + of Plato, 339-352; + of Aristotle, 392, 398-401; + of Epicurus, 442-444; + of the Stoics, 453, 454. + + Pythagoras, his doctrine that numbers are the first principles of + things, 297; + how to be interpreted, 297-304; + misrepresented by Aristotle, 298-300; + psychology of, 304. + +R. + + Reason, insufficiency of, to elaborate a perfect ideal of moral + excellence, 505-509. + + Redemption, desire of, awakened and defined by Greek philosophy, + 513-521. + + Relativity of all knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of, 229-236. + + Religion, the philosophy of, 53; + defined 53, 106; + universality of religious phenomena, 54; + hypothesis offered in explanation of, 55; + hypothesis of Epicurus and Comte, 56-65--of Hegel, 65-70--of + Jacobi and Schleiermacher, 70-78--of Cousin, 78-86--of Dogmatic + Theologians, 86-96--author's theory, 96, 97; + religion of the Athenians, 98--its mythological and symbolic + aspects, 128--exerted some wholesome influences, 161-163. + + Reminiscence, Plato on, 354, 355. + + Revelation, progressive, 462-464; + harmony of the two revelations in the volume of conscience and + the volume of the New Testament, 522-524. + +S. + + Sacrifice, universal prevalence of, 115, 124; + prompted by the universal consciousness of guilt, 126: + expiatory sacrifices grounded on a primitive revelation, 127. + + Schleiermacher, his theory that all religion is grounded on the + feeling of absolute dependence, 71, 72. + + Science, Plato's answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339. + + Self-determination, limited by idea of duty, 113; + implies accountability, 114; + recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge, 115. + + Socrates, his desire for truth, 316; + his dæmon, 317 _(note_); + his philosophic method, 318, 319; + a believer in one Supreme God, 320; + his argument for the existence of God from final causes, 320-324; + his belief in immortality and a future retribution, 324, 325; + his Ethics, 325; + the great prophet of the human conscience, 500-502. + + Socratic School, 314. + + Sophists, 315, 316; + their skeptical tendency, 315; + their defective ethics, 498, 499. + + Sophocles, believed in one Supreme God, 147. + + Soul, Plato on the nature of the, 350, 373; + eternity of the rational element, 373-375. + + Spencer, H., carries the law of the Conditioned forward to its + logical consequences, Atheism, 241, 242. + + Stoical School, 446; + its philosophy a moral philosophy, 447. + + Stoics, their Physiology, 448-453; their + Psychology, 453, 454; + their Ethics, 454-456; + their Theology, 452,453. + + Substance, principle of, 189; + Idealism seeks to undermine it, 193; + Reason affirms a permanent substance as the ground of all mental + phenomena, 201--and of the phenomena of the sensible world, + 202, 203. + + Sufficient Reason, law of, recognized by Plato, 359. + + Superstition, meaning of the term as used by Paul, 103. + + T. + + Teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491. + + Thales, a believer in one uncreated God, 152; + his first principles, 283; + he regards _water_ as the material cause, 284; + and God as the efficient cause, 285. + + Theistic argument, in its logical form, 487-494. + + Theistic conception, gradual development of, 481-484, + + Theological opinions of the early periods of Greek civilization, + 150, 151; 276-278. + + Theology of Aristotle, 404-417; + identical with Metaphysics, 404, 416. + + Theology of the Greek poets, 143-151; + proposed reform of Poetry by Plato, 131, 132. + + Thinking, conditionality of, 228; + in what sense to be understood, 237; + thought imposes no limits upon the object of thought, 237, 238. + + Thought, negative and positive, 242, 243; + negative thought an impossibility, 243; + all thought must be positive, 243. + + Time, Platonic notion of, 371, 372. + + Tragedians, the Greek, were the public religious teachers of the + Athenians, 145; + their theology, 146, 147; + influence of the religious dramas on the Athenian mind, 161-163; + guiltiness of man, and need of reconciliation confessed by, + 515-517. + +U. + + Unconditioned, principle of, 189; + assailed by Hamilton, 194. + + Unity of God, 259; + an affirmation of reason, 259-261; + Xenophanes taught the unity of God, 307--also Parmenides, + 309--and Plato, 377--and Aristotle, 415. + + Unity, principle of, 189; + attempt of Dogmatic Theologians to prove its insufficiency, 194, + 258-261; + recognized by Pythagoras, 296; + his effort to reduce all the phenomena of nature to a Unity, 303, + 304. + + Universal and necessary Principles, classification of, 189, 190; + these the foundation of our cognition of a God, 191; + how attained according to Plato, 360-364; + how by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403. + + Universe, the, is it finite or infinite? 178-184; + Epicurus teaches that it is infinite, 433. + + Unknown God, the true God, 104; + God not absolutely unknown, 107-110; + classification of opponents to the doctrine that God can be + cognized by reason, 166-168; + Idealist School of Mill, 194-203; + Materialistic School of Comte, 203-223; + Hamiltonian School, 224-252; + School of Dogmatic Theologians, 252-263. + +W. + + Watson, Richard, represents the views of Dogmatic Theologians 86; + asserts that all our religious knowledge is derived from oral + revelation, 86-88, 167; + incompleteness and inadequacy of this theory, 88-96; + in vindicating for the Scriptures the honor of revealing all our + knowledge of God, he casts doubt upon the principle of Causality, + 253-255--on the principle of the Unconditioned, 255-257--on the + principle of Unity, 258-261--and on the immutable principles of + Morality, 261-263. + + Wordsworth, on the Sentiment of the Divine, 118. + +X. + + Xenophanes, his attack on Polytheism, 130; + his faith in one God, 153, 306, 307. + +Z. + + Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoical School, 446; + a Spiritualistic Pantheist, 450, 451. + + Zeno of Elea, maintained the doctrine of Absolute Identity, 309. + + Zeus, originally the Supreme and only God of the Greeks, 143; + the Homeric Zeus, the Supreme God, 144, 145. + + +THE END. + + + +VALUABLE STANDARD WORKS +FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIBRARIES, +Published by HARPER & BROTHERS, New York. + + +_For a full List of Books suitable for Libraries, see _Harper & +Brother's Trade-List _and_ Catalogue, _which may be had gratuitously on +application to the Publishers personally, or by letter enclosing Five +Cents_. + + +HARPER & BROTHERS _will send any of the following works by mail, postage +prepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price_. + +MOTLEY'S DUTCH REPUBLIC. 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