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diff --git a/28158.txt b/28158.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31a3a65 --- /dev/null +++ b/28158.txt @@ -0,0 +1,24027 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of History of the War in South Africa +1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4), by Frederick Maurice + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4) + Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government + +Author: Frederick Maurice + +Release Date: February 23, 2009 [EBook #28158] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA *** + + + + +Produced by Malcolm Farmer, Christine P. Travers and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all +other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling +has been maintained. + +The sign + around words have been used to mark bolded text. + +The errors noted in the errata have been corrected in the text.] + + + + +HISTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA + +1899-1902 + + +[Illustration: Editor's arm.] + + +COMPILED BY DIRECTION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT + +BY + +MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE, K.C.B + +WITH A STAFF OF OFFICERS + + +VOLUME I + + +LONDON + +HURST AND BLACKETT LIMITED + +1906 + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + +[Illustration: The Chapel River Press Kingston Surrey.] + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The decision of His Majesty's late Government, mentioned on the first +page of this history, was not finally given till November, 1905. It +was, therefore, not till December 12th, 1905, that I was able to +obtain approval for the form in which the political facts connected +with the war are mentioned in the first chapter. Since then the whole +volume has necessarily been recast, and it was not possible to go to +page proof till the first chapter had been approved. Hence the delay +in the appearance of the volume. I took over the work from Colonel +Henderson in July, 1903. He had not then written either narrative of, +or comments on, the military operations. + + F. MAURICE. + +_May 22nd, 1906, London._ + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +VOLUME I. + + CHAP. PAGE + + I.--Preparation for War 1 + II.--The Outbreak of the War 35 + III.--The Theatre of War 54 + IV.--The Boer Army 68 + V.--The British Army 87 + VI.--The Navy in the Boer War 96 + VII.--Talana Hill 123 + VIII.--The Retreat from Dundee, and the action of Rietfontein 142 + IX.--Elandslaagte 157 + X.--Lombards Kop 172 + XI.--The Arrival of Sir Redvers Buller 196 + XII.--Advance from the Orange River 211 + XIII.--Belmont 218 + XIV.--Graspan 229 + XV.--The Battle of the Modder River 243 + XVI.--The Raid on Southern Natal 261 + XVII.--Operations round Colesberg up to the 16th December 275 + XVIII.--Stormberg 285 + XIX.--Halt on the Modder River before Magersfontein 304 + XX.--The Battle of Magersfontein 316 + XXI.--Sir Redvers Buller in Face of Colenso 332 + XXII.--Colenso, December 15th, 1899 351 + XXIII.--Lord Roberts' Appointment to the Command in South + Africa 376 + XXIV.--Operations Round Colesberg--December 16th, 1899, to + February 6th, 1900 389 + XXV.--Lord Roberts at Capetown; reorganises 408 + XXVI.--The Army Moves Forward 428 + + +APPENDICES. + + No. PAGE + + 1. Reinforcements sanctioned on 8th September, 1899 453 + 2. Distribution of British Forces on 11th October, 1899, + in Cape Colony 455 + 3. Distribution of British Forces on 11th October, 1899, + in Natal 456 + 4. Strengths of the Forces of the Transvaal and Orange Free + State 457 + 5. List of H.M. Ships and Vessels serving on the Cape Station, + October 11th, 1899, to June 1st, 1902 460 + 6. Approximate Strength and Casualties at Various Engagements + described in Volume I 462 + 7. The Expeditionary Force as originally organised and + sent to South Africa 471 + 8. The Composition and Distribution of British Troops + in Southern Natal, 23rd November, 1899 477 + 9. Reinforcements Landed in South Africa up to the + 13th February, 1900, other than those given in + Appendices 1 and 7 478 + 10. Distribution of Troops in South Africa on 11th + February, 1900, when the March from Ramdam began 485 + + Glossary 492 + + Index 497 + + +LIST OF MAPS AND FREEHAND SKETCHES. + +(_In separate case._) + +MAPS. + + General Map:--South Africa. + Special Maps:-- + No. 1. INDEX MAP. + No. 2. RELIEF MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA, to show Topographical + Features and Theatre of War. + No. 3. NORTHERN NATAL. + No. 4. SOUTHERN NATAL. + No. 5. TALANA. October 20th, 1899. + No. 6. ELANDSLAAGTE. October 21st, 1899. + No. 7. RIETFONTEIN. October 24th, 1899. + No. 8. LOMBARDS KOP. October 30th, 1899. _Situation before + 7 a.m._ + No. 8 (A). LOMBARDS KOP. October 30th, 1899. _Situation + from 7 a.m. to Close of Action._ + No. 9. NORTH CAPE COLONY and PART of the ORANGE FREE STATE. + No. 10. BELMONT. November 23rd, 1899. _Situation prior to + Capture of Gun Hill._ + No. 10 (A). BELMONT. November 23rd, 1899. _Situation prior + to Capture of Mont Blanc._ + No. 11. GRASPAN. November 25th, 1899. _Situation at 9 a.m._ + No. 12. MODDER RIVER. November 28th, 1899. _Situation at + about 3.30 p.m._ + No. 13. MAGERSFONTEIN. December 11th 1899. _Situation + at 4.30 a.m._ + No. 13 (A). MAGERSFONTEIN. December 11th 1899. _Situation + at 8 a.m._ + No. 13 (B). MAGERSFONTEIN. December 11th, 1899. _Situation + at 3.30 p.m._ + No. 14. STORMBERG. December 10th, 1899. + No. 15. COLENSO. December 15th, 1899. _Situation at 8 a.m._ + No. 15 (A). COLENSO. December 15th, 1899. _Situation at + 11 a.m._ + No. 16. OPERATIONS AROUND COLESBERG. + No. 17. SOUTH AFRICA. Map showing the approximate situation + on the 31st December, 1899. + + +FREEHAND SKETCHES. + + Talana. + Rietfontein. + Modder River. + Magersfontein. + Stormberg. + Colenso. + + +LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED ON THE MAPS. + + A. & S. Highrs. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. + Art. Artillery. + Art. Pos. Artillery position. + B.M.I. Bethune's Mounted Infantry. + Bn. Battalion. + Border. Border Regiment. + Br. Brigade. + Car. Carabineers. + Cav. Cavalry. + Cold. Gds. Coldstream Guards. + Co. Company. + Devon. Devonshire Regiment. + D.G. Dragoon Guards. + Dns. Dragoons. + Durh. L.I. Durham Light Infantry. + E. Surr. East Surrey Regiment. + Fus. Fusiliers. + Glouc. Gloucester Regiment. + Gordon., or + Gordon Highrs. Gordon Highlanders. + Gren. Gds. Grenadier Guards. + Gds. Guards. + Highrs. Highlanders. + Hosp. Hospital. + How. Howitzers. + Hrs. Hussars. + I.L.H. Imperial Light Horse. + King's King's Liverpool Regiment. + K.O.Y.L.I. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. + K.R. Rif. King's Royal Rifle Corps. + Lrs. Lancers. + L.I. Light Infantry. + Liv'rp'ls King's Liverpool Regiment. + Manch. Manchester Regiment. + M.B. Mountain Battery. + M.I. Mounted Infantry. + N. Car. Natal Carabineers. + N.F.A. Natal Field Artillery. + N.M.R. Natal Mounted Rifles. + North'd Fus. Northumberland Fusiliers. + North'n. Northamptonshire Regiment. + N. Lan. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. + Prs. Pounders (_e.g._, Naval 12-prs.). + Queen's Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment. + R.E. Royal Engineers. + R.F.A. Royal Field Artillery. + R.H.A. Royal Horse Artillery. + Rif. Brig. Rifle Brigade. + R.I. Rif. Royal Irish Rifles. + R. Irish Fus. Royal Irish Fusiliers. + R. Innis. Fus. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. + R. Fus. Royal Fusiliers. + R. Muns. Fus. Royal Munster Fusiliers. + R. Sc. Fus. Royal Scots Fusiliers. + R. Welsh Fus. Royal Welsh Fusiliers. + S.A.L.H. South African Light Horse. + S. Gds. Scots Guards. + Sco. Rif. Scottish Rifles. + T.M.I. Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry. + W. Yorks Prince of Wales's Own West Yorkshire Regiment. + + + + +MAPS TO VOLUME I. + + +Pains have been taken to embody in the maps all topographical +information existing up to date. A very considerable amount of +valuable triangulation has been executed over portions of South +Africa, but no systematic detailed survey has ever been made by any of +the South African colonies or states. Maps have, however, been +compiled by both Cape Colony and Natal. The former has prepared and +published a map extending north as far as Lat. 26 deg. 30'; this includes +the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Orange River Colony, but the +topographical detail shown over these two areas is exceedingly scanty. +The scale of the map is one inch to 12.62 miles. + +The Natal Government have a map similarly prepared and drawn in the +office of the Inspector of Schools, and published on a scale of one +inch to five miles. Both these maps are very fair general maps, and +show with rough accuracy the railways, main roads and large rivers, +but the delineation of hills is little more than suggestive. + +Of the Orange Free State and Transvaal the only general maps published +are based on the farm surveys. As these surveys show only those +topographical features which serve to fix the farm boundary, omitting +all other features, the map resulting from their compilation is not of +much use, especially for military purposes. + +Of the north of Natal there exists a series of one inch reconnaissance +surveys of the communications from Ladysmith to the Orange Free State +and Transvaal frontiers, with sketches of the whole of the Biggarsberg +and Laing's Nek positions, made in 1896 by Major S. C. N. Grant, Royal +Engineers, assisted by Captain W. S. Melville, Leicestershire +regiment, and Captain H. R. Gale, Royal Engineers. + +It is from these sources, as modified here and there by special +surveys made during or since the war, that the general maps 1, 3, 4, +and 9 have been compiled. + +Of the site of the battle of Talana no special survey has been made +since the war, and map 5 is a reproduction of a portion of Major +Grant's reconnaissance sketch before referred to. + +Maps 6, 7, and 8, of the battles of Elandslaagte, Rietfontein and +Lombards Kop, are prepared from surveys made since the events +occurred, by No. 4 Survey section, Royal Engineers, working under +Captain H. W. Gordon, R.E., and maps 14 and 16, of Stormberg and +Colesberg, have been prepared also from sketches made by the same +section. + +Maps 10, 11, 12 and 13, of Belmont, Graspan, Modder River and +Magersfontein, are from sketches made by Nos. 2 and 3 Survey sections, +under Captain P. H. Casgrain, R.E. The two sections on map 12 are from +drawings by Lieut. J. Cuthbert, Scots Guards. + +Map No. 15, of Colenso, is from a sketch made immediately after the +relief of Ladysmith by Major S. C. N. Grant, R.E., assisted by Captain +P. McClear, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and Lieut. S. A. Wilkinson, The +King's (Liverpool) regiment, and the sections from a sketch by Lieut. +M. G. Pollock, R.E. + +In most instances the special survey of the site of the battle has had +to be extended by enlarging portions of the general maps on smaller +scales. This sometimes causes a difference in the amount of detail +shown in different areas of the same map, but this is unavoidable if +the map be made to illustrate, not only the action itself, but also +the preceding and subsequent movements. + +The six panoramic sketches embodied in this Volume are facsimile +reproductions of a selection made from a number executed by the late +Captain W. C. C. Erskine, Bethune's Mounted Infantry. + + + + +LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THE TEXT + + A.A.G. Assistant Adjutant-General. + A.D.C. Aide-de-Camp. + A.S.C. Army Service Corps. + B.L. Breech-loading. + Battn. Battalion. + Brig. divn. Brigade division=2 batteries of horse, or 3 of + field artillery, commanded by a Lieut.-Colonel. + (The term has since been changed to "brigade.") + Captn. Captain. + C.B. Companion of the Order of the Bath. + C.I.F. Cost, Insurance, Freight: _i.e._, under the contract + so designated the price paid included the cost + of the article, its insurance while on the voyage, + and freight. + C.M.G. Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. + Col. Colonel. + C.O. Commanding Officer. + Comder. Commander. + Cos. Companies. + Coy. Company. + C.R.A. Commanding Royal Artillery. + C.R.E. Commanding Royal Engineers. + C.S.O. Chief Staff Officer. + Cwt. Hundred-weight. + D.A.A.G. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. + D.A.A.G.I. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence. + Det. Detachment. + D.C.L.I. Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. + D.G.O. Director General of Ordnance. + G.O.C. General Officer Commanding. + Govt. Government. + H.L.I. Highland Light Infantry. + H.M.S. His (or Her) Majesty's Ship. + I.L.H. Imperial Light Horse. + in. inch. + I.S.C. Indian Staff Corps. + K.C.B. Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. + K.C.M.G. Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and + St. George. + K.O.Y.L.I. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. + K.R.R. King's Royal Rifle Corps. + Lieut. or Lt. Lieutenant. + Lt.-Col. Lieutenant-Colonel. + L. of C. Lines of communication. + L.I. Light Infantry. + Maritzburg Pietermaritzburg. + M.B. Mountain battery. + m/m millimetre. + M.I. Mounted Infantry. + M.L. Muzzle-loading. + N.N.V. Natal Naval Volunteers. + N.S.W. New South Wales. + N.S.W.L. New South Wales Lancers. + N.Z. New Zealand. + N.C.O. Non-commissioned officer. + O.F.S. Orange Free State. + pr. pounder. + P.T.O. Principal Transport Officer. + Q.F. Quick-firing. + Q.M.G. Quartermaster-general. + Regt. Regiment. + R.M.L. Rifle-muzzle-loading. + R.A.M.C. Royal Army Medical Corps. + R.A. " Artillery. + R.B. Rifle Brigade. + Royal Commission. Royal Commission on the War in South Africa (1903). + R.E. Royal Engineers. + R.F.A. " Field Artillery. + R.G.A. " Garrison " + R.H.A. " Horse " + R.M.A. " Marine " + R.M.L.I. " " Light Infantry. + R.N. " Navy. + R. S. Fusiliers Royal Scots Fusiliers. + Sec. Section. + S.A. South Africa. + S.A.R. South African Republic. + Scots Greys 2nd Dragoons. + Sqdn. or Squadn. Squadron. + Tel. Telegram. + T.B. Telegraph battalion. + V.C. Victoria Cross. + W.O. War Office. + + + + +LIST OF ERRATA. + + Page 2, line 13 from top, omit "(Arabic)". + + " 14, " 2 " bottom, for "Sir H. Escombe" read "the Right + Hon. H. Escombe." + + " 78, first marginal note, for "of" read "in." + + " 128, second marginal note, for "comma" read "full stop." + + " 144, line 3 from top, for "The troops a Ladysmith" read "The + troops at Ladysmith." + + " 144, last marginal note, omit "full stop" and read on. + + " 160, bottom marginal note, for "full stop" read "comma." + + " 256, line 6 from bottom, for "Major T. Irvine" read "Captain + T. Irvine." + + " 337, line 12 from bottom, for "semi-colon" read "comma." + + + + +THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +PREPARATION FOR WAR. + + +[Sidenote: Scope of history.] + +The war in South Africa which began on October 9th, 1899, ended so far +happily on the 31st May, 1902, that, chiefly in consequence of the +tactful management of the negotiations with the leaders who then +guided them, those who had till then fought gallantly against the +British Empire agreed to enter it as subjects of King Edward. Under +the circumstances, His Majesty's late Government considered it +undesirable to discuss here any questions that had been at issue +between them and the rulers of the two republics, or any points that +had been in dispute at home, and to confine this history to the +military contest. The earlier period is mentioned only so far as it +concerns those incidents which affected the preparation for war on the +part of Great Britain, and the necessary modifications in the plan of +campaign which were influenced by the unwillingness of Her Majesty's +Government to believe in the necessity for war. + +[Sidenote: Situation Oct. 9th, /99.] + +When, on October 9th, 1899, Mr. Kruger's ultimatum was placed in the +hands of the British Agent at Pretoria the military situation was as +follows. It was known that the Boer Governments could summon to arms +over 50,000 burghers. British reinforcements of 2,000 men had been +sanctioned on the 2nd of August for a garrison, at that date not +exceeding 9,940 men; and on the 8th September the Viceroy of India had +been instructed by telegram to embark with the least possible delay +for Durban a cavalry brigade, an infantry brigade, and a brigade +division of field artillery. Another brigade division and the 1st +Northumberland Fusiliers were also ordered out from home. The 1st +battn. Border regiment was despatched from Malta, the 1st battn. Royal +Irish Fusiliers from Egypt, the 2nd battn. Rifle Brigade from Crete, +and a half-battn. 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry from +Mauritius. The total strength of these reinforcements, ordered on +September 8th, amounted to 10,662 men of all ranks. On the same day, +the 8th September, the General Officer Commanding in South Africa, Sir +F. Forestier-Walker, was directed by telegram to provide land +transport for these troops. For details see Appendix I. + +[Sidenote: Total forces.] + +The whole of these reinforcements, with the exceptions of the 9th +Lancers and two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, whose departure +from India was somewhat delayed by an attack of anthrax, a brigade +division of artillery, the 1st Border regiment and the 2nd battalion +Rifle Brigade, were landed in South Africa before the actual outbreak +of war. Including 2,781 local troops, the British force in Natal was +thus raised to 15,811 men of all ranks. In Cape Colony there were, +either under arms or immediately available at the outbreak of war, +5,221 regular and 4,574 colonial troops. In southern Rhodesia 1,448 +men, raised locally, had been organised under Colonel Baden-Powell, +who had been sent out on the 3rd July to provide for the defence of +that region. Thus the British total in South Africa, 27,054, was at +least 20,000 smaller than the number of the burghers whom the two +republics could place in the field, irrespective of any contingent +that they might obtain from the disaffected in the two colonies. Early +in June Sir Redvers Buller had been privately informed that, in the +event of its becoming necessary to despatch an army corps to South +Africa, he would be the officer to command it. On June 8th, the +Commander-in-Chief had recommended that as a precautionary measure an +army corps and cavalry division should be organised and concentrated +on Salisbury Plain. He had proposed that one complete army corps, one +cavalry division, one battalion of mounted infantry, and four +infantry battalions to guard the lines of communication, should be +sent out to South Africa, and he was most anxious that the +expeditionary force should be assembled beforehand, so as to render it +more effective for war purposes. The course of the negotiations which +were then being carried on convinced Her Majesty's Government that any +such step would tend to precipitate war, and, the weakness of our +troops at the time in South Africa being such as it was, that it would +be impossible to reinforce them before serious attack might be made +upon them. Moreover, there was this further difficulty, that adequate +attention had not been directed publicly to the circumstances in South +Africa which caused anxiety to the Government. + +[Sidenote: Causes of delay.] + +It was always possible to think that the preparations for war on a +large scale, which were undoubtedly being made both by the Transvaal +and by the Orange Free State, were the result of the anxiety which had +been caused to the rulers of those republics by the circumstances of +the Jameson raid. Every attempt by any statesman at home to bring the +facts, as they presented themselves to those behind the scenes, before +the world, was open to the imputation of being deliberately designed +to lead up to a war which it was intended to bring about. Thus it was +the very weakness of our position at that time in South Africa which +made it difficult to relieve the military danger. Any premature effort +to place our power there in a condition of adequate security tended to +suggest to foreign states that the movements made were directed +against the independence of the two republics; tended to shake public +confidence at home, and even to excite jealousy in our own colonies. +All through the long negotiations which were carried on during the +summer and autumn months of 1899 it seemed better, therefore, to incur +even some serious risk of military disadvantage rather than to lose +that general support of the nation, whether at home or in the +colonies, which would be secured by a more cautious policy, and to +hope against hope that a peaceful solution might be reached. + +[Sidenote: "Adequate strength."] + +In one respect there would appear to have been a misunderstanding +between the Government and their military advisers as to the sense in +which the reinforcements sent to South Africa were sufficient for the +temporary protection of our interests on the sub-continent. It is +remarkable that in the evidence subsequently given by the soldiers, +not only do they admit that they anticipated beforehand that for this +purpose the strength would be adequate, but that they assume, at the +end of the war, that it had as a matter of fact proved so. This can +obviously only be understood in the sense that the numbers then in +South Africa were able to retard the Boer operations until a large +army was thrown into the country. On the other hand, Lord Lansdowne, +describing what was evidently the meaning in which this language was +understood by himself and his colleagues, says: "I am not a soldier, +but I never heard of sending out reinforcements to a country which +might become the theatre of war merely in order that the +reinforcements might successfully defend themselves against attack; +they are sent there, I imagine, for the purpose of securing something +or somebody." And again: "I should say not sufficient to prevent raids +and incursions, but sufficient to prevent the colonies from being +overrun." It appears necessary, under its historical aspect, to draw +attention to this discrepancy of view, because it is one that may be +liable to repeat itself. + +[Sidenote: Plans delayed.] + +Another point influenced by the unwillingness of Her Majesty's +Government to believe in the possibility of the Orange Free State, +with which we had had for many years relations of the greatest +friendliness, appearing in arms against us, was this: that it delayed +for a very considerable time the determination of the general plan of +campaign on which the war was to be carried on. Practically, supposing +it became necessary to conduct an offensive war against the Transvaal, +the choice of operations lay between a movement by way of Natal and +one by way of the Orange Free State. Any advance by Natal had these +serious disadvantages. In the first place, the mountain region through +which it would be necessary to penetrate was one that gave very great +advantages to the Boer riflemen. In the second place, it lay exposed, +as soon as Northern Natal was entered, to attack throughout its +entire length from the Orange Free State. On the other hand, the march +by Bloemfontein opened up a country much more favourable for the +operations of a regular army, whether that march, as was originally +proposed, followed the direct line of railway through Bloemfontein, +or, as it did ultimately, the railway to Kimberley and thence struck +for Bloemfontein.[1] There remained, indeed, a third alternative, +which had at one time been proposed by Lord Roberts, of a movement +outside the Orange Free State through the north-western portion of +Cape Colony, but this had ceased to be applicable at the time when war +was declared. As a consequence of the uncertainties as to the ultimate +attitude of the Orange Free State, and the extreme hope that that +State would not prove hostile, it was not till the 3rd October that +Lord Lansdowne was in a position to say: "We have now definitely +decided to adopt the Cape Colony--Orange Free State route. It is +intended that a force of 10,000 men should remain in Natal, on which +side it will make a valuable diversion; that about 3,000 should be +detailed for service on the west side (Kimberley, etc.), and that the +main force should enter the Orange Free State from the south." + + [Footnote 1: See Chapters II. and III. for full discussion on + the Theatre of War.] + +[Sidenote: Limit of force.] + +In all schemes for possible offensive war by Great Britain, subsequent +to a memorandum by Mr. Stanhope, of 1st June, 1888,[2] it had been +contemplated that the utmost strength which it would be necessary for +us to embark from our shores would be that of two army corps with a +cavalry division. Those army corps and the cavalry division were, +however, neither actually, nor were they supposed to be, immediately +ready to be sent out. To begin with, for their despatch shipping must +be available, and this, as will be shown more in detail in a +subsequent chapter, was a matter which would involve considerable +delay and much preparation. During the time that the ships were being +provided it would be essential that the successive portions of the +army for which shipping could be obtained should be prepared for war +by the return to the depots of those soldiers who were not immediately +fit for service, and by their replacement by men called in from the +reserve to complete the ranks. None of these preparations could be +made without attracting public attention to what was done. The +reserves could not be summoned to the colours without an announcement +in Parliament, nor, therefore, without debates, which must necessarily +involve discussions which might be irritating to Boer susceptibilities +at the very time when it was most hoped that a peaceful solution would +be reached. It was not, therefore, till the 20th September that the +details of the expeditionary force were communicated to the Admiralty +by the War Office, nor till the 30th that the Admiralty was authorised +to take up shipping. Meantime on September 22nd, a grant of L645,000 +was made for immediate emergencies. On the 7th October the order for +the mobilisation of the cavalry division, one army corps, and eight +battalions of lines of communication troops was issued, and a Royal +proclamation calling out the army reserve was published. Of the +excellent arrangements made by the Admiralty a full account will be +found hereafter. + + [Footnote 2: "Her Majesty's Government have carefully + considered the question of the general objects for which our + army is maintained. It has been considered in connection with + the programme of the Admiralty, and with knowledge of the + assistance which the navy is capable of rendering in the + various contingencies which appear to be reasonably probable; + and they decide that the general basis of the requirements + from our army may be correctly laid down by stating that the + objects of our military organisation are:-- + + (_a_) The effective support of the civil power in all parts + of the United Kingdom. + + (_b_) To find the number of men for India, which has been + fixed by arrangement with the Government of India. + + (_c_) To find the garrisons for all our fortresses and + coaling stations, at home and abroad, according to a scale + now laid down, and to maintain these garrisons at all times + at the strength fixed for a peace or war footing. + + (_d_) After providing for these requirements, to be able to + mobilise rapidly for home defence two army corps of regular + troops, and one partly composed of regulars and partly of + militia; and to organise the auxiliary forces, not allotted + to army corps or garrisons, for the defence of London and for + the defensible positions in advance, and for the defence of + mercantile ports. + + (_e_) Subject to the foregoing considerations, and to their + financial obligations, to aim at being able, in case of + necessity, to send abroad two complete army corps, with + cavalry division and line of communication. But it will be + distinctly understood that the probability of the employment + of an army corps in the field in any European war is + sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the + military authorities to organise our forces efficiently for + the defence of this country."--(_Report of Royal Commission + on the War in South Africa_, p. 225.)] + +[Sidenote: The scheme of mobilisation.] + +The scheme for mobilisation had been gradually developed during many +years. The earliest stage was the appearance in the Army List of an +organisation of the army in various army corps. This was chiefly +useful in showing the deficiencies which existed. It had been drawn up +by the late Colonel Home, R.E. In August, 1881, it was removed from +the Army List. + +[Sidenote: Various stages of scheme.] + +Practically no mobilisation scheme really took shape until 1886, when +Major-General H. Brackenbury,[3] on assuming office as head of the +Intelligence branch, turned his attention to the question. The +unorganised condition of our army and the deficiency of any system for +either home defence or action abroad formed the subjects of three +papers,[4] in which he showed that, at the time they were written, not +even one army corps with its proper proportion of the different +departmental branches, could have been placed in the field, either at +home or abroad, while for a second army corps there would have been +large deficiencies of artillery and engineers, and no departments. For +horses there was no approach to an adequate provision. The urgent +representations contained in these papers were strongly taken up by +Lord Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, and pressed by him on the +Secretary of State for War,[5] with the result that a committee of +two, Sir Ralph Thompson[6] and Major-General H. Brackenbury, was +appointed to investigate the matter. + + [Footnote 3: Now General the Right Honourable Sir Henry + Brackenbury, G.C.B.] + + [Footnote 4: Mobilisation reports, Numbers I., II. and III.] + + [Footnote 5: The Right Honourable W. H. Smith.] + + [Footnote 6: Then Permanent Under-Secretary of State.] + +[Sidenote: Sub-division to carry out.] + +Their enquiry was entirely confined to the question of obtaining the +maximum development from the existing cadres. Their report was divided +under three headings, the first of which dealt with the "Field Army," +and laid down that two army corps and lines of communication troops +was the field army which the regular troops, as they then stood, were +capable of producing. The subjects of "Garrisons" and "Mobilisation +for Foreign Service" were dealt with under the other two headings. +Ultimately a Mobilisation sub-division, which was transferred from the +Intelligence department to the Adjutant-General's department in 1889 +and to the Commander-in-Chief's office, in 1897, was created. + +[Sidenote: 1890 to 1898.] + +Working on the lines laid down, the mobilisation section first +produced a complete scheme in 1890. Mobilisation regulations were +issued in 1892. Further revised editions followed in 1894, and again +in 1898. All were worked out on the basis of using what was available, +and not what was needed. + +[Sidenote: Scheme in 1899.] + +In the spring of 1899, in anticipation of possible events, the +mobilisation section turned their attention to the requirements of a +force for South Africa. Seeing that the regulations of 1898 dealt +principally with the mobilisation of the field army for service at +home or in a temperate climate, considerable modifications, relating +to such points as regimental transport, clothing, equipment, and +regimental supplies, were necessary to meet the case of operations +carried on in South Africa. Special "Regulations for the Mobilisation +of a Field Force for Service in South Africa" were accordingly drawn +up, with the object, not of superseding the Mobilisation regulations +of 1898, but "in order to bring together, in a convenient form, the +modifications necessary in those regulations." These regulations were +completed, printed, and ready for issue in June, 1899. In their +general application they provided for the preparation in time of peace +of all that machinery which, on the advent of war, would be set in +motion by the issue of the one word--"Mobilise." + +[Sidenote: Success in practice.] + +The mobilisation, thus carefully prepared in all its details +beforehand, proved a complete success. Ninety-nine per cent. of the +reservists when called out presented themselves for service, and 91 +per cent, were found physically fit. The first units, twenty companies +of the Army Service Corps, were embarked on the 6th of October. The +embarkation of the remainder of the expeditionary force was begun on +the 20th of October, and, with the exception of one cavalry regiment, +delayed by horse-sickness, completed on the 17th November. + +[Sidenote: Fresh units needed.] + +At an early stage in the war it became very plain that mere drafts of +details to replenish units would not suffice, but that organised +reinforcements would have to be sent. Even before the embarkation of +the field force was completed, orders were given for reinforcements to +be despatched; and within three months from that time the mobilisation +of four more divisions, fifteen extra batteries of artillery and a +fourth cavalry brigade, was ordered.[7] + + [Footnote 7: The following extract from the Statement of the + Mobilisation division gives the details and dates:-- + + "21. While the embarkation of the field force was proceeding, + news of the loss of the greater part of two battalions of + infantry and a mountain battery at Nicholson's Nek reached + England. Orders were accordingly given on 31st October for + the despatch of one mountain battery and three battalions of + infantry, to make good this loss. All this reinforcement went + from England, except one battalion. The embarkation from + England was finished on 16th November. + + "22. On 3rd November it was decided to organise and send out + a siege train. It embarked on 9th December. + + "23. Orders for the mobilisation of a 5th infantry division + (the troops under Sir G. White, in Ladysmith, being counted + as the 4th division) were issued on 11th November. An extra + brigade division of artillery (three batteries horse + artillery) was added on 20th November. + + "The embarkation of this 5th division began on 24th November, + and was completed on 13th December. That of the three + batteries horse artillery took place between 19th and 21st + December. + + "24. Orders were given for the mobilisation of a 6th infantry + division on 2nd December, _i.e._, as soon as the embarkation + of the 5th division was well under way. Mobilisation began on + 4th December, and was completed by 11th December. All + combatant units were embarked between 16th December and 1st + January, 1900. + + "25. The order to mobilise the 7th infantry division was + issued on 16th December. Mobilisation began on the 18th, and + was completed on 27th December. + + "Embarkation began on 3rd January, and was completed on 18th + January. + + "26. Meanwhile, on 16th and 22nd December, it had been + decided to mobilise and prepare for embarkation four + additional brigade divisions (twelve batteries) of field + artillery, one brigade division being armed with howitzers. + These were all embarked between 21st January and 27th + January, 1900. + + "28. The order to mobilise an additional brigade of cavalry + (the 4th cavalry brigade) was issued on 26th December. + Mobilisation began on 28th December, and was completed on 2nd + January, 1900. + + "The embarkation of this brigade was held back pending the + arrival of Lord Roberts in South Africa, and the receipt of a + communication from him. + + "Embarkation began on 8th February, and was completed on 17th + February. + + "29. Orders were issued for the mobilisation of the 8th + infantry division on 19th January, 1900. Mobilisation began + on 20th January. Embarkation began on 12th March, and the + last unit embarked on 18th April, 1900. + + "30. With the despatch of the 8th division, the last + organised and mobilised regular formation left this country, + and the work of the Mobilisation sub-division, in connection + with the despatch of reinforcements to South Africa, came to + an end." + + The executive work of organising, equipping, and despatching + drafts of Militia, Volunteers, and Imperial Yeomanry was + carried out entirely by the Adjutant-General, + Quartermaster-General, and Director-General of Ordnance.] + +[Sidenote: Smooth working.] + +[Sidenote: Inadequate reserve.] + +The machinery of the Mobilisation sub-division was equal to the task +and continued to work smoothly, while the Adjutant-General's +department was enabled, with little difficulty, to find men to +complete units on mobilisation.[8] All these units were brought up to +their establishment from their own regimental reserves. In order to +keep them up to their strength it was estimated that it would be +necessary to send out a series of drafts, calculated on a basis of 10 +per cent. for every three months.[9] This was the system which was put +into operation from the first, and subsequently adhered to as far as +possible, drafts being detailed from regimental reserves. It was, +however, soon found necessary to introduce modifications in accordance +with the wastage which varied in the different arms, as well as in the +different units.[10] In addition to the regular stream of drafts, +special drafts had occasionally to be sent out to make good instances +of abnormal loss. Especially was this the case with infantry +battalions.[11] Consequently, the regimental reserves of some units +were exhausted before those of others, and it became necessary to draw +on the reserves of other corps which had more than they required, +their militia reserves being selected for the purpose. By the time +the war had lasted a year the equivalents of five drafts on the 10 per +cent. basis had left England. But a limit had been reached. "By the +end of a year's campaigning our infantry reserves proper, including +the now non-existent militia reserve, were exhausted, a point which +was emphasised by Lord Lansdowne in the following words in his minute +of 2nd June, 1900....: + +"'Two points stand out clearly: (1) That in future campaigns we must +expect demands on a vast scale for infantry drafts; (2) that our +reserve is not large enough and must be increased.'"[12] + + [Footnote 8: Some difficulty was experienced in finding + certain specialists, such as farriers, &c.] + + [Footnote 9: Of this original force from England, all cavalry + and artillery units and eleven infantry battalions went out + with a "war establishment, plus excess numbers," which were + calculated at 10 per cent. to make good casualties for the + first three months. It was decided to adopt this standard in + all cases.] + + [Footnote 10: The reserve of the artillery fell short almost + at once, whereas the entire reserves of the cavalry were not + called out until the end of February, 1901.] + + [Footnote 11: For one battalion alone, the 2nd battalion + Royal Irish Rifles, 1,831 duly qualified soldiers left + England in six months, without having to draw on any reserves + outside its own corps.] + + [Footnote 12: Memorandum on Drafts prepared in the + Adjutant-General's department, 30th September, 1902. See + Appendix volume, Royal Commission, p. 86.] + +Short service had made it possible to build up a reserve substantial +enough to minister to the unprecedented requirements of the regular +army for a year. Without it, the end of our resources in trained men +would have been reached at a very early stage. + +[Sidenote: Borrowing, with results.] + +One difficulty arose. Staffs of many formations, such as those of +mounted infantry, ammunition columns and medical field units, did not +exist. The completion of these new creations for the original field +force necessitated the borrowing of officers and men from other +bodies, which, as was supposed at that time, would not be mobilised. +As the strain continually grew more severe it was found necessary to +mobilise successive divisions and additional batteries. Then, not only +had the loans to be made good to those depleted, but nearly the whole +of the personnel had to be found for the further number of fresh +organisms which were called into existence. This could only be done by +yet more borrowing. The difficulty, therefore, progressively +increased. More particularly was this the case with the ammunition +columns, the creation of which, together with the additional batteries +of artillery, caused a drain on artillery reservists, which resulted +in their being absorbed more quickly than those of the other branches +of the service.[13] All these special bodies, though essential for +war, were outside the peace establishment of the army. It became, +therefore, necessary to call out "the whole of the remainder of the +Army Reserve, in order to be able to utilise the services of +reservists belonging to Section D., none of whom could, by law, be +called out until all the reservists of all arms, in Sections A. B. and +C. had been called up."[14] This was done by special Army Order on +December 20th, 1899.[15] + + [Footnote 13: The experiences of a particular battery, Royal + Field artillery, afford an illustration of the consequences + detailed above. From this battery, by the end of November, + 1899, there had been drafted off to staff, service batteries, + ammunition columns, or excess numbers, the captain, the + senior subaltern (the only one who had had four months' + service in field artillery), five sergeants, one corporal, + one bombardier, four shoeing smiths, two trumpeters, the + wheeler, six gunners and five drivers. In December, 1899, the + battery commander, with the whole of one sub-division, was + taken away as the nucleus of a new battery to be formed. Ten + days after this the mobilisation of the battery was ordered. + Rather more than 50 per cent. of the battery when mobilised + were men of Section D. of the Reserve, of whom about half had + seen the gun which they were to work, while none had seen it + fired.] + + [Footnote 14: Statement of the Mobilisation sub-division.] + + [Footnote 15: The effect of this, as regards the cavalry, was + that some 2,000 reservists, over and above immediate + requirements, were prematurely placed at the disposal of the + department.] + +[Sidenote: Mr. Stanhope's two corps exceeded.] + +There was little breathing time between the successive embarkations of +the mobilised divisions from the commencement on 20th October, 1899, +to the completion on 18th April, 1900, with the result that in the +space of six months more than the equivalent of the two army corps and +the cavalry division, laid down in Mr. Stanhope's memorandum as that +which we should be prepared to send abroad in case of necessity, had +left our shores. By the despatch of these troops, followed by later +demands for reinforcements, our organised field army was practically +exhausted, and home defence, "the primary duty" of the whole army, was +enfeebled to a dangerous degree. In place of the army corps, "partly +composed of regulars and partly of Militia," required by the +memorandum, there remained for home service a few regular troops, some +hastily formed "Reserve Battalions," and such of the embodied Militia, +the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers, as had not already gone abroad--all +being for the most part unorganised, partially trained, and not fully +equipped. + +[Sidenote: Demand exceeds supply of units.] + +Mr. Stanhope's view of the "improbable probability"[16] of the +employment of "an army corps in the field in any European war"--and if +not in Europe, then where else?--certainly not in South Africa--had +had its effect. In respect of numbers, it imposed a limit on the +powers of preparation; and the condition of affairs was precisely +expressed by the following sentence: "The war conclusively proved, +therefore, that Mr. Stanhope's memorandum did not make sufficient +allowance for the general needs of the Empire."[17] + + [Footnote 16: "... But it will be distinctly understood that + the probability of employment of an army corps in the field + in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the + primary duty of the military authorities to organise our + forces efficiently for the defence of their country."--Mr. + Stanhope's memorandum. See pp. 5, 6.] + + [Footnote 17: Extract from note placed before the Royal + Commission by Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson. A. + 18,245.] + + +_Intelligence and Maps._ + +Whatever interpretation might be placed as between the Governments on +the accumulation of warlike stores in the Transvaal and Free State, it +had been obviously the duty of the Intelligence department of the War +Office to watch these as closely as the prevailing conditions +permitted. This had been done ever since 1896, when the +Commander-in-Chief had directed the department to undertake the +investigation. The material thus obtained was collated in June, 1898, +in the form of a handbook, entitled, "Military Notes on the Dutch +Republics of South Africa," which set forth in a concise form the +military strength, armament, organisation and tactics of the Boer +army. A revised edition of this book was issued in June, 1899. Other +handbooks, containing special reconnaissances executed in the more +important strategical localities of South Africa, and summaries of +information as to the various states and colonies, were also prepared +with a view to the possibility of active operations. The Royal +Commission on the South African War was able to pronounce in its +Report (paragraph 257) that the information contained in these +handbooks, as well as in a "valuable" series of memoranda extending +over several years, was in many respects remarkably accurate. + +[Sidenote: Maps--Transvaal and Free State.] + +Adequate military maps of the vast theatre over which the operations +of the 1899-1902 war subsequently spread could only have been produced +by the employment for many years of a large survey staff. The +production of correct maps of the Transvaal and Free State on a scale +of four miles to the inch would alone have taken five years to +complete, and would have cost L100,000. The state of tension existing +between Great Britain and the two republics in the years immediately +preceding the war rendered it impossible to undertake any serious work +of this description within those States. + +[Sidenote: Maps--Cape and Natal.] + +As regards the Cape Colony and Natal, the survey of all self-governing +colonies has been, and still is, regarded by the Imperial Government +as a matter for the Colonial Governments. The survey of Cape Colony +alone on a scale large enough for tactical purposes would have cost +L150,000, and it would have been perfectly useless to ask the Treasury +to sanction the provision of any such sum. A map, on a scale of twelve +and a half miles to an inch, had been produced by the Survey +department of the Cape Government, covering Cape Colony, Natal, Orange +Free State, and part of the Transvaal, and arrangements were made with +the Colonial Government for supplies of this for issue to the troops +on the outbreak of war. Of the northern parts of Natal two military +maps, produced during the previous wars on a scale of four miles and +one mile to an inch were available. But, though copies of one of these +maps were subsequently reproduced by the Boers and used by them in +their operations on the Tugela, it was well known that they were not +accurate and had not been corrected up to date. By arrangement, +therefore, with the Natal Government and at their expense, the +Director of Military Intelligence sent Major S. C. N. Grant, R.E., +from England, in 1896, to execute a more careful reconnaissance of the +portion of Natal north of Ladysmith. Recognising that the map thus +produced might prove insufficient, Sir J. Ardagh, in 1897, urged +personally on the Right Hon. H. Escombe, the Prime Minister of Natal, +the importance of continuing this survey, and the latter promised to +endeavour to make such arrangements as he could, although he stated +that political considerations rendered it difficult for him to ask the +Natal Parliament to provide funds for a survey of the colony avowedly +for military purposes. Sir H. Escombe's Ministry subsequently went out +of office, and the only map of Natal existing at the outbreak of war, +besides those above referred to, was one on a scale of five miles to +an inch prepared locally for educational purposes. + +[Sidenote: Intelligence map and Jeppe's.] + +For the Transvaal and Orange Free State the compilation, from all the +material available, of a map on a scale 1-250,000 was commenced in +January, 1899, by the Intelligence division; twelve sheets were +completed and issued before October, 1899, and the remainder shortly +afterwards. In the same year a map of the Transvaal, compiled by C. +Jeppe from farm surveys, was produced under the auspices of the +Government of that State. A limited number of copies of this map were +obtained by the Intelligence division and issued on the outbreak of +war to the higher staffs. Subsequently in January, 1900, Colonel G. F. +R. Henderson, Lord Roberts' Director of Military Intelligence, was +fortunate enough to seize at Capetown a thousand copies of this +survey, and maps were compiled from them by the Field Intelligence +department. These proved of great service in the advance northward. + +[Sidenote: A large question.] + +The provision of maps for the many possible theatres of war in which +British troops may be employed is a difficult question. In the present +case the above statement will account for the fact that the maps +provided by the War Office at the outbreak of the South African war +were pronounced by the Royal Commission on that war to have been, +"with perhaps one exception, very incomplete and unreliable" +(paragraph 261). + + * * * * * + +These matters preparatory to the war were not, in the ordinary work of +the departments, separated by any distinct break from the routine +necessary after hostilities had begun. + +_The Distribution of responsibility_ between the several offices in +regard to the despatch of an army to the field was as follows. The +Adjutant-General's department was charged with all that affected the +actual personnel--the flesh and blood--in such matters as the necessary +qualifications of age or service, the completion of cadres with +specialists, and the maintenance of recruiting. It was the province of +the Military Secretary's department of the Commander-in-Chief's office +to select the staffs and allot the commands. The provision of equipment, +clothing, and ordnance supplies was the duty of the Director-General of +Ordnance; with the Quartermaster-General rested the provision of animals +to complete the war establishment, supplies of food, and, in conjunction +with the Admiralty, arrangements for sea transport. The two departments +of the Director-General and Quartermaster-General, long before the final +sanction was given, had worked out on paper the details of future +requirements. + +[Sidenote: Personal action at War Office.] + +Apart from those proposals of the Commander-in-Chief to which it had not +been possible for Her Majesty's Government to accede, for the reason +already given, the several officers at Headquarters had done what they +could to make for possible future events such preparation as did not +involve expenditure. Sir Evelyn Wood, both as Quartermaster-General and +as Adjutant-General, carried on a vigorous private correspondence with +the several General Officers Commanding at the Cape, and it was at his +instance that as early as the autumn of 1896 contracts were made with +Messrs. Weil, who had complete command of the Cape market, for the +supply of horses, mules, and wagons at short notice when called for. He +sent for one of the firm to come to England, but a decision was given in +the spring of 1897 against immediate action. In April, 1898, he again +asked that the whole subject, both of transport and of the despatch of +cavalry and artillery to South Africa, should be taken up. Moreover, in +1897, he had pressed for horse-fittings for shipping, fearing the +trouble in this matter, which subsequently actually occurred. On taking +over the duties of Adjutant-General on October 1st, 1897, he, in view of +the extensive territory lately acquired in Rhodesia, proposed the +addition of 9,000 infantry to the army. The Commander-in-Chief, in +forwarding this memorandum, added to his request an additional 4,000 +men beyond what Sir E. Wood had recommended. As late as February, 1898, +the transport, necessary to make the troops in South Africa fit to take +the field, was refused, though pressed for by the Commander-in-Chief, in +consequence of a private letter to Sir E. Wood, which showed Sir A. +Milner's anxiety on the subject. To suppress a small rebel Basuto chief +it would have required a month to get transport ready. At a time when a +man so intimate with South African affairs as Mr. Rhodes was deriding +all fears of Boer power, war was not believed to be imminent, and the +long habit of saving the public purse during peace time was operative +against expenditure, which would not be needed if there were no war and +no need for suppressing Basuto rebels. The same cause had delayed till +April, 1897, the necessary supply of horses to infantry regiments, at +which date L36,000 was granted for this purpose. Both these horses and +the training of mounted infantry at home had been repeatedly asked for +by Sir Evelyn Wood as Quartermaster-General, by Sir Redvers Buller as +Adjutant-General, and by Lord Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief. + + +_Equipment and Transport._ + +From the great variety of countries and climates, in which it has been +the fate of the British army to be engaged for the last hundred years +or more, it has always been impossible to foresee what the particular +equipment required for any given expedition would be.[18] To keep up +permanently all the transport animals and the large reserves of food +supplies needed for both animals and men would have been wasteful +extravagance. In one campaign, only human porterage had been possible; +in another, only transport by river boats; in another, it had been +necessary to rely chiefly on camels; in another, on the development of +canal and railway communication. Therefore, much time is always needed +before it is possible so to prepare a British army that it is ready to +wage war. An army is as little able to march till it is supplied with +the necessary transport as a man would be without proper shoes, or a +cavalryman without his horse. For such a war as was in prospect in +South Africa, ranging possibly over tens of thousands of square miles, +immense quantities, both of animals and vehicles, would be needed. A +considerable proportion of these could no doubt be procured in the +country itself, but from the numbers required it was necessary to +extend our purchases over almost all the civilised world. This was +another of the cases in which the necessity not to provoke war tended +to prevent preparations for war. + + [Footnote 18: See also Chapter V.] + +[Sidenote: Land transport S.A.] + +The question of land transport, on which so much of the conduct of a +campaign must depend, was one of the highest importance. The nature of +the South African country, and the absence of roads, rendered it +necessary that transport vehicles, intended for horse-draught, should +be adapted for draught by animals suitable to the country and likely +to be obtainable--namely, oxen and mules. The form of the wagons in +use had been settled twenty years before on South African experience, +by a committee consisting of Sir Redvers Buller and Colonel H. S. E. +Reeves, but the South African brake, not being convenient for home +service, was no longer used, so that this had to be supplied. +Moreover, it was necessary to convert the carriages to pole draught +for mule traction. The Director-General of Ordnance[19] asked, on July +26th, 1899, for authority to carry out this change, involving an +outlay of L17,650, but at this time, for reasons already given, +sanction was refused to any expenditure on preparations for +despatching an army to South Africa. + + [Footnote 19: General Sir H. Brackenbury.] + +"On the 1st September the Director-General of Ordnance again asked for +authority. On the 5th September, in putting forward a schedule of +requirements, he pointed out that this service would take ten weeks, +and said the sanction of those items should be given at once, on +account of the time required to manufacture and obtain them, and that +if put off till the force is ordered to mobilise it would be +impossible to guarantee their being ready in time."[20] + + [Footnote 20: Extract from Minute by the Director-General of + Ordnance to the Commander-in-Chief, dated October 10th. See + Vol. I. Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission, p. 76.] + +[Sidenote: Delay.] + +In the still existing circumstances, neither the importance of the +demand, nor the smallness of the sum asked, saved the requisition from +sharing the fate of others, and authority for the expenditure was not +received until the partial grant of September 22nd.[21] Once begun, +the work was actually carried out in sixteen days less than the +estimated time, but the delay was sufficient to prevent sixteen or +more units from being accompanied by the vehicles of their regimental +transport.[22] + + [Footnote 21: See p. 6.] + + [Footnote 22: Water carts and ammunition carts.] + +[Sidenote: Q.M.G. provides vehicles.] + +Early in September an arrangement had been come to between the +Director-General of Ordnance (who, under normal conditions, was +responsible for the provision of all transport vehicles and harness) +and the Quartermaster-General, whereby the latter undertook the +furnishing of transport wagons and harness for supply trains and +parks. This in fact was carried out in South Africa. + +[Sidenote: Q.M.G. and supplies.] + +The Quartermaster-General, in response to demands from the General +Officer Commanding in South Africa, had sent two months' reserve +supplies from time to time since the beginning of June for the troops +already there. On receipt of the authority of September 22nd, one +month's reserves for 50,000 men, 12,000 horses and 15,000 mules were +ordered, and these were shipped by October 30th. Further expenditure +was sanctioned on September 29th. Another month's supplies for the +same numbers were therefore ordered to be despatched about November +18th. The provision of such quantities took time and, in consequence +of the delay in obtaining sanction for expenditure, the +Quartermaster-General was hard pressed in furnishing the supplies +early enough, but succeeded in doing so. + + +_Remount Department._ + +The provision of horses and mules to complete the war establishment +for mounted units was one function of the Quartermaster-General. The +Inspector-General of Remounts was charged, under him, with the detail +work connected therewith. As far back as 1887 a system of registration +of horses had been established in order to form a reserve to meet a +national emergency. With the aid of this reserve, it was calculated +that horses could be provided in sufficient numbers to complete the +mobilisation of the force laid down in Mr. Stanhope's memorandum and +to make good the wastage of the first six months. The number estimated +for these purposes was 25,000.[23] No difficulty, it was thought, +would be experienced in obtaining this number and, with the supply for +six months' wastage in hand, time would be available to arrange for +meeting further demands if they arose. + + [Footnote 23: "On mobilisation being ordered, horses to the + number of 3,682 were bought from the registered reserve, the + remainder required being obtained in the open market, and all + units received their full complement with 10 per cent. of + spare horses. No units were delayed for want of horses." + (Court of Inquiry, Remount department, 5,344-5). + + The number of horses actually purchased from the registered + reserve, and in the open market at home, amounted to 73,000 + by the end of 1901.] + +[Sidenote: Purchase of mules and horses.] + +Transport mules would in any case have to be purchased abroad and +records were preserved of the resources of different mule-producing +countries; but there had been no expectation of having to supplement, +to any extent, the home supply of horses. The Inspector-General of +Remounts had personal experience of horse purchase in Argentina, and +the success which had attended his transactions there, coupled with +his knowledge of the market, led him to believe that there would be no +difficulty in obtaining from that country a supply of good and +suitable horses, sufficient to meet any demand that might be +reasonably expected.[24] Information regarding the horse markets of +other countries did not go beyond such personal knowledge as a few +individuals in the department happened to possess. So enormous did +demands eventually become, that it is open to question whether, had +all possible information been at command, there existed for sale +anywhere a sufficient number of horses of the right age and stamp, +trained to saddle and in condition, to furnish the numbers +required.[25] Purchases of horses were, indeed, made in South Africa +before the war, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding in +that country. This was done as a mere matter of local convenience, not +as a preparation for war. Furthermore, in the middle of September +financial approval was given for the purchase "of 260 Australian +horses to replace the next year's casualties."[26] Illusions as to the +sufficiency of the home supply were speedily dispelled by the +unforeseen conditions accompanying the transition from peace to war. +Not only was the Remount department required to provide horses and +mules for a far larger British army than had ever before taken the +field, but that army was operating at an immense distance from its +base over a larger extent of country than any over which a British +army had ever before been called upon to act. Besides this, no force +previously sent into the field by any nation has included in its +composition such a large proportion of mounted men. Consequently, the +demands on the Remount department were of unprecedented magnitude.[27] + + [Footnote 24: A proposal to send 700 Argentine horses and + mules "to acclimatise, anticipating next year's casualties," + was sent to the General Officer Commanding S. Africa, in + April, 1899.--Tel. Q.M.G. to G.O.C., S.A., 28th April. (S.A. + Series No. 3.)] + + [Footnote 25: The total number of animals furnished by the + Remount department up to August, 1902, was as follows:-- + + +-----------------------+-------------------+----------+ + | Horses. | | | + +------------+----------+ Mules and Donkeys.| Total. | + | With units.| Remounts.| | | + +------------+----------+-------------------+----------+ + | 20,251 | 450,223 | 149,648 | 620,122 | + +------------+----------+-------------------+----------+] + + [Footnote 26: Court of Enquiry on Army Remounts. Q. 8, + Minutes of Evidence.] + + [Footnote 27: Court of Enquiry on Army Remounts. Report, + Para. 234.] + +[Sidenote: Absence of depots.] + +What contributed not a little to these demands was the absence of +preparation in South Africa in establishing beforehand depots from +which a regular supply could be maintained, and in which imported +animals could rest after the voyage and become to a certain extent +acclimatised before they were used in the field. + +[Sidenote: Partial provision of depots.] + +In June, 1899, the Inspector-General had represented the necessity of +sending out a proper remount establishment to receive animals, and a +supervising staff. This proposal was only adopted to the extent that, +on June 22nd, sanction was given for an Assistant-Inspector of +Remounts, accompanied by a small staff, to go to South Africa. In +August, 1899, approval was given for the retention of the existing +depot at Stellenbosch as a temporary measure, while on the Natal side +"the present depot" was reported by the Officer Commanding troops as +being "sufficient for all that the War Office had sanctioned."[28] + + [Footnote 28: Telegram General Officer Commanding South + Africa, to Secretary of State, 3rd September. (South African + Series, No. 200.)] + +[Sidenote: Mules and oxen.] + +Estimates of the number of mules which would be required to be +purchased abroad for regimental transport had been worked out in June. +A limited number had already been obtained in South Africa, and before +the war broke out the General Officer Commanding there had entered +into contracts for the supply of 1,470 additional animals. This met +the immediate necessity, and the subsequent purchases from all parts +of the world enabled every unit landing in Cape Colony to be +completely equipped with regimental transport when it reached its +concentration station.[29] In Natal ox-transport was principally used +as being more suitable for the country. + + [Footnote 29: There were three concentration stations in the + Cape Colony, viz.: De Aar, Naauwpoort and Queenstown.] + +[Sidenote: Animals from abroad.] + +In order to supplement this supply and "with a view to possible +contingencies, about the middle of July, 1899, commissions of +officers, to make preliminary enquiries, were sent to the United +States of America, to Spain and to Italy."[30] In order that these +preparations, indispensable if war was declared, should not tend to +excite war, the Secretary of State had given instructions that these +officers should not attract attention to their mission. They were not +allowed to make any purchases until they received instructions. These +were telegraphed on 23rd September, 1899, authorising the buying of +1,000 in Spain, 3,000 in Italy, and 4,000 at New Orleans. + + [Footnote 30: Report, Court of Inquiry, Remount department, + p. 3, para. 12.] + +[Sidenote: Ships for mules.] + +The conveyance of mules (but not horses) from ports abroad was carried +out by the Admiralty, and some difficulty was experienced at first in +chartering ships suitable for the purpose. The first ship-load did not +arrive in South Africa until 8th November. Mules for troops from India +were shipped under arrangements made by the Indian Government in +conjunction with the Admiralty Transport Officer. + +[Sidenote: Demands fully met.] + +The department succeeded in furnishing, and even in exceeding, the +numbers demanded from time to time. It had undertaken the transport of +horses purchased abroad, an arrangement which, while relieving the +Admiralty, caused no competition, as a different class of ship was +required. Horses and mules purchased in various countries were poured +into South Africa. They were used up almost as soon as they arrived. + +[Sidenote: Difficulties of Remount department.] + +There was no arrangement made for easy and rapid expansion. "The +Inspector-General of Remounts could do no more with the organisation +with which he was furnished; his functions were strictly limited, and +his staff even more so. It was inevitable that when a department so +equipped, and with no provision for expansion, was called upon to +extend its operations largely, there must be some lack of system."[31] +In addition to these difficulties, the department had to face others. +It was from the first made the object of attacks in the Press and in +Parliament. It was scarcely possible that the circumstances as here +recorded should be understood. To the labours of the officials, +already worked to breaking strain, was added the duty of preparing +constant written explanations of their actions, and this to an extent +that seriously interfered with the despatch of their current business. + + [Footnote 31: Report of Royal Commission, Para. 187.] + + +_Army Service Corps._ + +There was no difficulty in bringing the personnel of the transport +companies and supply detachments of the Army Service Corps up to the +war establishment laid down for them. Yet the total strength of the +corps, with its reserves called up, was far below what was required to +meet the calls which were eventually made on it. "After withdrawing +nearly every officer of the corps from England and stations abroad it +was necessary to employ in South Africa 126 additional officers of +other corps up to June, 1900, which number was increased to nearly 250 +later on in the war. To replace officers in England and stations +abroad, 98 retired and reserve officers were employed. The transport +personnel (non-commissioned officers and artificers) of the companies +in South Africa, when they were subsequently divided into two, was +hardly sufficient to carry on the work, but a large number of +promotions were made to fill up the deficiencies. With the supply +branch in South Africa, 364 civilians were engaged as clerks, bakers, +and issuers, and civilians were employed at every station at home to +take the place of Army Service Corps clerks."[32] + + [Footnote 32: Statement of Quartermaster-General, 23rd + September, 1902.] + +[Sidenote: Local Drivers relieve A.S.C.] + +On the other hand, the nature of the transport in South Africa +rendered the employment of native mule and ox drivers almost +imperative. A surplus of Army Service Corps drivers was thus created +sufficient to enable 600 to be lent to the Royal artillery, leaving +enough to be retained for duty at home and abroad. The duties of four +remount depots in Cape Colony and one in Natal were also carried out +by the Army Service Corps during the first part of the war until +relieved by remount depots from England and India. + +[Sidenote: Early despatch of A.S.C.] + +A notable feature in connection with the Army Service Corps was its +employment, before the outbreak of hostilities, in a role that was +essentially preparatory. For the first time in the history of the +corps, transport companies and supply detachments were sent in advance +of the troops whom they were to serve, and prepared the way for them. +With the despatch of two companies in July to make good the transport +of the existing force in South Africa, five officers also proceeded to +South Africa to assist in organising the supply and transport duties +in the event of a large force being sent out.[33] Further embarkations +took place in September and October, and the remainder of the Army +Service Corps units, detailed for duty with the army corps, embarked +before war had actually been declared, and before any of the troops of +the army corps had sailed. The advantages attending these measures +were that not only did all units on arriving at their concentration +stations in South Africa find their transport ready for them, but the +transport and supply services generally were organised and in working +order for their share of the operations. + + [Footnote 33: The General Officer Commanding South Africa had + applied for special service officers acquainted with "B." + duties.] + + +_Royal Army Medical Corps._ + +In respect of preparations, even up to the two army corps standard, +the Royal Army Medical Corps was weak in numbers. Barely sufficient in +its personnel even for peace requirements, it possessed no +organisation for expansion in war. The establishment of officers was +designed to provide for the bearer companies and field hospitals of +two army corps and a cavalry division, with seven stationary and three +general hospitals on the lines of communication. This only allowed for +under 3 per cent. of the troops having beds in general and stationary +hospitals. Without withdrawing officers from the colonies,[34] the aid +of 99 civil surgeons would be required. These gentlemen were to be +selected when their services were needed, but as there was no +registered list, no claim on the service of anyone could be exacted. +When the field army was provided for, the home hospitals were entirely +denuded of personnel. The work was carried on by retired officers and +civil surgeons. The establishment of non-commissioned officers and men +was designed only for peace purposes, and beyond the reserve there was +no estimate for additions in case of war. A state of war was to be met +by civilian assistance, increased employment of women nurses, and +active recruiting. An increase of establishment which had been +proposed for the estimates of 1893-4 and successive years had +gradually obtained complete sanction by 1898.[35] The increase of the +army as a whole and the known weakness in South Africa caused demands +for yet larger numbers in the estimates of 1899-1900. The Army Board +were not disposed to recommend more than a portion of these +additions.[36] The difficulty of obtaining sanction for expenditure on +measures of greater urgency required that that which was considered of +less importance should be dispensed with, so the hospital orderly had +to be rejected in favour of the soldier to fill the ranks. To provide +the general and stationary hospitals that accompanied the First Army +Corps with complete personnel, it became necessary to denude the +bearer companies and field hospitals of the Second Army Corps. It is +not surprising, therefore, that "war having been declared, and +practically the whole available personnel having been swept off to +South Africa with the first demands, it became necessary to seek for +other means of supply."[37] Hospital equipment was dealt with by the +Director-General of Ordnance, but with surgical and medical stores the +Army Medical Department was itself concerned. Funds to replace the +old-fashioned instruments then in use were asked for in 1896, and +between that date and the outbreak of war great improvements had been +made. The change, however, had not been universally completed, and on +the outbreak of war a few instruments of comparatively antiquated type +were still to be found in South Africa. A similar argument to that +which prevailed against the increase of personnel met the several +requests for storage room. It was represented that the indifferent +storage available deteriorated the instruments and made the drugs +worthless. On the other hand, the perishable nature of drugs renders +it inadvisable to keep a large amount in store, besides which, ample +supplies can always be purchased in the market. The subsequent +experience went to prove that there was no difficulty in this matter. +Throughout the war the department was wonderfully well equipped as +regards drugs and instruments, and no branch was more successful than +that concerned with medical supplies. + + [Footnote 34: The establishment for India is distinct.] + + [Footnote 35: An increase of 212 was asked for, and was + obtained by successive grants of 54, 53, 52 and 55--total, + 214.] + + [Footnote 36: The estimate was for 400 of all ranks, and 150 + were granted. The balance was granted in November, 1899, and + the men were of course untrained.] + + [Footnote 37: Statement by Surgeon-General Jameson, Royal + Commission on South African Hospitals.] + + +_Army Veterinary Department._ + +On the outbreak of war the Director-General of the Army Veterinary +department was responsible to the Adjutant-General for the efficiency of +his department and the maintenance of veterinary supplies. The superior +control was subsequently transferred to the Quartermaster-General. The +proportion of the veterinary service which should accompany a force on +active service was not laid down. Not only was there no organisation to +admit of expansion but, owing to the unattractive conditions attaching +to service in the department, the number of officers was actually below +the authorised establishment. In addition to the discharge of ordinary +duty, heavy demands were made by the Remount department for veterinary +officers to assist in the purchase and transport of horses and mules. It +was necessary, therefore, almost from the first, to engage civilian +veterinary surgeons.[38] The personnel of the department did not include +any subordinate staff. The Director-General[39] of the department was in +process of adopting, with improvements, the Indian system of equipment, +for which he had himself been responsible. The amount of this equipment +which it had been possible to prepare before the outbreak of war was +insufficient, but the deficiency was remedied by indenting on India for +four field veterinary hospitals and 100 field chests, which enabled the +supply to be kept up to the subsequent demands. + + [Footnote 38: The home establishment of the department was + 63; 121 civilian veterinary surgeons were employed in South + Africa, besides those engaged by local Volunteers.] + + [Footnote 39: Veterinary Colonel F. Duck, C.B., F.R.C.V.S.] + + +_Inspector-General of Fortifications._ + +This officer was responsible for engineer stores. The nature of those +required depends largely on the country in which the campaign is to be +carried on; therefore, practically no reserve was maintained of such +ordinary items as can easily be bought in the market. Of manufactured +goods, such as railway plant, telegraph material and pontoons, which +require time for production, there was an insufficient reserve, +notably of the last named. In order to send out a number sufficient to +meet the probable requirements in South Africa, all reserve pontoons, +including some of questionable value, were collected, and the country +was denuded. This deficiency had been represented on different +occasions, but for want of funds nothing could be done towards the +provision of new pontoons until October, 1899. + + +_Ordnance._ + +Of all the departments, this was subjected to the greatest strain and +was the least prepared to meet it. The reasons were as follows. For +some years previous to 1897 the system in force was that, although the +Director-General of Ordnance was charged with the supply of stores to +the army, the financial control and the entire direction of the +ordnance factories rested with the Financial Secretary to the War +Office, who belonged to the Ministry of the day. No supplies could be +obtained by the former unless with the permission and by the order of +the latter. The system conduced to a lack of sympathy of motive, which +caused a disinclination on the one part to ask for what on the other +there would be more than a disinclination to give. This tended to +crystallise the national proneness to defer until the emergency arose +the measures necessary to meet it. It followed, then, that while +attention was given to the needs of the moment, practically all +provision for the requirements of the future was relegated to the +background. A further defect in the system was that it resulted in +there being no proper understanding between those who had intimate +knowledge of what was required by the army and those who were +responsible for manufacture. + +[Sidenote: Sir Henry Brackenbury's appointment.] + +During the three years that Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Brackenbury +had been President of the Ordnance Committee at Woolwich he had been +impressed by the unsatisfactory working of the system and, on being +offered the appointment of Director-General of Ordnance, in November, +1898, he urged that the direction of the ordnance factories should be +transferred to the holder of that appointment. The matter was +discussed by the Cabinet and, on its being decided to make the +transfer, Sir H. Brackenbury took up the appointment in February, +1899. The transfer was effected by the Order in Council of March 7th, +1899, which enumerated the duties with which the Director-General of +Ordnance was charged,[40] and included in them that of the direction +of the manufacturing departments of the army. The financial control of +the factories still remained with the Financial Secretary. + + [Footnote 40: The duties are detailed in Sir Henry + Brackenbury's reply to the Royal Commission, A. 1,555.] + +[Sidenote: State of ordnance stores.] + +The Secretary of State himself had felt some concern as to the +condition of affairs in the Ordnance department and it was on his +initiative that Sir Henry Brackenbury was selected to set matters +right. On taking up the duties of Director-General of Ordnance, the +new chief commenced an enquiry into the condition of the armament and +the state of reserves of all ordnance stores. In the early months of +the year the greater part of his time and attention was taken up by +the important question of replacing the obsolete armament of our sea +defences. From June onwards the whole energies of the department were +directed towards meeting the requirements of the force which might +possibly have to take the field. It was not until the despatch of this +force that the true barrenness of the land came to be revealed, and +melancholy was the outlook it presented. + +[Sidenote: Warning to G.Os.C.] + +Early in 1899 the Director-General of Ordnance issued confidential +instructions to General Officers Commanding districts regarding +special scales of clothing and equipment for the field force +contemplated for service in South Africa. These instructions enabled +demands to be prepared, so that they could be put forward without +delay on the order to mobilise. + +[Sidenote: Method of keeping equipment.] + +Wherever storage buildings were available the war equipment of units +was kept on their charge. In other cases it was apportioned to units +but held in store for them by the Ordnance department. When +mobilisation was ordered, there was war equipment practically complete +to enable two army corps, a cavalry division, and lines of +communication troops to take the field. + +[Sidenote: Clothing.] + +The special clothing prescribed for South Africa entailed an entire +change of dress--helmet, body-clothing, and boots. Sanction had been +given in April, 1899, for the storage of a reserve of khaki drill +suits,[41] of which the amount authorised would have been insufficient, +but fortunately the Clothing department had a surplus which enabled a +complete issue to be made on mobilisation. It had been represented from +South Africa, with the support of the Director-General of the Army +Medical Service at home, that serge was more appropriate to the climate +than cotton drill, and the substitution had been approved by the +Commander-in-Chief on August 18th. No steps towards effecting the change +could be taken until the grant of September 22nd, and the first three +divisions embarked with cotton drill clothing.[42] It is probable, +however, that even had the money been forthcoming when the change was +first approved, not more than half the amount required could have been +obtained in the time. One difficulty experienced in connection with the +issue of clothing was that of providing each unit with the right number +of suits of particular sizes. Many of the reservists who presented +themselves on mobilisation were found to have increased considerably in +figure, and consequently much fitting and alteration was necessary. This +caused delay. At that time the boot for foreign service differed in +pattern from that for home service, and an issue of the former was made. +The supply on hand was only sufficient to allow a complete issue to men +of the mounted services, while dismounted soldiers had one pair of each +pattern, reservists having home service pattern entirely. The sudden +demand on the market for the materials necessary for these articles of +clothing entailed a considerable increase of cost, without, at the +outset at least, ensuring provision of the best quality. + + [Footnote 41: This reserve consisted of 40,000 suits; the + number actually issued was sufficient to equip the force + completely.] + + [Footnote 42: At the time of year this was suitable, and + serge clothing was eventually sent out. Troops subsequently, + up to May, 1900, took one suit of drill and one suit of + serge. Later each man took two suits of serge.] + +[Sidenote: War equipment.] + +At the outbreak of war the authorised war equipment was practically +complete, and there remained the equipment for a third army corps, +but suitable only for service at home. Beyond this, there was no +provision of special reserves to meet the continual drain by service +in the field abroad. Such reserve material as there was for batteries +of both horse and field artillery was speedily exhausted; while to +provide heavier ordnance it was necessary to draw upon the movable +armament for home defence. More speedy still was the exhaustion of gun +ammunition, and not even the suspension of Naval orders in the +factories, with loans from the Navy and from India, could enable +demands to be complied with quickly enough. Similarly, the +deficiencies in other stores, such as camp equipment, vehicles, +harness, saddlery and horse-shoes, made themselves apparent at a very +early date in the war.[43] + + [Footnote 43: In the matter of hospital equipment previous to + mobilisation there had been stores for field hospitals of + three army corps; but there was no reserve of equipment for + stationary hospitals or general hospitals, except for one + general hospital and two stationary hospitals, which were not + included in the army corps organisation.] + +[Sidenote: Purchases abroad.] + +[Sidenote: Mark IV.] + +Any idea that may have existed that the ordnance factories and the +trade would be able to meet all demands from week to week was quickly +dispelled. The supply could not keep pace with the need, and in some +cases the exhaustion of the home market necessitated large purchases +in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Of rifles and other weapons +at this time the store was ample, except in the case of sabres, of +which, owing to a contemplated change in pattern, the reserve had been +allowed to fall very low. There was a complete reserve of ball +ammunition of the kinds approved for use in the earlier part of 1899, +viz.: Mark II. and Mark IV., the latter having an expanding bullet. +During the summer of 1899 it was found that under certain conditions +the Mark IV. ammunition developed such serious defects that, apart +from the inexpediency of using a bullet which the signatories to the +Hague Convention[44] had condemned, it was deemed advisable to +withdraw this particular kind of ammunition as unsuitable for war +purposes. This meant that two-fifths of the reserve was unserviceable. + + [Footnote 44: The British Government was not a party to this + clause.] + +[Sidenote: Alarming minute from D.G.O.] + +On 15th December, 1899, as the result of his enquiry, Sir Henry +Brackenbury put forward his report to the Commander-in-Chief, in which +he enumerated in detail the various deficiencies of stores brought to +light by the war in South Africa. The condition of affairs was such as +to cause grave apprehension. To use his own words: "That war has now +disclosed a situation as regards armaments, and reserves of guns, +ammunition, stores and clothing, and as regards the power of output of +material of war in emergency which is, in my opinion, full of peril to +the Empire; and I, therefore, think it my duty, without waiting to +elaborate details, to lay before you at once the state of affairs, and +to make proposals, to which I invite, through you, the earnest and +immediate attention of the Secretary of State." These proposals dealt +with the provision of armaments, reserves of ammunition, stores and +clothing, and the improvement of factories and storage-buildings, with +the object of putting the country in a condition of safety and +preventing the possibility of the recurrence of the state of affairs +disclosed.[45] + + [Footnote 45: Sir H. Brackenbury's representation was laid + before the Cabinet and resulted, on the recommendations of + the Mowatt and Grant Committees, in a grant of L10,500,900 to + be distributed over a period of three years.] + +[Sidenote: A free hand.] + +In his minute Sir Henry Brackenbury also insisted on the necessity of +a free hand being given in time of war to the Inspector-General of +Fortifications as regards works and buildings, and to the +Director-General of Ordnance as regards armaments, stores and +clothing. He had, through the Army Board, on the 22nd September, +brought to the notice of the Secretary of State the difficulties and +delays inseparable from the financial system which obtained in peace +time, and had been granted practically what he asked in his +expenditure for the supply of the army during the war. On this point +Sir Henry Brackenbury remarked in his report:-- + +"It is only by such a free hand having been given to us since the +outbreak of war in October that it has been possible to supply the +army in the field, and even so, owing to the want of reserves, we have +been too late with many of the most important articles." + +The tale of deficiencies was thus summed up by the Secretary of +State:-- + +[Sidenote: Lord Lansdowne's note.] + +"It is, I think, abundantly clear from Sir H. Brackenbury's Report, +that we were not sufficiently prepared even for the equipment of the +comparatively small force which we had always contemplated might be +employed beyond the limits of this country in the initial stages of a +campaign. For the much larger force which we have actually found it +necessary to employ our resources were absolutely and miserably +inadequate. The result has been that the department, even by working +under conditions which have nearly led to a breakdown, has been barely +able to keep pace with the requirements of the army."[46] + + [Footnote 46: Extract from memorandum of May 21st, 1900, by + the Marquess of Lansdowne.] + + +_Colonies._ + +Offers of assistance had poured in from Greater Britain from the +moment that the imminence of war in South Africa was realised. It was +not the first time that our kinsmen had sent their sons for the +general service of the Empire. In 1881, within twenty-four hours of +the receipt of the news of the action at Laing's Nek, two thousand men +of the Australian local forces had volunteered for employment in South +Africa, but were not accepted. Four years later, eight hundred +colonists from New South Wales were welcomed for service at Suakim, +while a special corps of Canadian voyageurs was enlisted for the +advance up the Nile. But on neither of these occasions was the tender +of patriotic help so welcome to the Mother Country as in the present +instance, for it was felt that the whole Empire was concerned in the +contest for the establishment in South Africa of equal rights for all +white men independent of race, and that it was, therefore, peculiarly +fitting that the younger States of the great Imperial Commonwealth +should make the quarrel their own. As early as July, 1899, Queensland, +Victoria, New South Wales, the Malay States and Lagos, had tendered +their services, and Her Majesty's Government, though not then able to +accept the offers made, had gratefully acknowledged them. In +September, Queensland and Victoria renewed their proposals, and +further offers of assistance were received from Canada, New Zealand, +Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, and Hong Kong. The +majority of a squadron of the New South Wales Lancers, which had been +sent to England to undergo a special course of training at Aldershot, +also volunteered for South Africa. As regards Natal and Cape Colony, +it was assumed as a matter of course, both by the Colonial troops +themselves and by the Imperial and Colonial Governments, that they +would cheerfully do their duty if called out for local defence. The +whole of the Natal local forces were mobilised for active service on +29th September,[47] the day after President Kruger commandeered his +burghers. A portion of the Cape Volunteers were called out on 5th +October, and the remainder during the first month of the war.[48] On +the 3rd October the Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed to +various Colonial Governments a grateful acceptance by Her Majesty's +Government of the services of their contingents, indicating in each +case the units considered desirable. It was not found possible to take +advantage of the offers of some of the Crown Colonies, but from the +self-governing Colonies, troops numbering about 2,500 of all ranks +were accepted.[49] These proved but the advance guard to the total +force of nearly 30,000 men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India +and Ceylon, who at various times represented Greater Britain in the +army of South Africa. + + [Footnote 47: The corps mobilised were Natal Naval + Volunteers, Natal Field Artillery, Natal Royal Rifles, Durban + Light Infantry, Natal Mounted Rifles, Natal Carbineers, + Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Border Mounted Rifles.] + + [Footnote 48: For the local forces called out in Cape Colony, + see Chapter II., p. 53.] + + [Footnote 49: For arrivals of "Oversea Colonials," see + Appendix 9. The whole subject is treated more fully in Vol. + II. in a chapter on the Colonial Corps.] + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.[50] + + [Footnote 50: See general map of South Africa, Relief map No. + 2, and map No. 3.] + + +[Sidenote: Defence plans of local authorities.] + +[Sidenote: Genl. Goodenough.] + +It has been convenient to carry the statement of the measures adopted +for preparation at home in certain matters beyond the actual date of +the declaration of war. It is now necessary to view the state of +affairs in South Africa at that time. Although British preparations +for war had been retarded by the hope of the Queen's Government that +the grave issues with the Dutch Republics might be determined by +diplomatic action, yet the weakness of our military position in South +Africa had long been felt as keenly by the local military authorities +as it had been by the Headquarter staff at the War Office. In schemes +for the defence of the British colonies, submitted in 1896 and 1897 by +Lieut.-General Sir W. H. Goodenough, who was then commanding in South +Africa, the extraordinary extent of the frontiers to be defended, the +disadvantages entailed by their shape, and the overwhelming numerical +superiority of the Boers over the handful of British troops then in +South Africa, made it necessary to base the protection even of the +most important strategical points on sheer audacity. + +[Sidenote: War Office to Gen. Butler Dec. /98.] + +[Sidenote: Dec. /98, from W.O.] + +A letter addressed by the War Office to General Goodenough's +successor, Lieut.-General Sir W. Butler, on 21st December, 1898, had +requested him to reconsider his predecessor's proposals, and to report +at an early date the distribution of troops he would make in the event +of war with the two Dutch Republics. In a review of the strategical +situation, that despatch drew attention to the fact that the troops +then stationed in the command "would be inadequate for any other than +a defensive attitude, pending the arrival of reinforcements from +England." In the same paper the effect of the frontiers on the +questions, both of defence in the earlier stages of the war, and of +the ultimate form of offence, is so fully treated that it will be +convenient to quote here the official statement of the case. It must +be premised that it is assumed in it, as in fact proved to be the +case, that both sides would tacitly agree, for the sake of not raising +the native difficulty, to treat Basuto territory as neutral. That +mountain region was therefore throughout considered as an impassable +obstacle:-- + +"The frontiers of the Transvaal and the Free State are conterminous +with English territory for over 1,000 miles, but the defence of this +enormous frontier by Her Majesty's troops is impossible to +contemplate. Southern Rhodesia, although a possible objective for a +Boer raid, must rely entirely for its defence upon its own local +forces, and, although the line from Kimberley to Buluwayo is of some +strategic importance, yet its protection north of the Vaal river would +be altogether out of our power during the earlier stages of the war. +Basutoland may also be eliminated from defensive calculations, as its +invasion by the Boers would be improbable; moreover, the Basutos, if +invaded, would be able for some time to maintain an effective +resistance. + +"The frontier, therefore, the observation and defence of which appears +to need definite consideration, may be held to extend in Cape Colony +from Fourteen Streams bridge in the north to the south-west corner of +Basutoland, and to include in Natal the triangle, of which Charlestown +is the apex, and a line drawn from Mont Aux Sources to the +Intonganeni[51] district of Zululand the base. + + [Footnote 51: Now spelt Emtonjaneni on the general map.] + +"The mountains and broken country of Basutoland and Griqualand East, +which lie between Natal and the Cape Colony, are unpierced by railways +and ill-supplied by roads. It must be accepted, therefore, that a +force acting on the defensive in Natal will be out of touch with a +force in Cape Colony, and the two can only operate from separate +bases. + +[Sidenote: Dec. /98 from W.O.] + +"As regards the Cape frontier, for the portion lying between +Basutoland and Hopetown railway bridge,[52] the Orange river forms a +military obstacle of some importance, impassable, as a rule, during +the first three months of the year, except at the bridges, and even at +other times difficult to cross, owing to its quicksands, and liability +to sudden flood. Between Hopetown railway bridge and the Vaal the +frontier is, however, protected by no physical features and lies open +to invasion. + + [Footnote 52: The railway bridge at Orange River station.] + +"As regards the Natal frontier its salient confers on the enemy +facilities for cutting our line of communications, and for outflanking +at pleasure the positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg. This +facility is accentuated by the influence of the Drakensberg, which +forms a screen, behind which an enemy can assemble unobserved and +debouch on our flanks through its numerous passes. These passes, +however, have been recently examined and found to be for the most part +but rough mountain tracks available for raids, but unsuitable for the +advance of any large force accompanied by transport. To this Van +Reenen's Pass, through which the railway and main road issue from +Natal into the Free State, and Laing's Nek (across and under which the +main road and railway pass into the Transvaal) are notable exceptions, +and the possession of these two passes necessarily carry with them +great strategical advantages. + +"An appreciation of the relative importance of the defence of the two +frontiers of Cape Colony and Natal would, no doubt, be assisted if the +line by which the main advance on the Transvaal will ultimately be +undertaken were determined; but I am to say that in the +Commander-in-Chief's opinion the plan for offensive operations must +depend upon the political and military situation of the moment, and +cannot now be definitely fixed. The fact, however, that an offensive +advance will ultimately be undertaken, as soon as sufficient forces +have arrived, must be especially borne in mind in considering +arrangements for the first or defensive stage of the campaign." + +The despatch then stated that the following should be taken as the +basis of Sir William Butler's arrangements for frontier defence: "The +latest information in the possession of the War Office as to the +military strength of the two States will be found in the recent +pamphlet entitled 'Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South +Africa,' copies of which are in your possession. You will observe that +in that publication it is estimated that the total forces of the two +republics amount to over 40,000 men, and that of these some 27,000[53] +would be available for offensive operations beyond their frontiers. It +is known that projects for such offensive operations have actually +been under the consideration of the War department of Pretoria, but +although an attempt may be made on Kimberley and the northern strip of +Natal may be occupied by the Boers, yet it is considered to be +unlikely that any further serious advance into the heart of either +colony would be undertaken. Raids, however, of 2,000 to 3,000 men may +be expected, and it is against such raids that careful preparation on +your part is necessary." + + [Footnote 53: A later edition of the Military Notes (June, + 1899) estimated the total strength of the burgher and + permanent levies to be 53,743, and further that these would + be joined at the outbreak of war by 4,000 Colonial rebels. It + was calculated that of this total, and exclusive of those + detached for frontier defence and to hold in check Kimberley + and Mafeking, 27,000 effectives would be available as a field + army for offensive operations. When these estimates were + made, the large number of Uitlanders in Johannesburg made it + probable that a considerable Boer force would be detained to + watch that city.] + +[Sidenote: June /99. Sir W. Butler's reply.] + +Sir W. Butler, being occupied by other duties, did not reply to this +despatch until pressed by telegrams at the beginning of June of the +following year. He then reported by telegraph and in a letter to the +War Office, dated 12th June, 1899, that he intended, in the event of +war, to divide the troops in Natal into two; one part at +Dundee-Glencoe with orders to patrol to the Buffalo river on the east, +Ingagane on the north, and the Drakensberg Passes on the west, and the +other at Ladysmith, with instructions "to support Glencoe and maintain +the line of the Biggarsberg, or to operate against Van Reenen's Pass +should circumstances necessitate." In Cape Colony he proposed, with +the small number of troops then available (_i.e._, three battalions, +six guns and a R.E. company), to hold the important railway stations +of De Aar, Naauwpoort and Molteno (or Stormberg), with strong +detachments at Orange River station, and possibly Kimberley, and +outposts at Colesberg, Burghersdorp, and Philipstown. It will be seen, +therefore, that, while deprecating the actual occupation of the +Drakensberg Passes and of the Colesberg and Bethulie bridges over the +Orange river, which had been proposed by his predecessor and approved +by Lord Wolseley, Sir William Butler did not shrink from the forward +policy of endeavouring to bluff the enemy with weak detachments +stationed in close proximity to the frontier. + +[Sidenote: Baden-Powell sent out.] + +It was in conformity with this policy that, in July, 1899, the War +Office despatched Col. R. S. S. Baden-Powell, with a staff of special +service officers, to organise a force in southern Rhodesia. It was +hoped that, in the event of war, his column might detain a portion of +the Boer commandos in that quarter, since its position threatened the +northern Transvaal. To his task was subsequently added the +organisation of a mounted infantry corps which, based on Mafeking, +might similarly hold back the burghers of the western districts of the +South African Republic. + +[Sidenote: Choice of Routes.] + +The cloud of war rapidly spread over the whole of the South African +horizon, and the strategical situation became sharply defined. As +regards the determination of the plan of offence referred to in the +above War Office despatch, the difficulty was due to the hope +entertained by the Cabinet that, in the event of war between this +country and the Transvaal, the Orange Free State would remain neutral. +The choice in that case would have lain between an advance based on +Warrenton, _i.e._, on the Kimberley-to-Mafeking railway, or a movement +parallel to the Natal-to-Johannesburg railway. By the middle of 1899, +however, the Headquarter staff at the War Office were convinced that, +if war should supervene, the two republics would make common cause. A +memorandum, entitled, "The Direction of a Line of Advance Against the +Transvaal," was prepared by the Intelligence division on that basis +and submitted on 3rd June, 1899. It was contended in this memorandum +that the lack of any railway between Fourteen Streams and the +Transvaal capital eliminated that route from consideration, and that +the choice now lay between the line running up through the centre of +the Free State and the Natal route. + +[Sidenote: The better line.] + +In comparing the relative merits of these two routes it was shown that +strategically the Natal line would, owing to the shape of the frontier +and the parallel screen of the Drakensberg, be constantly exposed to +dangerous flank attacks, while the flanks of the Free State route +would be comparatively safe. "The Basutos' sympathies will be entirely +with us, while on the west the garrison of Kimberley will hold the +approaches." + +[Sidenote: Reasons.] + +Tactically, it was pointed out, the Natal route traversed "an ideal +terrain for the Boers," and crossed the "immensely strong" position of +Laing's Nek. On the other hand, a force advancing by the Free State +route, once over the Orange river, would have only to deal with the +Bethulie position, and would then reach open plains, which "afford the +freest scope for the manoeuvres of all three arms." + +[Sidenote: Conclusion.] + +Furthermore, the Free State route could be fed by three distinct lines +of railway from three ports, while the Natal route would be dependent +on a single line and one port. The memorandum, therefore, submitted +the conclusion that "the main line of advance against the Transvaal +should be based on the Cape Colony, and should follow generally the +line of railway through the Orange Free State to Johannesburg and +Pretoria." + +[Sidenote: Natal threatened.] + +In June it became evident that the vague designs of the Boer +Governments against Natal, of which the British Intelligence +department had had cognizance in the previous year, were taking +definite shape, and that, at any rate, so far as the Transvaal forces +were concerned, the eastern colony would probably become the main +object of their attack. The only British reinforcements immediately +available were therefore assigned to that colony. On the Cape side it +was manifest that the determining factor was the attitude of restless +elements within the colony itself. It was known that secret agents +from the Transvaal had, during the past two years, visited many parts +of the colony, and that arms had been distributed by those agents. The +investigations of the Intelligence department had, however, failed to +discover proofs of the establishment of such organisations as would +enable any formidable rising in the colony to coincide with a +declaration of war by the republics. It was fully realised that it +could not but be the case that there would be among many of the Dutch +colonial farmers some natural sympathy with their kinsmen, and that a +certain number of the younger and wilder would possibly slip across +the border to join the enemy's forces; but it was believed that, +provided this class of the community was not encouraged by any sign of +weakness to enter into relations with the republics, they would be, as +a whole, loath to throw off their allegiance to a State to which they +and their forefathers had for many generations been loyal, and under +whose rule they had enjoyed equal liberties, self-government and much +prosperity. + +[Sidenote: Protective Posts.] + +If these conclusions were sound--and the course of events during the +first month of the war was to prove their general correctness--it was +highly desirable that detachments of British troops should remain in +the northern districts of the colony, and thus carry out the double +function of encouraging the loyal while checking lawless spirits, and +of retaining possession of those lines of railways, the use of which +would be a matter of vital importance to the field army in its +subsequent advance from the coast. It was obvious that these isolated +posts of a few hundred men would run serious risks. Thrust forward in +close proximity to the enemy's frontier, they were separated from +their base on the coast by some four to five hundred miles of country, +throughout which there might be possible enemies; thus their +communications might at any moment be cut. Furthermore, until troops +arrived from England or India, no reinforcements would be available +for their assistance. But the alternative of abandoning the whole of +the northern districts of Cape Colony to the enemy, and thus allowing +them to enforce recruitments from colonists who might otherwise live +in peaceful security under the British flag, involved dangers far +graver, and was, in fact, never contemplated by the military +authorities either in London or at the Cape, except in the remote +contingency of war with some maritime Power coinciding with the +outbreak of hostilities with the Boer Republics. Moreover, by the +middle of September, 1899, the organisation and training of Colonel +Baden-Powell's two newly-raised corps, the one at Tuli and the other +near Mafeking, were already sufficiently advanced to afford good hope +of their being able to sustain effectively the role which had been +assigned to them, while arrangements were being taken in hand to +secure Kimberley from being captured by any _coup de main_.[54] + + [Footnote 54: See Vol. II.] + +[Sidenote: Forestier-Walker adopts Butler's plan.] + +Although, therefore, at that moment the only regular troops in Cape +Colony were three and a half battalions of infantry, two companies +Royal engineers, and two companies of Royal Garrison artillery, +General Sir F. Forestier-Walker, who, on September 6th, 1899, arrived +at Cape Town, replacing Sir William Butler, decided to adhere to his +forward defence policy, and to carry out unchanged the arrangements +contemplated by him. Thus, by the end of September, a series of +military posts had been formed encircling the western and southern +frontiers of the Free State at Kimberley, Orange River station, De +Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg, each post including a half-battalion +of regular infantry, and a section of engineers. To Kimberley were +also sent six 7-pr. R.M.L. screw guns, and to Orange River station, +Naauwpoort and Stormberg, two 9-pr. R.M.L. guns each. Each of these +three-named had also a company of mounted infantry. The guns were +manned by garrison artillerymen from the naval base at Cape Town. By +arrangement with the Colonial authorities the Cape Police furnished +various posts of observation in advanced positions. Behind the weak +line thus boldly pushed out in the face of the enemy there were no +regular troops whatever in the Colony, except half a battalion and a +handful of garrison gunners in the Cape peninsula. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers approves.] + +Sir F. Forestier-Walker had, however, the satisfaction to find that +these dispositions, which he had carried out on his own initiative +after consulting the High Commissioner, fitted in well with the plans +of Sir Redvers Buller, and were acceptable to that officer. A +telegram from Sir Redvers, dated London, 29th September, 1899, +informed Forestier-Walker that an expedition made up of an army corps, +a cavalry division, and seven battalions for the lines of +communication would be sent out to South Africa and would advance on +Pretoria through the Free State. That general was therefore directed +to make, so far as was compatible with secrecy, preliminary +arrangements for the disembarkation of this army at the three ports, +Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. In acknowledging these +orders on the following day, Sir F. Forestier-Walker accordingly +reported by telegram that he would arrange for the disembarkation +bases and that he was establishing advanced depots at De Aar, +Naauwpoort, and Stormberg;[55] Sir Redvers Buller, in a message +despatched from London on 2nd October, replied:-- + + [Footnote 55: These places had been suggested as suitable for + advanced depots in "Notes on the Lines of Communication in + Cape Colony," issued by the Intelligence Division, W.O., in + June, 1899.] + + "Your proposals are just what I wish, but I feared suggesting + depots at Naauwpoort and Stormberg, as I did not then know if you + had sufficient troops to guard them. It will not do to risk loss. + I leave this to your local knowledge." + +[Sidenote: Further Steps of Defence.] + +On the 7th of October, 1899, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers landed +at Cape Town from England and were sent on the 10th to De Aar; a wing +of the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers left Stellenbosch by train for the +same destination on the 9th. Stores were already accumulating at De +Aar but, having regard to Dutch restlessness in the vicinity of +Naauwpoort and Stormberg, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, after personal +inspection, considered it inadvisable to risk any large amount of +material at either until more troops could be spared to hold them. For +the moment it appeared to him desirable to concentrate all available +mobile troops at the Orange River station, where he retained command +of both banks of the river, and thus, as soon as adequate strength was +organised, could operate thence towards Kimberley or on some point in +the Free State. The energy of Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Kekewich, Loyal +North Lancashire regiment, who had been despatched to Kimberley to +take command, assisted by Mr. Cecil Rhodes and the officials of the De +Beers Company, had placed that town in a fair state of defence. At +Mafeking it was realised that Colonel Baden-Powell's troops would be +unable to do more than protect the large quantities of stores +accumulated by merchants at that station against the formidable Boer +force which was concentrating for attack upon it. Nevertheless, by so +doing, Baden-Powell would fulfil the role assigned to him, since he +would prevent large numbers of the enemy from engaging in the serious +invasion of the exposed frontier territories of Cape Colony. The +actual distribution of troops in the Colony at the outbreak of war is +shown in Appendix 2. + +[Sidenote: Natal defence--Generals Cox and Goodenough, 96/97.] + +Reports on the frontier defence of Natal had been submitted during the +years 1896-7, by Major-General G. Cox, who was then holding the +sub-command of that colony, and by Lieut.-General Goodenough. After a +careful examination of the question whether the tunnel under Laing's +Nek, the Dundee coalfields to the south, and Van Reenen's Pass could +be protected with the troops available, General Goodenough decided +that none of these could be guarded. Having then only one regiment of +cavalry, one mountain battery, and one infantry battalion, he thought +it better to concentrate nearly all of them at Ladysmith, the point of +junction of the branch railway to Harrismith with the main line to the +Transvaal, sending only small detachments to Colenso and Estcourt. On +the despatch to Natal, in the second quarter of 1897, of +reinforcements, consisting of another cavalry regiment, a second +battalion of infantry, and a brigade division of artillery, temporary +quarters were erected at Ladysmith for this increase to the garrison +of the colony, and Sir William Goodenough informed the War Office that +in case of emergency he proposed to watch the whole frontier with the +Natal Police, to hold Newcastle with colonial troops and to despatch +most of the cavalry, one field battery, and half a battalion of +infantry to Glencoe to cover the Dundee coalfields. The remainder of +the regular troops, consisting of a battalion and a half, a few +cavalry, and two batteries, would be placed at Ladysmith, where a +detachment of a battalion and the mountain battery would be kept ready +to occupy and entrench itself at Van Reenen's Pass. These proposals +were approved for execution on an emergency "so far as the exigencies +of the occasion may admit."[56] + + [Footnote 56: W.O. letter, September 3rd, 1897.] + +[Sidenote: Natal defence--Sir W. Butler, /99.] + +Sir W. Butler's report of 12th June, 1899, adopted practically the +same plan of defence. To a suggestion as to a possible occupation of +Laing's Nek,[57] General Butler had replied that he did not think the +immediate possession of that place of great importance and that its +occupation by a weak force would be a dangerous operation. The regular +troops in Natal had at this date been only reinforced by one more +battalion, and consisted of but two cavalry regiments, one brigade +division field artillery, one mountain battery, and three infantry +battalions. To these must be added the Natal Police, a corps about 400 +strong, admirably trained as mounted infantry, and nearly 2,000 +Colonial Volunteers of the best type. + + [Footnote 57: W.O. letter, February 23rd, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Protest of Natal Government, July /99.] + +The communication of this scheme of defence to the Natal Ministry in +July, 1899, led them to prefer an urgent request that sufficient +reinforcements should be sent out to defend the whole colony. In the +long telegraphic despatch addressed on 6th September, 1899, by the +Governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, to the Colonial Office, it was +urged that: "In the opinion of the Ministers, such a catastrophe as +the seizure of Laing's Nek, and the destruction of the northern +portion of the railway ... would have a most demoralising effect on +the natives and the loyal Europeans in the colony, and would afford +great encouragement to the Boers and their sympathisers." The +announcement from home of the early despatch of reinforcements from +India which was received by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson in reply to this +telegram, did not, in the opinion of Sir F. Forestier-Walker, or of +Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons, who had succeeded General Cox in the +local command of Natal, justify a deviation from the scheme of +defence put forward by their predecessors. Apart from the difficulty +of a water supply for a force occupying Laing's Nek, it was felt that +such a forward position would be strategically unsafe, and would +impose on the troops in Natal a task beyond their powers. On the other +hand, the decision to give the coalfields at Dundee the protection +contemplated by Sir W. Butler was adopted. + +[Sidenote: Sept. 25th, /99. Glencoe held.] + +By the 24th September the Governor told General Symons that the +gravity of the political situation was such that the dispositions of +the troops previously agreed on for the defence of the colony must at +once be carried out. The necessary permission to act having been +obtained by telegram from the General Officer Commanding South Africa, +the 1st Leicester and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, with a squadron of +the 18th Hussars were entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe on the +morning of the 25th September, the remainder of the 18th Hussars, with +a mounted infantry company and two field batteries reaching Glencoe by +march route on the 26th. The gaps these changes made in the Ladysmith +garrison were filled up, the 5th Lancers, 1st King's Royal Rifles, and +1st Manchester being ordered to move to that place from Maritzburg. + +[Sidenote: Sir George White, Oct. 7th, wishes to withdraw from +Glencoe.] + +Sir George White had been despatched early in September from England +to command the troops in Natal. When, on October 7th, he arrived and +assumed command, he found that the forces at his disposal were divided +into two bodies, the one at Glencoe and the other at Ladysmith. On +leaving England he had been given no instructions on the subject, nor +had the previous correspondence with the local military authorities as +to the defence of Natal been seen by him, but he held that from a +military point of view the only sound policy was to concentrate the +whole of the British troops in such a position that he would be able +to strike with his full strength at the enemy the moment an +opportunity offered. He determined, therefore, to withdraw the Glencoe +detachment and assemble the whole at Ladysmith, the importance of +which was increased by the preliminary dispositions of the Boer +commandos, to be described later. The Governor, on being informed of +this intention, remonstrated against the withdrawal from Glencoe in +terms which are thus recorded in his subsequent report of the +interview to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:-- + +[Sidenote: Protest by Governor.] + + "Now that we were there, withdrawal would, in my opinion, involve + grave political results, loyalists would be disgusted and + discouraged; the results as regards the Dutch would be grave, + many, if not most, would very likely rise, believing us to be + afraid, and the evil might very likely spread to the Dutch in + Cape Colony; and the effect on our natives, of whom there were + 750,000 in Natal and Zululand, might be disastrous. They as yet + believe in our power--they look to us--but if we withdraw from + Glencoe they will look on it in the light of a defeat, and I + could not answer for what they, or at all events a large + proportion of them, might do." + +[Sidenote: Sir G. White yields and retains Glencoe.] + +Influenced by these strong representations and especially by the +suggestion that the evacuation of Glencoe might lead to a general +rising of the natives--a very grave consideration in the eyes of an +officer with long Indian experience--the British commander decided to +acquiesce for the moment in the separation of his troops which had +been arranged by Major-General Symons. Sir George conceived, however, +from the Intelligence reports before him that the bulk of the Boer +commandos were assembling behind the screen of the Drakensberg, and +that the northern portion of Natal would be their primary and +principal object. He retained his own belief that the safety of the +colony could only be fully secured by decisive strokes at the enemy's +columns as they emerged from the mountain passes and, in pursuance of +this policy, General White impressed on his staff the necessity for +making such preparations as would set free the maximum number of +troops for active operations in the field. Under these circumstances +Sir W. Penn Symons started for Dundee on October 10th and on October +11th Sir George White went by train from Maritzburg to Ladysmith. The +distribution of the forces in Natal on the outbreak of war will be +found in Appendix 3. + +[Sidenote: Boer plans.] + +The exertions of ten special service officers despatched to South +Africa three months earlier had ensured the acquisition of accurate +information as to the enemy's mobilisation, strength, and points of +concentration. Sir George White's appreciation of the situation was, +therefore, in conformity with the actual facts. The main strength of +the enemy had been concentrated for an invasion of Natal. The +President hoped that it would sweep that colony clear of British +troops down to the sea, and would hoist the Vierkleur over the port of +Durban. Small detachments had been told off to guard the Colesberg, +Bethulie, and Aliwal North bridges and to watch Basutoland. On the +western frontiers of the Transvaal and the Free State strong commandos +were assembling for the destruction of Baden-Powell's retaining force +at Mafeking and for the capture of Kimberley. Both Kruger and Steyn +aimed at results other than those achieved by the initiatory victories +of 1880-1. They cherished the hope that the time had come for the +establishment of a Boer Republic reaching from the Zambesi to Table +Mountain; but, for the accomplishment of so great an enterprise, +external assistance was necessary, the aid of their kinsmen in the +south, and ultimately, as they hoped, an alliance with other Powers +across the seas. The authorities at Pretoria and Bloemfontein realised +fully that, though they might expect to have sympathisers in the +colonies, active co-operation on any large scale was not to be counted +on until successes in the field should persuade the waverers that, in +casting in their lot definitely with the republican forces, they would +be supporting the winning side. The conquest of Natal and the capture +of Kimberley would, it was thought, suffice to convince the most +doubtful and timid. As soon, therefore, as the British troops in Natal +had been overwhelmed and Kimberley occupied, the Boer commandos in the +western theatre of war were to move south across the Cape frontier to +excite a rising in that colony. A situation would thus be created +which, as they calculated, would lead to the intervention of one or +more European Powers, and terminate in the permanent expulsion of all +British authority from South Africa. + +[Sidenote: Boer Distribution Oct. 11th, /99.] + +[Sidenote: For Natal.] + +It was with these designs and based on this far-reaching plan of +campaign that the mobilisation of the burghers in both the republics +was ordered during the last week of September, and by the 11th of +October the following was approximately the constitution, strength and +distribution of the field forces.[58] The army for the invasion of +Natal was made up of three distinct bodies; the principal and most +important of these remained under the personal orders of General P. +Joubert, the Commandant-General of the Boer forces, and was +concentrated at Zandspruit and Wakkerstroom Nek, in immediate +proximity to the northern apex of Natal. It included the Krugersdorp, +Bethel, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, Boksburg and Germiston, Standerton, +Pretoria, Middelburg, and Ermelo commandos, the Transvaal Staats +Artillerie, and small Irish, Hollander and German corps of +adventurers; the total strength of this force was about 11,300 men. +Its armament included 16 field guns and three 6-inch Creusots. On the +eastern border of Natal, facing the British force at Dundee, lay the +Utrecht, Vryheid, Piet Retief and Wakkerstroom commandos, under the +leadership of General Lukas Meyer; this detachment numbered about +2,870 men. Westward, a Free State contingent, amounting to some 9,500 +burghers, and consisting of the Vrede, Heilbron, Kroonstad, Winburg, +Bethlehem and Harrismith commandos, occupied Botha's, Bezuidenhout, +Tintwa, Van Reenen's, and Olivier's Hoek passes. The republican +forces, to whom the task of conquering Natal had been assigned, +amounted therefore at the outset of war to about 23,500 men.[59] + + [Footnote 58: This statement is based on information obtained + from Boer sources during and since the war, but the numbers + must only be taken as approximately accurate.] + + [Footnote 59: Reinforcements, amounting in all to about 3,240 + men, joined the Boer Natal army during the months + November-December; these were made up of 1,300 Johannesburg + police and burghers, 290 Swaziland police and burghers and + the Lydenburg and Carolina commandos. These reinforcements + were, however, counterbalanced by the transfer of detachments + of the Free State commandos to the western theatre of war.] + +[Sidenote: For Mafeking.] + +For the attack on Colonel Baden-Powell's small garrison at Mafeking, a +body, in strength about 7,000, consisting of the Potchefstroom, +Lichtenburg, Marico, Wolmaranstad and Rustenburg commandos, with a +company of Scandinavian adventurers, had been concentrated close to +the western border. General Piet Cronje was in supreme command on this +side, his two principal subordinates being Generals Snyman and J. H. +De la Rey. + +[Sidenote: For Kimberley.] + +The capture of Kimberley and the duty of holding in check the British +troops at the Orange River station were assigned to Free State levies +composed of the Fauresmith, Jacobsdal, Bloemfontein, Ladybrand, Boshof +and Hoopstad commandos, the first two of these corps being assembled +at Boshof and the remainder at Jacobsdal. Their total strength was +probably about 7,500; a Transvaal detachment, about 1,700 strong, +composed of the Fordsburg and Bloemhof commandos, was concentrated at +Fourteen Streams, ready to join hands with the Free Staters. + +[Sidenote: For other points.] + +The Philippolis, Bethulie, Rouxville, and Caledon commandos, under the +orders of Commandants Grobelaar, Olivier and Swanepoel, were +assembling at Donkerpoort, Bethulie, and a little to the north of +Aliwal North for the protection, or possibly destruction, of the +Norval's Pont, Bethulie, and Aliwal bridges. These four commandos had +an approximate strength of 2,500 burghers. Detachments, amounting in +all to about 1,000 men, were watching the Basuto border; on the +extreme north of the Transvaal about 2,000 Waterberg and Zoutpansberg +burghers were piqueting the drifts across the Limpopo river. A small +guard had been placed at Komati Poort to protect the vulnerable +portion of the railway to Delagoa Bay, while the Lydenburg and +Carolina commandos, about 1,600 strong, under Schalk Burger, watched +the native population of Swaziland. Thus, including the police and a +few other detachments left to guard Johannesburg, about 48,000 +burghers were under arms at the outbreak of war. + +[Sidenote: Large influence of Baden-Powell on them.] + +The most remarkable feature of the Boer dispositions is the influence +on them of Baden-Powell's contingent. His two little corps, each +numbering barely 500 men, had drawn away nearly 8,000 of the best +burghers. Mafeking was in itself a place of no strategic value, and, +had the enemy been content to watch, and hold with equal numbers, +Lt.-Cols. H.C.O. Plumer's and C.O. Hore's regiments and the police and +volunteers assisting them, a contingent of 5,000 Transvaalers might +have been added to the army invading Natal, thus adding greatly to the +difficulties of Sir George White's defence. Alternatively it might +have ensured the capture of Kimberley, or might have marched as a +recruiting column from the Orange river through the disaffected +districts and have gradually occupied the whole of the British lines +of communication down to the coast. + +[Sidenote: Anxiety of British Situation.] + +The general distribution, therefore, of the Queen's troops in South +Africa at the outbreak of war appears, with the exception of the +division of the field force in Natal, to have been the best that could +have been devised, having due regard to the advantage of the +initiative possessed by the enemy, and to the supreme importance of +preventing, or at any rate retarding, any rising of the disloyal in +Cape Colony. Nevertheless, the situation was one of grave anxiety. The +reinforcements which would form the field army were not due for some +weeks. Meanwhile, in the eastern theatre of operations, the Boers +would have made their supreme effort with all the advantages of +superior numbers, greater mobility, and a _terrain_ admirably suited +to their methods of fighting. A considerable portion of the British +troops under Sir G. White were, moreover, mere units, lacking war +organisation except on paper, unknown to their leaders and staff, +unacquainted with the country, and with both horses and men out of +condition after their sea voyage. In the western theatre, the safety +of Kimberley and Mafeking mainly depended on the untried fighting +qualities of recently enlisted colonial corps, volunteers, and hastily +organised town-guards; detachments of regular troops dotted along the +northern frontier of Cape Colony were without hope of support either +from the coast or each other, and would be cut off and crushed in +detail in the case of serious attack or of a rising in their rear. +Thus, the initiative lay absolutely with the enemy, and, so far as +could be foreseen, must remain in his hands until the British army +corps and cavalry division should be ready to take the field about the +middle of December. + +[Sidenote: Actual movement of Boers begins.] + +According to the terms of the ultimatum of October 9th, a state of war +ensued at 5 p.m. on the 11th. The advance of the Boer forces destined +for the attack of Mafeking and Kimberley began on the following day, +and by the 14th both places were cut off from Cape Colony. On the 17th +the enemy occupied Belmont railway station. To meet these movements +the 9th Lancers, the squadrons of which disembarked at Cape Town from +India on the 14th, 15th, and 18th, were sent up to Orange River +station immediately on their arrival. The 1st battalion Northumberland +Fusiliers were also moved by train on the 15th from De Aar to Orange +River, being replaced at the former station by a half-battalion of the +2nd battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, which reached Cape +Town on the 14th, having been brought with extraordinary swiftness +from Mauritius by H.M.S. _Powerful_. The Orange River bridge garrison +was further strengthened by two 12-pr. B.L. guns manned by Prince +Alfred's Own Cape artillery. The first field artillery to land in Cape +Colony, the 62nd and half 75th batteries, were, on the evening of +their disembarkation, the 25th, entrained at once for Orange River. +The 1st Border regiment, which arrived from Malta on the 22nd, was +despatched immediately to De Aar, but subsequently, at the urgent +request of Sir George White, was sent by train to East London and +re-embarked for Natal. Steps were taken to make the Orange River +railway bridge passable by artillery and cavalry, by planking the +space between the rails. Meanwhile, on the advice of the local +magistrate, Colonel Money, who was in command at Orange River, +destroyed Hopetown road bridge, eleven miles to the westward, as it +was feared the enemy's guns might cross the river at that point. +Raiding parties of the Boers had overrun Bechuanaland and Griqualand +West and spread proclamations annexing the former district to the +Transvaal and the latter to the Free State. On the eastern side of the +colony the enemy made no move, but still hung back on the north bank +of the Orange River. The British garrison of Stormberg was reinforced +by two naval 12-pr. 8-cwt. guns, accompanied by 357 officers and men +of the Royal Navy and Marines, lent from Simon's Town by the Naval +commander-in-chief. In the opinion of General Forestier-Walker, this +reinforcement made this important railway junction, for the moment, +reasonably secure. Three months' supplies had been stored at all the +advanced posts. + +[Sidenote: Cape volunteers called out.] + +Two thousand of the Cape volunteer forces[60] were called out by the +Governor on the 16th October and placed at the disposal of the General +Officer Commanding the regular troops, on the understanding that they +were to be paid and rationed from Imperial funds. These corps were at +first employed as garrisons for Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East +London, Queenstown, and King William's Town; detachments of the +Kaffrarian Rifles being also stationed at Barkly East, Cathcart, +Molteno, and Indwe; but by the end of October the Colonial volunteers +were drawn upon to furnish military posts on the three lines of +railway from the coast, viz.: Touw's River, Fraserburg Road, and +Beaufort West, on the western system; at Cookhouse and Witmoss on the +central, and at Molteno and Sterkstroom, on the eastern. Arrangements +were made for patrolling the line between these posts by railway +employes. Having regard, however, to the great length of these lines, +it was obvious that protection of this description, although useful in +checking individual attempts to obstruct trains, or destroy bridges +and culverts, would be of no value against any armed bodies of the +enemy or of rebels. + + [Footnote 60: The corps mobilised were Prince Alfred's Own + Cape Field artillery, the Cape Garrison Artillery, the + Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles, Prince Alfred's Volunteer Guard, + the Duke of Edinburgh's Volunteer Rifles, and the Cape Town + Highlanders. The Kimberley and Mafeking corps had been called + out before the commencement of the war. Subsequently the + Uitenhage Rifles and the Komgha Mounted Rifles were called + out on the 10th of November, the Cape Medical Staff Corps was + mobilised on the 16th of November, and the Frontier Mounted + Rifles on the 24th of November, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: General success of policy of bluff.] + +Thus, in the western theatre of war, although the investment of +Kimberley, and, in a lesser degree, the attack on Mafeking, were +causes of grave alarm to the loyalists of Cape Colony, yet, from a +larger point of view, the forward policy of frontier defence +successfully tided over the dangerous weeks previous to the arrival of +the first units of the army corps from home. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE THEATRE OF WAR.[61] + + [Footnote 61: See general map of South Africa, Relief map, + No. 2, and map, No. 3.] + + +[Sidenote: Three chapters dealing with the ground and the two armies +engaged.] + +When the challenge to war, recorded in the first chapter, startled the +British people, it met with an immediate response alike in the home +islands, and in the Colonies, in India, or elsewhere, wherever they +happened to be. In order to understand the problems of no small +complexity confronting the statesmen at home and the generals who in +the field had to carry out the will of the nation by taking up the +gauntlet so thrown down, it is necessary, first, that the +characteristics of the vast area which was about to become the scene +of operations should be realised; secondly, that the strength of the +forces on which the challenger relied for making good his words should +be estimated; and, thirdly, that certain peculiarities in the +constitution of our own army, which materially affected the nature of +the task which lay before both Ministers and soldiers, whether in +London or in South Africa, should be recognised. The next three +chapters will deal in succession with each of these subjects. The +attempt which is here made to portray in a few pages the mountains, +the rolling prairies, and the rivers of the sub-continent must be +aided by an examination of the map which has been specially prepared +in order to make the description intelligible. + +[Sidenote: General aspect of area.] + +The tableland of South Africa is some 1,360,000 square miles in +extent, and of a mean altitude of 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level. +To the Indian Ocean on the east it shows a face of scarped mountains. +Following the coast-line at a distance inland of from 70 to 100 +miles, these sweep round from north to south: then stretch straight +across the extreme south-west of the continent through Cape Colony, +dwindling as they once more turn northward into the sand-hills of +Namaqualand, and rising again to the eminences above Mossamedes in +Portuguese territory. The rampart, however, though continuous for a +distance of more than 1,200 miles, scarcely anywhere presents an +abrupt wall to the seaboard, but on the contrary descends to it in +some parts in one gigantic step, in others in a series of steps, or +terraces. + +[Sidenote: Cape Colony: the Karroos.] + +Of the States within it, Cape Colony first claims consideration. In +the central section the step or terrace formation is so marked, and +the flats, which intervene between the rises, are of such extent, and +of a nature so curious, that they form one of the most remarkable +features of South Africa. They are known as "the Karroos," vast plains +stretching northward, firstly as the Little Karroo from the lower +coast ranges to the more elevated Zwarte Bergen, thence as the Great +Karroo to the still loftier Nieuwveld Mountains. In the rainless +season they present an aspect indescribably desolate, and at the same +time a formidable military obstacle to any invasion of Cape Colony on +a large scale from the north. They are then mere wastes of sand and +dead scrub, lifeless and waterless. The first fall of rain produces a +transformation as rapid as any effected by nature. The vegetable life +of the Karroos, which has only been suspended, not extinguished, is +then released; the arid watercourses are filled in a few hours, and +the great desert tract becomes within that brief time a garden of +flowers. Even then, from the scarcity of buildings and inhabitants, +and hence of supplies, the Karroos still form a barrier not to be +lightly attempted, unless by an army fully equipped, and carrying its +own magazines; or, on the other hand, by a band of partisans so +insignificant as to be able to subsist on the scanty resources +available, and to disappear when these are exhausted, or the enemy +approaches in strength. + +[Sidenote: Hills above Karroos.] + +The first noticeable feature of the hill systems which bind these +steppes is their regularity of disposition, and the second, their +steadily increasing altitude northwards to that mountain group which, +running roughly along the 32nd parallel of latitude, culminates in the +Sneeuw Bergen, where the Compass Peak (8,500 feet) stands above the +plains of Graaf Reinet. North of these heights, only the low Karree +Bergen, about 150 miles distant, and the slightly higher Hartzogsrand, +occur to break the monotonous fall of the ground towards the bed of +the Orange. All the geographical and strategical interest lies to the +north and east of the Compass Peak, where with the Zuurbergen +commences the great range, known to the natives as Quathlamba,[62] but +to the Voortrekkers, peopling its mysterious fastnesses with monsters +of their imagination, as the Drakensberg.[63] Throwing out spurs over +the length and breadth of Basutoland, this granite series, here rising +to lofty mountains, there dwindling to rounded downs, runs northward +to the Limpopo river, still clinging to the coast, that is to say, for +a distance of over 1,250 miles. The Zuurbergen, the western extremity, +are of no great elevation. They form a downward step from the Compass +and the Great Winterberg to the Orange river, whose waters they part +from those of the Great Fish and Great Kei rivers. The Stormbergen, on +the other hand, which sweep in a bold curve round to the north-east +until, on the borders of Basutoland, they merge into the central mass, +are high, rugged, and pierced by exceedingly few roads, forming a +strong line of defence. + + [Footnote 62: "Piled up and rugged."] + + [Footnote 63: "Mountains of the Dragons."] + +[Sidenote: Passes.] + +It may be said generally of the Cape highlands that the only passes +really practicable for armies are those through which, in 1899, the +railways wound upwards to the greater altitudes. These lines of +approach to the Free State frontier were as follows:-- + + 1.--THE CAPE COLONY--DE AAR line. + 2.--THE PORT ELIZABETH--NORVAL'S PONT line. + 3.--THE EAST LONDON--BETHULIE AND ALIWAL NORTH lines. + +These were connected by two transverse branches; elsewhere throughout +their length they were not only almost completely isolated, but divided +by great tracts of pathless mountains and barren plains, rendering, +except at the points mentioned, or by way of the sea, the transfer of +troops from one to the other a difficult process. Therefore the branch +lines (I. De Aar--Naauwpoort; 2. Stormberg--Rosmead) had a significance +hardly inferior to that of the three ports, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, +and East London. These varied greatly in the facilities they afforded. +Table Bay, with its docks, wharves and store-houses, took rank among the +great commercial harbours of the world. Port Elizabeth, 430 miles +eastward, had no true harbour. Its open roadstead, although frequented +by the mercantile marine, was exposed to the dangerous south-east gales +prevalent on that coast. At East London, 140 miles yet further +eastwards, there was a small although excellent harbour. Its deep basin +allowed ocean steamers to moor alongside the railway wharf, but the +water area was limited and a sandbank at the mouth of the river Buffalo, +which flows in here, barred the approach of vessels exceeding 4,000 tons +in burden. On the east coast, Durban, at a distance of 300 miles from +East London and 830 miles from Cape Town, formed a satisfactory base. +The difficulties of a bar at the entrance to the harbour, similar to +that at East London, had been overcome by the energy and enterprise of +the colonial authorities. There was no direct communication by land +between these four ports, but this was of little consequence to a power +holding command at sea. + +[Sidenote: The northern Drakensberg.] + +North of the Stormbergen the Drakensberg range maintains its +north-easterly trend continuously until it breaks up in the valley of +the Limpopo. Along the eastern Basuto border, from the Natal to the +Free State frontiers, its characteristics, which have been always +grand, become magnificent. Here it is joined by the Maluti Mountains, +a range which, bisecting the domains of the Basuto, and traversing +them with its great spurs, has earned for the little state the title +of the South African Switzerland. At the junction of the Basutoland, +Free State, and Natal frontiers stands Potong, an imposing +table-shaped mass, called by the French missionaries Mont Aux Sources, +from the fact that it forms the chief water parting between the +numerous streams flowing west and east. Further south tower Cathkin +(or Champagne Castle), Giants Castle, and Mount Hamilton, the latter +within the Basuto border. All these and many lesser peaks are joined +by ridge after ridge of rugged grandeur. + +[Sidenote: Drakensberg passes.] + +Between the Basuto border and Laing's Nek lies the chief strategic +interest of the Drakensberg. Of less elevation than the lofty giants +which lie behind it to the southward, this portion still preserves, +with a mean altitude of 8,000 feet, the peculiar scenic beauty of the +system. From the Basuto border northwards the mountains formed the +frontier between Natal and the Orange Free State. They are pierced by +a number of passes of which none are easy, with the exception of +Laing's Nek, leading into the Transvaal. The best known, starting from +the southern extremity of this frontier section, are Olivier's Hoek, +Bezuidenhout, and Tintwa Passes at the head-stream of the Tugela +river; Van Reenen's, a steep tortuous gap over which the railway from +Ladysmith to Harrismith, and a broad highway, wind upwards through a +strange profusion of sudden peaks and flat-topped heights; De Beers, +Cundycleugh, and Sunday's River Passes giving access by rough bridle +paths from the Free State into Natal, abreast of the Dundee +coalfields; Mueller's and Botha's Passes debouching on Newcastle and +Ingogo; and finally Laing's Nek, the widest and most important of all, +by which a fair road over a rounded saddle crosses the Drakensberg, +the Transvaal frontier lying four miles to the north of its summit. +Some of the eastern spurs thrown off from this section of the +Drakensberg completely traverse, and form formidable barriers across, +Natal. Such are the Biggarsberg, a range of lofty downs running from +Cundycleugh Pass across the apex of Natal to Dundee, and pierced by +the railway from Waschbank to Glencoe. Further to the south, Mount +Tintwa throws south-eastward down to the river Tugela a long, +irregular spur, of which the chief features are the eminences of +Tabanyama and Spion Kop. This spur, indeed, after a brief subsidence +below the last-named Kop, continues to flank the whole of the northern +bank of the Tugela as far as the railway, culminating there in the +heights of Pieters, and the lofty downs of Grobelaars Kloof, both of +which overhang the river. East of the railway another series of +heights prolongs the barrier, and joins hands with the lower slopes of +the Biggarsberg, which descends to the Tugela between Sunday's and +Buffalo rivers. Further south still, broad spurs from Cathkin and +Giants Castle strike out through Estcourt and Highlands, and connect +the Drakensberg with Zululand. + +[Sidenote: Spurs of Drakensberg.] + +North of Basutoland, the western spurs of the Drakensberg, jutting out +on to the Orange Free State uplands, are far less numerous and +pronounced than those in Natal, where the mountains dip steeply down +towards the sea; but the Versamelberg, the Witteberg, and the +Koranaberg further south, although of no great height, are strategical +features of importance. + +[Sidenote: Drakensberg and Lobombo ranges.] + +Beyond Laing's Nek, the Drakensberg, no longer a watershed, and losing +much both of its continuity and splendour, still preserves its +north-easterly trend, dropping still further to a mean altitude of +between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, and passing under many local +appellations, through the eastern Transvaal, until near Lydenburg, it +again rises in the Mauch Berg. Along its eastern edge the Drakensberg +here descends in the ruggedest slopes and precipices to the plains +which divide it from the Lobombo Mountains, a range which, commencing +at the Pongola river opposite Lake St. Lucia, runs parallel to the +Drakensberg, the two systems inclining inward to coalesce at the +Limpopo. South of that river the Lobombo formed throughout its length +the eastern frontier of the Transvaal State. + +[Sidenote: The rands.] + +North of the Oliphant river, which pierces both the Drakensberg and +Lobombo, the character of the Drakensberg becomes still more +fragmentary. Here its most important features are the transverse +ridges, or _rands_, thrown off from it in a direction generally +south-westerly. Chief amongst these are the Murchison and Zoutpansberg +Mountains, which, covering more than 350 miles of the country, unite +in the Witfontein Berg in the Rustenburg district. These ridges, +though of an elevation of over 4,000 feet above the sea level, rise +nowhere more than, and seldom as much as, 1,500 feet above the +terrain, and do little to relieve the monotony of the great prairies +they traverse and surround. The same type is preserved by the various +low ridges running parallel to and south of them towards the Orange +Free State border. One of these is the famous Witwaters Rand, +extending from Krugersdorp to Springs, and another the Magaliesberg, a +chain of more imposing character, connecting Pretoria and Rustenburg +to the north-east, and disappearing in the fertile Marico valley. +North of the Limpopo the Drakensberg, though becoming more broken and +complicated, still presents a bold front where the great +sub-continental plateau descends suddenly northwards to the Zambesi, +and eastwards to Portuguese territory, _i.e._, on the northern and +eastern frontiers of Mashonaland. Almost at the junction of these +boundaries it is joined by the Matoppo Hills, which rise from the +north-eastern limits of Khama's Country, bisect obliquely the region +between the Zambesi and the Limpopo, and culminate in Mount Hampden +(5,000 feet), near Salisbury. + +[Sidenote: Rivers Limpopo and Orange.] + +[Sidenote: The water-parting.] + +Passing from the mountains to the great plateau they enclose, the +first point to be noted is that its surface is set at two opposite +"tilts," the portion north of the Witwaters Rand inclining downward to +the east, the other, south of that ridge, to the west. The drainage, +therefore, runs respectively east and west, and it is effected by the +two great streams of the Limpopo and the Orange, with their many +affluents. The general river system of the central plains is thus of +the simplest; the Indian Ocean receives their northern waters, the +Atlantic their southern; the remarkable factor of the arrangement +being that a physical feature so insignificant as the Witwaters Rand +should perform the function of water-parting for a region so +gigantic.[64] + + [Footnote 64: There are, of course, in South Africa numerous + minor and local watersheds (_e.g._, the Drakensberg, where + they initiate the drainage of Natal in an easterly direction, + and the mountains of southern Cape Colony, which send some of + her rivers southward to the Indian Ocean). These have been + necessarily almost disregarded in so general a survey of the + sub-continent as that aimed at in the present chapter.] + +[Sidenote: Course of Limpopo.] + +The Limpopo, or Crocodile river, rises as a paltry stream in the +Witwaters Rand between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and flows into the +Indian Ocean, 80 miles north of Delagoa Bay, covering in its course +fully 1,350 miles. + +[Sidenote: Course of Orange.] + +The Orange has three distinct sets of headstreams from the western +flank of the Drakensberg, and a total length of 1,300 miles. From the +Basuto border to Ramah, on the Kimberley railway, about 220 miles, it +divided the Orange Free State from Cape Colony. The Orange receives on +its right bank its greatest affluent, the Vaal, which is between 500 +and 600 miles in length. Commercially, both the Orange and the Vaal +are as useless as their smallest tributary, being entirely unnavigable +at all times of the year. Raging floods in the wet season, and mere +driblets in the dry, they are at present denied to the most powerful +or shallowest of river steamboats. The prospects of the Orange river +as a potential waterway are in any case practically destroyed by a +great bar which blocks approach to the estuary from the sea. + +[Sidenote: Military character of streams of S.A.] + +The streams of the South African plateau, whether river, spruit, +sluit, or donga, have, in addition to their extreme variability, +another marked and almost universal peculiarity. Running in deep beds, +of which the banks are usually level with the surrounding country, and +the sides terraced from the highest to the lowest water-mark, they +constitute natural entrenchments which are generally invisible, except +where rarely defined by a line of bushes, and, owing to the dead +uniformity of the surrounding country, are almost impossible to +reconnoitre. Nor, in 1899, were their defensive capabilities lessened +by the dearth of bridges, by the dangers of the drifts, and by the +absence of defined approaches to all crossing-places away from the +main roads. The "drifts," or fords, especially rendered the laying out +of a line of operations in South Africa a complex problem. Their depth +varied with the weather of the day; they were known by many names even +to local residents, and were of many types; but all alike were so +liable to sudden change or even destruction, that any information +concerning them, except the most recent, was practically useless. + +[Sidenote: Effect of winds on climate.] + +[Sidenote: The velds.] + +To comprehend broadly the salient physiological features of a region +so enormous as South Africa, the causes of the climatic influences +which affect them must be understood. These causes on are simplicity +itself. The warm winds blow from the east, and the cold from the west; +the former, from the warm Mozambique current, skirting the eastern +seaboard, the latter, from the frigid Antarctic stream, setting from +south to north, and striking the western coast about Cape St. Martin. +It follows, therefore, that the climate and country become more genial +and fertile the further they are removed from the desiccating +influence emanating from the western seaboard. The dreariness of the +solitudes between Little Namaqualand and Griqualand West, the latter +slightly more smiling than the former, attests this fact. But the +comparative inhospitality of the Boer States--comparative, that is, to +what might be expected from their proximity to the warm Indian +Ocean--demands further explanation. From the Atlantic to the eastern +frontiers of these States no mountain ranges of any elevation +intervene to break the progress of the dry, cold breezes; from the +mouth of the Orange river to the Drakensberg the country is subject +almost uninterruptedly to their influence. But it is not so with the +milder winds from the east. The great screen of the Drakensberg meets +and turns them from end to end of South Africa; no country west of +this range profits by their moisture, whereas the regions east of it +receive it to the full. Hence the almost tropical fertility of Natal +and eastern Cape Colony, with their high rainfall, their luxuriance of +vegetation, indigo, figs, and coffee, and the jungles of cactus and +mimosa which choke their torrid kloofs. Hence, equally, the more +austere veld of the central tableland, the great grass wildernesses, +which are as characteristic of South Africa as the prairies and the +pampas of America, and, like them, became the home and hunting-ground +of a race of martial horsemen. Agriculture, following nature, divides +the veld into three parts, the "High," "Bush," and "Low" Velds; but it +is the first and greatest of these which stamps the central tableland +with its peculiar military characteristics. Almost the whole of the +Orange Free State, and the Transvaal east of the Natal railway, are +High Veld, which may be taken to mean any grassland lying at an +elevation of about 4,000 feet, upon which all vegetation withers in +the dry season, while in spring and summer it is covered with +nutritious herbage. The Low Veld lies properly between longitude 31 deg. +and the tropical eastern coast; while the Bush Veld is usually +understood to mean the country lying between the Pretoria-Delagoa +railway and the Limpopo river. The terms, however, are very loosely +used. The Low Veld differs widely from the High Veld. Upon the former +is rich--almost rank--vegetation and pasture flourishing throughout +the year. But the climate is hot, moist, and unhealthy; and the Boer +farmers, forced by the course of the seasons to drive their flocks +from the sparkling, invigorating air of the uplands to the steamy +lowlands, were wont to take the task in turn amongst themselves, as an +unpleasant one to be performed as seldom as possible. + +[Sidenote: Transvaal High Veld.] + +The High Veld of the Transvaal differs slightly from that of the Free +State in appearance. It is more broken and undulating; the range of +vision, at times apparently boundless in the southern state, is rarely +extensive, except from the summit of a kopje, being usually bounded by +the low ridge-lines of one of those great, gentle, almost +imperceptible, rolls of the ground which are a feature of the +Transvaal veld, and with its hidden watercourses, its peculiar +tactical danger. A mountain range is seldom out of sight; and, +speaking generally, the Transvaal may be said to be less sombre than +the southern or western districts of the great plateau. + +[Sidenote: The kopjes.] + +If the veld can only be compared with the sea, the kopjes which +accentuate, rather than relieve, its monotony resemble in as marked a +degree the isolated islands which rise abruptly from the waters of +some tropic archipelago. Sometimes, indeed, the kopjes form a rough +series of broken knolls, extending over a space of several miles, as, +for instance, the ridges of Magersfontein and Spytfontein, between +Kimberley and the Modder; sometimes a group of three or four, disposed +irregularly in all directions, become a conspicuous landmark, as at +the positions of Belmont and Graspan; and it is not uncommon to find +larger masses, not less irregular, enclosing the river reaches which +their drainage has created, among which may be enumerated the heights +south-east of Jacobsdal, and by the river Riet, and those about +Koffyfontein and Jagersfontein on the same stream. + +[Sidenote: Better for view than defence.] + +But, as a rule, the kopje of the veld is a lonely hill, a mass of +igneous rock--flat-topped or sharp-pointed. From 200 to 800 feet in +height, without spur or underfeature, accessible only by winding paths +among gigantic boulders, sheer of face and narrow of crest, it is more +useful as a post of observation than as a natural fortress; for it can +almost always be surrounded, and the line of retreat, as a general +rule, is naked to view and fire. + +[Sidenote: Boer States as defensive terrain.] + +So far as tactical positions are concerned, any force on the defensive +upon the veld of the Boer States must be mainly dependent on the +rivers. Yet the spurs of the Drakensberg, blending in a range of +ridges, form a mountain stronghold admirably adapted for guerilla +warfare; and all along the Basuto border, at a distance of from 10 to +20 miles west of the Caledon, stands out a series of high, detached +hills, which form a covered way along the eastern boundary of the Free +State, crossing the Orange, and leading into the recesses of the +Stormberg Mountains. + +[Sidenote: Natal features.] + +For every wavelet of land upon the surface of the Boer States, a +hundred great billows stand up in Natal. Kopje succeeds kopje, all +steep, and many precipitous, yet not the bare, stony cairns of the +transmontane regions, but moist green masses of verdure, seldom +parched even in the dry season, and in the wet, glistening with a +thousand cascades; not severely conical or rectangular, like the +bizarre eminences which cover Cape Colony with the models of a school +of geometry, but nobly outlined. Many of the foothills, it is true, +are mere heaps of rock and stone; but even these are rarely such naked +and uncompromising piles as are found on the higher levels. Even where +northern Natal occasionally widens and subsides to a savannah, as it +does below the Biggarsberg, and again south of Colenso, the expanse, +compared with the tremendous stretches of the Boer veld, is but a +meadow. + +[Sidenote: Healthy theatre sole favour for invader.] + +As a theatre of war South Africa had one advantage, that it was for +the most part eminently healthy. Enteric fever, the scourge of armies, +was bound to be prevalent amongst thousands exposed to hardships in a +country where the water supply was indifferent, where sanitation was +usually primitive amongst the inhabitants, and impossible to improvise +hurriedly. But the purity of the air, the geniality of the +temperature, the cool nights, the brilliant sunshine, and the hard dry +soil were palliatives of evils inseparable from all campaigning. +Otherwise, for regular armies of invasion, South Africa was +unfavourable. The railways were so few that the business of supply and +movement was always arduous; spaces so vast that large forces were +swallowed up; the enormous distances from one strategical point to +another, intensified, in difficulty by the almost entire absence of +good roads, the scarcity of substantial bridges, of well-built towns, +of commodious harbours, and of even such ordinary necessaries as flour +or fuel, all these complicated every military problem to a degree not +readily intelligible to the student of European warfare alone. + +[Sidenote: The central plateau.] + +It is not easy to sum up briefly the typical qualities as a fighting +area of a region so vast and diversified as South Africa; but its +dominant feature is undoubtedly the great central plateau comprising +southern Rhodesia, all the Transvaal, except a narrow fringe on the +eastward, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the Orange Free State, and +the northern and central portions of Cape Colony. Westward this +tableland slopes gradually and imperceptibly to sea level; to the +south it reaches the Atlantic in the series of terraces and +escarpments already described. Eastward it is shut in by the +Drakensberg, whose spurs, projecting to the Indian Ocean, traverse at +right angles Natal, Zululand, Swaziland, and Portuguese East Africa. + +[Sidenote: Effect on operations of plateau.] + +Upon the central South African plateau tactical and strategical +success is dependent upon rapid manoeuvring. Positions are so readily +turned that they can seldom be resolutely held. It is difficult, +therefore, to bring an evasive enemy to decisive action, and the +fruits of victory must chiefly be plucked by pursuit. The horse is as +important as the man, and the infantry arm is reduced to the position +of a first reserve, or to the _role_ of piquets on the lines of +communication, which remain always open to attack. Superior numbers +and, above all, superior speed, are irresistible. There are no +first-class physical obstacles; the rivers, excepting only the Orange +and the Vaal, are, as a rule, fordable; the hill features for the most +part insignificant or easy to mask. Mobility is thus at once the +chief enemy and aid to military success. + +[Sidenote: and of lower spurs.] + +But on the stairway descending from the south of this plateau, and on +the spurs reaching up from the coast on the east, all this is +reversed. The approach of an army acting on the offensive, uphill or +across the series of ridges, is commanded by so many points, that a +small number of defenders can readily arrest its advance. Position +leads but to position, and these, prolonged almost indefinitely on +either flank, are not readily turned, or, if turned, still offer +locally a strong frontal defence, should the enemy be sufficiently +mobile to reach them in time. Streamlets, which would be negligible on +the plateau, become formidable obstacles in their deep beds. The +horseman's occupation is greatly limited, for he can neither +reconnoitre nor gallop. Marches must, therefore, be made painfully in +battle formation, for every advance may entail an action. Thus +strategy is grievously cramped by the constant necessity for caution, +and still more by the tedious movements of the mass of transport, +without which no army can continue to operate in a country sparsely +inhabited, and as sparsely cultivated. + +[Sidenote: Variety of rainfall.] + +In South Africa even the rainfall militates against concurrent +operations on a wide scale, for, at the same season of the year, the +conditions prevalent upon one side of the sub-continent are exactly +the opposite to those obtaining on the other. In the western +provinces, the rainy season occurs in the winter months +(May--October), in the eastern, including the Boer States, the rain +falls chiefly in the summer (October--March). Yet so capricious are +these phenomena that a commander, who counted absolutely upon them for +his schemes, might easily find them in abeyance, or even for a period +reversed. + +[Sidenote: Variety of S.A. climate.] + +Beyond the broad facts stated above, the extent of South Africa +renders it as impossible to specify any typical climatic or scenic +peculiarities common to the whole of it, as to fix upon any +strategical or tactical character that is universal. Cape Colony alone +exhibits such antitheses of landscape as the moist verdure of the +Stormberg and the parched dreariness of Bushman and Little Namaqua +Lands, and a rainfall ranging from two to seventy-two inches per +annum. The variations in other parts are little less striking. The +temperature of the High Veld, for instance, is wont to rise or fall no +less than sixty degrees in twelve hours, or less. Thus, whilst one +portion of an army on a wide front might be operating in the tropics, +another might be in the snows, whilst a third was sheltering from the +sun by day, from the frost by night, conditions which actually +obtained during the contest about to be described. What effect such +divergencies must exercise on plans of campaign, on supplies of +clothing, shelter, food, forage, and on military animals themselves, +may be readily imagined. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE BOER ARMY. + + +[Sidenote: Many previous cases compare with Boer resistance.] + +[Sidenote: Inherited faculties.] + +Any force of irregulars which offers a prolonged resistance, not +unmarked by tactical successes, to a regular army of superior strength +is apt to be regarded as a phenomenon. Yet, from the earliest times, +history has shown how seasoned troops may be checked by an enemy who +is inferior in numbers, discipline and armament, but possessed of +certain counterbalancing resources, due either to the nature of his +country, to his own natural characteristics, or to a combination of +both.[65] Of such resources the Boers at the close of the nineteenth +century possessed, largely by inheritance, a full share. With their +forefathers, the early Afrikanders, loneliness had been a passion to +which their very presence north of the Orange river was due. Flying +from society, from burdens and responsibilities which they considered +intolerable, from pleasures which seemed to them godless, from a stir +which bewildered them, and from regularity which wearied them, they +had penetrated the wilds northward in bands as small as possible, each +man of which was wrapped in a dream of solitude, careless whither he +went so long as he went unseen. It troubled these pioneers little that +they were plunging into a sea of enemies. Society, with its +conventions and trammels, and most of all, perhaps, with its taxes, +was the only enemy whom they feared, the only one they could never +escape. But before it caught them up, their combats with corporeal +foes were incessant and deadly. Wild beasts prowled round their +herds; savages swooped upon their homesteads; all animated nature was +in arms against them; every farmhouse was a fortress, usually in a +state of siege. In the great spaces of the wilderness the cry for help +was but seldom heard, or if heard, only by one who had his own safety +to look to. The Boer farmer of the forties, therefore, had to work out +his rescue, as he worked out every other problem of his existence, for +himself, acquiring thereby, a supreme individuality and self-reliance +in the presence of danger. He acquired also other characteristics. The +fighting men of his nation were few in number; every mature life was +little less valuable to the State than it was to the homestead whose +existence depended upon it. The burgher's hope of injuring his enemy +was therefore subordinated to solicitude for his own preservation, and +he studied only safe methods of being dangerous. Even when in later +days the Boer expeditionary bands, reclaiming to the full from the +blacks the toll of blood and cruelty which had been levied on +themselves, were more often the attackers than the attacked, their +aggression was always tempered by the caution of the individual Boers, +who would still forego a chance of striking a blow should it contain +an undue element of hazard. The republican warriors relied, indeed, +less on attack than on defence. They trusted yet more to that weapon, +perfected by many small races which have been compelled to work out +their own methods of warfare, the weapon of evasion. Nearly always +outnumbered, never sure of victory, the burghers always provided, then +kept their eyes continually upon, a loophole of escape, for if that +were closed they felt themselves to be lost. These characteristics, +with many more which will be noted, the early Boer bequeathed to his +sons and grandsons; a legacy so strangely composed that many of the +very qualities which brought temporary victory to the campaigners of +1899 foredoomed them to ultimate defeat. + + [Footnote 65: _E.G._, the revolt of La Vendee, the resistance + of the Maories, the Red Indians, the Achinese, the + Montenegrins, of the Trans-Indus Highlanders, of Andreas + Hofer's Tyrolese, of Shamyl's Caucasians.] + +[Sidenote: Value of these in present warfare.] + +Self-reliance and individuality are factors of extraordinary military +importance under any conditions, but especially under circumstances +involving such dispersion of combatants, such distances between +commanders and commanded, as were brought about by the conjunction of +long-range arms, an open terrain and the clearest atmosphere in the +world. South Africa was a country which gave the freest play to the +deadly properties of small-bore rifles. The new weapons fitted into +the Boer's inherited conceptions of warfare as if they were a part for +which his military organisers had long been hoping and waiting. He had +an antipathy to fighting at close quarters, but he knew the value and +necessity of striking; the Mauser enabled him to strike at the extreme +limit of vision, multiplying tenfold the losses and difficulties of +the enemy who attempted to close with him. The portability of the +ammunition, the accuracy of the sighting, the absence of betraying +smoke, all these increased the Boer's already great trust in himself, +and he took the field against the British regular infantryman with +more confidence than his sires had felt when they held their laagers +against the Zulu and the Matabele. The modern rifle, moreover, still +further increased his self-reliance by rendering avoidance of close +combat, which alone he feared, a much simpler matter than hitherto. +His father had escaped the bayonets of the British at Boomplaats; he +himself was no more willing or likely to be caught by the steel fifty +years later, when he could kill at two thousand yards instead of two +hundred, or failing to kill, had hours instead of minutes in which to +gain his pony and disappear. Yet the long-range rifle had improved his +weapon of retreat until it had become a danger instead of an aid to +his cause. Failing so completely to understand the military value of +self-sacrifice, that he actually pitied, and slightly despised it, +when he saw it resorted to by his enemies, his refusal to risk his +life often proved disastrous to his side at times when more resolution +might have turned the scale of battle in his favour. + +There was much to be admired in the Boer defensive; up to a certain +point it was stubborn and dangerous. The musketry from a position, +poured upon zones of ground over which the British troops must pass +rather than upon the troops themselves, was heavy and effective, and +not easily quelled by bombardment. In battle, artillery may do its +work without causing a casualty; but so long as he had cover for his +body, the soul of the Boer rifleman was little shaken by the bursting +of projectiles; fierce firing came often from portions of a position +which appeared to be smothered by shrapnel, and invisible in the reek +of exploding lyddite. + +[Sidenote: Special habits of fighting.] + +Nor did the Boer armies, as regular armies have done, cling to strong +positions simply because they were strong. They considered a position +as a means to an end, and if it ceased to be the best, they discarded +it without hesitation, no matter with what toil it had been prepared. +Nevertheless, on ground of their own choosing, the abandonment without +a shot of strong, laboriously entrenched, positions by no means always +meant retirement. Much as they dreaded being enveloped, their flanks, +or what would have been the flanks of an European army, might be +threatened again and again only to be converted each time into new and +formidable fronts. The nature of the country, and the comparative +mobility of the opposing forces rendered these rapid changes of front +easy of execution, but they demanded promptness, and a genius for the +appreciation of the value of ground, not only on the part of the Boer +leaders, but also on that of the rank and file. In the ranks of the +commandos persuasion had to take the place of word of command; the +Boer soldier, before he quitted one position for another, had to be +convinced of the necessity for a repetition of the severe toil of +entrenching which had apparently been wasted. But his eye was as +quick, his tactical and topographical instinct as keen as those of his +commander, and if the new dispositions were not selected for him, he +often selected them himself. + +[Sidenote: Their defences: strong points.] + +Once on the ground the burghers' first care was to conceal themselves +quickly and cunningly, cutting deep and narrow entrenchments, if +possible upon the rearward crest, leaving the forward crest, of which +they carefully took the range, to the outposts. Upon the naked slope +between, which was often obstructed with barbed wire, they relied to +deny approach to their schanzes. A not uncommon device was the placing +of the main trench, not at the top, but along the base of the +position. Here the riflemen, secure and invisible, lay while the +hostile artillery bombarded the untenanted ridge lines behind them. +Such traps presented an enhanced danger from the fact that the Boers +would rarely open fire from them until the front of the attack was +well committed, though, on the other hand, they seldom had nerve or +patience to withhold their musketry until the moment when it might be +completely decisive. As regards the Boer artillery, its concealment +was usually perfect, its location original and independent, its +service accurate and intelligent. Dotted thinly over a wide front, the +few guns were nevertheless often turned upon a common target, and were +as difficult to detect from their invisibility, as to silence from the +strength of the defences, in the case of the heavy ordnance, and in +the case of the lighter pieces, from their instant change of position +when discovered. + +[Sidenote: A weakness in defence.] + +Nevertheless, with all these virtues, the Boer defensive, by reason of +the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual soldiers, was no +insurmountable barrier, but only an obstacle to a determined attack. +Many of the positions occupied by the Republicans during the campaigns +seemed impregnable. Prepared as skilfully as they had been selected, +in them some troops would have been unconquerable. But at the moment +when they must be lost without a serried front, the reverse slopes +would be covered with flying horsemen, whilst but a handful of the +defenders remained in the trenches. Nor, except on the feeblest and +most local scale, would the defenders at any time venture anything in +the nature of a counter stroke, though the attack staggered, or even +recoiled, upon the bullet-swept glacis, and victory trembled in the +balance. + +[Sidenote: A weakness in attack.] + +If the Boer defensive was force passive, their general attack became +force dissipated as soon as it entered the medium rifle zone. +Excessive individuality marked its every stage, the thought of victory +seldom held the first place. In the old days, when an assault had to +be attempted, as at Thaba Bosigo and Amajuba, it had been the custom +to call for volunteers. But when President Kruger pitted his burghers +against large armies, this expedient was no longer available; instead +of a few score such affairs required thousands, and they were not +forthcoming. The desire to close, the only spirit which can compel +decisive victory, entered into the Boer fighting philosophy even less +than the desire to be closed with; the non-provision of bayonets was +no careless omission on the part of their War department. During an +assault the Commandants might set, as they often did, a splendid +example of courage, but they could never rely on being followed to the +end by more than a fraction of their men. The attack, therefore, of +the Boers differed from that of a force of regulars in that it was +never made in full strength, and was never pushed home; and from that +of the Afghans, Afridis or Soudanese in that there was no strong body +of spectators to rush forward and assure the victory half won by the +bolder spirits in front. Their attack was, in consequence, little to +be feared, so long as the defence was well covered from the incessant +rifle fire which supported and accompanied it; for none but a few +gallant individuals would ever venture to close upon a trench or +sangar whose defenders yet remained alive behind it. Both in attack +and defence, therefore, the Boer army lacked the last essentials to +victory. + +[Sidenote: As partisans.] + +It was in the warfare of the partisan that the Boer excelled, in the +raid on a post or convoy, the surprise and surrounding of a +detachment, the harassing of the flanks and the rear of a column, and +the dash upon a railway. Their scouting has not often been excelled; +their adversaries seldom pitched or struck a camp unwatched, or +marched undogged by distant horsemen. How little the Boer generals and +Intelligence department knew how to utilise the fruits of this +constant watchfulness will be fully shown elsewhere, but the lack of +deductive power on the part of the leaders detracts nothing from the +unwearied cunning of their men. + +[Sidenote: Use of ground.] + +The combinations of scattered bands at a given rendezvous for a common +purpose were not seldom marvellous, effected as they often were by +rides of extraordinary speed and directness by night, when the men had +to feel with their hands for the goat and Kaffir tracks if astray, but +rarely astray, even in the most tangled maze of kopjes, or, still more +wonderful, on the broadest savannah of featureless grass. With the +Boer, direction had become a sense; not only were topographical +features, once seen, engraved indelibly on his memory, but many which +would be utterly invisible to untrained eyes were often detected at +once by inference so unconscious as to verge on instinct. He knew +"ground" and its secrets as intimately as the seaman knows the sea, +and his memory for locality was that of the Red Indian scout. + +[Sidenote: Mixed qualities.] + +Thus the Boer riflemen possessed many of the characteristics of the +same formidable type of irregular soldier as the backwoodsmen of +America or the picked warriors of the Hindustan border. Yet an exact +prototype of qualities so contradictory as those which composed this +military temperament is not to be recalled. No fighting men have been +more ready for war, yet so indifferent to military glory, more imbued +with patriotism, yet so prone to fight for themselves alone, more +courageous, yet so careful of their lives, more lethargic, or even +languid by nature, and yet so capable of the most strenuous activity. +Such were the Boers of the veld. In one particular they had never been +surpassed by any troops. No Boer but was a bold horseman and a skilled +horsemaster, who kept his mount ready at any moment for the longest +march or the swiftest gallop, in darkness, or over the roughest +ground. In camp the ponies grazed each one within reach of its master; +in action every burgher took care that his perfectly trained animal +stood, saddled and bridled, under cover within a short run to the +rear. In remote valleys great herds of ponies, some fresh, some +recouping their strength after the fatigues of a campaign, roamed at +pasture until they should be driven to the front as remounts. + +[Sidenote: Mobility.] + +The unrivalled mobility of the Boer armies, therefore, and the +vastness of its theatre of action, gave to them strength out of all +proportion to their numbers. A muster roll is little indication of the +fighting power of a force which can march three or four times as fast +as its opponent, can anticipate him at every point, dictating the hour +and place of the conflict, can keep him under constant surveillance, +can leave its communications without misgivings, and finally, which +can dispense with reserves in action, so quickly can it reinforce from +the furthest portions of its line of battle. Yet in this particular +again, the Boers' constitutional antipathy to the offensive robbed +them of half their power. They employed their mobility, their peculiar +strength, chiefly on the defensive and on tactics of evasion, often, +indeed, resigning it altogether, to undertake a prolonged and +half-hearted investment of some place of arms. Amongst their leaders +there appeared some who did all that was possible, and much more than +had seemed possible, with a few hundreds of devoted followers. But the +Republics possessed no Sheridan. Men who foresaw that in this mobility +might lie the making of a successful campaign, that the feats of the +raider might be achieved tenfold by large well-mounted armies, were +missing from their councils. + +[Sidenote: Organisation.] + +The Boer forces which took the field in 1899 were composed of two +divisions:-- + + (I.) The Burgher Commandos. + (II.) The Regular Forces. + +Of the former the whole male population, black and white, between the +ages of sixteen and sixty, formed the material,[66] the "Wyk" or Ward, +the lowest electoral unit, the recruiting basis. Upon the Field +Cornet, the chief officer of a Ward, elected by its votes for a term +of three years, devolved many responsibilities besides the civil +duties of collecting the taxes, administering the law, and maintaining +order in his small satrapy. He was also the sole representative of +Army Headquarters. One of the most important of his functions was that +of compiling the registers of burghers liable to war service.[67] + + [Footnote 66: Exemptions similar to those which obtain in + European schemes of universal service were sanctioned by the + military law of the Boer Republics.] + + [Footnote 67: These lists were of three kinds, comprising:-- + + (I.) Youths under 18 and men over 50. + (II.) Men between 18 and 34. + (III.) Men between 34 and 50. + + In the event of war, Class II. was first liable to service, + then Class III., and, as a last resort, Class I.] + +[Sidenote: Field cornet.] + +It was his business, moreover, to see that each man of his levy took +the field with clothing, rifle, horse and ammunition in good and +serviceable order; and if, as was rarely the case, means of transport +were insufficiently contributed by the burghers themselves, to provide +them by commandeering from the most convenient source. The whole +military responsibility, in short, of his Ward fell on him; and though +the men he inspected annually were rather his neighbours than his +subordinates, their habitual readiness for emergencies smoothed what, +in most other communities, would have been the thorniest of official +paths, and rendered seldom necessary even the mild law he could +invoke. + +[Sidenote: Ward levy.] + +The first acts of the Ward levy at the rendezvous were to elect an +Assistant Field Cornet and two or more Corporals, the former to serve +their commander during the campaign, the latter to serve themselves by +distributing rations and ammunition, and supervising generally their +comfort in laager, by performing, in fact, all the duties performed by +a section commander in the British infantry except that of command. + +[Sidenote: The commando and commandant.] + +The Field Cornet then rode with his burghers to the meeting-place of +the commando, usually the market town of the District. There a +Commandant, elected by the votes of the District, as the Field Cornet +had been by those of the Ward, assumed command of the levies of all +the Wards, and forthwith led them out to war, a Boer commando. + +[Sidenote: A nation in arms.] + +Thus, at the order to mobilise, the manhood of the Boer Republics +sprang to arms as quickly, as well prepared, and with incomparably +more zeal than the best trained conscripts of Europe. Not urged to the +front like slaves by the whips of innumerable penalties, their needs +not considered to the provision of a button, or a ration of salt, +shabby even to squalor in their appointments, they gathered in +response to a call which it was easy for the laggard to disobey, and +almost uncared for by the forethought of anyone but themselves. + +[Sidenote: Defects of system.] + +[Sidenote: In Boer army doubly dangerous.] + +In so far, therefore, as it applied to the actual enrolment and +mobilisation of the commandos, the military system of the Boer +Republics appeared well-nigh perfect. Yet it had radical and grievous +defects, and these, being in its most vital parts, robbed it of half +its efficiency. The election of military officers by the votes of the +men they were destined to command would be a hazardous expedient in +the most Utopian of communities; it was doubly dangerous with a people +trained in habits formed by the accustomed life of the Boers in the +nineteenth century. Its evil effects were felt throughout their +armies. Officers of all grades had been selected for any other +qualities than those purely military. Property, family interest, and +politics had often weighed more heavily in the balance than aptitude +for command. In the field the results were disastrous. Few of the +officers had sufficient strength of character to let it be seen that +they did not intend to remain subject to the favour which had created +them. The burghers were not slow to profit by the humility of their +superiors. Jealous of their democratic rights, conscious of their own +individual value in a community so small, the rank and file were too +ignorant of war to perceive the necessity of subordination. Especially +were these failings of leaders and led harmful in the Krijgsraads, or +Councils of War, which, attended by every officer from corporal +upwards, preceded any military movement of importance. Since most of +the members owed their presence to social and civic popularity, sound +military decisions were in any case not to be expected. Moreover, as +the majority of the officers truckled to the electorate which had +conferred upon them their rank, it followed that the decisions of a +Krijgsraad were often purely those of the Boer soldiers, who hung on +its outskirts, and did not scruple, when their predilections were in +danger of being disregarded, to buttonhole their representatives and +dictate their votes. Finally, there were not wanting instances of +unauthorised Krijgsraads being assembled at critical junctures, +avowedly in mutinous opposition to a lawful assembly, and actually +overriding the latter's decision. + +[Sidenote: Forms of discipline.] + +[Sidenote: Uncertain number in units.] + +There was, however, discipline of a theoretical kind in the commandos. +Two authorised forms of Courts-Martial existed to deal with offences +committed on active service. But Courts-Martial were an empty terror +to evil-doers. They were rarely convened, and when they were, the +burgher of the close of the nineteenth century knew as many methods of +evading the stroke of justice as did his father of escaping the stalk +of a lion or the rush of a Zulu spearman. + +A serious defect inherent in this military system was the inequality +of the strength of the units created by it. A commando was a commando, +of whatever numbers it consisted; and these, contributed by districts +greatly varying in population, ranged from 300 to 3,000 men. Thus the +generals, placed in command of forces composed of many commandos of +which they knew nothing but the names, were ever in doubt as to the +numbers of men at their disposal, a difficulty increased tenfold by +the constantly shifting strength of the commandos themselves. +Straggling and absenteeism are evils incident to all irregular or +hastily enrolled armies, however drastic their codes of discipline, or +however fervent their enthusiasm; with the Boers these maladies were +prevalent to an incredible degree. Many and stringent circulars were +promulgated by the Boer Presidents to cope with this disastrous source +of weakness. But one and all failed in their object, from the +impotence of the officers whose duty it was to enforce them, and at +every stage of the campaign many more than the authorised 10 per cent. +of the fighting line were absent from their posts. + +[Sidenote: Untrained staff.] + +If such were the faults of the machine, those of the motive power were +not less glaring. No provision had been made in peace for the training +of men for the duties of the Staff. At Pretoria, the Commandant-General, +forced to reign alone over the twin kingdoms of administration and +command, had not unnaturally failed to govern either. The chain of +authority between Commander-in-Chief and private soldier, a chain whose +every link must be tempered and tested in time of peace, was with the +Boers not forged until war was upon them, and then so hurriedly that it +could not bear the strain. When prompt orders were most needed, there +was often no one to issue them, no one to carry them, or, even if issued +and delivered, no one present who could enforce them. Nor were the +ramifications of departmental duty, which, like arteries, should carry +vitality to every portion of the army, of any more tried material. In +most existing departments there was chaos; many that are indispensable +did not exist at all. + +[Sidenote: Arms.] + +The service arms of the burgher forces were the Mauser .276 rifle and +carbine. + +The exact number of Mauser rifles brought into the Boer States is, and +will probably be always, uncertain. At least 53,375 can be accounted +for, of which 43,000 were imported by the Transvaal and the remainder +by the Orange Free State, the latter drawing a further 5,000 from the +stores of the sister Republic. These, with approximately 50,000 +Martini-Henry and other rifles known to have been in the arsenals and +in possession of the burghers before the commencement of hostilities, +made up over 100,000 serviceable weapons at the disposal of the two +countries.[68] Ammunition was ample, though, again, it is idle to +discuss actual figures. Neither the stock in the magazines, nor that +in the possession of the farmers, was for certain known to any man. +The most moderate of the Republican officials in a position to form a +credible estimate placed it at seventy millions of rounds; it was more +probably nearer one hundred millions. The Boer farmer, still uncertain +of security in the outlying solitudes of the veld, still unaccustomed +to it in the more frequented districts, never wasted ammunition even +though a use for it seemed remote. He hoarded it as other men hoard +gold; for deeply rooted in him was the thought, sown in the perilous +days of the past, that cartridges, with which to preserve the lives of +himself and his family, might at any moment become of more value than +gold pieces, which could only give to life the comfort he somewhat +despised. Thus the arsenals of the larger towns were not the only, or +even the chief, repositories of small-arm ammunition. Every farm was a +magazine; lonely caves hid packets and boxes of cartridges; they lay +covered beneath the roots of many a solitary tree, beneath conspicuous +stones, often beneath the surface of the bare veld itself. Whatever +were the actual amounts of arms and ammunition at the disposal of the +Republican riflemen, it was plain they were not only adequate but +extravagant. There was significance in the excess. The Boers possessed +sufficient munitions of war to arm and equip 30,000 or 40,000 men over +and above their own greatest available strength. It will be seen in +due course for whose hands this over-plus was designed. + + [Footnote 68: The following is a fairly accurate estimate in + detail:-- + + Mausers 53,375 + Martini-Henry 35,875 + Westley-Richards 9,780 + Guedes 6,049 + Lee-Metfords 2,850 + Krag-Joergensen 200 + ------- + 108,129 + + Besides the above, there were about 6,000 Webley pistols in + store.] + +[Sidenote: Rifle practice.] + +The Republican Governments had not been satisfied with the mere issue +of arms. As early as 1892 in the Transvaal, and 1895 in the Orange +Free State, rifle practice, at the periodical inspections of arms and +equipment, called Wapenschouws, had been made compulsory for the +burghers. For these exercises ammunition was provided free, and money +appropriated from the State funds for prizes. Every effort, in short, +was made to preserve the old skill and interest in rifle-shooting, +which it was feared would vanish with the vanishing elands and +gemsbok. If the skill had diminished, the interest had not. A rifle +had at all times an irresistible fascination for a Boer. The Bedouin +Arab did not expend more care upon his steed of pure Kehailan blood, +nor the medieval British archer upon his bow, than did the veld farmer +upon his weapon. Even he who kept clean no other possession, allowed +no speck of dirt on barrel or stock. On the introduction of the new +rifles, not only had shooting clubs sprung up in all quarters, but, in +aiding them with funds, ammunition, and prizes, the Republican +authorities, before they disappeared, had given at least one lesson to +Governments, that of fostering to the utmost any national predilection +which may be of service to the State. + + +THE REGULAR FORCE. + +Regular forces of similar, if not identical, composition were +authorised by the constitutions of both Republics, consisting in the +Transvaal of artillery and police, and in the Free State of artillery +only. These differed in no respects from similar units of any European +organisation, being raised, equipped, officered, instructed, and paid +in the ordinary manner, and quartered in barracks or forts. + +[Sidenote: Regulars.] + +The regular forces of the Transvaal consisted of:-- + + (a) The State Artillery. + (b) The South African Republic Police. + (c) The Swaziland Police. + +[Sidenote: Artillery.] + +The State Artillery of the South African Republic was as complete and +efficient a unit as any of its kind in existence. Originally +incorporated with the Police at the inception of both in 1881, it was +reorganised on a separate footing in 1894, in which year it also first +saw active service against Malaboch in the Blue Mountains. At this time +the strength of the Corps was but 100 gunners, 12 non-commissioned +officers and 7 officers. After the Jameson Raid, however, the force was +quadrupled and reorganised; the field and fortress departments were +differentiated, larger barracks built, and steps taken generally to +ensure the greatest possible efficiency and readiness for instant +service, the avowed object of the Government being to make the Corps +"the nucleus of the military forces of the Republic."[69] The only +qualifications necessary for the 300 additional men required by the +scheme were citizenship, either by birth or naturalisation, age not to +be less than 16, and the possession of a certificate of good conduct +from the Field Cornet. Service was for three years, with the option of +prolongation to six years, after which followed a period of service in +the reserve until the age of 35 was reached.[70] + + [Footnote 69: Law of Reorganisation, 1896.] + + [Footnote 70: Pay of Officers of the State Artillery:-- + + Commandant L700 per annum. + Major 600 " + Captain 500 " + First Lieutenant 350 " + Second Lieutenant 275 " + + All ranks received a horse from the Government, a special + board supervising the purchase and issue of remounts. Rations + and uniforms were also free issues, and on a most generous + scale to officers and men alike. + + The pay of non-commissioned officers and men was as + follows:-- + + Warrant Officers L180 and L150 per annum. + Farriers and Sergeants 6s. 6d. a day. + Corporals 5s. 6d. " + Gunners 5s. 0d. "] + +[Sidenote: Military courts.] + +For the maintenance of discipline the Corps had three Military Courts +of its own, whose powers extended from detention to death. They +differed in no way from similar tribunals in the British army save in +one respect, that convicted prisoners had a right of appeal from a +lower Court to that above it. Drill was on the German model, but the +language was Dutch. The Boer gunners were ready pupils, having much +the same natural aptitude for the handling of ordnance as is +observable in British recruits. Only 20 rounds per gun were allowed +for the yearly target practice. + +[Sidenote: Artillery divisions.] + +The State Artillery was divided into the following principal +departments:--[71] + + (a) Field Artillery. + (b) Fortress Artillery. + (c) Field Telegraph. + + [Footnote 71: There were in addition an Intendance Service, + Medical, Educational, Farriery, and Artificer staffs, and a + band of 20 performers; all maintained in a high state of + efficiency.] + +[Sidenote: Artillery weapons.] + +At the date of the outbreak of hostilities the modern armament of the +field artillery was as follows:-- + + 6 Creusot Q.F. 75 m/m (about 3 inches), supplied with 11,009[72] rounds. + 4 Krupp Howitzers 120 m/m (4.7-in.), supplied with 3,978 rounds. + 8 Krupp Guns Q.F. 75 m/m, supplied with 5,600 rounds. + 21 Vickers-Maxim (pom-pom) 37.5 m/m (about 1-1/2 inches), + supplied with 72,000 rounds (14,000 pointed steel, 58,000 + common). + 4 Vickers Mountain Guns 75 m/m. Ammunition not known. + 4 Nordenfeldts 75 m/m, supplied with 2,483 rounds, + 1 Armstrong 15-pr. Ammunition not known. + 1 Armstrong 12-pr. Ammunition not known. + + [Footnote 72: During the war about 26,000 projectiles of + various patterns were manufactured in Johannesburg. Both at + that place and at Pretoria an immense amount of manufacturing + and repairing of war material was effected, including the + making of a new 120 m/m Howitzer and the shortening of a + 6-in. Creusot.] + +In addition to this the field artillery possessed 12 Maxims for .303 +rifle ammunition, and 10 for the .450 Martini-Henry. For the latter +1,871,176 rounds of nickel-covered ammunition were in store. The total +modern armament of the field artillery, therefore, capable of service +in the field, was--excluding the 22 Maxims--49 pieces. The following +more or less obsolete weapons were also in charge of the Corps:-- + + 4 Krupp Mountain Guns, 65 m/m. + 6 7-pr. Mountain Guns. + 3 5-pr. Armstrong Guns. + +[Sidenote: Manning of artillery.] + +The personnel of the field artillery was, on a peace footing, 12 +officers and 394 N.C.O.s and men, but in the field this was found to +be very inadequate, and was eked out by the incorporation of +volunteers from the commandos.[73] + + [Footnote 73: As many as thirty-nine ordinary burghers were + noticed doing duty with a battery in action.] + +The fortress artillery had 9 officers and 151 N.C.O.s and men, but, +like the field artillery, drew many willing helpers from the burgher +ranks. Its armament consisted of:-- + + 4 Creusot 155 m/m (about 6 inches),[74] supplied with 8,745 rounds. + 6 Hotchkiss 37 m/m on parapet mounting, supplied with 3,663 rounds. + 1 Mortar 150 m/m. Ammunition not known, + 1 Howitzer 64-pr. Ammunition not known. + + [Footnote 74: The 6-in. Creusots were of somewhat peculiar + construction, having narrow iron wheels, not at all promising + the mobility which the Boers attained from them. The shell + weighed 94 lbs., charge 20 lbs. black powder, bursting charge + for shrapnel 5 lbs. melinite. Recoil was absorbed + pneumatically.] + +Besides these, a few guns of odd and mostly obsolete patterns, +including three Krupp, were on the books of the Fortress department. + +The third division of the State Artillery, the field telegraph +section, comprised 2 officers and 65 N.C.O.s and men. + +The State Artillery of the Transvaal, to sum up, was (excluding +Maxims) armed with 61 effective and about 20 semi-effective weapons, +manned by a personnel of about 800 men (including reservists). + + +THE POLICE. + +[Sidenote: The Police, Transvaal.] + +The Transvaal Police consisted of two bodies:-- + + (a) The South African Republic Police. + (b) The Swaziland Police. + +The former, whose _sobriquet_ of "Zarps" war made more famous with the +British than peace had rendered it infamous, numbered some 1,200 +whites and 200 blacks under 13 officers and 64 non-commissioned +officers. In peace time they were stationed chiefly in Johannesburg, +with detachments at Pretoria, Krugersdorp, and a few outlying +stations. Qualifications for service were an age of 21 years, with +burgher rights by birth, and the term for three years, with subsequent +yearly renewals. + +The S.A.R. Police, who were a purely regular force, were divided into +foot and mounted organisations of about 800 and 500 respectively. They +were thoroughly drilled, their fire discipline being on the most +approved German model. Their rigid training, however, had apparently +robbed them of much of the individual initiative which safeguarded the +persons and lost the battles of their less educated compatriots in the +ranks of the commandos. + +[Sidenote: Police, Swaziland.] + +The Swaziland Police were a small body of some 300 white and black +men, commanded by eight officers and 27 of non-commissioned rank. +Their formation was much more that of an ordinary commando than that +of the Europeanised "Zarps," and, in fact, from the commencement of +the war, they operated as a wing of the local commando. + + +REGULAR FORCES OF THE FREE STATE. + +[Sidenote: Free State Regulars.] + +These consisted of artillery only, numbering some 375 men (including +200 reservists), and possessed of the following armament:--[75] + + [Footnote 75: Three Krupp and three Maxims were on order in + Europe, but were not delivered in time to reach the Free + State capital.] + + 14 Krupp Guns 75 m/m, with 9,008 rounds. + 5 Armstrong Guns 9-pr., with 1,300 rounds, + 1 Krupp Q.F. 37 m/m. Ammunition not known. + 3 Armstrong Mountain Guns 3-pr., with 786 rounds. + 3 Maxim Guns. + +With all furniture and wagons complete. + +[Sidenote: Inferior organisation.] + +The Corps was by no means so thoroughly organised as the artillery of +the Transvaal. There was no division into batteries, the guns being +entrusted to the care of any commando which "liked to have a gun with +it."[76] Yet there was considerable _esprit de corps_ amongst the +gunners, who maintained their material, as well as their discipline, +in surprisingly good order considering the lack of officers, and the +general slovenliness of their surroundings. The conditions of service +for the men were the same as those which obtained in the Transvaal +Corps. + + [Footnote 76: Boer Account.] + +The Corps also possessed a small but efficient telegraph section. The +barracks, at Bloemfontein, compared most unfavourably with the fine +buildings which housed the Transvaal artillery at Pretoria. + + +NUMBERS OF THE BOER FORCES. + +[Sidenote: Uncertainty of Boer figures.] + +Figures of exact accuracy are, and must be for ever, unobtainable, for +none of the data from which they could be compiled were either +precisely recorded, or can be remembered. The Field Cornets' books, +and consequently the State lists, of those liable to service were all +alike full of errors and discrepancies. The statistical machinery of +the Republics, too primitively, and it may be added too loosely, +managed to be equal to the work of even a complete census in time of +peace, made no attempt to cope with the levy which crowded around the +Field Cornets in every market place at the issue of the Ultimatum in +October, 1899. Muster rolls of even those actually and officially +present in the field do not exist. Only one leader in either +Republican army ventured to call a roll of his command, and the loud +discontent of the burghers, scandalised at the militarism of the +proceeding, did not encourage other officers to follow his example. + +[Sidenote: Total engaged.] + +The estimate, however, of 87,365, has been arrived at after the +collation of so much independent testimony, that it may be taken as +fairly accurate.[77] + + [Footnote 77: See Appendix 4.] + +The grand total does not, of course, represent the number of men in +the field at any one time. It is an estimate of the numbers of all who +bore arms against the British troops at any time whatever during the +campaign. The Boer army numerically was the most unstable known to +history,[78] varying in strength as it varied in fortune in the field, +varying even with the weather, or with that mercurial mental condition +of which, in irregular forces, the numbers present at the front best +mark the barometer. Those numbers, even in the heroic stages of the +campaign, ranged from about 55,000 men to 15,000, with every +intermediate graduation. It is impossible to trace the vicissitudes of +an army which lost, regained, then lost again fifty per cent. of its +strength within a week. Nor is a periodic enumeration of vital +military interest. With the Boers the numbers actually present in the +fighting line were not, as with European troops, the measure of their +effective force. For the Boer, whether as absentee at his farm, or +wandering demoralised over the veld, was often little less a portion +of the strength of his side than his comrade who happened to be lying +alert in a shelter trench at the same moment. He intended to fight +again; and instances were not wanting of parties of burghers, thus +deserting their proper front, being attracted by the sound or the news +of fighting in a totally different direction, and riding thither to +form a reinforcement, as little expected upon the new battle ground by +their friends as by their enemies. + + [Footnote 78: The armies during the war between North and + South in America ran it close in this respect.] + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE BRITISH ARMY. + + +[Sidenote: Various employments of British Army.] + +Every army necessarily grows up according to the traditions of its +past history. Those of the Continent having only to cross a frontier, +marked by Royal, Imperial or Republican stones, have, in their rare +but terrible campaigns, to pursue definite objects that can be +anticipated in nearly all their details years beforehand. The British +army, on the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century, since the +great war came to an end in 1815, has had to carry out a series of +expeditions in every variety of climate, in all quarters of the globe, +amidst the deserts of North Africa, the hills, plains and tropical +forests of South Africa, the mountains of India, the swamps of Burma, +or the vast regions of Canada. Such expeditions have been more +numerous than the years of the century; each of them has differed from +the other in almost all its conditions. Amongst its employments this +army has had to face, also, the forces of a great Empire and troops +armed and trained by Britain herself. Accordingly, it has happened +that the experience of one campaign has almost invariably been +reversed in the next. To take only recent illustrations, the fighting +which was suitable for dealing with Zulu warriors, moving in compact +formations, heroic savages armed with spears or assegais, was not the +best for meeting a great body of skilled riflemen, mounted on +well-managed horses. Moreover, the necessary accessories of an army, +without which it cannot make war, such as its transport and its +equipment, have had to be changed with the circumstances of each +incident. Just as it has been impossible to preserve throughout all +its parts one uniform pattern, such as is established everywhere by +the nations of the Continent, so it has not been possible to have +ready either the suitable clothing, the most convenient equipment, or +the transport best adapted for the particular campaign which it +happened to be at the moment necessary to undertake. More serious than +this, and more vital in its effect on the contest about to be +described, was the fact that the services thus required continually of +British troops prevented the formation of larger bodies of definite +organisation in which the whole staff, needed to give vitality and +unity to anything more than a battalion or a brigade, was trained +together. For such wars as those in Egypt, or for the earlier wars in +South Africa, in Canada, or in many other countries, it was much more +practical to select for each enterprise the men whose experience +suited them for the particular circumstances, and form staffs as well +as corps of the kind that were needed, both in strength and +composition, for that especial work. This was a very serious +disadvantage, when it came to be necessary to make up a great host, in +which not a certain number of battalions, batteries, and cavalry +regiments had to be employed, but in which ultimately a vast +organisation of 300,000 men, many of whom were entirely new to army +life, had to be brought into the field. It is one thing for the army +corps of a great Continental State, in which everyone has been +practising his own special part precisely as he will be engaged in +war, to march straight upon its enemy in its then existing formation, +and it is quite another to draw together a staff formed of men, each +of them experienced both in war and peace, none of whom have worked +together, while few have fulfilled the identical functions which they +have to discharge for the first time when bullets are flying and +shells are bursting. It will so often appear in the course of this +history that the operations seriously suffered, because the necessary +links between a general in command and the units which he has to +direct were inadequate, that it is only fair to the many officers of +excellent quality who were employed on the staff that the nature of +this comparison should be clearly appreciated. It was no fault of +theirs, but a consequence of that past history which had built up the +British Empire, that they had neither previously worked together, nor +practised in peace time their special part in an organisation which +had, in fact, to be created anew for the immediate task in hand. + +[Sidenote: The total forces of Empire.] + +[Sidenote: Short service.] + +When the war began, and when there were in South Africa, as already +narrated, 27,054 troops,[79] there nominally stood behind them, if all +those who were armed and equipped throughout the British Empire be +included, more than a million men. These were of every religion, of +many colours, types and classes. On the 28th July, 1899, the Prime +Minister had made for the kingdom a self-denying declaration by which +one vast body of these forces was eliminated from the campaign. He +announced that none but white soldiers would be employed by us. Of +white men, 67,921 were in India, 3,699 in Egypt, 7,496 in Malta, 5,104 +in Gibraltar, 738 in Barbados, 570 in Jamaica, 1,599 in Canada, 1,896 +in Bermuda, 962 in Mauritius, 1,689 in China and Hong Kong, and 1,407 +in the Straits Settlements. Even these are only examples of the nature +of the duties on which the great mass of the British army was +employed. They are chiefly interesting, because the proportion between +the 67,921 men and the millions of the subject races of India, between +the 3,699 men and the vast regions throughout which they maintained +order under the sway of the Khedive, suggests to how fine a point had +been carried the doing of much with mere representatives bearing the +flag and little more. The extent of territory, the numbers of possible +enemies, the vastness of the interests which the 1,689 men in China +and the 1,407 men in the Straits Settlements had to watch, are +perhaps, to those who realise the geography, almost as significant. +Always it had been assumed that, if at any time some addition was +necessary to reinforce these far extended outposts of Empire, it was +to be provided from the regular army stationed at home. Up to the year +1888 no official declaration had ever been made of the purposes for +which the home army was to be used. In that year Mr. Stanhope issued +the necessarily often mentioned memorandum, which declared that, +though it was highly improbable that so large a force would ever be +required, yet two army corps, with a cavalry division, or a total of +81,952 men, were to be available for the purposes of action beyond the +seas. As will be seen from the chapter on the work of the Navy, it was +only in the year 1899 that the Admiralty, who necessarily would have +to transport whatever strength was thus employed, became aware for the +first time that the War Office would need shipping for more than one +army corps. The British army has had more, and more varied, service +during the nineteenth century than any other in the world. It +undoubtedly included more officers and men, who had experienced what +it meant to be under fire, than any other. But these experiences had +all been gained in comparatively small detachments, and each was so +unlike that of any other, that it was practically impossible that +those trainings by service, which are much more efficient in their +influence on the practical action of an army than any prescriptions, +should be uniform throughout it. At the same time, this had given both +to officers and men a habit of adapting themselves to unexpected +incidents which may perhaps, without national immodesty, be said to be +unique. In the year 1870 what is known as the short service system had +been introduced. Under that system there were, in 1899, in the British +Islands, 81,134 reservists available to be called up when required for +war, retained only by a small fee. The principle on which the scheme +was worked at the time was this: that as soon as the army was ordered +to be mobilised all those men who had not completed their training in +the ranks, or had not yet reached the age for service abroad, were +relegated to depots; their places were taken by the trained men from +the reserve, and out of the excess numbers of the reservists and the +men who gradually each month in succession completed their training, a +supplementary reserve to maintain the cadres of the army in the field +was created. Inevitably, as the numbers ultimately employed in this +case far exceeded the two army corps for which alone provision had +been made, these supplies of men only lasted for the first twelve +months; but as long as they did so, the waste of war was compensated +to an extent such as never has been known in our campaigns before, and +hardly in those of any other Power except Japan, who appears to have +borrowed our methods exactly for her great struggle with Russia. + + [Footnote 79: See Chap. I., p. 2.] + +At the time of Kruger's ultimatum of October 9, 1899, the British +regular army was composed as follows:-- + +[Sidenote: Regular White troops.] + + Warrant, + Officers. Non-Commissioned + Officers, and + men. + Cavalry 780 18,853 + Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery 660 18,855 + Royal Garrison Artillery[80] 775 20,103 + Royal Engineers 962 7,323 + Infantry 4,362 144,103 + Army Service Corps 240 3,858 + Army Ordnance Department and Corps 227 1,433 + Royal Army Medical Corps 831 2,876 + Army Pay Department and Corps 205 582 + Army Veterinary Department 131 -- + + 9,173 217,986 + + TOTAL, all ranks 227,159. + + [Footnote 80: Not including Royal Malta Artillery, 833 of all + ranks.] + +[Sidenote: Their dispersion.] + +These were all white troops; but it is essential that their +distribution over the surface of the globe should be realised. The +remarks which have been made as to the special cases quoted could +easily, with slight modification, be shown to apply in practically +every instance. + +There were, including troops on the seas, on 1st October, 1899:-- + + Aden (Naval base) 1,092 + South Africa (Naval base at Simon's Bay) 22,179 + West Africa (Naval base at Sierra Leone) 38 + Barbados 738 + Bermuda (Naval base) 1,896 + Canada (Naval bases at Esquimault and Halifax) 1,599 + Ceylon (Naval base at Trincomalee) 1,402 + China (Naval base at Hong Kong) 1,689 + Crete 1,628 + Cyprus 116 + Egypt 3,699 + Gibraltar (Naval base) 5,104 + Jamaica 570 + Malta[81] (Naval base) 7,496 + Mauritius (Naval base) 962 + St. Helena (Coaling station) 211 + Straits Settlements (Naval base at Singapore). 1,407 + Particular Service 47 + India (less garrison of Aden) 67,921 + United Kingdom (exclusive of Reserves) 108,098 + + 227,992 + + [Footnote 81: Includes Royal Malta Artillery.] + +[Sidenote: White Officers with natives.] + +This total does not include the white officers employed with native +troops, who numbered in all 1,814. The functions of these, however, +will be best understood when the figures which follow have been +considered, and the yet greater area of the earth's surface covered by +those who served under the British flag has been taken into account. +They are not matters for an appendix, but for the close study with a +map of every adult and every child in the realm. + +[Sidenote: Total strength and dispersion.] + +The effective strength of the armed land forces of the British Empire +(exclusive of the Royal Marines, but inclusive of local colonial naval +contingents for harbour defence), in September-October, 1899, was:-- + + Other All + Officers. ranks. ranks. + + _Regular Army (European) on + Oct. 1st, 1899._ + With Colours 9,173 217,986 227,159 + Reserves 1,803 81,134 82,937 + Royal Malta Artillery 31 802 833 + + _Regular Army_ (Colonial Corps, + European Officers, Native + Troops) 233 7,798 8,031 + 318,960 + _Regular Army of India._ + With Colours (European Officers, + Native Troops) 1,460 171,216 172,676 + Reserves -- 18,644 18,644 + 191,320 + _Hyderabad Contingent._ + (Officered by Europeans) 121 7,386 7,507 7,507 + + _Imperial Service Troops._ + (A few European Officers) -- 18,289 18,289 18,289 + + _Auxiliary Troops of the United Kingdom._ + Militia 3,036 106,515 109,551 + Yeomanry 654 9,460 10,114 + Volunteers 8,020 215,901 223,921 + Honourable Artillery Company 39 497 536 + 344,122 + + _Indian Volunteers_ -- -- 29,219 29,219 + + _Indian Military Police_ -- -- 30,284 30,284 + + _Channel Isles Militia_ 150 3,278 3,428 3,428 + + _Malta Militia_ 60 1,755 1,815 1,815 + _Cyprus Police_ 26 731 757 757 + + _Canada:_ + Local regular troops 91 936 1,027 + Militia 2,398 28,463 30,861 + Police (including 92 Newfoundland) 105 1,191 1,296 + Naval Forces 50 472 522 + 33,706 + + _Australasia: + New South Wales._ + Local regular troops 49 876 925 + Militia 228 3,815 4,043 + Volunteers 97 2,724 2,821 + Reserves 111 1,535 1,646 + Police -- -- 1,977 + Naval Forces 39 576 615 + 12,027 + + _Queensland._ + Local regular troops 22 265 287 + Militia 198 2,801 2,999 + Volunteers 50 758 808 + Cadets -- -- 875 + Police -- -- 869 + Rifle Clubs -- -- 2,520 + Naval Forces -- -- 584 + 8,942 + + _South Australia._ + Local regular troops 3 31 34 + Militia 72 625 697 + Reserves 40 529 569 + Police -- -- 349 + Rifle Clubs -- -- 1,003 + Naval Forces -- -- 120 + 2,772 + + _Tasmania._ + Local regular troops 2 20 22 + Volunteers 88 1,696 1,784 + Cadets 8 250 258 + Police -- -- 60 + 2,124 + _Victoria._ + Local regular troops 24 349 373 + Militia 158 2,867 3,025 + Volunteers 110 1,598 1,708 + Naval Forces -- -- 286 + 5,392 + + _West Australia._ + Local regular troops 15 261 276 + Volunteers 46 883 929 + 1,205 + + _New Zealand._ + Local regular troops 11 277 288 + Volunteers 330 6,368 6,698 + Naval Forces 30 682 712 + 7,698 + + _Fiji._ + Volunteers 19 189 208 + Police 16 143 159 + 367 + + _Cape Colony._ + Local regular troops 38 1,028 1,066 + Volunteers 186 3,486 3,672 + Cadets -- -- 2,000 + Police -- -- 1,401 + Mounted Rifle Clubs 64 997 1,061 + 9,200 + + _Natal._ + Volunteers 112 1,489 1,601 + Cadets -- -- 1,062 + Police -- -- 659 + Naval Forces 6 116 122 + 3,444 + + _Rhodesia._ + Protectorate Regt. raised by Col. + Rhodesian Regt. Baden-Powell 92 2,387 2,479 2,479 + British South Africa Police + + _Zululand._ + Police -- -- 500 500 + + _Basutoland._ + Police -- -- 260 260 + + _Bechuanaland Protectorate._ + Police 14 190 204 204 + + _West Indies._ + Militia 23 574 597 + Volunteers 122 1,845 1,967 + Police 54 2,924 2,978 + 5,542 + + _Falkland Isles._ + Volunteers 3 78 81 81 + + _Colonies in Asia._ + Local regular troops (Malay State + Guides) 9 623 632 + Volunteers 93 1,556 1,649 + Police 47 2,881 2,928 + 5,209 + + _St. Helena._ + Volunteers 4 51 55 55 + + _West Africa._ + Local regular troops 219 4,196 4,415 + Volunteers 11 187 198 + Police 40 2,202 2,242 + Naval Forces 15 87 102 + 6,957 + + GRAND TOTAL 1,053,865 + + +EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA. + +The local troops serving in Uganda, British East Africa, British +Central Africa, and Somaliland, are not given. The aggregate area of +these Protectorates is nearly four times that of Great Britain. The +majority of their inhabitants were, and still are, but semi-civilised +or wholly savage, and internal order has often to be maintained by +serious fighting. In 1899 the force included three and a half +battalions, but as it was then in process of reorganisation into one +corps, the "King's African Rifles," its precise strength at that time +cannot now be ascertained. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE NAVY IN THE BOER WAR.[82] + + [Footnote 82: For vessels serving on the Cape station during + the war, see Appendix 5.] + + +SECTION I. THE GENERAL WORK OF THE NAVY. + +The duty of the Navy in this, as in all war was:-- + + (1) To acquire and keep the command of the sea. + (2) To undertake, by full use of our great mercantile marine, all sea + transport. + (3) To carry out the instructions of Government for stopping the enemy's + supplies by sea. + (4) To render any local or temporary assistance to the Army that + circumstances might require. + +[Sidenote: Command of Sea.] + +[Sidenote: Transport.] + +[Sidenote: Stopping supplies.] + +During the Boer War the command of the sea was never disputed, so that +it gave rise to no anxiety after the first few months. The second +duty, that of transport, at once assumed extreme importance owing to +the 6,000 miles distance of the base of operations (Cape Town) from +England, the large number of men and animals, and the great quantity +of stores to be dealt with. The third duty, involving the much +disputed matter of contraband, etc., was, and is always likely to be, +a difficult one, owing to the rather nebulous state of International +Law on questions which were likely to, and did arise, and to the many +interests, belligerent and neutral, which might be involved. It was +further complicated by the fact that the enemy possessed no seaport +and no carrying trade of his own, so that all goods for him from over +sea had to be landed either at a neutral port or in a British colonial +port. The fourth duty, that of local assistance, was a simpler +matter. Owing to causes recorded elsewhere, the armed forces of Great +Britain in South Africa were not anything like adequate for the task +before them when the war broke out on October 9th, 1899. The grave +differences that existed between England and the Dutch Republics, and +the absolutely vital British interests involved, had, as the year 1899 +wore on, been realised not only by the Government, but by all the +world. It was inevitable that the delay in strengthening the garrison, +due to extreme unwillingness to present even the appearance of forcing +on the quarrel, should throw an exceptional responsibility on the +Navy. It became necessary to develop to the utmost limit the strength +that could be spared for work on shore in order to gain time for the +arrival of reinforcements. Happily our public services, both civil and +military, have grown up in the traditions that each branch and +department, while it has special grooves in which its own particular +duty runs, is at all times on the look-out to help any other +department. The Navy and Army are no strangers to this practice of +mutual aid. Their special duties have in times past so often led to +each helping the other in some way, that perhaps there exists between +them in a rather special degree that feeling of comradeship which is +engendered by sharing the same duties and the same perils and +hardships; just as boys who have gone through the same mill at school, +and got into and out of the same scrapes together, are undoubtedly +imbued with an _esprit de corps_ which is often a valuable possession +in after-life. + + +SECTION II. SEA TRANSPORT. + +The Army Sea Transport work was carried out by the Admiralty through +its Transport department, with the following exceptions. Arrangements +for the Indian contingent, the Remounts, and all else sent from India, +were made by the Director of Indian Marine, for the outward voyage; by +the Admiralty for the return voyage. For the Colonial contingents, +passage was provided partly in freight ships locally engaged by the +Colonial Governments and partly in Admiralty transports sent from the +Cape. The return voyage in all cases was regulated by the Admiralty. +Remounts (horses) from ports abroad were conveyed in freight ships +hired by the Remount department up to February, 1901; after that date +they were conveyed by the Admiralty. Stores from ports abroad were +delivered in South Africa by the contractors, from whom the War Office +obtained them at "C.I.F." rates; that is to say, that the price which +was paid for the stores included delivery. All other sea transport for +men, animals, and stores was organised by the Admiralty. The services +of the Admiralty shipping agents (Messrs. Hogg and Robinson) were +utilised as regards stores, but these agents worked under the +supervision of the Admiralty Transport department. + +[Sidenote: "Freight" and "transport" ships.] + +As the terms used above, "freight ships" and "transports," will +frequently recur in this chapter, it is necessary to give an +explanation of their meaning and of the distinction between them. +Troops are carried either in a transport or a freight ship. A +transport is a vessel wholly taken up by the Government on a time +charter. A freight ship is one in which the whole or a portion of the +accommodation is engaged at a rate per head, or for a lump sum for a +definite voyage. For a single voyage, freight, when obtainable, is +generally cheaper. But owners will not always divert their ships under +other than a time charter, and it is necessary that the bulk of the +engagements for the conveyance of troops should be on time charter in +order to secure control over the ships. Transports, when continuously +employed and utilised both ways, are cheaper than freight ships. Under +the transport charter the vessel, though engaged for a named period +certain, is at the disposal of the Admiralty so long as the Government +choose to retain her, except when it is expressly stipulated +otherwise. + +[Sidenote: Govt. sea transport.] + +The method by which the Government carries out the sea transport of +the Army is as follows: + +The Board of Admiralty, as agents for, and on the requisition of, the +Secretary of State for War, undertakes all this work, except coastwise +conveyance in the United Kingdom. + +[Sidenote: Office method.] + +Since 1st April, 1888, Army Sea Transport has been always charged to +Army instead of to Navy Votes; but the control of the Admiralty over +the Transport service remains unimpaired. The Admiralty has always +held that the work can be efficiently and satisfactorily carried out +only by an Admiralty department, in connection with similar work for +the Navy. For convenience sake the Director of Transports is placed in +direct communication with the War Office as to all ordinary matters. +An officer of the Quartermaster-General's department visits the +Transport department frequently in peace time, and in war time he is +placed at the Admiralty to assist the Director of Transports in +military questions. All claims chargeable to Army Votes, after +examination in the Transport department, receive, before they are +passed to the War Office for payment, the concurrence of Army +examiners, who visit the Admiralty daily. The Director of Transports +is responsible for the whole work; administration, claims and +accounts, custody of Army Transport stores, such as troop-bedding, +horse-gear, etc., etc. The system by which one department does the +work, while another provides for the cost, seems somewhat anomalous. +But the experience of the Boer War, in which it was put to a test of +some magnitude, has conclusively proved that it works well. That +experience has, moreover, fully shown the necessity of the Sea +Transport service remaining as it always has been, under the control +of the Admiralty. + +[Sidenote: Transport department at work.] + +Ever since 1876 the Transport department has been organised in such a +manner as to be ready to ship a considerable force overseas at short +notice. The office establishment, both clerical and professional, was +intended to be a sufficient nucleus to admit of rapid expansion in +time of war. Full particulars of all ships suitable for the conveyance +of men and animals were kept recorded in special books. A stock of +troop-bedding, horse fittings, etc., etc., was kept in the Government +depots, and standing contracts for putting these fittings in place, +etc., were in existence. Arrangements had been made with the Director +of Victualling and the War Office respectively for the food supply of +the troops to be embarked, and for the forage of the horses. Stocks of +printed forms ready for issue to the transports were also kept in +hand. All calculations were based on the understanding that the +Admiralty would not be called upon to convey much more than an army +corps without due warning. Bedding and horse fittings (of the old +kind) for 55,000 men and 10,000 horses were immediately available. +Moreover, a committee had recently met to provide for an increase of +the stocks in hand in consequence of information from the War Office +that two army corps could be ready to go abroad if required. + +[Sidenote: Time needed.] + +In August, 1899, the Director of Transports was asked how long it +would take to despatch 49,000 men and 8,000 horses. His reply was that +in the then state of the labour market, four to five weeks would be +required. Tentative enquiries of this kind, and the evidently critical +state of affairs in South Africa, had led the Transport department, as +early as July, to make for eventualities every preparation that was +possible within the department--such as conferring with contractors, +marine shipping superintendents, etc., and having all troop-bedding +and hammocks washed and overhauled, so that on receipt of any definite +instructions work might be commenced within an hour. + +[Sidenote: 23rd Sept./99 First grant.] + +On the 23rd September, 1899, the Secretary of State for War authorised +the expenditure of L25,000. This included money for a new pattern of +horse fittings which had been approved. On the same date came a +requisition for the conveyance of 7,000 mules from various foreign +ports. On 20th September the Quartermaster-General had sent to the +department a list giving details of the force proposed to be embarked +if it should become necessary. This list showed ports of embarkation, +and on receipt of it the Admiralty, without waiting for formal +requisition, and on their own responsibility, decided to engage two +large vessels of the Union-Castle Steamship Company, and to hold them +in readiness, and this was done.[83] Also on their own initiative the +Admiralty issued that same evening confidential circulars to +thirty-five leading ship owners, asking what ships now ready, or to be +ready shortly, they were prepared to place at Government disposal for +use as troop-transports, etc., for two months certain, asking for a +reply the following day. + + [Footnote 83: It is impossible, of course, to engage a ship + beforehand without incurring expenditure.] + +[Sidenote: Ships engaged Sept. 30/99.] + +On 30th September there was a conference at the War Office, at which +the Admiralty was represented, and verbal authority was then given to +the Director of Transports to engage vessels for the conveyance of the +force. It was there stated by the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley) +that the troops would not be ready to begin embarking before the 21st +October. That same night, 30th September, twenty vessels were engaged +from those of which particulars were given in the replies already +received; and from that time the work of engaging and preparing the +vessels proceeded continuously. Immediately, additions were made to +the professional and clerical staff, and more office accommodation was +provided at the Admiralty. On the 9th October, 1899, an official +requisition was received for the conveyance of 46,000 men and 8,600 +horses, and a notice that 24,000 of the men and 4,000 horses would be +ready to embark between the 21st October and the 25th October. By the +middle of November this whole force was embarked. + +[Sidenote: Time for fitting up.] + +A certain amount of time (ten to twelve days) and money (L2,000 to +L5,000, according to the kind of ship) is required to fit a vessel for +carrying either troops or animals after she is empty of cargo. The +vessel having been selected (sometimes even while she is still at +sea), has to be surveyed in order to decide details of the work +necessary, and also in order to obtain the Board of Trade's passenger +certificate if she is to carry men. Troops and horses cannot be +carried in ready-fitted accommodation. The space ordinarily devoted to +cargo or cattle is appropriated, and the requisite accommodation built +up. In the best cavalry ships, which are generally cattle ships +adapted, saloon and cabin accommodation has to be increased. This is +done at the owner's expense as part of the bargain. Height between +decks is an important factor. Even more height is required for horses +than for men. Ships otherwise good often have to be rejected for +failure in this respect. Mounted troops always travel men and horses +together. The men are for sanitary reasons placed on a deck below the +horses. In such cases the horses are not, as a rule, carried on +exposed decks. This is both for the sake of the horses and because the +deck space is required for exercising the men. For remount and mule +freight-ships the exposed decks are utilised, unless the nature of the +voyage renders it undesirable. + +[Sidenote: Provision for horses.] + +Horses must be carried either on wooden or wood-sheathed decks, or on +cemented decks, or on platforms over metal decks with the gangways +cemented. For men, in all cases, the decks must be wood or +wood-sheathed. As modern vessels, other than passenger ships, usually +have steel decks, this becomes a considerable item in the time and +cost of fitting. It is also frequently necessary to cut such extra +side-lights as are essential for carrying men or horses. Extra +lighting, ventilation and distilling apparatus, mess tables, stools, +and provision for men's hammocks must all be obtained. Latrines have +to be built, as well as a prison, a hospital, and the numerous +store-rooms and issue-rooms that are required. Horse stalls have to be +fitted, and sometimes even an extra deck has to be laid. A +considerable number of horse stalls are kept at the Government depots, +and the contractors who work for the Government are bound to be ready +to fit up a certain number of transports at short notice. For this war +the stock of horse fittings in hand was only utilised to a small +extent, as it had been decided, a short time before the war broke out, +to adopt a longer stall (eight feet) without horse hammocks, instead +of the existing six feet six inches stall with hammock. There is no +doubt that the new fitting was a great improvement. + +[Sidenote: "Transports." Mode of fitting up.] + +[Sidenote: "Freight" ships. Different method.] + +Transports are always fitted at the expense of Government. The work is +done either by (a) contractors who hold a standing contract, (b) +special supplementary contractors, or (c) the owners on behalf of the +Government. Freight ships, on the contrary, are fitted by the +shipowners, the cost being covered by the rate per head, whether they +take troops or animals. Horses in freight ships were provided with the +long stall under a modified specification. The fittings on these ships +were often required for one voyage only, whereas in the transports +they were used again and again. Mules were in all cases placed in +pens. These held, as a rule, five mules, and no detailed +specifications were necessary. Trade fittings were accepted if +satisfactory to the shipping officer. In all ships carrying animals, +whether transports or freight ships, spare stalls to the extent of +five per cent, were allowed to provide for sick animals and for +shifting the animals for cleaning purposes. + +_Hospital Ships._--Eight transports in all were fitted up as hospital +ships. Two, the _Spartan_ and _Trojan_, each of about 3,500 tons +gross, were prepared in England for local service at the Cape. The +other six, ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 tons gross, were infantry +transports converted at Durban, as they were required, for bringing +sick and wounded from the Cape to England. All were equipped in +concert with the Army Medical Officers, in accordance with plans which +had been found suitable on previous expeditions. All ordinary fittings +were cleared out, and the ship was arranged in "wards," with special +cots; operating rooms, laundries, ice room, special cooking +appliances, radiators for warming, punkahs and electric fans, cot +lifts, and everything else that medical science suggested, were added. + +[Sidenote: Special gifts to nation.] + +These ships were not officially declared under the Geneva Convention +and did not fly the Red Cross flag, as they were occasionally employed +during the return voyage for the conveyance of combatants. Besides +these eight vessels there were available the _Maine_, lent by the +Atlantic Transport Company, and most generously and at great cost +fitted out and maintained by the American Ladies' Committee, who +spared no time, trouble, or expense in making her most efficient and +comfortable. Their kindly action will not soon be forgotten by the +officers and men who benefited by her, by their immediate friends, or +by the British nation. There was also the _Princess of Wales_, +similarly sent out by the Central Red Cross Society, to whom much +gratitude was naturally felt. H.M. Queen Alexandra, then H.R.H. the +Princess of Wales, took special interest in the equipment of this +vessel. + +[Sidenote: Not a ship available at once.] + +It will be seen, therefore, that no ships exist which can be utilised +for sea transport without extensive adaptation and alteration. It is +perhaps hardly realised generally how much work has to be done both by +Government and the shipowner before a transport can be ready for sea. +In addition to all that has been described the ship must be docked and +her bottom coated with anti-fouling composition, and she must be +ballasted as needed. Boats, awnings and crews, efficient services of +fresh and salt water, and provision against fire, have to be secured, +and before any of the work can be started the ship herself must be +definitely engaged. + +_Animals._--The units to be employed in the war were not carried by +sea complete with their transport animals. The cavalry and artillery +were accompanied by their horses, but nearly all the transport animals +were taken direct to South Africa from ports abroad. Remounts and +mules from abroad were conveyed by freight ships at rates per animal, +which included forage, attendance, horse-gear and fittings, and all +expenses. + +_Stores._--It was decided from the first not to utilise the spare +space in the transports for conveying stores, because on arrival it +might well be that the stores were urgently required at the first +port, while the troops were wanted elsewhere with equal urgency. This +would have led to delay and confusion. Moreover, if the cargo could +not be at once received, the transport would be hampered in her +movements and inconvenience and expense would follow. Stores from +England were therefore carried in freight ships, either in full cargo +ships engaged at a lump sum, with special terms for varying ports and +demurrage, or in the regular liners at rates per ton. + +[Sidenote: Infantry and mounted troops.] + +For infantry, passenger ships or large fast cargo boats are selected. +The latter are preferred as the former require more extensive +alterations. Mounted troops are usually carried in ships specially +designed for the conveyance of live stock; remounts and mules in +similar vessels, or in specially roomy cargo ships. The vessels +employed for infantry and mounted troops were, in fact, running ships +belonging to good lines, and they had to possess, or take out, a Board +of Trade passenger certificate. The owners naturally do not keep such +ships waiting on the off-chance of Government employment. They are in +full work and have to sacrifice their own lucrative business to accept +an Admiralty contract. + +_Coaling Arrangements._--Whenever possible, space was appropriated in +the holds of the transports for additional coal bunkers, so that the +quantity of coal taken from England might be as great as possible. The +contractors at St. Vincent, Las Palmas and Teneriffe were also given +special instructions, and a constant stream of colliers was kept going +to the Cape. The transports were made to call at the three first-named +places in such rotation as should ensure there being no block at any +of them. A man-of-war was stationed at St. Vincent, one at Las Palmas, +and one at Teneriffe to supervise the arrangements and to make such +preparation and give such help as should preclude delay in dealing +with each of the ships as they arrived. This system proved to be a +good one. There was plenty of coal and no delay, but it was found that +the high-speed vessels, owing to their enormous coal consumption, were +not so suitable as others of more moderate speed. Eminently suited as +they were for the short run across the Atlantic, it was really hardly +worth while using them for the long voyage to the Cape. + +_Victualling._--The first batch of troops sent out was victualled from +the Navy Yards, and this practice was partially continued till early +in 1900. But, owing to considerations of the reserve of stores, and to +the fact that the Navy salt meat ration was new to the troops and not +liked by them, this was then changed. The owners contracted to victual +the men at a rate per head per day, and this, though more expensive, +worked well. Moreover, it gave greater satisfaction to the men, as it +was more like what they were accustomed to on shore; and it was an +important point to land them in the best possible condition. +Volunteers and yeomanry when carried separate from the regulars were +fed on a slightly better scale than the latter. If carried in the same +ship all were fed alike on the better scale. + +_Forage_ in transports was in all cases supplied from the Government +stores. In freight ships it was supplied by the owners, and was +included in the rate per animal. + +_Troop-bedding and horse-gear_ are supplied by Government in all +transports. Though a large stock is always kept on hand, special +purchases of both had also to be made from time to time as the war +went on to meet unexpectedly great demands. + +_Staff of the Transport Department._--To meet the requirements of this +sudden expansion of work, Naval staffs were sent out to Cape Town, +Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London, under Captain Sir Edward +Chichester, R.N., and at home--to assist the normal peace +establishment (which consisted of the Director of Transports, +Rear-Admiral Bouverie F. Clark, Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., the Naval +Assistant, and Mr. Stephen J. Graff, the Civil Assistant, with their +respective staffs)--the clerical establishment was enlarged and two +captains, four lieutenants, engineers, and paymasters, and the +requisite staff were appointed--some to each of the three districts, +the Thames, Liverpool, and Southampton. These three places are, by +reason of local considerations such as dock and repair accommodation, +railway service and tidal conditions, the most suitable for such work, +and with few exceptions the embarking was done in those districts. + +_General Remarks and Statistics._--Tables are given on pages 108-9, +showing the number of vessels employed and of the troops, etc., +carried. The total number of voyages out and home with troops, animals +or stores was about 1,500, representing over 9,000,000 miles steaming, +exclusive of coast movements at the Cape, and in addition to about +1,000,000 miles of cross voyages by the transports to India, +Australia, Bermuda, etc. The ships selected for the conveyance of +troops were chosen as the best adapted for the special work they had +to perform, viz.: to deliver them at their destination with the least +risk and in healthy condition, fit to take the field at once. That the +choice was not unsuccessful is evidenced by the fact that throughout +these vast operations not a single life was lost at sea from causes +due to the ship, and the only serious casualties were the loss of one +cavalry transport, the _Ismore_, with guns and 315 horses; one mule +freight ship, the _Carinthea_, with 400 mules; and two store freight +ships, the _Denton Grange_ and the _Madura_, the latter by fire. +Looking to the mileage run, this is a wonderful record, and one which +reflects the highest credit on the mercantile marine in general, and +on the management of the shipping lines concerned in particular. + +[Sidenote: The voyage to and fro.] + +There was no delay in getting the troops off. From 20th October, 1899, +when the first units of the army corps were ready to embark, to the +30th November, 1899, no less than 58,000 men and 9,000 horses left +England, and a steady stream continued month after month, the largest +shipment in one month being February, 1900, when 33,500 men and 5,500 +horses left this country. The removal from South Africa was even more +speedy. From 1st June, 1902, to 31st July, 53,800 men embarked. By the +end of August the number was 94,000 men, and by the end of September, +133,000 men had left South Africa. The homeward move was simplified by +there being no horses, and by the Government being able to utilise to +their full extent the resources of the Union-Castle Company, whose +large fleet of vessels, specially suitable for carrying troops, had an +important share in the work. + +[Sidenote: Patriotism of shipowners.] + +The shipowners, as a body, showed every desire throughout the war to +meet the wishes of the Admiralty, often (in the early days) placing +their ships at the disposal of the Government at great inconvenience +to their own trade, and making great personal exertions to expedite +the despatch of the troops and to ensure their comfort. In no case was +any vessel engaged, either for troops, animals, or stores, which was +not a registered British ship, and as far as possible the crews were +British subjects; practically the crews of all troop transports were +then exclusively so. + +[Sidenote: Numbers conveyed.] + +The following figures will convey an idea of the extent of the Sea +Transport work in connection with the war, from its commencement up to +the 31st December, 1902. + +The numbers conveyed were: + + To South Africa. Personnel. Horses. Mules. + + _From Home and Mediterranean:_ + Troops, &c. 338,547 84,213 249 + South African Constabulary 8,482 -- -- + British South Africa Police 353 -- -- + Imperial Military Railways 320 -- -- + Colonial Office Details 59 -- -- + Various 89 -- -- + + _From India:_ + Troops, &c. 19,438 8,611 1,117 + Natives 10,528 -- -- + + _From Ceylon, Mauritius, &c.:_ + Troops, &c. 690 -- -- + Natives 26 -- -- + Various 8 -- -- + + _From Colonies:_ + Contingents 29,793 27,465 19 + South African Constabulary 1,249 -- -- + Remounts -- 36,660 -- + + _From other countries:_ + Remounts, &c. -- 195,915 102,627 + Prisoners of War and Escorts 22,790 -- -- + + Totals 432,372 352,864 104,012 + + _From South Africa:_ + To United Kingdom, Colonies, + India, &c., including + Boer prisoners 372,320 2,460 -- + + Grand Total 804,692 persons. 459,336 animals. + +The tonnage of stores carried to South Africa was as follows, +exclusive of wagons, guns, baggage, and equipment accompanying the +troops, and of the vast quantities of supplies delivered by +contractors from abroad at rates inclusive of freight: + + In the Transports 4,990 tons. + Otherwise 1,369,080 tons. + + Total 1,374,070 tons. + +[Sidenote: Numbers of ships.] + +The number of specially engaged ships employed on the work was as +follows: + + No. + Transports engaged by the Admiralty 117 + Transports engaged in India 41 + ---- 158 + +Troop freight ships: + + Outwards. {Engaged by Admiralty 115 + {Engaged by Colonial Governments 13 + + Homewards. {Engaged by Admiralty 104 + {Engaged by P.T.O., South Africa 21 + ---- 253 + +Remount freight ships: + + Engaged by Remount Department 107 + Engaged by Admiralty 201 + ---- 308 + Mule Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 98 + Full Cargo Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 210 + ---- + 1,027 + +Nearly all the transports made several voyages, and some of them were +in continuous employment for over three years, and went to the Cape +and back as many as ten times besides coastal and colonial voyages. + +[Sidenote: Tonnage, transports and owners.] + +[Sidenote: Report of Royal Commission.] + +The 210 full cargo ships carried 974,000 tons of the stores, besides +3,745 oxen. The remainder was conveyed in running ships at current +rates. The transports engaged by the Admiralty were the property of +thirty-six owners, mostly Liverpool or London firms; their average +size was 6,400 tons gross, ranging from 12,600 to 3,500 tons, the +range of speed from nineteen to eleven knots. The proportion of +tonnage per man and per horse turns out, over the whole, four tons per +man, twelve and a half tons per horse. This estimate is made by +calculating the tonnage per man on the infantry ships alone, and +allowing for the men at that rate by casting out the tonnage per horse +over the transports which conveyed both men and horses. The following +is an extract from the report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed +to enquire into matters in connection with the war in South Africa, +dated 9th July, 1903, pp. 125, 126. + + +"TRANSPORT BY SEA. + +"The transport by sea to South Africa from the United Kingdom and the +Colonies of a force much larger than any which had ever crossed the +seas before in the service of this or any other country affords a +remarkable illustration not only of the greatness of British maritime +resources, but also of what can be done when careful forethought and +preparation is applied to the object of utilising rapidly in war +instruments which are in peace solely engaged in the purposes of civil +life. If the same forethought had been applied throughout, there would +have been little criticism to make with regard to the South African +War. A full account of the Sea Transport organisation will be found in +the evidence of Mr. Stephen Graff, Assistant Director of Transports at +the Admiralty, and of Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., Naval Assistant +Director of Transports. + + * * * * * + +"It had been represented by the Admiralty in a letter of the 4th +April, 1898 (in continuation of earlier representations), that the +stock of horse fittings and water tanks was inadequate even for one +Army Corps, inasmuch as one Army Corps, with a Cavalry Brigade and +Line of Communication troops, requires over 15,000 horses, and it was +represented that an expenditure of L25,000 to provide complete +fittings would be necessary. In April, 1899, there was a conference +between the Admiralty and War Office officials, who came to the +conclusion that 'the present stock of fittings, horse-gear, etc., is +dangerously insufficient and inadequate to ensure the rapid despatch +of even one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication +troops.' At this time it had been intimated by the War Office that +transport for two Army Corps might be needed. On the 19th July, 1899, +the Committee recommended the purchase of 6,000 new pattern stalls, +and on the 23rd September the Secretary of State for War authorised +the expenditure of L25,000. The engagement and preparation of ships +began on the 30th September. It does not appear that the absence of a +sufficient stock of horse fittings caused any appreciable delay. To a +large extent the difficulty was met by fitting up with lighter +fittings the Liverpool cattle ships, which are in many ways so +constructed as to be admirable conveyances for horses. The plan of +using these ships, and the kind of fittings to be used on them, had +been worked out some time before the war by Captain Pitt, R.N. + + * * * * * + +"The adjustment of ships to transport purposes involves much labour, +but the ships appear to have been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as +the troops were ready to start. The arrangements between the War +Office and the Admiralty for the embarkation of troops worked with +great success. Sir Charles M. Clarke, then Quartermaster-General, +stated that the demands of the War Office were 'most admirably met.' +The accommodation on the ships appears to have been well calculated. +The timing of the departures and arrivals, so as to regulate the +pressure on intermediate coaling stations and terminal ports, also +seems to have been satisfactory. The delays in disembarkation of men +and stores were slight, and, when they occurred, were due to +insufficient berthing accommodation at Cape Town. The accidents on +voyage were few, and only one ship, the _Ismore_, was entirely lost, +together with a battery of artillery." + + +NOTE BY THE OFFICIAL HISTORIAN. + +[Sidenote: Effect on Army.] + +[Sidenote: Questions of above record.] + +The record above given of the splendid triumph of the Admiralty +administration of Sea Transport during the war has been compiled by +Capt. A. H. Limpus, R.N., with the cordial assistance of the Transport +department of the Admiralty. The conclusion that the work of carrying +the Army by sea could not have been in more competent hands is one +which admits of no doubt in the mind of any reader who studies it. +There are, nevertheless, certain deductions to be made in regard to +the passengers carried--the greatest army ever delivered by any +country over 6,000 miles of sea-way--which closely concern the +efficiency of the instrument with which the blow of Britain has to be +struck, at points so distant from her shores. It is essential that the +management of railways shall be in the hands of the officials of the +particular company which conveys an excursion; but in order that the +undertaking may be a great success many things are needed besides the +perfect management of the trains. No one who has seen the amount of +labour and the kind of organisation required by those who yearly send +to the country the holiday-children, for instance, will fail to know +that the passengers also need to be prepared beforehand for their part +in the day. Moreover, some knowledge on the part of the most admirable +railway officials of the special needs of those they carry is +required; and, further, if any sudden change is made in the carriages +themselves, in the sequence of trains, or in other matters strictly +belonging to the functions of the company, this, if not communicated +to the managers of the excursion, may introduce dire confusion. + +[Sidenote: A new experience needs special training.] + +An army has over the holiday travellers the advantage of its +long-established unity, its discipline, and its training, but +embarkation and disembarkation are entirely outside its ordinary +experience. It needs, therefore, being much accustomed to work by +habit, to be prepared both for getting on board ship, and, still more, +for getting off it, in the manner that will best enable it to fulfil +its duties, and, as time is very precious, to do this with the least +possible delay, both in order to play completely into the hands of the +officers in charge of the ships and in order to be itself at its best +when it lands. This is the more easily accomplished because a ship in +dock is virtually a part of the mainland. Everything that has to be +done by troops in embarking can be imitated perfectly on shore, if the +ordinary fittings of a ship are placed in a hut or other building +outside which such a gangway is erected as that over which men and +horses have to be passed in entering a ship. Now, by the willing +assistance of the Admiralty in furnishing the exact fittings used in +transports, this practice had been carried out by all arms--cavalry, +horse and field artillery, army service corps and infantry--at least +in some instances. Practical adaptations in the training of each +corps had been made by the experiments conducted on shore by each. +Printed regulations embodying these had been framed. + +[Sidenote: Necessity for mutual understanding shown by incident.] + +Unfortunately, the sudden improvement in the ship fittings mentioned +above, coming as it did at the very moment of war, completely, for the +Army, upset the conditions on which the drill had been framed. It had +been devised to make the passage of horses on board as rapid as it +could be when the horses had to be placed in slings. Men, specially +trained in slinging, were in each corps detailed to do the work. To +find, when the embarkation began, that there were no slings, naturally +involved at the last moment a change in method. Moreover, horses +always obey more kindly, especially in strange circumstances, the men +to whom they are accustomed, those by whom they are groomed and fed. +It was, nevertheless, not surprising that the shipping authorities, +unaware that the soldiers were dealing with conditions already +familiar to them, should have detailed men of the ship to place the +horses in their stalls. The horses did not like the unfamiliar hands; +the soldiers were puzzled by their horses being taken from them. In +some cases much delay and confusion occurred, and, indeed, it needed +all the tact and good-fellowship of the navy and army officers to +adjust things satisfactorily. Relatively to other matters the incident +was a small one, but it illustrates the importance of a thorough +understanding between the two services such as can only be gained by +continued practice during peace-time for war. + +[Sidenote: Importance of the right stores being on top.] + +In the matter of stores a difficulty, which had been very strongly +commented upon in the case of the Egyptian expedition of 1882, again +presented itself. In 1882, in the disembarkation at Ismailia in the +Suez Canal, where the facilities were much less than they were in the +several harbours of South Africa, it became a very serious point that +the stores required by the Army at once on landing were at the bottom +of the holds. The ample landing capacities of Cape Town, of Durban, +and almost, relatively to Ismailia, of East London and Port Elizabeth, +made this in the present war less serious; but even in this case it +drew a strongly-worded telegram of remonstrance. It would be +impossible to reckon upon our having always at our disposal +conveniences so great as these for disembarking an army. It becomes, +therefore, for future expeditions, important to note that the trouble +which became so grave in 1882 was not removed at the ports of +embarkation when this war began. To say the least, it was not the +universally established practice to give to the naval officer in +charge or to any one else a list showing the order in which the +material embarked would be required on landing; and to ask that those +things which would be first needed should be put in last, so that they +might be on the top. + +[Sidenote: Co-operation in forcing a landing.] + +The army in South Africa had not to land against an opposing enemy. It +is obviously important that in conjoint practice of the two services +the possibility of an opposed landing should be taken into account. It +was unfortunate, therefore, that as a consequence of the limited time +at disposal, the other duties of the fleet, and the cost of demurrage, +it became necessary for the Admiralty, when it was wisely decided to +have combined manoeuvres of navy and army in the autumn of 1904, in +order to practise embarkation and disembarkation, to direct that the +landing should be carried out under peace conditions. As a consequence +of this the first party landed on a shore, supposed to be hostile, was +one of unarmed sailors; and orders, at least in one instance, filled +the foremost boats with the clerks and clerkly paraphernalia of a +divisional Headquarters. That may have been the routine rightly +followed in many cases at Cape Town, but the true application of the +lessons of history does not consist in blind imitation of precedent +from the past in those respects in which the conditions have changed. +Joint action in manoeuvre will be valueless unless it is used to +familiarise each service with the work of the other as it will be in +the actual fighting of the time. During the great war at the end of +the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century failure +followed failure because the services had not practised together. At +last they did so and the result was a brilliant success. The Japanese +have undoubtedly owed many of their triumphs to their having profited +by _our_ historical records. Their disembarkations have been models of +combined action. + +[Sidenote: Causes of delay, real and imaginary.] + +[Sidenote: Limit of striking force.] + +On one other point the Naval triumph is of great importance to the +Army. The passage quoted above (page 111) from the report of the +Commission on the War marks well the facts. "The ships appear to have +been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops were ready to +start." It follows that the shipping was just ready and no more for +the Army, after mobilisation, when the reserves had been called in and +incorporated. Moreover, it is to be noticed (page 100) that this +result was only secured by a splendid audacity in expenditure by the +Naval authorities, supplementing an admirable organisation. Now, as in +every war we carry out abroad, the earliest time at which any armed +force can move towards its object is the hour when the ships are ready +to convey it, it follows that no delay whatever was caused by the +necessity for summoning to the colours trained men retained for +service by a small fee. On the other hand very great delay was caused +by the impossibility of preparing for the particular campaign without +threatening those whom we desired to conciliate. It, therefore, +further follows that if there were ready at all times a force which +did not need to be ostentatiously prepared, we should avoid the crux +of not being able to make war without preparing for it and of not +being able to prepare lest we should provoke war. On the other hand, +this instance admirably illustrates the invariable law that the +strength that can be so used is strictly limited by the number of +properly fitted ships that the Admiralty can have ready at any given +moment. An examination of Captain Limpus' careful statement will show +how very small this inevitably is, and how much time is needed to fit +those that are not available. Moreover, there is, on the Army side, as +has been shown in Chapter V., this further restriction, that the +equipment and transport, without which a campaign cannot be carried +on, must be of the kind suited to the particular case. + + +SECTION III. THE WORK OF THE NAVY. + +THE STOPPAGE OF CONTRABAND. + +The task of the Navy in this matter lay so entirely outside the sphere +of the military operations on land that it will be sufficient to say +here that, despite the extreme delicacy of the situation created by +the fact that it was only through neutral ports that the Boers could +obtain supplies after the war had begun, the vigilance exercised was +remarkably effective. The amount of contraband which reached the enemy +was insignificant, yet very few claims for compensation were +successfully sustained by neutrals. Ordinary trade, through Lourenco +Marques, including, unfortunately, British trade, was uninterrupted +till, towards the end of 1900, in consequence of the progress of the +war, it died a natural death. In their careful watching of the coast +and river-mouths the sailors, under Captain W. B. Fisher, of the +_Magicienne_, had some trying experiences. Lieut. Massy Dawson, of the +_Forte_, and Lieut. H. S. Leckie, of H.M.S. _Widgeon_, who received +the Albert medal, did most gallant service. + + +SECTION IV. THE ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY ON SHORE. + +[Sidenote: The Navy on shore.] + +This is incorporated in the accounts of the several campaigns and +battles, but there were certain preparations made beforehand on +board-ship which must here be recorded. During a cruise up the east +coast in the month of July, 1899, Admiral Harris, the Naval +Commander-in-Chief, was convinced that there would be war and that the +Boers were only waiting till the grass was in fit condition for their +cattle, to invade the colonies. He therefore took steps to have all +the ships ready for service. He concentrated the fleet within easy +reach of call. Early in October he sent to the G.O.C. at the Cape a +list of small guns, etc., which he could furnish if needful. He was +then told that it was not anticipated that such assistance would be +necessary. Nevertheless, a Naval brigade of 500 men was exercised and +prepared for landing. When the ultimatum was delivered it was clear +enough that the troops were not in adequate strength to resist the +forces the Boers could place against them, and that the enemy were +bringing into the field guns of unusual calibre and range. The utmost +numbers which it was possible to land were about 2,500, but heavy guns +were the very weapons with which the sailors were most familiar. It +seemed likely that these might prove to be of great value. On +September 19th, the Admiral was informed that the _Terrible_, which +was to have relieved the _Powerful_, via the Canal, would, instead, +meet her on her voyage home at the Cape. On the 14th October the +_Terrible_ reached Simon's Bay. By October 21st, Captain Scott, her +commanding officer, had devised a field mounting for a long-range +12-pr. and, having put it through a satisfactory firing trial, was +authorised by the Commander-in-Chief to make several more. When, on +October 24th, the Admiralty telegraphed that the War Office would be +glad of all the assistance that the Navy could render, and that all +was to be given that would not cripple the ships, the order had been +so far anticipated that the upper decks of the _Terrible_, _Powerful_, +_Monarch_ and _Doris_, as well as the dockyard itself, had already +assumed the appearance of a gun-carriage factory. + +[Sidenote: Preparation of heavy guns for landing.] + +On October 24th, the day when this message was received from home, the +Admiral arranged with Sir A. Milner that the _Powerful_ should go to +Durban on the 26th. On October 25th the Governor of Natal telegraphed +to the Admiral that "Sir George White suggests that, in view of the +heavy guns with Joubert, the Navy should be consulted with the view of +sending a detachment of bluejackets with long-range guns firing heavy +projectiles." He also revealed to the Admiral the gravity of the +situation, and the scanty means available for defending Maritzburg and +even Durban itself. The Admiral replied at once, saying, "_Powerful_ +arrives Durban 29th. She can on emergency land four 12-prs. and 9 +Maxims." He then saw Captain Scott of the _Terrible_, and enquired if +he could design a mounting to take a 4.7-in. and have two ready for +the following afternoon, 26th. This Captain Scott did. By the next +evening two such mountings had been put on board the _Powerful_, and +before midnight she sailed for Durban. These 4.7-in. mountings were +meant for use as guns of position, and not as field guns. They +consisted--briefly described--of four 12-in. baulks of timber 14 feet +long, bolted together in the form of a double cross. This made a rough +platform to which was secured the plate and spindle which was used to +carry the ordinary ship mounting of the 4.7-in. guns. They were +intended to be placed in a hole in the ground 15 feet square and 2 +feet deep, and the ends of the timber baulks were to be secured with +chains to weights sunk in the ground. But this securing of the timbers +was found to be quite unnecessary when a mounting of this kind was put +through a firing trial near Simon's Town, and so it was not +subsequently employed with these "platform" mountings, as they came to +be called. Sir George White, in Ladysmith, to which place the first +two "platform" mountings had been promptly taken by the _Powerful's_ +Naval brigade, was, on October 30th, informed by telegram of the +result of the firing trial, also that no moorings had been found +necessary. + +[Sidenote: Scott's travelling carriage.] + +Captain Scott now obtained permission to make a travelling carriage +for a 4.7-in. gun. It consisted of a double trail of 14-inch timber +fitted with plates and bearings to carry the cradle of the ordinary +ship mounting. A pair of steel wheels and a heavy axle were required, +and all the work was done in the dockyard under Captain Scott's +supervision. This mounting was satisfactorily tried and embarked on +the _Terrible_ for Durban on November 3rd. + +In giving this brief description of the mountings which enabled +long-range guns to be put at the disposal of the General Officer +Commanding-in-Chief, the events which led to their use have been +anticipated. The foregoing explanation is necessary, because, though +the warships were already supplied with field mountings for the 12-pr. +8-cwt. and some smaller guns, and these were therefore available, and +to a certain extent were used during the war, yet when more powerful +guns were required it became necessary to extemporise a carriage for +them. + +[Sidenote: Numbers employed.] + +The first long 12-pr. was tried on October 21st, and by November 3rd +there were already prepared for use, or actually in use:-- + + 21 field mountings for 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns. + 3 platform mountings for 4.7-in. + 1 travelling carriage for 4.7-in. + +[Sidenote: Later developments.] + +This number was, soon afterwards, largely increased, and a 6-in. Q.F. +7-ton gun was also mounted on a travelling carriage at the Durban +Locomotive Works under Captain Scott's supervision. As more mountings +were made and other people's ideas were enlisted, modifications were +introduced; some mountings, entirely of steel, were indeed used for +4.7-in. guns; but in the main these mountings resembled those which +were so hurriedly prepared in the last ten days of October. + +To resume the sequence of Naval events at the Cape. + +[Sidenote: Difficulties of Naval C.-in-C.] + +The Commander-in-Chief found himself, when war broke out, with his +small squadron of ships ready for any service, and a Naval brigade of +500 of their crews ready whenever called for. He had informed the +military Commander-in-Chief to what extent he could give help on +shore, and his squadron was shortly increased as told above. He was +none too strong for the purely Naval duties which war would involve, +though a sufficient staff of officers was sent out to relieve him to a +large extent of the Sea Transport duty. Still he found himself with +the considerable responsibility of keeping the seaports--Table Bay, +Simon's Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban, secure and +available for our troops, and in the case of Durban, as the situation +developed, this promised to be no light matter. The timely +distribution of the coal supply, both for his own reinforced squadron +and for the transports, had to be arranged. At one time the +unfortunate grounding of a transport, the _Ismore_, caused extra work +and anxiety. The enemy's supplies by sea had also to be stopped. There +were precautions to be taken for the safety of H.M. ships while lying +in harbour, for the arriving transports, and the Naval establishments. +Later on there was the care of a considerable number of Boer prisoners +until regular camps could be formed for them. Altogether, therefore, +if the squadron was to be kept always fit for sea, some circumspection +was required when determining to land men and guns for service on +shore. + +[Sidenote: The Naval brigades.] + +Although in detail the record of the services of the men actually +landed falls into its place in the course of the campaigns, it should +here be noticed that these contingents resolved themselves eventually +into three Naval brigades. + +[Sidenote: Western brigade.] + +First, the Western brigade, a force of 357 of all ranks and two short +12-pounders under Commander Ethelston of the _Powerful_. This was +originally employed to garrison Stormberg, was then withdrawn to +Queenstown, and finally recalled to Simon's Bay via East London, to be +reorganised, strengthened, and sent up under Captain Prothero with +four long 12-prs., and about 400 men, to join Lord Methuen's force for +the relief of Kimberley. It left behind two short 12-pr. field guns at +Queenstown for the use of the Army. After Graspan, where it suffered +considerably, Captain J. E. Bearcroft was sent to replace Captain +Prothero, who was wounded, and the brigade was much augmented. It then +accompanied Lord Roberts' main advance; parties with guns being sent +on various detached services--until by 17th October, 1900, the men of +this brigade had all been recalled to their ships. + +[Sidenote: Ladysmith brigade.] + +Second, the Ladysmith brigade. The _Powerful_ having been sent to +Durban to comply with Sir George White's request for guns, there were +landed on arrival on October 29th, and taken at once to Ladysmith, two +4.7-in. guns on platform mountings, three long 12-pounders, one short +12-pounder, and four Maxims, with 283 of all ranks under Captain the +Hon. Hedworth Lambton. They arrived on the 30th October, 9.30 a.m., in +time to take part in the action of Lombards Kop, and remained in +Ladysmith during the siege. + +[Sidenote: Natal brigade.] + +The third, or Natal brigade, had its origin in the _Terrible_ being +sent to Durban, where she arrived on November 6th. Her Captain, Percy +Scott, at once became Commandant and organised--from the _Terrible_, +_Thetis_, _Forte_, _Philomel_, and _Tartar_, the defence of that town. +Over thirty guns were placed in position and put under the command of +Commander Limpus, of the _Terrible_, while a pair of 12-pounders, +drawn from the _Powerful_, had been pushed on to Maritzburg and placed +under Lieutenant James, of the _Tartar_, with the men of that ship +already up there. It was from this force that, as troops arrived, Sir +Redvers Buller drew the Naval brigade which accompanied the Ladysmith +relief column. Captain E. P. Jones, of the _Forte_, commanded this +brigade, with Commander A. H. Limpus, of the _Terrible_, second in +command. After the relief of Ladysmith, Captain Jones reorganised the +Naval brigade with ranks and ratings from the _Forte_, _Philomel_, and +_Tartar_. The _Terribles_ and _Powerfuls_ rejoined their ships by +March 13th. So reconstituted, the brigade served on with the Natal +Field Force until June 24th, 1900, when all but the _Philomel's_ and +_Tartar's_ men, under Lieutenant Halsey, were recalled to their ships. +Lieutenant Halsey, with four officers and thirty-eight men of the +_Philomel_, one officer and eighteen men of the _Tartar_, remained +until October, 1900, when they also returned. + +[Sidenote: All Naval brigades within recall.] + +Essential as were the services rendered on shore[84] it was always +arranged that, if it had become advisable at any time to recall +officers and men to their ships, they should be able to rejoin them +long before their presence was needed on board. Also as soon as any +article, including guns and ammunition, was landed from the fleet it +was replaced from England. When it became clear that the safety of +Durban was assured, its naval defence force was re-embarked; but +Captain Percy Scott remained on shore with his staff as Commandant +until 14th March, 1900. His work there, in preparing and sending +additional guns to General Buller--among them a 6-in. gun on a wheeled +carriage--and also as an able Commandant of Durban under martial law, +was highly appreciated.[85] + + [Footnote 84: See despatches giving the views of Sir Redvers + Buller, etc., on these.] + + [Footnote 85: See despatch from the Governor of Natal to + Admiral Harris, dated 9.3.00, and letter from the Colonial + Office to the Admiralty, dated 7.5.00.] + +[Sidenote: Natal Naval Volunteers.] + +A welcome addition was made to the strength of the Natal brigade by a +party of Natal Naval Volunteers, under Lieutenants T. Anderton and +Nicholas Chiazzari, who with forty-eight men of all ratings, joined +Captain Jones' force at Frere on 10th December, and reinforced the +crews of the 4.7-in. guns. Lieut. Barrett, N.N.V., also joined the +Naval brigade with the Natal Field Force after the relief of +Ladysmith. The Natal Naval Volunteers proved to be a most valuable +addition to the brigade, composed as they were of intelligent, +resourceful men, who were familiar with the ways of the country, and +many of whom spoke both the Taal and native languages. They were part +of a corps which had its origin in the previous scheme for the +defence of Durban, and possessed muzzle-loading 9-prs. + +[Sidenote: Why they joined.] + +They had been stationed at Colenso when the southward advance of the +Boers compelled the evacuation of that position on 3rd November, 1899. +Although told to abandon their guns they had carried them bodily away +with them in the retirement. Forced to recognise that such guns were +quite useless in the field, and unable to obtain better weapons +locally, they had eagerly volunteered to join the Naval brigade under +Captain Jones. Fortunately they obtained their wish, and the Naval +brigade gained the services of a body of men who soon proved their +sterling worth, and whose traditions will henceforth always be closely +associated with those of the Royal Navy. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +TALANA HILL.[86] + + [Footnote 86: See maps Nos. 3, 5, and the panoramic sketch.] + + +[Sidenote: Connection with Chap. II.] + +The last four chapters have dealt with subjects affecting the whole +course of the war, the theatre of operations, the two opposed armies, +and the British navy. The present one, which describes the first +action in the campaign, connects immediately with the second, that on +the outbreak of the war, taking up the narrative from the time when, +as a consequence of the conference at Maritzburg between the Governor +(Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson), Sir George White, Sir A. Hunter and +Maj.-Genl. Sir W. Penn Symons, the latter officer had been despatched +to take over the command at Dundee while Sir George White had gone to +Ladysmith. + +[Sidenote: Arrival, Oct. 12th/99 of Symons at Dundee.] + +On October 12th, the day when the British agent quitted Pretoria, +Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons arrived at Dundee, and took over +command of 3,280 infantry, 497 cavalry and eighteen guns from +Brigadier-General J. H. Yule.[87] He had gained his point. Dundee was +to be held, and held by him. As early as the 13th news came that a +strong commando was concentrating at the Doornberg east of De Jager's +Drift, and that small parties of the enemy had been sighted four miles +north of Newcastle, whilst to his left rear the Free Staters were +reported so close to Ladysmith, and in such strength, as to cause Sir +George White to recall one of Symons' own battalions, the 2nd Royal +Dublin Fusiliers, to strengthen a column which was pushed out on +October 13th towards Tintwa Pass to get touch with the enemy. This +column[88] failed, however, to observe even patrols of the enemy, and +the Dublin Fusiliers returned to Dundee by train the same night. On +this day the enemy fell upon a piquet of Natal Policemen posted at De +Jager's Drift, and made them prisoners. A patrol of the 18th Hussars +proceeding to reconnoitre the spot next day, the 14th, came upon a +scouting party of forty of the enemy a mile on the British side of the +Buffalo. On the 16th a fugitive from Newcastle announced the arrival +of a commando, 3,000 strong, before Newcastle, another in Botha's +Pass, whilst across Wools Drift, on the Buffalo, six miles of wagons +had been seen trekking slowly southwards. If the left, then, was for +the moment clear, it was plain that strong bodies were coming down on +Symons' front and right, a front whose key was Impati, a right whose +only bulwark was the hill of Talana. + + [Footnote 87: For composition of this force see Appendix 3.] + + [Footnote 88: Composition: 5th Lancers, detachment of 19th + Hussars, Natal Mounted Rifles, three batteries Royal Field + artillery, 1st Liverpool, 1st Devonshire, 2nd Gordon + Highlanders.] + +[Sidenote: Oct. 12th Joubert also starts.] + +Joubert quitted Zandspruit on the 12th October, and was at Volksrust +in the evening, with the forces of Generals Kock and Lukas Meyer +thrown widely forward on his right and left flanks respectively. Kock, +coming through Botha's Pass with his motley foreign levies,[89] halted +for the night at the mouth of the defile, whilst the units of the left +horn of the invading crescent, reinforced this day by the commandos of +Middelburg and Wakkerstroom, lay under Meyer some forty miles +eastward, some in Utrecht, some in Vryheid, and some already at the +concentration point, the Doornberg. On the 13th, whilst the wings +remained quiescent, Joubert, with the main column, occupied Laing's +Nek, having first, either by an excess of precaution, or from a fear +lest the gap between him and Meyer were too great, made good that +formidable obstacle by a turning movement around the left and over the +Buffalo at Wools Drift; this was executed by his advance guard +(Pretoria, Boksburg, part of Heidelberg, Standerton, Ermelo) under +Erasmus. But though a coal-truck drawn by cables through the long +tunnel, which penetrated the Nek, proved it to be neither blocked nor +mined, this stroke of fortune rather increased than allayed the +caution of the Boer General, to whom, grown old in Native wars, +nothing appeared more suspicious than an unimpeded advance against an +enemy. On the 14th he was still on the Nek, whilst Erasmus moved +timidly on Newcastle, and Kock, who remained on the Ingagane, +despatched a reconnoitring party of the German Corps along the +Drakensberg, to gain touch with Trueter's Free Staters at Mueller's +Pass. This patrol, riding back next day, found Newcastle occupied by +the commandos of Erasmus. The little town was almost empty of +inhabitants, and the burghers wrought havoc amongst the deserted shops +and houses. Not all the remonstrances of their officers, nor the +general order from Headquarters, nor even the heavy wrath of their +Commandant-General, who arrived in the town on the 18th, could stop +their ruthless plundering, and by nightfall the township was a scene +of sordid devastation. + + [Footnote 89: See Appendix 4.] + +[Sidenote: Joubert's net.] + +On the afternoon of the 16th Joubert called a council of war. So far +he had been without any settled scheme, and, owing to the straggling +and indiscipline of his burghers, the march was rapidly becoming +unmanageable. The commander, whose plans and army require +consolidation after but four days, may well look with foreboding upon +the campaign he has taken in hand, and Joubert was as little hopeful +as any invader in history. Nevertheless, at Newcastle he devised a net +which, had it been cast as he designed, might by entangling one +British force beyond salvation, have weakened another beyond repair +and perhaps have laid Natal at his feet. Whilst Erasmus with his 5,000 +men moved straight down upon Dundee, Kock with 800 riflemen, composed +of Schiel's Germans, Lombard's Hollanders, and 200 men of Johannesburg +under Viljoen, with two guns, was to reconnoitre towards Ladysmith, +gaining touch with the Free Staters at Van Reenen's and the other +passes of the Drakensberg. He was then to take up a position in the +Biggarsberg range, cutting the railway between Dundee and Ladysmith. +Thus isolated, the garrison of Dundee appeared to be at the mercy of +a combined attack by Erasmus from the north, and Lukas Meyer from the +east. + +[Sidenote: Slow movement of Boers.] + +Kock and Erasmus had left the neighbourhood of Newcastle on the 17th, +and on the afternoon of the 18th the latter's advance guard came into +collision with a squadron of the 18th Hussars, from Dundee, north of +Hatting Spruit. Meanwhile Meyer, who was much behindhand with his +concentration, lay so close in his camp at the Doornberg, that the +British patrols scouted up to De Jager's Drift again without +opposition. Meyer still lacked two commandos (Krugersdorp and Bethel) +and four guns, and as his transport animals were in a deplorable +condition, it was with relief rather than with impatience that he +watched the tardiness of his coadjutors. His missing units arrived in +the evening, however; Erasmus' advanced guard was close behind Impati +on the morning of the 19th, and Meyer then issued orders for a march. + +[Sidenote: Sir George White recalls Dundee detachment.] + +Meanwhile, on the 15th October, an officer of the Headquarter staff +visited Dundee, and on his return to Ladysmith was questioned by Sir +G. White as to the state of the defences existing at the post. To his +surprise he learnt that, properly speaking, no defences existed at +all--no position, no entrenchments, and, most important of all, no +assured and defended supply of water. His instructions, in short, +conditional upon which alone he had consented to the retention of +Dundee, had not been carried out. Not until three days had elapsed, +however, did he telegraph to Sir W. Penn Symons that, failing an +assurance of compliance, Dundee must be evacuated at once. In answer, +Symons admitted that he could not give the required assurance, and +must therefore carry out the order to retire. At the same time he +stated his requirements in the matter of rolling-stock for the +withdrawal of military stores and the non-combatant inhabitants of +Dundee. This reply raised a new point. To send the whole of the +rolling-stock--and nothing less would suffice--would be to expose it +to the gravest danger, for the railway line was in hourly insecurity. +Two hours after the despatch of his first telegram, therefore, Sir +George White sent a second, which became the determining factor of +subsequent events. + +"With regard to water, are you confident you can supply your camp for +an indefinite period? The difficulties and risk of withdrawing of +civil population and military stores are great. The railway may be cut +any day. Do you yourself, after considering these difficulties, think +it better to remain at Dundee, and prefer it?" + +[Sidenote: Cancels recall.] + +Sir W. Penn Symons replied as follows: "We can and must stay here. I +have no doubt whatever that this is the proper course. I have +cancelled all orders for moving." + +The question thus finally decided for good or ill, Sir George White +sent a third telegram: + +"I fully support you. Make particulars referred to by me as safe as +possible. Difficulties and disadvantages of other course have decided +me to support your views." + +[Sidenote: Symons faces a known situation.] + +Sir W. Penn Symons, his only fear about Dundee--that of being +withdrawn from it--thus finally removed, turned to the front again to +face the converging enemy with equanimity. His information continued +to be full and accurate. Erasmus' advance, Meyer's concentration at +the Doornberg, Kock's circuitous passage over the Biggarsberg, were +all known to him. On October 19th he received detailed warning that an +attack was to be made on him that very night by Erasmus from the +north, Meyer from the east, and Viljoen from the west. By midday, +communication by rail with Ladysmith was cut off--not, however, until +a party of fifty of the 1st King's Royal Rifles had returned in safety +from a visit to Waschbank, where they had rescued some derelict trucks +left by a train, which, having been fired on at Elandslaagte, had +dropped them for greater speed. Three companies 2nd Royal Dublin +Fusiliers, which had been railed to the Navigation Collieries, +north-east of Hatting Spruit, at 3 a.m., to bring back eight tons of +mealies which the General was unwilling to leave for the enemy, also +returned in safety. + +[Sidenote: Meyer Oct. 19th moves forward.] + +[Sidenote: Oct. 20th, 2.30 a.m., seizes Talana.] + +At sundown on October 19th, Lukas Meyer left his bivouac with about +3,500 men and seven guns. De Jager's Drift was crossed about 9 p.m.; +then, pressing through the Sunday's[90] river south-west of Maybole +farm, Meyer's force emerged on to the bleak expanse of veld stretching +east of Dundee. The Boer scouts, moving parallel to and north of the +Landman's Drift road, drew with great caution towards Talana. At 2.30 +a.m. a party of burghers came upon a British piquet of the Dublin +Fusiliers mounted infantry, commanded by Lieut. C. T. W. Grimshaw, at +the junction of the road with the track to Vant's Drift. Shots were +exchanged, the piquet disappeared, and the Boer advance guard was upon +the flat summit of Talana an hour before dawn, with Dundee sleeping +five hundred feet below. Close on the heels of the scouts pressed the +Utrecht and Wakkerstroom commandos, under Commandants Hatting and +Joshua Joubert, of about 900 and 600 men respectively, with some 300 +Krugersdorpers under Potgieter in addition, and a few men of the +Ermelo commando. The rest of the main body, consisting of the Vryheid +commando (600 men, under Van Staaden), the Middelburg commando (some +900 men, under Trichardt), portion of the Swazi Police, portion of the +Piet Retief commando (170 men, under Englebrecht), and odd men of the +Bethel and other absent commandos, made their way rapidly across the +Dundee road, and took up position on the heights south of it. Of the +artillery, two field-pieces (Creusot 75 m/m) were hauled into a +depression nearly at the rear edge of the top of Talana, a "pom-pom" +(37.5 m/m Vickers-Maxim) pushed forward to the advanced crest of the +same eminence, and the remainder, consisting of two Krupps (75 m/m) +and two more pom-poms, sent across under charge of the Vryheid men to +their position to the south. + + [Footnote 90: See map No. 5.] + +[Sidenote: The ground of Talana.] + +Talana Hill, situated about 5,000 yards east of the British camp, from +which it was separated by the wire-intersected environs of Dundee and +by the sunken bed of the Sand Spruit, was peculiarly adapted for +defence. From the summit a precipitous rocky face dropped on the +Dundee side to a nearly flat terrace, 160 feet below it, whose fifty +to eighty yards of width were commanded throughout by the +boulder-strewn brow of the mountain. A low stone wall bounded this +terrace at its outer edge, immediately below which the hillside again +fell suddenly, affording from ten to fifteen yards of ground dead to +the crest directly above it, but vulnerable to fire, both from Lennox +Hill, a slightly higher eminence on the other side of a Nek to the +south-east, and from a salient protruding from the northern extremity +of the hill. From the wall bounding the upper terrace, however, other +walls, running downhill, intersected this face of the mountain at +right angles, and served as low traverses affording some protection +from flanking fire. These formed the enclosures of Smith's farm, a +group of tree-encircled buildings around an open space at the base of +the mountain, near its centre, and some 400 feet below its summit. +Below, and on either side of the homestead stood copses of eucalyptus +trees, which, roughly in all some 500 yards square, occupied the top +of the glacis whose base was the Sand Spruit, which 800 yards of bare +and open grassland separated from the edge of the wood.[91] + + [Footnote 91: A sketch of the position, as seen from the side + of the British advance from Dundee, will be found in the case + of maps accompanying this volume.] + +[Sidenote: Symons receives the news.] + +Such was the position crowned by the Boer commandos in the first light +of October 20th. Swift as had been its captors, news of their success +was at once in the hands of the British commander. At 3 a.m. a +sergeant from Grimshaw's piquet, which had been surprised at the cross +roads, hurried into camp and reported the approach of the enemy in +force across the veld. Sir W. Penn Symons thereupon ordered two +companies of the Dublin Fusiliers to turn out in support. The rest of +the camp slept undisturbed, and the two companies, stumbling through +the dark and obstructed suburbs of Dundee, gained the shelter of the +Sand Spruit, where they found Grimshaw already arrived. The first +shots had stampeded his horses, which had galloped back to Smith's +Nek, the col between Talana and Lennox Hills. Retiring on foot, the +piquet had gained the Nek, recovered its horses, and making its way +first to Smith's farm, and thence to the cover of the Sand Spruit, had +turned and faced the enemy as he appeared over the crest of Talana +Hill. + +[Sidenote: The morning parade dismissed.] + +At 5 a.m. the British troops stood to arms as usual. It was a wet and +misty morning. As the men, few of whom knew of the occurrences of the +night, waited in quarter-column, to a few keen ears came the fitful +sound of musketry from the east. It was the fire of Grimshaw's piquet +just then at bay below Talana. The parade having been dismissed, at +5.20 a message from Headquarters assured commanding officers that all +was clear. A few companies moved directly from their lines for +skirmishing drill around the camp, the men of others hung about in +groups expecting the word to fall in for a similar purpose; the horses +of two of the three batteries, and all the transport animals, filed +out to water a mile and a half away. Suddenly at 5.30 a.m., the mist +upon Talana, wasting before the rising sun, lifted and revealed the +summit alive with figures. + +[Sidenote: The Boers make their presence known.] + +Ten minutes later the report of a gun sounded from the top, and a +projectile fell into the western enclosures of the town. Others, +better aimed, followed in quick succession; the camp came under a +rapid bombardment, accurate but harmless, for the small common shell +from the enemy's field-pieces failed to explode on impact with the +sodden ground. The cavalry and the mounted infantry, whose horses had +remained in camp, moved out of sight behind a stony kopje in front of +it; the infantry, already equipped, fell rapidly into their places, +each company before its own line of tents, and were immediately +marched at the "double" into the shelter of a ravine some 200 yards to +the south of the camp, where fighting formations were organised. + +[Sidenote: Symons prepares to clear Talana.] + +The General had already decided upon an assault. Before the infantry +were clear of camp he called out the artillery. Whilst the 67th +battery, whose horses were now hurrying back from water, replied to +the Boer shells from the gun-park itself, the 69th battery, already +horsed, waiting neither for its wagons nor an escort, galloped out +along the road to the railway station, swept through the town, and +swinging sharply to the right at the south-eastern extremity, came +into action on a roll of the veld immediately west of the colliery +extension railway line. As it advanced the Boers turned their guns +upon it, but within twenty minutes of the falling of the first shell +in camp, the 69th commenced a rapid and effective fire at 3,750 yards +upon the crest. Ten minutes later the 13th battery wheeled into line +alongside the 69th. In five minutes more the practice of the Boer +ordnance dropped to spasmodic bursts; in five more it was temporarily +silenced. Meanwhile the General, who had ridden out soon after the +batteries, had set his infantry in motion, and so fast did they go +forward that before the 69th had ended its first round they were +already almost beyond Dundee. + +[Sidenote: He guards against Erasmus and gives orders for attack.] + +To the 67th battery and the 1st Leicestershire regiment, with one +company from each of the other battalions, was now entrusted the +defence of the camp from the expected attack of Erasmus from Impati. +An officer of the King's Royal Rifles carried the orders to the +cavalry from the General: "Colonel Moeller is to wait under cover, it +may be for one or two hours, and I will send him word when to advance. +But he may advance if he sees a good opportunity. The M.I. are to go +with the 18th Hussars." The Royal Dublin Fusiliers were first in the +bed of the spruit at about 6.30 a.m., picking up the two companies +which had lain there since 4.30 a.m. in support of Grimshaw's piquet. +By 7 a.m. the whole of the infantry were in security in the same +shelter, 1,600 to 2,000 yards from the crest of the position. General +Penn Symons himself then rode down thither, and sending for commanding +officers, detailed orders for the assault. The Dublin Fusiliers were +to form the first line, with the King's Royal Rifles in support, the +Royal Irish Fusiliers in reserve. Brigadier-General Yule would command +the attack. + +[Sidenote: Infantry push up the hill.] + +[Sidenote: A treacherous donga.] + +At 7.20 a.m. the right-hand company of the Dublin emerged from the +Sand Spruit, the men extended to ten paces interval, and steadily in +quick-time moved towards the boundary of the wood. The other +companies, advancing in order from the right, soon followed. Before +the last of them was fairly clear, the King's Royal Rifles were +released and pressed forward. On the appearance of the first lines, a +hot fire, direct from Talana itself and crosswise from Lennox Hill on +the right, quickly caused casualties. Eager to be at closer quarters, +the men increased their pace, breaking from quick-time into the +double, and from that to a swift run upon the edge of the wood. A low +stone wall, topped by a broken-down fence of wire which ringed the +copse on this side, was tumbled flat, and the foremost soldiers of +the Dublin, pouring through the thicket, penetrated to the wall and +hedge on the farther side. Here their line was prolonged by the King's +Royal Rifles, who had come through the wood on the right. In front of +this line the crest of Talana was 550 yards distant. With the Dublin +Fusiliers, the general trend had been towards the left; now after a +short pause at the edge of the plantation they attempted to push on in +that direction. Enticed by a donga, which, quitting the wood at its +northern angle, looked like a covered way towards the crest of the +hill, the three leading companies ("A." "F." and "G.") worked steadily +along it in hopes of arriving within striking distance of the enemy +under comparative shelter. But the watercourse not only faded to +nothing before it reached the terrace wall, but was open to the +enemy's view and enfiladed by his musketry throughout its length. A +storm of bullets descending into it when it teemed with men, brought +down many and checked further progress. + +[Sidenote: K.R.R. and Dublin reach edge of wood.] + +[Sidenote: K.R.R. hold Smith's farm.] + +Of the King's Royal Rifles, four companies, under Colonel R. H. +Gunning, advancing through the right-hand half of the plantation, +found themselves amongst the Dublin Fusiliers at its forward edge, and +became in part intermingled with them. The three remaining companies +moved upon the buildings of Smith's farm, and gained the front and +right edges. Somewhat ahead of the general line, this portion of the +force was enfiladed from the crest of Talana on its left, and from +Lennox Hill on its right, and received so hot a cross-fire that it was +ordered to fall back to the cover of the farm walls. This it did with +the loss of three officers and many men; but from their more secure +location the Rifles here began a telling reply, both upon the crest in +front and upon the clouds of sharpshooters which hung upon the summit +and slopes of Lennox Hill. + +[Sidenote: "B." and "H." of R.I.F. on left of wood.] + +[Sidenote: Maxims at S.E. angle.] + +Lieut.-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, +immediately on entering the plantation, had detached two of his +companies ("B." and "H.") to line the left face of the wood, whence +they could watch the open ground beyond that flank. These sent volleys +against the enemy's right upon Talana. The remainder were held in +reserve, as ordered, amongst the small dongas and depressions in the +wood. The Maxim guns of all three battalions moved to the +south-eastern angle of the wood, and opened at 1,700 yards upon +Smith's Nek and Lennox Hill to their right front and right, doing much +to alleviate the musketry which came incessantly from these flanking +and partially invisible eminences. + +[Sidenote: 69th and 13th batteries change their ground.] + +[Sidenote: Reduced fire.] + +[Sidenote: Symons gives impulse.] + +[Sidenote: He receives his mortal wound.] + +Such was the situation at eight o'clock. At that hour the 69th and +13th batteries, quitting the position from which they had silenced the +Boer artillery, moved through the town, and unlimbered on rising +ground between the eastern boundary of Dundee and the Sand Spruit. +Thence they opened again, the 69th upon Talana at 2,300 yards, the +13th upon Lennox Hill at 2,500. Though they and their escort of King's +Royal Riflemen were targets for both hills, their practice was +admirable, and had it been more rapid, must speedily have smothered +the enemy's fire. But the artillery commander, fearing to run short, +and knowing his inability to replenish, was obliged continually to +check expenditure.[92] For a time the fight remained stationary. The +momentum of the attack had died away, and Yule found it impossible to +get it in motion again at once, in spite of numerous messages he +received from Sir W. Penn Symons urging immediate advance. At 9 a.m. +the infantry being still inert, the patience of the General was +exhausted. Despite the remonstrances of his staff, he, with three +staff officers and orderlies, rode into the wood, and, dismounting, +hurried into the foremost lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at its +northern angle. Calling to these to "push on!" he then pressed along +inside the boundary, animating by word and gesture all the troops he +passed, and halted for a moment to face the hill a little beyond where +the afore-mentioned donga disappeared into the wood. Here Major F. +Hammersley, of his staff, was wounded, and, immediately after, the +General himself was shot in the stomach. Directing Brigadier-General +Yule to proceed with the attack, he turned and walked calmly to the +rear. Then, meeting his horse, he mounted, and not until he had passed +entirely through the troops was any sign of suffering allowed to +escape him. At the station of the Bearer company he dismounted, and +was carried to the dressing station in a dhoolie. Five minutes later, +at 9.35 a.m., the surgeon pronounced his wound to be fatal, and the +news was telegraphed to Ladysmith. + + [Footnote 92: There were for each gun 154 rounds, including + 60 reserve.] + +[Sidenote: His impulse tells.] + +[Sidenote: K.R.R. seize wall of upper terrace.] + +[Sidenote: R.I.F join and also threaten Boer right.] + +The life of the General was not thrown away; his action had immediate +effect. Before he had quitted the wood a dying man, parties of +soldiers were already pushing forward from its front wall across the +100 yards of bullet-swept flat intervening between them and the first +slopes of Talana proper. On the right, the first to break cover, four +and a half companies of the King's Royal Rifles emerged in small +parties from Smith's farm. Leaving there two companies in support, +they pushed up along the right side of the transverse wall, in full +view of Lennox Hill, and suffering from its fire. So rapid were their +movements that the Boer shooting was hasty and ill-aimed, and the +losses were but few. Some distance forward they leapt across to the +left of the transverse wall, and reconnoitring that bounding the upper +terrace, found it, to their surprise, unoccupied by the enemy.[93] +Other groups, in response to signals, then worked their way upward, +until soon a considerable number of Riflemen were under the wall. On +their left the Royal Irish Fusiliers supported the attack. Two and a +half companies ("E.," "F." and half of "C.") of this battalion had, +when General Symons came to the front, been sent to the edge of the +wood, and these, seeing what the Rifles had done, streamed straight up +to the wall. "A." and half of "D." companies, which had been boldly +and independently handled wide on the left, avoiding the dongas, +pushed on gradually to well within five hundred yards of the enemy's +extreme right, on which they brought their rifles to bear. The other +half of "C." company, with men of other battalions, amounting to about +one hundred in all, had lain with the three companies of King's Royal +Rifles in the enclosure of Smith's farm, and advanced with them. One +company ("B.") Royal Irish Fusiliers had been ordered forward on the +left by General Symons himself immediately he arrived in the wood. +This company, perceiving the fallacious donga winding apparently to +the front, had dropped into it, and following it up with the same +expectations as had encouraged the Dublin Fusiliers, was speedily in +the same predicament at its open extremity. Another company ("H."), +taking this route with many losses, was similarly blocked at the same +point. But with the exception of these two companies, which could not +move for a time, the advance of the King's Royal Rifles to the wall +was strongly backed by the Royal Irish Fusiliers, whose men appeared +from all the near parts of the hill to join in with the rest. With +them ran many of the Dublin Fusiliers. This regiment, much entangled +in the watercourse already mentioned and in others equally exposed and +useless more to the right, could not progress, and, though a few men +managed to reach the upper wall direct, it was only possible to do so +by first going back to the edge of the wood, an attempt of great +hazard. + + [Footnote 93: The omission of the Boers to man this + breastwork, situated as it was within 400 yards of the edge + of the wood, and commanding every inch of the ground in + front, was not owing to any fears on the part of Lukas Meyer + as to its not being tenable. The orders of that general had + been plainly that the wall was to be held, but as he did not + remain to see them carried out, the burghers, fearing to hold + what appeared to them isolated and inadequate cover, + neglected it entirely.] + +[Sidenote: Two hours check.] + +[Sidenote: Guns gallop forward.] + +[Sidenote: The Infantry dash in.] + +[Sidenote: The onslaught having weakened, the Artillery opens fire +again.] + +The battle came to a standstill once more. The upper wall was won, but +the heavy and incessant fusilade directed upon it and upon the ground +below it, rendered its occupation precarious, and reinforcement a +matter of extreme difficulty. Not until two hours had passed were +sufficient men collected under it to render the last stage possible, +and the long delay cost many casualties. At 11 a.m. the officer +commanding the artillery received a request by flag-signal to cease +firing, as the assault was about to be delivered. He did so; but time +to acquire strength was still needed, and the artillery, itself +harassed by musketry, re-opened. At 11.30 a.m. the order was repeated, +and once more Colonel E. H. Pickwoad stopped his guns. Immediately +after, the batteries galloped forward, awaking against themselves the +full energy of all parts of the Boer line. They crossed a wide donga +and came into action again on the flat plain between the Sand Spruit +and Talana, sending their shells clear over and past the left edge of +the wood at a range of 1,400 yards from the crest of the enemy's +stronghold. Under the rapid bombardment the Mausers slackened and at +last were silent. For the third time the order was signalled to cease +firing. It was duly obeyed. Colonel Gunning, of the King's Royal +Rifles, who had called up his two supporting companies from Smith's +farm, passed the word, "Get ready to go over!" The men rose to their +knees; then, at the command "Advance!" scrambled and fell over the +obstacle. A blaze burst from the crest as the first figures wavered on +the wall, and many fell backward dead or wounded. Some could not +surmount the obstruction, which in parts was over-high for vaulting; +some, falling on the far side, picked themselves up and were struck +down in the first leap of their charge. A few, more fortunate, held +on. But the onset had not much weight, and losses quickly lightened it +still further. Many of the Boers had fled at the first sight of the +soldiers rushing forward, but of those who remained, not a few +actually came towards them, and shot rapidly point-blank at the +assailants, who were clawing their way up the last precipitous rampart +of the natural fortress. The artillery, therefore, knowing only that +the onslaught had been checked, about 12.30 p.m. re-opened with quick +and devastating rounds. But during the charge, the light had been bad, +and the gunners had not all observed the foremost groups of their +comrades lying amongst the rocks close to the crest. Soon shell after +shell burst amongst the latter. + +[Sidenote: It checks both sides.] + +A signaller of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, standing up near the top of +the hill, attracted the attention of the artillerymen, but was unable +to make them understand his message. Another of the same regiment +failed similarly from the wall. As the discharges, destroying both +combatants alike, became more overwhelming, both drew back. On the +extreme right a few of the Rifles still clung on. At first the Boers +melted from the front alone, but the shrapnel beat all over the hill, +and the retreat became a run before the rear edge was reached. + +[Sidenote: The final charge.] + +Behind the wall the regimental commanders, taking the cessation of +Boer fire as signal for a last successful attack, met in hasty +conference, and agreed to lead their men forward simultaneously. Soon +after 1 p.m. the whole British line surged over the wall, and +clambering up the hill, flooded its flat summit from end to end. + +[Sidenote: The Boers abandon Lennox Hill.] + +[Sidenote: Cavalry and guns both fail to make defeat crushing.] + +[Sidenote: A fatal error.] + +From Lennox Hill this final charge was marked, and in a few moments +it, too, was empty of Boers. Before 2 p.m. the entire position was +won, and Brigadier-General Yule, to whom the loss of General Symons +had given the command, at once ordered the artillery to the summit of +Smith's Nek, from whence they might shell the now flying foe. The +cavalry, looked for amongst the defeated Boers, who covered the plain +for miles in the direction of the Buffalo river, were nowhere to be +seen. On the guns then rested the last hope of confirming the victory, +but they, having gained the Nek, were, to the wonderment of all, +pointed silently at the receding commandos. Doubt had at this critical +moment assailed the artillery commander. Just before the final stroke, +about 1.30 p.m., a message, purporting to come from Lukas Meyer, +proposing an armistice to look for the wounded, had passed through his +hands on its way to the General. No authoritative information as to +its having been accorded or not having reached him, he, with other +officers, became uncertain as to the propriety of continuing the +battle. At this time a bystander exclaimed that the Boer hospital was +retreating before him, and believing that he himself saw red-crossed +flags waving over the Boer column moving slowly away within shrapnel +range, his hesitation deepened. He refrained from opening fire, and +the Boer army, defeated, but not crushed, made despondently, but +without further losses, for the laager under the Doornberg, from which +it had marched the night before. + +[Sidenote: The return to camp.] + +Brigadier-General Yule, beset with anxiety concerning the Boer army, +which had menaced his flank all day from Impati, had no thought but to +secure his men in quarters before night and the still expected attack +fell upon them together. The infantry, therefore, after searching the +hill for wounded, were sent from the field. By 6 p.m., as evening fell +amid a storm of rain, all were back in camp. The mounted troops alone, +unseen since the early morning, did not return to their lines, nor was +there any sign of them until, at 7 p.m., two squadrons of the 18th +Hussars, under Major Knox, reported themselves. No more came in that +night, nor next morning, nor at any time. + +[Sidenote: Moeller's disastrous day.] + +The brief orders given to Colonel Moeller at the commencement of the +action have already been detailed, and even before the enemy's guns +were silenced that officer began to put them into execution with +promise of brilliant results. As early as 5.45 a.m. he despatched a +squadron of the 18th Hussars, with instructions to move round the +northern extremity of Talana, and report if it were possible to take +ground on the flank from which the enemy's retreat or, at least, his +loose ponies might be threatened. The reconnaissance was perfectly +successful. Moving northwards a mile down an arm of the Sand Spruit, +under the harmless fire of two guns, Major E. C. Knox guided his +squadron across the watercourse, and hidden, by the mist from Impati, +by a spur from Talana, turned north-east. Then crossing the main +spruit, above the point where its northerly trend is deflected by the +spurs of the two mountains, he swung boldly south-east and, +unperceived by the enemy, seized a kopje from which he could actually +look into the right rear of their position upon Talana, only 1,200 +yards distant to the south-west. Behind the mountain stood herds of +saddled ponies, whose masters lay out of sight in action along the +western crest. A message despatched to Colonel Moeller informing him of +this achievement, and asking for reinforcements, brought to the spot +another squadron of the 18th and the regimental machine gun, with the +section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry. These made their +way at first through a sharp fire from the pom-pom near the northern +end of Talana, but, like their predecessors, were neglected as soon as +they moved out of sight around the spur swelling up from the Sand +Spruit to the right flank of the Boer fastness. Shortly afterwards, in +response to a message from the General, who thought that the enemy's +guns, now suddenly silent, were being withdrawn, and that a general +retreat would shortly follow, Colonel Moeller himself hurried after +with the remaining squadron of the 18th and the mounted infantry +company of the Dublin Fusiliers. The cavalry were now in rear of the +flank of an enemy already wavering, and certain to fly shortly, whose +lines of retreat would be at their mercy, whose means of retreat, the +ponies, they could already partially destroy. But here, Moeller, +refusing the requests of his subordinates to be allowed to open fire +on the closely-packed ponies on Talana, first despatched a squadron +under Major Knox towards the rear of Talana, then himself quitted his +vantage ground and lined up his force in some plough land towards +Schultz' farm, and later in the open veld astride of the Landman's +Drift road, two and a half miles in rear of the centre of the Boer +position. Whilst moving in accordance with these dispositions, a +section of the Dublin Fusiliers mounted infantry, turning aside to +assail a party of Boers in a small farmhouse on the flank, captured +seven of them. + +[Sidenote: Knox's happy charge.] + +Meanwhile the squadron under Knox, reconnoitring towards the rear of +Smith's Nek, had been harassed by hostile patrols on its left flank. +These were speedily dispersed with a loss of ten prisoners by the +charge of a troop. But other and stronger patrols coming up from the +direction of Landman's Drift hung so persistently on the flank that a +charge by the whole squadron was necessary. It was completely +successful, two of the enemy being killed and about twenty-five +captured. The other patrols then drew off, and the squadron, finding +nothing more to do, returned to hand over the prisoners. But Moeller, +seeing the enemy swarming about the rear of Lennox Hill, at once +ordered Knox out again in that direction, this time with two squadrons +and a troop, directing him to get behind the hill, which, in +prolongation of Lennox Hill to the south, overlooks the coalfields on +one side and on the other abuts on the heights of Halifax. + +[Sidenote: Moeller's surrender.] + +He himself remained out in the open with his diminished force of +mounted infantry and two troops of cavalry. Now the enemy were +quitting Talana and Lennox Hills in numbers which increased +momentarily, and when the mounted infantry opened fire upon them, they +began to converge on the insignificant party which barred the road to +safety. Moeller at length perceived his danger, and commencing a series +of rapid retirements towards the northern spur of Impati, fixed his +only hope on the possibility of riding completely around that +mountain, outwork though it was of the main Boer army in its descent +from the frontier. In a spruit, a branch of the Sand river, which runs +through Schultz' farm, the Maxim, outpaced and overdriven, stuck fast, +and it was promptly attacked and captured by a party of twenty-five of +the enemy who had descried its plight from Talana, its detachment +holding out until all were killed or wounded. In this affair nine Boer +prisoners were also released. About 1.15 p.m., a party of two hundred +Boers was seen descending Impati through the collieries at its +northern extremity. The mountain already held the enemy's van; +Moeller's retreat was cut off. Adelaide farm lay close ahead, and here +for the first time he faced about for a stand. The men of the 18th +Hussars, with the section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry, +and one of the Dublin mounted infantry, lined the farm walls; the +remaining two sections of the mounted infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers +held a small kopje, two hundred yards from the building. The Boers +closed around in force and poured a bitter fusilade upon the troopers. +A gun, which had opened ineffectively from the colliery, was then +brought forward to 1,400 yards, and its projectiles shattered the +buildings, and scattered the horses. In a few moments another gun +opened more to the left and 1,100 yards distant. At 4 p.m. the white +flag was by Moeller's order waved in the farmyard, and he capitulated +to Commandant Trichardt. Nine officers and 205 men laid down their +arms after a loss of 8 men killed, 3 officers and 20 men wounded. This +affair all but doubled the day's casualties, which now numbered +500.[94] + + [Footnote 94: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.] + +[Sidenote: Knox wins his way home.] + +Meanwhile Knox's two squadrons were in little less danger in the +opposite direction. Attempting to intercept with dismounted fire +parties of the enemy, who were retiring towards Halifax, the little +force became the focus of every wandering party of the enemy, not only +of those evacuating the positions of Talana and Lennox Hill, but also +of many riding in from the Buffalo. For the hills and plain were full +of Boers who had taken no part in the battle. But Knox was not to be +trapped. Moving swiftly towards Malungeni, and favoured by a slight +mist, he slipped away, though nearly surrounded, and halted for half +an hour under cover. Then, whilst the Boers were puzzled by his +circuitous track, he dashed westwards through their intervals and +escaped. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE, AND THE ACTION OF RIETFONTEIN.[95] + + [Footnote 95: See maps Nos. 3, 5 and 7.] + + +[Sidenote: Yule decides not to retreat, but shifts his ground.] + +At 5, on the morning of October 21st, the troops again stood to arms. +There was no sign of life upon Talana; the cavalry scouted out +unmolested on that side. The mounted patrols, however, supported by +"F." company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, reconnoitring northward, +discovered the enemy on the Dannhauser road, and the foremost scouts +were driven in. At the same time information came of a hostile +movement to the westward. Whatever illusions may have existed +previously about the strategical situation, none now remained. General +Yule himself had at no time shared them; yet he was disinclined to +retreat. He re-created a staff,[96] examined a fresh defensive +position, and determined to stand his ground. Sending for his +commanding officers shortly after midday, he pointed out the new site +he had selected below the sloping shoulder of one of the foremost +spurs of Indumeni, about a mile south of their present camp, and +desired them to rendezvous upon it with their commands at 2.30 p.m., +less, however, with any intention of occupying it definitely than of +seeing how the troops "fitted into the ground." In view of the +expected bombardment from Impati, the whole of the tents except those +of the hospital had previously been lowered, and in them the men's +kits had been left ready packed for a move. The cavalry and artillery +started at once. Before the hour appointed for the march of the rest +of the troops the enemy made his presence on Impati felt. At 1.35 p.m. +a squadron of the 18th Hussars, reconnoitring near the Dannhauser +road, came suddenly under the fire of four guns and many rifles from +the north-western slopes of the mountain. + + [Footnote 96: Appointing Major A. J. Murray, Royal + Inniskilling Fusiliers, (late D.A.A.G.I.) as A.A.G., Lieut. + G. E. R. Kenrick, the Queen's Regiment, as acting D.A.A.G., + Captain C. K. Burnett, 18th Hussars, as Brigade Major to the + 8th infantry brigade, and Lieut. F. D. Murray, the Black + Watch, as A.D.C.] + +[Sidenote: Yule asks for reinforcements.] + +The Royal Irish Fusiliers led off towards the rendezvous at 2 p.m. By +3 p.m. all were in their places, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Royal Dublin +Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment and King's Royal Rifles, in the +order named from right to left. It was cold and dull, and the slight +rain turned to a heavy downpour, which filled the shallow trenches as +soon as they were made. At 3.30 p.m. Yule, receiving reports from his +patrols that the enemy was mounting guns upon Impati, and realising +more fully his peril, despatched a telegram to Ladysmith reporting his +arrangements, declaring his expectation of being attacked from both +sides, and asking for reinforcements. Before the message had reached +its destination, a shell from a heavy piece upon the western shoulder +of Impati burst in front of the new line. Others followed quickly, +some into the deserted camp where the hospital tents stood up as a +target, some into the entrenchments, others into the cavalry, who had +taken ground in the rear of the line of defence, and further up the +slopes of Indumeni. One falling into a tin house, which lay behind the +left, killed Lieut. W. M. J. Hannah, of the Leicestershire M.I., who +was sheltering from the storm, and wounded two of his men; elsewhere a +gunner was killed and another wounded. Another and a smaller gun then +opened from a point below the western crest of Impati. The accuracy of +the piece and the smallness of its calibre challenged the British +batteries to reply. But the first shrapnel burst at the foot of the +mountain, far below the Boer artillery, and when sinking the trails +failed to give the necessary elevation by some two thousand yards, the +gunners desisted. + +[Sidenote: Reinforcements cannot be sent.] + +Shortly before 4 p.m. Brigadier-General Yule received the compliments of +Sir George White upon his appointment to the rank of Major-General. An +hour later, a second telegram from Ladysmith informed him that the +reinforcements, which at this juncture he desired more than promotion, +could not be sent. The troops at Ladysmith,--telegraphed the Chief Staff +Officer,--were engaged at Elandslaagte and the Commander-in-Chief was in +the field with them. General Yule's request would be submitted to him on +his return, but little hopes could be held out of its being complied +with. + +[Sidenote: Yule will wait.] + +Still the General was unwilling to retreat. Accompanied by his staff +officer, he was on his way to find new ground, out of range of Impati, +before that mountain had become indistinct in the twilight. He was +long in the saddle, examining the northern slopes of Indumeni for a +suitable spot. Night drew on, the rain increasing with the dying +light; the regular fire of the enemy's guns became intermittent, then +ceased, and darkness closed round the British force on the spur. + +[Sidenote: He moves again.] + +At midnight Yule gave instructions for a move at 3 a.m. to the spot he +had selected, a flat-topped foothill of Indumeni, on its northern +side, and some two miles south of the bivouac. Before that hour the +transport, escorted by the cavalry and mounted infantry, was quietly +withdrawn, and made its way safely to the place appointed, where it +found cover behind the reverse slopes. The remainder, marching +punctually, covered by a rearguard of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, +reached the new position at 5 a.m., and took up an open line along the +crest, facing generally north in the following order of units from +left to right: Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment, Royal +Irish Fusiliers and King's Royal Rifles. + +[Sidenote: Receives news of Elandslaagte.] + +At 8 a.m., October 22nd, two despatch riders arriving from Helpmakaar +delivered a message from the Prime Minister of Natal, announcing a +victory on the previous day at Elandslaagte. "The British force from +Ladysmith,"--telegraphed Sir Albert Hime,--"completely defeated Boer +force over a thousand strong at Elandslaagte, capturing guns, tents +and equipment. Cavalry in full pursuit." + +[Sidenote: Yule marches to intercept fugitives.] + +It was at once apparent to General Yule that he was directly on the +line of retreat of the Boers flying from Sir George White's cavalry, +and he determined to attempt to intercept them. Glencoe Junction, at +the mouth of the Biggarsberg, appeared to be the point most likely to +promise success; he immediately issued orders for a general march in +that direction. + +[Sidenote: Catches a Tartar and returns.] + +At 10 a.m. an advance guard of the 69th battery, the mounted infantry, +and the 18th Hussars moved off at the trot for Glencoe. A wounded +Boer, who had been pushed up along the railway from Elandslaagte on a +trolly, was their only capture, and less than a dozen rounds of +shrapnel at 3,800 yards dispersed the few scattered parties of the +enemy visible along the kopjes. The remainder of the column wended +their way across the lower spurs of Indumeni. Soon a portion of the +baggage, seeking an easier road too near the camp, was descried from +Impati by the Boer gunners, who turned their pieces on both camp and +troops, and opened a rapid fire. The 67th battery, which had +previously been directed upon the Glencoe kopjes, now endeavoured in +vain to silence the Impati battery from near the left of the Dublin +Fusiliers. The enemy's shooting was as accurate as it was impartial, +though it was singularly ineffective. Shells of 96 lbs. weight burst +between the guns of the 67th battery, amongst the troops and baggage, +and all over the camp, doing no other damage than to add to the +sufferings of the wounded lying, with the apprehension of helpless +men, in the field hospital.[97] The descent of mist, however, soon put +an end to the bombardment, and the mounted arms, pushing forward +towards Glencoe, endeavoured to carry out the original intention. But +instead of fugitives, they found the Boers showing a firm front on the +high land north and west of the station, and some slight interchange +of shots took place, during which a troop of the 18th Hussars, +reconnoitring too boldly, was cut off, and was seen no more that +day.[98] With the enemy in this attitude upon strong ground, General +Yule saw the inutility of further efforts of this kind, and gave the +order for retirement. At 1 p.m. the force was again below Indumeni, as +it had been in the morning, having effected nothing. As the men +climbed the last few yards of the precipitous ascent, the fog, rolling +for a short time from the summit of Impati, once more gave the Boer +artillerymen on their lofty platform a view of the plain below, and +again the sufferers in the hospital endured the explosion of the heavy +projectiles of the Creusot cannon close outside their shelter. + + [Footnote 97: The Red Cross flag was so placed, and so small, + as to be invisible to the Boers.] + + [Footnote 98: This patrol, finding its retreat impossible, + made straight for Ladysmith, where it arrived safely next + day.] + +[Sidenote: Yule ordered to attempt retreat, prepares for it.] + +Yule, whose health, previously bad, had given way under the toil, +anxiety and exposure, now unwillingly decided to retire on Ladysmith +whilst the road still remained open, and at 5.45 p.m. he dictated a +message acquainting Sir G. White with his determination. Before it +could be despatched, at 6.30 p.m. a telegram from Ladysmith was placed +in his hands. It was Sir G. White's reply to his request for +reinforcements, and it banished the last cause for hesitation. "I +cannot reinforce you without sacrificing Ladysmith and the Colony +behind. You must try and fall back on Ladysmith. I will do what I may +to help you when nearer." Acknowledging its contents, Yule prepared +for retreat. + +[Sidenote: Retreat begins.] + +No sooner had darkness fallen than Major Wickham, of the Indian +Commissariat, taking with him thirty-three wagons guarded by two +companies of the Leicestershire regiment, left the hill and moved with +great precaution into the deserted camp. The convoy performed its short +but dangerous journey without attracting the attention of the enemy, and +the wagons, after being quickly loaded with as many stores as the +darkness, the confusion of the levelled tents, and limited time made +possible, were drawn up on the outskirts to await the passing of the +column. At 9 p.m. the whole force fell in. The night was fine but +intensely dark, and the units had some difficulty in reaching their +stations in the carefully arranged order of march. At 9.30 p.m. all +being ready, the column, guided by Colonel Dartnell, went quietly down +the mountain side towards Dundee, the southern boundary of which it was +necessary to skirt to gain the Helpmakaar road. By 11.15 p.m. the last +company was clear of the mountain, and, striking the track to Dundee at +the foot of Indumeni, the troops passed close to the bivouac ground of +the 21st October. Outside the town Major Wickham's convoy stood +waiting, and when, at the right moment, the signal was given, the +above-mentioned wagons fell into their place in the line of march. The +pace was rapid, despite the impenetrable gloom. Skirting Dundee, the +route turned sharply south-east around the corner of the Helpmakaar +road. On the edge of the town the precaution was taken to cut the +telegraph wire to Greytown.[99] By 4.30 a.m. October 23rd, the leading +files having traversed safely the defile of Blesboklaagte[100], had made +good twelve miles of the road to Helpmakaar, fourteen miles from the +starting-point. Near Dewaas, Yule, sending a message to Ladysmith to +announce his progress, halted on open ground, over which piquets were at +once thrown out on every side, and the batteries formed up for action. +Ten a.m. was the hour of starting again, the Royal Irish Fusiliers +relieving the King's Royal Rifles as advance guard. A blazing sun +beating upon the treeless downs, and a rumour of the enemy having been +seen ahead, now made marching toilsome and slow. By 12.30 p.m., less +than five miles having been covered, Yule decided to halt again, until +darkness should arrive to lessen both the fatigue and the risk of +discovery by the enemy. His situation was hazardous in the extreme. +Behind him the Boers would be soon on his heels, if they were not so +already; before him lay a defile known as Van Tonders Pass, deep and +difficult, some six miles in length. But at the slow rate of movement, +necessitated by the nature of the route through it, the passage of this +dangerous ground would take so much time and cause such disorder, that, +balancing the evils, Yule, after reconnoitring the obstacle, bivouacked +at 2 p.m. on a high and open spur of the Biggarsberg, overlooking the +valley of the Waschbank river, two miles east-south-east of Beith, and +one mile west of the junction of the Helpmakaar and Ladysmith roads. +Here he waited anxiously for the night. + + [Footnote 99: See map No. 4.] + + [Footnote 100: See map No. 3.] + +[Sidenote: The Boers occupy Dundee.] + +Late on the morning of the 23rd the Boers, after reconnoitring the +camp and its vicinity as closely as they dared, opened once more from +Impati with their heavy gun. The first shell burst in the hospital +lines, and Major J. F. Donegan, the chief medical officer, who, +fearing to prejudice General Yule's operations, had done nothing to +inform the enemy that his marquees were the only inhabited tents, now +determined to spare the wounded the horrors of further bombardment. +Captain A. E. Milner was therefore sent with a white flag to ask that +the fire should be stopped. Thereupon Erasmus' men, to whom news of +Yule's evacuation was a complete surprise, filed down the mountain, +and approached, not without caution. There was soon no room for doubt; +Dundee had fallen, and Erasmus' prize was large in inverse proportion +to the share he had taken in capturing it. No sooner was the absence +of the British soldiers established beyond a doubt, than the burghers +made haste to sack the camp and town. In a short time every tent, +except those of the hospitals, which were scrupulously respected, was +ransacked, and every shop turned inside out. Commandant-General +Joubert now sent orders to Lukas Meyer to pursue Yule with a thousand +men. Meyer did so, but marching late and slowly, failed to come up +with the British. + +[Sidenote: Night march Oct. 23rd Oct. 24th.] + +At 11 p.m. Yule roused his men for a fresh effort. A hot day had given +place to a bleak and bitter night. But though the road was steep and +obstructed, and Van Tenders Pass plunged in profound gloom, the +column, headed by the Dublin Fusiliers, marched punctually and well. +By dawn the dangerous defile was safely threaded and the force +debouched on to the broad veld which rolls about the southern +buttresses of the Biggarsberg. At 6 a.m., October 24th, the vanguard +was at the Waschbank river, some thirteen miles from Beith, and on its +southern bank the troops were allowed to bivouac, the rearguard +closing up at 10 a.m., after ten weary hours' marching. + +[Sidenote: Yule, Oct. 24th, moves to sound of guns.] + +As they halted, heavy and prolonged reports of artillery sounded from +the westward. It was evident that Sir G. White was fighting an action +upon the flank near Elandslaagte or Modder Spruit, and, in response to +the urgent request of his senior officers, Yule determined to despatch +at once a portion of his command to co-operate. Yule himself, though +now almost prostrate with illness and fatigue, rode out westward at +the head of the 67th and 69th field batteries, two squadrons 18th +Hussars, and two companies M.I. The remainder of the troops were left +by the Waschbank under command of Lieut.-Col. Carleton, Royal Irish +Fusiliers, who took up a defensive position on the northern bank. + +[Sidenote: Yule recrosses Waschbank Oct. 24th.] + +Yule moved rapidly westwards over the shadeless tract lying between +the Sunday's and Waschbank rivers. Nine miles his mounted men pressed +towards the sound of the guns, but still the most advanced scouts saw +nothing, and when, about 2 p.m., the noise of the firing, still far +ahead, began to die away, he gave the order to retire to the +Waschbank. His men were back in bivouac at 4 p.m. No sooner had the +infantry from the height above filed over the muddy pools than a +storm, which had been gathering all day in the terrible heat, burst, +and cooled the sun-baked ground with a waterspout of rain. The +Waschbank, which had all but perished in the drought, in less than an +hour rose from three inches to a height of twelve feet of roaring +water, thirty-five yards in breadth. The rearmost infantry plunged +hurriedly across before it had attained its strength. A piquet of the +Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and a patrol of the 18th Hussars, who had +covered the passage, found themselves cut off, and remained long on +the enemy's side of the river. + +[Sidenote: Oct. 25 Yule gets touch with White.] + +At 4 a.m. on the 25th the march was resumed along the southern and +least direct[101] of the two routes, which bifurcate at the Waschbank. +At 8.30 a.m. the advance guard was at and over Sunday's river, seven +miles further on, the rearguard crossing by the steep drift at noon, +and here the column rested. At 1 p.m. it was on the move again, +breasting the gentler ascent which swells upwards from the southern +bank of the stream, and after covering some four and a half miles, was +again halted at 3.45 p.m. upon the summit of a high ridge due north of +Kankana Mountain. Here preparations were made to pass the night; the +piquets went out, rations were distributed and cooked. At 5 p.m., +however, a patrol of the 5th Lancers from Ladysmith rode up with +orders from Sir G. White. Behind them a column under Lt.-Col. J. A. +Coxhead, R.A., was on the way from Ladysmith to assist the Dundee +detachment over the last stage. There were reports that the enemy was +about to close in from every side. General Yule was to effect a +junction with Coxhead at once, and to proceed without another check +into Ladysmith. + + [Footnote 101: The northern road had been reconnoitred and + found to be without water.] + +[Sidenote: Night march Oct. 25th-26th.] + +At 6 p.m. began a night march of great distress and trouble. Soon +after the advance guard moved off, a heavy downpour converted the road +into a sea of semi-liquid mire, which the transport ploughed into +waves and furrows. These, invisible in the black darkness, almost held +down the soldiers plunging knee-deep into them. The teams of mules, +exhausted by prolonged labour and insufficient food, impatient by +nature of wet and darkness, strove with much suffering to drag the +rocking wagons through the mud, and, as is their habit when +overmastered by their load, threw themselves often in confusion +athwart the track and enforced a halt. At 9 p.m. the whole of the +transport stuck fast for more than two hours. The rearguard closed up, +but the troops in front of the baggage, knowing nothing of its +misfortunes, and travelling on a road not destroyed by its struggles, +pushed on and left it. With great efforts it was set in motion again, +but some half-dozen of the wagons, being imbedded hopelessly, had to +be abandoned.[102] Half a mile further the convoy was again in +difficulties. From this point all cohesion was lost. Some of the +wagons passed on, some remained; it was impossible for their escorts +to tell which were derelict and which they must still consider as in +their charge. + + [Footnote 102: They were recovered next day.] + +[Sidenote: Coxhead's relief column.] + +Throughout the night Lieut.-Col. Coxhead, R.A., who had left Ladysmith +at 9 a.m. on October 25th, lay waiting about a mile east of the Nek +between Bulwana[103] and Lombards Kop for the Dundee column to join +hands with his own. With him were the 5th Lancers, half a battalion +2nd Gordon Highlanders, half a battalion 1st Manchester regiment, the +21st battery R.F.A., and a convoy containing two days' supplies, which +General Yule had asked for, in a message despatched from the bivouac +at the Waschbank river on the 24th. Coxhead immediately gained touch +with Yule by means of his mounted troops, and learning that the food +would not be required, sent the wagons back. All day the troops from +Ladysmith remained on the Helpmakaar road. But night and torrents of +rain fell together, and Coxhead's men bivouacked in discomfort only +less than that of their comrades toiling towards them, still nine +miles distant. + + [Footnote 103: Or Umbulwana.] + +[Sidenote: The retreat ends Oct 26th.] + +At 3.30 a.m. on the 26th, just as the Ladysmith garrison was getting +under arms, in case a sally to bring in Yule might after all be +necessary, the foremost of the mounted men from Dundee rode up to +Modder Spruit. An hour later the Leicestershire regiment and the +King's Royal Rifles arrived, much exhausted, but in good order. After +a brief halt they went on into the town, which they entered at 6 a.m. +The other regiments, with the transport which had delayed them, coming +up to Coxhead between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., halted for two hours, and had +breakfast before pushing on. + +[Sidenote: Cause of Rietfontein action, Oct. 24th.] + +It is necessary now to revert to the action which had, on October +24th, been heard in the bivouac by the Waschbank, that action of which +a ride of nine miles westward had failed to disclose either the +purport or the scene. The arrival on the 23rd of Free State commandos +upon the heights north and west of the railway had redoubled Sir G. +White's already great anxiety for the safety of the retreat from +Dundee. In reality, the presence of the Free State forces on the +commanding ranges to the west of Elandslaagte was less dangerous than +it appeared, for Yule was marching in greater obscurity than either +he, or Sir G. White, imagined. When, indeed, on the morning of the +24th, the Free Staters saw troops issuing from Ladysmith, they +believed them to be the combined forces of Generals White and +Yule,[104] though the latter was at the moment still actually upon the +wrong side of the Waschbank. At still greater cross-purposes was +Erasmus, who set off on the morning of the 24th, with so little hope +of overtaking the retreat that he chose the only route by which it was +impossible for him to do so, the main road west of the railway. +Nevertheless, on the evening of the 25th, Erasmus' bivouac was near +Elandslaagte, and the wisdom of Sir G. White's order for the instant +continuance of the march of the column on that afternoon was +manifested. Had that march not been executed, Yule, the action of +Rietfontein notwithstanding, would have had the vanguard of Joubert's +army upon his flank next day, when only operations from Ladysmith on +the largest scale could have extricated him. + + [Footnote 104: C. de Wet, "Three Years' War."] + +[Sidenote: The Rietfontein position.] + +Some seven miles north-east of Ladysmith, Rietfontein[105] farmhouse +lay by a branch of the Modder Spruit, south-west of a long, low ridge, +which descended to the railway line in smooth and easy slopes dotted +with ant-heaps, with on its forehead a sparse eyebrow of stones. +Beyond the crest line, to the northward, the ground sank with a gentle +sweep, broken only by two rough under-features jutting from the +western extremity of the ridge, to rear itself again eight hundred +yards beyond into a line of abrupt heights. The southernmost of these, +called Intintanyoni,[106] leaped up steeply from the hollow, and +beyond and behind it stretched many leagues of rolling ground, with +scarce a subsidence until they merged in the tumultuous billows of the +Drakensberg. Two grassy pinnacles, nearly equal in height, flanked +Intintanyoni. Of these the western looked across a deep and narrow +gorge over to Nodashwana or Swaatbouys Kop, of a somewhat greater +elevation, whilst below the eastern, deep re-entrants, both on the +north and south, divided Intintanyoni from the magnificent curve of +highlands, which terminated west of Elandslaagte in the wooded mass of +Jonono's Kop.[107] + + [Footnote 105: See map No. 7.] + + [Footnote 106: Also called Tintwa Inyoni.] + + [Footnote 107: A freehand sketch of the position from + Nodashwana to Jonono's Kop will be found in the case of maps + accompanying this volume. Jonono's Kop is not shown in the + plan of Rietfontein, no part of the battle having been near + it.] + +[Sidenote: The Boer occupation of it.] + +East of the twin peaks of Intintanyoni various lesser eminences and +hollow Neks completed the tempestuous irregularity of this singular +feature, along whose crest six Free State commandos lay waiting for +their first battle on the morning of October 24th. To the east, with +patrols upon Jonono's Kop, lay the men of Bethlehem, Vrede, and +Heilbron; about the eastern peak of Intintanyoni the Winburg commando +held the ground, in charge of two pieces of artillery; on their right, +occupying the rest of the mountain, the burghers of Kroonstad made +ready; whilst those of Harrismith disposed themselves partly upon a +supporting position in rear, and partly as piquets and observation +posts on outlying kopjes, amongst others the lofty Nodashwana. Some +6,000 riflemen in all filled the six-mile line of heights. They were +commanded by General A. P. Cronje, who had arrived only on this +morning, the 24th, to replace de Villiers, who had been in temporary +charge. + +[Sidenote: Sir George marches out, Oct. 24th.] + +Sir G. White moved out from Ladysmith at 5 a.m. with the 5th Lancers, +19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, Natal Mounted Rifles, 42nd and +53rd batteries R.F.A., No. 10 Mountain battery R.G.A., 1st Liverpool, +1st Devon, 1st Gloucestershire regiments, and 2nd King's Royal Rifle +Corps, in all, some 5,300 officers and men, assuming himself the +direction of an operation certain to be delicate, likely to be +extremely dangerous. Moving up the Newcastle road from its rendezvous +near the junction of the Free State railway, the force had proceeded +six miles when the advanced screen of cavalry came under a dropping +rifle fire at 7 a.m. from the heights on their left. Their action was +prompt. Pushing rapidly across the Modder Spruit, a squadron of 5th +Lancers, supported by two others, drove back at the gallop the small +parties of Boers hovering in that neighbourhood, and themselves seized +and held this advanced position. The remainder of the cavalry, +stringing out along high ground dominating the western bank of the +spruit, and facing more to the eastward, formed a strong flank guard +towards Jonono's Kop. At 8 a.m., whilst fitful discharges of musketry +rose and fell along the widely-extended line of troopers, the infantry +had come up to Rietfontein. No sooner had they arrived at a point on +the road some five hundred yards east of the Modder Spruit, than a +loud report broke from the eastern peak of Intintanyoni, and a shell, +bursting on impact, fell into the head of the column. Thereupon the +British artillery wheeled out from the route, and in line of batteries +trotted towards a level crossing over the railway, some six hundred +yards west of the road. Arrived at this defile, and forming column +inwards to traverse it, the first gun had scarcely passed the rails, +when both the Boer guns on the high green rampart ahead opened upon +the point, which had been taken as one of their range marks. Five +hundred yards beyond it the artillery deployed behind a rise. The +second round from the 53rd battery, fused at 3,600 yards, burst full +upon one of the Boer pieces, and the gunners of both weapons fled. +After a few more rounds the 53rd limbered up and prepared to advance. + +[Sidenote: The infantry seize ridge facing hill.] + +The infantry were already over the railway, and moving +forward--Gloucester regiment on the left, Liverpool regiment on the +right--up the gentle but protected slope, swelling to the summit of +the low ridge of Rietfontein. The 1st Devonshire regiment, in support, +lay at the base, whilst the 2nd King's Royal Rifles remained in rear +in charge of the baggage. On the appearance of the leading companies +upon the crest, firing broke out from the whole length of the crest of +Intintanyoni, to which the British infantry, lying prone, soon replied +as vigorously. Of the artillery, the 42nd battery was quickly in +action near the centre of the front, whilst the 53rd unlimbered some +six hundred yards to the left, and began shelling a rocky underfeature +of Intintanyoni, at a range of 1,500 yards. Sharp musketry assailed +them. Then the 42nd battery, being ordered further to the left, passed +behind the 53rd and the 10th Mountain battery, which had come into +line on the left of the 53rd, and opened 1,900 yards from the summit +of Intintanyoni. Thus began a severe fire fight at ranges varying from +one to two thousand yards. Especially was it hotly contested where the +Gloucester on the left of the British opposed the 1,400 Kroonstad men, +who, under Nel, maintained the Boer right. Heavy exchanges of rifle +fire swept across the valley in this part, and in spite of the steady +practice of the artillery, it became necessary to reinforce the +attackers. For this purpose the Devonshire regiment was pushed up on +the left of the Gloucester, half the King's Royal Rifles coming from +the baggage train to fill its place in support. + +[Sidenote: An untoward incident.] + +Sir G. White had all but accomplished his purpose, that of intervening +between the Free State commandos and Yule's line of march, when one of +those accidents of war, inexplicable because of the death of those who +alone could explain them, largely increased his hitherto insignificant +losses. Shortly before midday Colonel E. P. Wilford, commanding the +1st Gloucestershire, taking a company of his battalion and the +regimental Maxim gun, dashed out of cover down the open slope as if to +assault. Another half company of the battalion moved on ahead to cut +a wire fence which obstructed the front. The Boers, who for a time had +lain quiet under the shrapnel, which searched their position from end +to end, at once opened a fierce fusilade. Colonel Wilford was shot +dead, and his men fell rapidly, the detachment finally halting upon a +low ridge beneath Intintanyoni. Further advance was impossible. Only +with difficulty could both the Gloucestershire and "D." squadron +I.L.H., which had joined in the attack, be withdrawn. Fortunately, as +the attempt was promptly ordered to cease, though many had been +wounded, only six were killed in the adventure. Meanwhile the shooting +over their heads had been continuous. The enemy, encouraged by this +event, and by the immobility of Sir G. White's line of battle, which +they imagined to be awed from its purpose by their resistance, still +clung to their fastness, and maintained a heavy though spasmodic fire. +More than once the gunners of the still uninjured piece beneath the +eastern peak made efforts to drag it forward into action, but the +British artillerymen watched the spot narrowly, and each attempt was +blown back by shrapnel, under which Intintanyoni burst into flames. +Many of the Boer ponies herded in rear, terrified by the blaze, +stampeded. Then, up on Nodashwana, amongst the Harrismith men, a stir +was descried which seemed to threaten an outflanking manoeuvre against +the British left. Sir G. White, anxious for his communications with +Ladysmith, promptly countered the movement by calling the Natal +Mounted Rifles across from his right, and sending them on in front of +his left flank.[108] The Colonial riflemen went with such skill into +the maze of broken ground below the mountain, that they not only +succeeded in outflanking the outflankers, but actually drove by +enfilade fire all of the Kroonstad commando, who were upon the right +of Intintanyoni, far back across the hill to where the Winburgers lay +at the eastern extremity. All danger ceased definitely on this side +when two guns of the 42nd battery, turning towards the ridges of +Nodashwana, in a few moments cleared it of the enemy, and converted it +also into a huge bonfire of blazing grass. At 1.30 p.m. the Boer fire +had dwindled all along the main ridge, and an hour later it ceased +altogether. Only from the far right came the sound of musketry from +the cavalry still fencing with scattered detachments of the Heilbron, +Vrede and Bethlehem burghers, who clung to them pertinaciously. + + [Footnote 108: The situation at this time is depicted on map + No. 7.] + +[Sidenote: Return to Ladysmith.] + +At 3 p.m. Sir G. White gave the order for a general retirement. His +object was accomplished, with the not undue loss of 114 casualties. +Yule was now safe for that day, and he believed the Free State army to +have suffered severely enough to keep it inactive on the next, when he +intended to assist the Dundee column by other means. But the Boers +watched the withdrawal of the British troops with very little +despondency. Unaware of the true situation of the Dundee column, they +misunderstood operations designed to keep them from it. The +demonstration against Intintanyoni seemed to them nothing less than a +serious attempt to drive them from their hold, and the retreat of the +British to be that of a baffled army. Thus, ignorant of their +strategical defeat, they rejoiced at what seemed a tactical victory. +Moreover, their losses[109] had been small. The cavalry alone, now +called upon to protect the rear--as all day they had covered the +right--had difficulty in returning. For some distance they had to +maintain a running fire fight, and it was nearly 7 p.m. before the +rearmost troopers entered Ladysmith, which the head of the infantry +column had reached two hours and a half earlier.[110] + + [Footnote 109: 13 killed, 31 wounded.] + + [Footnote 110: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +ELANDSLAAGTE.[111] + + [Footnote 111: See maps Nos. 3 and 6.] + + +[Sidenote: Early days in Ladysmith, Oct. 11th to 19th.] + +During the time (Oct. 12th-Oct. 26th, 1899) occupied by the episode of +the Dundee detachment, including the action of Rietfontein fought to +assist it in retreat, much had happened elsewhere. + +[Sidenote: Oct. 16th.] + +[Sidenote: Oct. 17th.] + +[Sidenote: Oct. 18th.] + +[Sidenote: Oct. 19th.] + +Sir G. White arrived in Ladysmith on the 11th October. On the 12th +telegraphic communication by Harrismith entirely ceased, and the mail +train from that town failed to arrive. Early on the 12th a telegram +from a post of observation of Natal Carbineers at Acton Homes gave +information that a strong column of Boers, with four miles of train, +was on the march through Tintwa Pass, the head of it being already +across the border; furthermore, that there seemed to be an advance +guard concealed in Van Reenen's Pass. Sir G. White prepared to strike +instantly; but a British detachment which reached Dewdrop next day saw +the Boer vanguard, halted in the mouth of Tintwa Pass, and as +previously described (p. 123) returned to Ladysmith. A cavalry +reconnaissance[112] in the same direction on the 16th found that the +commandos had not stirred and, though Olivier's Hoek, Bezuidenhout's, +Tintwa and Van Reenen's Passes were all occupied,[113] the country +east of them was as clear of the enemy as heretofore. There appeared +an unaccountable hesitation amongst the Free Staters. Rumours of +disagreement, and even of actual hostilities between the commandos, +reached the British camp. They were not altogether groundless, and Sir +G. White, utilising the respite, set himself to consider how his field +force might be turned into a garrison, and his place of rest into a +fortress, should it be necessary, as now seemed likely, to stand a +siege in Ladysmith. A complete scheme of defence was drawn up on the +16th, and a mobile column organised for instant service in any +quarter. But, whilst the real enemy lay idle on the west, rumour, +working in his favour far to the southward, troubled the British +general and robbed him of troops he could ill spare. On the 17th a +telegram from the Governor of Natal announced that there was evidence +of a contemplated Boer raid via Zululand upon Pietermaritzburg and +Durban,[114] and asked for reinforcements for the defenceless capital. +They were promptly sent,[115] and quitted Ladysmith just as the Free +Staters in the mountains received with much discussion the order to +cross the frontier. Before dawn of the 18th all the commandos were on +the move down the defiles, the men of Bethlehem in Olivier's Hoek +Pass, of Heilbron in Bezuidenhout's, of Kroonstad in Tintwa, of +Winburg in Van Reenen's, of Harrismith in De Beer's, of Vrede in +Mueller's. By 8 a.m. Acton Homes was in the hands of 3,000 Boers, and +shortly after, west of Bester's station, a piquet of the Natal +Carbineers was sharply attacked by the Harrismith commando, and forced +to retire with loss. The Boers then occupied Bester's station, where +they halted for the night. The news of this rapid development caused a +great stir in Ladysmith. As early as the 15th Sir George White had +decided upon the evacuation of the camp, which lay outside the town, +but hitherto no orders had been issued to this effect. All the 18th +the work of removing the troops and stores from the camp to the town +defences previously selected was pushed on with such despatch, that by +10 p.m. these were well manned. The Pietermaritzburg column, which had +reached Colenso, was ordered back to Onderbrook. Next day the General +rode around Ladysmith, re-adjusting with great care the line of +defence selected on the 16th. Instructions were then sent to +Wolseley-Jenkins to resume his march to Pietermaritzburg, the Imperial +Light Horse alone being taken from the column and brought back into +Ladysmith.[116] + + [Footnote 112: 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, M.I., 1st King's + (Liverpool) regiment.] + + [Footnote 113: On the 15th the Intelligence estimate of the + Free State forces in the Drakensberg was as + follows:--Olivier's Hoek, 3,000; Tintwa, 1,000; Van Reenen's, + 1,200, with 15 guns; Nelson's Kop, 3,500, with detachments in + the passes to the north. Total, 11,000 men.] + + [Footnote 114: Telegram No. 30 of 18th October, 1899, + Ladysmith. Sir G. White to Secretary of State.] + + [Footnote 115: Strength: 19th Hussars, one field battery, + five squadrons Imperial Light Horse (raised at Maritzburg in + Sept. 1899), seven companies Liverpool regiment, + half-battalion 2nd King's Royal Rifles, under + Brigadier-General C. B. H. Wolseley-Jenkins. The other half + of the latter battalion was already in Maritzburg.] + + [Footnote 116: The whole of Wolseley-Jenkins' column + eventually returned to Ladysmith during the night of + 22nd-23rd October.] + +[Sidenote: Kock Oct. 19th and night of Oct. 19th-20th seizes +Elandslaagte station.] + +Meanwhile, the Boer General, Kock, having arrived on the summit of the +Biggarsberg on the 19th, promptly pushed patrols down the southern +slopes. Field Cornet Potgieter, the leader of one of these, pressing +on in company with a party of Viljoen's men, under Field Cornet +Pienaar, dashed into Elandslaagte station, some twenty miles +southward, and attacked and captured a supply train which was steaming +through the station on its way to Glencoe. Potgieter at once sent back +word to Kock, who, replying with the order: "Hold on to the trains at +any cost, I am following with the whole detachment," marched all +night, and joined his lieutenant near the looted train at break of day +on the 20th. + +[Sidenote: French moves out Oct. 20th, but is recalled.] + +News of the event was quickly received at Headquarters. At 11 a.m. on +the 20th Major-General J. D. P. French, who had only arrived at 5 a.m. +that morning, left Ladysmith with the 5th Lancers, the Natal Mounted +Rifles and Natal Carbineers, and a battery Royal Field artillery, to +ascertain the situation at Elandslaagte. An infantry brigade, under +Colonel Ian Hamilton, moved out in support. But whilst they were on +the march, the Free Staters at Bester's became so active that Sir +George White, fearing an attack whilst part of his force was absent, +sent orders to check the reconnaissance before it was half completed, +and by sunset French was back in Ladysmith, having seen nothing but +the German commando, Kock's screen. + +[Sidenote: Encouraged by news of Talana.] + +[Sidenote: White, Oct. 21st, sends French out again to Elandslaagte.] + +[Sidenote: French retakes station.] + +[Sidenote: but falls back.] + +By this time news of the victory at Talana[117] had come in. Its +partial extent not fully understood at first, it not only lifted a load +from the General's mind, but showed him where he too could strike a +blow. The commandos at Elandslaagte, yesterday dangerous from their +position on Symons' line of retreat, were to-day in peril themselves, +and he determined to give them no time to remove into safety. At 4 a.m. +on the 21st French was again on the move towards Elandslaagte[118] with +five squadrons (338 men) Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Field +artillery. At 6 a.m. a half battalion (330 men) of the 1st Manchester +regiment, with Railway and Royal engineer detachments, followed by rail, +preceded by the armoured train manned by one company of the same +battalion. Moving along the Newcastle road, French made straight for the +high ground south-west of Elandslaagte station, and at 7 a.m. his +advance and right flank guards (Imperial Light Horse) came in touch with +the enemy, the former south of the collieries, the latter on the open +veld some four miles south of the railway. As the mist lifted, parties +of Boers were seen all about the station and colliery buildings, and +over the undulating veld, and it was observed that most of these, on +sighting the British scouts, drew back upon a group of kopjes situated +about a mile south-east of the station. French immediately ordered up +the Natal battery on to a flat hillock which rose between the railway +and the Newcastle road, south-east of Woodcote farm, and at 8 a.m. a +shot from the 7-pounders, sighted at 1,900 yards, crashed into the tin +out-buildings of the station. A crowd of Boers swarmed out at the +explosion and with them some of the British captured in the train the +day before, the former galloping for the kopjes, the latter making for +the protection of their countrymen at the battery. At the same time a +squadron of the Imperial Light Horse galloped for the station in +extended files, captured the Boer guard, and released the station and +colliery officials who were there in durance. But in a few moments +shells from the group of kopjes beyond the station began to fall into +the battery, one smashing an ammunition wagon. The gunners attempted in +vain to reply; their pieces were outranged by over 500 yards, and at +8.15, on the arrival of the infantry near at hand, they fell back +leaving the wagon derelict. At 8.30 a.m. French withdrew to a point four +miles south of Woodcote farm, and from here sent a report to Sir George +White, informing him that about 400 Boers with three guns were before +him on a prepared position, and asking for support. The enemy's +artillery continued to shell the troops, and French, after questioning +the prisoners and the released Britons, and examining more closely, came +to the conclusion that there were from 800 to 1,000 Boers in front of +him. When parties of the enemy began to appear also upon Jonono's Kop to +the north-west he judged it prudent to withdraw his weak detachment +still further, and by 11.30 a.m. was back nearly at the Modder Spruit. +On the way he fell in with a reinforcement from Ladysmith consisting of +one squadron 5th Lancers,[119] one squadron 5th Dragoon Guards, and the +42nd battery Field artillery, all under Colonel Coxhead, R.A., and with +these he retraced his steps to the Modder Spruit siding, where a halt +was called. + + [Footnote 117: Telegraphic communication by Greytown was + still intact.] + + [Footnote 118: See map No. 3. Orders were to "clear the + neighbourhood of Elandslaagte of the enemy and cover the + reconstruction of the railway and telegraphic lines."] + + [Footnote 119: Another squadron, 5th Lancers, supported from + Pepworth Hill by a company of the 1st Devonshire regiment, + turned aside when four miles out to watch the Free Staters + towards Bester's.] + +[Sidenote: He asks for reinforcements and orders.] + +It was now evident to General French that an action of great +importance could be fought or avoided before nightfall. At noon, +therefore, he communicated with Sir George White, and, after informing +him of his own and the enemy's situations, and the best line of +attack, stated that in his opinion the numbers required would be three +battalions of infantry, two batteries, and more cavalry than he had at +the moment. He would await instructions. They came with promptitude; +for Sir G. White had determined to ruin this commando, and sweep it +from Yule's communications, before it could separate. "The enemy must +be beaten, and driven off," he wrote to French. "Time of great +importance." Within a quarter of an hour of the receipt of the above +message, French had promulgated his orders; within half an hour, at +1.30 p.m., before the arrival of the reinforcements, the advance upon +the kopjes had begun. + +[Sidenote: The ground held by Boers.] + +Running south-east, with its northern extremity about a mile from the +station, the ground held by the enemy covered some 4,000 yards from +flank to flank, and consisted of four boulder-strewn kopjes. That +nearest the station was steep and rocky, its top 200 yards broad and +sloping rearwards; next and somewhat retired from the general line, +700 yards distant, on the far side of a deep cup scored with dongas, +arose one of those singular isosceles triangular eminences of which +South Africa almost alone possesses the mould. A Nek, carrying the +roadway to a farm behind, separated this from the main feature 500 +yards away. This was a bluff and precipitous hill, thatched here and +there with long grasses on its northern face, on its eastern sloping +easily down to the veld which rolled in rounded waves towards +Ladysmith. Its summit was almost flat, a bouldered plateau, 400 yards +long by 200 wide, falling in rocky spurs to the river a mile and a +half in rear, and slanting at its southern extremity into a broad and +broken Nek. This climbed again 2,000 yards away up to the last kopje +of the position, whose top, also flat, swung first south, then sharply +west, to merge finally into the grassy rises which approached almost +to Modder Spruit. Though the general elevation was no more than some +300 feet from the ground level, so bare was the terrain about its +base, that the insignificant hills presented a formidable face to the +south-west. Across the railway, some six miles to the north-west, +Jonono's Kop looked over these low ridges, and threw great spurs, +dotted with Kaffir villages, down into the undulating prairie which +rolled between them. On one of these spurs, which came down to the +Newcastle road, 100 men of the German commando, under Schiel, had, on +the retirement of the British, taken post, supported on an +underfeature close to the eastward by Field Cornet Joubert's +Johannesburgers, and Vrede men (100) under De Jager. The rest of the +commandos occupied the main feature above described, the remainder of +the Germans the kopje nearest the station, strong skirmishing parties +being thrown out, under Field Cornet Pienaar, along the uplands which +ran out southward in front of their left flank. Slightly retired from +the forward crest of the main hill were posted the two guns, below +and behind the right of which, beside the roadway creeping between the +bluff and the tall triangular kopje, the laager had been pitched on a +flat of sun-baked mud. + +[Sidenote: French attacks at once.] + +[Sidenote: The infantry reinforcements arrive.] + +Major-General French moved forward quickly without waiting for the +reinforcements from Ladysmith. A squadron 5th Dragoon Guards under +Major St. J. C. Gore on the west of the railway, and one of the 5th +Lancers on the east, each covering two miles, scouted in front of the +batteries and Imperial Light Horse, the 1st Manchester following +slowly in the train. The Lancers were first in touch with the enemy, +their progress being checked at 2 p.m. by Pienaar's piquets posted, as +already described, on the low ridge running parallel to the railway, +the ridge, indeed, which General French had selected as the +springboard for his attack. A gun, opening from the hills behind, +supported the skirmishers: the Lancer squadron had to retire. But +Colonel Scott Chisholme quickly brought up four squadrons Imperial +Light Horse, which, pressing forward in squadron-column with extended +files, with the 5th Lancer squadron on the right, stormed the ridge +and cleared it. The crest thus secured, the Manchester detrained under +its cover at 2.30 p.m. about three miles south-west of Elandslaagte. +Ten minutes later they were joined by a half-battalion 2nd Gordon +Highlanders and seven companies of the 1st Devonshire regiment, who +formed up on the veld in brigade-line of quarter-columns, facing +north-east, Devonshire on the right, Manchester on the left. Before +starting, the 7th brigade was addressed in inspiriting terms by its +commander, Colonel Ian Hamilton. The Manchester led the way, heading +for the ridge occupied by the Imperial Light Horse, with two companies +covering 500 yards in front line; the Devonshire supported, and the +Highlanders marched in reserve. As the brigade began to move, a burst +of musketry from across the railway to the north told that the +squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards had run into the enemy on the lower +spurs of Jonono's Kop. So strong did the opposition there appear that +the 42nd and 21st batteries, with a squadron 5th Lancers which had +just escorted the guns from Ladysmith, were despatched to the spot in +support. A few shrapnel from the 42nd battery sufficed to silence the +Mausers, and the artillery recrossed the railway, the 5th Dragoon +Guards also receiving an order to come in. The artillery were then +ordered to go on at once and open against the main position. On their +way to the front they passed the marching infantry, whose directions +were now somewhat altered; for whilst the Manchester in the van still +pushed eastwards for Scott Chisholme's captured ridge, the Devonshire, +diverging half left from this line, now led upon the enemy's right +flank, and behind, in the ever increasing interval thus created +between the two battalions, the Gordon Highlanders were extending in +reserve. + +[Sidenote: Sir George arrives and approves.] + +[Sidenote: The Boer guns are silenced.] + +Whilst the advance was in progress Sir G. White, who had ridden fast +from Ladysmith, arrived upon the field, escorted by a troop of Natal +Mounted Rifles. Recognising the excellence of General French's plans +and arrangements, he remained only as a spectator, leaving to his +subordinate complete control of the battle. A few moments later, at 4 +p.m., the British guns came into action in front of the infantry at a +range of 4,400 yards. The enemy replied, shells bursting in the 21st +battery. So rapid a bombardment was at once delivered against the hill +that, after firing twenty rounds, all of which fell among the guns, +the Boer gunners fled from their pieces. Then the artillery, changing +their target continually, searched all the top with shrapnel. The 1st +Devonshire regiment, pushing west of the rise to a point 800 yards +north of the batteries, lay down on a front of 500 yards. At 3.30 p.m. +this battalion had received an order to move, when the artillery +preparation should cease, right across the open grass plain which +separated them from the enemy, and to hold him to his defences. + +[Sidenote: Manchester with Gordons assail left.] + +[Sidenote: Devonshire pin right.] + +A thousand yards south-east of the Devonshire, beyond the batteries, +the Manchester had halted near the crest at the point of its curve +northward, and this curve they were ordered to follow until it brought +them upon the opposed left flank. A mile in rear, still, therefore, in +the plain below, the Gordon Highlanders halted, and orders came to +them to support the Manchester at the next stage. At 4.30 p.m. the +infantry rose and moved forward. On the left the Devonshire, with +three companies covering some 600 yards in front, and four companies +in reserve, in column, with 50 paces distance between the single +ranks, steered upon the tall cone which marked the right-centre of the +Boers. Their march led them at first downhill into the broad bowl +which lay below the foot of the kopjes, a hollow as smooth as a meadow +but for the infrequent ant-hills. Shrapnel began from the first to +burst over the battalion, but the soldiers pressed steadily onward +until, at a point some 1,200 yards from the enemy, severe rifle-fire +began to play upon them, and they were halted to reply to it. Their +section volleys soon beat heavily about the Boer right, and pinned the +burghers to their sangars. A little later, the Devonshire firing line, +now stiffened by the supports, advanced again down the bullet-swept +slope and gained a shallow donga about 850 yards from the crest. Here +Major C. W. Park disposed his battalion for a musketry fight. He had +carried out the first part of his orders, and it was necessary now to +await the development of the attack in progress against the other +flank. With some loss, therefore, the Devonshire lay within close +range of the hostile lines. So briskly, however, did they engage them, +that the attention of a great part of the Boer force was drawn to that +direction, and for a time the simultaneous movement against the other +flank proceeded almost unnoticed. The Manchester, indeed, during the +early portion of their advance, were not easily to be seen from the +Boers' left. Skilfully led, they made their way with two companies +extended in the firing line, over broken ground under the crest of the +ridge, and only some shells, aimed at the artillery, dropped amongst +them. Out of sight on the right the Imperial Light Horse and the +squadron 5th Lancers worked ahead on a parallel route, having drawn +towards the outer flank on the infantry coming up to them. In rear the +Gordon Highlanders, inclining to the right, followed in support of the +Manchester, in echelon of companies at 60 paces interval, the +companies marching in column of sections. A brisk shell fire assailed +this battalion as it crossed the rear of the batteries, but, like the +Manchester, the Highlanders for a time escaped the notice of the Boer +riflemen, and they pushed on with trifling loss. + +[Sidenote: Guns silence Boer artillery.] + +Thus by 4.30 p.m. the whole British force, 3,500 men in all, was in +motion, and Coxhead, during the temporary silence of the enemy's +artillery, ordered his command to support more closely. As the +batteries limbered up, the Boers re-opened and followed them with +shells. Only one horse fell, however, and the British guns, moving +swiftly between the Devonshire and Manchester regiments, were shortly +in action again three quarters of a mile nearer to the front. Under +their rapid rounds at 3,200 yards the hostile gunners relapsed +immediately and finally into silence. + +[Sidenote: Difficulties of approach to Boer left.] + +In approaching the occupied zone the cavalry on the right were first +closely engaged. A screen of skirmishers still lay out before the Boer +left, and these, as they fell back slowly, had an easy target in the +mounted men, who were working over ground of great difficulty. Then +the Manchester, emerging from their covered way, found themselves upon +the crest of a smooth and open plateau, which, sloping downwards for +200 yards from them almost imperceptibly, was traversed by a wire +fence, beyond which stony outcrops again gave promise of shelter. As +the foremost soldiers showed above the fringe of stones at the crest +line, a sudden rush of bullets drummed upon the sun-dried level in +front of them, and the men, in obedience to an order, dropped again +behind the protecting stones to reply. As they did so, some of the +officers of the Manchester, leaving their men in the security of the +rocks, ran through the storm of lead and severed the wires obstructing +advance. But the line was as yet too weak for a forward dash. + +[Sidenote: The attack on Boer left.] + +For a quarter of an hour the Manchester lay where they were, with +frequent casualties, but using their weapons so vigorously that soon the +Boers on their front, an advanced party of Lombard's commando, gave back +in spite of their leader's efforts to hold them, and at 5.20 p.m. the +Manchester poured from the stones after them. They were closely followed +by the Gordon, who, though under cover below them, had suffered somewhat +from the shots grazing the edge of the plateau. At their appearance +heavy musketry burst from the kopjes 1,200 yards ahead. The soldiers +were in a moment at the wire fence. This obstacle, only partially +destroyed, had been taken as a known range by the Boer marksmen, and so +accurate therefore was their shooting that soon there was scarce a +strand unrent by the bullets. In the crowding which ensued many men fell +amongst the now dangling wires, some pushed through, and some could find +no gap. Though the front of the brigade thus became broken and confused, +the advance continued uninterruptedly. Now Lieut.-Colonel W. H. +Dick-Cunyngham sent the Gordon Highlanders forward into the gaps opening +in the lines of the Manchester, some to the left, some to the right, +some wherever they could find room. The Imperial Light Horse, who had +been contending every foot of their progress with the cloud of +skirmishers retiring slowly before them, here joined on to the right of +the Gordon. Once at the edge of the ridge, from which, as the troops +rushed forward, a detached party of Boers fell back, still shooting +bitterly, the brigade found itself facing due north, and the Boer left +flank lay exposed. + +[Sidenote: Gore, dashing in, halts on Boer right rear.] + +Meanwhile Gore, reinforced by a squadron 5th Lancers, had moved out +yet further to the left, cutting in between the Boer main body and +Schiel's Germans, so that the latter only saved themselves by a +circuitous gallop behind Woodcote farm, not drawing rein until they +arrived in rear of the left of the main position. Gore then gained a +secure foothold near the colliery 1,700 yards from the enemy's right +rear. Here he concealed his squadrons, and awaiting the development of +the infantry attack, watched the rear face of the enemy's kopjes for +signs of a break away. + +[Sidenote: The position is captured.] + +Strengthened by the arrival of Schiel, the Boer left poured their +bullets chiefly upon that portion of the line occupied by the right +companies of the Gordon Highlanders and the Imperial Light Horse. +Below the fence the ground sloped gently downward to the foot of the +kopjes, where it again rose more steeply to the summit, some 350 yards +distant. Down the incline the firing line went rapidly, for the most +part by rushes of sections, carried out independently, yet with great +dash and unanimity. But the slope was exposed throughout, and there +were many casualties. About 5.30 p.m. the line of battle had arrived +at the foot of the kopjes; then, swinging slightly towards the left, +so as to envelop still more the flank of the enemy above, all supports +and reserves being now absorbed, it began to make head upwards, still +by short rushes. It was now nearly dark; rain burst down on them in a +torrent: the men, breathless from their eager pace, began to slacken +somewhat in their difficult progress up the hill-sides. At this moment +Colonel Hamilton, who had previously ridden to where the Devonshire +still held fast the Boer right with their volleys, hurried back to the +main attack. He at once ordered the "charge" to be sounded, and +running to the front, himself led the last onset. The Devonshire +simultaneously leaped from the donga where they had lain more than an +hour, and, advancing by companies from the right, reached the base of +the final kopje. For an instant they halted to gain breath and fix +bayonets, then, coming to the charge, assaulted the portion before +them, and carried it without a check, four companies swinging to the +left against the northernmost kopje, and three moving straight upon +the main hill whereon stood the enemy's artillery. Here, as occurred +all along the Boer line, though many fled at the sound of the charge, +many stood and continued shooting at the troops until the latter were +within twenty yards of them. Below the main crest a bitter contest was +also maintained, for as at Talana, many Boers, seeing the soldiers +determined to win the summit, pressed forward to oppose them, and lay +firing behind the rocks until their assailants were almost upon them. +Some acting thus were made prisoners; some escaped to the rear at the +last moment; many were shot down as they ran. The assault poured on +unchecked, the two guns falling to the converging Devonshire. At 5.55 +p.m. the infantry held all the upper part of the hill. + +[Sidenote: Gore attacks the flying Boers.] + +By that time the cavalry, lying in wait at Elandslaagte, had already +dealt their blow. A quarter of an hour before the infantry gained the +crest the majority of the defenders had begun to vacate the summit, +and, descending to the open ground behind, streamed raggedly across +the front, many within five hundred yards, of the concealed troopers. +The light was failing rapidly, and with it the chance of action. +Though the crowd in the loose disorder of retreat seemed to offer an +indefinite object for a charge, there was no likelihood of a better +whilst sufficient light remained. At 5.30 p.m. Gore gave the word and +pushed out eastwards with a squadron of the 5th Lancers on the right +of his line, and one of the 5th Dragoon Guards on the left, both in +extended files. The ground was difficult, boulders strewed the +surface, and a series of dongas, intersecting it at all angles, +seriously impeded progress. These obstacles once cleared, the cavalry +moved on rapidly and, topping a slight rise, came suddenly into full +view of the foremost Boers, some 300 in number, who were riding slowly +northward away from the ridges all but captured behind them. The +charge was instantly delivered, and the Boer retirement was dashed to +pieces in all directions. Then, having traversed completely the zone +of retreat, the cavalry were rallied and reformed into line. The +gallop had carried the squadrons more than a mile and a half from +their starting-place, and the intervening space was again covered by +the enemy, now in full flight from the kopjes. Once more, therefore, +the troopers charged, and, scouring in loose order back over the same +ground, cleared it of the enemy, and drew rein with many prisoners +near Elandslaagte, just as the last gleam of light died and gave place +to darkness. + +[Sidenote: A Boer rally after "cease fire."] + +Meanwhile there had occurred an anxious moment for the infantry, +victorious along the summit of the kopjes. Pressing forward from the +captured crest in pursuit, and firing fast, the soldiers were some +distance down the gentle reverse slope when a white flag was seen to +be waving from the conical kopje above the laager, and Colonel +Hamilton, believing it to signify a general capitulation, ordered the +"cease fire" to be sounded. Suddenly a body of some fifty Boers +charged boldly uphill against that section in which were the right +company of the Gordon Highlanders and the Imperial Light Horse, and, +seizing a small spur within twenty yards of the crest, turned their +rifles upon the surprised troops. For a moment there was some +confusion. The soldiers were scattered; some were continuing the +pursuit, some were seeking their units; many were resting; the cross +fire which thus assailed them was severe and accurate. + +[Sidenote: The enemy is swept off.] + +But the effect of this counter-attack was but momentary. Once more the +"advance" was sounded, and that part of the line, rallied by the voice +and example of Colonel Hamilton himself, surged forward again,[120] +and tumbled the last remnant of the enemy down the reverse slopes. +During this incident some of the Imperial Light Horse on the extreme +right, swinging round the enemy's left, surrounded a farmhouse which +had been the rallying point of the above counter-attack, and, after a +sharp encounter, stormed it, capturing twenty-one prisoners. + + [Footnote 120: For conspicuous gallantry in rallying their + men for this advance the following officers received the + Victoria Cross:--Captain M. F. M. Meiklejohn, Gordon + Highlanders, whose wound on the occasion deprived him of an + arm, and Captains C. H. Mullins and R. Johnstone, of the + Imperial Light Horse. Sergt.-Major W. Robertson, Gordon + Highlanders, was also awarded the Victoria Cross.] + +[Sidenote: Effect of the action.] + +Thus terminated an action of which there can be no greater praise than +that it was swiftly planned, carried out with determination, and that +its complete success was gained exactly as designed. That success, +moreover, was of more than local importance. Kock's hold upon the +communications of Dundee had been of the briefest. He himself was a +prisoner, mortally wounded, in British hands, and his force, rushing +headlong back to Newcastle from the battlefield, upon which it had +left over two hundred killed and wounded, nearly two hundred +prisoners, two guns and a complete laager, carried despondency into +the Boer Headquarters, so recently alarmed at the rebuff of Talana. +Moreover, the battle did more than clear Yule's rear; it also +safeguarded his front, by persuading Erasmus, already timorous upon +Impati, to cling to his mountain, at a time when Yule's exhausted +battalions were in no condition to resist the attack of 5,000 fresh +enemies. + +[Sidenote: French is recalled to Ladysmith.] + +It formed no part of Sir G. White's plan to keep the ground that had +been won. The position of Elandslaagte was useless alike for +observation, defence, or offence. Even had it been of value, the +presence of the Free State army upon its flank rendered the occupation +of it too hazardous in the view of a General already impressed by the +dangers of detachments. Throughout the day, indeed, the Free Staters +themselves had been reminding him of these dangers. As early as 11 +a.m. the piquets to the west of Ladysmith had reported significant +developments about Van Reenen's Pass, and these, as the day wore on, +became so threatening that at 5.30 p.m. General Hunter despatched a +message to Sir G. White, who was at that time still at Elandslaagte, +informing him that there was a hostile advance upon Ladysmith from +Bester's station. It was necessary, therefore, to recall French at +once, and at 9 p.m. he was so instructed by telephone. + +[Sidenote: Bivouacs on ground night 21st-22nd.] + +At 11 p.m. General French issued orders for the return to Ladysmith on +the morrow, and the troops bivouacked on the field, the infantry upon +the kopjes, the cavalry about the station. The day's losses amounted +to 263 officers and men killed and wounded.[121] + + [Footnote 121: For detailed casualties, etc., see Appendix + 6.] + +[Sidenote: All back in Ladysmith, Oct. 22/99.] + +At 3 a.m. on the 22nd the three batteries, the 5th Lancers and the +Natal Mounted Rifles[122] left by road for Ladysmith, the loaded +ambulance train quitting the station at the same time. From that hour +onwards the trains, bearing the soldiers, steamed away from the +battlefield, the last to leave by rail being a portion of the +Manchester escorting forty prisoners. They were detained until 3.20 +p.m. The 5th Dragoon Guards, who had reconnoitred northward, followed +last of all by road, and by evening the position was empty. + + [Footnote 122: This corps had remained as escort to the Natal + Field artillery, and as support to Gore's cavalry, throughout + the action.] + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +LOMBARDS KOP.[123] + + [Footnote 123: See maps Nos. 3, 8 and 8 (_a_).] + + +[Sidenote: Boer forces unite Oct. 26th. French reconnoitres, Oct. +27th.] + +On the very day of Yule's junction with Coxhead[124], Erasmus was in +touch with A. P. Cronje, next day with Lukas Meyer, who, still feeling +the blow of Talana, had moved timidly, wide on the left. At 4 a.m. on +the morning of the 27th a brigade of cavalry left Ladysmith under +Major-General French, and, proceeding to scout along the Newcastle and +Helpmakaar roads, was sighted at dawn by Meyer, who was then in laager +about seven miles south of Elandslaagte. The Boer leader, anticipating +a general attack, at once signalled to Erasmus, upon which a strong +contingent of the Ermelo burghers, accompanied by guns, made their way +across to him from their camp. French reconnoitred boldly, and at +10.35 a.m. he was able to send in to Sir George White his estimate of +the numbers confronting him. On Intintanyoni were 4,000-5,000 men. +Other strong bodies hovered between Rietfontein and Pepworth Hill, +whilst the enemy to his immediate front appeared to separate +themselves into two laagers, whose sites could be clearly +distinguished. One, sheltering about 2,000 men, lay at the junction of +the Beith and Glencoe roads, some five miles south-east of Modder +Spruit station, whilst the other, a much larger encampment, was +situated four miles nearer to the railway, that is to say, one mile +south-east of it. + + [Footnote 124: See page 150.] + +[Sidenote: Hamilton with Infantry and Artillery supports him.] + +[Sidenote: Troops return to camp.] + +Meanwhile Colonel Ian Hamilton had at 10 a.m. marched out of Ladysmith +to the Neks between Gun Hill, Lombards Kop and Umbulwana, with a +brigade consisting of the 1st Devonshire and 1st Manchester +regiments, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 2nd Gordon +Highlanders, with a brigade division of the 21st, 42nd and 53rd +batteries R.F.A., joined later by the 1st Liverpool regiment and the +13th battery R.F.A. This brigade, lying out all day in support of the +cavalry reconnaissance, caused continual apprehension to the enemy, +who covered all his positions with men and cannon in momentary +expectation of an attack. Altogether some 10,000 men with fifteen guns +were observed, and for the purpose intended by Sir George White, who +was only anxious to gain information, the object of the reconnaissance +was accomplished. The attack of the laagers was considered by Sir +George White, who rode out beyond Lombards Nek in the afternoon to +confer with General French and Colonel Hamilton; but after careful +examination it was ultimately decided to await a more suitable +opportunity, and the troops were withdrawn. + +[Sidenote: Both Transvaalers and Free Staters approach Ladysmith, Oct. +28th.] + +On October 28th Lukas Meyer with 2,000 men and three guns pushed +forward to Modder Spruit, where he went into laager behind a long flat +kopje, now called Long Hill, situated some four thousand yards +south-east of Pepworth Hill, the summit of which the Ermelo commando +had already piqueted. The Free Staters, coming down from Intintanyoni, +rode westward and lay in the evening upon the farm Kleinfontein, +joining hands with their allies of the Transvaal across Surprise Hill +and the heights above the Bell Spruit. Through their main laager on +Kleinfontein ran the railway line to Van Reenen's Pass. + +[Sidenote: Cavalry reports Boer dispositions. Oct. 29th.] + +On the 29th the cavalry made a reconnaissance eastwards, and reported +as follows. The laager which had been close to the Modder Spruit +station on the 27th had disappeared, but there were now two +encampments to the east and south-east of Lombards Kop, of which the +lower appeared to command the road to Pieters, thus threatening the +line of communication. Pepworth Hill was strongly occupied, and +artillery were now upon it; a large camp lay close to the north-west +of the height. The enemy was numerous upon Long Hill. Upon its flat +top two or three guns were already emplaced, and an epaulment for +another was in course of construction. Behind the hill was a laager. + +[Sidenote: White decides on attack.] + +This reconnaissance seemed to Sir G. White to furnish the reasons he +desired for assuming the offensive. The capture of Long Hill would at +least throw back the investing line of Transvaalers. It might do +more--break through it altogether, when a sweep north against Pepworth +would bid fair to drive together the Transvaal commandos in upon their +centre, and roll up the whole. The Free Staters, strung out as they +now are, thinly north-west and west, would then be cut off from the +rest. + +[Sidenote: Plan arranged, Oct. 29th.] + +[Sidenote: Carleton to approach Nicholson's Nek that night.] + +[Sidenote: Cavalry by dawn of 30th to be on ridges n.e. of Gun Hill.] + +[Sidenote: Grimwood to seize Long Hill.] + +[Sidenote: Hamilton then to capture Pepworth.] + +At 4 p.m. on the afternoon of the 29th his plans were formulated. Long +Hill was to be the primary, Pepworth Hill the secondary object, and to +secure them the whole of the troops were to be employed. His main army +he divided into two bodies, with separate missions. One, consisting of +No. 10 Mountain battery, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 1st +Gloucester regiment, all commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C. +Carleton, of the first-named battalion, was to move at 10 p.m. that +night northward along the Bell Spruit. The duties of this force were +twofold: first, to cover the left flank of the main operation; +secondly, to gain and hold such a position towards Nicholson's Nek (if +possible, the Nek itself) as would enable the cavalry to debouch +safely upon the open ground beyond, should opportunity arise for a +pursuit, or, better still, an interception of the Transvaalers as they +fell back on the Drakensberg passes. The left flank thus provided for, +a cavalry brigade, consisting of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, and +Colonel Royston's regiment of Colonials, under Major-General French, +were to reach the ridges north-east of Gun Hill before dawn, from +which, by demonstrating against the enemy's left, they would cover the +British right. Between these wings, the main infantry attack was to be +carried out by the 8th brigade, which, in the absence of its proper +commander, Colonel F. Howard, was under Colonel G. G. Grimwood, 2nd +King's Royal Rifles, whose five battalions would include the 1st and +2nd King's Royal Rifles, the 1st Leicestershire, and 1st King's +(Liverpool) regiments and the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The 1st +brigade division Royal Field artillery and the Natal Field battery +were to be attached to Grimwood's command. A general reserve of the +7th brigade, consisting of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 1st Manchester +and 1st Devonshire regiments, and, should it arrive from Maritzburg in +time, the 2nd Rifle Brigade, were to be under the command of Colonel +Ian Hamilton, who, besides his infantry, would have with him the 5th +Dragoon Guards, the 18th Hussars, the Imperial Light Horse, two +companies mounted infantry, and the 2nd brigade division of artillery. +Grimwood was to take Long Hill, and his path thereto was to be cleared +by the shrapnel of both brigade divisions. That position carried, he +was to hold it, whilst Colonel Hamilton, supported in turn by the fire +of the united artillery, was to throw his fresh infantry against +Pepworth Hill, and complete the victory. + +[Sidenote: Carleton's column parades 11 p.m. Oct. 29th.] + +At 10 p.m. Carleton left his parade ground with six companies (16 +officers, 518 other ranks) and 46 mules, and at 11 p.m. arrived at the +rendezvous, the level crossing of the Newcastle road close to the +Orange Free State railway junction, where the rest of his command had +been awaiting him for an hour. It consisted of five and a half +companies (some 450 men) of the Gloucester regiment, with 57 mules and +a Maxim gun; the 10th Mountain battery, comprising 137 N.C.O.s and +men, 6 guns, with 100 rounds for each, 133 mules, with 52 Cape Boys as +muleteers, and 10 horses. The total strength of the column was thus +about 1,140 men and 250 animals. + +[Sidenote: Grimwood starts same night at 12.30.] + +[Sidenote: Grimwood's column broken by error.] + +Half an hour after midnight Grimwood's brigade (8th) set out eastward +in the following order: 1st and 2nd battalions King's Royal Rifles, +1st Leicestershire regiment, 1st brigade division R.F.A., 1st King's +(Liverpool) regiment, and the Natal Field battery, with a rearguard of +the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.[125] Another brigade division, the +2nd, joining the line of march soon after it was put in motion, +marched in front of the 1st Liverpool regiment. The whole pressed on +for a time quietly and in order. Soon, however, the last arrival, the +2nd brigade division of artillery, in pursuance of orders, when +between Flag and Limit hills, drew away from out of the column to the +left and passed under the shelter of Flag Hill. The two battalions +behind, not being aware of any special instructions given to the +artillery, followed it, whilst those in front still pursued their +proper route, so that Grimwood's force was cut in two and separated +whilst yet but half his march was over. An hour before dawn, Grimwood, +unconscious of the mishap to his rear, gained some low kopjes 1,800 +yards from the south-eastern flank of Long Hill, and extended his +troops across them, the two battalions King's Royal Rifles in firing +line, Leicester in support, facing north-west. Here he waited for +light. One company, "F." of the 1st King's Royal Rifles, moved +cautiously forward to a small kopje, slightly in advance, to cover the +front. + + [Footnote 125: These battalions were not complete. The King's + Royal Rifles had left two companies in Ladysmith, the Dublin + Fusiliers three, the Leicester regiment two, the King's + (Liverpool) regiment two.] + +[Sidenote: French starting 3 a.m. dismounts 4,000 yards in rear of +Grimwood.] + +[Sidenote: Hamilton at 4 a.m. moves on Limit Hill.] + +[Sidenote: First news of disaster to Carleton.] + +At 3 a.m. Major-General French rode out of Ladysmith with his two +regiments and pushed for Lombards Kop, dismounting his command in a +hollow basin between Gun Hill and Lombards Kop, some 4,000 yards in +rear, and out of sight, of Grimwood's infantry. The Natal Volunteers, +who had been on the ground since the previous night, went on, and, +dividing right and left, secured the summits of Lombards Kop and +Umbulwana Mountain. Colonel Hamilton, quitting his rendezvous between +Tunnel and Junction Hills at 4 a.m., moved, as directed, on Limit +Hill, which had been piqueted throughout the night by "G." and "H." +companies Gordon Highlanders. As Hamilton rode at the head of his +brigade, a man was brought to him who proved to be a muleteer of the +10th Mountain battery. He reported that a sudden disturbance had +occurred in the midst of Carleton's night march; all the mules of the +battery had broken away, and, so far as he knew, had never been seen +again. A little further on an officer of the Scottish Rifles, who had +been attached to the Gloucester regiment a few hours previously, +appeared amongst the Gordon Highlanders. He, too, told of a stampede +amongst the battery mules, and, in addition, of resulting disturbance +of some of the infantry companies, amongst others that which he +accompanied. Yet a third warning of misadventure on the left was +received before dawn. In the early morning the sentries of the piquet +of the Leicester regiment at Cove Redoubt, one of the northerly +outposts of Ladysmith, became aware of the sound of hoofs and the +rattle of harness coming towards them from the north, and the +soldiers, running down, captured several mules bearing the equipment +of mountain guns. A patrol of the 5th Dragoon Guards,[126] which had +been despatched by Sir G. White to try to get news of Carleton's +column, was checked at the Bell Spruit, but met on the road a gunner +of the 10th Mountain battery, who related the same tale as had already +reached that General. This man said that the battery had been suddenly +fired on at 2 a.m.; the mules had stampeded and disappeared. Both its +ammunition and portions of most of its guns had been carried off. +Finally, a brief note from Carleton himself to the Commander-in-Chief +announced what had then happened. + + [Footnote 126: For gallantry on this occasion Second-Lieut. + J. Norwood, 5th Dragoon Guards, was awarded the Victoria + Cross.] + +[Sidenote: Pickwoad shells Long Hill.] + +[Sidenote: Pepworth replies.] + +[Sidenote: Downing moves the two Brigade Divs. against Pepworth.] + +[Sidenote: and silences the Boer guns.] + +At dawn Pickwoad's brigade division, which was now deployed 1-1/2 +miles south-eastward of Limit Hill, opened at Long Hill at 3,700 +yards. But Long Hill was silent. The three gun emplacements visible +upon the crest were empty. Instead, at 5.15 a.m., a heavy piece fired +from Pepworth Hill, and a 96-pound shell fell near the town, its +explosion greeting the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which, having detrained at +2.30 a.m., was marching out to join Hamilton's force at Limit Hill. +The next, following quickly, burst in Pickwoad's line of guns, and +Coxhead's artillery, which attempted to reply, found itself far +outranged, whilst Pickwoad's three batteries maintained for a time +their bombardment of Long Hill. In a few moments four long-range +Creusots of smaller calibre (75 m/m) joined in from either side of the +96-pounder, two others from lower ground about the railway below the +height. Both Coxhead's and Pickwoad's batteries were covered with +missiles. Colonel C. M. H. Downing, commanding all the artillery, +quickly assumed the offensive. Dissatisfied with his position, the +left of which, lying to the east of Limit Hill, was so encumbered with +rocks that of the 53rd battery only two guns could fire at all, and +those of the other batteries of the 2nd brigade division only by +indirect laying, he drew that part of his line clear, and moved +Coxhead's three batteries, the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd, out into the +open, facing north-west, to within 4,000 yards of Pepworth.[127] +Troubled, while the change was in course of taking place, by the +accurate shooting from that hill, Downing then ordered Pickwoad to +change front to the left and come into action against Pepworth on the +right of, but some distance from, the 2nd brigade division. The guns +on the low ground under the shadow of Pepworth were soon mastered. The +battery upon its summit, at distant range for shrapnel, withstood yet +awhile; but ere long the gunners there, too, temporarily abandoned +their weapons, and only returned when a slackening of Pickwoad's fire +gave opportunity for a hasty round. At 6.30 a.m., therefore, and for +some half hour more, the trend of battle seemed to the artillery to be +in favour of the British. After that, however, fresh hostile guns +opened, and the rattle of rifles arose in ever-increasing volume, not +only from the broken ground to the right, where Grimwood's infantry +lay lost to view amongst the low, rolling kopjes by the Modder Spruit, +but also far to the rear, towards Lombards Kop. Yet no British were +seen advancing. It was evident that the infantry and cavalry were not +delivering but withstanding an onslaught. + + [Footnote 127: This is shown on map 8 as the first artillery + position.] + +[Sidenote: Grimwood expecting support from the right, suffers from +that quarter.] + +The attack which Grimwood found to be developing rapidly against him +was less surprising from its suddenness than from the direction from +which it assailed him. Those with him, as described above, lay in the +precise position designed for them. He had taken the precaution of +covering his right rear, until it should be protected by the cavalry, +at first with a half company ("A.") of the Leicestershire regiment, +then with two more ("F." and "H.") of the same battalion and the Maxim +gun. Furthermore, a kopje to the right front, seen in the growing +light to command from the eastward that already occupied by "F." +company 1st King's Royal Rifles, was now crowned by "H." company of +the same battalion, and all had seemed safe on that side. But now a +raking fire from the right assailed all his lines, and Grimwood, +instead of outflanking, was outflanked. + +Every moment this fire grew more severe; beyond the Modder, Boer +reinforcements were streaming in full view up to the line of riflemen +shooting along the Modder Spruit. Two guns, which began to shoot from +a well-concealed spot near the Elandslaagte road, now took the British +line in enfilade, and partially in reverse. The Boer gunners upon +Pepworth and the low ground east of it again fired, the smaller pieces +into the batteries and infantry, the great Creusot frequently into the +town. + +[Sidenote: Grimwood fronts the new danger.] + +Instead of the anticipated change of front to the left for the +destruction of the enemy Grimwood had now, therefore, to prepare a new +frontage most speedily, almost to his present rear, for the safety of +his brigade. "H." company 1st King's Royal Rifles, on the advanced +kopje, first turned towards the east, and coming under heavy fire from +three directions, was later reinforced by "A." company of the same +battalion. "B." company, which had lain in support of "F.," moved to +the new right of "H." and "A.," and, with "E." company, lined up along +the rocks facing the Modder Spruit. Meanwhile the officer commanding +"F.," the other advanced company, who had turned east, now found his +left assailed, and threw back half his command in that direction. The +tripod Maxim gun of the 2nd King's Royal Rifles was placed in the +centre of this company.[128] + + [Footnote 128: It was found to be impossible to get the + wheeled gun of the 1st King's Royal Rifles over the boulders + of the kopje.] + +[Sidenote: 2nd K.R.R. fills gap between 1st K.R.R. and Leicester +detachment.] + +The 2nd King's Royal Rifles, which had lain in support whilst the +front circled round, were now sent to reinforce. Leaving two companies +still in support, the battalion changed front to the right, and, +extending from right to left, filled the gap between the right of the +1st King's Royal Rifles and the detached 2-1/2 companies of the +Leicester regiment. These, with a Maxim, somewhat isolated on the +kopje on what was now the right flank, were beginning to be hotly +engaged. + +[Sidenote: The arrival of two companies R.D.F. connects Grimwood with +Cavalry.] + +Thus under incessant and increasing fire the 8th brigade swung round, +pivoting on the left company 1st King's Royal Rifles, with the +detachment of the Leicester as "marker," so to speak, to its outer +flank. Two companies of the missing Royal Dublin Fusiliers[129] now +arrived to assist the Leicester, and were immediately assailed by some +sharpshooters who had worked around the right flank. They therefore +prolonged the line to the right, towards the northern spurs of +Lombards Kop, and here about 7 a.m. they joined hands with the +cavalry, whose movements must now be related. + + [Footnote 129: See p. 176.] + +[Sidenote: French's operations.] + +Waiting until the artillery duel seemed to be going in favour of +Downing's batteries, French gave the word for advance about 5.30 a.m. +The 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars, who had been lying in mass in the +hollow, quickly extended in a north-easterly direction, with orders to +work round the Boer left. The route taken by the brigade lay for some +distance within rifle range of the western flank of a line of low +kopjes, which, running down north-east as an irregular spur of +Lombards Kop, and parallel to the Modder Spruit, pointed in the +direction of Long Hill. At the termination of this ridge, the high +ground, dropping sharply to the plain, offered an outlet to the +eastward. For this gateway French's two regiments were making. They +had all but reached it when a sharp blaze of rifles broke from the +kopjes to their right. The squadrons thereupon wheeled to the right, +the troopers dismounted, and running a short way to the new front, +they soon reinforced a ridge, already thinly held by the right of +Grimwood's infantry, from whence they replied to the sharpshooters on +the kopjes beyond. It was soon evident that the Mausers were becoming +the masters of the carbines, and French, seeing the impossibility of +breaking through, at any rate at this period, ordered his brigade to +retire. As the men took to their horses, a gun, opening from the +enemy's left, threw shell rapidly amongst them, and made the +inequality of the combat yet more apparent. The two squadrons of the +5th Lancers, who were on the left, drew back over the plain, whilst +the 19th Hussars retraced their path under the ridges, both rejoining +General French under the lee of Lombards Kop, north of Gun Hill and of +their original point of departure. French immediately threw his +command forward again, and his two regiments, with some of the Natal +Carbineers, all dismounted, crowned the high ridges running northward +and downward from the summit of Lombards Kop, and were soon deep in +action with superior numbers all along the line. About 8 a.m. +Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst, who had only reached Ladysmith at 3 +a.m., arrived at Lombards Kop with two squadrons ("B." and "D.") of +the 5th Dragoon Guards, followed by the 18th Hussars; and Downing, +withdrawing the 69th battery from the line of guns still shelling +Pepworth, despatched it with all haste in the same direction. Of +Brocklehurst's reinforcement, the two squadrons 5th Dragoon Guards +came up on the right of the 19th Hussars on the crest, and found +themselves at once under fire from the front and right flank. Of the +three weak squadrons of the 18th Hussars--all that remained after the +catastrophe of Adelaide Farm[130]--one was directed to reinforce the +19th Hussars on the eastern slope of Lombards, the other two climbed +to the right of the 5th Dragoon Guards to the south. Sharp fire from a +pom-pom and many rifles met them on the shoulder of the ridge, and it +seemed as if the British right was to be overmatched. But the 69th +battery, which had moved up the Helpmakaar road, escorted by a +squadron of the 5th Lancers, now arrived, and, boldly handled, quickly +relieved the pressure in this portion of the field by drawing the +enemy's attention to itself. Pushing on through the Nek which joins +Lombards Kop to Umbulwana this battery came into action on an +underfeature south of the road one mile beyond it, and enfiladed the +Boer left. Soon, however, it found itself the focus of an increasing +fusilade, and its commander, Major F. D. V. Wing, saw that to continue +to work the guns would entail a grave loss of men. He therefore +determined to withdraw from his dangerously advanced position. It was +impossible to bring up the teams, but the gunners ran the guns back by +hand. The battery withdrew almost intact, and, coming into action +again, kept the balance level by steady practice carried on from the +Nek itself.[131] + + [Footnote 130: Following Talana, see p. 140.] + + [Footnote 131: This is the position shown on map 8 (_a_).] + +[Sidenote: Grimwood receives Artillery support.] + +Meanwhile, Grimwood was being hard pressed on the low kopjes to the +northward, and his line became thinner every moment as he endeavoured +to meet the continual attempts upon his flanks. Two Boer guns shelled +steadily the much exposed 8th brigade from various points, and when +about 8 a.m. a pom-pom, joining in the bombardment, killed with its +first discharges some of the ammunition mules and scattered the rest +far and wide, Grimwood sent urgent messages to the artillery for +support. Sir G. White was at that moment himself with the batteries, +which were being enfiladed again, this time by some guns on the low +ground below and south of Pepworth. He promptly despatched the 21st +and 53rd batteries to positions from which, facing eastwards, they +could support both the cavalry and Grimwood. The 21st moved far +southward, and from a gap in the hills between the infantry and +cavalry soon rendered for the left of the latter the same service as +the 69th was performing for the right. The 53rd battery, coming into +action near the Elandslaagte road, engaged the Boer guns on Grimwood's +front, and though kept at extreme range by Sir G. White's orders, +succeeded in much reducing their effect. At the same time the 13th +battery also left the line facing Pepworth, and, wheeling eastward, +shelled the hostile artillery on the left front of the infantry with +good results. + +[Sidenote: 9 to 11 a.m. a stationary battle.] + +For two hours, from about 9 a.m. to 11 a.m., the engagement continued +with little movement of either army. The Boers, being now within 800 +yards of the British, could advance no further, but sent a steady +stream of bullets against the ridges, pinning the cavalry to Lombards +Kop and the infantry to their line of hillocks along the Modder. By +9.30 a.m. Grimwood's last available reserve was put into the firing +line, and he could prolong his front no more, though the enemy still +threatened his flanks. The artillery was strangely dispersed. Far on +the right the 69th battery stood in action upon Umbulwana Nek; the +21st battery on the northern side of Lombards Kop covered French's +left and Grimwood's right; out in the open to their left rear the 53rd +battery shot above the heads of the right wing of the infantry, whilst +farther northward the 13th sent shrapnel over the left wing. Only the +42nd and 67th batteries remained on the site first held by the +artillery facing north-west, where the former suffered considerable +losses from the heavy enfilade and frontal fire which recommenced. For +the Boer artillerymen, encouraged by the diminution of the British +gun-power at this point, had not only returned to the pieces upon +Pepworth, but placed fresh ones upon the northernmost spurs of Long +Hill itself. + +[Sidenote: Reserve absorbed by action.] + +The reserve on Limit Hill, under Colonel Ian Hamilton's command, had +been reduced considerably by the successive demands of the battle. He +had been early deprived of most of his cavalry and all his artillery, +and shortly after 8 a.m., on a report coming of a hostile advance +against the left flank, two squadrons ("E." and "F.") of his remaining +mounted troops, the Imperial Light Horse, had left him to occupy some +kopjes on either side of the railway close to Aller Park, from which +they could see the enemy moving in strength about the heights of Bell +Spruit. At 10 a.m. the 1st Manchester regiment was also withdrawn from +Hamilton's brigade, the right half-battalion proceeding towards +Lombards Kop, the left half passing into the open as escort to the +artillery. The former portion eventually became incorporated with +French's firing line, whilst the latter lay out upon the shelterless +ground between the original artillery position and the new one taken +up by the 13th battery, where they suffered somewhat severely from the +intermittent shells. + +[Sidenote: Ladysmith threatened.] + +Meanwhile Colonel W. G. Knox, who, in the absence of the army, had +been placed in charge of the defences of Ladysmith, was by no means +secure. Left with a garrison of a few companies of infantry, he +detailed two of these, with the 23rd of the Royal engineers, and the +two Boer guns captured at Elandslaagte, to cover the north of the +town, posting them upon a ridge north-west of Observation Hill. Here +he found himself confronted immediately by strong bodies and two guns +of the enemy, who manoeuvred about Bell's and the adjacent kopjes. He +was soon strengthened by two guns and 88 men of the 10th Mountain +battery, hastily collected and reorganised after their stampede from +Carleton's party. But at no time could Knox do more than hold his own, +and the strength and boldness of the Boers, who at one time +threatened the town, seemed the last confirmation of Carleton's fate. + +[Sidenote: Sir George withdraws the troops.] + +[Sidenote: 13th battery covers retreat.] + +About 11 a.m. Sir G. White, having first despatched his Chief of the +Staff, Major-General A. Hunter, to investigate the situation, decided +to withdraw. To cover the movement he sent out three squadrons ("B.," +"C." and "D.") of the Imperial Light Horse which remained in reserve +at Limit Hill. The 13th battery, receiving an order to support them as +closely as possible, galloped in and unlimbered 800 yards behind +Grimwood's line. So screened, the infantry began to retreat at 11.30 +a.m. As the men rose from their shelters, a storm of fire broke from +the enemy's ridges. But the gunners of the 13th battery, turning the +hail of bullets from the infantry, faced it themselves. Almost the +whole volume of the enemy's fire soon centred on this battery. From +the right, four Boer guns concealed in the scrub raked the line; those +upon Long Hill bombarded from the left, whilst from the left rear the +heavy shells from Pepworth also struck in, hitting direct four of the +six guns. When twenty minutes had passed thus, and Grimwood's brigade +had almost removed itself into safety, the battery which had shielded +it looked as if it must itself be lost. + +[Sidenote: 53rd battery relieves 13th.] + +From their rear Major A. J. Abdy, commanding the 53rd battery, had +marked the perilous situation of the 13th and, obtaining permission +from Colonel Coxhead, advanced to succour it. Galloping to the front, +across a deep donga, the 53rd wheeled to the right of the 13th and +ranged upon some Boer artillery 2,350 yards to the eastward. By the +orders of Major-General Hunter, who was on the spot, the 13th retired +first, some 800 yards. But before it could come into action again, the +53rd, left alone on the plain, drew in its turn the fire of all the +Boer guns. A shell exploded beneath a limber, blowing the wheels to +fragments, so that the gun could not be removed, and had to be +temporarily abandoned. As soon as the 13th re-opened the 53rd was able +to draw back. In re-crossing the donga a gun upset, and the enemy's +shells burst over it, but whilst the battery fell back to a new site +to support the 13th, Lieutenant J. F. A. Higgins, having been left +with the team in the donga, succeeded in righting the gun, and +restored it to its place in the line. A few minutes previously, +Captain W. Thwaites, with six men, had ridden forward, and now +returned, bringing with him on a new limber the gun which had been +disabled in the open. Only the old limber and a wagon of stores +remained derelict. + +[Sidenote: The Infantry, under the protection of the guns, get away.] + +[Sidenote: The Naval guns appear and silence the Boers.] + +So covered, the infantry had been getting away with unimpaired +discipline, but in great confusion, owing to the intermixture of units +and the extreme exhaustion of the men. Two Maxims were abandoned, but +useless, on the kopjes--those of the Leicestershire regiment and 2nd +King's Royal Rifles--the mules of both having been shot or stampeded +by the last outburst from the Boer lines. The enemy made no serious +attempt to follow up the retirement. Some Boers did indeed speed +forward to the now empty kopjes, and began shooting rapidly from +thence, but under the fine practice of the 13th battery the musketry +soon dwindled. The Creusot on Pepworth Hill sounded on the right, and +every part of the route to be traversed by the troops lay within range +of its projectiles. About noon, a report, as loud as that of the great +French cannon itself, came from the direction of the town, and the +batteries on Pepworth sank immediately to silence under the repeated +strokes of shells from British Naval guns. Captain the Honourable +Hedworth Lambton, R.N., had detrained his command of two 4.7-in., +three 12-pr. 12-cwt. quick-firing guns, with some smaller pieces, 16 +officers and 267 men at 10 a.m., the very time when the enemy's 6-in. +shells were bursting over the railway station.[132] After conferring +with Colonel Knox, he was in two hours on his way towards the fight +with the 12-pounders, reaching the place held by Hamilton's brigade. +But in view of the imminent retirement, this was too far forward, and +Lambton was ordered back. Whilst he was in the act of Withdrawing, +the gunners on Pepworth, descrying the strings of moving bullocks, +launched a shell which pitched exactly upon one of the guns, and +tumbled it over. Lambton, however, coming into action nearer the town, +opened heavily and accurately on his antagonist, and reduced him to +immediate silence. + + [Footnote 132: Rear-Admiral Sir R. Harris, K.C.M.G., in Naval + command at the Cape, had been requested (October 24th) by Sir + G. White to send a heavy gun detachment to Ladysmith "in view + of heavy guns being brought by General Joubert from the + north." It will be seen with what promptitude the request was + acceded to and acted upon by the Naval commander. In + ninety-six hours the guns were disembarked from H.M.S. + _Powerful_ at Durban; seventeen hours later they were in + action.] + +[Sidenote: The garrison reaches Ladysmith by 2.30 p.m.] + +At 1 p.m. the cavalry on the right gave up the crests which they had +maintained so long, covered up to the last by the 21st battery on the +left, and on the right by the 69th battery, whose escort had been +strengthened by "C" squadron 5th Dragoon Guards taken from Limit Hill. +At 2.30 p.m. French's command was in Ladysmith, following the 1st +Manchester regiment, which had retired on the right of the cavalry. +With the exception of four companies of the 1st Devonshire regiment, +left upon Limit Hill, the rest of the troops engaged had reached their +camps a short time previously. Only the tents of Carleton's two +battalions were seen to be empty when evening fell. + +[Sidenote: Carleton's night march begins 11.15 p.m. 29th Oct./99.] + +[Sidenote: The disaster.] + +Carleton's detachment had moved from the rendezvous at 11.15 p.m. in +the following order: first, under Major C. S. Kincaid, a small party +of 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, who marched with fixed bayonets; then +Colonel Carleton himself, with Major W. Adye, D.A.A.G. for +Intelligence, and the guides; behind them the 1st Royal Irish +Fusiliers, followed by their 46 mules; then the 10th Mountain battery, +with 133 mules; then the 57 mules of the 1st Gloucester regiment; next +five and a half companies of that battalion, and finally a small +rearguard, under Captain B. O. Fyffe, of the Gloucester. The valley of +the Bell Spruit was wrapped in profound darkness, yet the force pushed +on at a rapid pace, and, in spite of the noise of its progress, was +undetected by the Boer piquets on the hills on either side. Shortly +after 1 a.m. the van was opposite the southern spur of the height +called Kainguba, at the other extremity of which, some two miles due +north, lay the object of the expedition, Nicholson's Nek. The column +was here in perfect order, the road to the Nek was good, and there was +promise of about two hours of darkness to conceal the remainder of the +march. But Colonel Carleton, thinking more of the lateness of his +start than of the excellence of his progress, and remembering that his +orders had not bound him absolutely to Nicholson's Nek, came to the +conclusion at this point that, if, as seemed possible, he could not +reach the Nek before dawn, it would be extremely rash to be surprised +by daylight in a narrow defile. He decided, therefore, at least to +make good the dangerous high ground on his left by occupying the +nearest crest of Kainguba above him, intending, if time allowed, to +continue his march to the Nek from this vantage ground. He therefore +wheeled the leading files to the left, and at their head began the +boulder-obstructed and finally almost precipitous ascent of the +mountain, ordering guides to be left to indicate the point of the +change of direction to the units following the Royal Irish Fusiliers. +When the head of that battalion had climbed two-thirds of the steep a +mysterious and fatal incident occurred. Suddenly from the darkness +encircling the clambering soldiers broke out a roar "like that of an +approaching train,"[133] there was a rush of hoofs and the clatter of +scattering stones. In a moment a group of loose animals, whether +horses, mules or cattle, it was impossible to discern, bounding down +the rocky precipice, tore past the last companies of the Royal Irish +Fusiliers and disappeared as quickly as they had come into the gloom +of the valley. The rear of the Irish Fusiliers checked and staggered +back upon the long line of ammunition mules. The natural timidity of +these animals, many of them almost untrained, had been increased by +their long wait at the rendezvous, and by the fact that they were led +by strange and unskilled men. Now it became an uncontrollable panic. +Leaping round, dragging their muleteers with them, they plunged +backwards in terror, wrenched themselves loose, and thundered over the +steep slope upon all below them. The battery mules and those of the +Gloucester regiment were dashed downwards and joined the riot, and the +whole mass poured upon the Gloucester regiment, which had just begun +to breast the hill. A shout arose; the men of the front companies were +buffeted and swept from the track in every direction. A few shots rang +sharply from behind, and a few more faintly from a startled Boer +piquet on Surprise Hill. Then the uproar died away in the valley of +the Bell Spruit, leaving the column disordered and amazed at its own +wreck. It was a disaster complete, sudden, and incurred by no fault of +officers or men. Up to this point the night march, conducted in deep +darkness and between the enemy's piquets, had been a conspicuous +success, and now in one swift moment the hand of fate had changed +order into chaos, and success into destruction. But the troops quickly +recovered, and indeed but few had yielded to the shock. Many had +gathered about their officers with fixed bayonets; many, hurled to the +ground, had nevertheless gripped their weapons and looked not for +safety, but the enemy. Only fifty of the infantry, and these included +many who had been actually stunned by the onset of the frenzied mules, +failed to fall into the ranks at the summons of the officers, who, +even before the tumult had ceased, were strenuously working to +re-organise their commands. + + [Footnote 133: The simile of an officer present.] + +[Sidenote: 2 a.m. the column reaches summit without guns or reserve +ammunition.] + +About 2 a.m. the leading files pressed over the crest on to the top of +the mountain. An hour of uncertainty and, had the enemy been near, of +extreme danger followed. Most of the Irish Fusiliers were now upon the +summit, disposed, as best could be, for defence. But the Gloucester at +the bottom were not yet formed, and when, about 3 a.m., they came up +in such order as they had been able to contrive, they brought only +nine of their fifty-nine mules with them. The Irish Fusiliers had +recovered but eight. The reserve of ammunition was thus practically +swept away. The Mountain battery did not appear at all. Only two of +the gun mules eventually arrived, carrying portions of two pieces. +Eighty-eight gunners and one hundred and thirty mules had dropped out, +and not a complete gun of all the six was available. + +[Sidenote: bivouacks on southern edge and awaits dawn.] + +[Sidenote: The ground.] + +[Sidenote: Carleton chooses a defensive position.] + +[Sidenote: Distribution of companies.] + +When at last both regiments reached the top they were formed in line +of quarter-columns--Gloucester on the right. Guided by Adye, they +moved towards the southern extremity of the ridge, where they halted, +lay down around the crest, and waited for light. Dawn revealed the +nature of the position which the diminished detachment occupied. +Behind, the southern end of the mountain dropped almost sheer to the +valley. In front, to the northward, the hill-top first sloped downward +somewhat to a point, where, like Talana, it was narrowed by a deep +re-entrant on one side, then rose to a new sky line, which hid from +the British troops the remainder of the ridge some 1,200 or more yards +from the southern crest. Over it the hill-top narrowed, and ran on for +a mile and a half towards Nicholson's Nek. A jungle of tall grass, +hiding innumerable boulders, clothed the mountain up to and a little +beyond the sky line, ceasing some 700 yards from the southern crest, +and between this thicket and the British line were dotted a few ruined +stone kraals, of a circular shape and some two feet high. Across the +valley of the Bell Spruit, to the east, a group of kopjes stood within +long rifle range of, but lower than, Kainguba. In the midst of the +British position itself, a small knoll, crowned by two trees, and +nearly as high as the grass-grown sky line in front, arose at the end +of the mountain before it plunged into the depth behind. Carleton, now +decided to stand on the defensive where he was, despatched a message +at 3.55 a.m. by a native, acquainting Sir G. White with his mishap, +his position, and his plan, and issued orders for the disposition and +entrenchment of the troops. The left or western crest of the hill was +assigned to the Gloucester regiment, the right to the Irish Fusiliers, +a reserve, consisting of two companies ("G." and "H.") of the latter +battalion, taking post in front of the knoll at the southern extremity +of the summit. The men began at once to build sangars. The position of +the Gloucester, which it is necessary to describe in detail, was as +follows: Along half of the southern and south-western crest lay "A." +company, its right being prolonged by "B." company, and at first by +"C." This last-named unit, however, was soon extended across the north +of the hill, at right angles to the crest and "B." company, and had +half completed a defensive wall when it was again pushed forward about +100 yards to the front, "B." company increasing its extension along +the crest to maintain junction with the left of "C." The right flank +of "C." company was marked by a round kraal, behind which stood up a +small tree, and beyond this the line across the mountain-top was taken +up by a company ("E.") of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, which, in its +turn, linked on to the defenders ("A.," "B.," "F." companies Royal +Irish Fusiliers) of the eastern crest. The formation thus took the +shape of a semicircle, behind a diameter, composed of one company +Gloucester and one Royal Irish Fusiliers, facing the rise to the +northward. Some 700 yards back from these the arc followed the contour +of the mountain in rear. Thus back from the fighting line the ground +sloped upwards, hiding from it the reserves, and exposing +reinforcements from them, or men retreating back to them, to the full +view and fire of anyone upon the shoulder which arose in front. Over +the brow of this rise "D." company Gloucester entrenched itself in a +position to support both "C." company Gloucester and "E." company +Royal Irish Fusiliers. Though less than 150 yards in rear, "D." +company was, owing to the bulging ground, invisible to "C." company, +and the officers of the latter knew nothing of the proximity of its +support. The movements necessary to these dispositions had scarcely +begun when a slow rifle-fire, commencing from Surprise Hill to the +south-west, showed that the presence of the British on the mountain +was discovered, and from the very first the toiling soldiers thus +found themselves taken in flank and reverse. Stones of manageable size +were scarce, tools were lacking with which to move the large ones, +and, with the smaller, defences of but the most paltry dimensions +could be erected. At this time the danger of the dead ground ahead, +and below the left front, became apparent to Carleton, and "E." +company of the Gloucester, moving out beyond the front line, took post +upon the densely-grown summit of the rise, 400 yards in front of "C." +turning its left section to face west. Here it was shortly joined by +the half of "H." company, some twenty men in all, sent forward by the +O.C. Gloucester in response to Carleton's order (which did not name +any precise strength) to reinforce. + +[Sidenote: 7 a.m. Boers appear.] + +At 7 a.m. bands of mounted men came down from Intintanyoni to the +heights east of Bell Spruit, whence they opened fire upon the right +rear of the British position. An hour later a hostile battery of +apparently four guns suddenly appeared upon the northern end of these +heights, and, unlimbering for action, threatened Kainguba in silence +for some time, only to disappear northwards without firing a shot. A +number of horsemen were seen to ride away with it, and these, bearing +to the left, vanished behind Nicholson's Nek. + +[Sidenote: 9 a.m. they threaten rear.] + +At 9 a.m. a movement still more threatening was descried from the +lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Groups of horsemen, breaking away +from the main laager visible at Pepworth, came riding up the valleys +and behind the crests towards the northern end of Kainguba. On the +right, amongst the Irish Fusiliers, the Maxim of the Gloucester +regiment stood ready for action, and the officer in charge commenced a +slow fire upon the stream of Boers. Opening at 1,200 yards, he +gradually increased the range to 2,000 yards, and the trotting +horsemen had just broken into a gallop as the bullets began to lash +amongst them, when an order was received not to fire unless the enemy +showed in masses at closer distances, ammunition being scarce. + +[Sidenote: Boer movements.] + +At 2 a.m. Commandant Van Dam, lying in bivouac with his Johannesburg +Police[134] beneath Pepworth, received orders from Joubert in person +to proceed at once to the northern summit of Kainguba and hold the +ridge above Nicholson's Nek. The Boer officer thereupon galloped for +that spot with 400 men, being warned of the proximity of British +troops by a Field Cornet of the Pretoria commando, who lay with thirty +men on the northern slope of the high ground east of Bell Spruit. +Gaining the Nek, the Police found it occupied by 150 Free Staters, who +moved away further west on their approach. Van Dam's plan was quickly +made. Sending a message to the Free Staters that if they would ride +round to the flank and rear of the British, he would attack straight +over the top of the mountain, he left fifty burghers in the Nek in +charge of the horses, and led the remainder on foot in straggling +order up the hill. The crest was gained and half the summit traversed +before shots rang out from the shelters of the advanced companies of +the Gloucester. But the Boers fired no round until, at 800 yards, the +foremost British sangar was visible through the long grass. Meanwhile +the Free Staters, under Christian De Wet and Steenkamp, crept around +the foot of the steep ground under Van Dam's right, swinging +northward. Then they, too, began to climb, and by 10 a.m. Carleton's +column was entrapped. + + [Footnote 134: Or South African Republic Police (the + "Zarps").] + +[Sidenote: Development of attack.] + +The weak company and a half in front of the Gloucester, badly +sheltered from the converging fire, could do little more than check +the foremost burghers. This, however, they did so effectually for a +time that Van Dam, fearing for the issue of a merely frontal attack, +and hearing nothing of the Free Staters, who had not yet reached their +goal, ordered one of his officers, Lieutenant Pohlmann, to take fifty +men out of sight under the hill to the right, and not to fire a shot +until he arrived within decisive range of the British. Pohlmann moved +boldly and skilfully, and, appearing suddenly upon the left of "E." +company Gloucester, poured a destructive shower over the defences. The +captain of "E." company perceived at once the hopelessness of his +situation, asked and received permission to retire, and took his men +and those of "H." company back under a heavy fusilade and with severe +loss, passing the left flank of "C." company, into whose sangars many +dropped for shelter. The section detached to the left, not receiving +the order--unable to retire, if it had received it--was shot down to a +man. The commander was taken prisoner. Carleton, who had not +authorised this retirement, and placed as he was, knew nothing of the +necessity for it, then ordered Major S. Humphery to reinforce the +diminished companies, and send them back to the abandoned sangars. +This Humphery found to be impossible, and thus the front of the +position receded to the line of "C." company Gloucester and of "E." +company Royal Irish Fusiliers, slightly to their right rear. Nor was +this to remain long unbroken; for most of the men of this company of +Royal Irish Fusiliers, finding their feeble defences crumbling to +nothing under the tremendous fire, drew off gradually towards their +comrades on the right, and soon the officers of "C." company +Gloucester saw that the prolongation of their line had vanished, and +that their right was now completely exposed. + +[Sidenote: 11:30 a.m. A heliograph cannot be answered.] + +About this time (11.30 a.m.) a heliograph from Sir G. White's main +body was seen. Carleton called for signallers to read the message; but +so deadly was the fire that three men were wounded in succession, and +one man thrice, as they stood by Carleton spelling out the signal. +This ran:--"Retire on Ladysmith as opportunity offers." The only +heliograph with the column had vanished in the stampede, and Carleton, +encircled by musketry, knew that he was as powerless to obey the order +as to acknowledge it. + +[Sidenote: A fatal misunderstanding.] + +The Boers, who had turned "E." company, Gloucester, crawled on to +within forty yards of the right of "B." company, threatening to roll +it up, and Lieutenant C. S. Knox, its commander, surrounded by dead, +found it necessary to go back to fetch up more men. Near him, in the +sangar of "C." company, lay Captain S. Willcock of "H." company, and +Knox, before starting back, waved his arms to attract his attention, +shouting to him that the Boers were coming up from behind, that he, +Knox, had to go back, and that Willcock must look to his left. But +Knox, with a gesture of his arms, had unwittingly imitated the +military signal to retire, and the musketry, which was now one +sustained roar upon the mountain, drowned all of his shouting, except +the words "from behind." Willcock, therefore, imagining that he was +receiving an order to retire, which might have been sent forward from +the commanding officer, passed it on to Captain Fyffe, who, in turn, +communicated it to Captain Duncan, the senior officer in the sangar. +In the short retirement which followed nearly forty-five percent fell. + +[Sidenote: Duncan occupies a kraal, and then surrenders.] + +Following their retreating companies, Captains Duncan and Fyffe (the +latter wounded) halted by a small ruined kraal some fifty yards back, +leaped into it with six or eight men, and determined to make a stand. +Behind the kraal, the ground sloping upwards, hid the rest of the +British lines entirely from a man lying prone in the sorry shelter. So +close now were the Boers that the uproar of their rapid and incessant +shots overwhelmed all else. To the occupants of the kraal it seemed as +though silence had fallen over the British part of the position, and +this, though "D." company was shooting steadily, unshaken in the +sangar not fifty yards to their right rear. They thought that Colonel +Carleton had taken his column from the hill, and that they were alone. +For a few moments they lay, the helpless focus of hundreds of rifles, +and then, after a brief conversation with his wounded junior, Duncan +decided to surrender. Two handkerchiefs tied to the muzzle of an +uplifted rifle were apparently invisible to the Boers, whose fire +continued unabated. But the white rags, fluttering just clear of the +brow of the rise, were marked in an instant from the sangar of "D." +company, of whose proximity Duncan and his party were absolutely +unaware, and Captain R. Conner, who lay there with the commanding +officer of the Gloucester, rushed out towards them over some fifty +yards of bullet-swept ground shouting an enquiry. Meanwhile, as the +storm of lead still beat upon the shelter, Duncan, taking a towel from +a soldier near him, tied it to his sword and held it aloft. For a +minute or two the enemy did not desist, and in this interval Conner, +running by order of his commanding officer, across to Colonel +Carleton, acquainted him with the fact that the flag had been upraised +in Duncan's sangar. At the same time a bugle, whether British or Boer +will never be known, sounded the "cease fire" somewhere on the British +left. There was a hasty consultation between Carleton and Adye as to +the possibility of repudiating the surrender altogether, or of +applying it solely to the small party which had yielded. But the +former officer, raising his eyes towards the spot, saw that the enemy +had practically decided the question for him. Having passed by +Duncan's kraal they were close in front of his main line, moving +quickly forward with shouts and waving of hats, with rifles held +confidently at the "trail." Many were already on the flank of the +right portion of the British line, which, surrender or not as it +would, was thus placed in an utterly untenable position. This right, +consisting of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, absorbed in action to the +front, knew nothing of the events on the left. + +[Sidenote: Carleton submits for all.] + +There was yet time to disown the flag. The Boers had so far possessed +themselves only of Duncan's sangar; but Carleton shrank from doing +what he knew would be construed into the blackest treachery by his +opponents, which he knew, moreover, could but prolong the resistance +of his trapped and exhausted battalions some half an hour or less. +Calling a bugler to him he bade him sound the "cease fire," set a +match to his maps and papers, and, with Adye, walked out towards the +enemy. Some of the Irish Fusiliers still fought on whilst Carleton, +meeting Commandant Steenkamp, handed over to him his sword and +revolver; it was some time before the bursts of firing ceased +altogether on the right. At about 1.30 p.m. 37 officers and 917 men +became prisoners of war.[135] + + [Footnote 135: For detailed casualties, etc., see Appendix + 6.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE ARRIVAL OF SIR REDVERS BULLER. + + +[Sidenote: Hopes of Sir George White's strength felt at home.] + +Reports of the concentration of large commandos of Transvaal and Free +State burghers on the Natal border had been telegraphed home by the +High Commissioner and the Governor of Natal on the 28th of September, +and reached the Colonial Office during the night of the 28th-29th. The +plan, therefore, of an advance through the Orange Free State, which +was adopted by the Cabinet on the following day, by implication +assumed that the force assigned to Sir George White for the defence of +Natal would be sufficient to check the threatened invasion until a +forward movement of the army corps in the western theatre of war +should draw away from the republican host the Free State men for the +protection of their own territory. + +[Sidenote: Situation when Sir R. Buller arrived.] + +The events of the first three weeks of the war showed that Sir George +White, without assistance, would not be able to protect Natal, and the +situation which met General Buller on his disembarkation in South +Africa on the morning of the 31st October could not but cause him +grave anxiety. The Natal Field Force, after three strenuous efforts at +Talana, Elandslaagte and Lombards Kop to repel the enemy's columns of +invasion, lay concentrated at Ladysmith, and to the north, east, and +west was already closely watched by the enemy in superior strength. +General Buller was convinced that the troops needed rest, and could +for a time only act on the defensive. He therefore telegraphed to +General White, on 1st November, suggesting that he should entrench and +await events either at Ladysmith or at Colenso. Sir George's reply +showed that he had already entrenched himself at Ladysmith, and could +not now withdraw. South of Ladysmith there were only very weak posts +at Colenso and Estcourt, and one regular battalion at Maritzburg. For +the moment, the safety of the capital of Natal appeared to be +precarious, and Sir Redvers even deemed it necessary to request the +Naval Commander-in-Chief to take steps for the protection of Durban +from land attack. In Cape Colony the Boer forces close to the Orange +river had been strengthened by reinforcements from the commandos +originally assigned to watch the Basuto border. Moreover, there was +some reason to believe that another commando from the north was moving +down upon Kimberley, and this report, coupled with the lack of news +from Mafeking, rendered it for the moment doubtful whether +Baden-Powell might not have been overwhelmed.[136] The first units of +the expeditionary force were not due at Cape Town for some ten days. +The complete disembarkation at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East +London would not be finished until early in December.[137] The British +Commander-in-Chief could not hope, therefore, for at least a month, +that his field army would be complete in organisation, equipment, and +transport, and ready to commence an advance into the Free State. +Notwithstanding these anxieties, General Buller was at first inclined +to adhere to the scheme originally designed, and to wait until he +could remove the pressure on Ladysmith and Kimberley by striking +straight at Bloemfontein. He so informed Lord Wolseley in a telegram +despatched from Cape Town on 1st November. Yet a few hours later it +became evident that the whole case was graver than Sir Redvers had at +first conceived. Both from the telegrams of Sir George White and from +those of Sir Archibald Hunter, from whom, as his own chief-of-staff, +Buller had called for a personal report on affairs in Natal, it was +manifest that Ladysmith was certain to be cut off from the outer +world. General White telegraphed: "I have the greatest confidence in +holding the Boers for as long as necessary," but he added that +"reinforcements should be sent to Natal at once. Ladysmith strongly +entrenched, but lines not continuous and perimeter so large that Boers +can exercise their usual tactics." General Hunter reported that +"Ladysmith lies in a hollow, commanded by heights too distant for us +to hold, and now possessed by the enemy"; and that "the Boers are +superior in numbers, mobility, and long-range artillery." In Cape +Colony the Intelligence officers at Naauwpoort and Stormberg +telegraphed that a commando, 800 strong, had crossed the Orange river +at Norval's Pont, and that another Boer force, stated to be 3,000 +strong, with two guns and a Maxim, was crossing the Bethulie bridge. +The enemy's successes in Natal were, in fact, encouraging the Free +State commandos to establish connection with the disaffected in the +eastern and midland districts of Cape Colony. As regards the general +attitude of those in the Colonies who sympathised with the Boers, +General Buller was aware that for the most part they possessed arms +and ammunition, and that if their districts were invaded the young men +would join the enemy. The information in his possession led to a +belief that the greater number were for the moment still very +undecided, wondering which side would win, and that their whole +attention was fixed on Ladysmith and Kimberley. If the relief of those +places could be effected, the hostile elements, it was held, would not +stir; but if the two towns should fall, a dangerous rising was thought +probable. Meanwhile at Kimberley, although the reports of the officer +in command of the garrison did not appear to Sir Redvers to show any +immediate anxiety, yet the successful defence of that place depended +on other than the regular troops,[138] and there were indications that +the strain of the situation was being already felt. Urgent appeals +were addressed by the civil community to the High Commissioner, +drawing his attention to the large number of women and children +within the town, the possibility of the cattle, on which the meat +supplies of the invested population mainly depended, being captured by +the enemy, and the difficulty of maintaining order amongst the 10,000 +"raw savages" employed in the mine compounds. + + [Footnote 136: See Sir R. Buller's despatch to Secretary of + State for War, dated 1st November, 1899.] + + [Footnote 137: Before leaving England Sir R. Buller had + informed the War Office that he proposed to disembark the 1st + (Methuen's) division at Cape Town, the 2nd (Clery's) at Port + Elizabeth, and the 3rd (Gatacre's) at East London; but, + having regard to possible changes in the strategic situation, + he requested that every ship should call at Cape Town for + orders.] + + [Footnote 138: See Vol. II.] + +[Sidenote: Difficulties to be dealt with.] + +The consideration of these reports and representations made it evident +that the whole situation had changed from that contemplated when the +original plan of campaign had been drawn up. For an aggressive advance +on Bloemfontein there was as yet no adequate army. The component parts +of it were on the high seas. Even after they should have arrived, much +time and labour would be required, before they could be welded +together, and supplied with all that was needed for an offensive march +into a country so distant from the coast. On the other hand, if +Ladysmith should meanwhile fall, the Boer commandos at present +surrounding that town would be set free to seize not only Maritzburg +but probably also the seaport of Durban, the possession of which would +give to the republics direct access to the outer world, and would, as +was believed by both Boer and British, be a signal to all the +disaffected in Cape Colony to take up arms. In the western theatre of +war, the early relief of Kimberley was an object dear to the hearts of +all loyalists, and its loss would undoubtedly give an immediate +impetus to the wave of rebellion. The necessity for immediate action +was urgent, both in Natal and Cape Colony, but the former appeared for +the moment to present the more critical situation. Sir Redvers, +therefore, on the 2nd November, telegraphed to the War Office: + + "I consider that I must reinforce Natal, hang on to Orange River + bridge, and give myself to organise troops expected from England. + I am, therefore, withdrawing the garrisons at Naauwpoort and + Stormberg. I shall send Gatacre's division on arrival to Natal, + and with Methuen's and Clery's try to keep the main line open, + and to relieve Kimberley. I do not wish to be pessimistic, but it + seems to me I shall have to wait until March to commence active + operations." + +[Sidenote: Messages from and to home. "Extreme gravity."] + +On receipt of this report Lord Lansdowne telegraphed an enquiry +whether the division sent to Natal should be replaced by a fresh +division from England. On the 3rd November, in consequence of further +reports from Natal, Sir Redvers telegraphed to the Secretary of State: + + "Telegraphic connection with Ladysmith was interrupted yesterday, + and White's force is isolated. He is well supplied with + everything, except ammunition for his naval 12-pounders, which + are the only guns that can compete with hostile artillery. I + regard the situation as one of extreme gravity. Colenso bridge + and Maritzburg are held by one battalion each; we are protecting + Durban from the fleet. I shall despatch the first reinforcements + I receive to Durban, but I cannot conceal from myself that if the + enemy previously occupy, even with a small force, the country + south of Mooi River, the relief of White by troops just landed + will be an almost impossible operation, unless he can hold out + six weeks at least from now." + +[Sidenote: Nov. 4/99. Sir Redvers decides to go to Natal.] + +By the following day, 4th November, General Buller had been able to +work out his plans more in detail. It had become more and more +apparent that Natal, where now the bulk of the enemy's strength lay, +was for the moment the scene of most difficulty and danger, and that +the relief of Ladysmith was all-important. For these reasons Sir +Redvers decided to proceed himself to Natal for a time to supervise +personally that critical operation. He telegraphed, therefore, to the +Secretary of State: + + "My intentions are as follows: I propose to send Clery and + Headquarters 2nd division to Natal to command. With him will go + the first three brigade Headquarters except Guards that arrive. + These three brigades will be composed of the first line + battalions that arrive. Headquarters 1st division will land at + Cape Town, and Lord Methuen will command advance on Kimberley + with Guards' brigade and one other. Headquarters 3rd division + will land at Cape Town or East London, as circumstances require, + and will be completed with a new brigade, under Fetherstonhaugh, + formed of three extra regiments and one from line of + communications, or else colonial regiment. + + "I propose to take charge of advance on Ladysmith. If under + Providence we are successful there and at Kimberley, I think + collapse of opposition possible. These proposals are subject to + High Commissioner's views of state of Cape Colony, and to what + may happen meantime anywhere else. + + "Preparation of extra division seems desirable, but I do not yet + see need for its despatch from England. I shall speak with more + confidence when I see French, who is, I hope, en route here from + Ladysmith." + +[Sidenote: More hopeful views.] + +On the 5th November Sir Redvers telegraphed further to the War Office +that 40 days' supplies for the force under orders for Natal should be +shipped direct from England to Durban. The more hopeful view the +General Commanding-in-Chief was already taking may be judged from the +fact that on the following day, the 6th of November, he requested the +War Office to read "January" instead of "March" in the last sentence +of his above quoted cypher of November 2nd. Five days later, in reply +to a telegram from Lord Lansdowne, stating that another infantry +division was being mobilised, and asking by what date it would be +required, General Buller reported: + + "The defence of Ladysmith seems to have so thoroughly checked + advance of enemy, that I have some grounds for hoping the + successful relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith may end opposition. + On the other hand, reliable Dutch here predict guerilla warfare + as a certainty. I think, therefore, that I ought to have another + division as soon as possible. My great want at present is mounted + men. I am raising as many as I can, and should like, as soon as + possible, a few good special service officers." + +To this despatch the War Office answered on 14th November that a fifth +infantry division would be sent out at an early date, under command of +Sir C. Warren. + +[Sidenote: The original scheme of march through Free State to be +carried out after relief of Ladysmith.] + +In arriving at the decisions recorded in the above official telegrams, +Sir Redvers Buller had not abandoned the intention of carrying out +ultimately the original plan of campaign. On the contrary, with a view +to its resumption, after the relief of Ladysmith had been effected, he +determined to instruct the General Officer Commanding the 1st +division, Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, as soon as he had thrust aside +the Boer commandos between the Orange river and Kimberley, to throw +into that town supplies and a reinforcement of one and a half +battalions of infantry and some naval long-range guns, and then move +back to the Orange river, withdrawing with him the women and children +and natives. Meantime, while the cavalry division, as its units +arrived from England, was being prepared for the front at a camp near +Cape Town, its commander, Lieut.-General French, who had been recalled +from Ladysmith, was to form a flying column at Naauwpoort, with +instructions to risk no engagement, but to manoeuvre and worry the +enemy, and thus check any invasion of the central districts of the +Cape. On the eastern side of that colony, the Commander-in-Chief +decided to assemble at Queenstown a force, under Lieut.-General Sir W. +Gatacre, the commander of the 3rd infantry division, whose duty it +would be to operate northwards, and endeavour to stop recruiting by +the enemy and protect the loyal. On Lord Methuen's return to Orange +River, it was Sir Redvers' intention that he should march eastwards in +conjunction with French, occupy the bridges of Colesberg, Norval's +Pont and Bethulie, and thus prepare for the advance on Bloemfontein, +which would be undertaken as soon as the relief of Ladysmith set him +(Sir Redvers) free from Natal. + +[Sidenote: Dissolution of Army organisation.] + +The decision to despatch to Natal the bulk of the earliest +reinforcements arriving from home has been often referred to as "the +break-up of the army corps." In a sense it was much more than that. +From the point of view of organisation, the transfer of one or more +intact divisions of the original army corps to Natal would have been +immaterial, since they would have remained still under the supreme +control of the General himself. But the urgency of the situation +compelled the British Commander not only to detach portions of the +army corps, but to improvise hastily, from the general officers and +regimental units as they arrived in transports at Cape Town, special +forces with hardly any regard to the composition of the divisions as +originally fixed by the War Office. Thus to the commander of the 2nd +division, Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, who was selected by Sir +Redvers Buller to make preparation for the relief of Ladysmith, and to +act as his second in command in that enterprise, two cavalry +regiments, four brigades of infantry,[139] two brigade divisions of +field artillery, a company of Royal engineers, and a pontoon troop +were assigned. But of these units, only the 4th brigade, commanded by +Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, and Lt.-Colonel L. W. Parsons' +brigade division, R.F.A. (63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries), belonged to +Clery's division. The 2nd infantry brigade, under Major-General H. J. +T. Hildyard, and Lt.-Colonel H. V. Hunt's brigade division (7th, +14th, and 66th batteries), being the first units of infantry and +artillery to arrive from England, were removed from Methuen's +division, and sent on at once to Natal. To these were subsequently +added both the infantry brigades of the 3rd division (the 5th, under +command of Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, and the 6th, under +Major-General G. Barton), the 13th Hussars, originally designated as +corps troops, the Royal Dragoons, drawn from the 2nd cavalry brigade, +and the pontoon troop of the army corps. + + [Footnote 139: The decision to despatch a fourth brigade to + Natal was made about 22nd November, after the development of + Joubert's raid south of the Tugela.] + +[Sidenote: Various new distributions.] + +The 3rd, or Highland brigade, under Major-General A. G. Wauchope, was at +first assigned by the Commander-in-Chief to Lord Methuen, to replace the +2nd brigade, transferred to Natal; but, as it was found later that +Wauchope's battalions would at the outset be needed to guard the railway +line in rear of Methuen's column, a 9th brigade, under Major-General +R.S.R. Fetherstonhaugh, was formed out of the infantry units already at +Orange River station, viz.: the half-battalion 1st Loyal North +Lancashire, 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Northumberland +Fusiliers, and 2nd Northamptonshire. Lt.-Colonel F. H. Hall's brigade +division (18th, 62nd, and 75th batteries[140]) and the 9th Lancers were +also allotted to the 1st division. + + [Footnote 140: The 62nd and half the 75th had been sent up to + Orange River in October; the other half of the 75th and the + 18th batteries were delayed on the voyage out by the breaking + down of their transport, the _Zibenghla_, and did not land at + Cape Town until 1st November.] + +[Sidenote: French's command.] + +For Naauwpoort, General French, in addition to the original garrison +of that place, was at first given the assistance of the 12th Lancers, +a battery of R.H.A., and a half-battalion of the Black Watch, besides +two companies of M.I. To these other units were to be gradually added, +as soon as they became available. + +[Sidenote: Gatacre's.] + +Sir W. Gatacre was instructed to develop a force on the eastern +railway line from the original Stormberg garrison,[141] the 1st Royal +Scots (originally allotted as corps troops), the 2nd Northumberland +Fusiliers (a lines of communication battalion), the 2nd Royal Irish +Rifles (detached from the 5th brigade[142]), and the brigade division +(74th, 77th and 79th batteries), of the 3rd division, supplemented by +such colonial corps as he could gather together locally. + + [Footnote 141: See Chapters II. and XVIII.] + + [Footnote 142: This battalion was replaced in Hart's brigade + by the 1st Border regiment.] + +The dates of the arrival of the various expeditionary units at Cape +Town and their disposal are shown in Appendix No. 7. + +[Sidenote: Less serious injury of the recasting of army because of +ordinary British habit.] + +The dislocation of the infantry divisions, which was caused by the +necessity for these sweeping changes, would have been even more +seriously detrimental had those divisions actually existed prior to +the embarkation of the troops from England; but, as has been shown in +an earlier chapter, one of the weak points of the British army in 1899 +was the imperfect development in peace time of the higher organisation +of the troops. Except, therefore, in Major-General Hildyard's brigade, +which came direct from Aldershot,[143] and had been trained there by +its brigadier under the immediate eye of Sir R. Buller, that +confidence, which is established between troops and their superior +leaders by intimate mutual knowledge, did not exist, and could not be +affected by that reorganisation, which the strategical situation +necessitated. + + [Footnote 143: Major-Generals Lyttelton and Hart no longer + had under their command the whole of the battalions which had + composed their brigades at Aldershot.] + +[Sidenote: Yet serious enough. Sir Redvers goes to Natal without a +staff.] + +Nevertheless, as regards staff arrangements, serious inconvenience was +for the moment inevitable. Sir F. Forestier-Walker, although appointed +officially to the post of General Officer Commanding the lines of +communication, had, through some oversight in London, not been given +the full staff, as prescribed by the regulations, for an officer +performing those onerous duties, and had been forced to improvise +assistants from such special service officers as he could lay hands +on. There was from the outset, therefore, a shortage of staff. +Officers were, moreover, urgently required for the development of +local troops and for censorship duties. The original Headquarter staff +had been calculated on the hypothesis that the whole of the +expeditionary corps would operate in the western theatre of war, Sir +George White being responsible for the Natal command. The +rearrangement carried out by Sir R. Buller created in Natal a second +field army. For this no Headquarter staff was available, without +robbing the Cape of needed men. He therefore kept with him only his +personal staff during his temporary absence in Natal, and issued +orders there through the divisional staff of General Clery. He decided +to leave the rest of the Headquarter staff at Cape Town to supervise +the disembarkation of the reinforcements from England and their +formation into a field army. + +[Sidenote: Help from the fleet.] + +The reports of the fighting during the opening phases of the war had +shown that our difficulties were mainly due to three causes--the +superior numbers of the enemy, their greater mobility, and the longer +range of their guns. In the operations he was now about to undertake, +Sir Redvers hoped partially to make good these deficiencies by +borrowing ships' guns from the Navy and by locally raising mounted +men. The Naval Commander-in-Chief had already lent one contingent, +under Commander A. P. Ethelston, R.N., to garrison Stormberg. Another +such contingent, under Captain the Hon. H. Lambton, R.N., was in +Ladysmith, and, at the request of Sir R. Buller, Captain Percy Scott, +R.N., in H.M.S. _Terrible_, had been despatched to Durban to arrange +the land defences of that port. Rear-Admiral Harris, with the approval +of the Admiralty, now consented to the Stormberg party being brought +back to Cape Town, with a view to its marching under the command of +Capt. R. C. Prothero, R.N., with Lord Methuen's column, to Kimberley +and there remaining as a reinforcement of the garrison. The Naval +Commander-in-Chief further agreed to organise yet a third detachment +to assist in the relief of Ladysmith. The cheerfulness with which the +Naval authorities rendered assistance to the army in this time of +stress and strain was only in conformity with the traditions of both +services; yet the readiness shown by the officers and men of the Royal +Navy and Marines in adapting themselves and their weapons to the +circumstances of a land campaign won the profound admiration even of +those who were best acquainted with the practical nature of the +normal training of the personnel of the fleet. + +[Sidenote: Raising colonial corps, for Natal.] + +The calling out of colonial mounted corps, both in Cape Colony and +Natal, is mentioned in Chapter I. and Chapter II. Mounted men were +urgently needed by all the columns in process of preparation, but, +adhering to his opinion that success in the relief of Ladysmith was +the most crucial matter, Sir Redvers decided to despatch to Natal the +first unit enlisted at Cape Town--the South African Light Horse. The +first party of "Light Horse" embarked at Cape Town for Natal on the +22nd November. In Natal itself two mounted corps, under the command of +Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots +Fusiliers, and Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) E. C. Bethune, 16th +Lancers, were already being formed. + +[Sidenote: Brabant in eastern districts.] + +Mr. Schreiner, the Prime Minister of Cape Colony, had, at the +suggestion of General Buller, endeavoured to raise in the districts of +Middleburg, Cradock, and Somerset East, a burgher force to maintain +internal order and repel invasion, but the local civil authorities +were unanimous in advising that an application of the Cape Burgher law +would furnish some recruits for the enemy. Captain Brabant (now +Major-General Sir E. Brabant), an ex-Imperial officer, was, with the +concurrence of the Cape Government, instructed to raise a mounted +corps from the loyalists in the eastern districts. + +[Sidenote: Work now done.] + +It will readily be conceived from the brief summary of the facts which +have been above recorded that the tasks which the Commander-in-Chief, +assisted by the Headquarter and lines of communication staffs, had to +carry out during the first three weeks of November were of an +overwhelming nature. These included the reorganisation of the various +bodies of troops which, from the 9th November onwards, arrived daily +in Table Bay from England; the disembarkation of the units; their +equipment for the field and despatch to the front; the issue of +operation orders to the troops in Natal and Cape Colony already in +touch with the enemy; the establishment of supply depots for the field +forces, the defence of Maritzburg and Durban from the Boer raid, which +threatened those very important towns; the protection of the lines of +railway through Cape Colony, with the mere handful of troops at first +available; and the checking of the invasion of the Free Staters across +the Orange river. To these must be added the anxious watching of the +signs in disaffected districts of smouldering rebellion, which a +single success of the enemy might fan into a burst of flame; these and +other cares formed an accumulation of pressing duties and heavy +responsibilities, which fully justify the frank statement of Sir R. +Buller to Lt.-Gen. Forestier-Walker on 20th November that "Ever since +I have been here we have been like the man who, with a long day's work +before him, overslept himself and so was late for everything all +day."[144] The position of affairs in South Africa throughout these +anxious weeks, in fact, forcibly proved the truth of Lord Wolseley's +warning, addressed on 3rd September, 1899, to the Secretary of State +that: "We have committed one of the greatest blunders in war, namely, +we have given the enemy the initiative. He is in a position to take +the offensive, and by striking the first blow to ensure the great +advantage of winning the first round." + + [Footnote 144: See the end of this chapter.] + +[Sidenote: Improved prospects.] + +Yet by the 22nd November the labours of the Headquarter staff of the +army in South Africa, assisted by the fullest co-operation of the two +Governors, Sir Alfred Milner and Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, and aided by +the strenuous exertions of the lines of communication staff in Cape +Colony and Natal, had sensibly improved the general situation in both +the western and eastern theatres of war. In Cape Colony, no part of +Bechuanaland and Griqualand West, it is true, except the areas +defended by the garrisons of Mafeking, Kuruman and Kimberley, remained +under British authority. But cheery reports from Colonel Baden-Powell +gave promise of a prolonged stand at the little northern town, while +Lord Methuen's column had on the previous day (the 21st November) +crossed the Orange river and made good the first eleven miles of its +march on Kimberley. Southward, Major-General Wauchope's brigade was +holding the section of the railway line from Orange River station, via +De Aar, to Naauwpoort, the latter station having been re-occupied, and +the formation of a column, to harass and menace the enemy in the +direction of Colesberg, had commenced under the direction of +Lieut.-General French. On the eastern side of the Colony only had the +Boers made any substantial advance; a strong Free State commando had +seized Burghersdorp and detached parties to Aliwal North and Lady +Grey. Sir W. Gatacre, on the other hand, had assumed command of +colonial corps and one and a half battalions of regular troops at +Queenstown, and was preparing to move northward, to check the +commandeering of British subjects, which Commandant Olivier had +instituted in the territory occupied by his burghers. The Basuto +chiefs remained true to their allegiance to the "Great White Queen," +and by tacit consent their territory was treated by both sides as +neutral. In Griqualand East and the native territories east of Cape +Colony, the Pondo, Tembu and Fingo tribes continued loyal, and +arrangements for the defence of these great masses of native +population against Boer raids were being made by Major Sir H. Elliott, +who as Commandant-General, under the sanction of the Governor, was +defending the passes leading from Barkly East with the Cape Mounted +Rifles and some Volunteers. + +[Sidenote: Natal. Sir G. White detains bulk of Boers. Time thus +gained.] + +In Natal Sir George White was holding his own at Ladysmith, and, as he +had anticipated, detaining north of the Tugela the main strength of +the enemy's army. After some hesitation on the part of the Boer +leaders, a raid in force had been made to the south, and had for the +moment caused much alarm. But the delay in the movement had greatly +diminished its chances of reaching Maritzburg, although the local +condition was still one of some anxiety. Reinforcements as they +arrived at Durban had been pushed rapidly up by rail north of +Maritzburg, and the British troops were now echeloned along the +railway up to Estcourt. The vanguard of the enemy's raiding column had +reached Mooi River, and his scouts had even penetrated as far as +Nottingham Road, but a day's ride from Maritzburg. The Boers were, +therefore, well in rear of the British advanced posts, and +Lieut.-General Clery felt some doubt whether a temporary retirement +from Estcourt might not prove necessary. The chief difficulty was the +lack of mounted troops to bring the enemy to action and put a stop to +his pillaging the outlying farms of the Natal colonists. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, 22nd Nov./99, starts for Natal.] + +Such were throughout South Africa the facts known to him when Sir +Redvers Buller, having issued instructions for the guidance of the +senior officer in Cape Colony, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, and for the +three commanders in the field, Lieut.-Generals Lord Methuen, French, +and Sir W. Gatacre, embarked at 7 p.m., the 22nd November, in the S.S. +_Mohawk_ for Natal. His military secretary, Col. the Hon. F. Stopford, +and aides-de-camp accompanied him. The rest of the Headquarter staff +remained at Cape Town. + +[Sidenote: His views at that time.] + +The appreciation of the situation written by the General +commanding-in-chief forty-eight hours earlier will place the reader in +possession of his views on the eve of his embarkation for Durban. The +memorandum ran as follows:-- + + Cape Town, + _November 20th, 1899_. + GENERAL WALKER, + + Before starting for Natal I think I should leave you my + appreciation of the situation. + + 1. Ever since I have been here we have been like the man, who, + with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and so was + late for everything all day. + + 2. In disposing the troops which arrived from England I have + considered that it was of the first importance to keep Cape + Colony from rebellion, even if by so doing I temporarily lost + Maritzburg. + + 3. I consequently have formed a strong column under Lord Methuen + which is in a position to take the field and I am forming a force + of mounted men and horse artillery under General French, which + will, I hope, be able to meet any commandos which may invade the + Colony. I have also done all I can to safeguard the western and + eastern lines of railway. + + 4. The state of Kimberley necessitated the first employment of + Lord Methuen's force in that direction. He starts to-day. General + French is at Naauwpoort, organising a column to attack Colesberg + at the earliest possible date. + + 5. My hope is that the Boers at Colesberg will have been defeated + before Lord Methuen returns from Kimberley. + + On his return he should send a force to attack the Boers at + Burghersdorp. There should then be 1,000,000 rations at Orange + River and 1,000,000 at De Aar, and I have directed that supply + should be accumulated at Port Elizabeth and East London. He can + then open new lines of supply as he moves eastward. + + 6. As soon as they can be occupied General Gatacre's force should + be advanced to Molteno or Stormberg, and any force at + Burghersdorp should be attacked. + + If the Burghersdorp force has meanwhile advanced south it would + be attacked by Lord Methuen, aided by part of General French's + force, the two being based on Naauwpoort or Middleburg. + + 7. The exact nature of this operation must depend on the actual + circumstances at the time. The main point is, there will be + rations at De Aar and near it to enable a force under Lord + Methuen to move along the line eastward, repairing it as he goes, + and strong enough to clear the northern districts. + + 8. As soon as ever circumstances admit the bridges at Norval's + Pont and Bethulie will, of course, be seized; in short, the plan + is, clear the northern districts by working from west to east, + seize the bridges, and, as occasion admits, bring the shorter + lines of supply into use. Then concentrate for an advance on + Bloemfontein. + + 9. I think there are enough troops in the Colony to work this + programme, except that: + + (1) There should be a battalion at Port Elizabeth. + + (2) General Gatacre wants another battalion and a battery of + field artillery. + + (3) General French should have the second battery Royal Horse + artillery, and eventually three cavalry regiments, and, if + possible, one more battalion. + + 10. With regard to Natal, I propose to send the 6th Dragoon + Guards and 10th Hussars, the 63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries Royal + Field artillery, the remainder of General Hart's Brigade, _i.e._, + three battalions, as soon as they come in. We must do with them + the best we can. + + 11. I think the Colonial contingents had better go to Natal. + + 12. In my opinion, so long as General White holds Ladysmith the + force able to attack you from the Orange Free State is not likely + to be serious, but if Natal goes you will have to concentrate for + defence, and you should make up your mind what positions to hold. + Probably the best military positions about Queenstown, + Middleburg, and Beaufort West will be found most convenient. + + REDVERS BULLER, + General. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +ADVANCE FROM THE ORANGE RIVER. + + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's instructions. Nov. 10/99.] + +On the 10th of November Lord Methuen, with his staff, left Cape Town +for Orange River station, where he arrived two days later. The orders +which he had received from Sir Redvers Buller ran as follows:-- + + November 10th, 1899. + + 1. You will take command of the troops at De Aar and Orange River + stations,[145] with the object of marching on Kimberley as + rapidly as possible. + + [Footnote 145: See map No. 9.] + + 2. In addition to the troops now at De Aar, the infantry of which + are being formed into the 9th brigade under Colonel + Fetherstonhaugh, you will have under your command:-- + + i. The 1st Infantry Brigade.--Major-Gen. Colvile. + ii. The Highland Brigade.--Major-Gen. Wauchope. + iii. The 9th Lancers. + iv. The Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery, under + Colonel Hall. + v. The Divisional Troops except Cavalry of the Division. + vi. Certain Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps and + Medical Details which have been collected at the + two stations. + + I wish you to march from the Orange river to the Modder river, + communicate with Kimberley, and to hold the line De Aar, Modder + river, so that we shall be able to bring up stores and heavy guns + and pass them into Kimberley. + + 3. The half-battalion Loyal North Lancashire regiment, which will + form part of the 9th brigade, is to be left in Kimberley. + + 4. You will afford help to Kimberley to remove such of the + natives as they wish to get rid of, and, generally, you will give + such advice and assistance in perfecting the defences as you may + be able to afford. + + 5. You will make the people of Kimberley understand that you have + not come to remain charged with its defence, but to afford it + better means of maintaining its defence, which will at the same + time be assisted by an advance on Bloemfontein. + + REDVERS BULLER, General. + + +Four days later, the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa addressed the +following letter to General Methuen:-- + +[Sidenote: Personal advice from Sir Redvers, Nov. 14th.] + + Cape Town, + November 14th, 1899. + LORD METHUEN,-- + + I do not want to tie your hands in any way, but I send this + letter for such use as you choose to make of it. + + 1. I think that you will find that the Guards and the 9th Brigade + and two batteries Royal Field Artillery will be as large a + portion of your force as you can take with advantage. + + 2. As to mounted men, you will of course take what you require. I + think it will be advisable to leave one-half of Rimington's + Guides, the party at Hanover Road, and sufficient others to scout + 20 to 25 miles on all sides of the line held by General Wauchope. + + 3. On your departure General Wauchope will have, including the + two half-battalions of Berkshire and Munster, four battalions; + and if you leave him one battery, six guns Royal Field Artillery, + with them he should be able to hold the line to Belmont with + perfect safety. Orange River bridge must of course be held at all + costs. I hope you will not remain a day longer at Kimberley than + you can help. + + 5. I have already told you that I am sending with you a Naval + brigade with four 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns; these guns range 6,000 + yards. You will not start without them, will leave them at + Kimberley, and such reinforcements not exceeding one-and-a-half + battalions as the commandant may require. + + 6. I have said in my instructions that you will proceed to Modder + river. If you can from there get a clear road to Kimberley, so + much the better, but you will act according to circumstances. The + main object is to save time.[146] + + [Footnote 146: The remainder of the letter contains + suggestions on tactics and so forth, which are not directly + relevant to the subject of this chapter, and are therefore + omitted.] + + * * * * * + + R. BULLER. + + +[Sidenote: Information gathered before the march, up to Nov. 21st.] + +Before Lord Methuen's arrival at Orange River station, the mounted +troops had been engaged in reconnoitring and sketching the country in +the neighbourhood of the railway bridge. On the 6th of November a +party of the 9th Lancers and mounted infantry, accompanied by guns, +had scouted up the railway to within five miles of Belmont. On the 9th +another reconnaissance was made up the line, past Belmont, to Honey +Nest Kloof, 37 miles from Orange River station. No Boers were seen +about Belmont, though they had left traces of their presence in broken +culverts and other damage to the railway. After falling back for the +night to Witteputs, the patrol marched north-eastward on the morning +of the 10th, and encountered several hundred Boers, with field guns, a +few miles to the east of Belmont. A skirmish ensued in which Lt.-Col. +C. E. Keith-Falconer was killed, Lt. C. C. Wood mortally wounded, and +Lts. F. Bevan and H. C. Hall and four men wounded. To the westward of +the railway line a detachment of thirty of Rimington's Guides +successfully reconnoitred as far as Prieska. Though the information +brought back by these reconnaissances was mainly negative, on the 18th +November Major R. N. R. Reade, Lord Methuen's Intelligence officer, +was able from various sources of information to report that a force, +estimated at from 700 to 1,200 men, with four guns, was at or near +Belmont; and that a small commando under Jourdaan had been +successfully recruiting from the disloyal farmers in the districts of +Barkly West, Campbell, Douglas, and Griquatown, which lay to the west +and north-west of the line of advance to Kimberley. + +[Sidenote: Constitution of 1st Division.] + +Thanks to the strenuous efforts of the staff and the departmental +corps, the reconstituted first division[147] was by the 20th of +November ready to take the field. Equipped with mule transport, and +marching with a minimum of baggage, Lord Methuen's column consisted of +about 7,726 infantry, 850 cavalry and mounted infantry, two batteries +of Royal Field artillery, four companies of Royal engineers and a +Naval brigade. + + [Footnote 147: For the causes which led to the partial + dispersion of the 1st division on its arrival in South + Africa, see Chapter XI.] + +It was thus composed:-- + + Naval brigade--Captain R. C. Prothero, R.N.:-- + Four naval 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns, with 363 officers and men of the + Royal Navy, sailors, Royal Marine artillery and Royal Marine Light + Infantry.[148] + + [Footnote 148: Owing to difficulties with transport, the + Naval brigade did not reach the 1st division until 1 a.m. on + the 23rd.] + + Mounted troops:-- + 9th Lancers. + One company mounted infantry Northumberland Fusiliers. + One company mounted infantry Loyal North Lancashire. + Half company mounted infantry King's Own Yorkshire + Light Infantry. + New South Wales Lancers (30 of all ranks). + Rimington's Guides. + + Royal Field Artillery:-- + Brigade division R.F.A.--Lt.-Colonel F. H. Hall. + 18th and 75th Field batteries (15-pr. guns).[149] + + Royal Engineers--Lt.-Colonel J. B. Sharpe:-- + 7th Field company. + 8th Railway company. + 11th Field company. + 30th Fortress company. + Telegraph section. + + [Footnote 149: The 62nd Field battery, which formed part of + Colonel Hall's brigade division of artillery, was left on the + line of communication, and did not rejoin until the battle of + Modder River.] + + 1st (Guards) brigade--Major-General Sir H. E. Colvile:-- + 3rd battalion Grenadier Guards. + 1st battalion Coldstream Guards.[150] + 2nd battalion Coldstream Guards. + 1st battalion Scots Guards. + + [Footnote 150: The 1st battalion Coldstream Guards landed + from Gibraltar on 16th November, and was detained at Orange + River, guarding the railway until the 22nd, when it was + relieved by the 1st battalion Highland Light Infantry and at + once pushed on to Belmont, where it arrived late on the night + of the 22nd.] + + 9th Infantry brigade--Maj.-Gen. R. S. R. Fetherstonhaugh:--[151] + 1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers. + Half-battalion 1st Loyal North Lancashire.[152] + 2nd battalion Northamptonshire. + 2nd battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. + + [Footnote 151: Two companies of the Royal Munster Fusiliers + also arrived at Belmont from Orange River on the 22nd + November, and were attached to the 9th brigade.] + + [Footnote 152: The remainder of this battalion formed part of + the garrison of Kimberley.] + +The medical services for the 9th infantry brigade were furnished by +the divisional Field Hospital of the 1st division, and the 3rd brigade +Field Hospital formed the new divisional Field Hospital. Subsequently, +when the 3rd (Highland) brigade joined Lord Methuen's force at Modder +river, its Field Hospital was provided by the 2nd division Field +Hospital and the Bearer company by "A." company Cape Medical Staff +Corps, under Lieut.-Col. Hartley, V.C. + +[Sidenote: Supporting forces. Wauchope. French.] + +Behind the 1st division, the Highland brigade, under Maj.-Gen. A. G. +Wauchope, guarded the railway up to the Orange river, and overawed the +disaffected element among the inhabitants along the line of +communication. In the neighbourhood of Colesberg, Lieut.-General +French, with a mixed force of all arms, was engaged in stemming the +tide of invasion from the Free State, and by incessantly occupying the +attention of the commandos opposed to him, prevented their massing +against Lord Methuen's right flank as he advanced towards Kimberley. + +[Sidenote: March fully known by Boers. They prepare to meet it.] + +The Boers were not taken by surprise by Lord Methuen's preparations +for an advance. Their spies and sympathisers kept them fully informed +of all the steps taken. In anticipation of a dash upon Kimberley they +had carefully prepared defensive positions along the railway at +Belmont and at Rooilaagte, or, as we term it, Graspan. To some 2,500 +burghers, under Commandant Jacobus Prinsloo, was entrusted the duty of +thrusting the British back towards the Orange; and, if the task should +prove beyond their strength, De la Rey, who, with his commando was +then investing the southern defences of Kimberley, could easily +reinforce them. A large supply of stores had been collected at +Jacobsdal, while subsidiary depots had been formed at Graspan and in +the neighbourhood of Koffyfontein. + +[Sidenote: 4 a.m., Nov. 21st., march begins.] + +At 4 a.m., on the 21st of November, the 1st division marched from +their bivouac on the northern bank of the Orange river. The General +followed the course of the railway in order to facilitate the carriage +of supplies, not only for his own column, but also for the inhabitants +of the town into which he was to throw stores and reinforcements. The +troops halted about 8 a.m. at Fincham's farm, near Witteputs, twelve +miles north of the Orange River bridge. The 9th Lancers and mounted +infantry were at once thrown forward with orders to reconnoitre +northwards on a front of about twelve miles. They found the enemy in +some strength among the hills which lie to the east of Belmont +station, and drew fire, fortunately with very slight loss. +Lieut.-Colonel Willoughby Verner, D.A.A.G., for topography to the army +corps, sketched the Boer position from the low hills east of Thomas' +farm, about a mile and a half south-east of Belmont station.[153] +These sketches were subsequently reproduced and distributed among the +officers of the column before the action of the 23rd. Later in the day +Lord Methuen himself studied the ground from the hills near Thomas' +farm, and then returned to Witteputs, followed by the mounted troops, +many of whom had covered forty miles during the day. + + [Footnote 153: See map No. 10.] + +[Sidenote: Approach to Belmont.] + +In the grey of the morning of the 22nd of November, the mounted +infantry swooped from Witteputs upon Thomas' farm, occupied it, and +threw out a chain of posts facing the station of Belmont and the hills +to the east. Lord Methuen, with his staff, the brigadiers commanding +the infantry brigades, Lt.-Col. Hall, C.R.A., and Lt.-Col. Sharpe, +C.R.E., arrived shortly afterwards, and again reconnoitred the Boer +position from the high ground above Thomas' farm. When the General had +completed his reconnaissance, he dictated the orders for the attack +which he proposed to deliver on the morrow. Then, leaving the mounted +infantry to hold the ground they occupied, and to protect the +companies of Royal engineers who were on their way from Witteputs to +repair the railway, Lord Methuen returned with his staff to the +column, to prepare for a further advance that afternoon. During the +morning there was intermittent firing between the mounted infantry +outposts and parties of the enemy, who occasionally showed themselves +for a short time, and then disappeared without affording any clue as +to the strength of the force concealed among the kopjes. In the +afternoon the Boers brought two guns into action, chiefly directed +against the 7th Field company R.E., then employed in improving the +supply of water at the site selected for that night's bivouac near +Thomas' farm. To silence this artillery fire the 18th and 75th +batteries were hurriedly despatched from Witteputs, and in order to +save the troops at Belmont as quickly as possible from this annoyance, +the Officer Commanding trotted nearly the whole distance. The horses, +still weak from the effects of the long sea voyage, suffered severely +from the strain. Five indeed actually died of exhaustion, and all were +so weary that during the engagement of the 23rd, the artillery was +unable to move with any degree of rapidity. + +[Sidenote: Division gathers before Belmont, Nov. 22nd.] + +At 4.30 p.m. the remainder of the troops marched from Witteputs and +reached their bivouac at Thomas' farm just before nightfall. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +BELMONT.[154] + + [Footnote 154: See maps Nos. 10 and 10 (a).] + + +[Sidenote: The Boer position Nov. 23rd/99.] + +Lord Methuen's dispositions for attack were necessarily determined by +the ground which the Boers had taken up to oppose his advance. Some +two miles to the south-east of Belmont station a hill, in form like a +sugar-loaf, rises abruptly about 280 feet above the veld. From it +extends northwards a broken line of kopjes which for several miles +runs parallel with the railway in its course from Orange River station +to Kimberley. Twelve hundred yards to the north of the "Sugar Loaf" +there is a precipitous hill of nearly equal height, which acquired the +name of the "Razor Back." The northern side of it overhangs a steep +ravine, some 600 yards wide. The most important feature of the range, +termed "Mont Blanc" by Lord Methuen, stretches northward from beyond +this ravine for three miles. It is irregular in outline and broadens +on its northern face to a width of a mile. Its average height may be +taken at 300 feet above the plain. To the south and west its slopes +are very steep; on the east they present fewer difficulties; on the +north they are comparatively easy. Between Mont Blanc and the railway +is a secondary line of heights about a mile and a half long, of an +average width of 1,200 yards. The northern portion of this western +range is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, called "Table Mountain" in +the orders for the battle; it lies about a mile due west of the +central portion of Mont Blanc. Its average height is perhaps 100 feet +lower than Mont Blanc, but here and there its surface is broken by +knolls which dominate not only the plateau itself, but the surrounding +country in every direction. A well-defined depression, almost +amounting to a valley, running from south-east to north-west, +separates Table Mountain from the southern half of the western +heights. To these the name of "Gun Hill" has been given. Gun Hill +consists of a series of undulations, bounded on the west and south by +kopjes, in places as precipitous as the sides of Table Mountain, and +varying in height from 80 to 120 feet above the plain. After the +engagement the most southerly of these knolls became known to Lord +Methuen's force as "Grenadier Hill." The valley between Mont Blanc and +the western range is open, but intersected by deep dongas running from +the north and north-east. The hills in both lines of heights are +covered with huge iron-stone boulders, in places so steeply piled that +men have to climb them on hands and knees, and their indented outlines +form many salients from which cross fire can be poured on troops +advancing to the attack. + +[Sidenote: Position as presented to the assailants Nov. 23rd.] + +As seen from the railway, the direct line of advance on Kimberley, the +Mont Blanc range stands out of the veld like a fortress. This, the +main range, is surrounded on the south and east by a level plain which +affords advancing troops no cover from fire. Its western face, +fronting the railway, has as natural outworks the heights of Table +Mountain and Gun Hill. Thus, when Lord Methuen at first designed to +drive off the Boers who flanked and menaced his further progress, the +nearest part of the enemy's position to him was Gun Hill, and beyond +this, further north, was Table Mountain, while supporting these from +the east was the main ridge of Mont Blanc. Therefore, in order to +clear away the enemy thus threatening him on his right, it was +necessary first to arrange the positions of rendezvous so that the +division should be arrayed against the hills about to be assailed. +Thus the 9th brigade on the left of the attack looked towards Table +Mountain. The Guards on the right, that is, to the south of the 9th +brigade, similarly faced Gun Hill. The Guards were both nearer to the +part to be assailed by them, and more immediately opposite to it, +than was the 9th brigade to the object of its attack. + +[Sidenote: Mode of attack as designed.] + +The 9th brigade was to assault the western face of Table Mountain, +while the Guards' brigade attacked Gun Hill. As soon as the enemy had +been driven off Table Mountain, the 9th brigade was to move eastwards, +swinging its left round so as to attack Mont Blanc from the north, +while supported by the fire of the Guards from the eastern side of Gun +Hill. The 75th battery on the left, the Naval guns and the 18th +battery on the right, were to co-operate with the infantry by +searching the heights with shrapnel. The mounted troops were to guard +the flanks, prevent the escape of the enemy to the east, and, if +possible, capture the Boer laager. With this object, two squadrons of +the 9th Lancers under Colonel B. Gough were to be on the left flank of +the 9th brigade, with one and a half companies of mounted infantry; +while the remaining squadron of the 9th Lancers, a company of M.I. and +Rimington's Guides, the whole under Major M. F. Rimington, were to +work on the outer flank of the brigade of Guards. The troops were to +march off from their respective rendezvous at 3 a.m. By this attack on +Mont Blanc from the north, after the outworks of Table Mountain and +Gun Hill had been carried, the Boers would be driven, not back along +the railway towards Kimberley, but eastwards, well off Lord Methuen's +proposed line of advance. + +[Sidenote: Strength and disposition of Boers.] + +The enemy under Jacobus Prinsloo consisted of the Jacobsdal, Winburg, +Fauresmith and Bloemfontein commandos, with detachments from +Kroonstad, Hoopstad and Boshof. It is difficult to arrive at an exact +conclusion as to their strength, for the Boers themselves do not agree +as to the number of burghers who took part in the action. Their +estimates vary from 2,100 to 2,500 men, with two field guns and a +pom-pom. Their artillery, however, hardly fired at all, nor were the +reinforcements which De la Rey brought from Kimberley actively +engaged. The exact ground held by each commando cannot be accurately +stated, but their approximate dispositions are shown upon the maps No. +10 and 10(a). There is some reason to believe that the Boer general +had intended to throw part of his right wing across the railway, as +trenches were found west of the line, so constructed as to bring +flanking fire against an attack on Table Mountain; but whether these +works were occupied on the morning of the 23rd cannot be ascertained. +That the enemy had posts along the line to the north of Belmont is +proved by the fact that one of these parties was captured by Colonel +Gough's detachment of mounted men. + +[Sidenote: 3.15 a.m. Nov. 23rd. Attack begins.] + +The troops left their bivouacs about 2 a.m. on the 23rd, reached their +respective rendezvous at the time appointed, and at about 3.15 moved +off towards the various parts of the enemy's position, to the attack +of which they had been assigned. + +[Sidenote: Guards move against Gun Hill.] + +In the assault on Gun Hill by the brigade of Guards, the two +battalions of the Coldstream Guards were in reserve; the 1st battalion +Scots Guards and the 3rd battalion Grenadier Guards were detailed to +deliver the attack. As the latter battalions, moving in line of +quarter-column, reached the wire fences along the railway line, they +demolished them or scrambled through them as best they could[155] and +then deployed into fighting formation. Four half companies, extended +to five paces, formed the firing line of each battalion, supported at +200 paces distance by the remainder of these four companies, also +extended to five paces. The battalion reserve, which followed about +200 paces behind the supports, consisted of four companies, which +moved in the same formation as the leading companies but with a +smaller extension between the men. As soon as the deployment was +completed the advance began, and the troops moved forward through the +darkness, over ground fairly open, but here and there made difficult +by rocks and ant-bear holes. The only sound to be heard was the steady +tramp of feet, which in the stillness of the night could be +distinguished many hundred yards away by the 9th brigade. In admirable +order, with their intervals and distances well maintained, the long +lines of men advanced, straining their eyes to catch a glimpse of the +kopjes they were to attack, and wondering when the Boers would open +fire upon them. They had not long to wait. Towards 4 a.m., when the +outlines of the hills began dimly to appear against the first glimmer +of dawn, a violent burst of musketry rang out. Each rifle as it +flashed against the dark background showed where it had been +discharged. The enemy were thus seen to be dotted at irregular +intervals in two tiers on the skyline and the upper slopes of the +heights. + + [Footnote 155: In some cases it was found that the wires were + too strong to be cut by the wire-cutters.] + +[Sidenote: Attack of Scots Guards.] + +The Scots Guards, who were marching on the point marked +c+ on map No. +10, were within about 150 yards of the foot of the kopje, and had +hardly fixed bayonets, when the enemy opened upon them. Col. A. H. +Paget ordered the charge to be sounded, and, with a ringing cheer, his +men carried the hill with comparatively small loss, to find themselves +exposed, not only to frontal but to cross fire from both flanks. The +musketry from the right ceased as soon as the Grenadiers stormed the +kopjes which they attacked, while, thanks to the initiative of Bt. +Lt.-Col. W. P. Pulteney, that from the left was checked. This officer, +whose company was on the left of the line of the Scots Guards, found +himself under heavy fire from the kopje marked +d+. Advancing against +it he dislodged its defenders, who, in their precipitate retreat to +Table Mountain, left some thirty ponies behind them. Colonel Pulteney +mounted as many of his men as possible upon them, galloped in pursuit +across the valley, then dismounted and worked up the kopje at the +south-western angle of Table Mountain (+b+ on map No. 10), until he +was stopped by the enemy concealed amongst its boulders. + +[Sidenote: of Grenadiers.] + +The front line of the Grenadiers was about 350 yards from the kopjes +when they first came under fire. To close with their enemy, the men +were ordered to double and then instinctively quickening their pace +they arrived panting at the foot of the hills, which loomed black and +threatening before them. Under a very heavy fusilade, which at times +came from both flank and front, the Grenadiers carried the position, +but not without considerable loss in officers and men. They were led +by Col. E. M. S. Crabbe, who fell wounded within a few feet of the top +of the kopje, and were reinforced as they reached the summit by the +battalion reserve under Major D. A. Kinloch. The Boers fought +gallantly on this part of the field; some indeed, as was also the case +on Table Mountain, clung so tenaciously to their defences that they +perished by the bayonet. As soon as the ground to the front of the +Grenadiers and Scots Guards had been cleared of the enemy, both +battalions were re-assembled by their commanding officers. + +[Sidenote: The left attack.] + +Thus on the right the battle so far had developed in substantial +agreement with Lord Methuen's plans. On the left also matters were +going well, but more slowly than the General had anticipated. At the +time when fire was opened on the Guards, the leading battalions of the +9th brigade were crossing the railway line which lay between their +rendezvous and their object, the western side of Table Mountain. They +were guided by Lieut. F. L. Festing, Northumberland Fusiliers. The +Northampton was on the right, the Northumberland Fusiliers on the +left, both in column of double companies, with increased distances +between the companies. In the same formation the Yorkshire Light +Infantry followed as reserve to the brigade about 1,000 yards in rear. +In rear of this battalion were two companies of the Royal Munster +Fusiliers.[156] After passing through the railway fence both the +leading battalions extended from their left, with the result that the +Northumberland Fusiliers somewhat overlapped the Northampton. To +correct this, the former battalion was ordered to take ground towards +Belmont station, and in doing so was exposed to heavy, but ill-aimed, +fire. The direction of the Northampton advance exposed the right of +their leading line to the Boer musketry on Gun Hill, from which they +suffered until the Guards captured that part of the position. The +greater part of the Northumberland Fusiliers pushed forward against +the south-west corner of Table Mountain, but were temporarily checked +by heavy fire from outlying rocks and knolls. One or two misdirected +British shells also contributed to delay the progress of the +battalion, but the forward movement of the Northampton, some of whom +charged with the bayonet, against the northern end of Gun Hill drove +away the parties of Boers opposing the Northumberland Fusiliers, who +were then able to continue their attack on Table Mountain. Two +companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers, under Major the Hon. C. +Lambton, had been left in reserve on the western side of the railway +near Belmont station. When, about 5 a.m., the sun rose just behind +Table Mountain, Major Lambton realised that, with the light shining +straight in their faces, his men could not see to shoot. He therefore +moved his two companies up the railway to the point marked +a+, and +then across the open veld to ground from which, unbaffled by the +morning sun, he was able to pour heavy volleys upon the burghers +opposed to the main attack of his battalion. His flanking fire largely +contributed to dislodge the Boers from Table Mountain, while the 75th +battery, from the neighbourhood of the railway, played upon the +north-west face of this portion of the western range. The positions +occupied by the detachment of Northumberland Fusiliers and by this +battery will be found on map No. 10 (a). + + [Footnote 156: The half-battalion Loyal North Lancashire + regiment had been left at Witteputs as baggage guard.] + +[Sidenote: Left attack continued.] + +The stubborn resistance of the defenders of Table Mountain greatly +delayed its complete occupation by the British troops; indeed, it +required the united exertions of the Northumberland Fusiliers, of part +of the Northampton, of several companies of the Guards, and of two +companies of the Yorkshire Light Infantry to drive the Boers +completely off the plateau. When the attack of the Northumberland +Fusiliers upon the south-western corner of Table Mountain was checked, +the Brigadier had brought up from his reserve half a battalion of the +K.O.Y.L.I. under Col. C. St. L. Barter. It had entered the depression +between Table Mountain and Gun Hill in the formation which the +battalion had assiduously practised for several years--waves of double +companies, in single rank, with an interval of 8 to 10 paces between +the men. Being struck in the flank by musketry from Table Mountain, +two companies turned and joined in the attack on that plateau. In the +course of the fight on Table Mountain Major-General Fetherstonhaugh +was severely wounded, and the command of the brigade devolved upon +Lieut.-Col. C. G. C. Money, Northumberland Fusiliers. + +[Sidenote: Coldstream are diverted from support of 9th brigade.] + +[Sidenote: They carry Razor Back and Sugar Loaf.] + +The original orders for the battle had directed that, when the +Grenadier and Scots Guards had carried Gun Hill, the two Coldstream +battalions should reinforce them and support the 9th brigade in the +attack on Mont Blanc. When, therefore, Gun Hill appeared to be +occupied by his leading battalions, Major-General Colvile ordered the +Coldstream to advance, the 1st battalion on the right, the 2nd on the +left, but as they approached Gun Hill they came under a heavy fire +from the Razor Back and the Sugar Loaf. To meet this attack they +changed front half right, and gradually inclined still more to this +direction until the Razor Back and Sugar Loaf Hills became the objects +of their attack. General Colvile, desiring to arrest this movement, +which threatened to become a purely frontal attack over most +unfavourable ground, despatched his brigade-major, Captain H. G. +Ruggles-Brise, to halt these two battalions. Ruggles-Brise succeeded +in reaching the 2nd battalion, and led part of them back to Gun Hill, +whence a portion of them, under command of Major H. Shute, were +immediately despatched by Major-General Colvile to re-establish +connection with the 9th brigade. This detachment gradually worked +northwards towards Table Mountain, and joining hands with Brevet +Lieut.-Col. Pulteney's company of Scots Guards, to which reference has +already been made, took part in the capture of the northern extremity +of the western range. But the remainder of the 2nd battalion of the +Coldstream under Lieut.-Col. H. R. Stopford, and the 1st battalion, +under Lieut.-Col. A. E. Codrington, were beyond recall; they pressed +forward, and, materially aided by the fire of the 18th battery, +assaulted and carried the Razor Back and Sugar Loaf kopjes. Captain J. +T. Sterling, who commanded a company of the reserve of the 1st +Coldstream, marching in rear of the remainder of the battalion, became +aware that the hills to the south of the Sugar Loaf were occupied by +Boers. Fearing that these burghers might attack Codrington in flank, +Sterling, deviating from his proper line of advance, moved his men +against them, in rushes of sections, at five paces interval, and +using independent fire. That there were many of the enemy opposed to +him is proved by the fact that he lost 20 men out of his company, 110 +strong; but his prompt action prevented the counter-stroke which he +had anticipated. + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen therefore changes his plan of attack.] + +[Sidenote: Capture of Table Mountain and Mont Blanc.] + +In consequence of this unexpected development in the battle, Lord +Methuen, abandoning his intention of attacking Mont Blanc from the +north, determined to support the Coldstream battalions, by launching +every available man to reinforce their attack upon the main ridge. The +Grenadiers and Scots Guards moved down into the valley which lies +between the two ranges, and, to minimize the effect of the plunging +cross fire from the heights of Mont Blanc and Table Mountain, passed +it as rapidly as possible in three widely-extended lines. The valley +once traversed, the Boer musketry ceased to be dangerous, but its +passage cost the Grenadiers nearly as dear as their capture of the +kopjes of Gun Hill. He also called up his last reserve, half a +battalion of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the two companies of +the Munster Fusiliers, and threw them into the fight, on the left of +the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream Guards. Thus, on the right of the +field of battle were long lines of skirmishers, either crossing the +valley or actually ascending its northern heights, while on the left a +fierce fight was raging between the 9th brigade and the stalwart +defenders of the crags and works on the plateau of Table Mountain. +Gradually the Boers at these points weakened, and then retreated in +all haste to the valley, where, pursued by long-range volleys, they +mounted their ponies and disappeared among the kopjes of the main +range. Then the 9th brigade, following them across the valley, scaled +the steep slopes of Mont Blanc, and those of the enemy who were still +holding this kopje, fell back before them, and galloped off to the +east and north-east, under the heavy fire of the infantry. + +[Sidenote: Boers escape untouched by shells or cavalry.] + +Neither of the field batteries from their positions could see the +Boers as they fled from Mont Blanc. The Naval guns, which had been +successfully co-operating with the 18th battery[157] in shelling the +Boers on the crest line of Mont Blanc, were the artillery nearest to +Lord Methuen's hand as, from the summit, he watched the retreating +Boers. He called upon the Naval brigade to bring one of their guns on +to the top of Mont Blanc, by the deep gorge which cuts into the +western face of the main range. But the ground was impossible; the +heavy gun could not be dragged up the mountain side, and the Boers +effected their retreat without molestation from artillery fire. The +18th battery indeed joined with Major Rimington in a pursuit of the +Boers eastwards, from the extreme south of the hills, but with horses +exhausted by thirst and fatigue, nothing could be effected. The +detachment of cavalry and mounted infantry on the left of the British +line pushed some distance to the north-east; its appearance scattered +considerable parties of the enemy who otherwise might have harassed +the left flank, but with this exception its influence on the fight was +small. About midday its progress was arrested by a very well handled +flank or rearguard of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Swinkpan.[158] + + [Footnote 157: The 18th battery fired 141 rounds. For the + greater part of the day it was in action at 1,375 yards.] + + [Footnote 158: This water-hole is not shown on map No. 10; it + appears on map No. 9.] + +[Sidenote: End of action. Casualties, Nov. 23rd.] + +By 10 a.m. the engagement was over, and by noon the greater part of +the British force had returned to camp. After the action the outposts +were furnished by the Northampton regiment, and half a battalion of +the Scots Guards held Belmont station with a detached post on Table +Mountain. The total loss of Lord Methuen's command was 3 officers and +51 N.C.O.s and men killed; 23 officers and 220 N.C.O.s and men +wounded. The Grenadiers suffered more heavily than any of the other +battalions. They lost 1 officer killed and 8 wounded, 2 mortally; 21 +N.C.O.s and men killed and 107 wounded, 24 mortally. Of the Boers, it +is known that more than 80 were killed, and 70 were taken prisoners. A +large amount of cattle, a considerable number of ponies, and much +ammunition were captured. + +[Sidenote: An indecisive but in some ways satisfactory engagement.] + +Though from the insufficient number of his mounted troops and from the +want of horse artillery, Lord Methuen was unable to convert his +successful engagement into a decisive victory, the action was +satisfactory in many ways. The first advance was made in darkness, in +a formation more extended than any practised at the same period in +broad daylight by continental nations. Such men as became detached +from their battalions promptly rallied upon the nearest officer of +another corps. The leading of company officers when, in the stress of +battle, they became separated from their battalions, and had thus to +act entirely on their own initiative, was most satisfactory. As an +instance of the manner in which troops become dispersed in modern +engagements, it is well to record the movements of the companies of +the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream Guards. One company joined or +closely followed the Grenadiers in their attack on Gun Hill. Two +companies worked with the Grenadiers in their attack on Mont Blanc. +Three companies fought on Table Mountain. One company kept touch with +the 1st battalion; another acted independently in clearing the eastern +side of Gun Hill, and then fought on Table Mountain. The fire +discipline proved distinctly good. Long range supporting fire, when +the light permitted it, was freely employed. The arrangements by the +R.A.M.C. for the removal of the wounded from the field of battle to +the base hospitals were admirable. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +GRASPAN.[159] + + [Footnote 159: See maps Nos. 9 and 11.] + + +[Sidenote: Boers gather at Graspan. Nov. 23rd/99.] + +Eleven miles north of Belmont station the road and railway leading to +Kimberley enter a network of kopjes, which dominate the line until the +plain through which the Modder river flows is reached. These rough +outcrops of rock and boulders from the plains of the open veld have +been arranged by nature in clusters of small hills, the most southern +group being so shaped as to form a natural redoubt astride of the +railway, midway between Graspan and Enslin, thus barring any advance +from the south along the line. The larger portion of the Boer force, +defeated at Belmont, had fallen back under Prinsloo, on the 23rd of +November, across the Free State border to Ramdam, about 13 miles east +of Enslin station. De la Rey, however, whose commando had taken but +little part in that action, halted his men at Graspan, and occupied +the excellent position which this redoubt offered for a further stand. +That same evening the Transvaal General sent an urgent despatch to his +Free State colleague, imploring him to return to the railway line, and +in compliance with this request Prinsloo on the following day left +Commandant T. van der Merwe with 800 men at Ramdam, and moved to +Graspan with the rest of his men. On the arrival of the Free State +commandos at Graspan, a Krijgsraad assembled, and decided to remain on +the defensive for the next twenty-four hours, after which period, if +no forward move were made by the British troops, the two republican +leaders would themselves assume the offensive. + +[Sidenote: Character of position.] + +The natural redoubt, which the Boer leaders had thus determined to +hold, rises abruptly from the level, and commands the approaches +across the veld on the south, east and west; the even surface of the +plain, the sandy soil of which was barely concealed by dry tufts of +coarse grass, presented not an inch of cover, save for a few +ant-mounds dotted about here and there: their hard sun-baked walls +afford good protection from bullets for a skirmisher lying close +behind them. The kopjes are so grouped as to facilitate the +reinforcement of either the front face or the flanks from a centrally +placed body. They overlook, moreover, the only water available in the +vicinity, a few muddy pans and wells within the hills to the rear. The +southern face of the stronghold, tracing it from west to east, has a +length of about a mile. The flanks of this face are very definitely +marked by two razor-backed kopjes, the one on the east and the other +on the west, rising some 150 feet above the surrounding ground; both +these kopjes run approximately from the south to the north. In the +centre of the southern face lies a third kopje, oval in shape, 200 +yards in length and 30 feet higher than the flank hillocks with which +it is connected by re-entrant ridges. + +[Sidenote: Its one weakness.] + +The left flank mentioned above consists mainly of that eastern +razor-backed kopje already referred to, which runs northward for a +distance of some 1,200 yards, its crest line broken by a series of +small knolls. Further north on this flank are one or two smaller +kopjes, then a mile of valley, on the far side of which, nestling +under another cluster of hills, lie the Rooilaagte homestead and a +Kaffir kraal. On the right flank in like manner the western razor-back +is similarly continued in a northerly direction by two other small +kopjes, the more northern of which is situated on the west side of the +railway. A Nek of land connects this kopje with the apex of a +triangular patch of broken ground, stretching several miles northward, +with its eastern side at right angles to the railway. Yet further +north, beyond the base or northern side of this third cluster of +hills, a valley some two miles broad runs from the railway on the east +to the open veld on the west, and thus completely separates the +quadrilateral redoubt, the Rooilaagte, and the triangular clusters of +hills already described, from a fourth group termed Honey Nest Kloof +Kopjes, which stretch northward to the Modder valley.[160] Strong, +therefore, although this whole position, or rather series of +positions, was on the front and flanks, it will be understood that if +the valley in rear could be seized by a sufficient mounted force, +while the front and flanks were threatened by infantry and guns, the +defenders would be cut off from their line of retreat, and their +safety seriously imperilled. + + [Footnote 160: Only the southern groups of kopjes are shown + on map No. 11.] + +[Sidenote: 23rd & 24th Nov. Preparation for advance.] + +On the afternoon and night of 23rd of November Lord Methuen's division +rested at Belmont. The forenoon of the 24th of November was spent in +preparing for another march, supplies of ammunition being replenished +by railway from Orange River station. Meanwhile an armoured train, +escorted by the mounted company of the Loyal North Lancashire, had +been despatched up the line to reconnoitre, and came under artillery +fire from the Boers on Graspan. Its escort pushed on, the foremost +scouts riding up to within fifty yards of the kopjes, and +ascertaining, although with the loss of an officer (Lieutenant +Owen-Lewis, I.S.C.) and two men, that these hills were held by a Boer +force of about 400 to 500 men, with two guns. The mounted infantry, +together with the train, then returned to Belmont. + +[Sidenote: Forward to Swinkpan. Nov. 24th.] + +On receipt of their report at 2.30 p.m. the General Officer commanding +the division ordered the 9th Lancers and the whole of the mounted +infantry to move forward, covering the front for three miles on each +side of the railway, and further reconnoitring the enemy's position. +Under cover of this reconnaissance, the rest of the division were +directed to march at once to Swinkpan, so that they might be within +easy striking distance of Graspan on the following morning. +Intelligence, however, having reached the British commander that a +party of Boers, stated to be 500 strong, were on his right flank, the +Scots Guards and the two companies of Royal Munster Fusiliers, +together with the Naval guns, remained at Belmont to protect the +railway and the rear of the column, but were ordered to march to +Enslin the next day. + +[Sidenote: Swinkpan lacks water.] + +[Sidenote: Methuen's intentions.] + +This information as to the enemy and an unfounded rumour of a Boer +movement to the westward somewhat delayed the start of the whole +division; the troops, therefore, did not reach Swinkpan until after +dark. On arrival barely sufficient water was found in the pan for the +men, and none could be spared for the battery horses, a hardship which +told against them severely in the fight of the morrow. The cavalry +reconnaissance, which Lord Methuen personally accompanied, tended to +confirm the original report that the strength of the Boer force +holding the position did not exceed five hundred men. He considered, +therefore, that on the following day he would be able to shell the +enemy out of the kopjes, and hoped that by despatching his cavalry and +mounted infantry well forward on both flanks he might have the good +fortune to capture the entire detachment. + +[Sidenote: Advance on Graspan. Nov. 25/99, 3.30 a.m.] + +With this design the mounted troops, the Field artillery, and the 9th +brigade under command of Lieut.-Col. Money, marched from Swinkpan +bivouac on Graspan at 3.30 a.m. on the 25th of November, the Guards' +brigade, under Major-General Sir H. Colvile, following in rear with +the baggage train at an interval of more than an hour. The Naval guns +at Belmont, mounted on goods trucks, simultaneously moved forward up +the line with the armoured train, followed by the Railway Troops, +viz., the 8th, 11th and 31st companies of the Royal engineers. The 1st +Scots Guards and two companies Munster Fusiliers went by road as +rearguard. + +To the 9th brigade had been attached this day a small Naval battalion, +commanded by Captain Prothero, R.N., consisting of a company of +bluejackets, one company of Royal Marine artillery, and two companies +of Royal Marine Light Infantry, the total strength of the battalion +being about 240 men. Besides this unit the brigade comprised the 1st +Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Northamptonshire regiment, 2nd King's +Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and a half-battalion of the Loyal North +Lancashire. + +[Sidenote: Metheun tries to intercept Boer retreat.] + +[Sidenote: 6.15 a.m. 18th and 75th batteries open fire.] + +In conformity with his plan of action Lord Methuen directed Colonel B. +Gough to pass beyond the enemy's position on the east with two +squadrons of the 9th Lancers, one company of mounted infantry, and +Rimington's Guides; to pass beyond it on the west he likewise sent Major +Milton with the third squadron of the 9th Lancers, the mounted company +of the Northumberland Fusiliers, the mounted half company of the +Yorkshire Light Infantry, and a detachment (thirty strong) of the New +South Wales Lancers. The batteries (18th and 75th) moved at first with +the main body of the 9th brigade, the Northumberland Fusiliers +furnishing the advance guard, but, when the sun rose at 5 a.m. and the +Boer position was approached, the guns were ordered forward and came +into action about 6.15 a.m. against the kopjes held by the enemy east of +the railway. The 75th on the left engaged in a duel with the Boer guns, +but owing to the careful concealment of the latter was unable to produce +much effect; the 18th on the right, at a range of 2,200 yards, searched +carefully with shrapnel the sangars on the kopjes. The four companies of +the Loyal North Lancashire were detailed as an escort to this battery, +two of them lying down close to the guns, the other two being in support +some distance in rear. The 75th battery at first lacked an escort, but +later on a half-battalion of the Northamptonshire was sent to it, and +remained near the railway until the end of the day. + +[Sidenote: Naval guns and field batteries shell the hills to drive out +Boers.] + +Meanwhile the remainder of the 9th brigade halted out of the enemy's +range midway between the two batteries, with a half-battalion of the +Northumberland Fusiliers extended in front. The armoured train and the +Naval guns, four 12-prs., commanded by Lieut. F. W. Dean, R.N., +arrived in sight of the Boer position a little before 6 a.m., +accompanied by the Royal engineer companies, who were in a repair +train in rear. The leading train halted at Graspan station, from +whence by means of field-glasses a large number of Boers could be seen +standing on the crests of the kopjes commanding the line. Almost +immediately a puff of smoke appeared on the ridge a little to the east +of the railway, and a shell whistled over the train, bursting some 200 +yards beyond. Lieutenant Dean at once detrained two guns (the strength +of his party being insufficient to man-handle more than two in the +soft ground), and with them ranged on the crest line, finding the +distance to be about 5,000 yards. The trains were then sent back about +half a mile, leaving, however, a trolly with ammunition. The Naval +guns, in conjunction with the field batteries, which had now come up, +continued to shell the Boer guns, and by 6.30 a.m. these for a time +ceased fire. + +[Sidenote: Boers, reinforced, are stronger than expected.] + +The estimate of the enemy's strength made by the reconnaissance of the +24th was not inaccurate, but the fact was that the situation had been +entirely changed by the arrival of Prinsloo with large reinforcements +later on that afternoon. The exact numbers of the Boers engaged in +this fight are, as in other cases, difficult to state with any +precision, but they were probably not less than about 2,300 men, with +three Krupp guns and two pom-poms. This force was disposed as +follows:--General De la Rey's commando of Transvaalers, consisting of +700 men and two Krupp guns, held the northern end of the kopjes on the +western flank, and was therefore on the north-western side of the +railway. Next on the western central kopje to the south-east of the +railway came the Winburg commando, about 250 with a Krupp gun, under +Commandant Jourdaan. These three Krupp guns were, however, controlled +by Major Albrecht, the officer commanding the Free State artillery. +The long kopje, at the southern end of which the western meets the +southern face, was held by the Bloemfontein commando, 500 strong, +under General J. Prinsloo. East of him, in the centre of the front +face, was placed the Jacobsdal commando, 300 strong, under Commandant +Lubbe. The eastern razor-backed kopje, which formed the left flank and +part of the frontal defence, was assigned to detachments of the +Bloemfontein, Hoopstad, and Fauresmith commandos under Commandants P. +Fourie and H. van der Venter. Two pom-poms were mounted on this side +of the defences. It will be seen from map 11 that the Graspan ground +differed in a marked way from the majority of the positions selected +by the Boers, being salient instead of re-entrant. It did not, +therefore, lend itself readily to the adoption of those enveloping +tactics which their forefathers learnt originally from the Zulus. +Prinsloo sought to remedy this defect by ordering up from Ramdam a +detachment to menace the eastern flank of the British advance. + +[Sidenote: Boer strength involves attack instead of mere shelling.] + +It was now seen that the enemy available for the defence of the main +position was too strong to be driven out there from by a brief +artillery bombardment, and it soon became clear to the British +Commander that an attack in due form had become necessary. Lord +Methuen determined, therefore, to direct the 9th brigade to go forward +and carry the kopjes. The artillery was to prepare the way for attack +at closer range, while the Guards' brigade was ordered to come up in +support and to hold the right flank, the presence of the Ramdam +detachment to the south-east having already been discovered by the +mounted troops. + +[Sidenote: 7.15 a.m. 18th battery prepares for infantry attack on +south-east. One section (two guns) against eastern face.] + +[Sidenote: 2 companies L.N.L., halted before eastern kopje, await 9th +brigade.] + +These orders were issued at about 7 a.m. The 18th battery started off +eastward, and a quarter of an hour later came into action under +infantry fire at a range of 1,425 yards against the southern end of +the long eastern kopje. Lord Methuen had already chosen that kopje as +the main object of the infantry attack. A section of the battery was a +little later moved round yet further east to search with shrapnel the +eastern face. Although all the guns of the 18th battery were thus for +a considerable period in action within long-range rifle fire of the +enemy, it did not suffer a single casualty during the whole +engagement. Two companies of the Loyal North Lancashire regiment +followed the battery, and continued to act as escort; the other two +companies of that half-battalion under Major Churchward were ordered +personally by Lord Methuen to move forward, the right company against +the eastern kopje, and the left against the central kopje of the +southern face. But, soon after they had started to do this, they were +instructed by a subsequent order to halt and await the arrival of the +rest of the brigade. + +[Sidenote: Northumberland Fusiliers leads 9th brigade.] + +Five companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers, which was still +leading the 9th brigade, were ordered to protect the left of the +attack and remained lying down 2,000 yards from the enemy, where the +half-battalion as advance guard had been originally halted.[161] Two +of the remaining companies were directed to reinforce the escort of +the guns (Naval and 75th battery) on the left flank, and the other one +moved to the right to support the 18th battery. + + [Footnote 161: See p. 233, 2nd par.] + +[Sidenote: 75th battery and Naval guns join in.] + +The 75th battery advanced at the same time parallel to the line. It +was accompanied by the two Naval 12-prs., and took up two successive +positions 4,000 and 2,300 yards from the enemy's guns, which now +re-opened fire. The Naval guns during these movements were dragged +forward by the seamen, assisted by sappers lent from the Royal +engineer companies. The fire of the enemy at the British as they came +into action at the nearer range was accurate. The Naval guns, +nevertheless, remained in action until the conclusion of the day. +When, a little later, the 75th battery was moved to the eastward, +Lieut. Dean held his ground. By making his men lie down as each flash +at the enemy's battery was seen, he was able to save them from any +heavy casualties. The effect of the British on the Boer artillery was +also very slight, the enemy's casualties being limited to one gunner +wounded and three horses killed. + +[Sidenote: Advance of Guards.] + +The Guards' brigade, in its march from Swinkpan, had been drawn to the +north-west by the sound of the guns and had moved in extended lines in +that direction, until the left company of its leading battalion, the +3rd Grenadier Guards, crossed the railway close to the spot where the +Naval guns were stationed; but at this moment Lord Methuen's order to +march to the south-east to protect the right rear of the main attack +reached the Brigadier by heliograph. In compliance with this +instruction Sir H. Colvile turned about the 3rd Grenadier Guards and +2nd Coldstream Guards, and moved them to the other flank; throughout +this movement from left to right behind the 9th brigade, the two +battalions were in extended order and beyond the range of the enemy. +The 1st Coldstream Guards were still protecting the transport column; +the 1st Scots Guards, which came up from Belmont, were also held back +on the left, under the immediate orders of the Lieut.-General, and +acted as a divisional reserve. Lord Methuen's preliminary +dispositions, therefore, of the troops not actually employed in the +assault, included the use of six field guns, two Naval guns, seven +companies Northumberland Fusiliers, four companies Northamptonshire, +and three companies Royal engineers, in facing the enemy's right and +centre; two battalions of the Guards watched the right flank, in +support of the main attack, and the other two battalions were +available as a final reserve. + +[Sidenote: 9th Brigade prepare to attack eastern kopje.] + +Meanwhile the units of the 9th brigade, intended to deliver the +assault, had extended in front of the centre of the position. The +Brigadier was, however, then instructed by Lord Methuen that he was to +act against the eastern kopje, and a little later was further informed +that the attack should also overlap its eastern face. Lieut.-Colonel +Money accordingly moved his brigade to the right in extended order, +and thus brought it to a point from whence a direct stroke could be +made at the assigned object. There the brigade halted for a moment; +the Naval battalion was immediately facing the eastern kopje and now +slightly in advance of the other units. The latter had somewhat +intermingled during the movement to the flank, with the result that +two companies of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and one +company of the Northampton were on the left of the Naval contingent, +the remaining six companies of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry +and three of the Northampton being on its right. These preparations +for the attack occupied nearly two hours, and were not completed until +9 a.m. The situation at this hour is shown on map No. 11. Meanwhile, +an hour earlier, the 75th battery had by Lord Methuen's order been +brought over from the western flank and co-operated with the 18th in +shelling the eastern kopje. All being now ready for the attempt, the +order to move was given by the Lieut.-General in person, and the Naval +battalion pushed on to a level with the two companies of the Loyal +North Lancashire regiment extended in their front.[162] Accompanied by +these on the left flank, and supported by the three Yorkshire Light +Infantry and Northamptonshire companies on that side, the Naval +contingent steadily and rapidly pressed on against the eastern kopje. +The sailors and marines had originally been extended to four paces, +but had somewhat closed in during the manoeuvring which preceded the +attack. The enemy remained silent until the assailants approached to +within 1,000 yards, but then began to pour in a rapid and effective +fire from the kopje attacked, and the ridge to the westward. At 600 +yards the British line halted to return this, and then from that point +onward advanced by rushes of from 50 to 100 yards at a time, the left +company of the Loyal North Lancashire, supported by the companies of +King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, moving on the centre kopje, and +the Naval brigade with the other North Lancashire company, under the +command of Lt. A. J. Carter, still leading towards the eastern kopje +with the Northamptonshire company in support. The enemy's fire +meanwhile increased in intensity, and both officers and men were +falling fast on the British side. The last 200 yards to the foot of +the hill were therefore traversed in a single rush. At the base of the +kopjes a certain amount of dead ground allowed of a short breathing +space, during which a consultation between the company officers left +in command took place. They determined to scale the hill and ordered +the men to fix bayonets. + + [Footnote 162: See p. 235, par. 2. The brigade, to the front + of which the Naval battalion had passed during the flank + movement, was now advancing to support these two companies in + the attack.] + +[Sidenote: Losses of attackers on south front.] + +The Naval contingent had already suffered heavily. Captain R. C. +Prothero, R.N., was wounded; Commander A. P. Ethelston, R.N., Major J. +H. Plumbe, R.M.L.I., and Captain Guy Senior, R.M.A., had been +killed;[163] the command of the battalion thus devolving on Captain A. +E. Marchant, R.M.L.I. The two companies of the North Lancashire, more +fortunate, owing to their wide extension and their use of such cover +as the ant-hills afforded, reached the base of the kopjes with +considerably less loss than the Naval battalion. + + [Footnote 163: The officers of the Naval brigade wore the + same headgear as their men, and, except Captain Prothero and + Midshipman Wardle, all carried rifles.] + +[Sidenote: Preparations for attack on east front.] + +While this advance against the southern face of the kopje was being +executed, the six companies of the King's Own Yorkshire Light +Infantry, and the three remaining companies of the Northamptonshire +regiment, had gradually worked round the enemy's left flank. The two +pom-poms posted on this side proved troublesome, although endeavours +were made to reach them by the two guns of the 18th battery[164] and +by long-range rifle-fire. The Yorkshire Light Infantry were being +carefully manoeuvred in successive lines extended at ten paces +interval, and having pivoted on the left flank, succeeded, +notwithstanding the pom-poms and a heavy rifle-fire, in crossing the +open plain to the foot of the eastern face of the kopje with only +moderate losses.[165] The Northampton supported this attack on the +right, the two companies of the Loyal North Lancashire, which formed +the original escort of the 18th battery, joining in on the left. + + [Footnote 164: See p. 235, par. 2.] + + [Footnote 165: The K.O.Y.L.I. throughout the day lost only 7 + men killed, 3 officers and 34 men wounded, and 4 men + missing.] + +[Sidenote: The assault, 9.30 a.m. Nov. 25th, carries the eastern +kopje.] + +The moment had now come for the assault. Under cover of a final +artillery preparation the bluejackets, marines, and North Lancashire +men began to climb the boulders which covered the front face of the +kopjes. A third of the way up a momentary halt again became necessary, +as the British shells were bursting just in front of the assaulting +line. Then the Royal artillery ceased fire and the assailants, having +been joined by their Brigadier, Lieut.-Col. Money, and the supporting +Northamptonshire and Yorkshire companies, eagerly dashed on up to the +crest. The eastern face of the position was carried at the same time. +The enemy had no desire to await this final onslaught and had already +retired to the broken ground further to the north. If the times were +correctly recorded, the advance and capture of this kopje did not take +more than half an hour, the final assault having been delivered at +9.30 a.m. + +[Sidenote: The Boers retreat.] + +The commando on the Boer right had had but little share in this fight, +being held in check by the force on the British left detailed +expressly for that purpose. The loss of the razor-backed kopje +rendered the whole position untenable; De la Rey and Prinsloo +therefore fell back with their men northwards, pursued by long-range +volleys from the British infantry. As soon as he was informed that the +infantry had made good the crest line, Lieut.-Col. Hall, commanding +the Royal artillery, pushed on with both the field batteries to the +ridge between the central and eastern kopjes, but the enemy had by +this time retreated too far for the fire of the British guns to be +effective. The batteries then were taken to water, of which the +animals were in dire need. + +[Sidenote: The attempt to cut off the fugitives.] + +Meantime the two bodies of mounted troops, which, according to Lord +Methuen's scheme, were to seize ground in the path of the now +retreating Boers, had set out on their mission. + +[Sidenote: The western march.] + +Major Milton, in the early morning, had led his small force of one +squadron and one and a half companies of mounted infantry by a +circuitous march well to the westward of the railway and thence +northward until he reached that previously described valley which +separates the three southern clusters of hills from Honey Nest Kloof +Kopjes. On a sugar loaf hill at its entrance he left an observation +piquet and, extending the Northumberland Fusiliers company very +widely, with instructions to hold its southern side, he pushed up the +valley eastward with the remainder (amounting now to less than two +hundred men) and reached Honey Nest Kloof station. This small +detachment had thus ridden completely across the Boer line of retreat, +and was now six miles in rear of their captured position. Moving +further to the east, Milton observed, in the plains beyond the distant +end of the valley, the two squadrons under Colonel Gough, but failed +in an attempt to attract their attention by heliograph. There were +already signs of Boers coming to him, and, hoping to intercept +fugitives, Milton moved back on the Fusilier company extended on the +southern side. But the Boers swarmed out of the kopjes on this very +side in greatly superior numbers, and opened a heavy fire upon the +weak line of the Northumberland Fusiliers. The audacity of their +position in the open with their horses some 1,000 yards in rear was +apparent to the enemy. About 400 Boers, moreover, detached themselves +from the main body and approached Milton's men. The situation thus +became very critical, and the cavalry squadron fell back to the +western entrance, covered by the mounted infantry, who succeeded in +seizing a kopje on the northern side. The Boers continued their +advance against the defending party to within three hundred yards of +this kopje, but then swerved off to the east, thus enabling Major +Milton to withdraw the whole of his detachment in safety. Any further +attempt at pursuit would have ended in disaster, because of the great +strength of the enemy, and the unbroken front they still presented. + +[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Gough on the east.] + +Lieut.-Col. B. Gough's force on the east had similarly found itself to +be insufficient in strength to reap the fruits of victory. During the +earlier part of the fight it had done good service in holding back the +Ramdam detachment of Boers which occupied a kopje about two and a +quarter miles to the south-east of the battlefield. This detachment +was reported at first to be about 500, but Major Rimington, who +reconnoitred close up to it, saw other Boers advancing westwards to +support it, and it is not improbable that the whole of van der Merwe's +commando may have ridden out from Ramdam in the course of the morning. +Fortunately, however, the Boers were not at this period of the war +disposed to attack mounted troops in the open plain; the +demonstration, therefore, of Rimington's Guides and the Lancers' +squadrons sufficed to chain them to the kopje. + +[Sidenote: Gough fails to stop Boers.] + +As soon as the main attack had succeeded, Gough moved northward and +sighted the Boer laager, which had been observed at Enslin the +previous night, now retiring north-east along the road to Jacobsdal. +The escort appeared, however, to be too strong to be charged. Urgent +requests for guns were therefore sent back to Headquarters and +ultimately the 18th battery, which had reached the bivouac at Enslin, +was sent out to join Gough, but the horses were too exhausted for +rapid movement and the guns only arrived in time to fire a dozen +rounds at the last Boer wagons, which were now 5,000 yards away.[166] + + [Footnote 166: This battery fired in all 482 rounds during + the action.] + +[Sidenote: Want of cavalry and horse artillery make Belmont and +Graspan indecisive.] + +Yet at Graspan, as at Belmont, the open plains across which the enemy +was compelled to retire after his defeat were singularly favourable to +cavalry action and, had a satisfactory mounted brigade with a horse +artillery battery been available, the Boers could not have effected +their escape without suffering very heavy losses. Not only were the +mounted troops at Lord Methuen's disposal insufficient numerically, +but their horses were already worn out by the heavy reconnaissance +duty, which had of necessity been carried out by them day after day +without relief, under the adverse conditions of a sandy soil, great +heat, and a scarcity of water. The results of this deficiency in +mounted men were far-reaching. Not only did the enemy avoid paying the +material penalties of successive failures on the battlefield, but his +_moral_ was stiffened by these demonstrations of the immunity from +disaster conferred by his superior mobility. + +[Sidenote: Losses at Graspan, Nov. 25th.] + +The casualties suffered by the 1st division on this day amounted to 3 +officers and 15 men killed, 6 officers and 137 men wounded, and 7 +missing. + +[Sidenote: Heavy Naval losses.] + +The proportion of these losses which fell on the Naval brigade was +very high, their returns showing 3 officers and 6 men killed and 3 +officers and 89 men wounded. The Marines, who took part in the actual +attack, lost 47 per cent. of their strength. It is remarkable that the +North Lancashire, two of whose companies shared in that assault, had +only 1 man killed, 6 wounded, and 2 missing. The Guards' brigade did +not suffer and did not fire a shot all day. + +[Sidenote: Boer losses.] + +The enemy's losses are not accurately known; the bodies of 23 Boers +were found by the British troops, and buried after the fight; the +total republican casualties probably, therefore, amounted to about 80 +or 90. Forty prisoners and a few ponies were captured. + +[Sidenote: After the action. Night of Nov. 25th.] + +Lord Methuen's division bivouacked the night of the 25th November at +or near Enslin station; the scarcity of water again caused much +discomfort to men and animals. Under the supervision of Colonel E. +Townsend, principal medical officer of the division, the wounded were +collected and entrained during the afternoon, the less severe cases +being sent off to Orange River, and the graver to Cape Town. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +THE BATTLE OF THE MODDER RIVER.[167] + + [Footnote 167: As a point of historical accuracy it should be + noticed that, for the battle of the 28th November, the + "Modder River" is a misnomer. The fighting, as will be seen + in this chapter, took place on the banks of the Riet; but + since the battle honours for the engagement have been given + for "Modder River," the name has become officially + recognised, and is therefore used here. See map No. 12.] + + +[Sidenote: Boers learn to change their ideas of a "strong position."] + +[Sidenote: The ground chosen by De la Rey. Nov. 26th.] + +When the Boers, after their defeat on the 25th November, retreated +from the heights of Graspan,[168] the greater part of their force +withdrew to Jacobsdal, little inclined to renew the combat. But +General De la Rey induced the burghers to make another effort to +arrest the British march on Kimberley, at a position of his own +selection at the confluence of the Riet and the Modder rivers, where +the terrain differed in character from that which had been occupied at +Belmont and Graspan. In those engagements the Boers had entrenched +themselves upon high and rugged kopjes, of which the apparent strength +became a source of weakness. The hills afforded an excellent target +for the British artillery. The riflemen who held the works had to aim +downwards at the enemy as he advanced to the attack, and a "plunging" +fire never yields satisfactory results. At their base was dead ground, +inaccessible to the musketry of the defenders. Here the attacking +infantry, after their rush across the open, could halt for breathing +space before delivering the final assault. For these reasons De la Rey +decided to adopt completely new tactics and to fight from the bed of a +river, surrounded on every side by a level plain, destitute of cover +over the surface of which the burghers could pour a continuous and +"grazing" fire upon the British from the time they first came within +range, up to the very moment of their final charge. The plain, across +which the railway from Orange River to Kimberley runs nearly due north +and south, is intersected by the devious windings of two rivers, the +Riet and the Modder. From Bosman's Drift (see map 12) the Riet, the +more southerly of the two, runs north-west for about a mile and a +half, and then for the same distance turns to the north-east. Its +course next changes abruptly to the north-west for nearly two miles +when, increased in volume by the waters of its affluent, the Modder, +it gently curves to the westward for about a mile and a half. The +meanderings of the Modder are even more remarkable. Its most southern +elbow is half a mile north-east of the spot where the Riet turns for +the second time north-west. Thence it runs for a mile to the north, +then about the same distance to the west; it turns southward for a +mile, and then flows westward for three-quarters of a mile, where, a +few hundred yards above the railway bridge, it merges into the Riet. +Both these streams have cut themselves channels so wide as to allow a +thick growth of trees and scrub to line their sides, so deep that the +vegetation which they contain hardly shows above the level of the +surrounding plain. There are few practicable fords across the Riet. +One exists at Bosman's Drift; there is a second near the railway +bridge; among the group of islets at Rosmead there is a natural ford, +while the retaining wall of the weir which dams the river at this +village can be used, not without difficulty, by active men in single +file. Elsewhere the depth of the water and the mud at the bottom of +the Riet effectually combine to prevent the passage of troops. Thus +the Riet and the Modder together formed not only a gigantic moat +across the approaches to Kimberley from the south and south-east, but +a covered way, by which its defenders could move unseen to any part of +the position. + + [Footnote 168: See map No. 9 and freehand sketch.] + +[Sidenote: Two hamlets on the Riet. Other details.] + +On the right bank of the Riet there are two hamlets. One, known as +Modder River village, is clustered round the station; the other, +Rosmead, lies a mile further down the river. In both are farms and +cottages with gardens, bounded by trees, strongly-built mud walls, and +fences of wire and prickly cactus. On the left bank, close to the +river, there are two or three farms, surrounded by gardens and +substantial enclosures. About five miles to the north-east of the +Modder River village the Magersfontein kopjes loom dark and frowning, +a landmark for all the country round; while still further to the north +the heights of Scholtz Nek and Spytfontein lie athwart the railway to +Kimberley.[169] A glance at the reproduction of Captain Erskine's +freehand sketch of the ground will help the reader to appreciate the +strength of the Boer position. + + [Footnote 169: See map No. 13.] + +[Sidenote: Nov. 26th/99. Halt at Enslin.] + +On the 26th November, Lord Methuen halted in the neighbourhood of +Enslin,[170] while supplies and ammunition were brought up by the +railway. As far as the exhausted condition of his horses permitted, he +reconnoitred in the direction of the Riet, and a strong patrol of +mounted men, led by Lt.-Colonel Verner, ascertained that the Boers +were in occupation of Honey Nest Kloof station (map No. 9), and saw +considerable numbers of the enemy moving across the veld, trekking, as +it seemed, from the river southwards towards Ramdam. But so tired were +the artillery horses that, when the leader of the patrol sent back a +request for guns with which to shell the Boers out of the railway +station, Lord Methuen thought it better to give them absolute rest, +and ordered the patrol to retire.[171] + + [Footnote 170: See map No. 9.] + + [Footnote 171: At the end of this reconnaissance Lt.-Col. + Verner was so severely injured by his horse falling with him + that he was invalided home.] + +[Sidenote: 1st Division marches, Nov. 27th to Wittekop.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's first intention.] + +[Sidenote: His purpose in moving on Modder River.] + +[Sidenote: 4.30 a.m. Nov. 28th the march begins.] + +At 4 a.m. on the 27th the division marched to Wittekop, about six +miles to the south of the Modder River bridge. Here the artillery and +infantry bivouacked while the cavalry and mounted infantry +reconnoitred on a front of six miles along the railway towards the +river. In the distance, lines of wagons could be seen leaving +Jacobsdal, apparently moving towards Modder River station, and at +about 1 p.m. the advance patrols of the 9th Lancers reported that they +had been forced to halt by the enemy's musketry from the direction of +the railway bridge, which had been wrecked by the Boers at the +beginning of the war. In the afternoon Lord Methuen joined Major +Little, commanding the 9th Lancers, in a reconnaissance towards the +Riet, but observed nothing to cause him to change the plan he had +already formed. This was to mask the Modder River bridge by a +reconnaissance in force, while he marched to Jacobsdal, and thence by +Brown's Drift across the Modder river to Abon's Dam, lying about +sixteen miles north-east of Jacobsdal, and thus turn the position of +Spytfontein (see map No. 9), on which he was convinced the burghers +intended to give him battle. The cavalry did not reconnoitre up the +Riet river towards Jacobsdal, and therefore the existence of the ford +at Bosman's Drift remained unknown to him. His only large scale sketch +of the ground near the Modder bridge did not include the windings of +this stream.[172] But in the course of the night much information came +in. Major Little reported that he estimated the number of Boers near +the Modder River village to be 4,000. Major Rimington ascertained that +the Boers expected reinforcements, and that they were making +entrenchments on the south bank near Modder River bridge. A loyal +British subject, at great personal risk, succeeded in sending a +message to the effect that the Boers were in force at the village, and +were "digging themselves in like rabbits." On this evidence Lord +Methuen concluded, and he continued to hold his opinion till the +battle began, that Modder River village was merely used as an advanced +post to cover the burghers' main position at Spytfontein. But as he +did not wish to leave even a detachment of the enemy threatening his +lines of communication, he decided to postpone his flanking movement +on Abon's Dam until he had captured the entrenched village. Before +dawn the orders were recast, and by 4.30 a.m. on the 28th, the +division was on the march,[173] but unfortunately the men were not +all of them adequately prepared for the work which lay before them, +for owing to the change of plan many started without their breakfasts. + + [Footnote 172: This sketch had been made a few days before + the outbreak of war by an officer who was ordered to report + on the best method of defending the Modder River bridge with + one or two companies of infantry. It was executed under + circumstances which, even had his instructions been more + comprehensive, would have prevented him from effecting any + extensive reconnaissance of the Riet and Modder rivers.] + + [Footnote 173: The Northamptonshire was detailed to guard the + baggage at Wittekop. The 1st battalion Argyll and Sutherland + Highlanders joined Lord Methuen's column on the night of the + 28th from the lines of communication.] + +[Sidenote: The cavalry stopped by concealed riflemen before division +arrives.] + +[Sidenote: The real dispositions of defenders.] + +The cavalry, who had moved off at 4 a.m., were brought to a standstill +by the enemy's fire at about 5.30 a.m. Major Little then reported to +Lord Methuen, who had accompanied the mounted troops, that all the +information sent in by the officers of the advance squadrons showed +that the river was strongly held from the railway bridge eastward to a +clump of high poplars. Major Little's deduction, as far as it went, +was perfectly correct; but he did not know, nor did anyone else in +Lord Methuen's force suspect, that admirably concealed entrenchments +had been thrown up along the left bank of the Riet, from Rosmead east, +to the bend where the bed of the river turns sharply southwards. At +many places on the northern bank shelter trenches had been +constructed. The farms on the southern bank had been prepared for +occupation by riflemen; the houses of Rosmead and Modder village had +been placed in a state of defence. At various points behind the Riet, +epaulments had been thrown up for the six field guns which the enemy +had with them, while among the foliage on the bank three or four +pom-poms were cunningly concealed. It is uncertain whether the whole +of the long series of trenches was actually manned when the cavalry +first appeared before the river, or whether the Boers only occupied +the western works after it had become clear that Lord Methuen did not +propose to force a crossing at Bosman's Drift, and that his line of +attack was to be roughly parallel to the railway. But there is no +doubt that the fear of being outflanked caused the burghers to take up +a very wide front, and that the manoeuvres of the mounted troops near +Bosman's Drift, and of the 9th brigade at Rosmead, forced them still +further to extend it on both flanks. When the whole position was taken +up, Free Staters under Prinsloo were posted on the right; the centre, +through which ran the railway line, was defended by De la Rey with +part of the Transvaal commandos; to the left stood another contingent +of Transvaalers, composed of some of the men who, two days earlier, +had arrived at Edenburg, weary with the forced march and long railway +journey by which P. Cronje had brought them from the siege of Mafeking +to protect the Riet. In all, between three and four thousand burghers +were in array. + +[Sidenote: Cronje fears for Bosman's Drift, which is unknown to +British.] + +[Sidenote: Mounted infantry seize farm a mile above this drift, on +Riet.] + +Noticing the direction of the British advance towards Modder River +village, Cronje at first believed that Lord Methuen was about to cross +the Riet at Bosman's Drift. He therefore hurriedly despatched a gun +and a pom-pom from the delta formed by the junction of the two rivers, +to support the outlying detachments of riflemen, already posted in the +neighbourhood of the ford and of a farmhouse a mile further up the +river. The 18th battery drove back the pom-pom and gun, and then, at +about 7.15 a.m. supported the mounted infantry who had been despatched +to capture the farm. Aided by the well-placed shells of the artillery, +the mounted infantry carried it, and established themselves so solidly +under cover of the mud walls of its kraal that a Boer gun, which later +in the day played upon them for several hours, failed to dislodge +them. The duty of watching the right rear was entrusted to the 9th +Lancers. By their repeated attempts to cross the Riet they prevented +the men who guarded it from reinforcing the main Boer positions; and +they warded off the threatened attack of detachments of the enemy who, +based on Jacobsdal, hovered on the right flank. Rimington's Guides at +the beginning of the action were sent to the west, where they +similarly covered the left flank. Among the first to cross the river +was a party of the Guides, and these did good service during the +subsequent fighting on the right bank. + +[Sidenote: 7 a.m. Guards attack east of railway bridge: 9th brigade +towards bridge.] + +The infantry began to arrive on the battlefield at about 7 a.m., and +Lord Methuen directed Major-General Colvile with the Guards' brigade +to attack the left flank of the supposed frontage of the enemy, viz., +the space from the railway bridge eastward to the clump of high +poplars on the Riet. Major-General R. Pole-Carew[174] was meanwhile to +lead the 9th brigade astride of the railway upon the broken bridge, +conforming his advance to that of the Guards. A verbal message was at +the same time sent by Lord Methuen to say that he thought that there +were along the river bank no Boers except possibly some 400 men who +might be covering the broken bridge itself. + + [Footnote 174: Major-General Pole-Carew had reached Lord + Methuen's column on the 27th to assume command of the 9th + brigade, of which Lieut.-Colonel Money, Northumberland + Fusiliers, had been in temporary charge since the 23rd, when + Major-General Fetherstonhaugh was wounded at Belmont.] + +[Sidenote: Development of Guards' attack.] + +[Sidenote: Scots Guards attempting outflanking attack are checked by +concealed riflemen.] + +It will be convenient to describe the operations of the Guards' +brigade throughout the day, before touching upon those of the 9th +brigade. On receipt of his instructions, Major-General Colvile formed +his troops, then at some distance east of the railway, into two lines; +the first consisted of the Scots Guards on the right, the Grenadiers +in the centre, the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream on the left; the +first battalion of the Coldstream was in reserve as second line. The +clump of high poplars was selected as the point of direction. As the +Guards deployed they were smitten by artillery, and later by rapid +musketry. As soon as the deployment was completed, the Scots Guards +were ordered to advance at once, swing round their right, and take the +enemy in flank. Lieut.-Colonel Pulteney with two companies and a +machine gun was pushing round to the right, to carry out the turning +movement, when, at about 8.10 a.m. he came under a sudden and violent +fire from the enemy concealed in the low bushes of the Riet or in the +trenches on its left bank. The companies suffered considerably; and of +the men forming the detachment with the Maxim all were killed or +wounded by a well-concealed pom-pom. Colonel Paget, who commanded the +Scots Guards, sent four companies to Colonel Pulteney's assistance, +but even with this reinforcement it was impossible to make further +progress across the plain. + +[Sidenote: 1st Coldstream, thrown in on right, are stopped by Riet.] + +[Sidenote: but move along it and entrench upon it.] + +When Major-General Colvile saw that the Boers had thus arrested the +march of the Scots Guards, he determined to employ his reserve, the +1st Coldstream, in prolonging the line of the brigade to the right so +as to extend beyond the enemy's left. The 1st Coldstream was then on +the right rear of the leading battalions and was formed in two lines, +one behind the other, each in echelon of companies from the left. +Lt.-Colonel Codrington, who commanded it, accordingly moved to the +right, where he was unexpectedly stopped by the Riet, of the existence +of which he was unaware. Major Granville Smith's company, which was +one of those that first reached the river, was ordered to line part of +the left bank, to repel an expected attack in flank from burghers who +had been seen on the plain beyond the further bank. In this part of +its winding course the right of the Riet is higher than the left, so +that Major Granville Smith's field of view was very limited. He +therefore sought for a ford by which he could reach the dominant bank. +Finding traces of a disused drift, he waded alone over a narrow spit +of rock through water which reached to his chin, to the right side of +the river, where he was soon joined by Lt.-Colonel Codrington with two +other officers and 18 non-commissioned officers and men. After driving +away some Boers by musketry, the little party reconnoitred up and down +the stream in the vain hope of finding a more practicable ford, and +was then ordered by a staff officer to recross and return. During the +time employed in this unsuccessful quest the greater part of Colonel +Codrington's battalion had pushed down the river, some companies in +the bed, others along the bank. As they scrambled on, fording was +attempted at many points, but in every case the deep water, and the +almost equally deep mud at the bottom of the stream, proved +impassable. The leading company reached the angle of the bend where +the Riet breaks away to the westward, but there, shot down by +invisible Boers, some hidden along the right bank, others holding a +farm and garden on the left bank, they could get forward no further. A +patrol worked down stream sufficiently far to the west of the bend to +be able to see the railway bridge, but was driven back by musketry. +The battalion took up a position along the left bank, entrenching +itself with the Slade-Wallace tools, carried as part of the soldiers' +equipment. Some companies faced to the west, the remainder to the +north and east. Here they remained till nightfall. They were a target +for the defenders of the banks of the Riet, for a detachment which +lined the Modder near the northern reservoir, and for a pom-pom. This +latter was, however, quickly driven away by a few well-aimed section +volleys. Some time after 9 a.m. two companies of Scots Guards, by +order of Major-General Colvile, fell back from where they were on the +plain, and forming up along the river bank prolonged the line of the +1st Coldstream to the south-west. At dusk a handful of officers and +men succeeded in making their way to the Scots Guards' machine gun +which had been silenced in the morning, and brought it back, together +with one or two wounded men of the detachment who lay around it. At +intervals during the day the British right flank was annoyed by shots +from Boers on the plain to the east of the Riet. These men several +times appeared to be about to make a serious attack upon this part of +the line, but their purpose always withered up under the fire of the +Grenadiers' Maxim gun, of detachments of the Guards left to hold the +southern reservoir, and of the mounted infantry and 9th Lancers on the +extreme right rear. + +[Sidenote: Grenadiers and 2nd Coldstream move at 7 a.m., Nov. 28th, +straight for river east of bridge.] + +[Sidenote: They are stopped at 1,000 yards from it.] + +When the Scots Guards commenced their turning movement, the Grenadiers +and the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream began their frontal attack, +and arrived within 1,000 or 1,100 yards of the enemy who lined the +river bank.[175] At this range the hostile fire was so severe that it +became impossible to get nearer and, as the day wore on, the +difficulty of keeping the men supplied with ammunition grew more and +more serious. When night put an end to the engagement, in many +companies the soldiers had but ten cartridges left in their pouches +with which to cover an attack, or repel a counter-stroke. So long as +the men lay flat on the ground they were little molested, as a growth +of thistles hid them from the enemy's view, but any attempt to move +brought upon them a shower of bullets, to which they were unable to +reply with any effect, as the Boers, perfectly protected by their +trenches or concealed by the vegetation which lined the river bank, +suffered little from the shrapnel of the supporting British guns, and +could not be seen by the infantry. + + [Footnote 175: A few groups of officers and men were able to + win their way three or four hundred yards nearer to the Boer + defences, but with heavy loss.] + +[Sidenote: 18th and 75th batteries support Guards.] + +[Sidenote: Naval guns engage Boer guns.] + +The 18th and 75th batteries came into action to the east of the +railway, and after various short duels with Boer guns which appeared +and disappeared on different parts of the field, they covered the +movements of the brigade of Guards. The 75th battery was to the left +rear of the 2nd Coldstream, first at 1,700, then at 1,200 yards, +range. There it remained till 4 p.m. when, owing to casualties and +want of ammunition, it was ordered to fall back a few hundred yards. +The 18th battery, two hundred yards to the left rear of the 75th, +opened fire at 1,400 yards range; the targets for both batteries were +the buildings and enclosures stretching eastward for a mile from the +railway bridge. The Naval brigade, about 250 strong, under the command +of Major A. E. Marchant, R.M.L.I., had been brought up by rail from +Enslin under the escort of an armoured train. At about 7 a.m. their +four 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns began to engage the enemy's artillery from a +knoll, a little to the west of the line, distant 4,800 yards from the +broken bridge. + +[Sidenote: The 9th brigade advance.] + +While the Guards, covered by the fire of the artillery, were preparing +for the already described movements, Major-General Pole-Carew, as +ordered by Lord Methuen, led the 9th brigade towards the broken +railway bridge, the point assigned as his object. The Northumberland +Fusiliers and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were ordered to +advance along the railway, the former on its east, the latter on its +west, each supported by half a battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders, while the half-battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire +was to prolong the line to the left, and if possible cross the river +and threaten the enemy's right. But Pole-Carew speedily realised that +by the time the first line of the Guards' brigade had fully extended, +their left would almost reach the railway, and would therefore overlap +his right. To obtain more room, and also in the hope of being able to +turn the right flank of the enemy, he marched westward, and, thanks to +a slight swell in the ground, was able to reach the railway, some +2,000 yards south of the broken bridge, without attracting much +attention. But as soon as the Northumberland Fusiliers were in the act +of crossing the line from east to west, the Boer guns opened upon them +and a few minutes later, about 7.30 a.m., the whole river bed, west of +the bridge, burst into one wide fusilade. In order to maintain touch +with the Guards, and to protect the westward march of his brigade, the +Major-General ordered the Northumberland Fusiliers to change +direction to their right, extend, and endeavour to beat down the +enemy's enfilading musketry, which was pouring across the plain, here +smooth as a glacis and as destitute of cover. Soon afterwards he found +it necessary to leave half the battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders to prolong the line of the Northumberland Fusiliers to the +left; and, later, he was compelled to direct the King's Own Yorkshire +Light Infantry yet further to prolong the covering force, behind whose +protection he was making the westward march. The continual necessity +thus to increase the numbers employed in this protective work now left +him only the half-battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire and the +half-battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders available for +carrying out the original design. + +[Sidenote: Attempt to take Boer outposts.] + +The left of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry made their way to +within a few hundred yards of a farmhouse and kraal, some 300 yards +south of the river. These buildings and a patch of rocky ground to the +west were strongly held as outworks by the Boers; and Major-General +Pole-Carew, being convinced by a report from Captain E. S. Bulfin, his +brigade-major, that they covered a ford across the Riet, endeavoured +to take them, but without success. In the hope of bringing enfilade +fire upon the defenders, he sent a small party of Argyll and +Sutherland Highlanders into a donga, which runs into the river between +the farmhouse and the nearest Boer trench on the left bank. Advancing +with a rush, this detachment reached the river bed without loss, and +was subsequently reinforced by another handful of the same battalion. + +[Sidenote: After some delay they are captured.] + +About 11 a.m. an order reached Pole-Carew telling him that as the +Guards were crossing the river, his battalion near the railway was to +cease fire so as to avoid the possibility of injuring their comrades. +This order was with the greatest difficulty conveyed to the right of +the 9th brigade, but as soon as it was obeyed, the musketry of the +Boers so redoubled in intensity that in self-defence the troops had to +re-open fire. Almost immediately after the message had arrived, Lord +Methuen came up and told Pole-Carew that the Guards had not succeeded +in their attempt to cross. His purpose was to arrange for concerted +action on the left flank. The Major-General explained to him the local +situation, and said that he proposed to reinforce the little party of +Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the river bank, and under cover +of their fire on the farm, rush it, and then make every effort to +cross the river by the islands at Rosmead. Lord Methuen approved, and +some twenty or thirty more of the Argyll and Sutherland rushed down +into the donga. A strong flanking patrol of the King's Own Yorkshire +Light Infantry, under Lt. R. M. D. Fox, supported by a detachment of +the Argyll and Sutherland, was now utilised for the attack on the +house and kraal. The Boers did not make a vigorous resistance but +retreated across the river as the British advanced, and at about 11.30 +the farm and the rocky ground were in Major-General Pole-Carew's +hands. The enemy on the north bank had been so greatly shaken by the +fire of two guns of the 18th battery, under Capt. G. T. +Forestier-Walker, that they were already in retreat from Rosmead when +the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry attacked the farmhouse. This +section, which at 10.15 a.m. was sent to assist the 9th brigade by +Col. Hall, the officer commanding the artillery, had come into action +on a small knoll south-west of the village of Rosmead, on the extreme +left of the line, and its shells had dislodged a party of about 300 +Boers, who were seen galloping away northwards from Rosmead and from +the wood to the east of it. + +[Sidenote: Situation at 11.30 a.m. Nov. 28th.] + +At 11.30 a.m. the general situation was as follows:--the half +battalion Loyal North Lancashire was close to the southern bank facing +a ford, to which it had been sent by Capt. Bulfin. The farm covering +the weir was in our hands; thence eastwards to the railway stretched +the 9th brigade, immovable under the fire of the Boers entrenched +along both banks. The small detachment of Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders held the donga between the farm and the nearest Boer +trench on the south bank. + +[Sidenote: Lodgments on further bank.] + +[Sidenote: Rosmead is captured.] + +A few minutes later Lieut.-Col. Barter, K.O.Y.L.I., followed by a few +men of various corps, began to cross the river by the weir, while a +quarter of a mile lower down the stream two companies of the Loyal +North Lancashire under Major Coleridge commenced the passage of the +drift. Major-General Pole-Carew now despatched a messenger to inform +Lord Methuen, who had returned to the centre of the line, that he had +made a lodgment on the right bank and required reinforcements. But +there were no troops in hand. No battalions had been retained as final +reserve, and the only troops not engaged were the baggage guard of six +companies of the Northampton regiment and three companies of Royal +engineers. All that could be done was to direct various officers to +convey orders to the 9th brigade, and to the companies of the Guards +in its immediate neighbourhood to move westward, in support of the +movement on the extreme left. But their efforts served to prove once +more the truth of the axiom that when once troops are heavily engaged +in the fire-fight, they can only advance or retire; for it was found +impossible to withdraw any large number of men from the right and +centre of the 9th brigade. Without waiting for the reinforcements he +had asked for, the Major-General, as soon as he had collected about +150 men of various corps, dashed into the river, and partly by wading +through water up to the men's armpits, partly by scrambling along the +wall of the weir, brought his party safely into Rosmead. + +[Sidenote: Pole-Carew moves against Modder River village.] + +After making preparations to repulse any attempt by the enemy to +recapture the village, the Brigadier began to organise a force with +which to push up the right bank towards Modder River village, and thus +attack the heart of the defence. In about an hour he had collected +some five hundred men of various corps, and leaving part of the Loyal +North Lancashire to guard Rosmead, he advanced eastward to capture +this important post. On his right, in the brushwood, were some of the +Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. On the left were parties of the +King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry under Colonel Barter, and some of +the Loyal North Lancashire. A company of Northumberland Fusiliers, +commanded by Major the Hon. C. Lambton, followed in support; and a +patrol of Rimington's Guides scouted on the left flank. + +[Sidenote: Vigorous resistance by Albrecht.] + +At first his men were little exposed to fire, but when they reached +the neighbourhood of Fraser's farm they found the enemy prepared for +them. A storm of bullets, and of inverted shrapnel from Albrecht's +guns[176] (at the spot where these guns are shown 500 yards north-west +of the bridge), fell upon them as they endeavoured to cross long +hedges of prickly pear, and to climb through strong wire fences. Nor +were other Boer artillerymen, posted close to the railway station, +unobservant of the British flanking movement. Their shells fell thick +among the ranks of the detachment, while the burghers in the trenches +on the south side of the river, turning their aim from the right and +centre of the 9th brigade, poured their fire against those who were +the more dangerous enemy, because threatening to cut off their +retreat. The Brigadier had expected that the party of Argyll and +Sutherland Highlanders, placed in the donga on the left bank of the +river, would have kept these Boers in check by flanking fire; but +owing to a mistake either in the delivery, or in the interpretation, +of an order, the officers had brought their men across the Riet and +had joined in the advance along the right bank. + + [Footnote 176: Major Albrecht fought his guns with great + determination; his infantry escort, according to Boer + accounts, retreated when they saw the advance of the British, + and his ammunition was almost exhausted, but his gunners + stood their ground.] + +[Sidenote: Pole-Carew is obliged to fall back to Rosmead.] + +[Sidenote: Nov. 28th/99.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen being wounded command devolves on Colvile.] + +Captain Forestier-Walker, who was now in action with the section of +the 18th battery near the farm which had been carried earlier in the +day by the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, vigorously shelled the +trees and brushwood in front of our men as they advanced, but his +efforts were much hampered by the fact that the undergrowth was so +thick that it was impossible to see exactly how far forward they were. +All attempts to establish communication by signal, between the officer +commanding the 9th brigade and the troops on the south side of the +river, failed. The attack broke down from want of strength to drive it +home, and the baffled troops sullenly fell back to Rosmead. They were +so closely pressed by the enemy's musketry that, in order to cover the +retreat, two officers, Major H. F. Coleridge, North Lancashire, and +Captain T. Irvine, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, each with ten or +eleven men of different battalions, threw themselves into farmhouses, +which they stubbornly defended until, many hours later, after their +detachments had suffered severe loss, they were ordered to evacuate +their posts. On his return to the village Major-General Pole-Carew +found that the British strength on the north bank had been increased +by the arrival of 300 officers and men of the Royal engineers, and of +part of a company of the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream Guards. After +writing to Lord Methuen to report his failure to force his way up the +right bank, and to ask for co-operation in the fresh attempt for which +he was then rallying his troops, Pole-Carew heard a rumour that Lord +Methuen had been wounded, and that Major-General Colvile was now in +command of the division. The rumour was true. Lord Methuen had been +wounded at about 4 p.m. near the centre of the line, and one of his +staff officers, Colonel H. P. Northcott, had previously fallen +mortally wounded, while conveying orders for the reinforcement of the +troops on the north bank. Not long after this news came in, the +officer commanding the two guns of the 18th battery, still in action +near the farm to the south of Rosmead, reported that he heard through +the officer commanding the artillery that Major-General Colvile had +issued orders for a vigorous bombardment of the position by the +artillery till dusk, when the Guards were to attack the left of the +Boer line with the bayonet. Pole-Carew then considered whether, in +view of the projected movement of the Guards' brigade, his local +attack was still feasible. He decided that, owing to the configuration +of the ground over which both bodies of troops would have to move in +the darkness, the danger was so great lest his detachment should +enfilade the Guards as to prohibit an advance from Rosmead. All, +therefore, that could be done was to secure firmly that village. + +[Sidenote: 62nd battery with four guns arrives after forced march.] + +While the little column had been striving in vain to force its way up +the right bank of the river, the situation on the left bank had +remained unchanged. The infantry lay prone on the ground, engaged in a +desultory fire-fight with an unseen enemy, while the artillery +continued to shell the buildings and the river-banks near the railway +bridge. During the course of the afternoon Colonel Hall, commanding +the artillery, had received a welcome reinforcement of four guns of +the 62nd battery, under Major E. J. Granet. The 62nd, which had been +left to guard the Orange River bridge, received orders late on the +26th to leave two guns at that camp, and proceed with all speed to +rejoin Lord Methuen's division. Owing to a deficiency in rolling +stock, no railway transport was available, and it became necessary for +the battery to march the whole way. Starting at 10 a.m. on the 27th, +Major Granet reached Belmont, thirty miles distant, at dusk. He halted +there till 6 a.m. on the 28th, when, escorted by twenty-five of the +Royal Munster Fusiliers mounted infantry, he marched to Honey Nest +Kloof, where he decided to water and feed his horses. He had but just +halted, when a message reached him that there was fighting on the Riet +river and that guns and ammunition were urgently required there. He +started immediately, and despite the heavy ground over which he had to +pass, reached the battlefield a little after 2 p.m. In twenty-eight +hours the 62nd battery had covered sixty-two miles, at the expense of +six horses which fell dead in the traces, and of about forty more, +which never recovered from the fatigue of this forced march. The +battery was first sent to the left to support the advance up the north +bank of the river, but before it had opened fire, Colonel Hall ordered +Major Granet more to the eastward, as he was afraid that the shells +might fall among the detachment during its progress through the trees +and brushwood which concealed its movements. At 2.45 p.m., the 62nd +came into action 1,200 yards from the south bank, behind a swell in +the ground which covered the gunners from the waist downwards. Its +fire, aimed first at the north bank, was distributed laterally, and +then for depth, with good results, as the enemy's musketry slackened, +and numbers of men were seen stealing away. About 5 p.m., to support +the projected attack by the Guards, the battery was moved close to a +sandpit on the west of the railway, where it was joined by the section +of the 18th from the left of the line. + +[Sidenote: Colvile breaks off the fight.] + +After considerable delay, caused by the difficulty of sending +messages across the shot-swept plain, Major-General Colvile was +informed that Lord Methuen had been wounded, and that the command of +the division had devolved upon him. He handed over the Guards' brigade +to Colonel Paget, Scots Guards, with orders to collect his battalions +for the attack upon the left of the Boer line, but soon afterwards +decided that it was too late to risk the passage of the river at night +with troops exhausted by hunger, thirst, and the burning heat of an +exceptionally hot day. He therefore resolved to break off the fight +till daybreak next morning, and directed Colonel Paget to form up his +brigade for the night at the southern reservoir. + +[Sidenote: Pole-Carew holds Rosmead, and concentrates 9th brigade on +north bank.] + +[Sidenote: Boers abandon position. Night, Nov. 28-29.] + +As soon as Major-General Pole-Carew reluctantly abandoned the idea of +renewing his attack along the north bank of the Riet, he posted his +troops for the defence of Rosmead. He realised the risks which he ran +in holding so isolated a position throughout the night, but he and his +staff considered that the importance of maintaining the lodgment, +which had been effected on the enemy's side of the Riet, made it worth +while to incur the danger. To the Royal engineers, under Major G. F. +Leverson, was allotted the western face of the village; the Yorkshire +Light Infantry held the north, and the Loyal North Lancashire the +north-east; the Argyll and Sutherland guarded the east. The men lined +the walls, banks, and houses at a yard and a half apart, in groups of +six, of whom five rested while one stood sentry. In the centre of the +village was the reserve, two companies of the Northumberland +Fusiliers, and a company of the 2nd battalion Coldstream Guards. The +remainder of the 9th brigade was ordered to cross the river. To guide +them, two fires were lit at the drift; and by daybreak the whole +command was concentrated on the north bank. It was reinforced by the +1st Highland Light Infantry, who had arrived during the night by rail +from Orange River. In the grey of the morning, while the Guards were +preparing to support the 9th brigade, the guns[177] re-opened fire +upon Modder River village, but it was soon discovered that during the +night the enemy had abandoned his position, and had disappeared with +all his guns and pom-poms. With horses utterly tired out, immediate +pursuit was impossible, though by midday patrols of mounted men had +regained touch with such of the Boers as had fallen back upon +Magersfontein. By the afternoon, the whole division had crossed the +Riet, and was concentrated on its northern bank. + + [Footnote 177: On the 28th, the field batteries expended + ammunition as follows:-- + + 18th 1,029 rounds + 62nd 247 " + 75th 1,008 " + The Naval guns 260 "] + +[Sidenote: Casualties of Nov. 28th.] + +The British casualties consisted of four officers killed (among whom +was Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Stopford, commanding the 2nd battalion +Coldstream Guards) and 19 wounded; among the other ranks 67 were +killed, and 370 wounded.[178] The losses among the Boers are not +accurately known, but 23 burghers were found dead in Rosmead and +buried near the village, while 27 bodies were subsequently found in +the river itself. + + [Footnote 178: For details as to casualties, see Appendix 6.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +THE RAID ON SOUTHERN NATAL.[179] + + [Footnote 179: See map No. 4.] + + +[Sidenote: The relation of Ladysmith to the defence of Natal.] + +Throughout the operations in Natal during the opening phase of the +war, Sir G. White had held that a mobile force, concentrated north of +the Tugela, afforded better protection to the central and southern +portions of the colony than any number of detachments stationed on the +lines of communication. Face to face as he was with an enemy in +superior strength, the retention with his field force of every +available unit was essential to the British commander's plan of +striking at his opponents whenever an opportunity offered. Sir W. +Hely-Hutchinson, although anxious as to the security of Maritzburg and +Natal from Boer raids, accepted Sir George's decision, telegraphing to +the General on 26th October: "I shall do my best in consultation with +General Wolfe Murray.... I think we shall be able to deal with any +small raid, but a raid in force, especially if supported by guns, will +be a serious matter. We must take the risk, and hope for the best." On +October 30th, the date of the battle of Lombards Kop,[180] the only +regular unit on the Natal line of communication was the 1st Border +regiment, which had arrived at Maritzburg that morning from East +London. Detachments of colonial troops held Colenso bridge and +Estcourt. To the eastward the Umvoti Rifles, a mounted corps rather +more than one hundred strong, had been ordered to fall back from +Helpmakaar and watch the ferry, by which the Dundee-Greytown road +crosses the Tugela. A battalion of mounted infantry was being raised +at Maritzburg by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers, +and another at Durban by Lieut.-Colonel Bethune, 16th Lancers. + + [Footnote 180: See Chapter X.] + +[Sidenote: Threatened siege changes situation.] + +The result of the battle of 30th October made it probable that the +field force at Ladysmith would be soon cut off from its +communications. To keep the road open to the south, Sir George White +that evening reinforced the garrison of Colenso by despatching thither +by rail from Ladysmith the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a company of +mounted infantry, and the Natal Field battery, whose obsolete +7-pounder guns had been grievously outranged at Elandslaagte. On +arrival at Colenso, the commanding officer of the Dublin, Colonel C. +D. Cooper, assumed command of that post, finding there one squadron of +the Natal Carbineers, one squadron Imperial Light Horse, a party of +mounted Police, and the Durban Light Infantry (about 380 strong), and +a detachment (fifty strong) of the Natal Naval Volunteers, with two +9-pounder guns. The total strength of the command, including the +reinforcements from Ladysmith, was approximately 1,200 men. The Natal +Royal Rifles (150 strong) were encamped at Estcourt, twenty-five miles +in rear. + +[Sidenote: An anxious fortnight, Oct. 31st-Nov. 14th.] + +On the following day General White telegraphed to the Governor of the +colony: "My intention is to hold Ladysmith, make attacks on the +enemy's position whenever possible, and retain the greatest number of +the enemy here." Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson and the officer commanding the +Natal line of communication, Brigadier-General J. S. Wolfe Murray, +were thus confronted with a difficult and anxious situation. It was +obvious that, having regard to the numerical superiority and greater +mobility of the enemy, the British force at Ladysmith would, in all +probability, be unable to retain the whole of the Boer army. A raid on +southern Natal was therefore to be expected immediately, and the +strength of that raid might well be such as to overwhelm, or, at any +rate, to ignore, the weak garrisons which so imperfectly covered +Maritzburg and Durban. Moreover, General Murray was aware that even if +Sir R. Buller should think fit to divert from Cape Colony any portion +of the expeditionary force now on the high seas, a fortnight must +elapse before a single man could be landed at Durban. + +[Sidenote: Provisional steps in case of Boer raid.] + +Maritzburg, from its topographical environment, is even less adapted +by nature for defence than Ladysmith. Lying in a deep depression +surrounded by high hills, the positions covering the capital of the +colony are so extensive that a very large force would be needed for +their effective occupation. Nevertheless, after consultation on the +afternoon of 31st October with the Governor and the Prime Minister of +the colony (Colonel Hime), the Brigadier-General decided that, +although it was impossible to protect the town itself, it was +advisable to prepare the cantonments, so-called "Fort Napier," for +defence, and for that purpose to borrow Naval guns from the ships at +Durban. As regards Durban, a telegram was received from Sir Alfred +Milner stating that arrangements had been made by Sir Redvers Buller +with the admiral for the immediate despatch to that port of H.M.S. +_Terrible_ and _Forte_ as a reinforcement to the _Tartar_ and +_Philomel_, already in the harbour, and suggesting that in the case of +a complete disaster to Sir G. White's force it would be wise to retire +on the seaport and there make a stand. + +[Sidenote: Changes of stations, Nov. 2nd and 3rd, in expectation of +raid.] + +But the responsible military authorities were by no means inclined to +take a pessimistic view of the situation. The final instructions, +dated 1st November, received from Sir G. White's Chief of the Staff, +directed General Murray "to remain and defend Maritzburg to the last," +and on the following day Sir R. Buller telegraphed from Capetown that +a division would be despatched as soon as possible to Natal, adding: +"Do all you can to hold on to Colenso till troops arrive." Meanwhile, +a warning had been received from the Intelligence staff at Ladysmith, +that a considerable body of Free Staters was moving on Colenso, and +Brigadier-General Murray, realising that the situation of Colonel +Cooper's force at the bridge, commanded by the heights on the northern +bank of the Tugela, was becoming precarious, directed that officer to +fall back on Estcourt, should he consider his position no longer +tenable. On the afternoon of November 2nd, telegraphic communication +between Colenso and Ladysmith was cut off by the enemy, and a large +Boer commando, having occupied the high ground near Grobelaars Kloof +(map No. 15), opened fire on the two little works, Forts Wylie and +Molyneux, which had been constructed by the Natal Volunteers on the +left bank of the Tugela to cover the crossings of that river, and the +approaches to Langewacht Spruit. The Natal Field battery and Natal +Naval Volunteers' guns were again seriously outranged by the Boer +artillery, and Colonel Cooper decided that, having regard to his +instructions, he must fall back on Estcourt. The withdrawal to that +town was effected on the night of November 2nd-3rd without molestation +from the enemy, the infantry being conveyed in special trains, the +mounted troops and field artillery moving by road. The 1st battalion +Border regiment was simultaneously pushed forward by rail from +Maritzburg to Estcourt, and Brigadier-General Murray proceeded, on 3rd +November, to the latter station to take personal command of the force +there concentrated, which now amounted in all to about 2,300 men. With +this force, weak though it was in guns and mounted troops, he intended +to dispute the Boer advance from the north, falling back, if +necessary, on the prepared position at Maritzburg. A telegram, dated +4th November, conveyed General Buller's approval of these +dispositions, but added: "Do not risk losing Durban by over-prolonged +defence of Maritzburg, but hold the latter so long as you safely can. +I fear it will be at least ten days before I can send you substantial +assistance." + +[Sidenote: After much delay, on Nov. 13th/99, 4,200 Boers under +Joubert and Botha reach Colenso.] + +Fortunately, until the last but one of these ten days, the enemy held +back on the north bank of the Tugela. A Krijgsraad, at which all the +Boer generals and commandants attended, had assembled in front of +Ladysmith on 1st November to decide whether the main effort of the +Boer army should be concentrated on the attack of that town, or +whether, leaving a detachment to hold Sir G. White's troops, they +should at once advance on Maritzburg and Durban. Some of the younger +leaders, including Louis Botha, as yet only plain commandant, were in +favour of the latter course. The majority of the council decided that, +so long as 12,000 effective British troops remained at Ladysmith, the +commandos were not numerous enough to allow them to win the +much-coveted prizes of the capital and seaport of Natal. It was +believed that General White's troops would be unable to withstand an +assault. On the 9th November, therefore, an abortive and ill-arranged +attack was made. It sufficed to show that the Ladysmith garrison was +by no means disposed to yield, and that a formal and perhaps prolonged +investment would be needed to weaken its powers of resistance. To this +task, therefore, the main body of the Boer commandos was assigned; +but, as an erroneous report had come in that 5,000 English troops had +concentrated at Frere, it was decided that a strong reconnaissance, +under the personal command of General Joubert, should cross the Tugela +to ascertain the disposition and strength of the British column. On +the evening, therefore, of the 13th November, a force about 4,200 +strong was assembled at Colenso with orders to push to the south. As +agreed, Joubert, although Transvaal Commandant-General, went with it. +Louis Botha, promoted to the rank of "Fighting General," was second in +command. There is reason to believe that the presence of the senior +General was due to a desire to restrain the impetuosity of his +subordinate. + +[Sidenote: Defensive measures taken during the time of grace given by +Boer delay.] + +The fifteen days' breathing space which the authorities in southern +Natal had thus been given, after receipt of the disquieting +intelligence of the battle of Lombards Kop, had been of great value. +Captain Percy Scott, H.M.S. _Terrible_, had reached Durban on November +6th, and was appointed commandant of that town. A defence scheme was +prepared and a battalion of "Imperial Light Infantry" was raised to +assist the Naval contingent,[181] and guns (including two 4.7-in. guns +and sixteen 12-pr. 12-cwt.) were landed for its protection. At +Maritzburg a position in the vicinity of Fort Napier had, under the +supervision of Col. C. C. Rawson, C.R.E., been prepared for defence, +the work being executed by a hastily improvised Pioneer Corps of +artisans, assisted by native labour. In selecting this position and +planning its defence, it was assumed that if the force at Estcourt +fell back on Maritzburg, 4,000 men in all would be available for its +occupation. Meanwhile, in addition to Thorneycroft's corps, the +recruiting and training of which were proceeding satisfactorily, a +provisional garrison was arranged for Maritzburg by the despatch of +two 12-pounders and a Naval detachment from the fleet at Durban, by +the withdrawal of the detachment of the Naval Volunteers from +Estcourt, and by the organisation into a Town Guard of all able-bodied +citizens willing to carry a rifle. Moreover, some 150 loyal and +zealous Natal colonists volunteered for scouting duties, and were +formed into a corps under the command of the Hon. T. K. Murray, +C.M.G., finding their own horses, saddlery, and rifles, and serving +without pay. This body of patriotic men did useful work to the north +of Maritzburg, in the neighbourhood of Mooi River, from the 4th to the +16th November, when on the arrival of reinforcements from the Cape +they were released from further duty, and thanked in General Orders +for their "excellent service." + + [Footnote 181: This contingent consisted of parties from the + _Terrible_, _Forte_, _Thetis_, _Philomel_ and _Tartar_, of a + total strength of 35 officers and 423 men. Commander Limpus, + R.N., was placed in command of the guns (see p. 120).] + +[Sidenote: Nov. 11th/99. Reinforcements begin to disembark. Sir F. +Clery takes command, Nov. 15th.] + +On 11th November General Murray, with the approval of Sir R. Buller, +handed over the command of the Estcourt garrison to Colonel Charles +Long, R.H.A., and returned to Maritzburg to direct personally the +heavy work falling on the line of communication staff in arranging for +the disembarkation and equipment of the reinforcements, whose arrival +at Durban was now hourly expected. He had been warned by Headquarters, +on the 7th, that these reinforcements would be made up to three +brigades and divisional troops, and that Lieut.-General Sir C. F. +Clery would be sent in command. On the evening of the 11th the first +battalion, the 2nd West Yorkshire, arrived at Durban with the +Brigadier of the 2nd brigade, Major-General Hildyard, and was sent on +the following day to Estcourt, accompanied by two naval 12-prs. and a +7-pr. manned by a detachment of bluejackets under the command of Lt. +H. W. James, R.N.[182] These units reached Estcourt on the 13th. +Lt.-General Clery reached Durban on November 15th, and assumed command +of the troops south of the Tugela. By the 17th five more battalions +and a brigade division of field artillery had landed at that port. The +British troops in southern Natal were thus in numerical superiority +to the Boer column, moving south of the Tugela. The dates of the +disembarkation of the remaining units of the corps for the relief of +Ladysmith, to which a fourth brigade was ultimately assigned by Sir R. +Buller, are shown in Appendix 7. + + [Footnote 182: The 12-prs. were replaced at Maritzburg by two + others sent up from Durban under command of Lieut. A. Halsey, + R.N.] + +[Sidenote: Nov. 14th. The raid begins.] + +On the morning of the 14th November, Joubert's men crossed the Tugela +and off-saddled on the Colenso plain, pushing patrols forward to Frere +and finding there only an observation post of eight of the Natal +Mounted Police. These patrols, as well as the large number of horses +grazing near Colenso, were observed and reported by the armoured +train, which, according to the daily practice of the Estcourt +garrison, was sent up the line to reconnoitre in the direction of the +Tugela. No mounted troops accompanied these train reconnaissances, but +doubtful ground was, as a rule, made good by flankers on foot, +detailed when required from the infantry in the train. + +[Sidenote: Nov. 15th. Disaster to the armoured train.] + +Early on the following morning, 15th November, the armoured train, +carrying a 7-pounder M.L. gun, manned by five bluejackets, one company +Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and one company Durban Light Infantry, was +again despatched to reconnoitre northward from Estcourt. Captain J. A. +L. Haldane, Gordon Highlanders, was placed in command. The train, +after a brief halt at Frere to communicate with the police post, +pushed on to Chieveley station. No flanking patrols appear to have +been sent out; but as Chieveley station was reached a party of 50 +Boers was seen cantering southward about a mile to the west of the +railway. An order was now received by telephone from Estcourt: "Remain +at Frere, watching your safe retreat." The train accordingly commenced +to move back on Frere, but on rounding a spur of a hill which commands +the line, was suddenly fired at by two field guns and a pom-pom. The +driver put on full steam, and the train, running at high speed down a +steep gradient, dashed into an obstruction which had been placed on a +sharp curve of the rails. A detachment of about 300 men of the +Krugersdorp commando had concealed themselves and their guns behind +the hill during the train's outward journey, and blocked the line in +its rear by filling the space between the doubled rails at the curve +with earth and small stones, thus forcing the wheels off the metals. + +[Sidenote: The reconnoitring party with train suffers severely.] + +An open truck and two armoured trucks were derailed, one of the trucks +being left standing partly over the track. An engagement ensued, in +which the British troops fought under great disadvantages. Mr. Winston +Churchill, a retired cavalry officer, who had been allowed to +accompany the train as a war correspondent, having offered his +services, Captain Haldane requested him to endeavour, with the +assistance of the Durban Light Infantry company, to clear the line. +Haldane meanwhile with the naval gun and the Dublin kept back the +enemy. The naval gun was almost at once put out of action. After an +hour's work under a heavy shell and rifle fire, Mr. Churchill +succeeded in his task, but the coupling between the engine and the +rear trucks had been broken by a shell, the engine itself injured, and +its cab was now filled with wounded. Captain Haldane accordingly +ordered the engine to move back out of fire towards Frere, and, +withdrawing his men from the trucks, directed them to make a dash for +some houses 800 yards distant, where he hoped to effect a further +stand. During this movement across the open veld two privates, without +orders, held up white handkerchiefs; the Boers ceased fire, galloped +in on the retreating soldiers, and called upon them to surrender. Thus +Captain Haldane, a subaltern of the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, Mr. Winston +Churchill, and 53 men were captured. One officer and 69 men succeeded +in making their way back to Estcourt, their retirement being covered +by a detachment of mounted troops sent out to their assistance. The +remainder of the 4 officers and 160 men, of whom the original party +consisted, were killed or wounded. General Buller, in commenting +subsequently on this unlucky affair, recorded his opinion that the +officer in command "acted in trying circumstances with great judgment +and coolness." A Boer account mentions that the British troops fought +"with exceptional gallantry." + +[Sidenote: Joubert divides his column and pushes south.] + +Emboldened by this success, General Joubert determined to carry +onwards his raid to the south. For this purpose he divided his force +into two columns, 3,000 men being retained under his personal orders +to operate on the west side of the railway, and 1,200 detached to the +eastward under the command of his son, David Joubert. The western +column reached Tabanhlope, a hill thirteen miles west of Estcourt, on +the 16th, and there remained for two days, reconnoitring Estcourt with +patrols. The eastern column occupied Weenen on the 18th, and on the +following day both columns continued their movement southward, +inclining somewhat towards each other. On the 20th Piet Joubert +arrived at Hlatikulu, and, having halted there a night, he further +divided his command, sending forward a detachment with a field gun +towards Mooi River, where they skirmished at long range on the 22nd +and 23rd with the force which, under Major-General Barton, had +recently been concentrated at that station. Some scouts of this +detachment even pushed on as far as Nottingham Road. The remainder of +the Commandant-General's column moved eastward, seized the railway +between the Highlands and Willow Grange, and joined hands with David +Joubert's commando, which since the 19th had remained halted at Warley +Common, a farm three or four miles to the east of Highlands station. + +[Sidenote: Situation. Night of Nov. 22nd.] + +The situation, therefore, on the night of the 22nd was remarkable. The +British collected at Estcourt, whither General Hildyard had been sent +on the 15th to take command, now amounted to 800 mounted troops +(including Bethune's newly-raised battalion), one battery of R.F.A., +the Natal Field battery, two naval 12-prs., and 4,400 infantry. +Major-General Barton, who had reached Mooi River on the 18th, had, by +the night of the 22nd, under his orders Thorneycroft's mounted +infantry (490 strong), a battery and two sections of R.F.A., and about +4,000 infantry. Estcourt and Mooi River stations are 23 miles apart. +Although, therefore, the Boers had cut the railway and telegraphic +communication between the two stations, yet the situation of Gen. +Joubert (halted between two British forces, each equal in strength to +the two Boer commandos), was audacious, if not dangerous. Moreover, in +rear of Mooi River, further British reinforcements were disembarking +at Durban, and being pushed up to the front in a continuous stream. +The composition and exact distribution of the troops actually in +southern Natal on the 23rd November is given in Appendix 8. The +pendulum had thus swung completely over. The armoured train incident +was of no importance either tactically or strategically, and that +momentary success was the only one achieved by Joubert. The slow and +hesitating movements of the Boer columns had but hastened the +disembarkation and concentration of the troops destined for the relief +of Ladysmith. Finally, a tardy fit of rashness had induced the old +Commandant-General to place his burghers in peril. + +[Sidenote: Exaggerated estimate of Boer strength causes hesitating +British action.] + +The danger of Joubert's situation was not fully realised by the +British staff. The strength of the enemy's invading columns had been +magnified by rumour to 7,000, and the number of their guns doubled. +Moreover, the units at Mooi River, and in a lesser degree those at +Estcourt, had for the most part only just arrived from a long sea +voyage, and as yet lacked the organisation, transport, and physical +fitness necessary for rapid movements in the field. At Mooi River, +General Barton was without Intelligence staff, guides, or even a map. +Under these circumstances, the instructions issued by General Clery +from Maritzburg to his subordinate commanders were based on a policy +of cautious defensive, although he hoped that in a few days an +opportunity for striking at the enemy might arise. Thus, the six days, +from the 17th to the 22nd, were marked on the British side by advances +to, and withdrawals from, posts between Estcourt and Mooi River, which +showed a strong desire to avoid all risks. A detachment of the West +Yorkshire, with some mounted men, was despatched from Estcourt on the +17th to occupy Willow Grange, and on the following day a similar mixed +garrison was sent up to the Highlands from Mooi River; but on the +20th, under instructions from Maritzburg, both these garrisons were +withdrawn. The position of David Joubert's laager to the east of +Willow Grange was ascertained by the mounted troops of both Barton's +and Hildyard's forces, and on the night of the 20th the latter +despatched to Willow Grange eight companies of infantry and 430 +mounted men under the command of Colonel Hinde, 1st battalion Border +regiment, intending an attack. But the enemy was judged by General +Hildyard to be too strongly posted, and the party was withdrawn to +Estcourt on the following day. + +[Sidenote: Hildyard sends force against Brynbella, Nov. 22nd, under +Col. W. Kitchener. Action of Willow Grange.] + +[Sidenote: Kitchener seizes Brynbella.] + +On the morning of the 22nd, it was reported that the Boers had +occupied Brynbella, a commanding hill to the south of Estcourt about +700 feet above the level of the surrounding plateau, as an advanced +post. General Hildyard considered that this development offered a good +opportunity for striking a blow at the enemy, and he determined to +attempt the capture of the post, and of some guns it was reported to +contain. That afternoon, therefore, he moved a Naval 12-pr., the 7th +Field battery, a half-battalion 2nd West Surrey, 2nd battalion West +Yorkshire, Durban Light Infantry, and seven companies of the 2nd +battalion East Surrey regiment, to a height called Beacon Hill, which +lay between Estcourt and the enemy's position, about 3,000 yards +distant from the latter. Colonel W. Kitchener was entrusted with the +command of this force and directed to seize Brynbella by a night +attack. Beacon Hill was occupied without opposition, and the Naval +gun, Field battery, and 2nd Queen's were detailed to hold it as a +support to the attack; to these was subsequently added the 1st Border. +A thunderstorm of great severity now delayed the advance upon +Brynbella; the night was intensely dark; the rocky nature of the +ground and the absence of beaten tracks made the task of assembling +the troops and directing their movements extremely difficult. It was +not, therefore, until after midnight that the column, led by Colonel +Kitchener, moved forward under the guidance of a Natal colonist, Mr. +Chapman, who was unfortunately killed in action after he had +successfully accomplished his task. The march was made in column of +double companies. Owing to the darkness of the night and the broken +ground, the difficulty of keeping touch between the companies was +great; firing had been forbidden, but when half the distance had been +covered, a company reached a wall and rushed it, thinking that it was +the enemy's position; the next company was thrown into confusion, and +a third in rear and on higher ground opened fire and began cheering. +Colonel Kitchener with great coolness succeeded in restoring order, +but not before eight soldiers had been hit by bullets from their +comrades' rifles. The advance was then continued and Brynbella Hill +was occupied at 3.30 a.m. without further casualties. The Boer party, +which consisted of eighty Johannesburg policemen, under Lieut. van +Zyl, retired to a ridge about 1,500 yards further to the south. A +Creusot field gun had been withdrawn the previous evening after a +brief exchange of shots with the Naval gun on Beacon Hill. + +[Sidenote: He falls back to Estcourt, Nov. 23rd.] + +At daybreak next morning Kitchener's men came under the fire of the +Boer commando holding the southern ridge, and after some two hours' +skirmishing at long range the enemy began to creep forward, and the +rifle and gun fire gradually became very effective. Kitchener, +perceiving that no supports were being sent forward to him, decided to +retire, and in this carried out the Major-General's intentions. A +gradual withdrawal from the hill in groups of two or three was +therefore commenced. Mounted troops, which had left Estcourt at +daybreak under command of Lt.-Colonel C. G. Martyr, were now +protecting Kitchener's right flank; the squadron of Imperial Light +Horse, under Capt. H. Bottomley, dismounted and ascended Brynbella +Hill, where with much coolness and gallantry they covered the +retirement of the infantry. The Border was also moved forward from +Beacon Hill to support the retreating troops. In this manner the whole +was withdrawn and subsequently fell back on Estcourt, General Hildyard +having decided that it was better to keep his brigade concentrated, +ready to move in any direction that might be necessary. The total +British loss in this action was eleven men killed, one officer and +sixty-six men wounded, and one officer and seven men taken prisoners. +A considerable portion of these losses was due to the attempts of +combatants to assist the wounded to the rear during the +retirement.[183] + + [Footnote 183: This practice had grown up in the British + service through the large number of wars with savages, who + killed the wounded and mutilated the dead.] + +[Sidenote: Joubert, Nov. 25th, retreats.] + +The action of Willow Grange brought home to Joubert the fact that his +commandos were in a hazardous situation, and in that way, therefore, +tended to clear south Natal of the enemy. If the Estcourt and Mooi +River forces could have closed on the Boer laager simultaneously, it +is probable that more important results would have been achieved. To +gain this object Major-General Hildyard despatched on the 22nd a +written message to Major-General Barton, stating his plan of attack, +and asking for his co-operation. Unfortunately this message was not +sent in duplicate, and the native to whom it was entrusted did not +deliver it until 10.30 a.m. on the following morning; by that time +Hildyard's troops had withdrawn from Brynbella, and were retiring on +Estcourt. The Boer Commandant-General was not disposed to run any more +risks, and by the 25th the burghers were in full retreat back to the +Tugela, taking with them much cattle and many valuable horses, which, +in spite of the vehement remonstrances of Piet Joubert, had been +looted from the rich grazing grounds of central Natal. The main body +of the Boers moved eastward to gain the crossing of Bushman's river at +Weenen. A small detachment passed round Estcourt about twelve miles to +the westward. + +[Sidenote: Boers escape over Tugela unscathed. Nov. 28th.] + +A reconnoitring column, consisting of about 300 of Thorneycroft's +regiment and four guns, with two infantry battalions left close to the +camp, in support, was pushed out on the 24th November by General +Barton from Mooi River to feel for the Boers. It came in touch with +the enemy, but the force was not deemed sufficiently strong to press +an attack. On the 26th General Hildyard, with the bulk of his troops, +advanced to Frere, hoping to intercept the Boers' eastern column, and +on the following day General Barton marched from Mooi River to +Estcourt. But the burghers, now disorganised and alarmed, fell back +too fast to be seriously molested, and on the 28th, when Lord +Dundonald advanced with a field battery and all available mounted +troops on Colenso, the Boer rearguard merely withdrew across the road +bridge. The demolition that evening of the railway bridge was a proof +that any lingering hope, which the Boers may up to that date have +cherished of mastering southern Natal, was abandoned. + +[Sidenote: Boers on east hold Helpmakaar and patrol from it.] + +On the eastern side of northern Natal,[184] a Boer force about 800 +strong, under Commandant Ferreira, consisting of the Piet Retief and +Bethel commandos, and about 120 Natal rebels, was still in occupation +of Helpmakaar, patrolling country on the left bank of the Tugela from +below Colenso. They went as far as Rorke's Drift. One of these patrols +attempted to cross the river at the Tugela Ferry on the 23rd November, +but was repulsed by the Umvoti Rifles, commanded by Major Leuchars. +Further east again small parties of Boers had raided into Zululand, +but their movements were of no importance. + + [Footnote 184: See map No. 3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +OPERATIONS ROUND COLESBERG UP TO THE 16th DECEMBER.[185] + + [Footnote 185: See maps Nos. 9 and 16.] + + +[Sidenote: Schoeman at Norval's Pont Nov. 1st.] + +[Sidenote: Colesberg Nov. 14th, is annexed.] + +A Boer force seized the passage of the Orange river at Norval's Pont +on the 1st November.[186] It consisted of the Philippolis and Edenburg +commandos, with a detachment from the Bethulie district and some +burghers from the Transvaal, and was commanded by a Transvaaler named +Schoeman. Schoeman's subsequent advance was extraordinarily cautious +and hesitating, a caution probably more due to the existence amongst +the Free State burghers of a strong party opposed on political grounds +to the invasion of the colony than to strategical considerations. +Although on the withdrawal of the British garrison from Naauwpoort on +the 3rd, there was for the moment not a single British post between +Port Elizabeth and the frontier, it was not until the 14th that the +little town of Colesberg was occupied by the enemy. That this Boer +force was not the advance guard of any large army had been shown by +the destruction on the 5th of two railway bridges, at Van Zyl and +Achtertang, between Colesberg junction and Norval's Pont; on the other +hand, the aggressive intention of Schoeman's movement had been +demonstrated by the issue on the 9th of a Boer proclamation, declaring +the Colesberg district to be Free State territory. The main object of +this proclamation, as well as of similar announcements made in the +Aliwal, Albert, and Barkly East districts, was to apply the Free State +commando laws to British subjects, and under that legal pretext force +them to join the invading columns. Nor did this policy at first lack +encouragement, for a public meeting held at Colesberg on the day of +its occupation passed a resolution in favour of throwing in its lot +with the Orange Free State. These facts were duly reported to the +Intelligence staff at Cape Town. The strength of Schoeman's column was +variously assessed, one report placing it as high as 3,000, but the +estimate considered most reliable stated that the Boer commandant had +at this time under his orders 1,200 men, two field guns, and a Maxim. +On the 17th the Intelligence department was informed that the column +intended to occupy Naauwpoort, and there divide into two sections, one +pushing across country to the south-west for the purpose of cutting +the railway at Richmond Road, and the other moving south on a +recruiting mission to Middleburg. + + [Footnote 186: See page 198.] + +[Sidenote: Danger of the raid. French ordered to check it.] + +A series of boldly-conducted raids on the long line of railway from +Cape Town to De Aar might at this period have paralysed Lord Methuen's +advance on Kimberley, while a Boer column in the central districts of +the Colony would have formed a nucleus round which the disaffected and +lawless might have rallied, before the loyal farmers could be armed +and organised to defend their own homes. It was thus evident that +immediate steps must be taken to check the commando at Colesberg, and +it was for these reasons that the orders, already mentioned,[187] were +issued by Sir R. Buller for the re-occupation of Naauwpoort by a +half-battalion of the 2nd Berkshire, a half-battalion of the Black +Watch, the New South Wales Lancers (40 all ranks), 25 Cape Police, and +a party of Royal Garrison artillery manning two 9-pr. R.M.L. guns, and +for the despatch of Lieut.-General French to organise as a combined +force these and such further troops as Wauchope could spare, so as to +oppose Schoeman's operations. + + [Footnote 187: See Chapter XI.] + +[Sidenote: French confers with Wauchope Nov. 19th.] + +General French, accompanied by Major D. Haig as his Chief Staff +Officer, and Captain the Hon. H. A. Lawrence as Intelligence Officer, +left Cape Town by train on the evening of the 18th November, reaching +on the following night De Aar, where he had been instructed to confer +with Major-General Wauchope (at that time commanding the lines of +communication from De Aar to Orange River) as regards the plan of +campaign and as to the units that could be given him. In telegraphic +orders sent to French on the 19th Sir R. Buller laid down his mission +in the following terms:-- + +[Sidenote: French's instructions, Nov. 19th.] + +"I shall reinforce you as rapidly as possible; meanwhile do your best +to prepare for a flying column, strength say, nearly 3,000 men, with +which as soon as I get more troops, I mean you to attack the Boers +about Colesberg. I think such an attack should be based on Hanover +Road. Do all you can to reconnoitre the country, to obtain guides and +information, and to be prepared to start; keep your men in condition, +and exercise horses and mules." + +[Sidenote: French reports on situation, Nov. 20th.] + +As a result of his conference with Wauchope, General French reported +to Headquarters on the 20th that Naauwpoort, which had already been +re-occupied by the troops above-named, would be a better base than +Hanover Road for a movement on Colesberg, considering both the +flatness of the country, the fewer wire fences, and the railway and +direct road. But for the moment Wauchope could spare no more troops +except two companies of M.I. The telegram added that arrangements were +being made for the formation at Naauwpoort of a depot containing +thirty days' supplies for 3,000 men, 600 horses, and 500 mules. After +the despatch of this report General French, accompanied by his staff, +proceeded by train to his destination, and immediately on his arrival +issued orders for a reconnaissance on the following day. + +[Sidenote: Nov. 21st. French reconnoitres towards Colesberg. He asks +for reinforcements.] + +On the morning of the 21st, the General Officer commanding pushed +forward up the railway with the N.S.W. Lancers, followed by a section +of infantry in a train. The line was found to be broken one mile north +of Tweedale siding, but the cavalry advanced to within eight miles of +Colesberg without meeting the enemy (see map No. 10). On reporting by +telegram the result of this reconnaissance, General French added that, +on the arrival from De Aar of the two companies M.I., he proposed to +occupy a strong position north of Arundel, and that he considered +that, with a view to an attack on Colesberg, he should be reinforced +by two and a half battalions and a few squadrons of cavalry, "most +necessary for reaping fruits of victory in this country." The same +afternoon R. battery R.H.A. and an ammunition column reached +Naauwpoort by train from Cape Town. The two companies M.I., under +Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Tudway, marched in from De Aar, but were found to +be so insufficiently trained in their mounted duties that they were as +yet unfit to take the field as complete units against the enemy.[188] + + [Footnote 188: These two companies were part of the M.I. + battalion of the cavalry division, and were composed of + sections drawn from various infantry battalions, and trained + in different districts in different ways.] + +[Sidenote: Steps taken Nov. 22nd and 23rd. Reinforcements arrive.] + +On the 22nd, culverts north of Tweedale siding were repaired, and an +obstruction on the line was removed. A patrol of the N.S.W. Lancers +was pushed on to a kopje north of Arundel, but no sign of the enemy +was seen. On the 23rd the other half-battalion Black Watch came in +from General Wauchope, and a reconnaissance of New South Wales Lancers +and a picked detachment of the M.I., supported by a company of +infantry in a train, was despatched up the line towards Arundel, with +a view to observing by patrols the vicinity of Colesberg; the kopjes, +however, north of Arundel station were found to be now occupied by the +Boers in sufficient strength to check further progress. In reporting +this to Cape Town by telegraph, General French stated that he did not +think that the enemy intended to attack Naauwpoort, but considered +that the Boers should be dislodged from Colesberg as soon as possible, +as they were obtaining recruits there. Naauwpoort had meantime been +placed in a thorough state of defence. + +[Sidenote: French's command extended.] + +Reconnaissances continued to be made almost daily towards Arundel. +Meanwhile General French's sphere of command had been increased by the +addition to it of the central line of communication down to Port +Elizabeth, volunteer corps, including the Prince Alfred's Guards, of a +strength of 900 all ranks, being placed at his disposal. Some +difficulty, however, arising as to the movement of these colonial +troops north of Cradock, detachments of regulars were sent temporarily +from Naauwpoort to hold Rosmead Junction and the railway bridges near +it against small rebel parties, which were reported to be under arms +in that neighbourhood. The force at Naauwpoort was gradually augmented +by the arrival of the 12th Lancers on the 25th, and O. battery R.H.A., +and another ammunition column on the 27th. On the other hand, by the +1st December the whole battalion of the Black Watch had been, at the +urgent request of Major-General Wauchope, returned to Orange River to +replace infantry sent forward to Lord Methuen. The 1st Suffolk +regiment arrived at Naauwpoort that afternoon, and on the 2nd December +the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, a fine corps 400 strong, and the 26th +company R.E., joined General French. + +[Sidenote: Nov. 26th to Dec. 7th. The "policy of worry."] + +[Sidenote: Arundel occupied, Dec. 7th.] + +On the 26th November Sir R. Buller had telegraphed to Sir F. +Forestier-Walker: "French should attack Arundel as soon as he feels +strong enough, but not before, and he should be sure that he is strong +enough. We can now afford to wait;" and on the following day he added: +"Tell French to maintain an active defence, not running any risk." On +the 30th another despatch from the General Commanding-in-Chief to +General Forestier-Walker ran: "suggest to French that a policy of +worry, without risking men, might have a good effect on the enemy at +Colesberg and keep him occupied." Meanwhile the constant appearance of +patrols from Naauwpoort had not only completely chained to the +vicinity of Colesberg the main body of the enemy, but had made him +nervous for the safety of his advance party on the kopjes north of +Arundel station; and on the 29th November a squadron of the 12th +Lancers discovered that those kopjes had been evacuated. On this, two +days later, two squadrons of that regiment were sent forward to +Arundel station to bivouac there that night with a view to a +reconnaissance being pushed on to Colesberg on the following morning. +But at 10 p.m. the Lieutenant-General received a telegram from the +Chief of the Staff ordering the 12th Lancers to join Lord Methuen on +the Modder river. The squadrons were, therefore, recalled from Arundel +and the regiment entrained for the Modder on the following day, as +soon as sufficient rolling-stock could be obtained. Its departure left +French for the moment with insufficient mounted men to keep touch with +the enemy, but the arrival of the New Zealanders on the 2nd December +enabled active operations to be renewed, and on the 5th the +Carabiniers, commanded by Colonel T. C. Porter, increased the +Naauwpoort force sufficiently to warrant the adoption of the "policy +of worry" suggested by Sir R. Buller. Moreover, arrangements had now +been completed for the protection of the railway line from Cradock to +Rosmead by part of the Port Elizabeth Volunteer Corps. The details of +the Suffolk regiment and M.I., which had been guarding these +localities, were thereupon recalled to Naauwpoort and rejoined on the +afternoon of 5th December. On the 6th orders were issued for the +occupation on the following day of a position near Arundel with +mounted troops "with the object of pushing forward detachments to +observe the enemy, and clear up the situation near Colesberg next +day." In pursuance of these orders the New Zealand Mounted Rifles +moved out to the ridge to the south of Arundel early on the morning of +the 7th, and later in the day the Carabiniers, mounted infantry (less +a detachment holding Hanover Road station), the N.S.W. Lancers, a +detachment of the R.E. company, and Field Telegraph section were +brought out by train from Naauwpoort under the command of Colonel +Porter; and, having detrained at Hartebeestfontein farm, covered by +the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, advanced with that regiment to Arundel +without meeting any opposition. There the force bivouacked for the +night, the enemy's piquets watching them from a ridge three miles +north of the station. + +[Sidenote: Dec. 8th to Dec. 11th, 1899. Schoeman's strength +ascertained. French seizes hill north of Arundel.] + +At dawn on the 8th, Colonel Porter sent forward his mounted infantry, +with some cavalry, and seized a hill three miles north of Arundel. +General French, accompanied by his staff and two Berkshire companies, +arrived at Arundel by train from Naauwpoort at 6 a.m., and by his +orders the reconnaissance was then pushed home. The Boers were found +to be now occupying a series of kopjes called Taaiboschlaagte which +run in a south-easterly direction from Rensburg, and extend to the +westward, across the line. The cavalry was sent round both flanks of +the enemy, while the mounted infantry held him in front. This movement +caused the Boers to fall back and disclose a second position athwart +the railway, with a wide frontage both to the east and west. Artillery +fire was opened on the British troops from three points of this new +post, and a large gun was seen being dragged into action near +Rensburg, which appeared to be the centre of the Boer line. It was +estimated that the opposing commando was on this occasion about 2,000 +strong. A prisoner was captured, who alleged that he was adjutant to +the officer commanding a reinforcement just arrived from Pretoria. He +stated that the total force under Schoeman's orders was now 3,000, +exclusive of local rebels, that it included four field guns and three +smaller pieces, and that Grobelaar's commando of 1,700 men at +Burghersdorp would shortly receive a reinforcement of 600 men from the +Free State and intended then to co-operate with Schoeman. A telegram, +despatched by Major Haig in the evening to Cape Town, reported the +above information and the day's operation, adding: "General French +desires me to say that in face of attitude of enemy to-day he cannot +do more than reconnoitre with forces here." The mounted troops, who +had now been joined by R. battery R.H.A., continued in occupation of +the kopjes north of Arundel, and on the 11th December, the railway +having been repaired, three companies of the Royal Berkshire, under +Major McCracken, were moved by train to that station, and a detachment +of 50 M.I. was sent to Tweedale to patrol and guard the line; the +remainder of the troops continued to garrison Naauwpoort under command +of Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Watson, 1st Suffolk regiment. + +[Sidenote: French seizes Vaal Kop and repels Boer advance. Dec 11th.] + +Two squadrons of the Inniskilling Dragoons reached Naauwpoort on the +10th, and with two squadrons of the 10th Hussars, arriving on the +11th, were sent on to Arundel. Early on the morning of the 11th the +British patrols reported that the Boers had seized Vaal Kop, an +isolated hill some six miles west of Rensburg, with open ground all +round it, and Kuilfontein farm, one and a half miles to the north-west +of the kop. By the Lieut.-General's directions a squadron of the 10th +Hussars and two Horse artillery guns were sent out against these +detached posts, and having forced the enemy back remained in +possession of Vaal Kop. Some anxiety was still felt as regards +Schoeman's designs on his left side, as it was surmised that his +continued occupation of a position so much in advance of Colesberg was +probably due to an intention of holding out a hand to Grobelaar in the +Burghersdorp district. Colonel Porter was, therefore, ordered to +patrol widely to the east and north-east to discover whether any +movements were taking place in those quarters. Early on the morning of +the 13th his patrols reported that about 1,800 Boers were leaving +their laagers in three detachments and pushing southward towards +Naauwpoort. By 7 a.m. Colonel Porter had made the following +disposition to meet this development--Vaal Kop on his extreme left was +still occupied by a squadron and two guns, and the kopjes to the north +of Arundel were held by the three companies of the Berkshire and two +9-pr. R.M.L. guns, supported by the M.I. on the right and the New +Zealand Mounted Rifles on the left, with the N.S.W. Lancers at the Nek +near the railway. The main body of the cavalry (six squadrons) with +four guns of R. battery was concentrated on the threatened flank two +to three miles to the east of the remainder. In a skirmish which +ensued, the enemy brought up two guns, but these were quickly silenced +and the Boer commandos were driven back by the cavalry. By 2 p.m. the +bulk of the enemy's forces had returned to their old ground; a party, +which about that hour occupied Kuilfontein farm on the western flank, +was driven away by the shell fire of the two British guns on Vaal Kop, +suffering considerable loss. The British casualties during the day +were limited to one officer and seven men wounded. A congratulatory +telegram, received by General French from Sir R. Buller next day, +commented: "You are following the right policy. Worry them." The +tactics prescribed by General French at this period can be best +realised from the following extract from the instructions issued by +his Chief Staff Officer on the 14th to Major-General Brabazon, who, on +his arrival on that date, was placed in command at Arundel:-- + +[Sidenote: French's method.] + + "Your task is to prevent the enemy moving from his present + positions closer to Naauwpoort, or reaching the railway + connecting that place with Arundel. The Lieut.-General + Commanding considers that the best method to pursue to attain + this end is: + + "(a) Hold Arundel as a pivot. + + "(b) Using that as a pivot, act energetically with your mounted + troops against any of the enemy's detachments which may leave his + main position and cross open ground. + + "(c) Select and hold certain points (such as Vaal Kop), to retain + the enemy and make him fear an offensive movement against his + line of retreat; (which is via Colesberg wagon bridge)." + +[Sidenote: French, because of effect of "Black Week," takes command at +Arundel and reorganises. Dec. 16th.] + +[Sidenote: Dec. 17th.] + +On the 16th, however, notwithstanding these instructions, the officer +commanding the detachment on Vaal Kop fell back from that post on its +being threatened by distant artillery fire, and the whole of the +troops at Arundel were turned out on a false alarm that the enemy was +advancing. The defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso, +recorded in later chapters, had meantime darkened the prospect, so +that manifestly the utmost care must be taken by all commanders to +obviate mistakes which might lead to further misfortunes. General +French, therefore, moved his Headquarters to the front, and assumed +personal command of the troops at Arundel. He had telegraphed on the +previous day offering to despatch all his cavalry to the Modder river, +but this suggestion was negatived "on account of scarcity of water." +He reorganised the Arundel command into a division as follows, +appointing Major-General Brabazon second in command:-- + + _1st Cavalry Brigade (under Colonel T. C. Porter)._ + + The Carabiniers. + New South Wales Lancers (40 men), + 1 company mounted infantry. + + _2nd Cavalry Brigade (under Lieut.-Colonel R. B. W. Fisher)._ + + The Inniskilling Dragoons (2 squadrons), + 10th Hussars (2 squadrons), + 1 company mounted infantry. + + _Divisional Troops._ + + Brigade division R.H.A. (under Colonel F. J. W. Eustace). + New Zealand Mounted Rifles. + R.E. company. + Bearer company. + Half-battalion Royal Berkshire } + regiment. } under Major F. W. N. + 2 guns R.G.A. } McCracken. + +[Sidenote: French pivoting on certain strong points continues "policy +of worry." Dec. 16th-17th 1899.] + +Major McCracken was directed to fortify the kopjes north of Arundel, +and to hold them "at all costs" as a pivot of manoeuvre. The country, +for purposes of reconnaissance, was divided into two zones, the +railway being taken as the line of demarcation. The 1st brigade was +assigned to the western zone, the 2nd to the eastern; the Brigadiers +were instructed to occupy certain tactical points towards the front +and flanks, and were made responsible that the enemy was not allowed +to establish himself unmolested on any kopje south of the Arundel +ridge. The Horse artillery and New Zealand Rifles were kept in reserve +under the personal orders of the General Officer Commanding. With +these arrangements the Lieut.-General felt assured that his position +was secure, and hoped to be able to continue to pursue a bold and +aggressive policy, a duty to which he was now able to devote his whole +attention, as other arrangements had been made for the command of the +lines of communication to Port Elizabeth. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +STORMBERG.[189] + + [Footnote 189: See maps Nos. 9 and 14.] + + +[Sidenote: The Boers occupy Stormberg, Nov. 25/99.] + +President Steyn early in November ordered an invasion of the +north-eastern portion of Cape Colony. In doing so he acted against the +advice of a Krijgsraad held at Bethulie to discuss the project. A +considerable party of the Free State burghers was, in fact, opposed to +an offensive plan of campaign, but the President held that success in +the struggle against Great Britain could not be attained without +enlisting in his favour all the external support he could obtain. The +mission of the invaders was therefore to incite the discontented in +the colony to open rebellion. Under these circumstances, although many +communications passed between the disaffected amongst the local +farmers and Olivier, the commandant of the Boer contingent which had +crossed Bethulie bridge early in November, the movements of the +burghers were at first slow and hesitating. Aliwal North was occupied +on the 13th, and Burghersdorp--a town without any great reputation for +loyalty--two days later. The districts of Aliwal North, Albert and +Barkly East were at once proclaimed to be Free State territory. It was +not until the 25th that the Boer commando seized the important railway +junction of Stormberg, from which the British garrison had three weeks +earlier been withdrawn by Sir R. Buller to Queenstown.[190] + + [Footnote 190: Chapter XI.] + +[Sidenote: Sir W. Gatacre reaches East London, Nov. 16th.] + +Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre, with the staff of the 3rd division, the +two brigades of which had been sent on to Natal, disembarked at East +London on 16th November. The tasks assigned to that General were to +prevent British subjects from being persuaded or compelled to take up +arms against their Sovereign, to encourage and protect the loyal, and, +so far as possible, to stem the Boer invasion until the return of Lord +Methuen's division from Kimberley enabled the country south of the +Orange river to be swept clear of the enemy, preparatory to the +general advance through the Free State. + +[Sidenote: Moves to Queenstown. His available strength.] + +Sir W. Gatacre moved immediately up to Queenstown, taking with him the +2nd Royal Irish Rifles (898 all ranks), who had landed the same day at +East London. On arriving at Queenstown he found at that station the +half-battalion and a mounted company of the 2nd Berkshire regiment +(strength, 574 all ranks), a small detachment of Royal Garrison +artillery, and a half company of Royal engineers, which, with the +Naval contingent, had formed the original garrison of Stormberg. The +_personnel_ of the Naval contingent had been ordered to return to Cape +Town, but had left with the Royal artillery their two 12-pr. guns. +Besides these, the gunners had two obsolete field guns belonging to +the armament of the naval base, but owing to the lack of mules and +equipment none of the guns were mobile. In addition to these troops +the local volunteers, consisting of the Kaffrarian Rifles, the +Frontier Mounted Rifles (about 229 strong), and the Queenstown Rifle +Volunteers (285), had been called out; a corps of mounted infantry was +being raised locally from the farmers of the Eastern province by +Colonel Brabant, and a contingent of the Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape +Police had been placed at the Lieut.-General's disposal. The +Kaffrarian Rifles, 285 all ranks, held the base at East London. The +remainder of the local troops, except some posts of observation at +Cathcart, Indwe and Molteno, were concentrated at Queenstown. An +armoured train, commanded by Lieutenant F. J. Gosset, 2nd Berkshire, +patrolled the railway. + +[Sidenote: Pushes on to Putterskraal, Sterkstroom.] + +[Sidenote: and Bushman's Hoek, Nov. 27th-28th.] + +For the moment it was obvious that no forward movement could take +place; indeed, a telegram despatched by Sir R. Buller to General +Gatacre, on 18th November, reminded him that "the great thing in this +sort of warfare is to be perfectly certain that one position is safe +before you advance to another, and that we are not yet strong enough +in troops to play tricks." Yet patrols, furnished by the Cape Police, +were sent out to Dordrecht, Stormberg and Tarkastad, and the +employment of reliable native scouts was arranged. In a telegram, +dated 21st November, Sir Redvers suggested that a portion of General +Gatacre's force might be moved to Stormberg for the purpose of +covering the coal mines at Indwe. Sir W. Gatacre replied on the same +day that he had not sufficient men as yet to advance to Stormberg, +but, as soon as more troops arrived, he intended to occupy that +junction and clear the country round it. Meanwhile, as a result of a +personal reconnaissance of the district, he proposed to occupy +Putterskraal, a position which, with outposts at Bushman's Hoek and +Penhoek, would "command Sterkstroom junction with the colliery line, +reassure loyal farmers, and steady disloyal men." The arrival from +England of two companies of mounted infantry (part of the mounted +infantry of the cavalry division), under Capt. E. J. Dewar, King's +Royal Rifles, on the 22nd, and of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers on +the 27th November, enabled a concentration of all the mounted troops, +the detachment of Royal Garrison artillery, the 2nd Northumberland +Fusiliers, and the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, to be effected at +Putterskraal on the latter date. Sterkstroom was also occupied as an +advanced post, and on the following day the Berkshire mounted +infantry, four companies of the Irish Rifles, and the Kaffrarian +Rifles, brought up from East London, were pushed on to Bushman's Hoek. + +[Sidenote: Situation graver. Buller suggests closing with enemy.] + +The enemy was becoming bolder. A considerable number of disaffected +farmers had joined the commando at Burghersdorp; more were known to be +on their way up from Cradock, while at Barkly East a disloyal field +cornet was issuing Government arms and ammunition to rebels. The Boer +occupation of Stormberg on the 25th was followed immediately by the +destruction of the railway and telegraph line to the westward. Thus +French's force at Naauwpoort and Gatacre's troops at Putterskraal were +cut off from each other, and the latter were left for the moment +entirely dependent on their own resources. Sir Redvers, who was kept +daily informed of these developments, felt "anxious," and telegraphed +orders from Maritzburg on 26th November to Sir F. Forestier-Walker: +"Caution Gatacre to be careful. I think he is hardly strong enough to +advance beyond Putterskraal, until Methuen's return;" and on the +following day he telegraphed instructions to reinforce General Gatacre +by one, or, if possible, by two battalions, "and any mounted men that +can be spared." Barkly East was reported to be in open rebellion, +although Sir H. Elliott's action in defending the passes leading south +to Griqualand East continued to be effective.[191] The "annexation" of +Dordrecht to the Free State, proclaimed officially on its occupation +by the enemy, further complicated the situation. General Gatacre +accordingly telegraphed direct to the General Commanding-in-Chief:-- + + [Footnote 191: Chapter XI.] + + "Military situation here requires dealing with extreme + carefulness. Boers have occupied Dordrecht and enemy is advancing + in a southerly direction, evidently pointing for Queenstown. I + have two British regiments only, and I am 33 miles to the north + of Queenstown--I am holding Bushman's Hoek range to endeavour to + prevent descent into Queenstown district, which would mean + general state of rebellion of Dutch. Force will be strengthened + at Queenstown by next British regiment which should arrive at + Queenstown 5th December, but Queenstown is indefensible position. + Are there any orders especially as regards my movements?" + +Sir Redvers replied the same day (2nd December) from Maritzburg:-- + + "Your No. A 514. We have to make the best of the situation, and + if the enemy is advancing by Dordrecht, the importance of + Bushman's Hoek is diminished. You have a force which altogether + is considerably stronger than the enemy can now bring against + you. Cannot you close with him, or else occupy a defensible + position which will obstruct his advance? You have an absolutely + free hand to do what you think best." + +[Sidenote: Gatacre seizes Molteno and Penhoek, Nov. 29th.] + +Meanwhile, on the 29th November, a raid by train had been made from +Putterskraal on Molteno, and a large amount of corn removed from a +mill which it was feared might fall into the enemy's hands. An officer +and 50 men of the Cape Police were left in observation at Molteno, and +detachments of Cape Mounted Rifles and of the newly-raised corps, +Brabant's Horse, of a total strength of 400 men, was pushed out to +Penhoek, a pass through the hills ten miles east of Sterkstroom. + +[Sidenote: Dec. 7th Gatacre tells C.O.s of intended night march.] + +By the 6th December, Sir W. Gatacre had been reinforced by two +batteries of his divisional artillery, the 74th and 77th, the +divisional ammunition column, the 12th company R.E., the 1st Royal +Scots, the 33rd company Army Service Corps, and 16th Field Hospital. +The greater portion of his detachment was unfortunately only just free +from the confinement of the voyage from England. Every effort had been +made on board ship to keep the infantry in good condition by +gymnastics and physical drill, but they were naturally not in the best +trim for a long march. The horses of the artillery had suffered from a +somewhat stormy passage of 31 days, during which 14 had died of +influenza. They, too, therefore, were hardly yet ready for hard work. +Nevertheless, the G.O.C. considered that, in the existing strategic +situation, any further prolongation of the defensive attitude he had +hitherto been obliged to maintain would be injurious.[192] He +determined, therefore, to take advantage of the free hand left to him +by Sir R. Buller, and to follow the further suggestion that he should +close with the enemy. On the evening of the 7th he informed the +commanding officers of units that he intended to make a night march on +Stormberg and attack the Boer laager. It will be seen from map No. 14 +that the buildings and sheds which mark the railway junction lie at +the foot of a steep razor-back hill, called Rooi Kop, and on the +eastern edge of a valley or vlei, about two miles in length from north +to south, and one in breadth. This vlei, in which the enemy's main +body was known to be, is shut in on the east by the Rooi Kop, which +dominates all of the surrounding country. To the south and south-west, +it is enclosed by a lower hill, named the Kissieberg, and on the north +by a flat-topped kopje on which forts had been constructed by the +British garrison when in occupation of the junction. Between this +kopje and the northern point of the Kissieberg, there is a gap of a +mile through which pass out the spruit, which drains the vlei, and +the branch line to Naauwpoort. The railway from East London to +Bloemfontein and the main road from Molteno to Burghersdorp, via +Stormberg, cross a Nek between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop, +subsequently skirting the latter hill very closely. This Nek, on which +the intelligence scouts reported the Boer guns to be posted, and the +Rooi Kop, Sir W. Gatacre planned to seize before dawn on the morning +of the 9th by a night march from Molteno. He proposed to employ on the +enterprise the whole of the mounted infantry, one field battery, the +R.E. company, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Irish Rifles, +and a detachment of Cape Police. The mounted troops from Penhoek were +also to co-operate on the right flank. Arrangements were also made +with Sir H. Elliott for an advance of the Headquarters of the Cape +Mounted Rifles in the direction of Dordrecht. By concentrating at +Molteno late on the day previous to that chosen for the attack, +General Gatacre hoped to surprise the enemy. Owing, however, to some +difficulties in obtaining rolling stock, the movement was postponed +till the 9th. + + [Footnote 192: The Intelligence reports of General Gatacre's + staff show that they at this time believed that Olivier was + expecting a large reinforcement from the Transvaal.] + +[Sidenote: Move postponed to Dec. 9th.] + +[Sidenote: Concentrates at Molteno, Dec. 9th.] + +Early on the morning of that day, camp was struck at Putterskraal, and +the baggage packed, the wagons being ordered to travel by road to +Molteno. The assembling of the troops at that village was effected +during the afternoon in the following manner:-- + + _By Train from Putterskraal._ + + Divisional Staff. + R.A. Staff, 74th and 77th batteries R.F.A. + R.E. Staff, 12th company R.E. + 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers. + Headquarters and 4 companies Royal Irish Rifles. + Field Hospital and Bearer company. + + _By Train from Bushman's Hoek._ + + 4 companies Royal Irish Rifles. + + _By Road from Putterskraal._ + + 2 companies mounted infantry. + 42 Cape Mounted Police. + + _By Road from Bushman's Hoek._ + + 1 company Royal Berkshire mounted infantry. + +Besides these, three companies Royal Scots were sent by rail from +Putterskraal. One of them was dropped at Bushman's Hoek, the other two +being taken on to Molteno. The units that went by train had with them +their first line transport. Although the entraining of the troops +began about 12 noon, it was not completed till after 5 p.m., owing to +the lack of sufficient sidings. The movement to Molteno was covered by +the armoured train, and was carried out without interruption. The +detachments of Brabant's Horse and Cape Mounted Rifles ordered in from +Penhoek to Molteno failed, however, to appear. A message to the +officer commanding at Penhoek, conveying the order, had been handed in +at the telegraph office at Putterskraal at midnight on the 8th, but +owing to some carelessness had not been forwarded by the telegraph +clerk. The precaution of demanding an acknowledgment of the receipt of +this important order, or of sending a duplicate, does not appear to +have been taken by the divisional staff. + +[Sidenote: Arrangements for feeding men.] + +The troops had dined before leaving Putterskraal, and took with them +one and a half day's rations, the half ration to be eaten in the train +on the way to Molteno, and the remainder to be carried by the men on +the march. The preserved meat had been issued in 6lb. tins. These were +very inconvenient. Therefore many of them were thrown away. + +[Sidenote: Dec. 9th, 1899. Orders for night march issues. Lack of +maps.] + +On arriving at Molteno, Sir W. Gatacre assembled the commanding +officers and issued personally to them his orders for the movement +against Stormberg. His Intelligence staff had ascertained that the +actual strength of the Boers in laager at that moment was about 1,700, +and that the southern face of the Kissieberg and the Nek between that +hill and Rooi Kop were entrenched. The General, on receipt of this +information, determined to modify his original plan. Although +Stormberg had been occupied for more than a month by British troops, +no systematic sketching of the surrounding country had been +undertaken. Except a plan made more than a year before of the ground +in the immediate neighbourhood of the junction, and reproduced in one +of the Intelligence handbooks, the only map at the disposal of the +Staff was the Cape Survey, the scale of which, 12-1/2 miles to an +inch, was too small for tactical purposes. + +[Sidenote: The method of march.] + +The local Cape Police, the Berkshire mounted infantry, and others were +very well acquainted with the country; and, after a personal +examination of Sergeant Morgan, Cape Police, and several native +policemen, who had previously been selected as guides, Sir W. Gatacre +determined to move his force out from Molteno by the Steynsburg road, +and to diverge from that road by a cross track, leading northwards +from a point near D. Foster's farm to Van Zyl's farm,[193] which was +situated immediately in rear of the western face of the Kissieberg. +Thus the position on the Nek would be turned. The distance to be +covered during this flank march was said by his informants to be about +nine miles. The actual distance was about ten miles. Allowing for +intermediate rests for the men, the General anticipated that he would +be able so to order the time as to place his men in a position to rush +the Kissieberg with the bayonet before dawn, and then, as soon as +daylight appeared, to plant the guns on that kopje, thus commanding +the whole of the Stormberg valley. Sir W. Gatacre informed commanding +officers verbally of these intentions, and arranged the following +succession: + + [Footnote 193: It will be observed that four houses marked + Van Zyl's are shown in map 14, but, except when otherwise + specified, the most northern of these is the one referred to + throughout in the text.] + + Royal Irish Rifles. + Northumberland Fusiliers. + 74th and 77th batteries, escorted by + Two companies M.I. and the Cape Police. + Berkshire M.I. company. + Machine guns, ammunition reserve, and + Field Hospital, escorted by 12th company R.E. + +[Sidenote: Dependence on guides.] + +The column was to move off in three echelons, the first consisting of +the divisional staff and the infantry, the second the artillery and +mounted infantry, and the third the field hospital, machine guns, etc. +Guides were allotted to each unit. Complete reliance was placed on the +efficiency of these guides, and the precaution of causing the road to +be previously reconnoitred by a staff officer had not been taken. Both +Sir W. Gatacre's intelligence officers, one of whom knew the ground +intimately, had duties on the line of communication, and were thus +unable to accompany the column. The General, with all the rest of his +staff, took his place at the head of the leading battalion, which was +preceded by eight infantry scouts under a subaltern. The remainder of +the infantry marched in fours. The batteries were in column of route. +The wheels of the 77th were covered with raw hide. The wheels of the +74th had not been so padded, as that battery was only added to the +column at the last moment. The hide proved to be of but little value +for the purpose of deadening the sound, and only made the draught +heavier. + +[Sidenote: Mistake at starting.] + +The head of the column moved off about 9 p.m., somewhat later than had +been originally planned. The artillery and mounted infantry followed +in due course along the Steynsburg road, but the machine guns, field +hospital, and R.E., owing to a lack of staff supervision, took the one +direct on Stormberg, and, finding that there were no troops in front +of them, halted where they were until daylight, having first +ascertained from the officer left in command at Molteno that he did +not know the route by which the main column was advancing. + +[Sidenote: The guides miss the road.] + +Meanwhile, the infantry of that column had pressed on with the +keenness of soldiers eager for their first fight, and at 1 a.m. a +homestead, which proved to be that of Mr. J. Roberts. The guides had +in fact passed the branch road leading to Van Zyl's farm, but on being +interrogated, the head guide, Sergeant Morgan, assured Sir W. Gatacre +that he and his assistants knew the way perfectly, and that they were +leading the column by a road which, though slightly longer than that +originally selected, avoided wire and a bad piece of track which the +guns would have found it difficult to cross at night. They added that +they were within one and a half miles of the spot, to which the +General desired to be guided. The map and freehand sketch show that +the guides now proposed to lead the column to the rear of the +Kissieberg by the wagon-track which leaves the Steynsburg road at +Roberts' homestead, and after crossing the Bamboosberg Spruit and the +colliery branch line, strikes, near Van Zyl's house, the track by +which General Gatacre had intended to approach the enemy's position. +The distance still to be traversed was, as will also be noticed, not +one and a half, but about two and a half miles. Moreover, after +crossing the spruit and the railway, the track traverses the northern +slopes of a stony irregular underfeature which guards the approaches +to the Kissieberg from the south and west. Progress over this ground +was unlikely to be rapid. Roberts' homestead is 10-1/2 miles from +Molteno. The troops had, therefore, already marched rather further +than was originally anticipated; and, as they had halted for a short +time every hour, their rate of marching had been fast for night-work +over such country. The men were somewhat weary owing to the march. +They were out of condition. They had been engaged on heavy fatigue +work on the morning of the 9th. Whether, therefore, the guides had +missed the true road in the dark, a supposition which is favoured by +the fact that they had previously assured the General that the whole +route was fit and easy for wheeled transport, or whether, not +realising the importance in military operations of obedience to +orders, they had, on their own judgment, diverted the column to the +longer route in the belief that it would be easier, the effect on the +General's plan of attack was serious. Sir W. Gatacre, nevertheless, +decided that he would give his men an hour's rest, and then push on. + +[Sidenote: The march resumed. Column arrives at dawn at destined +spot.] + +About 2 a.m. the march was resumed in the same order as before, except +that the guns and mounted infantry had closed up to the infantry. But +after crossing the railway the roughness of the ground added to the +fatigue of the troops; moreover, doubt as to the manner in which the +column was being guided had spread discouragement. The General, moving +at the head of the leading battalion, constantly questioned the +guide, but was as constantly assured by Sergeant Morgan that the right +road was being followed, although the distance was greater than he had +estimated. The column, therefore, trudged on until at length, as the +first signs of dawn were beginning to appear, it reached the cross +roads near Van Zyl's house, and thus was on the very ground from +whence General Gatacre intended to make his assault on the Kissieberg. +If the assault had been delivered at once, the ridge might have been +carried and command over the Stormberg valley have been thus secured. + +[Sidenote: Boers quite unprepared for the surprise march. All +circumstances favourable.] + +[Sidenote: The column is taken away two miles further. _En route_ it +is surprised.] + +The Boers in and near Stormberg on the morning of the 10th December were +under the command of Olivier: they consisted of about 1,700 burghers of +the Bethulie, Rouxville and Smithfield commandos, with two guns and a +Maxim. A detachment under Commandant Swanepoel, with one gun, held the +Nek between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop. A piquet of about fifty men was +stationed on the western ridge of the former hill, and another piquet +watched the north end of the vlei; the remainder of the burghers slept +on the lower inner slopes of the two hills. The Boer accounts of the +fight all agree in stating that Gatacre's night march was a complete +surprise to them. So secure did Olivier feel in his position that on the +9th he had detached a commando of colonial rebels, amounting to some 500 +or 600 men, under Grobelaar and Steinkamp, to Steynsburg to beat up more +recruits in that direction. In consequence of a dispute about a gun, +which was referred to President Steyn by telegram for settlement, +Grobelaar had outspanned for the night some seven or eight miles away on +the Stormberg-Steynsburg road, and his commando lay about a mile +north-west of Roberts' farm. Sir W. Gatacre's information, therefore, as +to the strength of the Boers in the Stormberg valley was accurate, their +dispositions favoured the plan he had formed for a surprise, and the +British assailants, notwithstanding the circuitous march, had now +arrived in time, though only barely in time, at the spot for its +execution. But either the chief guide did not fully comprehend the +General's intentions, or he had lost his bearings, for he pointed to a +kopje nearly two miles off, and said that that was the real place. The +wearied men continued to trudge along the road, which, skirting the +lower western slopes of the Kissieberg, leads to Stormberg junction. Day +was breaking,[194] but no change was made in the formation of the +troops. The infantry remained in fours, with no flankers out, and still +only eight men were in front as an advance guard. The Boer piquet on the +Kissieberg saw the grey thread as it wound its way slowly along the foot +of the hill within effective range of the crest. A single shot echoed +through the valley, and a corporal of the leading company of Irish +Rifles fell dead. A rapid fire, although from but a few rifles, was then +opened on the British troops at a range of about 400 yards. It was +impossible to convey orders to a long column of route, thus taken at a +disadvantage. Each company officer had to act on his own initiative, and +as few, if any of them, knew where they were, or where was the enemy +they were required to attack, confusion inevitably arose. + + [Footnote 194: The sun rose at Stormberg on December 10th at + 4.38 a.m. (Cape Government Railway time).] + +[Sidenote: A confused attack on Kissieberg.] + +The three leading companies of the Irish Rifles, under their +commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Eagar, front-formed, extended +rapidly at right angles to the road, and dashed forward and seized the +underfeature +a+ (map No. 14), which faces the extreme northern spur +of the Kissieberg. In pushing on towards this point, the men were much +exposed to enfilade fire from their right, and a good many casualties +occurred. The other five companies of the Irish Rifles and the +Northumberland Fusiliers faced to the right, confronting the main +ridge, against which they scrambled upwards by successive stages. The +companies extended as they moved on, and gradually opened out into +firing line and supports. The western face of the Kissieberg was found +to be exceedingly steep and difficult to climb. A series of krantz, or +perpendicular walls of rocks, barred the ascent, except at certain +gaps, while between these krantz were interspersed bushes and large +boulders. The company officers ordered their men to unfix bayonets, +and to help each other up the rocks. The enemy's fire for the moment +had ceased to be effective, as the British soldiers were more or less +under cover of the krantz, but the clamber through the gaps in the +first barrier, nearly twelve feet high, took a considerable time. On +the top a halt was made to let men get their breath, and then began +again the onward advance of small groups of twos and threes in the +direction of the shoulder of the hill, where the burghers had managed +to place a gun. The Boers' shooting from the crest now again became +effective, whilst they themselves, carefully concealed, offered no +target to the British rifles. The rocks and bushes made communication +between the different parts of the line of the attack very difficult. + +[Sidenote: Artillery come into action. A gun lost.] + +At the moment when the first shot killed the corporal, the batteries, +under the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Jeffreys, had rapidly moved +off to the left by sub-divisions for about 1,000 yards, and then +onward up the valley. There was no good position for the British guns, +except the ridge 2,000 yards to the west of the Kissieberg. But the +infantry's need of immediate support was too pressing to allow time +for that ridge's occupation. Lieut.-Colonel Jeffreys therefore, by the +direction of General Gatacre, caused the 77th battery to come into +action near kopje +a+, the 74th unlimbering on the open veld to the +westward. The mounted infantry continued to escort the batteries. In +getting into place a gun of the 74th battery had stuck in a donga, +owing to a horse being struck. It was smothered by a hail of bullets. +The three drivers were almost immediately wounded, and all the rest of +the team were shot down. The gun had therefore to be abandoned, part +of its breech mechanism being first removed. + +[Sidenote: The course of the attack on Kissieberg.] + +[Sidenote: Retreat.] + +Meanwhile the three companies of the Irish Rifles, which had seized +kopje +a+, had made their way step by step up the northern extremity +of the Kissieberg, and had struggled on to within close proximity of +its crest line. The Boers from the main laager had now manned the +hill, but the British artillery was bursting shells on the threatened +crest, and a Boer gun which had come into action was for a time +silenced. The attack had lasted about half an hour, and progress up +the hill was being slowly made by the British infantry, when the five +companies of the Northumberland on the right of the line were ordered +to retire by their commanding officer. He considered that his +battalion must leave the hill. The three foremost companies, who were +nearly on to the summit, did not hear of this order, and, under the +command of Capt. W. A. Wilmott, remained with the Irish Rifles, +clinging on as they were. The fire of the enemy appeared to be +slackening, and for the moment the groups of British officers and men +were convinced that, if they were supported, they could gain the +crest. But the withdrawal of a portion of the attacking line had made +any further success impossible. Nor was that all. Seeing the five +companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers falling back to the west, +the batteries conceived that all the assailants were retreating, and +exerted themselves to the utmost to cover the movement by their fire. +The sun was now rising immediately behind the western face of the +Kissieberg, so that all the upper part presented to the British guns a +black target, on which neither friend nor foe could be distinguished. +Thus a fatal mischance came about. A shell fused for explosion just +short of the Boer defensive line burst over the foremost group of the +Irish Rifles, and struck down Lieut.-Colonel Eagar, Major H. J. Seton, +the second in command, Major H. L. Welman, Captain F. J. H. Bell, and +three men. A conference had a few moments before been held between +Lieut.-Colonel Eagar and Captain Wilmott as to the steps which should +be taken to protect the men from the shells of their own gunners. The +former officer had stated that as the situation of the infantry was +evidently unknown to the batteries, and was masking their fire, it was +necessary to fall back. Captain Wilmott, on the other hand, urged that +if the men were once ordered to withdraw it would be very difficult to +get them up the hill again. Colonel Eagar replied that there was no +help for it. Therefore a general retirement now began from the main +ridge of the Kissieberg downwards towards the rising ground a mile to +the westward. The movement was made by rushes. The enemy had been +reinforced by Swanepoel's detachment from the Nek, and coming down the +slopes of the hill poured in a hot fire on the retiring infantry. The +material effect of this was not great, because the Boers' shooting +throughout the day was remarkably indifferent. But under its +influence a large proportion of the British troops took cover in the +donga which drains the valley between the Kissieberg and the height to +the westward. As an eye-witness describes it:-- + +[Sidenote: Word-sketch of retreat.] + + "This donga was too deep to be used as a line of defence, being + six feet deep at least, with both banks washed away underneath, + and with nothing for the men to stand upon to enable them to + bring their rifles to bear. It was here that the trouble in the + retirement commenced. The men retiring from the hill rushed to + this donga for cover from the heavy rifle-fire, and on getting + into it, and thinking they were safe from immediate danger, laid + down and many went to sleep, and the greatest difficulty was + experienced to get them on the move again and to leave the donga. + Many men were by this time thoroughly done up and did not appear + to care what happened to them. Many men still remained on the + hill, some because they had not heard the order to retire, and + some because, utterly weary, they had sunk down in sleep in the + dead angle at the foot of the height." + +[Sidenote: Stages of retreat.] + +On the extreme left the retreat to the western ridge was effected in +good order, the three companies of the Irish Rifles moving back first, +then the batteries in succession, the mounted infantry covering the +first stage, and remaining in close touch with the enemy, until +Colonel Jeffreys was able again to bring his guns into action on the +spur marked +b+ on the map. During this withdrawal, Major E. Perceval +was severely wounded, but continued to command the 77th battery until +the close of the day's operations. The artillery held this second +position for over an hour, the infantry forming up in rear. The enemy +now re-opened with a very long range gun, which made excellent +practice, but fortunately the large majority of its shells only burst +on impact, or not at all. + +[Sidenote: New foes appear, but are driven off.] + +[Sidenote: An ill-starred order.] + +At about 6 a.m. a further development began, one which might have +proved fatal to the British force had the Boers then possessed the +discipline and vigour in counter-attacks they acquired in the later +stages of the war. Grobelaar and Steinkamp with the Burghersdorp +commando had been roused by the sound of the guns from their bivouac +on the Steynsburg road, and, riding back, lined the crest of the hill +to the west of Bamboosberg Spruit, and thence opened a long-range fire +threatening the line of retreat. Against this fresh enemy five guns of +Major Perceval's battery were brought into action facing west, and +with well-directed shrapnel at a range of 1,200 yards, drove back the +dangerous force. The remaining gun of that battery and the 74th +battery continued to check the Boers' pursuit from the eastward. Yet +it was evident that the whole plan had failed, and that the troops +were not in a physical condition to renew the attack on the +Kissieberg. Sir W. Gatacre therefore decided to retire on Molteno, and +directed the retreat on Van Zyl's farm, 1,200 yards to the north-west +of D. Foster's homestead, the mounted infantry and artillery covering +the retirement. The General, when he gave this order, had received no +report that a considerable proportion of the infantry had failed to +rejoin their proper units. He had remained with the mounted infantry +throughout the action, and having seen numbers of men of both +regiments crossing the valley, was under the impression that the +battalions were now intact behind the western ridge. An extraordinary +number of them were, in fact, still missing. The largest proportion of +these had probably never left the Kissieberg. The equivalent of two +companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers are known to have been taken +prisoners there. Of those who had retired, some had remained in the +donga. Besides all these, there was a considerable number of officers +and men dispersed about the valley, and particularly in the enclosures +near the northern Van Zyl's farm. It seems possible that, if the +general retreat from the position at +b+ could have been delayed even +for a comparatively short time, some of the scattered parties of men, +who were afterwards taken prisoners, might have rejoined their +battalions. + +[Sidenote: The course of the retreat.] + +The line of the retreat to Molteno was to the west of the ridge which +rises between the colliery line and the Kissieberg, and so gave some +shelter from the enemy's fire. The minished battalions struggled +along, some of the companies being able at first to keep their +formation, though, long before they arrived at Molteno, almost all had +fallen into disarray. The fatigue of the men had reached its climax, +and most of them could hardly keep on their feet. Whenever there was a +necessary halt, not a few fell down, asleep almost before they +reached the ground, and it was with difficulty that they could be +again roused. They suffered very much from thirst as there were no +water-carts, and they had had no opportunity of drinking during many +hours. The batteries of artillery remained in action at +b+ for some +time. They then retired alternately, and by their steadiness and the +excellence of their practice held the enemy at bay. + +[Sidenote: Boers gain a second gun, but do not seriously pursue.] + +The Boers followed in the rear sufficiently close to necessitate the +abandonment of a second gun, which stuck in a water course, but there +was no determined attempt at vigorous pursuit, and when once the +kopjes had been passed, the mounted infantry were able to keep at a +distance those of the enemy who did not linger in the valley to loot. + +[Sidenote: Distribution of troops after action.] + +The various units of Sir W. Gatacre's force reached Molteno between 11 +a.m. and 12.30 midday. In the evening they were moved as follows: + +_To Cypher Gat:_ Divisional staff and Royal artillery, by train; +mounted infantry, by road. + +_To Sterkstroom:_ Northumberland Fusiliers and Royal Irish Rifles, by +train. + +_To Bushman's Hoek:_ Royal engineers and two companies Royal Scots, by +train. + +[Sidenote: British losses, Dec. 10th/99.] + +The British casualties in the action at Stormberg were: + + Killed. Wounded. Missing. + + Officers --- 8 13 + Other Ranks 25 102 548 + --- --- --- + Total 25 110 561 + --- --- --- + +Colonel Eagar, Royal Irish Rifles, died some months later of the +wounds received in this action. + +[Sidenote: Boer losses.] + +The casualties of the Boers were 8 killed and 26 wounded. Commandant +Swanepoel afterwards died of his wounds. + +[Sidenote: Points to be noted.] + +Sir W. Gatacre's decision to advance on Stormberg was fully justified +by the strategical situation. General Buller's telegram, although it +left him a free hand as to time and opportunity, had suggested that +operation. The plan, though bold, was sound in its design, and would +have succeeded had not exceptional ill-fortune attended its execution. +Several of the causes of failure stand out conspicuously in the +narrative: the mistake of the guides in taking the longer route, which +unduly fatigued the men; the failure to realise that the Kissieberg +was within striking distance, when the cross roads near Van Zyl's farm +were reached; the premature withdrawal of the five companies of one of +the battalions from the attack, and the subsequent shelling of the +British infantry who still clung to the hill. Without these +accumulated mishaps a blow would in all probability have been struck +at the enemy, such as would have had an important influence on the +general situation in South Africa. Yet it cannot be held that chance +was alone responsible for this miscarriage. A long night march to be +followed by a night attack involves, under the most favourable +circumstances, a considerable element of hazard, and it is therefore +essential that every possible precaution should be taken to obviate +mistakes and to ensure that the column should not, in its mission to +surprise, be itself taken at a disadvantage. Careful reconnaissance by +the staff of the route to be followed can, therefore, never be +neglected with impunity. If a staff officer had examined beforehand +the Steynsburg road, at least as far as the branch track which it was +intended to follow, and if he had been made responsible for the +supervision of the guides, the mistakes as to the route would in all +probability have been avoided. This omission is the more remarkable in +that one of the Intelligence staff, upon whom the duty of this +reconnaissance would naturally have devolved, was well acquainted with +the ground in the neighbourhood of Stormberg. It is perhaps doubtful +whether in view of the fatigue shown by the troops on their arrival at +Roberts' farm, and the uncertainty of the staff as to the situation, +it was wise to persist in the enterprise. In any case, it is clear +that the neglect to change the formation of the column, and to send +out flank and advance guards when dawn appeared whilst the movement +was being carried along a road surrounded by hills, was a dangerous +and unnecessary risk. Finally, the abandonment of large detachments of +infantry, when retreat was ordered, implies a serious lack of +supervision both by the staff and by the officers then left in command +of the battalions. Yet in weighing the responsibility for these +errors, it must be borne in mind that the units composing the force +had only just come together for the first time, that General, staff, +and troops were all new to one another, and that the men engaged were +not yet in hard condition. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. + +HALT ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN.[195] + + [Footnote 195: Map No. 13 and freehand sketch.] + + +[Sidenote: Reasons for the halt on the Modder.] + +The Modder River battle (November 28th, Chap. XV.) had placed the 1st +division within twenty miles of Kimberley. Signals were made to that +town by a Naval searchlight fitted "with a flasher."[196] Lord +Methuen[197] halted for a short time on the banks of the Modder. +Horses and men, worn out by the fighting and marching of the last six +days, required rest. Reinforcements of troops and supplies were on +their way to him along the lines of communication with the coast. +Moreover, before he could attempt to carry out his orders to remove +the non-combatant population of 8,000 Europeans and 25,000 natives +from Kimberley, it was necessary to restore or replace the railway +bridge which had been wrecked by the Boers. A message from Colonel +Kekewich, who commanded at Kimberley, reached the General on the 4th +December. It was to the effect that the town could hold out for forty +days more. His fears for the immediate safety of the place thus +allayed, Lord Methuen was able to concentrate his energies on the +construction of the temporary (or "deviation") bridge across the Riet. +He also threw up a series of redoubts on both sides of the river to +enable a small garrison to defend the bridge when the column should +resume its march on Kimberley. By dint of great exertions on the part +of the Royal engineers and the infantry employed with them, the +temporary bridge was completely finished by the 10th December. + + [Footnote 196: It was not until the 3rd December that the + signals were clearly understood, and an exchange of messages + properly established.] + + [Footnote 197: Wounded at the action of the Modder on 28th, + he left hospital on 29th, but had to return there from 2nd to + 6th December.] + +[Sidenote: Boers select their position for stopping further advance.] + +[Sidenote: Its nature.] + +After the engagement of the 28th November, Lord Methuen had reason to +believe that the Boers would make their next stand at Spytfontein, +twelve miles south of Kimberley. This was at first their intention, +but on the 29th November a Boer council of war was held at Jacobsdal, +at which two different plans of action were discussed. P. Cronje +wished to take up a flank position at Jacobsdal, so as to compel the +British troops to attack him, and thus diverge from their direct line +for Kimberley. With the Boers so placed, if Lord Methuen had marched +straight upon the town, he would have exposed himself to the danger of +being cut off from his line of supply over the Modder bridge. De la +Rey, on the other hand, desired to make one more effort to bar the +direct road, and his scheme was eventually adopted. At first the +heights of Spytfontein were chosen. Preparations for their defence +were taken in hand on the afternoon of the 29th, when Cronje and the +bulk of his force arrived from Jacobsdal. But De la Rey realised that +if the heights of Magersfontein, which lay between Spytfontein and the +river, were allowed to fall into the hands of the British, Lord +Methuen could utilise them as artillery positions for a bombardment of +the Spytfontein range. Under cover of this he would be able to deliver +an infantry attack. De la Rey suggested that the Magersfontein heights +should themselves be held as the cornerstone of the defence. His views +prevailed, and the fortification of a position nearly nine miles in +length was at once begun. The fight at Modder River had demonstrated +the advantage of placing the main firing line so that it should just +be able to graze the surface of the country over which the British had +to advance. He therefore proposed to hold the ground, now to be +occupied, in a similar manner. In the centre, Magersfontein Hill, a +grim and rock-bound kopje, rises precipitously from the veld and +dominates the plain, six miles in width, which stretches from its foot +to the Modder River bridge. From this hill the Boer line extended five +miles north-west to Langeberg farm along the foot of a series of +kopjes, in some places sufficiently well defined to be marked on map +No. 13, in others mere hillocks, but together forming a continuous and +formidable line of defence across the railway. From the south-east of +Magersfontein Hill a low scrub-covered spur, or ridge, three miles in +length, runs southward to Moss Drift on the Modder. Though not of +sufficient height to be fully shown upon the map, it exercised an +important influence upon the course of the battle. From the river the +ground rises gradually towards the heights of Magersfontein. There are +two well-marked knolls upon its surface; one, equidistant between the +kopjes and the railway bridge, was chosen by Lord Methuen to be his +Headquarters for the coming battle; the other, about a mile to the +southward of the main hill, was held by the Horse artillery battery +during the engagement. The greater part of the plain was comparatively +free from scrub, but in the neighbourhood of the low ridge the bush +was thick enough to retard the movement of the troops, and in places +it was so dense as to limit the range of vision to a few yards. Nor +was the scrub the only obstacle for the assailants--two high wire +fences crossed the plain; one, stretching away towards the north-east, +marked the frontier of the Orange Free State; while the other ran +across the trenches which guarded the centre of the Boer position. The +reproduction of the freehand sketch of Magersfontein will show the +strength of the ground taken up by the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Boers gather from all quarters. Their occupation of the +ground.] + +During the twelve days which elapsed between the engagement at the +Modder and the battle of Magersfontein large reinforcements reached +General Cronje. These additions to his army were chiefly due to the +energy of President Steyn, who ordered up every available burgher to +oppose the British advance. Parties of men summoned from the commandos +watching the Basuto border; the Bloemhof and Wolmaranstad commandos, +and detachments of Free Staters, were marched southward from the +investment of Kimberley; and the Heilbron, Kroonstad, and Bethlehem +commandos, detached from the Boer camps in Natal, increased Cronje's +righting power. Nor were the exertions of the President of the Orange +Free State confined to hurrying fresh troops to the point of immediate +danger, for realising that the _moral_ of the Boers had been shaken +by the losses they had already sustained, he went down to the laager +on the 5th December, and by his fiery eloquence infused fresh life +into the somewhat depressed burghers. By the 10th December the right +and centre of the enemy were entrenched along the line of kopjes which +runs south-east from Langeberg farm on the west to Magersfontein Hill +on the east; their left held the low scrub-covered ridge which extends +from Magersfontein Hill to Moss Drift on the Modder. Owing to the fact +that many of the Boer field-works at Magersfontein were constructed +after the battle of the 11th December, it is impossible to describe +with accuracy the defences which they had thrown up before that date. +On the right and centre these appear to have consisted of narrow +trenches, dug about 150 yards in front of the hills. They were three +or four feet in depth, and owing to the peculiar nature of the soil it +was possible to make them with perpendicular sides--mere narrow slits +in the ground which afforded complete protection from shrapnel fire. +These trenches were not in one continuous line, but were dug along the +waving foot-line of the hills, and so arranged that they flanked one +another. The parapets, slightly raised above the ground, were well +concealed by bushes and stones. On the Boers' left but little work had +been done, and the men who held this section were largely dependent on +natural cover. Cronje's dispositions were as follows: When the action +of the 11th December began, the right was held by part of the +Potchefstroom commando, who were soon afterwards ordered to reinforce +the left wing. The works in the right centre were manned by another +detachment of the Potchefstroom and part of the Fauresmith commandos; +while further to the south-east the Ladybrand, Hoopstad, Kroonstad, +Bloemhof, and Boshof commandos defended Magersfontein Hill. The +Scandinavian corps, about sixty strong, connected the centre with the +left wing, which was posted on the low ridge running southward to the +river. The remainder of the Fauresmith and the Wolmaranstad commandos +held the northern end of this low ridge, the centre of which was +occupied by those of the Potchefstroomers who were transferred from +the right wing. The south end was defended by the men of Lichtenburg, +while across the Modder river near Brown's Drift was posted a +detachment of 200 Jacobsdalers with a gun, under Albrecht. On the +right the supervision was entrusted to A. Cronje, on the left to De la +Rey, while the supreme command was vested in Piet Cronje. As regards +the Boer numbers there is the usual conflict of evidence. A Boer +general says that there were from 5,000 to 6,000 burghers present; an +ambulance officer reckons them in all at 7,000; while two commandants +estimate them at 4,000. The Boers had five field guns, distributed +along their line; two pom-poms were posted on Magersfontein Hill; +while three more pom-poms were allotted to the defence of the low +ridge. + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's reinforcements and detachments.] + +By the 10th December all the reinforcements expected by Lord Methuen +had gradually reached the Modder River camp. These consisted of the +2nd battalion Black Watch and the 2nd battalion Seaforth Highlanders, +who, together with the 1st battalion Highland Light Infantry[198] and +the 1st battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, composed the +Highland brigade, commanded by Major-General Wauchope. The 12th +Lancers, G. battery R.H.A., the 65th (Howitzer) battery R.F.A., and +some details of mounted infantry, also joined the relieving column. +Drafts of sailors and marines raised the strength of the Naval +brigade, now under command of Captain Bearcroft, R.N., to 375 officers +and men, with one 4.7-in. gun, and four 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. The +latest arrival, that of the 1st battalion Gordon Highlanders, placed +under Lord Methuen's command a total of about 15,000 officers and men. +The lines of communication with Orange River were held by the 2nd +battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 2nd battalion +Shropshire Light Infantry, and part of the 1st battalion Royal Munster +Fusiliers, strengthened at various points by sections of P. battery +R.H.A. The Royal Canadian regiment of infantry garrisoned Belmont, and +a mixed force of Australians, consisting of a detachment of Victorian +Mounted Rifles, and infantry companies from Victoria and South +Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia, occupied Enslin. + + [Footnote 198: This battalion reached the Modder battlefield + on the evening of the 28th November.] + +[Sidenote: Minor engagements.] + +During the halt on the Modder river small affairs had been of daily +occurrence. The patrols had frequently come into collision with the +enemy. On the 7th December, Prinsloo, the Free State Commandant-General, +with about a thousand Boers and three guns had attacked Enslin station, +which at that time (prior to the arrival of the Australians) was held by +Captain H. C. Godley, with two companies of the Northamptonshire. +Prinsloo did not press home the assault, and when the 12th Lancers and +the 62nd battery arrived from the camp on the Modder, followed by an +armoured train carrying the Seaforth Highlanders, he withdrew to +Jacobsdal. Some damage was done by the enemy to the railway and +telegraph lines, but this was quickly made good. + +[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's information Dec. 10th.] + +When Lord Methuen, on the 10th December, issued orders for an advance, +the information which he had been able to obtain from a reconnaissance +by Major G. E. Benson, D.A.A.G., and from the reports of scouts, +patrols, and strong reconnoitring parties, showed that the enemy's +main line of defence ran along the foot of the hills stretching from +Langeberg farm to Magersfontein Hill. It was known that the Boers had +outposts on the low ridge, that they held Moss Drift, that they had +detachments to the south of the river, and that near Langeberg farm +and Brown's Drift were laagers of considerable extent. The General +estimated the numbers opposed to him at 12,000 to 15,000 men, with six +or eight guns. + +[Sidenote: Plans proposed and rejected.] + +Various projects for the further movement upon Kimberley had been +weighed and found wanting. A purely frontal attack upon the kopjes +between Langeberg and Magersfontein Hill involved the crossing of a +wide extent of open and level ground, with the danger of a +counter-attack by the enemy from the low ridge held by the left wing +of Cronje's army. To the west of Langeberg farm the country was so +waterless as to preclude any attempt in that direction. A flank march +up the Modder river to Brown's Drift, and thence to Abon's Dam, about +16 miles N.E. of Jacobsdal, seemed feasible, for the British column +would turn the works of Magersfontein and then fall upon the eastern +flank of Spytfontein, the northern of the two lines of heights which +lay athwart the railway between the Modder and Kimberley. But before +the relieving column could thus swing clear of Magersfontein and +strike off thirteen or fourteen miles to the eastward through a +country cut up by wire fences, the consequent exposure of Modder River +camp, with all its accumulation of stores and its newly-restored +railway bridge, had to be taken into account. Lord Methuen considered +its safety, and that of the line of communication along the railway to +the nearest post at Honey Nest Kloof, essential to his enterprise. Now +the adequate defence of the station and this section of the railway +required a far larger detachment than he could spare from his division +engaged in making a flank march and an attack on Spytfontein. The idea +of assaulting the left flank of the Boers was discussed, but +abandoned, because it was thought that the bush-covered ground would +diminish the effect of the artillery and cause an undue loss of life +among the infantry. Therefore, it was finally decided to carry the +heights of Magersfontein, and after their occupation and entrenchment +to make a turning movement against the left flank of the Spytfontein +range. The tactics of Belmont were to be repeated. After a vigorous +bombardment of the hill of Magersfontein in the late afternoon of the +10th, the Highland brigade was to march at night to its foot, and at +dawn on the 11th attack this, the key of Cronje's position. + +[Sidenote: The plan finally chosen for Dec. 10th night attack.] + +Lord Methuen's orders, which are textually quoted at the end of the +chapter, may be thus summarised. A preliminary bombardment of the main +Boer position was fixed for the afternoon of the 10th; and to +facilitate this a column, consisting of the 9th Lancers, mounted +infantry, G. Battery R.H.A., the 18th, 62nd and 75th Field batteries, +the 65th (Howitzer) battery, the Highland brigade, and the 2nd +Yorkshire Light Infantry, was to move forward from the Modder river +towards the southern end of Magersfontein Hill. The main body of +infantry was to halt behind Headquarter Hill, while the 2nd Yorkshire +Light Infantry was to proceed to Voetpads (or Bridle) Drift, and +entrench there against attack from all sides. The cavalry and mounted +infantry were to cover the advance on a line from the railway to the +river. After the reconnaissance they were to retire to the right of +the Highland brigade, protect it, and leave a party to watch the outer +flank of the artillery. Major-General Pole-Carew, with two battalions +of the 9th brigade (1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd +battalion Northampton), was to move with the 4.7-in. Naval gun, which +from a position west of the railway was to co-operate with the +artillery engaged in the bombardment. Major Rimington, with his +Guides, was to guard the left of this column. On the following morning +(the 11th December) fire was to be re-opened, care being taken that +the guns were not directed against Magersfontein Hill, the point at +which the Highland brigade was to break into the enemy's line. The +camp on the Modder river was to be garrisoned by the half-battalion of +the North Lancashire regiment, by details, and by the greater part of +the Naval brigade, whose four 12-pr. guns were mounted in the works on +the south side of the river. The supply column, with five days' +rations, under the escort of half the Gordon Highlanders, was to move +off at 4 a.m. on the 11th December, and to follow the route taken by +the Highland brigade for two miles. Major-General Colvile, with the +12th Lancers, the 7th company Royal engineers, the Guards' brigade, +with its Bearer company, the Field Hospitals of the Guards' and +Highland brigades, and the ammunition column, by 3 a.m. on the 11th +was to be 500 yards to the left rear of the ground to be occupied by +the brigade division of Field artillery, _i.e._, somewhat in rear of +Headquarter Hill. + +[Sidenote: Wauchope with Methuen, Dec. 9th.] + +On Saturday afternoon, December 9th, Major-General Wauchope had a +conversation with Lord Methuen in the hotel which was used for +Headquarters. When he came out he said to Colonel Douglas, Lord +Methuen's Chief Staff Officer: "I do not like the idea of this night +march." Colonel Douglas urged him to see Lord Methuen again and +frankly tell him so. He, however, did not go back again to Lord +Methuen. The written orders for the march were received at General +Wauchope's quarters at 7 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 10th. Later +in the day, Major-General Wauchope assembled the officers commanding +the four battalions of his brigade, and explained to them the manner +in which he proposed to carry out his mission. The brigade was to form +a mass of quarter-columns, the battalions marching in the following +order. The Black Watch was to lead, with the Seaforth and the Argyll +and Sutherland Highlanders following in succession. The Highland Light +Infantry was to close up the rear. The deployment from mass for attack +was to be to the left. The Seaforth would thus be on the left of the +Black Watch, the Argyll and Sutherland on the left of the Seaforth. +The Highland Light Infantry was to remain in reserve. + +[Sidenote: Wauchope issues his orders.] + +[Sidenote: Bombardment of Dec. 10th.] + +[Sidenote: Metheun sees Wauchope again.] + +Late in the afternoon of the 10th December, the preliminary +bombardment took place. The 4.7-in. gun came into action to the west +of the railway, near the Ganger's Hut, two miles and a half north of +Modder River bridge. The Howitzers went to a point near Headquarter +Hill, the three field batteries took up a position somewhat more +forward and to the east. As the artillery was brought into action the +infantry was withdrawn, and the guns shelled Magersfontein Hill for +two hours. At 6.30 p.m. Lord Methuen ordered the fire to cease. Soon +after the bombardment was over he visited General Wauchope at his +quarters. Shortly afterwards he told Colonel Douglas that General +Wauchope thoroughly understood his orders and appeared to be quite +satisfied with the work he had to do. Though his guns had provoked no +reply from the Boers, Lord Methuen felt confident that they had not +only inflicted loss, but had produced considerable moral effect on the +Boer commandos. This, however, was not the case. The fire had but one +important result, that of warning the enemy that an attack was +imminent. + + +ORDERS FOR ATTACK ON MAGERSFONTEIN RIDGE. + +1. Enemy in occupation of kopjes to N. and N.E. of camp and also high +ground between Modder and Riet rivers. + +2. It is intention of G.O.C. to hold enemy on north, and to deliver an +attack on southern end of Magersfontein ridge (see map). On the +afternoon of 10th December the position will be bombarded; it will be +assaulted on the 11th. With this end in view three columns will be +formed. + +[Sidenote: No. 1 Column.] + +3. No. 1 Column will assemble on ground N.E. of 9th brigade camp at 3 +p.m. on 10th December in following formation:-- + + 9th Lancers. + Mounted Infantry. + G. Battery R.H.A. + Brigade Division R.F.A. and Howitzer Battery. + Highland Brigade (in mass). + Bearer Company, Highland Brigade. + 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry. + Sec. T.B., R.E. + Balloon Sec. R.E. + +The C.R.A. will arrange for a portion of the ammunition column to +accompany this force. + +4. The advance will be directed on the southern end of Magersfontein +ridge. + +5. At 3 p.m. the R.H.A., cavalry and mounted infantry will advance +covering the front from railway to Modder river; the mounted infantry +forming escort to R.H.A. After the reconnaissance the cavalry will +withdraw to the right flank of Highland brigade and protect that +flank, leaving a party to watch the left of artillery. + +6. At 3.10 p.m. the remainder of the column will advance on the +southern end of Magersfontein ridge, keeping well under shelter of +Outpost ridge (concealed from view of enemy) in following order: + +Advance Guard--half-battalion; followed at 2.30 p.m. by +half-battalion, R.F.A., remainder of force (except 2nd Yorkshire L.I.) +in the order of parade. + +7. The R.F.A. will, when within range, open fire on the ridge, +applying to G.O.C. Highland brigade for an escort. + +8. The remainder of column will form up concealed to right rear of +artillery in action. + +9. The 2nd Yorkshire L.I. will proceed from place of assembly along +the northern bank of Modder river (under guidance of Rimington's +Guides) to Bridle Drift[199] four miles up river, where they will +entrench themselves against attack from all sides--especially from +north-east to south.--Entrenching tools to be carried. Signal +communication to be established (if possible) with Highland brigade, +and with Modder River camp. + + [Footnote 199: This was another name for Voetpads Drift; the + latter name is used on map No. 13.] + +10. The Sec. T.B., R.E., will lay a field cable from 9th brigade camp +to Highland brigade as they proceed. + +11. G.O.C. will receive reports at head of main body of Highland +brigade. + +12. Half rations for 11th December will be carried in haversacks; and +half forage for animals on them. These rations and forage not to be +consumed before 11th. + +13. One blanket per man will be carried (rolled by dismounted troops). +Great coats will not be taken, but will be stored in tents or brigade +stores, under charge of details left behind. + +14. Tents will not be struck. + +15. All horses will be watered immediately before starting. + +[Sidenote: No. 2 Column.] + +16. On the 10th December No. 2 Column, under the command of +Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., composed of 1 battalion, 9th brigade, +Naval brigade (with 4.7-in. gun), and Rimington's Guides, will +assemble at such hour and place as may be fixed by him, so that the +column will be in position at 4 p.m. to co-operate with No. 1 Column, +making a diversion against Magersfontein ridge (along the railway). + +This force will remain in position on the night of 10th, and will +recommence the bombardment on the morning of 11th; but the fire is _on +no account to be directed on the southern end of the ridge which the +infantry will be assaulting_. + +[Sidenote: No. 3 Column.] + +17. No. 3 Column, under command of Major-General Sir H. Colvile, +K.C.M.G., C.B., composed as under, will assemble on the same ground as +No. 1 Column at such hour as the commander will direct, so as to +enable the column to reach 500 yards to the left rear of the R.F.A. +brigade division position (of No. 1 Column) by 3 a.m. on the 11th +December, where the commander will report to an officer of the +Divisional Headquarter Staff sent to meet the column. A Staff Officer +of No. 3 Column will accompany No. 1 Column to ascertain the position +of artillery brigade division. + +The orders regarding great coats, blankets, and tents (paragraphs 13 +and 14) for No. 1 Column will apply to No. 3 Column. + +No. 3 Column will consist of 12th Lancers, No. 7 Field Company R.E., +Guards' brigade, Bearer Company Guards' brigade, Field Hospitals +Guards' and Highland brigades and divisional troops, ammunition +column. + +[Sidenote: Supply column.] + +18. The Supply Column (with five days' rations), escorted by half +Gordon Highlanders, will assemble at the place of assembly of Nos. 1 +and 3 Columns at 4 a.m. on the 11th December, and will follow the +route taken by No. 1 Column for two miles, and await orders. + +[Sidenote: General.] + +19. The Divisional Signalling Officer will arrange for signalling +communication being kept up between Nos. 1 and 2 Columns on the 10th +December. + +20. Outposts protecting Modder River camp will be taken over by 9th +Brigade at 8 a.m. on 10th December. + +21. No light is to be lit or smoking allowed from 7 p.m. on 10th to 4 +a.m. on 11th. + +22. During the absence of the Lieut.-General Commanding, the command +at Modder River will, after departure of No. 3 Column, devolve on +Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., details of Nos. 1 and 3 Columns being +attached to 9th brigade. + +23. Arrangements will be made by G.O.C. Cavalry brigade for the care +of all horses belonging to Nos. 1 and 3 Columns left at Modder River. +Horses and men of Divisional Headquarter Staff left behind will be +attached to 9th brigade. + +24. If any of these orders are not understood, a Staff Officer should +attend at Divisional Headquarters. + +By Order, + C. W. DOUGLAS, Col., C.S.O. + +Modder River, 10th December, 1899. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. + +THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONSTEIN.[200] + + [Footnote 200: See maps Nos. 13, 13(a), 13(b) and free hand + sketch.] + + +[Sidenote: The 1st Division takes up assigned places, Dec. 10th, for +night march.] + +The preliminary movements for the attack on Magersfontein Hill, the +orders for which are given at the end of the last chapter, were duly +executed. Major-General Wauchope's brigade spent the first part of the +night of the 10th December bivouacked near the dam behind Headquarter +Hill. Close to the Highlanders lay the artillery, the 9th Lancers, the +detachment of New South Wales Lancers, the Balloon section, R.E., and +the mounted infantry. The covering outposts were furnished by the +mounted infantry and the Seaforth Highlanders. The brigade of Guards +in the evening crossed the Modder and halted on its northern bank, +while the 12th Lancers remained south of the river until midnight, +when, though originally directed to accompany the brigade of Guards, +they joined the 9th Lancers at their bivouac in accordance with a +later order. + +[Sidenote: Highland Brigade starts 12.30 a.m. Dec. 11th.] + +The night was of a darkness such as might be felt. A drizzle in the +afternoon had been succeeded by pouring rain, and a thunderstorm was +imminent before the start was made. The ground between the bivouac and +Magersfontein Hill was known to be obstructed by boulders, ant-heaps, +and patches of bush. These various conditions strengthened +Major-General Wauchope in his conviction that for the Highland brigade +to advance in any but the most compact formation was impossible. At +12.30 a.m. he therefore marched from his bivouac in mass of +quarter-columns--or in other words in a column of thirty[201] +companies, one behind the other. To minimise the chances of loss of +connection during the night, the ranks were closed up as densely as +possible, and each soldier was ordered to grasp the clothing of his +neighbour. As an additional precaution, the left guides (_i.e._, the +non-commissioned officers on the left of each company) held ropes +which ran from front to rear of the mass. At the head of the column +was Major-General Wauchope with part of his staff, all afoot. The +mounted officers' horses were led by grooms in rear. Major Benson, +D.A.A.G., during his reconnaissances of the enemy's position, had +taken the compass bearing of Magersfontein Hill, and to him was +assigned the duty of guiding the troops to the foot of this kopje, +towards which the march was made. On the directing flank, the +brigade-major, Lt.-Colonel J. S. Ewart, continually passed up and +down, having the names of the officers repeated to him in an +undertone, so that he might identify the several companies, and see +that they were not losing close touch. + + [Footnote 201: The two companies of Seaforth Highlanders, who + had been on outpost, did not accompany their battalion, but + worked their way to the front later in the day.] + +[Sidenote: The Highland Brigade night march.] + +To maintain regularity in the march occasional short halts were +necessary; but at 2 a.m. there was a more serious check. The +torrential rain had clogged Major Benson's compass, and he became +uncertain whether the column had not trended away towards the left. +Major-General Wauchope sent back for Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart. After a +brief consultation, a slight change of direction to the right was +made. In daylight and on a level parade ground this is a very simple +matter; but in darkness and during a South African tempest, it was by +no means easy. The inclination to the right was given to the column. +The advance was resumed. Nothing else occurred seriously to retard +progress until, just as the top of Magersfontein Hill was first made +visible by the lightning, a growth of mimosa bush brought the brigade +to a standstill. Major-General Wauchope, had already decided to +deploy. To hasten this, he himself led the Black Watch in single file +through the bush, and desired Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart to guide the +remainder of the brigade round the obstruction. The three battalions +in rear, easily avoiding the small patch of thorny shrubs, rejoined +more quickly than had been expected, and soon fell into their proper +places. When the brigade-major reported their arrival, Major-General +Wauchope issued instructions for deployment on the Black Watch, but +not in the same order of battalions as he had laid down on the +previous day.[202] The Seaforth Highlanders were now to come up on the +left, the Argyll and Sutherland on the right, of the battalion of +formation. Major-General Wauchope had originally intended that both +the Seaforth and the Argyll and Sutherland should prolong the left of +the Black Watch, each having two companies in the firing line, two in +support and four in reserve. According to this design the twelve +reserve companies were to have been formed in two ranks, and were to +have occupied approximately the same space from flank to flank as that +covered by the six companies in the firing line. The Highland Light +Infantry was intended to act as the reserve to the brigade. The +presumption is that he changed his plan at the last moment, in the +hope of ensuring that his right should completely overlap the eastern +flank of Magersfontein Hill. + + [Footnote 202: See p. 312.] + +[Sidenote: 4 a.m. the Boers smite the brigade in the act of deploying. +The consequent rush forward.] + +At about 4 a.m., almost before the officers commanding battalions had +issued executive orders for the deployment, a well-sustained fire from +the Boer trenches a few hundred yards away, at the foot of +Magersfontein Hill, was suddenly poured into the serried ranks of the +Highlanders. The brigade was thus assailed at a most inopportune +moment, when in the act of changing from mass of quarter-columns into +fighting formation, a manoeuvre which under the most favourable +circumstances always requires time. To carry it out under the close +range of magazine rifles was impossible. By a common impulse, such +officers and men as were able to extricate themselves from the mass +rushed towards the enemy. In the confusion caused by the unexpected +bullets, and by the partial disintegration of the column, due to the +onward dash, battalions became intermixed, and regular formation, +though not discipline, was lost. Though the dull grey of early dawn +nearly put a stop to all supervision, though the Major-General, while +leading the two foremost companies of the Black Watch,[203] was almost +instantly shot dead, and no one knew who was present to assume the +chief command--the crowd pushed forward. A mixed body of soldiers from +various battalions succeeded in making their way to within 200 or 300 +yards of the enemy. Then, unable to advance further, they flung +themselves on the ground behind such scanty cover as there was, and +opened fire. In the centre of the group were many of the Black Watch. +Lieutenant-Colonel G. L. J. Goff, who commanded the Argyll and +Sutherland, was killed, but his officers and men came up, some on the +left, some on the right. Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Hughes-Hallett, in +accordance with his instructions, brought the greater portion of the +Seaforth towards the right. Such was, broadly speaking, the character +of the movement, though all were greatly intermixed. The result was +that Magersfontein Hill, originally assigned as the object to be +assailed, had now an irregular line of Highlanders in the plain at its +foot, lapping round its eastern extremity and spreading somewhat to +the west of it. Those of the Highland Light Infantry who had not +joined the men in front, extended as a reserve in rear. + + [Footnote 203: These companies of this, the leading battalion + of the brigade, had actually deployed when the Boers opened + fire.] + +[Sidenote: The course of The Highlanders' attempt on Magersfontein +Hill.] + +The Scandinavians, posted on the level ground at the junction of the +Boer left and centre, had, from the first, enfiladed the British +troops. When some of the Highlanders came round the foot of the hill +the opposing forces were at close quarters. The Scandinavian commando, +resisting bravely, was destroyed by mixed detachments as they pressed +onwards. Having thus succeeded in getting round the key of the whole +position, Magersfontein Hill itself, these composite parties several +times attempted to storm it. Some ninety or a hundred of the Black +Watch, under Captain W. Macfarlan, made some progress up its steep +slopes. A body composed of Seaforth and Black Watch, perhaps a hundred +in all, under Lieut. R. S. Wilson, was also struggling upwards, as was +Lieutenant E. Cox, with another party of the Seaforth. It was now +daylight, and the British artillery, knowing that the Highland brigade +had sustained a check, and unaware that their comrades were on the +kopje, scourged the Boer position with shrapnel. Some of the shells +burst over the assailants. Though, owing to this mischance, the rest +of the stormers could not advance further, the men under Lieutenant +Wilson, probably less exposed to the guns, pressed onwards till they +were unfortunately taken in flank. Cronje, who had been sleeping at a +farm six miles from the centre of his line, was aroused by the sound +of battle, and galloping to the hill, chanced to arrive at this +moment. The rifles of his escort suddenly smiting Wilson's men from an +unexpected direction at short range, checked them and possibly changed +the issue of the day. At the same time Boers from the northern end of +their left wing, who had hurried up to fill the gap caused by the +destruction of the Scandinavians, between the low ridge and the hill, +opened upon Wilson's detachment from the rear. Thus assailed from two +quarters at once, the attack withered away and all fell back. Some +were captured; the remainder made good their retreat to the right of +the brigade. The Boers, following up this success, pressed the right +wing of the most advanced Highlanders in flank, and gradually drove it +back.[204] The brigade came to a halt, and, although the greater part +of the Highland Light Infantry was brought up on the right by +Lt.-Colonel H. R. Kelham, no further progress could be made. The front +line was now dissolved into groups of men, who lay grimly under the +storm of bullets poured upon them by the well-concealed riflemen four +or five hundred yards away. Then followed from time to time a series +of gallant but spasmodic efforts by successive detachments, who +attempted to storm as opportunity offered. Senior regimental officers +led some of these; subalterns rushed forward with others, but all were +equally unsuccessful. As soon as they moved they were fully exposed to +a hail of lead, and after a short rush were arrested under close fire +by the wire fence which ran across the central defences. Not a few as +they attempted to struggle through it were caught by their clothes and +accoutrements, and held there, targets for the defenders. The burghers +who manned the trenches, though greatly harassed by the artillery, +were therefore still able to hold their own against the troops who +faced them, and the attack was brought to a complete standstill. For +many hours this situation continued. The wearied soldiers remained, +fasting and without water, exposed to the blazing sun of a South +African midsummer's day and pinned to the ground by an unseen enemy. + + [Footnote 204: An officer in the Highland brigade who took + the time fixes the hour of this retirement at about 8 a.m.] + +[Sidenote: The artillery saves the brigade, and with other corps, the +division.] + +The accurate and well sustained shooting of the artillery now saved +the brigade from destruction. The resolute action of the cavalry and +mounted infantry, of the brigade of Guards, and of the Yorkshire Light +Infantry on the right, prevented the reverse from becoming a disaster +for the whole division. The Naval 4.7-in. gun, under Captain +Bearcroft, R.N., with two officers and 80 men, occupied the same +ground as during the bombardment of the 10th, the ground, namely, on +the west of the railway near the Ganger's Hut. To its right front was +the Howitzer battery, while the three field batteries came into action +to the north-east of Headquarter Hill, at a range of 2,000 yards. +Their first target was Magersfontein Hill, on which they opened about +4.50 a.m., as soon as they could see to lay their guns, but the +officers, soon realising that the Boers were holding, not the kopje +itself, but trenches cut at its foot, reduced their range to 1,700 +yards, with the result that the volume of the enemy's fire sensibly +decreased. Half an hour later the officer commanding the artillery, +Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, pushed the 18th battery to within 1,400 yards +of the entrenchments, and shortly afterwards supported it with the +62nd battery. There these two batteries continued in action for the +rest of the day and, thanks to a slight swell in the ground in front +of the guns and to a favourable background, with exceedingly small +loss. The 75th, which had been supporting the bombardment of the +trenches by the other two batteries, was despatched between 9 and 10 +a.m. to reinforce G. battery Royal Horse artillery, whose movements +will now be recorded. + +[Sidenote: Babington's mounted column on the east.] + +Shortly before 4 a.m. Major-General J. M. Babington led the 12th +Lancers, with G. battery and the greater part of the mounted infantry, +to the eastward, hoping to turn the enemy's left flank. In a few +minutes the sudden roar from the trenches warned him that fighting had +begun, and soon afterwards his patrols were shot at from the low ridge +which stretches from Magersfontein Hill to the Modder. He accordingly +ordered G. battery to shell this ridge from the ground shown on the +map, No. 13. In twenty minutes, the defenders had been at least +temporarily silenced. About the time that G. battery opened +Major-General Babington sent the 9th Lancers also eastwards, with +instructions to force their way along the river to Brown's Drift and +thus turn the enemy's left. Very early in the morning they reached +Moss Drift, but their repeated efforts to advance further up the +Modder were beaten back by musketry. While G. battery was employed +against the low ridge, it became evident to Major-General Babington +that the Highlanders not only had failed to carry the Magersfontein +heights, but that they required instant reinforcement. He accordingly +desired Major R. Bannatine-Allason, the battery commander, to move +north-east over the scrubby ground, and not to come into action until +he was stopped by the bullets or could get a clear view of what was +going on at the front. The battery, with an escort of 12th Lancers and +mounted infantry, advanced at a trot, and its commander, having +obtained information from scattered Highlanders, pushed on towards the +low knoll called on the map Horse Artillery Hill, the name by which it +became known during the battle. Whilst the wire fence[205] which ran +sixty or seventy yards to the south of Horse Artillery Hill was being +cut to clear the way the battery came under infantry fire.[206] The +commander, on reconnoitring the knoll in preparation for the battery, +decided to run the guns up by hand and place them on the reverse +slope.[207] Having taken up this situation he was able to continue in +action there for twenty-four hours with the loss of only four men. The +selected spot was 2,200 yards from the Boer trenches at the foot of +Magersfontein Hill, and 1,400 yards from the low ridge, which was a +few feet higher than Horse Artillery Hill. In consequence of the +position being on the reverse slope there was, between the hill on +which the guns were, and the low ridge, "dead ground." That is to say, +that no shells from the battery could reach the space which lay +nearest in the valley below. Therefore, on the one hand, this could be +safely occupied by protecting troops, and on the other, unless some +were there, the Boers could almost without risk have assailed the +battery and perhaps have carried it by surprise. Before Major +Allason's arrival there were on this dead ground many of the Highland +brigade. Very soon after G. battery opened fire these men were +reinforced by part of two dismounted squadrons of the 12th Lancers +under Lieut.-Colonel the Earl of Airlie, who passed between the guns, +and by parties of mounted infantry who came up on the right under +Major P. W. A. A. Milton. During the early hours of the morning, Major +Allason distributed his shells over the trenches at the foot of +Magersfontein Hill and along the low ridge down to the river; but on +the arrival of the 75th battery R.F.A. on his left, the target was +divided. From that time, the 75th ranged upon the Magersfontein +trenches and the northern end of the low ridge, while the Horse +artillery battery kept down the musketry from its centre and south. + + [Footnote 205: The fence which runs north-west from Moss + Drift.] + + [Footnote 206: See map No. 13(a).] + + [Footnote 207: See Footnote at the end of the chapter.] + +[Sidenote: The night-march of the Guards and their entry into the +fight.] + +At 1 a.m. the brigade of Guards fell in and moved towards its +rendezvous, near the previous bivouac of the Highland brigade; the two +battalions of the Coldstream were followed by the Grenadiers and the +Scots Guards. Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the storm, +and difficulties similar to those experienced by Major-General +Wauchope's brigade, connection was not maintained in the rear half of +the column. The battalion of Scots Guards, in consequence of some +confusion during the march, which they attribute to the fact that two +companies of the regiment in front of them had lost connection, became +detached from the column, and therefore halted till dawn. The two +companies in question went on to the place ordered, but the Scots +Guards marched to Headquarters, where they were detailed to act as +escort to the Howitzers and Field artillery, and did not rejoin their +brigade until the 12th. The three other battalions pushed on to the +rendezvous which they reached about half an hour before the Boers +opened on the Highlanders. After Lord Methuen had realised that the +attack had failed, he ordered Major-General Colvile to occupy the +often mentioned low ridge, but to avoid committing himself to a +decisive engagement. Keeping the Grenadiers as a general reserve, +Major-General Colvile directed the two battalions of Coldstream, the +1st on the right, the 2nd on the left, towards Horse Artillery Hill. +The 2nd battalion moved in echelon from the right with four half +companies in the firing line, four half companies in support, and four +companies in reserve. The 1st battalion was in much the same +formation, but being on the immediately exposed flank, took the +precaution of posting two companies in echelon on the right rear. As +the brigade approached the low ridge it was seen that the 1st +battalion was in danger of being enfiladed. The direction was +accordingly changed to the right; and, as the new line of advance +would necessarily carry the brigade to the south of Horse Artillery +Hill and therefore connection with the Highland brigade would not be +established, unless special provision for it were made, Major H. G. D. +Shute was ordered to move half his company of the 2nd Coldstream to +the left, to keep touch with Major-General Wauchope's right. This +half-company reached Horse Artillery Hill, and passing the battery, +pushed forward against the ridge about the same time as Major Milton +with his mounted infantry and the dismounted 12th Lancers entered the +dead ground in front of the guns. At about 6 a.m. Major-General +Colvile was ordered to reinforce the right of the Highland brigade, +and accordingly sent forward the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream. +Several hours later he also sent two companies of the 1st battalion to +strengthen this part of the line. Lt.-Colonel the Hon. A. H. +Henniker-Major, who commanded the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream +Guards, received urgent appeals for help from the dismounted Lancers +and mounted infantry, then hotly engaged at very short range with the +enemy, who were hidden behind the bush and boulders on the northern +end of the low ridge. In order to enable them to retain this ground, +so important because of the protection its possession by infantry +afforded to the two batteries on the hill behind it, he was compelled +to send almost half of his battalion to their assistance. Later in the +day the 12th Lancers and M.I. were withdrawn. From that time onwards, +the portion of the 2nd Coldstream occupied the place hitherto held by +these mounted troops, and remained there until the next morning; the +rest of the 2nd Coldstream was more to the right, and like the 1st +battalion, which prolonged the line towards the river, was engaged +against the enemy's left wing until nightfall. During the course of +the day two companies of the Grenadiers were sent up to reinforce the +firing line, and to connect the 1st and 2nd battalions of the +Coldstream.[208] Many of the Guards, the dismounted cavalry, and the +mounted infantry, were fighting all day at exceedingly short range. In +some cases barely 100 yards separated the skirmishers from the Boer +riflemen, but Major-General Colvile had not sufficient strength to +push home a decisive attack upon the ridge, even had his instructions +not forbidden him to do so. + + [Footnote 208: See map No. 13 (a).] + +[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Barter and Major Little at Voetpads, Moss Drift +and elsewhere.] + +The right bank of the Modder was guarded by the King's Own Yorkshire +Light Infantry. Early in the morning their commanding officer, +Lt.-Colonel C. St. L. Barter, whilst holding the works he had thrown +up at Voetpads Drift, ascertained that a commando was passing along +the left bank down stream towards Moss Drift, thereby threatening to +turn the right of the Guards' brigade. Though the letter of his orders +limited him to the defence of Voetpads Drift, he, on his own +responsibility, marched up the river with five companies towards Moss +Drift.[209] Owing to the severity of the Boer fire, the K.O.Y.L.I. +failed to reach this ford; yet their presence not only frustrated the +outflanking movement, but checked an intended demonstration on the +left bank, and set free two of the three squadrons of the 9th Lancers, +who, unable to make headway on horseback, had been fighting +dismounted. Major M. O. Little, who was thus released for more +suitable service, left one squadron to connect the K.O.Y.L.I. with the +right of the 1st Coldstream, and led the remainder of his regiment to +the neighbourhood of Horse Artillery Hill, where they remained until +ordered back to support the extreme right flank. + + [Footnote 209: See map No. 13 (a).] + +[Sidenote: Fresh troops available up to 7 a.m. Dec. 11th.] + +[Sidenote: Pole-Carew's dispositions.] + +[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Downman leads half of Gordons to support Highland +brigade.] + +[Sidenote: He is joined by Lt.-Col. Macbean and three more companies.] + +Though the early failure of the attack had compelled Lord Methuen to +throw the Guards, his reserve, into the fight almost from its +beginning, a considerable number of his troops had not been engaged up +to 7 a.m. Major-General R. Pole-Carew, to whom had been entrusted the +double duty of guarding the camp and, without seriously committing +himself, of demonstrating along the railway line, had disposed of his +men in the following manner. The Headquarters of his brigade (the +9th), with the Northumberland Fusiliers and three companies of the 2nd +Northamptonshire regiment, were near the railway. The other five +companies of the Northampton remained in the camp, which was further +protected to the north-west by outposts of the half-battalion of the +Loyal North Lancashire regiment. Two companies of Royal Munster +Fusiliers guarded the armoured train. Besides these, three companies +of the Royal engineers and about 240 of the Naval brigade with four +12-pounder 12-cwt. Naval guns were available to man the works if +necessity should arise. Close to Headquarter Hill six companies of the +Scots Guards lay in rear of the field guns as their escort. A wing of +the Gordon Highlanders, under Lt.-Colonel G. T. F. Downman, detached +by Lord Methuen's orders from the original duty assigned to the +battalion, that of convoying the transport of the division, was also +at hand. On his arrival at Headquarter Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel +Downman was ordered to march this half-battalion towards the extreme +eastern point of Magersfontein Hill and to despatch a message to +Lieutenant-Colonel F. Macbean, who was in charge of the rear wing, +telling him to leave one company with the convoy and hasten with three +companies to Headquarters.[210] When within 2,200 yards of the enemy +Lieutenant-Colonel Downman extended, and in successive waves of +skirmishers passed through various parties of the Highland brigade. In +this formation he pressed forward until the leading line of the Gordon +was within 290 paces of the Boers, when further advance became +impossible, and a halt was ordered.[211] The supporting skirmishers +also halted, and joined the groups which were nearest to them. The +movement of these reinforcements across the plain attracted the +enemy's attention and caused a recrudescence of his fire, which had +been dying down. When the three companies of the rear half-battalion +reached Headquarter Hill they were sent to report to Major-General +Babington, then at Horse Artillery Hill. Finding that he was not +required there, Lieutenant-Colonel Macbean rejoined the remainder of +his corps. + + [Footnote 210: This order was despatched to + Lieutenant-Colonel Macbean at 7.40 a.m.] + + [Footnote 211: The distance is verified by Capt. W. E. + Gordon, V.C., Gordon Highlanders, who, while in the leading + line, fell wounded at a spot which many months later he was + able to identify. Thence he paced to the Boer trench. Lt. H. + E. M. Douglas, R.A.M.C., crept forward to inject morphia into + various wounded officers and men at this very spot. He was + awarded the V.C. for this act. This decoration was given to + Capt. E. B. Towse, Gordon Highlanders, and Corporal J. Shaul, + H.L.I., for gallantry during the action.] + +[Sidenote: A grave misunderstanding takes Highlanders to rear of +guns.] + +[Sidenote: Scots Guards protect dispersed Highlanders.] + +About 1 p.m. the Boers began to outflank the right and right rear of +the Highland brigade. Colonel Hughes-Hallett, Seaforth Highlanders, +who was on this side of the line, thereupon gave orders to the men +near him, intending to throw back the flank so as to meet the +threatened attack. Colonel Downman, Gordon Highlanders, who was in the +centre, seeing what was Colonel Hughes-Hallett's intention, raised +himself to give to those in his neighbourhood the necessary directions +for its execution. He at once fell mortally wounded. The officers +strove hard to effect an orderly change of front; but their signals +were misconstrued by many of the rank and file, who began to retire. +First the right gave way; then at about 1.30 p.m. the movement became +general and, covered by a very rapid and well aimed hail of shells +from the Field artillery against the works at the foot of +Magersfontein Hill, nearly all the Highlanders who were immediately in +front of the Boers, gradually and with considerable loss, ebbed away +to the guns. The men were reformed at about 3.30 p.m. in rear of the +18th and 62nd batteries.[212] Some groups, however, perhaps altogether +amounting to two or three hundred officers and men, held on where +they were till nightfall. As soon as Lord Methuen saw the situation, +he sent forward the only formed unit that was near enough to the much +dispersed troops to cover their retirement. This was that body of six +companies of Scots Guards which had been detailed to act in support of +the Field artillery. Passing through the broken ranks they halted +about 1,500 yards from Magersfontein Hill. + + [Footnote 212: During the battle the 18th battery fired 940 + rounds, the 62nd about 1,000 rounds, the 75th, 721, G. + battery R.H.A., 1,179, and the Naval 4.7-in. 73.] + +[Sidenote: A lost battle.] + +The unfortunate incidents of the early morning had gravely compromised +Lord Methuen's battle array. The attack on the key of the enemy's +position, on the success of which his later combinations depended, had +failed. The brigade employed in it had fallen back with heavy loss, +and was for the moment not available for further employment. Of the +three battalions of Guards left to Major-General Colvile, two were +fully engaged in holding the right of the British line; the third, or +reserve battalion, could not be withdrawn from their support. +Major-General Pole-Carew's brigade was so weakened by the absence of +the K.O.Y.L.I., who were keeping the enemy back at Moss Drift, and by +the number of troops retained in the neighbourhood of the camp for its +defence, that it could not be called upon for reinforcements. To +oppose the centre of the Boer line Lord Methuen had to rely entirely +upon his guns, and on the battalion of Scots Guards which formed their +escort. The greater part of his cavalry was fighting dismounted in the +bush on his right flank, and of other infantry immediately available +he had none. Fortunately the Boers were unenterprising. After rapid +shooting at the Highlanders, while they were retreating, the hostile +musketry practically ceased, though against the right flank heavy +bursts of spasmodic energy occasionally broke out, notably at 5.30, +when for a short time it appeared as though an attack threatened +Major-General Colvile's brigade. As the afternoon wore on, it became +possible to withdraw the cavalry from their dismounted duties, and, +although the enemy suddenly opened fire with their guns and pom-poms, +these did but little damage before they were silenced by the British +artillery. Yet some shells fell among the Highland brigade during its +reorganisation behind the field batteries, and it was found necessary +to remove it to the original bivouac, which was well out of range. + +[Sidenote: Arrangements for night of Dec. 11th.] + +At nightfall the 75th battery was transferred from Horse Artillery +Hill to the left of the 18th battery. The guns of the brigade +division, and of G. battery R.H.A., which was left on Horse Artillery +Hill, were kept ready for instant action all night. The Scots Guards +established outposts within 1,100 yards of Magersfontein Hill, and the +2nd Coldstream continued to hold the ground they had gained during the +day's fighting. The mounted troops were withdrawn to the river, and +such of the Guards' brigade as were not on outpost bivouacked on the +field. + +[Sidenote: The part of 9th brigade and use of the balloon on Dec. +11th.] + +The 9th brigade were unable to play any important part in the battle. +Major-General Pole-Carew, hampered by the necessity of leaving a +considerable body of men to guard the camp, could only demonstrate +along the railway in small force. This feint caused Cronje no anxiety, +and did not prevent him from withdrawing many of the Potchefstroom +commando from his right to strengthen his left during the action. The +officer in charge of the balloon, despite a strong wind which impeded +his operations, observed and reported this movement. He also informed +Lord Methuen of the gradual trickling back of the Highlanders, and of +the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy from Spytfontein and the +north-east. Thanks also to the help of the balloon, the howitzer +battery obtained the range of Boer ponies, concealed behind the low +ridge, and accounted for more than 200 of them. + +[Sidenote: British and Boer losses.] + +The British casualties amounted in all to 22 officers and 188 other +ranks killed, 46 officers and 629 other ranks wounded, and 1 officer +and 62 other ranks missing. Of this total the Highland brigade lost 15 +officers killed and 30 wounded, 173 other ranks killed, 529 wounded +and missing. Among the battalions engaged the Black Watch suffered +most severely: 7 officers were killed, and 11 wounded; 86 men were +killed, and 199 wounded. The Boers are believed to have lost 87 killed +and 188 wounded. + +[Sidenote: Dec. 12th. Lord Methuen decides to fall back to Modder.] + +Soon after daylight on the 12th, Lord Methuen made a personal +reconnaissance. He hoped to find that, as at Modder river, the Boers +had withdrawn before dawn. His own observations confirmed reports he +had received during the night, showing that the ground was still +strongly held. Major R. N. R. Reade, his intelligence officer, +accompanied by a colonial scout named Harding, making his way across +the battlefield, had investigated the Boer trenches, and found them +occupied. A patrol from the Scots Guards had been received with many +shots from the foot of Magersfontein Hill. The General then summoned +his brigadiers and the Headquarter Staff to discuss the situation. +Major-General Colvile suggested that the troops should continue to +retain what had been gained; but Lord Methuen, agreeing with the +remainder of his subordinates who took a different view, gave orders +for a retirement to the Modder River camp at noon. He left the +execution of the operation to Major-General Colvile. + +[Sidenote: The gathering in of the wounded.] + +While the dead and wounded were being gathered in, a messenger, +bearing a flag of truce from the Boers, arrived at the outposts of the +Scots Guards to say that the British might send ambulances for those +who were lying near the foot of Magersfontein Hill. This was done, and +the Royal Army Medical Corps worked side by side with the Boer +doctors. For a moment this unofficial armistice was broken by the fire +of a gun. The officer in charge of it had not been informed of the +suspension of hostilities. A medical officer was sent with an apology, +explaining the incident, and the labour of mercy proceeded unhindered. + +[Sidenote: The retreat carried out by 4 p.m. Dec. 12th/99.] + +When the truce was over, a rearguard, composed of the cavalry brigade +and mounted infantry, G. battery R.H.A., and the 62nd Field battery, +the Guards' brigade and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was +detailed to cover the retreat. The enemy's guns, which during the +battle had been notably silent, sent a few shells after the column, +but they were soon stopped by the batteries of the rearguard, and by +the 4.7-in. gun, which fired 50 rounds during the 12th. By 4 p.m. Lord +Methuen's division, not otherwise molested, was once more collected +round Modder River station. + + * * * * * + + The successful choice of the reverse slope at Horse Artillery + Hill by Major Allason raises a point of considerable interest. + During the war of 1870 the Germans habitually preferred the slope + facing their enemy. Though as yet we have not had sufficient + details as to the action of the Japanese to enable us to draw + definite conclusions, it is practically certain that they will, + at least at first, have followed their German instructors in this + matter. Yet the two experiences, those of Magersfontein and of + the greater wars, are not really in conflict. The reason of the + selection of the forward slope during these was that when the + battles began the two opposed artilleries were engaged against + one another. The shell taking the curve of the hill was found to + produce deadly effects both upon the guns, when placed on the + reverse slopes, and on the limbers and wagons in rear. The target + for the hostile layers against those placed on the slope nearest + to them was much more difficult. Moreover, the Germans wished to + be able to depend on the arm itself for the protection of its + immediate front. For that purpose it was essential that the guns + should be able to cover with their shells all the ground that lay + before them: there must be no "dead ground." But at Magersfontein + the Boer artillery was insignificant, the rifle fire exact and + deadly. The circumstances therefore bore no analogy to one + another, and Major Allason's judgment was unquestionably right. + The infantry were not about to carry out any aggressive movement, + and could without injury to the conduct of the whole operation + occupy the "dead ground," and so render the position safe. + Furthermore, the long array of the guns of a vast army affords + very much more security for the artillery front than is given to + a solitary battery which could be approached much more easily by + skirmishers, so that some independent guardians were needed. It + would, however, be a misfortune if this example were taken as one + of general application under conditions different from those of + this particular day. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. + +SIR REDVERS BULLER IN FACE OF COLENSO.[213] + + [Footnote 213: See maps Nos. 3, 4, 15, and freehand sketch.] + + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, 25th Nov./99, to 6th Dec./99, in Natal.] + +[Sidenote: The force available for him at Frere.] + +Sir Redvers Buller reached Durban on 25th November. He was greeted by +the good news that the invaders were falling back from Mooi river, +that Lord Methuen had driven the Boers from Belmont and Graspan, and +that Generals French and Gatacre were holding their own at Naauwpoort +and Queenstown. He spent a few days at Maritzburg in inspecting this +advanced base of the Natal army, and in directing preparations for the +reception of a large number of wounded. He then pushed on to Frere, +reaching that place on 6th December. The enemy's raiding columns had +now retired across the Tugela, and by the 9th a well-equipped British +force of all three arms was concentrated at Frere. The mounted +brigade, commanded by Colonel the Earl of Dundonald, consisted of the +Royal Dragoons, 13th Hussars, Thorneycroft's and Bethune's +newly-raised regiments of mounted infantry, the South African Light +Horse, also only just enlisted and brought round from Cape Town, a +squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, detachments of the Natal +Carbineers and Natal Police, and one company of British mounted +infantry. The Naval brigade, commanded by Capt. E. P. Jones, H.M.S. +_Forte_, was composed of detachments (or landing parties) from H.M.S. +_Terrible_, _Forte_, and _Tartar_; to it were attached the Natal Naval +Volunteers; its armament consisted of two 4.7-in. and fourteen 12-pr. +12-cwt. guns. The Field artillery consisted of the 1st brigade +division (7th, 14th, and 66th batteries) under Lt.-Col. H. V. Hunt, +and the 2nd brigade division (64th and 73rd[214]) under Lt.-Col. L. +W. Parsons. The infantry formed four brigades: the 2nd brigade, under +Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard, consisting of the 2nd Royal West +Surrey, 2nd Devonshire, 2nd West Yorkshire, and 2nd East Surrey; the +4th brigade, under Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, comprising +2nd Scottish Rifles, 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Durham Light +Infantry, and 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th brigade, under Major-General +A. FitzRoy Hart, composed of 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st +Border, 1st Connaught Rangers, and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the 6th +brigade, under Major-General G. Barton, formed of the 2nd Royal +Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and +2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 17th company R.E. and A. Pontoon troop +were with the command. + + [Footnote 214: The 3rd battery of this brigade division had + not yet arrived, having been shipwrecked on its voyage out.] + +[Sidenote: Tabular statement of strength.] + +The following table shows the approximate strength of the force:-- + + Arms. Officers. Other Horses, Guns + Ranks. Riding & Naval. Naval Field Machine. + Draught. 4.7-in. 12-pr. 15-pr. + Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- -- + Naval brigade 31 297 6 2 12 -- -- + Mounted Troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2 + Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 -- + Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- -- + Infantry(4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16 + A.S. Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- -- + R.A.M. Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- -- + + Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18 + +[Sidenote: On line of communication.] + +Two battalions of regular infantry (the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers and +the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry), and three Colonial corps (the Natal +Royal Rifles, the Durban Light Infantry and the Imperial Light +Infantry), with four Naval 12-pounders, manned by detachments from +H.M.S. _Philomel_ and _Forte_, and the Natal Field battery, held the +line of communication with Durban. + +[Sidenote: Method of issuing orders.] + +Although Sir Redvers Buller had assumed personal command, it was +arranged that, in the absence of the Headquarter staff, his orders +should be issued by the divisional staff of Lieutenant-General Sir C. +F. Clery, who had hitherto been the senior officer south of the +Tugela. + +[Sidenote: Boers in the Natal region Dec. 6th-Dec. 14th.] + +In the chapter dealing with the constitution of the Boer army, it has +been pointed out that any statement of the strength of a Boer force at +a particular period is quite misleading, if regarded like a formal +"daily state" of a European force in the field. Subject to this +reservation, the aggregate strength of the original commandos, which +invaded Natal on the outbreak of war, has already been assessed at +23,500, and it has been stated that Transvaal reinforcements, +amounting to some 3,000 men, had subsequently been added; but this +increase was reduced by the departure at the end of November of three +Free State commandos to oppose Lord Methuen's advance on Kimberley. +The commandos remaining in Natal were, moreover, much weakened by the +practice of burghers returning to their farms to visit their families +without leave, and, although some Natal Dutchmen had been commandeered +to take up arms, the total Boer forces actually serving in Natal at +this period did not probably much exceed 20,000 men. A detachment of +800 was at Helpmakaar,[215] watching the Tugela Ferry and the western +frontier of Zululand, from which, throughout the middle of the month, +the Boer Intelligence department expected an attack. Another +detachment of 500 piqueted the river from the Tugela Ferry up to +Colenso. To the west four commandos were stationed near Potgieters and +Skiet's drifts, and detachments watched the intermediate crossings. +The attacks of the Ladysmith garrison on Gun Hill and Surprise Hill +and the destruction of the Waschbank bridge produced a considerable +feeling of uneasiness at Boer Headquarters soon after Sir Redvers +reached Frere. Their own official records show that there was a +reluctance to detach any more burghers than were deemed absolutely +necessary to the Tugela. Having regard to these facts, although no +exact figures can be given, it is probable that an estimate made on +13th December by General Buller's Intelligence staff, that about +6,000 to 7,000 men had been concentrated under Louis Botha in the +neighbourhood of Colenso, was not far from the mark. On the other +hand, the Boer official telegrams of that date put the number as low +as 5,000. + + [Footnote 215: Map No. 3.] + +[Sidenote: Close connection between Boer main army in Natal and +Botha.] + +Botha's detachment and the Boer main army were, however, within an +hour's ride of each other, and thus could readily render mutual +assistance, unless an attack from the south should be combined with an +exactly-timed sortie by the Ladysmith garrison. Yet the Boers had +reason to fear this combination against them. The troops under Sir +George White were still mobile, and the enterprises against Gun Hill +and Surprise Hill, in the second week of December, had shown that both +officers and men were keen to be again let slip at the enemy.[216] +Moreover, the large number of mounted men, who, though shut up in +Ladysmith, were in fact astride of the Boers' lines of communication, +both with the Transvaal and with the Free State, would be likely to +prove a serious danger in the event of Botha's defeat by Sir Redvers. + + [Footnote 216: See Volume II.] + +[Sidenote: A formidable natural fortress.] + +Nevertheless, the task which the British commander-in-chief had decided +to undertake was not an easy one. From Potgieters Drift on the west to +the junction of the Tugela with Sunday's river, about 30 miles east of +Colenso, a ridge of hills, broken only by narrow kloofs and dongas, line +like a continuous parapet the northern bank of the former river. +Westward the ridge is connected by the Brakfontein Nek with that spur of +the Drakensberg which is entitled the Tabanyama Range. This was +destined, a month later, to bar the advance of the relieving army on +that side. The eastern flank was guarded by the lower slopes of the +Biggarsberg, which run parallel to Sunday's river and fill the area +lying between that stream and the Buffalo. The approaches to the +beleaguered town from the south were thus covered by an immense natural +redoubt. Opposite to the very centre of the front face of this redoubt +lay Colenso. Behind this centre, and at right angles to the parapet, a +cluster of hills was flung back to the ridge of Caesar's Camp, +immediately to the south of Ladysmith. Through this confused mass of +broken ground, so favourable to the methods of fighting of its +defenders, ran the three roads which connect Colenso and Ladysmith. Of +these roads the western passed over three very strong and presumably +entrenched positions. The central had become by disuse impassable.[217] +Much of the eastern was only fit for ox-wagons. Along the face of this +strategic fort ran the Tugela, an admirable moat, as completely +commanded by the heights on its left bank as is the ditch of a permanent +work by its parapet. West of Colenso this moat was traversable by guns +and wagons at only five places, _i.e._, Robinson's, Munger's, Skiet's, +Maritz, and Potgieters drifts. Of these the four first named were +difficult for loaded wagons. Eastward of Colenso the only practicable +drift was that by which the Weenen road crosses the river. Other fords, +through which single horsemen or men on foot, breast-high, could wade, +existed both to the east and to the west, but with the exception of a +bridle drift near Colenso they were not marked on the maps in possession +of the troops, and could only be discovered by enquiry and +reconnaissance. + + [Footnote 217: This central road, or old track, is not shown + on maps 3 and 4, but is shown on map 15.] + +[Sidenote: Botha depends on mobility for holding his long line of +defence.] + +The commandos assigned to General Louis Botha for the defence of the +line of the Tugela were obviously insufficient to man the whole of +this immense position; yet he was able to rely on the mobility of his +burghers; and on this, also, that he was so situated that his +assailant would, in order to attack him anywhere, have to traverse +distances greater than Botha need cover to reinforce from the centre +either flank as soon as threatened. Moreover, not only did the heights +he held afford a perfect view for miles over the country to the south, +but the Tugela hills are precipitous and rocky as to their southern +faces, while the approaches to them from the north present, as a rule, +easy slopes and gentle gradients. + +[Sidenote: Difficulty of finding out where the Boers were.] + +In ascertaining the exact localities occupied by the enemy, Sir +Redvers Buller was handicapped by many circumstances. A considerable +space along the river could in the daytime only be approached by +reconnoitrers under the close view and fire of the picked riflemen of +the veld. The whole of the original Intelligence staff and the +subordinate personnel of scouts and guides, organised for the Natal +Field Force before the outbreak of the war, had been left locked up +with the troops in Ladysmith. The nucleus of a fresh Intelligence +staff had, however, been started by 2nd Lieut. A. N. Campbell, R.A., +and was subsequently taken over by Mr. T. K. Murray, C.M.G., after the +disbandment of his corps of scouts. The reports of Mr. Murray, who was +subsequently created a K.C.M.G. for his services, as well as +information sent out by runners, heliograph, and pigeon post from +Ladysmith, agreed that the main body of Botha's force was concentrated +immediately in front of Colenso. A reconnaissance, suggested by a +Ladysmith message, dated 17th November, had been conducted by Captain +H. De la P. Gough towards Potgieters drift on the 29th November, but +had failed to get touch with the enemy. Intelligence scouts had, +however, reported the Boer commandos at Potgieters and Skiet's drifts, +and it was also known that Boer patrols were watching the intermediate +crossings. It might therefore be assumed that the whole line of the +river was kept under Boer observation. + +It will be seen that the topographical conditions, though not at the +time fully known, made it impossible to turn either flank of the great +crescent of hills which barred an advance on Ladysmith. On the other +hand, it seemed probable that a sudden march, eastward or westward, +would find some passage of the river, and of the natural parapet +beyond, unentrenched and but slightly guarded. An examination of the +map, and a study of the country to the eastward, showed that a flank +movement in that direction would be compelled to follow a circuitous +route, and to traverse broken ground, covered with bush and +exceedingly favourable to ambuscade and to surprise attacks. Sir +Redvers judged that to commit troops, untrained to manoeuvre over +terrain of this description and hampered by many ox-wagons, to a +rather long flank march in presence of a mobile enemy, would be too +dangerous an enterprise. Moreover, the ground to the east was +unfavourable for any sortie from Ladysmith, and in a telegram dated +the 30th November, Sir George White had definitely reported that he +could give most help to the relieving force if it advanced via +Onderbrook Spruit (_i.e._, by the western of the two possible +Colenso-Ladysmith roads) or via Springfield and Potgieters drift. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers' view of the choice open to him.] + +Sir Redvers thought that he must either assault the strongly +entrenched position of Colenso or make a flank march to Potgieters. If +that drift and the Brakfontein Nek were seized, the way would be +opened to the rolling plain which lies westward of Ladysmith, between +that town and the Tabanyama range. This course, though it presented +difficulties of its own, was tactically by far the easier method of +attempting the task before him. On the other hand, this flank movement +would, for some days, expose the British line of communication with +the coast. + +[Sidenote: He decides to march by Potgieters, 7th Dec./99.] + +A review of all these considerations led General Buller to decide in +favour of the route via Potgieters drift, and on the 7th December he +so informed Sir George White. He told him that he hoped to start on +the 12th, and would probably take five days in bringing the operation +to a successful conclusion. Sir George, in reply, reported by +heliograph that he proposed to sally out from Ladysmith the night +before the relieving force attempted its crossing of the Tugela at +Potgieters, and to "work towards you as far as I can." He added: "As +time is an all-important factor in co-operation, you will, I am sure, +inform me of any change." On the 11th December, Sir Redvers answered +that he could not be certain of his dates till his transport arrived, +so that Sir George had better not try to help him until the relieving +force had reached Lancer's Hill,[218] a point about six or seven miles +west of Ladysmith, "unless you feel certain where I am." This limit +was imposed by General Buller, as he was unwilling that Sir G. White's +troops should be committed to a serious action against the enemy until +his own army was within supporting distance. On the 12th December Sir +Redvers moved the 6th brigade, accompanied by two 4.7-in. and six +12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns, to a camp two miles north of Chieveley, so +as to cover the flank march to the west. He sent that day a despatch +to the Secretary of State reporting that, after a careful +reconnaissance by telescope, he had come to the conclusion that "a +direct assault upon the enemy's position at Colenso would be too +costly," and that he had therefore decided to "force the passage of +Potgieters drift." + + [Footnote 218: See map No. 3.] + +[Sidenote: News of Magersfontein and Stormberg changes his purpose, +Dec. 13th.] + +Only a few hours later telegrams, reporting the serious check suffered +by Lord Methuen at Magersfontein, were placed in his hands. This +disquieting intelligence, coupled with news of the reverse at +Stormberg, in the opinion of Sir Redvers Buller, so entirely changed +the situation that he no longer considered the movement by Potgieters +advisable. "This operation," he told the Secretary of State, "involved +the complete abandonment of my communications, and in the event of +want of success, the risk that I might share the fate of Sir George +White, and be cut off from Natal. I had considered that, with the +enemy dispirited by the failure of their plans in the west, the risk +was justifiable, but I cannot think that I ought now to take such a +risk. From my point of view it will be better to lose Ladysmith +altogether than to throw open Natal to the enemy."[219] + + [Footnote 219: See despatch, Sir R. Buller to Secretary of + State for War, dated 13th December, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Informs Sir George that Dec. 17th is probable date of +attack on Colenso. Sir George prepares to sally out.] + +Accordingly, on the 13th December he heliographed to Ladysmith: "Have +been forced to change my plans; am coming through via Colenso and +Onderbrook Spruit"; and later on the same day, in reply to an enquiry +from Sir George White as to the probable date of his advance, he +informed that officer: "Actual date of attack depends upon +difficulties met with, probably 17th December." On receipt of these +messages the commander of the Ladysmith garrison, after detailing some +weak detachments to continue manning the defences, prepared the whole +of the rest of his troops for fighting their way out southward under +his personal command, at the moment of the attack on Colenso by the +relieving army. No further notification of the date of that attack +reached him until the 16th, when he was informed by the +Commander-in-Chief that he had "tried Colenso yesterday and failed." +The sound of very heavy artillery firing on the 15th was, it is true, +heard in Ladysmith, but the Colenso position had been shelled by the +Naval guns on the two previous days, and in face of Sir Redvers' +message that the actual attack would probably be made on the 17th, +there was doubt whether the firing heard on the 15th might not be +merely a continuation of the preliminary bombardment. A premature +sortie before the signal had been given might seriously hamper, or +possibly entirely frustrate, concerted action between the two forces. + +[Sidenote: Features of Colenso position.] + +Map 15 and the hand sketch show that the hills facing Colenso from the +north form a great amphitheatre, the western horn of which reaches +down to the river near E. Robinson's farm about four miles due west of +the village, the eastern horn being Hlangwhane. Immediately after +completing the loop in front of the village, in which lie the +road[220] and railway bridges, the Tugela turns sharply to the north +for two miles, and then dashes north-eastward down a series of rapids +through an abrupt gorge in the hills, ultimately resuming its course +towards the east. + + [Footnote 220: Shown on map No. 15 as the Bulwer bridge.] + +[Sidenote: Hlangwhane.] + +[Sidenote: The Colenso kopjes.] + +[Sidenote: Fort Wylie.] + +Hlangwhane, the eastern horn of that amphitheatre, which, with its +included area, formed the Boer position, lies on the southern bank of +the river; and, as soon as the occupation of Chieveley by Barton's +brigade denied the use of the Colenso bridges to the enemy, was for +the time only accessible to the Boers by two bridle drifts near the +rapids. It was not until after the Colenso fight that a bridge was +thrown across the river near its junction with the Langewacht Spruit. +The northern portion of the hollow of the amphitheatre is crossed from +west to east by the Onderbrook Spruit. To the south of this spruit +stand the Colenso kopjes, described by Sir Redvers as "four +lozenge-shaped, steep-sided, hog-backed hills, each, as it is further +from the river, being higher and longer than the next inner one."[221] +The southernmost of these kopjes, Fort Wylie, had been used as a +bridge-head by the British troops prior to their retirement from the +Tugela. The Onderbrook road to Ladysmith runs north-west from the +bridge across the arena of the amphitheatre and then ascends through +the steep gorge of Grobelaar's Kloof, a defile of forbidding +appearance. The other road and railway run north, following at first +the general trend of the great bend of the Tugela, then penetrating +the mass of hills and making their way eventually into the Klip +valley. + + [Footnote 221: Sir R. Buller's despatch, dated 17th December, + 1899.] + +[Sidenote: The river as known, and unknown to the staff.] + +In this section of the Tugela, the only crossings which seem to have +been known to Sir Redvers Buller's staff, before the battle, were the +two bridges, the drifts immediately above and below that over which +the road passes, and the "Bridle Drift" four miles up stream to the +south-east of E. Robinson's farm. There were other fords which will be +mentioned later; but the river, in consequence of the difficulty of +approaching it, had not been systematically reconnoitred, nor had the +known drifts been tested, although, as elsewhere in South Africa, they +are subject to sudden variations, here dependent on the rainfall in +the Drakensberg. The Tugela is, as a rule, fordable at this season of +the year at the regular passages, and has an average breadth of some +120 to 150 yards. The banks, fringed in places with low bushes, are +near Colenso twenty feet above the summer level of water. Immediately +to the south and to the south-west of the bridges the ground runs down +to the bank in gentle glacis-like slopes, which, except where the +Doornkop Spruit and a few dongas traverse them, afford no cover to +troops advancing towards the river. East of the railway the terrain is +more broken, and the fringe of bush country is soon reached. For this +reason, but still more on account of its isolation on the south bank +of the river, Hlangwhane Hill, which looked down on the Colenso +kopjes, was tactically weak and has generally been regarded as the +true key of the whole position. Nevertheless, even if Hlangwhane and +the crossings close to Colenso had been captured, only one stage of +the task would have been accomplished. Further severe fighting would +have been necessary before the defiles and the very difficult country +to the north-west or north could have been forced. + +[Sidenote: The Boer defences.] + +[Sidenote: Their occupation.] + +[Sidenote: The story of the Boers on Hlangwhane. 1st stage.] + +The whole of the mountain redoubt had been elaborately fortified under +the personal direction of General Louis Botha. A special commission, +consisting of Generals Erasmus and Prinsloo, had been nominated by a +Krijgsraad, held on 2nd December, to supervise the defence +arrangements on the Tugela, but the commission made but one inspection +and Louis Botha was given practically a free hand. Three weeks of +incessant labour had been spent on this task, the work being continued +up to the very eve of the battle. The trenches had been constructed +with remarkable ingenuity, so as to be almost invisible from the south +bank. They ran for the most part along the lower slopes of the great +hills on the west and across the flats round which circled the +amphitheatre. The only part of these defences which caught the eye +from the far side of the river were the tiers of entrenchments +covering the Colenso kopjes, and especially Fort Wylie. Emplacements +had been constructed in many more places than there were guns +available to fill them, and, in order to ensure that the exact +positions from which shells would be actually thrown should be unknown +to the British commander, the guns were shifted from gun-pit to +gun-pit the night before the battle. The artillery at the disposal of +General Botha was far less numerous than that of his opponent. On the +day of the fight a 120 m/m howitzer was mounted on the crest of +Vertnek (or Red Hill) on the right, a field gun being posted lower +down on its south-eastern slope. Two field guns were placed in pits in +proximity to the western Ladysmith road. This group of four guns was +intended to command the crossings in, and near, the western salient +loop of the river, including the Bridle Drift, a mile to the west of +that loop. Four or five 75 m/m field guns and one or two pom-poms, +posted on the Colenso kopjes, swept the bridges and drifts in front. +The whole of these guns were under the command of Captain Pretorius, +Transvaal Staats Artillerie. General Botha had placed his riflemen as +follows:--on his right, which extended to the west of H. Robinson's +farm, was stationed the Winburg commando of Free Staters under van der +Merwe, supported by detachments of Ben Viljoen's Johannesburgers, and +of the Middelburg commando; east of these, men of the Zoutpansberg, +Swaziland, and Ermelo commandos, under the orders of Christian Botha, +continued the line to the head of the western loop of the Tugela, +where a donga enters the river on its left bank. The eastern face of +this loop was also manned by portions of the Ermelo, Standerton, and +Middelburg corps. The ground intervening between the two re-entrants +was considered to be sufficiently protected by the unfordable river in +its front, save that a small detachment was posted in the building +shown as "Barn" on map No. 15, thus acting as a connecting link. The +centre, facing the Colenso crossings, was very strongly held. Here lay +the Boksburg and Heidelberg commandos, the Johannesburg Police, and +the burghers of Vryheid and Krugersdorp districts, the two last-named +units being placed in the trenches along the flats immediately in +front of Fort Wylie. Neither on the centre nor on the right were there +any men posted to the south of the river. The story of the successive +changes in the garrison of the eastern extremity of the crescent of +hills, across the river on the left of the Boer position, is a curious +one, and shows forcibly how much the element of chance at times +influences the operations of war. From the 30th November to the 13th +December, Hlangwhane, which was known to the Boers as "the Boschkop," +had been occupied by part of the Wakkerstroom commando under a +commandant named Dirksen. A Boer deserter informed Sir Redvers' Field +Intelligence department on the 9th December that the strength of this +detachment was then about 700; but the real numbers were not more than +400 to 500. The arrival of Barton's brigade at Chieveley intimidated +the commando, and on the night of the 13th the burghers, against +Dirksen's orders, withdrew across the river. Botha at first acquiesced +in this abandonment, but Dirksen himself telegraphed to Kruger what +had happened. "If we give this Kop over to the enemy," he added, "then +will the battle expected at Colenso end in disaster." + +[Sidenote: 2nd stage.] + +The acting commandant-general, Schalk Burger, supported Dirksen's +appeal,[222] and, as a result, a Krijgsraad was held the same evening, +at which, with the concurrence of General Botha, it was unanimously +resolved that Hlangwhane should be re-occupied. A fresh garrison about +800 strong, chosen by lot from the Middelburg, Ermelo, Standerton, +Wakkerstroom and Zoutpansberg commandos, was therefore placed under +the orders of Commandant J. J. Joubert, and moved to the hill during +the night of the 14th. The burghers, on whom this duty fell, accepted +it with much reluctance as they feared that they would be cut off from +their main body. In a Boer official telegram dispatched during the +battle of the 15th, Hlangwhane was referred to as "the dangerous +position." + + [Footnote 222: A telegram despatched by Schalk Burger to + Botha on 14th December directed that "Under no circumstances + must Dirksen's position be abandoned.... If this position be + abandoned, all others are endangered." President Kruger + telegraphed the same day to Botha, through Burger: "The Kop + on the other side of the river must not be given up, for then + all hope is over.... Fear not the enemy, but trust in God."] + +[Sidenote: The Boers hide themselves and reserve their fire.] + +The details of the Boers' line of battle would have been difficult to +discover even by the fullest reconnaissance and by the best trained +Intelligence department. General Louis Botha was so sanguine of +success that he had even proposed at a Krijgsraad, on 9th December, +that a detachment of burghers should be sent again across the river to +entice the British troops to advance against the prepared positions; +but the Council held that this device was unnecessary, as the British +commander was "bound to attack, and it was thought better to await the +attack." The Boer commander so fully realised the advantage of +reserved fire, that, giving effect to a telegram from General Piet +Joubert,[223] he had issued stringent orders to ensure that his men +indulged in no casual shots. He made no reply whatever to a heavy +bombardment maintained by the British Naval guns during the 13th and +14th December, intended to compel him to disclose his dispositions. +The same system of silence was to be adopted when the real attack was +delivered. Not a shot was to be fired against the British advance +until he himself had given the signal by firing the great howitzer. He +even hoped to be able to allow portions of the attacking columns to +cross the river, and there to overwhelm them utterly by well-sustained +fire at close range. The use of the Naval guns on the 13th and 14th +and the accumulation at Chieveley, had convinced General Botha that a +frontal attack was about to be made. Although his burghers were +anxious, and even inclined to be despondent, Botha himself hoped not +only to repulse the British troops, but also to envelop them with +counter-attacks, from Hlangwhane on the east and the Wagon Drift on +the west. + + [Footnote 223: 7.12.99. Telegram despatched by + Commandant-General P. Joubert to Assistant-General Botha:-- + + "I cannot neglect to reiterate pointing out to you and + begging you to insist sternly with the officers and men + against wild firing at long and almost impossible + distances. Our greatest good fortune in the Freedom war + was the immediate nearness (of positions), so that the + smoke from the two forces made one cloud through which + our men were better enabled to defeat the enemy. It was + always my endeavour as long as the enemy blustered with + his guns to conceal my men as much as possible and to + strengthen them in their positions till the enemy's guns + were tired and they then advanced and attacked us; then + and not before, when they were between their own guns + and our men, the burghers sprang forwards and shot them + away by batches. Now our burghers with their rapid-fire + rifles begin to shoot at so great a distance, and it is + much to be feared that in a fierce fight lasting a whole + day, they fire away all their ammunition to no purpose + without hurting the enemy, and the enemy is then able to + make use of lance and sword after exhausting their + ammunition. Warn your men thus and work against this + error. You must also take good thought for your reserve + ammunition, and its position and the way it can be + brought up to firing line. You know yourself how often + we have already captured the English ammunition mules; + do not let the same take place with ours. Now secondly, + I am certain Buller will not operate against you with + his whole force at once; he will place supports in his + rear and again and again bring up fresh men. His cavalry + will wait as far as possible, to make their attack from + the rear, or to try to move round to our rear. So be on + your guard. Place your supports so that at such times + new forces can advance; let some one be just on some + high and visible place so as to send support in time to + the spot where it is required. It is bitter to lie here + on my back and think and advise from such a distance, + but God's Will be done, just in Heaven as on Earth. Best + wishes."] + +[Sidenote: The army, in full view of the Boers, gathers for the fray.] + +The advance of Barton's brigade on the 12th had been unopposed, and +during the two following days the remainder of the Natal army was +moved up to the north-west of Chieveley, and collected in a large camp +on the western side of the railway, near Doornkop Spruit. It was, of +course, impossible to conceal this movement from the Boer commander on +the heights north of the river. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, Dec. 14th, issues his orders for attack.] + +On the afternoon of the 14th Sir Redvers Buller, who had spent the +earlier part of that day in examining the enemy's positions through a +telescope, assembled his subordinate commanders and their staffs, to +communicate, and personally explain to them his instructions for the +operations of the following day. His plan was to try to force the +passage of the river by direct attack. The written orders signed by +the Assistant Adjutant-General of the 2nd division were not issued +until late in the evening, and did not reach the Brigadiers until +about midnight. They will be found at the end of this chapter. The +first paragraph of these orders appears to imply that the enemy's +entrenchments were limited to the Colenso kopjes; at any rate, it is +clear that the extent and strength of the Boer entrenchments westward +were not then known. These kopjes were selected as the object of the +main attack, and this duty was assigned to the 2nd brigade +(Hildyard's). The crossing of this brigade "by the iron bridge," that +is, the Bulwer bridge, was to be prepared by the fire of No. 1 brigade +division Royal Field artillery, less one field battery which was +replaced by six Naval guns. This artillery preparation was to be +assisted by the fire of the remaining Naval guns, two 4.7-in. and four +12-pounders,[224] and by that of the 2nd brigade division, which was +instructed to "take up a position whence it can enfilade the kopjes +north of the iron bridge." This latter artillery unit was also to "act +on any orders it receives from Major-General Hart." + + [Footnote 224: Two Naval 12-prs. had been left at Frere; the + remaining two 12-prs. were placed on Shooter's Hill, at a + distance of about 6,000 yards from the bridge.] + +[Sidenote: Orders for Hart.] + +To Major-General Hart's brigade (the 5th) had been assigned a special +role; it was ordered to cross the river at the "Bridle Drift, +immediately west of the junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela," +and subsequently to move down the left bank of the river towards the +Colenso kopjes. The Commander-in-Chief hoped that this supplementary +crossing would be accomplished before the central attack was +delivered, and that the 5th brigade would thus be able to render +substantial assistance in the assault on the bridge; even if General +Hart did not succeed in passing his battalions across the river, Sir +Redvers anticipated that he would, in any case, be able at least to +cover the left flank of the main attack by engaging the enemy on the +western side.[225] + + [Footnote 225: See despatch to the War Office, dated 17th + December, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Orders for right flank.] + +[Sidenote: and for watching left flank.] + +The right flank of the main attack was to be guarded by the 6th +brigade (Barton's), less half a battalion on baggage guard duty, and +the mounted brigade. Lord Dundonald, who was in command of the latter +unit (the total effective strength of which was about 1,800), was +instructed to detail 500 men to watch the right flank of the enemy, +and 300 to cover Buller's right flank and protect the baggage. With +the remainder of his brigade, and a battery detached from No. 1 +brigade division, "he will," said the order, "cover the right flank of +the general movement and will endeavour to take up a position on +Hlangwhane Hill, whence he will enfilade the kopjes north of the iron +bridge." + +[Sidenote: for 6th brigade.] + +The 6th brigade was further charged with covering the advance of No. 1 +brigade division. + +[Sidenote: for 4th brigade.] + +The 4th brigade was directed to remain in reserve midway between the +left and main attacks, ready to support either if required. + +[Sidenote: for ammunition columns, pontoons, hospitals, engineers, +bearer companies.] + +The ammunition columns and Pontoon troop were to be parked in the +first line of the baggage in rear of Shooter's Hill, behind which the +four Field Hospitals were also pitched. Two sections of the 17th +company R.E. were attached to General Hart's brigade, the remainder of +the company being allotted to General Hildyard's. The Bearer companies +marched with their brigades. + +Verbal instructions were given to general officers at the conference +that if the Colenso kopjes were carried the force would bivouac among +them on the night of the 15th. + + +ORDERS BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS CLERY, K.C.B., COMMANDING SOUTH +NATAL FIELD FORCE. + + Chieveley, + 14th December, 1899. 10 p.m. + +1. The enemy is entrenched in the kopjes north of Colenso bridge. One +large camp is reported to be near the Ladysmith road, about five miles +north-west of Colenso. Another large camp is reported in the hills +which lie north of the Tugela in a northerly direction from Hlangwhane +Hill. + +2. It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to force the +passage of the Tugela to-morrow. + +3. The 5th brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30 +a.m., and march towards the Bridle Drift, immediately west of the +junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The brigade will cross at +this point, and after crossing move along the left bank of the river +towards the kopjes north of the iron bridge. + +4. The 2nd brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4 +a.m., and passing south of the present camping ground of No. 1 and No. +2 Divisional troops, will march in the direction of the iron bridge at +Colenso. The brigade will cross at this point and gain possession of +the kopjes north of the iron bridge. + +5. The 4th brigade will advance at 4.30 a.m., to a point between +Bridle Drift and the railway, so that it can support either the 5th or +the 2nd brigade. + +6. The 6th brigade (less a half-battalion escort to baggage) will move +at 4 a.m., east of the railway in the direction of Hlangwhane Hill to +a position where it can protect the right flank of the 2nd brigade, +and, if necessary, support it or the mounted troops referred to later +as moving towards Hlangwhane Hill. + +7. The Officer Commanding mounted brigade will move at 4 a.m., with a +force of 1,000 men and one battery of No. 1 brigade division in the +direction of Hlangwhane Hill; he will cover the right flank of the +general movement, and will endeavour to take up a position on +Hlangwhane Hill, whence he will enfilade the kopjes north of the iron +bridge. + +The Officer Commanding mounted troops will also detail two forces of +300 and 500 men to cover the right and left flanks respectively and +protect the baggage. + +8. The 2nd brigade division, Royal Field artillery, will move at 4.30 +a.m., following the 4th brigade, and will take up a position whence it +can enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge. This brigade +division will act on any orders it receives from Major-General Hart. + +The six Naval guns (two 4.7-in. and four 12-pr.) now in position north +of the 4th brigade, will advance on the right of the 2nd brigade +division, Royal Field artillery. + +No. 1 brigade division, Royal Field artillery (less one battery +detached with mounted brigade), will move at 3.30 a.m., east of the +railway and proceed under cover of the 6th brigade to a point from +which it can prepare the crossing for the 2nd brigade. + +The six Naval guns now encamped with No. 2 Divisional troops will +accompany and act with this brigade division. + +9. As soon as the troops mentioned in preceding paragraphs have moved +to their positions, the remaining units and the baggage will be parked +in deep formation, facing north, in five separate lines, in rear of +to-day's artillery position, the right of each line resting on the +railway, but leaving a space of 100 yards between the railway and the +right flank of the line. + +In first line (counting from the right):-- + + Ammunition column, No. 1 Divisional troops. + 6th brigade Field Hospital. + 4th brigade Field Hospital. + Pontoon troop, Royal Engineers. + 5th brigade Field Hospital. + 2nd brigade Field Hospital. + Ammunition column, No. 2 Divisional troops. + +In second line (counting from the right):-- + + Baggage of 6th brigade. + Baggage of 4th brigade. + Baggage of 5th brigade. + Baggage of 2nd brigade. + +In third line (counting from the right):-- + + Baggage of mounted brigade. + Baggage of No. 1 Divisional troops. + Baggage of No. 2 Divisional troops. + +In the fourth and fifth lines (counting from the right):-- + +Supply columns, in the same order as the Baggage columns in second and +third lines. + +Lieut.-Colonel J. Reeves, Royal Irish Fusiliers, will command the +whole of the above details. + +10. The position of the General Officer Commanding will be near the +4.7-in. guns. + +The Commander Royal Engineers will send two sections 17th company, +Royal Engineers, with the 5th brigade, and one section and +Headquarters with the 2nd brigade. + +11. Each infantry soldier will carry 150 rounds on his person, the +ammunition now carried in the ox wagons of regimental transport being +distributed. Infantry greatcoats will be carried in two ox wagons of +regimental transport, if Brigadiers so wish; other stores will not be +placed in these wagons. + +12. The General Officer Commanding 6th brigade will detail a +half-battalion as Baggage Guard. The two Naval guns now in position +immediately south of Divisional Headquarter camp will move at 5 a.m., +to the position now occupied by the 4.7-in. guns. + +BY ORDER, + + B. HAMILTON, Colonel, + Assistant Adjutant-General, + South Natal Field Force. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. + +COLENSO, DECEMBER 15th, 1899.[226] + + [Footnote 226: See maps Nos. 15 and 15(a), and freehand + sketch.] + + +[Sidenote: The move begins. Power of the Naval guns.] + +In the cool of the early morning of December 15th, 1899, while it was +yet dark,[227] the British troops were set in motion. The day was to +prove intensely hot, a sign, at this period of the Natal summer, of +the approaching rains. Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., commanding the Naval +brigade, moved with two 4.7-in. and four 12-pounder guns to a site +pointed out to him personally by Sir Redvers on the previous day, to +the west of the railway and about 4,500 yards from Fort Wylie. From +thence, at 5.20 a.m. he began to shell the kopjes on the far side of +the river. For more than half an hour no reply was made and, even when +the Boers opened fire, no guns appear to have been directed on Captain +Jones' six pieces until about 7 a.m. These Naval guns with their +escort, a company of the 2nd Scottish Rifles, remained on the same +spot until the close of the action, suffering no loss. Their +telescopes made it easy to see, their long range and powerful shells +to silence, guns unseen by others. + + [Footnote 227: Sunrise at Colenso on 15th December is at 5 + a.m.] + +[Sidenote: The march of the 14th and 66th batteries and six Naval +12-pounders.] + +[Sidenote: and 6th brigade.] + +[Sidenote: Dundonald and 7th battery.] + +[Sidenote: 2nd and 4th brigades.] + +Meanwhile the larger units had begun to carry out their orders. The +14th and 66th Field batteries of No. 1 brigade division, under command +of Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, and six Naval 12-pounders, under the command +of Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, R.N., moved across the railway line at +3.30 a.m., accompanied by the officer commanding the whole of the +Royal Artillery then in Natal, Colonel C. J. Long, who had been +directed by General Buller personally to supervise the movements of +these batteries. East of the railway these guns joined the 6th brigade +and advanced at 4 a.m. with that unit, northward. Lord Dundonald's +brigade moved also at 4 a.m., accompanied by the 7th Field battery. +The 2nd brigade, at the same hour, left camp and marched towards +Colenso, followed at 4.30 a.m. by the 4th brigade. + +[Sidenote: 5th brigade. 2nd brigade division.] + +The 5th brigade moved off at the same time. Lieut.-Colonel Parsons, +commanding No. 2 brigade division, although directed by the written +operation orders to follow the 4th brigade (Lyttelton) in order to +enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge, had received verbal +instructions from Sir R. Buller through Colonel Long that at least one +of his batteries was to cross the river with Hart's brigade. He +accordingly marched with his guns on the right rear of the 5th +brigade. + +[Sidenote: Hart's instructions, guide, and map.] + +Major-General Hart had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir +guide, and a colonist as interpreter to assist him in finding "the +Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the Doornkop Spruit +and the Tugela," by which he was to cross the river. This map was a +plane-table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the +action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land +registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen +from a distance. Unfortunately it had not been verified by any close +reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders +were misleading. A Bridle Drift, used by natives in the dry season of +the winter but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on +that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the +order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at +the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the +north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed, +moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the spruit, and +placed, also immediately to the west of the Drift, another loop of the +river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a +short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop, +near 2 on map No. 15. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the +eastern, not the western bend of the loop. The Bridle Drift lies, not +near to the western bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward. +Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the +westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map, and in +the written orders was further enhanced by another serious +misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous +evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to +cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it. +Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been +given wrong instructions, for he conceived that he was intended to +lead the column, not to the Bridle Drift, but to a point (marked 4 on +map No. 15) close to his own kraal, at the head of and inside the +loop, where, owing to the existence of rapids, the river was fordable, +breast-high, by men on foot. The practicability of this drift had been +personally verified by the native on the two previous nights, but no +staff officer had accompanied him. Another similar foot-ford might +have been found at point 6 immediately below the junction of the +Doornkop Spruit with the Tugela, but the existence of neither of these +fords was known to Major-General Hart or to the Headquarter +staff.[228] + + [Footnote 228: General Buller's telegram to the War Office, + dated 15th December, 1899, states: "There are two fordable + places in the Tugela ... they are about two miles apart ... + General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard + the right."] + +[Sidenote: The march of Hart's (5th) brigade.] + +The 5th brigade marched from its parade ground in mass of +quarter-columns, the battalions being arranged in the following +order:-- + + 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commanded by Col. C. D. Cooper. + 1st Connaught Rangers, commanded by Col. L. G. Brooke. + 1st Border regiment, commanded by Col. J. H. E. Hinde. + 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, commanded by Lt.-Col. T. M. G. + Thackeray. + +Half of the 17th Company, R.E., under the command of Major H. H. +Massy, followed in rear. A squadron of the Royal Dragoons acted as +advance guard as far as Doornkop Spruit, where the cavalry moved off +to the left. + +[Sidenote: Hart's intention.] + +The Brigadier had informed the commanding officers on the previous +evening that he intended the leading battalion to line the right bank +of the Tugela, while the remainder crossed. After passing, the brigade +was to move eastward, and attempt to close the enemy into the Colenso +loop of the river. + +[Sidenote: Hart plunges into the loop.] + +[Sidenote: The Boer artillery opens fire, shortly after 6 a.m.] + +[Sidenote: Unseen riflemen enfilade the attack.] + +Hart, following the directions of the Kaffir guide, led his brigade in +a north-westerly direction to the first drift over the Doornkop +Spruit,[229] and thence northward, the formation of the leading +battalion being now changed to an advance in fours from the right of +companies at deploying interval, the three rear battalions continuing +in mass of quarter-columns. A few cavalry scouts preceded the brigade: +the main body of the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel J. F. +Burn-Murdoch, watched the left flank, his officers' patrols moving +down to the river's bank, without provoking any fire. Colonel +Burn-Murdoch despatched three successive gallopers to inform General +Hart that these patrols reported the enemy in force on his front and +left. General Hart replied that he intended to cross by the drift in +front of him, and would ignore the enemy on his left, unless they +attacked in strength. The column, therefore, continued to move +steadily on the point, near to the western bend of the loop, where the +sketch had placed the Bridle Drift. But, as the brigade was crossing a +newly-ploughed mealie-field, within 300 yards of the entrance of the +loop, the Brigadier riding at its head perceived that the map was +misleading, and on enquiry, the Kaffir guide pointed up the loop, and +stated, through the interpreter, that it was in that direction that +the ford lay. Almost simultaneously a Boer gun opened on the column +from the underfeature below Grobelaar Mountain, and its shell, passing +over the whole depth of the brigade, burst behind the rear battalion. +A second shell, passing over the heads of the Dublin Fusiliers, fell +in front of the Connaught Rangers. A third almost immediately followed +and knocked over nine men of that battalion. These, the first shots +from the Boer side, were fired by their artillery, in disobedience to +the orders of Louis Botha, who had not given the signal, and hoped to +entice the attack to closer range. The time was now a little after 6 +a.m. The Dublin Fusiliers immediately front-formed and extended to the +right; the battalions in rear were deployed to the left in single rank +in quick time, and were subsequently opened out with from two to three +paces interval, the enemy meanwhile continuing to shell them with +shrapnel. The ground on the far side of the river presented a +formidable appearance to these troops while deploying. It rose rapidly +from the left bank to a line of hills, which, towards their crest, +seemed steep, rugged, and inaccessible. After Hart had deployed, his +brigade moved on the same point by rushes, the right half-battalions +being directed on the gorge of the loop, while the left +half-battalions overlapped this gorge, and were cramped by the bank on +their western flank. As the brigade came near the river it was +subjected to a very heavy fire from the long Boer trench to the north, +occupied by the Standerton commando. The battalions were also +enfiladed from trenches on the right and left. At the time it was only +possible to guess from the course of the bullets where these shelter +trenches were. The left half-battalions temporarily obtained a certain +amount of cover from the bank of the river. The right half-battalions, +when a little further on, gained for the moment some shelter from a +long, narrow underfeature, towards the centre of the loop. With the +exception of the 1st Border regiment, which was on the extreme left, +the units rapidly intermingled. This mixture of commands was soon +increased when the left half-battalions of the Dublin Fusiliers and +Connaught Rangers, followed by two companies of the Border regiment, +came up. They had been ordered to cross the donga, near 2 on map No. +15, and move eastward in succession in support of those in front. The +passage to the flank in file of these half-battalions was carried out +under a severe and accurate cross musketry fire, while the Boer guns +continued to make excellent practice with shrapnel on the extended +British lines. + + [Footnote 229: It is noteworthy that Major-General Hart is + emphatic in asserting that "he did not cross the Doornkop + Spruit." It will be understood from the explanation given in + the text that he did not cross what was marked for him on the + map as the spruit. The map was wrong. He crossed the spruit + shown as "Doornkop Spruit" on map 15.] + +[Sidenote: The guide disappears.] + +As the Kaffir guide had disappeared, the actual position of the ford +was unknown. Major C. R. R. McGrigor, King's Royal Rifle Corps, +General Hart's brigade-major, had ridden up the river in search of the +Bridle Drift, and, finding a spot where there appeared to be a ford, +entered the river on foot, but was soon out of his depth, and was +compelled to swim back to the right bank. + +[Sidenote: Hart's brigade struggles forward up the loop.] + +Meanwhile parties of the Connaught Rangers, the Dublin, and +Inniskilling, Fusiliers, had worked their way up the loop by a series +of rushes in extended order at about three to four paces interval, +suffering heavy loss. Each group followed the nearest officer, +irrespective of his corps, of its own volition, and worked forward, as +it were, automatically, the rushes, however, varying in length, +sometimes carrying the men through the group in front, sometimes not +reaching it. There was very little shooting, as nothing could be seen +to aim at. The enemy's fire was too heavy to allow of any combined +command of the movement. Nevertheless, there was little or no +confusion, and the advance continued with the steady progress of an +incoming tide. Eventually a detachment of the Dublin Fusiliers, under +Lieut. T. B. Ely, and Major M. G. Moore's company of the Connaught, +mingled with men of other regiments, reached the kraal, about two +hundred yards from the head of the loop; others of the Inniskilling, +and Dublin, Fusiliers and of the Connaught Rangers pushed on to the +river bank; there these handfuls of men remained for several hours, +little more than one hundred yards from the Boer trenches on the far +bank, but in face of the storm of bullets it was impossible to cross +the river, nor were either officers or men aware that they were near a +ford. The rest of the brigade, except the left half-battalion of the +Inniskilling Fusiliers and one or two companies of the Border regiment +who lined the river bank west of the loop, were on, or in rear of, the +knoll, the cohesion of units being now almost entirely lost. The +artillery and rifle fire, concentrated on the British troops from the +far bank, was too continuous and accurate to permit of any further +advance being attempted for the moment. The shrapnel of the two field +guns, posted in emplacements on the lower ridge to the north-west, was +particularly effective, and the Boer riflemen did not disclose whence +their deadly shots came. Volleys were fired from time to time by the +British infantry, but comparatively little ammunition was expended. +Yet, notwithstanding these trying conditions, the men clung on +steadfastly, each group being well under the control of the officer +nearest to them, whether of their own corps or of another.[230] +Meantime, Parsons' batteries, the 64th and 73rd, had come into action +on the right bank of the Doornkop Spruit, and were busily engaged in +shelling a kraal immediately in front of the loop, and in endeavouring +to silence the Boer guns. These somewhat outranged the Field +artillery, and an attempt to cross over the spruit so as to come into +closer action on its left bank was for the moment frustrated by a Boer +shell bursting on the team of the leading gun, killing two horses, +upsetting the gun, and thereby blocking the ford of this stream. On +this the two batteries re-opened fire from the right bank of the +spruit. + + [Footnote 230: In consequence of the heavy losses suffered by + the commissioned ranks in previous actions all the +infantry+ + officers had been ordered to discard their swords, and for + the most part carried a rifle and men's equipment.] + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers recalls Hart.] + +Sir Redvers Buller had watched from Naval Gun Hill the original +advance of the 5th brigade. As soon as he observed the movement into +the loop, he despatched a galloper to order General Hart to halt; the +messenger was caught in a bog and failed to reach his destination. A +second officer was sent, but was unable to find the Brigadier. +Finally, when the brigade had become heavily engaged, Colonel Stopford +was instructed by Sir Redvers to direct Major-General Hart to retreat, +and to inform him that his retirement would be covered by artillery +fire. Major Cooper, A.D.C. to General Clery, conveyed orders to +Lieut.-Colonel Parsons to move his guns across the spruit and divert +the fire from Hart's brigade during the withdrawal. Subsequently, +fearing a flank counter-attack on the left, General Buller directed +Major-General Lyttelton to support the 5th brigade with two battalions +of the 4th. + +[Sidenote: Barton's (6th) brigade marches.] + +[Sidenote: Col. Long's guns move off with Barton, then diverge.] + +Major-General Barton at 4 a.m. had moved off with the 6th brigade on +the east side of the railway in the following order: the 1st Royal +Welsh Fusiliers, with six companies in line, each company having a +sub-section in its front, and two companies in support; the +half-battalion of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in echelon of +companies on the left flank, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers in echelon of +companies on the right flank, and the half-battalion 2nd Royal Irish +Fusiliers in rear, at a distance of 1,500 yards from the leading +battalion.[231] The direction of the brigade's advance was to the +north-east, towards Hlangwhane Hill, in conformity with the operation +orders of the previous evening. + + [Footnote 231: The other half-battalion of the Royal Irish + Fusiliers, under command of Lieut.-Col. J. Reeves, was on + baggage guard. Headquarters and four companies of the 2nd + Royal Scots Fusiliers were at Frere.] + +Colonel Long's guns accompanied the brigade for some distance, the +field batteries leading, with the Naval guns, dragged by spans of +oxen, in rear. After a time, however, the respective directions +assigned by Sir R. Buller to the guns and the infantry brigade were +found to diverge, and General Barton accordingly detailed two +companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers to continue with the guns as +escort. At 5.30 a.m. the Brigadier halted his command, his leading +battalion being then about two miles from the river. + +[Sidenote: Col. Long's mission.] + +The specific task assigned to No. 1 brigade division by the operation +orders was, "to proceed to a point from which it can prepare the +crossing for the 2nd brigade." Sir Redvers Buller, at the conference +of the previous afternoon, had thought it desirable to supplement and +anticipate this written order with verbal instructions as to the exact +point at which the batteries should come into action. He had intended +to convey to Colonel Long by these verbal instructions that the +purposed preparation should be carried out at long range. But the +impression left on the subordinate officer's mind, when he left the +conference, was that medium range was meant. As he rode therefore with +Lieut.-Colonel Hunt and Lieut. Ogilvy, R.N., at the head of the field +artillery, now marching in battery column, Long was on the look out +for a suitable position at a distance of not less than 2,000 yards and +not more than 2,500 yards from Fort Wylie, the southernmost of the +kopjes which had been pointed out as the brigade division's targets. +Had a site between those limits been selected, the batteries would not +have been seriously molested by the Boer riflemen entrenched on the +far bank of the river, and could, by superior strength, have crushed +the enemy's gunners posted among the Colenso kopjes. + +[Sidenote: Long brings his guns into action, after Boer guns open on +Hart, _i.e._, about 6.15 a.m.] + +It was not until after 6 a.m. that Long arrived at the distance from +the river at which he had intended to come into action. The batteries +were still at a walk, with the Naval guns in rear, when suddenly heavy +firing was heard on the left flank. It was evident that part of the +British force was closely engaged. Anxious to afford immediate +effective support, and deceived by the light as to his actual distance +from Fort Wylie, Long ordered Hunt's brigade division to push on, and +come into action at a point about eighty yards to the north of a broad +and shallow donga, which runs at right angles to the railway and was +just in front of his guns. Ogilvy's Naval guns were to follow with the +infantry escort and to unlimber on the left of the field batteries. +The ground scouts of the brigade division had by this time reached the +bush, lining the south bank of the river, and had ascertained that +this bank was clear of the enemy. A section of the infantry escort had +also been sent forward to reconnoitre Colenso. Not a sign had been +given by the Boer guns and riflemen concentrated in front of Hunt, on +the far side, for the defence of the Colenso crossings. As soon as the +batteries approached the spot selected by the artillery commander, it +proved to be within 1,250 yards of Fort Wylie, and not much more than +1,000 yards from the Boer infantry entrenchments between that work and +the river. Then Louis Botha, fearing that their further advance would +intimidate his inexperienced burghers, gave the order to fire. +Immediately a storm of bullets and shells burst on the British guns, +both field and Naval. The Boers knew the exact range from whitewash +marks on the railway fence and adjacent stones; their fire was +therefore from the outset accurate.[232] The field batteries, led by +Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt, continued to go forward at a steady trot and +came into action at the chosen place in an excellent line. The limbers +were taken to the rear and wagons were brought up in the ordinary +manner. + + [Footnote 232: In addition to the field guns on the Colenso + kopjes, a heavy gun, north of them, was observed by the Naval + officers of Capt. Jones', R.N., battery.] + +[Sidenote: The Naval guns also come into action.] + +The two leading Naval guns, under Lieutenant James, R.N., had at this +moment just crossed the drift of a deep donga, about 400 yards behind +Hunt. The central section of the battery was still in the drift, and +the rear section on the south side. The leading section, by direction +of the battery commander, Lieutenant Ogilvy, moved a little to the +left and opened fire against Fort Wylie. The native drivers of the +ox-spans of the other four guns had bolted, and the central guns were, +for the moment, jammed with their ammunition wagons in the drift, but +eventually the oxen were cut loose, and the guns, together with those +of the rear section, brought into action on the south side of the +donga, whence they also fired on Fort Wylie. During all this delay the +enemy's artillery, and in particular a pom-pom, had maintained a +well-directed fire on the drift. + +[Sidenote: The batteries suffer severely.] + +[Sidenote: The arrival of fresh ammunition being delayed, the gun +teams are withdrawn to the donga.] + +Meanwhile, the personnel of the field batteries in the open, 400 yards +in front of Ogilvy's guns, was beginning to suffer from the accurate +shrapnel and rifle fire concentrated on them. The escort of "A." and +"B." companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, under command of Captain +D. H. A. Dick, extended on the immediate left of Long's guns up to the +railway line; four companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, under Major +C. R. Rogers, were sent in extended order by General Barton, two +companies in advance and two in support, to aid this escort. Of these, +one company halted in rear of the Royal Scots Fusiliers companies; one +company remained in the donga near Ogilvy's guns, and the other two +lay down about 300 yards to the right rear of the field guns. The +Royal Scots Fusiliers companies[233] endeavoured to subdue the enemy's +riflemen, but unsuccessfully. After a few minutes Colonel Long was +very severely wounded. A little later Lieut.-Colonel Hunt was also +wounded, and the command devolved on Major A. C. Bailward. Casualties +amongst the men, especially in the centre gun detachments, were +frequent. Nevertheless, the batteries continued to be served with +great efficiency, the guns being worked steadily by sections with +accurate elevation and fuse. Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the +enemy, the second line ammunition wagons were brought up to the guns, +and the empty wagons removed in strict conformity with regulations. +The requisition, however, for further supplies for the batteries from +the ammunition column three miles in rear was delayed by the death of +Captain A. H. Goldie, 14th battery, and by the wounding of Captain F. +A. Elton, 66th Battery. Officers and men the while, soldiers and +sailors alike, fought their guns with the utmost determination, and +with great effect. Fort Wylie became a mass of bursting shell and red +dust, and for a time the Boer guns on the kopjes some 500 yards in +rear of that work were silenced. The infantry fire of the enemy had +been also greatly reduced,[234] but after being in action for an hour +the ammunition of the British batteries began to run short, each gun +having now fired from 80 to 100 rounds. Major Bailward therefore, +after first obtaining Colonel Long's approval, decided to withdraw the +gun detachments temporarily into the donga, and keep them under cover, +pending the arrival of reinforcements of men and ammunition. + + [Footnote 233: The two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers + subsequently ran short of ammunition, but a further supply + was brought up to them under a heavy fire by Sergeant-Major + J. Shannon, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.] + + [Footnote 234: Three burghers of the Krugersdorp commando, + who were manning the trenches near the river, stated + subsequently that it would have been impossible for them to + have maintained "any sort of fire" on the infantry, if these + had advanced while the guns were in action.] + +[Sidenote: Two messengers sent to Sir Redvers.] + +The effective strength of the detachments was by this time reduced to +an average of about four men per gun.[235] The remaining men were +accordingly formed up and marched quietly to the donga at about 7.15 +a.m. All the wounded were placed under cover in small dongas, close to +the outer flanks of the batteries, but no attempt was made to disable +the guns, as the officer in command only awaited fresh supplies of men +and ammunition to open fire again. Captain G. F. Herbert, R.A., +Colonel Long's staff officer, and an Australian officer attached to +his staff, were instructed to ride at once to Sir Redvers Buller and +report the situation and the needs of the batteries. + + [Footnote 235: Exclusive of prisoners, the 66th battery's + losses throughout the day were 1 officer and 10 men killed, + and 2 officers and 30 men wounded; these casualties include + those incurred in the attempts to carry away the guns.] + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers receives various reports and leaves Naval Gun +Hill.] + +Sir Redvers had already felt some anxiety as to Long's guns, as +Colonel Stopford had already pointed out to him that they were not in +the intended position. An aide-de-camp had been despatched to +ascertain their exact situation, and, having observed the guns in +action from a distance through field-glasses, that officer had +reported that they were "all right and comfortable," but under a +certain amount of fire. Sir Redvers' anxiety as to the guns was not +relieved, and a little later he left Naval Gun Hill with the intention +of seeing himself what was going on. On his way he met the Australian +officer, who stated that the batteries, including the Naval guns, were +all out of action, their ammunition exhausted, and every officer and +man of the gun detachments killed or wounded. Shortly afterwards +Captain Herbert rode up, and was understood by General Buller to +confirm the previous report, with the exception that he estimated that +six rounds per gun were still left. It was not until the following day +that the General Commanding knew that men had been all along available +to fight the guns. He had already ordered the retirement of Hart's +brigade, but, until hearing of this fresh mishap, had still hoped to +succeed with his main attack. The operation orders had contemplated +that the fire of the whole of the Naval guns and of both brigade +divisions of Royal artillery (amounting in all to 44 guns) should be +concentrated on the Colenso kopjes, so as to pave the way for an +attack upon them. The 2nd brigade division had been diverted to assist +Hart's brigade and, conceiving from the reports now made that the 1st +brigade division and six of the Naval guns were permanently out of +action for the day, Sir Redvers immediately decided that the artillery +left to him was insufficient and that "without guns it would be +impossible to force the passage of the river."[236] He determined, +before falling back, to make an effort to save Long's guns from what +seemed to him their desperate position. + + [Footnote 236: See despatch to Secretary of State, dated 17th + December, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: He decides to withdraw from the attack. 8 a.m.] + +[Sidenote: The distribution of the troops at 8 a.m.] + +He came to this decision, which marks the crucial point of the action, +a little before 8 a.m.[237] Hart's brigade was at that moment slowly +beginning to carry out the order to retire from the western loop of +the river. Barton's brigade, save the two companies Royal Scots +Fusiliers and the half-battalion Irish Fusiliers, which had been +pushed forward to support Long's guns, had not been engaged, although, +to meet any advance of the enemy from the bush near the river on the +right front, the Brigadier had moved the Royal Welsh Fusiliers some +1,000 yards beyond the point where they had first halted. Neither the +2nd nor the 4th brigade had yet fired a shot. The former had been +halted by Major-General Hildyard a little in front of Naval Gun Hill, +with its right on the railway and its left near some kraals, awaiting +the completion of the artillery preparation. Two battalions of the 4th +brigade, the 2nd Scottish Rifles and the 3rd King's Royal Rifles, were +lying close beside Hildyard's brigade, in rear of Captain Jones' Naval +artillery. Two other battalions, 1st Rifle Brigade and 1st Durham +Light Infantry, were moving in accordance with Sir R. Buller's orders +to the left flank to cover the withdrawal of the 5th brigade; one +company, however, of the latter battalion had been left with the Naval +guns. The mounted brigade, whose proceedings will be narrated later, +was advancing against Hlangwhane Hill, but no report of their progress +had yet reached Sir Redvers Buller. + + [Footnote 237: The positions of the troops at this period of + the action are given in detail on map No. 15.] + +[Sidenote: Hildyard moves 2nd brigade forward.] + +[Sidenote: He occupies Colenso, and joins hands with Barton.] + +He himself now considered it advisable to go in person to the critical +point, and ascertain by his own inspection the true facts about the +guns. On his way to the front, he informed Major-General Hildyard that +the attack, as originally planned, was to be given up, and instructed +him to advance two of his battalions to cover the extrication of the +guns, taking care not to get involved in any engagement with the enemy +that could be avoided. The G.O.C., 2nd brigade, had already extended +his two leading battalions, the 2nd Queen's and 2nd Devon, for the +attack on the bridge, as first ordered. Both these battalions being to +the west of the railway, Hildyard directed the 2nd Devon to pass +through the Queen's and cross over to the east side of the line. The +two battalions then advanced, the 2nd Queen's on Colenso and the Devon +on Long's guns, the formation adopted being columns of half companies +at from fifty to eighty paces distance, the half companies being +deployed in single rank, with six to eight paces interval. The 2nd +East Surrey formed a second line in rear; the 2nd West Yorkshire was +in third line. In this formation, the 2nd brigade moved forward across +the open plain under a heavy fire, experiencing but slight loss. By +9.30 a.m. five companies of the Queen's, under the command of Major W. +S. Burrell, had occupied the village of Colenso. About two sections of +"C." and "G." companies of the Devon, accompanied by their battalion +commander, Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Bullock, had reached the donga +immediately in rear of Long's guns, the rest of that battalion being +echeloned in the open, further back as a support. A little later "E." +and "F." companies crossed the railway, and seized some farm +buildings, close to the road near the village. Part of these were +already occupied by the 2nd Queen's. Between Bullock's two foremost +Devon sections and Burrell's five companies lay the companies of the +Royal Scots Fusiliers, which formed the original escort to the guns, +and behind them, in support, were those two other companies of R. S. +Fusiliers which had been despatched by General Barton, when he +observed that an attempt was being made to withdraw the field guns. To +the right, and on the left rear of Bullock, four companies of Irish +Fusiliers were still extended. At this time, therefore, nearly ten +companies of infantry were in the firing line. Three companies of the +Queen's, about seven of the Devon, two of the Irish, and two of the +Scotch Fusiliers were in immediate support, and the remainder of the +2nd and 6th brigades and a battalion of the 4th brigade (the King's +Royal Rifles) were near at hand in rear. During this period of the +fight, Lieutenant R. E. Meyricke, Royal Engineers, of his own +initiative, worked down the spruit above the Bulwer bridge to the +river, and thence along its bank to the bridge, which he tested under +heavy fire, and found not to be mined. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, in zone of fire, orders Naval guns to retire.] + +After giving his orders to General Hildyard's brigade, Sir Redvers +rode forward with Lieut.-General Clery and his staff into the zone of +fire, Captain M. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C., being killed, and Sir Redvers +himself hit by a shrapnel bullet. On reaching that donga, where +Lieutenant Ogilvy's Naval guns were still in action, General Buller +ordered their retirement. Two of these guns, whose oxen had been kept +at hand, went off to join the main Naval battery under Captain Jones. +The remaining four were withdrawn out of range one by one with the +help of artillery horses, and were eventually brought back to camp by +fresh spans of oxen. This withdrawal was covered by "C." squadron of +the 13th Hussars. The casualties among Ogilvy's party during the day +only amounted to three men wounded, and twenty-eight oxen killed, +wounded or lost. + +[Sidenote: He stops despatch of ammunition to Long's guns.] + +The field guns were still in the open, beyond the further donga, under +cover of which the surviving officers and men of the brigade division +were lying, hoping for ammunition to enable them to resume the action. +Major W. Babtie, R.A.M.C., who had volunteered to go forward to the +gun line, was attending to the wounded. Captain Herbert, on his +return, after his interview with the General Commanding-in-Chief, had +again been despatched to the rear by Colonel Long to seek for +ammunition. At his request Major W. Apsley Smith, commanding No. 1 +ammunition column, ordered forward nine wagons, and to cover their +advance Captain Jones, R.N., concentrated the fire of his Naval guns +on Fort Wylie, but the wagons were stopped on their way by General +Buller. + +[Sidenote: Gallant attempts to rescue guns.] + +Sir Redvers, by the time he arrived at the Naval donga, had decided +that it was impracticable to re-man the guns of the field batteries. +Since the batteries ceased fire, Fort Wylie had been re-occupied by +the enemy, and the fire therefrom, and from the neighbouring trenches, +was so heavy that he considered that it was impossible that troops +could live in the open by the guns. He sanctioned a series of gallant +attempts being made by volunteers to withdraw them. Limber teams were +collected for this purpose, in the rear donga. The first of these +attempts was made by Captains Schofield and Congreve, both serving on +Sir Redvers' staff, Lieut. the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts (who was acting +as an extra A.D.C. to General Clery, until he could join Sir George +White's staff), Corporal Nurse and others, gathered from the drivers +of the 66th battery. Two guns were limbered up and brought back to the +rear donga under a very severe fire, but Lieutenant Roberts fell +mortally wounded, and was carried into some shelter on the left flank +by Major Babtie, R.A.M.C., Major W. G. Forster, R.F.A., and Captain +Congreve. One of the limbers which had been brought for the guns had +been reduced to a standstill by the enemy's fire. Lieutenants C. B. +Schreiber and J. B. Grylls, both of the 66th battery, accompanied by +Bombardier Knight and two gunners, thereupon made a valiant endeavour +to assist the endangered drivers. Schreiber was shot dead, and Grylls +severely wounded, but the bombardier and gunners succeeded in bringing +back two wounded men. + +[Sidenote: The last effort.] + +Later in the morning a final effort was made by Captain H. L. Reed, of +the 7th Field battery, who, with three wagon-teams, came across from +the eastern flank, but before the teams could reach the guns, Captain +Reed was wounded and his horse killed. Of his thirteen men, one was +killed and five wounded, while twelve of their horses were shot. After +this failure Sir Redvers refused to allow any more volunteering to +withdraw the guns.[238] Captain Reed, by General Buller's direction, +and with the assistance of Major F. C. Cooper, A.D.C., withdrew from +the rear donga the unwounded drivers and horses of No. 1 brigade +division, and took them back to the wagons of the 7th Field battery. +No order to retire appears to have been sent to the artillery officers +and men in the front donga. A written message--"I am ordered to +retire; fear that you cannot get away"--was sent by Lieut.-Col. E. O. +F. Hamilton, commanding 2nd Queen's, to the donga, addressed to +"O.C.R.A., or any other officer," but it did not reach an officer's +hands. + + [Footnote 238: For conspicuous gallantry displayed in the + attempt to carry away the guns, the following were awarded + the Victoria Cross: Captain W. N. Congreve, Rifle Brigade; + Captain H. L. Reed, 7th battery R.F.A.; Captain H. N. + Schofield, R.F.A.; Lieutenant the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts, + King's Royal Rifle Corps (posthumous); Corporal G. E. Nurse, + 66th battery R.F.A.; and Private C. Ravenhill, Royal Scots + Fusiliers. For devotion to the wounded under very heavy fire, + Major W. Babtie, C.M.G., Royal Army Medical Corps, also + received the Victoria Cross.] + +[Sidenote: The mounted brigade.] + +Whilst the fortunes of the day had thus been proving unfavourable to +the main attack, the mounted brigade had been endeavouring to carry +out its part in the programme. The 7th battery R.F.A., according to +orders, reported before daylight to Lord Dundonald. Lord Dundonald +detached the Royal Dragoons to watch the left flank of the general +advance, detailed Bethune's M.I. to act as baggage guard, and moved +off from his rendezvous on the west side of the railway at 4 a.m. +Crossing the line at the platelayer's cottage about 4.30 a.m., he +advanced on Hlangwhane, employing the Composite regiment[239] to +reconnoitre to the front and flanks. + + [Footnote 239: This regiment was made up of one squadron + Natal Carbineers, a detachment of Natal Police, one squadron + Imperial Light Horse, and one mounted company formed from 2nd + King's Royal Rifles and Dublin Fusiliers; Major R. L. Walter, + 7th Hussars, was on that day in command.] + +[Sidenote: The mission of the mounted brigade.] + +The Commanding Officers were informed by the Brigadier that their +mission was "to prevent the enemy working round on the right, to +occupy Hlangwhane Mountain if possible, and to assist the main attack +on Colenso by a flank fire." A little before 7 a.m., when the main +body of the brigade was still about two miles from Hlangwhane, the +scouts reported that the hill was held by the enemy. The 7th battery, +commanded by Major C. G. Henshaw, had already come into action, at +about 6 a.m., close to the right battalion of the 6th brigade, the +Royal Fusiliers, on an underfeature to the north of Advance Hill, +about 3,000 yards from Hlangwhane. The targets selected for the +battery were at first Fort Wylie and the other Colenso kopjes, the +range of the former being about 3,100 yards; but when Hlangwhane was +found to be occupied by the enemy, the fire of the right section, and +later on of another section, was directed on its south-western slopes +at a range of from 2,400 to 2,600 yards. + +[Sidenote: It tries to capture Hlangwhane but finds Boers in full +possession.] + +Meanwhile, the Brigadier had despatched the South African Light Horse, +under Lt.-Colonel the Hon. Julian Byng, to demonstrate against the +southern slope of the hill, and had directed Thorneycroft's and the +Composite regiment to work round by the Gomba Spruit, and to endeavour +to push through the dense thorn-bush up the eastern face. The 13th +Hussars were held in reserve close to Advance Hill. Deducting the +horse-holders, the force thus launched for the attack of Hlangwhane +was somewhat less in strength than the commando defending it; the +Boers were holding entrenched and well-concealed positions on the +lower southern slopes of the hill, with their left flank prolonged for +a considerable distance to the eastward. Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's +men gained ground to the north-east for about a mile, under cover of +the spruit, and then moved through the bush northwards until they came +in contact with the enemy at a distance of about 300 yards from the +base of the hill. The two leading companies of Thorneycroft's corps +still tried to push on, but they were stopped by finding that they +were outflanked by Boers occupying the ridge to the eastward. The +advance of the South African Light Horse against the southern spur of +the hill was also checked. It was now about 7.40 a.m. + +[Sidenote: Dundonald asks for infantry support, but does not get it.] + +On receiving Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's report that he could make +no further progress, and that the enemy was outflanking him, Lord +Dundonald sent "A." squadron of the 13th Hussars towards Green Hill to +strengthen his right flank, and asked Major-General Barton to support +his attack on Hlangwhane with some infantry. General Barton was unable +to comply with this request. The Royal Fusiliers were at this moment +his last reserve, and having regard to his instructions, the G.O.C., +6th brigade, did not feel justified, without the specific sanction of +General Buller, in committing this battalion to what appeared to him a +doubtful enterprise on intricate ground. + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers decides that Hlangwhane would be useless +without Colenso.] + +[Sidenote: The decision 11 a.m. to abandon the guns and return to +camp.] + +On receipt of this reply, Lord Dundonald directed his troops to hold +on to the positions they were occupying, and reported the situation to +the General Commanding-in-Chief, who now (about 10 a.m.) had left the +donga and ridden over to the mission station at the cross roads +between Advance Hill and Hussar Hill. There he received Lord +Dundonald's and General Barton's reports; the former was of the +opinion that, with the help of one or two battalions, he could carry +Hlangwhane, while the latter considered that his whole brigade, +including the eight companies now in the firing line by Long's guns, +would be needed if the hill was to be taken. Sir Redvers decided that +the occupation of Hlangwhane would be useless unless he had first +forced the passage of the Tugela at Colenso, and of this he had +already relinquished all hope. He therefore ordered the Commander of +the mounted brigade to keep his men well in hand, and not to allow +them to become too closely engaged in the bush. As regards the 6th +brigade, General Buller considered the Royal Fusiliers already too far +forward on the right flank, and ordered that the battalion should be +drawn in. Five companies of the battalion were accordingly moved to +the south; the other three companies remained with the commanding +officer, Lt.-Colonel C. G. Donald, in support of Thorneycroft, and +were advanced to a point half a mile in front of the position of the +7th battery. General Buller now went back to the donga, and thence +watched Captain Reed's effort to save Long's guns. After its failure, +Sir Redvers, sending away his staff and escort, rode personally +through part of the extended battalions of the 2nd brigade, and formed +the opinion that the men were too exhausted with the extreme heat to +be kept out all day, with the probability at nightfall of a severe +fight at close quarters for the guns. He therefore decided to abandon +the guns, and to withdraw the whole of his force forthwith to camp. +The decision was given about 11 a.m. + +[Sidenote: Parsons and Lyttelton successfully cover the retreat of +Hart's brigade.] + +The retirement of the 5th brigade, which had been ordered more than +three hours earlier, was now approaching completion. Lieut.-Colonel +Parsons[240] had succeeded in moving the 64th and 73rd Field batteries +across the Doornkop Spruit, somewhat higher up than the place of his +first attempt; to afford the infantry better support, he advanced to a +low ridge near a kraal, as close in rear of the left of the brigade as +would permit of sufficient command to fire over them. Thence, at a +range of 2,800 yards, the batteries searched with shell the kopjes on +the north bank of the Tugela, and, assisted by the fire of Captain +Jones' Naval guns, silenced the two Boer guns near the Ladysmith road, +using for this purpose shrapnel with percussion fuse. Parsons' +batteries were at this time only 1,200 yards from the river, and came +under the rifle fire of the enemy. Their casualties were but slight. +The 1st Rifle Brigade and the 1st Durham Light Infantry, which, under +the personal command of Major-General Lyttelton, had gone to assist in +covering Hart's retreat, had reached the Doornkop Spruit. The 1st +Rifle Brigade and four companies of the Durham Light Infantry crossed +it and opened out to six or eight paces interval on the far side, four +companies of the Rifle Brigade and two of the Durham forming a firing +line at a distance of about 500 yards from the river. The three +remaining companies of the Durham Light Infantry lined the spruit. + + [Footnote 240: See p. 357.] + +[Sidenote: The retreat down the loop.] + +The order to retire appears to have reached some of the units of the +5th brigade as early as 7.30 a.m., but under the heavy fire which +still continued, the transmission of orders up the long salient of the +loop was difficult, and the foremost detachments of the intermingled +battalions did not begin to fall back until nearly 10.30 a.m. One or +two small bodies of officers and men, who had reached the bank at the +farthest end, never received the order, and were so absorbed in their +duel across the Tugela that, failing to observe the withdrawal of +their comrades until too late, they were eventually cut off and taken +prisoners. The rest of the brigade retired slowly in small groups, the +1st Border regiment covering the movement. Thanks to the artillery +fire of No. 2 brigade division and the presence of the two battalions +of the 4th brigade, the Boers made no attempt at direct pursuit, and +many of the British rank and file thought that they were engaged in a +counter-march to bring them to another crossing, which their comrades +had already found. Others, especially the Irish soldiers, were with +difficulty induced to turn their backs on the enemy. Gradually the +whole brigade, except the unlucky parties already mentioned, passed +through the files of the Riflemen and Durham Light Infantry, and +formed up out of range. The battalions were then marched back to camp. +The men were in the best of spirits and eager for battle. + +[Sidenote: Botha orders right wing to cross river and attack Hart's +brigade. They do not obey.] + +Louis Botha had directed that the Middelburg and Winburg commandos, +who had been posted to the west of the salient loop, and had hardly +fired a shot all day, should cross higher up and attack the flank of +the Irish brigade as it fell back. The Free Staters, who at this +period of the war were inclined to resent the control of a Transvaal +Commandant, declined to take part in the enterprise. But as, +irrespective of the Irish brigade, a cavalry regiment, two batteries, +and two fresh battalions were available to repel any counter-attack, +it was perhaps fortunate for the Boer Commandant-General that his +orders were disregarded. A few Boers did actually pass the river, and +were seen working round Parsons' left flank, just as Hart's rear +companies came level with the guns. The work of the artillery as a +covering force was then finished, and Colonel Parsons recrossed the +spruit, moved somewhat to the eastward, and then again came into +action for a short time. Colonel Parsons subsequently moved his +brigade division further to the eastward, near Captain Jones' Naval +guns and remained with them to the end of the day, till ordered by Sir +Redvers Buller to return to camp. The gun of the 73rd battery, upset +in Doornkop Spruit at the commencement of the attack, was retrieved by +Captain H. S. White, of that battery, during the afternoon and brought +back in safety. + +[Sidenote: Burrell asks leave to hold Colenso and recover the guns, +but the order to retire is general.] + +The G.O.C. the 2nd brigade at 10 a.m. had sent written orders to his +two leading battalions that they were to retreat on the Naval guns, as +soon as the Field artillery had been withdrawn. Sir Redvers' order +that the guns were to be abandoned, and that the force was to return +to the camp of the previous night, was received by Major-General +Hildyard at 11.10 a.m., and was immediately sent by him to +Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton, commanding the 2nd Queen's, with instructions +to pass it to Colonel Bullock, commanding the 2nd Devon on his right. +Major Burrell had previously asked to be allowed to hold Colenso until +nightfall, in the hope of bringing away the guns; but in face of this +definite order to retire, the O.C. the 2nd Queen's felt unable to +sanction his request. The same difficulty in sending such messages +under modern quick-fire, which had made itself felt on the left flank, +again arose. Colonel Hamilton passed the order to the officer +commanding the rear half-battalion of the Devon, who received it about +12.30 p.m. and sent it on to the front companies, but it failed to +reach Colonel Bullock, who, with two sections of his battalion, the +remnant of the Royal Scots Fusilier companies, and the survivors of +No. 1 brigade division, was still in the donga, behind the ten guns +remaining in the open. + +[Sidenote: The fate of those in the donga.] + +[Sidenote: Hildyard's (2nd) brigade, 3.30 p.m., reaches camp except +Major Pearse's half-battalion which arrives 4 p.m.] + +The remainder of the Devon conformed to the movement on their left. Of +the infantry scattered in the donga, the curves of which hid one small +party in it from another, some saw what was going on and also fell +back. The retirement was carried out with coolness and precision under +cover of the 2nd East Surrey, who were holding a shelter trench on the +west and a donga on the east of the railway. The officers and men of +the Queen's and Devon doubled back in small groups through their +files. By 2.30 p.m. the 2nd brigade, except a half-battalion of the +East Surrey, was beyond the range of the enemy's guns, and by 3.30 +p.m. had reached camp. This half-battalion of the East Surrey, under +command of Major H. W. Pearse, remained for more than an hour in +position near the platelayer's hut, hoping to cover the withdrawal of +the detachments near the guns. Finally, finding that no more men fell +back, and that his command was becoming isolated, Major Pearse also +marched back to camp. + +[Sidenote: Gen. Lyttelton's (4th) brigade falls back, covering the +rear.] + +Of General Lyttelton's battalions, the 1st Rifle Brigade and the +Durham Light Infantry had already been drawn in from the left flank +after the completion of the duty of covering Hart's brigade. The +foremost of the two remaining battalions was the 3rd King's Royal +Rifles. This unit, about 8.30 a.m., had advanced and extended some 800 +yards in rear of Long's guns. When the general retreat was ordered, +the senior officer with the battalion, Major R. C. A. B. +Bewicke-Copley,[241] was told to furnish the outposts. He therefore +held his ground. Each half company occupied a suitable knoll, with its +supporting half company in rear; the left of the battalion rested on +the railway. At 2 p.m. he was directed to fall further back. On this +Major Bewicke-Copley twice submitted a request to Lieut.-Colonel R. G. +Buchanan-Riddell that he might be allowed to stay where he was, with +a view to saving the guns, when dusk came. He was informed that Sir +Francis Clery had issued definite instructions that the battalion must +place all of the outposts further back and more to the west. The +battalion accordingly retired by companies to a line in the immediate +front of the camp. The Scottish Rifles on the left had covered the +retirement of the 2nd brigade, and as soon as the last battalion had +passed through its extended files, it also withdrew to camp. + + [Footnote 241: Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan-Riddell was the + commanding officer of the 3rd K.R.R., but on the movement of + General Lyttelton to the western flank he had assumed command + of the battalions left in the centre (Scottish Rifles and + King's Royal Rifles).] + +[Sidenote: Captain Jones' guns withdraw from Naval Gun Hill, 2.30 +p.m.] + +The Naval guns under Captain Jones received the order to retire at +12.40 p.m., but as they had to send back to Shooter's Hill for their +oxen, it was not until nearly 2.30 p.m. that the last gun limbered up +and moved off. The central Naval battery had during the day fired 160 +rounds of 4.7-in. and 600 rounds of 12-pounder ammunition. Lieutenant +Ogilvy's six guns expended about 50 rounds per gun. + +[Sidenote: Mounted brigade retreats, fighting.] + +The order to retreat reached the officer commanding the mounted troops +about noon. The brigade was still hotly engaged with the enemy, and +its gradual disentanglement took nearly three hours. Colonel +Thorneycroft was told by Lord Dundonald to fall back slowly along the +Gomba Spruit, protecting the flank of the South African Light Horse. +His retreat, which was covered by the 13th Hussars and three companies +of the Royal Fusiliers, was a good deal harassed by the enemy, who +crept up through the bush on the east and on the north. The +well-directed fire of the 7th battery checked this attempt at pursuit. +Eventually, Lord Dundonald succeeded in extricating his whole force +safely, except a small section of two officers and sixteen men of the +South African Light Horse, who were taken prisoners. The Royal +Dragoons had been recalled from the left flank by Sir Redvers Buller +at noon, and were employed in conjunction with Bethune's mounted +infantry in screening the retreat of the centre. + +[Sidenote: Barton's brigade reaches camp, 3.30 p.m.] + +Major-General Barton began to draw back his brigade about noon, and +arrived with it in camp about 3.30 p.m. His order failed to reach the +detachment of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the survivors of which, some +38 men in all, had about noon been placed under cover in the donga +behind Long's guns. After five and a half hours fighting in the open, +their ammunition, except the rounds in their magazines had been +expended. + +[Sidenote: Boers hesitate to take guns till Naval guns are withdrawn.] + +[Sidenote: Mounted brigade sees capture, but cannot fire because of +ambulances.] + +[Sidenote: Mounted brigade reaches camp 4.30 p.m.] + +But though the guns now stood unprotected on the open veld, save for +the handful of gunners, Devon, and Scots Fusiliers left in the donga +in rear, the Boers feared a trap, and could not at first realise their +good fortune. A telegram despatched at 12.40 p.m., by Botha to +Pretoria had reported that "we cannot go and fetch the guns, as the +enemy command the bridge with their artillery." When the Naval battery +had been withdrawn the burghers ventured across the river and made +prisoners of the party in the donga, Colonel Bullock making a sturdy +resistance to the last. Then the guns, with their ammunition wagons, +were limbered up and taken leisurely over the river as the prizes of +the fight. Lord Dundonald's brigade on its way back to camp had made a +detour northward to help in stragglers, and, approaching to within +2,600 yards of Long's guns, had observed the Boers swarming round +them. The 7th battery unlimbered and was about to open, when British +ambulances approached the donga, and men in khaki were seen +intermingled with the Boers. Under these circumstances it was judged +impossible to fire, and the mounted brigade withdrew to camp, arriving +there about 4.30 p.m. The 7th, Henshaw's, battery had expended 532 +rounds in all. + +[Sidenote: Casualties.] + +The total casualties on the British side throughout were 74 officers +and 1,065 men; of these seven officers and 136 men were killed; 47 +officers and 709 men were wounded, and 20 officers and 220 men +returned as prisoners or missing.[242] The Boer losses were six +killed, one drowned, and 22 wounded, the relative smallness of these +figures being largely due to their admirable system of entrenchment +and to the invisibility of smokeless powder. + + [Footnote 242: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.] + +[Sidenote: Two views of the course of the day.] + +The British Commander's plan for the passage of the Tugela was +undoubtedly so hazardous that only the most exact sequence of the +phases of its execution, as conceived by Sir R. Buller, could have +brought it to a successful issue.[243] Imperfect knowledge of the +topographical conditions of the problem, and of the dispositions of +the enemy, combined with misapprehension of orders, sufficed to wreck +it at the outset. + + [Footnote 243: This is Sir Redvers' own view. On the other + hand Botha, after the war, said that the loss of the guns and + the mistakes as to Hart's brigade deprived him of the + opportunity of inflicting a ruinous defeat upon the British + army. He had hoped to induce his assailants to cross the + river without a shot being fired.] + +[Sidenote: Good points in a day of misfortune.] + +The gallant conduct and bearing of the regimental officers and men +were conspicuous through this day of ill-fortune. The reservists, who +formed from 40 to 50 per cent. of the men of the infantry battalions, +displayed a battle-discipline which supported that of their younger +comrades, while the newly-raised colonial corps gave a foretaste of +the valuable services which such units were destined to render +throughout the war. + +[Sidenote: The heavy Naval guns and telescopes.] + +The influence of the telescopes and long-ranging heavy guns of the +navy has been noticed in the course of the narrative; but the subject +is an important one and it was not only at Colenso that this influence +was felt. It will be more convenient to deal with the general question +when other instances of the same kind have been recorded. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. + +LORD ROBERTS' APPOINTMENT TO THE COMMAND IN SOUTH AFRICA. + + +[Sidenote: Realisation at home of the magnitude of the task before the +country.] + +[Sidenote: Danger of possible Boer offence.] + +After three reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, it was +clear to all that forces far larger than had been estimated would be +now required for the war. Much had already been done before the news +of Colenso arrived. Another division--the 5th--prepared at home early +in November for service in South Africa, was due in a few days' time +at Cape Town. A sixth division had been mobilised at the end of +November and was on the point of embarkation,[244] and the +mobilisation of a seventh had been ordered as soon as the news of +Stormberg and Magersfontein had reached England. Yet there was cause +for anxiety. Until the 5th division actually landed, not a man was +available to be sent forward to reinforce either Lord Methuen on the +Modder, or the troops under Sir R. Buller's immediate command facing +the Tugela. After Stormberg, Sir W. Gatacre had been strengthened with +the 1st Derbyshire from the lines of communication. He had now a weak +brigade to cover all the eastern province, from Queenstown northwards. +Lt.-General French had, it is true, successfully checked the Boer +advance into the Colesberg district, but his success had been due to +skilful tactics and audacity, not to any superiority in strength. The +true strategy for the enemy would be to assume the offensive, and, +using his superior mobility, attack the lines of communication with +the coast of one or more of the three British columns in Cape Colony, +each of which was in fact in a sense isolated. Bold raids executed for +this purpose would have probably secured the active support of a large +number of disaffected colonists, whose loyalty had been seriously +impaired by the recent victories of their kinsmen. The attitude of +many in the districts through which the Cape lines of communication +passed was already very unsatisfactory. + + [Footnote 244: The despatch of a 6th division to South Africa + had been offered to, and accepted by, Sir R. Buller. His + telegram is dated 1st December, 1899. He wished this division + to arrive in Cape Colony on 1st January, by which date he + then hoped to begin his advance into the Free State by + Bethulie.] + +[Sidenote: Dec. 15th, after Colenso Buller sends message home, "I +ought to let Ladysmith go."] + +Nor was this all: for the moment Sir R. Buller thought that, by direct +order of the Cabinet, the 5th division had been assigned to the task +of relieving Kimberley,[245] and he judged that without reinforcements +the relief of Ladysmith was impracticable. Late, therefore, in the +evening of the 15th December, when the work of that exhausting and +disheartening day was drawing to a close, he telegraphed in the +following terms to the Secretary of State for War:-- + + "My failure to-day raises a serious question. I do not think I am + now strong enough to relieve White. Colenso is a fortress, which + I think, if not taken on a rush, could only be taken by a siege. + There is no water within eight miles of the point of attack, and + in this weather that exhausts infantry. The place is fully + entrenched. I do not think either a Boer or a gun was seen by us + all day, yet the fire brought to bear was very heavy. Our + infantry were quite willing to fight, but were absolutely + exhausted by the intense heat. My view is that I ought to let + Ladysmith go, and occupy good positions for the defence of South + Natal, and let time help us. But that is a step on which I ought + to consult you. I consider we were in face of 20,000 men to-day. + They had the advantage both in arms and in position. They admit + they suffered severely, but my men have not seen a dead Boer, and + that dispirits them. My losses have not been very heavy. I could + have made them much heavier, but the result would have been the + same. The moment I failed to get in with a rush, I was beat. I + now feel that I cannot say I can relieve Ladysmith with my + available force, and the best thing I can suggest is that I + should occupy defensive positions, and fight it out in a country + better suited to our tactics." + + [Footnote 245: On 14th December Lord Lansdowne had + telegraphed to Sir F. Forestier-Walker: "On arrival, Warren + is to be sent immediately to assume command of the forces + under Methuen. Buller will be informed of this by telegraph." + This telegram did not prescribe the disposal of the 5th + division, but that of Lt.-General Sir C. Warren, its + commander.] + +[Sidenote: Sir R. Buller's arrangements for Natal;] + +[Sidenote: for the western theatre of war.] + +In pursuance of this policy Sir R. Buller sent Sir G. White, next +morning, a cipher message, which, with the reply, will be recorded in +another chapter.[246] He also directed the Natal line of communication +staff to select, on the route Eshowe-Greytown-Estcourt, positions for +camps, which the Natal army could occupy "until the weather is +cooler." As regards the western theatre of war, he was more sanguine. +On receiving the news of the repulse at Magersfontein he had, it is +true, at first considered that, if the British troops remained on the +Riet, they might be enveloped by Cronje's force, with disastrous +results. He sent instructions, therefore, to Forestier-Walker that +Lord Methuen must be told either to attack Cronje again or to fall +back at once on the Orange river. This order was received with dismay +by Lord Methuen, for, after consultation with his brigadiers, he was +convinced that, until reinforcements arrived, his force was not in a +fit state to resume the offensive. He prepared to fall back. But in a +telegram, dated 14th December, Sir F. Forestier-Walker urged Sir +Redvers to support Methuen with the 5th division[247] and with a +brigade of cavalry from Naauwpoort, so as to enable him promptly to +relieve Kimberley. He added: "Methuen reports his force in safe +position, and well supplied. His communications are held by +detachments posted at no great distance apart, and can be further +protected by mounted troops. The effect of retirement upon the spirit +of Methuen's force after such hard fighting, and upon the general +military and political situation, appears to me to justify my placing +this alternative before you." Forestier-Walker's proposal was +immediately accepted by Sir Redvers, with the exception that he forbad +the reduction of French's strength at Naauwpoort. A telegram to that +effect had been despatched from Headquarters at Chieveley to the +General Officer Commanding Cape Colony the evening before the day of +Colenso. + + [Footnote 246: See Vol. II. Siege of Ladysmith.] + + [Footnote 247: Sir R. Buller had directed, on 9th December, + that a brigade and a battery of this division should be sent + to East London to reinforce General Gatacre, and that the + remainder should disembark at Port Elizabeth and proceed to + Rosmead junction.] + +[Sidenote: The Cabinet answers Sir Redvers' proposal to give up +Ladysmith, Dec. 16th, 1896.] + +Meantime the Cabinet had received and considered General Buller's +suggestion that Ladysmith should be abandoned. They felt that to leave +the invested troops to their fate would be equally injurious in its +strategical, political, and moral effect on South Africa; a blow to +British prestige throughout the world. Sir R. Buller was therefore +informed by a cipher telegram, dated 16th December, that "Her +Majesty's Government regard the abandonment of White's force and its +consequent surrender as a national disaster of the greatest magnitude. +We would urge you to devise another attempt to carry out its relief, +not necessarily via Colenso, making use of the additional men now +arriving, if you think fit." A War Office telegram of the same date +advised Sir Redvers that the embarkation of the 6th division for South +Africa had already begun, that the 7th division would begin to embark +on the 4th January, that another cavalry brigade would be sent out as +soon as ships could be provided, and that additional field artillery +would replace the guns lost at Colenso. In reply to a request made by +him that morning by telegram that 8,000 irregulars "able to ride +decently, but shoot as well as possible," should be raised in England, +the General Commanding-in-Chief was told that "a considerable force of +militia and of picked yeomanry and volunteers will also be sent." + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, being promised reinforcements, prepares for +new effort.] + +These promises, and the assurance that the 5th division was at his +free disposal, though that had always been the home view, greatly +strengthened Sir Redvers Buller's hands. He decided to make another +effort to break through the barriers round Ladysmith. He therefore +ordered Warren's division to Natal. Warren himself, with two +battalions of the 10th brigade, had disembarked at Cape Town, and been +despatched by train up country. These battalions, the 1st Yorkshire +and 2nd Warwick, were subsequently, at Forestier-Walker's request, +left in Cape Colony for duty on the line of communication at De Aar. +The rest of the 5th division, together with Sir C. Warren and his +staff, went to Durban. + +[Sidenote: The nation roused.] + +The immediate response made by the Cabinet to Sir R. Buller's request +for reinforcements, and their instant rejection of the proposal to +abandon Ladysmith, expressed the spirit in which the nation received +the news of "the black week"[248] in South Africa. The experiences of +such contests as had been waged by Great Britain since the great +Indian mutiny had led public opinion to expect, in time of war, no +strain on the national resources, no call for national effort. War was +regarded as a matter for which the War Office and the army should make +preparation, but not the nation. The despatch of the largest British +Army ever sent across the seas had been regarded as ensuring rapid +success. A decisive termination of the campaign before the end of the +year was anticipated. The disappointment of these hopes at first +caused dismay; but this was quickly replaced by a stern determination +to carry through the South African undertaking, and, at all costs, not +to shirk troublesome responsibilities in that sub-continent. It was +realised that the task to be faced was serious, and that the time had +come to devote to it the best resources of the Empire. The manhood of +the country was eager to assist by any possible means, and therefore +learnt with satisfaction that not only would the 6th and 7th divisions +be sent out at once, but that nine militia battalions had been asked +to volunteer for foreign service, and that yeomanry and select +companies of volunteers had had their eager demands to be allowed to +help gladly granted. With even greater pleasure was the announcement +received, two days after the battle of Colenso, that the General in +command in South Africa had been given _carte blanche_ to raise mounted +troops locally; that the self-governing Colonies, again with true +patriotism rallying round the mother country, had proposed to send +further military contingents, and that these also were to join in the +struggle. + + [Footnote 248: The popular name for the week in which + occurred the defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein and + Colenso.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Roberts is appointed to command, Dec. 16.] + +The action of the Cabinet in dealing with the difficult question of +the command, in South Africa was prompt. The size of the army which +would in a few weeks be assembled at the seat of war, and the nature +of the work which lay before it, made it necessary that an officer of +the highest standing and experience should be selected for the supreme +control. It was apparent that the direction of the operations for the +relief of Ladysmith would absorb all the attention and energies of +Sir R. Buller. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C., then commanding the +forces in Ireland, was therefore asked to undertake the duty of +Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, a responsibility which he +instantly accepted. As Lord Roberts' Chief of the Staff the Cabinet, +with the Field-Marshal's approval, recommended to the Queen the +appointment of Major-General Lord Kitchener, who was still serving as +Sirdar of that Egyptian army with which, stiffened by British troops, +he had destroyed the power of the Mahdi little more than a twelve +month earlier. The decision to make these appointments was notified to +Sir R. Buller, in the telegram quoted below.[249] Sir Redvers, to use +his own words, had "for some time been convinced that it is impossible +for any one man to direct active military operations in two places +distant 1,500 miles from each other."[250] + + [Footnote 249: "In Natal and in Cape Colony distinct + operations of very great importance are now in progress. The + prosecution of the campaign in Natal is being carried on + under quite unexpected difficulties, and in the opinion of + Her Majesty's Government it will require your presence and + whole attention. It has been decided by Her Majesty's + Government, under these circumstances, to appoint + Field-Marshal Lord Roberts as Commanding-in-Chief, South + Africa, his Chief of Staff being Lord Kitchener."] + + [Footnote 250: See letter from Sir Redvers Buller to + Under-Secretary of State for War, dated 20th December, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Roberts embarks Dec. 23/99.] + +Within a few days Lord Roberts nominated the rest of his staff,[251] +and, accompanied by the majority of them, embarked for South Africa on +23rd December, arrangements being made for Lord Kitchener to join him +at Gibraltar. + + [Footnote 251: In a telegram dated 21st December, Sir R. + Buller recommended that Lord Roberts should bring out a fresh + Headquarter staff, reporting that there was already a lack of + senior staff officers throughout the theatre of war. His own + Headquarter staff left Cape Town to join him in Natal at the + end of December.] + +[Sidenote: Weakness of defence in Cape Colony.] + +The fact that it had been decided to send the 5th division to Natal +involved in Cape Colony the resumption of the policy of bluff which +had proved so successful earlier in the war. It was now attended with +greater risk, owing to the spread of disaffection amongst the +sympathisers with the Boer Republics. Three distinct areas in the "old +colony" were already in the actual occupation of the enemy, and had +been annexed by Boer proclamations. The first of these areas included +Griqualand West, Barkly West, Taungs, Vryburg, and Mafeking districts, +in fact, with the exception of the besieged towns of Kimberley, +Kuruman,[252] and Mafeking, the whole of the colony north of the Riet +river and of the Orange river below its junction with the Riet. East +of this came the Boer enclave round Colesberg, the extent of which was +being much diminished by General French's operations. Further east +again, the north-east angle of the colony, including the districts of +Herschel, Aliwal North, Barkly East, Wodehouse, and Albert, had for +the time being become _de facto_ Free State territory. Kruger +telegraphed to Steyn on the 20th of December: "I and the rest of the +War Commission decide that every person in the districts proclaimed, +so far as the annexed portions shall extend, shall be commandeered, +and those who refuse be punished. So say to all the officials south of +Orange river and in Griqualand West, that while we are already +standing in the fire they cannot expect to sit at home in peace and +safety." In all these areas, therefore, extraordinary pressure was +placed on the colonists to renounce their allegiance and take up arms +against their Sovereign. Indeed, but six weeks later the whole of the +inhabitants of the Barkly West district who refused to be commandeered +were, irrespective of nationality, removed from their homes by the +Boers' Landrosts and thrust across the Orange river in a state of +absolute destitution.[253] The number of recruits which had accrued to +the enemy's commandos by these means was already, by the end of +December, considerable; it was assessed at the time by the British +authorities as high as ten thousand. But the danger for the moment was +not so much the numerical strength of the actively disloyal as the +attitude of the disaffected in the districts which the enemy had not +reached. Here, again, the areas which caused special anxiety fell into +three groups. In the eastern province certain of the farmers of the +Stockenstroom and adjacent districts had gathered together in a laager +on the Katberg Pass across the Winterberg Mountains, a strong position +some forty miles in rear of General Gatacre at Queenstown. In the +thinly-populated and backward regions bordered by the Orange river on +the north, the Roggeveld and Nieuwveld Mountains on the south, and the +main line from Cape Town to De Aar on the east, racial feeling was +known to be greatly inflamed, and it was reported that, if a few +recruiters crossed the Orange river from the districts occupied by the +enemy to the north of the river, a rising would probably take place. +Even nearer to Cape Town, in the fertile and wine-producing districts +of Stellenbosch, Paarl, Ceres, Tulbagh, and Worcester, all most +difficult to deal with, owing to the broken character of the ground +and its intersection by rough mountain ranges, a portion of the +inhabitants had shown signs of great restlessness. If even small bands +of insurgents had taken up arms in these parts, the British lines of +communication would have been imperilled. A very large force would be +required for their protection. + + [Footnote 252: A detachment of thirty-five Cape police and + thirty-three civilians made a gallant defence of Kuruman, + under Capt. A. Bates, against a Boer commando much superior + in strength. The garrison held out from 12th November until + their last redoubt was destroyed by artillery fire on 1st + January (see General map of South Africa and map No. 17).] + + [Footnote 253: For the details of this wholesale eviction see + article in _Cape Times_, dated 16th February, 1900, enclosed + in High Commissioner's despatch No. 85, dated 21st February, + 1900 (p. 194-195 of C.O. White Book Africa 629).] + +[Sidenote: The enthusiasm of the loyal furnishes large numbers of +Volunteers.] + +On the other hand, although the loyalty of a portion of the population +was shaken, there were large numbers not only steadfast in their +allegiance, but anxious to fulfil the duty of good citizens. +Considerable advantage had already been taken of this patriotic +spirit. Practically the whole of the Volunteer forces of the colony +had been called out in the first phase of the war and were still under +arms. The good services of the South African Light Horse and of +Brabant's Horse, raised respectively in the western and eastern +province, showed that the time had now come to make fuller use of the +admirable recruiting material that was available. + +[Sidenote: Full advantage taken of this by Sir A. Milner and Sir +Redvers.] + +On the 17th December Sir A. Milner telegraphed to Sir Redvers: "As +rebellion in the colony is still spreading and our latest +reinforcements are wanted elsewhere, I hope you will authorise G.O.C. +here to raise all the men he can get in loyal districts. Mounted +corps are being increased, and are no doubt what we most want. But for +defence of ports, which we must hold at all costs, and of places like +King William's Town and Grahamstown, even unmounted men, if otherwise +fit, will be useful, and I think considerable numbers might be +obtained. Where resistance is at all practicable I think it should be +offered, if only to gain time." This suggestion that a large increase +should be made in the forces raised locally was not a new one. Sir +Redvers had already been in communication on the subject with the War +Office, and had been informed by the Secretary of State, in a +telegram, dated 16th December, that: "I hope that you understand that +we are greatly in favour of the policy indicated in your telegram +(10th December) of raising local mounted corps and that you are free +to carry it out." On receipt of the High Commissioner's message +General Buller gave Forestier-Walker a free hand to raise both mounted +and dismounted men for the defence of Cape Colony, directing him to +consult Sir A. Milner as to details. On the 27th of December the +General Commanding-in-Chief was in a position to telegraph to Lord +Lansdowne that, exclusive of the colonial troops belonging to +Kimberley and Mafeking garrisons, 2,100 mounted and 4,300 dismounted +irregulars were under arms in Cape Colony besides a Railway Pioneer +regiment, 500 strong, in process of organisation.[254] + + [Footnote 254: The strength of the corps was soon afterwards + raised to 1,000, and eventually expanded to four battalions.] + +[Sidenote: Large numbers of Volunteers.] + +He hoped to increase still further these numbers by 2,000 mounted and +2,000 dismounted men. In Natal the Volunteers who had been called out, +and the special service corps enrolled since the war, numbered in all +6,700 men, and efforts were being made to raise another 700. +Including, therefore, the 4,000 colonial and local troops besieged in +Kimberley, the 1,000 defending Mafeking, and 1,500 Southern +Rhodesians, there were at this time 20,000 South African colonists +employed in the defence of their country, and arrangements were being +made to augment this total to about 25,000 men. The men who thus +served their Sovereign were not all of British descent. Some were +loyal Dutchmen. The figures no doubt include as "South Africans," +because present in local units, Johannesburg Uitlanders,[255] as well +as others who flocked to South Africa from various parts of the Empire +to fight for the maintenance of equal rights for all white men. These +large bodies might, had the Imperial Government thought fit, have been +almost indefinitely reinforced by native levies; but such a course was +impossible without danger to the future welfare of South Africa. It +was deemed legitimate to sanction the organisation of the tribes of +British Kaffraria, under Sir H. Elliott, for the defence of their own +homes against the Boer commandos. + + [Footnote 255: The term used by the Boers for all + foreigners.] + +[Sidenote: Methuen since Magersfontein.] + +After withdrawing from the battlefield of Magersfontein, Lord Methuen +had directed the whole of his energy to strengthening his hold on the +Riet and establishing his troops firmly astride that river. General +Buller had finally decided to retain Lord Methuen in that forward +situation, for on reflection he perceived that a retirement would +leave Cronje free to concentrate his whole force against Kimberley. +Moreover, he foresaw that the so-called "Modder position" could be +utilised later on as a pivot of manoeuvre, or as a screen behind which +a turning offensive movement might be made to the east into the Free +State. With this end in view he proposed to begin constructing a +railway from Honey Nest Kloof to Jacobsdal, to be extended eventually +to Bloemfontein after the arrival of the 6th division. The occupation +of Jacobsdal would, General Buller anticipated, "frighten" Cronje out +of Magersfontein.[256] Lord Roberts, however, in telegraphing to Sir +Redvers from Gibraltar on 26th December his concurrence in the +retention of Methuen on the Modder, added: "As regards railway +extension, I fear that construction of line will so seriously +interfere with the utility of present working line that I should ask +you to consult Girouard[257] on this subject before coming to any +decision." The execution of this project was therefore suspended +pending Lord Roberts' arrival. + + [Footnote 256: Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 23rd + December, 1899.] + + [Footnote 257: Bt.-Maj. (local Lieut.-Col.) E. P. Girouard, + R.E., who had at the outbreak of the war been appointed + Director of Railways on the lines of communication staff. + After Lord Roberts' arrival the Director of Railways worked + under the immediate orders of the Chief of the Staff.] + +[Sidenote: Cronje remains passive.] + +Meanwhile, although with the mobile force at his disposal General +Cronje might have struck at the British communications, the Boer +commander remained passive, and devoted himself to the improvement and +extension of his defences. He was indifferent to the fact that his +line of supply to the eastward was exposed and almost entirely +unguarded. Enterprises proposed by De Wet and others of his +subordinates against the British connection with the sea he sternly +forbad. + +[Sidenote: Activity in the west.] + +[Sidenote: Pilcher's raid on Douglas.] + +[Sidenote: Alderson threatens Prieska.] + +In the more western theatre of war, on the contrary, the Boers made +some attempt to take advantage of the situation. Recruiting parties +were sent across the Orange river, and visited Prieska. The village of +Douglas, lying south of the Vaal, a little below its junction with the +Riet, and commanding the road from Griqualand West to Belmont, was +also occupied by a small commando. The section of Lord Methuen's line +of supply from De Aar to Honey Nest Kloof was at this time held by +some 11,000 men under the command of Major-General E. Wood.[258] The +greater part of this force was distributed in strong posts at Honey +Nest Kloof, Enslin, Belmont, Witteputs, Orange River bridge, and De +Aar. The garrison of Belmont was under command of Lt.-Colonel T. D. +Pilcher, and consisted of two guns of P. battery, R.H.A., a half +company of the Munster Fusiliers mounted infantry, 250 Queensland +M.I., two companies of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the +Royal Canadian regiment, amounting in all to about 1,600 men. General +Wood determined to use a portion of this garrison to brush away the +hostile gathering on the left flank. With this object, Colonel Pilcher +was directed to move out from Belmont on the afternoon of the 31st +December with a flying column, composed of the two guns of P. battery, +42 officers and men of the Munster Fusiliers M.I., 12 officers and 187 +men of the Queensland M.I. under command of Lt.-Colonel P. R. Ricardo, +and a company of the Canadian regiment, the last-named unit being +carried in ten buck wagons with mule transport. The two companies +D.C.L.I. formed a supporting column and followed later. In order to +deceive the enemy, Pilcher on the previous day had made a feint from +Belmont towards the Free State, returning ostensibly on the ground +that a mistake had been made as to supply arrangements; the real +object of the column was Douglas, and it had been arranged to cover +Pilcher's right flank, by moving Babington with his mounted brigade +and G. battery westward from Modder camp. His left flank was protected +by the despatch of the Scots Greys from Orange River station to Mark's +Drift, a point close to the junction of the Vaal and Orange rivers. On +the night of the 31st December, Colonel Pilcher halted at Thornhill +farm, eighteen miles north-west of Belmont, and thence moved on the +following morning to Sunnyside, where in a cluster of kopjes a small +laager had been formed by an advance party of the enemy. This commando +(about 180 strong), was surprised, and defeated, with a loss of +fourteen killed and thirty-eight prisoners, after a brief engagement, +in which the Canadian and Queensland troops proved their fitness to +fight side by side with British regulars. On the 2nd January, the +flying column pushing on to Douglas, found the village evacuated by +the enemy. Meanwhile, a strong commando, detached by Cronje, had +eluded the cavalry brigade and crossed the Riet river near +Koodoesberg. Lt.-Colonel Pilcher had already fallen back on Thornhill +on 3rd January, and evading the enemy by a night march, regained +Belmont unmolested. Ninety loyalist refugees from Douglas accompanied +him on his return. Simultaneously with this successful raid, a patrol +of about a company of M.I. under Lieut.-Colonel Alderson had been sent +to Prieska from De Aar, and on the 3rd January exchanged shots at that +place with the enemy across the river, falling back subsequently on De +Aar. + + [Footnote 258: Colonel H. S. G. Miles had been in command of + this section up to 26th December, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Wood seizes Zoutpans Drift.] + +Lord Methuen now determined, in conjunction with Major-General E. +Wood, to demonstrate to the eastward against the enemy's line of +communication, which was known to run through Jacobsdal, Koffyfontein, +and Fauresmith. On the 7th January Major-General Wood therefore, with +a force of all three arms, seized Zoutpans Drift, a ford across the +Orange river twenty miles above the railway bridge. The ford had been +reconnoitred as early as 13th December. Here General Wood placed a +permanent post on favourable ground on a hill, to protect the drift +from the Free State side, and to command the road leading thence to +Fauresmith. A Boer detachment remained in observation of this post on +the adjacent farm of Wolvekraal, but did not attack. Further to the +north, reconnaissances into the Free State, made by the cavalry +brigade, and by Pilcher's troops at Belmont, ascertained that the +enemy was not yet in great strength on the right flank, but that +Jacobsdal was occupied. The Field Intelligence department at Cape Town +had already (3rd January) received information from a trustworthy +source that Cronje had at and near Magersfontein 8,000 to 9,000 men, +and that he was relying on being attacked there. The report stated: +"An advance on Bloemfontein up the right bank of Riet river by +Kaalspruit would draw off the main Boer forces towards Bloemfontein. +President O.F.S. is stated in district to have said that he 'could not +cope with such a movement.' ... Bloemfontein is undefended except by +two forts, the guns of which have been moved to Kimberley." + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. + +OPERATIONS ROUND COLESBERG--DECEMBER 16th, 1899, TO FEBRUARY 6th, +1900.[259] + + [Footnote 259: See maps Nos. 9 and 16.] + + +[Sidenote: French's operations during Lord Roberts' voyage.] + +[Sidenote: He worries Schoeman out of Rensburg.] + +[Sidenote: and pursues him to Colesberg.] + +Whilst Lord Roberts was on his voyage to the seat of war, the three +portions of the army which had sustained severe checks were chiefly +employed in recuperating and receiving reinforcements. General French, +on the other hand, was continuing his successful operations. These, +therefore, with the exceptions mentioned in the last chapter, alone +represent the active work in the field in South Africa between the time +of the decision of the Cabinet appointing the new Commander-in-Chief and +his arrival at Cape Town. The task of General French at Arundel was now +as important as the strength of his command seemed inadequate to perform +it. The enemy on his front formed one of four invading columns, three of +which had already been victorious. Schoeman had, therefore, strong +reasons for wishing to emulate the prowess of Cronje at Magersfontein, +of Botha at Colenso, and of the fortunate trio at Stormberg. French had +to deal with an opponent whose confidence must now be presumed to be at +its height. Moreover, reinforcements might reach the Boer leader at any +moment. It had become more than ever necessary to paralyse him before he +could initiate even the semblance of an organised incursion into +territory where disloyalty might largely increase his numbers in a +night. Only by incessant activity could French hope to attain this +object, and fortunately the force under his command, if small, was +suitable both in composition and spirit to that most difficult of +military operations, the surveillance and protection of a large area by +mobility alone. His dispositions, detailed in Chapter XVII., whilst they +denied a front of nearly forty miles to the enemy, effectually covered +the Hanover Road-Naauwpoort-Rosmead line of railway. The area occupied +by the Boers round Rensburg was, like that of the British, bisected by +the railway. It was roughly as follows:--On the west of the line lay +some 800 Transvaalers with a long-range gun; on the east about 2,000 +Free Staters, with two guns, were partly entrenched, whilst 600 burghers +guarded the Boer Headquarters at Colesberg and their line of retreat. +Against the enemy, thus distributed, French now began a series of +reconnaissances and rapid movements in force, which, directed against +Schoeman's flanks and rear, and often against his convoys, left him no +peace. Some of these expeditions, notably an attack by the New Zealand +Mounted Rifles and a battery R.H.A. on December 18th against the Boer +left rear, led to brisk skirmishing; but the British losses were always +trifling, and Schoeman, continually forced to show his hand, eventually +wearied of his insecurity. On the 29th he abandoned Rensburg, and fell +back by night upon Colesberg. At daybreak on the 30th, French followed +in pursuit with the Carabiniers, New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and two +guns R.H.A. and, reaching Rensburg at 7 a.m., soon regained touch with +the enemy upon the ridges south-west of Colesberg. A demonstration by +the artillery disclosed a strong position, strongly held. Colesberg town +lies in a hollow in the midst of a rough square of high, steep kopjes, +many of them of that singular geometrical form described in Chapter III. +Smaller kopjes project within rifle range from the angles of the square, +whilst 2,000 yards west of its western face a tall peak, called Coles +Kop, rises abruptly from the encircling plain, and dominates the entire +terrain. The isolation of this hill was doubtless the reason why it was +not occupied by the Boers. They were in strength everywhere along the +hilly ramparts around Colesberg. French, therefore, perceiving the +formidable nature of this "natural fortress,"[260] contented himself +with seizing a group of hills (Porter's Hill) 2,000 yards south-west of +the south-western angle. Here he planted artillery, and, leaving Porter +with the above mounted troops in observation, himself returned to +Rensburg siding, which he made his Headquarters, calling up the main +body from Arundel. + + [Footnote 260: Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.] + +[Sidenote: French decides to attempt Colesberg.] + +The rearward concentration of the enemy at Colesberg, in itself a +partial triumph for the British Commander, had now cleared the +situation, and opened to General French the final object defined by +his instructions.[261] The arrival of reinforcements, moreover, seemed +to warrant a serious attempt upon Colesberg. The third squadrons of +the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons and 10th Hussars, which had been +wrecked in the transport _Ismore_, had joined on the 18th and 21st +December, the 1st Suffolk regiment from Naauwpoort on the 26th, and +Rimington's Guides (173 strong) on the 28th, the 1st Essex regiment +from De Aar relieving the Suffolk at Naauwpoort. + + [Footnote 261: "To seize and hold Naauwpoort, and whenever + possible to push on and gain possession of Colesberg." + Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.] + +[Sidenote: Dec. 31st/99 to Jan. 1st, 1900, makes night attack on +McCracken's Hill and takes it.] + +At daybreak on the 31st the General made in person a close +reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and at noon he issued orders +for an offensive movement. The most vulnerable, indeed, the only +vulnerable portions of the bulwark of hills, seemed to be the kopjes +previously described as projecting from the square, especially those +upon the western face. These gained, it would be possible to push +northward along the flank, threatening the Colesberg road bridge and +the enemy's line of retreat, regarding the safety of which the Boers +had shown themselves peculiarly sensitive. Seeking a base from which +to attack these outlying kopjes, French settled upon Maeder's farm, +lying five miles west-south-west of Colesberg, and at 4 p.m. a +squadron 10th Hussars moved thither as a screen to the main body,[262] +which marched an hour later, and arrived at the farm between 8 p.m. +and 9 p.m., the troops bivouacking there under arms. At midnight the +men were roused, and at 12.30 a.m., January 1st, the column, led by +the wing of the Royal Berkshire, set out in thick darkness towards the +enemy.[263] The route taken ran for two and a half miles on Colesberg, +and then north-east across the veld, past the east of Coles Kop. The +infantry marched in profound silence; even the regimental carts were +dropped behind, lest the noise of the wheels should betray the design. +It was not until the leading companies at 3.30 a.m. were close to the +base of the hill to be attacked, that a loud shout and a scattered +fire of rifles from the right front broke the stillness, and showed +that the enemy had detected the advance. Major McCracken, who had so +organised the march of the Berkshire as to be ready for this, extended +his ranks to two paces interval, and, without awaiting his supports, +which had been delayed by the darkness, ordered the charge. Thereupon +the enemy's piquet fled, and the Royal Berkshire, just as day dawned +on January 1st, 1900, gained, without opposition, the crest of the +hill, henceforward to be known as McCracken's Hill. + + [Footnote 262: Composition:--Inniskilling Dragoons, 10th + Hussars, ten guns R.H.A., one company M.I., with four + companies, 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment, under Major F. W. N. + McCracken, the whole under command of Lieut.-Col. R. B. W. + Fisher, 10th Hussars. Two days' supplies, went with the force + and half the infantry were carried in wagons.] + + [Footnote 263: Order of march:--Point of M.I., half battalion + R. Berkshire, remainder M.I., 10th Hussars, R.H.A., + Inniskilling Dragoons.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 1st, 1900. Colesberg is shelled whilst Fisher works +round the north towards the bridge road on Boer right, and Porter acts +against their left.] + +This point being won, General French immediately despatched Colonel +Fisher on from the place, where he had halted with his cavalry, past +Coles Kop towards the north-west corner of the heights encircling +Colesberg, with orders to establish a squadron at the corner, and to +work round the northern face against the Boer right. In this duty +Fisher was only so far successful as to get his patrols astride the +track to Colesberg road bridge, failing to secure the hills commanding +the northern exits from the town. To distract attention from this +movement, and to clear the kopjes on McCracken's front, ten guns had +previously been placed opposite the western face of the Colesberg +heights, and as soon as it became light enough, these opened a heavy +bombardment. The enemy responded at once with field guns and a pom-pom +from higher ground, and for three hours the batteries endured a +galling fire of great accuracy, the Boer pom-pom especially +bespattering the line of guns with a continuous stream of projectiles. +Not until the Horse artillery had expended 1,043 rounds of shrapnel +did the enemy's gunners desist. During this time Colonel Porter, based +on Porter's Hill, was operating vigorously against the enemy's left. +He had moved out overnight with two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards +(Carabiniers), one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and two guns, +R.H.A. Reinforcing these mounted troops, Porter made a determined +effort against the outworks of the Schietberg at the south-western +angle of the Colesberg heights. But the Boers were here in strength, +and the New Zealanders, after a gallant attack up the stiff slopes, +were compelled to fall back upon Porter's Hill, whence for the rest of +the day Porter engaged, though he could not dislodge, large numbers of +the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Boers try to retake McCracken's Hill, but fail.] + +Meanwhile the wing of the Royal Berkshire regiment had not been left +in peaceful possession of McCracken's Hill. To the east, and between +this hill and Colesberg, another height of similar command was +strongly held by the enemy, who not only opened a troublesome fire at +daybreak, but a little later attempted first a counter-attack up the +steep re-entrants to the north-east, or left, of the infantry, and +next an enveloping movement around the right. + +[Sidenote: The first attempt stopped by Fisher's appearance, after +evacuation of the hill had been ordered.] + +[Sidenote: Rimington's Guides and Porter's men stop the second.] + +Both enterprises finally failed; but about 7 a.m., so insecure seemed +the situation of the Berkshire, that the General sent orders to +McCracken to evacuate. At that moment Fisher's appearance upon the +heights to the north-west somewhat after relieved the pressure, and +McCracken, receiving to his satisfaction permission to retain what he +had won, soon had his command so safely entrenched against musketry +and shell fire, that, for the next forty-three days, during which it +never ceased, his casualties numbered but eighteen. So passed the day +without further incident until, late in the afternoon, Schoeman +suddenly led a column, about 1,000 strong, out of the south-eastern +corner of the Colesberg _enceinte_, making as if to envelop the +British right. Fortunately, Rimington's Guides, who had been posted +overnight at Jasfontein farm, six miles east of Rensburg, to watch +this flank, detected the Boer advance. Simultaneously the troops at +Porter's Hill saw it also, and Schoeman, confronted by both +detachments, retired to Colesberg. Thus by evening French, though +disappointed with the results north of the town, where he had hoped to +secure "Grassy" (later Suffolk) Hill, had cut off Colesberg from the +rest of the colony on the south and west. His intercepting line ran +north as far as Kloof camp.[264] As all the troops were thus fully +occupied, French asked for reinforcements with which to "manoeuvre the +enemy out of his position." Schoeman himself, at the same time, was +demanding assistance from the Boer Headquarters to enable him to hold +his ground.[265] + + [Footnote 264: Casualties, January 1st:--Killed, one officer; + wounded, six officers, twenty-one N.C.O.s and men; missing, + one man.] + + [Footnote 265: The former received the 1st Essex regiment, + two companies 1st Yorkshire regiment, 4th battery R.F.A., and + the Household cavalry composite regiment; the latter the + Johannesburg Police under Van Dam, and a commando under + Commandant Grobelaar. The reinforcements reached the two + opponents on January 4th, 5th and 6th.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 4th, 1900. Schoeman attacks French's left, obtains a +momentary advantage, but completely fails.] + +Next day (January 2nd) General French delegated the command of the +left attack to Major-General Brabazon, with Headquarters at Maeder's +farm, and relieved the cavalry at Kloof camp by four companies of the +1st Suffolk regiment, one squadron alone remaining there to act as a +screen to the northern flank. This day and the next passed +uneventfully. Early in the morning of the 4th, Schoeman, baulked in +his attempt of the 1st January against the British right, dashed +suddenly from his lines with a thousand men against the left, and all +but rolled it up. Eluding the cavalry piquets posted on the outer +flank of the Suffolk, the burghers galloped for a line of kopjes which +ran east and west across the left and left rear of Kloof camp, into +which they therefore looked from the flank, and partially from the +rear. The enemy's artillery at once opened fiercely from their main +position upon the entrenchments of the Suffolk, who, assailed from +three directions, were for some time seriously threatened. Much +depended upon the action of the next few minutes. French's front line +was for the moment truly outflanked, and, were the enemy to establish +himself where he was, nothing would remain but a speedy and difficult +evacuation of the ground hitherto held, right back to Porter's Hill. +The tables were quickly turned. General French, who was riding up from +Rensburg, at this moment reached Porter's Hill, and immediately +telegraphed to Maeder's farm for all the troops to turn out and move +on Coles Kop. He also ordered two companies of the Royal Berkshire +regiment from McCracken's Hill to reinforce the threatened point, and +the 10th Hussars, a squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, and two guns +R.H.A. to advance upon the right of the Boer attack. Four guns had +already opened against their centre from in front of Coles Kop. These +movements chilled the Boers, who, especially alarmed at the approach +of the cavalry from the direction of Windmill camp, abandoned the most +advanced points they had reached, hotly pursued by the 10th Hussars on +one flank and "B." squadron Inniskillings on the other. Yet some of +them soon turned, and, standing on rocky hills, attempted to cover the +flight of the rest, by checking the 10th Hussars. Colonel Fisher +thereupon dismounted his men, and leading a charge on foot, +brilliantly drove off the Boer rearguard and sent them after their +comrades, whilst the Inniskillings continued the pursuit, getting +amongst the fugitives with the lance. Still a part of the enemy, about +200 in number, clung stoutly to the broken hills in spite of the +severe cross fire of the artillery. About 1 p.m., therefore, the +General ordered Capt. H. de B. de Lisle to dislodge this remnant with +200 mounted infantry. De Lisle, using all the advantages of the +ground, skilfully manoeuvred his men, mounted, till he was within a +distance convenient for attack. His dismounting was the signal for +another break away of at least half of those fronting him, and the +mounted infantry, in open order, scaled the hill with fixed bayonets +against the remainder. There was a short encounter, but De Lisle's men +were not to be denied, twenty-one prisoners falling into their hands +as they cleared the summit. The rest of the Boers scattered in flight, +and by 2 p.m. Schoeman's attempt was over. His failure had cost him +ninety killed and wounded, and the loss of some forty prisoners.[266] + + [Footnote 266: Casualties, January 4th:--Killed, one officer, + six N.C.O.s and men; wounded, two officers and thirteen + N.C.O.s and men.] + +[Sidenote: French, Jan. 5th, issues orders for attack on Grassy Hill +next day.] + +During this (January 4th) and the two following days, the requested +reinforcements, in number some 1,500 men of all arms, arrived. With +this accretion of strength it was now possible to renew the offensive, +and General French at once turned his attention to the capture of +Grassy Hill (Suffolk Hill on map No. 16), which he had early marked as +the key to the Boer stronghold. This height lay at the junction of the +roads leading respectively to Colesberg road bridge and to Norval's +Pont, both of which it commanded. Fisher's operations on the left +flank on January 1st had been designed to seize this important point, +and without it there was little hope of forcing the enemy from +Colesberg. On the 5th, whilst all the artillery shelled the hill, +French made a personal and careful reconnaissance,[267] and on his +return to Headquarters issued orders for an attack next day. It was to +be based on Kloof camp, whence a force of all arms[268] under the +command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. W. Eustace, R.H.A., was to be in +readiness to start at 5 a.m. As before, the 1st cavalry brigade and +the post at Porter's Hill were to co-operate to the southward, both to +divert attention from the true attack, and to prevent the enemy +withdrawing his guns. + + [Footnote 267: During the reconnaissance, Lieutenant Sir J. + P. Milbanke, Bart., 10th Hussars, the General's A.D.C., was + severely wounded whilst rescuing a dismounted trooper under + heavy fire, an act for which he subsequently received the + Victoria Cross.] + + [Footnote 268: Composition:-- + + 10th Hussars, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, eight guns R.H.A. + 4th battery Royal Field artillery, three companies M.I. + Detachments 1st Suffolk and 2nd Royal Berkshire regiments.] + +[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Watson volunteers to take the hill, and is granted +leave to try.] + +[Sidenote: Watson during night, 5th to 6th Jan. attacks and fails.] + +Lt.-Colonel A. J. Watson, commanding the 1st Suffolk regiment at Kloof +camp, who had frequently reconnoitred Grassy Hill in company with +General French, had from the first expressed his belief that he could +capture it with his battalion. On the previous day (5th January) his +remaining half-battalion had joined him, and during an interview with +Eustace in the evening regarding the arrangements for next day, he +asked the latter to obtain from the General leave for him to rush the +position in the night with four companies. Eustace, though he did not +share the confidence of the infantry commander, nevertheless carried +the request to Headquarters. As a result, about 8 p.m., a message was +sent to Watson authorising him to attack the hill if he saw a +favourable chance. He was first, however, to inform the General and +all troops in the vicinity of his intention. No more was heard of +Watson and the Suffolk regiment until, about 3 a.m. on the 6th, a +crash of rifle fire, breaking the silence from the direction of Grassy +Hill, proclaimed that the attack had been delivered. The sound was +clearly heard by General French and his staff who were riding up from +Headquarters to witness the day's operations. Halting below Coles Kop, +French immediately sent Eustace forward to get the guns into action, +but soon afterwards received intelligence that the Suffolk were +returning to camp, and that their colonel and 120 officers and men +were missing. The attempt on Grassy Hill had failed, and the plan for +the day was shattered before it had been properly set on foot. + +[Sidenote: Watson's attempt.] + +Having obtained the General's sanction, Watson, overlooking perhaps +the attached conditions, had eagerly prepared to avail himself of it. +The key of the whole situation seemed to be within his reach, and he +determined not to lose the chance of seizing it. Not until 11.30 p.m., +when they were roused from sleep to form up their companies, had even +his own officers any inkling of the project on foot, and when, an hour +later, under cover of profound darkness, four companies (305 officers +and men) moved noiselessly out of camp, the soldiers for the most part +marching in soft deck shoes, the least sanguine felt assured at least +of secrecy. The formation was quarter-column in the following order of +companies, "H." "D." "A." "B."; the men's bayonets were fixed. The +Colonel, who was carrying a long white stick as a distinguishing mark, +moved in front of his command and felt for the route. When about half +way, a halt was called and Watson, sending for his officers, told them +for the first time on what they were bent, and ordered, as the attack +formation, column of companies at fifty paces distance. The advance +was then resumed. The march seemed unduly long. The route to Grassy +Hill from the British lines was more than twice the supposed length. +In the darkness and over the difficult ground, it was impossible to +maintain distances for any time at all, so that column had again +contracted to quarter-column before the hill was reached. Arrived at +the foot, there was a short halt in a donga. Then the ascent, which +from the halting-place was at once very steep and covered with +boulders, was essayed. Higher up, more gentle gradients led to the +summit. Scarcely had the leading companies, somewhat disordered by the +severe climb, emerged upon the easier ground near the top, when a +single shot from a Boer sentry rang out close in front of the foremost +files. It was instantly followed by a blaze of musketry which leaped +from the whole crest. A volley so sudden and heavy could only come +from men prepared for action; it was evident that the advance of the +Suffolk was not only detected but awaited. Nevertheless, "H." company, +supported by "D.," immediately dashed forward, at once losing both its +officers and many men, the regimental adjutant and another officer +being struck down at the same moment. Watson, recognising the +preparations made to receive him, seeing from the confusion which had +arisen the futility of so informal an attack, directed a retirement, +intending, doubtless, no more than that his men should temporarily +seek the cover of the dead ground from which they had just climbed. +But such instructions, at such a time, were more easy to obey than to +understand. Whilst some fell back but a short distance, many made +their way to the foot of the hill, and so to the camp. Some again were +unable to retreat under the tremendous fusilade, and together with +those who had not heard the word of command, or did not credit it, +held on in front, and suffered losses rapidly. In short, for a few +moments, though the officers worked hard to restore regularity, +confusion reigned in the column, whilst the Boer fire continued to +rake it without cessation. Watson then desired the commander of the +third company, ("A."), to support "H." company upon the crest. Captain +C. A. H. Brett, having extricated about half his men from the press, +pushed out to the right flank and advanced. A storm of fire, delivered +at a few yards' range, met this attempt, and here, as before, all the +officers (three) and many of the rank and file fell before they could +close. Still Watson, whose gallantry compelled order wherever his +influence could be felt, strove to retrieve the situation. Going back +a little, he called up the rear company ("B.") and led it forward in +person, making for the right front. Again a murderous fire shattered +the effort, and no sooner had Watson disposed the remnants of "B." +company on the crest, than he himself fell dead just as dawn appeared. +Only about 100 officers and men were now scattered over the hill, many +of them wounded, but opposing as hot a fire as they could deliver to +the invisible enemy who was firing point blank into them. The pouches +of the dead were rifled for cartridges with which to continue the +struggle; but no hope remained; even the shrapnel of Eustace's +artillery, which now opened from Kloof camp, became an added danger: +while the Boers, aided by the increasing light, shot with +ever-increasing accuracy. About 4.30 a.m. the survivors, ninety-nine +in number, of whom twenty-nine were wounded, surrendered.[269] + + [Footnote 269: Casualties, January 6th:-- + + Killed: Five Officers; thirty-two N.C.O.s and men. + Wounded and taken prisoners: Three Officers; twenty-six + N.C.O.s and men. + Unwounded and taken prisoners: Two Officers; sixty-eight + N.C.O.s and men. + Wounded and returned to camp: One Officer; twenty-two + N.C.O.s and men. + The Boers stated their losses as one officer and eight men + killed, seventeen men wounded.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 6th.] + +In the evening the 1st Essex relieved the 1st Suffolk at Kloof camp, +the latter battalion being sent first to Rensburg, and subsequently to +the lines of communication to be re-officered. + +[Sidenote: Jan. 7th, 1900. French reconnoitres Boer left.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 9th. Slingersfontein Farm on Boer left occupied.] + +It was now evident to General French that the Boer right was so strong +and so watchful as to be proof against either stratagem or open +attack. He therefore turned at once to the other flank for +opportunities, seeking by a reconnaissance on the 7th January a +suitable point to the eastward from whence to threaten the enemy's +rear along the line of the Norval's Pont railway. The operation, which +was carried out under long-range fire both of artillery and +rifles,[270] disclosed the fact that owing to lack of water none of +the kopjes that were near enough to the line were tenable as +permanent posts. At Slingersfontein farm, however, eleven miles +south-east of Colesberg, and seven miles from the nearest point of the +Norval's Pont line, an excellent position was found. On January 9th it +was occupied by two squadrons Household cavalry, three squadrons the +6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), the N.S.W. Lancers and four guns, +under command of Colonel Porter. To divert attention from this +movement, the whole of the enemy's western flank was bombarded by +twelve guns disposed from Kloof camp to Porter's Hill, whilst a +section R.H.A. and a squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons made an +attack on the southern front above Palmietfontein farm, drawing in +reply the fire of two field guns and two pom-poms.[271] + + [Footnote 270: Casualties, January 7th:--One officer and four + men missing.] + + [Footnote 271: Casualties, January 9th:--Two men wounded; + seventeen battery horses were struck by shells during this + engagement.] + +[Sidenote: Feeling the enemy's left, Jan. 11th.] + +During the 8th and 9th the 1st Yorkshire regiment arrived, and was +posted at Rensburg. On the 10th Schoeman also received reinforcements +from Norval's Pont, and these he placed so as to cover the railway +south of Joubert siding, opposite to Porter, who turned out his men at +Slingersfontein to stop further advance southward. French, on the 11th +January, made a reconnaissance, employing the whole of Porter's force +in an attempt to turn the left of this new development of the enemy. +But the Boers, after a short retirement, received further strong +reinforcements from Norval's Pont, and prolonging the threatened left, +showed a bold front. French, therefore, who had no intention of +becoming seriously engaged, ordered Porter to return to +Slingersfontein. An attempt by Major A. G. Hunter-Weston, R.E., to +reach the railway line round the enemy's left flank, and destroy the +telegraph wire, was foiled at Achtertang when on the very point of +success. A Boer laager was in fact close at hand. At the same time +Captain de Lisle, pushing out from the extreme left towards Bastard's +Nek, reconnoitred the country to the northward, and found the enemy in +strength along the line Bastard's Nek--Wolve Kop--Spitz Kop--Plessis +Poort.[272] + + [Footnote 272: Casualties, January 11th:--Wounded, five men; + missing, one man.] + +[Sidenote: Butcher places 15-pr. on precipitous height. Jan 11th.] + +Whilst these affairs were in progress, a feat astonished both sides +alike by its triumph over difficulty. Major E. E. A. Butcher, R.F.A., +commanding the 4th Field battery, placed a 15-pr. gun upon the peak of +Coles Kop, a kopje already described as standing by itself in the +plain to the west of Colesberg. Rising to a height of 600 feet, its +sides varying from the almost perpendicular to a slope of 30 deg., and +covered with boulders, the hill presented a formidable climb even to +an unhampered man, and its use for any purpose but that of a look-out +post seemed impossible. Nevertheless, aided by detachments of the +R.A., R.E., and Essex regiment, Butcher had his gun on the summit in +three hours and a half. The supply of ammunition for it, and of +rations for the gunners, were more serious problems even than the +actual haulage of the piece itself. These were ingeniously solved by +the installation of a lift composed of wires running over +snatch-blocks affixed to standards, which were improvised from steel +rails, and driven in, in pairs, five yards apart, both at the top and +bottom of the kopje. Those at the top were wedged into natural +fissures in the rocks, the bottom pair being driven twelve inches into +the ground, and held upright by guy-ropes fixed to bollards or +anchorages. To the top of each upright was lashed a snatch-block, over +which, from summit to base of the hill, were stretched the carrying +wires. Along these, suspended by blocks and tackle, loads up to thirty +pounds in weight were hauled by means of a thin wire, which was wound +upon a drum fixed between, and passed through, pulleys attached to the +top of each of the two upper standards. The lift was so contrived as +to be double-acting, the turning of the drum and a ratchet causing one +wire bearing its load of supplies to ascend, whilst another descended, +the hill. + +[Sidenote: It has immediate effect. Jan. 12th.] + +At 6 o'clock next morning this gun opened upon a laager in the very +midst of the enemy's main position. The effect was instantaneous; the +Boers, thunderstruck by the sudden visitation of shrapnel, which came +they knew not whence, abandoned their camp and fled to the kopjes for +shelter. Another laager, 2,000 yards more distant, then became the +target with the same result, the enemy's doubt as to the situation of +the gun being deepened by the simultaneous practice of two 15-prs. +fired from the plain below the kop. A few days later Butcher succeeded +in getting a second gun up the hill, and by means of his great +command, forced the Boers to shift every laager into sheltered kloofs, +and caused them considerable losses. + +[Sidenote: Jan. 14th. A flying column under Allenby threatens Boer +connection with the bridge.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 15th. Boers attack Slingersfontein.] + +[Sidenote: The Boers are repulsed.] + +On Jan. 14th, a flying column[273] under Major E. H. H. Allenby +(Inniskilling), marched northward along the Seacow river. Turning to +the east, he demonstrated against the enemy's communications at the +Colesberg road bridge, at which about twenty shells were fired at +5,000 yards' range. The Boers thereupon appeared in three bodies in +greatly superior numbers, and Allenby, having taken five prisoners, +fell back, easily avoiding an attempt to cut him off. This +reconnaissance had the effect of causing the enemy to cease to use the +wagon road for transport purposes. Next day (15th) the Boers +retaliated by a determined attack on the isolated post at +Slingersfontein, held on that day by a half company 1st Yorkshire +regiment,[274] commanded by Captain M. H. Orr and a company (58 men) +New Zealand Mounted Rifles under Captain W. R. N. Madocks, R.A. +(attached). These had their trenches above the farm, the New +Zealanders upon the eastern and the Yorkshire upon the western sides +of a steep and high hill, the lower slopes of which were largely dead +ground to those in the defences. Other kopjes, accessible to the +Boers, were within rifle range. The position was thus to the Boer +rifleman an ideal one for the most exceptional of his fighting +practices, the close offensive. In the subsequent attack, every detail +was typical of his methods on such occasions. At 6.30 a.m. a +long-range sniping fire began to tease the occupants of the hill. They +vainly searched amongst the broken kopjes for sight of an enemy. +Growing, certainly, but almost imperceptibly, in volume and accuracy, +this fire was directed chiefly at the New Zealanders on the east, and +by 10 a.m. had become so intense that an attack in that direction +seemed imminent. Meanwhile, a body of the enemy had been crawling from +exactly the opposite quarter towards the western side, upon which they +succeeded in effecting a lodgment unseen. They then began to climb, +scattering under cover of the boulders. Not until they were close in +front of the sangars of the Yorkshire regiment was their presence +discovered by a patrol which Madocks had sent from his side of the +hill. Thereupon the Boers opened a hot fire, striking down both the +officer and the colour-sergeant of the Yorkshire, whose men, taken by +surprise and suddenly deprived of their leaders, fell into some +confusion. The Boers then occupied the two foremost sangars. The hill +seemed lost. Then Madocks, hearing the outburst on the further side +from him, took a few of his men and hurried round to assist, appearing +amongst the Yorkshire just as the enemy were all but into them. +Rallying the soldiers, and perceiving the Boers a few yards away +behind the rocks, he immediately ordered a charge, and followed by a +few, cleared the enemy out of the nearer of the two abandoned sangars. +The Boers continued to shoot rapidly from the wall beyond, and +Madocks, a few moments later, charged again. Accompanied this time by +but three men, he closed to within a few feet of the more distant +sangar. Two of the men with him were here killed, and Madocks, seeing +the uselessness of remaining, made his way back again to the sangar in +rear with his sole companion, called together the rest of the +Yorkshire detachment, and began hurriedly to strengthen the wall under +a searching fire. At this moment a party of his own New Zealanders, +for whom he had sent back, doubled up to the spot, and led by himself, +whilst a storm of bullets broke over them from the surrounding kopjes, +charged down on the Boers with fixed bayonets. The enemy fled at once, +rising from behind the stones upon the hillside. Pursued by volleys +from the crest of the British position, they made their way back to +their lines, leaving twenty-one dead upon the field.[275] + + [Footnote 273: Composition: One squadron 6th (Inniskilling) + Dragoons, one squadron 10th Hussars, two companies M.I., and + two guns R.H.A.] + + [Footnote 274: This battalion had joined on January 8th and + 9th. On January 12th, 1st half-battalion Welsh regiment and a + squadron 10th Hussars had also arrived; they were followed on + the 14th by half a battalion, 2nd Worcestershire regiment.] + + [Footnote 275: Casualties, January 15th:-- + + Killed, six N.C.O.s and men; wounded, one officer, five + N.C.O.s and men. Boer losses: twenty-one killed: about + forty wounded.] + +[Sidenote: Arrival, Jan. 15th, of Clements, and fresh troops then and +later to Jan. 21st, causes changes in dispositions.] + +Whilst this affair was in progress, a welcome reinforcement arrived. +Major-General R. A. P. Clements brought with him the 1st Royal Irish +and the remainder of the 2nd Worcestershire of his brigade (12th), in +all an addition of 18 officers and 874 men. Clements was immediately +placed in command of the Slingersfontein area.[276] This increase of +strength enabled French to extend his right still further by moving +Porter's command[277] south-eastward to Potfontein farm, and that of +Rimington,[278] hitherto stationed at Jasfontein farm, to Kleinfontein +farm, five miles north of Porter. For a time Rimington was able to +station some Household cavalry in close touch with the enemy at +Rhenoster farm, on the Bethulie road, but it was thought prudent to +withdraw them on January 21st, as a commando of 1,000 men had gathered +opposite the post. A demonstration by Porter towards Hebron farm on +the 19th disclosed, about Keerom, south of Achtertang, a large Boer +laager, which was shelled with effect. A deserter reported the enemy +in this direction to consist of 6,000 men. During the next two days +the following reinforcements reached the camp:--2nd Bedfordshire +regiment, 2nd Wiltshire regiment, detachments of the 1st Essex and 1st +Yorkshire regiments and details of Royal engineers and Army Service +Corps, a total accession of about 50 officers and 1,900 men. Two +howitzers,[279] which had come up on the 18th, shelled Grassy Hill on +the 19th and following days with effect, their fire being directed by +telegraph from Coles Kop. + + [Footnote 276: With the following:--1st Royal Irish and 2nd + Worcestershire regiment, one squadron cavalry, one company + New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and four guns.] + + [Footnote 277: Three squadrons Carabiniers, two squadrons + Household cavalry, N.S.W. Lancers, one company New Zealand + Mounted Rifles and four guns.] + + [Footnote 278: Rimington's Guides, one squadron Household + cavalry, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles.] + + [Footnote 279: A section of the 37th Howitzer battery, from + Modder River.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 24th. French seizes Bastard's Nek.] + +Recognising that he was blocked to the eastward by the superior and +apparently constantly increasing commandos, French now turned once +more to the westward for a chance of gaining commanding positions, +such as alone could enable him to manoeuvre the enemy from Colesberg. +An opening seemed to offer, because of the reported partial or entire +abandonment of the important defile known as Plessis Poort, through +which ran the road from Colesberg northward to the bridge and Botha's +Drift. The possession of this pass would not only cut the Boers' line +of retreat and northerly communications, but would seriously imperil +those leading to Norval's Pont; for high ground, running +south-eastward from the Poort, in parts parallel to the road and +railway, in parts impinging on them, practically commanded both for a +distance of some twenty miles from Colesberg. French, therefore, +determined to lose no time in reconnoitring and, if possible, seizing +on so valuable a point, and on the evening of January 24th, despatched +de Lisle to occupy Bastard's Nek, a defile cutting the same range as +Plessis Poort, and five miles to the westward of it. This being safely +effected, early on the 25th a strong column[280] concentrated at the +Nek. French's plan was as follows:-- + + [Footnote 280: Composition:--6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, + 10th Hussars, a battery R.H.A., under Major-General Brabazon; + four companies 1st Yorkshire, four companies 1st Essex, the + 2nd Wiltshire regiment, the M.I., and a field battery, under + Colonel T. E. Stephenson, 1st Essex regiment.] + +[Sidenote: Jan. 25th. He strikes at Plessis Poort.] + +[Sidenote: French avoids a trap, and returns to camp.] + +Whilst the infantry, covered by a cross fire of artillery, pushed +along the high ground towards Plessis Poort, the cavalry, diverging +north-eastward, were to turn the Poort by the Boer right, and at the +same time watch for any counter attack from the direction of the road +bridge. To draw attention from these movements, demonstrations were to +be made from every part of the British lines about Colesberg. As soon +as it was light these operations began. Whilst McCracken, under cover +of the howitzers and the two guns on Coles Kop, advanced from Kloof +camp, whilst Clements, pushing out from Porter's Hill and +Slingersfontein, shelled once more the laager at Keerom, and Porter +from Kleinfontein, made as if to fall upon the railway towards Van Zyl +siding, Brabazon's mounted force drew out to the northward, and +Stephenson sent the infantry, the Essex leading, along the ridge +towards the Poort. By 10 a.m. the four R.H.A. guns were in action +against the Poort at a point 2,400 yards north-west of it. Brabazon's +cavalry started late, owing to a delay on the part of the battalion +told off to relieve the intermediate posts: the enemy, getting wind of +his presence, advanced from the north with two guns, and from the +east, and so delayed him that his turning movement was completed too +late in the day to be utilised. Meanwhile the infantry, covered by the +fire of the 4th battery, worked rapidly towards the Pass, driving +scattered parties before them, and by 2 p.m. had reached favourable +ground within 1,500 yards of it. Here Stephenson deployed the 2nd +Wiltshire regiment, and sent it forward with orders to establish +itself within 800 yards of the enemy, unless heavily fired upon whilst +advancing. This the Wiltshire, moving in six lines 100 yards apart, +did without loss, under a fire so trifling that the enemy seemed to be +falling back, and Stephenson sent word to the General requesting +permission to push the attack home. But French, who knew his +opponents, had grown suspicious because of their silence. The hour was +late, the cavalry turning movement had not been carried out, and +finally instructions from the Commander-in-Chief had enjoined him to +avoid serious fighting.[281] At 4 p.m., therefore, he gave the order +to retire, and the Wiltshire firing lines rose to obey. Scarcely had +they done so, before a burst of fire, both of rifles and guns, from +the enemy's ridges, showed the nature of the trap that had been +prepared. But in spite of the heavy fusilade which followed them back, +the Wiltshire, retiring as steadily as they had advanced, rejoined the +column with a loss of but ten men wounded. The whole force then +returned to its bivouacs. + + [Footnote 281: See pages 434-5.] + +[Sidenote: French, Jan. 29th, is summoned to Cape Town.] + +This reconnaissance, though it failed to give General French the +Poort, succeeded in disclosing to him the nature of the enemy's +dispositions in this neighbourhood, especially of those behind the +hitherto impenetrable Grassy Hill. Such knowledge might have gone far +towards a solution of the problem which had so long engaged his +energies, the ousting of the Boers from their stronghold on British +territory. The more vital portion of his task, the prevention of a +further inroad into the colony, he had already performed. He was now +to be called away to a wider field. On January 29th he went down to +Cape Town to receive instructions from the Commander-in-Chief. He +returned to Rensburg on the 31st to break up his command. On February +6th he finally left Rensburg, after issuing an order in which he paid +full tribute to the courage and energy of staff and troops, who had so +long held in check "an enemy whose adroit skill in war demands the +most untiring vigilance."[282] With French went all the Regular +cavalry, except two squadrons, and also the 1st Essex and 1st +Yorkshire regiments, the half-battalion 1st Welsh regiment, and O. and +R. batteries, R.H.A. Major-General Clements was left at Rensburg with +the remainder.[283] + + [Footnote 282: Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.] + + [Footnote 283: General Clements' command was as follows:-- + + Two squadrons 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons. + J. battery, R.H.A. + 4th battery, R.F.A. + A section, 37th Howitzer battery, Royal Field Artillery. + The Australian M.I. (490 men). + The Victorian M.I. (175 men). + Mounted infantry (450 men). + 2nd Bedfordshire regiment. + 1st Royal Irish regiment. + 2nd Worcester regiment. + Half battalion 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment. + 2nd Wiltshire regiment.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. + +LORD ROBERTS AT CAPE TOWN; REORGANISES.[284] + + [Footnote 284: See maps Nos. 9 and 17.] + + +[Sidenote: 10th Jan. 1900. Lord Roberts lands. Situation at that +date.] + +Field-Marshal Lord Roberts landed at Cape Town on the 10th January, +1900, and assumed the supreme command. + +The situation with which he was confronted will be more easily +realised if a brief summary be here given of the facts as they now +presented themselves at each of the several widely separated points of +contact between the opposed forces. + +[Sidenote: French before Colesberg.] + +[Sidenote: Gatacre at Sterkstroom.] + +[Sidenote: Boers in front of him.] + +[Sidenote: Mafeking and Kimberley.] + +[Sidenote: Natal.] + +[Sidenote: Ladysmith.] + +As described in detail in the last chapter, the Boer commandos in +front of General French having fallen back on Colesberg at the end of +December, he had, on the 1st January, seized a group of hills on the +south-western edge of the plain in which the town lies, and was +continuing his tactics of active defence with constant success, save +that a night attack made by the Suffolk regiment on 6th January had +been repulsed with somewhat heavy loss. The Cavalry Lieut.-General's +never-ceasing energy had not only foiled the enemy in his attempt to +advance into the central districts of Cape Colony, but had appreciably +diminished the pressure in other portions of the theatre of war. +Gatacre was firmly established at Sterkstroom, with an advanced post +at Cypher Gat, the main body of those fronting him remaining passively +at Stormberg. A Boer commando had made a demonstration towards Molteno +on 3rd January, and another party, about the same date, had driven out +of Dordrecht a patrol of British mounted troops, which had occupied +that place on the 23rd December. At Mafeking and Kimberley the +garrisons were still gallantly holding their own against the enemy, +although in the latter town the hardships of the siege were telling +much on the spirits of the civilian portion of the population. In +Natal the 5th division had landed; and an attack, made by the Boers on +Ladysmith on 6th January, had been repulsed after a severe struggle in +which the fighting efficiency of the British troops was shown to be +unimpaired. Yet disease, coupled with losses in action, was beginning +seriously to reduce their effective strength and their capacity for +active co-operation in the field with the relief force. + +[Sidenote: Boers.] + +[Sidenote: In Natal.] + +[Sidenote: Cape Colony. 1. With Grobelaar at and near Stormberg. 2. +With Schoeman at Colesberg. 3. Reinforcements on road. 4. With Cronje. +5. With Ferreira before Kimberley. 6. With Snyman before Mafeking, and +in the west. 7. Under Botha fronting Plumer.] + +The Boer scheme for the whole war still centred on the capture of +Ladysmith. For the siege of that town, and for the repulse of the +British relieving force, at least 21,000 burghers appear to have been +still employed under the supreme command of Joubert. In the western +theatre Grobelaar had probably 4,000 men under his control at +Stormberg and in the adjacent areas: facing French at Colesberg were +some 5,000 men, with Schoeman as leader; Boer reinforcements, gathered +from various sources, amounting in all to some 2,000, were on their +way, or would shortly be on their way, to that threatened point. The +strength of Cronje's commando at Scholtz Nek may be estimated at +8,000, while 3,000 men, under Wessels and Ferreira, were investing +Kimberley. Snyman had under his orders some 2,500, most of whom were +encircling Mafeking, although a few detachments patrolled and +dominated those western districts of Cape Colony which lie to the +north of the Orange river. North of the frontier of the colony about +1,000 men, under Commandant Botha, opposed Plumer's efforts to relieve +Baden-Powell's garrison from southern Rhodesia. Thus the total +effective strength of the Boer forces actually in the field at this +time may be approximately set down as nearly 46,500 men. Of these +probably 1,000 were Natal rebels, and 5,000 British subjects belonging +to Cape Colony, the latter being mainly distributed between the +Stormberg, Colesberg, Kimberley, and Mafeking commandos. Of the Boer +leaders, some, notably De Wet, had realised the folly of remaining on +the defensive, but Joubert, whose appreciation of the conditions of +the contest can be judged from his circular letter printed at the +close of this chapter, was opposed to any forward movement, and +Joubert's views prevailed. Sir Redvers Buller personally, although the +Field Intelligence staff in South Africa did not agree with his +estimate, assessed the strength of the enemy in the field at far +higher figures than those above given;[285] and on 9th January he +telegraphed to the Secretary of State that there was reason to believe +that it was not less than 120,000 men, of whom 46,000 were in Natal. + + [Footnote 285: The views of the Field Intelligence department + as to the actual strength of the enemy may be gathered from + Lord Roberts' report to the War Office on 12th January, that + in his opinion the total strength against us had never been + more than 80,000 men (telegram to Secretary of State for + War).] + +[Sidenote: Buller's memorandum for Lord Roberts of Dec. 28th/99.] + +Lord Roberts received on landing a memorandum, written by Sir R. +Buller at Frere camp on 28th December, the following extracts from +which will serve to explain the views of Sir Redvers: + + "The whole Tugela river is a strong position; there is no + question of turning it; the only open question is whether one + part of it is easier to get through than another. I tried + Colenso, because, though unaided I could not have forced the + defile north of Colenso, it was the only place in the whole line + in which Sir George White's force could aid me in my advance from + the Tugela. I am now waiting for reinforcements, and am going to + try and force a passage at Potgieters Drift. If I can find water + to use in the subsequent advance, I think I ought to just pull + through: but the difficulties are very great. If I succeed, it + should be about the 12th January, and if then I join hands with + Sir G. White, I think together we shall be able to force the + enemy to retire and so free Sir G. White's force." + +After stating that, in the event of success in the relief of +Ladysmith, he hoped to be able to spare a division from the Natal +army, and after referring Lord Roberts to instructions issued from +time to time to Sir F. Forestier-Walker as regards the general plan of +his operations in the western theatre, Sir R. Buller continued: + + "You will see that my original idea was to bring Methuen back, + but as his task has grown harder I have proposed a railway to + Jacobsdal and thence to Bloemfontein. I think that for many + reasons you would find such a line of advance easier and quicker + than one up the main railway. Up that line the enemy will have a + rail behind them, and will tear it up as you advance, and occupy + positions that you must attack and from which they can escape. If + I could have had my own way on arrival I should have pushed + through Bethulie to Bloemfontein, but the fat was in the fire + before I got out. Kimberley I believe will be saved. Ladysmith is + a terrible nut to crack, but I hope it will (? be relieved). Then + I would propose to attack Bloemfontein from Kimberley, and I + think an army holding Bloemfontein based on Kimberley will be + better off than one which holds Bloemfontein but has allowed + Kimberley to be again invested. Time, after all, is in our + favour. The Boers cannot reproduce their horses which are being + used up, and if they lose their mobility, they lose their power. + I believe that French and Gatacre are strong enough to prevent + the spread of disaffection, and that when the 7th division + arrives they will join hands, and the disaffected Dutch will go + back to their homes." + +[Sidenote: Sir Redvers telegraphs, Jan. 10th, 1900, that he is about +to try to reach Ladysmith by Potgieters or Trickhardts.] + +This written memorandum was supplemented by a telegram, in which +General Buller reported that he was leaving Chieveley the next day +(11th January), and would operate towards Ladysmith from Potgieters +Drift or Trickhardts Drift. From the larger point of view Lord Roberts +would have preferred that the forward movement in Natal should have +been delayed a little longer; but he felt that he was not in a +position to judge how far Sir R. Buller was committed to an immediate +stroke, or whether the situation before him or Ladysmith itself +demanded prompt action. He decided, therefore, to give General Buller +an absolutely free hand to carry out the operations he had +planned.[286] + + [Footnote 286: See p. 461, Vol. I., Minutes of Evidence + before War Commission.] + +[Sidenote: Lord Roberts prepares to carry out his plan of campaign.] + +Before he left England Lord Roberts had determined on the line for the +advance of the army which he had to command in person. Though in +detail his scheme was somewhat modified afterwards, he began to +prepare for the execution of it as soon as he had landed. For reasons +which will be more fully recorded in his own words, he had decided to +choose the route along the western line of railway, on which side +alone a bridge over the Orange river was in his possession. In order +to possess the freedom of movement essential to the execution of any +sound schemes of war, he determined to make such arrangements as would +enable him to cast himself loose from the railway and to march across +the Free State eastward. His first idea was to strike the central +railway as close as possible to Springfontein junction. He believed +that the Boers would thus be compelled to evacuate their positions at +Stormberg and Colesberg, and to abandon to him the Norval's Pont and +Bethulie bridges over the river. The Commander-in-Chief was convinced, +moreover, that this course, by menacing Bloemfontein, would oblige the +enemy to relax his hold on the Modder river and Natal.[287] But, on +the 27th January, increasing anxiety as to Kimberley led him to decide +that the prompt relief of that town had become necessary. This +involved, not a change of plan, but merely a modification of details. +The initial march eastward was still to be carried out, but as soon as +Cronje's flank had thus been effectively passed, a wheel northward +would bring the British troops athwart the Boer line of communication, +and, when the passage of the Modder was made, the way to Kimberley +would be opened.[288] After relieving Kimberley the Field-Marshal's +movements would depend on the situation, as it might then present +itself, but should such a march appear possible, he determined to make +straight for Bloemfontein.[289] The occupation of that capital would, +he thought, make it easy to re-establish direct railway communication +with Cape Colony through Norval's Pont and Bethulie. The +considerations which guided Lord Roberts to the adoption of this plan, +as finally formulated, were explained by him in detail nearly three +years later to the War Commission in the following terms:[290] + + [Footnote 287: Telegram, Lord Roberts to Secretary of State, + 26th January, 1900.] + + [Footnote 288: Telegram, Lord Roberts to Secretary of State, + 27th January, 1900.] + + [Footnote 289: Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 30th + January, 1900.] + + [Footnote 290: Minutes of Evidence of War Commission, Vol. + I., pp. 460-1.] + + "Before leaving England I had practically determined that the + advance must be through the Orange Free State, but by one, not by + three lines through Cape Colony, as was originally intended;[291] + and the western line commended itself to me for the following + reasons: + + [Footnote 291: This would seem to be a misapprehension. Sir + R. Buller's intention had been to advance by Bethulie (see + page 411).] + + "1. It was on that line only that we had possession of a railway + bridge over the Orange river: + + "2. It was by that line only that Kimberley could be relieved in + time, and had Kimberley fallen, Mafeking must have fallen also: + + "3. It was by that line only I could deal with the Boer forces in + detail, and defeat Cronje before he could be reinforced. + +[Sidenote: Lord Roberts' explanation why he chose the route he took.] + + "Both the Norval's Pont and Bethulie bridges were in the hands of + the enemy, and by the time I had forced them back into the Orange + Free State, and had been able to repair either of these bridges + (which I was certain would be destroyed, and which actually + happened), and I had occupied Bloemfontein, I should have between + me and Kimberley, not only Cronje, but the whole of the Boer + force which was not engaged in Natal. I should have then been + obliged either to march across the veld against this increased + force, or to have transported the greater portion of my troops by + rail to the Modder River camp (if the railway could have been + kept intact, which was hardly likely, seeing how weakly it was + necessarily guarded and the number of Boers who would have been + available to destroy it), and then to turn the Magersfontein + position. To carry out either of these operations, and for the + onward advance on an extended front to Pretoria, at least the + same amount of transport would have been required as was needed + for the march from Modder River camp to Bloemfontein. But this + would not have been forthcoming had I adopted the railway line to + Bloemfontein and not organised the system of transport directly I + arrived at the Cape. + + * * * * * + + "I felt convinced that an advance on Bloemfontein must draw the + Free Staters back from Kimberley and Natal, and that the + occupation of their capital would render the Boer positions to + the south of the Orange river untenable. To carry out this + scheme, as large a force as could be collected was necessary, as + the enemy had through railway communication (about two days' + journey) between Natal and Bloemfontein, and could transfer a + considerable portion of their forces from one of the theatres of + the war to the other in infinitely less time than we could. + Moreover, rapidity was essential in concentrating this force and + making an advance towards Bloemfontein, as Ladysmith and + Kimberley were, so far as I know, only provisioned for a very + limited time." + +[Sidenote: His reason for deciding against the railway through +Jacobsdal.] + +It will be seen that Lord Roberts rejected Sir R. Buller's suggestion +that a railway should be made through Jacobsdal to Bloemfontein. +Colonel Girouard had estimated that this line could be constructed at +the rate of a mile a day without interfering with the traffic for the +supply of the troops, and, in an offer made to the Home Government by +a private firm, hope had been held out that the work might be carried +through at the rate of five or six miles a day, or in other words, +that, assuming fighting conditions to be favourable, the whole would +be finished in about a month. The latter estimate seemed altogether +too sanguine. Moreover, the practical difficulty of guarding those +employed on the required task from the raids of a mobile enemy would +have been very great. Finally, the chance of surprise would have been +lost, and, hard to secure as secrecy in, military projects had been +found in South Africa, Lord Roberts was certain that to obtain +decisive results the complete concealment of his plan of operations +was essential. + +[Sidenote: Reinforcements from home.] + +Great exertions had been made during the period of his voyage to South +Africa, both by the Government and by private individuals, to provide +the troops needed for the success of these schemes. He was informed of +the result of these exertions by the following telegram from Lord +Lansdowne of 9th January: + + "Please let us know what you think about further reinforcements + as soon as you have thoroughly examined the situation. We have + arranged for the following reinforcements in addition to the 7th + Division, viz.: + + "1. Four brigade divisions Field Artillery, embarking as soon + after the 20th January as possible. + + "2. One volunteer company for each line battalion, amounting in + all to about 7,000. + + "3. The City of London regiment of Volunteers, and the battery of + the Honourable Artillery Company.[292] + + [Footnote 292: The City of London Imperial Volunteers was + formed as a special regiment under a Royal Warrant, dated + 24th December, 1899, and organised under a Special Army + Order, dated 6th January, 1900. The regiment was raised by + the Lord Mayor and his committee under instructions + informally given between the 16th December and the date of + the Order of 6th January, which embodied these instructions. + + The employment of the Service companies of the Volunteers was + regulated by a Special Army Order, dated 2nd January, 1900.] + + "4. One Field Artillery battery of Volunteers from Elswick. + + "5. Colonial contingents, inclusive of four artillery batteries, + mostly mounted, and amounting in all probably to about 3,000. + + "6. Seven Militia battalions. + + "Of these some have already started. As to the Imperial Yeomanry, + it is not yet possible to say what number will be raised, but + 4,000 at least will probably be the total, and the material, + though raw, is good.[293] We have also mobilised a cavalry + brigade which could embark at once. If, however, it is sent, only + the remainder of the Household cavalry and five line regiments + will be left at home. Do you wish to have it? We are also + mobilising the 8th division, which could begin to embark about + the 20th February, but if it goes there will only be seven + infantry battalions left, and unless the 8th division is urgently + required this reduction of the home garrison does not appear + desirable, in view of the general outlook. It might answer your + purpose if we sent for the lines of communication eight or more + Militia battalions instead." + + [Footnote 293: The original proposal to organise regiments of + Yeomanry for service in South Africa was made by Lord Chesham + and other Yeomanry officers in October, 1899. Sanction for + the formation of the corps of "The Imperial Yeomanry" was + given by Royal Warrant, dated 24th December, 1899. Under a + Special Army Order of 4th January, 1900, a committee of + Yeomanry officers was constituted to administer the force. + This committee was dissolved in May, 1900, the administration + being then taken over by the War Office. The first + contingent, which went out early in 1900, numbered about + 10,000. A second contingent went in the spring of 1901, + numbering about 17,000; and a third contingent, of about + 7,000, in the winter of 1901-1902.] + +To this telegram Lord Roberts replied on the 12th January: + + "As to reinforcements that may be required, I am a little + diffident about giving a definite opinion until matters still + further develop and the result is known of Buller's operations to + relieve Ladysmith. I trust that if White and Buller succeed, + without very heavy losses, in joining hands, it will not be + necessary to send the 8th division or another brigade of cavalry. + For the lines of communication I shall require eight Militia + battalions, in addition to the seven already detailed, but I + should prefer thirteen Militia battalions, and if Lord Cromer + agrees, the two Highland battalions which are now in Egypt, two + of the Militia battalions to be sent there, taking the places of + the latter. I hope, with the regular forces already under orders, + the 4,000 Imperial Yeomanry, and the volunteer battalion, and the + Colonial details referred to in your telegram, that the force in + South Africa will be sufficient, and am most reluctant to request + the despatch of more troops from home." + +[Sidenote: Large numbers of mounted corps raised.] + +Immediately on his arrival the Field Marshal strove to systematise and +support the efforts of the many South African colonists who were +pressing to be allowed to take up arms in self-defence. Their +embodiment had already been sanctioned by Sir R. Buller and approved +by the Home Government. Colonel Brabant's corps was expanded into two +regiments, and their leader appointed a brigadier-general to command a +Colonial division, composed of his own two regiments (Brabant's +Horse), the Cape Mounted Rifles, Kaffrarian Rifles, Border Horse, and +Queenstown Rifle Volunteers. Two new mounted corps, entitled Roberts' +Horse and Kitchener's Horse, were raised, besides numerous local +defence corps, such as Nesbitt's and Bayley's from the eastern +province, and Orpen's from the Hopetown district. The mounted troops +at Lord Roberts' disposal were further substantially increased by the +formation of mounted companies from all battalions of the line serving +in Cape Colony.[294] By this means sufficient units were formed to +make up eight additional mounted infantry battalions, but, owing to +the difficulty in procuring remounts, the greater part of these did +not receive their horses until the first week of February. + + [Footnote 294: It had for many years been the practice in + South Africa to mount at least one company of each battalion + in the command, but this had not been carried out at the + commencement of the war in battalions as they arrived from + England.] + +[Sidenote: The transport arrangements.] + +The provision of sufficient and suitable transport for the new army +now being organised was a question which naturally needed the +consideration of Lord Roberts and his staff. From the first, even +before war was generally regarded as inevitable, the subject had been +found to be beset with difficulties. The nature of the country +permitted little deviation from, or modification of, that form of +transport which experience has taught the dwellers in the land to +adopt. The roughness of the tracks across the veld, which were given +the deceptive name of roads, necessitated a particular build of +vehicle, while the draught animals which could be employed were almost +exclusively oxen and mules. The pace at which oxen are able to move, +and the fact that they must graze in the daytime, limit the length of +a march and the hours of working. Nevertheless, oxen can draw far +greater loads than mules, can work over heavy ground in wet weather, +and for most of the year depend for their sustenance on grazing alone. +On the other hand, mules travel more quickly, and can feed at any time +of the day or night, but forage for them must be carried, since +grazing alone is not sufficient to keep them in working condition--and +their loads must be lighter; their use, therefore, increases the +amount of transport and the length of the column. With mixed +transport, drawn partly by mules and partly by oxen, the daily +distance is regulated by the slower animal. In ordinary circumstances +mules may do sixteen to eighteen miles a day, but oxen can hardly be +counted on for more than twelve for many days in succession. It was +because of such considerations that Sir R. Buller reported to Lord +Roberts on his arrival that "there is no such thing as a rapid advance +anywhere in South Africa, except by railway."[295] + + [Footnote 295: Memorandum dated December 28th, 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Difficulties in providing both kinds of transport.] + +Ox-transport could only be obtained in South Africa itself. A system +of contracts organised by Colonel Bridge and the officers who +accompanied him had hitherto enabled all troops to be fully supplied +on their arrival with such ox-transport as was necessary for +them.[296] The Bechuanaland district of Cape Colony was the best +ox-wagon country, but as this was occupied by the enemy there remained +only the eastern parts of the Colony upon which to draw. In default of +a general application of Martial Law, "commandeering" was not +possible. Prices consequently ruled high, and at one time some doubt +existed whether all demands could be met. By the middle of November, +the steady influx of imported mules dispelled this anxiety, and +numbers in excess of the contracts were also assured. The local supply +of mule-wagons could not, however, keep pace with the demand, and was +supplemented by the despatch of vehicles from England. These began to +arrive in December, and on the 11th January the General Officer +Commanding the lines of communication was able to report to the +Secretary of State that "... speaking in general terms, units of all +sorts have been completed with authorised or extempore regimental +transport and equipment on arrival." + + [Footnote 296: Col. C. H. Bridge, Army Service Corps, took up + the duties of Director of Supplies and Transport on July + 30th, 1899, and held this position until the arrival of Col. + W. Richardson on October 3rd.] + +[Sidenote: Ox-transport, left by troops moved to Natal, available for +reinforcements expected. Mule-wagons gradually received from England.] + +The transference to Natal of a large part of the field force, +originally destined to advance from Cape Colony, released the +ox-transport prepared for those troops and left it available for the +reinforcements which were on their way from England. The Transport +staff had, therefore, no difficulty in providing a sufficient amount +of ox-transport to meet Lord Roberts' needs. Of mules there was a +large number in hand. These, for the sake of economy, had been +collected in batches, at various places where they could be kept +without heavy expenditure, pending the receipt of mule-wagons and +harness. But although, as troops were placed under orders at home, +every effort was made to provide both wagons and harness for them in +advance, the supply reaching South Africa, especially of mule-harness, +was necessarily intermittent. Transport and equipment for the 7th +Division had been shipped from England in December, and was coming in +daily. Sir F. Forestier-Walker reported on January 14th that, as far +as could be foreseen, "the provision of wagons already made is much +more than our known requirements," _i.e._, on the scale which had +hitherto been accepted. + +[Sidenote: System existing. "The Regimental."] + +The allotment of transport which had been made prior to the +Field-Marshal's arrival was based on principles worked out by the +Mobilisation branch of the War Office, and embodied in the regulations +entitled, "War Establishments, 1898." Under these rules the +distribution was as follows:[297] + + [Footnote 297: This system was commonly termed in South + Africa the "Regimental System," although the regimental + transport was in fact only about one-eighth of the whole.] + +(A.) Regimental transport, _i.e._, transport allotted to regiments and +battalions, and placed under charge of an officer and small staff +furnished by the unit. This was available for the general service of +the station where the unit was posted.[298] It was sub-divided into: + + [Footnote 298: Para. 10A, "Instructions regarding Regimental + Transport, South African Field Force," issued October, 1899.] + + 1. First Line Transport--for ammunition, entrenching tools, + medical stores, signalling equipment, machine gun, and + water-carts. + + 2. Second Line Transport--for regimental equipment, blankets, + baggage, and rations and forage for one day or more. + +(B.) The Supply Column.--An Army Service Corps organisation forming +the first reserve, and carrying at least one day's ration, an +emergency ration for every man, and one day's forage for every animal. + +(C.) The Supply Park.--Under the supply and transport officers of the +Army Service Corps. The park carried at least three days' rations and +forage, but this amount could be increased as circumstances might +dictate. + +(D.) Auxiliary Transport.--To be composed of excess or reserve +transport organised in companies under Army Service Corps officers. +It was intended primarily for use on the lines of communication.[299] + + [Footnote 299: A scheme for this existed and regulations had + been issued, but prior to Lord Roberts' arrival there had + been no excess transport to enable the scheme to be put into + operation.] + +(E.) Technical Transport.--To meet the requirements of ammunition +columns, Royal engineers, technical equipment, medical units, and any +special purpose, such as the Naval heavy guns.[300] + + [Footnote 300: Excepting for the last-named, transport for + each of these units had been issued in Cape Town, October, + 1899.] + +[Sidenote: Proportion drawn by oxen and mules.] + +Arrangements had been made in South Africa that (A) the regimental +transport and (B) the supply column should be entirely drawn by mules. +The supply park (C) consisted solely of ox-wagons with spans of +sixteen oxen. The remainder of the transport had partly ox and partly +mule draught, although in Natal ox-transport was mainly used. Under +the conditions of the local contracts all ox-wagons were grouped in +sections of ten, with a conductor and sub-conductor for each section. +These sections of ten were organised in sub-divisions of fifty and +divisions of one hundred wagons, respectively under a sub-inspector +and an inspector. + +[Sidenote: Lord Roberts recasts the transport system.] + +[Sidenote: S.A. Army orders of Jan. 24th, 1900, and Jan. 29th +determine details of change.] + +This system had the advantage that, being prescribed in the existing +regulations, it was more or less familiar to staff and regimental +officers; moreover, the organisation of the Army Service Corps for +field service had been adapted to it. But against this had to be set +the serious objection of its extravagance. Under the regulations, the +transport allotted to units employed as garrisons or for other reasons +remaining stationary, would be idle and wasted. Without the transport +so lost the mobility needed to carry out the Commander-in-Chief's plan +would be unattainable. Lord Roberts therefore decided that in order to +equip his army, so as to enable it to operate with rapidity at a +distance from the railway, the transport must be reorganised.[301] The +regimental mule-transport from units was to be called in and formed +into transport companies, which could be attached to brigades or +columns in whatever manner the circumstances of the moment required. +In short, decentralisation was to be replaced by concentration of the +transport for redistribution in proportion to the wants of the +service. The change of system was effected successfully under the +supervision of Lord Kitchener and Major-General Sir William Nicholson +whose experience of similar arrangements in Egyptian and Indian +campaigns were of much assistance to the Commander-in-Chief. Returns +of the mule-transport in possession of units were called for, and on +January 24th an Army order was published withdrawing mule-transport +with certain exceptions. On the 29th January a further order was +issued, giving the details of the vehicles which were to remain with +units and stating how their draught was to be provided. The general +transport obtained by this withdrawal was formed into companies of +four sections each, each company consisting of forty-nine wagons, one +Scotch cart, and a water-cart; it was calculated that one of these +companies would suffice to carry the baggage and two days' supply of +food and forage for an infantry brigade of four battalions or a +cavalry brigade of three regiments. The ox-transport was organised in +companies of one hundred wagons each, from which convoys could be +formed, as required, to fulfil the functions of the supply columns of +the previous system.[302] These transport companies were placed under +Army Service Corps officers, and the administration of the whole was +at first undertaken by the Deputy Adjutant-General for Supplies and +Transport, Colonel Richardson, who had been transferred from the lines +of communication to the Headquarter staff. The general principles now +adopted were that complete transport, and transport animals for +certain vehicles still left in charge of units, should be placed at +the disposal of the commander of any force when it was ordered to +move; such transport was to remain with that force during the move, +but on its completion was to be returned to the transport department, +so as to be again available for whatever duty was most urgent. + + [Footnote 301: The "regimental" system was, however, retained + by the force under Sir R. Buller until the break up of the + Natal army, in October, 1900.] + + [Footnote 302: Mule companies had 520 mules; ox companies, + 1,600 oxen.] + +[Sidenote: Difficulties in practice.] + +Some difficulties naturally arose. By the abolition of regimental +transport the services of the regimental officers and non-commissioned +officers hitherto employed on that duty were regained by their corps, +but were lost to the transport department. The personnel of the Army +Service Corps was not equal to the demands thus made upon it, and it was +found necessary to allot two transport companies to one company of Army +Service Corps, and to attach to these so-formed companies officers of +other branches as they happened to be available. Moreover, to ensure the +requisite amount of mule-transport for the combatant portion of the +troops that of bearer companies and of field hospitals was cut down. In +the former the number of ambulances was reduced from ten to two, and for +the latter only two wagons could be allowed in place of four. On the +other hand, owing to fear of a scarcity of water on the intended march, +the number of water-carts with the medical units was doubled. The +mule-transport was speedily assembled at the places ordered. The +concentration of the ox-transport for convoy purposes took a longer +time, but partly by rail and partly by march route it was completed soon +enough to enable the Field-Marshal to carry out his plan of operations. + +[Sidenote: Supplies on the coast ample. The difficulty of getting them +forward and distributing them.] + +Owing to the efforts of the Quartermaster-General's department of the +War Office, a steady stream of supplies had, since the beginning of +the war, been poured into the country, and had removed all anxiety as +to the possibility of food or forage running short at the coast. The +difficulty was the transmission of these up country simultaneously +with the troops and their equipment. Arrangements were made by the +railway staff which enabled sufficient quantities to be forwarded from +the sea bases and to be accumulated at Orange River, De Aar, and at +depots between the Orange and Modder rivers. For the forward move into +the Orange Free State two days' supplies were to be carried by the men +and two days' in the mule-transport allotted to brigades; the brigade +supplies were to be filled up from convoys moving in rear of the +troops, and for this purpose some five hundred ox-wagons, carrying ten +days' rations and forage, were assembled.[303] + + [Footnote 303: The cavalry division was accompanied by a + supply park on the old system.] + +[Sidenote: Separation of supply and transport.] + +These changes foreshadowed the separation of supply and transport into +two departments, a separation which, shortly after the advance into +the Free State had begun, was carried out by the transfer of +Major-General Sir W. G. Nicholson from the appointment of Military +Secretary to that of Director of Transport. Colonel Richardson still +continued to have charge of supplies. + +[Sidenote: Increase of heavy artillery.] + +Meantime, steps were taken to improve the artillery equipment of the +army in South Africa. Prior to the war it had been ascertained by the +Intelligence department that the Boers had in their possession several +150 m/m Creusots and a battery of 120 m/m howitzers, but the +cumbersome carriages on which the former weapons were mounted had led +to the belief that they were intended solely for use in the forts and +positions near Pretoria and Johannesburg. The howitzers had been +classified in the intelligence reports as field artillery armament, +because in the year before the war the French, Austrian, and German +armies had added howitzers to their field equipment. The enterprise of +the Boers in bringing 150 m/m (6-in.) guns into the field at the +outset of the campaign formed in a sense a new departure in modern +warfare, although in 1870 fortress guns had been taken from Belfort +and used in the fighting on the Lisaine. On the receipt of Sir George +White's report that one of these guns had been employed against the +troops at Dundee, telegraphic orders, at the suggestion of +Major-General Sir John Ardagh, were sent out by the War Office to Cape +Colony to insure the immediate despatch to Natal of two 6.3-in. R.M.L. +howitzers, lying at King William's Town, the property of the Cape +Government.[304] The arrangements made by the Naval Commander-in-Chief +for the despatch to the front of Naval contingents, placed at the +disposal of the military authorities, both in the western and eastern +theatres of war, a number of long-range guns which, in the skilled +hands of the officers and men of the Royal Navy and Marines who +accompanied them, rendered valuable service. The War Office also took +immediate action to reinforce the arm. On the 9th of December a +battery of four 4.7-in. Q.F. guns, manned by a company of R.G.A., was +despatched from England to South Africa, together with eight 6-in. +B.L. howitzers, which formed part of the approved siege train of the +army. On the 22nd two companies with eight 5-in. B.L. followed. On the +22nd January two more companies with eight 4.7-in. Q.F., mounted on +6-in. howitzer carriages, were embarked for the Cape, and supplemented +on the 28th by six additional guns of the same type, intended to +replace any naval guns which might be showing signs of deterioration. +On the 3rd of February another batch of eight 5-in. B.L. guns, +accompanied by two companies R.G.A., left Southampton in order to +relieve some of the naval contingents; on the previous day a battery +of four 9.45-in. B.L. howitzers had been embarked with the necessary +personnel. The only further additions made during the war to the heavy +armament were four 6-in. howitzers sent out at Lord Roberts' request +on 27th April, 1900, and two 5-in. B.L. guns despatched at the end of +the same year to replace two which had become unserviceable. With the +exception of the howitzers the whole of these guns were taken from +forts. Carriages for them were improvised by the Ordnance department. +The use by the Boers of the 37 m/m Vickers-Maxim Q.F. guns,[305] +nick-named "pom-poms" by the men, was met by the despatch of +forty-nine of these weapons from England. Another important change was +the introduction of a longer time-fuse for use with field guns. The +regulation time-fuse at the outbreak of the war burnt in flight for +twelve seconds only, suited to a range of 4,100 yards for the 15-pr. +B.L. guns and 3,700 yards for the 12-pr. B.L. Experiments had been +already made by the Ordnance Committee to obtain a satisfactory +time-fuse effective for longer ranges, and on receipt of reports of +the extreme distance at which the Boers were using their field +artillery, these were rapidly pushed on, with the result that by the +middle of January fuses capable of burning twenty-one seconds, +corresponding to a range of 6,400 yards, were sent to South Africa. + + [Footnote 304: As will be seen in the account of the siege of + Ladysmith (Vol. II.), these howitzers arrived in time and + proved most useful.] + + [Footnote 305: It was known before the war that the Boers had + purchased a considerable number of "pom-poms." The artillery + authorities of the army did not at that time attach much + importance to them, but, as their fire was found to produce + great moral effect, guns of this type were sent out at Sir R. + Buller's request.] + +[Sidenote: Railway system.] + +At no time was a heavier call made on the personnel and material of +the Cape Government railways than during the concentration for Lord +Roberts' advance into the Free State. At an early date an organisation +for the control of the transport of troops and stores by rail had been +instituted, and had gradually been perfected by experience. +Lieutenant-Colonel Girouard, R.E., the Director of Railways, had +arrived with a staff of fifteen officers at Cape Town towards the end +of October, 1899, and had, under the orders of the General Officer +Commanding the lines of communication, initiated a system based on the +principle that it was the controlling staff's duty to keep in close +touch with the permanent traffic officials of the railway and to act +as intermediaries between them and the military commanders. Much to +his satisfaction, the Director of Railways had found on his arrival +that "all the British lines were in good working order and +administered by a highly loyal, capable, and enthusiastic staff +prepared for any emergency, including risks of war."[306] In +conjunction with this permanent staff, of whom Mr. C. B. Elliott was +the General Manager and Mr. T. R. Price the Traffic Manager, +uniformity of military administration throughout the whole railway +system of Cape Colony was speedily established.[307] The technical +working of the railways was left entirely in the hands of the civil +officials, supported and protected by the military controlling staff +from interference by officers or men. Repairs to the line were +undertaken by the railway troops of the R.E.,[308] with such of the +British employes of the Orange Free State railway as had not, at the +outbreak of the war, been absorbed into the permanent staff of the +Cape Government railways. The number of skilled artisans thus +available was insufficient for the reconstruction of the Norval's Pont +and Bethulie railway bridges and other extensive works which it was +foreseen would be necessary in order to make good the damage done by +the enemy in his retreat. The Director of Railways accordingly +obtained leave to avail himself of the offer of Messrs. L. I. Seymour +and C. A. Goodwin, leading mining engineers of Johannesburg, to form a +corps of the miners and artisans, thrown out of employment by the war. +With the title of the Railway Pioneer regiment, it was placed under +the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Capper, R.E., Messrs. Seymour +and Goodwin being appointed wing commanders, having the rank of major. +The material needed for the construction of temporary bridges at +Norval's Pont and Bethulie and for the rapid reconstruction of the +permanent bridges at these points was, during the month of January, +prepared. + + [Footnote 306: General Report on Military Railways, South + Africa, by Lieut.-Col. Sir E. P. C. Girouard.] + + [Footnote 307: The conditions in Natal differed considerably + from those in Cape Colony, and the system of railway + administration was modified accordingly, but here, too, the + military staff received the most loyal assistance in every + way from Sir David Hunter and the rest of the civil staff.] + + [Footnote 308: The 8th and 10th Railway Companies, 20th, 31st + and 42nd Fortress companies R.E.] + +Joubert's circular letter, referred to on p. 410 as having had great +importance because it enjoined a passive defensive attitude on all +Boer commanders at the very time when Lord Roberts was designing an +active offence, ran as follows:-- + + 29.12.99. + +FROM COMDT.-GENERAL TO ACTG. GENERAL DU TOIT. + +FELLOW OFFICERS,-- + +It is obvious that England is exasperated that her army is not able, +against the will of our God, to annihilate us and to overwhelm us as +easily as they had expected. While they were governed and inspired by +this thought, the name of Sir Redvers Buller was on the lips of +everybody and his praise and prowess were elevated to the clouds. Now +that our God and Protector has revealed His will, and Buller has not +succeeded in crushing the hated Boers, or, as Sir Alfred Milner has +it, the Boerdom, and to subjugate them and to banish from the face of +the earth the name which God, as it were, had given them--now they, +instead of admitting and acknowledging their fault and looking for it +in the right place, want to have a scapegoat, and for this purpose Sir +Redvers Buller must serve; he is not brave enough, not wise enough; he +is not strong and powerful enough to carry on the war for them against +the will of the High God of Heaven and to annihilate the Africander in +South Africa. Many a person now deems it well that Buller has been +humiliated; but I have to say in regard to this that when I withstood +General Colley in the same way in the War of Independence, he was +urged to attempt a successful battle before his successor could +arrive, as he would otherwise lose all military honour and fame. He +was moved to such an extent that he acted on the suggestion, ascended +Amajuba Hill, which is to-day still so intensely hated by the blinded +Englishman and Jingo, where the Lord then said, "Thus far and no +further." And now, my friends, you may suspect and expect that Mr. +Buller will receive the same advice, and that he may attempt to do as +the late Sir George Colley had done. Therefore, he will issue orders +either here at Colenso, at Ladysmith, Scholtz Nek, or elsewhere where +there is an English force in South Africa, to attempt a successful +action, either by means of a sortie or attack, or in some other way, +in order, if possible, to regain his good name and military fame. For +this reason we must, in firm faith in the help of our faithful and +beloved God, be on our guard against such action. I very much fear a +night attack, when our men are not alert and on their guard. The +fright in case of a false alarm, when so much ammunition is blindly +wasted, makes me fear that a disaster may be in preparation, and +demonstrates that the burghers are not organised properly on outpost +duty. On dark nights the outposts should be strengthened to such an +extent that they could almost independently hold their position. In +all cases at least the half of the outpost guard, if not two-thirds, +must remain awake, so that the men are not aroused from sleep with +fright and confusion, but, being on the alert, can independently offer +defence. Therefore, let the words of our Lord be impressed on the mind +of everyone: "Watch and pray, lest ye enter into temptation." Our +enemy is not only powerful, but also artful, and treason is +continually taking place, for it appears from the newspapers that the +enemy is even cognisant of our most secret plans, and we cannot +advance, but remain stationary, while the enemy is continually +strengthening himself. + +Your sincere friend, + + P. J. JOUBERT, + Comdt.-General. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. + +THE ARMY MOVES FORWARD. + + +[Sidenote: The intended stroke.] + +The first stage in the realisation of Lord Roberts' plan of campaign +must necessarily be the transfer to the neighbourhood of Lord +Methuen's camp of the army with which it was his purpose to manoeuvre +Cronje out of Magersfontein, to relieve Kimberley, and strike for +Bloemfontein. + +[Sidenote: The problem. How solved.] + +The problem was to carry out this transfer without allowing the Boer +General to suspect the design with which it was made, and, till this +first movement was completed, in order to gain time for it, to keep +him as long as possible uncertain whether the real advance would not +be, as he had always hitherto supposed, along the railway which runs +directly from Colesberg by Norval's Pont to Bloemfontein. Both +purposes were accomplished with rare success. It becomes, therefore, +in all ways interesting, as a study of the larger scope of the +campaign, to realise by what means this result was secured. In all +war, and in every campaign, so far as the two opposing commanders are +concerned, it is the play of mind upon mind which is the ruling +factor. To put himself in the place of the man whom he must outwit, if +he is to give his soldiers the best chance of victory, is for each +commander the essential preliminary. To take such steps as will tend +to confirm that man in any false impressions he is known or reasonably +suspected to have received, and to conceal as far as possible those +measures which are preparing the way for the real stroke, are common +characteristics of all triumphant achievement. The means by which the +end is gained--reticence, the movement of troops in such a way as +will suggest that they are placed with one object when, in fact, the +posts chosen will make it easy to use them for another, the allowing +of subordinate, even high, commanders, to misconceive, until it is +necessary for them to know, why orders are given--all these are the +well-tried methods. The fact that rumours spread almost automatically +and quite invariably from camp to hostile camp, so that what is +believed on one side largely affects belief on the other, is one of +the fixed data on which much depends. The issue openly of fictitious +orders, cancelled by cypher messages, is another available means of +throwing a cloud over what is being done. The art lies in applying +these well-known principles to the particular case to be dealt with. +It will be found that in practice Lord Roberts took advantage of every +one of them; but without a clear understanding of the methods which +the long experience of war has taught those whose duty it is to study +it, the underlying motive of much that has now to be described would +not be clear. + +[Sidenote: Causes tending to deceive Cronje.] + +Many things tended to convince Cronje that it was along the railway +direct on Bloemfontein that the march into the Free State would be +made. The capture at Dundee, in October, 1899, of certain Intelligence +department papers by the Boers had shown them that this had been the +first design. During the weeks which had immediately followed Lord +Roberts' appointment to command, when, though he had not reached Cape +Town, at least the wider scope of manoeuvres might be supposed to be +directed by him, or to be in accordance with his wishes, the only +fierce fighting which had taken place was round Colesberg, and much of +it suggested a wish to secure the passage of the Orange river at +Norval's Pont, an obvious necessity if the great movement was to be +made along the Colesberg--Norval's Pont--Bloemfontein route. Outside +Natal this continued, after Lord Roberts arrived, to be even more the +case, and so far as Cape Colony was concerned, the distribution of +troops showed Norval's Pont as the central point of the front of +attack. Lord Methuen's line of communications, supply and +reinforcements through Orange River station marked the left, Gatacre's +slowly gathering division the right, and French, now close to +Norval's Pont, the centre. Without delaying the progress over Orange +River bridge, it was possible to strengthen the conviction in Cronje's +mind that it was at Norval's Pont that danger threatened. + +[Sidenote: and means taken to hoodwink him.] + +In the first place, the great number of wagons, horses and stores +which had to be passed up under the protection of Lord Methuen's +division, and of the troops immediately engaged in guarding the line, +needed ample time, and, as it was not easy for the Boers to +distinguish between what was required for Lord Methuen's army and the +accumulations that were being made for a very different purpose, this +necessary preparation for the decisive move was not likely to attract +much notice. If, therefore, a freshly-arrived division were sent to +French's neighbourhood, say from Port Elizabeth to Naauwpoort +junction, since its coming there was sure to be reported to the Boers, +it would not merely meet the need for having a reinforcement for +French available in case of emergency, which, as will be seen further +on, was the reason assigned at the time by Lord Roberts for sending +it, but it would help to confirm the idea that it was towards Norval's +Pont that the whole concentration was trending. The division and the +whole of French's command could be kept in this district to the last +moment, because of the cross railway which from Naauwpoort junction +runs to connect the railway from Port Elizabeth with that from Cape +Town to Kimberley. The troops moving up by this the most westerly line +would draw the less attention as long as the force at and near +Colesberg was formidable and active. When the right time was +come--that is, as it worked out, when French handed over to Clements +those who were to remain round Colesberg--all the rest, including the +new division, could be carried from Naauwpoort junction and so on +towards the Riet, being, during their passage, far in rear of the +fighting line around Colesberg. It will be easily seen from the map +how greatly the trace of the railways facilitated the removal of +strong bodies from the Naauwpoort--Colesberg region to the Kimberley +railway, the whole movement being screened by the fighting forces left +round Colesberg. + +[Sidenote: Further causes of success.] + +Cronje himself was a Transvaaler, and his principal line of supply +ran northwards through the ground held by the besiegers of Kimberley. +Although, therefore, many of those under him were from the Orange Free +State and likely to be disturbed by a movement against Bloemfontein, +any such danger appeared to be remote as long as the Orange river, +both at Norval's Pont and Bethulie, was in the hands of the Boers. His +retreat northwards was at all events quite secure. The reports of the +arrival of ever increasing numbers south of Lord Methuen's camp seemed +to imply that, whatever might be done elsewhere, his entrenchments +were to be again attacked, and as he wished for nothing better than +this, he very naturally interpreted the information he received in +accordance with his hopes. It was not difficult, therefore, to impose +on him, in this respect also, by demonstrations against the opposite +flank to that which Lord Roberts intended--not to attack but to pass +by on his route northwards--so placing his army ultimately athwart +Cronje's line of retreat. The execution of this scheme, the guiding +principles of which have thus been sketched, will perhaps now be more +easily followed in detail. It only remains to add here that the +fictitious orders, cancelled by cypher telegrams, were actually sent, +and were very useful in their effect of imposing on the Boers. + +[Sidenote: A railway scheme. Facilities and difficulties.] + +The interest of the whole scheme for modern soldiers lies in the fact +that it was an application of very ancient principles of war to the +times of railways and telegraphs. Everything turned upon the +facilities afforded by the railways on the one hand, upon the +difficulties which the railway authorities had to surmount on the +other, and, above all, upon this: that where accumulation of rolling +stock, vast in proportion to the resources of the country, had to be +collected from every direction upon a single line, it needed much tact +and management to make the preparations required to enable the +transport of troops, when once begun, to continue rapidly without +interruption, and yet not to disclose the secret. Engines were more +essential than anything else, and to obtain them in sufficient number +the Port Elizabeth lines had to be swept almost bare, although the +supply of the troops round Naauwpoort junction and Colesberg largely +depended on that railway. It may, therefore, be imagined how hard it +was to placate the zealous civil officials, who, without understanding +why it was done, found themselves deprived of the very instruments +needed for their work, and had as best they could to make bricks +without straw. All the organisation of this fell upon Colonel +Girouard, who had promised Lord Roberts to have the immense volume of +stores necessary for the campaign, as well as the troops, delivered at +the assigned stations by February 14th, on two conditions: one, that +absolute secrecy as to all that was being done should be strictly +observed, Girouard himself naming the men to whom he must disclose his +plans; the other, that when he had received his instructions as to the +places where delivery was to be made by the railway these should not +be changed. Unfortunately this latter condition could not be kept. +Honey Nest Kloof, which had been at first selected as the place for +the great camp and depot, was found to be inadequately supplied with +water, so that Graspan and Belmont inevitably replaced it. + +[Sidenote: The nature of task.] + +The fact that, with the exception of the two Generals, Kelly-Kenny and +French, who knew the scheme after French's visit to Cape Town, none of +the officers in the trains had any idea where they were going or what +was intended, and did not realise what was essential for the success +of the undertaking, occasionally gave trouble to the railway +authorities. For instance, water for the troops bivouacking at Graspan +was some two miles from the station, but the water indispensable for +the service of the railway was close to the spot where the +disembarkation from the carriages had taken place. Colonel Girouard +himself found to his horror that this, without which he could send no +train forward, was being freely expended by men and officers for their +own use. There was some delay before he secured an adequate guard to +protect it. Despite many incidents, equally inconvenient to this, time +was well kept and Lord Roberts' reliance on the silence and efficiency +of the officials was fully justified. + +[Sidenote: Secrecy and orders adapted to case.] + +Throughout the month of January Lord Roberts so directed the conduct +of operations and disposed of reinforcements arriving from England as +to mislead the Boer General as to his designs. His real intentions +were, in fact, known only to his Chief of the Staff (Lord Kitchener), +his Military Secretary (Major-General Sir W. G. Nicholson), to the +Director of Military Intelligence (Local Colonel G. F. R. Henderson), +and to those who had to make the railway arrangements, Colonel +Girouard, Major D. Murray, Assistant Director of Railways, Mr. T. R. +Price, Chief Traffic Manager, Major H. Hamilton, who acted as +intermediary for Lord Kitchener, and to Colonel C. P. Ridley, in +charge of the western line of communications. To Lord Methuen the +Commander-in-Chief wrote on the 11th January:-- + + "I have come to the conclusion that I must ask you to act + strictly on the defensive, and as it may be even necessary for me + to withdraw a portion of your force, you should consider how your + line of entrenchments could be sufficiently reduced to enable you + to hold the position with two, instead of three, brigades, and + possibly with one or two batteries and one regiment of cavalry + less than you have at present. Your request for four of the siege + 4.7-in. guns will be complied with, and when these reach you, you + will doubtless be able to make your position practically + impregnable. That the relief of Kimberley cannot be immediately + effected I am as sorry for, as I am sure you must be, but I trust + that it will still be possible for you to give the brave garrison + at that place a helping hand before they run short of supplies + and ammunition." + +To the central line of operations where, owing to the activity of +French, the strength of the enemy had increased, Lord Roberts +despatched the 6th division and placed a portion of one of its +brigades (the 12th, under Maj.-Gen. R. A. P. Clements) at French's +disposal. It was decided to give Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny a separate +command from Naauwpoort southward, leaving French to continue his +previous campaign against the enemy round Colesberg.[309] To General +French, therefore, the Field-Marshal addressed the following +instructions on the 12th January:-- + + [Footnote 309: Lt.-General Kelly-Kenny was very much senior + in the army to Lt.-General French, but the latter's local + commission as Lt.-General was of older date.] + + "As I see no chance of being able to leave Cape Town just at + present, and cannot therefore offer you my congratulations in + person, I write to let you know the satisfaction it has given me + to hear of the good work you have been doing in the neighbourhood + of Colesberg. + + "You will have learnt by telegram that we have sent you three + battalions of the 12th brigade under Clements. Kelly-Kenny, who + commands the 6th division, sails to-morrow for Port Elizabeth, + and the whole of his eight battalions will, I hope, be collected + shortly at Naauwpoort junction, I gather that the Boers are + increasing in strength between Colesberg and the river. It seems + almost certain that their numbers will be still further augmented + if Buller succeeds in relieving Ladysmith, for Joubert's force + will then be free, and he is almost certain to hurry his men to + the south-west in order to try and block our way into the Orange + Free State. + + "This may make the seizure of the Norval's Pont bridge out of the + question; as it would, however, be of such supreme importance to + get possession of this crossing of the Orange river, I shall be + greatly obliged if you will inform me whether you think the + operation in any way feasible. We could increase your force still + more, or what would probably be of even greater assistance to + you, we could threaten the enemy from the Orange River station + direction. The greatest secrecy and caution would be required, + and the seizure of the bridge could only be effected by a very + carefully-thought-out and well-planned _coup de main_, for, if + the Boers had the slightest inkling of our intention, they would + assuredly blow it up. There would, moreover, be no object in our + getting possession of the bridge, and thus risking a number of + valuable lives, unless it could be made perfectly secure on its + immediate northern bank, and this, from the nature of the ground, + might be impossible. + + "I hope that your men and horses are keeping thoroughly + efficient. Please take every care of them and save the horses as + much as possible, for, until we can get hold of some of the + regiments now in Ladysmith, yours is almost the only cavalry we + have to depend upon." + +The seizure of the bridge[310] would have been useful both in +deceiving Cronje and in facilitating later movements, but the +intricate ground on the northern bank of the river at that point would +have rendered further advance costly, and the defence of the bridge +itself difficult, and as yet it was unnecessary. French, therefore, +though he at the time knew nothing of the intended scheme, exactly +carried out what was the purpose of Lord Roberts' instructions when, +as recorded in Chapter XXIV., he, after the demonstration of January +25th, abandoned further efforts against Norval's Pont. It was not till +January 30th, during his brief visit to Cape Town, that he was given +two copies of the complete plan of operations, one for himself and one +for General Kelly-Kenny. It was no doubt due to these careful +precautions that the secret was so admirably kept as it was, and that +the Boers were so completely deceived as they were as to what was +going on.[311] + + [Footnote 310: See map No. 9.] + + [Footnote 311: President Steyn telegraphed to C. De Wet as + late as the end of January that the British advance would be + made by Colesberg, and suggested the despatch of + reinforcements to that point from Magersfontein. But De Wet, + who was now in command of all Free State troops in the + western theatre, having been transferred from Natal early in + December, refused, on the ground that if Magersfontein were + weakened, the British would make Kimberley their point of + attack. The records of the O.F.S. railway at this period show + how much anxiety was felt as to Colesberg. Between the 27th + December and 13th January 2,700 burghers passed through + Bloemfontein _en route_ to Norval's Pont, and between the + 25th January and 8th February (including a Heidelberg + commando over 500 strong between 6th and 8th) another 1,442; + not until the 9th was the stream of reinforcements for the + south stopped at Bloemfontein. By that time Lord Roberts + himself, and nearly all the army, including Kelly-Kenny's and + French's divisions, had reached their destination south of + the Riet.] + +Kelly-Kenny, with his division, less Clements' brigade, was to cover +the communications south of Naauwpoort, allay unrest and disaffection, +and open up the railway line as far as possible from Rosmead in the +direction of Stormberg, thus diverting attention from Gatacre. A +proposal made on the 23rd by him that French should be instructed to +seize Bethulie bridge by a forced march was refused by the +Field-Marshal, who, not to disclose his real reasons, told him that +the enterprise was a doubtful one; the country difficult, and strong +opposition would be offered to the move. To Sir W. Gatacre the +Commander-in-Chief issued orders on the 19th January that Dordrecht +should be garrisoned, and that Brabant's newly-formed Colonial +division should use that town as a base, and thence operate towards +Jamestown so as to menace the line of retreat of the Boer force at +Stormberg. Meanwhile Gatacre himself was to act strictly on the +defensive. Brabant was placed under his orders, but was to be given a +"perfectly free hand" and be allowed to report direct to Army +Headquarters. + +[Sidenote: Enemy perplexed. Move begun.] + +These various orders and instructions successfully effected Lord +Roberts' purpose. The distribution of the British troops perplexed and +confused the enemy, and the Boer leaders remained passive, making no +substantial change in their dispositions save to increase the strength +of the body covering the crossing to the north of Colesberg. By the +end of January Lord Roberts' staff had nearly finished the work of +preparation, and the Commander-in-Chief directed the concentration of +all available troops between the Orange river and the Modder for the +delivery of the stroke he had designed, leaving before Colesberg and +Magersfontein sufficient forces under the respective commands of +Major-General Clements and Lord Methuen to hold the enemy, at each of +these points, in check. It was on January 29th that General French was +summoned to Cape Town.[312] Immediately after his return the actual +transfer northwards of an army corps, made up of a cavalry division, +three infantry divisions, and some corps troops, was carried out. A +few details had started as early as the 28th. + + [Footnote 312: It is one of the sequels of any attempt to + preserve in war that secrecy which is the very master-key of + the house of success that the evidence of much that has been + done during the period of reticence is conflicting. The + actual motive which led Lord Roberts to desire General + French's presence at Cape Town was anxiety as to the + expenditure of horses and ammunition, which the brilliant + operations around Colesberg had involved. He did not summon + him in order to discuss with him the plan of campaign, which + was only incidentally disclosed to him during his visit. The + demonstration that in all essentials that plan had been + definitely formed; and that Lord Kitchener and Sir W. + Nicholson had been engaged in making the necessary changes in + the distribution of transport in order to carry it out; and + that they began this work about two or three days after Lord + Roberts arrived, is complete. Moreover, there is not a trace + in the records or in the memory of any of those at Cape Town + of an idea of employing in command of the cavalry division + anyone else but the man who had given so much cause to put + trust in him. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that General + French acquired the impression, from his conversations with + Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, that he only with difficulty + persuaded them on January 29th to send the cavalry division + and himself in command of it. What, other things apart, makes + it certain that this cannot have been so is that the cavalry + division moved at once when General French returned to + Colesberg. To make so sudden a change was a physical + impossibility. The preparations had required weeks of + strenuous work.] + +[Sidenote: The cavalry division.] + +The commander of the cavalry division was Lieut.-General J. D. P. +French. It consisted of three cavalry brigades and two M.I. brigades; +of these the 1st cavalry brigade (Brig.-Gen. T. C. Porter) was formed +of the 6th Dragoon Guards, 2nd Dragoons, one squadron of the +Inniskilling Dragoons, one squadron of the 14th Hussars, New South +Wales Lancers, and T., Q., and U. batteries R.H.A.; the 2nd cavalry +brigade (Brig.-Gen. R. G. Broadwood) was made up of the composite +regiment of the Household cavalry, 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers, and G. +and P. batteries R.H.A.; the 3rd cavalry brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. R. P. +Gordon), of 9th and 16th Lancers, and O. and R. batteries R.H.A. To +the 1st M.I. brigade (Colonel O. C. Hannay) were assigned the 1st, +3rd, 5th, and 7th regiments M.I., the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, +Roberts' Horse, Kitchener's Horse, and the Grahamstown Volunteers +M.I.; the 2nd M.I. brigade, commanded by Colonel C. P. Ridley, was +made up by the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th M.I. regiments, the City +Imperial Volunteers, Queensland M.I., and Nesbitt's Horse.[313] Each +cavalry brigade had an ammunition column, detachment of A.S.C., field +hospital, and bearer company. The division was given a field troop +R.E. and six transport companies. + + [Footnote 313: The New Zealand Mounted Rifles joined the + brigade on 14th February.] + +[Sidenote: The infantry divisions.] + +The infantry divisions were the 6th (Kelly-Kenny), the 7th +(Tucker[314]), which had landed from England during the fourth week of +January, and a new division, the 9th, to be formed under command of +Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Colvile. Of these divisions the 6th comprised the 76th +and 81st Field batteries, an ammunition column, the 38th company R.E., +the 13th infantry brigade, under Major-General C. E. Knox (composed of +2nd East Kent, 2nd Gloucester, 1st West Riding, and 1st Oxfordshire +L.I.), and a new brigade, the 18th, made up of the 1st Yorkshire, 1st +Welsh, and 1st Essex, under the command of Brigadier-General T. E. +Stephenson. The 7th division retained its original constitution, viz.: +the 14th brigade, under Major-General Sir H. Chermside (consisting of +2nd Norfolk, 2nd Lincolnshire, 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, and +2nd Hampshire), the 15th brigade under Major-General A. G. Wavell +(including 2nd Cheshire, 2nd South Wales Borderers, 1st East +Lancashire, and 2nd North Staffordshire), and as divisional troops, +the 18th, 62nd, and 75th Field batteries, an ammunition column, and +9th company R.E. The new 9th division, under Lieut.-General Colvile, +had as its nucleus the 3rd, or Highland brigade, now under +Major-General H. A. MacDonald (2nd Black Watch, 1st Highland Light +Infantry, 2nd Seaforth, and 1st Argyll and Sutherland). The other +brigade, to be termed the 19th, was assigned to Colonel H. L. +Smith-Dorrien, and was to be organised from the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's +L.I., 2nd Shropshire L.I., 1st Gordon Highlanders, and the Royal +Canadian regiment. The 65th (howitzer) and 82nd Field batteries, an +ammunition column, and 7th company R.E., formed Colvile's divisional +troops. Each of the infantry brigades included a bearer company, a +field hospital, and a detachment of the Army Service Corps. From each +of these divisions the cavalry was withdrawn and included in the +cavalry division. Two naval guns were attached to each of the 6th and +9th divisions, but the remainder of the naval brigade, under Captain +J. Bearcroft, R.N., was at first ordered to remain with Lord Methuen. +The only corps troops retained by the Commander-in-Chief were the 15th +company Southern division R.G.A., the 1st Telegraph division, and the +balloon section, Royal Engineers. Rimington's Guides were distributed +amongst the various columns. The total effective strength of the +force, including the Guards' and 9th brigades, which remained before +Magersfontein to hold Cronje in check, was a little under 40,000 men +and 108 guns. The battalions at this time much varied in strength, +those of the 13th brigade averaged but 721, those of the Highland +brigade 780, the battalions of the 15th brigade were as high as 900, +and the Guards' battalions reached the figure of 938. The cavalry +regiments had an average of about 473 all ranks. For details of units, +see Appendix 10. + + [Footnote 314: Lt.-General C. Tucker.] + +[Sidenote: Reinforcements asked for.] + +The intelligence of the failure of Sir R. Buller's operations against +Spion Kop forced the Field-Marshal on 28th January to telegraph to the +War Office that the despatch of the 8th division and another cavalry +brigade from England had become advisable, but, in deference to +reluctance felt by the Cabinet to denude further the home garrisons of +regular infantry, Lord Roberts suspended his request for them at +present until the result of later operations in Natal should be +known.[315] The brigade of cavalry was at once promised. + + [Footnote 315: The 8th division was again definitely asked + for on 28th February, and then granted.] + +[Sidenote: Demonstrations westward. MacDonald seizes Koodoesberg, Feb. +5th, 1900.] + +Lord Roberts did not wait for it, for his advance could no longer be +delayed. As the troops were pushed forward successively, it was +certain that the enemy must become aware of the assembly of so large a +number very close to Magersfontein, even though the concentration was +screened by Lord Methuen's and General Clements' forces. It was +essential, therefore, to distract Cronje's attention from the flank, +eastward of which the Field-Marshal meant to aim his blow. Nor were +there lacking ample excuses for demonstrations to the westward. The +very unsatisfactory condition of the districts south of Orange river +west of the Kimberley railway was known to the Boer leaders. Cronje +had already detached to Douglas 200 men and two guns, under Commandant +Liebenberg, to support a Cape rebel, L. F. Steinkamp, in raising the +standard of revolt in those regions. To counteract this effort, +Prieska had been re-occupied on 27th January by Lieut.-Colonel +Alderson with a battery and 600 M.I., but their immediate return to De +Aar was necessary, as the mounted men were needed for the general +advance. A diversion on a larger scale was now planned. By Lord +Roberts' order Lord Methuen temporarily attached to the Highland +brigade two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the 62nd Field battery, and +the 7th company R.E., and directed Major-General MacDonald to march at +5.30 on the morning of the 4th February to Koodoesberg Drift, where +the road from Kimberley to Douglas crosses the Riet at about twenty +miles below its junction with the Modder, and to begin the +construction of a fort covering this passage of the river. The column +halted at Fraser's Drift, seven miles out, and there bivouacked for +the night. Koodoesberg Drift was reached the following day. The hot +season was at its height. A reconnaissance was pushed to the +north-west. The top of the Koodoesberg, a long, flat-topped kopje, +about 1,200 yards from the river, was seized. It completely commanded +the drift. A mounted patrol of fifteen Boers retired from this hill as +the British cavalry approached. General MacDonald's force passed that +night on the south bank, being covered by two companies of infantry on +the far side of the river. At daylight, on the 6th of February, the +construction of a redoubt suitable for 200 men on a small knoll to +the north of the drift was begun. Almost immediately a patrol of 9th +Lancers reported that about 300 of the enemy[316] were creeping up the +northern slope of the Koodoesberg. The Major-General accordingly +ordered his brigade-major, Lieut.-Colonel Ewart, to advance rapidly +with the working parties on the hill and try to anticipate the +assailants at the summit. Ewart, supported by the Highland Light +Infantry under Lt.-Colonel Kelham, succeeded in doing so. A Boer +detachment which had already reached the top retired hastily. It was +then found that the plateau was some two miles in length, and +therefore too extensive for complete occupation. Kelham was +accordingly ordered to hold its southern edge, and the R.E. began to +build sangars across the narrow Nek which divided the south of the +hill from the main plateau. The Black Watch was moved over the river +to the right bank in support. In the afternoon arrived large +reinforcements, which had been despatched by Cronje from Scholtz Nek +to aid De Wet. These, estimated by the British troops to be about +2,000 strong,[317] enabled the enemy to push on again up the reverse +slopes of the Berg and definitely establish themselves on the northern +and western edges of the plateau. On this the British field-works were +further strengthened. Visser's homestead, a farmhouse lying in the +plain to the south-east of the kopje and to the north of the drift, +was placed in a state of defence, and occupied by two companies of the +Black Watch. The two squadrons of 9th Lancers during this time were +manoeuvred by Major Little near to the farm, with the object of +inducing the Boers to come out into the open and attack, but they +confined themselves all that afternoon to heavy sniping. At dusk the +companies of the H.L.I. on the eastern extremity of the Berg were +relieved by another company of that battalion and four companies of +the Seaforth. + + [Footnote 316: The actual strength of this force was 350. Its + leader was C. De Wet.] + + [Footnote 317: General De Wet officially reported that he + only received a reinforcement of 200 men. Other Boer accounts + give his total strength during the action as 800.] + +[Sidenote: Course of struggle.] + +As soon as it was dark the Boers dragged a gun, which, with a further +reinforcement of 200 men, had been received from Cronje, up the +north-western slopes of the hill, and at 9 a.m. (7th February) they +opened with shrapnel on the breastworks at the eastern edge of the +plateau. The troops holding that ground were now reinforced by two +more companies of the H.L.I. and four of the Black Watch, +Lieut.-Colonel Hughes-Hallett being placed in command. A little later +the cavalry patrols reported that a party of Boers was passing across +Painter's Drift, two miles down the river, to attack the left flank. +The defence of the bank of the Riet had been entrusted to Lt.-Colonel +A. Wilson, commanding the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and that +officer despatched two and a half companies of his battalion with two +guns, under Major E. B. Urmston, to meet this movement. The rest of +Major Granet's battery was in action on the left bank of the river +against the enemy's artillery. On the Koodoesberg itself there was a +sharp fight, and a few of the burghers crept within 300 yards of the +British sangars. The heat of the day was intense, and considerable +difficulty was experienced in conveying water and ammunition up the +steep slopes of the kopje to the British fighting line. Unfortunately, +this steepness at the same time rendered it almost impossible to +withdraw the wounded. Meanwhile Major Urmston's detachment frustrated +the attempt of the enemy, a Ladybrand commando under Commandant +Froneman, to work down the bed of the river from Painter's Drift. + +[Sidenote: MacDonald receives reinforcements.] + +[Sidenote: MacDonald withdrawn.] + +General MacDonald had early in the morning telegraphed to the Modder +camp for reinforcements. In response to this request a cavalry +brigade, with two batteries R.H.A. had been sent out under +Major-General Babington,[318] and about 3.15 p.m. could be seen at a +distance of about four or five miles to the north approaching the +river. MacDonald now hoped to assume the offensive, and reinforced +Hughes-Hallett with the remaining half-battalion of the Seaforth, +preparatory to a direct attack upon the Boers on the plateau, but, +owing to some misunderstanding, concerted action with the cavalry +brigade was not arranged until too late, and the general advance was +accordingly postponed until the following morning. The enemy, +meanwhile, fully realised that the arrival of the cavalry brigade +rendered his isolated position on the plateau no longer tenable. The +burghers, therefore, began slipping away from the hill, and by +nightfall had practically evacuated it, leaving their gun for some +time on the kopje unprotected save by a small escort. General +Babington tried to follow them up, but the Household cavalry, which +was in front, was checked by wire fences and came under heavy rifle +fire. Their attempt to cut off the gun was also quite stopped by +musketry from some thick bush and broken ground. The Boers +subsequently succeeded in removing the piece during the night, +although its descent from the kopje was a task of some serious labour +and took two hours. The Commander-in-Chief's object in making this +feint against the enemy's right had been gained. He had arrived that +morning at the Modder camp, and now ordered the two brigades to +return. General MacDonald therefore withdrew on the evening of the 8th +of February, having first ascertained by a reconnaissance that the +enemy had completely evacuated both the Berg and Painter's Drift. + + [Footnote 318: O. and R. batteries R.H.A., composite regiment + of Household cavalry, 16th Lancers, one squadron 10th + Hussars, one squadron 12th Lancers, and two troops of the + Scots Greys.] + +[Sidenote: Results of demonstration.] + +The British losses during this action were two officers and four men +killed, and five officers and forty-two men wounded. The Boers +admitted a loss of five killed and six wounded. Locally the results of +the engagement were hardly satisfactory, but nevertheless its effect +was exactly what had been hoped for, as General Cronje at once began +to reinforce his right and further strengthen his entrenchments on +that side. A simultaneous demonstration, also made to the westward, by +a body of 1,500 men under Brig.-Gen. Broadwood, helped to confirm the +Boer leaders' assumption that the relief of Kimberley would be +attempted by the west route. Broadwood reached Sunnyside on the 7th, +hoping to strike a blow at Liebenberg's commando at Douglas; but it +had already fallen back across the river, and the British, unable to +spare the time to pursue, retired on the 8th to Richmond, a farm +thirteen miles west of Graspan. + +[Sidenote: Numbers in South Africa, 4th Feb. 1900.] + +The Commander-in-Chief had at first intended to leave Cape Town for +the north on 30th January, but postponed his departure, as he found +that a little more time was required to collect between the Modder and +Orange rivers the troops he designed to employ. On the 4th February, +"to correct any misapprehension which may exist at the War Office as +to the total force at my disposal," the Field-Marshal informed the +Secretary of State by telegram that the effective strength of fighting +men in Cape Colony, exclusive of seven militia battalions and of the +garrisons of Kimberley and Mafeking, was 51,900, and that the entire +fighting strength of the force in Natal was estimated at 34,830, of +whom 9,780 were invested in Ladysmith. Under these circumstances Lord +Roberts recommended that the number of militia battalions in the +country should be increased to thirty, and that, if possible, two more +regular battalions should be sent, one from Malta and the other from +Egypt. Four days later Lord Roberts informed the War Office that he +would be glad if the whole of the 8,000 Imperial Yeomanry originally +asked for by Sir R. Buller could be sent out, and more, if available. +He suggested that additional mounted men should be raised in the +colonies, and added, + +"I trust you will make arrangements to supply us with horses from +Australia, India, and America. Our wants will, I fear, be +considerable." + +[Sidenote: Details of movement. 25th Jan. to 12th Feb. 1900.] + +On 6th February the Field-Marshal, accompanied by his Chief of the +Staff, left Cape Town for Lord Methuen's camp. Meanwhile the +concentration had gone on. The details of the moves by rail had been +worked out by the Director of Railways and the General Traffic +Manager; ten miles of additional sidings had been laid down between +Orange River and the Modder, and at these sidings, between the 28th of +January and the 12th of February, there were detrained some 30,000 +troops, with horses, guns, equipment, and transport, besides an +immense amount of supplies. Clements' brigade, with two squadrons +Inniskilling Dragoons, 660 Australian infantry who were in process of +being converted into mounted troops, 450 mounted infantry, two +batteries (J., R.H.A. and 4th R.F.A.) and a section 37th Howitzer +battery, lay round Rensburg to face General Schoeman's commandos. The +rest of Kelly-Kenny's division and French's original force were +brought round by rail to Orange River, the former unit being there +completed by the new brigade--the 18th--formed out of line of +communication battalions, under the command of Brig.-Gen. T. E. +Stephenson. Seven militia battalions, just disembarked from England, +were hurried up country to replace these regular battalions, and +protect the western and the central lines of rail. By the 8th of +February the cavalry division, except detachments of the 6th Dragoon +Guards and 14th Hussars and Hannay's M.I. brigade, had been assembled +at the Modder River camp under Lieut.-General French. Hannay's brigade +was at Orange River station; the 6th division at Modder River camp; +the 7th at Enslin and Graspan. Of the 9th division, the Highland +brigade was on the Riet, while the new 19th brigade was in process of +formation under Smith-Dorrien at Graspan. The distribution of troops +in South Africa on the 11th February, 1900, will be found in Appendix +10. + +[Sidenote: Motives of Lord Roberts. Instructions given below.] + +To Cronje it appeared that the English were about once more to hurl +themselves against his carefully-prepared entrenchments. Lord Roberts +had at last under his hand a force whose strength and mobility +permitted of the execution of a great turning movement, and warranted +the confident hope that the tide of fortune would turn in favour of +the British flag. It was his desire that the troops, about to engage +in this fresh enterprise, should reap to the full the benefit of the +practical experiences of the earlier actions of the war, both as +regards the special conditions of fighting in South Africa and the +modifications in tactics necessitated by the introduction of smokeless +powder and magazine small-bore rifles. He also recognised that the +tasks he was about to assign to his mounted troops would tax their +horses to the utmost, and was anxious to impress on all concerned the +necessity for the most careful horsemastership. He therefore issued +the following instructions:-- + + +NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE. + +INFANTRY. + +As it is desirable that full advantage should be taken of the +experience gained during the past three months by our troops in South +Africa, the following notes are issued for the guidance of all who may +find themselves in command of a force (large or small) on service in +the field. + +We have to deal with an enemy possessing remarkable mobility, +intimately acquainted with the country, thoroughly understanding how +to take advantage of ground, adept in improvising cover, and most +skilful in the use of their weapons. + +Against such an enemy any attempt to take a position by direct attack +will assuredly fail. The only hope of success lies in being able to +turn one or both flanks, or what would, in many instances, be equally +effective, to threaten to cut the enemy's line of communication. +Before any plan of attack can be decided upon, the position must be +carefully examined by reconnoitring parties, and every endeavour must +be made to obtain all possible information about it from the people of +the country. It must, however, be remembered that the position +ostensibly occupied is not always the one the Boers intend to defend; +it is often merely a decoy, a stronger position in the vicinity having +previously been prepared upon which they move rapidly, and from which +they can frequently bring a destructive fire to bear upon the +attacking line. Their marvellous mobility enables them to do this +without much risk to themselves, and also to be in strength at any +point of the position that may be seriously threatened. It follows, +therefore, that our object should be to cripple the mobility of the +Boers, and to effect this, next to inflicting heavy losses on the men +themselves, the surest means would be the capture or destruction of +their horses. + +When the extreme rifle range from the position is reached (1,500 to +1,800 yards) by the advance troops, or before, if they find themselves +under artillery fire, all column formations must be given up, and, +when advancing to the attack of the position, infantry must be freely +extended, even on occasions, if necessary, to six or eight paces, the +front and both flanks being well covered with scouts. This extended +formation will throw increased responsibility on battalion and company +commanders. The objective aimed at, therefore, should be carefully +explained to them. They should be allowed to make use of any +opportunity that may offer to further the scheme, on the distinct +understanding that no isolated acts are attempted, such as might +endanger the general plan. During the attack commanding officers must +be careful not to lose touch with the troops on their right and left, +and they should, as far as possible, ensure their co-operation. Every +advantage should be taken of cover, and battalion and company +commanders should look out for and occupy positions from which they +would be able to bring an enfilading fire to bear upon the enemy. The +capacity of these officers will be judged by the initiative displayed +in seizing rapidly every opportunity to further the general scheme of +attack. + +An essential point, and one which must never be lost sight of, is the +power of endurance of the infantry soldier. If infantry soldiers +(carrying as they do a considerable weight on their backs) are called +upon to march a longer distance than can reasonably be expected from +men in a normal state of health, or if they are injudiciously pressed +as regards the pace, they will necessarily commence to feel the strain +before they reach a point where their best energies are required to +surmount the difficulties which lie before them. If at such a period a +man feels exhausted, moral deterioration and the consequences to our +arms which such deterioration entails, must readily supervene. + + +ARTILLERY. + +As a general rule the artillery appear to have adapted themselves to +the situation, and to the special conditions which present themselves +in a campaign in South Africa. + +The following points, however, require to be noticed:-- + +1. At the commencement of an action artillery should not be ordered +to take up a position until it has been ascertained by scouts to be +clear of the enemy and out of range of infantry fire. + +2. When it is intended to take a position with infantry the +preparation by artillery should be thorough and not spasmodic. Unless +a strong force of infantry is pushed within 900 yards of the position, +the enemy will not occupy his trenches and the guns will have no +target. It is a mere waste of ammunition also to bombard an +entrenchment when the infantry attack is likely to be delayed, even +for a short time. To be of real value the fire of the guns should be +continuous until the assault is about to be delivered. + +3. The expenditure of ammunition is a matter which can only be +regulated by the circumstances of the moment, officers commanding +should, however, always bear in mind that the supply of artillery +ammunition in the field is necessarily limited. + +4. It is of great importance that artillery horses should be kept fit +for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the +duty of artillery officers to represent to the commander of the column +whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked, as +regards either pace or distance. + + +CAVALRY AND MOUNTED TROOPS. + +Similarly with cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save +them as much as possible, for unless this is done they cannot be +expected to last through a lengthened campaign. + +The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if for a few +minutes only at a time, and, on the line of march, it will be +advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their +horses. + +Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept +too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable +horses to withstand hard work, but they will never keep in condition +unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent. + +On the line of march scouting must be carried out by the mounted +troops in the most searching manner, in front and on both flanks. All +high ground should be visited and, whenever practicable, horsemen +should ride along ridges and hills. As soon as parties of the enemy +are observed the mounted troops (after sending back word to the +commander) should make a considerable detour round the position +occupied by the Boers, endeavour to estimate their numbers, and to +ascertain where their horses have been left. They should also see +whether, by threatening the Boers' line of communication, they would +not be forced to fight on ground unprepared for defence. + + ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, + Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. + + +Chief of Staff (Circular Memorandum). + + Cape Town, 5th February, 1900. + +The following notes by Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief are +communicated for the guidance of all concerned. + +By Order, + + KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, + Chief of Staff. + + +NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE. + +CAVALRY. + +1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one +day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be lightened as much as +possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with. + +2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly +when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessarily long halts are +made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the +cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the +country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the +Orange rivers its general features are such as to admit of small +parties of cavalry accompanied by field guns being employed with +impunity. + + +ARTILLERY. + +3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours +in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should +make use of this by not remaining in positions, the precise distance +of which from the enemy's batteries has evidently been fixed +beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers' fire is far +less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions compact +battery formations should be avoided. The guns should be opened out, +or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly, +retirements should be carried out at considerably increased intervals, +by alternate batteries or sections if necessary, and care should be +taken to travel quickly through the danger zone of hostile artillery +fire. + +The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in +deceiving our artillery on several occasions:-- + +Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder; +simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a powder flask of +black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in the rear, leading us to +direct our projectile on B. Careful calculation with a watch, however, +will defeat this plan. + + +INFANTRY. + +4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to +exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their +immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of +whistle calls by which a company lying in extended order could obey +orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for +such a system of whistle calls as would be useful. + +5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and +it seems desirable they should wear a distinguishing mark of some +kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck, or on the back of +the coat. + +6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the +sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such +soil is scraped even with a canteen lid, a certain amount of cover +from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time. + +7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the +most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution, which has +been suggested to me, is for a portion of the supports gradually to +creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the +supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing +line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it +reached the firing line, where it could be passed along as required. +This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but +it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost +impossible to carry out under fire. + +8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold +entrenchments _on the plain_ with the same tenacity and courage as +they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies +especially to night time, if they know that British infantry are +within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time +only can show. + + ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, + Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. + + + + +END OF VOL. I. + + + + +APPENDICES + + + + +APPENDIX 1. + + +REINFORCEMENTS SANCTIONED ON THE 8th SEPTEMBER, 1899. + + +--------------------+ + | STRENGTH | + Officers + |---- + | Other Ranks + | |------ + | | Horses + | | |----- + | | | Guns + | | | |---- + | | | | Ship in which embarked. + | | | | |----------- + | | | | | Place of embarkation. + | | | | | |---------- + | | | | | | Date of embarkation. + | | | | | | |-------- + | | | | | | | Place of + | | | | | | | disembarkation. + | | | | | | | |------- + | | | | | | | | Date of + UNIT. | | | | | | | | disembarkation. + ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + | | | | | | | | | + (_a_) FROM INDIA. + | | | | | | | | | + General | 3| 2| 7| --|_City of |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + Staff | | | | | London_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Cavalry | 9| 15| 23| --|_Pundua_ |Bombay | 22.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + brigade | | | | | | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 5th Dragoon | 21| 474| 523| 1|_Lindula_ |Bombay | 26.9.99|Durban |11.10.99 + Guards | | | | |_Patiala_ | | 8.10.99| |22.10.99 + | | | | |_Virawa_ | | 8.10.99| |25.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + 9th Lancers | 15| 476| 515| 1|_Wardha_[1]|Bombay | 24.9.99|Cape |18.10.99 + | | | | |_Nowshera_ | | 24.9.99| Town |15.10.99 + | | | | |_Nairung_ | | 25.9.99| |14.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + 19th Hussars| 23| 474| 533| 1|_Vadala_ |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 7.10.99 + | | | | |_Pundua_ | | 22.9.99| | 5.10.99 + | | | | |_Warora_ | | 23.9.99| | 9.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade Div.| 3| 1| 7| --|_Lalpoora_ |Bombay | 18.9.99|Durban | 2.10.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 21st battery| 5| 176| 152| 6|_Lalpoora_ |Bombay | 18.9.99|Durban | 2.10.99 + R.F.A | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 42nd battery| 5| 169| 153| 6|_Secundra_ |Bombay | 17.9.99|Durban | 4.10.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 53rd battery| 5| 173| 153| 6|_Booldana_ |Bombay | 19.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + R.F.A | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | 3| 90| 149| --|_Nevassa_ |Bombay | 27.9.99|Durban |12.10.99 + Column | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Infantry | 9| 20| 14| --|_City of |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + Brigade | | | | | London_ | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | 22| 843| 7| 1|_Sutlej_ |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + Devonshire | | | | |_City of | | | | + regt. | | | | | London_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | 29| 846| 5| 1|_Nurani_ |Calcutta | 20.9.99|Durban | 9.10.99 + Gloucester-| | | | |_India_ | | 24.9.99| |13.10.99 + shire rgt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 25| 844| 5| 1|_Purnea_ |Calcutta | 18.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99 + King's | | | | |_Nurani_ | | 20.9.99| | 9.10.99 + Royal Rifle| | | | | | | | | + Corps | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 29| 843| 6| 1|_Palitana_ |Bombay | 23.9.99|Durban | 9.10.99 + Gordon | | | | |_Sirsa_ | | | | + Highlanders| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Carried | | | | | | | | | + forward to | | | | | | | | | + _(b)_ | 206| 5,446|2,252|25[2] | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + (_b_) FROM HOME AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + division | | | | | | | | | + Staff and | | | | | | | | | + 18th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | | | | | | | | | + R.F.A. | 9| 182| 166| 6|_Zibenghla_|Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |30.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 62nd | | | | | | | | | + battery, | | | | | | | | | + R.F.A. | 4| 169| 151| 6|_Zayathla_ |Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |25.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 75th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | | | | | | | | | + R.F.A. | 4| 166| 151| 6|_Zayathla_ |Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |25.10.99 + | | | | |_Zibenghla_| | | Town |30.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | | | | | | | | | + column | 8| 202| 120| --|_Gaika_ |Southampton 30.9.99|Durban |29.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Headquarters| | | | | | | | | + and No. 1 | | | | | | | | | + Telegraph | | | | | | | | | + section, | | | | | | | | | + R.E. | 3| 55| --| --|_Jelunga_ |Southampton 20.9.99|Durban |26.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd Balloon | | | | | | | | | + section, | | | | | | | | | + R.E. | 2| 33| --| --|_Kinfauns |Southampton 30.9.99|Durban |26.10.99 + | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Northumberland | | | | | | | | + Fusiliers | 27| 784| 5| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Border | | | | | | | | | + regt.[3] | 26| 961| 6| --|_Sumatra_ |Malta | 27.9.99|Cape |21.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal Irish | | | | | | | | + Fusiliers | 26| 848| 5| --|_Avoca_ |Egypt | 24.9.99|Durban |12.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Rifle | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | 26| 835| 5| --|_Jelunga_ |Crete | 2.10.99|Durban |26.10.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Half 2nd | | | | | | | | | + battn. | | | | | | | | | + King's Own| | | | | | | | | + Yorkshire | | | | | | | | | + Light | | | | | | | | | + Infantry | 12| 438| 3| --|_H.M.S. |Mauritius | 6.10.99|Cape |14.10.99 + | | | | | Powerful_ | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service | | | | | | | | + Corps | 9| 130| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | |_Kinfauns | | 30.9.99| |18.10.99 + | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army | | | | | | | | | + Ordnance | | | | | | | | | + Corps | 1| 50| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + ------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- + TOTAL. | 363|10,299|2,864| 43 + | | | [2]|[4] + ----------------------------------- + +[Tablenote 1: _Wardha_ returned to Durban damaged and the squadron was +transferred to _Nevassa_.] + +[Tablenote 2: Includes seven machine.] + +[Tablenote 3: Subsequently went to Natal.] + +[Tablenote 4: Includes seven machines.] + + + + +APPENDIX 2. + + +The distribution of British forces under arms in Cape Colony on 11th +October, 1899. + + { Detachments 14th and 23rd cos., R.G.A. + CAPE PENINSULA { Headquarters 8th coy., R.E. + { Two cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers. + { 9th coy., Army Service Corps. + + STELLENBOSCH { Two cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers. + { 15th coy., Army Service Corps. + + { One section, 7th coy., R.E. + { One section, 29th coy., R.E. + DE AAR { 1st battn. Northumberland Fusiliers. + { Four cos., 2nd battn. King's Own Yorkshire + Light Infantry. + { M.I. coy., 1st battn. Northumberland Fusiliers. + + { One section, R.G.A. + { One section, 7th coy., R.E. + { Four cos., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire + { regt. + ORANGE RIVER STATION { Four cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers. + { M.I. coy., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire + regt., less detachment at Kimberley. + { M.I. coy., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers. + + { One section, 7th coy., R.E. + { 23rd coy., R.G.A. + { Diamond Fields artillery (six guns). + { Diamond Fields Horse. + KIMBERLEY { Four cos., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire + { regt. + { Kimberley regt. + { Town Guard. + { Detachment M.I. coy., 1st battn. Loyal North + Lancashire regt. + + FOURTEEN STREAMS Detachment Cape Police. + + TAUNGS Detachment Cape Police. + + VRYBURG { Detachment Cape Police. + { Vryburg Mounted Rifles (one coy.) + + { Bechuanaland Rifles. + { Protectorate regiment. + MAFEKING { Detachment Cape Police. + { Detachment British South African Police. + { Town Guard. + + TULI { Rhodesian regiment (_en route_ from Buluwayo). + { Detachment British South African Police. + + { One section, (two guns) R.G.A. + { One section, 29th coy., R.E. + NAAUWPOORT { Four cos., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt. + { M.I. coy., 2nd battn. King's Own Yorkshire + Light Infantry. + + { One section, (two guns) R.G.A. + STORMBERG { One section, 29th coy., R.E. + { Four cos., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt. + { M.I. coy., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt. + + + + +APPENDIX 3. + + +The distribution of British forces under arms in Natal on 11th +October, 1899. + + { 18th Hussars. + { One sqdn., Natal Carbineers. + { M.I. coy., 1st battn. Leicestershire regiment. + { M.I. coy., 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps. + DUNDEE[5] { M.I. coy., 2nd battn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. + { Detachment Natal Police. + { 13th, 67th, and 69th batteries, R.F.A. + { 1st battn. Leicestershire regt. + { 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps. + { 2nd battn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. + + { 5th Lancers. + { 19th Hussars. + { 21st, 42nd, and 53rd batteries, R.F.A. + { 10th mountain battery, R.G.A. + { 23rd coy., R.E. + { 1st battn. Liverpool regt. and M.I. coy. + { 1st battn. Devonshire regt. + LADYSMITH { 1st battn. Manchester regt. + { 2nd battn. Gordon Highlanders. + { Natal Mounted Rifles. + { Natal Carbineers. + { Border Mounted Rifles. + { Natal Field artillery. + { Detachment Natal Police. + { Natal Naval Volunteers. + { Natal Corps of Guides. + + { Durban Light Infantry. + COLENSO { Detachment Natal Naval Volunteers. + { One sqdn., Natal Carbineers. + + ESTCOURT { Natal Royal Rifles. + + PIETERMARITZBURG { 2nd battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps. + { Imperial Light Horse. + + HELPMAKAAR { Umvoti Mounted Rifles. + + ESHOWE { One mounted coy., 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle + { Corps. + + DURBAN { One sqdn., 5th Dragoon Guards. + +[Tablenote 5: The 1st battn. Royal Irish Fusiliers, and one section, +23rd coy., R.E., arrived at Dundee during 15th and 16th October.] + + + + +APPENDIX 4. + + +STRENGTH OF BURGHER ARMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. + + -----------------------+---------------+--------------------- + District. | Present on | Subsequent Increase. + | Mobilisation. | + -----------------------+---------------+--------------------- + Bethel | 700 | } + Bloemhof | 800 | } + Carolina | 506 | } + Ermelo | 800 | } + Fordsburg | 900 | } + Germiston and Boksburg | 1,050 | } + Heidelberg | 1,685 | } + Jeppestown | 400 | } + Johannesburg[6] | 1,000 | } + Krugersdorp | 800 | } + Lichtenburg | 850 | } + Lydenburg | 1,230 | } + Marico | 1,050 | } + Middelburg | 1,317 | } 14,779[8] + Piet Retief | 230 | } + Potchefstroom | 3,000 | } + Pretoria | 2,540 | } + Rustenburg | 1,500 | } + Springs | 60 | } + Standerton | 1,100 | } + Swaziland[6] | 290 | } + Utrecht | 900 | } + Vryheid | 944 | } + Waterberg | 732 | } + Wakkerstroom | 800 | } + Wolmaranstad | 400 | } + Zoutpansberg | 1,287 | } + -----------------------+---------------+--------------------- + 26,871[7] 14,779 + \-------------------------/ + + Total Transvaal Burghers in the field 41,650 + +[Tablenote 6: Exclusive of police.] + +[Tablenote 7: Boer evidence.] + +[Tablenote 8: Intelligence statistics on conclusion of peace.] + + +STRENGTH OF BURGHER ARMY OF ORANGE FREE STATE. + + ------------------------------------------------------------- + District. | Present on | Subsequent Increase. + | Mobilisation. | + ------------------------------------------------------------- + Bethlehem | 1,605 | } + Bethulie | 385 | } + Bloemfontein | 2,824 | } + Boshof | 1,030 | } + Ficksburg | 633 | } + Fauresmith | 1,560 | } + Heilbron | 1,671 | } + Harrismith | 915 | } + Hoopstad | 799 | } 6,264[10] + Jacobsdal | 250 | } + Kroonstad | 2,561 | } + Ladybrand | 1,113 | } + Philippolis | 402 | } + Rouxville | 1,109 | } + Smithfield | 797 | } + Vrede | 1,006 | } + Winburg | 2,114 | } + Wepener | 571 | } + ------------------------------------------------------------- + 21,345[9] 6,264 + \------------------------/ + + Total O.F.S. Burghers in the field 27,609 + + +REGULAR FORCES OF BOTH REPUBLICS. + + State Artillery S.A.R 800 + State Artillery O.F.S 375 + South African Republic Police (whites only) 1,209 + Swaziland Police (whites only) 302 + ----- + 2,686 + ===== + + +FOREIGN CORPS. + + Hollanders 320 + Italian 75 + Scandinavian 100 + Irish 500 + German 200 + French 50 + Russian 25 + American 50 + Foreigners serving with Commandos 800 + ----- + 2,120 + ===== + +[Tablenote 9: Boer evidence.] + +[Tablenote 10: Intelligence statistics on conclusion of peace.] + + +ADDITIONS. + + Rebels 13,000 + Small bands[11] 300 + ------ + 13,300 + ====== + + +GRAND TOTAL. + + Burghers of S.A.R. 41,650 + Burghers of O.F.S. 27,609 + Regular Forces 2,686 + Foreign Corps 2,120 + Rebels, etc. 13,300 + ------ + 87,365 + ====== + +[Tablenote 11: _E.g._, those under S. Eloff, W. Mears, J. Hindon, etc.] + + + + +APPENDIX 5. + + +List of H.M. ships and vessels serving on the Cape station October +11th, 1899, to June 1st, 1902, showing the approximate dates when they +were so engaged. + +Those that were present on the station at the beginning of the war are +shown with an asterisk. + + Name of Dates between Commanded by Remarks. + vessel. which so serving. + from to + + BARRACOUTA* 10/99 6/02 Comder. R.H. Peirse + Comder. H. Cotesworth + Comder. S. H. B. Ash + + BARROSA* 10/99 3/01 Comder. W. F. Tunnard + + BEAGLE 7/01 6/02 Comder. H. V. W. Elliott + + BLANCHE 1/01 6/02 Comder. M. T. Parks + + DORIS* 10/99 4/01 Capt. R. C. Prothero, C.B. Flagship of + Rear Admrl. + Sir R. H. + Harris, + K.C.B. + K.C.M.G. + DWARF* 11/99 6/02 Lieut. H. F. Shakespear + Lieut. W. N. England + + FEARLESS 12/99 8/00 Comder. H. R. P. Floyd Detached from + Mediterranean + station. + + FORTE* 10/99 6/02 Capt. E. P. Jones C.B. + Comder. C. H. Dundas + Capt. R. C. Sparkes, C.M.G. + Capt. P. Hoskyns, C.M.G., + M.V.O. + + GIBRALTAR 4/01 6/02 Capt. A. H. Limpus Flagship of + Rear Admiral + Arthur W. + Moore, C.B., + C.M.G. + + MAGICIENNE* 10/99 11/00 Capt. W. B. Fisher, C.B. + + MAGPIE 11/00 5/02 Lieut. J. K. Laird + + MONARCH* 10/99 6/02 Capt. R. D. B. Bruce + Capt. C. H. Bayly + Capt. W. L. Grant + + NAIAD 4/01 11/01 Capt. the Hon. A. E. Detached from + Bethell Mediterranean + station. + + NIOBE 11/99 8/00 Capt. A. L. Winsloe Detached from + Channel + Squdrn. + + PARTRIDGE* 10/99 6/02 Lieut. A. T. Hunt + Lieut. E. La T. Leatham + + PEARL 4/02 6/02 Capt. E. P. Ashe + + PELORUS 12/99 6/00 Capt. H. C. B. Hulbert Detached from + Channel + Squdrn. + + PHILOMEL* 10/99 1/02 Capt. J. E. Bearcroft, C.B. + + POWERFUL 10/99 3/00 Capt. the Hon. Hedworth On way home + Lambton, C.B. from China. + + RACOON 1/00 7/00 Comder. G. H. Hewett Detached from + Comder. A. E. A. Grant East Indies + stn. + + RAMBLER 11/99 6/00 Comder. H. E. P. Cust Surveying + Service. + + RATTLER 9/01 6/02 Lieut. C. Tibbits + + REDBREAST 2/01 4/01 Lieut. M. R. Hill Detached from + East Indies. + + SAPPHO 2/01 7/01 Capt. C. Burney Dtchd. from + S.E. Coast + America. + + SYBILLE 1/01 2/01 Capt. H. P. Williams Wrecked near + Lambert's + Bay. + + TARTAR* 10/99 7/01 Comder. F. R. W. Morgan + Comder. R. H. Travers + + TERRIBLE 10/99 3/00 Capt. P. M. Scott, C.B. On her way out + to China + station. + + TERPSICHORE 3/01 3/02 Capt. C. H. Coke Replaced the + Sybille. + + THETIS 11/99 4/01 Capt. W. Stokes Rees, C.B. Detached from + Mediterranean + station. + + THRUSH* 10/99 6/02 Lieut. W. H. D'Oyly + + WIDGEON* 10/99 6/01 Lieut. A. F. Gurney + Lieut. W. Forbes + + + + +APPENDIX 6. + + +SHOWING APPROXIMATE STRENGTH, CASUALTIES, &C., IN THE PRINCIPAL +ENGAGEMENTS DESCRIBED IN VOLUME I. + + +TALANA HILL, OCTOBER 20th, 1899. + +CHAPTER VII. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Warrant Horses Guns + Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Field. Machine. + + Cavalry (includes + detachment Natal + Carbineers.) 21 497 485 -- 1 + Royal Artillery 17 454 428 18 -- + Infantry and details + (includes mounted + infantry companies) 89 3,285 655 -- 4 + + Total 127 4,236 1,568 18 5 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total + (Prisoners). Casualties. + + Officers 11 23 9 43 + N.C.O.s and men 40 180 237 457 + + 500 + +APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 30; wounded, 100; prisoners, 12 = 142. + + +AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Weapons. + 15-pr. Field Guns. .303 L.M. rifles. + + Number of rounds 1,237 82,000 + + + + +RIETFONTEIN, OCTOBER 24th, 1899. + +CHAPTER VIII. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Warrant Horses Guns + Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Field. Machine. + + Cavalry (includes Natal 110 1,842 2,024 -- 6 + Mounted Volunteers.) + Royal Artillery 16 479 553 18 -- + Infantry 92 2,782 400 -- 4 + + Total 218 5,103 2,977 18 10 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total + (Prisoners). Casualties. + + Officers 1 6 -- 7 + N.C.O.s and men 13 92 2 107 + ---- + 114 + +APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 13; wounded, 31--44. + + +AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Weapons. + 15-pr. 2.5-in. .303 L.M. + Field Guns. Mountain Guns. rifles. + + Number of rounds 680 125 52,951 + + + + +ELANDSLAAGTE, OCTOBER 21st, 1899. + +CHAPTER IX. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Warrant Horses Guns + Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Field. Machine. + + Cavalry (includes Imperial + Light Horse and 17 1,297 1,319 -- 3 + Natal Carbineers) + + Royal Artillery (includes + Natal Field Artillery) 20 532 481 18 -- + Infantry 47 1,583 322 -- 3 + + Total 84 3,412 2,122 18 6 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total + (Prisoners). Casualties. + + Officers 4 31 -- 35 + N.C.O.s and men 46 182 -- 228 + + Total 263 + +APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 67; wounded, 108; prisoners, 188 = 363. + + +AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Weapons + 15-pr. Field 2.5-in. Natal .303 L.M. Pistol. + Guns. F.A. rifles. + + Number of rounds 423 74 61,212 241 + + + + +LOMBARDS KOP, 30th OCTOBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER X. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS. + + Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns + N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). 4.7-in. 12-pr. 15-pr. Machine. + Naval. 2.5-in. + Cavalry (includes + Imperial Light Horse 160 2,946 3,121 -- -- -- -- 7 + and Natal Mounted + Volunteers) + + Royal Artillery + (includes Naval 74 1,677 1,230 2 4 50 6 6 + Brigade and Natal + Volunteer Artillery) + + Royal Engineers 10 224 95 -- -- -- -- -- + + Infantry 212 7,150 1,397 -- -- -- -- 10 + + Total 456 11,997 5,843 2 4 50 6 23 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total + (Prisoners). Casualties. + + Officers 6 10 37 53 + N.C.O.s and men 63 239 917 1,219 + + Total 1,272 + + +AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Weapons. + 15-pr. Field 2.5-in. Naval .303 + Guns. 12-pr. 12-cwt. L.M. rifles. + + Number of Rounds 2,359 330 25 433,247 + + + + +BELMONT, 23rd NOVEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XIII. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns + N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Naval Field Machine. + 12-pr. 15-pr. + Cavalry (includes + Imperial Light Horse) 160 2,946 3,121 -- -- -- + + The Naval Brigade 18 384 10 4 -- -- + 1st Division Staff 12 55 46 -- -- -- + Mounted troops 48 920 999 -- -- 3 + Royal Artillery 19 546 514 -- 12 -- + Royal Engineers 13 333 71 -- -- -- + Infantry(2 brigades) 216 7,010 347 -- -- 7 + + Army Service Corps + and Royal Army 20 418 312 -- -- -- + Medical Corps + + Total 346 9,666 2,299 4 12 10 + + +BELMONT. + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. + + Officers 3 23 -- 26 + Other ranks 51 220 -- 271 + + 297 + +Note.--The force engaged at Graspan was the same as at Belmont, less +casualties, &c., of the 23rd November. + + + + +GRASPAN, 25th NOVEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XIV. + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. + + Officers 3 6 -- 9 + Other ranks 15 137 7 159 + + 168 + + + + +MODDER RIVER, 28th NOVEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XV. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns + N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Naval Field Machine. + 12-pr. 15-pr. + + The Naval Brigade 16 238 10 4 -- -- + 1st Division Staff 12 55 46 -- -- -- + Mounted troops 47 866 895 -- -- 3 + Royal Artillery 23 656 704 -- 16 -- + Royal Engineers 13 333 71 -- -- -- + Infantry 211 7,500 379 -- -- 8 + Armed Service Corps + and Royal Army 20 418 312 -- -- -- + Medical Corps + + Total 342 10,066 2,417 4 16 11 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES, 28th NOVEMBER, 1899. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. + + Officers 4 19 -- 23 + Other ranks 67 370 18 455 + + 478 + + + + +STORMBERG, 10th DECEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns + N.C.O.s (Riding and + and men. Draught). Field Machine. + + Divisional Staff 7 14 7 -- -- + Mounted Troops + (includes detachment + Cape Police) 17 436 453 -- 2 + Royal Artillery 19 466 514 12 -- + Royal Engineers 7 200 63 -- -- + Infantry 50 1,710 84 -- 2 + Armed Service Corps, + Royal Army Medical 8 101 88 -- -- + Corps, &c. + + Total 108 2,927 1,209 12 4 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total + Casualties. + + Officers -- 8 13 21 + N.C.O.s and men 25 102 548 675 + + 696 + + +SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Guns, &c. + 15-pr. Machine. Lee-Metford + .303. + + Number of rounds 569[12] 1,146 137,382[13] + +[Tablenote 12: Includes 67 rounds captured by the enemy.] + +[Tablenote 13: Includes 37,400 rounds lost in ammunition carts, and +86,560 rounds in the pouches of the killed and prisoners.] + + + + +MAGERSFONTEIN, 11th DECEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XX. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF THE TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns + N.C.O.s (Riding and Naval. Field. Machine. + and men. Draught). 4.7-in. 12-pr. Howitzer. 15-pr. 12-pr. + + The Naval Brigade 18 294 10 1 4 -- -- -- -- + 1st Division Staff 10 53 44 -- -- -- -- -- -- + 1st Cavalry Brigade 77 1,627 1,686 -- -- -- -- 6 4 + Royal Artillery 29 918 931 -- -- 4 18 -- -- + Royal Engineers 12 325 70 -- -- -- -- -- -- + Infantry (3 brigades) 297 10,672 551 -- -- -- -- -- 12 + Armed Service Corps + and Royal Army 32 600 431 -- -- -- -- -- -- + Medical Corps + + Total 475 14,489 3,723 1 4 4 18 6 16 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. + + Officers 22 46 1 69 + Other ranks 188 629 62 879 + 948 + + +SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + + Description of Guns, &c. + Howitzers. Field Guns. Machine. Lee-Metford + .303. + Rounds 402 4,189 18,487 321,782 + + + + +COLENSO, 15th DECEMBER, 1899. + +CHAPTER XXII. + +APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF THE TROOPS ENGAGED. + + Guns. + Arms. Officers. Other Horses Naval. Field Machine. + Ranks. (Riding 15-pr. + and 4.7in. 12-pr. + Draught). + + The Naval Brigade 31 279 6 2 12 -- -- + Natal Army Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- -- + Mounted troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2 + Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 -- + Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- -- + Infantry + (4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16 + Army Service Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- -- + Royal Army Medical + Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- -- + + Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18 + + +SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES. + + Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. + + Officers 7 47 20 74 + Other ranks 136 709 220 1,065 + 1,139 + + +NAVAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED. + Rounds. + 4.7-inch 160 + 12-pr. 12-cwt. 900 + + + + +APPENDIX 7. + + +THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AS ORIGINALLY ORGANISED AND SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA. + + +--------------------+ + | STRENGTH | + Officers + |---- + | Other Ranks + | |------ + | | Horses + | | |----- + | | | Guns + | | | |---- + | | | | Ship in which embarked. + | | | | |----------- + | | | | | Date of leaving England. + | | | | | |-------- + | | | | | | Date of Arrical + | | | | | | at Cape Town. + | | | | | | |-------- + | | | | | | | Place of + | | | | | | | disembarkation. + | | | | | | | |--------- + | | | | | | | | Date of + | | | | | | | | disembarkation. + UNIT. | | | | | | | | | + ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Army Corps | 36| 119| 29| --{_Dunottar |14.10.99|31.10.99|Cape |31.10.99 + Staff | | | | { Castle_ | | | Town | + | | | | {_Caspian_ |17.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | {_Carisbrook|28.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99 + | | | | { Castle_ | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Corps Troops: | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 13th Hussars| 25| 558| 499| 1{_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|Durban |13.12.99 + | | | | {_Templemore_10.11.99| 2.12.99|Durban | 5.12.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Corps | | | | | | | | | + Artillery | 4| 15| 16| --|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + G. battery, | 5| 178| 196| 6|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + P. battery, | 5| 179| 196| 6|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 7th brigade | | | | | | | | | + Division | 4| 13| 14| --|_Algeria_ | 7.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99 + Staff, | | | | | | | | Town | + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th battery,| 5| 170| 137| 6|_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|Cape |10.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 38th battery, 5| 173| 137| 6|_Algeria_ | 7.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 78th battery, 5| 171| 137| 6|_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|East |12.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | |[14] | + | | | | | | | | | + 8th brigade | | | | | | | | | + Division | 4| 14| 10| --|_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99 + Staff, | | | | | | | | Town | + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 37th battery, 5| 194| 161| 6|_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + R.F.A. | | | | {_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|East |11.12.99 + 61st battery, | | | { Princess_ | | | London | + R.F.A. | 5| 194| 152| 6{ | | |[14] | + | | | | {_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|East |11.12.99 + | | | | { | | | London | + | | | | { | | |[14] | + | | | | | | | | | + 65th battery, 5| 194| 162| 6|_Canning_ |12.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 4.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | {_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|Cape | 6.12.99 + | | | | { Princess_ | | | Town | + Ammunition | | | | { | | | | + Park | 17| 269| 260| --{_Canning_ |12.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 4.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | {_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|Cape |10.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 10| 245| --| --|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99{Durban |27.11.99 + Engineers | | | | | Castle_ | | {Cape |22.11.99 + | | | | | | | { Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + the Royal | 27| 1,014| 2| 1|_Dictator_ | 6.11.99| 1.12.99|East | 4.12.99 + Scots | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | {_Braemar | 6.10.99|27.10.99|Cape |27.10.99 + Corps | 19| 326| --| --{ Castle_ | | | Town | + | | | | {_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Cape | 9.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | {_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |26.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | {_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99 + | | | | { | | | London | + Royal Army | | | | {_Dictator_ | 6.11.99| 1.12.99|East | 4.12.99 + Medical | 4| 35| --| --{ | | | London | + Corps | | | | {_Ranee_ | 5.11.99| 5.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | {_Arawa_ | 7.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 2.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| 21| 482| --| --|_Braemar | 6.10.99|27.10.99|Cape |27.10.99 + Corps | | | | | Castle_ | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Cavalry Division: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Cavalry | | | | | | | | | + Division| 4| 16| 17| --|_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + Staff | | | | | Vienna_ | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Field | | | | | | | | | + troop, | 4| 116| 88| --|_Rapidan_ |13.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape | 9.12.99 + R.E. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st cavalry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + cavalry| 3| 13| 4| --|_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + brigade| | | | | Vienna_ | | | Town | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 6th | 25| 563| 499| 1{_Chicago_ | 8.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 2.12.99 + Dragoon| | | | { | | | Town | + Guards | | | | {_Wakool_ | 4.11.99|27.11.99|Cape |28.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 10th | 26| 565| 502| 1{_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked.|Columbine 3.12.99 + Hussars| | | | { | | |Pnt.[15]| + | | | | {_Columbian_| 6.11.99| 2.12.99|Cape | 3.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 12th | 26| 559| 500| 1{_Mohawk_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + Lancers| | | | {_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + | | | | { Vienna_ | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Southern, 25| 575| --| 4{_Malta_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + Aldershot, | | | { | | | Town | + South-Eastern| | | {_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99 + and | | | | { | | | Town | + Cork M.I. | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + R. battery, 6| 180| 198| 6|_America_ |24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |19.11.99 + R.H.A.| | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition 3| 83| 75| --|_America_ |24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |19.11.99 + column| | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 11 | 4| 57| --| --|_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked.|Columbine 3.12.99 + Bearer| | | | | | | |Pnt.[15]| + company | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 11 | 5| 35| --| --|_Mohawk_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99 + Field | | | | | | | | Town | + Hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd cavalry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + cavalry| 3| 13| 4| --|_Carisbrook|28.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99 + brigade| | | | | Castle_ | | | Town | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 27| 562| 520| 1|_Manchester|30.10.99|22.11.99|Durban |27.11.99 + Dragoons | | | | Port_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | {_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99 + 2nd | | | | { | | | Town | + Dragoons 25| 548| 498| 1{_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|Cape | 7.12.99 + | | | | { Princess_ | | | Town | + | | | | {_Ranee_ | 9.11.99| 5.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | {_Jamaican_ |23.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + 6th | | | | {[16]_Persia_28.10.99|11.12.99|Cape |11.12.99 + Dragoons 25| 557| 498| 1{ | | | Town | + | | | | {_Siberian_ |24.10.99|19.11.99|Cape |20.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + O. battery, 6| 180| 198| 6|_Glengyle_ |27.10.99|20.11.99|Cape |21.11.99 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition 3| 86| 61| --|_Glengyle_ |27.10.99|20.11.99|Cape |21.11.99 + column | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Northern, | | | | | | | | + Western, 24| 581| --| 4{_Orient_ |22.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |13.11.99 + Eastern| | | | { | | | Town | + and | | | | {_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + Dublin | | | | { | | | Town | + M.I. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + cavalry| 2| 55| --| --|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Cape |26.11.99 + brigade| | | | | | | | Town | + Bearer | | | | | | | | | + company| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 6 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st Infantry Division: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + Division | 10| 4| --| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Cape | 9.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional Troops: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + "A." | | | | | | | | | + squadron, 8| 186| 191| --|_Maplemore_|29.11.99|25.12.99|Cape |25.12.99 + 1st Life | | | | | | | Town | + Guards | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + Division 9| 183| 152| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + Staff and | | | | | | | | + 7th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | | | | | | | | + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 14th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 172| 137| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 66th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 136| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition 5| 129| 94| --|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + column | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 8| 208| --| --|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99{Durban |21.11.99 + Engineers | | | | | | {Cape |15.11.99 + | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 7 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + brigade| 2| 16| 3| --|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99|[17]Cape|15.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd battn. | | | | | | | | + Grenadier 32| 1,083| 6| 1|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99|[17]Cape|15.11.99 + Guards | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. 31| 1,090| 5| 1|_Malta_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|[17]Cape|16.11.99 + Coldstream | | | | | | | Town | + Guards | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. 31| 1,082| 3| 1|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99 + Coldstream | | | | | | | Town | + Guards | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. 30| 1,089| 3| 1|_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |14.11.99 + Scots | | | | | | | | Town | + Guards | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 1 | 3| 58| --| --|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99 + bearer | | | | | | | | Town | + company| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 1 | 4| 35| --| --|_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |13.11.99 + Field | | | | | | | | Town | + Hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | 3| 18| 3| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 8.11.99|Durban |12.11.99 + brigade| | | | | Castle_ | | | | + staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 26| 1,064| 3| 1|_Yorkshire_|20.10.99|11.11.99|Durban |14.11.99 + West | | | | | | | | | + Surrey | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + battn. | 24| 1,041| 3| 1|_Manila_ |20.10.99|15.11.99|Durban |19.11.99 + Devonshire | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + West | 27| 936| 3| 1|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |12.11.99 + Yorkshire | | | | Castle_ | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + battn. | 26| 1,082| 3| 1{_Harlech |20.10.99|15.11.99|Durban |20.11.99 + East | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + Surrey | | | | {_Lismore |20.10.99|11.11.99|Durban |14.11.99 + regiment | | | { Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 4 | | | | | | | | | + bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |15.11.99 + company| | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 3 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 4| 35| --| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |15.11.99 + Hospital | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd Infantry Division: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional Troops: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + infantry 11| 8| 4| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |14.11.99 + division | | | | | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + "B." | | | | | | | | | + squadron, 9| 191| 199| --{_Maplemore_|29.11.99|24.12.99|Cape |25.12.99 + Royal | | | | { | | | Town | + Horse | | | | {_Pinemore_ | 4.12.99|29.12.99|Cape |29.12.99 + Guards | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 5th | | | | | | | | | + brigade| 4| 12| 16| --|_Urmston | 1.11.99|27.11.99|Durban | 2.12.99 + division, | | | | Grange_ | | | | + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 63rd | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked |Durban |27.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | |[18] | | + | | | | | | | | | + 64th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Urmston | 1.11.99|27.11.99|Durban | 2.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | Grange_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 73rd | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 139| 6|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition 5| 123| 93| --|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + column | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 9| 208| --| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99 + Engineers | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + divisional | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd | | | | | | | | | + infantry 2| 18| 1| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99 + brigade| | | | | | | | Town | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 29| 1,014| 3| 1|_Orient_ |24.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99 + Highlanders | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Highland 26| 1,087| --| 1|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99 + Light | | | | | | | | Town | + Infantry | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Seaforth 27| 927| 3| 1|_Mongolian_|21.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + Highlanders | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Argyll | 30| 1,081| 3| 1{_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Cape |24.11.99 + and | | | | { | | | Town | + Sutherland | | | {_Orcana_ |27.10.99|17.11.99|Cape |17.11.99 + Highlanders | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 3 | | | | | | | | | + Bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99 + company| | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 10 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Mongolian_|21.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade| 3| 22| 3| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Scottish 26| 939| 3| 1|_City of |23.10.99|16.11.99|Durban |22.11.99 + Rifles | | | | | Cambridge_| | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd battn. | | | | | | | | + King's | 29| 1,074| 3| 1|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |28.11.99 + Royal | | | | | | | | | + Rifle | | | | | | | | | + corps | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Durham | 28| 921| 3| 1|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99 + Light | | | | | | | | | + Infantry | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Rifle | 29| 1,082| 3| 1|_German_ |28.10.99|21.11.99|Durban |25.11.99 + brigade| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 9 | | | | | | | | | + Bearer | 2| 54| --| --|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |29.11.99 + company| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 9 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 6| 38| --| --|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |29.11.99 + hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd Infantry Division: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional Troops: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd infantry | | | | | | | | + division 11| 8| 4| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|East |16.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + "C." squadron, | | | | | | | + 2nd Life 9| 186| 193| --|_Pinemore_ | 4.12.99|29.12.99|Cape |29.12.99 + Guards | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 6th | | | | | | | | | + brigade| 4| 13| 5| --|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99 + division, | | | | | | | London | + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 74th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 138| 6|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + 77th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + 79th | | | | | | | | | + battery, 5| 173| 141| 6|_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|East |11.12.99 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition 5| 128| 94| --|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99 + column | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 9| 220| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Cape |28.11.99 + Engineers | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 16 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 4| 35| --| --|_Cheshire_ | 9.11.99|29.11.99|East | 5.12.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + 5th infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 5th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade| 3| 21| 3| --|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 29| 969| 3| 1|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99 + Inniskilling| | | | | | | | + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 25| 875| 3| 1|_Britannic_|26.10.99|14.11.99|East |16.11.99 + Irish Rifles| | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Connaught 28| 855| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + Rangers| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 28| 923| --| 1|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + Dublin | | | | | | | | | + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 8 | | | | | | | | | + Bearer | 3| 57| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + company| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 15 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 6th infantry brigade: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 6th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade| 3| 21| 3| --|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 25| 769| 3| 1|_Pavonia_ |22.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99 + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 29| 870| 2| 1{_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + Scots | | | | {_Pavonia_ |22.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99 + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 27| 1,074| 3| 1|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + Welsh | | | | | | | | | + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | + Royal | 29| 946| 3| 1|_Hawarden |23.10.99|12.11.99|Durban |16.11.99 + Irish | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 12 | | | | | | | | | + Bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99 + company| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + No. 17 | | | | | | | | | + Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99 + Hospital | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Lines of Communication: | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | 29| 977| 3| 1|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99|East |26.11.99 + Northumberland| | | | Castle_ | | | London | + Fusiliers| | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | | | | | | | | | + Somerset | 29| 875| 3| 1|_Briton_ | 4.11.99|20.11.99|Durban |24.11.99 + Light | | | | | | | | |[19] + Infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd Duke of | | | | | | | | + Cornwall's 29| 920| 3| 1|_Formosa_ | 5.11.99|29.11.99|Cape |29.11.99 + Light | | | | | | | | Town | + Infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + Welsh | 28| 823| 3| 1|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99|Port |26.11.99 + regiment | | | | | Castle_ | | | Elizabeth + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd | 28| 990| 3| 1{_Harlech |20.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99 + Northamptonshire | | { Castle_ | | | Town | + regiment | | | | {_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |13.11.99 + | | | | { | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd Shropshire | | | | | | | | + Light | 29| 905| 3| 1|_Arawa_ | 8.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 1.12.99 + Infantry | | | | | | | | Town | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + Gordon | 29| 855| 4| 1|_Cheshire_ | 9.11.99|29.11.99|Cape |29.11.99 + Highlanders | | | | | | | Town | + +[Tablenote 14: Battery subsequently went to Natal.] + +[Tablenote 15: Arrived Cape Town, 6.12.99.] + +[Tablenote 16: _Persia_ broke down at St. Vincent.] + +[Tablenote 17: Started from Gibraltar.] + +[Tablenote 18: Guns lost.] + +[Tablenote 19: The battalion transhipped to S.S. _Orcana_, which +arrived at Durban 24.11.99.] + + + + +APPENDIX 8. + + +The composition and distribution of British troops in southern Natal, +23rd November, 1899, the morning of the fight at Willow Grange. + + ESTCOURT. { 2nd brigade Staff. + { Naval detachment with two 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns. + { 7th battery, R.F.A. + { Natal Field artillery. + MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. T. { 2nd battn. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey + HILDYARD { regiment), five companies. + { 2nd battn. West Yorkshire regiment. + { 2nd " East Surrey regiment. + { 1st " The Border regiment. + { 2nd " Royal Dublin Fusiliers. + { Mounted infantry company of 2nd battn. King's + { Royal Rifle Corps. + { 16th company, Army Service Corps. + { Natal Royal Rifles. + { Durban Light Infantry. + { Natal Carbineers (one squadron). + { Imperial Light Horse (one squadron). + { Bethune's mounted infantry. + { Natal Police. + + MOOI RIVER. { 6th brigade Staff. + { 14th battery, R.F.A. + MAJOR-GENERAL G. { 2nd battn. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey + BARTON. { regiment), three companies. + { 2nd battn. Devonshire regiment. + { 2nd " Royal Scots Fusiliers (one company). + { 1st " Royal Welsh Fusiliers. + { 2nd " Royal Irish Fusiliers. + { 24th company, Army Service Corps. + { Thorneycroft's mounted infantry. + + NOTTINGHAM ROAD. { 66th battery, R.F.A. (two guns). + { 2nd battn. Scottish Rifles. + + PIETERMARITZBURG. { Divisional Staff of 2nd division. + { Headquarters line of communication. + { Naval contingent with four 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval + { guns.[20] + { 66th battery, R.F.A. (four guns). + LT.-GENERAL SIR C. F. { Divisional ammunition column. + CLERY. { General depot. + { Natal Naval Volunteers. + { Imperial Light Infantry. + { Pietermaritzburg Rifle association. + { Home Guard. + { Reserve Rifle association. + { Railway Rifle association. + + GREYTOWN. { + MAJOR G. LEUCHARS. { Umvoti Mounted Rifles. + + DURBAN. { Naval contingent, two 6-in. guns, two 4.7-in. + { guns, 12 Naval 12-pr. 12-cwt. and two Naval + { 12-pr. 8-cwt. guns. + CAPT. PERCY SCOTT, R.N. { [21]2nd battn. Royal Fusiliers. + { [21]2nd " Royal Scots Fusiliers (seven + { companies). + { [21]1st " Durham Light Infantry. + +[Tablenote 20: Two of these guns were _en route_ to Mooi River.] + +[Tablenote 21: _En route_ to Pietermaritzburg.] + + + + +APPENDIX 9. + + +REINFORCEMENTS LANDED IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO THE 13th OF FEBRUARY, +1900, OTHER THAN THOSE GIVEN IN APPENDICES 1. AND 7. + + +--------------------+ + | STRENGTH | + Officers + |---- + | Other Ranks + | |------ + | | Horses + | | |----- + | | | Guns + | | | |---- + | | | | Ship in which embarked. + | | | | |----------- + | | | | | Place of Embarkation. + | | | | | |------------- + | | | | | | Date of + | | | | | | Embarkation. + | | | | | | |-------- + | | | | | | | Place of + | | | | | | | Disembarkation. + | | | | | | | |---------- + | | | | | | | | Date of + | | | | | | | | Disembarkation. + UNIT. | | | | | | | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + (A) REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA AFTER "LOMBARDS KOP." + + | | | | | | | | | + No. 4. | | | | | | | | | + Mountain | 6 | 276| 18| 6|_Narrung_ |Royal |16.11.99|Durban |12.12.99 + battery, | | | | | | Albert | | | + R.G.A. | | | | | | Dock | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Suffolk | 22| 1,081| 3| 1|_Scott_ |Southampton|11.11.99|Cape Town |28.11.99 + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Essex | 23| 912| 3| 1 |_Greek_ |Southampton|11.11.99|Cape Town | 3.12.99 + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Derbyshire | 29| 1,091| 5| 1 |_Dunera_ |Malta |21.11.99|East |15.12.99 + regiment | | | | | | | | London | + | | | | | | | | | + + (B) FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION. + + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional | | | | | | | | | + Staff | 11| 29| 7| --|_Norham |Southampton|25.11.99|Cape Town |13.12.99 + | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 14th | | | | | | | | | + Hussars | 25| 599| 497| 1 {_Victorian_|Southampton|13.12.99|Durban | 6.1.00 + | | | | {_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00 + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + division | 4| 13| 13| --|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 19th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | 5| 170| 133| 6|_Atlantian_|Liverpool | 3.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 20th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | 5| 170| 137| 6|_Victorian_|Southampton|13.12.99|Cape Town | 1.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 28th | | | | | | | | | + battery, | 5| 170| 137| 6|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | 5| 128| 93| --|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00 + column | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 37th | | | | | | | | | + Field | 7| 207| --| |_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + company, | | | | | | | | | + R.E. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 10th | | | | | | | | | + Infantry [22]1| 17| 2| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99 + brigade | | | | | | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 25| 1,078| 3| 1|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99 + Warwickshire | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st | | | | | | | | | + battn. | 22| 956| 4| 1|_Doune |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |15.12.99 + Yorkshire | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Dorset | 22| 944| 3| 1|_Simla_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Durban |21.12.99 + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Middlesex | 25| 1,023| 4| 1|_Avondale |Southampton| 2.12.99|Cape |26.12.99 + regiment | | | | | Castle_ | | | Town[23] | + | | | | | | | | | + 11th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade | 3| 12| 3| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 25| 1,049| 3| 1|_Dilwara_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Durban |30.12.99 + Lancaster | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Lancashire | 21| 1,082| 3| 1|_Norman_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Cape |19.12.99 + Fusiliers | | | | | | | | Town[24] | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + South | 22| 1,049| 3| 1|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + Lancashire | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + York and | 24| 838| 4| 1|_Majestic_ |Liverpool |13.12.99|Durban | 2.1.00 + Lancaster | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | | | | | | | | | + No. 27 coy.| 2| 47| --| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | | | | | | | | | + No. 32 coy.| 2| 60| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | | | | | | | | | + No. 25 coy.| 2| 60| 1| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + | | | | | | | | | + Royal Army | 15| 153| --| --{_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99 + Medical | | | | {_Simla_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Durban |21.12.99 + Corps | | | | {_Dilwara_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Durban |30.12.99 + | | | | | | | | | + + (C) ADDITIONAL UNITS MOBILIZED WITH FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION. + + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + division | 4| 16| 18| --|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00 + Staff, | | | | | | | | | + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Q. battery, | 4| 174| 194| 6{_Manchester_Southampton|19.12.99|Cape Town { 25.1.00 + R.H.A. | | | | {_Corporation_ | | { [25] + | | | | | | | | | + T. battery, | 5 | 170| 196| 6{_Manchester_Southampton|19.12.99|Cape Town | 25.1.00 + R.H.A. | | | | {_Corporation_ | | | + | | | | | | | | | + U. battery, | 3 | 178| 196| 6|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | | | | | | | | | + column | 5| 107| 93| --|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00 + | | | | | | | | | + Army Ordnance 2| 80| --| --|_Guelph_ |Southampton|18.11.99|Cape Town |10.12.99 + Corps | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + + (D) SIXTH INFANTRY DIVISION. + + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional | 10 | 40| 8| --|_Dunottar |Southampton|23.12.99|Port | 15.1.00 + Staff | | | | | Castle_ | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + division | 4| 13| 16| --|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 76th battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 81st battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 82nd battery, 5| 170| 138| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | 4| 123| 96| --|_America_ |Royal | 5.1.00|Cape Town | 31.1.00 + column | | | | | | Albert | | | + | | | | | | Dock | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 10| 208| 10| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00 + Engineers | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 12th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade | 3| 21| --| --|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00 + Staff | | | | | | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 22| 903| 2| 1|_Sumatra_ |Royal |16.12.99|Port | 13.1.00 + Bedfordshire | | | | | Albert | | Elizabeth| + regt. | | | | | | Dock | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal Irish| 18| 843| 18 | 1|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00 + regt. | | [26]| | | | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 27| 1,055| 117| 1|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape | 8.1.00 + Worcestershire | [27]| | | Castle_ | | | Town | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 8| 823| 3| 1|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00 + Wiltshire | | | | | | | | Elizabeth| + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 13th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade | 3| 21| 3| --|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + East Kent | 21| 934| 120| 1|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00 + regt. | | [28]| | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 26| 930| 119| 1|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + Gloucestershire | [29]| | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | 27| 981| 109| 1|_Orient_ |Southampton|29.12.99|Cape Town | 19.1.00 + West Riding| | [30]| | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | 26| 768| 87| 1|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00 + Oxfordshire| | [31]| | | | | | | + Light | | | | | | | | | + Infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| 2| 60| --| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00 + Corps, No. 10 | | | | Castle_ | | | | + company | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| 2| 60| --| --|_Sumatra_ |Royal |16.12.99|Port | 13.1.00 + Corps, No. 7 | | | | | Albert | | Elizabeth| + company | | | | | | Dock | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| 3| 46| --| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00 + Corps, No. 23 | | | | Castle_ | | | | + company | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal Army | | | | | | | | | + Medical Corps 20| 221| -- | --{_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00 + | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + | | | | {_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00 + | | | | {_America_ |Royal | 5.1.00|Cape Town | 31.1.00 + | | | | { | Albert | | | + | | | | { | Dock | | | + | | | | { _Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00 + | | | | | | | | | + + (E) SEVENTH DIVISION. + + | | | | | | | | | + Divisional | 18| 48| 31| --{_Kildonan |Southampton| 3.1.00|Cape Town | 20.1.00 + Staff | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + | | | | {_Dwarka_ |Bombay | 4.1.00|Cape Town | 18.1.00 + | | | | | | | | | + Brigade | | | | | | | | | + division | 4| 12| 14| --|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00 + Staff, R.F.A. | | | | Port_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 83rd battery, 5| 170| 134| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 84th battery, 5| 170| 135| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 85th battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00 + R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Ammunition | 3| 126| 93| --|_Glengyle_ |S.W. India | 10.1.00|Cape Town | 4.2.00 + column | | | | | | Dock | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 7| 213| --| --|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00 + Engineers | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 14th infantry | | | | | | | | + brigade | 2| 20| 3| --|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00 + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 26| 984| 5| 1|_Assaye_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 23.1.00 + Norfolk regt. | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 25| 971| 5| 1|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00 + Lincolnshire | | | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + King's Own | 28| 1,067| 3| 1|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00 + Scottish | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + Borderers | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 22| 838| 3| 1|_Assaye_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 23.1.00 + Hampshire | | | | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 15th infantry 3| 21| 1| --|_Briton_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 29.1.00 + brigade | | | | | | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 27| 963| 3| 1|_Britannic_|Southampton| 7.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00 + Cheshire | | | | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st battn. | | | | | | | | | + East | 27| 948| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00 + Lancashire | | | | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | 29| 1,064| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00 + South Wales| | | | | | | | | + Borderers | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + North | 27| 998| 3| 1|_Aurania_ |Southampton| 15.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00 + Staffordshire | | | | | | | | + regt. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | 2| 41| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00 + No. 12 | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + company | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | 2| 37| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00 + No. 17 | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + company | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Army Service| | | | | | | | | + Corps, | 2| 42| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00 + No. 34 | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + company | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Royal Army | | | | | | | | | + Medical | 16| 164| --| --{_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00 + Corps | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + | | | | {_Britannic_|Southampton| 7.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00 + | | | | {_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00 + | | | | {_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00 + +[Tablenote 22: Maj.-Gen. Talbot Coke embarked at Mauritius, 1.12.99.] + +[Tablenote 23: The battalion was transhipped to _Mongolian_, which +arrived at Durban on 1.1.00.] + +[Tablenote 24: The battalion was transhipped to _Roslin Castle_, which +arrived at Durban on 23.12.99.] + +[Tablenote 25: Accident to propeller twice during voyage.] + +[Tablenote 26: Strength includes mounted infantry company in +_America_.] + +[Tablenote 27: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British +Prince_.] + +[Tablenote 28: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British +Prince_.] + +[Tablenote 29: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British +Prince_.] + +[Tablenote 30: Strength includes mounted infantry company in +_Pindari_.] + +[Tablenote 31: Strength includes mounted infantry company in +_Pindari_.] + + +(F) (_a_) ARTILLERY UNITS UNALLOTTED TO BRIGADES AND DIVISIONS AT THE +TIME OF LORD ROBERTS' ADVANCE. + + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + | Date of | Date of + Company. | Embarkation. |Arrival at Cape + | | Town. + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + No. 15 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. | 9th December,|26th December, + No. 15 company, Western Division, R.G.A. | 1899. | 1899. + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + No. 16 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. |22nd December,|18th January, + No. 36 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. | 1899. | 1900. + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + No. 2 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. |22nd January, |13th February, + No. 5 company, Eastern Division, R.G.A. | 1900. | 1900. + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + No. 14 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. | | + No. 17 company, Southern Division, R.G.A. | | + No. 10 company, Eastern Division, R.G.A. |2nd & 3rd Feb.|24th to 27th + No. 2 company, Western Division, R.G.A. | 1900. | Feb. 1900. + No. 6 company, Western Division, R.G.A. | | + No. 10 company, Western Division, R.G.A. | | + ------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------- + +These companies arrived in various ships. + + +--------------------+ + | STRENGTH | + Officers + |---- + | Other Ranks + | |------ + | | Horses + | | |----- + | | | Guns + | | | |---- + | | | | Ship in which embarked. + | | | | |----------- + | | | | | Place of Embarkation. + | | | | | |------------- + | | | | | | Date of + | | | | | | Embarkation. + | | | | | | |-------- + | | | | | | | Place of + | | | | | | | Disembarkation. + | | | | | | | |---------- + | | | | | | | | Date of + | | | | | | | | Disembarkation. + UNIT. | | | | | | | | | + --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + (F) (_b_) UNITS UNALLOTTED TO BRIGADES AND DIVISIONS LANDED IN SOUTH AFRICA + UP TO 13th FEBRUARY, 1900. + + | | | | | | | | | + Militia: | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 25| 658| 2| --|_Nile_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 1.2.00 + Lancaster | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 6th battn. | 25| 687| 4| --|_Umbria_ |Southampton| 11.1.00|Cape Town | 29.1.00 + Royal Warwick | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd battn. | 24| 735| 4| --|_City of |Liverpool | 16.1.00|Cape Town | 13.2.00 + S. Lancashire | | | | Rome_ | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th battn. | | | | | | | | | + Derbyshire| 31| 651| 4| --|_Umbria_ |Southampton| 11.1.00|Pt. | 2.2.00 + regiment | | | | | | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + 3rd battn. | 29| 703| 4| --|_Umbria_ |Southampton| 11.1.00|East London 3.2.00 + Durham Light | | | | | | | | + Infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 4th battn. | | | | | | | | | + Argyll & | 28| 772| 5| --|_City of |Queenstown | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 13.2.00 + Sutherland| | | | | Rome_ | | | | + Highlanders | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 9th battn. | 24| 672| 2| --|_Nile_ |Queenstown | 13.1.00|Cape Town | 1.2.00 + King's Royal | | | | | | | | + Rifle Corps | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Imperial | 4| 5| --| --|_Kinfauns |Southampton| 20.1.00|Cape Town | 5.2.00 + Yeomanry | | | | | Castle_ | | | | + Staff | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + City of | 28| 812| --| --{_Garth |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 4.2.00 + London | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + Imperial | | | | {_Briton_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 29.1.00 + Volunteers | | | | {_Gaul_ |Southampton| 20.1.00|Cape Town | 12.2.00 + | | | | {_Kinfauns |Southampton| 20.1.00|Cape Town | 5.2.00 + | | | | { Castle_ | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + + (G) REINFORCEMENTS FROM INDIA. + + | | | | | | | | | + 16th Lancers| 23| 551| 540| 1{_Lindula_ |Bombay | 6.1.00|Pt. | 23.1.00 + | | | | { | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | {_Fazilka_ |Bombay | 6.1.00|Pt. | 21.1.00 + | | | | { | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | {_Nairung_ |Bombay | 6.1.00|Pt. | 23.1.00 + | | | | { | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + A. battery, | 3| 174| 206| 6|_Urlana_ |Bombay | 8.1.00|Durban | 22.1.00 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + J. battery, | 5| 179| 208| 6|_Ujina_ |Bombay | 11.1.00|Pt. | 28.1.00 + R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Elizabeth| + | | | | | | | | | + Burma mounted | | | | | | | | + infantry | 18| 308| 340| --|_Palamcotta_Rangoon | 24.1.00|Cape Town | 13.2.00 + | | | | | | | | | + + (H) OVERSEA COLONIAL CONTINGENTS LANDED IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO 13th + FEBRUARY, 1900. + + | | | | | | | | | + New South | 2| 68| --| --|_Nineveh_ |London |10.10.99|Cape Town | 2.11.99 + Wales Lancers | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + New Zealand | 15| 205| 251| --|_Waiwera_ |Wellington |20.10.99|Cape Town |23.11.99 + mounted rifles | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Victorian | 5| 120| 9| --|_Medic_ |Melbourne |28.10.99|Cape Town |27.11.99 + Rifles | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Tasmanian | 4| 76| 4| --|_Medic_ |Melbourne |28.10.99|Cape Town |26.11.99 + infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Victorian | 8| 118| 157| --|_Medic_ |Melbourne |27.10.99|Cape Town |27.11.99 + mounted rifles | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + South | 6| 121| 3| --|_Medic_ |Adelaide |31.10.99|Cape Town |26.11.99 + Australian | | | | | | | | | + infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + West | 5| 125| 17| 2|_Medic_ |Albany | 5.11.99|Cape Town |26.11.99 + Australian | | | | | | | | | + infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + New South | | | | | | | | | + Wales Lancers 5| 33 | 130| --} | | | | + | | | | }_Kent_ |Sydney |28.10.99| Cape Town| 1.12.99 + New South | 6| 85| 50| --} | | | | + Wales Army | | | | } | | | | + Medical Corps | | | } | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd battn. | | | | | | | | | + Royal | 43| 997| 6| 2|_Sardinian_|Quebec |30.10.99|Cape Town |30.11.99 + Canadian | | | | | | | | | + regiment | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + Queensland | 14| 248| 285| 1|_Cornwall_ |Brisbane | 1.11.99|Cape Town |14.12.99 + mounted | | | | | | | | | + infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + New South | | | | | | | | | + Wales | 3| 73| 35| --|_Aberdeen_ |Sydney | 3.11.99|Cape Town | 7.12.99 + mounted | | | | | | | | | + rifles | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + New South | 4| 121| 9| --|_Aberdeen_ |Sydney | 3.11.99|Cape Town | 6.12.99 + Wales | | | | | | | | | + infantry | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 1st Australian | | | | | | | | + Horse | 2| 32| 37| --} | | | | + | | | | }_Langton {Newcastle }14.11.99|Cape Town |19.12.99 + New South | 1| 26| 69| --} Grange_ { N.S.W. } | | + Wales mounted | | | | | | | | + rifles | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + A. battery, | 6| 170| 140| 6|_Warrigal_ |Sydney |30.12.99|Cape Town | 7.2.00 + New South Wales | | | | | | | | + Artillery | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | + 2nd contingent | | | | | | | | + Victorian | 14| 249| 305| --|_Euryalus_ |Melbourne | 13.1.00|Cape Town | 7.2.00 + mounted rifles | | | | | | | | + + + + +APPENDIX 10. + + +Distribution of troops in South Africa on 11th February, 1900, when +the march from Ramdam began. + +FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS. + +Commander-in-Chief's Bodyguard. + + Cavalry division. Lt.-Genl. J. D. P. French. + + 1st Cavalry brigade (Brig.-Genl. T. C. Porter). + 6th Dragoon guards (Carabiniers). + 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys). + 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons (one squadron). + 14th Hussars (one squadron). + New South Wales Lancers. + Q.T. and U. batteries, Royal Horse Artillery. + + 2nd Cavalry brigade (Brig.-Genl. R. G. Broadwood). + Composite regiment of Household cavalry. + 10th Hussars. + 12th Lancers. + G. and P. batteries, Royal Horse artillery. + + 3rd Cavalry brigade (Brig.-Genl. J. R. P. Gordon). + 9th Lancers. + 16th Lancers. + O. and R. batteries, Royal Horse artillery. + + Divisional troops. + 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th regiments of + mounted infantry. + Roberts' Horse. + Kitchener's Horse. + Rimington's Guides. + New Zealand mounted rifles. + Queensland mounted infantry. + New South Wales mounted rifles. + Nesbitt's Horse. + Ammunition Column. + Field Troop, R.E. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Companies. + Field Hospitals. + + +6th infantry division. Lieut.-General T. Kelly-Kenny. + + 13th brigade (Maj.-Genl. C. E. Knox). + 2nd battn. East Kent regiment. + 2nd " Gloucestershire regiment. + 1st " West Riding regiment. + 1st " Oxfordshire Light Infantry. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer coy. + Field Hospital. + + 18th brigade (Brig.-Genl. T. E. Stephenson). + 1st battn. Yorkshire regiment. + 1st " Welsh regiment. + 1st " Essex regiment. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer coy. + Field Hospital. + + Divisional troops. + Two 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. + 76th battery, R.F.A. + 81st battery, R.F.A. + Ammunition column. + 38th Field company, R.E. + Det. A.S.C. + Field Hospital. + + +7th infantry division. Lieut.-General C. Tucker. + + 14th brigade (Maj.-Genl. H. Chermside). + 2nd battn. Norfolk regiment. + 2nd " Lincoln regiment. + 1st " King's Own Scottish Borderers. + 2nd " Hampshire regiment. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + 15th brigade (Maj.-Genl. A. G. Wavell). + 2nd battn. Cheshire regiment. + 2nd " South Wales Borderers. + 1st " East Lancashire regiment. + 2nd " North Staffordshire regiment. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + Divisional Troops. + 18th battery, R.F.A. + 62nd battery, R.F.A. + 75th battery, R.F.A. + Ammunition Column. + 9th Field company, R.E. + Det. A.S.C. + Field Hospital. + + +9th infantry division. Lieut.-Genl. Sir H. Colvile + + 3rd brigade (Maj.-Genl. H. A. MacDonald). + 2nd battn. Black Watch. + 1st " Highland Light Infantry. + 2nd " Seaforth Highlanders. + 1st " Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + 19th brigade (Maj.-Genl. H. L. Smith-Dorrien). + 2nd battn. Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. + 2nd " Shropshire Light Infantry. + 1st " Gordon Highlanders. + 2nd " Royal Canadian regiment. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + Divisional Troops. + Two 4.7-in. Naval guns. + 65th (Howitzer) battery, R.F.A. + 82nd battery, R.F.A. + Ammunition column. + 7th Field company, R.E. + Det. A.S.C. + Field Hospital. + City of London Imperial Volunteers mounted infantry. + Grahamstown Volunteers mounted infantry. + + +LIEUT.-GENERAL LORD METHUEN, MODDER RIVER. + + 1st brigade (Maj.-Genl. R. Pole-Carew). + 3rd battn. Grenadier Guards. + 1st " Coldstream Guards. + 2nd " Coldstream Guards. + 1st " Scots Guards. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + 9th brigade (Maj.-Genl. C. W. H. Douglas). + 1st battn. Northumberland Fusiliers. + 1st " Loyal North Lancashire regiment (four companies). + 2nd " Northamptonshire regiment. + 2nd " King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. + Det. A.S.C. + Bearer Coy. + Field Hospital. + + Divisional Troops. + Two 4.7-in. and two 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. + 20th battery, R.F.A. + 37th (Howitzer) battery, R.F.A. (four Howitzers). + 38th battery, R.F.A. + Detachment 14th company, Southern Division, R.G.A. + Ammunition Column. + Field company, R.E. + Balloon section, R.E. + Det. A.S.C. + Field Hospital. + + +LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. FORESTIER-WALKER. + + 83rd battery, R.F.A. + 84th battery, R.F.A. + 85th battery, R.F.A. + A. battery, New South Wales artillery. + Detachment 14th coy., Southern Division, R.G.A. + 15th coy., Southern Division, R.G.A. + 15th coy., Western Division, R.G.A. + Two 5-in. guns 16th coy., Southern Division, R.G.A. + 2nd battn. Royal Warwickshire regiment. + 1st " Suffolk regiment. + 1st " Royal Munster Fusiliers. + 4th " Royal Lancaster regiment. + 6th " Royal Warwickshire regiment. + 3rd " South Lancashire regiment. + 9th " King's Royal Rifle Corps. + 4th " Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. + City of London Imperial Volunteers. + Railway Pioneer regiment. + + +MAJOR-GENERAL R. A. P. CLEMENTS, NAAUWPOORT AND COLESBERG. + + 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons (two squadrons). + J. battery, R.H.A. + 37th (Howitzer) battery, R.F.A. (two Howitzers). + 4th battery, R.F.A. + 2nd battn. Bedfordshire regiment. + 1st " Royal Irish regiment. + 2nd " Worcestershire regiment. + 2nd " Royal Berkshire regiment (four companies). + 2nd " Wiltshire regiment. + 4th " Derbyshire regiment. + Detachment 14th coy., Southern Division, R.G.A. + + +LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR W. GATACRE, STERKSTROOM. + + Two 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. + 74th battery, R.F.A. + 77th battery, R.F.A. + 79th battery, R.F.A. + Detachment, R.G.A. (two 9-pr. guns). + 1st battn. The Royal Scots. + 2nd " Northumberland Fusiliers. + 1st " Derbyshire regiment. + 2nd " Berkshire regiment (four companies). + 2nd " Royal Irish Rifles. + 3rd " Durham Light Infantry. + Two companies of mounted infantry. + Cape Mounted Rifles. + Brabant's Horse. + Kaffrarian Rifles. + De Montmorency's Scouts. + Queenstown Mounted Volunteers. + + +COLONEL R. G. KEKEWICH, KIMBERLEY. + + 23rd company, Western Division, R.G.A. + 7th Field company, R.E. (one section). + 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire regiment (four companies). + Diamond Fields artillery. + Kimberley regiment. + Diamond Fields Horse. + Kimberley Light Horse. + Cape Police. + Town Guard. + + +COLONEL R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, MAFEKING. + + Protectorate regiment. + Bechuanaland Rifles. + British South Africa Police. + Cape Police. + Town Guard. + + +SOUTH RHODESIA AND BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE. + + Rhodesia regiment. + British South Africa Police. + Buluwayo Volunteers. + Buluwayo Town Guard. + + +GENERAL SIR G. WHITE, LADYSMITH. + + Naval brigade, with two 4.7-in, and four 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. + Natal Naval Volunteers. + + Cavalry brigade (Maj.-Genl. J. F. Brocklehurst). + 5th Dragoon Guards. + 5th Lancers. + 18th Hussars. + 19th Hussars. + Imperial Light Horse. + + Mounted brigade (Colonel W. Royston). + Natal Carbineers. + Natal Mounted Rifles. + Border Mounted Rifles. + Natal Police. + ---- + 13th battery, R.F.A. + 67th battery, R.F.A. + 69th battery, R.F.A. + 21st battery, R.F.A. + 42nd battery, R.F.A. + 53rd battery, R.F.A. + No. 10, Mountain battery, R.G.A. (two guns). + Two 6.3-in. Howitzers. + + 7th brigade (Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton). + 1st battn. Manchester regiment. + 2nd " Gordon Highlanders. + 1st " Royal Irish Fusiliers (two companies). + 2nd " Rifle Brigade (seven companies). + + 8th brigade (Colonel F. Howard). + 1st battn. Leicestershire regiment. + 2nd " King's Royal Rifle Corps. + 1st " Liverpool regiment (four companies). + 2nd " Rifle Brigade (one company). + + Divisional Troops (Colonel W. G. Knox). + 23rd Field coy., R.E. + Telegraph section, R.E. + Balloon section, R.E. + 1st battn. Liverpool regiment (four companies). + 1st " Devonshire regiment. + 1st " King's Royal Rifle Corps. + 1st " Gloucestershire regiment. + Town Guard. + + +GENERAL SIR R. BULLER, CHIEVELEY. + + Naval Brigade (Captain E. P. Jones, R.N.). + One 6-in. gun. + Five 4.7-in. guns. + Eight 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns. + + Corps Troops. + 19th battery, R.F.A. + 61st (Howitzer) battery, R.F.A. + Two 5-in. guns, 16th company, Southern Division, R.G.A. + No. 4, Mountain battery, R.G.A. + Ammunition Column. + Telegraph Detachment, R.E. + "A." Pontoon Troop, R.E. + Balloon section, R.E. + + 2nd Mounted brigade (Colonel the Earl of Dundonald). + Composite regiment of mounted infantry. + South African Light Horse. + Thorneycroft's mounted infantry. + + 2nd infantry division. Major-Genl. the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton. + + 2nd brigade (Maj. Genl. H. J. T. Hildyard). + 2nd battn. Queen's regiment. + 2nd " Devon regiment. + 2nd " West Yorkshire regiment. + 2nd " East Surrey regiment. + 4th brigade (Colonel C. H. B. Norcott). + 2nd battn. Scottish Rifles. + 3rd " King's Royal Rifle Corps. + 1st " Durham Light Infantry. + 1st " Rifle brigade. + Divisional Troops. + One troop, 13th Hussars. + 7th battery, R.F.A. + 63rd battery, R.F.A. + 64th battery, R.F.A. + 17th Field company, R.E. + + 5th infantry division Lieut.-Genl. Sir C. Warren. + 10th brigade (Maj.-Genl. J. Talbot Coke). + 2nd battn. Somerset Light Infantry. + 2nd " Dorset regiment. + 2nd " Middlesex regiment. + 11th brigade (Maj.-Genl. A. S. Wynne). + 1st battn. Royal Lancaster regiment. + 1st " South Lancashire regiment. + Rifle Reserve battalion. + Divisional Troops. + One troop Royal Dragoons. + Colonial Scouts. + 28th battery, R.F.A. + 73rd battery, R.F.A. + 78th battery, R.F.A. + Ammunition Column. + 37th company, R.E. + + 6th brigade (temporarily attached to 5th division). (Major-Genl. + G. Barton). + 2nd battn. Royal Fusiliers. + 2nd " Royal Scots Fusiliers. + 1st " Royal Welsh Fusiliers. + 2nd " Royal Irish Fusiliers. + + 5th brigade (unattached). (Major-Genl. A. F. Hart). + 1st battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. + 1st " Border regiment. + 1st " Connaught Rangers. + 2nd " Royal Dublin Fusiliers. + + +AT SPRINGFIELD. + + 1st Cavalry brigade (Colonel J. F. Burn-Murdoch). + 1st Royal Dragoons. + 13th Hussars. + 14th Hussars (two squadrons). + A. battery, R.H.A. + Two Naval 12-prs. + 1st battn. York and Lancaster regiment. + Imperial Light Infantry. + + +AT GREYTOWN. + + Colonel E. C. Bethune, 16th Lancers. + Bethune's mounted infantry. + Natal Police. + Umvoti Mounted Rifles. + Two 7-pr. Field guns, Natal Field artillery. + Two Naval 12-pr. 8-cwt. guns. + Detachment mounted infantry. + + +LINES OF COMMUNICATION. + + 2nd battn. Lancashire Fusiliers. + 1st " Royal Dublin Fusiliers. + Natal Royal Rifles. + Colonial Scouts. + Durban Light Infantry. + Natal Field artillery. + + + + +GLOSSARY. + + BAD A spring, bath. + + BERG A mountain. + + BILTONG Dried meat. + + BOER Literally farmer; often used as generic term for a + Dutchman of South Africa. + + BRANDWACHT An outpost, or picket; literally beacon or camp fire. + + BULT A ridge in a rolling down country; literally a hump. + + BURG A town; literally a borough. + + BURGHER A male inhabitant of one of the Boer Republics who + possessed full political rights. + + BUSH Country covered in a varying degree with trees and + undergrowth. + + BUSHVELD Generally used in the Transvaal in reference to the low + veld, in contrast to the high veld of the south and east + and the bushveld of the north-east and north. + + COMMANDANT Senior officer of a commando; a commander. + + COMMANDEER To requisition for military service. + + COMMANDO A Boer military force of any size, usually the fighting + force of one district. + + CORPORAL Assistant to a Veld-Cornet (q.v.). + + DONGA A cutting made on the surface of the ground by the action + of water--sometimes filled with water, often dry. + + DOPPER A sect, religious, and to some extent political, among the + Boers. + + DORP A village. + + DRIFT A ford. + + FONTEIN A spring; literally a fountain. + + HOEK A re-entrant in a range of hills; literally corner; also + used for pass and ravine. + + HOOFD An adjective signifying head or chief. + + HOUT Wood. + + IMPI A Zulu army. + + INDABA Native council. + + INDUNA Zulu, or Kaffir, chief. + + INSPAN To attach transport animals of any kind to their + vehicles--to get ready to march--to harness-up. + + KLOOF Ravine, a gorge; literally a cleft. + + KOP A hill; literally head. + + KOPJE A small hill. + + KRAAL Native village, or collection of huts; an enclosure for + cattle. + + KRANZ, KRANTZ + or KRANS Cliff. + + KRIJGSRAAD War council. + + LAAGER Camp, bivouac. + + LANDDROST Boer magistrate. + + MORGEN A land measurement, roughly equal to two acres. + + NEK A pass between two hills of any height. + + PAN A pond, full or empty; a saucer-like depression, usually + dry in winter. + + PLAATS House or farm. The term is equivalent to "an estate," + large or small. + + PONT A ferry-boat or pontoon, worked by ropes or chains. + + POORT A gap, breaking a range of hills; literally gate. + + RAND Ridge or edge--_i.e._, the edge of a plateau. + + ROER An old-fashioned gun or rifle. + + SANGAR Anglo-Indian term for a stone breastwork. + + SCHANZ Stone entrenchment or breastwork. + + SLOOT + or SLUIT Open watercourse; an artificial ditch or gutter. + + SPAN A team of animals. + + SPRUIT A watercourse, sometimes dry. + + STAD Town. + + STOEP A masonry platform in front of a house; a verandah. + + TREK To travel--march. + + UITSPAN To detach transport of any kind from their + vehicles--to halt--to unharness. Used as a substantive + to denote the public places on main roads set aside for + watering cattle and encamping. + + VALLEI Valley. + + VECHT-GENERAL Fighting General as opposed to the Administrative + General. + + VELD The country as opposed to the town; the open country. + + VELD-CORNET The senior officer of a ward or sub-district. + + VLEI A small lake, usually formed by the widening of a stream. + + VOLKSRAAD Parliament; People's Council. + + WAPENSCHOUW Rifle meeting. + + WARD Sub-district. + + WIJK Ward, constituency. + + WINKEL Shop or store. + + ZARP A member of the Transvaal Police + (Zuid-Afrikaansche-Republiek-Politie). + + ZWART + or SWART Black. + + + + +INDEX + + + + +INDEX TO VOLUME I. + + + Abdy, Major A. J., 184. + Abon's Dam, 246, 309. + Achtertang, 275, 400, 404. + Acton Homes, 157, 158. + Adelaide Farm, 140, 181. + Aden, 91. + Adjutant-General's Department, 8, 10, 16. + Admiralty, 6, 16, 97-122; + acts as agent for War Office for shipping army, 98, 107; + assistance on shore ordered by, 117; + conference between War Office and, 110; + contracts, 105; + control of transport service, 99; + conveyance of mules by, 23; + early measures taken by the, 100; + embarkation arrangements between War Office and, 111; + Messrs. Hogg & Robinson, shipping agents of the, 98; + office accommodation, additions to, 101; + Royal Commission, as to the success of the, 110; + statement that stock of horse-fittings and water-tanks was inadequate, + 110; + Transport Department, 98; + transports engaged by the, 109; + transport work carried out by the, 97, 98. + _See also_ NAVY. + Advance Hill, 367, 368. + Adye, Major W., 186, 188, 194, 195. + Afrikanders, the, 68. + Airlie, Lieut.-Col. the Earl of, 323. + Albert (district), 275, 285, 382. + Albrecht, Major, 234, 256, 308. + Aldershot, brigades direct from, 204. + Alderson, Lieut.-Col. E. A. H., 387, 439. + Aliwal (district), 275. + Aliwal North, 48, 50, 208, 285, 382. + Allenby, Major E. H. H., 402. + Aller Park, 183. + Amajuba, or Majuba, 72, 426. + America, 443. + Ammunition (British):-- + rifle, 31; + gun, 31; + reserves of, 32. + Ammunition columns, 437, 438. + Anderton, Lieut. T., 121. + Animals purchased abroad, 20. + Annexed districts, 382. + Ardagh, Sir J. C., K.C.I.E., C.B., 14, 422. + _See also_ INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (BRITISH, HOME). + Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Armed forces of the British Empire, 92-95. + Army, British. _See_ BRITISH ARMY. + Army Board, 26. + Army Corps, 26, 110. + Army Medical Department, 26, 30. + _See also_ ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS. + Army Orders, 12, 414, 420. + Army remounts. _See_ REMOUNT DEPARTMENT. + Army reserves. _See_ RESERVES. + Army Service Corps. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Army Veterinary Department, 27. + Artillery. _See_ REGULAR _and_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Artillery equipment, 422. + Arundel, 277-284, 389, 391. + Atlantic Transport Co., 103. + Australia, 34, 443. + _See also the various Australian Colonies._ + Australian Mounted Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Auxiliary troops of the United Kingdom, 93. + + + Babington, Maj.-Gen. J. M., 321, 322, 327, 387, 441, 442. + Babtie, Major W., C.M.G., M.B., 365; + awarded the V.C., 366. + Baden-Powell, Colonel R. S. S., 2, 39, 42, 44, 48-49, 197, 207, 409; + influence of, on the Boer dispositions, 50. + Bailward, Major A. C., 360, 361. + Bamboosberg Spruit, 294, 299. + Bannatine-Allason, Major R., 322, 323, 330, 331. + Barbados, 89, 91. + Barkly East, 53, 208, 275, 285, 287, 288, 382. + Barkly West, 214, 382. + Barrett, Lieut. N., 121. + Barter, Lieut.-Col. C. St. L., 224, 254, 255, 325. + Barton, Major.-Gen. G., C.B., 203, 269, 273, 333, 345, 347, 357-373. + Bastard's Nek, 400, 405. + Basutoland, 36, 37, 48, 56-59, 61, 64, 94, 197, 306. + Basutos, 40. + Batteries. _See_ ROYAL ARTILLERY _and_ NAVAL BATTERIES. + Bates, Captain A., 382. + Battalions, average strength of, in February, 1900, 438. + Bayley's Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Beacon Hill, 271, 272. + Bearcroft, Captain J. E., R.N., 120, 308, 321, 438. + Bearer companies. _See_ ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS. + Beaufort West, 53, 210. + Bechuanaland, 52, 65, 95, 207, 417. + Bedfordshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Beith, 147, 148. + Belfort, 422. + Bell, Captain F. J. H., 298. + Bell Spruit, 173, 177, 183, 186, 188-191. + Belmont, 52, 63, 212, 213, 215-217, 218-228, 229, 231, 232, 241, 258, + 308, 310, 332, 386, 432. + Benson, Major G. E., 309, 317. + Berkshire regiment, Royal (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Bermuda, 89, 91. + Besters station, 158, 171. + Bethel commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Bethlehem commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Bethulie commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Bethulie, 40, 50, 275, 411-413, 431. + Bethulie bridge, 39, 48, 50, 198, 202, 210, 413, 425, 435. + Bethulie road, 404. + Bethune, Lieut.-Col. E. C., 206, 262. + Bethune's Mounted Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Bevan, Lieut. F., 213. + Bewicke-Copley, Major R. C. A. B., 372. + Bezuidenhout's Pass, 49, 58, 157. + Biggarsberg Range, 37, 38, 58, 59, 125, 147, 159, 335. + Black Watch (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + "Black week," the, 380. + Blesboklaagte, 147. + Bloemfontein, 5, 48, 85, 197, 202, 210, 290, 385, 388, 410-413, 428, + 429, 431, 435. + Bloemfontein commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Bloemhof commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Blue Mountains, 81. + Board of Trade, 101, 105. + Boers: + advance on Colesberg, 275; + advance on Kimberley, 50, 52; + advance on Mafeking, 49, 50, 52; + advance into Northern Natal, 124; + advance into Southern Natal, 265; + advance on Stormberg, 285; + annexations by, 382; + armament of, 79-85; + enterprise of, in use of heavy guns, 422; + initial numerical superiority of, 2, 35, 49, 50; + leaders of, deceived by Lord Roberts' movements and secrecy, 435; + methods of warfare of, 69-75, 402; + military system of, 75-79; + proclamations by, 52, 275; + strength of, 1, 49, 334, 335, 409, 410. + Boer commandos: + assembly of, behind the Drakensberg, 47; + preliminary distribution of, at beginning of war, 49, 50; + waiting in July, 1899, till grass fit to invade Colonies, 116. + _See also_ COMMANDOS. + Boer Intelligence Department. _See_ INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. + Boksburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Boomplaats, 70. + Border Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Border Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Border regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Boshof commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Bosman's Drift, 244, 247. + Botha, Commandant Christian, 342. + Botha, General Louis, 264, 265, 332-375, 389. + Botha, Commandant (Mafeking), 409. + Botha's Drift, 405. + Botha's Pass, 49, 58, 124. + Bottomley, Captain H., 272. + Brabant, Brig.-General E. Y., C.M.G., 415, 435; + raises mounted corps, 206, 286. + Brabant's Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Brabazon, Major-General J. P., C.B., 282, 394, 405, 406. + Brackenbury, Lieut.-General Sir H., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., 7, 16, 18, 19, + 26, 28, 29, 32, 33. + Brakfontein Nek, 335. + Brett, Captain C. A. H., 398. + Bridge, Colonel C. H., C.B., 416, 417. + Bridle Drift (Colenso), 310, 314, 341, 342, 346, 348, 352-354, 356. + Bridle Drift (Magersfontein). _See_ VOETPAD'S DRIFT. + Brigades. _See_ CAVALRY _and_ INFANTRY BRIGADES. + British Agent at Pretoria, 1; + leaves, 123. + British Army, 87-95; + distribution of the, previous to the war, 89; + composition of the, 91; + effective strength of the armed land forces of the Empire, 92-95; + number of troops in South Africa when war began, 1, 2, 89; + regiments of the, _see_ REGULAR UNITS; + short service system in the, _see_ SHORT SERVICE SYSTEM _and_ RESERVES; + organisation of, as affected by conditions of shipping, 115. + British Government. _See_ CABINET. + British Intelligence Department. _See_ INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. + British Kaffraria, 385. + British Navy, duties of the, 96. + _See also_ ADMIRALTY _and_ NAVY. + British Regular Army (European), effective strength of the, 92; + (Colonial), 92; + (India), 92. + British Regular Units. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + British South Africa Police. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Broadwood, Brig.-General R. G., 437, 442. + Brocklehurst, Major-General J. F., M.V.O., 181. + Brooke, Colonel L. G., 353. + Brown's Drift, 246, 308, 309, 322. + Brynbella Hill, 271-273. + Buchanan-Riddell, Lieut.-Col. R. G., 372. + Buffalo River (Cape Colony), 57. + Buffalo River (Natal), 38, 59, 124, 137, 140, 335. + Bulfin, Captain E. S., 253, 254. + Buller, The Right Hon. Sir Redvers H., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 17, 18, + 42, 43, 120, 262, 415, 416, 419, 425, 426, 434, 438; + appointed to command army for South Africa, 2; + arrival at Cape Town, 196; + arrival at Durban, 332; + arrival at Maritzburg, 332; + arrival at Frere, 332; + Colenso, battle of, 351-375; + decision to go to Natal, 200, 209; + decision to relieve Ladysmith via Potgieters Drift, 338; + decision to make direct attack on Colenso, 339; + informs General White of his intention to attack Colenso, 339; + informed that Lord Roberts is appointed Commander-in-Chief in South + Africa, 381; + Lord Roberts gives him "free hand" to try Potgieters or Trickhardts + Drifts, 411; + measures on arrival at Cape Town, 200-207; + memorandum of his views awaits Lord Roberts at Cape Town, 410; + message after Colenso, to Secretary of State for War, 377; + message after Colenso to General White, 378; + orders to generals in Cape Colony, 207-210, 277, 288; + orders for battle of Colenso, 345-350; + receives news of Stormberg and Magersfontein, 339; + reports he is about to renew attempt to relieve Ladysmith, via + Potgieters or Trickhardts Drifts, 411; + Secretary of State for War replies to telegram announcing result of + Colenso, 379; + situation in South Africa on arrival of, 197-200; + Spion Kop, failure at, 438. + Bullock, Lieut.-Col. G. M., 364, 371, 374. + Buluwayo, 36. + Bulwana, or Umbulwana, 150, 176, 181, 182. + Bulwer bridge, 340, 346. + Burger, General Schalk, 50, 343. + Burghers, mobilisation of, 49; + number of, under arms at outbreak of war, 50. + Burghersdorp, 39, 208-210, 281, 282, 285, 287. + Burghersdorp commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Burma, 87. + Burnett, Captain C. K., 142. + Burn-Murdoch, Lieut.-Col. J. F., 354. + Burrell, Major W. S., 364, 371. + Bushman Land, 66. + Bushman's Hoek, 287, 288, 290, 291, 301. + Bushman's river, 273. + Bush veld, 62. + Butcher, Major E. E. A., mounts two 15-prs. on Coles Kop, 401, 402. + Butler, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. F., K.C.B., 35, 37-39, 42, 45, 46. + Byng, Lieut.-Col. the Hon. J. H. G., 367. + + + Cabinet: + date of choice of plan of campaign by, 5; + dates of successive sanctions of expenditure and of mobilisation by, 6; + date of decision by, appointing Lord Roberts, 380, 389; + decision by, as to this history, 1; + decision by, not to employ coloured troops, 89; + effect of wish of, not to provoke war, in delaying preparation, 3, 6, + 16-19, 207; + effect of wish of, in postponing plan of campaign, 4; + misunderstanding of decision of, in _re_ 5th division, 377; + reply by, to Sir R. Buller in _re_ Ladysmith, 379; + selects Sir R. Buller as Commander-in-Chief, 2. + Caesar's camp (Ladysmith), 335. + Caledon commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Campbell, 2nd Lieut. A. N., 337. + Campbell (Town, Cape Colony), 214. + Canada, 31, 88, 89, 91, 93; + offers assistance, 34. + Canadian regiment, Royal. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Colony, 2, 14, 22, 36, 94, 197, 199, 206, 262, and appendices; + distribution of British troops in, at the outbreak of war, 44; + President Steyn orders invasion of N.E. of, 285. + Cape Garrison artillery. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Government, 14; + howitzers of, 422; + railways of, 424, 425. + Cape Medical Staff Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Police. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Town, 43, 52, 53, 57, 106, 111, 113, 197, 206, 211, 276, 406, + 408, 436, 442, 443. + Cape Town Highlanders. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Cape Volunteer forces. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Capper, Lieut.-Col. J. E., 425. + Carbineers, _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Carbineers, Natal. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + _Carinthea_ (freight ship), loss of the, 107. + Carleton, Lieut.-Col. F. R. C., 132, 149, 174-177, 183, 186-195. + Carolina commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Carter, Lieut. A. J., 238. + Cathcart, 53, 286. + Cathkin Castle, 58, 59. + Cattle ships, 111. + Cavalry Brigades:-- + 1st Cavalry brigade (Porter), 283, 396-398, 436. + 2nd Cavalry brigade (Fisher, later Broadwood), composition of, + at Arundel, 283; + composition of, at Modder river, 437. + 3rd Cavalry brigade (Gordon), formation of, 437. + 4th Cavalry brigade, despatch of, advisable owing to failure at + Spion Kop, 438; + embarkation of, 9; + orders for mobilisation of, 9; + to be sent out as soon as ships ready, 379. + Cavalry Division:-- + Assembly of, at Orange river, 444; + bearer companies and Field hospitals of, 25; + composition of, at Arundel, 283-284; + composition of, at Modder river, 436-437; + to form part of expeditionary force, 6, 90; + to go to South Africa, 43; + to take the field by middle of December, 51; + war equipment complete for, 29. + Cavalry in Ladysmith. _See_ APPENDIX 10, page 489. + Ceres, 383. + Ceylon, 91; + offers assistance, 34. + Champagne Castle, 58, 59. + Channel Isles militia, 93. + Chapman, Mr. (guide at Willow Grange), 271. + Charlestown, 36. + Chermside, Major-Gen. Sir H. C., G.C.M.G., C.B., 437. + Chesham, Lieut.-Col. Lord, 414. + Cheshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Chiazzari, Lieut. N., 121. + Chichester, Captain Sir E., Bart., R.N., C.M.G., 106. + Chieveley, 267, 338, 340, 343, 345, 347, 378, 411. + China, 89, 91. + Chisholme, Colonel J. J. Scott, 163, 164. + Churchill, Mr. W. L. S., 268. + Churchward, Major P. R. S., 235. + City of London Imperial Volunteers, 414, 437. + Clark, Rear-Admiral Bouverie F., R.N., 106. + Clarke, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles M., Bart., K.C.B., 111. + _See also_ QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. + Clements, Major-Gen. R. A. P., D.S.O., 404, 405, 407, 430, 433-436, + 439, 443. + Clements' brigade. _See_ INFANTRY BRIGADES. + Clery, Lieut.-General Sir C. F., K.C.B., 197, 199, 200, 202, 205, 208, + 266, 270, 334, 347, 357, 364, 365, 373. + Climate of South Africa, 61. + Clothing, changes made in, for South African campaign, 30. + Coal, consumption of, by high speed vessels, 105. + Coaling of transports, etc., 105. + Codrington, Lieut.-Col. A. E., 225, 249, 250. + Coldstream Guards (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Colenso, 44, 122, 159, 197, 200, 216-263, 265, 267, 273, 332-375, 389, + 410. + Colenso bridge, 200; + Colonial troops hold, 261. + Coleridge, Major H. F., 254, 256. + Colesberg, 39, 48, 209, 275-284, 376, 382, 389-409, 412, 429, 430, + 431-436. + Colesberg road bridge, 48, 283, 391, 392, 396, 402. + Colesberg Junction, 275. + Coles Kop, 390, 392, 395, 397, 401, 404, 405. + Colley, Major-General Sir George P., K.C.B., 426. + Colonial corps, work of, 375. + Colonial forces, 414. + Colonial troops in previous campaigns, 33. + Colonial Units:-- + Australian Mounted Infantry, 407. + Baden-Powell's contingent, 50. + Bayley's Corps, 415. + Bethune's M.I., 206, 269, 332, 367, 373. + Border Horse, 415. + Border Mounted Rifles, 34. + Brabant's Horse, 206, 286, 288, 291, 383, 415. + British South Africa Police, 94. + Cape Garrison artillery, 53. + Cape Medical Staff Corps, 53, 215. + Cape Police, 42, 94, 276, 286-288, 290-292, 382. + Cape Mounted Rifles, 208, 286, 288, 290, 291, 415. + Cape Town Highlanders, 53. + Colonial division, 435. + Colonial Scouts, 491. + Duke of Edinburgh's Volunteer Rifles, 53. + Durban Light Infantry, 34, 262, 267, 268, 271, 333. + Frontier Mounted Rifles, 53, 286. + Grahamstown Volunteer M.I., 437. + Hore's regiment, 51. + Imperial Light Horse, 155, 158-160, 163, 165, 167, 169, 170, 175, + 183, 184, 262, 272, 332, 367. + Imperial Light Infantry, 159, 175, 183, 265, 333. + Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles, 53, 286, 287, 415. + Kimberley Corps, 53. + Kitchener's Horse, 415, 437. + Komgha Mounted Rifles, 53. + Mafeking Corps, 53. + Murray's Scouts, 266, 337. + Natal Carbineers, 34, 157-159, 180, 262, 332, 367. + Natal Field Artillery, 34, 160, 171, 175, 262, 264, 269, 333. + Natal Mounted Rifles, 34, 124, 153, 155, 159, 164, 171. + Natal Naval Volunteers, 34, 121, 262, 264, 266, 332. + Natal Police, 44, 45, 94, 124, 262, 267, 332, 367. + Natal Royal Rifles, 34, 262, 333. + Nesbitt's Horse, 415, 437. + New South Wales Lancers, 34, 214, 233, 276-283, 316, 400, 404, 436. + New South Wales Mounted Rifles, 437. + New Zealand Mounted Rifles, 279, 280, 282, 284, 390, 393, 402-404, 437. + Orpen's Corps, 415. + Pioneer Corps of Artisans, 265. + Plumer's regiment, 51. + Port Elizabeth Volunteers, 278, 280. + Prince Alfred's Own Cape Field Artillery, 52, 53. + Prince Alfred's Volunteer Guard, 53, 278. + Protectorate regiment, 94. + Queensland Mounted Infantry, 386, 387, 437. + Queenstown Rifle Volunteers, 286, 415. + Railway Pioneer regiment, 384, 425. + Rhodesian regiment, 94. + Rimington's Guides, 200, 212-214, 220, 227, 233, 241, 246, 248, 255, + 311, 314, 391, 393, 404, 438. + Roberts' Horse, 415, 437. + Royal Canadian Regiment, 308, 386, 387, 438. + South African Light Horse, 206, 332, 367, 368, 373, 383. + South Australian Infantry, 309. + Tasmanian Infantry, 309. + Thorneycroft's M.I., 206, 261, 269, 273, 332, 367-369, 373. + Town Guards, 51, 266. + Uitenhage Rifles, 53. + Umvoti Mounted Rifles, 34, 261, 274. + Victorian Infantry, 309. + Victorian Mounted Infantry, 407. + Victorian Mounted Rifles, 308. + West Australian Infantry, 309. + Colonies, offers of assistance from the, also in previous campaigns, + 33, 34; + strength of armed forces in the, 93-95. + Colvile, Major-General Sir H. E., K.C.M.G., C.B., 211, 215, 218-225, + 232, 236, 248-257, 259, 311-330, 437. + Commandeering, impossible in Cape Colony, 417. + Commander-in-Chief. _See under respective heads_: BULLER, HARRIS, + ROBERTS, WOLSELEY. + Commandos:-- + Bethel, 49, 126, 128, 274. + Bethlehem, 49, 152, 156, 158, 306, 344. + Bethulie, 50, 275, 295. + Bloemfontein, 50, 220, 234. + Bloemhof, 50, 306, 307. + Boksburg, 49, 124, 343. + Boshof, 50, 220, 307. + Burghersdorp, 299. + Caledon, 50. + Carolina, 49, 50. + De la Rey's, 216, 234. + Edenburg, 275. + Ermelo, 49, 124, 128, 172-3, 342-344. + Fauresmith, 50, 220, 234, 307. + Fordsburg, 50. + German Corps, 49, 125, 159, 162, 167. + Germiston, 49. + Grobelaar's, 281, 394. + Harrismith, 49, 152, 155, 158. + Heidelberg, 49, 124, 343, 435. + Heilbron, 49, 152, 156, 158, 306, 334. + Hollander Corps, 49, 125, 166. + Hoopstad, 50, 220, 234, 307. + Irish Corps, 49, 370, 371. + Jacobsdal, 50, 220, 234, 308, 325. + Johannesburg, 49, 125, 162, 191, 342. + Joubert's, 269. + Jourdaan's, 214. + Kock's, 124. + Kroonstad, 49, 152-155, 158, 220, 306, 307, 334. + Krugersdorp, 49, 126, 128, 343, 361. + Ladybrand, 50, 307, 441. + Lichtenburg, 49, 308. + Liebenberg's, 442. + Lydenburg, 49, 50. + Marico, 49. + Middelburg, 49, 124, 128, 342-344, 370. + Orange Free Staters, 158-159, 161, 171, 173, 191-192, 207, 229, 247, + 306, 370, 390, 413. + Philippolis, 50, 275. + Piet Retief, 49, 128, 274. + Potchefstroom, 49, 307, 329. + Pretoria, 49, 124, 191. + Rouxville, 50, 295. + Rustenburg, 49, 50. + Scandinavian Corps, 50, 307, 319, 320. + Smithfield, 295. + Standerton, 49, 124, 343, 344, 355. + Swaziland, 49, 342. + Transvaalers, 174, 234, 247-248, 390. + Trueter's, 125. + Utrecht, 49, 128. + Van der Merwe's, 241. + Vrede, 49, 152, 155, 156, 158, 162. + Vryheid, 49, 128, 343. + Wakkerstroom, 49, 124, 128, 343, 344. + Waterberg, 50. + Winburg, 49, 152, 155, 158, 214, 220, 234, 342, 370. + Wolmaranstad, 49, 306-307. + Zoutpansberg, 50, 342, 344. + Compass Peak, 56. + Composite regiment, 332, 367. + Composite regiment (Household Cavalry). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Concentration stations for animals, 22, 25. + Congreve, Captain W. N., 365; + awarded the V.C., 366. + Connaught Rangers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Conner, Captain R., 194. + Cookhouse, 53. + Cooper, Colonel C. D., 262-264, 353. + Cooper, Major F. C., 357, 366. + Cove Redoubt, 177. + Cox, Lieut. E., 319. + Cox, Major-General G., 44-45. + Coxhead, Lieut.-Colonel J. A., 149-151, 161, 166, 172, 177-178, 184. + Crabbe, Lieut.-Colonel E. M. S., 222. + Cradock, 206, 278, 280, 287-380. + Crete, 2, 91. + Creusot guns, 49, 82-83, 128, 146, 177, 179, 185, 272, 422. + Crimea, 380. + Crocodile river (Limpopo), 60. + Cromer, Major the Right Hon. Viscount, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., + C.I.E., 415. + Cronje, General A. P., 153, 172, 308. + Cronje, General P., 50, 248, 305-310, 320, 378, 385-389, 409-412, + 429-431, 434, 438-442, 444. + Cundycleugh Pass, 58. + Cypher Gat, 301, 408. + Cyprus, 91, 93. + + + Dannhauser Road, 142, 143. + Dartnell, Colonel J. G., C.M.G., 146. + De Aar, 22, 39, 42, 43, 52, 207, 209-211, 276, 379, 386-387, 391, + 421, 439. + Dean, Lieut. F. W., R.N., 233, 236. + De Beers Co., 44. + De Beers Pass, 58, 158. + De Jager, Field-Cornet, 162. + De Jager's Drift, 123-127. + Delagoa Bay, 50, 60, 116. + De la Rey, General J. H., 50, 216, 220, 229, 234, 239, 243-244, 247, + 305, 308. + de Lisle, Captain H. de B., D.S.O., 395, 400, 405. + _Denton Grange_, loss of the, 107. + Depots, 421. + Derbyshire regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + De Villiers, General C. J., 153. + Devonshire regiment (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Dewaas, 147. + Dewar, Captain E. J., 287, 292. + Dewdrop, 157. + De Wet, General Christian R., 151, 192, 386, 409, 435, 440. + Dick, Captain D. H. A., 360. + Dick-Cunyngham, Lieut.-Col. W. H., V.C., 167. + Director-General of Ordnance. _See_ BRACKENBURY. + Dirksen, Commandant, 343. + Divisions. _See_ CAVALRY _and_ INFANTRY DIVISIONS. + Donald, Lieut.-Col. C. G., 369. + Donegan, Major J. F., 147. + Donkerpoort, 50. + Doornberg, 123-124, 126-127, 137. + Doornkop Spruit, 341, 345, 346, 348, 352-354, 357, 369-371. + _Doris_, H.M.S., 117. + Dordrecht, 287-288, 290, 408, 435. + Douglas (Town, Cape Colony), 214, 386, 387, 439, 442. + Douglas, Colonel C. W. H., 311, 312, 315. + Douglas, Lieut. H. E. M., awarded the V.C., 327. + Downing, Colonel C. M. H., 177-178, 180-181. + Downman, Lieut.-Col. G. T. F., 326, 327. + Dragoon Guards, 5th. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Dragoon Guards, 6th. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Dragoons, 1st (Royal). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Dragoons, 2nd (Royal Scots Greys). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Dragoons, 6th (Inniskilling). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Drakensberg Mountains, 37, 38, 40, 47, 54-67, 125, 157, 174, 335. + Dublin Fusiliers, Royal (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Duck, Vety.-Colonel F., C.B., 27. + Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Duke of Edinburgh's Volunteer Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Duncan, Captain S., 193-194. + Dundee, 35, 44, 47, 49, 58, 125-141, 429; + retreat from, 142-151. + _See also_ GLENCOE. + Dundonald, Colonel the Earl of, C.B., M.V.O., 273, 332, 347, 352, + 366-368, 373-374. + Durban, 48, 57, 113, 117-121, 200, 209, 262; + Boer raid contemplated on, 158, 206; + locomotive works assist mounting Naval guns at, 119; + protection at, from land attack, 197; + scanty means of defence at, 117. + Durban Light Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Durham Light Infantry (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Du Toit, Acting-General, 425. + + + Eagar, Lieut-Col. H. A., 296, 298, 301. + East and Central Africa, 95. + Eastern Cape Colony, 62. + East Kent regiment (The Buffs) (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + East Lancashire regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + East London, 43, 52, 53, 57, 106, 113, 119, 120, 197, 200, 261, 286, + 290, 378. + East Surrey regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Edenburg, 248. + Edenburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Egypt, 2, 88-89, 92, 415, 443. + Elandslaagte, 127, 144-145, 148, 151-152, 157-172, 182-183, 192. + Elandslaagte road, 179, 182. + Elliott, Major Sir H. G., K.C.M.G., 208, 288, 290, 385. + Elliott, Mr. C. B., General Manager, Cape Government Railways, 424. + Elswick battery, 414. + Elton, Captain F. A., 361. + Ely, Lieut. T. B., 356. + Embarkation, dates of, for South Africa, 9, 101, 107; + importance of Army being practised in, 112; + numbers embarked from South Africa, 107; + not delayed by mobilisation, 115; + political situation greatly delays, 115; + ports of, 100. + Empire, British, 1, 13, 32, 87, 89, 380. + Engineers, Royal. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Englebrecht, Commandant, 128. + Enslin, 229-242, 247, 309, 386, 444. + _See also_ GRASPAN. + Enteric fever, 64. + Equipment and clothing, 30, 417; + boots, 30; + camp, 31; + hospital, 26; + in previous campaigns, 17; + khaki drill, 30; + serge clothing, 30. + Erasmus, General, 124-127, 131, 148, 151, 170, 172, 341. + Ermelo, 124. + Ermelo commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Erskine, Captain W. C. C., 245. + Escombe, The Right Hon. H., 14-15. + Eshowe, 378. + Essex regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Estcourt, 44, 59, 197, 208, 261, 262, 268, 273, 378. + Ethelston, Commander A. P., R.N., 120, 205, 238. + Eustace, Lieut.-Col. F. J. W., 284, 390, 396, 397, 399. + Ewart, Lieut.-Col. J. S., 317, 440. + + + Falkland Isles, 95. + Fauresmith, 387, 388. + Fauresmith commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Ferreira, Commandant, 274. + Ferreira, General J. S., 409. + Festing, Lieut. F. L., 223. + Fetherstonhaugh, Maj.-Gen. R. S. R., 200, 203, 211, 215, 224, 248. + Field artillery, Royal, 52, 332, 414, 417. + _See also_ REGULAR UNITS. + Field Cornets, 75-76. + Field hospitals, 25, 26, 31, 289, 290, 292, 421, 437, 438. + _See also_ ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS. + Fiji, 94. + Financial Secretary, 28-29. + Fincham's farm, 216. + Fingo tribe, 208. + Fisher, Captain W. B., R.N., 116. + Fisher, Lieut.-Col. R. B. W., 283, 391-396. + Flag Hill, 176. + Food supplies, 17, 209, 421. + _See also_ SUPPLIES. + Forage: + and horse-gear, 106; + in freight ships, and in transports, 106; + supplied from Government stores, 106, 421. + Fordsburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General Sir F. W. E. F., K.C.B., C.M.G., 2, + 42, 43, 45, 53, 204, 207, 209, 279, 288, 377-379, 383, 409-411, 413, + 417, 418, 424. + Forestier-Walker, Capt. G. T., 254, 256. + Forster, Major W. G., 366. + _Forte_, H.M.S., 116, 120, 121, 263-265, 332, 333. + Fort Molyneux, 264. + Fort Napier, 263, 265. + Fort Wylie, 264, 340, 342, 343, 351, 358-361, 365, 367. + Foster's Farm, 292, 300. + Fourie, Commandant P., 234. + Fourteen Streams, 39, 50. + Fourteen Streams Bridge, 36. + Fox, Lieut. R. M. D., 254. + Fraserburg Road, 53. + Fraser's Drift, 439. + Fraser's Farm, 255. + Free State. _See_ ORANGE FREE STATE. + Freight ships: + contracts for, nature of, 98; + engaged by Colonial governments, 97; + forage supplied by owners of, 106; + for mules, 109; + for troops, 109; + full cargoes of, 109; + hired by Remount Department, 98; + stores from England carried in, 104. + French, Lieut.-Gen. J. D. P., 159-171 (Elandslaagte), 172-174, 176, + 181, 182, 183, 186, 200-203, 208-210, 215, 275-284 (Colesberg), 287, + 332, 376, 378, 382, 389-407 (Colesberg), 408, 409, 411, 430, 432-436, + 444. + Frere, 121, 265, 267, 268, 273, 332, 333, 358, 410. + Froneman, Commandant, 441. + Frontiers of British South Africa, 36-41. + Frontier Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Fuse, time, 423. + Fyffe, Captain B. O., 186, 193. + + + Gatacre, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W., K.C.B., D.S.O., 197, 199, 202, 203, 208-210, + 285-303 (Stormberg), 332, 376, 378, 383, 408, 411, 429, 435. + German Corps. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Germiston commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Giants Castle, 58, 59. + Gibraltar, 89, 92. + Girouard, Lieut.-Col. E. P. C., D.S.O., 385, 413, 424, 432, 433, 443. + Glencoe, 38, 44, 46, 47, 58, 145, 159, 172. + _See also_ DUNDEE. + Gloucestershire regiment (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Godley, Captain H. C., 309. + Goff, Lieut.-Colonel G. L. J., 319. + Goldie, Captain A. H., 361. + Gomba Spruit, 367, 373. + Goodenough, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H., K.C.B., 35, 44. + Goodwin, Mr. (later Major) C. A., 425. + Gordon, Brig.-General J. R. P., 437. + Gordon, Captain W. E., V.C., 327. + Gordon Highlanders (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Gore, Lieut.-Col. St. J. C., 163, 167-169, 171. + Gosset, Lieut. F. J., 286. + Gough, Col. B., 220, 221, 232, 240, 241. + Gough, Captain H. de la P., 337. + Graaf Reinet, 56. + Graff, Mr. S. J., 106, 110. + Grahamstown, 384. + Grahamstown Volunteer Mounted Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Granet, Major E. J., 258, 441. + Grant Committee, 32. + Grant, Major S. C. N., 14. + Graspan, 63, 120, 216, 229-242, 243, 332, 432, 442, 444. + _See also_ ENSLIN. + Grassy (later "Suffolk") Hill, 394, 396-399, 404, 406. + Great Fish River, 56. + Great Karroo, 55. + Great Kei River, 56. + Great Winterberg, 56. + Green Hill, 368. + Grenadier Guards (3rd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Greytown, 147, 159, 261, 378. + Grimshaw, Lieut. C. T. W., 128-131. + Grimwood, Col. G. G., 174-176, 178-182, 184. + Griqualand East, 36, 208, 288. + Griqualand West, 52, 62, 207, 382. + Griquatown, 214. + Grobelaar, Commandant E. R., 50, 281, 282, 295, 299, 394, 409. + Grobelaars Kloof, 59, 263, 340, 354. + Grylls, Lieut. J. B., 366. + Guards' Brigade. _See_ INFANTRY BRIGADES. + Guns, 6-in. Boer, 422; + British, 422, 423; + heavy, 433. + Gun Hill (Belmont), 219-221, 223-238. + Gun Hill (Ladysmith), 172, 174, 176, 180, 334. + Gunning, Colonel R. H., 132, 136. + + + Hague Convention, 31. + Haig, Major D., 276, 281. + Haldane, Capt. J. A. L., D.S.O., 267, 268. + Halifax, 139, 140. + Hall, Lieut.-Col. F. H., 203, 211, 214, 217, 239, 258, 321. + Hall, Lieut. H. C., 213. + Halsey, Lieut. A., R.N., 121, 266. + Hamilton, Colonel B. M., 346, 350. + Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. E. O. F., 366, 371 + Hamilton, Col. Ian S. M., C.B., D.S.O., 159, 163, 168-170, 172, 175-177, + 183, 185. + Hamilton, Major H. I. W., D.S.O., 433. + Hammersley, Major F., 133. + Hampshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hannah, Lieut. W. M. J., 143. + Hannay, Colonel O. C., 437, 444. + Hanover Road, 212, 277, 280, 390. + Harding, Mr., 330. + Harness, 19, 31; + mule, 417. + Harris, Rear-Admiral Sir R. H., K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief of Cape + of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa Station, 53, 116-119, 121, 185, + 205, 263, 422; + in July, 1899, sees that Boers are only waiting for the grass to invade + Natal, 116. + Harrismith, 44, 58, 157. + Harrismith commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Hart, Major-Gen. A. FitzRoy, C.B., 203, 204, 210, 333, 346, 348, 352-357, + 362, 369-372. + Hart's brigade. _See_ INFANTRY BRIGADES. + Hartley, Lieut.-Col. E. B., V.C., 215. + Hartebeestfontein Farm, 280. + Hatting, Commandant, 128. + Hatting Spruit, 126-127. + Hartzogsrand (mountain), 56. + Headquarter Hill, 306, 310-312, 316, 321, 323, 326, 327. + Hebron Farm, 404. + Heidelberg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Heilbron commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Helpmakaar, 261, 274, 334. + Helpmakaar Road, 146-147, 150, 181. + Hely-Hutchinson, The Honourable Sir W. F., G.C.M.G., 45, 123, 207, + 261-262. + Henderson, Colonel G. F. R., 15, 433. + Henniker-Major, Lieut.-Col. the Hon. A. H., 324. + Henshaw, Major C. G., 367, 374. + Herbert, Captain G. F., 361, 362, 365. + Herschel, 382. + Her Majesty's Government. _See_ CABINET. + Higgins, Lieut. J. F. A., 184. + High Commissioner. _See_ MILNER, SIR ALFRED. + Highland Brigade. _See_ INFANTRY BRIGADES. + Highland Light Infantry (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Highlands, 59, 269-270. + High Veld, 62, 63, 66, 67. + Hildyard, Maj.-Gen. H. J. T., C.B., 202, 204, 266, 269-273, 333, 346, + 347, 363, 364, 371, 372. + Hime, Lieut.-Col. the Hon. Sir Albert H., K.C.M.G., 144, 263. + Hinde, Colonel J. H. E., 270, 353. + His Majesty's Commissioners. _See_ ROYAL COMMISSION ON SOUTH AFRICAN WAR. + His Majesty's Government. _See_ CABINET. + Hlangwhane (mountain), 340, 341, 343-345, 347, 348, 358, 363, 367-369. + Hlatikulu, 269. + Hogg & Robinson, Messrs., 98. + Hollander Corps. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Home, Colonel, 7. + Honey Nest Kloof, 213, 231, 240, 245, 258, 310, 385, 386, 432; + railway proposed from, to Jacobsdal, 385. + Hong Kong, 89, 91; + offers assistance, 34. + Honourable Artillery Company of London, 93. + Hoopstad commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Hopetown Road bridge, 52. + _See also_ ORANGE RIVER BRIDGE. + Hore, Bt. Lieut.-Colonel C. O., 51. + Horse Artillery Hill (Magersfontein), 306, 322, 324, 326, 327, 329, 331. + Horses, 16, 434, 443, 444, 447; + Argentina, 20; + Australian, 21; + embarking, 113; + for infantry regiments, grant in 1897, 17; + in South Africa, 21; + Royal Commission's report on system of supply of, 23; + supply of, in excess of demands, 23. + Horse-shoes, deficiency of, 31. + Hospitals, equipment of, 26, 31; + general, 31; + stationary, 31; + stores for, 31; + veterinary, 27. + Hospital ships, 103. + Household Cavalry. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Howard, Colonel F., C.B., C.M.G., 174. + Howitzers, 9; + 6.3-in. Cape Government, 422, 423; + Boer, 422. + Hughes, Captain M. L., 364. + Hughes-Hallett, Lieut.-Col. J. W., 319, 327, 441. + Humphery, Major S., 192. + Hunt, Lieut.-Col. H. V., 203, 332, 351, 358-360. + Hunter, Major-General Sir A., K.C.B., D.S.O., 123, 144, 171, 184, 197, + 198. + Hunter, Sir D., K.C.M.G., 424. + Hunter-Weston, Major A. G., 400. + Hussar Hill (Colenso), 368. + Hussars (10th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hussars (13th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hussars (14th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hussars (18th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hussars (19th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Hutchinson. _See_ HELY-HUTCHINSON. + Hyderabad contingent, 92. + + + Impati, 124, 126, 131, 137, 138, 140, 142-147. + Imperial Commonwealth, 33. + Imperial Light Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Imperial Light Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Imperial Service troops, 92. + Imperial Yeomanry, 10, 414, 415, 443. + India, 31, 34, 41, 54, 89, 92, 443. + Indian Government, 20. + Indian Marine, Director of, 97. + Indian Military Police, 93. + Indian Volunteers, 93. + Indumeni, 142-146. + Indwe, 286, 287. + Infantry Brigades:-- + 1st brigade (Guards) (Colvile), 200, 211, 212, 215, 219-228, 232, 235, + 236, 242, 248-260, 311-315, 316-330, 438. + 2nd brigade (Hildyard), 202, 204, 266, 272, 333, 346, 348, 357-373. + 3rd brigade (Highland) (Wauchope, later MacDonald), 203, 207, 211, 215, + 308, 310-315, 316-330, 415, 437, 439-442, 444. + 4th brigade (Lyttelton), 202, 204, 333, 347, 348, 351-373. + 5th brigade (Hart), 203, 204, 210, 333, 346, 348, 351-373. + 6th brigade (Barton), 203, 269, 273, 333, 345, 347, 348, 351-373. + 7th brigade (Ian Hamilton), 163-171, 172-195. + 8th brigade (Yule, later Howard), 123-141, 142-151, 172-195. + 9th brigade (Fetherstonhaugh, later Pole-Carew), 203, 211, 212, 215, + 219-228, 229-242, 248-260, 311-315, 316-330, 438. + 12th brigade (Clements), 404, 407, 430, 433, 435, 443. + 13th brigade (C. E. Knox), 437. + 14th brigade (Chermside), 437. + 15th brigade (Wavell), 437. + 18th brigade (Stephenson), 437, 444. + 19th brigade (Smith-Dorrien), 438, 444. + Infantry Divisions:-- + 1st division (Methuen), at Belmont, 218-228; + at Graspan, 229-242; + at Magersfontein, 316-331; + at Modder river, 243-260; + change in composition of, 202-203; + detailed fresh composition of, 214-215; + equipped with drill clothing, 30; + final decision as to employment of, 200; + Lord Roberts' instructions to G.O.C., 433; + march of, from Orange river, 216; + Naval brigade joins, 120; + on Modder before Magersfontein, 304-315; + retained on Modder as a screen, 385; + Sir R. Buller's instructions to G.O.C., 201; + Sir R. Buller's instructions, before leaving for Natal, to G.O.C., + 209-213; + to be employed in relief of Kimberley, 199; + to disembark at Cape Town, 197. + 2nd division (Clery), arrives in Natal, 266-267; + at Colenso, 351-375; + change in composition of, 203; + equipped with drill clothing, 30; + final decision as to employment of, 200; + Sir R. Buller issues orders through Divisional staff of, 205; + to be employed in relief of Kimberley, 199; + to disembark at Port Elizabeth, 197. + 3rd division (Gatacre), change in composition of, 203-204; + destination changed to Natal, 199; + equipped with drill clothing, 30; + final decision as to employment of, 200; + G.O.C. and staff arrive at East London, 285; + instructions to G.O.C., 202; + portion of, at Stormberg, 285-303; + Sir R. Buller's instructions, before leaving for Natal, to G.O.C., + 209-210; + to disembark at East London, 197; + to operate towards Jamestown, 435. + 4th division, Naval brigade joins, 120, 185; + troops under Sir G. White considered as, 9. + 5th division (Warren), Buller informed that it is to be sent to South + Africa, 201; + Buller thinks division assigned to relief of Kimberley, 377; + departure of, involves policy of bluff in Cape Colony, 381; + due at Cape Town, 376; + embarkation of, 9; + lands in Natal, 409; + ordered to Natal, 379; + orders for mobilisation of, 9; + proposal to support 1st division with, 378. + 6th division (Kelly-Kenny), brought to Modder river, 444; + Buller advised of embarkation of, 379, 380; + composition of, 437; + despatched to Naauwpoort, 433-435; + embarkation of, 9; + on point of embarkation, 376; + orders for mobilisation of, 9. + 7th division (Tucker) at Graspan and Enslin, 444; + composition of, 437; + embarkation of, 9; + embarkation of, to begin on 4th January, 1900, 379, 380, 414, 417; + mobilisation of, ordered, 376; + orders for mobilisation of, 9. + 8th division (Rundle), despatch of, advisable owing to failure at Spion + Kop, 438; + embarkation of, 10; + embarkation of, if required, about 20th February, 1900, 415; + Lord Roberts hopes division not necessary, 415; + orders for mobilisation of, 9. + 9th division (Colvile), assembled on the Riet and at Graspan, 444; + composition of, 437, 438. + Infantry, Mounted:-- + Mounted Brigades and Mounted Infantry Brigades:-- + Mounted brigade (Dundonald), 332, 351-375. + 1st Mounted Infantry brigade (Hannay), 437, 444. + 2nd Mounted Infantry brigade (Ridley), 437. + Mounted infantry in Ladysmith. _See_ APPENDIX 10, page 489. + Ingagane, 38, 125. + Ingogo, 58. + Inniskilling Dragoons. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Inspector-General of Fortifications, 27, 28, 32. + Inspector-General of Remounts, 20-23. + Intelligence Department (British, Home), 7, 8, 13, 17, 40, 276, 292, 422, + 429; + (British, Field), 15, 47, 48, 157, 198, 213, 231, 263, 270, 276, 289, + 291, 302, 330, 335, 337, 343, 388, 410; + (Boer), 73, 216, 334. + International law, 96. + Intintanyoni, 152-156, 172, 173, 190. + Intonganeni or Emtonjaneni, 36. + Irish Corps. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Irish Fusiliers, Royal (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Irish regiment, Royal (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Irish Rifles, Royal (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Irvine, Captain T., 256. + Ismailia, 113. + _Ismore_ (transport), 107, 111, 119, 391. + + + Jacobsdal, 50, 63, 216, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 305, 309, 385, 387, 388. + Jacobsdal commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Jacobsdal to Bloemfontein railway project, 410, 413. + Jagersfontein, 63. + Jamaica, 89, 92. + James, Lieut. H. W., R.N., 120, 266, 360. + Jameson raid, 3, 81. + Jameson, Surg.-Gen. J., M.D., C.B., Q.H.S., 26. + Jamestown, 435. + Japanese disembarkations, 114. + Jasfontein farm, 393, 404. + Jeffreys, Lieut.-Col. H. B., 297, 299. + Jeppe, Mr. C., 15. + Johannesburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Johannesburg police, 394. + Johannesburg, Uitlanders in, 38, 385. + Johnstone, Capt. R., awarded the V.C., 170. + Jones, Capt. E. P., R.N., 120, 121, 122, 332, 351, 359, 363, 365, 369, + 371, 373. + Jonono's Kop, 152, 161-163. + Joubert, Commandant D., 269, 270. + Joubert, Commandant J. J., 128, 344. + Joubert, Field Cornet, 162. + Joubert, Comt.-Gen. Piet, 49, 117, 124, 125, 148, 151-2, 185, 191, 202, + 265, 267-270, 272, 273, 344, 409, 410, 425, 427, 434; + circular memorandum of, 425-427. + Joubert siding, 400. + Jourdaan, Commandant, 214, 234. + Junction Hill, 176. + + + Kaalspruit, 388. + Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Kainguba height, 186-189, 191. + Kankana mountain, 149. + Karree Bergen, 56. + Karroos, 55. + Katberg Pass, 383. + Keerom, 404, 405. + Keith-Falconer, Lieut.-Col. C. E., 213. + Kekewich, Colonel R. G., 44, 304. + Kelham, Lieut.-Col. H. R., 320, 440. + Kelly-Kenny, Lieut.-Gen. T., C.B., 432-435, 437, 444. + Kenrick, Lieut. G. E. R., 142. + Khama's country, 60. + Kimberley, 5, 36-40, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 53, 120, 197, 198-207, 209, + 211, 212-216, 218, 229, 243, 244, 276, 304-5, 310, 334, 377-8, 382, + 384, 388, 408, 409, 411-413, 428, 430, 431, 433, 435, 439, 442, 443. + Kimberley Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Kincaid, Major C. S., 186. + King's African Rifles, 95. + King's (Liverpool regiment) (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + King's Own Scottish Borderers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + King's Royal Rifle Corps (1st, 2nd, and 3rd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + King William's Town, 53, 384, 422. + Kinloch, Major D. A., 223. + Kissieberg, 289-292, 294-300, 302. + Kitchener, Colonel F. W., 271-272. + Kitchener of Khartoum, Major-Gen. The Lord, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., 420, 433, + 436, 443, 448; + (Sirdar of the Egyptian Army), appointed Chief of Staff, 381. + Kitchener's Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Kleinfontein (near Ladysmith), 173. + Kleinfontein farm (near Colesberg), 404, 405. + Klip Valley, 341. + Kloof camp, 394, 396, 399, 400, 405. + Knight, Bombardier W., 366. + Knox, Major-General C. E., 437. + Knox, Lieut. C. S., 193. + Knox, Major E. C., 138-141. + Knox, Colonel W. G., C.B., 183, 185. + Kock, General, 124-127, 159, 170. + Koffyfontein, 63, 216, 387. + Komati Poort, 50. + Komgha Mounted Rifles: _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Koodoesberg, 387, 439-442. + Koodoesberg Drift, 439. + Kopjes, description of, 63, 64. + Koranaberg, 59. + Krijgsraad (council of war), 77, 229, 264, 285, 341, 343-344. + Kroonstad commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Kruger, President S. J. P., ultimatum of, 1; + commandeers his burghers, 34; + designs of, 48; + telegraphs to Botha to hold on to Hlangwhane, 343; + to President Steyn to commandeer everyone in annexed districts, 382. + Krugersdorp, 60. + Krugersdorp commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Kuilfontein farm, 281, 282. + Kuruman, 207, 382. + + + Ladybrand Commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Lady Grey, 208. + Ladysmith, 9, 38, 44-47, 58, 118, 120, 123, 144, 146-147, 150-153, + 157-202, 205-210, 262-265, 334-340, 377, 379, 380, 411, 415, 434, + 443; + arrival of Sir G. White at, 157; + attack on, of 6th January, 1900, repulsed, 409; + communication with Dundee cut, 127; + invested, 197, 198, 262; + Naval reinforcements for, 120. + Ladysmith Naval Brigade. _See_ NAVAL BRIGADES. + Lagos, 33. + Laing's Nek, 37, 44-46, 58, 124-125; + action of, 1881, Australia offers help after, 33. + Lake St. Lucia, 59. + Lambton, Captain The Hon. H., R.N., 120, 185-186, 205. + Lambton, Major The Hon. C., 224, 255. + Lancers (5th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lancers (9th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lancers (12th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lancers (16th). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lancer's Hill, 338. + Landman's Drift road, 128, 139. + Landrosts, 382. + Langeberg farm, 305, 307, 309. + Langewacht Spruit, 264, 340. + Lansdowne, The Most Hon. the Marquis of, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., + G.C.I.E., 4, 5, 11, 29, 32-34, 98, 110, 197, 199-201, 338, 377, 384, + 414, 443. + Lawrence, Captain the Hon. H. A., 276. + Leckie, Lieut. H. S., R.N., 116. + Leicestershire regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lennox Hill, 129-140. + Leuchars, Major G., 274. + Leverson, Major G. F., 259. + Lichtenburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Liebenberg, Commandant, 439, 442. + Limit Hill, 176, 177, 183-184, 186. + Limpopo (river), 50, 56, 57, 59, 60. + Limpus, Commander A. H., R.N., 111, 115, 120, 265. + Lincolnshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lisaine, 422. + Little, Major M. O., 246-247, 325, 440. + Little Karroo, 55. + Little Namaqualand, 62, 66. + Liverpool regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lobombo Mountains, 59. + Lombards Kop, 120, 150, 172-195, 196, 261. + Long, Colonel C. J., 266, 351, 352, 358-365, 369, 372-374. + Long Hill, 173-177, 180, 183-184. + Lord Mayor of London, 414. + Lourenco Marques, 116. + Low Veld, 62-63. + Loyal North Lancashire regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Lubbe, Commandant, 234. + Lydenburg, 59. + Lydenburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Lyttelton, Major-Gen. the Hon. N. G., C.B., 202, 204, 333, 352, 357-373. + + + Macbean, Lieut.-Colonel F., 326, 327. + McCracken, Major F. W. N., 281, 284, 391-393, 405. + McCracken's Hill, 392, 393, 395. + MacDonald, Major-General H. A., C.B., D.S.O., 437, + at Koodoesberg, 439-442. + Macfarlan, Captain W., 319. + McGrigor, Major C. R. R., 355. + Madocks, Captain W. R. N., 402, 403. + _Madura_, loss of the, 107. + Maeder's farm, 391, 394, 395. + Mafeking, 38, 39, 42, 44, 48-53, 197, 207, 248, 382, 384, 408, 409, 412, + 443. + Mafeking Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Magaliesberg, 60. + Magersfontein, 63, 245, 260, 283, 304-331, 339, 376, 385, 389, 413, 428. + Magersfontein position, 304-331, 428, 436, 438, 439. + _Magicienne_, H.M.S., 116. + Malaboch, 81. + Malay States, 33, 95. + Malta, 2, 89, 92, 93, 443. + Malungeni, 141. + Maluti Mountains, 57. + Manchester regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Maps. _See_ MILITARY MAPS. + Marchant, Major A. E., 238, 252. + Marico commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Marico valley, 60. + Marine Artillery, Royal. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Marine Light Infantry, Royal. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Maritzburg, 46, 47, 120, 158, 175, 197, 199-200, 208, 261-266, 270, 288, + 332; + conference at, 123; + scanty means of defence of, 117; + threatened by Boer raid, 206; + topographical environment of, 263. + Maritz Drift, 336. + Mark's Drift, 387. + Martial law, 417. + Martyr, Lieut.-Col. C. G., D.S.O., 272. + Mashonaland, 60. + Massy, Major H. H., 353. + Massy-Dawson, Lieut. F. E., R.N., 116. + Matabele, 70. + Matoppo Hills, 60. + Mauch Berg, 59. + Mauritius, 2, 52, 59, 89, 92. + Maybole farm, 128. + Medical Staff Corps, Royal. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Meiklejohn, Captain M. F. M., awarded the V.C., 170. + Memorandum, Mr. Stanhope's, of 1st June, 1888, 5, 12, 13, 89. + Merwe, Commandant T. van der, 229, 241. + Merwe, Commandant van der, 342. + Methuen, Lt.-Gen. The Lord, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G., 120, 197, 199-203, + 205, 207, 209-220, 223, 231, 232, 235-237, 240-242, 252-255, 257-260, + 276, 279, 286, 288, 332, 334-339, 376, 386-387, 410, 428-431; + advance from Orange river, Belmont, Graspan, and Modder river, 211-260; + at Magersfontein, 304-331; + camp of, Lord Roberts arrives at, 443; + division (1st), strength of, 214, 215, 308; + ordered to throw reinforcements into Kimberley, 211-213; + to attack Cronje again or fall back (order cancelled), 378, 385; + ordered by Lord Roberts to remain on defensive, 433, 436, 438, 439. + Meyer, General Lukas, 49, 124, 126-128, 134, 137, 148, 172-173. + Meyricke, Lieut. R. E., 364. + Middelburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Middleburg, 206, 210, 276. + Milbanke, Lieut. Sir J. P., Bart., awarded the V.C., 396. + Miles, Colonel H. S. G., M.V.O., 386. + Military maps, 13-15. + Military Secretary's department, 16. + Militia (home), 10, 12, 93-95, 379-380, 414-415, 443, 444. + For names of Militia units which landed up to 13th February, 1900, + _see_ APPENDIX 9, page 483. + Milner, Captain A. E., 148. + Milner, Sir A., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., High Commissioner for South Africa and + Governor of Cape Colony, 17, 117, 196, 198, 200, 207, 263, 383, 384, + 425. + Milton, Major P. W. A. A., 233, 240, 241, 323, 324. + Mobilisation, complete success of, 8; + danger lest political considerations shall postpone, 115; + date of, 6; + development of scheme, 7, 8; + details of later stages of, 9; + extent of, limited by Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum, 5, 6; + must be based on shipping available, 115; + war establishments for, 418; + section and sub-division, 8, 10. + _See also_ SHORT SERVICE _and_ RESERVES. + Mobilisation of burghers, 49. + Mobility of Boers, 66, 336. + "Modder position" (also called "Modder River camp" and "Lord Methuen's + camp"), 229, 279, 304, 313, 385, 413, 428, 441, 443, 444. + Modder river, 63, 211-214, 231, 243-260, 304-316, 325, 412, 421, 436, + 439, 443, 444. + Modder Spruit, 148, 151-153, 161-162, 172-173, 178-180. + _Mohawk_, S.S., 209. + Moeller, Lieut.-Col. B. D., 131, 138-140. + Molteno, 39, 53, 210, 286, 288, 290-294, 300-301, 408. + Money, Lieut.-Col. C. G. C., 52, 225, 232, 237, 239, 248. + _Monarch_, H.M.S., 117. + Mont Aux Sources, 36, 57. + Mont Blanc, 218-228. + Mooi river, 200, 208, 266, 269, 270, 273, 332. + Moore, Major M. G., 356. + Morgan, Sergeant, 292-293, 295. + Mossamedes, 55. + Moss Drift, 306, 307, 309, 322, 325, 328. + Mounted infantry, 131, 138-140, 148, 157, 203, 214, 233, 240-241, 278, + 280-283, 287, 291, 292, 310, 313, 316, 332, 391-392, 402, 405, 407, + 415, 416, 437, 439, 444. + _See also_ INFANTRY, MOUNTED. + Mount Hamilton, 58. + Mount Hampden, 60. + Mount Tintwa, 58. + Mowatt Committee, 32. + Mozambique current, 61. + Mules, 18, 21-23, 155, 176, 416-422. + Mule wagons and harness, 417, 418. + Mueller's Pass, 58, 125, 158. + Mullins, Captain C. H., awarded the V.C., 170. + Munger's Drift, 336. + Munster Fusiliers, Royal (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Murchison Range, 59. + Murray, Major A.J., 142. + Murray, Major D., 433. + Murray, Lieut. F. D., 142. + Murray, Brig.-Gen. J. Wolfe, 261-264, 266. + Murray, the Hon. T. K., C.M.G., 266, 337. + + + Naauwpoort, 22, 39, 42, 43, 57, 198, 199, 201, 203, 207, 209, 210, 275, + 276, 282, 287, 290, 332, 378, 390, 391, 430, 431, 433-435. + Namaqualand, 55. + Natal, 4-34, 36-94, 196-210, 261-274, 334, 351, 381, 384, 409, 411, 413, + 417, 422, 429, 438, 443; + strength of local forces in, 94; + Natal Government Railway staff, 424. + Natal Carbineers. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Natal Field Artillery. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Natal (South) Field Force, 350. + Natal Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Natal Naval Brigade. _See_ NAVAL BRIGADES. + Natal Naval Volunteers. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS _and_ NAVY. + Natal Police. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Natal Royal Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Navy, Royal: + assistance of, required, 116, 117; + delay in preparation due to Cabinet's unwillingness to cause war throws + exceptional responsibility on, 97; + guns and improvised carriages, 116-121; + Natal Naval Volunteers' connection with the, 121, 122; + mutual aid between Army and, 97; + necessity of special practice together of Army and, 114; + number of troops, etc., carried by, 108; + ready for landing, 116; + Royal Commission, report on success of, 115; + statistics of transport work of the, 106-109; + stoppage of contraband by the, 115, 116; + triumph of the Admiralty administration of sea transport, 111; + votes, cost of sea transport not charged to the, 99; + conditions of, and use of mercantile marine, by fixed Army + organisation, 115. + Naval brigades, 116-122, 185-186, 205, 214, 218-260, 266, 267, 304-375, + 438. + Naval Commander-in-Chief. _See_ HARRIS. + Naval Gun Hill, 357, 362, 363. + Naval staffs, 106. + Nel, Commandant, 154. + Nesbitt's Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Newcastle, 44, 58, 123-126, 160, 170, 175. + New South Wales, 93; + offers help, 33, 34. + New South Wales Lancers and Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + New Zealand, 94; + offers help, 34. + New Zealand Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Nicholson's Nek, 9, 174, 186-195. + _See also_ LOMBARDS KOP. + Nicholson, Major-General Sir W. G., K.C.B., 13, 420, 422, 433, 436. + Nieuwveld Mountains, 55, 383. + Nodashwana, 152-153, 155. + Norfolk regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Northamptonshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Northcott, Lieut.-Col. H. P., C.B., 257. + North Staffordshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Northumberland Fusiliers (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Nottingham Road, 208, 269. + Norval's Pont, 50, 198, 202, 210, 275, 396, 399, 400, 405, 412, 413, 425, + 428-431, 434, 435. + Norwood, 2nd Lieut. J., awarded the V.C., 177. + Nurse, Corporal G. E., 365; + awarded the V.C., 366. + + + Observation Hill, 183. + Ogilvy, Lieut. F. C. A., R.N., 351, 358-360, 365, 373. + Oliphant river, 59. + Olivier, Commandant, 50, 208, 285, 289, 295. + Olivier's Hoek Pass, 49, 58, 157. + Onderbrook, 159, 340. + Onderbrook Spruit, 338-340. + Orange Free State, 3-85, 157, 196, 229, 275, 276, 306, 335, 382, 388, + 411-413, 421, 431-435; + advance through, 196; + armament of, 79, 85; + frontier of, 36; + railway staff of, 424; + regular forces of, 85. + Orange river, 37-40, 56, 60, 61, 197-198, 201, 203, 207, 211-218, 258, + 259, 382, 383, 386-388, 409, 411-413, 421, 430, 431, 434, 436, 439, + 443. + Orange River station, 39, 42, 43, 50, 52, 203, 207, 211, 213, 231, 258, + 387, 429, 434, 444. + Ordnance department, 28-33; + committee, 423. + _See also_ BRACKENBURY. + Ordnance factories, administration of, 28, 29. + Orr, Captain M. H., 402. + Orpen's Corps. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Outbreak of war, 35-53. + Owen-Lewis, Lieut. F., 231. + Oxfordshire Light Infantry (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Ox transport, 22, 416-422. + + + Paarl, District of, 383. + Paget, Colonel A. H., 222, 249, 259. + Painter's Drift, 441, 442. + Palmietfontein farm, 400. + Park, Major C. W., 165. + Parsons, Lieut.-Col. L. W., 202, 333, 352, 357, 369, 371. + Pearse, Major H. W., 372. + Penhoek, 287, 289-291. + Pepworth Hill, 161, 172-175, 177, 178, 182, 184-186, 191. + Perceval, Major E., 299-300. + Philippolis commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Philipstown, 39. + _Philomel_, H.M.S., 120, 121, 263, 333. + Pickwoad, Colonel E. H., 135, 177, 178. + Pienaar, Field Cornet, 159, 162. + Pietermaritzburg. _See_ MARITZBURG. + Pieters, 58, 173. + Piet Retief commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Pilcher, Lieut.-Col. T. D., 386-388. + Pitt, Captain F. J., R.N., 106, 110, 111. + Plessis Poort, 400, 405, 406. + Plumbe, Major J. H., 238. + Plumer, Bt.-Lieut.-Col. H. C. O., C.B., 51, 409. + Pohlmann, Lieut., 192. + Pole-Carew, Major-General R., C.B., 248, 252-259, 311, 314-315, 326, 328, + 329. + Pom-poms (37-m/m Vickers-Maxim Q.F. guns), sent out from England, 267, + 423. + Pondo tribe, 208. + Pongola river, 59. + Pontoons, 27. + Port Elizabeth, 43, 53, 57, 58, 106, 113, 119, 197, 278, 284, 378, 434. + Port Elizabeth Volunteers. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Porter, Colonel T. C., 280, 282, 283, 391, 393, 400, 404, 405, 436. + Porter's Hill, 391, 393-396, 400, 405. + Portuguese East Africa, 65. + Potchefstroom commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Potfontein farm, 404. + Potgieter, Field Cornet, 128, 159. + Potgieters Drift, 334-339, 411. + Potong (Mont Aux Sources), 57. + _Powerful_, H.M.S., 52, 117, 118, 120, 121, 185. + Preparation for war, 1-34. + Pretoria, 1, 38, 40, 48, 60, 123, 413. + Pretoria commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Pretorius, Captain, 342. + Price, Mr. T. R., traffic manager, Cape Government railways, 424, 443. + Prieska, 213, 386, 387, 439. + Prince Alfred's Own Cape Field Artillery. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Prince Alfred's Volunteer Guard. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + _Princess of Wales._ _See_ HOSPITAL SHIPS. + Prinsloo, Commandant-General J., 216, 220, 229, 234, 239, 247, 309. + Prinsloo, General, 341. + Protectorate regiment. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Prothero, Captain R. C., R.N., 120, 205, 214, 232, 238. + Pulteney, Bt.-Lieut.-Col. W. P., 222, 225, 249. + Putterskraal, 287, 288, 290, 291. + + + Quartermaster-General, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27, 99, 100, 111, 421. + Quathlamba (mountain range), 56. + Queen Alexandra, H.M., 103. + Queen's (Royal West Surrey regiment) (The) (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Queensland, 93; + offers assistance, 33; + renews offer, 34. + Queensland Mounted Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Queenstown (Cape Colony), 22, 53, 120, 202, 210, 285-287, 332, 383. + Queenstown Rifle Volunteers. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + + + Railway Pioneer Regiment. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Railways, 36, 37, 39, 56, 57, 61, 63, 390, 413, 428-436; + Bloemfontein, 428, 429; + cross from Naauwpoort, 430; + essential condition of Lord Roberts' scheme, 430, 431; + proposed to Jacobsdal, 385; + railway troops (R.E.), 424; + staff of, 421, 424; + system of, 421, 424. + Ramah, 61. + Ramdam, 229, 235, 241, 245. + Rands, 59. + Ravenhill, Private C., awarded the V.C., 366. + Rawson, Colonel C. C., 265. + Razor Back Hill, 218, 225. + Reade, Major R. N. R., 213, 330. + Red Hill ("Vertnek"), 342. + Reed, Captain H. L., 366, 369; + awarded the V.C., 366. + Reeves, Colonel H. S. E. (Army Service Corps), 18. + Reeves, Lieut.-Col. J. (Royal Irish Fusiliers), 350, 358. + REGULAR UNITS. + Cavalry:-- + Household Cavalry, Composite regiment of, 394, 400, 404, 437, 441, + 442. + 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, 2, 161, 163, + 164, 169, 171, 175, 177, 181, 186. + 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), 210, 280, 283, 390, 393, 400, 404, + 436, 444. + 1st (Royal) Dragoons, 203, 332, 353, 354, 367, 373. + 2nd Dragoons (_Royal Scots Greys_), 387, 436, 441. + 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, 46, 124, 149, 150, 153, 157, 159, 161, + 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 174, 180, 181. + 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, 281, 283, 391, 392, 395, 396, 400, 402, + 405, 407, 436, 443. + 9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers, 2, 52, 203, 211, 213, 214, 216, 220, + 231, 233, 245, 246, 248, 251, 310, 313, 316, 322, 325, 437, 439, + 440. + 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal) Hussars, 210, 281, 283, 391, 392, + 395, 396, 402, 405, 437, 441. + 12th (Prince of Wales's Royal) Lancers, 203, 279, 308, 309, 311, 315, + 316, 321-325, 437, 441. + 13th Hussars, 203, 332, 365, 367, 368, 373. + 14th (King's) Hussars, 436, 444. + 16th (Queen's) Lancers, 437, 441. + 18th Hussars, 46, 124, 126, 131, 138, 140, 143, 145, 148, 149, 175, + 181. + 19th (Princess of Wales's Own) Hussars, 124, 153, 157, 158, 174, 180, + 181. + Artillery:-- + Royal Horse Artillery, 9, 91, 210, 284, 390-393, 395, 396, 399, 400, + 402, 405. + G. battery, 308, 310, 313, 321-323, 327, 329, 330, 387, 437. + J. battery, 407, 443. + O. battery, 279, 407, 437, 441. + P. battery, 308, 386, 437. + Q. battery, 436. + R. battery, 278, 281, 282, 407, 437, 441. + T. battery, 436. + U. battery, 436. + Royal Field Artillery:-- + 4th battery, 394, 396, 401, 406, 407, 443. + 7th battery, 203, 271, 332, 352, 366, 367, 369, 373, 374. + 13th battery, 131, 133, 182-184. + 14th battery, 203, 332, 351, 361. + 18th battery, 203, 214, 217, 220, 225-227, 233, 235-239, 248, 251, + 252, 254, 256-259, 310, 321, 327, 329, 437. + 21st battery, 150, 163, 164, 173, 178, 182, 186. + 37th (Howitzer) battery, 404, 407, 443. + 42nd battery, 153-155, 161, 163, 164, 173, 178, 182. + 53rd battery, 153, 154, 173, 177, 178, 182, 184. + 62nd battery, 52, 203, 214, 258, 259, 309, 310, 321, 327, 330, 437, + 439, 441. + 63rd battery, 202, 210. + 64th battery, 202, 210, 332, 357, 369. + 65th (Howitzer) battery, 308, 310, 321, 329, 438. + 66th battery, 203, 332, 351, 361, 366. + 67th battery, 130, 131, 145, 148, 182. + 69th battery, 130, 131, 133, 145, 148, 181, 182, 186. + 73rd battery, 202, 210, 333, 357, 369, 371. + 74th battery, 204, 289, 290, 292, 293, 297, 300. + 75th battery, 52, 203, 214, 217, 220, 224, 233, 235-237, 251, 252, + 259, 310, 321, 323, 327, 329, 437. + 76th battery, 437. + 77th battery, 204, 289, 290, 292, 293, 297, 299. + 79th battery, 204. + 81st battery, 437. + 82nd battery, 438. + Royal Garrison Artillery, 42, 91, 276, 284, 286, 287, 423, 433, 438; + 10th Mountain battery, 153, 154, 174-177, 183, 186, 188. + Ammunition columns, 315, 349, 361, 437, 438. + Royal Marine Artillery, 214, 232, 238. + Royal Malta Artillery, 91, 92. + Engineers:-- + Royal Engineers, 42, 91, 183, 202, 211, 214, 215, 217, 232, 236, 237, + 255, 257, 259, 279, 280, 284, 286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 301, 305, + 311, 313, 314, 316, 326, 333, 336, 347, 349, 350, 353, 364, 373, + 385, 400, 401, 404, 424, 425, 437-439, 440. + Foot Guards:-- + Grenadier Guards (3rd), 215, 221-223, 225-228, 236, 249, 251, + 323-325. + Coldstream Guards (1st), 215, 221, 225, 226, 228, 236, 249-251, + 323-325. + Coldstream Guards (2nd), 215, 221, 225, 226, 228, 236, 249-252, 257, + 259, 260, 323-325, 329. + Scots Guards (1st), 215, 221-223, 225-227, 231, 232, 236, 249-251, + 323, 326, 328-330. + Infantry:-- + Royal Scots, Lothian (1st) [formerly 1st Foot], 203, 289, 291. + The Queen's (Royal West Surrey) (2nd) [formerly 2nd Foot], 271, 333, + 363, 364, 366, 371, 372. + The Buffs (East Kent regiment) (2nd) [formerly 3rd], 437. + Northumberland Fusiliers (1st) [formerly 5th], 2, 43, 52, 203, 214, + 215, 223, 224, 225, 232, 233, 235, 237, 240, 252, 253, 255, 259, + 311, 326. + Northumberland Fusiliers (2nd) [formerly 5th], 203, 287, 290, 292, + 296-298, 300, 301. + Royal Warwickshire (2nd) [formerly 6th], 379. + Royal Fusiliers (City of London regiment) (2nd) [formerly 7th], 333, + 358, 367-369. + The King's (Liverpool) (1st) [formerly 8th], 124, 153, 154, 157, 158, + 173-175. + Norfolk (2nd) [formerly 9th], 437. + Lincolnshire (2nd) [formerly 10th], 437. + Devonshire (1st) [formerly 11th], 124, 153, 154, 161, 163-168, 172, + 175, 186. + Devonshire (2nd) [formerly 11th], 333, 363, 364, 371, 372, 374. + Suffolk (1st) [formerly 12th], 279, 281, 391, 394, 396-399, 408. + The Prince Albert's (Somersetshire Light Infantry) (2nd) [formerly + 13th], 333. + Prince of Wales's Own (West Yorkshire) (2nd) [formerly 14th], 266, + 270, 271, 333, 364. + Bedfordshire (2nd) [formerly 16th], 404, 407. + Leicestershire (1st) [formerly 17th], 46, 131, 143, 144, 146, 151, + 174-180, 185. + Royal Irish (1st) [formerly 18th], 404, 407. + Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire (1st) [formerly 19th], 379, 394, + 400, 402-405, 407, 437. + Royal Scots Fusiliers (2nd) [formerly 21st], 333, 358, 360, 363, 364, + 366, 372-374. + Cheshire (2nd) [formerly 22nd], 437. + Royal Welsh Fusiliers (1st) [formerly 23rd], 333, 357, 363. + South Wales Borderers (2nd) [formerly 24th], 437. + King's Own Scottish Borderers (1st) [formerly 25th], 437. + The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) (2nd) [formerly 90th], 333, 351, + 363, 372, 373. + Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (1st) [formerly 27th], 333, 353, 356. + Gloucestershire (1st) [formerly 28th], 153-155, 174-176, 186-194. + Gloucestershire (2nd) [formerly 61st], 437. + Worcestershire (2nd) [formerly 36th], 402, 404, 407. + East Lancashire (1st) [formerly 30th], 437. + East Surrey (2nd) [formerly 70th], 271, 333, 364, 372. + Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (2nd) [formerly 46th], 308, 386, + 387, 438. + Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) (1st) [formerly 33rd], 437. + Border (1st) [formerly 34th], 2, 52, 204, 261, 264, 270, 271, 333, + 353, 355, 356, 370. + Hampshire (2nd) [formerly 67th], 437. + Welsh (1st) [formerly 41st], 402, 407, 437. + Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) (2nd) [formerly 73rd], 203, 276, 279, + 308, 312, 317-319, 329, 437, 440, 441. + Oxfordshire Light Infantry (1st) [formerly 43rd], 437. + Essex (1st) [formerly 44th], 391, 394, 399, 401, 404, 405, 407, 437. + Sherwood Foresters (Derbyshire) (1st) [formerly 45th], 376. + Loyal North Lancashire (1st) [formerly 47th], 44, 203, 212, 214, 215, + 223, 231-233, 235, 237-239, 242, 252-256, 259, 311, 326. + Northamptonshire (2nd) [formerly 58th], 203, 215, 223, 224, 232, 233, + 236-239, 247, 255, 309, 311, 326. + Princess Charlotte of Wales's (Royal Berkshire) (2nd) [formerly + 66th], 276, 281, 282, 284, 286, 291, 292, 391-393, 395, 396, 407. + Royal Marine Light Infantry, 52, 99, 205, 214, 232, 238, 239, 242, + 422. + King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry) (2nd) [formerly 105th], 2, 52, + 203, 214, 215, 223, 224, 226, 232, 233, 237-239, 252-256, 259, 310, + 313, 321, 325, 328. + King's (Shropshire Light Infantry) (2nd) [formerly 85th], 308, 438. + King's Royal Rifle Corps (1st) [formerly 60th], 46, 127, 131-136, + 138, 140, 143, 144, 147, 151, 174-176, 178, 179. + King's Royal Rifle Corps (2nd) [formerly 60th], 153, 154, 158, + 174-176, 179, 185, 367. + King's Royal Rifle Corps (3rd) [formerly 60th], 333, 363, 364, 372. + Duke of Edinburgh's (Wiltshire) (2nd) [formerly 99th], 404-407. + Manchester (1st) [formerly 63rd], 46, 150, 160, 163-167, 171, 173, + 175, 183, 186. + Prince of Wales's (North Staffordshire) (2nd) [formerly 98th], 437. + Durham Light Infantry (1st) [formerly 68th], 333, 363, 370, 372. + Highland Light Infantry (1st) [formerly 71st], 215, 308, 312, + 318-320, 327, 437, 440. + Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's) (2nd) + [formerly 78th], 308, 312, 316, 318, 319, 327, 438, 440, 441. + Gordon Highlanders (1st) [formerly 75th], 308, 311, 315, 326, 327, + 438. + Gordon Highlanders (2nd) [formerly 92nd], 124, 150, 163-167, 169, + 170, 173, 175, 176. + Royal Irish Rifles (2nd) [formerly 86th], 10, 204, 286, 287, 290, + 292, 296-298, 301. + Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers) (1st) [formerly 87th], 2, + 131-136, 142-144, 147, 149, 173, 174, 186-192, 195. + Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers) (2nd) [formerly 89th], + 333, 358, 360, 363, 364. + Connaught Rangers (1st) [formerly 88th], 333, 353-356. + Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) (1st) [formerly + 91st], 247, 252-256, 259, 308, 318, 319, 330, 438, 441. + Royal Munster Fusiliers (1st) [formerly 101st], 43, 212, 215, 223, + 226, 231, 232, 258, 308, 326, 386. + Royal Dublin Fusiliers (1st) [formerly 102nd], 333. + Royal Dublin Fusiliers (2nd) [formerly 103rd], 46, 123, 124, 127-129, + 131, 132, 135, 139, 140, 143-145, 148, 149, 174, 175, 180, 262, + 267, 268, 333, 353-356, 367. + Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own) (1st), 333, 363, 370, 372. + Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own) (2nd), 2, 175, 177. + Army Service Corps:--8, 23-25, 91, 211, 289, 404, 417-421, 437, 438. + Royal Army Medical Corps (includes Bearer companies, Field hospitals, + etc.):--25, 91, 134, 147, 148, 211, 215, 228, 242, 284, 289, 290, + 292, 313-315, 327, 330, 333, 347, 349, 364-366, 374, 421, 437, 438. + Remount department, 19-23, 24, 27. + Rensburg, 280, 390, 391, 395, 399, 400, 407, 443. + Reserves: + necessity of announcement in Parliament before summoning, 6; + date of proclamation calling out, 6; + numbers who obeyed the call and were fit, 8; + value in the field of, 375; + supply of, furnished during war, 10; + inconvenience of Act requiring all classes A. B. C. to be exhausted + before D. was summoned, 12; + not numerous enough, 11; + number in 1899, in British Islands, 90; + great assistance rendered to army in field, 67, 11; + a real reserve for war, not a mere substitution, 90; + no delay caused by necessity for filling up ranks by, 115. + Retreat from Dundee. _See_ DUNDEE. + Rhenoster farm, 404. + Rhodes, The Right Hon. Cecil J., 17, 44. + Rhodesia, 16, 36, 39, 94, 409. + Rhodesian regiment. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Ricardo, Lieut.-Col. P. R., 386. + Richardson, Colonel W. D., C.B., 417, 420, 422. + Richmond farm, 442. + Richmond road, 276. + Ridley, Colonel C. P., 433, 437. + Rietfontein, 142, 151-156, 172. + Riet River, 63, 243, 244, 246-248, 250, 251, 253, 256, 259, 260, 304, + 378, 385, 387, 388, 430, 439, 441, 444. + Rifle Brigade (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Rimington, Major M. F., 220, 227, 246. + Rimington's Guides. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Roberts, Field Marshal the Right Hon. F. S. Lord, V.C., K.P., G.C.B., + G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Army Corps reconstituted, 436-438; + appointed to command in South Africa, 376, 381, 386, 389; + appoints his staff, 381; + arrives at Cape Town, 408; + Buller reports fresh attempt to relieve Ladysmith, 411; + plan of campaign, 411-413, 428-436, 439; + railways in Cape Colony, 425, 426; + railways in Cape Colony, strategic value of, 430, 431; + raises more local corps, 415, 416; + reinforcements promised of troops, 414, 415; + reinforcements promised of guns, 422-424; + situation on his arrival, 408-411; + transport reorganised, 416-421; + telegram from Gibraltar, 385. + Roberts, Lieut. the Hon. F. H. S., 365; + awarded the V.C. (posthumous), 366. + Roberts' Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Roberts', Mr. J., farm, 293-295. + Robertson, Sergt.-Major W., awarded the V.C., 170. + Robinson's Drift, 336. + Robinson's farm, 340, 341, 352. + Rogers, Major C. R., 360. + Roggeveld mountains, 383. + Rooi Kop, 289, 290, 291, 295. + Rooilaagte, 216, 230. + Rorke's Drift, 274. + Rosmead, 244, 247-260. + Rosmead Junction, 278, 378, 435. + Rouxville commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Royal Army Medical Corps. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Berkshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Canadian regiment. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Royal Commissions, on South African hospitals, 26; + on South African war, 13, 110, 411, 412. + Royal Dragoons. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Dublin Fusiliers (1st and 2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Engineers. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Field Artillery. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Fusiliers (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Garrison Artillery. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Horse Artillery. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Irish Fusiliers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Irish regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Irish Rifles (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Malta Artillery. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Marine Artillery. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Marine Light Infantry. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Munster Fusiliers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Scots Fusiliers (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Scots regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Warwickshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal Welsh Fusiliers (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royal West Surrey regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Royston, Colonel W., 174. + Ruggles-Brise, Captain H. G., 225. + Rustenburg, 59, 60. + Rustenburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + + + St. Helena, 92, 95. + St. Vincent, 105. + Salisbury (Rhodesia), 60. + Salisbury plain, 2. + Sand river, 140. + Sand Spruit, 128, 129, 131, 133, 135, 138, 140. + Sangars, 73. + Scandinavian commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Schanzes, 71. + Scheme, Lord Roberts', 428. + Schietberg, 393. + Schiel, Colonel, 125, 167. + Schoeman, Commandant, 275, 276, 280, 281, 389, 390, 393-395, 400, 409, + 443. + Schofield, Captain H. N., 365; + awarded the V.C., 366. + Scholtz Nek, 245, 409, 426, 440. + Schreiber, Lieut. C. B., 366. + Schreiner, The Hon. Mr. W. P., C.M.G., Q.C. (Premier of Cape Colony), + 206. + Schultz' farm, 139, 140. + Scots Greys, Royal. _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Scots Guards (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Scott, Captain P., R.N., 117-121, 205, 265. + Scottish Rifles (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Seacow river, 402. + Seaforth Highlanders (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Secrecy, 414; + essential to Lord Roberts' scheme, 431. + Secretary of State for War. _See respectively_, LANSDOWNE, SMITH, + STANHOPE. + Senior, Captain G., R.M.A., 238. + Seton, Major H. J., 298. + Seymour, Mr. (later Major) L.I., 425. + Shannon, Sergeant-Major J., 360. + Sharpe, Lieut.-Col. J. B., 215, 217. + Shaul, Corporal J., awarded the V.C., 327. + Sheridan, General, 75. + Shipping, necessary dependence of nature of effective British army + organisation on, 115; + patriotic conduct of owners of, 107; + success of Admiralty administration of, 110, 111; + small quantity of, available at given moment, 103, 104, 105; + statistics of, 108, 109; + time required for getting ready, 100, 101, 102, 104. + _See also_ ADMIRALTY _and_ NAVY. + Shooter's Hill, 347, 373. + Short Service, the system as worked in the Boer War, 90; + how it supplied fresh drafts during war, 90; + comparison with other wars, 91; + effect of, on strength in the field, 11; + caused no delay, 115; + _See also_ RESERVES _and_ MOBILISATION. + Shropshire Light Infantry (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Shute, Major H. G. D., 225, 324. + Sierra Leone, 91. + Simon's Bay, 117, 119, 120. + Simon's Town, 52, 118. + Slade-Wallace tools, 250. + Slingersfontein, 400, 402, 404, 405. + Sluits, 61. + Skiet's Drift, 334, 336, 337. + Smith, Major Granville, R. F., 250. + Smith, The Right Hon. W. H., 7. + Smith, Major W. Apsley, 365. + Smith-Dorrien, Colonel H. L., D.S.O., 438. 444. + Smithfield commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Smith's farm, 129, 132, 135. + Smith's Nek, 129, 133, 137. + Sneeuw Bergen (mountain), 56. + Snyman, General, 50, 409. + Somaliland, 95. + Somerset East, 206. + Somersetshire Light Infantry (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + South Africa: + absence of roads in, 18, 65; + agriculture in, 62; + as a theatre of war, 64; + climatic influences on, 61; + cool nights in, 65; + dearth of bridges in, 61, 65; + drifts of, 61; + eminently healthy, 64; + harbours of, 57, 65, 113; + hill systems of, 55; + nature of the country in, 18; + physiological features of, 61; + rainfall in, 66; + rivers of, 60, 61, 65; + scarcity of well-built towns in, 65; + special clothing prescribed for, 30; + tableland of, 54. + South African Light Horse. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + South African Republic Police (Zarps), 49, 81, 84. + South African War. _See_ WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. + South Australia, 93; + offers assistance, 34. + South Australian Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + South Natal raid, 261-274. + Southern Rhodesia. _See_ RHODESIA. + South Wales Borderers (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + _Spartan._ _See_ HOSPITAL SHIPS. + Spion Kop (mountain), 58, 438. + Spitz Kop, 400. + Springfield, 338. + Springfontein Junction, 411. + Springs, 60. + Spruits, 60. + Spytfontein, 63, 245, 305, 310, 329. + Standerton commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Stanhope, The Right Hon. E. (Secretary of State for War in 1888), his + memorandum of June 1st, 1888, 5, 12, 13, 20, 89. + Steenkamp, Commandant, 192, 195. + Steinkamp, Commandant L. F., 439. + Steinkamp, Commandant, 295, 299. + Stellenbosch, 22, 43, 383. + Stephenson, Brig.-General T. E., 405, 406, 437, 444. + Sterkstroom, 53, 301, 408. + Sterkstroom Junction, 287. + Sterling, Captain J. T., 225. + Steyn, President M. T., 48, 285, 295, 306, 382, 388; + outwitted by Lord Roberts, 435. + Steynsburg, 295. + Steynsburg road, 292, 293, 299, 302. + Stockenstroom, 383. + Stopford, Colonel the Hon. F., C.B., 209, 357, 362. + Stopford, Lieut.-Col. H. R., 225, 260. + Stores, deficiency of, 31, 32; + in freight ships, 104; + tonnage of, 108, 109; + those wanted first placed at bottom of ships, 113. + Stormberg, 39, 42, 43, 52, 57, 66, 120, 198, 199, 205, 210, 283, 285-303, + 339, 376, 389, 408, 409, 412, 435. + Stormbergen, 56, 57. + Straits Settlements, 89, 92. + Strength of army in South Africa, at various dates, 1, 2, 443, and + Appendices. + Strength of Boers, estimated, 1, 2, 38, 265, 377, 409, 410, 459. + Strength of regular army and armed forces of the British Empire, 89-95. + Strength of various arms, average, 438. + Suffolk Hill. _See_ GRASSY HILL. + Suffolk regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Sugar Loaf Hill, 218, 225. + Sunday's river, 59, 127, 149, 335. + Sunday's River Passes, 58. + Sunnyside, 387, 442. + Supplies, 19, 43, 44, 67, 106, 108, 200, 206, 209, 210, 216, 310, 315, + 418, 421, 443; + supply department, 422. + Surprise Hill, 188, 190, 334, 335. + Survey department of Cape Colony, 14. + Swaatbouys Kop (or Nodashwana), 152. + Swanepoel, Commandant, 50, 295, 298, 301. + Swaziland, 50, 65. + Swaziland commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Swaziland Police, 49, 81, 84. + Swinkpan, 227, 231, 232. + Symons, Major-General Sir W. Penn. K.C.B., 45-47, 123-137, 160. + + + Taaiboschlaagte, 280. + Taal language, 121. + Tabanyama (mountain), 58, 335, 338. + Tabanhlope, 269. + Table Bay, 119, 206. + Table Mountain (Cape Town), 48. + Table Mountain (Belmont), 218-228. + Tactics, Lord Roberts' instructions for, 445-450. + Talana, 123-142. + Tarkastad, 287. + _Tartar_, H.M.S., 120, 263, 265, 332. + Tasmania, 309; + offers assistance, 34. + Tasmanian Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Taungs, 382. + Telegraph, essential to Lord Roberts' scheme, 431. + Tembu tribe, 208. + Teneriffe, 105. + _Terrible_, H.M.S., 117, 120, 205, 263, 265, 332. + Thaba Bosigo, 72. + Thackeray, Lieut.-Col. T. M. G., 353. + Theatre of war, 54-67. + _Thetis_, H.M.S., 120, 265. + Thomas' farm, 216, 217. + Thompson, Sir Ralph, K.C.B., 7. + Thorneycroft, Major A. W., 206, 261, 368, 369, 373. + Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Thornhill farm, 387. + Thwaites, Captain W., 184. + Tintwa Pass, 49, 58, 123, 157. + Touw's river, 53. + Town Guards. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Townsend, Colonel E., M.D., C.B., 242. + Towse, Captain E. B., awarded the V.C., 327. + Transport (land), 413, 416-421; + delay imposed by peace wishes, during time needed for getting, 19; + difficulty because of, in having British army ready for war, 18; + early attempts made by Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Wolseley, and Sir A. + Milner to provide, 16, 17; + harness for, 19; + impossibility of keeping British ready for war, 17; + in previous campaigns, 17; + mules for, purchased abroad, 20; + mules in South Africa, 22; + native drivers needed for, 24; + necessary change of vehicles for South Africa for, 18; + necessity for, 18; + peculiarities of South African, 416, 417; + reorganised by Lord Roberts, 416-421; + respective advantages of ox and mule, 416, 417; + successive demands for, 18; + transport by rail, 424; + transport companies, 421, 437; + transport department, 422; + transport, regimental, 418, 419; + transport staff, 417; + transport (sea). _See_ NAVY; + varied character of British, 17; + vehicles for, 19. + Transvaal, 3-85, 335. + Transvaalers. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Transvaal Police. _See_ SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC POLICE. + Transvaal Staats Artillerie, 49, 81-84. + Trichardt, Commandant, 128, 140. + Trichardt's Drift, 411. + _Trojan._ _See_ HOSPITAL SHIPS. + Trueter's commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Tucker, Lieut.-Gen. C., C.B., 437. + Tudway, Lieut.-Col. R. J., 278. + Tugela Ferry, 274, 334. + Tugela river, 14, 58, 208, 261, 263-265, 267, 273, 332-376, 410. + Tulbagh district, 383. + Tuli, 42. + Tunnel Hill, 176. + Tweedale siding (or station), 277, 281. + + + Uganda, 95. + Uitenhage Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Uitlanders, 38, 385. + Ultimatum of October 9th, 1899, 1, 86. + Umbulwana (or Bulwana), 150, 172, 176, 181, 182. + Umvoti Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Union Castle, S.S. Co., 100, 107. + Urmston, Major E. B., 441. + Utrecht, 124. + Utrecht commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + + + Vaal Kop, 281, 282. + Vaal river, 36, 37, 61, 387. + Van Dam, 191, 192, 394. + Van der Merwe's commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Van der Merwe, Commandant. _See_ MERWE. + Van Reenen's Pass, 37, 38, 44, 45, 49, 58, 125, 157, 158, 171, 173. + Van Staaden, Commandant, 128. + Van Tenders Pass, 147, 148. + Vant's Drift, 128. + Van Zyl, Lieut. _See_ ZYL. + Van Zyl's farm, 292-295, 300. + Van Zyl Siding, 405. + Venter, Comdt. H. van der, 234. + Verner, Lieut.-Colonel W. W. C., 216, 245. + Versamelberg (mountain), 59. + Vertnek (Red Hill), 342. + Veterinary Department. _See_ ARMY VETERINARY DEPARTMENT. + Viceroy of India, 1. + Vickers-Maxim, 37 m/m Q.F. guns. _See_ POM-POMS. + Victoria, 94; + offers assistance, 33, 34. + Victorian Infantry, Mounted Infantry, and Mounted Rifles. _See_ COLONIAL + UNITS. + Victualling of troops at sea, 99, 105. + Vierkleur, 48. + Viljoen, General Ben, 125, 127, 159, 342. + Visser's homestead, 440. + Voetpads Drift, 310, 314, 325. + Volksrust, 124. + Volunteers: Home, 10, 12, 93-95, 380, 414. + _See also_ COLONIAL UNITS. + Vrede commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Vryburg, 382. + Vryheid, 124. + Vryheid commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + + + Wakkerstroom Commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Wakkerstroom Nek, 49. + Walker, Lieut.-Gen. Sir F. Forestier-. _See_ FORESTIER-WALKER. + Walter, Major R. L., 367. + Wapenschouws, 80. + War Department of Pretoria, 38. + "War Establishments," 418. + War in South Africa: + British preparations for, 1-34; + outbreak of, 35-53; + theatre of, 54-67. + War Office, 6, 15, 22, 28, 35, 38, 44, 89, 100, 110, 111, 117, 199-201, + 353, 379-381, 384, 410, 412-415, 418, 421, 422, 438, 443. + Wardle, Midshipman T. F. J. L., R.N., 238. + Warley Common, 269. + Warren Lieut.-Gen. Sir C., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., 201, 377, 379. + Warrenton, 39. + Warwickshire regiment, Royal (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Waschbank, 58, 127. + Waschbank bridge, 334. + Waschbank river, 147-151. + Water, story of, at Graspan, 432; + carts, 421. + Waterberg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Watson, Lieut.-Colonel A. J., 281, 396-399. + Wauchope, Major-Gen. A. G., C.B., C.M.G., 203, 207, 211, 212, 215, + 276-279, 308, 311, 312, 316-319, 323, 324. + Wavell, Major-General A. G., 437. + Weenen, 269, 273. + Weenen road, 336. + Weil, Messrs., 16. + Welman, Major H. L., 298. + Welsh regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Wessels, Commandant, 409. + West Africa and various African protectorates, 91, 95. + West Australia, 94; + offers assistance, 34. + West Australian Infantry. _See_ COLONIAL UNITS. + West Indies, 95. + West Riding regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + West Yorkshire (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + White, Lieut.-General Sir George S., V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., 9, + 46-48, 51, 52, 123, 126, 127, 143, 144, 148, 149, 205, 208, 210, + 261-264, 335, 377, 378, 410, 415, 422; + arrived in Natal, 46; + at Elandslaagte, 157-171; + at Lombards Kop, 172-184; + at Rietfontein, 151-156; + his knowledge of Buller's plans, 338, 339; + isolated, 200; + suggests that Navy should be consulted, 117, 118, 120; + unable to protect southern Natal, 196-198. + White, Captain H. S., 371. + Wickham, Major W. J. R., 146. + _Widgeon_, H.M.S., 116. + Wilford, Colonel E. P., 154, 155. + Willcock, Captain S., 193. + Willow Grange, 269, 270, 272. + Willmott, Captain W. A., 298. + Wilson, Lieutenant R. S., 319, 320. + Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel A., 441. + Wiltshire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Winburg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Windmill camp, 395. + Wing, Major F. D. V., 181. + Winterberg mountains, 383. + Wire fences, 71, 155, 166, 167, 221, 256, 320, 442. + Witfontein Berg (mountain), 59. + Witmoss, 53. + Witteberg (mountain), 59. + Wittekop, 245. + Witteputs, 213, 216, 223, 386. + Witwaters Rand, 60. + Wodehouse district, 382. + Wolmaranstad commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Wolseley, Field Marshal the Right Honourable G. J. Viscount, K.P., + G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 7, 17, 39, 101, 197, 207. + Wolseley-Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. C. B. H., 158, 159. + Wolve Kop, 400. + Wolvekraal farm, 388. + Wood, Lieutenant C. C., 213. + Wood, General Sir H. Evelyn, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 16, 17. + Wood, Major-General E., C.B., 386-388. + Woodcote farm, 160, 161, 167. + Wools Drift, 124. + Worcester district, 383. + Worcestershire regiment (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Wyk, 75. + + + Yeomanry, 12, 93, 379, 380. + _See also_ IMPERIAL YEOMANRY. + Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Yorkshire regiment (1st). _See_ REGULAR UNITS. + Yule, Major-Gen. J. H., 123, 131, 133, 137, 138, 142-156, 161, 172. + + + Zambesi, 48, 60. + Zandspruit, 49, 124. + Zarps. _See_ SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC POLICE. + _Zibenghla_ (transport), 203. + Zoutpansberg commando. _See_ COMMANDOS. + Zoutpansberg Range, 59. + Zoutpan's Drift, 387, 388. + Zululand, 36, 65, 94, 158, 274. + Zulus, 70. + Zuurbergen (mountain), 56. + Zwarte Bergen (mountain), 55. + Zyl, Lieutenant Van, 272. + + +_Printed by The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey._ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of the War in South Africa +1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4), by Frederick Maurice + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA *** + +***** This file should be named 28158.txt or 28158.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/2/8/1/5/28158/ + +Produced by Malcolm Farmer, Christine P. 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