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+The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sound Military Decision, by U.s. Naval War
+College
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Sound Military Decision
+
+
+Author: U.s. Naval War College
+
+
+
+Release Date: February 24, 2009  [eBook #28178]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOUND MILITARY DECISION***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Jeannie Howse, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net)
+
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+Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
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+
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+      +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+      | Transcriber's Note:                                       |
+      |                                                           |
+      | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has     |
+      | been preserved.                                           |
+      |                                                           |
+      | The original book used bold face as a means to find the   |
+      | index entries. This has not been reproduced in this       |
+      | e-book.                                                   |
+      |                                                           |
+      | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For     |
+      | a complete list, please see the end of this document.     |
+      |                                                           |
+      +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
+
+
+SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+
+U.S. Naval War College
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Naval Institute Press                   Annapolis, Maryland
+
+This book is the 1942 edition of a book originally published in 1936
+by the U.S. Naval War College.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+   _Sound Military Decision_                                 1
+
+   Index                                                   227
+
+
+
+
+Sound Military Decision
+
+
+
+
+U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island
+
+                                                November 30, 1941
+
+
+SOUND MILITARY DECISION was first published at the Naval War College
+in 1936. It included the essential features of THE ESTIMATE OF THE
+SITUATION which, since 1910, had been issued at intervals in a series
+of revised editions. The new material that was added in 1936 was
+intended to assist in enlarging the viewpoint and in broadening the
+basis of professional judgment.
+
+Primarily intended for the purposes of the Naval War College, this
+work is the cumulative result of years of untiring and loyal effort on
+the part of the College staff and student body. Equally important have
+been the advice and assistance contributed by other officers of wide
+professional experience and attainment.
+
+The objective has been a brief but inclusive treatment of the
+fundamentals of the military profession, i.e., the profession of arms.
+The emphasis, naturally, is on the exercise of mental effort in the
+solution of military problems, more especially in our Navy. An
+enormous literature has been consulted, and research has included all
+available and pertinent military writings. Care has also been taken to
+include, from civil sources, the findings of those authoritative works
+which deal with related matters and with the applicable underlying
+truths.
+
+In a work of this type and scope, it is manifestly not possible to
+illustrate the abstract text by historical examples and analogies.
+These are complementary features of the War College resident and
+correspondence courses; provision for the necessary historical
+background is otherwise the concern of the individual student.
+
+In this edition of SOUND MILITARY DECISION no radical changes have
+been made; the revision has been confined to rearrangement and
+amplification of the subject matter.
+
+                                               E.C. KALBFUS,
+                                        Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
+                                                  President.
+
+    [Illustration: SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+    THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS
+
+    Through the studied employment of the Natural Mental Processes
+
+    (Foreword) The Scientific Approach to the Solution of Military
+      Problems
+
+    PART I
+
+    PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+    in its relation to the successful Conduct of War
+
+    (Chapter I) Command and its Problems
+
+    (Chapter II) Mental Processes and Human Tendencies
+
+    THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+
+    (Ch. III) leading to SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+
+    (Ch. IV) THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+    The Two Major Applications, i.e.,--
+      THE SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES
+      THE DETERMINATION OF OPERATIONS
+
+    (Ch. V) THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
+
+
+    Part II--PLANNING
+
+    (Ch. VI) THE FIRST STEP The Estimate of the Situation The Decision
+
+    (Ch. VII) THE SECOND STEP The Detailed Plan
+
+
+    Part III--EXECUTION
+
+    (Ch. VIII) THE THIRD STEP The Directives
+
+    (Ch. IX) THE FOURTH STEP The Supervision of the Planned Action]
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+(See Chart on page XXXX)
+
+
+                                                                  Page
+
+FOREWORD                                                             1
+
+    Science of War--Scientific Investigation--Fundamental
+    Considerations--Art of War--Scientific Method--Leadership
+    and Training--Sound Decision--Judgment--The Approach to
+    the Solution of Military Problems--Fundamental
+    Philosophy--Technique of Solution--Process of
+    Education--Outline of the Discussion.
+
+
+PART I. PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE SUCCESSFUL
+        CONDUCT OF WAR.
+
+Chapter
+
+   I Command and its Problems                                        7
+
+    The Implementation of National Policy--The Primary Function
+    of the Armed Forces--Military Strategy and Tactics--Command
+    of the Armed Forces--Unity of Effort--The Chain of
+    Command--Mutual Understanding--Indoctrination.
+
+  II Mental Processes and Human Tendencies                          19
+
+    Natural Mental Processes--The Necessity for Logical
+    Thought--Principles in their Relation to Logical
+    Thought--Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles
+    of War--Formulation and Use of Principles--Summary of
+    Fundamental Considerations.
+
+ III Basic Principles Applicable to Military Problems (The
+     Fundamental Military Principle)                                29
+
+    Review of Conclusions--Procedure--Suitability,
+    Feasibility, and Acceptability--Fundamental Principle for
+    Attainment of an End--Interdependency of Factors--Special
+    Nature of War--Factors in War--The Objective in
+    War--Military Operations--Salient Features--The Fundamental
+    Military Principle--Corollaries.
+
+  IV The Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+     (Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment)                   43
+
+    The Basis for Solution of a Military Problem--The Major
+    Components of a Military Problem--Essential
+    Elements--Selection of Correct Military Objectives--
+    Determination of Effective Military Operations--Physical
+    Objectives--Relative Positions--Apportionment of Fighting
+    Strength--Freedom of Action--Summary.
+
+
+   V The Four Steps in the Solution of a Military Problem           79
+
+    A Situation--The Incentive--The Assigned Objective--The
+    Motivating Task--The Natural Mental Processes--The Approach
+    to the Solution--The First Step--The Basic Problem--Tasks--
+    The Mission--Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength--Courses
+    of Action--Reflective Thinking--Naval Operations--Analysis
+    and Selection of Courses of Action--The Decision--The Second
+    Step--The Third Step--The Fourth Step--Sequence of Events in
+    the Four Steps--The Use of a Form in the Solution of
+    Problems--Conclusion.
+
+
+*PART II. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN PLANNING.
+
+  VI The Selection of a Correct Objective (Including the
+     Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+     for its Attainment) The First Step--The Solution of a
+     Basic Problem (The Estimate of the Situation)                 117
+
+    Process of solving a Problem--Sections of the Estimate
+    Form--Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the
+    Problem--Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and
+    Acceptable Courses of Action--Examination into the
+    Capabilities of the Enemy--Selection of the Best Course
+    of Action--The Decision.
+
+ VII The Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed
+     Operations (The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary
+     Problems)                                                     155
+
+    Assumptions--Alternative Plans--Application of the
+    Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation--
+    Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability--
+    Formulation of Tasks--Organization of Task Groups--
+    Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the
+    Determination of Objectives embodied in Tasks--Assembly
+    of Measures for Freedom of Action--Preparation of
+    Subsidiary Plans.
+
+
+*PART III. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN THE
+EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
+
+VIII The Inauguration of the Planned Action (The Third
+     Step--The Formulation and Issue of Directives)                183
+
+    Scope of the Third Step--Military Plans and Military
+    Directives--Essentials of Military Directives--
+    Restatement of the Decision--Standard Forms for Plans
+    and Directives--The Order Form--Types of Naval
+    Directives.
+
+ IX The Supervision of the Planned Action (The Fourth Step)        197
+
+    Nature of the Discussion--Goal of Planning--Importance
+    of Execution--The Incentive--Conditions in War--
+    Recognition of New Problems--Nature of Readjustments
+    Required--Importance of the Will of the Commander--
+    Problems Involving Modification of the Basic Plan--
+    Problems Challenging Integrity of Basic Plan--Further
+    Procedure Applicable to such Problems of the Fourth
+    Step--The Running Estimate of the Situation--Journal
+    and Work Sheet--Special Remarks as to Entries--Summary.
+
+*CONCLUSION                                                        217
+
+*APPENDIX
+
+    Outline Form of an Operation Plan                              219
+    Tabular Form of the Estimate of the Situation                  222
+
+*INDEX                                                             227
+
+* Not included in the limited issue for use in Part I of the
+  Correspondence Course.
+
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+
+From the earliest days of recorded history, the facts associated with
+military operations of the past have been constantly studied. The
+result has been the accumulation of a mass of information from which
+conclusions have been drawn as to the causes of success and failure.
+Although scattered through countless volumes, and nowhere completely
+systematized and classified, this accepted body of knowledge
+constitutes the basis for the science of war.
+
+Scientific investigation--that is, the collection, verification, and
+classification of facts--follows the recurrent procedure of successive
+analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test. The application of this
+process to the campaigns of history reveals fundamentals common to
+all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea,
+or air. In the ceaseless struggle for supremacy between the offense
+and the defense, great technological changes have taken place. The
+successful conduct of war, however, has always depended on effective
+operations for the creation or maintenance of favorable military
+situations, whose essential elements have remained unchanged
+throughout the years (see page 46).
+
+These fundamental considerations (see page 28), whatever the detailed
+form of their presentation, are the basis for the successful conduct
+of war. The need of such a basis has been felt from very early times.
+It was not, however, until the early part of the Nineteenth Century
+that students of warfare appear to have recorded the view that the
+conduct of war is susceptible of reduction to scientific analysis, and
+that only through a reasoned theory can the true causes of success and
+failure be explained.
+
+Such a scientific analysis of any subject has for its chief practical
+aim the improvement of the art, or practice, of that subject. Forming
+an important part of the science of war are those new developments in
+weapons and in other technological fields which, with the passage of
+time, have brought about great changes in methods of waging war. It is
+only through founding the art of war--the application of the science
+of war to actual military situations--on the fundamental truths
+discovered through the science of war, that changes in method, due to
+technological evolution, can be made most effective.
+
+In preparing for war, the only practicable peacetime tests are usually
+restricted to those afforded by examples of the past, by problems such
+as chart (map) and board maneuvers, and by fleet and field exercises.
+While the military profession can afford to neglect none of them,
+such tests can never be conclusive. This fact, however, far from
+justifying resort to any other procedure, emphasizes the necessity for
+utilization of the scientific method in order to arrive at conclusions
+which are as exact as possible.
+
+An exact result is, of course, the aim of all scientific research, but
+exactitude necessarily depends on the establishment of correct
+relationships among facts which have so far come to light.
+Consequently, there is great variation in the degree of accuracy which
+actually characterizes the several sciences. If it be maintained that
+only those studies which have resulted in exact conclusions may
+properly be regarded as sciences, then it can hardly be said that many
+sciences, now regarded as such, exist; for the findings of medicine,
+biology, chemistry, and even physics are continually being revised in
+the light of new data.
+
+The science of war necessarily includes knowledge gained in other
+fields. In war, as in medicine or any other practical activity, the
+more inclusive and dependable the body of knowledge available as a
+basis for action, the more probable it is that the application of this
+knowledge, the art (page 1), will be effective.
+
+Realization of these facts has led to renewed emphasis on the
+scientific approach to the solution of military problems. The fallacy
+of staking the future upon the possible availability of a military
+genius in time of need became clear when it was appreciated that more
+than one nation, hitherto victorious in arms, had been defeated and
+humiliated when genius no longer led its forces.
+
+There followed in the military profession a conviction that, although
+extraordinary inherent capacity can be recognized and utilized when
+known to exist, it is safer and wiser to develop by training the
+highest average of ability in leadership than to trust to untrained
+"common sense" or to the possible advent of a genius. History has
+abundantly proved the folly of attempting, on any other basis, to cope
+with the unpredictable occurrence of genius in the hostile leadership.
+With the actual exercise of leadership in war restricted to the
+reality of war, there is emphasized the need of peacetime
+training--training of subordinates in efficient performance, and, more
+important, training of those who will be placed by the State in
+positions of responsibility and command.
+
+Campaigns of the Twentieth Century reflect the intensity of mental
+training among the armed forces of the greater powers; the planning
+and conduct of war have acquired a precision, a swiftness, and a
+thoroughness before unknown. The study and analysis of past campaigns,
+the sifting of technical details from fundamental truths, and the
+shrewd combination of the theoretical and the practical form the basis
+of this training.
+
+The proper solution of military problems requires the reaching of
+sound decision as to what is to be done. Upon the soundness of the
+decision depends, in great part, the effectiveness of the resulting
+action. Both are dependent on the possession of a high order of
+professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on
+experience. Theoretical knowledge supplements experience, and is the
+best substitute in its absence. Judgment, the ability to understand
+the correct relationship between cause and effect, and to apply that
+knowledge under varying circumstances, is essential to good
+leadership. Professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental
+exercise in the application of logical processes to the solution of
+military problems.
+
+The approach, presented herein, to the solution of military problems
+is intended to assist the military profession in reaching sound
+decisions as to (1) the selection of its correct objectives, the ends
+toward which its action is to be directed under varying circumstances;
+(2) planning the detailed operations required; (3) transmitting the
+intent so clearly as to ensure inauguration of well-coordinated
+action; and (4) the effective supervision of such action.
+
+The student of war will find in these pages a fundamental military
+philosophy whose roots go down to very ancient times. In the technique
+described for the solution of military problems, experienced officers
+will recognize a system with which they are already familiar. This
+system, constantly under study to improve its details, has been in use
+in our military Services for many years.
+
+The foundation of this philosophy and of the system for its practical
+utilization rests on the concept of relative or proportional values.
+In the military environment, change, rather than stability, is
+especially to be expected, and the relationships existing among the
+essential elements of a military situation are, in fact, the
+significant values. Such values, themselves, vary with the viewpoint
+of the person concerned. Accordingly, because of the difference in
+objectives (defined above), what is strategy as viewed by a commander
+on a higher echelon may have more of a tactical aspect to those on a
+lower (page 10). Immediate objectives and ultimate objectives (page
+54) can scarcely be understood in their true proportions unless the
+point of reference is clear. The point of view of the commander, as
+established by the position he occupies in the chain of command, is,
+therefore, to be taken into consideration in every phase of the
+solution of a problem,--in the determination of the appropriate effect
+desired (page 43), of relative fighting strength (page 35), and of
+courses of action and the detailed operations pertaining thereto (page
+88).
+
+On the basis of these facts, instantaneous and easy understanding of
+all the elements involved is not to be expected. Were such
+understanding possible, the expert conduct of war would be one of the
+easiest, instead of one of the most difficult, of human activities. It
+is only through a gradual assimilation of its fundamentals that the
+profession of arms is to be mastered. A process of true education is
+involved,--that of enlarging the viewpoint and broadening the basis of
+professional judgment (see page i),--and its essentials are the proper
+foundation for any system of self-improvement in the exercise of
+mental power. There is no easy road to the goal of military effort.
+
+Part I, hereafter, discusses professional judgment in its basic
+relation to the successful conduct of war. This treatment examines the
+responsibilities of the armed forces, discusses the role of the
+commander, indicates the natural mental processes employed in the
+solution of military problems, formulates and explains the Fundamental
+Military Principle, and concludes with an outline of the procedure for
+its further application in Parts II and III.
+
+Part II is concerned with the solution of the problems encountered
+during the planning stage.
+
+Part III discusses the execution of the plan,--the directives and the
+supervision of the action,--but the treatment as to details is chiefly
+from the standpoint of the mental effort. During hostilities the vital
+issues which hinge on alert supervision create an accentuated demand
+for the intelligent exercise of professional judgment. Its possession
+to a highly developed degree and its exercise on a foundation of
+knowledge and experience, are prerequisite to attainment of the
+highest standards in the conduct of war.
+
+The following pages are intended, therefore, to provide a fundamental
+basis upon which the commander, by thoughtful study and reflection,
+may develop his professional judgment to the end that its exercise
+result in sound military decision, essential alike to wise planning
+and to consistently effective action.
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO
+THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF WAR
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+COMMAND AND ITS PROBLEMS
+
+    The Foreword, preceding, has explained the scientific
+    approach to the solution of military problems. It has been
+    brought to notice that the science of war can be utilized to
+    further sound military decision and, so, to improve the
+    practice of war, i.e., the art of war, whether under assumed
+    or actual conditions. The Foreword has also stressed the
+    importance of education for the development of judgment in
+    the application of mental power to the solution of military
+    problems.
+
+    Chapter I, which now follows, deals with the armed forces in
+    their relation to national policy, and discusses,
+    specifically, the role of the commander with respect to the
+    use of mental power as a recognized component of fighting
+    strength. Emphasis is placed on the important subjects of
+    military strategy and tactics, unity of effort, the chain of
+    command, authority and responsibility, organization, mutual
+    understanding, loyalty, and indoctrination.
+
+
+The Implementation of National Policy. Organized government exists for
+the purpose of bringing into systematic union the individuals of a
+State for the attainment of common ends. The primary national
+objective (page 3) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of
+essential security for the social system which is the fundamental
+basis of the community. Whatever the form of government, the power and
+authority of the State are vested in an individual, or in a grouping
+of individuals, whose voice is the voice of the State. In the
+prosecution of the chief aim of organized government, the State
+crystallizes the many conflicting desires and views of its people into
+policies, internal and external. Each policy is a method of procedure
+for attaining one or more national objectives.
+
+Internal policies are rendered effective by enforcement of the laws of
+the State.
+
+External policies, to become effective, require recognition by other
+States, tacitly or by agreement. When there is conflict between the
+policies of one State and those of another, peaceful means of
+settlement are usually sought.
+
+If peaceful (diplomatic) means fail to settle the point at issue, the
+State abandons the policy in question, defers action to enforce it, or
+adopts stronger measures. Such measures may take the form of
+psychological, political, or economic pressure. They may even include
+the threat to employ armed force before actually resorting to the
+imposition of physical violence. During actual hostilities, also,
+every means of pressure known to man, in addition to physical
+violence, may be employed.
+
+Whether the use of armed force to impose or to resist the imposition
+of policy constitutes a legal state of war is a political question
+which does not affect the tasks the armed forces may be called on to
+perform. War, therefore, is to be understood herein as any condition
+in which one State employs physical violence against another, or
+against an organized part of itself which may be in rebellion.
+
+By agreement among nations, effort has been made to discountenance
+aggressive warfare. The distinction between aggression and
+self-defense is, however, not a matter of agreement. War is still
+employed as an instrument of national policy. No nation has, as yet,
+manifested willingness to relinquish the right to employ armed force
+in resisting aggression, nor the right to decide what constitutes
+self-defense. States still maintain and employ armed forces as a means
+of promoting and expanding, as well as of defending, their welfare and
+interests.
+
+The Primary Function of the Armed Forces. Whether war is an ethical
+institution is not a matter within the purview of the armed forces.
+Their primary function is, when called upon to do so, to support and,
+within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policy of the
+State. The performance of this function constitutes the chief reason
+for their existence.
+
+The fundamental objective of the armed forces is, therefore, the
+reduction of the opposing will to resist. It is attained through the
+use of actual physical violence or the threat thereof (page 7). This
+fact constitutes the underlying motive of every military plan, whether
+for the conduct of a minor or contributory operation, or for the
+prosecution of a major campaign. The final outcome is dependent on
+ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the
+enemy, for land is the natural habitat of man (page 46). Since
+opposition is to be expected, the military problem is primarily
+concerned with the application of power--mental, moral, and
+physical--in overcoming resistance, or in exerting effort to resist.
+
+The application of power implies effort, i.e., the exertion of
+strength. The mental, moral, and physical power at the disposal of the
+armed forces depends on the effort which can be exerted by the human
+and material components of their fighting strength.
+
+The skillful employment of fighting strength, as a weapon more
+effective than the enemy's under a given set of circumstances, is the
+goal toward which the armed forces direct their effort. The elements
+of the material component--arms, ammunition, and other equipment--are
+indispensable. They are impotent, however, without the direction and
+energy supplied by the human component, its moral and mental elements
+nicely balanced and judiciously compounded with physical fitness. A
+true concept of the art of war will insist that the necessity for the
+achievement of a high standard of technical and administrative skill
+not be permitted to outweigh the need for maximum development of other
+mental attainments, and of the moral components of fighting strength.
+
+The moral elements include all the essential attributes of personal
+character, and more especially those qualities of courage, loyalty,
+decisiveness, modesty, patience, tolerance of the opinions of others,
+and fearlessness of responsibility which are characteristics of true
+military leadership. The maintenance of a high ethical standard is
+essential to the establishment and continuance of mutual confidence.
+
+The qualifications essential to the proper application of the mental
+elements include a creative imagination and the ability to think and
+to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a
+knowledge of the science of war. An unmistakable mark of mental
+maturity is the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and
+fundamental knowledge. Intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the
+influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion, is the essential basis
+for the effective employment of mental power.
+
+The numerical size of the armed forces, in their correct perspective
+as an instrument of the State, as well as the extent to which they are
+supplied with material components of fighting strength, are matters to
+be determined by the State after consultation with the responsible
+military authorities. The development of the essential military
+qualities of the instrument is the special charge of the armed forces.
+It is their task to weld the assemblage of men, armed and maintained
+by the State, into an harmonious whole, skilled in technique and
+imbued with a psychological and mental attitude which will not admit
+that any obstacle is insuperable.
+
+The Advisory Function. Understanding between the civil representatives
+of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly
+essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to
+enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of
+ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise
+professional counsel be available to the State. While military
+strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of
+attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or
+failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only
+that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of
+strategy be allotted adequate means, and be undertaken under the most
+favorable conditions.
+
+These considerations require that the military profession be
+qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and
+capacity for expression, to advise the State in military matters.
+There is thus accentuated the need for mental training, as set forth
+previously in the Foreword.
+
+Military Strategy and Tactics. Military strategy as distinguished by
+objectives (page 3) representing a larger, further, or more
+fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is
+concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn
+permit strategy to accomplish its further objective.
+
+Consequently, every military situation has both strategical and
+tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a
+particular time, and the action to be taken to that end, may be
+governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical,
+considerations. Whether an operation is distinctively strategical or
+tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned,
+on the end which he has in view.
+
+To attain its objective, strategy uses force (or threatens such use)
+(see page 8) as applied by tactics; tactics employed for a purpose
+other than that of contributing to the aims of strategy is unsound.
+Proper tactics, therefore, has a strategic background. Definition of
+tactics as the art of handling troops or ships in battle, or in the
+immediate presence of the enemy, is not all-inclusive. Such a view
+infers that the field of battle is the only province of tactics, or
+that strategy abdicates when tactics comes to the fore.
+
+Actually, while tactical considerations may predominate during battle,
+their influence is not confined to the immediate presence of the
+enemy. Tactical dispositions are frequently adopted for convenience,
+for time saving, or for other reasons, long before entry into the
+immediate presence of the enemy. Nor do strategical considerations end
+when battle is joined. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly
+make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But
+strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord
+with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics are inseparable.
+
+It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are
+appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at
+the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.
+The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that
+the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can
+be made available.
+
+Consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy, generally
+depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially
+responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the
+province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical
+objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that
+the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the
+attainment of the designated objectives.
+
+Command of the Armed Forces. The initial requisite to the effective
+use of the armed forces is an agency authorized to direct them.
+
+Command directs the armed forces. It is vitalized and personified in
+the commander, the human directing head, both of the whole and of
+organized groupings in descending scale of importance. Its
+responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the armed forces to
+the point of readiness for war and, during the conflict, their
+effective employment.
+
+Training for command, to be effective, is necessarily dependent upon
+an understanding of the position occupied by the commander, and of the
+role which he plays. Accordingly, this understanding is an essential
+in the study of that aspect of command training which has as its
+purpose the development of ability to reach sound decision.
+
+The ideal of military command combines the best of human qualities
+with sound knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the armed
+forces. It recognizes in war a form of human activity whose conduct,
+like that of all other human activities, is subject to natural law. It
+applies to the mastery of the problems of war, therefore, the natural
+mental processes of human thought (see Chapter II); it adapts these
+natural processes to a specific purpose, and consciously develops
+their use to the maximum degree for the attainment of this end. As
+command ascends the scale, its viewpoint broadens. Experience and
+added knowledge, with increasing authority and responsibility, lead to
+a concept of war more and more comprehensive, with the resultant
+growth in ability to evolve and put into effect a general plan for
+the effective control of collective effort.
+
+Unity of Effort. An objective is best attained by effective
+application of properly directed effort, exerted by a single
+individual or by groups of individuals. Where individuals are
+collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single
+factor contributory to the common success. The basic condition to be
+sought by the armed forces is an harmonious whole, capable of putting
+forth combined effort, intensified in strength because of the
+collective feature, and rendered effective by its unity.
+
+The Chain of Command. Within the limits of human capacity, an
+organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the
+more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single
+competent commander. To divide the supreme command in any locality, or
+to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to
+diffuse responsibility. In that degree there is then incurred the
+danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and
+of creating corresponding diffusion of effort.
+
+Realization of this danger has led the military profession to entrust
+command, subject to justifiable exceptions (see page 71), to a single
+head, while ensuring, by careful selection and training of personnel,
+that competent individuals are available for this duty. Although this
+method is in seeming conflict with the restriction imposed by
+recognized limitations of human capacity, the difficulty is
+effectively met through the chain of command, whereby responsibility
+is assigned and authority is transmitted without lessening of ultimate
+responsibility. Responsibility and authority, the latter properly
+apportioned to the former, are inseparably inherent in command, and
+may not justifiably be severed from one another.
+
+In the abstract, the chain of command consists of a series of links,
+through which responsibility and authority are transmitted. The
+supreme commander is thus linked with his successively subordinate
+commanders, and all are disposed on, so to speak, a vertical series of
+levels, each constituting an echelon of command.
+
+By means of the chain of command, a commander is enabled to require of
+his immediate subordinates an expenditure of effort which, in the
+aggregate, will ensure the attainment of his own objective (page 3).
+He thus assigns tasks to his immediate subordinates, whom he holds
+directly responsible for their execution without, however, divesting
+himself of any part of his initial responsibility. The accomplishment
+of each of these assigned tasks will involve the attainment of an
+objective, necessarily less in scope than that of the immediate
+superior but a contribution to the attainment of the latter.
+
+The character and magnitude of the objective of the highest echelon
+involved will have considerable bearing upon the number of echelons
+required for its attainment. Whatever the number, a commander on a
+particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate subordinate
+to a commander on the next higher echelon, and that of an immediate
+superior with relation to a commander on the next lower echelon.
+Within these confines, authority is exercised and accomplishment
+exacted, both to the extent calculated to ensure unity of effort.
+
+There may frequently be found two or more commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon, all with the same immediate
+superior, and all charged with loyalty to him and to each other in the
+attainment of a common objective. In no case, however, will a
+commander be directly answerable to more than one immediate superior
+for the performance of the same duty. Thus is fulfilled the
+requirement that the command, although relatively narrower in scope as
+the scale is descended, be reposed in a single head.
+
+The experience gained and the knowledge acquired during early service
+on the lower echelons provide a basis for later expansion of
+viewpoint, a better understanding of the position occupied by the
+subordinate and of the obligations of higher command, including its
+dependence on subordinates. As the echelons of command are ascended,
+the details involved become more and more numerous, because of the
+increased scope of the problems. On the higher echelons, therefore,
+staff assistance is provided so that the commander may be left free to
+consider matters in their major aspects. The staff of a commander is
+not, however, a part of the chain of command; its members, as such,
+exercise no independent authority.
+
+A chain of command is not created by the subdivision of the officer
+corps into grades on a basis of relative rank. Such subdivision is for
+the purpose of classification from the standpoint of potential
+competency and capacity for responsibility, and carries no authority
+to command by virtue of rank alone. Organization, systematized
+connection for a specific purpose, is first necessary.
+
+The armed forces, during peace, are usually subdivided into permanent
+major organizations for the purpose of attaining and maintaining
+readiness for action. From the several grades of the officer corps, a
+permanent chain of command is instituted by the process of organization,
+the supreme command being reposed in a commander-in-chief. The basis of
+the permanent organization is that chosen as best suited to attain and
+maintain readiness. Its choice requires consideration of many factors,
+such as the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses, and their
+capabilities, severally and in combination. Further specific demands are
+met by temporary arrangements effected through "task organization".
+Whether the organization be permanent or temporary, its establishment
+places in effect a chain of command applicable to that organization
+throughout its continuance.
+
+Habitual and studied adherence to the chain of command in
+administrative matters, in consultation, in the exchange of
+information, and in the issue of directives is essential to mutual
+understanding, and therefore to unity of effort. The right of a
+commander, however, because of the responsibility he shoulders, to
+deal directly with subordinates more than one echelon removed is not
+relinquished because of the existence of the chain of command.
+Circumstances may arise which require him to issue orders directly to
+any person under his command. Fully aware, however, of the value of
+unity of effort, and recognizing that failure to deal through his
+immediate subordinate, no matter what the exigency, cannot but tend to
+weaken the chain of command, he will, as soon as the state of the
+emergency permits, inform intervening commanders of the action he has
+been compelled to take.
+
+Mutual Understanding. The chain of command, though providing the
+necessary linkage, does not of itself ensure that the command
+organization will be adequate, nor can it ensure that unity of effort
+will result. To meet the requirement of adequacy, there is needed in
+the person of each commander not only the ability to arrive at sound
+military decision, to plan, and to direct the operations of his
+command, but also an appreciation of the position which he occupies in
+his relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand, and to
+his own immediate subordinates on the other. To meet the requirement
+of unity of effort, it is also essential that there exist a state of
+mutual understanding throughout the chain of command.
+
+Loyalty is not merely a moral virtue; it is a great military
+necessity. To establish and to cultivate a state of mutual
+understanding from which will flow mutual loyalty born of mutual
+confidence (page 9) are prime obligations of command. Within the
+limits of responsibility and resultant authority, individual
+initiative will follow. On a foundation of intelligent cooperation and
+resolute determination, the acts of the lowest commander will be in
+accordance with the desires of the highest. This, in effect, will
+constitute unity of effort, accomplished through the vesting of
+command in a single head.
+
+The final aim of mutual understanding is attained when, in the absence
+of specific instructions, each subordinate commander in the chain acts
+instinctively as his immediate superior, if present, would have him
+act, and also cooperates intelligently with commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon. For this reason there is
+need, on all echelons, of a complete grasp of the significance of the
+relationship between immediate superior and immediate subordinate, and
+of the obligations of each to the other.
+
+The proper relationship is such that a subordinate, even though
+separated from his commander, can confidently take action as if the
+latter were present. To this end, the competent commander will earlier
+have cultivated the personal relationship between his immediate
+superior and himself, and between himself and his subordinates. It is
+through such close relationship that mutual understanding is best
+developed and harmony promoted, so that intelligent and cordial unity
+of effort may exist among the personnel of a command.
+
+The commander, however competent, necessarily relies on his
+subordinates. Recognizing the psychological factors involved, he will
+therefore manifest confidence in their abilities, display sympathetic
+interest in their efforts, and evince pride in their achievements. He
+will also exercise patience with the mistakes which will inevitably
+occur, without condonement, however, of disaffection, neglect, or
+carelessness. The commander may reasonably expect, by the same token,
+that this attitude will characterize his immediate superior.
+
+In the absence of his superior, and faced with a changing situation, a
+commander may be forced to the conclusion that his assigned task
+requires modification or alteration. Conditions permitting, he will of
+course communicate with proper authority, and will make constructive
+representations. If he is without adequate communications facilities,
+or if circumstances have imposed restrictions on communications
+facilities otherwise available, he takes action according to the
+dictates of his own judgment, guided by the known views of his
+superior. On occasions when he believes that the immediate situation
+so requires, he may even depart from his instructions. He realizes
+that in so doing he accepts the gravest of military responsibilities.
+At the same time, however, he recognizes that to fail to take the
+indicated action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of
+courage, judgment, initiative, and loyalty (page 9). He will, of
+course inform his superior of his action at the first available
+opportunity. In the meantime, he has been enabled to act intelligently
+and fearlessly because of the existence of a state of mutual
+understanding.
+
+Indoctrination. Both the necessary process and the final result of
+establishing a state of mutual understanding are sometimes known as
+indoctrination.
+
+The word carries the dual meaning of "the act of indoctrinating" and
+"the state of being indoctrinated". In common with the word doctrine,
+it has its root in the Latin verb which means "to teach". A doctrine,
+in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for
+acceptance or belief.
+
+It does not follow that every doctrine is necessarily sound, nor that
+it is founded on conviction reached as the result of intelligent
+thought. Nor is the encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread
+of a doctrine, necessarily inspired by good motives. The preaching of
+doctrine known to be false is frequently encountered in many human
+activities. The deliberate spread of false propaganda is an example.
+But, whatever the motive and whether the doctrine be sound or false,
+the act of indoctrination is intended to shape opinion and thus
+influence action.
+
+Manifestly, to be along permanently useful lines, indoctrination flows
+from sound philosophy, i.e., is rooted in truth. All teachings, all
+opinions that may be advanced, all expressions of viewpoint, i.e., all
+doctrine, is therefore to be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of
+validity, and then from that of usefulness of application. It is the
+responsibility of command to ensure that these conditions are met
+before doctrine is pronounced.
+
+Military doctrine, in its broad sense, is a digest of the accepted
+beliefs of the military profession. In a narrower sense a military
+doctrine may be confined to the views of a single commander on a
+specific subject. The object of military doctrine, however, is always
+to furnish a basis for mutual understanding to the end that prompt and
+harmonious action by subordinate commanders may ensue without the
+necessity for referring every problem to superior authority before
+taking action (page 15). Doctrine thus provides a basis for action in
+possible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions
+have not been issued.
+
+The term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content
+of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a
+particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under
+circumstances of the moment. The precise instructions thus issued,
+though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves
+constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the
+nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative
+opinion.
+
+In the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified
+demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is
+an essential to unity of effort. If the members of the military
+profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to
+the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected
+more nearly to approach unanimity. The attainment of unity of effort
+therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic
+indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all
+commanders of the chain of command.
+
+Wars come and go. Their effects are painful, but when their wounds are
+healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that
+peace will henceforth be unbroken. Psychological and economic forces
+then not infrequently impel the State to subordinate the national
+defense in favor of other interests. During such periods the burdens
+of command are enlarged. Its responsibility is not lessened, but the
+means for effective discharge thereof are withheld.
+
+The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist
+(see pages 9 and 10) between the civil representatives of the State
+and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with
+the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of
+the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war
+demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with
+intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities
+and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the
+practical details into the general plan in their true relation
+thereto.
+
+The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour
+of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is
+wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its
+adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment
+until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are
+essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite
+intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied
+effort during peace.
+
+It follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is
+directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific,
+rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary
+components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the
+readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the
+application of power more likely to be successful. History records, as
+facts, that certain States have given their armed forces great
+stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases,
+failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof.
+Military problems are not confined to those presented after war is
+begun.
+
+Mental power (see pages 8 and 9), which includes the ability to solve
+military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound
+decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength
+because it is the source of professional judgment. The development of
+such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct
+of war (page 4) may not safely be postponed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+MENTAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN TENDENCIES
+
+    The discussion in Chapter II deals, first, with the natural
+    mental processes employed by the normal mature human being
+    before taking deliberate action.
+
+    With the necessity for logical thought thus established, there
+    arises a need for valid statements of cause and effect, i.e.,
+    of relationships resulting from the operation of natural laws,
+    for use as reliable rules of action. The discussion of this
+    subject explains the dangers inherent in the use of faulty
+    rules, emphasizes the role played by the various factors
+    applicable in particular cases, and describes the method of
+    formulating reliable rules, i.e., principles.
+
+
+All living beings and their surroundings are understood, on the basis
+of informed authority, to be governed in their characteristic
+activities by natural law (page 11). The natural forces inherent in
+living things and in their environment are continually reacting upon
+each other, either maintaining the existing condition or creating a
+new one, each of which is a situation or state of affairs. There is
+thus always a relationship (page 3) existing between such natural
+forces and the resultant condition which they produce. The natural
+forces are causes; the resultant conditions are effects.
+
+It is a recognized natural phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of a certain cause, or of a combination of causes, and that each
+effect is itself, in turn, the cause of additional effects. Action and
+reaction are the basis of natural law. Cause and effect, the latter
+being the cause of further effects, follow each other in ceaseless
+succession in the world of human affairs.
+
+Except by putting proper natural causes into action, it is impossible
+to produce the effect desired. It follows that specific knowledge of
+causes is necessary for the planned production of specific effects.
+Toward the accumulation of such knowledge the methods of science
+(pages 1 and 2) are constantly directed.
+
+The uncertainties of war are largely the outgrowth of the fact that
+the minds of men are pitted against one other. Because of this, a
+knowledge of the manner in which the human mind seeks its way out of
+difficulties is a great military asset. Consideration is next given,
+therefore, to the natural mental processes employed (page 11) and to
+certain human tendencies which have been known to militate against
+their successful employment.
+
+The mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before
+taking deliberate action, or in making studied provision for possible
+future action, are natural procedures, in that they employ the
+intellectual powers bestowed by nature, without artificial
+modification or embellishment.
+
+When the individual concerned has a background of adequate knowledge
+and experience, his ability to solve problems is limited only by his
+native intellectual endowment. That he falls short does not
+necessarily indicate, however, that the limit of native endowment has
+been reached. It happens frequently that latent powers have not been
+cultivated, or have not been utilized.
+
+A problem is, by definition, a perplexing question. In any human
+activity, a problem appears when a perplexity arises as to a way out
+of a difficulty inherent in a situation. The question involved then
+is, what is a way, more especially the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty?
+
+To determine the best way out of the difficulty, i.e., the best
+solution of the problem, involves:
+
+        (1) The establishment of the proper basis for the
+    solution of the problem,
+
+        (2) The actual solution of the problem through the
+    employment of the reasoning power in the consideration of
+    various possible solutions and the selection of the best
+    solution, and
+
+        (3) The conclusion, i.e., the decision, embodying the best
+    solution.
+
+Considered in greater detail, the process has its inception in a
+combination of circumstances, existent or assumed, which, constitutes
+a situation. No problem will result however, unless the situation
+involves an apparent difficulty. Even in such a case, a problem will
+result only if such involvement exists and gives rise to a perplexity
+as to a way, more especially as to the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty.
+
+The problem will require solution only when accompanied by an
+incentive which demands a changed situation or resistance against a
+threatened change. A recognition of the incentive thus necessarily
+involves realization of a desire or need to maintain the existing
+situation or to change it into a new one.
+
+Such realization may come on the initiative of the person confronted
+with the situation, or because he has received instructions from
+someone in authority. In either case, the effect so indicated is the
+outcome of a desire for change or for resisting change, and may
+therefore be regarded properly as an effect desired (page 19).
+
+As so far outlined, therefore, the establishment of the correct basis
+for the solution of the problem involves (1) a grasp of the salient
+features of the situation, (2) a recognition of the incentive, and (3)
+an appreciation of the effect desired.
+
+The "appropriate" effect desired will necessarily be suitable to the
+further effects (page 19) which are inherent in the situation. An
+effect to be attained is accepted as appropriate when, after due
+examination, its relationship with the further effects involved, in
+all their pertinent implications, has been found to be in accordance
+with the dictates of sound judgment.
+
+The establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem will
+also require an understanding of the resources involved, as influenced
+by the conditions obtaining, for the maintenance of the existing
+situation or for the creation of a new one.
+
+The resources available, as influenced by the conditions obtaining,
+are correctly considered on a relative basis as compared to those of
+any persons who may oppose the effort.
+
+With the basis for the solution of the problem established in this
+manner, the actual solution involves the consideration of one or more
+plans, i.e., proposed methods of procedure, and the selection of the
+one considered to be the best.
+
+The person concerned, taking cognizance of the present condition,
+i.e., the existing situation, first considers whether this situation,
+if maintained, will be suitable to the appropriate effect desired.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates one or
+more images of future conditions, i.e., mental pictures of new
+situations, which will also be suitable to this end. The maintenance
+of the existing situation, or the creation of a new one, will in each
+case involve a plan.
+
+Necessarily, each such plan includes provision for (1) an effect to be
+produced by the person solving the problem, which effect will be the
+maintenance of the existing situation or the creation of a new one as
+visualized by himself, and (2) the action required to produce this
+effect and so to attain the appropriate effect desired, already
+established as an essential part of the basis of his problem.
+
+After systematic examination of such plans, those retained for further
+consideration can be subjected to a comparison as to their relative
+merits.
+
+The best plan, selected accordingly, is then incorporated into a
+decision as to the procedure to be adopted.
+
+This decision is then available as a general plan, or may be developed
+into one, to serve as a basis if necessary for a more detailed plan
+for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired.
+
+Later development, herein, of the details of this procedure will
+disclose many ramifications. The treatment, so far, points to the fact
+that the best method of reaching sound decision is through systematic
+thought which employs logic, i.e., sound reasoning, as its machinery.
+
+The Necessity for Logical Thought. Logical thought separates the
+rational from the irrational. Its use avoids the wastefulness of the
+trial-and-error method. By its insistent employment, dormant powers of
+reasoning are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive,
+spontaneous, impulsive, or emotional acceptance of conclusions (page
+9) is lessened. The evil effects of an inclination to dodge the issue
+or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. The
+fallacy of employing the reasoning power to justify conclusions
+already reached, whether on the basis of tradition or habit, or
+because of the bias or bent of a school of thought, or because of the
+tendency of human nature to accept plausible suggestions, is also made
+apparent. Through the deliberate practice of testing and weighing, the
+faculty of arriving swiftly at accurate decisions is strengthened and
+is brought more quickly into play when time is a matter of immediate
+concern.
+
+Principles in their Relation to Logical Thought. Because of the
+necessity for the exercise of judgment (page 3) in the systematic
+arrangement of thought, the relationship between cause and effect, as
+expressed in principles, is of great assistance in applying logical
+processes to the problems of human life.
+
+A principle establishes a correct relation between cause and effect.
+The word, derived from the Latin "principium", meaning a foundation,
+beginning, source, origin, or cause, has, because a cause implies an
+effect, acquired in correct usage the significance of a true statement
+of relationship between cause and effect. A principle, so formulated,
+is a natural law (page 19) because it expresses a fact of nature; it
+thus becomes a reliable rule of action and may be confidently adopted
+as a governing law of conduct. If basic in its field, such a rule or
+law becomes a general or fundamental principle with respect thereto;
+each such basic truth may be the basis for the determination of many
+corollary or subordinate principles dealing with the details of the
+particular subject.
+
+The formulation of a principle, therefore, requires the determination
+of the causes that generate a particular effect (or effects), and the
+accurate expression of the resultant relationship. Such expression
+frequently takes the form of a proportion. In the mathematical
+sciences the proportion may represent a precise balance; its statement
+may be an exact formula. In other sciences, a definite relationship
+between cause and effect has likewise been established in many cases,
+though not always with mathematical precision. Comparable exactitude
+has not been attained, in some cases, because the field has not been
+so thoroughly explored; moreover, greater difficulty is experienced,
+at times, in isolating the cause, or causes. The balance represented
+by such equations, therefore, is based on quantities whose weights
+vary within wide ranges. (See page 3.)
+
+Human conduct does not lend itself to analysis as readily as do
+mathematical and physical phenomena. The advance in the psychological
+and sociological sciences is not so marked as in the physical, and the
+actions and reactions of the mind of man have not yet proved to be
+susceptible of reduction to exact formulae. Nevertheless, man, in his
+intuitive search for valid guides for his own action, has been able,
+with the advance of time, greatly to improve his own lot through the
+medium of the scientific approach to human problems.
+
+The insistent search of the human mind for reliable rules of action is
+a recognized natural phenomenon. As understood on the basis of expert
+investigation of the subject, this trait results from the recognition,
+conscious or otherwise, by countless generations of mankind, of the
+relationships between cause and effect as evidenced in the workings of
+the laws of nature (page 22). A logical outcome, therefore, of
+experience, this instinctive demand of the mind constitutes a force
+which defies opposition. Properly utilized, this force affords a
+powerful and natural aid in the solution of problems.
+
+Inasmuch as a valid rule, or principle, is of great assistance in
+arriving at sound decisions and in formulating effective plans (see
+page 22), this demand for reliable guides is logical, as well as
+natural. In any event, the demand for such guidance, if not met by
+provision for reliable rules of action, may result in the adoption of
+faulty rules, with frequent unfortunate consequences.
+
+The formulation of principles, already referred to in this connection,
+constitutes in itself a recognized problem (see also page 27) of great
+difficulty; for it is a human failing to avoid the mental effort
+involved in thinking through such a problem, and to rely on rules
+whose plausibility and seeming simplicity are frequently a measure of
+their incompleteness and inaccuracy.
+
+Since the earliest days, man has attempted to formulate the
+relationships between causes and effects without, however, always
+possessing the specific knowledge essential to accuracy. Pithy
+statements have always had great appeal to man, as evidenced by the
+existence of proverbs, maxims, and adages preserved from times of
+great antiquity. Frequently, however, such statements are not
+expressive of the truth. Sometimes, again, they state facts, without,
+nevertheless, expressing the whole truth.
+
+Only when the relationship between cause and effect has been
+demonstrated to be always true can the trained, inquiring mind receive
+its statement as a valid guide, acceptable as a principle in the light
+of the knowledge of the day.
+
+To rely upon rules of action which do not express the whole truth is
+to court the danger of encountering exceptions which may entail
+serious consequences. The value of those rules known to be
+inexpressive of the whole truth lies in the fact that they may invite
+attention to circumstances which are sometimes encountered, or may
+suggest methods of action which are sometimes appropriate. Danger lies
+in the fact that such rules may fail to give proper emphasis to other
+circumstances or other methods which are encountered or are more
+appropriate in other cases.
+
+Such a rule may fail to consider the entire problem. Its use,
+therefore, implies the necessity of recognizing cases to which it is
+not applicable. This may frequently be difficult in the active
+operations of war, when nervous strain and the urgency of events are
+handicaps to quick and accurate thinking (see page 22).
+
+To express the whole truth, a rule of action calls to attention all
+circumstances, or causes, which may ever influence the result. The
+saying that "the exception proves the rule" is properly interpreted
+only in the older sense that an exception "tests" the rule, indicating
+by the mere fact of exception that the rule is to such extent
+incomplete.
+
+Subject to variations of phraseology, the old adage "circumstances
+alter cases" is the sole reliable and fundamental rule of action. A
+corresponding maxim of the military profession, "It depends on the
+situation", has its root in recognition of the same fact, i.e., that
+the action taken in any situation depends, properly, on the
+circumstances of the case, and that the relationship between cause and
+effect (page 22) is always the governing consideration. The principles
+deduced hereafter (Chapter III) have these irrefutable findings as
+their foundation.
+
+Factors. A situation is by definition (page 20) a combination of
+circumstances, which are the effects of certain causes. To these
+causes, the term "factors", long in use in the military profession, is
+customarily applied in many other activities. Through their influence
+as causes, these factors operate to produce, as their effects, the
+circumstances which, in combination, constitute the situation. A
+combination of factors, therefore, gives to each situation its
+distinctive character, differentiating it from other situations.
+
+To maintain an existing situation, it is necessary to preserve, in
+total effect, the influence of factors already present, or to
+introduce new factors to offset the influence of any which tend to
+cause a change. To change the situation, it is necessary to introduce
+factors which will exert the desired influence; or, change may be
+effected by altering the influence of factors already present. To say,
+therefore, that "It depends on the situation", as in the maxim cited
+(above), is to state that under all circumstances, the proper action
+depends on, or is determined by, the influence of the factors
+involved. Any valid rule, or principle, will accordingly take into
+account the factors applicable to the case.
+
+The application of any rule will similarly take into account the
+influence of the particular factors involved. The danger of the
+application of such factors to all circumstances, without due
+circumspection as to their value in the existing situation, lies in
+the fact that, in any particular combination of circumstances, they do
+not necessarily carry equal weight.
+
+If this view be accepted, it follows that in many situations certain
+factors may, after mature deliberation, be rejected, or relegated to a
+relatively inferior status, without detracting from their potential
+value as fundamental considerations (page 1) in all situations.
+
+Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles of War. The human
+preference for catchwords has, by many writers on the science and art
+of war, been extended to the attempted condensation of a principle or
+of several principles into a single all-inclusive word or phrase. As
+a result, varying lists of abstract nouns and phrases have been
+advanced to constitute epitomes of the principles of war. Subject to
+minor differences in number and in designation, the list most
+frequently encountered comprises The Objective, Superiority, The
+Offensive, Economy of Force, Movement, Cooperation, Surprise,
+Security, and Simplicity.
+
+To rely on a list of this nature, as a condensation of the
+fundamentals of war, has been known to cause confusion and to result
+in failure to recognize the principles which are intended to be
+brought to mind.
+
+For example, misunderstanding has resulted from the designation of the
+single word, surprise, as a "principle of war". On the one hand, it
+has been denied that surprise embodies a principle, the reason being
+advanced that it is neither always necessary, nor feasible, nor even
+desirable to attempt to obtain surprise. On the other hand, the
+acceptance of the word surprise (see page 73), as itself expressing a
+universal truth (which it of course does not except by inference), has
+been known to result in the incorrect belief that surprise is always
+essential to success. Action based on such a viewpoint is the
+equivalent of applying general treatment to specific cases, regardless
+of circumstances.
+
+Thus there have resulted distortions of the simple fact that a
+relationship exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the
+creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent. The correct
+formulation of a principle, or of several principles, governing the
+employment of surprise, will result in a definite statement that its
+appropriate employment is dependent upon the various factors (page 25)
+that make up the situation, the influence of each of which requires
+evaluation in each separate situation.
+
+Analysis, in like manner, of the so-called "principle of the
+objective" as a "principle of war" will show that the objective of a
+military force is, in itself, no more a principle of war than the
+direction of a physical force is, in itself, a principle of mechanics.
+Both concepts, however, involve certain matters of fact which can best
+be explained by principles. Such principles take note of the factors
+pertaining to the subjects, and indicate the underlying relationships
+in a manner to be later shown herein.
+
+Certainly the preceding list (above) of isolated expressions includes
+no item which, in the abstract, may not properly be considered as
+possibly vital from the strategical and tactical standpoints. But
+that these expressions are always vital, and that there are no other
+considerations, can scarcely be accepted as final. Even if this
+objection could be removed by the inclusion of all factors well known
+to be vital, the fact would still remain that these expressions,
+standing alone, fail to satisfy the real need; i.e., they fail to
+indicate any practical application of the concepts which they are
+intended to imply. They do no more than provide a useful point of
+origin for further inquiry. When understood on this basis, they
+possess a certain value.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The concept underlying the application of principles is correct with
+respect to military problems, as well as for all others (page 22).
+This purpose, however, cannot be served by a mere collection of nouns
+or noun-phrases. Such expressions make no statements of cause and
+effect. Their meaning is therefore left to inference and to the
+idiosyncrasy of individual interpretation. The formulation, moreover,
+of useful principles cannot be satisfactorily established by the
+more-or-less random selection of matters, however important,
+pertaining to the subject at hand. What is required is a systematic
+analysis of the essentials of the subject, with resultant emphasis on
+the fundamental causes and effects whose relationships are to be
+expressed.
+
+Formulation and Use of Principles. The formulation of a principle,
+referred to previously (page 24) as itself a difficult problem,
+requires a citation of the factors pertaining to the subject. On the
+basis of these factors as causes, the principles, when properly
+formulated, also state the effects which may properly be expected.
+(See page 22.)
+
+The relationship between causes and effects, or between effects and
+their causes, may be expressed in various ways. The requirement is
+that the expression be one of fact and that, if the principle purport
+to cover the entire subject, all of the pertinent facts (page 24) be
+stated, though not necessarily all the details involved.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In addition to the principles of general application (Chapter III),
+the later discussion herein includes numerous other principles, with
+reference to matters of detail (pages 22-23). To some of these
+principles the treatment invites special attention. All principles
+included have been phrased with due care, to ensure conformity with
+the requirements above stated. The preferred form, herein, for the
+usual statement of cause and effect is through the use of phraseology
+such as that certain effects "depend on" or are "dependent on" certain
+causes, or that certain causes "determine" certain effects, or that
+the latter "are determined by" certain causes.
+
+From the standpoint of the exercise of judgment, it is a principle
+that the due determination of effects to be produced depends on the
+proper consideration of pertinent factors. Once the principles
+applicable to any subject have been formulated in necessary detail,
+the evaluation of the cited factors with respect to a particular
+situation becomes the vital procedure as to any problem where that
+subject is involved. In the course of this evaluation, corollary or
+subordinate principles may be of assistance (page 22). In military
+problems, however, the evaluation usually involves many factors not
+susceptible of reasonably exact determination by the use of formulae
+(see page 23). In such cases, experience, education, and training
+afford the only secure basis for judgment which will produce reliable
+conclusions. The principles, therefore, provide reliable guides by
+citing the factors to be evaluated in order to arrive at desired
+results, but the principles cannot replace logical thought in the
+evaluation of the factors.
+
+In formulating principles (see also page 23) as practical guides for
+action, as well as in using them when formulated, failure to give
+consideration to all pertinent factors may result in vitiating the
+effort based on their application. Danger also lies in the fact that
+any particular factor will infrequently have the same value--the same
+influence on the situation--in any two problems (page 25). Therefore,
+in each situation, each factor requires to be weighed in connection
+with the others. The soundness of the resulting conclusion will depend
+on the extent of the knowledge available (page 2) and on its useful
+employment.
+
+Summary of Fundamental Considerations. The factors (page 25) involved
+in determining the nature of an effect and of the action to attain it
+become fundamental considerations (page 25) when it is desired to
+arrive at such a result under a particular set of circumstances.
+
+The relationships obtaining between the desired effect and the action
+to attain it, on the one hand, and the factors involved, on the other,
+are best expressed in the form of principles. The next chapter is
+therefore devoted to the development of basic principles applicable to
+military problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+BASIC PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PROBLEMS
+
+(The Fundamental Military Principle)
+
+    On the basis of the previous discussion as to the natural
+    mental processes and as to principles useful in their
+    employment, Chapter III discusses the requirements for the
+    attainment of an end in human affairs.
+
+    The fundamental principle thus derived is then applied to the
+    needs of the military profession, so as to develop the
+    Fundamental Military Principle. This Principle indicates the
+    requirements of a correct military objective and of the action
+    for its attainment.
+
+
+Review of Conclusions as to Principles. On the premise that all human
+activities and their environment are governed by natural laws (page
+22), the preceding chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the
+natural mental processes employed in meeting the problems of human
+life. This analysis has stressed four fundamental truths:
+
+    (1) That a valid rule, or principle, when complete, embraces
+        all known phenomena pertinent to the relationship
+        established.
+
+    (2) That the logical application of principles to particular
+        incidents will take account of all the factors of the
+        principles, and of all known conditions of the incidents.
+
+    (3) That such principles afford great assistance in arriving
+        at sound conclusions, and that the human mind, if without
+        access to such valid guides, tends to adopt faulty rules
+        in the effort to serve the same purpose.
+
+    (4) That rules of action, however, even though they be valid,
+        cannot be depended upon to replace the employment of
+        logical thought.
+
+Procedure for Developing Military Principles. Logically, the next
+stage in the treatment of this subject is to develop certain basic
+principles applicable, more especially, to the solution of military
+problems.
+
+The development of such principles starts, on the basis already
+established in this discussion, with a reference to the natural mental
+processes used by the normal mature human being before taking
+deliberate action (page 19). Under such circumstances, the person who
+is to solve the problem has first to establish a basis for his
+solution.
+
+To arrive at this basis, which involves an understanding of the
+appropriate effect desired, the person concerned requires a grasp of
+the salient features of the situation, a recognition of the incentive,
+and an appreciation of the effect which he has been directed to
+produce or has adopted on his own initiative. To complete the basis
+for his solution, he also requires an understanding of comparative
+resources as influenced by the conditions obtaining at the time.
+
+During the actual solution of the problem, the person concerned takes
+cognizance first, of the existing situation, picturing it in his mind.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates for
+himself mental images of future situations. The pictured condition
+decided upon after consideration of the pertinent factors involved, be
+it the situation to be maintained or a new situation to be created,
+constitutes an effect he may produce for the further attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part
+of the basis of his problem. (See page 25.)
+
+With the existing situation and a new situation now clear, what action
+is he to take to change the one into the other? Or, if no change is
+desired, what action is he to take to maintain the existing situation?
+What acts or series of acts should he decide upon, plan in detail,
+inaugurate, and supervise (page 3), to attain the effect which he has
+envisaged for the further attainment of the appropriate effect
+desired?
+
+The correct solution of problems therefore hinges on the requirements
+involved in the effects to be produced and in the action to produce
+them. If these requirements are ascertained, a principle can be
+formulated as a valid guide for the solution of human problems.
+
+Requirements for the Attainment of an End. The discussion to this
+point has established the fact that an end in view, a result to be
+produced, an effect desired, is very closely connected with a further
+effect which the attainment of the former is intended to produce.
+Human motives spring from deep-seated incentives often derived from
+distant sources, so that, even when the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative, he will rarely, if ever, be uninfluenced
+by some further effect desired, inherent in his situation (see page
+19).
+
+An end in view, therefore, from the viewpoint of the person who is
+endeavoring to visualize its accomplishment as a method for attainment
+of a further aim, will necessarily achieve such further aim, or at
+least contribute to its achievement. The first requirement,
+accordingly, of such an end in view is that it be suitable to any
+further aim, whatever that aim may be. It may be said, therefore, that
+a correct end in view satisfies the requirement of suitability as to
+the appropriate effect desired, whatever this further effect may be.
+
+Important as suitability is, however, a reasonably responsible person
+will recognize that this consideration, alone, does not satisfy all
+requirements. An end in view remains a mere desire, without
+possibility of attainment, unless such a result is practicable of
+accomplishment. A correct end in view, therefore, satisfies also the
+requirements of feasibility.
+
+Consideration of feasibility calls for a survey of comparative
+resources (page 30). Such a survey will cover the extent of the
+resources (means available) of those making the effort, as compared to
+the resources (means opposed) of those who may oppose it. Full account
+is also to be taken, as to feasibility, of the natural and artificial
+conditions which the effort will encounter before it can produce the
+contemplated result. The responsible person will ask himself where the
+effort is most likely to be successful, and what obstacles, in
+addition to those represented by opponents, he will be required to
+surmount. The effects of such conditions may alter the ratio otherwise
+presented by comparative resources.
+
+Consideration of the characteristics of the field of action may thus
+disclose features which will greatly influence the possibility of
+accomplishment, as well as the character of the effort to be made,
+from the standpoint of feasibility. The second requirement, therefore,
+is that of feasibility with respect to comparative resources, i.e.,
+the means available and opposed, as influenced by the physical
+conditions prevailing in the field of action.
+
+Although believed to be both suitable and feasible, the requirements
+for the attainment of an end are not yet completely established. There
+is still required a reckoning of a profit-and-loss account of the
+whole undertaking, to estimate whether it will be advantageous. What
+will be the cost, and what will be the gain? Is the effort worth
+while? Or should one be content with venturing less and gaining less?
+What is the bearing on possible future action? The consequences as to
+costs, always important considerations in dealing with human problems,
+are frequently the paramount determinant. The third requirement,
+therefore, is acceptability with respect to the consequences as to
+costs.
+
+These requirements invite attention to the factors, already
+discussed, whose influence (see page 25 as to factors) determines the
+character of the effort required to attain an end.
+
+The Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End. Here, then,
+are the broad fundamental considerations which affect the solution of
+every human problem. In a narrower field, the considerations may fall
+within more specific limits, but a principle sufficiently broad to be
+applicable to all cases appears to comprehend those inclusive factors
+mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
+
+A review of these paragraphs will disclose that the factors pertaining
+to the several requirements may be so grouped as to constitute a
+single fundamental principle governing the attainment of an end in
+human affairs,--as follows:
+
+In any human activity, the attainment of a correct end in view depends
+on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+        of the appropriate effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility of the effort required, on the basis of
+        comparative resources, as determined by the means
+        available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+        physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs,
+
+    which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
+
+The Interdependency of the Factors. As previously observed (page 28),
+the factors cited in the foregoing principle are themselves
+interdependent. This fact results from working of natural law (page
+22), for it is a recognized phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of certain causes, and that every effect is itself, in turn, the cause
+of further effects (page 19).
+
+Accordingly, when the evaluation of any factor is under consideration,
+its value as an unknown quantity can be determined to the extent that
+the values of the other pertinent factors are known. (See page 23, as
+to the discussion of the quantities in an equation.) The significance
+of each, in any situation, is therefore determined by the influence of
+the other factors. The relationships existing among them can best be
+expressed in the terms of four corollary principles (page 27), next to
+be discussed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+For example, questions frequently arise as to what is the appropriate
+effect to be desired in a particular situation. Whether a desired
+effect is feasible of attainment, and whether certain consequences,
+though undesirable, will be acceptable, in view of the gains, can be
+determined by evaluation of the means available and opposed,
+influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of
+action, and of the consequences as to costs. If a desired effect is
+thereby found to be not feasible of attainment, or to be unacceptable
+as to consequences, deferment of such effort is indicated. A proper
+solution in such case would adopt some lesser effect, in conformity
+with the further aim, feasible of accomplishment, and acceptable as to
+its consequences.
+
+If (with respect to the further aim, mentioned above) the person
+concerned is acting under the instructions of another, there will
+frequently be injected into the equation, in addition to the factors
+already noted, a further effect desired, indicated by higher
+authority. Such an indication will often operate to narrow the limits
+of the problem. This is true even if the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative and responsibility (pages 29-30).
+
+These considerations lead to the formulation of what may be called the
+corollary principle for determination of the appropriate effect to be
+desired in human affairs,--as follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the appropriate effect to be desired
+  (i.e., an end in view, a result to be accomplished) depends on
+  fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of
+        the further effect desired (if such further effect is
+        indicated),
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+        field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If, to take a further example, the known factors include the
+appropriate effect desired, the means opposed, the physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action, and the consequences as to costs,
+the only unknown remains the means available. The question then is,
+what means need be made available for the accomplishment of the
+contemplated effort? The answer to this question may be found in the
+application of what may be called the principle for the determination
+of the proper means to be made available in human affairs,--as
+follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the proper means to be made available
+  depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the means (in kind and amount) to accomplish
+        the end in view, as determined by the factor of the
+        appropriate effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to make such means available on the
+        basis of comparative resources as determined by the factor
+        of the means opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+        physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The influence of physical conditions in the field of action may be
+illustrated by any case where ends otherwise feasible of attainment
+cannot be achieved without effecting changes in such conditions. The
+resolution of the uncertainty then requires study to determine what
+suitable changes can be made. Changes for such a purpose may take
+various forms, such as the construction of physical features in the
+area involved, or the destruction of such features already existing;
+or, again, both methods may be employed. Examples of such changes have
+existed and still exist in profusion, some of them, military and
+non-military, being on such a scale as radically to alter the previous
+status with respect to entire nations. The question as to what changes
+ought to be effected in the prevailing physical conditions, in order
+to attain a certain objective, can be answered by the application of
+what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper
+physical conditions to be established in the field of action,--as
+follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the proper physical conditions to be
+  established in the field of action depend on fulfillment of the
+  requirements of
+
+    Suitability of such conditions to the end in view, as
+        determined by the factor of the appropriate effect
+        desired,
+
+    Feasibility of effort to establish such conditions, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions existing in the
+        field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The factor of consequences as to costs also calls for special notice.
+The influence of this factor frequently justifies abandonment of
+suitable ends in view, even though their attainment has been
+determined to be feasible, because the loss involved would out-weigh
+the gain. Immediate success may be attained at such cost as to prevent
+the attainment of larger ends (see the discussion, pages 9 and 10, of
+the relationship of strategy and tactics).
+
+On the other hand, the circumstances of the case may well justify
+loss, however great, because the alternative is unacceptable, even
+though the consequences involve complete destruction. Moreover, the
+need for swift and aggressive action in many activities (notably in
+war), for resolute prosecution of the plan, for timely seizure of
+opportunity, and for acceptance of justified risks, requires that
+consideration of consequences as to costs never be emphasized beyond
+its proper weight. To determine such proper weight calls, frequently,
+for judgment of the highest order, and is, in the military profession,
+a direct responsibility of command. This responsibility can be
+discharged by the application of what may be called the corollary
+principle for the determination of acceptable consequences as to
+costs,--as follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the acceptable consequences as to costs
+    depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+        of the appropriate effect desired, and
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+        field of action.
+
+Special Nature of War as a Human Activity. A principle found, by
+careful analysis, to be governing as to human activities of any
+nature, is also applicable to the problems of war. This is true
+because war is a human activity, differing from other human activities
+only in the specialized character of the factors that enter.
+
+The effect desired in war has a character distinctly military and,
+ultimately, through the reestablishment of a favorable peace, a
+political character (see pages 7-9).
+
+The means available (or opposed) in war are the human and material
+components of fighting strength (page 8). The physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action are, in war, the characteristics of
+the theater of operations. Fighting strength is thus derived from the
+means available (or opposed) in war, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting strength
+(comparative resources in war) involves a comparison of means
+available with means opposed, due account being taken of the influence
+exerted on both by the characteristics of the theater. In war,
+relatively large masses of human beings oppose each other with hostile
+intent, while the means available and opposed, and the physical
+conditions established by the operations of war in the theater of
+action, tend more and more to acquire a highly specialized character.
+
+The consequences as to costs, in war, also assume a special
+significance, inasmuch as they may materially influence the
+development of entire nations or of the world situation.
+
+Factors as Universal Determinants in War. Tabulated for convenient
+reference and expressed in terms in general use in the military
+profession, the factors governing the attainment of an end in war are
+therefore:
+
+  (a) The Nature of the appropriate Effect Desired,
+  (b) The Means Available and Opposed,
+  (c) The Characteristics of the Theater of Operations,
+      and
+  (d) The Consequences as to Costs.
+
+These factors, thus expressed in abstract form, are the universal
+determinants of the nature of the objective and of the character of
+the action to attain it. Their further resolution into factors of more
+concrete form is indicated hereinafter (see Chapter VI, in the
+discussion of Section II of the Estimate Form).
+
+The Objective in War. The objective (page 3), a term long in use in
+the military profession in connection with the "objective point", has
+acquired by extension the significance of something more than the
+physical object of action. The latter, as explained later (page 37),
+is properly denominated the "physical objective".
+
+In the abstract, an "objective", in present general usage as well as
+in the military vocabulary, is an end toward which action is being
+directed, or is to be directed; in brief, an end in view, a result to
+be attained, an effect desired (pages 19 and 30). An objective is an
+effect to be produced for the attainment of a further objective,
+itself a further effect. As already demonstrated (page 30 and
+following), the attainment of an end, in any human activity, requires
+action to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one.
+Therefore, in war, a special form of human activity, the attainment of
+an objective requires that action be actual imposition of an outside
+agency. The attainment of a correct military objective (discussed in
+detail in Chapter IV) requires, accordingly, the creation or
+maintenance of a favorable military situation.
+
+An objective, in the sense of an end in view, a result to be
+accomplished, is manifestly an objective in mind. As already indicated
+(page 36), however, military usage also assigns to the term
+"objective" an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete.
+Results in war are attained through the actual or threatened use of
+physical force (pages 8 and 9) directed with relation to something
+tangible, such as, for example, some physical element of the enemy's
+strength.
+
+Action as to this tangible feature (e.g., if it is destroyed,
+occupied, neutralized, or otherwise dealt with) will result in, or
+further the attainment of, an effect desired. Thus the physical
+objective occupies a sharply defined position in warfare, in that it
+establishes the physical basis of the objective and indicates the
+geographical direction of the effort. Since the physical objective is
+always an object--be it only a geographical point--, it is more than a
+mental concept; it is an objective in space.
+
+For example, the objective being "the destruction of the enemy
+battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship.
+
+As used herein the expression "the objective" or "the military
+objective" (page 55), when unqualified, ordinarily indicates the
+mental objective. The term is properly applicable to a physical
+objective when the context makes the meaning clear. Ordinarily, and
+always when clarity demands, a tangible focus of effort is herein
+denoted a "physical objective".
+
+Military Operations. Appropriate action to create or maintain a
+situation will take the form of a military operation. An operation, in
+the basic sense, is merely an act, or a series of acts. The word is
+derived from the Latin opus, meaning "work". A military operation is
+therefore an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a
+military character. A military operation may consist of an entire
+campaign, or even of several such, constituting a clearly defined
+major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions
+thereof. The term is also applied, properly, to entire series of acts
+on the part of successive commands, from the higher to the lower
+echelons, to and including distinctive military actions which relate
+to the merest routine.
+
+A plan of action to attain a military objective is, therefore, a plan
+of military operations, including supporting measures (see page 167),
+considered or adopted as a method of procedure for the achievement of
+that end (see page 21). Such a plan or method of procedure requires
+action with relation to correct physical objectives in such a manner
+as to attain the objective, i.e., to maintain the existing situation
+or to create a new one, conformably to the appropriate effect desired.
+
+A plan of military operations may be regarded as reasonably effective
+if the direction or geographical trend of the effort provides for
+proper action with relation to the correct physical objectives; if the
+force concerned utilizes positions advantageous in relation to those
+of the opponent; if the fighting strength is so apportioned as to
+provide for requisite power at points likely to be decisive, without
+undue weakening at other points; and if future actions, in seeking the
+effect desired, will be unhampered by obstacles with which the force
+cannot cope. These essentials apply to all of the various combinations
+of circumstances, i.e., situations (page 20), which may materialize as
+action progresses and the original situation unfolds.
+
+A properly conceived plan of military operations therefore makes
+provision, necessarily, for certain salient features of such
+operations, as follows:
+
+  The physical objectives involved,
+  The relative positions utilized,
+  The apportionment of fighting strength, and
+  The provisions for freedom of action.
+
+As will later be observed (Chapters VII and VIII), the content of
+plans for naval operations may be classified under the headings listed
+above. In such plans the salient features noted will be observed,
+also, to occur, subject to certain exceptions, in the sequence above
+indicated. Similar observations are applicable as to plans
+systematically prepared for direction of forces operating on land and
+in the air.
+
+A military operation which is progressing favorably, whatever the
+medium of action, may therefore be justifiably stated to include
+provision for the following salient features:
+
+      Effective action with relation to correct physical
+  objectives,
+
+      Projection of military action from advantageous relative
+  positions,
+
+      Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
+
+      Ensurance of adequate freedom of action.
+
+Since, at any moment of its successful prosecution, a military
+operation presents, inherently (page 38), a favorable military
+situation, the salient features of such an operation constitute, also,
+the salient features of a favorable military situation. Manifestly,
+any deficiencies in these respects will indicate that in certain
+particulars the situation is not entirely favorable, if not actually
+unfavorable.
+
+Determination of the Salient Features. Because the form which a
+military operation takes, in the effort to attain a military
+objective, depends upon the factors which are the universal
+determinants (page 36) of the character of the effort, the salient
+features of such an operation are determined by the same factors. A
+valid guide as to determination of the salient features of a favorably
+progressing military operation, seen (above) to be identical with
+those of a favorable military situation, may therefore be formulated
+as a principle for determining these salient features, as follows:
+
+The determination of
+
+                             }         { Suitability, as determined by
+                             }         { the factor of the appropriate
+Correct physical objectives, }         { effect desired.
+                             }         {
+Advantageous relative        }         { Feasibility, by reason of
+ positions,                  }         { relative fighting strength,
+                             } depends { as determined by the factors
+Proper apportionment of      } on      { of the means available and
+fighting strength, and       } their   { opposed, influenced by the
+                             }         { factor of the characteristics
+Provision for adequate       }         { of the theater of operations,
+freedom of action            }         { and
+                             }         {
+                             }         { Acceptability, as determined
+                             }         { by the factor of the
+                             }         { consequences as to costs.
+
+Since the particular character of each salient feature of a situation,
+or of an operation, is determined by the influence, exerted by the
+identical factors (as noted), there is a resulting interdependency,
+important though indirect, among the several features. This
+interdependency is explained hereafter. (Chapter IV).
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle. The Fundamental Principle for the
+Attainment of an End in human affairs (page 32) has invited
+attention to the factors, pertinent to suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability, seen to be applicable, as well, to any military effort
+(page 35). As also noted, a military effort will necessarily consist
+of military operations, whose salient features depend upon the same
+factors. The factors, in turn, have been observed (page 32 and
+following) to be interdependent.
+
+[Illustration: THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE (diagram)]
+
+These considerations lead to the formulation of a derivative of the
+Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End in human affairs,
+in the form of
+
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle
+
+The attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance of
+a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations
+involving the salient features of
+
+    Effective action with relation to correct physical
+        objectives,
+
+    Projection of action from advantageous relative positions,
+
+    Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
+
+    Ensurance of adequate freedom of action,
+
+    each fulfilling the requirements of
+
+    Suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate
+        effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength as
+        determined by the factors of the means available and
+        opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics
+        of the theater of operations, and
+
+    Acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences
+        as to costs,
+
+    which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle, as a valid guide, encounters no
+exception in the field it purports to cover. As a practical guide, it
+brings to attention, in broad outline, all the causes and effects
+which are involved. The principle affords a proper basis for the
+formulation of corollary principles for the determination, in any
+particular situation, of any element noted therein whose value may be
+unknown but may be ascertained by reference to other pertinent
+elements which constitute known quantities. (See pages 21-27.)
+
+As later explained (Chapter IV), the two major applications of the
+Principle relate to the selection of a correct military objective and
+to the determination of effective military operations to attain an
+objective (see page 28).
+
+A corollary Principle of the Correct Military Objective will
+accordingly state that the selection of a correct military objective
+depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the
+factors cited in the Fundamental Military Principle. The application
+of this corollary is discussed in Section II of Chapter IV.
+
+A corollary Principle of Effective Military Operations will similarly
+state that the determination of effective operations for the
+attainment of a military objective depends on the due consideration of
+the salient features and the factors cited in the Fundamental Military
+Principle. The application of this corollary is explained in Section
+III of Chapter IV.
+
+These principles can be used as a basis for formulating the plans of
+the commander concerned, and, accordingly, for determining his own
+action. They can also be used as a basis for rendering sound opinions,
+when requested of the commander, as to plans and actions contemplated
+by higher authority. The principles are in like manner applicable for
+purposes of historical study involving analysis of operations of the
+past.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+
+(Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment)
+
+    Section I of Chapter IV discusses the major components of all
+    military problems.
+
+    Section II deals with the fundamental considerations having to
+    do, generally, with the first of these components, i.e., the
+    selection of correct military objectives; the application,
+    more specifically, is reserved for Chapter VI.
+
+    Section III deals with the fundamental considerations having
+    to do, generally, with the second of the two major components,
+    i.e., the determination of effective military operations for
+    the attainment of such objectives; the application, more
+    specifically, is reserved for Chapter VII.
+
+    The selection of objectives has a secondary application, also,
+    to the discussion in Chapter VII, while the determination of
+    operations has a similar application to that in Chapter VI.
+    Both subjects, i.e., as to objectives and as to operations,
+    have application also to Chapter IX.
+
+    The chart on page ii shows these relationships.
+
+
+I. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PROBLEMS.
+
+In the two preceding chapters, the study of the natural mental
+processes has brought to notice that, to meet the requirements of
+suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as to consequences in the
+proper solution of a military problem, it is first necessary to
+establish a sound basis for that solution. Such a basis involves an
+understanding of the appropriate effect desired and of relative
+fighting strength (see pages 29 and 30).
+
+In each situation an understanding of the appropriate effect desired,
+from the standpoint of suitability, requires:
+
+        (1) A grasp of the salient features of the situation,
+    favorable and unfavorable, including the perplexity inherent
+    therein,
+
+        (2) A recognition of the incentive to solution of the
+    problem, i.e., a realization of the desire or need for
+    attaining a certain effect, an objective (page 36) which will
+    be the maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+    situation, and
+
+        (3) An appreciation of this objective in its relationship
+    to the next further result to be accomplished by its
+    attainment.
+
+An understanding of relative fighting strength involves consideration
+of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. With this understanding
+there is provided a sound basis for the determination, later, of the
+feasibility of courses of action and of their acceptability with
+respect to consequences as to costs.
+
+In the premises, the ability to understand the nature of a military
+problem is dependent on the knowledge, experience, character, and
+professional judgment of the commander. These qualities enable him to
+grasp the significance of the salient features of the situation. The
+same personal characteristics are instrumental in the recognition of
+the incentive. Analysis indicates that an incentive may arise (1) by
+reason of a directive issued by higher authority, or (2) from the fact
+that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced
+further problems, or (3) because of the demands of the situation.
+However, the primary consideration in understanding the nature of the
+problem is the appreciation of the objective from which the problem
+originates, i.e., the just estimation or accurate evaluation of this
+objective. Such consideration is primary because appreciation of this
+objective involves, as necessary concomitants, a grasp of the salient
+features of the existing situation (to be maintained or changed) and a
+recognition of the incentive.
+
+Correct appreciation of this objective, in its relationship to the
+further effect to be produced, is thus the principal consideration in
+reaching an understanding of the appropriate effect desired. It is, to
+repeat, through an understanding of this factor and of the factors of
+relative fighting strength that the commander establishes the basis
+for the solution of his problem. (See Section I of Chapter VI, page
+118).
+
+The Solution of a Military Problem. When the commander has thus
+obtained an understanding of the basis of his problem, the actual
+procedure of solution is undertaken through the consideration of the
+factors involved in their influence on the various plans for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired, as thus established. The
+best plan, selected and embodied in outline in the decision, can then
+be further developed, if necessary, into a general plan for the
+commander's force and, finally, into a detailed plan, as the solution
+of the problem. (See page 22.)
+
+The Major Components of a Military Problem. Each plan considered by
+the commander will involve (page 21) two major considerations:
+namely--an effect to be produced and the action required to produce
+it; or, in military terms, a correct military objective (or
+objectives) and effective operations for its attainment. The selection
+of correct military objectives and the determination of effective
+operations for their attainment are therefore the two major components
+of a military problem, because they are the principal considerations
+on which depends the soundness of military decision. To meet these
+requirements is a prime function of command, one which demands
+professional judgment of the highest order.
+
+The major components of a military problem are of course intimately
+connected, because a purposeful action, accomplished, is equivalent to
+an objective, attained. Furthermore, the attainment of an objective
+involves the accomplishment of effective operations.
+
+Because of the importance of the subject, the relationship between
+these two major components deserves very careful analysis. As has been
+observed (page 30), the action to be taken depends, in the first
+instance, on the effect to be produced. Therefore, the objective is,
+as compared to the action to attain it, the paramount matter.
+Moreover, there is necessarily included, in the procedure of selecting
+a correct objective, a consideration as to whether the action to that
+end will be feasible and as to whether the consequences involved will
+be acceptable on the basis of the costs which will be exacted. If,
+then, the objective has been correctly selected in any situation, this
+procedure will have included, as a necessary incidental, the
+determination also, in the proper detail, of the operations required
+for its attainment.
+
+Of the two major components involved in the selection of the best
+plan, the primary relates, therefore, to correct objectives.
+Accordingly, this consideration is most aptly expressed in terms of
+the "selection" of objectives. The "determination" of necessary
+operations is a proper expression of the procedure therein involved,
+because this procedure, though also involving a major component of the
+problem is dependent on the primary consideration of objectives.
+
+A valid guide for practical use during the process of solving military
+problems will therefore provide a basis, primarily, for the selection
+of correct objectives. However, the procedure for such selection,
+though requiring consideration of the action involved in attaining
+objectives, will seldom call for a complete analysis of such
+operations. Therefore, it is also desirable, for the solution of
+military problems, to provide a valid guide for the determination of
+effective operations, in detail. This guide may be used on occasions
+when, the correct objective having been selected, the only remaining
+problem is to work out the detailed operations involved.
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle, developed in the preceding
+chapter, has been formulated to fulfill the requirements described in
+the preceding paragraph. Through the exhaustive analysis of the
+elements involved, there has been provided, in the form of a single
+fundamental principle, a valid guide for the selection of correct
+military objectives and for the due determination of effective
+operations for their attainment.
+
+In the present chapter, the abstract application of the Principle is
+discussed in terms of fundamental considerations. Section II of the
+chapter deals with the selection of objectives; this subject, in more
+specific terms, is later expanded in Chapter VI. Section III of the
+present chapter deals with the determination of operations; this
+subject, in more specific terms, is expanded in Chapter VII. The
+present chapter affords a treatment applicable to military problems of
+any nature. Later expansion is applicable, more especially, to naval
+problems.
+
+This arrangement of the subject matter has been adopted for two
+reasons. First, discussion of fundamental considerations, thus taken
+up at the present point, immediately follows the formulation of the
+principle (in Chapter III). Furthermore, a fundamental treatment,
+prior to Chapters VI and VII, permits maximum brevity in the
+discussion, therein. The commander, having mastered the fundamentals
+dealt with here, can later follow the detailed procedure with minimum
+distraction due to reference to the preceding discussion.
+
+Essential Elements Involved. As previously stated, the problems of war
+differ from those of other human activities with respect, only (page
+35), to the specialized character of the factors that enter.
+
+The final outcome is dependent (page 8) on ability to isolate, occupy,
+or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it
+supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many
+essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the
+secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of
+man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The
+air affords routes of communication over both land and sea.
+
+These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar
+to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air (page 60). There
+are also involved the specialized demands of a technique for the
+imposition of and the resistance to physical violence. In addition
+there appear those factors related to the psychology of human
+reactions to armed conflict.
+
+In any situation involving opposing armed forces, the problem, as in
+any human activity (page 30), is, from the standpoint of each
+opponent, a matter of maintaining existing conditions or of bringing
+about a change. The method employed, if the action is to be effective,
+will follow lines calculated to shape the ensuing progressive changes
+in circumstances toward the attainment of the end in view. The action
+to be taken will be ineffective if it does not support the calculated
+line of endeavor, i.e., if it is not suitable or adequate forcibly to
+shape the course of events either toward the creation of a desired new
+and more favorable situation, or the maintenance of the original
+conditions.
+
+The analysis of the principal components of a military problem--i.e.,
+the military objectives and the military operations appropriate to the
+effort for their attainment--therefore requires a study of such
+objectives and operations in terms, respectively, of a favorable
+military situation (page 37) and of a favorably progressing military
+operation (page 38). As has been observed, the salient features of
+such a situation or operation are, from the abstract viewpoint,
+identical, as are also the factors which determine the character of
+such features (page 39). As a covering word for such features and
+factors, alike, the term "elements" appears especially suitable,
+inasmuch as it properly comprises the constituent parts of any
+subject, as well as the factors which may pertain thereto.
+
+Accordingly, the analysis, following, of the procedure for selection
+of correct military objectives is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorable military situation. For like reasons, the
+analysis of the procedure for determining the character of the
+detailed operations required is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorably progressing military operation. (For these
+elements, see the salient features and the factors cited in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, page 41.)
+
+
+II. SELECTION OF CORRECT MILITARY OBJECTIVES
+
+Nature of Military Objectives. In the previous discussion (page 36),
+the military objective has been defined as the end toward which action
+is being, or is to be, directed. As such it has been noted as an
+objective in mind. The tangible focus of effort, the physical
+objective toward which the action is directed, has been observed to be
+an objective in space. The physical objective is always an object, be
+it only a geographical point, while the objective, being a mental
+concept, is a situation to be created or maintained.
+
+The term "objective" requires circumspection, not only in the manner
+of its expression (see page 53), but in its use. The latter is true
+because the purport of the objective under consideration will vary
+with the viewpoint of the echelon concerned. For instance, the proper
+visualization of an objective, as an "effect desired" (page 19), calls
+for a correct answer to the question, "Who desires this effect to be
+produced?" (See page 4).
+
+A variety of viewpoints is thus a natural characteristic of the chain
+of command (pages 11-13), whose functioning creates what may be called
+a "chain of objectives".
+
+Necessary exceptions aside, the commander expects to receive, from his
+immediate superior, an assigned objective, which that superior thus
+enjoins the commander to attain. The commander, in turn, through the
+use of the natural mental processes already explained, decides on an
+objective, for the general effort of his own force, to attain the
+objective assigned by his immediate superior.
+
+As a subordinate, a commander to whom an objective has been assigned
+is responsible to his immediate superior for its attainment. The
+commander may, however, also occupy the position of an immediate
+superior to one or more commanders on the next lower echelon. In such
+capacity, he may assign objectives to these immediate subordinates. By
+attaining such an assigned objective, each of these subordinates thus
+contributes to the success of the complete effort planned by his
+immediate superior, to the extent represented by his own assigned
+share of the effort.
+
+A commander can scarcely expect to receive in full the intelligent
+support of his subordinate commanders, unless he makes clear to them
+the character of his own planned effort. It is customary, therefore,
+when assigning an objective to a subordinate, also to inform him of
+the purpose which its attainment is intended to further. Stated
+differently, a commander, when imposing upon an immediate subordinate
+an effect which he is to produce, informs him, at the same time, of
+the nature of the military result which he, the immediate superior,
+has determined to bring about.
+
+This is the part of wisdom, not merely of choice. It acquaints the
+immediate subordinate with the objective of the immediate superior and
+thus enables the former to comprehend wherein the attainment of his
+own assigned objective is expected to contribute to the attainment of
+the effect desired by his superior.
+
+Since the attainment of the assigned objectives will represent the
+consummation of the general plan of the immediate superior, the
+purpose of each of these assignments is to assist in the attainment of
+the objective announced, for his entire force, by the immediate
+superior (see also page 12).
+
+From the viewpoint of the subordinate, the objective thus assigned by
+the immediate superior becomes the appropriate effect desired,
+essential to the determination of the accomplishment which the former
+is to effect by his own effort. On occasion, also, the full scope of
+the appropriate effect desired may require consideration of the
+objectives of higher echelons in the chain of command, so far as such
+objectives may be known or deduced.
+
+The responsibility of the immediate superior, in the matter of
+ensuring that his immediate subordinates understand the purpose of
+their assigned objectives, is in no respect less than that which falls
+upon these subordinates in the execution of their own assignments. By
+failing to provide subordinate commanders, through whatever methods,
+with a knowledge not only of the details of his plan but of the
+general objective which their integrated effort is calculated to
+attain, the superior may actually subject his undertaking to the risk
+of failure.
+
+The decision as to the general plan (page 44) for the attainment of
+his assigned objective provides the commander with an objective which
+he himself has originated. With the plan for the attainment of his
+general objective clearly fixed in mind, the commander may now proceed
+to the selection of one or more objectives of a specific nature, the
+integrated attainment of which will ensure the attainment of his
+assigned objective. The instructions which he may then give,
+severally, to his immediate subordinates in a detailed plan of
+operations, thus indicate to the latter their assigned objectives.
+(See also page 22.)
+
+The source of the incentive (page 44) has an intimate connection with
+the assigned objective. Furthermore, whatever the origin of the
+incentive, the ability to select correct objectives is an essential
+element in the mental equipment of the commander.
+
+For example, if the incentive arises by reason of a directive received
+from higher authority, such directive will presumably assign an
+objective, specific or inferred. The commander to whom such an
+objective is assigned is responsible for a correct understanding of
+all the implications involved, including the relationship between the
+assigned objective and the general objective of the next higher
+commander, which represents the purpose of the assigned objective. On
+occasion it will also be necessary for the commander to consider the
+relationships involved with the further objectives of the higher
+command (page 49). Again, without any suggestion of cavilling at
+orders received, the commander may also find occasion to examine, with
+care, the implications of his assigned objective, because of his
+responsibility for taking correct action in the premises (page 15).
+
+If the incentive arises from a decision previously made by the
+commander, it follows that such decision will have embodied an
+objective, selected by the commander himself.
+
+If the incentive arises because of the demands of the situation, the
+commander is responsible for recognition of the necessity for action
+and for the correct selection of an appropriate objective, to be
+adopted by him as a basis for his own action as if it were assigned by
+higher authority.
+
+An assigned objective having been established with respect to the
+basis for his problem, the commander is always responsible for the
+correct selection of an objective to serve as the end in view for the
+general, integrated action of his subordinate commanders.
+
+Once such an objective has been selected, the commander is further
+responsible for selecting, on the basis provided thereby, correct
+objectives to be assigned to his subordinate commanders.
+
+For various practical reasons, therefore, the responsibility of the
+commander requires of him the ability to select correct objectives. On
+the basis of classification with respect to the authority making the
+selection, analysis will demonstrate the existence of two types of
+objectives.
+
+These two types of objectives are (see page 30 as to effects and
+further effects), namely, (1) the assigned objective (page 48)
+ordinarily indicated by higher authority, exceptionally determined by
+the commander for himself, and (2) the objective typically selected by
+the commander, himself, as the end in view for the integrated effort
+of his subordinates. It will be noted that in the latter category
+there will fall, not only the general objective referred to
+immediately above, but numerous other objectives for whose attainment
+provision may be needed during the actual prosecution of the effort or
+in anticipation thereof.
+
+Procedure for Selection of Correct Military Objectives. The
+Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), properly applied, is the
+basis for the selection of any or all of such objectives. The
+procedure involves the direct application of the corollary Principle
+of the Correct Military Objective.
+
+According to this principle, the selection of a correct military
+objective depends on due consideration of the salient features noted,
+i.e., correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions,
+proper apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for adequate
+freedom of action. These features, discussed in greater detail
+hereafter (in this chapter), are determined by factors cited in the
+Principle (pages 41-42).
+
+The first factor being the appropriate effect desired, a correct
+military objective is selected, in the first instance, by reference to
+the requirement of suitability as to this factor. This appropriate
+effect desired may be indicated by the higher command (page 44), or
+may be determined by the commander himself as hereinafter explained
+(page 52).
+
+When the appropriate effect desired has been established, the next
+consideration is, "What physical objective (or objectives) can be
+found, action with relation to which will, if successful, attain this
+effect?"
+
+For example, if the appropriate effect desired were the "reduction of
+enemy battleship strength" in a certain area, then an enemy battleship
+appearing therein would manifestly be a correct physical objective. A
+suitable action with relation thereto would be "to destroy the enemy
+battleship", in which case the objective involved in the action would
+be "the destruction of the enemy battleship".
+
+Any lesser accomplishment, such as infliction of damage on the enemy
+battleship, or its repulse, or its diversion elsewhere, would also be
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, though not in the same
+degree. Each such visualized accomplishment, suitable to the
+appropriate effect desired, may properly be considered as a
+tentatively selected objective.
+
+An objective having been tentatively selected on the basis of the
+appropriate effect desired, its final selection will naturally depend,
+as indicated in the Principle, on the feasibility of the effort
+involved in the attainment of each such objective, and on the
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+In investigating such feasibility, account is taken of the relative
+fighting strength. With relation to the enemy battleship, for example
+(see above), the commander would consider the means available to him
+and the means opposed (including the enemy battleship and any
+supporting forces), as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater.
+
+This investigation will include, necessarily, a sufficient analysis of
+the salient features of the operation required to attain each
+objective. Such features include the nature of the physical objectives
+(the battleship and any other forces, for instance), the possibilities
+of relative position, the problems involved in apportioning the forces
+on either side, and the proper considerations as to freedom of action.
+
+A similar study with respect to the acceptability of the consequences
+to be expected, as to the costs involved in the operation, will
+provide a basis for a conclusion as to that factor.
+
+If the attainment of an objective is found to be infeasible, or
+feasible only at the expense of unacceptable consequences, the
+proposed objective will naturally be rejected, and some other
+objective will be considered (page 33).
+
+The objective finally adopted as the best will be that which, all
+things considered, is best adapted to the requirements of suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability, as outlined in the Fundamental
+Military Principle.
+
+The Appropriate Effect Desired, as the Basis for the Objective. As
+will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the first factor in
+the selection of a correct objective is the "appropriate effect
+desired". The evaluation of this factor is not always easy, for
+reasons which will be explained.
+
+The procedure (as indicated by the Principle of the Appropriate Effect
+to be Desired--page 33) is the same as for the selection of an
+objective. This identity of procedure is natural, because the
+appropriate effect desired, used as a basis for selecting the
+commander's general objective, itself involves the appreciation of an
+objective. The latter is, in fact, one of the "chain of objectives"
+previously mentioned (page 48).
+
+Under conventional conditions this objective is selected by higher
+authority, and is assigned to the commander in his instructions from
+the next higher echelon (page 48). The objective so indicated will of
+course, under sound procedure, have been selected by higher authority
+on the basis embodied in the Fundamental Military Principle.
+
+When an established chain of command (page 11) is in effective
+operation, the path to the appropriate effect desired will therefore
+normally be indicated through an assigned objective, by the immediate
+superior. This assignment, however, or the failure to receive such an
+indication, does not relieve the commander from the responsibility for
+taking correct action on his own initiative. Such necessity may arise
+should he find, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that his
+instructions need modification or alteration, or even that it is
+necessary for him to depart from his instructions under circumstances
+of great emergency (page 15-16).
+
+Furthermore, the objective may be adopted by (rather than assigned to)
+the commander concerned, on his own initiative, in order to meet the
+demands of a situation (page 50) as to which the higher command has
+not yet had time or opportunity to act.
+
+Moreover, even when an objective is assigned by higher authority in
+the usual course, it may be expressed in such terms as to require
+examination in order to enable the commander to appreciate it (page
+43), as to its bearing on his operations. In fact, studious analysis
+may be necessary for this purpose.
+
+For example, if the objective so indicated does not specify a
+clearly-defined goal, the commander will need to make a thorough study
+in order to appreciate the full implications intended. He may find it
+necessary to analyze his immediate superior's instructions pertaining
+to the entire force of which his command is a part, and to consider,
+also, the objectives indicated for other commanders, on his own
+echelon, who also belong to that force.
+
+On occasion, also, higher authority may acquaint the commander with
+the general plan adopted by the superior, and may order action--such
+as movement in a certain direction or to a certain locality--without
+assigning a more definite objective. Should it happen in emergency
+that later developments prevent higher authority from making such an
+assignment, the commander may find himself under the necessity of
+selecting, for himself, an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him
+as if it were assigned.
+
+Should the commander find that his instructions do not clearly
+indicate an objective, or should he find that the one indicated is not
+applicable under the circumstances of the case, he will select an
+appropriate objective for his own guidance as if it were assigned by
+higher authority. He will make such selection through use of the same
+procedure already described herein as applicable to the selection of
+an objective of any sort. In such case he puts himself in his
+superior's place, in order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion such as
+the higher commander, if apprised of the circumstances, would desire
+to adopt. Circumstances permitting, the commander will of course
+communicate with higher authority, and will make constructive
+representations. (See page 15.)
+
+The appropriate effect desired, as the first factor to be applied in
+selecting such an objective, will naturally involve the objective
+indicated in the general plan for the immediate superior's entire
+force. This general plan is normally announced by the superior for the
+guidance of the commander and of other commanders on the same echelon.
+If, however, this further objective is not known to the commander, he
+will endeavor to obtain a proper point of reference. To this end, he
+will use his knowledge of the objective assigned to his immediate
+superior, or of the further intentions of the higher command with
+respect to the conduct of the operations, or of the campaign, or of
+the war.
+
+The provisions for the formulation of plans and orders (Chapters VII
+and VIII) take account of the fact that the commander may require
+definite information as to the objectives of higher echelons. In
+organizations where a state of mutual understanding has been well
+established, the commander will rarely be without some guidance in the
+premises (see also page 33), by reason of the chain of objectives
+indicated in plans and orders of the higher command (page 48).
+
+From the viewpoint of the commander, this relationship among
+objectives presents to him a series, from the present or immediate
+objective to others more distant in time. Thus there may be one or
+more intermediate objectives, leading away from the immediate one to
+the ultimate objective, so far as the concern of the moment is
+involved.
+
+This relationship of immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives
+may also exist in situations where the commander, operating on his own
+initiative and responsibility, determines such a chain of objectives
+for himself.
+
+Such a situation frequently arises in a campaign or a major operation,
+and is normal, also, as to minor operations (see page 56, as to
+physical objectives).
+
+As already observed, the relationship of objective and further
+objective is the criterion for distinguishing between strategical and
+tactical considerations, from the viewpoint of the commander concerned
+(pages 9 and 10).
+
+What has been noted in the foregoing as to the objective (singular) is
+also applicable to situations where such an objective involves two or
+more objectives collectively considered.
+
+
+III. DETERMINATION OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
+
+As noted with respect to the Fundamental Military Principle (page 41),
+the effort required for the attainment of a military objective
+involves military operations (page 37), whose salient features are
+listed in the Principle. These features, including physical
+objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength,
+and freedom of action, will now be discussed to indicate how they are
+correctly determined by the factors, also cited in the Principle,
+pertaining to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Such
+determination is accomplished through application of the corollary
+Principle of Effective Military Operations (page 42).
+
+
+Physical Objectives
+
+Fundamental Considerations. An operation, however splendidly conceived
+and faultlessly executed, involves waste of effort if directed with
+relation to wrong physical objectives.
+
+Since a physical objective constitutes the tangible focus of effort
+(page 47) toward the attainment of the effect desired, its correct
+determination is of paramount importance both before and during the
+prosecution of operations.
+
+As has been demonstrated (page 51), the consideration of possible
+physical objectives (in space) is essential to the selection of
+suitable objectives (in mind). Moreover, action with reference to one
+or more physical objectives is the necessary basis for determining the
+feasibility and acceptability of a plan.
+
+Military objectives can be achieved only through the application of
+power, actually or by threat (page 8), with reference to physical
+objectives.
+
+The determination of correct physical objectives is followed, if more
+than one such objective is found, by the selection of the one or more
+which are best adapted to the requirements of the situation. The
+procedure for determination and for selection is a matter for
+painstaking mental effort, based on the considerations now to be
+presented.
+
+The term "military objective" is frequently used in military
+literature to distinguish physical objectives which are combatant in
+character from those which are noncombatant. The considerations which
+follow are applicable to physical objectives of all categories.
+
+Procedure for Determination and Selection of Correct Physical
+Objectives. In a particular set of circumstances, the field wherein
+correct physical objectives may be found and the best selected, is
+that of an existent or probable theater of action.
+
+The determination of a physical objective, when correct, initially
+satisfies the requirement of suitability with respect to the nature of
+the objective,--this being, in such case, the appropriate effect
+desired (page 31). Physical objectives not suitable, with relation to
+the objective to be attained, are manifestly incorrect physical points
+of orientation with respect to the operations involved in the effort
+to attain such an objective.
+
+It may be found, however, that the selection of a single physical
+objective will not fulfill this requirement. A commander may find it
+necessary to direct his effort simultaneously, or in succession, with
+relation to more than one physical objective.
+
+When a succession of physical objectives has to be dealt with, the
+selection will necessarily include such a series. Such a case might
+occur where a campaign has been found necessary in the form of
+successive stages as essential features. The visualized termination of
+each successive stage may be marked by the successful application of
+effort with respect to one or more physical objectives. Such a series
+of physical objectives may frequently also occur in operations on a
+smaller scale; even in very minor actions such a succession of efforts
+is normal. (See page 54, as to objectives.)
+
+The choice as to the specific nature of physical objectives will
+extend, for example, from the enemy's organized forces as a whole to
+the physical body of an individual combatant. Within this range will
+be included all manner of physical elements of enemy fighting
+strength, singly and in combination, such as troops, ships,
+geographical points, lines and areas, fortifications, bases, and
+supplies.
+
+The physical objective may take the form of a fixed geographical
+position, the occupation of which, because of its inherent
+advantages, may be, for example, an essential preliminary to further
+progress. The position may, for instance, be merely a point in the
+ocean (page 47), a rendezvous beyond which, although its occupation
+may be uncontested, it has been deemed unwise to proceed without
+further information or additional strength.
+
+The physical objective, therefore, does not always take the form of
+some element of the enemy fighting strength; not infrequently, the
+occupation of a correct physical objective may be uncontested by the
+enemy. However, intervening armed forces of the enemy may constitute
+the physical objective for application of successful effort before a
+further physical objective may be dealt with. The possibility of enemy
+opposition may, therefore, place the selection of one or more physical
+objectives on an indeterminable basis at the time of the original
+solution of the problem. This may require a commander to defer his
+choice until the situation has become more fully developed.
+
+For example, his objective may be the occupation of a certain harbor,
+preliminary to the establishment of a base. The harbor is then a
+correct physical objective, perhaps the only physical objective which
+need be dealt with, if there are no other obstacles to prevent or
+interrupt the operation. Armed forces of the enemy may, however, stand
+as an obstacle to the undisputed occupation of the harbor and,
+therefore, to the attainment of the objective. In such case they
+become, for the time being, the correct physical objective.
+
+While the armed forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate
+physical objectives, this is not always the case (see above). It is
+true that, in war, the armed forces of the enemy, until they can no
+longer offer effective resistance, prevent the full attainment of the
+objective of the State. Accordingly, from the broad viewpoint, they
+may constitute the legitimate and proper physical objective of the
+opposing armed forces. Armed forces of the enemy which are present in
+opposition to any projected operations are likely to offer proper
+physical objectives.
+
+These facts, however, do not restrict a commander, in his choice of a
+physical objective, to the armed forces of the enemy. Nor do these
+considerations require him to search for and destroy the enemy forces
+before directing his effort toward the attainment of an objective
+under circumstances where the enemy is seen to be incapable of
+presenting effective opposition.
+
+The correct physical objective may change several times during the
+course of an operation. This is particularly to be expected in a naval
+tactical engagement of considerable scope. While the enemy fleet, as a
+whole, may properly be considered in such a case to be the physical
+objective, the component parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and
+their combinations, may, from time to time, find in their opponents a
+variety of physical objectives, the particular identity of which can
+scarcely be predicted with assurance. It is here that the importance
+of the correct selection of physical objectives stands out in bold
+relief.
+
+Infliction of loss on enemy forces, or support of own forces hard
+pressed, may always seem tempting immediate objectives in war.
+However, there may be occasions when disengagement or refusal to
+engage an enemy force, even though it be of manifestly inferior
+strength, may be appropriate to the attainment of the end in view.
+Necessity for speed or secrecy, or other demands, may make the
+required operations unacceptable. (See page 75 as to the offensive and
+the defensive.)
+
+Land, as the natural habitat of man (page 46), is always the principal
+store-house of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary
+scene of his activities. Naval operations, therefore, have always in
+view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+situation in critical land areas. From this fundamental viewpoint, the
+eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land
+objective.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The suitability of a physical objective having been determined, the
+next consideration is the feasibility (page 31) of taking such action,
+with relation thereto, as will, if successful, attain the objective in
+mind. Feasibility is determined by evaluation of the factors of means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater, in order to assess relative fighting strength (see page 52).
+In connection with the effort involved with relation to any physical
+objective, questions of feasibility may make it desirable or necessary
+to visualize the detailed operations which arise from considerations
+of relative position, of apportionment of fighting strength, and of
+provision for freedom of action.
+
+Of particular interest with respect to such operations, it is noted
+that the premature disclosure of a selected physical objective is a
+military error. By appearing, however, to operate against more than
+one physical objective, a commander may lead the enemy to overstrain
+his resources in the effort to protect them all. Thus the commander
+may reduce the resistance to be encountered in dealing with what have
+already, or may finally, become the selected physical objectives.
+Feints in several directions may even divert all of the enemy's
+effective defense from the vital points (see also page 68).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+After the suitability of a physical objective has been established, as
+well as the feasibility of the contemplated action with relation
+thereto, such action is next considered from the standpoint of
+acceptability with reference to the consequences as to costs. The
+specific factors involved in acceptability as to consequences have
+previously been mentioned (page 31).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+When the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability
+have been satisfied, the locality, the opposing force, or other
+subject of consideration may be regarded as a correct physical
+objective.
+
+When more than one correct physical objective has been determined and
+a choice is indicated, such selection will also be founded on the
+foregoing requirements.
+
+No doctrine, no advance instructions, can replace the responsible
+judgment of a commander as to his correct physical objectives. On
+occasion, higher authority may request recommendations (see page 42,
+as to opinions) with respect to such objectives. The duty of a
+commander to depart from his instructions under certain conditions,
+and the grave responsibility which he thereby assumes, have also been
+referred to (page 16).
+
+
+Relative Positions
+
+Fundamental Considerations. The relative positions occupied or
+susceptible of occupancy by armed forces are matters which demand
+constant and intelligent attention before and during hostilities.
+Being fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative
+positions assume primary importance where enemy forces are concerned,
+and are scarcely of less importance from the standpoint of the correct
+apportionment of the subdivisions of one's own forces, and from the
+viewpoint of their freedom of action.
+
+During periods of actual tactical contact, the successful delivery of
+the decisive thrust against selected physical objectives is greatly
+furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of advantageous relative
+positions.
+
+The fundamental significance of relative position lies in the fact
+that position is the basis of movement, for movement is merely a
+change of position. Speed is the rate at which movement takes place.
+The particular factors to be reckoned with are, therefore, time and
+space. In skillful utilization of these elements lies the successful
+employment of relative position in the creation or maintenance of a
+favorable military situation, whether the movement be by land, sea, or
+air (page 46).
+
+The necessity for movement may be an important consideration in
+determining possible or likely theaters of operations. Where
+transportation between two or more positions within a certain area is
+essential to the successful conduct of a war, the area which includes
+the routes between these positions, or a portion of such routes,
+becomes at once a possible or likely theater. Such an area may be
+normally within the control of one or the other of the belligerents,
+or the control may be in dispute. Certain of the positions themselves
+may belong to neither of the belligerents. The area itself may be a
+land area, or a sea area, or a combination of the two. It may be an
+area which borders upon the sea, or an island area. In any case, the
+air is a common characteristic.
+
+The movement of a force is properly regarded, not as an even flow, but
+as a series of steps from one position to another. The movement may or
+may not be continuous. Pauses are usual, their occurrence and duration
+being a matter dependent upon circumstances and calling for the
+exercise of sound professional judgment. Intermediate positions may be
+utilized, successively, so as to facilitate occupancy of the final
+position which is the goal of that phase of operations (page 56). This
+procedure often effects an ultimate saving of time. In many cases,
+other advantages also may accrue.
+
+The foregoing considerations are applicable to changes of position
+whether in the direction of the enemy, toward a flank, or to the rear.
+Flanking maneuvers and retrograde movements, both sometimes profitably
+employed to decoy the enemy, may frequently be utilized to gain
+advantageous relative position. The proper objective of each is the
+maintenance of a favorable situation, or the alteration of an
+unfavorable one, either locally or with reference to the larger phases
+of operations, through measures involving apportionment of fighting
+strength, or obtaining advantages of position, or retaining or gaining
+freedom of action. Combinations of forward, flanking, or retrograde
+movements are frequent in war, the skillful combination of the
+offensive and the defensive (see page 75) being no less applicable to
+the problem of relative position than to the other elements of a
+favorable military operation.
+
+Procedure for Determination and Selection of Advantageous Relative
+Positions. Since the various positions to be occupied become physical
+objectives for the time being, their proper determination and
+selection are governed by the same considerations which apply to
+physical objectives (see page 55 and following).
+
+Thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, as to suitability,
+whether the position, once gained, will permit the attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired.
+
+Secondly, consideration is required as to feasibility. Are the
+available means adequate to gain or to maintain such position? In
+answering this question, due regard is paid to opposing means and to
+the characteristics of the theater.
+
+Finally, there is to be considered, as to acceptability, whether the
+consequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength, will
+be such, if the position is gained or maintained, as to permit the
+attainment of the objective. The possible effect of these consequences
+on future action, whether the attempt succeeds or fails, may be
+vitally significant.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With regard to suitability, the factor of the appropriate effect
+desired calls for special consideration of the requirements with a
+view to future action. This is true because of the relationship which
+naturally exists between successive positions (page 60) if changes of
+location from one to another are to be integrated into movement
+calculated to accomplish the effect desired. Each position, itself for
+the time being a physical objective, offers certain advantages or
+involves certain disadvantages with relation to a further physical
+objective. The position of the latter, in turn, presents possibilities
+(or denies them) with respect to future movement. The influence of
+considerations with respect to time (in addition to those noted above
+with regard to space) is also a factor whose importance increases when
+urgency is a matter of immediate concern.
+
+With regard to feasibility, the technical capabilities and
+limitations of the armed forces (page 67) are, of course, among the
+principal factors. These capabilities and limitations are respectively
+promoted and imposed primarily by considerations peculiar to the
+particular medium of movement involved.
+
+With specific regard to the areas within which military operations may
+suitably be undertaken, the fundamental distinctions created by
+recognized political sovereignty require attention. That part of the
+surface of the earth which comprises its land area is recognized as
+the property or the charge of one or another of the sovereign states,
+although in certain cases the title may be in dispute. The air above a
+nation's territorial domain is generally understood to be part of that
+domain. The point to be observed is that there are no land areas which
+belong equally to all nations. Accordingly; because of the factor of
+neutral sovereignty, both land and air forces of belligerent States
+may be under the necessity of following indirect routes to their
+physical objectives.
+
+In the case of the sea, however, all those portions of the earth's
+surface which are covered by water (exclusive only of the recognized
+territorial waters of the several nations), i.e., the high seas, are
+presumably common property. The same applies to the air above the sea.
+
+These considerations, and the fact that the surface of the sea is a
+broad plane, permit open sea areas to be traversed by a variety of
+routes to an extent not applicable in the case of land areas and the
+air above them. In addition, the fact that technological developments
+have been such as to permit movement, not only on the surface of the
+sea and through the air above but also beneath the surface, gives
+distinctive characteristics to the sea when considered as a theater of
+operations.
+
+The surface of the sea has, from the earliest days to the present,
+provided roads over which human beings in greatest numbers and the
+resources of the world in greatest weight and volume can be
+transported in single carriers. From the standpoint of any belligerent
+it is imperative that, during war, these roads be kept open to the
+extent demanded by the needs of the State. It is equally imperative
+that an enemy be deprived of the advantage which their use might
+otherwise afford. In both cases localized (even though temporary)
+control, not only of the surface but of the water beneath and the air
+above, may be essential. It is pertinent, also, to note at this point
+the interest of neutrals, or of unneutral nonbelligerent Powers, in
+keeping open the trade routes via the high seas. Such interest may
+constitute an important factor in the calculations of a belligerent
+State.
+
+Considerations of maximum capacity for speed represent the utmost
+possibilities with respect to movements (i.e., change of positions)
+(page 60) in a given medium within a given time limit. A knowledge of
+maximum speed potentialities, one's own and those of the enemy, is
+required if changes in position are intelligently to be made. A
+knowledge of the variety of conditions, controllable and otherwise,
+which affect or preclude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise
+a requisite. Poor material condition, inadequate training, and
+incorrect methods of operation are preventable or correctable. The
+limitations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by natural
+obstacles such as the hydrography, the climate, the wind, the weather,
+and the state of the sea, are susceptible of greatest possible
+adjustment to circumstances only by the exercise of foresight and
+judgment. All these conditions indicate the close relationship that
+exists between relative position and freedom of action (page 70).
+
+The same observations apply to considerations of maximum capacity for
+endurance, the ability to operate without necessity for replenishment
+from an outside source. Radius of action is decreased or increased
+accordingly with resultant restrictions, or otherwise, on freedom of
+action.
+
+With respect to the freedom of action of armed forces, also a
+consideration in relation to feasibility, the logistics of a military
+operation, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins when
+the plan is in process of formulation. This problem ends only when the
+necessity for sustaining the movement, and for retaining the position
+gained, no longer exists.
+
+Ships and other means of conveyance, surface, subsurface, and air, are
+incapable of providing the necessities of life and the implements of
+warfare beyond the capacity built into them. Operations which extend
+beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless replenishment and
+support, possible only from other sources, are provided. The logistics
+problem may be so difficult as to cause rejection of a course of
+action involving distant operations. From the standpoint of supply,
+military movements by land, sea, and air are, therefore, vitally
+associated with positions on land and with their relation to the area
+of operations (see also page 58).
+
+The same observations apply in larger scope to the State itself,
+which, because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain
+essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support from outside
+sources lest supplies on hand become exhausted. In all cases, great
+importance attaches to the geographical location of sources of supply
+in their relation to a required point of delivery and to the routes
+which lie between.
+
+It follows that enemy sources of supply may be suitable physical
+objectives (see page 56). Their destruction or capture, or the
+severance of the enemy's lines of communication with them, may
+seriously restrict his freedom of action.
+
+From the standpoint of the relative position of its features, and
+apart from their inherent military value, the characteristics of the
+theater of military operations may exert an important influence upon
+the shaping of events. Each characteristic merits consideration as a
+potential means of facilitating or obstructing movement. Some
+localities may have been developed as repair, supply, or air bases.
+Others may be sources of essential raw materials. Certain points may
+be heavily fortified. Island formations may be valuable to either
+opponent, or to both, because of the capacity and security of their
+harbors, the character of their terrain, or their positions relative
+to each other. The inherent military value of the several features of
+the theater may be enhanced or vitiated by the relative position which
+each occupies with respect to other features, and with reference to
+the location of the armed forces involved.
+
+So-called "strategic points", historically significant in connection
+with military operations, derive their importance by reason of their
+relative position with reference to routes of movement.
+
+The possibilities of utilizing or of changing the characteristics of a
+theater of operations, to assist, hamper, or deny movement, are
+governed by considerations previously discussed (see the Principle of
+the Proper Physical Conditions to be established in the Field of
+Action--page 34).
+
+In planning the creation or maintenance of a favorable military
+situation from the standpoint of relative position, there may,
+therefore, profitably be included an examination into:
+
+(a) The relation which may exist between the geographical location of
+the subdivisions of one's own forces and
+
+      (1) Those of the enemy,
+
+      (2) Geographical areas under one's own control, and
+          positions within those areas,
+
+      (3) Geographical areas not under one's own control, and
+          positions within those areas,
+
+      (4) Areas coveted or in dispute,
+
+      (5) Fixed actual and potential repair and operating bases
+          and sources of supply and replenishment, own and enemy,
+          controlled or otherwise.
+
+(b) The relation existing among the geographical locations listed
+immediately above, including the effect of possible changes in
+control.
+
+(c) The bearing of the sun and moon, and the direction of the wind and
+sea.
+
+(d) The length and vulnerability of possible lines of communication.
+
+(e) The time and distance, and resulting relative speeds, involved in
+movements necessary to change or to maintain an existing relation.
+
+(f) The measures incident to adequate freedom of action.
+
+A more detailed analysis of the factors influencing relative position
+is made in Section I-B of the Estimate Form (Chapter VI).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In connection with the factor of consequences as to costs, the
+requirement as to acceptability is a weighing of expected gains and of
+reasonably anticipated losses, a balancing of the one against the
+other, with due attention to the demands of future action, (see page
+61).
+
+Military movement normally involves an inescapable expenditure of
+military resources. The characteristics of the theater, alone, will
+exact their due toll, even if no enemy be present. In the presence of
+the enemy, such expenditures may increase with great rapidity. The
+fundamental consideration here is whether the resultant losses are
+disproportionate to the gains.
+
+Avoidance of movement is frequently the correct decision, because
+movement, if it offers no advantages, is scarcely justifiable even if
+it entails no material loss. Movement, merely for the sake of moving,
+is not a profitable military operation. However, the conduct of
+military operations without major movement is a concept inherently
+defensive (page 75), even apathetic, whose outcome, against an
+energetic enemy, can rarely be other than defeat. In the execution of
+advantageous movement to achieve correct military objectives, the
+competent commander is always ready to accept the losses which are
+inseparable from his gains.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The foregoing considerations as to advantageous relative positions are
+applicable, not only in the realm of the commander's decisions as to
+his own action, but also to his judgments rendered when higher
+authority calls for recommendations (see page 42).
+
+
+Apportionment of Fighting Strength
+
+Fundamental Considerations. The assignment of a task may be expected
+to carry with it availability of fighting strength deemed adequate by
+higher authority for accomplishment of the operation involved.
+
+In appropriate instances, the higher command may call for
+recommendations as to the amount and character of the means deemed
+adequate by the subordinate for performance of the task with which he
+is, or is to be, charged (page 42).
+
+In any case, means having been made available, it remains for a
+commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion these
+available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite
+strength at points likely to be decisive, without unduly weakening
+other points. In effect, he is charged with a practical adjustment of
+means to ends. This responsibility is discharged by the effective
+utilization of means and prevention of waste nicely balanced through
+full consideration of all essential elements of a favorable military
+operation. The procedure involved has been indicated (see the
+corollary Principle for the determination of the Proper Means to be
+Made Available--page 34).
+
+The relation between the strength to be brought to bear in dealing
+with a selected physical objective, the tactical concern of the
+moment, and that necessary to the attainment of the strategical aim
+(see pages 9 and 10), constitutes a fundamental consideration in
+effecting such a balance.
+
+In making a correct apportionment, there will be involved not only the
+physical elements of fighting strength, but the mental and moral as
+well. With respect to mental and moral factors, the capabilities of
+particular commanders and organizations may be an important factor in
+apportioning forces to tasks. In the physical field, numbers and types
+occupy a prominent position, each however, requiring consideration
+from the standpoint of the existing situation.
+
+Thus, forces composed of appropriate types and suitably equipped and
+trained may exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not
+so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. On the other
+hand, numerical considerations become predominant under conditions
+otherwise substantially equal.
+
+These considerations, viewed in the light of the relationship of naval
+operations to land areas (page 63), indicate the importance which may
+attach to immediate availability, with a naval force, in addition to
+its own air strength, of a proper complement of land forces (with
+appropriate air strength) which are organized, equipped, and trained
+for amphibious operations.
+
+The same considerations point also to the vital importance of due
+provision, with respect to the armed forces of a State, for joint
+operations involving concerted action on land, by sea, or in the air.
+
+In connection with the capabilities of particular commanders (page
+66), it will be appreciated how important it is, more especially in
+amphibious or joint operations, for responsible officers to have a
+correct understanding of the powers and limitations of the several
+types of military forces involved, be their primary medium of movement
+the land, the sea, or the air.
+
+Factors of dispersion and concentration are also involved in
+apportionment of fighting strength.
+
+While undue dispersion may result in lack of adequate fighting
+strength where required, a certain degree of dispersion may be
+necessary to meet the demands of movement and of freedom of action.
+Serious errors in this regard, however, may result in inability to
+furnish support where needed, and in consequent punishment or
+isolation of one or more valuable detachments.
+
+In distant operations some dispersion is required to safeguard long
+lines of communication. The requirements for this purpose may
+sometimes be so great that, unless the total available strength is
+adequate, a due apportionment to the guarding of long lines of
+communication may so weaken the main force as to prevent the
+attainment of the objective. (See also page 63.)
+
+Proper dispersion is, therefore, a requirement to be met, while undue
+dispersion is to be avoided. But realization is also necessary, in
+this connection, that there is an equal danger in over-concentration.
+An undue concentration of means at any point may subject such a force
+to unnecessary loss. Another disadvantage may be lack of adequate
+fighting strength elsewhere.
+
+Accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to divide a total
+force, while containing a sound element of caution, is misleading and
+inadequate, for division is often necessary or desirable. To be
+adequate, a maxim or rule relating to division of force should
+indicate when, and in what measure, such division may or may not be
+necessary or desirable. (See also page 25.)
+
+Similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is the statement
+that the requirements of effective warfare are met by bringing
+superiority to bear at the decisive time and place. Such an injunction
+is of little assistance in solving practical problems as to the
+appropriate degree of superiority, and as to the proper time and
+place.
+
+In like manner, any rule is faulty which advises a commander to seek
+the solution of his problems by always bringing to bear his elements
+of strength against the hostile elements of weakness. It may be found,
+on occasion, that it is necessary or desirable to act with strength
+against strength.
+
+But it is equally faulty to maintain that action, to be effective,
+seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements
+of strength. Even when the strongest opposition cannot be defeated by
+direct action of this nature, success may still be possible by first
+disposing of elements of weakness. When the stronger elements of a
+hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss, yet cannot
+stand without the weaker, consideration may well be given to an
+apportionment of fighting strength on the basis of seeking a decision
+against the latter. The defeat of a relatively small force at a
+distance from the area where the main forces are concentrated in
+opposition, may hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective.
+
+The main effort, where the greater force is employed, may be identical
+with the effort contributing most directly to the final result. This
+identity, however, does not always exist, and the decisive influence
+is frequently exerted by a relatively small force, sometimes at a
+distance from the principal area of action.
+
+Diversions (see also as to feints, page 59) are not likely to be
+profitable unless constituting a sufficient threat, or unless offering
+apparent advantages to the enemy which he feels that he cannot forego.
+Success will attend justified diversions if they lead the enemy to
+reapportion his fighting strength to meet the threat, either because
+he expects repetitions (see page 73, as to raids), or because the area
+involved may become a new theater of action, or for other pertinent
+reasons.
+
+Means which are inadequate for the attainment of an objective if used
+in one effort may sometimes be rendered adequate by utilizing them in
+a series of successive impulses. Similarly, the effect of employing
+means otherwise adequate may be intensified by the delivery of attacks
+in waves.
+
+Procedure for Determining Proper Apportionment. The fundamental
+considerations outlined above as to apportionment of fighting strength
+have application both to the offensive and the defensive (see also
+discussion on page 75). As to all of these considerations, the
+solution for the particular situation is to be found only through an
+analysis of the factors applying to the particular problem.
+
+Thus, the first consideration relates to suitability, and requires
+that the apportionment of means be suitable both as to type and as to
+amount, in order to produce the appropriate effect desired in view of
+the means opposed and of the influence of the characteristics of the
+theater. The fundamentals involved, applicable in all human activities
+(see the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made Available--page 34),
+are the factors cited above. These are also, of course, indicated in
+the Fundamental Military Principle.
+
+The correct apportionment may also be influenced by any military
+changes to be effected in the characteristics of the theater (as
+indicated in the Principle of Proper Physical Conditions to be
+Established--page 34). Thus, the establishment of a well defended base
+may operate, properly, to reduce the requirements for apportionment of
+a force for a particular duty in that locality. Similarly, the proper
+use of fortifications, obstacles, demolitions, and routes by land,
+sea, and air, as well as facilities for exchange of information and
+orders, all operate to increase fighting strength relative to that of
+the enemy.
+
+The next consideration, that of feasibility, takes account of the type
+and of the amount of means that can be apportioned in view of the
+means available.
+
+In connection with the foregoing there will be appropriate
+requirements for the operation as a whole and for its component
+operations. All of these requirements may call for analysis of the
+relative positions to be utilized, with reference to the selected
+physical objectives, and of the requirements for adequate freedom of
+action.
+
+Finally, the requirement of acceptability as to the factor of
+consequences will call for consideration of the results of the
+allotments of forces to particular tasks. This is necessary in order
+to arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the military costs involved
+either in event of the success of the effort or in event of its
+failure, and with respect, more especially, to the effects on future
+action.
+
+The attainment of the objective, however suitable as to the effect
+desired, may be found, on the basis of due study, to be infeasible or
+to involve unacceptable consequences. The inescapable conclusion is
+then that an increase in relative fighting strength is required or
+that another objective, feasible of attainment and acceptable with
+respect to consequences, is necessarily to be adopted (see page
+52-53).
+
+
+Freedom of Action
+
+Fundamental Considerations. In providing for proper apportionment of
+fighting strength, a commander may attain the end in view by
+increasing the physical, mental, or moral elements of his own
+strength, relative to the enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's
+strength through imposing restrictions on hostile freedom of action.
+
+Freedom of action will enable a commander to prosecute his plan in
+spite of restrictive influences. That enemy interference will, to a
+greater or less extent, impose restrictions on freedom of action is to
+be expected. Restrictions may also be imposed by physical conditions
+existing in the theater of operations, and by deficiencies and
+omissions which are within the field of responsibility of the
+commander to correct.
+
+Even with fighting strength adequate to overcome enemy opposition and
+physical handicaps, deficiencies and omissions within a commander's
+own field may become effective checks to further progress unless
+avoided through the exercise of foresight. To this end, it is
+desirable to consider certain possibilities which are likely to
+promote freedom of action if properly exploited, and to restrict it if
+neglected.
+
+To a considerable extent, a commander has within his own control the
+degree of influence which his force will exert in the creation or the
+maintenance of a favorable military situation. The power applied by a
+military force is determined not only by the fighting strength of its
+component commands, but also by the degree of coordination of their
+several efforts in the attainment of the objective (see also page 12).
+Whatever the inability of the commander to influence the other aspects
+of a situation, the ability of his command to act unitedly is a matter
+largely in his hands.
+
+When time permits, subordinate commanders, apprised of contemplated
+tasks in general terms, may be called upon to submit recommendations
+as to the detailed instructions to be issued them, as well (page 66)
+as to the means to be allotted for the purpose. By this procedure,
+individual initiative (page 15) is fostered and the higher command
+enabled to utilize the first-hand knowledge and experience gained on
+lower echelons without, however, divesting the higher command of any
+of its responsibility.
+
+The command system may provide for unified action through unity of
+command or through cooperation resulting from mutual understanding. On
+the assumption that commanders are competent and that communications
+are adequate, unity of command is the more reliable method. However,
+it cannot be obtained everywhere and at all times, because of the
+necessary decentralization of the command system in areas distant from
+the commander. In such areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured
+by provision for local unity of command. At other times, unity of
+effort may depend entirely on cooperation between adjacent commands
+within the same area. (See page 12.)
+
+Organization (see page 13), the mechanism of command, is most
+effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate
+with responsibility (page 12) and through the assignment of tasks to
+commanders with appropriate capabilities (see also page 66), the
+highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. The command
+organization and mutual understanding are of primary importance as
+methods of ensuring maximum power with available fighting strength,
+and of affording consequent maximum contribution to freedom of action.
+
+Deficiencies in technical training are capable of imposing grave
+restrictions upon freedom of action. Material equipment, even though
+it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction,
+will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained.
+Even though mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity
+which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless
+the methods of movement, i.e., of effecting change in relative
+position (page 59), are intelligently planned and are developed to a
+point which assures facility of operation when in the hands of skilled
+personnel.
+
+Tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations
+(page 67), is one of the vital factors of fighting strength, with
+respect, more especially, to its contributions to freedom of action.
+
+A state of high and stable morale (page 9), founded upon sound
+discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. An
+understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of
+the science of war.
+
+Discipline, in its basic meaning, is the treatment suitable to a
+disciple. The objective of discipline is therefore the creation and
+maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander
+leads. The exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those
+occasions when the commander can be physically present. The exigencies
+of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from
+being always, personally, in the forefront of action. These
+restrictions as to considerations of space however, impose no
+limitations on leadership in terms of time.
+
+The influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to
+shape the situation according to his will (page 47), though the
+necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. The
+ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute
+the commander's will wherever he may be (page 15) is, accordingly, a
+primary attribute of command.
+
+With this objective in mind, the true disciplinarian runs no risk of
+confusing harshness with the exercise of justice. He understands the
+difference between an overbearing arrogance, arising from unconscious
+ignorance, and the pride which springs from a justified self-respect.
+He appreciates the distinction between mere stubbornness, which would
+alienate his followers, and the necessary firmness which binds the
+bonds between the leader and the led. He realizes that comradeship,
+without presumptuous familiarity, is the firmest foundation for mutual
+loyalty (page 14). He knows that kindness and consideration, without
+suggestion of pampering, will not be mistaken for weakness by any
+subordinate worthy of the name.
+
+Military subordination, which implies a proud obedience without trace
+of servility, is the essential basis for the development of the
+qualities of command. It is an old adage that, to know how to command,
+one must know how to obey. In the profession of arms, every man is at
+once a leader and a follower; the uncertainties of war may suddenly
+confront any individual, even on the lowest echelon, with the call to
+exercise command.
+
+The requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for
+all training. By proper training of his command, by instilling in it a
+spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its
+morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may
+increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition.
+When a command is inured to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack
+of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually
+employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy.
+
+In connection with these measures, surprise, when judiciously
+conceived and successfully employed, may be a most potent factor.
+Surprise (see page 26) is the injection of the unexpected for the
+purpose of creating an unfavorable military situation for the enemy.
+Its effect is particularly telling when it results in disruption of
+enemy plans, and thus promotes the execution of one's own.
+
+The raid, an offensive measure swiftly executed, often by surprise,
+and followed by a withdrawal, may be a valuable operation when
+employed to attain objectives within its capacity. The collection of
+information, the destruction of important enemy equipment or supplies,
+the neutralization of enemy positions, the severing of physical means
+of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable objectives.
+The attritional effect of repeated raids may be very great. Skillfully
+executed raids frequently produce panic among the populace and thus,
+by political pressure, cause a change in the existing apportionment of
+fighting strength to the extent of upsetting military plans in other
+theaters. This is particularly likely to occur when there is fear,
+justified or otherwise, of repetition (see page 69).
+
+However, because a raid necessarily includes a withdrawal and cannot,
+therefore, accomplish the occupation of territory (see page 46), it
+can have only indirect bearing, however important, upon the final
+outcome of the hostilities against a strong and competent enemy. Like
+other forms of surprise, the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve
+only to disclose one's presence, and thus to betray more important
+future plans. If the raid fails to attain its objective, it may even
+strengthen enemy morale.
+
+The form which surprise may take is not confined to the stratagem, the
+ruse, or the sudden appearance. Any unexpected display of novel
+methods or of fighting strength, moral, mental, or physical, the
+last-named sometimes assuming the character of new and especially
+effective weapons or equipment, is included in the category of
+surprise. The potential value of such methods or weapons is, however,
+reduced or even completely vitiated by the leakage of advance
+information concerning them, not only as to their details, but as to
+the fact of their existence.
+
+Other conditions remaining unchanged, an offensive surprise measure is
+therefore more likely to be effective when the opponent has not been
+given time to prepare a defense against it. On the other hand, where
+there is knowledge that an opponent or possible opponent is taking
+steps of a new or unusual nature and no adequate defense is prepared,
+the equivalent of surprise has been granted him.
+
+Security measures are necessary in order to minimize or prevent
+surprise, or to defeat other efforts aimed at disruption of plans.
+Protection brings security; its basic objective is the conservation of
+fighting strength for future employment. Primarily requiring the
+maintenance of secrecy and the exercise of vigilance and foresight,
+security may be furthered by efficient scouting, by appropriate
+dispositions and formations within the command, and by the use of
+protective detachments and of various types of works in the sphere of
+engineering. Previous discussion (pages 64 and 69), with respect to
+relative position and to the apportionment of fighting strength, has
+indicated how, through fortification and related measures, the
+commander may increase relative fighting strength and thereby promote
+his own freedom of action while restricting that of the enemy.
+
+A commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at
+its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal,
+adequate logistics support. Because of its intimate relationship to
+mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of
+action. Logistics support requires provision for procurement and
+replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and
+replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance.
+Freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics
+support can be extended. (See page 63.)
+
+The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring freedom of
+action. If the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate
+strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. If initiative is
+lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure.
+
+The offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the
+initiative, and of regaining it if lost. Even though there be an
+actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will,
+however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive
+mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable
+opportunity to strike. Completely to abandon the offensive state of
+mind is to forswear victory.
+
+Whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent
+commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will
+of the enemy commander (see page 8). By effective attack upon the
+hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the
+enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which
+the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect.
+
+It does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable
+under all circumstances. Even with superior strength the most skillful
+commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such
+manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive.
+Without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the
+defensive for considerable periods. If the offensive mental attitude
+is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive
+measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and
+deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time,
+may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. It is of
+the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted
+as a settled procedure (see page 65) beyond the time necessary to
+prepare for an effective offensive.
+
+Both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation
+whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. In
+operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a
+combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found
+necessary (see also references to distant operations on pages 63 and
+74). Though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom
+of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive
+action. The enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to
+seize every opportunity to employ the offensive.
+
+Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has
+been found to be sound procedure (see also page 61), provided that the
+general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at
+the proper moment, of the offensive. The methods employed during the
+period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of
+action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the
+offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been
+created.
+
+Familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and
+possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the
+strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be
+encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of
+action. Additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a
+continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information
+collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. Of equal
+importance is the denial of information to the enemy.
+
+In connection with counter-information measures (see page 127), the
+scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular
+consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior
+to publication. A resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn
+to his own advantage all available information, including that
+ostensibly innocuous.
+
+As to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional
+knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both,
+and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for
+devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of
+action.
+
+With a given fighting strength, the ensurance of freedom of action,
+within the field of responsibility of a commander, requires
+consideration of such matters as:
+
+  (a) Efficient provisions for exercise of command,
+  (b) Effective training,
+  (c) A state of high and stable morale, founded on
+  (d) sound discipline,
+  (e) The offensive spirit,
+  (f) The initiative,
+  (g) Surprise,
+  (h) Security,
+  (i) Adequate logistics support,
+  (j) Adequate intelligence and counter-intelligence.
+
+A more detailed analysis of such factors is provided hereafter
+(Chapter VI, as to Section I-B of the Estimate Form). With proper
+provision made in these respects, the commander will be better able to
+deal with those restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the enemy
+and by adverse geographical conditions. With respect to restrictions
+that in a particular situation may be due to the latter cause, it will
+at once be appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend on the
+selection of correct physical objectives, on utilization of
+advantageous relative positions, and on an effective apportionment of
+fighting strength.
+
+Each measure, or each operation, for freedom of action, if it is to
+meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability,
+will be planned on the basis of the foregoing considerations and will
+take account, also, of the inherent requirements of that measure, or
+operation, for freedom of action for itself.
+
+On occasion, higher authority may request the recommendations of the
+commander (see page 42, as to opinions) with reference to provision
+for freedom of action. Such recommendations will properly be based on
+the elements considered in the preceding discussion.
+
+
+IV. SUMMARY
+
+All these considerations involve the proper evaluation of the factors
+applicable (page 25) to the particular problem. Each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, will
+require examination of its suitability with regard to the appropriate
+effect desired; of its feasibility with respect to the action
+contemplated as to physical objectives, relative positions, the
+concurrent apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action;
+and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to consequences as
+to costs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
+
+    Chapter V discusses the four steps in the application of
+    mental effort to the successful attainment of a military
+    objective. Emphasis is placed on such matters as: the Estimate
+    of the Situation in basic problems, together with certain
+    details as to tasks, the mission, courses of action, and the
+    Decision; the formulation of detailed plans, including
+    subsidiary plans; directives; the Running Estimate of the
+    Situation; and the use of Forms in the solution of problems.
+
+
+In Chapter II it has been brought to notice that every problem,
+regardless of its type and scope, has its source in a perplexity
+created by an apparent difficulty inherent in a situation. Where there
+is a sufficient incentive to change or maintain the situation, the
+problem is one which requires solution. (See page 20.)
+
+A situation may be actual or assumed. In broad outline, an actual
+military situation is always likely to present a picture of opposing
+organizations of human beings, each possessed of fighting strength and
+disposed in a locality or localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other.
+
+This picture may be expected to assume various aspects as action
+progresses (see page 38). The concern of the commander is to control
+the unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may attain
+the effect he desires (page 72). (See also Chapter IX.)
+
+The incentive to solve a problem is provided by a realization, on the
+part of the individual concerned, of a need to make provision for the
+attainment of an objective. In the ease of a military problem, such
+incentive may result (1) from a directive issued by higher authority,
+usually in the form of an assigned task, or (2) from the fact that a
+decision already reached by the commander has introduced further
+problems, or (3) from a recognition of the demands of the situation.
+(See page 44.)
+
+An objective is best attained by the successful application of
+properly directed effort. There is thus an essential and continuing
+relationship between the incentive to solve a problem, and the task
+which assigns the objective (or objectives) and thus motivates the
+procedure necessary for the attainment of the objective(s) so assigned
+(page 50).
+
+Such a task may, therefore, be referred to as the motivating task.
+
+The natural mental processes which normal human beings employ in
+solving their problems of business, public affairs, or even personal
+matters, have been previously described as the natural processes for
+employment in the solution of military problems (see Chapter II). In
+adapting these natural processes to military requirements (page 43),
+the only difference imposed is that of studied insistence that the
+factors peculiar to the conduct of war, as recognized in the
+Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), receive thorough analytical
+treatment from the professional viewpoint.
+
+The same observations apply when the field of military operations is
+restricted to that which primarily concerns the naval branch of the
+military profession. No fundamental difference in the solution of
+problems is introduced thereby. The only variations in the application
+of the Fundamental Military Principle are those due to the fact that
+the sea provides the theater of naval operations with distinctive
+characteristics (see page 62).
+
+
+The Approach to the Solution
+
+Studies of the subject indicate that the successful attainment of an
+assigned military objective involves the application of mental effort
+in four distinct steps (see page 3), in fixed sequence, as follows:
+
+    (1) The selection, by the commander, of a correct objective
+        (or objectives) by achieving which he may attain his
+        assigned objective(s). Such selection includes the
+        determination, in proper detail, of the action required.
+
+    (2) The resolution of the required action into detailed
+        military operations.
+
+    (3) The formulation of a directive, or directives, with the
+        intention of immediately inaugurating planned action.
+
+    (4) The supervision of the planned action.
+
+In the chapters which follow, the fundamental procedure distinctive of
+each of these steps will be treated separately and in the sequence
+shown. The sequence of the steps is fixed because of the consequential
+nature of the relationship among the procedures distinctive of the
+several steps. The complete solution of a problem involves,
+necessarily, all four steps. Each step deals with a distinctive type
+of problem, or problems, pertaining to an aspect of the comprehensive
+problem whose solution requires all four steps. No step after the
+first can properly be undertaken unless the included problems involved
+in the preceding steps have been solved.
+
+It does not follow that the completion of one step necessarily
+requires that the next step be undertaken immediately. It will be
+seen, for instance, that the first two steps are concerned with
+planning, the latter two more especially with execution. It is not
+always necessary that a plan be executed; it may be drawn up as a
+precautionary measure.
+
+It is possible, therefore, that the first step only may be taken;
+i.e., that the procedure for the attainment of a particular assigned
+objective may be determined for the sole purpose of making provision
+against a contingency, at that particular time merely an obscure
+probability. Or, as may frequently be the case during peace, the
+procedure may terminate, for the time being, with the completion of
+the second step. In such cases, certain of the necessary military
+operations are worked out in the desired detail as a provision against
+future possibilities, are listed, and filed for reference as needed.
+
+Parts II and III, which follow, deal primarily with the solution of
+those problems of the naval commander which require familiarity with
+the entire process, i.e., all of the four steps given above.
+
+For simplicity of presentation, the procedure is described throughout
+from the mental standpoint of the same commander. The arrangement of
+subject matter conforms to this basis. The several types of problems,
+classified according to the source of the incentive (page 79), are
+discussed in connection with the appropriate step. When a problem
+typical of a previous step arises during the process, the sequence of
+steps is interrupted thereby, but is resumed by a mental return, on
+the part of the commander, to the proper earlier step.
+
+
+The First Step
+
+The mental procedure distinctive of the first step (more fully
+discussed in Chapter VI) deals with the usual case where a commander
+becomes acquainted with the nature of his assigned objective through
+receipt of a directive from his immediate superior, ordinarily in the
+form of an assigned task or assigned tasks. In the discussion of the
+first step, this most likely type of problem is chosen for
+description, i.e., the one where the motivating task (see page 80)
+comes directly from the immediate superior.
+
+For purposes of reference, this problem may conveniently be termed a
+basic problem. In such a case the original situation which gives
+character to the problem may be similarly referred to as the basic
+situation. The full solution of a basic problem always involves a
+basic estimate of the situation, a basic Decision, a basic plan of
+operations, and one or more basic directives. It may, as will be
+shown, also require certain additional directives.
+
+The military Estimate of the Situation, based on the natural mental
+processes (pages 19-20 and 43), is introduced in the first step. The
+reason for making such an Estimate is to provide a basis for a plan to
+accomplish the assigned task. The Estimate constitutes a systematic
+procedure for selection of a correct objective (or objectives),
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, feasible of attainment,
+and acceptable as to the consequences involved in its achievement. The
+selection of such an objective or objectives involves, incidentally
+(see page 44), the determination, in the proper detail, of the action
+required.
+
+This estimate procedure is founded on the Fundamental Military
+Principle (page 41). The procedure is the same as previously indicated
+for the correct selection of objectives (Section II of Chapter IV).
+
+On the basis of a summary of the situation, a recognition of the
+incentive, and an appreciation of the assigned objective(s) (page 79),
+the estimate of a basic problem enables the commander to obtain,
+first, an understanding of (page 43) the appropriate effect desired.
+As a result of this procedure, he can then correctly formulate his
+mission (discussed hereinafter).
+
+For the further understanding of all details pertaining to the
+situation (page 43), the estimate next determines relative fighting
+strength through a survey of the means available and opposed, as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater.
+
+With the basis for solution of the problem thus established, the
+actual solution (page 44), conforming to the system indicated in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, starts with consideration of pertinent
+methods of procedure, as tentative solutions of the problem. These
+take the form of military operations, each denominated a course of
+action (discussed in detail hereinafter). Each such course embodies,
+specifically or inferentially, an objective to be achieved for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired. Each course also
+indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken. Every pertinent
+course of action is tested to determine whether it meets the
+requirements of suitability as to the appropriate effect desired, of
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength, and of
+acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs.
+
+Enemy courses of action are subjected to the same treatment.
+
+Each course of action which passes the tests is compared with each
+retained enemy course, after which those courses of action not
+rejected on this basis are compared with each other. The best is then
+selected and embodied in the Decision.
+
+The Decision, accordingly, expresses a general plan of action (or
+provides a basis therefor), including the commander's general
+objective (page 49) for the attainment of the assigned objective. The
+Decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken.
+
+The estimate procedure is applicable not only to the problem of the
+first step, viewed as a whole, but also to the numerous included
+problems. These present themselves during the procedure of solution,
+and call for "estimates within the estimate".
+
+For example, the proper nature of the objective embodied in the
+assigned task (discussed hereinafter), if not clear in the directive
+received, may be determined by the use of the natural mental
+processes. This is done through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle, as previously described (page 52).
+
+Similarly, the solution of the included problems as to the salient
+features of the operations involved (correct physical objectives,
+etc.) can be arrived at through the same processes. The procedure is
+that indicated previously (in Section III of Chapter IV).
+
+The estimate procedure may, however, be somewhat varied, as to
+details, in accordance with the nature of the problem. Such adaptation
+is applicable, for example, as to the special features which
+distinguish certain types of strategical and tactical problems.
+
+Every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects
+(see discussion of strategy and tactics, pages 9 and 10). The
+character of the effort to be exerted at a particular time, and the
+nature of the objectives to be attained, may be governed chiefly by
+strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations. This fact may
+affect details in the estimate of the situation, e.g., as to the
+weight to be given various factors.
+
+The essential difference between strategy and tactics has been shown
+to lie in the end in view. It follows, then, that estimates of broad
+strategical situations and of localized tactical situations tend to
+differ from each other. The former lead to decisions as to such
+matters, among others, as whether a battle shall be fought. The latter
+lead to decisions, among others, as to the comprehensive tactical
+methods to be followed in furtherance of strategical aims. Certain
+distinctions of method as to such estimates are noted hereinafter with
+respect to the analysis of fighting strength and with reference to
+courses of action.
+
+Tasks. The assignment of tasks to subordinates is an essential
+function of the chain of command, applicable to all of the echelons of
+command, from the highest to the lowest (page 12). On the lowest
+echelons, such as that of a gun's crew or a fireroom watch, operations
+thus prescribed involve numerous small specialized tasks, each
+requiring the performance of a simplified routine by a few trained
+men. Although earlier training in the performance of such tasks is
+calculated to remove the necessity of solving the problems of the
+lowest echelons in the four studied steps stated above, it is only
+when the same methods of logical thought have previously been applied
+to the solution of these problems that this state of affairs can be
+brought about.
+
+Properly conceived, each assigned task indicates, either specifically
+or inferentially, an objective (or objectives). The relationships
+existing among the echelons of command, with reference to objectives,
+have previously been noted. (See page 48.) These relationships,
+because a correctly conceived task specifies or infers an objective,
+are equally applicable as to such tasks.
+
+The manner of expressing tasks calls for special comment (see also
+page 53, as to expressing objectives).
+
+The commander may find in the expression of his task a statement,
+only, of the action required. For example, the order "Proceed toward
+the enemy battle line" involves movement, indicating merely a change
+in relative position. No provision appears as to a future condition or
+state of affairs.
+
+Again, the task may be expressed as an order to "Attack the enemy
+battle line." In this case, the enemy battle line is the physical
+objective, but no specific future condition to result from the attack
+is indicated. Here the action and the physical objective are given,
+but the objective is left to be inferred.
+
+If the commander can ascertain, from the directives he receives, his
+task expressed in terms of accomplishment, he may be able to
+visualize the action, the physical objective, and the condition to be
+created. The order "Destroy the enemy battleship" (indicating, as the
+objective, "the destruction of the enemy battleship"), results, when
+successfully completed, in a new condition which is the objective of
+the action against the physical objective.
+
+Accordingly, a task expressed in such terms of accomplishment conveys
+precise information as to the objective; yet such an expression of the
+task does not prevent freedom of action, with opportunity for exercise
+of initiative. The commander who is assigned such a task can clearly
+visualize the results demanded of him, and may feel at liberty to
+employ any one or all of the methods at his disposal.
+
+However, it is not always possible or even desirable to express tasks
+in terms of accomplishment.
+
+For example, where the future situation cannot be adequately
+visualized, either because of the doubtful values of certain factors
+or because of possible changes in circumstances, it may be
+impracticable to assign a definite task in terms of accomplishment.
+
+Under such conditions, and sometimes for other proper reasons, it may
+be desirable to afford a trusted and competent subordinate a
+corresponding measure of freedom of action. In such a case, the
+indication of the commander's general objective for his entire force,
+together with a directive for action along a certain general line,
+without prescription of a definite objective, may be especially
+appropriate to the situation. Such is the frequent usage in the issue,
+for example, of directives of the type known as letters of instruction
+(Chapter VIII).
+
+Again, where immediate response is desired, and where the objective
+may be understood by implication, the task may be better expressed in
+terms of action, rather than of accomplishment. This is frequently the
+case where the task is assigned by word of mouth, by memorandum, or by
+signal. In the last-named instance, the signal, when it constitutes a
+command fully understood by previous usage or experience, may convey a
+practically instantaneous comprehension of the objective. In many such
+instances, however, an inferred objective will require more analysis.
+
+The expression of the task in terms of action is frequently desirable,
+more especially during an engagement, when tactical considerations are
+uppermost. Under such circumstances, two or more objectives may be
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, but their degree of
+suitability, and the influence of the factors pertaining to
+feasibility and acceptability, may vary rapidly with the course of
+events. In such conditions, an order such as "Attack" without
+indicating a specific physical objective, may be best calculated to
+attain desired results, for the reason, more especially, that it
+affords the subordinate a proper freedom of action.
+
+In many cases, the instructions received by a commander will set forth
+more than one task, often of varying importance. The proper bearing of
+such a double or multiple task upon his future action is set forth,
+together with other relevant matters, in the discussion of the
+mission, which follows.
+
+On occasion, a higher commander, in assigning a task, may elect to
+specify, also, the course of action to be pursued by a subordinate for
+the attainment of the assigned objective: for example--
+
+    "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD by capturing X Island".
+
+Here the task is to deny the enemy the use of available bases in the
+area described; in addition, the higher commander has specified that
+this be accomplished by the adoption of a predetermined course of
+action (page 88), expressed in the words "by capturing X Island."
+Higher authority has in this case made the subordinate's estimate of
+the situation for him, and has thus arrived at the decision which the
+subordinate would ordinarily reach for himself.
+
+Such procedure may be deemed advisable under certain circumstances:
+for example, when time is pressing; when a close control of the
+situation is an important factor; when the qualifications of the
+subordinate are unknown, as yet doubtful, or known to be inadequate
+for the operation in hand; or, for various other reasons which may
+suggest themselves according to the nature of the problem.
+
+Occasionally, higher authority, for similar reasons, may also
+prescribe the action to be taken, in considerable detail. Examples
+occur during operations of unusual complexity, or when the personnel
+factors call for special care in coordination of the action.
+
+Sometimes, higher authority, instead of announcing both the task and
+the predetermined course of action, may indicate only the latter; in
+the example given above, the higher commander would then direct,
+"Capture X Island". The directive might also include, in some detail,
+the action to be taken to this end.
+
+Procedure such as noted in the foregoing examples involves certain
+special considerations from the viewpoint of the subordinate. These
+considerations are discussed hereafter (page 96).
+
+The Mission. In our naval service an assigned task, coupled with its
+purpose, is known as a mission. As explained previously (page 48), the
+purpose indicates the larger aim which is to be served by the
+execution of the task. The task indicates the assigned objective,
+i.e., what is to be accomplished; the purpose, the further objective
+to be served thereby.
+
+The word mission is a derivative of the Latin verb, "to send". Its use
+implies the act of sending someone, or of being sent, as an agent for
+some special duty, a duty imposed by one in authority. Although an
+individual, free to do so, may select his own mission, and thereby
+send himself on a special duty, this is not usually the case where an
+effective military chain of command exists. Normally the sending
+authority is the immediate superior; the agent, the immediate
+subordinate.
+
+The mission, once assigned, does not change until it has been
+accomplished or until it has been modified or revoked by higher
+authority, usually the immediate superior by whom it was assigned.
+
+As previously explained in this connection, the designation of a
+purpose, linked with a task, is an essential element of a mission as
+treated herein. It is essential to unity of effort that the purpose of
+the mission of a commander be common with that of other commanders of
+the same echelon who are to participate in the effort enjoined by
+their superior's directives. Directives expressed in the Order Form
+(page 112 and Chapter VIII) facilitate clear recognition of this
+purpose, which appears in the general plan of action prescribed in the
+second paragraph of that form. The commander may consider the
+relationship thus:
+
+My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out
+my designated part of my immediate superior's general plan.
+
+It is customary to simplify the foregoing to the statement that the
+mission is:
+
+(Task) (statement of the assigned task),
+
+(Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement
+of the superior's general plan).
+
+The words "assist in", etc., may frequently be understood and
+therefore omitted.
+
+The foregoing expression of a mission affords, as later explained
+(Chapter VI), a method for clear visualization of the effect desired
+by higher authority. (See also page 84.)
+
+All of his assigned tasks which materially influence the commander's
+Decision (hereinafter discussed) are properly included in his mission;
+other tasks, naturally, may be omitted in this connection. In the case
+of a double or multiple task (page 86), all the tasks may be related
+to a single purpose, or the included tasks may each, or in certain
+combinations, be linked separately to appropriate purposes.
+
+Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength. The feasibility and
+acceptability of action for the attainment of an objective are
+dependent (see the Fundamental Military Principle--page 41) on the
+factors of fighting strength. Fighting strength (page 35) is derived
+from the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. A survey of these
+factors, in proper detail according to the nature of the problem, is
+therefore a necessary phase in the process of its solution. Such a
+survey completes the basis for the study of courses of action.
+
+Courses of Action. The estimate process naturally takes account (page
+80) of methods for attaining the objective indicated in the assigned
+task. The military profession has, from time to time, applied a
+variety of terms to designate such methods. Terms so used include,
+among others, "plans open to us" (or "to the enemy"), "lines of
+action", and "courses of action". The last-noted, having been standard
+in our naval service for many years, is the term used in this
+discussion.
+
+Each course of action is thus a plan of military operations for the
+attainment of the assigned objective, and each thus indicates (page
+37) "an act or a series of acts" which may be undertaken to that end.
+Until a final selection is made for embodiment in the Decision, each
+course of action is a tentative solution of the problem. For the
+reason given below, a course of action, while under consideration as a
+tentative solution of the problem, is also correctly conceived as
+indicating an objective and, in proper detail, the action for its
+attainment.
+
+When embodied in the Decision, the adopted course of action or
+combination of courses becomes the commander's general plan (or the
+basis thereof) for the employment of his force; such a general plan
+will naturally indicate the commander's general objective (page 49)
+and, in proper detail, the action to be taken for its attainment (page
+44).
+
+The objective may be specifically stated or may be inferred (see page
+82; also page 84 for the corresponding discussion of the expression
+of tasks); but, in any event, clear thinking demands that the
+objective be definitely envisaged. There is a manifest advantage in
+such definite envisaging of the objectives involved in courses of
+action. Suitability as to the appropriate effect desired--the first
+requirement in the selection of a correct objective (page 51)--is much
+more readily tested on this basis. The practical bearing of this fact
+becomes apparent during the early stages (Chapter VI) of the process
+of solving military problems.
+
+Frequent examples of naval courses of action include (see page 92):
+
+(1) "To destroy the enemy force." Here the objective, "destruction of
+the enemy force", is specifically indicated.
+
+(2) "To divert the enemy force." Here also the objective, in this case
+"diversion of the enemy force", is specifically indicated.
+
+(3) "To evade the enemy." Here again the objective, "evasion of the
+enemy", is specifically indicated.
+
+(4) "To cover friendly and neutral trade." Here the objective,
+"protection of friendly and neutral trade by the utilization of
+advantageous covering positions", is more or less inferred.
+
+(5) "To escort trade." Here the objective, "protection of trade by
+escorting it in convoys", is more or less inferred.
+
+(6) "To patrol the trade routes." Here the objective, e.g.,
+"protection of trade by patrolling the trade routes", is inferred.
+
+(7) "To raid." Here the objective, e.g., "infliction of loss and
+damage by raiding", is inferred.
+
+In the foregoing instances, the action to be taken is indicated in
+general terms. The extent to which the action may properly be
+indicated depends on the nature of the problem and is necessarily left
+to the judgment of the commander. Two possibilities, between which
+there may be various intermediate cases, are as follows:
+
+        (a) To destroy the enemy force by simultaneous attacks on
+    the escort and convoy.
+
+        (b) To destroy the enemy force by an attack with the main
+    force on the escort, following this immediately by an attack
+    on the convoy with a flanking force before the convoy can
+    scatter so widely as to make ineffective the pursuit of any of
+    its units.
+
+For a further application, it will be noted that the national policies
+referred to early in this discussion (page 7) are national courses of
+action, considered and adopted as methods of attaining national
+objectives.
+
+The expression "courses of action", in the sense of a plan considered
+or adopted as a solution of the problem, has the defect that it
+appears to emphasize the action, rather than the paramount component,
+i.e., the objective. So long as this fact is borne in mind, the
+limitations of the term "courses of action" need not operate to
+influence, adversely, the solution of the problem.
+
+As noted above, the commander brings to mind courses of action by the
+mental act of "envisaging", i.e., "viewing with the mind's eye or
+conceptionally", "seeing as a mental image", bringing fully and
+distinctively to view. How is this done?
+
+Although the time available for the process depends on the particular
+problem, the process itself is the same for all. During the
+clarification of the problem, the commander will have entertained
+certain ideas,--ideas as to such matters as the existing situation,
+the desired new situation, the possible physical objectives, the
+relative positions and movements of the forces involved, and related
+matters. His training and experience cause these ideas to evoke
+others, which are associated in his mind with problems of the
+past,--in particular, with the bearing of such ideas on the outcome of
+those problems.
+
+This process of thinking, if it is to be effective as well as
+reflective, requires mental access to certain sources of ideas. These
+sources may lie in the study of history, or in the wealth of doctrine
+and instructions gathered into official manuals and into other
+professional writings, or in the commander's own practical experience.
+Logicians who have investigated this natural process point out that
+suggested solutions are the resurrection of ideas from past
+experience. Good thinking demands access to a large storehouse of
+ideas connected in various and flexible ways. The best available
+knowledge is the main source from which reflective thinking obtains
+relevant and promising suggestions for a solution.
+
+By such resort to analogy, the commander utilizes the accumulations of
+past experience. Sometimes he finds that the courses of action thus
+suggested are exactly suitable as tentative solutions for his problem.
+In other instances, of course, only parts of the present situation are
+found to be analogous to those previously encountered. Even then,
+however, the similarity of the facts may be helpful in providing
+suggestions. Guidance based on limited or partial similarity has been
+demonstrated to be better than purely intuitive thinking.
+
+The commander cannot be content, however, to depend wholly on the
+guidance of the past. Sometimes, moreover, he may not be able to
+obtain suggestions by analogy. New suggestions, ideas not drawn from
+past experience, are very desirable; they are possible, also, in the
+sense that the result of the analysis of past experience may be
+reassembled, in imagination, in novel ways. New courses of action,
+overlooked in the past, may be contrived. Original combinations, not
+previously entertained, may be devised. Readiness to employ the novel
+and the new, as well as to utilize the old, is a prime qualification
+for command.
+
+Reflective thinking of this nature requires adequate knowledge of the
+capabilities of weapons, so that new possibilities may be perceived as
+to coordination in their use. While analogy looks backward to find
+applicable lessons, the search for novelty seeks suggestions from
+potentialities not heretofore utilized.
+
+The development of the full possibilities of new weapons is an
+important source of forward thinking. Such thinking constantly
+integrates the current developments in war. The competent commander
+does not wait for history to be made; he makes it.
+
+Familiarity with experimentation, research, and new performance is
+also a fruitful source of suggestions. When used, this method results
+in advance demands by the armed forces for new weapons not yet
+supplied.
+
+Closely allied to analogy is the application of ordered and classified
+knowledge as to the nature of warfare. Aware of the effects which can
+be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander
+identifies his objective with one or more of these effects.
+
+The application of ordered and classified knowledge of naval warfare
+starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and
+proceeds thereafter to the study of the various classes of operations
+which may be utilized to this end. Naval effort has as its objective
+the keeping open of sea communications (see page 62). Command of the
+sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the
+ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the
+enemy from doing so.
+
+Naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the
+purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas,
+especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping
+open of sea communications are of vital importance.
+
+Such operations may be classified under the headings:
+
+    (1) For securing command of sea areas,
+    (2) In sea areas not under command, and
+    (3) In sea areas under command.
+
+On the basis of this classification, specific operations, broadly
+considered, appear to be limited in number. As to classification (1),
+applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to
+contain them, or to divert them. For (2), applicable operations are:
+to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval
+lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring
+overseas movement. For (3), applicable operations are: to blockade
+trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard
+expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive
+operations against enemy coastal objectives.
+
+Manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in
+an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. Each such course
+of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or
+less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which
+constitute parts of the whole. (See page 37.)
+
+There can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between
+courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto.
+For example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a
+character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged,
+correlatively with "to destroy", as one of his courses of action. Yet,
+in another problem, a raid may be visualized, properly, as a detailed
+operation pertaining, in a subordinate capacity, to a more
+comprehensive operation envisaged as a course of action "to destroy".
+
+Similarly, what is a broad course of action from the viewpoint of one
+echelon in the chain of command, may be correctly viewed, on a higher
+echelon, as a detailed operation. Operations assigned in tasks imposed
+by higher authority become the basis for the determination of courses
+of action on the next lower echelon, a procedure which continues
+throughout the chain of command until specialized, on the lowest
+echelons, in the form of a simplified routine (see page 84).
+
+While the list of courses of action given above is made up from the
+viewpoint of broad strategical problems, a similar list can be
+assembled for other problems. For example, the order, "Destroy enemy
+naval forces", if taken as the motivating task of a tactical
+estimate, will be the basis for certain courses of action,
+constituting, when complete (see below), a well-recognized general
+plan for a naval battle. This plan will in turn call for various
+detailed operations on the part of the several subdivisions of the
+force under the commander who makes the estimate (see page 95).
+
+As a tentative solution of the problem a course of action may be
+complete or partial, i.e., it may, if carried out, provide for the
+complete attainment of the objective; or, such complete attainment may
+require a combination of several of the courses of action under study.
+
+The exclusive consideration of courses of action of the complete type
+possesses the advantage of minimizing the total number of solutions
+under study. This simplifies the procedure of analysis and of
+comparing courses of action with each other, because of the relatively
+small number of courses to be tested and to be compared.
+
+However, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
+visualize complete courses of action, especially during the early
+stages of the estimate. Sometimes the initial visualization of partial
+courses and their eventual combination into a complete solution will
+be found necessary.
+
+Therefore, either or both of the foregoing systems of formulating
+courses of action may be found appropriate, according to individual
+preference and the nature of the particular problem.
+
+Individuals, comparable with respect to knowledge, appear to vary
+greatly in their ability to produce the appropriate suggestion, as to
+courses of action, at the right time. The reason for this phenomenon
+is not altogether clear, but it is known that thinking seems to be
+limited not merely by the range of knowledge, but by whatever part of
+it becomes available when needed. This point invites attention to
+another procedure which is open to the commander with respect to
+stimulating reflective thinking. This procedure recognizes the fact
+that, when two or more minds attack a problem, together, the combined
+effort often increases the applied mental power. This fact is
+universally recognized, for example, in the utilization of staff
+assistance (page 13).
+
+Inherent and acquired ability have unquestionably much to do with the
+possibilities of visualizing single courses of action with respect to
+their completeness as to attainment of the objective. One method of
+visualization seems to be the mental picturization of more or less
+detailed operations, followed by their combination, through rapid
+synthesis, into complete courses of action.
+
+An example of this method would occur where several rather specific
+operations were visualized, involving seizure of certain localities as
+a defensive measure. If it were then observed that the objective in
+each such case was "denial to the enemy of a particular naval-base
+site in the area ABCD", an appropriate expression of a comprehensive
+course of action would be "to deny the enemy naval-base sites in the
+area ABCD".
+
+Another method of visualizing appropriate courses of action seems to
+involve initial recognition, in the first instance, of such courses as
+broad and comprehensive general plans, without first visualizing and
+combining their details. This method appears to be more usual after
+considerable experience or training. It is therefore possible that
+this second method is merely a practiced development of the first, the
+process of synthesis being so rapidly accomplished that it becomes
+subconscious.
+
+The nature of the particular problem has also an unquestioned bearing
+on this subject. In instances where no single course of action can be
+found which is adequately expressive of complete attainment of the
+objective, the final selection of a method of attaining the objective
+will necessarily be through a combination of the courses of action
+under study (page 93).
+
+For example, if the assigned task were to "protect trade in sea area
+ABCD", the extent of the area, together with its geographical position
+relative to locations from which enemy attacks could be launched,
+might not be such as to permit the attainment of the objective by a
+single course of action such as "to escort trade in convoys" or "to
+patrol the trade routes". Both of these courses of action might be
+necessary, and, in addition, perhaps, the further course "to cover
+focal points M and N".
+
+Each of these courses of action has, as its objective, the
+establishment of a protected area or areas, stationary or moving, for
+the safe passage of merchant vessels. However, for purposes of
+expressing the course of action involved, the contemplated procedure
+is in this case better indicated by a combination expressed in terms
+of action, the objective being inferred as a matter of mutual
+understanding. The less particularized expression of the course of
+action in terms of the objective would, in this instance, convey a
+less definite idea of the procedure under consideration.
+
+Similar considerations pertain frequently to naval problems, more
+especially to those involving naval engagements of considerable scope.
+The solution of such a problem takes, typically, the form of an
+operation consisting, not of a single "act", but of "a series of
+acts", i.e., of a number of stages or phases of battle, each being a
+preparation for the one following, until the final stage provides for
+the attainment of the assigned objective.
+
+For example, a first consideration might be "to reduce enemy carrier
+aircraft strength by" certain pertinent operations. A second
+consideration might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed by" certain
+operations in order to force the enemy to accept battle. A third might
+be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed, life, and hitting power by
+gunfire" within certain range bands, in order to exploit own strength
+and enemy weakness at those ranges. A fourth might be "to continue
+reduction of enemy battle-line strength by gunfire, closing to" such a
+range as is suitable to that end. Finally, a fifth consideration might
+be "to inflict conclusive damage on enemy battle-line with torpedoes".
+All of the foregoing partial courses (other possibilities having been
+studied and discarded) might then be combined into one operation as
+the selected course of action "in order to destroy the enemy
+battleship strength",--such destruction being the assigned objective.
+
+The degree of detail in which a course of action may be visualized for
+purposes of the estimate will vary with the same factors, i.e.,
+personal facility and the nature of the problem. Practice in the
+solution of problems appears to develop such facility that entire
+plans can be visualized as courses of action, each plan reasonably
+complete as to details with reference to physical objectives, relative
+positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for
+freedom of action. However, it is rarely, if ever, necessary to
+visualize courses of action minutely in an estimate of a basic
+problem; the extent to which they are viewed mentally, as detailed
+plans, need only be such as to fulfill the requirements of the
+particular problem (see Section I of Chapter IV).
+
+The statement of a course of action, for purposes of the estimate,
+will naturally be along broad and comprehensive lines, although some
+important matters of detail (relatively speaking) may be added if this
+is found desirable as the estimate proceeds. It is with these
+considerations in mind that the standard practice has been developed
+of formulating courses of action, while under study as tentative
+solutions of the problem, in broad terms, appropriate to general plans
+of action.
+
+The commander may find, on occasion, what appears, on first
+examination, to be an exception to the rule, herein treated as valid,
+that a course of action, correctly conceived, always contains the two
+elements (1) objective, specific or inferred, and (2) action for its
+attainment. However, apparent exceptions to this principle are due to
+special conditions which, on proper analysis, reveal no actual
+exceptions. Certain examples, now to be discussed, demonstrate this
+fact.
+
+For instance, when the higher commander deems such procedure advisable
+(page 86), he may make his subordinate's estimate of the situation, as
+well as his own, and may accordingly indicate both a task and a
+predetermined course of action for the subordinate to pursue: for
+example:
+
+    "Deny enemy base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island."
+
+In such a case the higher commander has indicated the predetermined
+course of action in the words "by capturing X Island". This expression
+indicates a specific objective, the capture of X Island. The
+expression also indicates, though not in any detail, the action to be
+taken, i.e., it specifies "capture", rather than "occupation",
+"isolation", or some other form of control (page 8). Any further
+development of the action is left for the subordinate to determine.
+The procedure to be followed by the subordinate commander in solving
+such a problem is described hereafter (page 102) in the discussion of
+the analysis of courses of action. In any event, it is manifest that
+there is here no exception to the rule that a course of action,
+correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action
+for its attainment.
+
+A further example may occur when the higher commander, instead of
+indicating both the task and the predetermined course of action,
+indicates only the latter (page 86), by directing "Capture X Island".
+Once the subordinate has recognized this directive as containing a
+predetermined course of action, but not a normal task, he realizes
+that the objective so indicated would ordinarily be left for him to
+select. He also realizes that the action to be taken for its
+attainment is left for him to determine, in further detail.
+
+In this case, then, what is really a predetermined course of action
+appears in the guise of a task. When the commander, receiving the
+directive, has recognized this fact, he proceeds in the manner
+hereafter indicated (page 103) in the discussion of the analysis of
+courses of action.
+
+In any event, it is manifest that here, also, there is no exception
+to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the
+two elements of objective and action for its attainment.
+
+In such a case as the foregoing, how does the commander recognize that
+the apparent task is really a predetermined course of action? He could
+easily go astray because the directive, until analyzed, appears to
+contain a normal task. The directive indicates an objective, thereby
+resembling a task. The directive will usually indicate, at least in
+some degree, the action which the subordinate is to take. Hence, so
+far as superficial appearance is concerned, the subordinate commander
+may easily mistake the predetermined course of action for a normal
+task. However, he discovers the difference when he endeavors to find
+courses of action which are appropriate to this apparent task.
+
+The commander will then discover that, while he can visualize actions
+whose accomplishment will attain the objective indicated in the
+apparent task, he cannot visualize any objective completely suitable
+to the case (page 93), intermediate between the assigned objective and
+the indicated action. He can state the assigned objective in other
+words and adopt such a statement as an expression of his general
+objective, but the two objectives, the one he selects and the assigned
+one, will really be identical.
+
+This inability to visualize an objective of the commander's own
+selection, suitable to the case, is inevitable, because higher
+authority has already done this for him. He may find it advisable to
+develop further the action needed for the attainment of the indicated
+objective. On occasion this, also, will have been predetermined by the
+higher commander.
+
+The foregoing considerations have been given special emphasis and
+deserve careful study, because an appreciation of these facts is
+necessary to a true understanding of the nature of correctly conceived
+courses of action.
+
+Analysis and Selection of Courses of Action. After one or more courses
+of action have been determined as tentative solutions of his problem,
+the commander will be confronted with the necessity of deciding upon
+that course of action, or combination of courses of action, which will
+best attain the assigned objective, i.e., be the best way out of the
+seeming difficulty. The analysis, in each case, will settle
+suitability on the basis of the appropriate effect desired,
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength as established
+by a survey of means available and opposed, influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater, and acceptability on the basis of
+consequences as to costs.
+
+In connection with these considerations, the detailed operations
+involved in each course will be analyzed so far as may be necessary
+(page 95) and with respect to correct physical objectives,
+advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting
+strength, and adequate freedom of action (see the Fundamental Military
+Principle--page 41). A selection shown to be best, from the standpoint
+of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the consequences,
+will be adopted as the decision.
+
+The tests of courses of action to determine whether they fulfill the
+requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability as
+to consequences take account of the usual included determinants as
+listed and explained below. The list is not rigid, and the commander,
+according to the nature of his problem, may desire to omit certain of
+the items or to include any other considerations which may be
+applicable.
+
+With respect to suitability, the commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The test for suitability (see also page 31)
+    calls for conformity as to both the nature and the scope of
+    the motivating task. With respect to conformity in nature,
+    the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+    action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+    contribute to the accomplishment of the task. As to scope,
+    the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+    action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+    accomplish the task in full; and, if not in full, to what
+    extent. The factor of urgency is also considered here.
+
+    It is frequently possible for the commander, merely by
+    concentrating his thought on this particular perplexity, to
+    conclude at once that the course of action is suitable. In
+    other cases, a considerable amount of study may be needed.
+    This analytical study consists in breaking down the course of
+    action into its component parts, i.e., the detailed operations
+    which naturally grow out of it. This procedure is similar to
+    that described later (Chapter VII), with respect to
+    formulating a plan, but during the basic estimate the
+    procedure, when utilized, is for a different reason--solely
+    that of assisting in the analysis.
+
+    (2) Details, (a) Conformity as to nature. Will the course of
+    action, if successfully carried out, contribute, at least in
+    some degree, to the accomplishment of the task? If not, such a
+    course is rejected. Courses that do contribute, however, are
+    not rejected until the possibilities of combination have been
+    examined, later.
+
+    (b) Completeness. If the course of action is successfully
+    carried out, will it accomplish in full the motivating task?
+    If not, how much will it contribute towards such
+    accomplishment? With what other courses of action can it be
+    combined, to accomplish the motivating task in full? With what
+    others can it be combined to accomplish the motivating task in
+    part, and in such case how nearly does the combination
+    contribute to full accomplishment?
+
+    This examination may lead to combinations of certain partial
+    solutions.
+
+    (c) Desirability as to Urgency. The commander now considers
+    the element of time. Complete accomplishment of the motivating
+    task within his own theater may come too late to meet the
+    requirements of the common effort of the entire force.
+    Synchronization with the action of other task-group commanders
+    may be so important that timing becomes vital. As to this
+    consideration, two courses of action, equally competent, may
+    differ greatly in their qualification relating to urgency; one
+    may be found highly desirable and the other completely
+    unsatisfactory.
+
+As to feasibility, the commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The test for feasibility (see page 31) is
+    concerned with whether the course of action is practicable.
+    Has it reasonable chances of success under the particular
+    circumstances? Are the difficulties surmountable? Is it
+    easily practicable, practicable with some difficulty, or very
+    difficult?
+
+    The commander, if he concludes that the course of action is
+    not a practicable one, rejects it from further consideration
+    in the estimate of the situation. However, care is taken at
+    this point not to dismiss, abruptly, courses of action which
+    may later be combined advantageously with one or more others.
+
+    Here, again, as noted for the suitability test, the commander
+    may sometimes profitably analyze the course of action by
+    breaking it down into more detailed operations.
+
+    As a result of the tests discussed above, the commander is
+    able to make a list of courses of action upon which his
+    confirmed judgment has bestowed the qualities of suitability
+    and feasibility.
+
+    He is also able to take stock to see how many of the solutions
+    are complete, how many are incomplete, and in the latter case
+    to what extent they constitute partial solutions. It is, of
+    course, desirable to have as many complete solutions as
+    possible, and at this point it may be possible to merge two or
+    more incomplete solutions into a single course of action which
+    better fulfills the test of suitability. The commander can
+    also take stock, similarly, of the degree of feasibility,
+    already referred to, as to the retained courses of action.
+
+    (2) Details, (a) Prospects of Success. Here the several courses
+    of action are considered relatively, with respect to the chance
+    of success in each. In the rating of courses on this basis,
+    the commander excludes consideration of losses except as they
+    may influence success or failure. He notes, however, his
+    considered expectations as to losses. Losses may appear to be
+    so great that success is doubtful. Certain courses of action
+    may be particularly vulnerable to enemy opposition because of
+    the types of weapons involved or because of favorable enemy
+    positions. Choice of such a course would permit the enemy an
+    initial advantage.
+
+    (b) Facility of Execution. This subject has to do with the
+    relative ease or difficulty of carrying out the several
+    courses of action. On the basis of the existing situation,
+    each course of action may be compared with all the others to
+    determine their relative merits with regard to the facility of
+    execution. Consideration is given to the action involved
+    against the several physical objectives; to the movements
+    needed in making new dispositions; to the relative adequacy of
+    the forces as to numbers and types of weapons; and to the
+    measures required for freedom of action.
+
+    A review of the previous discussion of these elements (Chapter
+    IV) may be very helpful in connection with this comparison. As
+    to freedom of action, for example, the commander may ask
+    himself which course is best from the standpoint of using the
+    initiative to advantage; and which course of action lends
+    itself best to the advantageous use of surprise. As the
+    commander reflects on these matters, other similar questions
+    may be suggested.
+
+    (c) Utilization of Own Strength and Exploitation of Enemy
+    Weakness. In his original visualization of each course of
+    action, the commander has naturally considered how to utilize
+    his own strength to best advantage, and how best to exploit
+    enemy weakness. In fact, especially in a detailed tactical
+    estimate, these considerations may have been predominant in
+    envisaging the courses of action. A careful evaluation of the
+    merits of each course of action in this respect is accordingly
+    necessary before a choice is made.
+
+With regard to acceptability of consequences as to costs, the
+commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The process of putting a course of action to
+    proof as a tentative solution of the problem remains
+    incomplete until the course has been tested to determine its
+    consequences as to costs, so far as these can be visualized
+    in advance. The process involves an evaluation of the
+    diminution in total advantage which will result in the event
+    of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the
+    event of success. The situation to be expected, if the course
+    of action is carried out, is visualized in order to determine
+    the future effect on the creation or maintenance of an
+    ultimately favorable military situation.
+
+    In testing each course of action for acceptability as to its
+    consequences (page 31), the commander considers the cost of
+    success, the cost of failure, and the possible gain and loss
+    in perspective with the united effort as a whole. Questions
+    which he may pose include: If the course of action is
+    successful, will the costs be so prohibitive as to adversely
+    affect the successful accomplishment of the further effort? If
+    a tactical situation is under consideration, will the costs
+    prevent the accomplishment of the strategical aim? If the
+    course of action fails, what will be its effect? Will it cause
+    the entire plan to fail? Will its failure affect, for example,
+    the national morale?
+
+    If the command--and ultimately the State--can afford the
+    losses and other disadvantages which will be incurred as a
+    result of either the success or the failure of the
+    contemplated effort, a course of action may be considered as
+    acceptable from the standpoint of consequences as to costs.
+
+    As previously noted with respect to suitability, it may be
+    desirable to consider, with regard to consequences, the
+    detailed operations which may be involved in each course of
+    action.
+
+    Courses of action involving excessive consequences as to costs
+    are rejected. Notation is made of the relative degree of
+    acceptability, with respect to consequences as to costs, of
+    those courses of action which are retained.
+
+    (2) Details. (a) The Results of Success and of Failure. Each
+    course of action is examined to visualize the situation which
+    would be brought about for the commander and for the enemy in
+    case of success or of failure. The relative possibilities of
+    recovery toward a more favorable situation are weighed. This
+    consideration involves relative risks, for it may be that a
+    certain course, otherwise satisfactory, might entail
+    intolerable conditions should failure ensue.
+
+    The costs are measured in terms of fighting strength. It has
+    to be considered whether the sacrifices involved are worth the
+    gains which will follow; whether the objectives if attained
+    will be sufficiently valuable when the need of fighting
+    strength to accomplish further aims is considered.
+
+    (b) Comparison of gains and costs. When costs are found to be
+    in excess of the over-all gains, this fact may be the basis
+    for rejecting any courses of action which are less desirable
+    than others. However, retention of a course found to be costly
+    may be justified for sound reasons.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+When, as in the example given previously (page 96), the commander
+receives a directive such as "Deny enemy base sites in the area ABCD
+by capturing X Island", he carries through his estimate of the
+situation in the usual manner. He notes, however, that the capture of
+X Island has been indicated as a predetermined course of action. He
+makes a proper survey of the factors of relative fighting strength. He
+considers all pertinent courses of action. He goes through this
+procedure in order to reach an understanding of all the elements of
+his problem. He wishes to understand the necessary background. He
+realizes the importance of a grasp of the considerations which have
+led higher authority to arrive at the predetermined course of action.
+
+By carrying through the usual estimate procedure, including the
+analysis of all pertinent courses of action, he assists himself to
+arrive at a proper concept of the action to be taken to capture X
+island. In this way he establishes a sound basis for formulating a
+detailed plan (in the second step), for inaugurating planned action
+(in the third step), and for supervising this action (in the fourth
+step). He also establishes a basis for any constructive
+representations which he finds it advisable to make to higher
+authority (page 15).
+
+In another example previously given (page 96), the higher commander
+indicates only the predetermined course of action (by a directive
+"Capture X Island") and omits the statement of the true underlying
+task. The subordinate, on discovering this fact, deduces the
+underlying task and carries through the estimate procedure, modified,
+as explained for the previous example. In addition to the merits as
+previously stated, this method has a further advantage. The deduction
+of the underlying task enables the commander to judge whether any
+advisable or necessary deviation or departure from the predetermined
+course of action (page 15) involves merely a variation from the letter
+of his instructions or, more important, from their spirit.
+
+For instance, the directive, as in the case previously discussed, may
+have been "Capture X Island". The higher commander when issuing this
+order, may have stated his own general plan to be "This force will
+protect the base at A." The commander, on receipt of this directive,
+then deduces his true task. This is "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD"
+("by capturing X Island"--a predetermined course of action), the
+purpose of the mission being "in order to protect the base at A".
+
+Now it may be found that the enemy, unconcerned as to X Island, is
+moving to reinforce Y Island and to use it as a base to attack the
+base at A. The commander then properly decides to capture Y Island,
+instead of X Island. By his identification of the predetermined course
+of action as such, and by his correct deduction of the true underlying
+task, the commander has established a sound basis for the solution of
+his problem. He can now, with confidence, defer or abandon the capture
+of X Island, and can devote his efforts to the capture of Y Island.
+His confidence is justified because he knows his decision to be in
+accordance with the spirit of his instructions.
+
+Naturally, if the higher commander directed, "This force will protect
+the base at A----", and added, later in his directive, "Deny enemy
+base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island", the subordinate
+commander's deductions would have been made more easily.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The full play of the reasoning power is called for in the process of
+visualizing courses of action and of selecting the best. This process
+is the crux of the first step. Here the knowledge of the relationship
+between cause and effect is applied. Here, also, the commander is
+brought fully to realize that, to reach a sound decision, there is a
+requirement for a studied development of each stage by which the human
+mind passes from recognition of a necessity for action to the ultimate
+conviction as to the best course to pursue.
+
+As essential background for the utilization of his intellectual powers
+in this process, the commander requires knowledge of the capabilities
+and limitations of the technique of his profession and of the weapons
+of his calling. To the necessary knowledge gained through his own
+experience, either in actual warfare or in peacetime exercises
+simulating this experience, he adds the equally essential familiarity
+with the science of war, and with the lessons to be drawn from
+historical instances of success and failure. In effect, it is here
+brought home to him that, on a fundamental basis of earnest thought,
+mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests
+the soundness of decision (see page 219).
+
+The Decision. The word "decision" has the primary meaning of a
+conclusion. A decision (conclusion) is essential as a starting point
+for further procedure. Sound decision is the essential preliminary to
+wise planning and effective action.
+
+The range within which military decisions may fall extends from the
+instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to the conditional
+intentions of a distant future. Within this range will be found many
+decisions which the commander is necessarily called upon to reach
+during the four steps toward the attainment of an assigned objective.
+
+The course of action, or the combination of courses, as finally
+selected by the commander upon the termination of the first step,
+represents his conclusion as to his outlined plan for the attainment
+of his assigned objective. This conclusion will indicate, specifically
+or inferentially, his general objective, as selected by himself,
+and--in proper detail--the action required for its attainment. (See
+pages 88 and 95). The conclusion is thus his Decision, which provides
+the general plan, or the basis therefor, from which he will, in the
+second step, develop a detailed plan of operations for his force.
+
+Illustration of the foregoing process may profitably be initiated with
+respect to the highest echelon involved in the case of a State. The
+primary national objective of organized government (Chapter I, page 7)
+is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for
+the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community.
+This aim, as embodied in basic policy (see pages 8 and 9), is the
+objective visualized by the people of the State, or by its
+policy-forming elements, in the capacity of an organized government.
+
+For the maintenance of the condition represented in this policy, or
+for the creation of such a condition not already existing, an
+appropriate task of the State, as the political embodiment of the
+national will, might be to maintain or establish friendly (at least,
+not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of
+the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise.
+
+The national mission (the mission of the State) then becomes:--
+
+    (Task) To maintain or establish friendly (at least, not
+        hostile) governments and social systems In those key
+        localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective
+        threats may arise,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to ensure envisaged prosperity and
+        essential security for the social system which is the
+        fundamental basis of the community.
+
+A national estimate of the situation, by the highest authority of the
+State, to determine the effect to be attained for the accomplishment
+of the foregoing mission, takes account of the possibilities of
+accomplishment through psychological, political, economic, or military
+pressure, or by combinations thereof. As a result of this accounting,
+the State adopts a national Decision which indicates the best way of
+accomplishing its mission.
+
+To carry out this Decision, each of the primary subdivisions of the
+State's organization is assigned a specific task or tasks, whose total
+effect is designed to achieve the result embodied in the national
+Decision. The task of each such primary subdivision is linked to a
+purpose which is the attainment of the objective indicated in the
+national Decision.
+
+In like manner, each organization of the national armed forces is
+governed in its action by a task assigned to it as a result of a
+Decision made by the proper authority on the next higher echelon. Each
+commander is thus provided with a mission which consists of an
+assigned task and of a purpose as indicated by the general objective
+decided upon by his immediate superior.
+
+
+The Second Step
+
+The second step, that of resolving the required action into detailed
+military operations, may now be undertaken unless the Decision reached
+in the first step is intended for future reference only. During the
+second step the commander, if he carries the procedure through to its
+logical end, visualizes his proposed operations as tasks, in order to
+ensure their proper formulation. He may, if it is his intent to issue
+a directive or directives for the execution of his plan of operation,
+or a part thereof, arrange his procedure so as to facilitate the third
+step.
+
+The common characteristic of problems of the second step is that they
+deal with matters pertaining to the support of the action decided upon
+in the first step, and that they are properly problems for the
+commander who made that Decision, and not for his subordinates, to
+solve. Such problems are appropriately termed subsidiary problems.
+Their full solution involves subsidiary estimates, subsidiary
+decisions, and, not infrequently, distinct subsidiary plans and
+subsidiary directives.
+
+Each detailed operation derived, during the second step, from the
+outlined plan of operations (as embodied in the basic Decision) is
+determined upon the basis of an estimate procedure essentially similar
+to the basic estimate. There is thus a series of subsidiary estimates
+for this purpose. Such estimates tend to be abbreviated and informal,
+since the necessary data, and often much of the consideration as to
+the subsidiary courses of action, may be available from the basic
+estimate.
+
+Unless the detailed operations are of such a character as to require
+development into subsidiary plans as a basis for subsidiary
+directives, such operations are merely embodied, in the form of tasks
+or otherwise as may be appropriate, in the basic plan. In the excepted
+cases, where subsidiary plans, in detailed form, are necessary or
+desirable, such a plan may be the result of a more formal and
+specialized subsidiary estimate.
+
+Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the second step.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The problem involved in the first step has been conveniently termed
+the basic problem because it is directly concerned with the attainment
+of the assigned objective (page 81). The solution of the basic problem
+in the first step, and of its corollary in the second step, completes
+the planning stage.
+
+
+The Third Step
+
+The third step consists of the formulation, and--if appropriate--the
+issue, of the directives which convey to the subordinate the will and
+intent of the commander. From the mental standpoint, the third step
+begins when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating
+his directives for the execution of the planned action. Whether or not
+the third step is partially combined with the second, its problem is a
+separate one. Its complete solution inaugurates the action planned in
+the second step.
+
+The third step is discussed and developed in Chapter VIII.
+
+
+The Fourth Step
+
+The fourth step, which calls for mental effort in the solution of the
+problem of supervising the action, requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation. The procedure
+employed is customarily termed The Running Estimate of the Situation.
+Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the
+directives of the third step. In effect, the commander, after action
+is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the
+problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation.
+With the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to
+detect whether variations from the original situation are in
+accordance with his design or whether these variations have introduced
+new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or
+its complete abandonment.
+
+The fourth step is discussed and developed in Chapter IX.
+
+
+Sequence of Events in the Four Steps
+
+When all of the elements of the entire procedure of the four steps are
+present, they take, from the viewpoint of the same commander
+throughout, the following form:
+
+(1) First step: The commander, confronted with a strategical situation
+(page 83), makes a strategical estimate and comes to a strategical
+Decision. The problem, the estimate, and the Decision are basic.
+
+(2) Second step: The commander now is confronted with a particular
+problem, one proceeding from his basic problem and involving the
+details of a plan of execution to carry out the Decision reached in
+the first step; this problem consists, itself, of numerous other
+problems of detail, which require solution by the commander himself.
+The basic Decision has embodied an outlined plan, strategical in
+nature, for an operation to accomplish the motivating task of the
+first step. This plan requires resolution into the detailed operations
+necessary for its full accomplishment.
+
+Each such detailed operation, as part of the outlined plan embodied in
+the strategical Decision, calls for a proper estimate. Though usually
+not formal in nature, more especially if the necessary data can be
+found in the basic estimate, such estimates are fundamentally the same
+as for the basic problem. The assembly of such detailed operations
+results in the formulation of a basic plan.
+
+At this point, additional problems may present themselves, these being
+frequently tactical in nature. Such, for example, may be sortie plans,
+approach plans, and Battle Plans. Other specialized plans (training,
+intelligence, logistics, etc.) may be needed. The data essential for
+the solution of such problems are more detailed than for the usual
+strategical basic problem. In some instances, such subsidiary plans
+may be developed directly from the basic Decision by procedures
+distinctive of the second step. In other instances, solution may
+require an additional subsidiary estimate, along the lines typical of
+the first step. These subsidiary estimates lead to subsidiary
+decisions, which in turn require to be resolved into the necessary
+detailed operations.
+
+(3) Third step: In the third step, the directives, if the basic
+problem was strategical in nature, will be of a strategical character.
+However, if subsidiary tactical problems were also involved, tactical
+directives will frequently be included. Logistics directives and other
+specialized instructions may also be a feature.
+
+(4) Fourth step: The supervision of the planned action, in the fourth
+step, may involve a new strategical problem, perhaps several. In such
+event each new basic problem will initiate a new series of problems,
+with corresponding directives, as described above. Changes in
+strategical plans may be called for. If no strategical changes are
+involved, there may nevertheless be introduced one or more new
+tactical or logistics problems, with corresponding changes in the
+subsequent procedure. The fourth step may, however, merely involve
+changes in supporting plans (tactical, logistics, etc.), with
+resultant changes in the directives involved. Finally, the fourth step
+may involve changes, for clarification, in the directives formulated
+in the third step.
+
+Variations in the foregoing procedure are frequent. The most usual is
+perhaps the case where the commander, receiving a tactical (instead of
+a strategical) mission, solves such a tactical problem as a basic
+problem in the first step; resolves his Decision into detailed
+tactical operations in the second step; issues a tactical directive or
+directives in the third step; and supervises his planned tactical
+action in the fourth step.
+
+Phraseology as to "Course of Action", "Operation", and "Task". It is
+important to avoid the possibility of becoming confused because each
+of the terms "a course of action", "an operation", and "a task", is
+correctly visualized as "an act or a series of acts". In the first
+step, the selected course of action (see page 104) indicates the "act
+or series of acts" decided upon as representing, in general terms, an
+effort for attainment of a specified objective and is therefore stated
+as a comprehensive method of attaining that objective. The Decision
+thus adopts this course of action as a general plan of operations, or
+as a basis therefor.
+
+In the second step, the required action is developed to place it upon
+a practical, workable basis as a detailed plan to be executed. The
+"act or series of acts" represented by the selected "course of action"
+has now become a detailed "act or series of acts". As such, it is now
+susceptible of being assigned, in whole or in part, to subordinate
+commanders as "tasks". The cycle within that particular echelon is
+completed when the tasks are thus assigned. The commander has thereby
+charged his immediate subordinates with the commission of specific
+"acts or series of acts".
+
+Each such subordinate commander necessarily decides on the best method
+of accomplishing his assigned task, i.e., on the course of action (act
+or series of acts) which will best accomplish the effort required of
+him. The procedure (for each commander on that echelon) thus begins
+anew until an echelon is reached where the character of the required
+action has already been determined as a matter of routine (see page
+84).
+
+
+The Use of a Form in the Solution of Problems
+
+The natural mental processes (see page 19) are employed in all of the
+four steps. The processes, in each step, require modification to an
+extent dependent upon the factors to be evaluated.
+
+A form has been adopted for the application of the mental processes in
+the first step. This form, long known to the military profession as
+The outline of The Estimate of The Situation (see Appendix), sets
+forth in a logical manner and order the several considerations likely
+to influence the selection of correct military objectives in problems
+of wide, as well as of lesser, scope. The use of this form is
+conducive to uniformity of reasoning. It centers the attention upon
+essentials, in order to ensure that no material factor bearing on the
+solution of the problem is overlooked. It guides thought along a
+specific path and, through the influence of suggestion, deliberately
+increases the expenditure of mental effort.
+
+The procedure indicated in the form contributes to the Decision
+reached as a result of an Estimate of the Situation, only to the
+extent that it provides an outline for, and encouragement of,
+systematic analysis and reasoning.
+
+To prove successful in stimulating rather than stifling creative
+thought, flexibility is a characteristic of any form capable of
+application in such dissimilar circumstances as may be presented by
+the varying scope of military problems. The Estimate Form is such a
+flexible guide. If a commander, in solving a problem, feels the need
+of greater flexibility, he may, of course, modify or adapt the form to
+his particular needs. In so doing, however, he bears in mind that
+departure from orderly processes of reasoning, on which the form is
+based, tends, through possible neglect of fundamental considerations,
+to lead to the omission of essential features of the analysis.
+
+On the other hand, a rigid following of the form may frequently cause
+much repetition. This may be avoided, unless desired for emphasis or
+other appropriate reasons, by reference back to preceding portions of
+the estimate. It is also to be noted, however, that the Estimate Form
+is adapted to a progressive procedure. Very frequently the earlier
+consideration of some aspect of the problem can later be expanded both
+in scope and in proper detail by reason of additional information
+which has become available during the intervening stages of the
+procedure.
+
+The distinction between certain strategical and tactical problems
+(page 83) may introduce variations in the handling of the Estimate
+Form, and may affect the weight to be given the various factors. The
+use of the Estimate Form, as described in Chapter VI, applies in full
+to problems which embrace the complete scope of broad strategical
+concepts. It is suitable also for problems of limited scope, for which
+certain modifications or abbreviations are required. When applied to
+problems of a detailed tactical nature, the emphasis on the factors of
+fighting strength is somewhat different from that for strategical
+problems. For certain subsidiary problems (page 106), the Form may be
+closely applicable or may require considerable adaptation. In no case
+is it difficult to modify the Form to suit the requirements of the
+problem.
+
+An estimate of a relatively broad strategical situation may normally
+be reduced to writing, because time is usually available. On the other
+hand, an estimate of a localized tactical situation frequently
+requires almost instantaneous decision. Except in the preparation of
+plans to meet contingencies, such an estimate can rarely be given the
+elaborate form frequent in estimates of situations which are broadly
+strategical in nature. When such tactical plans are prepared well in
+advance of the event, the commander bases the estimate upon various
+assumptions as to the circumstances of a probable situation.
+
+The written solution of tactical situations under various assumptions
+is a valuable feature of training to this end.
+
+During the second step, i.e., the resolution of the action, as
+embodied in the Decision, into the detailed operations required, the
+method considered most helpful is to arrange the procedure on the
+basis of the salient features of a military operation (page 39 and
+Section III of Chapter IV). This procedure facilitates not only the
+determination of the necessary operations, but also the later
+formulation of directives.
+
+The second step, like the first, makes use of the estimate procedure.
+This is inevitable, in view of the fact that the mental processes are
+identical (page 106) for the solution of the problem of both steps.
+
+The application of the estimate procedure to the second step may be
+tested, aside from the logic of the theory involved, by careful
+analysis of examples. For instance, if the basic Decision was to
+determine the location of enemy forces in the area ABCD, this becomes
+the basis for a plan embodying the best method of determining the
+location of such enemy forces (an operation, or a series of
+operations). One method of procedure (course of action) to achieve
+this objective may be to search the area by aircraft; another may
+involve a search by cruisers; another by destroyers; another by
+submarines; etc. The operation or operations finally determined upon
+may be any one of these, or a combination of two or more of them,
+perhaps of all of them. The fundamental procedure leading to this
+conclusion is identical with that of the basic estimate.
+
+There are a number of possible variations of the fundamental mental
+processes applicable to the second step, according to the facility and
+the preference of the commander. Practice seems to develop such
+facility (see also page 94) that entire plans, each properly
+integrated with respect to physical objectives, relative positions,
+apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, may be
+visualized separately from each other.
+
+At the other extreme, the elementary procedure is to utilize these
+salient features of such a plan, successively, to suggest detailed
+operations. The features after the first are then used either to adapt
+or to complete the operations suggested by preceding features, or to
+suggest new operations. This elementary procedure, being the simpler
+and more methodical of the two, is the one explained hereafter
+(Chapter VII).
+
+However, there are various possibilities as to procedures intermediate
+between these extremes. One such procedure would visualize operations
+primarily on the basis of correct physical objectives, adapting and
+completing such operations by reference to the other features; the
+procedure would then utilize relative positions, etc., to suggest
+additional operations, which in turn may be similarly adapted or
+completed. The commander is of course at liberty to use the procedure
+best suited to his own working methods and to the particular
+situation; naturally, he bears full responsibility for any errors due
+to a faulty choice of procedure.
+
+From the standpoint of the exercise of mental power in the solution of
+military problems, the second step may be taken to include the
+assembly of the commander's conclusions in the form of directives. The
+third step begins, however (page 107), when the commander forms the
+intent of immediately promulgating such directives.
+
+The third step makes use of the Order Form. In our naval service, this
+form is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written
+directives pertaining to operations other than routine. The subject
+matter is presented in a logical sequence which experience has shown
+to be effective. The Order Form assists in the solution of the problem
+by providing a comprehensive vehicle with which all echelons are
+familiar.
+
+In the fourth step, i.e., the supervision of the planned action, the
+prime essential is the maintenance by the commander of a Running
+Estimate (page 107). For this purpose there is a definite technique of
+which the Estimate Form provides the basis, and by means of which the
+solution of this important problem is aided.
+
+
+Conclusion As To the Approach to the Solution of Military Problems
+
+The foregoing considerations indicate that planned attainment of a
+military objective requires the application of mental effort in four
+distinct steps.
+
+The sequence of the four steps necessarily is fixed because of the
+consequential relationship among the problems typical of the several
+steps. The mission, in the first step, furnishes the nature of the
+appropriate effect desired. Until modified or revoked by higher
+authority, it clearly remains the governing influence throughout the
+entire range of mental effort which, in conjunction with the moral and
+physical effort, is calculated to result finally in the attainment of
+the assigned objective.
+
+The procedure involved, being natural and universal, is fundamentally
+the same even in those tactical situations where the commander
+performs all of the steps in almost instantaneous succession. The
+Estimate Form, as presented herein, is adaptable to military problems
+of any nature. The systematic approach represented in the Form is
+subject to adaptation by the competent commander--provided that the
+essentials are preserved--in any manner appropriate to his personal
+preference and to the nature of his particular problem.
+
+The essentials of the military Estimate of the Situation, as a
+specialized use of the natural mental processes, are inherent in the
+proper application of the Fundamental Military Principle (see page
+82). The Estimate Form merely provides a more detailed guide for the
+use of the Principle. Facility in the use of the Principle will enable
+the competent commander, once he has formed a proper understanding of
+the basis for solution of a problem, to solve the problem correctly
+without reference to the Estimate Form. Reference to the Form may be
+necessary in problems of broad scope, in order to ensure a complete
+survey of factors of fighting strength. Time, in such cases, is
+usually available for purposes of a detailed study. Subject to this
+exception, the Principle, alone, may be used effectively as a basis
+for sound military decision,--a fact of particular significance where
+time (page 22) is an element of immediate concern.
+
+That this procedure may be successfully and repeatedly applied in the
+fast-moving events of the decisive tactical engagement is, more
+particularly, the goal of mental preparation for the exercise of
+command.
+
+
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+IN PLANNING
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE SELECTION OF A CORRECT OBJECTIVE
+
+(Including the Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+for its Attainment)
+
+The First Step--The Solution of a Basic Problem (The Estimate of the
+Situation)
+
+    The type of problem distinctive of the first step, now to be
+    discussed, is a basic problem. It is the most likely type when
+    an organized chain of command is in effective operation, the
+    incentive for solution being derived from a directive issued
+    by higher authority (Chapter V).
+
+    The problem of the first step is described by the question,
+    "What objective should I select, and what action (in outline)
+    should I take for its attainment, in order to achieve the
+    objective assigned to me by higher authority?"
+
+
+The procedure for solution of the type of problem distinctive of the
+first step is that already indicated as applicable to all military
+problems, i.e., a specialized employment of the natural mental
+processes (Chapter II) through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. The studied application of the Principle is
+assisted through the Estimate Form which provides a more detailed
+guide.
+
+The fundamentals of the Estimate Form have already been discussed
+(Chapter V). Except for emphasis, or to afford a basis for further
+detailed discussion, the basic matters previously dealt with are not
+repeated in the present chapter. It is therefore advisable, before
+studying the details applicable to the first step, to make an adequate
+review of the pertinent portions of the preceding chapter. With the
+necessary background thus provided, the Estimate Form can be followed
+with a minimum of distraction caused by reference to related subjects.
+
+For special emphasis, it is repeated here (see also page 110) that the
+Estimate Form is a flexible guide. The commander is of course at
+liberty to vary the procedure according to his particular needs and
+the nature of his problem; however, he will bear in mind that errors
+of commission or of omission arising by reason of departure from the
+essential features of the procedure may disrupt orderly reasoning.
+
+The Estimate Form is divided into sections and sub-sections, each of
+which presents a subject for consideration. The Form follows,
+sequentially, the salient features of the natural mental process
+described in Chapter II. It will be seen, from an examination of the
+section headings listed below, that Section I has to do with
+establishing the basis for solution of the problem; Sections II, III,
+and IV relate to the actual process of solution through consideration
+of various courses of action; while Section V states the conclusion
+reached.
+
+    I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.
+
+    II. Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and Acceptable
+        Courses of Action.
+
+    III. Examination into the Capabilities of the Enemy.
+
+    IV. Selection of the Best Course of Action.
+
+    V. The Decision.
+
+A tabular form inserted in the Appendix lists the foregoing headings
+and their principal subdivisions within the Estimate Form. For
+convenience, the appended Form also includes page references to the
+discussion in this chapter.
+
+
+SECTION I
+
+ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
+
+As noted in the Fundamental Military Principle, each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, requires
+examination from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability. Suitability involves the factor of the appropriate
+effect desired; feasibility involves the factors of the means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater; and acceptability involves the factor of the consequences as
+to costs.
+
+In order to establish a sound basis for the solution of a military
+problem, one which will permit the tests for suitability, feasibility,
+and acceptability (see pages 98-102) to be intelligently applied, it
+is necessary that the factors involved be studied.
+
+
+A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.
+
+The appropriate effect desired, the first factor listed, is the goal
+toward which the commander is working. He is enabled to form an
+understanding of this essential aspect of his problem through (1) a
+grasp of the salient features of the situation, (2) a recognition of
+the incentive to solution, and (3) an appreciation of the assigned
+objective. He expresses this understanding by (4) formulating the
+mission.
+
+The sequence in which the commander takes up these considerations is a
+matter for his own choice. Usually, directives from higher authority
+(see Chapter VIII as to the Order Form) give him, first, information
+as to the situation; thereafter, such directives assign him a task (or
+tasks) involving one or more assigned objectives. For this reason, the
+sequence so indicated is the one utilized here.
+
+(1) Summary of the Situation. Before the commander can decide whether
+he wishes to maintain the existing situation or to change it, he
+requires a mental picture of its salient features. On beginning the
+Estimate, the available information is therefore briefly summarized.
+The picture presented here will show in broad outline (page 79) the
+opposing forces as disposed in localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other. Details are reserved for
+Section I-B of the Estimate.
+
+The appropriate data are noted on the chart, and study of the chart
+goes hand in hand with the development of the Estimate.
+
+The summary of the situation may include statements as to present
+activities of own and enemy forces. It may recite significant
+occurrences. It does not attempt to compare or to deduce; such
+processes are deferred until Section I-B. The commander extracts, from
+the information furnished by higher authority, such data as are
+pertinent to his own problem. He includes these data in his own
+summary, supplementing them by information from other sources, to the
+extent deemed advisable. In the exercise of judgment as to the content
+of his summary, the commander is influenced by the fact that the
+summary is the point of departure for visualizing the appropriate
+effect desired.
+
+(2) Recognition of the Incentive. In basic problems (the type now
+under discussion, see page 117), the commander finds his incentive in
+directives received from higher authority. Under the procedure of the
+Estimate, a notation of that fact, with a citation of the
+directive(s), is all that is required to indicate that the commander
+has formed a proper recognition of his incentive.
+
+(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective. A correct understanding of
+the nature and of the involvements of the assigned objective is,
+naturally, an essential to the establishment of the basis for the
+solution of a problem of the first step.
+
+At this stage of the Estimate the commander cannot, however, expect
+always to reach a final conclusion as to this matter. He will have
+opportunity for further consideration, later, in Section II. It will
+be realized that, after intervening portions of the Estimate have been
+worked out, the commander will be in a position to examine the
+assigned objective again, and to make a more thorough analysis.
+
+In a basic problem, the commander is assigned his objective by higher
+authority, usually in the form of an assigned task. Although, as
+stated on page 84, such task may be expressed by one of various
+methods, a properly conceived task always indicates, either
+specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives).
+
+Whatever method of expression may have been employed by higher
+authority, the commander will facilitate his appreciation of the
+assigned objective if he now sets down his assigned task, scrutinizes
+it carefully, and then makes note of the objective which is either
+specifically or inferentially indicated by that task. (See pages
+52-54).
+
+The commander's basis for solving the problem is not complete,
+however, with merely a statement of his own objective. Full
+visualization of the effect desired is not obtained until the
+commander appreciates not only the result which he, himself, is
+required to accomplish, but also the next further result which is
+expected to eventuate as, at least in part, an effect of his
+accomplishment. His goal, as an "effect desired", includes not only
+the effect desired of him by higher authority, but also the effect
+which his immediate superior desires to be accomplished by that
+superior's entire force.
+
+Occasionally, full appreciation of the commander's objective will
+require, also, consideration of the further effects desired by yet
+higher successive echelons.
+
+The natural requirement is that the goal be so clearly defined as to
+obviate any material doubt as to the implications involved in the
+commander's assigned objective. When the goal has been thus defined,
+there results a linking of effect and further effect, of objective and
+further objective,--in short, of task and purpose,--the importance of
+which has previously been emphasized (page 48).
+
+In making notation of this further objective for the solution of
+problems typical of the first step, the commander normally sets down
+the general plan of his immediate superior for the employment of the
+latter's entire force. When the linking of objective to objective,
+echelon by echelon, has involved no complication, the immediate
+superior's general plan will be a sufficient indication of the
+purpose for which the commander is to carry out his task.
+
+(4) Formulation of the Mission.
+
+The linking of the commander's assigned task to the general plan of
+his immediate superior permits the commander to formulate his mission
+(page 87). His assigned task becomes the task of his mission; his
+superior's general plan becomes the purpose of his mission. In this
+manner he crystallizes into a clear statement the part of the common
+effort which he is to carry out, indicating the assigned objective he
+is himself to attain, as well as the further objective to whose
+attainment his effort is to contribute.
+
+In establishing the basis for solution of his problem with respect to
+suitability, the commander may have considered his assigned objective
+before studying his situation. If so, he may now desire to modify his
+earlier statement of that objective, before incorporating it in the
+formulation of his mission, to the end that a more clear-cut and
+concise expression may be obtained.
+
+The relationship (restated from page 87 for emphasis) is expressed in
+the following;
+
+    My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of
+    carrying out my designated part of my superior's general plan.
+
+This formula is customarily simplified to the following:
+
+    (Task) (statement of the assigned task),
+
+    (Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of
+    (statement of the superior's general plan).
+
+The words "assist in the successful execution of" may frequently be
+understood and therefore omitted.
+
+The mission, thus formulated, clearly indicates the appropriate effect
+desired, i.e., the factor which establishes the basis for the solution
+of the problem from the standpoint of suitability.
+
+
+B. Relative Fighting Strength.
+
+As indicated in the Fundamental Military Principle, the second and
+third requirements for a sound solution of the problem are feasibility
+of accomplishment and acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+Both requirements have to do with the factors of relative fighting
+strength. Fighting strength is derived from the means available as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting
+strength is determined by a weighing of these factors against the
+means opposed, as influenced also by the characteristics of the
+theater.
+
+These are the factors, then, which are next studied in the Estimate.
+They are studied in order to complete the establishment of the basis
+for the solution of the problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The factor of consequences, as listed in the Fundamental Military
+Principle, is related to the factors pertinent to feasibility. This is
+true because consequences are assessed, in the Estimate, on the basis
+of the envisaged results of proposed actions. These results are
+necessarily predicated on the grounds established by consideration of
+the factors of relative fighting strength. The study of relative
+fighting strength thus provides not only a sound basis for the
+determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action, but
+also of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs.
+
+Particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion as to relative fighting
+strength, to the end that specific advantages may be ascertained. Such a
+study is primarily concerned with information:--its collection, its
+analysis, its evaluation, and its interpretation so as to convert it
+into military (naval) intelligence (page 76), with a view to its use by
+the commander in the solution of his problem. Information as to forces
+present and as to their positions is of course prerequisite to a clear
+comprehension of the possibilities as to physical objectives, as to
+relative positions, as to apportionment of fighting strength, and as to
+freedom of action.
+
+The commander may choose whether he shall, in his estimate, first
+consider the means available and opposed, or reverse the order and
+give priority to the characteristics of the theater. In a particular
+situation, the significance of these characteristics is frequently
+determined by the capabilities and limitations of the means available
+and opposed. For this reason, these means are first discussed in this
+treatment, which thereafter includes the analysis of the
+characteristics of the theater.
+
+The capabilities and limitations of the means, and the significance of
+the characteristics of the theater, may be expressed in terms of
+certain specific factors (page 25). Each of these factors may
+influence, or be influenced by, any or all of the others. Situations
+occur in which certain factors exert little or no influence. Yet, in
+other situations, these same factors have a paramount effect.
+
+The classification of factors utilized in the following treatment is
+applicable to most military problems.
+
+A list of pertinent factors, to be of real use in the solution of
+problems, is required, first, to be complete, so that no factor will
+be overlooked, and, second, to be simple, so that, as far as
+practicable, all similar data may be discussed under one heading.
+
+With respect to the factors set forth in succeeding pages, the
+solution of a particular problem may call for a different listing.
+
+Such listing may involve, in some cases, the contraction or the
+omission of certain of the headings.
+
+In other cases, an expansion will be necessary or desirable under
+certain headings, in considerably greater detail than shown here. For
+example, Section I-B of a National Estimate may involve reference to
+several volumes of printed books or of similar data, while, even in
+ordinary strategical situations, numerous charts, books of sailing
+directions, and other compilations may require study. Where such
+references are not standard and generally available, they may be
+appended, preferably in condensed form.
+
+The proper listing of pertinent factors will depend on the nature of
+the problem.
+
+
+(1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed.
+
+The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the
+ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to
+develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat (page 8).
+These components, as ranged on one side or the other, constitute the
+means available and opposed. (See page 31). Analysis of these means
+requires a classification of the various factors which influence the
+situation.
+
+For a broad strategical estimate made by the State, economic and
+political factors require intensive study; physical objectives,
+relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of
+action are all involved in such a survey.
+
+For a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these
+factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. Such a commander is
+concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the
+operations projected for the particular theater involved in his
+problem. From his point of view, the economic and political factors
+often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military
+situation. In such a case, the commander concentrates in this section
+on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his
+important considerations deal with such matters as numerical
+strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of
+action.
+
+For strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further
+restricts his study accordingly.
+
+In detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive
+comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy
+armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use
+of relative position are affected by such considerations. This is
+manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet
+contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its
+bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. At that
+time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly
+changing conditions. (Chapter IX.)
+
+In the Form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to
+broad estimates are included under "general factors". These are
+followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces.
+
+(a) General Factors. (i) Political Factors. The prosecution of the war
+is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of
+the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the
+moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war
+aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to
+which the government can make available necessary resources, both
+domestic and foreign.
+
+External relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad
+estimates of the employment of national forces. The wartime factors
+which influence these relations include the effect of the clash
+between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of
+interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and
+the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each
+belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the
+ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine
+the manner in which neutrality will be enforced.
+
+Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret,
+directly influence an estimate. When a war of any importance breaks
+out in any part of the world, all States are affected to some degree.
+One may have an alliance which, though not requiring active
+participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts
+of a belligerent. Another alliance may require active participation,
+while still another State may attempt to maintain strict neutrality.
+Every State remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from
+that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the
+contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. The estimate of the
+international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the
+war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each State
+concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct
+of war.
+
+(ii) Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of
+industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is
+prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the
+civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses
+of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing
+upon the industrial capacity of that State.
+
+The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes
+the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign
+credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national
+capability for war.
+
+The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade,
+including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of
+supply, affects its strength. No State yet has complete autarchy.
+Thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain
+of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. As
+each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the
+other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade
+protection.
+
+(iii) Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a stable morale (page
+72) at a high level is a primary concern. Such stability inures the
+nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear,
+disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences,
+while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which
+strengthen the moral fiber of a people.
+
+Training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to
+overestimate. They provide a basis for evaluating discipline. A study
+of the history of the State may prove valuable in estimating the
+present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be
+classed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of
+war.
+
+Another important factor relates to the existence of the skills
+necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. The
+control of skilled personnel is a psychological consideration of
+great importance.
+
+Unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and
+labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate.
+
+Special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and
+versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in
+development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war
+effort.
+
+Racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale
+and training. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions
+of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past
+performance, to prove of some value. Service traditions may furnish
+clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors.
+
+While only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible
+of quantitative comparison, failure to take account of mental and
+moral factors may involve serious error. Nevertheless, in many
+situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until
+subjected to test. Inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a
+basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. In these,
+racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. History,
+however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and
+military nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than
+that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has
+demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or
+unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably
+warrant otherwise.
+
+(iv) Information and counter-information measures. Operations of war
+are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent
+possesses of the others. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh
+the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of
+obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.
+
+There may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible
+use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured
+documents, and material; reports from other friendly units;
+interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped
+or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of
+cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and
+mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of
+communications systems, ashore and afloat, which include all means of
+interchange of thought. In this connection it will be recalled that
+information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot
+be conveyed in time.
+
+The direct methods of obtaining information are military operations
+intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance,
+scouting, trailing.
+
+Counter-information measures are no less important than those
+pertaining to collection of information. Such measures include all
+provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage,
+cryptography, control of own communications, security of documents,
+camouflage, and applicable tactical operations.
+
+(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to Armed Forces, (i) Vessels,
+including aircraft. The numbers and characteristics, of the ships and
+aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and
+less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. The
+information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under
+the specific headings of the factors of the Estimate Form as later
+enumerated.
+
+(ii) Land forces, including land-based aviation. Important facts
+concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based
+aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case
+of the naval forces. The value of a comparison--naval, land, or
+air--may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the
+accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected
+accurate additional information.
+
+(iii) Personnel. The status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency
+of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale,
+skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can
+seldom be accurately known. Unless there is positive information to
+the contrary, the wise commander will assume in this respect that the
+status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to
+that of his own command. Full consideration will be given to all known
+facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any
+proposed situation may be properly evaluated.
+
+The basic discussion of the psychological factors (page 125) is
+applicable here as to the respective armed forces. Personal
+characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study,
+since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength.
+The military value of the various units and forces is a similar
+consideration. The present attitude and past actions of enemy
+commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national,
+and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation
+in this connection.
+
+(iv) Material. The material characteristics of the commander's own
+implements of war are generally known to him. The characteristics of
+enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become
+available, but are not to be underestimated.
+
+Material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility.
+
+Armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other
+weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with
+their own weapons). It also includes chemical agents and other
+instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to
+range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate
+use and as replacements. Ammunition supply is a factor here. In the
+evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available
+to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to
+underestimate.
+
+Life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms
+of standards which can be clearly visualized. For a vessel, life is
+the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its assigned task. In
+the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of
+foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. Here, again, an
+underestimate is dangerous.
+
+Mobility is capability of movement. It is compounded of the elements
+of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions
+of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to
+certain and free movement. Mobility is one of the most important
+factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of
+fighting strength, and to freedom of action. Closely related factors
+are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the
+enemy, and of own forces. Accurate knowledge of these factors, before
+an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing
+effectively with the enemy.
+
+The condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the
+efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater
+compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance.
+The last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and
+involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations,
+whether due to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other
+causes. Here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have
+only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect.
+His experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own
+condition. Definitely, unless he has positive information to the
+contrary, he assumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or
+better than his own. (See also the psychological factors, page 125 and
+the personnel factor, page 127).
+
+(v) Logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. In the
+naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate.
+While the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate,
+logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval
+battle, to affect the outcome. This support exercises a dominant
+influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. It is concerned
+with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:
+
+    Material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft,
+        food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals,
+        and general supplies.
+
+    Personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of
+        replacements.
+
+    Facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair
+        facilities, afloat and ashore; shelter; sanitation;
+        hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education;
+        counter-espionage; counter-propaganda.
+
+The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the
+final limit of a commander's plan of action.
+
+
+(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.
+
+The characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence,
+always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of
+attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical
+operations that may be employed.
+
+At this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts,
+intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual
+study of the theater. This study is not for the purpose, at this time,
+of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to
+furnish data which will assist in consideration of later sections of
+the estimate. The study may be made under several important headings,
+as follows:
+
+(a) Hydrography. A study of the hydrography will determine the depth
+of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents,
+the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and
+other pertinent features. These are recorded for later use.
+
+Shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of
+submarines. On the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water
+may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the
+tide. Again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the
+range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the
+entrance to a port or base. In a tactical action, advantage may be
+taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without,
+however, interfering with that of one's own forces.
+
+(b) Topography. The topography of the area is also frequently of
+interest to the naval commander. In actions close to the shore, the
+character of the coast may play an important role. A high bluff,
+combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite
+advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation.
+
+Topography may be a most important consideration in determining what
+bases are to be used. The commander makes note of the topography of
+the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural
+features lending assistance to the defense of the various sites may
+play an important part in the selection of bases.
+
+The use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering
+land. Questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held,
+or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to
+the channel.
+
+In any landing operation, the topography of the area to be occupied
+may be the controlling factor.
+
+(c) Weather. The seasonal weather in the theater will have a direct
+bearing upon operations. The use of aircraft, the employment of light
+forces, the habitability of ships over long periods, the use of smoke,
+the range at which a gun action may be fought, the effect of spray and
+gases,--these considerations are but some of the matters which will be
+affected by weather.
+
+The possession of, and the position of, meteorological stations within
+the theater are of growing importance in the successful planning of
+coordinated air, submarine, and surface operations.
+
+(d) Daylight and Dark Periods. It may be well under this heading to
+put in tabular form the times of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset,
+the phases of the moon, and the duration of morning and evening
+twilight. When, for example, the commander is considering night
+destroyer attacks, the operation of submarines, or the type of
+protective screens he desires to use, he may profitably refer to these
+tabulations.
+
+(e) Relative Location and Distance. No part of the study of the
+characteristics of the theater is of greater importance than that
+pertaining to relative location and distance. At this point it may be
+found advantageous to place in tabular form the distances between the
+important positions within the geographical area of the theater. This
+study furnishes knowledge as to the availability of certain localities
+for use in support of, or in cooperation with, forces at other
+localities, and as to distances in relation to steaming capabilities
+of the various units which make up the commander's force.
+
+(f) Lines of Transportation and Supply. The usual sea routes which
+pass through the theater are an important subject of study; also,
+particular focal points, defiles, and restricted waters which are, or
+may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces.
+Other items are the significant routes from home or enemy territory,
+i.e., the lines of communication, the terminal points, and the
+flanking positions along these lines.
+
+(g) Facilities and Fortifications. The facilities for the support,
+upkeep, and repair of the units of the commander's forces and of the
+opposing force, as well as the fortifications existing within the
+area, may require consideration. Other features which may render a
+port or base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of
+denying it to the enemy, also merit attention.
+
+(h) Communications. In strategical estimates, more particularly in
+broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves
+not only those means under the commander's control, but also his
+relation to the system of regional and national communications
+operated by his government. Examination is made into the established
+physical stations; such examination includes radio, cables, and
+perhaps land wires.
+
+In tactical estimates the means of communication which affect the
+engagement are more directly those under the control of the commander.
+An examination into the organization of the means to meet conditions
+prevailing in the theater is appropriate here.
+
+Another aspect of communications is that of maintaining all forms
+against enemy interference. The importance of this feature in planning
+may not safely be overlooked, and careful study is indicated to
+provide for guaranteeing communications during action. The
+characteristics of the theater, as they relate to this feature, are
+considered here.
+
+For the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy
+communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them
+with respect to the theater of operations.
+
+This portion of the Estimate Form varies greatly with the type of
+problem under consideration. However, in all estimates, this is the
+place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting
+communications for the particular problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander
+has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he
+expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate.
+
+
+(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.
+
+Having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the
+characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find
+it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order
+that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily
+visualized and compared. Thus the existing advantages and
+disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to
+relative fighting strength.
+
+A satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in
+parallel columns for own and enemy forces. From careful consideration
+of the facts so far determined in Section I-B, there are extracted and
+expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors.
+
+It is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness
+factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical
+estimates.
+
+The former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite
+comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and
+caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of
+torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for
+comparison.
+
+In broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g.,
+as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and
+the like. But other factors may not be so definite, especially as
+regards enemy forces. For example, it will often be difficult for the
+commander to say that the enemy's logistics problem is easier or more
+difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of
+fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time
+limits involved. The evaluation of training, spirit, health, and
+courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to
+determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard
+to the enemy.
+
+The value of the entries in the parallel columns at this point of the
+estimate will depend upon the skill of the commander in judging the
+factual data contained in all of the known factors of strength and
+weakness. The proper entries to be made will depend upon
+circumstances. In one estimate, for example, the anti-aircraft
+armament available to a carrier group will be of vital importance. In
+another estimate of the same carrier group, anti-aircraft defense will
+be of no importance because no enemy aircraft can be employed in the
+situation being estimated. Again, in a local tactical situation, if
+the ships involved have just been fueled, the economical steaming
+radius may be of no immediate importance. And while the total amount
+of high-test gasoline which can be produced in a State in the coming
+year may be vital to a broad strategical estimate involving war
+against trade, that information may be of little use in a tactical
+estimate of a localized, fleeting situation.
+
+Thus, in determining what factors to evaluate, and in assessing their
+relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly
+affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration. The
+summary of strength and weakness factors is, then, a summary of those
+factors which the commander considers will affect the character of his
+effort. This summary indicates the relative importance of such
+factors.
+
+A mere list of facts will not serve the purpose. What is needed here
+is a series of evaluations and conclusions which may result from a
+study of the pertinent details.
+
+With the circumstances attending his particular problem clearly in
+mind, the commander carefully reviews each of the factors of fighting
+strength in the theater; he classes each as either a strength or
+weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enters it in the
+proper column. A strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as
+a weakness factor for the opponent:--what is required is a
+well-digested summary of the factors which give to either side an
+advantage or a disadvantage as compared to the other.
+
+
+NOTE
+
+The Estimate procedure has, to this point, established the basis for
+the solution of the problem through evaluation of the factors
+pertaining to the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+On this basis, the commander is ready to consider such courses of
+action as may be pertinent. To this end, he has a choice of
+procedures. He may first consider courses of action for himself. He
+may prefer, however, to consider first those which are applicable to
+the enemy.
+
+If the commander considers his own courses of action first, this
+procedure has an advantage in that it narrows, later, the scope of
+enemy courses which are pertinent to his situation. This is true
+because consideration of enemy courses may in such a case be
+restricted to those which give promise of countering, effectively, his
+own courses of action.
+
+This procedure may also have a certain psychological advantage, in
+that the commander may thereby avoid becoming unduly impressed by the
+potentialities of enemy action. Occasionally, prior consideration of
+enemy courses may tend to put the commander, unnecessarily, on the
+mental defensive.
+
+First consideration of his own courses of action is especially
+appropriate for a commander whose mission requires him to assume the
+initiative, particularly when the relative fighting strength indicates
+that he can compel enemy action to conform to his. This is frequently
+the case when enemy action will chiefly affect details rather than the
+general trend of the operations.
+
+These reflections indicate that first consideration of his own courses
+of action will very frequently be advantageous to the commander. Such
+a sequence is therefore indicated preferentially in the Estimate Form,
+and next discussed. However occasions may arise when consideration in
+the reverse order is preferable. Sometimes the prior consideration of
+enemy potentialities has the advantage of making the commander's
+estimate more complete with respect to the obstacles which he is to
+overcome. Furthermore, when the effectiveness of his future action is
+seen to depend chiefly upon what the enemy can do, or when the
+initiative lies manifestly with the enemy, and when the commander's
+mission requires him to frustrate enemy action, rather than to assume
+the initiative himself, the prior consideration of enemy courses of
+action may be indicated.
+
+The commander may therefore consider the subject matter of Sections II
+and III in the order hereinafter followed, or he may reverse that
+order.
+
+
+SECTION II
+
+DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION
+
+A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective.
+
+In order further to clarify the problem, consideration of the
+commander's courses of action may profitably commence with an analysis
+(page 53) of the assigned objective. Section I-A contained an
+appreciation of this objective on the basis of the salient features of
+the situation. A close examination is now possible in the light of the
+additional information furnished by the full details (Section I-B) as
+to the means available and opposed, and as to the characteristics of
+the theater (page 121).
+
+Accordingly, the mission (page 121), is now again stated, and is
+restudied. The task is thoughtfully examined anew, in view of the
+forces and positions now known. The purpose is scrutinized with equal
+care, because it indicates the further end in view for the common
+effort. Now, obstacles to success which, in Section I-A, could not
+fully be appreciated can be examined against the background afforded
+by visualization of the enemy's ability to oppose the attainment of
+the assigned objective.
+
+This analysis calls for such discussion by the commander as is
+essential to better understanding of his assigned objective. Some
+restatement and repetition may be desirable as to the subjects already
+discussed under the appreciation of the assigned objective. In solving
+certain types of problems, where simple estimates, only, are required,
+there may be no necessity for further treatment. Even in these cases,
+however, the commander restates his mission in this subsection, in
+order to ensure a clear comprehension of its task and purpose, as a
+sound basis for his further solution of the problem.
+
+
+B. Survey of Courses of Action.
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle (page 41) represents an equation
+(page 23) based on five factors: the appropriate effect desired, the
+means available, the means opposed, the characteristics of the
+theater, and the consequences as to costs. Of these five factors, all
+but the last (the consequences as to costs) have by this time, in the
+course of the estimate, been assigned values as definite as the
+commander's information and his study permit.
+
+From this point on, the problem is to evolve tentative solutions
+(courses of action) and to test them (page 98), severally, by
+reference to the factors. The tests as to suitability and feasibility
+can now be made with reference to the known factors. The test as to
+acceptability of the consequences involves an unknown factor. However,
+for each tentative solution of the problem, a value can be assigned
+for this factor, because all five factors are interdependent (pages 32
+and following), so that the value of any of them can be set by a study
+of the others. It is through this procedure that evaluation of the
+consequences factor is accomplished (an application of the corollary
+Principle of the Acceptable Consequences as to Costs, page 35).
+
+By means of the standard tests, the several tentative solutions are
+also compared to each other in the light of envisaged enemy action, so
+as to enable the commander to select the best solution.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander now, as a result of his reflective thinking as to
+courses of action, makes a list of those which he has visualized for
+himself. There may be one course of action, or many; ordinarily there
+are several.
+
+Examples of courses of action have been given in the basic discussion
+of the subject (pages 89 and 92). In listing his courses, the
+commander can add to clarity of thought and of expression by
+visualizing the objective embodied in each course and by envisaging
+also, the action, expressed in proper detail, for its attainment. This
+process is naturally the more important when the objective is inferred
+rather than specifically expressed, and when the action involved calls
+for more description than can be obtained merely by stating the
+objective.
+
+For example, the commander may include a course of action such as "to
+raid enemy trade in the area EFGH". The objective is here inferred; it
+is not clearly stated. The commander may therefore be well advised to
+add a notation of what the objective is; indeed, more than one
+objective may be involved. Objectives thus inferred might include,
+when specifically stated, the infliction of damage on enemy trade, the
+infliction of damage on enemy combatant forces protecting such trade,
+the disruption of enemy supply arrangements, or such others as may be
+applicable.
+
+This clear visualization is essential to the establishment of the
+relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inherent
+in the course of action (page 89). If, for instance, the motivating
+task is to "divert enemy forces to the area EFGH", the commander may
+consider the course of action "to raid enemy trade in area EFGH". By
+infliction of damage to, and by disruption of, enemy supply
+(objectives of his raiding), he expects to accomplish the diversion of
+enemy forces to the area EFGH, because the enemy will wish to protect
+his trade against such raids. The relationship between the assigned
+objective and the objective inferred in the course of action is thus
+made clear.
+
+With regard to expression of the action to be taken, the commander may
+properly desire to be more explicit than by merely saying, for
+example, "to destroy the enemy". Here the objective is clear (it is
+"the destruction of the enemy"), but the expression of the action is
+so general that additional description may be needed. Examples of more
+explicit statement have been given previously (page 89).
+
+On occasion the higher commander may predetermine the commander's
+course of action for the attainment of the objective assigned to the
+latter. Circumstances under which such procedure may be properly
+applicable, and the effect which it has on the commander's estimate,
+have been previously discussed (page 86).
+
+
+C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.
+
+The courses of action which the commander has envisaged are now
+subjected to test (page 98). This essential stage in thought is
+intended to put the courses of action to proof as tentative solutions
+of the problems. The principle here recognized is that suggestion has
+no logical nor rightful claim upon action or belief until it has
+received adequate confirmation. Such confirmation is, in part,
+provided by these tests.
+
+The tests applied are for suitability, for feasibility, and for
+acceptability as to consequences. Each of these tests is a separate
+one. Each course of action is formally subjected to test. When the
+tests are completed, the courses of action stand classified in these
+respects. During these tests, some courses of action may be rejected;
+such are then omitted in the final classification.
+
+These formal tests are not to be confused with the preliminary tests
+already given by the commander to each course of action as it occurs
+to mind. Necessarily, there is such a preliminary test, because the
+commander does not wish to entertain inappropriate courses of action.
+For a competent commander, the mental power to envisage solutions of a
+military problem is so much grounded in experience that appropriate
+suggestions are most likely to occur; in fact, discriminating thought
+with respect to military problems is natural for such a commander.
+This immediate discrimination is, however, merely the preliminary
+test. It prevents setting up wooden soldiers only to knock them down,
+but it does not necessarily subject each suggested solution to a
+thorough analysis.
+
+The commander may apply the tests to each course of action as it
+occurs to his mind. This procedure, however, may be rendered
+impossible by the fertility of suggestion; perhaps the commander has
+thought of several courses of action practically simultaneously. It
+is, therefore, often better to apply the tests to all of the courses
+of action, in turn, during a separate stage of the process of
+thinking. This is the procedure indicated herein, as standard, by the
+sequence of steps in this section of the Estimate. The process of
+testing, itself, may bring to mind those combinations of courses of
+action previously referred to (page 93).
+
+The degree of formality characteristic of the tests varies with the
+nature of the problem. In a broad strategical estimate, these tests
+may be searching and extensive; they may then consume much time. Yet,
+if the commander, in making a quick decision of great urgency in
+actual battle, does not apply the tests, he may adopt a course of
+action leading to tragic results. In such circumstances, the competent
+commander, under pressure of danger, grasps the whole complex
+situation without loss of time. He is not carried away by any chance
+impressions. He does not overlook what is significant in the
+unexpected event. Because he is mentally prepared for the exercise of
+command (page 114) he sees things in their true proportions (page 4).
+In immediate response, he coolly chooses the same course of action
+which he would adopt if he had time for careful deliberation.
+
+In making the tests, the commander rejects courses of action found
+unsuitable in that they will not, if successfully prosecuted,
+contribute to the attainment of the objective. He does not, as yet,
+reject courses of action found to be promising of only partial
+accomplishment of the task, because there may be later possibilities
+of effecting combinations to this end.
+
+The commander also rejects, at this point, courses of action found to
+be infeasible of accomplishment. He is careful, however, not to
+reject, abruptly, any which may later be found to be feasible in
+combination with other courses.
+
+Similarly, the commander now rejects courses of action found to
+involve excessive consequences as to costs. Here, again, however, he
+bears in mind the possibilities of later combinations.
+
+The commander does not, as yet, make a selection of one course of
+action in preference to another. He merely desires to restrict further
+thought, toward his Decision, to those which are found, on the basis
+of the estimate so far, to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. He
+may, however, make a selection to the extent of effecting proper
+combinations whose applicability has already been demonstrated.
+
+The commander also takes stock, at this stage of the estimate, of the
+relative degree of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of
+retained courses, so far as can be substantiated.
+
+
+D. Listing Retained Courses of Action.
+
+The foregoing process indicates to the commander the courses of action
+which may properly be retained as suitable, as feasible, and as
+acceptable. He therefore draws up a list of retained courses and
+classifies them according to the degree of their suitability, of their
+feasibility, and of their acceptability with respect to consequences.
+
+This list does not necessarily represent the final combinations of
+courses of action; the incomplete solutions may yet become part of the
+course of action finally selected. Also it is not impossible that
+combinations already made will subsequently be recombined as a result
+of further analysis.
+
+It may be apparent to the commander at this time that he does not
+have, as yet, any course of action which fulfills the test of
+suitability as to scope, either originally or by combination. A later
+conclusion is made (Section V) as to final combinations to achieve
+full scope. This conclusion, however, may point the way, as later
+observed, to a Decision adopting an objective short of that which
+would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task.
+
+
+SECTION III
+
+EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY
+
+While the commander realizes that the Fundamental Military Principle
+(page 41) governs the enemy's problem no less than his own, he has to
+accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called "fog of war")
+in applying the principle to the enemy's situation. The method of
+reflective thinking utilized (Section II) for the commander's own
+problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the
+enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known
+to the commander as are his own.
+
+Capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which
+the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such
+actions, has the capacity to carry out. Such potentialities of the
+enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in
+estimating the situation. In his estimate, however, the commander's
+interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do;
+probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the
+whole field of capabilities. The commander is not exclusively
+interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the
+enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are
+also subject to change. The commander is interested in everything that
+the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander's own
+courses of action.
+
+In reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes
+an estimate from the enemy's viewpoint and considers that the enemy
+commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is
+endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission.
+Each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable
+military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the
+same intent. The physical objectives for each may be the other's armed
+forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also
+be likely physical objectives.
+
+In such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the
+opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual
+conflict. More especially in the initial stages, the respective plans
+may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. Again, the
+geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss contact.
+Moreover, unless one commander definitely makes provision to seek out
+and engage, the two forces, each on the defensive, may find themselves
+"shaking fists" at each other across an ocean area.
+
+Notwithstanding this possibility, however, a conclusion, on an
+insufficient basis, that the enemy will or will not seek him out and
+engage him, or that the enemy will or will not do anything else, may
+be fraught with the most serious consequences for the commander.
+Accordingly, in estimating the enemy's situation, he puts himself in
+the enemy's position, while subordinating his own hopes and desires.
+He credits the enemy with the possession of good judgment and of the
+resolution and ability to apply with skill the fundamentals of
+effective warfare, subject, naturally, to the justified conclusions
+which the commander has drawn (Section I-B) on the basis of the
+available factual data as to relative fighting strength.
+
+
+A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem.
+
+This portion of the commander's estimate pertains, of course, to the
+existing situation as viewed by the enemy. This fact, alone, may
+inject into the problem certain factors which differ from those
+applicable with respect to the commander's view of his own problem, as
+determined to this point.
+
+(1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation.
+
+Frequently it may happen that the enemy does not have certain
+significant information. The fact of such lack of information may have
+been established by the conclusions drawn as to relative fighting
+strength (Section I-B). If this be the case, notation of the fact is
+made at this point in the commander's estimate of the enemy's
+situation. If doubt exists as to the extent and accuracy of the
+enemy's information, it will be desirable to credit the enemy with any
+knowledge which it would be dangerous for the commander to conclude
+was not available to his opponent.
+
+In summarizing the enemy's situation, the commander may brief the
+procedure by indicating those significant features of his own
+situation, as summarized in Section I-A and as particularized in
+Section I-B, which he does not consider are known to the enemy. The
+commander will also indicate here any items of important information
+as to which he has only a suggestion or an inkling, but which he
+considers may be known in greater detail to the enemy.
+
+(2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy.
+
+It may appear on first thought that the best basis for determining the
+pertinent enemy courses of action is to make a deduction of the
+enemy's mission. Sometimes, undoubtedly, this is the case. However, it
+is not always possible to deduce the enemy's mission correctly. If the
+deduction is incorrect the remainder of the estimate will be on an
+unsound basis. If, as may happen, the enemy's plan has been captured,
+or if, by some other method, conclusive information has been
+obtained, it may be possible to state the enemy's mission. Even then,
+however, the enemy's mission may sometimes be changed. It is thus
+evident that the commander, by restricting his thought, may frequently
+fail to consider all of the enemy capabilities which may materially
+influence his own course of action.
+
+With this precaution in mind, the commander, at this point in his
+Estimate, proceeds to analyze the effect desired by the enemy. The
+commander intends to use his deductions, if such use appears to be
+sound, to narrow the field of consideration as to enemy courses of
+action. However, he reminds himself that such restriction will be
+dangerous unless it is established on sound grounds.
+
+The first mental act toward determining the effect desired by the
+enemy is to form a reasoned opinion as to the situation which the
+enemy wishes to maintain or to create. The maintenance or creation of
+this situation, existent or to be brought about, is an enemy
+objective.
+
+From earlier association with the enemy, from intelligence of his
+peacetime preparations, and from a knowledge of his political and
+military history, his broad current policies are generally matters of
+common report. The motives impelling the enemy to action may thus be
+evident. Past or present tendencies of the enemy, along certain
+specific lines of endeavor, may be known. These may be corroborated by
+the enemy action which has recently occurred.
+
+In military undertakings of major scope the objectives of the enemy
+are often difficult of concealment. A survey of the objectives which
+the enemy has been pursuing may allow a reasoned opinion to be formed
+as to the enemy's immediate objectives,--whether, at least, his future
+action will be offensive or defensive. The importance to be attached
+by the enemy to certain physical objectives may be indicated by the
+broad aims known to exist. Present composition and disposition of the
+enemy's forces may betray the effort which he intends. Circumstances,
+clearly disadvantageous to the commander's forces, may disclose what
+his enemy's aim may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy)
+military situation.
+
+However scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others,
+the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of
+workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy's
+future action.
+
+The enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the purpose of the
+enemy's mission. The situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad
+in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. This, in
+turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information
+available.
+
+It may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when
+accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. However, as
+previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. The
+commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out
+will attain the purpose. By being inclusive instead of restrictive in
+this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities.
+Moreover, the information available will not always justify the
+derivation of a specific task.
+
+By this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied
+opinion as to the enemy's appropriate effect desired. The commander's
+safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. He
+expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy's
+objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail
+to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the
+situation.
+
+Situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in
+Section II-B (page 135), no value can be assigned the factor of the
+appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis
+for deducing enemy courses of action. Such situations are not unusual,
+especially in problems of lesser scope. In such cases, the commander
+is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which
+can materially influence his own plan. Therefore, in instances of this
+nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first
+consideration to the commander's own courses of action affords the
+advantage of (see page 134) narrowing the field as to the enemy
+capabilities.
+
+
+B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities.
+
+If, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the
+commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a
+sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now
+proceeds, by the mental process described in Section II, to list the
+enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. If there be
+no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all
+enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort.
+
+The survey of fighting strength (Section I-B) has established, through
+consideration of the "means available and opposed", and of the
+"characteristics of the theater", the limitations of enemy
+capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. Because, however, so
+much of the enemy's situation is usually conjectural, it is important
+to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in
+Section I-B,--in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and
+strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. Such a study will
+disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. The
+commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which
+can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the
+commander's courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities
+of obtaining information concerning the enemy's moves.
+
+Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations
+which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list
+the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of
+action, for purposes of further analysis. Naturally, he lists courses
+which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to
+consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of
+the estimate.
+
+
+C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.
+
+Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above,
+the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and
+for acceptability as to their consequences.
+
+The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (Section
+II). However, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if
+deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for
+suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's
+own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy's fighting
+strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis,
+the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the
+commander's own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts
+as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly
+retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the
+same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the
+consequences.
+
+
+D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action.
+
+All enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for
+further study are now listed by the commander.
+
+While it is manifestly of advantage to the commander if the number of
+enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one,
+it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because
+of undue restriction of the field.
+
+The previous analysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases,
+the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the
+commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the
+enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs.
+
+In many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained
+enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed
+before the less likely. In case of doubt, the higher priority is
+awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous
+from his (the commander's) point of view.
+
+In other instances, no priority can properly be indicated.
+
+As a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine
+certain enemy courses. In any case, he closes this portion of the
+estimate with a list of them, classified so far as he finds
+justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the
+estimate.
+
+
+SECTION IV
+
+SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION
+
+The extent to which detail is desirable in Section IV of the Estimate
+will vary with the nature of the problem (page 95). Experience usually
+demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail
+escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog
+the main issues. As the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will
+recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will
+conduct such examination accordingly.
+
+
+A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of Action.
+
+The next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the
+commander's retained courses of action with those of the enemy which
+have been retained for further study. This process consists of
+executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the
+commander's courses of action, against that in each of the enemy's.
+One method is for the Commander to take the initiative with each of
+his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. By this
+procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced,
+on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the
+enemy, on the modification in the enemy's effort which will be
+caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will
+create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome
+the obstacles.
+
+It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate
+the enemy situation during this analysis. Such necessity arises
+because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy
+situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as
+to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the
+planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the
+situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are
+familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will
+have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments
+may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of
+this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after
+reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy
+estimate (Section III). The particular procedure adopted is
+unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a
+re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to
+this portion of the Estimate.
+
+The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination
+into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself
+in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original
+situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander
+examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed
+situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has
+superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. Thus only can the
+commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his
+own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later
+be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course
+of action, or combination of courses, is the best.
+
+The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to
+the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his
+own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy
+as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against
+each of the commander's courses. This method is applicable, for
+instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which,
+by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander's
+courses. The choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of
+the commander.
+
+It is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving
+each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises.
+However, this analysis is confined, as previously explained (see page
+145), to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of
+a sound comparison. In some cases there may be need for study in the
+greatest detail. Generally, however, the requirement can be met by
+considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of
+weapons, and the physical objectives.
+
+During the progress of these analyses of the impact of operations upon
+each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert
+and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these
+operations may also suggest itself.
+
+The use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here
+frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing
+possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges,
+relative strength in types and weapons are useful.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded
+further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability. He can, once more, view each of his
+courses from the standpoint of its suitability. The visualized enemy
+action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to
+whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate
+effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the
+possible opposition. As to feasibility, the analysis permits him to
+make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to
+obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander's)
+courses of action. In addition, by visualizing the pertinent
+operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be
+expected.
+
+Should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further
+consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not
+justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine
+further analysis within narrower limits.
+
+Should he find, during his analysis, that further combinations should
+be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and
+uses them in his comparison.
+
+However, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the
+course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can
+justifiably be adopted. The process of comparison is confined to
+deduction, rearrangement, and justified rejection, preliminary to
+weighing and selecting in the next subsection.
+
+
+B. Determination of the Best Course of Action.
+
+The commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of
+action as further analyzed in the light of enemy opposition. All of
+these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying
+extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. He will now examine
+and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion
+as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. The
+analysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course
+has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander's
+retained courses with each other.
+
+At this point, therefore, the commander again assembles his retained
+courses of action.
+
+He includes the combinations which the preceding analysis has
+indicated belong properly together. He then considers the final
+tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted.
+
+The conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility,
+and for acceptability as to consequences. Because of the importance of
+this terminal analysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise
+as possible.
+
+The commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses
+of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the
+several pertinent headings. He next examines this all-inclusive
+summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action.
+
+It may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best.
+Again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of
+action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage
+toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.
+
+If the result of the analysis has demonstrated that there is no
+satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a
+notation as to the reasons for such opinion. In this case the
+commander faces a dilemma.
+
+Usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a
+carefully considered assignment of part of the superior's planned
+effort. The commander may expect normally to find that his own
+estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if
+successfully carried out, will accomplish the task assigned. The
+reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect.
+
+Nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to
+meet the possible dilemma:--When he cannot envisage a course of action
+for accomplishing the assigned task, or when, of the several courses
+of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he
+to do? (See page 70).
+
+Under these circumstances the commander reviews his estimate in all
+its aspects. By minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of
+accomplishing his assigned task. If he cannot accomplish the task, he
+seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is
+reasonably feasible. If unable, in any degree, to further the
+accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he
+feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of
+his mission.
+
+It is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his
+assigned task, the commander will make constructive representations
+(page 103) to higher authority. The latter may then assign additional
+forces or may otherwise alter the problem,--for example, by assigning
+a new task. However, a situation such as described may occur when the
+commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he
+finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority.
+
+In such a situation the commander is under the necessity of
+determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and
+acceptable under the circumstances (page 52).
+
+It is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the
+commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic
+problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. He has
+not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because
+he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. However, the
+solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new
+phase, or step.
+
+The new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the
+solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the
+abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation,
+which has not changed. The new problem is, however, differentiated
+from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive.
+The incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out
+of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that
+no sound solution for the basic problem can be found. The new problem
+is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be
+delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is
+necessary as a basis for the commander's detailed plan. For these
+reasons the new problem is, by definition (page 106), a subsidiary
+problem, of the type distinctive of the second step.
+
+At what point in the solution of the original problem does the
+commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of
+the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? There are
+various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this
+question.
+
+From the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that
+the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its
+motivating task cannot be accomplished. It might also be said that the
+basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the
+commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the
+motivating task.
+
+Practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can
+profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no
+contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. At this point
+a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins.
+This view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point
+in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the
+appropriate effect desired. In such circumstances, the commander
+concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the
+accomplishment of his immediate superior's general plan.
+
+The incentive for the solution of the subsidiary problem will
+therefore arise, on the basis thus adopted, when the commander has
+concluded that he cannot contribute to the accomplishment of his basic
+mission, and that he is under the necessity of evolving a new mission
+for himself. His basic Decision (see discussion, hereafter, of Section
+V of the Estimate Form) will reflect this conclusion and will thereby
+afford him a basis for the solution of his subsidiary problem.
+
+Problems of the foregoing nature, where the commander justifiably
+departs from his instructions, are not unusual during the first step.
+However, they are scarcely typical of that step so long as an
+organized chain of command is in effective operation. In the more
+usual case, the commander, at this point in his estimate, makes note
+of his selected course of action. Whether he selects a single course
+or a combination, the selection is thereafter known as the best course
+of action (singular).
+
+
+SECTION V
+
+THE DECISION
+
+In the final section of the Estimate the commander is concerned with a
+decision as to the selection of an objective or objectives determined
+by himself, for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. This
+decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken for
+the attainment of the commander's selected objective. The decision
+reached at this point becomes the commander's general plan of action
+or provides the basis therefor. It is accordingly so important that
+when it has been formally stated in a basic problem it is thenceforth
+known as the Decision.
+
+The Statement of the Decision. Frequently the statement of the
+Decision may be merely a restatement of the best course of action.
+Such phraseology is often adequate, provided, naturally, that the
+selected course of action has been, itself, correctly expressed (page
+95). Sometimes, however, the commander may desire, at this point in
+his estimate, to develop such expression more fully. He may at this
+point develop his selected course into a general plan, or he may defer
+this development to the second step.
+
+In any event the commander now scrutinizes his selected course of
+action to ensure that its expression conveys exactly the meaning which
+he has in mind.
+
+He bears in mind, also, that his Decision will settle the pattern of
+his future action. If the selected objective is inferred, rather than
+specifically stated, the commander will then ensure that the
+inference, with all its vital implications, is plain.
+
+As to the statement of the action required to achieve this objective,
+the commander realizes that the pattern laid down by the Decision is
+merely a shape or general outline. The details will be introduced
+later. The Decision covers the general outline of the action
+contemplated for the entire force.
+
+If, for example, only a part of the commander's force is to act, while
+the remainder is to remain inactive, the Decision will cover not only
+the kind of activity but also the extent of the inactivity. However,
+for convenience in stating the Decision, such inactivity may be
+inferred, rather than expressly stated, so long as the meaning is
+made clear. Thus, if the force, except for a raiding task group, is to
+remain inactive for the time being, the Decision may properly be "to
+raid enemy communications in the area ---- with a task group
+consisting of ----", so long as the commander is satisfied that the
+implication is clear, under the circumstances, that the remainder of
+his force is to remain inactive.
+
+The commander may properly include brief summarizing remarks as to the
+methods, broadly viewed, whereby he intends to take action. However,
+he introduces such detail only to the extent that he feels
+amplification is needed, either for his own benefit or for the
+assistance of others who may use his estimate.
+
+Deductions or inferences which the commander wishes to note may, at
+this point, be included with the Decision as corollaries (see next
+page).
+
+Where combinations of courses of action have been made in selecting
+the best course, the meaning can sometimes be improved at this point
+by modification of the previous wording.
+
+When, as previously discussed (page 151), the commander has concluded
+that he cannot feasibly or acceptably adopt any course of action which
+will accomplish his task, contribute in any measure to its
+accomplishment, or even contribute in any degree to the accomplishment
+of the purpose of his mission, he records that fact in his Decision.
+His study of the problem will by this time, however, have given him
+the necessary data for a conclusion as to what his new mission should
+be. He therefore closes his basic estimate with a Decision, coupled
+with a purpose therefor, (see below), which will serve as a new
+mission, i.e., as an appropriate effect desired. This provides a basis
+for his solution of a subsidiary problem whose incentive is derived
+from this Decision.
+
+Of course, if the commander has had time and opportunity to represent
+his situation on this basis to higher authority, and has received a
+new task therefrom, the new task, coupled with the purpose also
+indicated by higher authority, will provide the mission for the
+solution of a new basic problem.
+
+The Purpose of the Decision. The purpose of the Decision is identical
+with the motivating task,--provided, of course, that the Decision, if
+carried out, will accomplish that task in full. When stated, the
+purpose is usually connected with the Decision by the words "in order
+to".
+
+If the commander has concluded that he will take action by stages, the
+Decision may cover only the first stage. In all cases where the
+Decision will only partially accomplish the motivating task,
+appropriate words to link the Decision to its purpose may be such as
+"to assist in" or "preparatory to".
+
+The statement of this purpose, in connection with the Decision, is
+frequently helpful and is sometimes necessary in making clear the
+exact relationship between the Decision and the motivating task. In
+the next planning step, where the detailed operations are determined,
+this purpose is an important guide because each detailed operation is
+expected to contribute to the accomplishment, not only of the
+Decision, but also of the motivating task.
+
+Corollaries to the Decision. The Decision may involve certain
+deductions or inferences, either delimiting or amplifying its nature.
+The commander may find it desirable to make note of these matters in
+connection with his Decision. He may later wish to use these notes
+when formulating his plan. Since these matters relate to deductions or
+inferences which naturally follow as results of the Decision they are
+properly referred to as "corollaries" to the Decision.
+
+The nature of such corollaries may best be shown by an example. It is
+supposed, for instance, that the commander has made the Decision "to
+guard the Eastern Caribbean barrier against enemy penetration". During
+the course of his estimate of the situation, he has come to the
+conclusion that his operations to carry out this Decision will extend
+into the area limited by Port X on the north, and Port Y on the south.
+This conclusion is a deduction, which immediately assumes importance
+when the Decision is made. The commander states this deduced
+conclusion here, in connection with the Decision, for future guidance
+in resolving the Decision into detailed operations, as well as for
+later use in his directives to limit the action of his subordinates.
+
+No particular form is specified for such corollaries. It is
+satisfactory to list them as Corollary I, Corollary II, etc. They do
+not constitute a part of the Decision.
+
+Relation of the Decision to the Detailed Plan and Directives. The
+Decision is the basis for the commander's plan of action for his
+entire force. This plan is promulgated in one or more directives. The
+Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not yet the concern of
+subordinate commanders. It does not become their concern until it is
+used in directives. As incorporated in the commander's detailed plan
+and in his directives, the Decision, whether further developed or not,
+constitutes the commander's general plan and is referred to in those
+terms.
+
+The Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not bound by any rigid
+specifications as to form. Later (Chapter VII), when the commander
+prepares for the inauguration of planned action by the formulation and
+issue of directives, he assumes the obligation of conveying the
+substance of his Decision to his subordinates in clear language. At
+that time he will again have to subject its expression to scrutiny,
+and may find that he has to make modifications solely for
+clarification.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED OPERATIONS
+
+(The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary Problems)
+
+    The problem of the second step may be stated in question form
+    as follows: "What action should I take for the attainment of
+    my objective as selected in the first step?"
+
+
+[Sidenote: For convenience a tabular form, inserted in the appendix,
+page 224, gives page references to the principal subdivisions of this
+Chapter.]
+
+Having arrived at his basic Decision, the commander, if he wishes to
+put it into effect, will proceed to formulate a plan of action which
+can be cast into the forms of directives for execution. In making such
+a plan, he provides for operations in the detail proper for his
+situation. He thereby expands the general plan, indicated in or
+developed from his basic Decision, into a complete plan which can
+readily be placed in the Order Form (Chapter VIII) as a directive or
+directives for the guidance of his subordinates.
+
+The procedure involved in formulating such a detailed plan of action
+has been described previously in general terms (Chapter V). The method
+of determining the salient features of the operations required has
+also been discussed (in Section III of Chapter IV). Therefore, these
+matters are not repeated at this point.
+
+The problems distinctive of this procedure (the second step, as
+described in Chapter V) are subsidiary problems, in the sense that the
+incentive for their solution arises by reason of a decision already
+made by the commander, i.e., the basic Decision, and because they are
+problems which the commander recognizes are to be solved by himself
+and not by his subordinates.
+
+Assumptions. The commander's plan has been derived from an estimate of
+the situation based on the best information available to him. Complete
+and accurate information is frequently lacking; hence, many military
+plans consider contingencies which, to make a plan possible, have been
+accepted in the estimate as assumptions.
+
+The word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies
+"the taking of something for granted". It does not mean a conjecture,
+guess, or probability. The proposed action, resulting from a decision
+made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the
+disclosure of the truth of the assumption. The fact that the
+assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates the
+advisability of developing several plans based upon various sets of
+assumptions.
+
+It would be erroneous to believe that all contingencies can be
+foreseen, and to be content with a particular set of plans, all of
+which may prove to be wrong. It is not to be expected that a plan
+based upon assumptions will, in all respects, be suitable for use in
+an actual situation. For example, it will seldom occur that an
+elaborate Battle Plan, based upon assumptions as to the various types,
+dispositions, and strengths of forces present, the weather conditions,
+and the intent of the enemy, can be used without changes.
+
+On the other hand, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a harbor
+under assumptions that high visibility exists, that airplanes can
+operate, and that hostile submarines will be the only force in
+opposition, may frequently be found entirely applicable to the actual
+situation, or so nearly so as to require only slight modification. It
+is possible so to standardize such plans that only minor variables
+need be indicated when the plan is to be used.
+
+The visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the
+most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment.
+
+Alternative Plans. The word "alternative" is generally applied to
+contingent plans intended to accomplish a common task, but developed
+from varying sets of assumptions. "A choice between several" is the
+meaning of the word as here used. When such choice becomes necessary
+in a situation not yet clarified, that plan will be selected which has
+been derived from the set of assumptions considered by the commander
+as most likely to be correct. The selected plan is usually called the
+plan or the "accepted plan", and the other plans, coming from other
+less likely but still possible sets of assumptions, are called
+Alternative Plan No. 1, Alternative Plan No. 2, etc.
+
+Naval tactical situations particularly lend themselves to the drawing
+up of alternative plans in advance. There are numerous general
+categories of such tactical plans. Among these the Battle Plan is of
+paramount concern. Others include plans for sortie, entrance, defense
+while cruising, etc. In each category, alternative plans may be
+developed, based on various sets of assumptions.
+
+Alternative plans evolved in advance of detailed information may be
+found useful as a general basis for action. Circumstances may prove to
+be different from those previously visualized. The correct procedure
+is to keep the plans up to date, testing them, by the latest
+information, in a Running Estimate (Chapter IX). The commander will
+thus have a foundation for sound decision in the circumstances which
+actually arise.
+
+Still another use of alternative plans merits consideration. Early
+coordinated action during actual operations may be demanded although
+neither time nor the information available has permitted a detailed
+estimate. If the commander has drawn up, in advance, plans based on
+assumptions as to conditions that conceivably might exist, he will be
+better able to appreciate the situations which actually arise. He can
+thus direct the necessary action with more rapidity and understanding
+than if completely unprepared because of lack of planning. If he
+informs his subordinates of his proposed action under certain assumed
+conditions, he will facilitate cooperation, because better mutual
+understanding will exist. The advance alternative plans here discussed
+are not necessarily confined to problems confronting a commander
+during actual war operations. They may profitably be drawn up in
+peace, and may be the basis of training exercises.
+
+
+Application of the Essential Elements of a Favorable Military
+Operation
+
+In the solution of the problems distinctive of the second step, the
+commander starts with a consideration of the salient features of a
+favorably progressing military operation. This procedure is
+appropriate because any series of these problems, considered as a
+whole, pertains to the single problem of determining the most
+effective operation, or series of operations, for carrying his basic
+Decision into effect. If the action contemplated in the basic Decision
+is of such a nature as to call for successive included efforts in more
+than one stage, the commander limits his consideration, should he find
+such restriction advisable on sound grounds, to the operation or
+operations included in the first stage.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+On this basis, the commander considers, first, the feature of correct
+physical objectives. He has first to determine what his correct
+physical objectives will be.
+
+This determination may or may not present a perplexity. Frequently,
+the procedure of the first step (Chapter VI) will have plainly
+indicated one or more, perhaps all, of the physical objectives
+involved. In some cases, also, the basic Decision will have plainly
+pointed out the action to be taken, and with respect to what physical
+objectives. In these instances, the commander may, with little further
+analysis or none, set down the operations which he considers necessary
+or desirable with respect to these physical objectives.
+
+In other cases, however, the action indicated in the Decision, though
+plainly indicating the commander's intent--that is, his calculated
+line of endeavor--may not have designated the numerous physical
+objectives as to which his effort is to be exerted. For example, the
+Decision "to interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes" is
+quite clear, but what are the numerous exertions of force required,
+and with relation to what physical objectives? Immediately there is a
+perplexity. Guided by the analysis made in his previous estimate of
+the situation, the commander now determines what the physical
+objectives are, action as to which will contribute to the
+accomplishment of the effort. The sum total of the actions taken
+against these physical objectives is properly equivalent to the
+accomplishment of the action indicated in his Decision. He may not be
+able at this time to determine all of the correct physical objectives,
+but he can determine certain correct ones (for the method, see Section
+III of Chapter IV).
+
+The correct physical objectives having been determined, so far as can
+be done at this time, the commander studies each thoroughly,
+developing the possibilities of certain effective actions (operations)
+with reference thereto. For instance, in the case of a commander who
+has been ordered to "interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime
+routes", he might develop one operation "to bomb enemy facilities at
+Port X", and another "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade
+routes" (with an indication of the routes involved).
+
+The operations thus developed are now listed in a definite sequence,
+in order to provide a proper basis for the further procedure. The
+commander may find it desirable to state them in their order of
+importance. Sometimes, however, it may be found advantageous to list
+the operations in chronological sequence, i.e., in the order of their
+execution. This point is further discussed hereafter (pages 166 and
+192). The commander is at liberty, of course, to use either method
+according to its helpfulness in enabling him to visualize the elements
+of his problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander now considers the second feature: advantageous relative
+positions. He may already occupy an advantageous geographical location
+or locations (see pages 64 (bottom) and 65 (top)), or he may desire to
+improve his positions in certain respects. An advantageous position
+might be between the enemy and his base, in order to deny it to him.
+Another advantageous position might be to windward of the enemy, for
+the purpose of making a destroyer attack under the protection of a
+smoke screen.
+
+The commander now reconsiders, from the viewpoint of "advantageous
+relative positions", the operations deduced with respect to "correct
+physical objectives". As a result of this reconsideration, he may find
+that certain of these operations may be retained without change,
+whereas others may require modification.
+
+Suppose, for example, that two of the operations listed are those
+noted above, viz:
+
+    "To bomb enemy facilities at Port X", and
+
+    "To capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes
+    between the ---- parallels of north latitude and the
+    ---- meridians of west longitude."
+
+From the viewpoint of relative position, it may appear that the first
+operation is not affected seriously, if at all. Therefore, this
+operation may be left unchanged. However, the second operation may be
+definitely affected by relative position, because the best method of
+interrupting enemy trade may be to employ raiding forces in focal
+areas. Therefore this operation might be altered to the form, "to
+capture or destroy enemy trade by raiding focal areas" (with a
+designation of the areas).
+
+The commander's study is now likely to suggest operations which were
+not apparent when the analysis was confined to the correct physical
+objectives, alone. New physical objectives may appear to require
+attention. If so, all such new operations are added to the list
+compiled.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander may now study his list of operations, compiled to this
+point, from the standpoint of the third feature, proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. However, if the commander considers such apportionment
+now, his subsequent study of the fourth element--"adequate freedom of
+action"--may develop a need for further operations which will in turn
+call for a re-analysis as to his apportionment of fighting strength.
+Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the
+commander now defers consideration of such apportionment, and that
+he proceeds at this point to study measures for ensuring adequate
+freedom of action.
+
+This study requires consideration of such matters as training, morale,
+surprise, secrecy, cooperation, intelligence, logistics, and
+provisions (communications, location of the commander, and the like)
+for effective exercise of command. (See page 76). The commander
+exercises his judgment as to the degree of detail in which such
+matters should be treated, according to the nature of his problems.
+
+If any such subject--for example, communications--involves the
+development of a subsidiary plan (page 168), the measures noted in
+connection with the formulation of the basic plan may be stated along
+broad lines, such as: "To provide for effective communications." Any
+specific matters of considerable importance may also be included,--for
+example, as to secrecy with respect to the use of communications.
+Other details may then be deferred until the commander takes up the
+necessary subsidiary plan. Otherwise, all pertinent operations in
+connection with these measures are naturally noted at this point.
+
+Certain of these measures for freedom of action are now to be
+discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on basic
+plans.
+
+In certain operations contemplated by the commander, there may be a
+requirement for additional training, sometimes of a special nature.
+This may be true, for instance, if an operation involves the landing
+of an expeditionary force. Conditions permitting, the commander will
+naturally desire to make provision for training exercises. If time or
+other conditions do not permit necessary training, he may find it
+desirable to modify his plans accordingly. The salient features of a
+subsidiary training problem are discussed hereafter (page 176), and
+may well be considered at this point in developing the basic plan.
+
+The commander may already have noted, in considering operations
+suggested by his previous study of the situation, a need for certain
+action as to security, secrecy, and intelligence. Any additional
+operations of this nature, not previously noted, may well be
+incorporated at this point.
+
+Security of his own plan, and secrecy therefor, are important
+considerations with reference to intelligence activities. The
+requirements as to intelligence and counter-intelligence features are
+primary considerations as to any plan. Such considerations involve the
+collection of information and its conversion into intelligence. The
+hampering of enemy intelligence activities is a related consideration.
+
+The collection of useful information, and its denial to the enemy,
+call for a definite plan. When information has been collected, it is
+subjected to the processes (page 122) of analysis, evaluation,
+interpretation, and dissemination. Collection, to be consistently
+effective, calls for specific directives to, or requests on, the
+appropriate collecting agencies. Analysis determines the source of the
+information and the circumstances under which it was obtained.
+Evaluation determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation
+consists of drawing conclusions; when information thus takes the form
+of facts (so far as they can be ascertained) and of sound conclusions
+drawn therefrom, it becomes military (naval) intelligence. It is then
+disseminated to those concerned and is used in the solution of the
+commander's own problems.
+
+The basis for collection of such data is the determination of the
+essential elements of information desired by the commander. The
+notation of these essential elements, for later incorporation in his
+directive(s), naturally constitutes a primary feature of his basic
+plan. The essential elements of information are frequently formulated
+as questions--e.g., Will the enemy do this? Is the enemy doing that?
+What are the principal topographic features of Y Island, with respect
+to so and so?
+
+These questions cover the essential matters of perplexity as to enemy
+courses of action and as to the characteristics of the theater. Each
+enemy course of action, for example, may provide the basis for a
+question; or, if the scope of the problem has narrowed sufficiently,
+such question may deal with one of the enemy's possible operations,
+related to a course of action which he may be pursuing or is known to
+be pursuing.
+
+On the basis of the essential elements of information, the commander
+provides for proper reconnaissance activities by the several
+collecting agencies under his command, or for appropriate requests to
+be made by him on other collecting agencies. A sound plan will always
+make adequate provision for such measures.
+
+These subjects are treated in more detail in the later discussion
+(page 177) of intelligence problems.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In connection with freedom of action, the commander will also make
+adequate provision for logistics support. In its unrestricted sense,
+the term "logistics" relates to the supply and movement of a military
+force, and to such related matters as the disposition and replacement
+of ineffective personnel. Logistics measures, as comprehended in the
+development of the basic plan, exclude movement primarily of a
+strategical or tactical nature, but include movement related primarily
+to supply and similar matters. This requirement gives rise to the
+necessity for logistics measures which may further call for operations
+such as to provide fuel oil and supplies at rendezvous X and Y, and
+tender facilities at port D. An incidental requirement will relate to
+movements of train ships. Hence, the commander formulates these, also,
+and includes them in his list of operations for later assignment as
+logistics tasks. (Page 166). Fuel oil may likewise be required at Port
+D, but if the commander knows that ample fuel oil is in store there,
+no operation to cover this feature is required of him.
+
+The solution of logistics problems is further discussed hereafter
+(page 179).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander has now, it may be presumed, evolved all of the
+operations that his analysis tells him are appropriate with respect to
+correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, and
+freedom of action. Therefore, he now studies all of these operations
+from the viewpoint of the remaining element--proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. This consideration involves, initially, a
+determination of what forces will be necessary to carry out the
+operations listed. The commander thereby determines the requirements,
+as to forces, for each such operation.
+
+For example, the operation "to locate an enemy force" may require the
+use of several types of naval vessels and aircraft. The commander
+determines what method of search is best for the purposes of this
+specific operation; thereafter, he determines what forces are
+necessary to conduct the search. The procedure has previously been
+indicated (in the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made
+Available--page 34).
+
+In this study the commander will often find it necessary to divide
+some of the more extensive operations into component parts, suitable
+for later assignment as tasks for subordinates. Fundamentally, there
+is no difference between an operation and a task, except that the
+latter includes also the idea of imposing on another person, or
+assigning to him, a definite amount of work or duty (page 84). At this
+stage, then, the commander deals with components suitable for
+performance by available weapons, in the usual units, or combinations
+of units, in which they are effective. Of course, when an operation
+meets this requirement without subdivision into components, it need
+not be subdivided.
+
+These component parts are not yet actually tasks, because the
+commander does not plan to assign them at this time to any one for
+execution. However, the components are visualized as clearly, and are
+formulated as definitely, as is possible at this point. The
+requirement is that they be acts that available forces can perform.
+
+The method of breaking down an operation into component parts is one
+of analysis and deduction. Having visualized the manner whereby the
+operation can contribute to the accomplishment of the effort, the
+commander has now to determine the means to be employed to this end.
+Experience and knowledge tell him what numbers and types of ships,
+aircraft, and other weapons, if properly employed, will attain the
+effect desired.
+
+Each component part will indicate both the action and the physical
+objectives of the action. For each component, the commander estimates
+what forces are required. He knows the extent of the armed forces
+available, and he can, if his total force is adequate, adjust matters
+to allow each component a force capable of carrying it out.
+
+For example, a component operation might call for a search by
+destroyers, but the commander might find that his destroyers were in
+such poor relative position as to prevent them from reaching the point
+of origin in time. Therefore he would be unable to conduct the search
+by using destroyers alone. He might now consider a search by aircraft.
+A study of this proposal might indicate that it could be carried out
+in part by aircraft, but that available aircraft were inadequate to
+carry it out in its entirety. In such event, consideration would be in
+order of the possibility of conducting this search by use of other
+forces also, e.g., submarines and cruisers.
+
+In case the commander believes an indicated operation to be
+infeasible, he first restudies that operation to see whether he can
+modify it, without adversely affecting the accomplishment of the
+effort. He may even find that he can eliminate it by including its
+essential features in some other operation.
+
+If the commander finds that his forces are inadequate for the
+accomplishment of an effort in one stage, but that they are adequate
+for its accomplishment in successive stages, he may draw a conclusion
+as to which of the operations he can carry out first. On this basis,
+he may proceed with the formulation of tasks to include these
+operations, leaving the remainder to a future time (see page 56).
+
+It may be that all operations set down cannot be accomplished by the
+forces available, but that they will be possible of accomplishment if
+other forces are provided. This knowledge, of the sum total of forces
+required for the action indicated in the Decision, is an essential. It
+is only by such a searching inquiry that the commander ensures that
+the operations resolved from the Decision will result in a full
+solution of his problem. Usually the forces available will be found
+adequate, because the superior who provided them gave consideration,
+on his part, to the requirements. However, if the forces available are
+not deemed adequate, the commander either modifies the operations, or
+restricts them, or subdivides them into parts for performance in
+succession by stages. In any such case, conditions permitting, he
+makes constructive representations, together with a report of the
+facts, to his superior (see page 103).
+
+
+Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.
+
+Each of the operations finally deemed necessary or desirable is now
+tested as to its suitability, its feasibility, and its acceptability
+as to consequences. The considerations involved have been explained
+previously (Section III of Chapter IV) and are therefore not repeated
+here.
+
+The testing process will eliminate those operations found not
+suitable, feasible, or acceptable.
+
+In addition, the tests may lead to the elimination of operations
+which, while both suitable and feasible, do not contribute enough
+toward the accomplishment of the effort to warrant their retention.
+For example, among the operations listed might be one to capture X
+island and one to capture Y island, both suitable and feasible. The
+commander, having analyzed these proposals, might conclude that the
+capture of Y island would not constitute a sufficient contribution to
+warrant its adoption as an operation at this time. Therefore, he might
+omit this operation, or he might defer it to a later stage.
+
+A feasible operation may similarly be rejected or deferred out of
+preference for another which can more readily be accomplished.
+
+The tests may also reveal important facts as to the relative
+consequences with respect to costs. For example, two operations might
+both be acceptable as to this factor, but one might be less acceptable
+than the other. Accordingly, the less acceptable operation might be
+omitted, or might be deferred for the time being.
+
+Upon the completion of the tests, all operations retained are listed
+for further development.
+
+
+The Formulation of Tasks
+
+The correct resolution of the Decision into the detailed operations
+required is further ensured by the visualization of these operations
+as tasks. Tasks so formulated (page 162), become a basis for the
+preparation of directives.
+
+To prepare a plan as a basis for directives, or for use as such, the
+commander first finds it desirable to formulate and assemble the
+various tasks. The tasks are formulated as a result of his study of
+(1) those operations which do not require to be broken down, and which
+may now be rewritten as tasks, and of (2) the component parts of the
+more extensive operations (See page 162, bottom).
+
+Each of the tasks, as now listed, is tested for suitability, for
+feasibility, and for acceptability with respect to the consequences as
+to costs. In view of the fact that the operations have all been
+thoroughly tested, this process now becomes not a formal analysis but
+merely a check.
+
+
+The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups
+
+The commander now classifies the tasks on the basis of their
+suitability for accomplishment by appropriate task forces or
+subdivisions thereof, i.e., task groups. In so doing he endeavors to
+avoid forming any more classifications than are necessary for the
+accomplishment of the full effort.
+
+Note: In the remainder of this work, the term Task Group, except as
+may otherwise be indicated, will be understood in the inclusive sense
+of either "task force" or "task group".
+
+Tasks are assigned to task groups on the basis of such factors as the
+nature and geographical location of physical objectives, the existing
+disposition of the several units, their capabilities, and their
+freedom of action. The last-named may be the determinant, and,
+because of the importance of such considerations, tasks which would
+otherwise fall to one group might be assigned to another. Features
+influencing a change might include lack of training of the personnel
+available in the first group, or the special qualifications of a
+particular commander, or a justified desire to adhere to a previously
+determined permanent task organization.
+
+Logistics tasks, i.e., those requiring operations for placing
+logistics measures in effect, require the same careful consideration
+as do combat tasks. (See page 162).
+
+Certain tasks apply to all of the task groups, or pertain to the
+general conduct of the common effort. Among such may be provision for
+security, for unity among the subdivisions, and for intelligence
+activities (page 160). In order to avoid repetition, these tasks are
+assembled in one group.
+
+The commander analyzes the requirements of fighting strength for each
+task group. He then, from the means available to him, assigns the
+necessary strength to each group, making adjustment between the
+theoretical requirements and the actual strength available.
+
+He is familiar with the types of vessels and aircraft constituting his
+command, and with their military characteristics; with the
+capabilities and cooperative qualities of his commanders; with the
+degree of training of his various units; and with the geographical
+location of physical objectives. He recognizes that each task requires
+adequate strength for its accomplishment. Because these requirements
+have been thoroughly considered during the study of the effective
+apportionment of fighting strength, he is able to make adjustments as
+necessary.
+
+The commander now fully organizes each classification of tasks and its
+corresponding task group by naming the task group (or task force), by
+making notation of its composition and of the rank and name of its
+commander, and then by listing the tasks of each group. The principal
+task (or tasks) may be listed first, the other tasks following in the
+order of their importance. If preferred, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological. Also, either major or minor tasks may be listed
+chronologically. (See pages 158 and 192).
+
+If the chronological sequence of tasks is utilized, that fact, in
+order to avoid confusion, is clearly indicated.
+
+Thus organized, the whole plan can be transferred almost bodily into
+the Order Form (Chapter VIII).
+
+
+Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the Determination
+of Objectives Embodied in Tasks
+
+In formulating tasks for the several task groups, the commander has
+now visualized, for each such group, an objective (or objectives) for
+the subordinate to attain. In selecting these objectives, the
+commander has placed himself, mentally, in the subordinate's
+situation, visualizing the problem which the subordinate is to solve.
+On this basis the commander has apportioned the strength needed for
+the attainment of the objectives assigned to his subordinates. This
+procedure, of evident importance, is frequently one of considerable
+difficulty, because a higher commander, lacking detailed information
+of the situation which may confront a subordinate cannot always
+anticipate all the obstacles to the latter's success.
+
+In formulating tasks, and in apportioning strength, by the procedure
+already described, the commander has applied the Fundamental Military
+Principle. Now, to ensure the practical adjustment of means to ends
+(page 66), the commander reviews the process in the light of that
+Principle, so that he may be assured that he has selected a correct
+objective (or objectives) for each subordinate. By using the tests
+indicated in the Principle, the commander confirms the suitability of
+each objective so selected, satisfies himself of its feasibility of
+attainment, and assures himself that the costs involved will be
+acceptable. If these requirements cannot be so satisfied, necessary
+adjustments are in order.
+
+These tests may frequently be of a routine nature, by reason of the
+previous painstaking tests of the several operations involved.
+However, such final tests cannot be omitted without incurring the
+danger of selecting incorrect objectives for subordinates to attain.
+
+
+The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action
+
+Having completed the classification of his tasks, the commander next
+assembles the measures determined upon as necessary for ensuring
+adequate freedom of action.
+
+When the subject matter is not too bulky, these measures are
+incorporated in their proper place in the basic plan. Otherwise,
+instructions as to these matters will be issued as annexes.
+
+The various measures are assembled under the classification shown
+below:
+
+    (a) Measures required for security, for cooperation, and for
+        intelligence activities.
+
+    (b) Measures for logistics support. These cover provision for
+        procurement and replenishment of supplies, disposition and
+        replacement of ineffective personnel, satisfactory
+        material maintenance, sanitation, battle casualties, and
+        the like.
+
+    (c) Measures for the exercise of command. These include
+        provision for communications, location of rendezvous, zone
+        time to be used, and the location of the commander.
+
+This classification corresponds to that used in the Order Form (page
+193). Experience has indicated that such a classification facilitates
+the transmission of instructions to subordinate commanders.
+
+If desired, the material which will be required to be incorporated in
+paragraph (1) of the Order Form (see pages 190, 191, 219 and 221) may
+be also assembled at this point.
+
+
+The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans
+
+As previously noted (page 106), certain subsidiary problems require
+the preparation of subsidiary plans to be included with the directive
+as annexes. In broad strategical estimates, the solution of such
+subsidiary problems involves a vast amount of mental effort; even in
+restricted estimates, these problems may require most intensive
+thought. It is therefore appropriate at this point to discuss, in some
+detail, the nature of these subsidiary problems.
+
+During the solution of his basic problem and later, during the process
+of evolving his basic plan, the commander may become aware of the need
+for further action of a supporting nature with respect to his basic
+mission, distinct from that which he intends to assign as tasks to
+subordinate commanders. If the nature of this action involves
+perplexity, he will be confronted with new problems to be solved. When
+he recognizes that such problems exist and are to be solved by
+himself, this awareness is a recognition of the incentive.
+
+For example, one of these problems may involve a battle in which the
+entire force will participate, or perhaps a sortie requiring
+coordination of the several subdivisions of his force. Others will be
+concerned with measures recognized as necessary for ensuring freedom
+of action.
+
+These problems give rise to the subsidiary plans previously referred
+to (page 106). They are not necessarily subsidiary in importance; even
+the Battle Plan, the basis for the culmination of tactical effort, may
+result from the solution of a subsidiary problem. The word
+"subsidiary", as here used, merely indicates that the problem has its
+origin in the commander's own Decision.
+
+When the incentive is thus recognized during the solution of the
+basic problem or during the second step, the commander solves these
+new problems, and includes their solutions as a part of the directives
+prepared for the carrying out of the basic plan. As will be seen later
+(Chapter VIII), there is a prescribed place for such solutions in the
+usual form in which directives are issued. Often, however, because of
+extent and bulk, these solutions are included with the directives as
+annexes.
+
+The commander will desire to provide for all contingencies, but he can
+rarely, during the planning stage, see completely into the future, so
+as to foretell all pertinent events which may befall. During the
+unfolding of events, therefore, unforeseen subsidiary problems will
+probably arise. Whether visualized during planning, or encountered
+during the execution of the plan, these problems have the same
+relationship with the basic problem. Reference is later made (Chapter
+IX) to subsidiary problems which arise during the action.
+
+Subsidiary problems, according to their nature in each case, may be
+solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step or by that
+distinctive of the second. In many instances either may be applicable,
+the choice being a matter of convenience.
+
+Battle Plans, for example, can demonstrably be formulated by the use
+of either procedure. Thus, a Decision "to destroy the enemy in a
+daylight fleet engagement" may be used as the basis for an Estimate of
+the Situation, by the procedure distinctive of the first step, in
+order to reach a decision as to the plan, in outline, for the
+contemplated engagement. However, the same result can also be attained
+through the procedure distinctive of the second step, with the basic
+Decision as the point of departure.
+
+A solution also can be reached by a method which is, in effect,
+intermediate between the procedures of the first and second steps. For
+example, the basic (broad strategical) Decision noted above can be
+taken, in a detailed tactical Estimate, as the only suitable,
+feasible, and acceptable course of action. Then, in Section IV of the
+Estimate, a study of the more detailed operations involved can be
+developed into an outlined plan for the battle. Thus, a single course
+of action, expanded to include the outlined plan so developed, can
+then be adopted as the decision and can in turn be expanded by
+second-step methods into a detailed tactical plan.
+
+On the grounds of simplicity, the procedure distinctive of the second
+step is preferable, when it is applicable to the particular problem.
+Therefore, when a subsidiary plan is to be developed directly from a
+basic Decision, this is frequently the better procedure. This comment
+is applicable not only to battle plans but also to other subsidiary
+plans such as sortie plans, entrance plans, and logistics plans. The
+commander may find it necessary, however, to expand the study of
+fighting strength made in Section I-B of the basic estimate, in order
+to obtain the detailed data needed for formulating the subsidiary
+plan.
+
+In spite of the relative simplicity of the second-step method, cases
+occur where the procedure of the first step is nevertheless
+preferable. For example, a basic Decision making provision for a major
+campaign, divided into stages of some scope, may involve, as part of
+one of these stages, an operation to capture an island. Such an
+operation may itself require a considerable effort on the part of the
+whole force; yet the operation may be so specialized or localized, or
+both, with reference to the entire effort contemplated in the basic
+Decision, that the solution of this subsidiary problem can best be
+accomplished through the procedure distinctive of the first step.
+
+The commander will therefore necessarily be the judge, in each case,
+as to the particular procedure to be adopted.
+
+There are wide variations in the requirements of the Estimate Form,
+when used for the solution of subsidiary problems. This is natural
+because these problems vary widely in nature. They include, on the one
+hand, problems dealing directly with the conflict of armed forces, for
+which the Form is especially designed. On the other hand, these
+problems include those dealing with the factors related to freedom of
+action. To be suitable for this purpose, the Form requires
+modification in varying degrees. Certain examples are included in the
+latter part of this chapter (page 176 and following).
+
+The application of the procedure of the first step to the solution of
+such subsidiary problems requires provision for deriving, in each
+case, a (subsidiary) mission appropriate to the problem. Of the two
+elements of the mission, the (subsidiary) purpose is first determined,
+because the (subsidiary) task will necessarily be suitable to the
+(subsidiary) purpose. These elements of the (subsidiary) mission may
+be obtained from one or more of the operations into which the basic
+Decision has been resolved. They may also be obtained from a preceding
+subsidiary problem, already solved.
+
+In illustration of the preceding, discussion is first centered on a
+strategical problem of usual type, involving a subsidiary tactical
+problem calling for the detailed employment of weapons in a naval
+engagement. Other illustrations will deal with subsidiary problems
+relating to particular aspects of freedom of action.
+
+In the first example it is supposed that the commander has already
+solved a basic problem of broad strategical scope, and has arrived at
+a Decision which contemplates an engagement. A further logical act of
+planning is now to develop a Battle Plan. Such development involves
+the solution of a subsidiary problem. In this case the commander is
+supposed to have found it desirable to solve this subsidiary problem
+by the procedure distinctive of the first step.
+
+In this problem, the situation summarized is an imaginary one. It may
+eventuate either through the natural future developments of the
+situation existing at the time of the solution of the basic problem,
+or it may confront the commander during the execution of the plans
+derived from the Decision of that (basic) problem. The Battle Plan
+finally to be formulated will be for use under the conditions assumed
+in this situation.
+
+The commander will desire to draw up a Battle Plan as a provision for
+the situation which he believes most likely to eventuate. However, as
+he cannot be certain that this situation will occur, he may also
+desire to assume other situations, i.e., prepare in advance for other
+contingencies. It is then necessary for him to solve several problems,
+each differing from the others in the assumptions (page 155) as to the
+form the situation may take. The summary of the situation therefore
+requires a brief statement of the conditions which are assumed. In
+addition, such parts of the basic problem may be included as are
+deemed pertinent to the new problem in hand.
+
+In his new problem the purpose of the (subsidiary) mission may readily
+be obtained from the basic problem. Suppose the assigned task,
+motivating the estimate of the basic problem, to have been to "prevent
+enemy convoy from reaching destination". This, the motivating task of
+the basic problem, then becomes a suitable (subsidiary) purpose for
+the mission of the subsidiary problem.
+
+For the mission of the subsidiary problem, a motivating task, suitable
+to the purpose thus determined, will be found in the Decision of the
+basic problem. Suppose the Decision in this case to have been "to
+destroy the enemy convoy". The task thus determined for the subsidiary
+problem becomes an assigned task in the sense that it is assigned by
+the commander to himself, instead of to a subordinate; however, it is
+also an assigned task in the sense that it has been indirectly
+assigned by the immediate superior, because it has been derived, in
+the basic estimate, from the motivating task which was directly
+assigned by the superior.
+
+The two elements, of task and purpose, when linked together, enable
+the commander to visualize the appropriate effect desired, as the
+basis for his subsidiary estimate,--a procedure identical with that
+followed in a basic estimate. As in the latter, the commander can now
+formulate his subsidiary mission, as:--
+
+    (Task) To destroy the enemy convoy,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to prevent it from reaching its
+    destination.
+
+The mission of the subsidiary problem is thus seen to be identical
+with the basic Decision linked to the purpose of that Decision.
+
+However, this is not always the case. A subsidiary problem may merely
+involve the execution by the commander, i.e., under his own immediate
+direction, of a designated part of his general plan. Or, such a
+problem may involve execution, by the commander, of one or more of the
+detailed operations for the accomplishment of his general plan or of a
+part thereof. The commander may also find it necessary to solve
+numerous subsidiary problems of relatively restricted scope pertaining
+either to his general plan or to a part thereof or to the detailed
+operations involved.
+
+In some of these cases the purpose of the subsidiary mission may be
+readily apparent. In others, its nature may become clear only after
+the application of considerable mental effort. In every case the
+determination of a proper (subsidiary) purpose involves visualization
+of a situation which the commander desires to bring about or to
+maintain. The (subsidiary) task, appropriate to the (subsidiary)
+purpose, will always necessarily be suitable to the latter. This task
+is then the motivating task for the solution of the particular
+subsidiary problem in hand. This will be the case whether the
+commander makes a simple mental solution or produces a more complex
+one in which the formal written estimate of the situation is employed.
+In the former instance, the brevity of the mental process tends to
+obscure this fact.
+
+An example might occur in a situation where the commander has received
+an order to "Protect the base at A". It is then supposed that, after
+estimating the situation, he has reached the Decision "to deny the
+enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of A", the
+purpose of the Decision being, of course, "in order to protect the
+base at A". The action required might then be undertaken in two
+stages. The first stage might be confined to the area ABCD. If, then,
+all available base sites in this area, except Y island, were already
+securely in friendly hands, the commander would find it necessary to
+make provision for an operation to deny the use of this island to the
+enemy. If this operation is of such a nature that the commander
+desires to execute it under his own direct control, instead of
+assigning it to a subordinate, it presents a subsidiary problem which
+the commander, himself, has to solve.
+
+The commander has now determined the necessity of solving a subsidiary
+problem relating to the accomplishment of a designated part of his
+general plan. He has also determined the necessity of solving another
+subsidiary problem presented by an operation pertaining to the first
+stage of the accomplishment of his general plan.
+
+Each subsidiary problem requires an estimate of the situation although
+"the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact" (page
+172).
+
+In making his basic estimate, the commander may have discovered the
+need for these subsidiary estimates. In this case, he may have
+included them in his estimate, as "estimates within the estimate"
+(page 83), in his analysis of the operations involved in the various
+courses of action which he considered. For instance, his basic
+Decision may have included the capture of Y island, and he may have
+covered this feature by a corollary to that Decision, as follows:
+
+    Corollary: As a first stage, to deny the enemy the use of
+    available base sites in the area ABCD, by capturing Y island.
+
+However, the commander may not discover the desirability or need of
+solving these subsidiary problems until the second step, when
+resolving the basic Decision into the detailed operations required. In
+this case, he might make due provision at that time for the operations
+involved in the subsidiary problems. The mental procedure would be the
+same in either event.
+
+The commander may find, however, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate with respect to the determination of the stages of
+his operation, including the details as to the performance of the
+first stage. In this case he finds a proper mission for his subsidiary
+estimate in the basic Decision, linked to its purpose. This mission
+would be as follows:--
+
+    (Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+    effective bombing range of A,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to protect the base at A.
+
+During the subsidiary estimate the commander may discover, in his
+study of the area ABCD, the necessity for an operation to deny Y
+island to the enemy, and may even go so far, in this study, as to
+decide on the capture of this island. The decision, settling on this
+area as the scene of the first stage of his effort, may then include
+provision for the capture of the island, as follows:
+
+    Decision: To deny the enemy the use of base sites in the area
+    ABCD as a first stage toward denying him the use of all base
+    sites within effective bombing range of the base at A.
+
+    Corollary: To capture Y island.
+
+However, the commander may not take up the matter of denying Y island,
+specifically, to enemy use until he studies the detailed operations
+required for the accomplishment of the action involved in his first
+stage. In such event, he may make provision for the capture of the
+island in his subsidiary plan for the execution of the first stage. He
+may find, on the other hand, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate as to this feature. If so, the mission for this
+subsidiary estimate would be identical with the decision (less the
+corollary, but plus the purpose of the estimate), i.e.,--
+
+    (Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+    effective bombing range of the area ABCD as a first stage
+
+    (Purpose) toward denying him the use of all base sites within
+    effective bombing range of the base at A.
+
+During this estimate the commander considers the various courses of
+action whereby he can deny to the enemy all bases in the area of the
+first stage. Concluding that Y island is the only base site not
+securely in friendly hands, and that the best method of denying it to
+the enemy is to capture it himself, he reaches a decision as follows:
+
+    Decision: To capture Y island, in order to deny to the enemy
+    the use of the only available base site in the area ABCD.
+
+In each of the foregoing cases, the commander is said to have
+"deduced" the mission for his subsidiary problem. As has been
+demonstrated, the process of deduction is merely the application of
+the natural mental processes through the use of the estimate of the
+situation. Whether the estimate is formal or informal, detailed or
+brief, written or mental, is immaterial; in any case, the estimate
+results in a decision which provides, with its purpose, a proper
+mission for the succeeding problem which has been presented by
+solution of its predecessors.
+
+In logical sequence, from problem to problem, the procedure outlined
+in the preceding discussion enables the commander to derive a correct
+mission for the problem involving the capture of Y Island. Clear
+visualization of such a subsidiary mission is frequently of great
+importance, and may be difficult unless the procedure has been
+carefully traced from each problem to the next. In this particular
+example, if the commander finds that the capture of Y Island is of
+such a specialized and localized nature (page 170) as to call for a
+formal estimate (as may frequently be the case in capturing a
+well-defended island base), he will be especially desirious of
+deriving a correct (subsidiary) mission as a basis for this estimate.
+In this instance a correct mission would be:--
+
+    (Task) To capture Y Island,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only
+    available base site in the area ABCD.
+
+This mission is identical with the decision, linked to its purpose, of
+the preceding subsidiary problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Subsidiary problems relating to training (page 160), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, involve estimates of the
+situation very similar to those explained previously (Chapter VI).
+
+Section I-A of such a training estimate will include a summary of the
+salient features of the existing situation, from the strategical or
+tactical viewpoint, together with a statement of the salient features
+of the operations to be carried out for which the projected training
+is designed. The incentive will be found in a previous decision
+calling for the operations which require the training to be given. The
+assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for
+training appropriate to the projected operations. The (subsidiary)
+mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) to provide appropriate training,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action during
+    the operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+    operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+    phraseology in the mission or by reference to the preceding
+    summary of the situation.)
+
+Section I-B of a training estimate will take account of the training
+factors cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic problem,
+but will specify details with respect to both own and enemy forces.
+This section will also cover existing facilities for training, as well
+as the characteristics of the theater which have now or may have a
+bearing on the training to be given.
+
+Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+the appropriate training.
+
+Section III will deal with any measures which may be adopted by the
+enemy (through actual attack, through propaganda, or any other
+methods) to hinder or prevent the desired training.
+
+Section IV will be devoted to the selection of the best training
+procedure.
+
+Section V will state the decision as to the essentials of the training
+to be given and as to the method of giving the training. The decision
+will be in such detail as to constitute a general plan, or a proper
+basis therefor, from which a detailed plan may be developed.
+
+A detailed training plan, developed from the foregoing decision, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions, will state the
+general plan for training, and will prescribe the appropriate training
+tasks. It will also include any proper coordinating measures, make
+provision for the logistics of the training plan, and finally provide
+for the exercise of command and for supervision over the training.
+
+A training plan may be briefed by annexing appropriate
+documents,--e.g., a program and a schedule. The commander will
+ordinarily issue a schedule for training to be given under his own
+supervision; he will usually issue a program for training to be given
+by his subordinates, who will in turn prepare their own schedules.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Subsidiary problems involving intelligence (page 160), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, call for an intelligence
+estimate along the lines indicated, in general, in Chapter VI.
+
+Section I-A of the Estimate will include a summary of the salient
+features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical
+and tactical operations. The incentive, to be found in a previous
+decision of the commander, will be noted. The assigned objective will
+be the making of provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and
+of the theater of operations. The mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) To make provision for adequate intelligence of the
+    enemy and of the theater of operations,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+    operations contemplated.
+
+Section I-B of the intelligence estimate will take account of the
+factors as to intelligence and as to related matters which are noted
+in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate.
+
+Section II will consider the possible procedures for obtaining
+information, i.e., for its collection, including reports from
+collecting agencies.
+
+Section III will consider the capabilities of the enemy as to
+counter-intelligence measures.
+
+Section IV will compare the various procedures open for the collection
+of information and for reports thereof.
+
+Section V will include a decision as to the essential elements of
+information desired. The decision will be in sufficient detail to
+serve as a general plan (or a basis therefor), to be developed into a
+detailed plan for obtaining information and for converting it into
+intelligence.
+
+A detailed intelligence plan will include appropriate information and
+assumptions. It will state the general plan for obtaining
+intelligence. This statement will include the essential elements of
+information desired. The plan will include appropriate tasks for
+information-collecting agencies, with times and destinations for
+reports of information. The task for each collecting agency will be
+based on the general plan (above); such task will also be
+synchronized with the projected operations prescribed for such agency
+in current Operation Orders (Chapter VIII). The agency's inherent
+capabilities--its limitations as well as its powers--will be given
+due consideration. Requests to be made on collecting agencies not
+under the commander's control will be noted in the information (as to
+own forces) given in the plan (see above).
+
+Logistics arrangements will include, for example, provisions for
+handling prisoners of war, the disposition of captured documents and
+other materials, and the supply of maps, charts, and photographs.
+Counter intelligence measures will be specified where applicable.
+These include such matters as censorship, press relations, camouflage,
+and propaganda. Finally, the plan will include provision for the
+rendition of routine and special reports, for special charts (or maps)
+accompanying or pertinent to such reports, and for any intelligence
+conferences.
+
+The essential elements of information desired are frequently stated in
+question form. Each question deals with an enemy course of action or
+with one or more of the enemy operations pertaining to such a course
+(page 161).
+
+The tasks assigned to collecting agencies, or the requests made on
+collecting agencies not under the commander's control, will call for
+information (negative, if desired, as well as positive) as to specific
+indications of the enemy's action--past, present, or intended--and of
+the characteristics of the theater as related thereto. The indications
+to be sought for and reported are carefully determined by the
+commander in expectation that information obtained as to such matters
+will enable him to draw conclusions which will answer the questions
+posed by the essential elements of information.
+
+For example, essential elements of information, with corresponding
+indications, may be as follows:
+
+Essential Elements               Indications
+
+1. Will the enemy patrol the     a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   trade route from A to B?         forces (number and types of
+                                    vessels) between meridians--and--,
+                                    as far north as--and as far
+                                    south as--.
+
+                                 b. Times enemy forces observed
+                                    in area noted.
+
+                                 c. Apparent activity of enemy
+                                    forces so noted.
+
+2. Will the enemy cover focal    a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   points M and N?                  forces (numbers and types of
+                                    vessels) in (a specified area
+                                    or areas).
+
+                                 b. Times enemy forces observed
+                                    in areas noted in a, above.
+
+                                 c. Apparent activity of enemy so
+                                    noted.
+
+                                 d. Has M or N been prepared
+                                    as a naval base; an air base
+                                    for seaplanes, for land planes?
+                                    Is M or N readily accessible to
+                                    enemy battleships? What are
+                                    the characteristics of the
+                                    available entrances to sheltered
+                                    anchorages? (Etc.)
+
+Another type of subsidiary problem which may call for a separate
+subsidiary plan relates to logistics (page 162). This problem is
+particularly applicable to the planning stage, because the
+contingencies which it involves can, to a considerable degree, be
+foreseen. In this case the situation which the commander usually
+desires to bring about is adequate freedom of action with respect to
+supply and related matters. He wishes to solve this problem so
+completely during the present step that a logistics plan, concurrently
+executed with his basic plan, will require minimum subsequent
+attention.
+
+A logistics estimate by the procedure distinctive of the first step
+will include in Section I-A a summary of the pertinent features of the
+existing strategical and tactical situation, and of contemplated
+strategical and tactical operations. It will also include a statement
+of the salient features of the existing logistics situation. The
+incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will
+be noted. The assigned objective will be the making of adequate
+provision for logistics support. The mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) to make provision for adequate logistics support,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+    operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+    operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+    phraseology in the mission or by reference to the summary of
+    the situation).
+
+Section I-B of the estimate will take account of the logistics factors
+cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate, but will
+specify details to the further extent necessary.
+
+Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+appropriate logistics support of the various categories.
+
+Section III will discuss enemy actions to hamper or prevent adequate
+logistics support.
+
+Section IV will deal with selection of the best logistics procedure.
+
+Section V will state the decision as to the essential elements of the
+logistics support to be afforded, in such detail as will constitute a
+general plan (or a proper basis therefor) from which a detailed plan
+can be developed.
+
+A detailed logistics plan, developed from the foregoing estimate, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions. It will state the
+general plan for logistics support. It will then provide for
+appropriate action as to each type of logistics support, or will state
+proper tasks for the several subdivisions of the force concerned
+therewith. It will include, also, any coordinating measures. It will,
+finally, make provision for exercise of command with reference to
+logistics support, as well as for any necessary or desirable time
+elements and similar considerations.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+From all of the foregoing discussions it is apparent that the numerous
+possible subsidiary problems are all related to the basic problem
+either directly or through an intervening subsidiary problem. The
+nature of this relationship is seen through the (subsidiary) purpose,
+determined for the particular (subsidiary) task; therefore, the
+understanding of the problem involves a statement or visualization of
+the (subsidiary) purpose in each case.
+
+
+
+
+PART III
+
+
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+IN THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE INAUGURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTION
+
+(The Third Step--The Formulation and Issue of Directives)
+
+    In the discussion which now follows, it is demonstrated that,
+    if the second step (Chapter VII) has been carried through
+    completely, the formulation of directives requires only the
+    completion of details of the Order Form, which is explained.
+    The various types of naval plans and directives are also
+    described.
+
+
+Scope of the Third Step. As previously stated (in Chapter V, on page
+107), the inauguration of the planned action (the third step) begins
+when the commander forms the intention of immediately promulgating, as
+one or more directives, his solution of the problem represented by the
+second step. The third step ends at the moment when the problem
+becomes one of supervising the planned action in the course of its
+execution.
+
+Military Plans and Military Directives. A plan is a proposed scheme,
+procedure, or method of action for the attainment of an objective. It
+is one of the essential links between decision and action.
+
+A directive, in the general sense, initiates or governs conduct or
+procedure. It is the means by which one's will or intent is made known
+to others. Sometimes the word is employed as a synonym for "order"; at
+others, it carries the significance of various instructions ranging
+from the simple to the complex; at still others, it denotes a plan
+formulated to be placed in effect in a particular contingency or when
+so directed. In all cases, a directive, to be suitable as a guide for
+others, has as its origin a plan.
+
+The words plan and directive are used herein as follows:--A plan may
+exist only in the mind. Even if formulated and set down in writing, it
+may receive no distribution. A plan continues to be exclusively a plan
+so long as it concerns the originating commander alone, and it never
+loses its identity as a proposed procedure or method of action. When,
+however, the commander forms the intent of promulgating the plan
+immediately, the plan becomes also a directive. At this point, as
+noted in the preceding paragraph ("Scope of the Third Step"), the
+execution phase begins, from the standpoint of the exercise of mental
+power, with the inauguration of the planned action.
+
+A directive may therefore be (1) an order effective upon receipt, in
+which case it may be an order placing in effect a plan already issued;
+or a directive may be (2) a formulated plan which the commander
+intends to issue immediately to his subordinates.
+
+Accordingly, certain written instruments prepared under the
+designation of plans are also included under the classification of
+directives. In the use of these terms hereinafter, the distinction
+between a plan viewed as a basis for a directive, and a plan intended
+to be promulgated as a directive, will be indicated in the context.
+
+Whether written or mental, the complete plan will cover the scope of
+the Decision, and will be the commander's method of procedure for his
+future conduct of operations. A commander may, or may not, formulate
+his complete plan in writing, or embody it in a formal directive which
+will provide for the execution, in full, of the Decision of his
+estimate. He may find that his plan divides into several parts, and he
+may make separate provision for the execution of each of these parts.
+While the integrity of a plan depends upon the soundness of its
+essential details, the plan is properly formulated as a directive or
+directives projected in detail, only so far into the future as the
+commander's estimate of the situation assures him of reasonable
+freedom of action (see page 57).
+
+Where the commander divides his plan into parts for separate
+accomplishment, he will naturally exercise care that each part is, in
+itself, the suitable basis for a complete and homogeneous plan.
+Successful execution of all these plans results in the complete
+accomplishment of his Decision.
+
+Directives required to further the success of a particular operation
+may be issued without awaiting formulation of the entire plan. Parts
+of the plan may be transmitted as fragmentary directives to guide the
+action of subordinates in instantaneous or early execution. Such cases
+are far more frequent than are those in which a formal written plan,
+to guide either the operations in their entirety or a part thereof, is
+prepared and distributed as a directive. Effective action by the
+subordinate is thus not delayed by the absence of complete written
+directives.
+
+The commander, more especially during war, may be the only individual
+who is conversant with the entire plan. He may consider that the
+necessity for secrecy is paramount, or that there are features to
+whose details he is unwilling to commit himself until the situation is
+clearer. However, he may usually expect to disclose its scope and
+general features to his immediate superior, and the plan in its
+entirety to his next junior; or, in the interests of mutual
+understanding, to all his subordinates of the next lower echelon or
+even to his entire command. The scope of the plan also may be a
+determining factor. If the plan covers an entire campaign or an
+extended series of operations, its dissemination is less likely and
+less general than if it is concerned with only a minor operation.
+
+During peace, in exercises simulating war, the complete plan is
+frequently given circulation for purposes of training.
+
+Subsidiary Plans. Subsidiary plans, discussed in Chapter VII (page
+168), are frequently issued as annexes to the Operation Plan (page
+196) which carries into effect the basic Decision. The commander will
+be the judge as to whether alternative subsidiary plans are necessary
+or desirable under the circumstances.
+
+
+Essentials of Military Directives.
+
+General. By the issue of directives, a commander communicates to his
+subordinates his plans or such parts of them as he desires. Directives
+may be oral or written, or may be transmitted by despatch.
+
+Whether a directive is to be effective upon receipt, or under
+specified conditions, or at a specific time, or upon further
+instructions from the commander, will be evident from its nature, or
+will be prescribed in the body of the directive itself.
+
+The manner of determining the details of a plan has been discussed in
+Chapter VII. The matter contained therein is pertinent to the
+preparation of a plan that is not to be issued as a directive as well
+as to one that is to be so issued.
+
+The various categories of directives customarily employed in our naval
+service, and standard forms for these, are described hereinafter.
+
+The essentials of a military directive which is designed to govern the
+execution of a plan are:
+
+    (a) That it indicate the general plan for the common effort
+        of the entire force.
+
+    (b) That it organize the force with a view to the effective
+        accomplishment of this plan.
+
+    (c) That it assign tasks to the subdivisions of the force,
+        such that the accomplishment of these tasks will result in
+        the accomplishment of the plan adopted for the entire
+        force.
+
+    (d) That it make appropriate provision for coordination among
+        subdivisions, for logistics support, and for the
+        collection of information and the dissemination of
+        intelligence, that it state the conditions under which the
+        plan is to become effective; and that it indicate the
+        location of the commander during the period of execution.
+
+Some of these essentials may have found their expression in previous
+instructions, or may be unnecessary because of the state of mutual
+understanding. On the other hand, the directive may include annexes in
+the form of alternative and subsidiary plans, letters of instructions
+(page 188), and other material designed to be of assistance in the
+intelligent accomplishment of the assigned task.
+
+In issuing a directive, whether written or oral, except such a
+fragmentary order as has previously been described (page 184), a
+commander has the following definite responsibilities:
+
+    (a) To ensure that subordinates understand the
+        situation,--therefore, to give them pertinent available
+        information.
+
+    (b) To set forth clearly the general plan to be carried out by
+        his entire force, as well as the tasks to be accomplished
+        by each subdivision of his force.
+
+    (c) To provide each of these subdivisions with adequate means
+        to accomplish its assigned task.
+
+    (d) To allow subordinate commanders appropriate discretion
+        within the limits of their assigned tasks, without,
+        however, sacrifice of the necessary coordination.
+
+He will also bear in mind that a directive will best convey his will
+and intent and will be most easily understood by his subordinates if
+it is clear, brief, and positive.
+
+Clarity demands the use of precise expressions susceptible of only the
+desired interpretation. Normally, the affirmative form is preferable
+to the negative. The importance of clarity has been summed up in the
+saying, "An order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood".
+If misunderstandings arise on the part of trained subordinates the
+chief fault often lies with the person who issued the directive.
+
+Brevity calls for the omission of superfluous words and of unnecessary
+details. Short sentences are ordinarily more easily and rapidly
+understood than longer ones. Brevity, however, is never to be sought
+at the expense of clarity. The attainment of brevity often requires
+considerable expenditure of effort and of time. But time is not to be
+sacrificed in the interests of obtaining brevity in directives, when
+the proper emphasis should rather be on initiating early action.
+
+Positiveness of expression suggests the superior's fixity of purpose,
+with consequent inspiration to subordinates to prosecute their tasks
+with determination. The use of indefinite and weakening expressions
+leads to suspicion of vacillation and indecision. Such expressions
+tend to impose upon subordinates the responsibilities which belong to
+and are fully accepted by a resolute superior.
+
+
+Restatement of the Decision for Use in the Directive
+
+Except where special considerations exist to the contrary, it will be
+found that the expression of the Decision for use in a directive will
+most clearly indicate the intent of the commander if stated in terms
+of the objective to be attained by his force (i.e., of the situation
+to be created or maintained) and of the outlined action for its
+attainment (page 104). Such expression is usually possible in problems
+of broad strategical scope (page 88). In other cases difficulty may be
+encountered. For instance, in tactical problems dealing with the
+detailed employment of weapons, the action may necessarily be couched
+in the terms of a series of acts (see page 95).
+
+No precise form is prescribed; thoughts clearly expressed are more
+important than form. It is customary to begin with "This force (or
+group) will", and then state with brevity the Decision as (and if)
+modified, adding the motivating task which is the purpose of the
+Decision. The motivating task is connected with the preceding
+statement by words such as "in order to", "to assist in", or
+"preparatory to", as the case may be.
+
+Since his original expression of the Decision in the first step
+(Chapter VI), the commander has studied the operations required to
+carry it out. He therefore has gained a knowledge, which he did not
+then have, of how his action is to be carried out. He may now be able
+to compile a brief of these operations, applicable to all of them and
+therefore informative to all subordinate commanders. He may be able to
+say how, or even where and when, the effort of his force will be
+exerted.
+
+As an illustration, if his Decision is "to destroy enemy battle-line
+strength", his operations might be described "by gun action at long
+range during high visibility". Should the commander, solely for the
+purpose of making his intent clearer to his subordinate commanders,
+now decide to include the latter phrase in the re-wording of his
+Decision, he may do so at this point.
+
+It may sometimes be necessary to restate the Decision for another
+reason. It will be recalled that the commander is frequently obliged
+to recognize that he cannot carry out all of these operations, and
+that he therefore decides to issue a directive to carry out certain
+ones selected for the first stage (page 164). In such a case, he may
+not now be able to use the full Decision as originally determined. In
+that event he couches the Decision in terms of the partial
+accomplishment inherent in the operations to be undertaken.
+
+
+Standard Forms for Plans and Directives
+
+Form. Experience has shown that military directives usually give best
+results if cast in a standard form well known alike to originator and
+recipient. Such a form tends to prevent the omission of relevant
+features, and to minimize error and misunderstanding. However, a
+commander may find that lack of opportunity to facilitate mutual
+understanding by personal conference requires that one or more
+subordinates receive instructions in greater detail than a standard
+form seems to permit. A letter of instructions may then be
+appropriate. The commander himself is the best judge as to the
+application of a form to his needs of the moment, and as to the
+necessity for adherence to form in whatever particular.
+
+Useful as form is, it is important to keep in mind that it is the
+servant and not the master.
+
+The standard form in use in our naval service, long known as the Order
+Form, is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written plans
+and directives.
+
+The Order Form will now be described in detail from the standpoint of
+its general application to all classes of directives, including the
+commander's written plan, whether or not promulgated as a directive.
+
+The Order Form. Because of established usage, and for other reasons
+noted hereinafter, it is desirable that certain clerical details be
+handled as follows:
+
+    (a) To minimize errors, all numerals are spelled out, except
+        paragraph numbers and those in the heading.
+
+    (b) For emphasis, and to minimize errors, all geographical
+        names and names of vessels are spelled entirely with
+        capitals.
+
+    (c) To standardize arrangement and facilitate reading, a
+        narrow left-hand margin is left abreast the heading and
+        the task organization, and a wider margin is left abreast
+        the paragraphs.
+
+    (d) For the same reasons, the main paragraph numbers are
+        indented in the wider margin.
+
+    (e) For emphasis, the task-force or task-group titles of the
+        task organization, wherever occurring, are underlined.
+
+The sequence in which the subject matter is presented is a logical
+arrangement which experience has shown to be effective. Since every
+item has a definite place in the form, formulation is simplified, and
+ready reference is facilitated.
+
+In a written directive, the prescribed paragraph numbering is always
+followed, even if no text is inserted after a number. This practice
+serves as a check against accidental omission, and as confirmatory
+evidence that omissions are intentional. For example, if there is no
+new information to be disseminated, the paragraph number "1" is
+written in its proper place, followed by the words "No further
+information".
+
+When the subject matter to be presented under any one paragraph is
+voluminous, it may be broken up into a number of subparagraphs. Except
+in paragraph 3, these subparagraphs are unlettered.
+
+The Heading contains:
+
+In the upper right-hand corner in the following sequence:
+
+    (a) The title of the issuing officer's command, such as
+        NORTHERN SCOUTS, or ADVANCED FORCE, etc., preceded by the
+        titles, in proper order within the chain of command, of
+        all superior echelons or of such higher echelons as will
+        ensure adequate identification.
+
+    (b) The name of the flagship, as U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship.
+
+    (c) The place of issue: for example, NEWPORT, R.I., or, At
+        Sea, Lat. 34°-40' N., Long. 162°-20' W.
+
+    (d) The time of issue: that is, the month, day, year, and
+        hour; for example, July 12, 1935; 1100.
+
+In the upper left-hand corner in the following sequence:
+
+    (e) The file notations and classification: SECRET or
+        CONFIDENTIAL, the classification being underlined and
+        spelled with capitals. This classification is repeated on
+        succeeding pages,
+
+    (f) The type and serial number of the directive, such as
+        Operation Plan No. 5, the words Operation Plan being
+        underlined. This is repeated on succeeding pages.
+
+The Body. The task organization, which consists of a tabular
+enumeration of task forces or task groups, the composition of each,
+and the rank and name of its commander, is the beginning of the body
+of the directive. It is customary to omit the name of the issuing
+officer from any task force or task group commanded by him. Any unit
+included in a force named in the task organization is, by virtue of
+that fact, directed to act under the command of the commander of the
+specified force.
+
+When so desired for additional ready identification, task forces and
+their subdivisions may be numbered. In our naval service, systematic
+methods for such numerical designation are indicated from time to time
+by proper authority. Numerals for this purpose are entered in the task
+organization to the left of the title of each appropriate task force
+or subdivision thereof. The numerals may be placed in parentheses.
+
+The directive is addressed for action solely to the commanders of the
+task forces or task groups listed in the task organization.
+
+Train vessels assigned exclusively to particular combatant task forces
+are listed among the units of those forces in the task organization.
+If the directive is to be used for assigning tasks involving
+strategical or tactical movement directly to the Train, or to any
+Train units, such units are grouped together to form a separate task
+force. If instructions to the Train are to be issued in another
+directive, the Train need not appear as a separate force in the task
+organization. As a matter of general custom, the Train is usually not
+included as a task force unless it is to accompany, or act in tactical
+concert with, some one or more of the combatant task forces listed.
+
+Each task force named in this table, together with its numerical
+designation, is preceded by a separate letter, (a), (b), (c), etc.,
+and its assigned task is set forth in a similarly lettered
+subparagraph in paragraph 3.
+
+Paragraph 1 is the information paragraph. It contains such available
+information of enemy and own forces as is necessary for subordinates
+to understand the situation and to cooperate efficiently. Paragraph 1
+contains no part of the tasks assigned by the commander. Information
+of the enemy and that of own forces, and assumptions where pertinent,
+are usually set forth in separate unlettered subparagraphs.
+
+When deemed advisable, unless secrecy or other considerations forbid,
+paragraph 1 may include statements of the general plans of various
+higher echelons in the chain of command. A statement of the general
+plan of the next higher commander will frequently be included. For the
+same reasons, the commander will often include in this paragraph a
+statement of his own assigned task, unless, of course, this point is
+adequately covered in the statement of his general plan in paragraph
+2. Inclusion of such matters may enable subordinates to gain a clearer
+visualization of the relationships existing among the several
+objectives envisaged by the higher command.
+
+To promote cooperation, paragraph 1 may also state the principal tasks
+of coordinate forces of the commander's own echelon; for like reasons,
+the principal tasks of other task forces of the command not listed in
+the task organization may be included. Where the immediate superior
+has prescribed particular methods to other forces for cooperation and
+security, these may also be set forth as a matter of information. (See
+page 167.)
+
+In this paragraph, distinction is drawn between information which is
+based upon established facts, and that of merely probable accuracy.
+The latter is not to be confused with assumptions which, in Operation
+Plans, are accepted as a basis. (See page 155.)
+
+When writing their own information paragraphs, subordinate commanders
+do not necessarily copy verbatim the information contained in the
+order of their superior. Good procedure calls for them to digest that
+information, select what is essential, and present it with any
+additional information considered necessary. Care is taken to include
+necessary information of coordinate task forces.
+
+Paragraph 2 states the general plan of the complete force under the
+command of the officer who issued the directive. If several directives
+are issued for carrying out a single, complete plan (see, for example,
+discussion of fragmentary orders, page 184), then paragraph 2 is
+usually the same in all of them. The amount of detail given in this
+paragraph is sufficient to ensure a clear comprehension by the
+subordinates as to what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole.
+It is customary to begin with the words, "This force will", followed
+by a statement of the general plan and, unless secrecy or other
+considerations forbid, by the purpose of the effort embodied therein.
+(See Restatement of the Decision, page 187).
+
+Paragraph 3 assigns individual tasks to all of the task forces listed
+in the task organization. This paragraph is divided into as many
+subparagraphs, (a), (b), (c), etc., as there are task forces
+enumerated in the task organization. Each subparagraph commences with
+the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the title of the
+task force, underlined.
+
+Normally the tasks for each task force are stated in order of their
+importance. If preferred, however, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological, i.e., in the order of their execution. Each method has
+certain advantages, according to the nature of the situation. Where
+the chronological sequence is utilized, that fact is clearly
+indicated, in order to avoid confusion. (See also page 166). After the
+statement of the tasks, these subparagraphs conclude with such
+detailed instructions as are necessary.
+
+In cases where the entire force is listed in the task organization,
+the proper formulation of tasks requires that the accomplishment of
+all the tasks of paragraph 3 result in the accomplishment of the
+general plan set forth for the entire force in paragraph 2. On the
+other hand, where several directives are issued, each to a different
+part of the force, with a paragraph 2 common to all, then the
+accomplishment of the tasks of all of the paragraphs 3, of the several
+directives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the general
+plan prescribed in the common paragraph 2.
+
+Where two or more task forces have identical task assignments, only
+the common subparagraph need be written after the title of the task
+forces concerned, thus:
+
+    (a) Submarine Detachment,
+
+    (b) Air Patrol, (assignment of the common task or tasks).
+
+If the Train has been included as a separate force of the task
+organization, it will be given its tasks as to tactical and
+strategical movement in a separate subparagraph of paragraph 3.
+
+In order to avoid repetition, task assignments and instructions which
+apply to all task forces, or which pertain to the general conduct of
+the operation, are embodied in a final subparagraph, designated as
+3(x). It is particularly necessary that there be included in this
+subparagraph the measures (e.g., as to cooperation, security,
+intelligence, and the like) pertaining to freedom of action and
+applicable to the force as a whole. Any tasks or instructions
+applicable to individual task forces, only, will have been included in
+the appropriate earlier subparagraph(s) (i.e., 3 (a), (b), (c), etc.).
+To avoid repetition in these subparagraphs, coordinating instructions
+applying to more than one task force may also be included, when
+convenient to do so, in paragraph 3 (x).
+
+Paragraph 3 (x) of Operation Plans and Battle Plans prescribes, in
+addition to other applicable matters, the time and/or manner of
+placing the plan in effect.
+
+Paragraph 4 is the logistics paragraph. It sets forth the availability
+of services and supplies, and describes and gives effect to the
+general plan for the logistics support of the operation. If the
+information and instructions as to logistics are long and detailed,
+they may be embodied in a separate logistics plan, which is referred
+to in paragraph 4, and is attached as an annex.
+
+Paragraph 4 is not used for assigning tasks as to movement, either for
+the Train or for any other subdivision of the force.
+
+Paragraph 5 is the command paragraph. It contains instructions
+considered necessary for the control of the command during the
+operation, such as the plan of communications, zone time to be used,
+rendezvous, and location of the commander. Paragraph 5 completes the
+body.
+
+The Ending consists of the signature, the list of annexes, the
+distribution, and the authentication, as noted below:
+
+    The Signature of the commander issuing the directive, with his
+    rank and command title, is placed at the end, for example:
+    John Doe, Vice Admiral, Commander Northern Scouts.
+
+    Annexes consist of amplifying instructions which are so
+    extensive as to make them undesirable for inclusion in the
+    directive itself. They contain detailed instructions, in
+    written form or in the form of charts or sketches. Separate
+    Communications, Logistics, Sortie, Movement, Cruising,
+    Intelligence, Scouting, Screening, Approach and Deployment
+    Plans may be, and frequently are, disseminated as annexes to a
+    directive. Alternative Plans may also be annexed.
+
+    Annexes are referred to in the appropriate paragraph of the
+    body of the directive, and are listed and serially lettered in
+    capitals at the end near the left-hand margin, immediately
+    below the body and the signature, and above the distribution.
+
+    The Distribution indicates to whom the directive will be
+    transmitted and the medium of transmission. The recording of
+    this distribution in the directive is essential for the
+    information of all concerned.
+
+    Standard distribution may be indicated, as Distribution I, II,
+    etc.
+
+    Authentication. Unless signed by the issuing officer, each
+    copy of the directive distributed is authenticated by the
+    signature, rank, and designation of the Flag Secretary, with
+    the addition of the seal whenever possible.
+
+Campaign Plans. Campaign Plans (see page 196), when communicated to
+officers on the highest echelons, are usually, in the Order Form,
+modified as follows:
+
+Heading. No change.
+
+Task Organization. Not usually used.
+
+    Paragraph 1. In addition to the information to be furnished,
+        a statement is given of the assumptions (page 155)
+        forming the basis of the plan.
+
+    Paragraph 2. No change.
+
+    Paragraph 3. This shows the stages into which the campaign has
+        been divided; the several operations which will be
+        undertaken in each stage, and the order of their
+        accomplishment; and usually the forces to be made
+        available for the first stage.
+
+    Paragraph 4. No change.
+
+    Paragraph 5. No change.
+
+If it be found desirable, however, to employ a letter of instructions
+instead of a formal directive, this may be done. In this case the
+letter sets forth the essential features of the subject matter as
+above described for the Order Form.
+
+Sample Outline Form. For convenient reference, the outline form of an
+Operation Plan is appended (see page 219). The Operation Order follows
+the same form, the essential difference being that the Operation Order
+makes no provision for assumptions, and is effective upon receipt
+unless otherwise provided in the body of the Order.
+
+
+Types of Naval Directives
+
+Naval directives in common use are: War Plans, Campaign Plans,
+Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Battle Plans, and Battle Orders.
+
+Basic War Plans designate operating forces, assign broad strategical
+tasks to these forces, and, where required, delimit theaters of
+operations. These plans also assign duties to the supporting services
+such as naval communications, etc. Requirements as to logistics plans
+are also included. Accepted usage designates, as Contributory Plans,
+the subsidiary plans which are prepared in support of Basic War Plans.
+
+Campaign Plans. A campaign, as initially visualized, is a clearly
+defined major stage of a war. A campaign, after it has passed into
+history, sometimes bears the name of a leader, or a seasonal or
+geographical designation. It may consist of a single operation, or of
+successive or concurrent operations. The operations of a campaign have
+properly a definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which
+marks the end of the campaign. (See also page 37, as to operations.)
+
+A Campaign Plan indicates what might be called the "schedule of
+strategy" which the commander intends to employ to attain his ultimate
+objective for the campaign. Such a plan usually sets forth the stages
+into which he proposes to divide the campaign, shows their sequence,
+and outlines:
+
+(a) The general plan for the entire campaign.
+
+(b) The general plan involved in each stage and the order of
+accomplishment, so far as the commander has been able to project his
+action into the future, and usually,
+
+(c) The forces to be made available for the first stage. The Campaign
+Plan is primarily for the guidance of the commander himself. When
+necessary for information or approval, it is forwarded to higher
+authority. To provide the necessary background, it may sometimes be
+furnished to the principal subordinates. In any case, the interests of
+secrecy demand that its distribution be extremely limited.
+
+Operation Plans. An Operation Plan may cover projected operations, or
+may be contingent upon the occurrence of a particular event, or
+combination of events. It may be issued in advance of the event. It is
+placed in effect at a specified time or by special order, as
+prescribed in the body of the plan itself. It provides for either a
+single operation, or for a connected series of operations to be
+carried out simultaneously or in successive steps. It is prepared for
+dissemination to task-force commanders.
+
+Usually, an Operation Plan covers more complex operations than does an
+Operation Order, and projects operations over a greater time and
+space. It allows more latitude to subordinate commanders, and provides
+for less direct supervision by the issuing officer. It has typically
+the distinguishing feature of including, in paragraph 1, the
+assumptions upon which the plan is based.
+
+To provide for eventualities under varying sets of assumptions, the
+commander may formulate several alternative Operation Plans (see pages
+155 and 156).
+
+Operation Orders. An Operation Order deals with an actual situation,
+usually of limited scope, in which the commander considers that he
+possesses sufficient reliable information to warrant an expectation
+that certain specific operations can be initiated and carried through
+to completion as ordered. The Operation Order does not include
+assumptions and, unless it contains a proviso to the contrary, is
+effective upon receipt.
+
+Under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, there are few
+occasions where the Operation Plan will not accomplish the full
+purpose of the Operation Order. The use of the Operation Plan removes
+the undesirable feature of imposing possible restriction on the
+latitude allowed the subordinate without, in any degree, lessening the
+authority of the commander.
+
+Battle Plans. A Battle Plan sets forth methods for the coordinated
+employment of forces during battle. If prepared in advance, it usually
+is based on certain assumptions which are clearly stated in the plan.
+
+Battle Plans may merely include provisions for a particular combat, or
+they may include provisions for a connected series of separate or
+coordinate engagements, possibly culminating in a general action, and
+all directed toward the early attainment of a specified tactical
+objective. Such combats may range in scope from engagements between
+small forces to engagements between entire fleets.
+
+Battle Orders are generally limited to the despatches required to
+place a Battle Plan in effect, and to direct such changes in plan, or
+to initiate such detailed operations, as may be necessary during the
+progress of battle.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION
+
+(The Fourth Step)
+
+    The discussion in Chapter IX invites attention to the special
+    considerations which influence the supervision of the planned
+    action. The Running Estimate, which employs the procedure
+    typical of the fourth step, is described in detail.
+
+
+Nature of Discussion. As explained previously (Foreword, page 4), the
+vast and important subject of the execution of the plan is treated
+herein, as to details, chiefly from the standpoint of the mental
+effort.
+
+After the commander has issued a directive placing a plan in effect,
+it is his responsibility to supervise the execution of the planned
+action. Through the collection, analysis, evaluation, and
+interpretation of new information (page 161), he will be able to
+maintain a grasp of present progress and of future possibilities. He
+will correct deficiencies and errors in the plan and in its execution.
+He will guide the direction of effort toward the attainment of the
+objective. He will ensure that his forces conform their movement in
+correct relation to the physical objectives and to each other. He will
+reapportion strength to meet new conditions, through comparison of his
+accrued losses with respect to those he has anticipated. He will take
+appropriate measures for freedom of action.
+
+If a new plan is needed, the commander will evolve one and adopt it.
+If the old plan requires changes as to its larger aspects, he will
+make such changes. Otherwise, he will modify details of his plan as
+the situation may demand, always, however, endeavoring to retain the
+integrity of the larger aspects. He will issue additional directives
+as may be required from time to time.
+
+Goal of Planning. The function of planning (Part II, preceding) is to
+afford a proper basis for effective execution. Effective action,
+therefore, is the goal of planning.
+
+Otherwise, planning is aimless, except as a mental exercise. Such
+mental exercise, though it be with no thought of specific application
+in the realm of action, has nevertheless the same fundamental aim as
+if the planning were so intended. The aim of such mental exercise is
+the inculcation of habits of thought which will provide a sound basis
+for effective action.
+
+Importance of Execution. Sound planning is, as explained in previous
+chapters, the best basis for consistently effective action. Yet,
+important as planning is, the effective outcome of plans depends upon
+their execution.
+
+While an unsound plan affords no firm basis for successful action,
+recognition has long been accorded to the companion fact that a
+perfect plan, poorly executed, may not provide as firm a foundation
+for success as a reasonably good plan, carried out with resolution.
+
+No plan, moreover, can be confidently expected to anticipate all
+eventualities. Notwithstanding every effort to foresee all
+possibilities, unexpected changes are to be regarded as normal. This
+fact emphasizes the importance of effective supervision of the planned
+action.
+
+The importance of such supervision reaches its maximum during actual
+hostilities; then (page 4) the necessity for alert supervision creates
+an accentuated demand for the intelligent application of mental power
+to the solution of military problems. Professional judgment then
+assumes supreme importance because vital issues may hinge upon the
+decisions reached during the development of the action.
+
+Conditions in War. Standards of performance in peacetime exercises
+cannot be a conclusive guide as to what may be expected under the
+conditions of war. In the conduct of hostilities against a strong and
+determined enemy, men and materiel do not always function at their
+best. Commanders undergo extreme strains. Orders are often
+misinterpreted or go astray. Men, and the machines which they operate,
+frequently give less effective service than under the conditions of
+peace.
+
+In war, mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom
+complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won,
+not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of
+an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock
+of battle. The objective is attained, in war, under conditions which
+often impose extreme disadvantages. It is in the light of these facts
+that the commander expects to shape his course during the supervision
+of the planned action.
+
+The Incentive. During the supervision of the action, problems calling
+for decision may derive their incentive, as already noted (page 79)
+either from a directive issued by superior authority, or by reason of
+a Decision which the commander himself has already made, or because of
+a recognition, by the commander concerned, of an incentive
+originating from the demands of the situation.
+
+In the event that the incentive appears in the form of a new task
+assigned by a higher echelon, the commander's problem may become,
+relatively, simple. In such a case he is relieved of the necessity of
+recognizing for himself that the time is ripe for a new decision. This
+fact, however, in no wise alters his fundamental responsibility for
+taking action, or for abstaining therefrom, in accordance with the
+actual demands of the situation (page 15) in the event that the
+assigned task requires modification or alteration, or, further, in the
+event that circumstances even call for a departure from his
+instructions. Should modification, alteration, or departure be in
+order, the commander is responsible for recognition of the fact that
+the demands of the situation have introduced further problems.
+
+Such recognition, therefore, irrespective of whether higher authority
+has issued instructions covering the new situation, constitutes an
+incentive to take action. No commander is justified in taking wrong
+action, or in taking none, merely because no instructions have been
+received. The ability to recognize the fact that the situation
+presents a new problem is therefore a primary qualification for
+command.
+
+Recognition of New Problems. The supervision of the planned action, as
+the fourth step (see Chapter V) of the exercise of mental effort in
+the solution of military problems, therefore constitutes in itself a
+problem, in that it involves fundamentally the ability to recognize
+the existence of new situations which present new problems for
+solution. To recognize such new problems requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation.
+
+Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines which he desires and as promulgated in
+the directives formulated in the third step (see Chapter V and Chapter
+VIII). In effect, the commander, after action has begun, considers the
+changing situation as a variable in the problem presented by the
+original situation. With the march of events he is, therefore,
+constantly critical to detect whether variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design or whether these
+variations demand a departure from his plan.
+
+Nature of Readjustments Required. If variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design, the commander has the
+assurance that all goes well, and that the unfolding of the situation
+is following his intent. However, if this is not the case, changed
+circumstances may demand recognition of the fact that a new problem
+has presented itself. In this event a new incentive, arising from the
+demands of the situation, calls for the solution of the new problem by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step (Chapter VI).
+
+Should directives of higher authority introduce a new incentive, the
+commander solves such a new problem, also, by employing the procedure
+distinctive of the first step.
+
+On the other hand, the commander may find that the changed situation
+motivates merely a modification of his previously determined
+operations and of his directives already in force. In other words,
+while his basic problem (Chapters V and VI) may remain the same, need
+may arise for certain deviations from the decisions arrived at in the
+first and second steps of its solution. Should this be the case, each
+such problem will require solution by a return to the procedures
+described (Chapter VII) with reference to the second step.
+
+In the event of a demonstrated need, not for any change of plan, but
+for a clarification of directives, the procedure involved is that
+distinctive of the third step (Chapter VIII).
+
+The commander may not safely view the succession of events with
+complacency, even though the situation appears to be unfolding
+according to plan. Perhaps the enemy may be purposely lessening his
+opposition, in order to prepare for the launching of an offensive
+elsewhere. As the situation unfolds, everything is viewed with
+intelligent suspicion.
+
+It is also possible that, during the progress of an operation, an
+unforeseen opportunity may present itself to take advantage of a new
+situation and to strike the enemy a more serious blow than that
+originally intended.
+
+Unwise caution is to be avoided no less than undue temerity. Where a
+change appears, after proper consideration, to be indicated, no
+hesitancy is justified in abandoning the original plan. Blind
+adherence to plan is to be condemned no less than unwarranted
+departures from predetermined procedure. Obstinate insistence on the
+use of a certain method, to the exclusion of others calculated to
+attain the same effect, may jeopardize the success of the effort.
+Undue emphasis on the particular means to be used, and on the manner
+of their employment, may exact a penalty by obscuring the objective.
+
+On the other hand, undesirable departures from plan involve a
+corresponding penalty, because changes, unless duly justified by the
+situation, increase the possibility of failure. Frequency of such
+changes, to the point of vacillation, is a sure indication of a lack
+of aptitude for the exercise of command.
+
+Importance of the Will of the Commander. It is accordingly clear that
+qualification for the exercise of command requires the mental capacity
+to recognize the need for changes in plan, or for no change. No less
+essential, however, are the moral qualities required to carry
+justified changes into effect, or to resist the pressure of events in
+favor of changes not justified by the situation. (See also pages 8, 9,
+and 72.)
+
+Hence the universal importance accorded, by the profession of arms, to
+the will of the commander. This is the quality which, together with
+the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander
+to bend events in conformity with his plan (page 47), or, where such
+shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command
+every possible advantage which can be obtained.
+
+A recognized defect of certain forms of theoretical problems lies in
+the fact that they indicate, themselves, the time when a Decision is
+needed. In other words, they fail to vest the commander with
+responsibility for the decision that the time has come for a Decision
+to be made. Hence the great importance, from the viewpoint of timing,
+of those problems and exercises which partake more fully of the
+reality of war. The successful conduct of war, notwithstanding its
+demand for utmost mental power, is founded predominantly on those
+moral qualities (see pages 9 and 72) which spring less from the
+intellect than from the will.
+
+
+Problems Involving Modifications of the Basic Plan
+
+Relatively minor deviations from decisions reached during the first
+and second steps of the solution of a military problem are frequently
+required during the action phase, because of incentives arising from
+the demands of the situation. Such requirements will not occasion
+serious dislocation in the predetermined effort of the competent
+commander.
+
+However, more momentous situations are also to be expected. These will
+present new problems for the commander to solve. Such new problems, so
+long as they do not challenge the integrity of the basic plan, will
+not prevent the competent commander from proceeding with his
+predetermined effort if he takes appropriate action in due time to
+control the unfolding situation. To maintain such control may call for
+the exercise of outstanding qualities of the mind and of the will.
+
+For example, it is assumed that the commander's basic Decision was to
+destroy an enemy convoy, the purpose of the Decision being to prevent
+the convoy from reaching its destination. Now, it is supposed that,
+during the supervision of the action planned for the destruction of
+the enemy convoy, the commander receives information of a hostile
+reinforcement. It is further supposed that this reinforcement, if it
+joins the enemy convoy's escort, can jeopardize the success of the
+basic plan.
+
+The commander is now confronted with a serious situation which, if not
+controlled by action of the right kind, at the right time, and at the
+right place, may result in shattering his basic plan. However, if the
+commander takes action along correct lines in due time, he can still
+preserve the integrity of his basic plan and so continue to control
+the shaping of the situation.
+
+Having re-examined his solution of his basic problem and found it
+sound, the commander finds himself under the necessity of resolving a
+perplexity as to what to do about the enemy reinforcement. In this
+case, he concludes that his proper action is to prevent the enemy
+reinforcement from protecting the convoy. This task, self-assigned
+because of the demands of the situation, becomes the basis for the
+mission of his new problem, the mission being:--
+
+    (Task) To prevent the enemy reinforcements from protecting the
+    convoy,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to the eventual destruction
+    of the convoy.
+
+The commander now considers the various courses of action open to him
+for the accomplishment of this mission. He also considers the enemy
+courses of action. He then considers each of the former in relation to
+each of the latter. He compares, on this basis, each of his retained
+courses of action with the others and so selects the best course of
+action. Finally, he arrives, in this manner, by the same process as in
+a basic problem (Chapter VI), at a decision as to the best course of
+action. Should this decision be to sink the enemy reinforcement, its
+statement linked to its purpose, would be:--
+
+    To destroy the enemy reinforcement, in order to prevent it
+    from protecting the convoy.
+
+
+Problems Challenging the Integrity of the Basic Plan
+
+During the planned action, a change in the situation may have the
+effect of challenging the integrity of the basic plan. The commander
+is then faced by a problem calling for the exercise of the highest
+order of ability. While problems of this type probably occur with
+least frequency, they are the most important of those which may be
+encountered during the fourth step.
+
+Because such a problem, arising from the demands of a new situation,
+requires a re-estimate of the basic situation, the essential procedure
+is the same as for a basic problem (Chapter VI), but certain
+modifications necessarily appear.
+
+Summary of the Situation. While a commander will rarely find himself
+operating without instructions, the importance of problems arising
+when no directive applies is not lessened by the fact that such
+problems may infrequently occur. When the commander is faced with a
+situation not covered in orders of his superior, action may be
+necessary before he can inform higher authority and receive
+instructions. Usually this situation will be an emergency. Often it
+will not allow time for a written estimate. The fact that such a
+situation has arisen, and the reasons causing the commander to
+conclude that it has arisen, are appropriately included in Section I-A
+of the Estimate, under the "Summary of the Situation".
+
+Recognition of the Incentive. The conclusion on the part of the
+commander that the situation requires him to make provision for its
+maintenance, or for a change, which in either case calls for a
+departure from his basic Decision, constitutes a recognition of his
+new incentive.
+
+Appreciation of the Objective. Frequently the new incentive will
+indicate that the objective embodied in the commander's present task
+is no longer suitable, but that the purpose of his mission still
+applies. By modifying the objective indicated in his assigned task,
+but adhering to that in the purpose of his mission, he may be able to
+visualize a new objective which will be appropriate to the new
+circumstances. In this case the retained purpose assists the commander
+to select a new objective which he can confidently adopt as the basis
+for a new task which he assigns to himself.
+
+If neither the commander's task nor the purpose of his mission apply
+in the new situation, the evolution of a proper new objective may be
+much more difficult. Under such circumstances the commander, by the
+use of such information as may be in his possession, will first
+endeavor to deduce an objective whose attainment constitutes a
+suitable purpose. Such a deduction will be made on the basis of the
+larger circumstances of the war, the campaign, or the operation.
+Having made this determination, the commander will then deduce a task
+appropriate to the new situation and in furtherance of the adopted
+purpose. (See Chapter IV, page 52.)
+
+Formulation of the New Mission. An appropriate new task having been
+determined, as well as a proper purpose, the commander is now in a
+position to formulate his mission. The procedure to this end is the
+same as described (Chapter VI) with respect to the estimate of a basic
+problem.
+
+Other Items of the Estimate. For such problems of the fourth step,
+other items of the Estimate Form require no essential modification of
+the procedures described (Chapter VI) as applicable for the first
+step.
+
+
+The Further Procedure Applicable to Such Problems of The Fourth Step
+
+After the commander has reached his new decision, the further course
+of events may call for the resolution of the required new action into
+detailed operations and for the inauguration of a new planned effort.
+In such case, these procedures are accomplished through processes
+essentially similar to, and fortified by the experience gained in,
+those distinctive of the second and third steps. (Chapters VII and
+VIII, respectively).
+
+The new planned effort having been inaugurated, its supervision
+continues, in turn, through the critical observation and the
+appropriate action described herein as distinctive of the fourth step.
+
+
+The Running Estimate of the Situation
+
+The procedure employed in the constant, close observation of the
+unfolding of the situation--to the end that justified changes of plan
+may be initiated, while those uncalled-for may be avoided--is known as
+the "Running Estimate of the Situation". Such an estimate, as
+indicated by its name, is intended to keep pace with the flow of
+events, so that the commander may be assured, at any time, that his
+concurrent action will be based on sound decision. To this end, there
+is a definite technique for which the standard Estimate Form provides
+the basis. This technique is an aid for solution of the problem
+involved in the supervision of the planned action.
+
+Aim of the Technique Involved. Any procedure adopted to this end is
+properly intended to assist in the supervision of the planned action,
+but not to restrict the commander to particular methods. Flexibility
+is a prime consideration. The ultimate aim of the technique is (see
+also page 114) the rapid and successful exercise of mental effort in
+the fast-moving events of the tactical engagement. It is under such
+conditions, more especially, that effective supervision of the planned
+action becomes a problem calling for every facility that can be
+afforded the commander.
+
+Nature of the Technique. The solution of this problem requires
+mentally or in writing according to the particular case, (a) the
+assembly of information as to events bearing on the situation, and (b)
+the organization of this knowledge in a manner permitting its ready
+use. Accordingly, it will be found helpful, where circumstances permit
+written records to be kept, to provide for (a) a journal (a form of
+diary) of events, with a file to support it, and (b) a work sheet to
+organize applicable information in proper form for use. The journal
+affords a basis for the work sheet. The latter in turn facilitates the
+procedure, continuous while the action lasts, of estimating the
+situation so that a Decision maybe rendered at any time desired.
+
+Where written records are unnecessary or impracticable, the same
+fundamental process is nevertheless employed. The fact that the
+process is then wholly mental, without extraneous aids, involves no
+change in the basic character of the essential procedure.
+
+Journal. The journal, to serve the purpose indicated above, is kept in
+a form permitting entry of essential data as to information needed for
+the Running Estimate. Such data may include (see the suggested Form,
+next page) the appropriate heading of the journal, the entries
+applicable to each item of pertinent information, and the
+authentication with which the journal, for any chosen period, is
+closed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+JOURNAL
+
+(Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)
+
+From: .................................................
+                          (date and hour)
+
+To: ...................................................
+                          (date and hour)
+
+Place: ................................................
+
+
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+TOR | TOD | Time | Serial| From |  To    |Incidents, Messages,|Action
+    |     | Dated|  No.  |      |(Action)|   Orders, etc.     |Taken
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+
+The heading of the journal is completed by inserting the designation
+of the organization and, where appropriate, the staff subdivision
+concerned, as well as the date and hour of beginning and closing the
+journal, and the place (or general area) where the commander is
+located.
+
+Each entry includes, where appropriate, a time notation: for example,
+as to the occurrence of an incident; the receipt (TOR) or despatch
+(TOD) of a message; the receipt or issue of an order. The serial
+number assigned to the entry is recorded. The "time dated" is the date
+and hour of the incident, or, in the case of the message or order, the
+date and hour appearing thereon.
+
+Entry of the nature of incidents or of the content of messages and
+orders, etc., is made under the heading "Incidents, Messages, Orders,
+etc."; for example:
+
+    As to an incident:
+
+      Enemy bombed light forces in screen from northward.
+
+As to a message:
+
+      Our troops held up on Beach A since 0500 this date.
+
+In the case of a message or order, the source and the action
+addressee(s) are recorded in the columns marked "From" and "To
+(action)" respectively. The content of the despatch or order then
+follows. The amount of detail to be included depends upon the needs of
+the work sheet (see below) in its capacity as a basis for the running
+estimate of the situation. Further details can be ascertained, if
+needed, by reference to the journal file.
+
+The action taken ("None" entered, if none is taken) is indicated
+briefly under that heading. In the case of the above entry as to the
+enemy bombing light forces, the "action taken" might, for example
+read:
+
+    Prepared for torpedo attack.
+
+A single journal may be maintained for the commander concerned; or, if
+so desired, separate journals may be kept, for their respective
+purposes, by the several principal officers of his staff.
+
+The journal itself and its use are readily adaptable to informal
+methods of preparation and maintenance. The Journal Form may be
+prepared hastily, as needed or desired. Where appropriate, the Journal
+Form may be made up in quantity by printing, multigraphing, or other
+practicable methods.
+
+Journal File. The file to support the journal is merely an assembly of
+the records (messages, records of oral orders, and the like) from
+which the journal is compiled. Each item of the file bears a serial
+number corresponding to that of its entry in the journal. An ordinary
+spike-file is frequently adequate for safe-keeping of these records
+while in use. When the journal is closed, the corresponding
+journal-file is filed with the journal, in accordance with standing
+instructions or in compliance with any particular disposition directed
+by the commander concerned or by higher authority.
+
+Work Sheet. The usual form of the work sheet follows the form of the
+estimate of the situation. A single work sheet may be kept for the
+commander concerned, or, if so desired, separate work sheets may be
+maintained, for their respective purposes, by the several principal
+subdivisions of his staff. If a single work sheet is maintained,
+entries by the several staff subdivisions may be facilitated by
+dividing the work sheet among them, provided that the entire document
+can always be promptly assembled for use as needed.
+
+The work sheet, while an important official document, is ordinarily
+informal in nature. The various headings, items, or titles (other than
+the main heading) are merely copied, ordinarily, from the usual
+Estimate Form. An example of a work sheet is as follows (see next
+page):
+
+
+WORK SHEET
+(For Running Estimate of the Situation)
+
+    ........................................
+    (Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)
+
+    From: ..................................
+               (Date and hour)
+
+    To: ....................................
+           (Date and hour, if pertinent)
+
+    Place: .................................
+
+I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.
+
+  A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.
+
+    (1) Summary of the Situation.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the first page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+    (2) Recognition of the Incentive.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (second) page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+    (3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (third) page.)
+
+    (4) Formulation of the Mission.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (fourth) page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+  B. (Note: This and subsequent headings are entered in the manner
+     indicated as to Section I-A, above.)
+
+The remaining necessary headings and subheadings of the Estimate Form
+would be entered similarly, in due order, on succeeding pages.
+
+The use of a voluminous work-sheet is facilitated by entering item
+headings in a narrow column at the left, and by cutting away unused
+space below the several headings in such column, so that all the
+headings (or the more important ones) can be seen at a glance. A
+person using the work-sheet can then readily find any page desired.
+
+The main heading (top, first page) is filled out in the same manner as
+for the journal.
+
+The other headings, for subdivisions of the work sheet, are ordinarily
+transcribed from the usual Estimate Form, according to the needs for
+the purpose of the particular work sheet. Such needs will vary with
+circumstances. As has also been noted, the Estimate Form, itself
+(Chapter VI), varies with the situation. For these reasons, the
+work-sheet form is necessarily flexible, and will rarely be prescribed
+in detail. Reproduction by printing, etc., will not be so frequent as
+in the case of more rigid forms. The work sheet is authenticated only
+if it is filed (see below), or if authentication is desired for other
+reasons. The work sheet is, in fact, as indicated by its name, merely
+a vehicle to facilitate the performance of important mental work.
+
+When the work sheet has served its purpose, it is usually destroyed.
+It is not, ordinarily, a permanent record, since such purpose is
+served by the journal and its file. When a formal Estimate is made up
+from the work sheet, such Estimate may serve the purpose of an
+additional record. If no formal Estimate is made up for a given period
+and the commander desires the corresponding work sheet to be preserved
+for record, he may so direct.
+
+Ordinarily, the work sheet is not destroyed or filed (and a new one
+started) at any specified time. The work sheet is kept current by
+marking out old entries no longer applicable; by inserting new
+entries; and by inserting fresh pages when old ones have been filled.
+The old pages, unless otherwise desired, may be destroyed.
+
+A separate page of the work sheet is ordinarily used for each item
+under which entries are to be made. This procedure applies not only to
+principal headings, but also to subordinate titles, according to the
+convenience of the user.
+
+The procedure of devoting a separate page, initially, to each item of
+the form enables additional pages to be inserted, where needed.
+Manifestly, the amount of space needed for particular items of the
+form cannot always be foreseen. The entries, for example, under the
+"Summary of the Situation", in Section I-A of the Estimate Form, may
+require little space or a great deal, depending upon the occurrence of
+events and upon the period of time covered by the particular work
+sheet. The same considerations are applicable as to other items.
+
+When a work sheet is used as the basis for rendering special reports
+(e.g., as to intelligence or operations), its form follows that used
+for such reports. It is, therefore, in essence, merely an
+outline-form, for entry of applicable data.
+
+Procedure as to Entries. When a report, a plan, a dispatch, or other
+pertinent item is received, its applicable content may first be
+entered on the chart (or charts) maintained by the commander (or by
+his staff). Thereafter the usual procedure would be an entry in the
+journal, followed by a corresponding entry in the work sheet. The
+document so received and recorded would then be placed in the journal
+file. This procedure is subject to proper variation, as desired.
+Immediate entry of data on the chart enables the commander and staff
+to study the implications of the item, without waiting for completion
+of routine clerical work.
+
+Outgoing messages, instructions, etc., after approval or signature by
+the commander, are handled by a similar routine. Where applicable,
+such routine involves appropriate entry on the chart, in the journal,
+and in the work sheet. The routine of entry is preferably based on a
+copy (or copies), in order to avoid delay in dispatch.
+
+Staff Organization and Functioning. The commander may desire important
+documents to be handed to him at once, on receipt. He may, of course,
+call for them at any time. He naturally will not, however, permit any
+unnecessary delay to occur in the usual routine disposition of such
+items. The routine exists to assist him, and its arbitrary disruption,
+if he has properly defined the essential routine in the first
+instance, cannot but work to his disadvantage.
+
+Few things are more disturbing to the functioning of a staff than
+undue eccentricity on the part of the commander or of senior members
+of the staff. For instance, a personal habit to be rigorously
+suppressed--a habit not infrequently in evidence, especially under
+strain of active operations--is that of absent-mindedly pocketing
+documents needed in the work under way. This subject might, but for
+limitations of space, be illustrated by numerous other examples whose
+homely character may not safely be permitted to detract from their
+considered importance to unity of effort.
+
+Where circumstances permit, it is desirable that incoming and outgoing
+items be reproduced in quantity sufficient to supply separate copies
+for the commander and for the several interested members of his staff.
+
+A competent staff brings to the commander's attention all the items
+necessary--but only those necessary--for his proper performance of his
+duties. Inordinate attention by the commander to unnecessary detail
+cannot but tend to distract his attention from his proper duties.
+
+The importance of smooth and effective functioning of a staff
+emphasizes the need for an established, though flexible, procedure.
+Such procedure, if reasonably standardized, facilitates unity of
+action, not only within staffs, but also among the several commanders,
+and their staffs, throughout the chain of command.
+
+The same fundamentals apply as to staff organization. If proper
+functioning of staffs is generally understood, and if staffs are
+correctly organized to perform their functions, the basis for their
+sound organization will become a matter of general understanding. Such
+organization, so understood, becomes a powerful influence in behalf of
+unity of effort.
+
+Staff functions--i.e., characteristic activities of staffs--divide
+fundamentally into two classifications. These may be referred to, for
+convenience of terminology, as "general" and "special".
+
+The latter have to do with the characteristic operations of the
+command, rather than of the commander; they therefore relate to such
+matters as routine administration and to the technical aspects of
+movement, of the use of weapons, and of supply, sanitation, and
+hospitalization. The administrative, technical, and supply staff, thus
+broadly considered, may be said to be concerned with special functions
+relating to the operations of the command.
+
+By contrast, the functions of the commander, as such, have to do with
+the necessary supervision of these special functions and, more
+especially, with the important duty of planning for the future
+employment of the command. The supervisory and planning activities
+may, for purposes of differentiation from the specialties noted above,
+be properly described as general functions. They relate more
+particularly to the duties performed personally by the commander or,
+where such duties become too onerous for performance by one person, by
+specifically designated members of his staff.
+
+In our naval service, the higher commanders are provided, where
+appropriate, with a chief of staff, who coordinates and supervises the
+work of the entire staff. Provision is also made, where the nature and
+amount of the work to be done calls for such assignment, for the
+detail of additional staff officers to perform the important general
+functions mentioned above. Appropriate provision is also made for
+staff officers to care for the special functions inherent in the
+character of the particular command.
+
+The important general functions referred to are those relating to
+intelligence duties, and to operations. Intelligence duties have to do
+with the collection of information as to the enemy and the theater of
+operations, the analysis of this information, its evaluation, its
+conversion into intelligence by the process of drawing conclusions,
+i.e., by interpretation, and, finally, its dissemination to the
+command or to other appropriate destinations (page 161). Intelligence
+estimates and plans have been discussed previously (Chapters VII and
+VIII).
+
+Operations, in the sense in which the term is employed in this
+connection, relate to the strategical or tactical activities of the
+command, as distinguished from routine functions pertaining to such
+matters as administration and supply. Operations, therefore, as a term
+employed in contradistinction to intelligence activities, refer more
+especially to the performance of the commander's own force, while
+intelligence functions are oriented more particularly with respect to
+the activities of the enemy. Operation plans, which may include
+subsidiary intelligence plans, have been discussed previously
+(Chapters VII and VIII).
+
+Further details in this connection are touched on hereafter with
+respect to rendition of reports and estimates.
+
+Reports. The work-sheet facilitates the rendition, at any time, of
+such special reports as may be required by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff. The appropriate staff officer is prepared at
+all times to render a report, oral or written, informal or formal,
+brief or detailed, of the situation of the command and of other
+friendly forces, or of the situation with reference to the enemy.
+
+No less important than rendition of reports to the commander and to
+higher authority is the duty of the staff, or of the commander if he
+lacks such staff assistance, to insure that subordinate commands
+receive pertinent information at the proper time. Cooperating friendly
+forces will also require such information. This need is sometimes met
+by the issue of periodical reports or bulletins. However, during the
+intervals between such reports, and at all times when such reports are
+lacking, it is a primary duty of the commander and staff to ensure
+that all concerned are informed as to the situation. The work sheet is
+a valuable aid for the performance of this duty.
+
+Oral Estimates. When called for by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff, oral estimates of the situation can be
+rendered promptly and effectively by reference to the work sheet.
+Estimates called for by the commander are presented by the appropriate
+staff officers. Presentation is made to the commander or, if so
+directed, to the chief of staff, the latter being prepared to render,
+in turn, an estimate to the commander. Oral estimates desired by
+higher authority are made by the commander, or by the staff officer
+concerned, at the direction of his commander.
+
+Partial estimates may be called for from time to time as to particular
+aspects of the situation.
+
+In the larger staffs, the work is facilitated if each principal staff
+officer is prepared to present his appropriate portion of the
+estimate. In such case the intelligence officer deals with matters
+relating to the enemy; the operations officer deals with those
+relating to own forces, etc. The entire staff acts as a team in the
+presentation of a well-rounded estimate which will bring all pertinent
+matters to the attention of the commander so that he may arrive at a
+sound decision.
+
+Should the commander call also for recommendations as to the decision
+or decisions to be made, the appropriate members of the staff will be
+prepared to submit their views. They will be prepared, as well, to
+answer at any time the calls of higher authority for information, for
+the conclusions of the commander, or for his recommendations. Should
+the commander have no staff for the performance of the foregoing
+functions, such detailed duties devolve upon him personally.
+
+Certain further aspects of estimates of the situation, with reference
+to the circumstances obtaining during the supervision of the planned
+action, are noted under the discussion of written estimates, which
+follows.
+
+Written Estimates. The foregoing remarks as to oral estimates are no
+less applicable to those submitted in written form, whether formal or
+informal, partial or full, brief or detailed. The nature of an
+estimate, as to these characteristics, will largely depend on the time
+element. A long and detailed estimate, often desirable when time is
+available, may be wholly impracticable when the press of events
+requires rapid decision. The written estimate, even if informal,
+partial, or brief, would frequently be out of place in situations
+where an oral estimate would be adequate or, if not adequate, would be
+all that could be accomplished under the circumstances of the case.
+
+
+Special Remarks as to Entries
+
+Entries on Charts. Entries on charts are made by the usual
+conventional signs and symbols. Colors are employed where appropriate.
+Information not yet confirmed is indicated as doubtful; e.g., by a
+question mark. Special remarks, comments, or other notations may also
+be entered, but in such a manner as not to obscure other data on the
+chart.
+
+Where operations of land forces are involved, maps are prepared by the
+methods prescribed for own land forces. The higher naval staffs, or
+those of forces specially designated for such operations, may include
+army officers who will look after these matters; marine officers may
+also be assigned such duties.
+
+Special charts or maps are those prepared for special purposes. A
+chart (or map) maintained to show the existing situation is known as a
+"situation chart" (or map). Charts (or maps) prepared for particular
+operations are known as "operations charts" (or maps).
+
+Entries in Journals. Entries in journals, already referred to, are
+purely factual. Such entries may be complete copies of the content of
+incoming or outgoing orders or messages. Again, as already indicated
+(page 209), entries may consist of condensations of such matters. The
+oral instructions of the commander are also appropriate items for
+entry, when the matter is of sufficient importance. The journal may
+also make note of the movements of the commander, his staff officers,
+and other persons. Other pertinent happenings may also be made the
+subject of entry.
+
+Entries in Work Sheets. Entries in the work sheet, since it is the
+basis for estimates of the situation, are both factual and otherwise.
+All matters entered in the journal are normally appropriate for
+notation in the work sheet. Information not yet confirmed is indicated
+as doubtful. The work sheet is also the proper place for notation of
+matters of conjecture (noted as such) and for other like items related
+to estimates of the situation. The various considerations influencing
+the commander and staff, with respect to current operations, are
+proper entries in the work sheet. Its informal character affords wide
+latitude as to entries which may be considered worthy of record in
+this manner. The underlying consideration is that anything may and
+should be entered which will be of value in preparing estimates or
+rendering the special reports for which the work sheet is to provide
+the basis.
+
+A succinct running account of the situation is kept posted to date
+under the appropriate heading of the work sheet.
+
+Entry is also made of the incentive which motivates the solution of
+the problem presented by the situation. Notation is made as to whether
+the incentive arises from a task imposed by higher authority or is
+derived by the commander from other sources (see page 200). In either
+case, the work sheet is the proper place for the entry of such facts
+and of the reasons which have led the commander to regard this
+incentive as motivating his actions in the situation existing at the
+time.
+
+Information of the enemy, after receipt from the various collecting
+agencies (radio, observers, subordinate forces, etc.), is subject to
+the usual procedures of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and
+dissemination (page 214). Analysis determines the source and the
+circumstances which led to the dispatch of the message. Evaluation
+determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation calls for drawing
+conclusions. The resulting intelligence is then disseminated to those
+concerned, either within the command or elsewhere.
+
+Since information of the enemy does not become intelligence until
+converted thereinto by the process of drawing conclusions, this
+important procedure is recorded briefly in the work sheet. Such record
+makes available, for inclusion in estimates or in reports, the reasons
+which have formed the basis for such conclusions.
+
+Information of friendly forces, with any deductions drawn therefrom,
+is similarly entered in the appropriate portions of the work sheet.
+
+The facts and conclusions as to fighting strength of own and enemy
+forces are important entries. The summary of fighting strength
+includes proper conclusions as to the relative fighting strength of
+the opposing forces, own and enemy's.
+
+The work sheet is also the proper document for other entries pertinent
+to estimates of the situation: e.g., the determination of own courses
+of action, the examination into enemy capabilities, and the selection
+of own best course of action. The commander's decisions, as rendered
+from time to time, are also entered for purposes of temporary record.
+
+
+Summary
+
+The work sheet, therefore, if properly utilized, contains the Running
+Estimate of the Situation, and is supported by the journal and the
+journal file. By the use of the Running Estimate and its supporting
+documents, the commander is enabled to keep himself apprised of the
+developments of the situation. On this basis he is able to detect the
+necessity for any changes in his plan and to arrive promptly at
+decisions in accordance with such needs. These decisions become the
+basis for new or modified plans and directives, to cause the action of
+his command to conform to changes in the situation.
+
+Where the full procedure described in this Chapter is unnecessary or
+impracticable, a suitable modification without fundamental change will
+be found applicable. The mental process, even if no records are kept
+in writing, applies to the supervision of the planned action in every
+situation.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+    The discussion of "Sound Military Decision" now closes with a
+    brief review of the application of mental power to the
+    solution of military problems.
+
+
+Mental power, which includes the ability to arrive at sound solutions
+of military problems, is a recognized essential component of fighting
+strength because (page 18) it is the source of professional judgment.
+
+The procedure most likely to ensure sound solutions is the studied
+employment of a natural mental process, differing in no fundamental
+respect from that effectively utilized in all other human activities.
+The basic mental procedure remains unchanged, irrespective of the
+nature of the problem,--be it simple or complex, its solution
+instantaneous or slow. The procedure is especially adapted to the
+needs of the profession of arms through the use of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. By outlining the essential elements involved, this
+Principle, a valid guide for the solution of military problems, covers
+the full scope of the application of mental power as a recognized
+component of fighting strength.
+
+It is more especially during the swift-moving action of the tactical
+engagement that moral capacity to command, and mental ability to solve
+military problems, experience the maximum pressure of events. It is
+then, also, that the responsibility of the commander creates an added
+demand for intelligent application of mental power because of the
+vital issues which may hinge upon his decisions. That this pressure be
+successfully sustained, and this responsibility effectively
+discharged, is the goal of any system of mental training in the
+profession of arms (page 114).
+
+On a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character,
+knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision.
+
+
+OUTLINE FORM OF AN OPERATION PLAN
+
+                                      TITLES OF THE
+                                      SUPERIOR ECHELONS,
+File Notations                        TITLE OF THE FORCE,
+SECRET (or CONFIDENTIAL)              NAME OF SHIP, Flagship.
+
+Operation Plan                        PLACE OF ISSUE,
+         No. ----                     Date and hour of issue.
+
+TASK ORGANIZATION.
+
+  (a) Task Force Title, Rank and name of its commander. Composition
+      of Task Force.
+
+  (b) (Similarly enumerate other Task Forces after appropriate
+      letter (b), (c), etc.)
+
+      1. Information. Information of enemy and own forces affecting
+         the Plan and needed by subordinate commanders. If no
+         further information is available, the statement "No
+         further information" is inserted. Distinction is made
+         between matters of conjecture and of fact. If desired,
+         indicate the tasks and general objectives of higher
+         echelons and of coordinate forces of the commander's
+         echelon, and of other forces of the command, not listed in
+         the Task Organization. If desired, include general
+         measures prescribed by the immediate superior for
+         cooperation and security.
+
+         Assumptions. Statement of the assumptions upon which the
+         Plan is based. Assumptions are things taken for granted as
+         the basis for action.
+
+      2. The general plan for the whole force actually under the
+         command of the officer issuing the Plan, and, if desired,
+         the methods of executing it, and its purpose. If
+         additional matter is needed to convey clearly the will and
+         intent of the commander, such matter may be added.
+
+      3. (a) Title of Task Force (a), followed by a statement of the
+         principal task, other tasks, and detailed instructions for
+         the particular Task Force. Tasks may be stated, if
+         preferred, in chronological order. Include directions as to
+         cooperation, security, and intelligence activities.
+
+         (b) Title of Task Force (b), followed by a subparagraph of
+         similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above.
+
+         (x) Instructions that apply to all Task Forces or that
+         pertain to the general conduct of the operation, including,
+         if desired, coordinating instructions applying to more than
+         one task force. Include, particularly, measures for
+         cooperation, security, and intelligence activities. Include
+         statement of the time and/or manner in which the Operation
+         Plan is to be placed in effect.
+
+      4. Broad instructions concerning logistics measures necessary
+         to the operation, or reference to Logistics Annex, if one
+         has been prepared in connection with the operation.
+
+      5. Measures necessary to the exercise of command, such as plan
+         of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous, and
+         location of Commander during operation.
+
+                                       (Signature)
+                                        Rank,
+                                        Title of Command.
+
+ANNEXES.
+
+A. (Name)
+B. do          NOTE--The Operation Order (see page 196) follows this
+               Form except that it makes no provision for assumptions,
+DISTRIBUTION   and is effective on receipt unless otherwise provided in
+               the body of the Order.
+
+(Authentication)
+
+(Seal)
+
+
+
+
+TABULAR FORMS
+
+
+TABULAR FORM OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
+
+
+Section                                                      Page
+
+I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.
+
+  A. The Appropriate Effect Desired                           118
+     (1) Summary of the Situation                             119
+     (2) Recognition of the Incentive                         119
+     (3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective               119
+     (4) Formulation of the Mission                           121
+
+  B. Relative Fighting Strength                               121
+
+   (To include only such of the following factors as appear
+   to be necessary background for the later reasoning in
+   Sections II to IV.)
+
+  (1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed               123
+     *(a) General Factors                                     124
+            (i) Political Factors                             124
+           (ii) Economics Factors                             125
+          (iii) Psychological Factors                         125
+           (iv) Information and Counter-Information
+                Measures                                      126
+      (b) Factors More Directly Applicable to the
+          Armed Forces                                        127
+            (i) Vessels, including Aircraft                   127
+           (ii) Land Forces, including land-based
+                aviation                                      127
+          (iii) Personnel                                     127
+           (iv) Material                                      128
+            (v) Logistics                                     128
+
+  (2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater
+      of Operations                                           129
+      (a) Hydrography                                         129
+      (b) Topography                                          130
+      (c) Weather                                             130
+      (d) Daylight and Dark Periods                           130
+      (e) Relative Location and Distance                      131
+      (f) Lines of Transportation and Supply                  131
+      (g) Facilities and Fortifications                       131
+      (h) Communications                                      131
+
+  (3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength            132
+
+
+II. DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE
+    COURSES OF ACTION.
+
+  A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective                       135
+
+  B. Survey of Courses of Action                              135
+
+  C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility,
+     and Acceptability                                        137
+
+  D. Listing Retained Courses of Action                       139
+
+
+III. EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF
+THE ENEMY                                                     139
+
+  A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem                            141
+     (1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation                     141
+     (2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy          141
+
+  B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities                             143
+
+  C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility,
+     and Acceptability                                        144
+
+  D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action                 144
+
+
+IV. SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION.
+
+  A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of
+     Action                                                   145
+
+  B. Determination of the Best Course of Action               148
+
+
+V. THE DECISION                                               151
+
+* Usually included only in an estimate of broad scope.
+
+On the reverse side, page 224, will be found a Tabular Form of the
+Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed Operations.
+
+CAUTION. This folder is merely a guide, provided in order to
+facilitate reference to the subject matter of Chapters VI and VII. It
+is not possible to arrive at sound military decision by its use
+alone.
+
+
+TABULAR FORM OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED
+OPERATIONS
+
+                                                             Page
+
+1. Assumptions                                            155-156
+
+2. Alternative Plans                                      156-157
+
+3. Application of the Essential Elements of a
+Favorable Military Operation                              157-164
+  (a) Correct physical objectives                         157-158
+      (1) Effective action with relation to                   158
+  (b) Advantageous relative positions                         159
+  (c) Freedom of action                                   159-162
+  (d) Proper apportionment of fighting strength           162-164
+
+4. Testing of Operations for Suitability, Feasibility
+   and Acceptability                                      164-165
+   (a) Listing of retained operations                         165
+
+5. The Formulation of Tasks                                   165
+   (a) Testing of tasks for suitability, feasibility
+       and acceptability                                      165
+
+6. The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups        165-166
+   (a) Grouping of tasks                                  165-166
+   (b) Assignment of necessary strength                       166
+   (c) Completion of the organization                         166
+
+7. Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+   to the Determination of Objectives Embodied in Tasks       167
+
+8. The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action         167-168
+
+9. The Assembly of Information                                168
+
+10. The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans                   168-179
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+A
+
+Acceptable consequences as to costs, principle for determination
+  of 34, 35
+
+Acceptability, application of test for 101, 102, 137, 144, 147, 164,
+  165, 167
+
+Action,
+  effective, against correct physical objectives 157
+  freedom of (See Freedom of Action)
+  physical conditions prevailing in field of 31
+  supervision of the 4, 197
+
+Action, courses of, (See Courses of Action)
+
+Annexes to Order Form 193
+
+Application of
+  essential elements of favorable military operations 157-164
+  tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability 99-102,
+    137-139, 144, 147, 164, 165, 167
+  the Fundamental Military Principle 43-77
+
+Apportionment of fighting strength,
+  during amphibious operations 67
+  discussion of 66-70
+  dispersion and concentration involved in 67, 68
+  diversion, bearing of, on 68
+  feasibility and acceptability of 69, 70
+  joint operations 67
+  numerical considerations 67
+  procedure for determining proper 69
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38, 39, 40, 41
+  types, training and equipment of forces 67
+
+Appropriate effect desired,
+  assigned objective becomes 49
+  as the basis for the objective 52
+  definition of 21
+  enemy's 143
+  operations studied from viewpoint of 162-164
+  forms part of basis for solution of problem 30
+  principle for determination of 33
+  requirements for an understanding of 43
+  suitability as to 118-120
+
+Areas,
+  coveted or in dispute 65
+  geographical not under one's own control 65
+  geographical under one's own control 65
+  no land, belong equally to all nations 62
+  sea, not under command 92
+  sea, securing command of 92
+  sea, under command 92
+
+Armament, material factor of 128
+
+Armed forces,
+  command of 11
+  factors more directly applicable to 127
+  function and character of 8
+  fundamental objective of 8
+  initial requisite to effective use of 11
+
+Art of War,
+  a true concept of, requirement of 9-10
+  foundation of 1
+
+Assumptions,
+  defined and discussed 155, 171
+  may form basis of Estimate 111
+
+Authentication, order form 194
+
+
+B
+
+Basic,
+  decision 82
+  estimate of the situation 82
+  problem 81
+  problems challenging integrity of, plan(s) 203
+  problems involving modification of, plan(s) 201
+  situation 82
+  war plans 195
+
+Basis,
+  of science of war 1
+  for solution of problem 20, 21, 29, 30, 43, 118, 134
+
+Battle Plans 168-171, 196
+
+Blind adherence to plan condemned 200
+
+Body of order form 190
+
+Brevity, required in directives 186
+
+
+C
+
+Campaign Plans,
+  defined 195
+  form of 194
+
+Campaigns of Twentieth Century reflect intensity of mental training 2
+
+Capabilities of enemy,
+  examination into 139-145
+  examination not complete under certain conditions 146
+  survey of 143
+
+Cause and effect 3
+  correct relation between, established by principles 22
+  natural forces and resultant conditions 19
+  principles as valid statements of 19
+
+Challenge to integrity of basic plan 203
+
+Characteristics,
+  commander's personal 127
+  influence of, on fighting strength 31, 34, 43
+  of (field) theater of (action) operations 31, 35, 39-41, 43, 52, 64,
+    65, 129-132
+  racial or national 126
+
+Clarity,
+  required in directives 186
+
+Command,
+  adherence to chain of, essential to mutual understanding 14
+  chain of 12, 53
+  echelons of 12
+  mental preparation for 114
+  paragraph, in order form 193
+  responsibility and authority inherent in 12
+  the ideal of 11
+  training for 11
+  unity of 71
+
+Commander,
+  may depart from his instructions 16
+  may modify or alter assigned task 15
+  relation of, to subordinates 15
+  staff of a 13
+  the personification of command 11
+
+Communication(s),
+  lines of 67, 91
+  plans, as an annex 193
+  provision for 168
+  study of in strategical and tactical estimates 131-182
+
+Component(s),
+  human and material, of fighting strength 8, 9
+  major, of military problems 43-47
+  mental power, recognized essential, of fighting strength 18, 217
+  parts of an operation assigned as tasks 162
+
+Condition(s),
+  influence of, on resources 21
+  of armed forces 128, 129
+  of material 128
+  in war, peacetime exercises not a conclusive guide to 198
+
+Consequences as to costs, principle for determination of acceptable 35
+
+Constructive representations, establishing basis for 103
+
+Corollaries to the Decision 153
+
+Corollary principle,
+  of the Correct Military Objective 42
+  of Effective Military Operations 42
+
+Correct military objective(s),
+  corollary principle of the 42
+  selection of 47-51
+
+Correct physical objectives, effective action against 157, 158
+
+Course(s) of action,
+  analysis and selection of 97, 104
+  analysis of, settles suitability, feasibility and acceptability 97
+  as tentative solutions, complete or partial 88, 93, 136
+  classified as to suitability, feasibility and acceptability 139
+  combination of enemy's 146
+  combination of, into complete solution 93, 138
+  comparison of, summarized 148
+  consideration of operations involved in 98
+  defined 88
+  degree of detail in which, may be visualized varies 96
+  determination and selection of the best 145-161
+  each, embodies an objective 82
+  examples of 89
+  how phrased 109
+  listing of 136, 139
+  listing of retained 139, 148
+  listing of retained enemy's 144
+  no rigid line of demarcation between, and operations pertaining
+    thereto 92
+  predetermined 86, 96, 102
+  rejection of 138, 139, 147
+  resolving into operations 147
+  retained, analyses and comparison of 145-147
+  selection of the best 145-151
+  survey of 135-137
+  test for suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 82, 98-102,
+    187, 144, 147, 164, 166, 167
+  visualization of 93
+  when embodied in decision 88
+
+
+D
+
+Daylight and dark periods 130
+
+Decision 161-154
+  basic 82
+  corollaries to the 153
+  embodies best solution of the problem 22
+  expresses a general plan of action 83
+  indicates general objective 104
+  purpose of the 152
+  relation of, to detailed plan and directives 153
+  relation of, to mission 105
+  restatement of, for use in directive 187
+  statement of 151
+  subsidiary 106, 108
+
+Detailed Plan 44, 49
+
+Dilemma,
+  definition of 148
+  procedure in case of 149
+
+Directive(s)
+  basic 82
+  defined 183
+  formulation and issue of 183
+  fragmentary 184
+  military, essentials of 185
+  military plans and military 183
+  requirements of a 186
+  subsidiary, and plans 106
+  types of naval 195
+
+Distance,
+  involved in movements 65
+  relative location and 131
+
+Distribution of Order Form 194
+
+Diversions 68
+
+Doctrine,
+  derivation of meaning of 16
+  military 16
+
+
+E
+
+Echelon of command, definition of 12
+
+Economic factors 125
+
+Effect desired,
+  appropriate, defined 21
+  by enemy, analysis of 141
+  character distinctly military, in war 35
+  enemy's 143
+  factor of the 39-41
+  further 20
+  produced by action of natural causes 19
+  source of 20-21
+  suitable to further effect, if appropriate 21, 30
+
+End in view,
+  a result to be produced, an effect desired 30
+  requirements for attainment of an 30, 31
+
+Ending of Order Form 193
+
+Enemy, information of 215
+
+Enemy('s),
+  capabilities, examination into 139-146
+  capabilities, survey of 143
+  information of the 190, 216
+  problem, survey of 141-143
+  situation, summary of 141
+  situation, re-estimate of 146
+
+Entries in journals and work-sheets 214
+
+Essential elements,
+  of a favorable military operation 47, 157
+  of a favorable military situation 47
+  relationship existing among 3
+
+Establishment of the basis for solution of the problem 118-136
+
+Estimate form,
+  a flexible guide 117
+  variation in requirements of 170
+
+Estimate(s) of the Situation,
+  basic 82
+  provides basis for plan 82
+  estimate within an 83
+  form, a detailed guide for use of Fundamental Military Principle 113
+  founded on Fundamental Military Principle, 82
+  oral 212
+  running 107, 118, 204-205
+  subsidiary 106
+  tabular form of 222
+
+Examination into capabilities of enemy 139-145
+
+Execution of plans, importance of 198
+
+
+F
+
+Facilities and fortifications 131
+
+Factor(s),
+  defined 25
+  directly applicable to armed forces 127
+  each to be weighed in connection with others 28
+  general, applicable to broad estimates 124
+  in relation to a situation 25
+  interdependency of 32, 39-41
+  pertinent, relation of, to effects to be produced 28
+  strength and weakness 132, 133
+
+Favorable military situation,
+  essential elements of a, unchanged through the years 1
+  salient features of a 39
+
+Favorably progressing military operation, salient features of a 38, 39
+
+Feasibility 39-41, 61, 99
+  application of test of 187, 144, 147, 164, 165, 167
+  consideration of, calls for survey of comparative resources 31
+  facility of execution as test for 100
+  prospects of success as test for 100
+  relation of, to correct end in view 31, 32
+
+Features,
+  salient, of favorable military situation 38-41
+
+Feints 59
+
+Fighting strength,
+  apportionment of 66-70, 162-164
+  conclusions as to 132
+  derivation of 35
+  human and material components of 8
+  mental power, a recognized essential component of 18, 217
+  relative 4, 35, 43, 52, 121, 122, 132
+  survey of factors of 88
+
+File, journal, description of 207
+
+Force(s),
+  armed, function and character of 8
+  requirements of, for task groups 166
+  task, organization of 165
+
+Form,
+  estimate, a flexible guide 117
+  order, detailed description of 188-195
+  order, discussion of 183-196
+  standard, for plans and directives 188
+  use of, in solution of problem 110-113
+
+Formulation,
+  of mission 82, 87, 121, 204
+  of tasks 84-86, 165, 192
+
+Freedom of action,
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38-41
+  adequate, measures for ensuring 160-162
+  assembly of measures for 167
+  best basis for devising measures for 76
+  discussion of 70-77
+  initiative, of paramount importance to 74
+  list of matters requiring consideration for ensurance of 16
+  logistics support essential to 74
+  morale founded upon sound discipline, an essential to 72
+  organization, of primary importance in contributing to 71
+  relation of offensive to 75
+  security measures necessary to 74
+
+Fundamental considerations,
+  factors become, in particular circumstances 28
+  the basis for the successful conduct of war 1
+
+Fundamental military philosophy 3
+
+Fundamental Military Principle 39-42
+
+Fundamental principle for attainment of an end 32
+
+Fundamentals common to all campaigns of history 1
+
+Further effect(s),
+  consideration of 120
+  indicated by higher authority 33
+  relation of, to effect desired 30
+
+
+G
+
+General factors applicable to broad estimates 124
+
+General plan,
+  a comprehensive method of attaining the assigned objective 49, 109
+  the Decision available as a 22, 44, 88
+  indicated in or developed from the Decision 155
+
+Genius, fallacy of relying on availability of 2
+
+Goal of planning 197
+
+Groups, Task, organization of 165
+
+Guide,
+  the Estimate Form a flexible 117
+  the Fundamental Military Principle a valid and practical 41
+
+
+H
+
+Heading of Order Form 189
+
+Hydrography in theater of operations 129
+
+
+I
+
+Incentive,
+  during supervision of the action 198
+  recognition of the 20, 43, 44, 50, 79, 82, 119, 203
+  relationship of, with motivating task 79
+
+Indoctrination, meaning and application of 16
+
+Information,
+  and counter-information measures 126
+  its collection, analysis, evaluation and interpretation 122
+  of enemy and of friendly forces 190, 216
+  paragraph of Order Form 190
+
+Initiative,
+  offensive is a method of seizing 75
+  relation of, to freedom of action 74
+
+Instructions,
+  action may be necessary before receipt of 203
+  commander may depart from 16
+  letter of, in lieu of directive cast in standard form 188
+  the letter and spirit of, variation from 103
+
+Intelligence,
+  accurate, related to freedom of action 76
+  and counter-intelligence, measures for 160-161
+  derived from information 122
+  plan 177
+  subsidiary problem involving 176
+
+Intelligent suspicion, everything to be viewed with 200
+
+Inventiveness and versatility, special attention to desirable 126
+
+
+J
+
+Journal file, description of 207
+
+Journal for entry of data in running estimate,
+  description of 205-207
+  entries in, purely factual 214
+
+Judgment, professional,
+  essential to good leadership 3
+  exercise of, in planning 117-179
+  exercise of, in the execution of the plan 183-217
+  has its source in mental power 217
+  relation of to successful conduct of war 40-114
+
+
+L
+
+Letters of instruction, use of 85, 188
+
+Life, the ability to withstand punishment 188
+
+Listing,
+  of courses of action 186, 189
+  of operations in definite sequence 158
+  of retained courses of action 139, 148
+
+Logical thought,
+  necessity for 22
+  principles in their relation to 22
+  separates the rational from the irrational 22
+
+Logistics,
+  factor of direct concern to armed forces 129
+  paragraph of Order Form 198
+  plan 179
+  support, commander hampered without 74
+  support, measures for 162
+
+Loyalty,
+  a military necessity 15
+  more than a moral virtue 14
+  mutual, born of mutual confidence 9
+
+
+M
+
+Material, a factor applicable to armed forces 128
+
+Means,
+  available, and opposed 31-36, 38-41, 43, 52
+  survey of 123
+  to be made available, principle for determination of 34
+
+Measures,
+  for adequate freedom of action 160-162, 167
+  for exercise of command 160, 168
+  for information and counter-information 126
+  for intelligence and counter-intelligence 160
+  for logistics support 162, 167
+  for security, cooperation and intelligence 167
+  for training 160
+
+Mental elements of fighting strength enumerated 9
+
+Mental power,
+  essential component of fighting strength 18, 217
+  vital, as basis for professional counsel to State 10
+
+Mental process(es) (See Natural mental process(es))
+
+Military plans and directives (See Directive(s))
+
+Military effort, no easy road to goal of 4
+
+Military operation(s),
+  application of essential elements of a favorable 157
+  as tentative solutions of problems, denominated as course(s) of
+    action 82
+  attainment of military objective depends on effective 40, 47
+  determination of effective 55
+  possible confusion because of phraseology as to 109
+  principle of effective 42
+
+Military principles, procedure for developing 29
+
+Military problem(s), (See also Problem(s))
+  conclusion as to approach to solution of 113
+  approach to solution of, involves four distinct steps 80
+  basic 81, 82
+  effect to be produced and action required to produce it, major
+    considerations in solving 44
+  use of a form in solution of 110-118
+  four steps in solution of 79-114
+  involvements of full solution of 82
+  major components of 43, 44
+  solution of 44, 79-114
+    first step, in 81-106
+    second step, in 106, 117-164
+    third step, in 107, 155-179
+    fourth step, in 107, 183-216
+    sequence of the four steps in 107-109, 113
+    sound basis for, establishment of 20, 43
+
+Military situation, every, has both strategical State in military
+    matters 10
+
+Military situation, every, has both strategical and tactical aspects 83
+
+Mission,
+  an assigned task coupled with purpose 87
+  clearly indicates the appropriate effect desired 121
+  double or multiple tasks in 88
+  formulation of, 82, 87, 121 204
+  manner of expressing 87
+  restated 135
+  subsidiary 170, 172, 174-176
+
+Mobility, as a material factor 128
+
+Modification of basic plan, problems involving 201
+
+Morale, discussion of 72, 73
+
+Motivating task 80
+
+Mutual understanding essential to unity of effort 14
+  final aim of 15
+
+
+N
+
+National and racial characteristics, factors of 126
+
+Natural law,
+  human activities governed by 29
+  relation of cause, effect and further effect to 19, 32
+  relation of, to human activity 11
+
+Natural mental process(es),
+  adapted to military requirements 80
+  application of, to problems of war 11
+  employed by normal mature human beings 19
+  studied employment of, ii, 217
+
+Naval directives, types of 195
+
+
+O
+
+Objective(s),
+  appreciation of (assigned) 44, 82, 119, 203
+  assigned 48-50, 119-121, 135
+  attainment of, by chain of command 12
+  best attained by properly directed effort 45, 79
+  chain of 48, 62, 54
+  correct military, principle of 42
+  selection of 43, 46, 47, 51, 117-184
+  correct military, relation of, to favorable military situation 37
+  correct physical, determination of (See also physical
+    objective(s)) 157, 158
+  determination of, embodied in tasks 167
+  general 49, 60
+  immediate 3, 64
+  inferred in assigned tasks 49, 84, 88, 104
+  in mind 37, 47
+  in space, physical 37, 47
+  intermediate 54
+  in war is an effect to be produced 36
+  national 7
+  physical (See also physical objective(s))
+  purpose of attainment usually given to subordinates, 48
+  selection of correct military 43, 45, 47, 51, 117-134
+  specified in tasks 84, 104, 49, 88
+  tentatively selected 51
+  typically selected by commander himself 50
+  ultimate 3, 54
+
+Offensive, relation of, to freedom of action 75
+
+Operation plans 195
+
+Operation(s),
+  planning detailed 3
+  developed from measures for freedom of action 160
+  effective military, principle of 42
+  enemy's, envisaged by commander 144
+  favorable military situation dependent upon effective 1, 41
+  in relation to required action 106-107
+  listing of 158
+  military 37, 109
+  naval, classification of 92
+  order (plan), outline form of 219
+  reconsideration of 159
+  resolution of required action into 155-179
+  resolving courses of action into 147
+  theater of, characteristics of 129
+
+Oral estimate 212
+
+Order form,
+  annexes to 193
+  authentication of 194
+  body of 190
+  detailed description of 188-194
+  distribution of 194
+  purpose of 112, 188
+
+Organization of task forces and tasks groups 165
+
+Organization, staff, and functioning 210-212
+
+Outline form of Operation Plan 219
+
+
+P
+
+Perplexity, source of every problem 20, 79
+
+Personnel factor applicable to armed forces 127
+
+Philosophy, fundamental military 3
+
+Physical conditions in field of action 34
+
+Physical objective(s),
+  defined 37, 47, 167
+  determination of correct 65
+  discussion of 55-59
+  effective action against 157, 158
+  eventual, a land objective 58
+  fundamental considerations in determination of 55
+  relation of, to (mental) objective 38
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 47
+  series of, to be dealt with in successive stages 56
+  suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 56-59
+
+Pithy statements, danger of 24
+
+Planned action,
+  inauguration of 183-196
+  supervision of 197-217
+
+Planning, goal of 197
+
+Plan(s),
+  alternative 156
+  as proposed methods of procedure 21
+  basic 82, 108, 195
+  basic, problems challenging integrity of 203
+  basic, problems involving modification of 201
+  battle, described 168-171
+  best, incorporated in Decision 22
+  blind adherence to, condemned 200
+  campaign 194, 195
+  comparison of 21
+  detailed 22, 49, 105
+  general 2, 22, 88, 105, 155, 183
+  intelligence 177
+  logistics 179
+  military directives and military 183
+  of execution 108
+  operation, outline form of 219
+  outlined, plan embodied in basic decision 108
+  subsidiary 106, 168, 186, 201
+
+Policy,
+  coordination of national 9
+  implementation of national 7
+  relation of, to military strategy 9
+
+Political factors 124
+
+Position(s) (See relative position(s))
+
+Positiveness, required in directives 187
+
+Power, mental, moral and physical 8, 217
+
+Predetermined course(s) of action 86, 96, 102
+
+Principle(s),
+  a natural law 22
+  cannot replace logical thought 28
+  corollary for determination of the appropriate effect to be desired 33
+  corollary or subordinate 22, 23, 28
+  establish (es) relations between cause and effect 22
+  false, why man adopts them; their danger 24
+  for determination of acceptable consequences as to cost 35
+  for determination of the proper means to be made available 34
+  for determination of the proper physical conditions to be
+    established in the field of action 34
+  for determining salient features of favorable military situation 39
+  formulation and use of 23, 27
+  fundamental, if basic in its field 22
+  fundamental, for the attainment of an end 32
+  in relation to logical thought 22
+  military, procedure for development of 29
+  of effective military operations 42
+  of the correct military objective 42
+  review of conclusions as to 29
+  the Fundamental Military 39-41
+
+Principles of War (so-called) value and limitations of 25
+
+Problem(s),
+  appearance of perplexity in situation results in 20
+  basic, the solution of 117
+  basis for solution of 20-21
+  challenging integrity of basic plan 203
+  courses, of action as tentative solutions of 136
+  enemy's, survey of 141
+  establishment of basis for solution of 118
+  involving modification of basic plan 201
+  recognition of new 199
+  solution of 20, 44
+  subsidiary 106
+  arising because of no sound solution for basic 149
+  how solved 106, 169
+  involving intelligence 176
+  involving preparation of battle plans 171
+  relating to logistics 178
+  relating to training 175
+  tactical 108
+
+Psychological factors 125
+
+Purpose,
+  of Decision 152-153
+  of Mission 87, 121
+  re-examined 135
+
+
+R
+
+Racial characteristics as psychological factor 126
+
+Raid may be a valuable operation 73
+
+Readjustments required during supervision of planned action 199
+
+Recognition of the incentive 119, 203
+
+Reestimate of the situation 146
+
+Rejection of courses of action 138, 139, 147
+
+Relations, external 124
+
+Relative fighting strength 4, 35, 43, 52, 121, 122
+  conclusions as to 132
+  feasibility and acceptability as to 121-133
+
+Relative location and distance 131
+
+Relative position(s),
+  advantageous 159
+  characteristics of theatre, important from standpoint of 64
+  discussion of 59-66
+  fundamental considerations as to 59
+  procedure for determination and selection of advantageous 61, 159
+  salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38-41
+  suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 61-66
+
+Resources,
+  as part of basis for solution of problem 21, 30
+  feasibility requires survey of 31
+
+Restatement of the decision for use in the directive 187
+
+Rule(s) of action,
+  circumstances alter cases, a reliable 24
+  faulty, unfortunate consequences of 23, 24
+  pithy statements as 24
+  search for reliable, by human mind 23
+
+Running estimate 107, 113, 204
+
+
+S
+
+Salient features,
+  considered in selecting objective 51
+  of a situation 39
+  of military operations 38-41, 111
+
+Science of war, basis for 1
+
+Scientific analysis 1
+
+Scientific approach to solution of military problems 2
+
+Scientific investigation 1
+
+Sea(s),
+  areas, operations for securing command of 92
+  high, and air above, presumably common property 62
+  movement by land, and air 60
+  provides theatre of operations with distinctive characteristics 80
+  routes, an important subject of study 62, 131
+  surface of, provides roads 62
+
+Security measures 74
+
+Selection of the best course of action 145-151
+
+Sequence of operations, visualized 158
+
+Sequence of tasks, chronological or in order of importance 166
+
+Signature in Order Form 193
+
+Situation,
+  a combination of circumstances 20, 25
+  actual or assumed 79
+  basic 82
+  enemy, summary of 141
+  produced by effects of certain causes 25
+  summary of 82, 119, 203
+  to be maintained or created 21, 30
+
+Solution(s) of problem(s),
+  establishment of basis for 118-135
+  process of 135-151
+  tentative 88, 93, 97, 136
+
+Sound decision, approach presented for reaching 3
+
+Staff,
+  assistance, utilization of 93
+  of commander 13
+  organization and functioning 210-212
+
+Stages, successive, for accomplishment of effort 164
+
+Standard form for plans and directives 188
+
+Strategy,
+  and tactics inseparable 10, 11
+  differentiated from tactics by end in view 83
+  distinguished by objectives 3, 10
+  in relation to policy 9
+  in relation to tactics 10
+
+Strength and weakness factors 132
+
+Strength, relative fighting (see also fighting strength) 4, 33, 43,
+    52, 121, 122, 132
+
+Subordinates, proper relationship of, to commander 15
+
+Subsidiary mission 170, 172, 174, 175, 176
+
+Subsidiary plans,
+  as annexes 185
+  preparation of 168-179
+
+Subsidiary problem(s) (See also Problem(s))
+  arising because of no sound solution for basic problem 149
+  how solved 106,169
+  involving intelligence 176
+  involving preparation of battle plan 171
+  relative to logistics 178
+  relative to training 175
+
+Suitability,
+  application of test for 98-102, 137, 144, 147, 164
+  requirement of 31, 32, 39-41, 43, 51, 56
+
+Summarized comparison of courses of action 148
+
+Supervision of planned action 197-216
+
+Suspicion, intelligent, everything to be viewed with 200
+
+
+T
+
+Tactics,
+  and strategy inseparable 10
+  differentiated from strategy by end in view 83
+
+Task(s)
+  as a predetermined course of action 86
+  assignment of, to subordinates 84, 192, 193
+  expressed in terms of accomplishment 84
+  forces and task groups 165, 166, 190
+  formulation of 165
+  logistics 166
+  manner of expressing 84-86
+  modification of, may be required by changing situation 15
+  motivating 80, 153
+  of the mission 87, 121, 136
+  organization 14, 165, 166, 190
+  properly conceived, indicate an objective 84
+  re-examination of 135
+  underlying 103
+
+Technique, nature of, in solution of problems 205
+
+Tentative solution(s) of problem(s) 88, 93, 97, 136
+
+Tests for suitability, feasibility and acceptability 137-139, 144,
+    147, 164, 168
+
+Theater of operations, survey of characteristics of 129-132
+
+Training,
+  measures for 160
+  peacetime 2
+  subsidiary problem relating to 175
+  tactical 72
+
+Transportation and supply, lines of 131
+
+Types of naval directives 195
+
+
+U
+
+Undesirable departures from plan involve penalty 201
+
+Unforeseen opportunity to strike enemy may be presented 200
+
+Unity of effort,
+  adherence to chain of command, essential to 12
+  between management and labor 126
+  most important single factor 12, 13
+  mutual understanding requisite to 14
+
+
+V
+
+Versatility, as a psychological factor 126
+
+Vessels, including aircraft, as a factor applicable to armed forces 127
+
+
+W
+
+War,
+  a human activity and subject to natural law 11
+  as understood herein 8
+  conditions in, peacetime exercises not conclusive guide to 198
+  effective conduct of, requirements and demands of 17
+  specialized nature of, as a human activity 35
+
+Warfare, naval, discussion of 91, 92
+
+Weather 130
+
+Will of the commander, importance of 201
+
+Work Sheet,
+  description of 207-210
+  entries in 214
+  facilitates oral estimates 212
+  facilitates special reports 212
+  facilitates written estimates 213
+  summary of 216
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+    +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+    | Typographical errors corrected in text:                   |
+    |                                                           |
+    | Page   8: circumtances replaced with circumstances        |
+    | Page  61: skillfull replaced with skillful                |
+    | Page 172: therof replaced with thereof                    |
+    | Page 175: caried replaced with carried                    |
+    |                                                           |
+    +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOUND MILITARY DECISION***
+
+
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+               font-style: normal;
+               font-weight: normal;
+               font-variant: normal;} /* page numbers */
+
+    hr.full { width: 100%;
+              margin-top: 3em;
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+              border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */
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+    pre      {font-size: 85%;}
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+</head>
+<body>
+<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sound Military Decision, by U.s. Naval War
+College</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: Sound Military Decision</p>
+<p>Author: U.s. Naval War College</p>
+<p>Release Date: February 24, 2009  [eBook #28178]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOUND MILITARY DECISION***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3 class="pg">E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Jeannie Howse,<br />
+    and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br />
+    (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<div class="tr">
+<p class="cen" style="font-weight: bold;">Transcriber's Note:</p>
+<br />
+<p class="noin">Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document
+has been preserved.</p>
+<p class="noin">The original book used bold face as a means to find
+the index entries. This has not been reproduced in this e-book.</p>
+<p class="noin">A link to an image of the form on page 219 has been
+provided for the reader's convenience.</p>
+<p class="noin" style="text-align: left;">Obvious typographical errors
+have been corrected. For a complete list, please see the
+<span style="white-space: nowrap;"><a href="#TN">end of this
+document</a>.</span></p>
+<p class="noin">Click on the images to see a larger version.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h1>Sound<br />
+Military<br />
+Decision</h1>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2>U.S. Naval War College</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class="sc">Naval Institute Press</span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Annapolis, Maryland</h4>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<div class="block2">
+<p class="noin">"This book is the 1942 edition of a book originally published in 1936
+by the U.S. Naval War College"&mdash;T.p. verso.</p>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+<h3>CONTENTS</h3>
+<br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="60%" summary="Contents">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" width="80%">Introduction</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="20%">ix</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Sound Military Decision</i></td>
+  <td class="tdr">1</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Index</td>
+  <td class="tdr">227</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2>Sound Military Decision</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xxxix" id="Page_xxxix">[xxxix]</a></span><br />
+
+<h2>U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE</h2>
+<h3>Newport, Rhode Island</h3>
+
+<br />
+
+<p class="right">November 30, 1941</p>
+
+<p>SOUND MILITARY DECISION was first published at the Naval War College
+in 1936. It included the essential features of THE ESTIMATE OF THE
+SITUATION which, since 1910, had been issued at intervals in a series
+of revised editions. The new material that was added in 1936 was
+intended to assist in enlarging the viewpoint and in broadening the
+basis of professional judgment.</p>
+
+<p>Primarily intended for the purposes of the Naval War College, this
+work is the cumulative result of years of untiring and loyal effort on
+the part of the College staff and student body. Equally important have
+been the advice and assistance contributed by other officers of wide
+professional experience and attainment.</p>
+
+<p>The objective has been a brief but inclusive treatment of the
+fundamentals of the military profession, i.e., the profession of arms.
+The emphasis, naturally, is on the exercise of mental effort in the
+solution of military problems, more especially in our Navy. An
+enormous literature has been consulted, and research has included all
+available and pertinent military writings. Care has also been taken to
+include, from civil sources, the findings of those authoritative works
+which deal with related matters and with the applicable underlying
+truths.</p>
+
+<p>In a work of this type and scope, it is manifestly not possible to
+illustrate the abstract text by historical examples and analogies.
+These are complementary features of the War College resident and
+correspondence courses; provision for the necessary historical
+background is otherwise the concern of the individual student.</p>
+
+<p>In this edition of SOUND MILITARY DECISION no radical changes have
+been made; the revision has been confined to rearrangement and
+amplification of the subject matter.</p>
+
+<p class="right"><span style="padding-right: 5%;">E.C. KALBFUS,</span><br />
+Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,<br />
+<span style="padding-right: 5%;">President.</span></p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+
+<div class="img">
+<a href="images/chart01.png">
+<img border="0" src="images/chart01.png" width="55%" alt="The Solution of Military Problems" /></a>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="toc" id="toc"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xli" id="Page_xli">[xli]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h3>
+
+<h4>(See Chart on page XXXX)</h4>
+<br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="75%" summary="Table of Contents">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr" width="10%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="75%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr2" width="15%" style="font-size: 90%;">Page</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 2em;" colspan="2"><a href="#FOREWORD">FOREWORD</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">1</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Science of War&mdash;Scientific Investigation&mdash;Fundamental
+    Considerations&mdash;Art of War&mdash;Scientific Method&mdash;Leadership
+    and Training&mdash;Sound Decision&mdash;Judgment&mdash;The Approach to
+    the Solution of Military Problems&mdash;Fundamental
+    Philosophy&mdash;Technique of Solution&mdash;Process of
+    Education&mdash;Outline of the Discussion.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><h4>PART I. PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE SUCCESSFUL
+        CONDUCT OF WAR.</h4></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">I</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">Command and its Problems</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">7</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">The Implementation of National Policy&mdash;The Primary Function
+    of the Armed Forces&mdash;Military Strategy and Tactics&mdash;Command
+    of the Armed Forces&mdash;Unity of Effort&mdash;The Chain of
+    Command&mdash;Mutual Understanding&mdash;Indoctrination.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">II</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">Mental Processes and Human Tendencies</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">19</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Natural Mental Processes&mdash;The Necessity for Logical
+    Thought&mdash;Principles in their Relation to Logical
+    Thought&mdash;Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles
+    of War&mdash;Formulation and Use of Principles&mdash;Summary of
+    Fundamental Considerations.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">III</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">Basic Principles Applicable to Military Problems</a> (The
+     Fundamental Military Principle)</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">29</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Review of Conclusions&mdash;Procedure&mdash;Suitability,
+    Feasibility, and Acceptability&mdash;Fundamental Principle for
+    Attainment of an End&mdash;Interdependency of Factors&mdash;Special
+    Nature of War&mdash;Factors in War&mdash;The Objective in
+    War&mdash;Military Operations&mdash;Salient Features&mdash;The Fundamental
+    Military Principle&mdash;Corollaries.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">IV</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">The Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+     (Objectives&mdash;Their Selection and Attainment)</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">43</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">The Basis for Solution of a Military Problem&mdash;The Major
+    Components of a Military Problem&mdash;Essential
+    Elements&mdash;Selection of Correct Military Objectives&mdash;Determination
+    of Effective Military Operations&mdash;Physical
+    Objectives&mdash;Relative Positions&mdash;Apportionment of Fighting
+    Strength&mdash;Freedom of Action&mdash;Summary.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xlii" id="Page_xlii">[xlii]</a></span>V</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">The Four Steps in the Solution of a Military Problem</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">79</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">A Situation&mdash;The Incentive&mdash;The Assigned Objective&mdash;The
+    Motivating Task&mdash;The Natural Mental Processes&mdash;The Approach
+    to the Solution&mdash;The First Step&mdash;The Basic Problem&mdash;Tasks&mdash;The
+    Mission&mdash;Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength&mdash;Courses
+    of Action&mdash;Reflective Thinking&mdash;Naval Operations&mdash;Analysis
+    and Selection of Courses of Action&mdash;The Decision&mdash;The Second
+    Step&mdash;The Third Step&mdash;The Fourth Step&mdash;Sequence of Events in
+    the Four Steps&mdash;The Use of a Form in the Solution of
+    Problems&mdash;Conclusion.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><h4>*PART II. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN PLANNING.</h4></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">VI</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">The Selection of a Correct Objective</a> (Including the
+     Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+     for its Attainment) The First Step&mdash;The Solution of a
+     Basic Problem (The Estimate of the Situation)</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">117</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Process of solving a Problem&mdash;Sections of the Estimate
+    Form&mdash;Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the
+    Problem&mdash;Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and
+    Acceptable Courses of Action&mdash;Examination into the
+    Capabilities of the Enemy&mdash;Selection of the Best Course
+    of Action&mdash;The Decision.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">VII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">The Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed
+     Operations</a> (The Second Step&mdash;The Solution of Subsidiary
+     Problems)</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">155</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Assumptions&mdash;Alternative Plans&mdash;Application of the
+    Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation&mdash;Testing
+    for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability&mdash; Formulation
+    of Tasks&mdash;Organization of Task Groups&mdash; Application
+    of the Fundamental Military Principle to the
+    Determination of Objectives embodied in Tasks&mdash;Assembly
+    of Measures for Freedom of Action&mdash;Preparation of
+    Subsidiary Plans.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xliii" id="Page_xliii">[xliii]</a></span><h4>*PART III. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN THE
+EXECUTION OF THE PLAN</h4></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">VIII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">The Inauguration of the Planned Action</a> (The Third
+     Step&mdash;The Formulation and Issue of Directives)</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">183</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Scope of the Third Step&mdash;Military Plans and Military
+    Directives&mdash;Essentials of Military Directives&mdash;Restatement
+    of the Decision&mdash;Standard Forms for Plans
+    and Directives&mdash;The Order Form&mdash;Types of Naval
+    Directives.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">IX</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">The Supervision of the Planned Action</a> (The Fourth Step)</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">197</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl2">Nature of the Discussion&mdash;Goal of Planning&mdash;Importance
+    of Execution&mdash;The Incentive&mdash;Conditions in War&mdash;Recognition
+    of New Problems&mdash;Nature of Readjustments
+    Required&mdash;Importance of the Will of the Commander&mdash;Problems
+    Involving Modification of the Basic Plan&mdash;Problems
+    Challenging Integrity of Basic Plan&mdash;Further
+    Procedure Applicable to such Problems of the Fourth
+    Step&mdash;The Running Estimate of the Situation&mdash;Journal
+    and Work Sheet&mdash;Special Remarks as to Entries&mdash;Summary.</td>
+  <td class="tdr2">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 2em;" colspan="2">*<a href="#CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">217</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><h4>*APPENDIX</h4></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#APPENDIX_1">Outline Form of an Operation Plan</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">219</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><a href="#APPENDIX_2">Tabular Form of the Estimate of the Situation</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">222</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 2em;" colspan="2">*<a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr2">227</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">* Not included in the limited issue for use in Part I of the
+  Correspondence Course.</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="FOREWORD" id="FOREWORD"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>FOREWORD<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>From the earliest days of recorded history, the facts associated with
+military operations of the past have been constantly studied. The
+result has been the accumulation of a mass of information from which
+conclusions have been drawn as to the causes of success and failure.
+Although scattered through countless volumes, and nowhere completely
+systematized and classified, this accepted body of knowledge
+constitutes the basis for the science of war.</p>
+
+<p>Scientific investigation&mdash;that is, the collection, verification, and
+classification of facts&mdash;follows the recurrent procedure of successive
+analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test. The application of this
+process to the campaigns of history reveals fundamentals common to
+all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea,
+or air. In the ceaseless struggle for supremacy between the offense
+and the defense, great technological changes have taken place. The
+successful conduct of war, however, has always depended on effective
+operations for the creation or maintenance of favorable military
+situations, whose essential elements have remained unchanged
+throughout the years (see <a href="#Page_46">page 46</a>).</p>
+
+<p>These fundamental considerations (see <a href="#Page_28">page 28</a>), whatever the detailed
+form of their presentation, are the basis for the successful conduct
+of war. The need of such a basis has been felt from very early times.
+It was not, however, until the early part of the Nineteenth Century
+that students of warfare appear to have recorded the view that the
+conduct of war is susceptible of reduction to scientific analysis, and
+that only through a reasoned theory can the true causes of success and
+failure be explained.</p>
+
+<p>Such a scientific analysis of any subject has for its chief practical
+aim the improvement of the art, or practice, of that subject. Forming
+an important part of the science of war are those new developments in
+weapons and in other technological fields which, with the passage of
+time, have brought about great changes in methods of waging war. It is
+only through founding the art of war&mdash;the application of the science
+of war to actual military situations&mdash;on the fundamental truths
+discovered through the science of war, that changes in method, due to
+technological evolution, can be made most effective.</p>
+
+<p>In preparing for war, the only practicable peacetime tests are usually
+restricted to those afforded by examples of the past, by problems such
+as chart (map) and board maneuvers, and by fleet and field exercises.
+While the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span>military profession can afford to neglect none of them,
+such tests can never be conclusive. This fact, however, far from
+justifying resort to any other procedure, emphasizes the necessity for
+utilization of the scientific method in order to arrive at conclusions
+which are as exact as possible.</p>
+
+<p>An exact result is, of course, the aim of all scientific research, but
+exactitude necessarily depends on the establishment of correct
+relationships among facts which have so far come to light.
+Consequently, there is great variation in the degree of accuracy which
+actually characterizes the several sciences. If it be maintained that
+only those studies which have resulted in exact conclusions may
+properly be regarded as sciences, then it can hardly be said that many
+sciences, now regarded as such, exist; for the findings of medicine,
+biology, chemistry, and even physics are continually being revised in
+the light of new data.</p>
+
+<p>The science of war necessarily includes knowledge gained in other
+fields. In war, as in medicine or any other practical activity, the
+more inclusive and dependable the body of knowledge available as a
+basis for action, the more probable it is that the application of this
+knowledge, the art (<a href="#Page_1">page 1</a>), will be effective.</p>
+
+<p>Realization of these facts has led to renewed emphasis on the
+scientific approach to the solution of military problems. The fallacy
+of staking the future upon the possible availability of a military
+genius in time of need became clear when it was appreciated that more
+than one nation, hitherto victorious in arms, had been defeated and
+humiliated when genius no longer led its forces.</p>
+
+<p>There followed in the military profession a conviction that, although
+extraordinary inherent capacity can be recognized and utilized when
+known to exist, it is safer and wiser to develop by training the
+highest average of ability in leadership than to trust to untrained
+"common sense" or to the possible advent of a genius. History has
+abundantly proved the folly of attempting, on any other basis, to cope
+with the unpredictable occurrence of genius in the hostile leadership.
+With the actual exercise of leadership in war restricted to the
+reality of war, there is emphasized the need of peacetime
+training&mdash;training of subordinates in efficient performance, and, more
+important, training of those who will be placed by the State in
+positions of responsibility and command.</p>
+
+<p>Campaigns of the Twentieth Century reflect the intensity of mental
+training among the armed forces of the greater powers; the planning
+and conduct of war have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span>acquired a precision, a swiftness, and a
+thoroughness before unknown. The study and analysis of past campaigns,
+the sifting of technical details from fundamental truths, and the
+shrewd combination of the theoretical and the practical form the basis
+of this training.</p>
+
+<p>The proper solution of military problems requires the reaching of
+sound decision as to what is to be done. Upon the soundness of the
+decision depends, in great part, the effectiveness of the resulting
+action. Both are dependent on the possession of a high order of
+professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on
+experience. Theoretical knowledge supplements experience, and is the
+best substitute in its absence. Judgment, the ability to understand
+the correct relationship between cause and effect, and to apply that
+knowledge under varying circumstances, is essential to good
+leadership. Professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental
+exercise in the application of logical processes to the solution of
+military problems.</p>
+
+<p>The approach, presented herein, to the solution of military problems
+is intended to assist the military profession in reaching sound
+decisions as to (1) the selection of its correct objectives, the ends
+toward which its action is to be directed under varying circumstances;
+(2) planning the detailed operations required; (3) transmitting the
+intent so clearly as to ensure inauguration of well-coordinated
+action; and (4) the effective supervision of such action.</p>
+
+<p>The student of war will find in these pages a fundamental military
+philosophy whose roots go down to very ancient times. In the technique
+described for the solution of military problems, experienced officers
+will recognize a system with which they are already familiar. This
+system, constantly under study to improve its details, has been in use
+in our military Services for many years.</p>
+
+<p>The foundation of this philosophy and of the system for its practical
+utilization rests on the concept of relative or proportional values.
+In the military environment, change, rather than stability, is
+especially to be expected, and the relationships existing among the
+essential elements of a military situation are, in fact, the
+significant values. Such values, themselves, vary with the viewpoint
+of the person concerned. Accordingly, because of the difference in
+objectives (defined above), what is strategy as viewed by a commander
+on a higher echelon may have more of a tactical aspect to those on a
+lower (<a href="#Page_10">page 10</a>). Immediate objectives and ultimate objectives (<a href="#Page_54">page
+54</a>) can scarcely be understood in their true proportions unless the
+point of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span>reference is clear. The point of view of the commander, as
+established by the position he occupies in the chain of command, is,
+therefore, to be taken into consideration in every phase of the
+solution of a problem,&mdash;in the determination of the appropriate effect
+desired (<a href="#Page_43">page 43</a>), of relative fighting strength (<a href="#Page_35">page 35</a>), and of
+courses of action and the detailed operations pertaining thereto (<a href="#Page_88">page
+88</a>).</p>
+
+<p>On the basis of these facts, instantaneous and easy understanding of
+all the elements involved is not to be expected. Were such
+understanding possible, the expert conduct of war would be one of the
+easiest, instead of one of the most difficult, of human activities. It
+is only through a gradual assimilation of its fundamentals that the
+profession of arms is to be mastered. A process of true education is
+involved,&mdash;that of enlarging the viewpoint and broadening the basis of
+professional judgment (see page i),&mdash;and its essentials are the proper
+foundation for any system of self-improvement in the exercise of
+mental power. There is no easy road to the goal of military effort.</p>
+
+<p>Part I, hereafter, discusses professional judgment in its basic
+relation to the successful conduct of war. This treatment examines the
+responsibilities of the armed forces, discusses the role of the
+commander, indicates the natural mental processes employed in the
+solution of military problems, formulates and explains the Fundamental
+Military Principle, and concludes with an outline of the procedure for
+its further application in Parts II and III.</p>
+
+<p>Part II is concerned with the solution of the problems encountered
+during the planning stage.</p>
+
+<p>Part III discusses the execution of the plan,&mdash;the directives and the
+supervision of the action,&mdash;but the treatment as to details is chiefly
+from the standpoint of the mental effort. During hostilities the vital
+issues which hinge on alert supervision create an accentuated demand
+for the intelligent exercise of professional judgment. Its possession
+to a highly developed degree and its exercise on a foundation of
+knowledge and experience, are prerequisite to attainment of the
+highest standards in the conduct of war.</p>
+
+<p>The following pages are intended, therefore, to provide a fundamental
+basis upon which the commander, by thoughtful study and reflection,
+may develop his professional judgment to the end that its exercise
+result in sound military decision, essential alike to wise planning
+and to consistently effective action.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h3>PART I<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span>
+<br />
+PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO<br />
+THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF WAR</h3>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span><br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER I<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>COMMAND AND ITS PROBLEMS</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The Foreword, preceding, has explained the scientific
+approach to the solution of military problems. It has been
+brought to notice that the science of war can be utilized to
+further sound military decision and, so, to improve the
+practice of war, i.e., the art of war, whether under assumed
+or actual conditions. The Foreword has also stressed the
+importance of education for the development of judgment in
+the application of mental power to the solution of military
+problems.</p>
+
+<p>Chapter I, which now follows, deals with the armed forces in
+their relation to national policy, and discusses,
+specifically, the role of the commander with respect to the
+use of mental power as a recognized component of fighting
+strength. Emphasis is placed on the important subjects of
+military strategy and tactics, unity of effort, the chain of
+command, authority and responsibility, organization, mutual
+understanding, loyalty, and indoctrination.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+
+<p>The Implementation of National Policy. Organized government exists for
+the purpose of bringing into systematic union the individuals of a
+State for the attainment of common ends. The primary national
+objective (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of
+essential security for the social system which is the fundamental
+basis of the community. Whatever the form of government, the power and
+authority of the State are vested in an individual, or in a grouping
+of individuals, whose voice is the voice of the State. In the
+prosecution of the chief aim of organized government, the State
+crystallizes the many conflicting desires and views of its people into
+policies, internal and external. Each policy is a method of procedure
+for attaining one or more national objectives.</p>
+
+<p>Internal policies are rendered effective by enforcement of the laws of
+the State.</p>
+
+<p>External policies, to become effective, require recognition by other
+States, tacitly or by agreement. When there is conflict between the
+policies of one State and those of another, peaceful means of
+settlement are usually sought.</p>
+
+<p>If peaceful (diplomatic) means fail to settle the point at issue, the
+State abandons the policy in question, defers action to enforce it, or
+adopts stronger measures. Such measures may take the form of
+psychological, political, or economic pressure. They may even include
+the threat to employ armed force before actually resorting to the
+imposition of physical violence. During actual hostilities, also,
+every means of pressure known to man, in addition to physical
+violence, may be employed.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>Whether the use of armed force to impose or to resist the imposition
+of policy constitutes a legal state of war is a political question
+which does not affect the tasks the armed forces may be called on to
+perform. War, therefore, is to be understood herein as any condition
+in which one State employs physical violence against another, or
+against an organized part of itself which may be in rebellion.</p>
+
+<p>By agreement among nations, effort has been made to discountenance
+aggressive warfare. The distinction between aggression and
+self-defense is, however, not a matter of agreement. War is still
+employed as an instrument of national policy. No nation has, as yet,
+manifested willingness to relinquish the right to employ armed force
+in resisting aggression, nor the right to decide what constitutes
+self-defense. States still maintain and employ armed forces as a means
+of promoting and expanding, as well as of defending, their welfare and
+interests.</p>
+
+<p>The Primary Function of the Armed Forces. Whether war is an ethical
+institution is not a matter within the purview of the armed forces.
+Their primary function is, when called upon to do so, to support and,
+within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policy of the
+State. The performance of this function constitutes the chief reason
+for their existence.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental objective of the armed forces is, therefore, the
+reduction of the opposing will to resist. It is attained through the
+use of actual physical violence or the threat thereof (<a href="#Page_7">page 7</a>). This
+fact constitutes the underlying motive of every military plan, whether
+for the conduct of a minor or contributory operation, or for the
+prosecution of a major campaign. The final outcome is dependent on
+ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the
+enemy, for land is the natural habitat of man (<a href="#Page_46">page 46</a>). Since
+opposition is to be expected, the military problem is primarily
+concerned with the application of power&mdash;mental, moral, and
+physical&mdash;in overcoming resistance, or in exerting effort to resist.</p>
+
+<p>The application of power implies effort, i.e., the exertion of
+strength. The mental, moral, and physical power at the disposal of the
+armed forces depends on the effort which can be exerted by the human
+and material components of their fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>The skillful employment of fighting strength, as a weapon more
+effective than the enemy's under a given set of circumstances, is the
+goal toward which the armed forces direct their effort. The elements
+of the material <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span>component&mdash;arms, ammunition, and other equipment&mdash;are
+indispensable. They are impotent, however, without the direction and
+energy supplied by the human component, its moral and mental elements
+nicely balanced and judiciously compounded with physical fitness. A
+true concept of the art of war will insist that the necessity for the
+achievement of a high standard of technical and administrative skill
+not be permitted to outweigh the need for maximum development of other
+mental attainments, and of the moral components of fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>The moral elements include all the essential attributes of personal
+character, and more especially those qualities of courage, loyalty,
+decisiveness, modesty, patience, tolerance of the opinions of others,
+and fearlessness of responsibility which are characteristics of true
+military leadership. The maintenance of a high ethical standard is
+essential to the establishment and continuance of mutual confidence.</p>
+
+<p>The qualifications essential to the proper application of the mental
+elements include a creative imagination and the ability to think and
+to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a
+knowledge of the science of war. An unmistakable mark of mental
+maturity is the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and
+fundamental knowledge. Intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the
+influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion, is the essential basis
+for the effective employment of mental power.</p>
+
+<p>The numerical size of the armed forces, in their correct perspective
+as an instrument of the State, as well as the extent to which they are
+supplied with material components of fighting strength, are matters to
+be determined by the State after consultation with the responsible
+military authorities. The development of the essential military
+qualities of the instrument is the special charge of the armed forces.
+It is their task to weld the assemblage of men, armed and maintained
+by the State, into an harmonious whole, skilled in technique and
+imbued with a psychological and mental attitude which will not admit
+that any obstacle is insuperable.</p>
+
+<p>The Advisory Function. Understanding between the civil representatives
+of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly
+essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to
+enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of
+ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise
+professional counsel be available to the State. While military
+strategy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span>may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of
+attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or
+failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only
+that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of
+strategy be allotted adequate means, and be undertaken under the most
+favorable conditions.</p>
+
+<p>These considerations require that the military profession be
+qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and
+capacity for expression, to advise the State in military matters.
+There is thus accentuated the need for mental training, as set forth
+previously in the Foreword.</p>
+
+<p>Military Strategy and Tactics. Military strategy as distinguished by
+objectives (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>) representing a larger, further, or more
+fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is
+concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn
+permit strategy to accomplish its further objective.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently, every military situation has both strategical and
+tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a
+particular time, and the action to be taken to that end, may be
+governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical,
+considerations. Whether an operation is distinctively strategical or
+tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned,
+on the end which he has in view.</p>
+
+<p>To attain its objective, strategy uses force (or threatens such use)
+(see <a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>) as applied by tactics; tactics employed for a purpose
+other than that of contributing to the aims of strategy is unsound.
+Proper tactics, therefore, has a strategic background. Definition of
+tactics as the art of handling troops or ships in battle, or in the
+immediate presence of the enemy, is not all-inclusive. Such a view
+infers that the field of battle is the only province of tactics, or
+that strategy abdicates when tactics comes to the fore.</p>
+
+<p>Actually, while tactical considerations may predominate during battle,
+their influence is not confined to the immediate presence of the
+enemy. Tactical dispositions are frequently adopted for convenience,
+for time saving, or for other reasons, long before entry into the
+immediate presence of the enemy. Nor do strategical considerations end
+when battle is joined. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly
+make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But
+strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord
+with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span>are inseparable.</p>
+
+<p>It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are
+appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at
+the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.
+The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that
+the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can
+be made available.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy, generally
+depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially
+responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the
+province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical
+objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that
+the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the
+attainment of the designated objectives.</p>
+
+<p>Command of the Armed Forces. The initial requisite to the effective
+use of the armed forces is an agency authorized to direct them.</p>
+
+<p>Command directs the armed forces. It is vitalized and personified in
+the commander, the human directing head, both of the whole and of
+organized groupings in descending scale of importance. Its
+responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the armed forces to
+the point of readiness for war and, during the conflict, their
+effective employment.</p>
+
+<p>Training for command, to be effective, is necessarily dependent upon
+an understanding of the position occupied by the commander, and of the
+role which he plays. Accordingly, this understanding is an essential
+in the study of that aspect of command training which has as its
+purpose the development of ability to reach sound decision.</p>
+
+<p>The ideal of military command combines the best of human qualities
+with sound knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the armed
+forces. It recognizes in war a form of human activity whose conduct,
+like that of all other human activities, is subject to natural law. It
+applies to the mastery of the problems of war, therefore, the natural
+mental processes of human thought (see Chapter II); it adapts these
+natural processes to a specific purpose, and consciously develops
+their use to the maximum degree for the attainment of this end. As
+command ascends the scale, its viewpoint broadens. Experience and
+added knowledge, with increasing authority and responsibility, lead to
+a concept of war more and more comprehensive, with the resultant
+growth in ability to evolve and put into effect a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span>general plan for
+the effective control of collective effort.</p>
+
+<p>Unity of Effort. An objective is best attained by effective
+application of properly directed effort, exerted by a single
+individual or by groups of individuals. Where individuals are
+collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single
+factor contributory to the common success. The basic condition to be
+sought by the armed forces is an harmonious whole, capable of putting
+forth combined effort, intensified in strength because of the
+collective feature, and rendered effective by its unity.</p>
+
+<p>The Chain of Command. Within the limits of human capacity, an
+organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the
+more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single
+competent commander. To divide the supreme command in any locality, or
+to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to
+diffuse responsibility. In that degree there is then incurred the
+danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and
+of creating corresponding diffusion of effort.</p>
+
+<p>Realization of this danger has led the military profession to entrust
+command, subject to justifiable exceptions (see <a href="#Page_71">page 71</a>), to a single
+head, while ensuring, by careful selection and training of personnel,
+that competent individuals are available for this duty. Although this
+method is in seeming conflict with the restriction imposed by
+recognized limitations of human capacity, the difficulty is
+effectively met through the chain of command, whereby responsibility
+is assigned and authority is transmitted without lessening of ultimate
+responsibility. Responsibility and authority, the latter properly
+apportioned to the former, are inseparably inherent in command, and
+may not justifiably be severed from one another.</p>
+
+<p>In the abstract, the chain of command consists of a series of links,
+through which responsibility and authority are transmitted. The
+supreme commander is thus linked with his successively subordinate
+commanders, and all are disposed on, so to speak, a vertical series of
+levels, each constituting an echelon of command.</p>
+
+<p>By means of the chain of command, a commander is enabled to require of
+his immediate subordinates an expenditure of effort which, in the
+aggregate, will ensure the attainment of his own objective (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>).
+He thus assigns tasks to his immediate subordinates, whom he holds
+directly responsible for their execution without, however, divesting
+himself of any part of his initial responsibility. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span>accomplishment
+of each of these assigned tasks will involve the attainment of an
+objective, necessarily less in scope than that of the immediate
+superior but a contribution to the attainment of the latter.</p>
+
+<p>The character and magnitude of the objective of the highest echelon
+involved will have considerable bearing upon the number of echelons
+required for its attainment. Whatever the number, a commander on a
+particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate subordinate
+to a commander on the next higher echelon, and that of an immediate
+superior with relation to a commander on the next lower echelon.
+Within these confines, authority is exercised and accomplishment
+exacted, both to the extent calculated to ensure unity of effort.</p>
+
+<p>There may frequently be found two or more commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon, all with the same immediate
+superior, and all charged with loyalty to him and to each other in the
+attainment of a common objective. In no case, however, will a
+commander be directly answerable to more than one immediate superior
+for the performance of the same duty. Thus is fulfilled the
+requirement that the command, although relatively narrower in scope as
+the scale is descended, be reposed in a single head.</p>
+
+<p>The experience gained and the knowledge acquired during early service
+on the lower echelons provide a basis for later expansion of
+viewpoint, a better understanding of the position occupied by the
+subordinate and of the obligations of higher command, including its
+dependence on subordinates. As the echelons of command are ascended,
+the details involved become more and more numerous, because of the
+increased scope of the problems. On the higher echelons, therefore,
+staff assistance is provided so that the commander may be left free to
+consider matters in their major aspects. The staff of a commander is
+not, however, a part of the chain of command; its members, as such,
+exercise no independent authority.</p>
+
+<p>A chain of command is not created by the subdivision of the officer
+corps into grades on a basis of relative rank. Such subdivision is for
+the purpose of classification from the standpoint of potential
+competency and capacity for responsibility, and carries no authority
+to command by virtue of rank alone. Organization, systematized
+connection for a specific purpose, is first necessary.</p>
+
+<p>The armed forces, during peace, are usually subdivided <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span>into permanent
+major organizations for the purpose of attaining and maintaining
+readiness for action. From the several grades of the officer corps, a
+permanent chain of command is instituted by the process of organization,
+the supreme command being reposed in a commander-in-chief. The basis of
+the permanent organization is that chosen as best suited to attain and
+maintain readiness. Its choice requires consideration of many factors,
+such as the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses, and their
+capabilities, severally and in combination. Further specific demands are
+met by temporary arrangements effected through "task organization".
+Whether the organization be permanent or temporary, its establishment
+places in effect a chain of command applicable to that organization
+throughout its continuance.</p>
+
+<p>Habitual and studied adherence to the chain of command in
+administrative matters, in consultation, in the exchange of
+information, and in the issue of directives is essential to mutual
+understanding, and therefore to unity of effort. The right of a
+commander, however, because of the responsibility he shoulders, to
+deal directly with subordinates more than one echelon removed is not
+relinquished because of the existence of the chain of command.
+Circumstances may arise which require him to issue orders directly to
+any person under his command. Fully aware, however, of the value of
+unity of effort, and recognizing that failure to deal through his
+immediate subordinate, no matter what the exigency, cannot but tend to
+weaken the chain of command, he will, as soon as the state of the
+emergency permits, inform intervening commanders of the action he has
+been compelled to take.</p>
+
+<p>Mutual Understanding. The chain of command, though providing the
+necessary linkage, does not of itself ensure that the command
+organization will be adequate, nor can it ensure that unity of effort
+will result. To meet the requirement of adequacy, there is needed in
+the person of each commander not only the ability to arrive at sound
+military decision, to plan, and to direct the operations of his
+command, but also an appreciation of the position which he occupies in
+his relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand, and to
+his own immediate subordinates on the other. To meet the requirement
+of unity of effort, it is also essential that there exist a state of
+mutual understanding throughout the chain of command.</p>
+
+<p>Loyalty is not merely a moral virtue; it is a great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span>military
+necessity. To establish and to cultivate a state of mutual
+understanding from which will flow mutual loyalty born of mutual
+confidence (<a href="#Page_9">page 9</a>) are prime obligations of command. Within the
+limits of responsibility and resultant authority, individual
+initiative will follow. On a foundation of intelligent cooperation and
+resolute determination, the acts of the lowest commander will be in
+accordance with the desires of the highest. This, in effect, will
+constitute unity of effort, accomplished through the vesting of
+command in a single head.</p>
+
+<p>The final aim of mutual understanding is attained when, in the absence
+of specific instructions, each subordinate commander in the chain acts
+instinctively as his immediate superior, if present, would have him
+act, and also cooperates intelligently with commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon. For this reason there is
+need, on all echelons, of a complete grasp of the significance of the
+relationship between immediate superior and immediate subordinate, and
+of the obligations of each to the other.</p>
+
+<p>The proper relationship is such that a subordinate, even though
+separated from his commander, can confidently take action as if the
+latter were present. To this end, the competent commander will earlier
+have cultivated the personal relationship between his immediate
+superior and himself, and between himself and his subordinates. It is
+through such close relationship that mutual understanding is best
+developed and harmony promoted, so that intelligent and cordial unity
+of effort may exist among the personnel of a command.</p>
+
+<p>The commander, however competent, necessarily relies on his
+subordinates. Recognizing the psychological factors involved, he will
+therefore manifest confidence in their abilities, display sympathetic
+interest in their efforts, and evince pride in their achievements. He
+will also exercise patience with the mistakes which will inevitably
+occur, without condonement, however, of disaffection, neglect, or
+carelessness. The commander may reasonably expect, by the same token,
+that this attitude will characterize his immediate superior.</p>
+
+<p>In the absence of his superior, and faced with a changing situation, a
+commander may be forced to the conclusion that his assigned task
+requires modification or alteration. Conditions permitting, he will of
+course communicate with proper authority, and will make constructive
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span>representations. If he is without adequate communications facilities,
+or if circumstances have imposed restrictions on communications
+facilities otherwise available, he takes action according to the
+dictates of his own judgment, guided by the known views of his
+superior. On occasions when he believes that the immediate situation
+so requires, he may even depart from his instructions. He realizes
+that in so doing he accepts the gravest of military responsibilities.
+At the same time, however, he recognizes that to fail to take the
+indicated action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of
+courage, judgment, initiative, and loyalty (<a href="#Page_9">page 9</a>). He will, of
+course inform his superior of his action at the first available
+opportunity. In the meantime, he has been enabled to act intelligently
+and fearlessly because of the existence of a state of mutual
+understanding.</p>
+
+<p>Indoctrination. Both the necessary process and the final result of
+establishing a state of mutual understanding are sometimes known as
+indoctrination.</p>
+
+<p>The word carries the dual meaning of "the act of indoctrinating" and
+"the state of being indoctrinated". In common with the word doctrine,
+it has its root in the Latin verb which means "to teach". A doctrine,
+in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for
+acceptance or belief.</p>
+
+<p>It does not follow that every doctrine is necessarily sound, nor that
+it is founded on conviction reached as the result of intelligent
+thought. Nor is the encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread
+of a doctrine, necessarily inspired by good motives. The preaching of
+doctrine known to be false is frequently encountered in many human
+activities. The deliberate spread of false propaganda is an example.
+But, whatever the motive and whether the doctrine be sound or false,
+the act of indoctrination is intended to shape opinion and thus
+influence action.</p>
+
+<p>Manifestly, to be along permanently useful lines, indoctrination flows
+from sound philosophy, i.e., is rooted in truth. All teachings, all
+opinions that may be advanced, all expressions of viewpoint, i.e., all
+doctrine, is therefore to be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of
+validity, and then from that of usefulness of application. It is the
+responsibility of command to ensure that these conditions are met
+before doctrine is pronounced.</p>
+
+<p>Military doctrine, in its broad sense, is a digest of the accepted
+beliefs of the military profession. In a narrower sense a military
+doctrine may be confined to the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span>views of a single commander on a
+specific subject. The object of military doctrine, however, is always
+to furnish a basis for mutual understanding to the end that prompt and
+harmonious action by subordinate commanders may ensue without the
+necessity for referring every problem to superior authority before
+taking action (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>). Doctrine thus provides a basis for action in
+possible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions
+have not been issued.</p>
+
+<p>The term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content
+of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a
+particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under
+circumstances of the moment. The precise instructions thus issued,
+though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves
+constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the
+nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative
+opinion.</p>
+
+<p>In the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified
+demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is
+an essential to unity of effort. If the members of the military
+profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to
+the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected
+more nearly to approach unanimity. The attainment of unity of effort
+therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic
+indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all
+commanders of the chain of command.</p>
+
+<p>Wars come and go. Their effects are painful, but when their wounds are
+healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that
+peace will henceforth be unbroken. Psychological and economic forces
+then not infrequently impel the State to subordinate the national
+defense in favor of other interests. During such periods the burdens
+of command are enlarged. Its responsibility is not lessened, but the
+means for effective discharge thereof are withheld.</p>
+
+<p>The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist
+(see <a href="#Page_9">pages 9 and 10</a>) between the civil representatives of the State
+and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with
+the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of
+the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war
+demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with
+intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities
+and limitations of the technique, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span>and the ability to fit the
+practical details into the general plan in their true relation
+thereto.</p>
+
+<p>The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour
+of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is
+wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its
+adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment
+until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are
+essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite
+intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied
+effort during peace.</p>
+
+<p>It follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is
+directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific,
+rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary
+components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the
+readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the
+application of power more likely to be successful. History records, as
+facts, that certain States have given their armed forces great
+stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases,
+failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof.
+Military problems are not confined to those presented after war is
+begun.</p>
+
+<p>Mental power (see <a href="#Page_8">pages 8 and 9</a>), which includes the ability to solve
+military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound
+decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength
+because it is the source of professional judgment. The development of
+such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct
+of war (<a href="#Page_4">page 4</a>) may not safely be postponed.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER II<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>MENTAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN TENDENCIES</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The discussion in Chapter II deals, first, with the natural
+mental processes employed by the normal mature human being
+before taking deliberate action.</p>
+
+<p>With the necessity for logical thought thus established, there
+arises a need for valid statements of cause and effect, i.e.,
+of relationships resulting from the operation of natural laws,
+for use as reliable rules of action. The discussion of this
+subject explains the dangers inherent in the use of faulty
+rules, emphasizes the role played by the various factors
+applicable in particular cases, and describes the method of
+formulating reliable rules, i.e., principles.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>All living beings and their surroundings are understood, on the basis
+of informed authority, to be governed in their characteristic
+activities by natural law (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>). The natural forces inherent in
+living things and in their environment are continually reacting upon
+each other, either maintaining the existing condition or creating a
+new one, each of which is a situation or state of affairs. There is
+thus always a relationship (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>) existing between such natural
+forces and the resultant condition which they produce. The natural
+forces are causes; the resultant conditions are effects.</p>
+
+<p>It is a recognized natural phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of a certain cause, or of a combination of causes, and that each
+effect is itself, in turn, the cause of additional effects. Action and
+reaction are the basis of natural law. Cause and effect, the latter
+being the cause of further effects, follow each other in ceaseless
+succession in the world of human affairs.</p>
+
+<p>Except by putting proper natural causes into action, it is impossible
+to produce the effect desired. It follows that specific knowledge of
+causes is necessary for the planned production of specific effects.
+Toward the accumulation of such knowledge the methods of science
+(<a href="#Page_1">pages 1 and 2</a>) are constantly directed.</p>
+
+<p>The uncertainties of war are largely the outgrowth of the fact that
+the minds of men are pitted against one other. Because of this, a
+knowledge of the manner in which the human mind seeks its way out of
+difficulties is a great military asset. Consideration is next given,
+therefore, to the natural mental processes employed (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>) and to
+certain human tendencies which have been known to militate against
+their successful employment.</p>
+
+<p>The mental processes employed by the normal mature <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span>human being before
+taking deliberate action, or in making studied provision for possible
+future action, are natural procedures, in that they employ the
+intellectual powers bestowed by nature, without artificial
+modification or embellishment.</p>
+
+<p>When the individual concerned has a background of adequate knowledge
+and experience, his ability to solve problems is limited only by his
+native intellectual endowment. That he falls short does not
+necessarily indicate, however, that the limit of native endowment has
+been reached. It happens frequently that latent powers have not been
+cultivated, or have not been utilized.</p>
+
+<p>A problem is, by definition, a perplexing question. In any human
+activity, a problem appears when a perplexity arises as to a way out
+of a difficulty inherent in a situation. The question involved then
+is, what is a way, more especially the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty?</p>
+
+<p>To determine the best way out of the difficulty, i.e., the best
+solution of the problem, involves:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p>(1)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The establishment of the proper basis for the
+solution of the problem,</p>
+
+<p>(2)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The actual solution of the problem through the
+employment of the reasoning power in the consideration of
+various possible solutions and the selection of the best
+solution, and</p>
+
+<p>(3)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The conclusion, i.e., the decision, embodying the best
+solution.</p></div>
+
+<p>Considered in greater detail, the process has its inception in a
+combination of circumstances, existent or assumed, which, constitutes
+a situation. No problem will result however, unless the situation
+involves an apparent difficulty. Even in such a case, a problem will
+result only if such involvement exists and gives rise to a perplexity
+as to a way, more especially as to the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>The problem will require solution only when accompanied by an
+incentive which demands a changed situation or resistance against a
+threatened change. A recognition of the incentive thus necessarily
+involves realization of a desire or need to maintain the existing
+situation or to change it into a new one.</p>
+
+<p>Such realization may come on the initiative of the person confronted
+with the situation, or because he has received instructions from
+someone in authority. In either case, the effect so indicated is the
+outcome of a desire for change or for resisting change, and may
+therefore be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span>regarded properly as an effect desired (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>).</p>
+
+<p>As so far outlined, therefore, the establishment of the correct basis
+for the solution of the problem involves (1) a grasp of the salient
+features of the situation, (2) a recognition of the incentive, and (3)
+an appreciation of the effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>The "appropriate" effect desired will necessarily be suitable to the
+further effects (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>) which are inherent in the situation. An
+effect to be attained is accepted as appropriate when, after due
+examination, its relationship with the further effects involved, in
+all their pertinent implications, has been found to be in accordance
+with the dictates of sound judgment.</p>
+
+<p>The establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem will
+also require an understanding of the resources involved, as influenced
+by the conditions obtaining, for the maintenance of the existing
+situation or for the creation of a new one.</p>
+
+<p>The resources available, as influenced by the conditions obtaining,
+are correctly considered on a relative basis as compared to those of
+any persons who may oppose the effort.</p>
+
+<p>With the basis for the solution of the problem established in this
+manner, the actual solution involves the consideration of one or more
+plans, i.e., proposed methods of procedure, and the selection of the
+one considered to be the best.</p>
+
+<p>The person concerned, taking cognizance of the present condition,
+i.e., the existing situation, first considers whether this situation,
+if maintained, will be suitable to the appropriate effect desired.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates one or
+more images of future conditions, i.e., mental pictures of new
+situations, which will also be suitable to this end. The maintenance
+of the existing situation, or the creation of a new one, will in each
+case involve a plan.</p>
+
+<p>Necessarily, each such plan includes provision for (1) an effect to be
+produced by the person solving the problem, which effect will be the
+maintenance of the existing situation or the creation of a new one as
+visualized by himself, and (2) the action required to produce this
+effect and so to attain the appropriate effect desired, already
+established as an essential part of the basis of his problem.</p>
+
+<p>After systematic examination of such plans, those retained for further
+consideration can be subjected to a comparison as to their relative
+merits.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span>The best plan, selected accordingly, is then incorporated into a
+decision as to the procedure to be adopted.</p>
+
+<p>This decision is then available as a general plan, or may be developed
+into one, to serve as a basis if necessary for a more detailed plan
+for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>Later development, herein, of the details of this procedure will
+disclose many ramifications. The treatment, so far, points to the fact
+that the best method of reaching sound decision is through systematic
+thought which employs logic, i.e., sound reasoning, as its machinery.</p>
+
+<p>The Necessity for Logical Thought. Logical thought separates the
+rational from the irrational. Its use avoids the wastefulness of the
+trial-and-error method. By its insistent employment, dormant powers of
+reasoning are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive,
+spontaneous, impulsive, or emotional acceptance of conclusions (<a href="#Page_9">page
+9</a>) is lessened. The evil effects of an inclination to dodge the issue
+or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. The
+fallacy of employing the reasoning power to justify conclusions
+already reached, whether on the basis of tradition or habit, or
+because of the bias or bent of a school of thought, or because of the
+tendency of human nature to accept plausible suggestions, is also made
+apparent. Through the deliberate practice of testing and weighing, the
+faculty of arriving swiftly at accurate decisions is strengthened and
+is brought more quickly into play when time is a matter of immediate
+concern.</p>
+
+<p>Principles in their Relation to Logical Thought. Because of the
+necessity for the exercise of judgment (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>) in the systematic
+arrangement of thought, the relationship between cause and effect, as
+expressed in principles, is of great assistance in applying logical
+processes to the problems of human life.</p>
+
+<p>A principle establishes a correct relation between cause and effect.
+The word, derived from the Latin "principium", meaning a foundation,
+beginning, source, origin, or cause, has, because a cause implies an
+effect, acquired in correct usage the significance of a true statement
+of relationship between cause and effect. A principle, so formulated,
+is a natural law (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>) because it expresses a fact of nature; it
+thus becomes a reliable rule of action and may be confidently adopted
+as a governing law of conduct. If basic in its field, such a rule or
+law becomes a general or fundamental principle with respect thereto;
+each such basic truth may be the basis for the determination of many
+corollary <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span>or subordinate principles dealing with the details of the
+particular subject.</p>
+
+<p>The formulation of a principle, therefore, requires the determination
+of the causes that generate a particular effect (or effects), and the
+accurate expression of the resultant relationship. Such expression
+frequently takes the form of a proportion. In the mathematical
+sciences the proportion may represent a precise balance; its statement
+may be an exact formula. In other sciences, a definite relationship
+between cause and effect has likewise been established in many cases,
+though not always with mathematical precision. Comparable exactitude
+has not been attained, in some cases, because the field has not been
+so thoroughly explored; moreover, greater difficulty is experienced,
+at times, in isolating the cause, or causes. The balance represented
+by such equations, therefore, is based on quantities whose weights
+vary within wide ranges. (See <a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Human conduct does not lend itself to analysis as readily as do
+mathematical and physical phenomena. The advance in the psychological
+and sociological sciences is not so marked as in the physical, and the
+actions and reactions of the mind of man have not yet proved to be
+susceptible of reduction to exact formulae. Nevertheless, man, in his
+intuitive search for valid guides for his own action, has been able,
+with the advance of time, greatly to improve his own lot through the
+medium of the scientific approach to human problems.</p>
+
+<p>The insistent search of the human mind for reliable rules of action is
+a recognized natural phenomenon. As understood on the basis of expert
+investigation of the subject, this trait results from the recognition,
+conscious or otherwise, by countless generations of mankind, of the
+relationships between cause and effect as evidenced in the workings of
+the laws of nature (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>). A logical outcome, therefore, of
+experience, this instinctive demand of the mind constitutes a force
+which defies opposition. Properly utilized, this force affords a
+powerful and natural aid in the solution of problems.</p>
+
+<p>Inasmuch as a valid rule, or principle, is of great assistance in
+arriving at sound decisions and in formulating effective plans (see
+<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>), this demand for reliable guides is logical, as well as
+natural. In any event, the demand for such guidance, if not met by
+provision for reliable rules of action, may result in the adoption of
+faulty rules, with frequent unfortunate consequences.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>The formulation of principles, already referred to in this connection,
+constitutes in itself a recognized problem (see also <a href="#Page_27">page 27</a>) of great
+difficulty; for it is a human failing to avoid the mental effort
+involved in thinking through such a problem, and to rely on rules
+whose plausibility and seeming simplicity are frequently a measure of
+their incompleteness and inaccuracy.</p>
+
+<p>Since the earliest days, man has attempted to formulate the
+relationships between causes and effects without, however, always
+possessing the specific knowledge essential to accuracy. Pithy
+statements have always had great appeal to man, as evidenced by the
+existence of proverbs, maxims, and adages preserved from times of
+great antiquity. Frequently, however, such statements are not
+expressive of the truth. Sometimes, again, they state facts, without,
+nevertheless, expressing the whole truth.</p>
+
+<p>Only when the relationship between cause and effect has been
+demonstrated to be always true can the trained, inquiring mind receive
+its statement as a valid guide, acceptable as a principle in the light
+of the knowledge of the day.</p>
+
+<p>To rely upon rules of action which do not express the whole truth is
+to court the danger of encountering exceptions which may entail
+serious consequences. The value of those rules known to be
+inexpressive of the whole truth lies in the fact that they may invite
+attention to circumstances which are sometimes encountered, or may
+suggest methods of action which are sometimes appropriate. Danger lies
+in the fact that such rules may fail to give proper emphasis to other
+circumstances or other methods which are encountered or are more
+appropriate in other cases.</p>
+
+<p>Such a rule may fail to consider the entire problem. Its use,
+therefore, implies the necessity of recognizing cases to which it is
+not applicable. This may frequently be difficult in the active
+operations of war, when nervous strain and the urgency of events are
+handicaps to quick and accurate thinking (see <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>).</p>
+
+<p>To express the whole truth, a rule of action calls to attention all
+circumstances, or causes, which may ever influence the result. The
+saying that "the exception proves the rule" is properly interpreted
+only in the older sense that an exception "tests" the rule, indicating
+by the mere fact of exception that the rule is to such extent
+incomplete.</p>
+
+<p>Subject to variations of phraseology, the old adage "circumstances
+alter cases" is the sole reliable and fundamental <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>rule of action. A
+corresponding maxim of the military profession, "It depends on the
+situation", has its root in recognition of the same fact, i.e., that
+the action taken in any situation depends, properly, on the
+circumstances of the case, and that the relationship between cause and
+effect (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>) is always the governing consideration. The principles
+deduced hereafter (Chapter III) have these irrefutable findings as
+their foundation.</p>
+
+<p>Factors. A situation is by definition (<a href="#Page_20">page 20</a>) a combination of
+circumstances, which are the effects of certain causes. To these
+causes, the term "factors", long in use in the military profession, is
+customarily applied in many other activities. Through their influence
+as causes, these factors operate to produce, as their effects, the
+circumstances which, in combination, constitute the situation. A
+combination of factors, therefore, gives to each situation its
+distinctive character, differentiating it from other situations.</p>
+
+<p>To maintain an existing situation, it is necessary to preserve, in
+total effect, the influence of factors already present, or to
+introduce new factors to offset the influence of any which tend to
+cause a change. To change the situation, it is necessary to introduce
+factors which will exert the desired influence; or, change may be
+effected by altering the influence of factors already present. To say,
+therefore, that "It depends on the situation", as in the maxim cited
+(above), is to state that under all circumstances, the proper action
+depends on, or is determined by, the influence of the factors
+involved. Any valid rule, or principle, will accordingly take into
+account the factors applicable to the case.</p>
+
+<p>The application of any rule will similarly take into account the
+influence of the particular factors involved. The danger of the
+application of such factors to all circumstances, without due
+circumspection as to their value in the existing situation, lies in
+the fact that, in any particular combination of circumstances, they do
+not necessarily carry equal weight.</p>
+
+<p>If this view be accepted, it follows that in many situations certain
+factors may, after mature deliberation, be rejected, or relegated to a
+relatively inferior status, without detracting from their potential
+value as fundamental considerations (<a href="#Page_1">page 1</a>) in all situations.</p>
+
+<p>Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles of War. The human
+preference for catchwords has, by many writers on the science and art
+of war, been extended to the attempted condensation of a principle or
+of several <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span>principles into a single all-inclusive word or phrase. As
+a result, varying lists of abstract nouns and phrases have been
+advanced to constitute epitomes of the principles of war. Subject to
+minor differences in number and in designation, the list most
+frequently encountered comprises The Objective, Superiority, The
+Offensive, Economy of Force, Movement, Cooperation, Surprise,
+Security, and Simplicity.</p>
+
+<p>To rely on a list of this nature, as a condensation of the
+fundamentals of war, has been known to cause confusion and to result
+in failure to recognize the principles which are intended to be
+brought to mind.</p>
+
+<p>For example, misunderstanding has resulted from the designation of the
+single word, surprise, as a "principle of war". On the one hand, it
+has been denied that surprise embodies a principle, the reason being
+advanced that it is neither always necessary, nor feasible, nor even
+desirable to attempt to obtain surprise. On the other hand, the
+acceptance of the word surprise (see <a href="#Page_73">page 73</a>), as itself expressing a
+universal truth (which it of course does not except by inference), has
+been known to result in the incorrect belief that surprise is always
+essential to success. Action based on such a viewpoint is the
+equivalent of applying general treatment to specific cases, regardless
+of circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>Thus there have resulted distortions of the simple fact that a
+relationship exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the
+creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent. The correct
+formulation of a principle, or of several principles, governing the
+employment of surprise, will result in a definite statement that its
+appropriate employment is dependent upon the various factors (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>)
+that make up the situation, the influence of each of which requires
+evaluation in each separate situation.</p>
+
+<p>Analysis, in like manner, of the so-called "principle of the
+objective" as a "principle of war" will show that the objective of a
+military force is, in itself, no more a principle of war than the
+direction of a physical force is, in itself, a principle of mechanics.
+Both concepts, however, involve certain matters of fact which can best
+be explained by principles. Such principles take note of the factors
+pertaining to the subjects, and indicate the underlying relationships
+in a manner to be later shown herein.</p>
+
+<p>Certainly the preceding list (above) of isolated expressions includes
+no item which, in the abstract, may not properly be considered as
+possibly vital from the strategical and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span>tactical standpoints. But
+that these expressions are always vital, and that there are no other
+considerations, can scarcely be accepted as final. Even if this
+objection could be removed by the inclusion of all factors well known
+to be vital, the fact would still remain that these expressions,
+standing alone, fail to satisfy the real need; i.e., they fail to
+indicate any practical application of the concepts which they are
+intended to imply. They do no more than provide a useful point of
+origin for further inquiry. When understood on this basis, they
+possess a certain value.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The concept underlying the application of principles is correct with
+respect to military problems, as well as for all others (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>).
+This purpose, however, cannot be served by a mere collection of nouns
+or noun-phrases. Such expressions make no statements of cause and
+effect. Their meaning is therefore left to inference and to the
+idiosyncrasy of individual interpretation. The formulation, moreover,
+of useful principles cannot be satisfactorily established by the
+more-or-less random selection of matters, however important,
+pertaining to the subject at hand. What is required is a systematic
+analysis of the essentials of the subject, with resultant emphasis on
+the fundamental causes and effects whose relationships are to be
+expressed.</p>
+
+<p>Formulation and Use of Principles. The formulation of a principle,
+referred to previously (<a href="#Page_24">page 24</a>) as itself a difficult problem,
+requires a citation of the factors pertaining to the subject. On the
+basis of these factors as causes, the principles, when properly
+formulated, also state the effects which may properly be expected.
+(See <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>The relationship between causes and effects, or between effects and
+their causes, may be expressed in various ways. The requirement is
+that the expression be one of fact and that, if the principle purport
+to cover the entire subject, all of the pertinent facts (<a href="#Page_24">page 24</a>) be
+stated, though not necessarily all the details involved.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>In addition to the principles of general application (Chapter III),
+the later discussion herein includes numerous other principles, with
+reference to matters of detail (<a href="#Page_22">pages 22-23</a>). To some of these
+principles the treatment invites special attention. All principles
+included have been phrased with due care, to ensure conformity with
+the requirements above stated. The preferred form, herein, for the
+usual statement of cause and effect is through the use of phraseology
+such as that certain effects "depend on" or are "dependent on" certain
+causes, or that certain causes <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span>"determine" certain effects, or that
+the latter "are determined by" certain causes.</p>
+
+<p>From the standpoint of the exercise of judgment, it is a principle
+that the due determination of effects to be produced depends on the
+proper consideration of pertinent factors. Once the principles
+applicable to any subject have been formulated in necessary detail,
+the evaluation of the cited factors with respect to a particular
+situation becomes the vital procedure as to any problem where that
+subject is involved. In the course of this evaluation, corollary or
+subordinate principles may be of assistance (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>). In military
+problems, however, the evaluation usually involves many factors not
+susceptible of reasonably exact determination by the use of formulae
+(see <a href="#Page_23">page 23</a>). In such cases, experience, education, and training
+afford the only secure basis for judgment which will produce reliable
+conclusions. The principles, therefore, provide reliable guides by
+citing the factors to be evaluated in order to arrive at desired
+results, but the principles cannot replace logical thought in the
+evaluation of the factors.</p>
+
+<p>In formulating principles (see also <a href="#Page_23">page 23</a>) as practical guides for
+action, as well as in using them when formulated, failure to give
+consideration to all pertinent factors may result in vitiating the
+effort based on their application. Danger also lies in the fact that
+any particular factor will infrequently have the same value&mdash;the same
+influence on the situation&mdash;in any two problems (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>). Therefore,
+in each situation, each factor requires to be weighed in connection
+with the others. The soundness of the resulting conclusion will depend
+on the extent of the knowledge available (<a href="#Page_2">page 2</a>) and on its useful
+employment.</p>
+
+<p>Summary of Fundamental Considerations. The factors (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>) involved
+in determining the nature of an effect and of the action to attain it
+become fundamental considerations (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>) when it is desired to
+arrive at such a result under a particular set of circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The relationships obtaining between the desired effect and the action
+to attain it, on the one hand, and the factors involved, on the other,
+are best expressed in the form of principles. The next chapter is
+therefore devoted to the development of basic principles applicable to
+military problems.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER III<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>BASIC PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PROBLEMS</h4>
+
+<h4>(The Fundamental Military Principle)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>On the basis of the previous discussion as to the natural
+mental processes and as to principles useful in their
+employment, Chapter III discusses the requirements for the
+attainment of an end in human affairs.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental principle thus derived is then applied to the
+needs of the military profession, so as to develop the
+Fundamental Military Principle. This Principle indicates the
+requirements of a correct military objective and of the action
+for its attainment.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>Review of Conclusions as to Principles. On the premise that all human
+activities and their environment are governed by natural laws (<a href="#Page_22">page
+22</a>), the preceding chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the
+natural mental processes employed in meeting the problems of human
+life. This analysis has stressed four fundamental truths:</p>
+
+<div class="block4"><p class="hang">(1) That a valid rule, or principle, when complete, embraces
+all known phenomena pertinent to the relationship
+established.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(2) That the logical application of principles to particular
+incidents will take account of all the factors of the
+principles, and of all known conditions of the incidents.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(3) That such principles afford great assistance in arriving
+at sound conclusions, and that the human mind, if without
+access to such valid guides, tends to adopt faulty rules
+in the effort to serve the same purpose.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(4) That rules of action, however, even though they be valid,
+cannot be depended upon to replace the employment of
+logical thought.</p></div>
+
+<p>Procedure for Developing Military Principles. Logically, the next
+stage in the treatment of this subject is to develop certain basic
+principles applicable, more especially, to the solution of military
+problems.</p>
+
+<p>The development of such principles starts, on the basis already
+established in this discussion, with a reference to the natural mental
+processes used by the normal mature human being before taking
+deliberate action (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>). Under such circumstances, the person who
+is to solve the problem has first to establish a basis for his
+solution.</p>
+
+<p>To arrive at this basis, which involves an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span>understanding of the
+appropriate effect desired, the person concerned requires a grasp of
+the salient features of the situation, a recognition of the incentive,
+and an appreciation of the effect which he has been directed to
+produce or has adopted on his own initiative. To complete the basis
+for his solution, he also requires an understanding of comparative
+resources as influenced by the conditions obtaining at the time.</p>
+
+<p>During the actual solution of the problem, the person concerned takes
+cognizance first, of the existing situation, picturing it in his mind.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates for
+himself mental images of future situations. The pictured condition
+decided upon after consideration of the pertinent factors involved, be
+it the situation to be maintained or a new situation to be created,
+constitutes an effect he may produce for the further attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part
+of the basis of his problem. (See <a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>With the existing situation and a new situation now clear, what action
+is he to take to change the one into the other? Or, if no change is
+desired, what action is he to take to maintain the existing situation?
+What acts or series of acts should he decide upon, plan in detail,
+inaugurate, and supervise (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>), to attain the effect which he has
+envisaged for the further attainment of the appropriate effect
+desired?</p>
+
+<p>The correct solution of problems therefore hinges on the requirements
+involved in the effects to be produced and in the action to produce
+them. If these requirements are ascertained, a principle can be
+formulated as a valid guide for the solution of human problems.</p>
+
+<p>Requirements for the Attainment of an End. The discussion to this
+point has established the fact that an end in view, a result to be
+produced, an effect desired, is very closely connected with a further
+effect which the attainment of the former is intended to produce.
+Human motives spring from deep-seated incentives often derived from
+distant sources, so that, even when the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative, he will rarely, if ever, be uninfluenced
+by some further effect desired, inherent in his situation (see <a href="#Page_19">page
+19</a>).</p>
+
+<p>An end in view, therefore, from the viewpoint of the person who is
+endeavoring to visualize its accomplishment as a method for attainment
+of a further aim, will necessarily achieve such further aim, or at
+least contribute to its achievement. The first requirement,
+accordingly, of such <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span>an end in view is that it be suitable to any
+further aim, whatever that aim may be. It may be said, therefore, that
+a correct end in view satisfies the requirement of suitability as to
+the appropriate effect desired, whatever this further effect may be.</p>
+
+<p>Important as suitability is, however, a reasonably responsible person
+will recognize that this consideration, alone, does not satisfy all
+requirements. An end in view remains a mere desire, without
+possibility of attainment, unless such a result is practicable of
+accomplishment. A correct end in view, therefore, satisfies also the
+requirements of feasibility.</p>
+
+<p>Consideration of feasibility calls for a survey of comparative
+resources (<a href="#Page_30">page 30</a>). Such a survey will cover the extent of the
+resources (means available) of those making the effort, as compared to
+the resources (means opposed) of those who may oppose it. Full account
+is also to be taken, as to feasibility, of the natural and artificial
+conditions which the effort will encounter before it can produce the
+contemplated result. The responsible person will ask himself where the
+effort is most likely to be successful, and what obstacles, in
+addition to those represented by opponents, he will be required to
+surmount. The effects of such conditions may alter the ratio otherwise
+presented by comparative resources.</p>
+
+<p>Consideration of the characteristics of the field of action may thus
+disclose features which will greatly influence the possibility of
+accomplishment, as well as the character of the effort to be made,
+from the standpoint of feasibility. The second requirement, therefore,
+is that of feasibility with respect to comparative resources, i.e.,
+the means available and opposed, as influenced by the physical
+conditions prevailing in the field of action.</p>
+
+<p>Although believed to be both suitable and feasible, the requirements
+for the attainment of an end are not yet completely established. There
+is still required a reckoning of a profit-and-loss account of the
+whole undertaking, to estimate whether it will be advantageous. What
+will be the cost, and what will be the gain? Is the effort worth
+while? Or should one be content with venturing less and gaining less?
+What is the bearing on possible future action? The consequences as to
+costs, always important considerations in dealing with human problems,
+are frequently the paramount determinant. The third requirement,
+therefore, is acceptability with respect to the consequences as to
+costs.</p>
+
+<p>These requirements invite attention to the factors, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span>already
+discussed, whose influence (see <a href="#Page_25">page 25</a> as to factors) determines the
+character of the effort required to attain an end.</p>
+
+<p>The Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End. Here, then,
+are the broad fundamental considerations which affect the solution of
+every human problem. In a narrower field, the considerations may fall
+within more specific limits, but a principle sufficiently broad to be
+applicable to all cases appears to comprehend those inclusive factors
+mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.</p>
+
+<p>A review of these paragraphs will disclose that the factors pertaining
+to the several requirements may be so grouped as to constitute a
+single fundamental principle governing the attainment of an end in
+human affairs,&mdash;as follows:</p>
+
+<p>In any human activity, the attainment of a correct end in view depends
+on fulfillment of the requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block4"><p class="hang">Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+of the appropriate effect desired,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility of the effort required, on the basis of
+comparative resources, as determined by the means
+available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">which factors are in turn dependent on each other.</p></div>
+
+<p>The Interdependency of the Factors. As previously observed (<a href="#Page_28">page 28</a>),
+the factors cited in the foregoing principle are themselves
+interdependent. This fact results from working of natural law (<a href="#Page_22">page
+22</a>), for it is a recognized phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of certain causes, and that every effect is itself, in turn, the cause
+of further effects (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, when the evaluation of any factor is under consideration,
+its value as an unknown quantity can be determined to the extent that
+the values of the other pertinent factors are known. (See <a href="#Page_23">page 23</a>, as
+to the discussion of the quantities in an equation.) The significance
+of each, in any situation, is therefore determined by the influence of
+the other factors. The relationships existing among them can best be
+expressed in the terms of four corollary principles (<a href="#Page_27">page 27</a>), next to
+be discussed.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span>For example, questions frequently arise as to what is the appropriate
+effect to be desired in a particular situation. Whether a desired
+effect is feasible of attainment, and whether certain consequences,
+though undesirable, will be acceptable, in view of the gains, can be
+determined by evaluation of the means available and opposed,
+influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of
+action, and of the consequences as to costs. If a desired effect is
+thereby found to be not feasible of attainment, or to be unacceptable
+as to consequences, deferment of such effort is indicated. A proper
+solution in such case would adopt some lesser effect, in conformity
+with the further aim, feasible of accomplishment, and acceptable as to
+its consequences.</p>
+
+<p>If (with respect to the further aim, mentioned above) the person
+concerned is acting under the instructions of another, there will
+frequently be injected into the equation, in addition to the factors
+already noted, a further effect desired, indicated by higher
+authority. Such an indication will often operate to narrow the limits
+of the problem. This is true even if the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative and responsibility (<a href="#Page_29">pages 29-30</a>).</p>
+
+<p>These considerations lead to the formulation of what may be called the
+corollary principle for determination of the appropriate effect to be
+desired in human affairs,&mdash;as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>In any human activity, the appropriate effect to be desired
+(i.e., an end in view, a result to be accomplished) depends on
+fulfillment of the requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of
+the further effect desired (if such further effect is
+indicated),</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+field of action, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>If, to take a further example, the known factors include the
+appropriate effect desired, the means opposed, the physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action, and the consequences as to costs,
+the only unknown remains the means available. The question then is,
+what means need be made available for the accomplishment of the
+contemplated effort? The answer to this question may be found in the
+application of what may be called <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span>the principle for the determination
+of the proper means to be made available in human affairs,&mdash;as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>In any human activity, the proper means to be made available
+depend on fulfillment of the requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Suitability of the means (in kind and amount) to accomplish
+the end in view, as determined by the factor of the
+appropriate effect desired,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility of the effort to make such means available on the
+basis of comparative resources as determined by the factor
+of the means opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The influence of physical conditions in the field of action may be
+illustrated by any case where ends otherwise feasible of attainment
+cannot be achieved without effecting changes in such conditions. The
+resolution of the uncertainty then requires study to determine what
+suitable changes can be made. Changes for such a purpose may take
+various forms, such as the construction of physical features in the
+area involved, or the destruction of such features already existing;
+or, again, both methods may be employed. Examples of such changes have
+existed and still exist in profusion, some of them, military and
+non-military, being on such a scale as radically to alter the previous
+status with respect to entire nations. The question as to what changes
+ought to be effected in the prevailing physical conditions, in order
+to attain a certain objective, can be answered by the application of
+what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper
+physical conditions to be established in the field of action,&mdash;as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>In any human activity, the proper physical conditions to be
+established in the field of action depend on fulfillment of the
+requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Suitability of such conditions to the end in view, as
+determined by the factor of the appropriate effect
+desired,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility of effort to establish such conditions, on the
+basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+the factor of the physical conditions existing in the
+field of action, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The factor of consequences as to costs also calls for special notice.
+The influence of this factor frequently justifies abandonment of
+suitable ends in view, even though <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span>their attainment has been
+determined to be feasible, because the loss involved would out-weigh
+the gain. Immediate success may be attained at such cost as to prevent
+the attainment of larger ends (see the discussion, <a href="#Page_9">pages 9 and 10</a>, of
+the relationship of strategy and tactics).</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the circumstances of the case may well justify
+loss, however great, because the alternative is unacceptable, even
+though the consequences involve complete destruction. Moreover, the
+need for swift and aggressive action in many activities (notably in
+war), for resolute prosecution of the plan, for timely seizure of
+opportunity, and for acceptance of justified risks, requires that
+consideration of consequences as to costs never be emphasized beyond
+its proper weight. To determine such proper weight calls, frequently,
+for judgment of the highest order, and is, in the military profession,
+a direct responsibility of command. This responsibility can be
+discharged by the application of what may be called the corollary
+principle for the determination of acceptable consequences as to
+costs,&mdash;as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>In any human activity, the acceptable consequences as to costs
+depend on fulfillment of the requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+of the appropriate effect desired, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+field of action.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Special Nature of War as a Human Activity. A principle found, by
+careful analysis, to be governing as to human activities of any
+nature, is also applicable to the problems of war. This is true
+because war is a human activity, differing from other human activities
+only in the specialized character of the factors that enter.</p>
+
+<p>The effect desired in war has a character distinctly military and,
+ultimately, through the reestablishment of a favorable peace, a
+political character (see <a href="#Page_7">pages 7-9</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The means available (or opposed) in war are the human and material
+components of fighting strength (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>). The physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action are, in war, the characteristics of
+the theater of operations. Fighting strength is thus derived from the
+means available (or opposed) in war, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting strength
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span>(comparative resources in war) involves a comparison of means
+available with means opposed, due account being taken of the influence
+exerted on both by the characteristics of the theater. In war,
+relatively large masses of human beings oppose each other with hostile
+intent, while the means available and opposed, and the physical
+conditions established by the operations of war in the theater of
+action, tend more and more to acquire a highly specialized character.</p>
+
+<p>The consequences as to costs, in war, also assume a special
+significance, inasmuch as they may materially influence the
+development of entire nations or of the world situation.</p>
+
+<p>Factors as Universal Determinants in War. Tabulated for convenient
+reference and expressed in terms in general use in the military
+profession, the factors governing the attainment of an end in war are
+therefore:</p>
+
+<p class="noin" style="padding-left: 8%;">
+  (a) &nbsp;&nbsp;The Nature of the appropriate Effect Desired,<br />
+  (b) &nbsp;&nbsp;The Means Available and Opposed,<br />
+  (c) &nbsp;&nbsp;The Characteristics of the Theater of Operations,<br />
+      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;and<br />
+  (d) &nbsp;&nbsp;The Consequences as to Costs.</p>
+
+<p>These factors, thus expressed in abstract form, are the universal
+determinants of the nature of the objective and of the character of
+the action to attain it. Their further resolution into factors of more
+concrete form is indicated hereinafter (see Chapter VI, in the
+discussion of Section II of the Estimate Form).</p>
+
+<p>The Objective in War. The objective (<a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>), a term long in use in
+the military profession in connection with the "objective point", has
+acquired by extension the significance of something more than the
+physical object of action. The latter, as explained later (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>),
+is properly denominated the "physical objective".</p>
+
+<p>In the abstract, an "objective", in present general usage as well as
+in the military vocabulary, is an end toward which action is being
+directed, or is to be directed; in brief, an end in view, a result to
+be attained, an effect desired (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a> and <a href="#Page_30">30</a>). An objective is an
+effect to be produced for the attainment of a further objective,
+itself a further effect. As already demonstrated (<a href="#Page_30">page 30</a> and
+following), the attainment of an end, in any human activity, requires
+action to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one.
+Therefore, in war, a special form of human activity, the attainment of
+an objective requires that action be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>actual imposition of an outside
+agency. The attainment of a correct military objective (discussed in
+detail in Chapter IV) requires, accordingly, the creation or
+maintenance of a favorable military situation.</p>
+
+<p>An objective, in the sense of an end in view, a result to be
+accomplished, is manifestly an objective in mind. As already indicated
+(<a href="#Page_36">page 36</a>), however, military usage also assigns to the term
+"objective" an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete.
+Results in war are attained through the actual or threatened use of
+physical force (<a href="#Page_8">pages 8 and 9</a>) directed with relation to something
+tangible, such as, for example, some physical element of the enemy's
+strength.</p>
+
+<p>Action as to this tangible feature (e.g., if it is destroyed,
+occupied, neutralized, or otherwise dealt with) will result in, or
+further the attainment of, an effect desired. Thus the physical
+objective occupies a sharply defined position in warfare, in that it
+establishes the physical basis of the objective and indicates the
+geographical direction of the effort. Since the physical objective is
+always an object&mdash;be it only a geographical point&mdash;, it is more than a
+mental concept; it is an objective in space.</p>
+
+<p>For example, the objective being "the destruction of the enemy
+battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship.</p>
+
+<p>As used herein the expression "the objective" or "the military
+objective" (<a href="#Page_55">page 55</a>), when unqualified, ordinarily indicates the
+mental objective. The term is properly applicable to a physical
+objective when the context makes the meaning clear. Ordinarily, and
+always when clarity demands, a tangible focus of effort is herein
+denoted a "physical objective".</p>
+
+<p>Military Operations. Appropriate action to create or maintain a
+situation will take the form of a military operation. An operation, in
+the basic sense, is merely an act, or a series of acts. The word is
+derived from the Latin opus, meaning "work". A military operation is
+therefore an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a
+military character. A military operation may consist of an entire
+campaign, or even of several such, constituting a clearly defined
+major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions
+thereof. The term is also applied, properly, to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span>entire series of acts
+on the part of successive commands, from the higher to the lower
+echelons, to and including distinctive military actions which relate
+to the merest routine.</p>
+
+<p>A plan of action to attain a military objective is, therefore, a plan
+of military operations, including supporting measures (see <a href="#Page_167">page 167</a>),
+considered or adopted as a method of procedure for the achievement of
+that end (see <a href="#Page_21">page 21</a>). Such a plan or method of procedure requires
+action with relation to correct physical objectives in such a manner
+as to attain the objective, i.e., to maintain the existing situation
+or to create a new one, conformably to the appropriate effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>A plan of military operations may be regarded as reasonably effective
+if the direction or geographical trend of the effort provides for
+proper action with relation to the correct physical objectives; if the
+force concerned utilizes positions advantageous in relation to those
+of the opponent; if the fighting strength is so apportioned as to
+provide for requisite power at points likely to be decisive, without
+undue weakening at other points; and if future actions, in seeking the
+effect desired, will be unhampered by obstacles with which the force
+cannot cope. These essentials apply to all of the various combinations
+of circumstances, i.e., situations (<a href="#Page_20">page 20</a>), which may materialize as
+action progresses and the original situation unfolds.</p>
+
+<p>A properly conceived plan of military operations therefore makes
+provision, necessarily, for certain salient features of such
+operations, as follows:</p>
+
+<p class="noin" style="padding-left: 8%;">
+  The physical objectives involved,<br />
+  The relative positions utilized,<br />
+  The apportionment of fighting strength, and<br />
+  The provisions for freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>As will later be observed (Chapters VII and VIII), the content of
+plans for naval operations may be classified under the headings listed
+above. In such plans the salient features noted will be observed,
+also, to occur, subject to certain exceptions, in the sequence above
+indicated. Similar observations are applicable as to plans
+systematically prepared for direction of forces operating on land and
+in the air.</p>
+
+<p>A military operation which is progressing favorably, whatever the
+medium of action, may therefore be justifiably stated to include
+provision for the following salient features:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p>Effective action with relation to correct physical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span>
+objectives,</p>
+
+<p>Projection of military action from advantageous relative
+positions,</p>
+
+<p>Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and</p>
+
+<p>Ensurance of adequate freedom of action.</p></div>
+
+<p>Since, at any moment of its successful prosecution, a military
+operation presents, inherently (<a href="#Page_38">page 38</a>), a favorable military
+situation, the salient features of such an operation constitute, also,
+the salient features of a favorable military situation. Manifestly,
+any deficiencies in these respects will indicate that in certain
+particulars the situation is not entirely favorable, if not actually
+unfavorable.</p>
+
+<p>Determination of the Salient Features. Because the form which a
+military operation takes, in the effort to attain a military
+objective, depends upon the factors which are the universal
+determinants (<a href="#Page_36">page 36</a>) of the character of the effort, the salient
+features of such an operation are determined by the same factors. A
+valid guide as to determination of the salient features of a favorably
+progressing military operation, seen (above) to be identical with
+those of a favorable military situation, may therefore be formulated
+as a principle for determining these salient features, as follows:</p>
+
+The determination of<br /><br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="75%" summary="Table of Contents">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" width="40%">Correct physical objectives,<br /><br />
+<br />Advantageous relative positions,<br /><br />
+<br />Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and<br /><br />
+<br />Provision for adequate freedom of action<br /></td>
+  <td class="tdb1" width="1%" style="border-top: solid 1pt black; border-bottom: solid 1pt black;">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdc2" width="6%">depends on their</td>
+  <td class="tdb2" width="1%" style="border-top: solid 1pt black; border-bottom: solid 1pt black;">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="50%" style="padding-left: .5em;">Suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate
+    effect desired.<br />
+<br />Feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength, as determined by the factors
+      of the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics
+      of the theater of operations, and<br />
+<br />Acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+
+<p>Since the particular character of each salient feature of a situation,
+or of an operation, is determined by the influence, exerted by the
+identical factors (as noted), there is a resulting interdependency,
+important though indirect, among the several features. This
+interdependency is explained hereafter. (Chapter IV).</p>
+
+<p>The Fundamental Military Principle. The Fundamental Principle for the
+Attainment of an End in human affairs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span> (<a href="#Page_32">page 32</a>) has invited
+attention to the factors, pertinent to suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability, seen to be applicable, as well, to any military effort
+(<a href="#Page_35">page 35</a>). As also noted, a military effort will necessarily consist
+of military operations, whose salient features depend upon the same
+factors. The factors, in turn, have been observed (<a href="#Page_32">page 32</a> and
+following) to be interdependent.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="img">
+<a href="images/chart02.png">
+<img border="0" src="images/chart02.png" width="55%" alt="The Fundamental Military Principle" /></a>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span>These considerations lead to the formulation of a derivative of the
+Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End in human affairs,
+in the form of</p>
+
+<h4>The Fundamental Military Principle</h4>
+
+<p>The attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance of
+a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations
+involving the salient features of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Effective action with relation to correct physical
+objectives,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Projection of action from advantageous relative positions,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Ensurance of adequate freedom of action,</p></div>
+
+<p class="noin">each fulfilling the requirements of</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">Suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate
+effect desired,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength as
+determined by the factors of the means available and
+opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics
+of the theater of operations, and</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences
+as to costs,</p></div>
+
+<p class="noin">which factors are in turn dependent on each other.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The Fundamental Military Principle, as a valid guide, encounters no
+exception in the field it purports to cover. As a practical guide, it
+brings to attention, in broad outline, all the causes and effects
+which are involved. The principle affords a proper basis for the
+formulation of corollary principles for the determination, in any
+particular situation, of any element noted therein whose value may be
+unknown but may be ascertained by reference to other pertinent
+elements which constitute known quantities. (See <a href="#Page_21">pages 21-27</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>As later explained (Chapter IV), the two major applications of the
+Principle relate to the selection of a correct military objective and
+to the determination of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span>effective military operations to attain an
+objective (see <a href="#Page_28">page 28</a>).</p>
+
+<p>A corollary Principle of the Correct Military Objective will
+accordingly state that the selection of a correct military objective
+depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the
+factors cited in the Fundamental Military Principle. The application
+of this corollary is discussed in Section II of Chapter IV.</p>
+
+<p>A corollary Principle of Effective Military Operations will similarly
+state that the determination of effective operations for the
+attainment of a military objective depends on the due consideration of
+the salient features and the factors cited in the Fundamental Military
+Principle. The application of this corollary is explained in Section
+III of Chapter IV.</p>
+
+<p>These principles can be used as a basis for formulating the plans of
+the commander concerned, and, accordingly, for determining his own
+action. They can also be used as a basis for rendering sound opinions,
+when requested of the commander, as to plans and actions contemplated
+by higher authority. The principles are in like manner applicable for
+purposes of historical study involving analysis of operations of the
+past.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER IV<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE</h4>
+
+<h4>(Objectives&mdash;Their Selection and Attainment)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Section I of Chapter IV discusses the major components of all
+military problems.</p>
+
+<p>Section II deals with the fundamental considerations having to
+do, generally, with the first of these components, i.e., the
+selection of correct military objectives; the application,
+more specifically, is reserved for Chapter VI.</p>
+
+<p>Section III deals with the fundamental considerations having
+to do, generally, with the second of the two major components,
+i.e., the determination of effective military operations for
+the attainment of such objectives; the application, more
+specifically, is reserved for Chapter VII.</p>
+
+<p>The selection of objectives has a secondary application, also,
+to the discussion in Chapter VII, while the determination of
+operations has a similar application to that in Chapter VI.
+Both subjects, i.e., as to objectives and as to operations,
+have application also to Chapter IX.</p>
+
+<p>The chart on page ii shows these relationships.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<h4>I. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PROBLEMS.</h4>
+
+<p>In the two preceding chapters, the study of the natural mental
+processes has brought to notice that, to meet the requirements of
+suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as to consequences in the
+proper solution of a military problem, it is first necessary to
+establish a sound basis for that solution. Such a basis involves an
+understanding of the appropriate effect desired and of relative
+fighting strength (see <a href="#Page_29">pages 29 and 30</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In each situation an understanding of the appropriate effect desired,
+from the standpoint of suitability, requires:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p>(1)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A grasp of the salient features of the situation,
+favorable and unfavorable, including the perplexity inherent
+therein,</p>
+
+<p>(2)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A recognition of the incentive to solution of the
+problem, i.e., a realization of the desire or need for
+attaining a certain effect, an objective (<a href="#Page_36">page 36</a>)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; which will
+be the maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+situation, and</p>
+
+<p>(3)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An appreciation of this objective in its relationship
+to the next further result to be accomplished by its
+attainment.</p></div>
+
+<p>An understanding of relative fighting strength involves consideration
+of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. With this understanding
+there is provided a sound basis for the determination, later, of the
+feasibility of courses of action and of their acceptability with
+respect to consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>In the premises, the ability to understand the nature of a military
+problem is dependent on the knowledge, experience, character, and
+professional judgment of the commander. These qualities enable him to
+grasp the significance of the salient features of the situation. The
+same personal characteristics are instrumental in the recognition of
+the incentive. Analysis indicates that an incentive may arise (1) by
+reason of a directive issued by higher authority, or (2) from the fact
+that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced
+further problems, or (3) because of the demands of the situation.
+However, the primary consideration in understanding the nature of the
+problem is the appreciation of the objective from which the problem
+originates, i.e., the just estimation or accurate evaluation of this
+objective. Such consideration is primary because appreciation of this
+objective involves, as necessary concomitants, a grasp of the salient
+features of the existing situation (to be maintained or changed) and a
+recognition of the incentive.</p>
+
+<p>Correct appreciation of this objective, in its relationship to the
+further effect to be produced, is thus the principal consideration in
+reaching an understanding of the appropriate effect desired. It is, to
+repeat, through an understanding of this factor and of the factors of
+relative fighting strength that the commander establishes the basis
+for the solution of his problem. (See Section I of Chapter VI, page
+118).</p>
+
+<p>The Solution of a Military Problem. When the commander has thus
+obtained an understanding of the basis of his problem, the actual
+procedure of solution is undertaken through the consideration of the
+factors involved in their influence on the various plans for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired, as thus established. The
+best plan, selected and embodied in outline in the decision, can then
+be further developed, if necessary, into a general plan for the
+commander's force and, finally, into a detailed plan, as the solution
+of the problem. (See <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>The Major Components of a Military Problem. Each plan considered by
+the commander will involve (<a href="#Page_21">page 21</a>) two major considerations:
+namely&mdash;an effect to be produced and the action required to produce
+it; or, in military terms, a correct military objective (or
+objectives) and effective operations for its attainment. The selection
+of correct military objectives and the determination of effective
+operations for their attainment are therefore the two major components
+of a military problem, because they are the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>principal considerations
+on which depends the soundness of military decision. To meet these
+requirements is a prime function of command, one which demands
+professional judgment of the highest order.</p>
+
+<p>The major components of a military problem are of course intimately
+connected, because a purposeful action, accomplished, is equivalent to
+an objective, attained. Furthermore, the attainment of an objective
+involves the accomplishment of effective operations.</p>
+
+<p>Because of the importance of the subject, the relationship between
+these two major components deserves very careful analysis. As has been
+observed (<a href="#Page_30">page 30</a>), the action to be taken depends, in the first
+instance, on the effect to be produced. Therefore, the objective is,
+as compared to the action to attain it, the paramount matter.
+Moreover, there is necessarily included, in the procedure of selecting
+a correct objective, a consideration as to whether the action to that
+end will be feasible and as to whether the consequences involved will
+be acceptable on the basis of the costs which will be exacted. If,
+then, the objective has been correctly selected in any situation, this
+procedure will have included, as a necessary incidental, the
+determination also, in the proper detail, of the operations required
+for its attainment.</p>
+
+<p>Of the two major components involved in the selection of the best
+plan, the primary relates, therefore, to correct objectives.
+Accordingly, this consideration is most aptly expressed in terms of
+the "selection" of objectives. The "determination" of necessary
+operations is a proper expression of the procedure therein involved,
+because this procedure, though also involving a major component of the
+problem is dependent on the primary consideration of objectives.</p>
+
+<p>A valid guide for practical use during the process of solving military
+problems will therefore provide a basis, primarily, for the selection
+of correct objectives. However, the procedure for such selection,
+though requiring consideration of the action involved in attaining
+objectives, will seldom call for a complete analysis of such
+operations. Therefore, it is also desirable, for the solution of
+military problems, to provide a valid guide for the determination of
+effective operations, in detail. This guide may be used on occasions
+when, the correct objective having been selected, the only remaining
+problem is to work out the detailed operations involved.</p>
+
+<p>The Fundamental Military Principle, developed in the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span>preceding
+chapter, has been formulated to fulfill the requirements described in
+the preceding paragraph. Through the exhaustive analysis of the
+elements involved, there has been provided, in the form of a single
+fundamental principle, a valid guide for the selection of correct
+military objectives and for the due determination of effective
+operations for their attainment.</p>
+
+<p>In the present chapter, the abstract application of the Principle is
+discussed in terms of fundamental considerations. Section II of the
+chapter deals with the selection of objectives; this subject, in more
+specific terms, is later expanded in Chapter VI. Section III of the
+present chapter deals with the determination of operations; this
+subject, in more specific terms, is expanded in Chapter VII. The
+present chapter affords a treatment applicable to military problems of
+any nature. Later expansion is applicable, more especially, to naval
+problems.</p>
+
+<p>This arrangement of the subject matter has been adopted for two
+reasons. First, discussion of fundamental considerations, thus taken
+up at the present point, immediately follows the formulation of the
+principle (in Chapter III). Furthermore, a fundamental treatment,
+prior to Chapters VI and VII, permits maximum brevity in the
+discussion, therein. The commander, having mastered the fundamentals
+dealt with here, can later follow the detailed procedure with minimum
+distraction due to reference to the preceding discussion.</p>
+
+<p>Essential Elements Involved. As previously stated, the problems of war
+differ from those of other human activities with respect, only (<a href="#Page_35">page
+35</a>), to the specialized character of the factors that enter.</p>
+
+<p>The final outcome is dependent (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>) on ability to isolate, occupy,
+or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it
+supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many
+essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the
+secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of
+man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The
+air affords routes of communication over both land and sea.</p>
+
+<p>These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar
+to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air (<a href="#Page_60">page 60</a>). There
+are also involved the specialized demands of a technique for the
+imposition of and the resistance to physical violence. In addition
+there appear those factors related to the psychology of human
+reactions to armed conflict.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span>In any situation involving opposing armed forces, the problem, as in
+any human activity (<a href="#Page_30">page 30</a>), is, from the standpoint of each
+opponent, a matter of maintaining existing conditions or of bringing
+about a change. The method employed, if the action is to be effective,
+will follow lines calculated to shape the ensuing progressive changes
+in circumstances toward the attainment of the end in view. The action
+to be taken will be ineffective if it does not support the calculated
+line of endeavor, i.e., if it is not suitable or adequate forcibly to
+shape the course of events either toward the creation of a desired new
+and more favorable situation, or the maintenance of the original
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The analysis of the principal components of a military problem&mdash;i.e.,
+the military objectives and the military operations appropriate to the
+effort for their attainment&mdash;therefore requires a study of such
+objectives and operations in terms, respectively, of a favorable
+military situation (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>) and of a favorably progressing military
+operation (<a href="#Page_38">page 38</a>). As has been observed, the salient features of
+such a situation or operation are, from the abstract viewpoint,
+identical, as are also the factors which determine the character of
+such features (<a href="#Page_39">page 39</a>). As a covering word for such features and
+factors, alike, the term "elements" appears especially suitable,
+inasmuch as it properly comprises the constituent parts of any
+subject, as well as the factors which may pertain thereto.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, the analysis, following, of the procedure for selection
+of correct military objectives is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorable military situation. For like reasons, the
+analysis of the procedure for determining the character of the
+detailed operations required is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorably progressing military operation. (For these
+elements, see the salient features and the factors cited in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, <a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>.)</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>II. SELECTION OF CORRECT MILITARY OBJECTIVES</h4>
+
+<p>Nature of Military Objectives. In the previous discussion (<a href="#Page_36">page 36</a>),
+the military objective has been defined as the end toward which action
+is being, or is to be, directed. As such it has been noted as an
+objective in mind. The tangible focus of effort, the physical
+objective toward which the action is directed, has been observed to be
+an objective in space. The physical objective is always an object, be
+it only a geographical point, while the objective, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span>being a mental
+concept, is a situation to be created or maintained.</p>
+
+<p>The term "objective" requires circumspection, not only in the manner
+of its expression (see <a href="#Page_53">page 53</a>), but in its use. The latter is true
+because the purport of the objective under consideration will vary
+with the viewpoint of the echelon concerned. For instance, the proper
+visualization of an objective, as an "effect desired" (<a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>), calls
+for a correct answer to the question, "Who desires this effect to be
+produced?" (See <a href="#Page_4">page 4</a>).</p>
+
+<p>A variety of viewpoints is thus a natural characteristic of the chain
+of command (<a href="#Page_11">pages 11-13</a>), whose functioning creates what may be called
+a "chain of objectives".</p>
+
+<p>Necessary exceptions aside, the commander expects to receive, from his
+immediate superior, an assigned objective, which that superior thus
+enjoins the commander to attain. The commander, in turn, through the
+use of the natural mental processes already explained, decides on an
+objective, for the general effort of his own force, to attain the
+objective assigned by his immediate superior.</p>
+
+<p>As a subordinate, a commander to whom an objective has been assigned
+is responsible to his immediate superior for its attainment. The
+commander may, however, also occupy the position of an immediate
+superior to one or more commanders on the next lower echelon. In such
+capacity, he may assign objectives to these immediate subordinates. By
+attaining such an assigned objective, each of these subordinates thus
+contributes to the success of the complete effort planned by his
+immediate superior, to the extent represented by his own assigned
+share of the effort.</p>
+
+<p>A commander can scarcely expect to receive in full the intelligent
+support of his subordinate commanders, unless he makes clear to them
+the character of his own planned effort. It is customary, therefore,
+when assigning an objective to a subordinate, also to inform him of
+the purpose which its attainment is intended to further. Stated
+differently, a commander, when imposing upon an immediate subordinate
+an effect which he is to produce, informs him, at the same time, of
+the nature of the military result which he, the immediate superior,
+has determined to bring about.</p>
+
+<p>This is the part of wisdom, not merely of choice. It acquaints the
+immediate subordinate with the objective of the immediate superior and
+thus enables the former to comprehend wherein the attainment of his
+own assigned objective is expected to contribute to the attainment of
+the effect <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>desired by his superior.</p>
+
+<p>Since the attainment of the assigned objectives will represent the
+consummation of the general plan of the immediate superior, the
+purpose of each of these assignments is to assist in the attainment of
+the objective announced, for his entire force, by the immediate
+superior (see also <a href="#Page_12">page 12</a>).</p>
+
+<p>From the viewpoint of the subordinate, the objective thus assigned by
+the immediate superior becomes the appropriate effect desired,
+essential to the determination of the accomplishment which the former
+is to effect by his own effort. On occasion, also, the full scope of
+the appropriate effect desired may require consideration of the
+objectives of higher echelons in the chain of command, so far as such
+objectives may be known or deduced.</p>
+
+<p>The responsibility of the immediate superior, in the matter of
+ensuring that his immediate subordinates understand the purpose of
+their assigned objectives, is in no respect less than that which falls
+upon these subordinates in the execution of their own assignments. By
+failing to provide subordinate commanders, through whatever methods,
+with a knowledge not only of the details of his plan but of the
+general objective which their integrated effort is calculated to
+attain, the superior may actually subject his undertaking to the risk
+of failure.</p>
+
+<p>The decision as to the general plan (<a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>) for the attainment of
+his assigned objective provides the commander with an objective which
+he himself has originated. With the plan for the attainment of his
+general objective clearly fixed in mind, the commander may now proceed
+to the selection of one or more objectives of a specific nature, the
+integrated attainment of which will ensure the attainment of his
+assigned objective. The instructions which he may then give,
+severally, to his immediate subordinates in a detailed plan of
+operations, thus indicate to the latter their assigned objectives.
+(See also <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>The source of the incentive (<a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>) has an intimate connection with
+the assigned objective. Furthermore, whatever the origin of the
+incentive, the ability to select correct objectives is an essential
+element in the mental equipment of the commander.</p>
+
+<p>For example, if the incentive arises by reason of a directive received
+from higher authority, such directive will presumably assign an
+objective, specific or inferred. The commander to whom such an
+objective is assigned is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span>responsible for a correct understanding of
+all the implications involved, including the relationship between the
+assigned objective and the general objective of the next higher
+commander, which represents the purpose of the assigned objective. On
+occasion it will also be necessary for the commander to consider the
+relationships involved with the further objectives of the higher
+command (<a href="#Page_49">page 49</a>). Again, without any suggestion of cavilling at
+orders received, the commander may also find occasion to examine, with
+care, the implications of his assigned objective, because of his
+responsibility for taking correct action in the premises (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>).</p>
+
+<p>If the incentive arises from a decision previously made by the
+commander, it follows that such decision will have embodied an
+objective, selected by the commander himself.</p>
+
+<p>If the incentive arises because of the demands of the situation, the
+commander is responsible for recognition of the necessity for action
+and for the correct selection of an appropriate objective, to be
+adopted by him as a basis for his own action as if it were assigned by
+higher authority.</p>
+
+<p>An assigned objective having been established with respect to the
+basis for his problem, the commander is always responsible for the
+correct selection of an objective to serve as the end in view for the
+general, integrated action of his subordinate commanders.</p>
+
+<p>Once such an objective has been selected, the commander is further
+responsible for selecting, on the basis provided thereby, correct
+objectives to be assigned to his subordinate commanders.</p>
+
+<p>For various practical reasons, therefore, the responsibility of the
+commander requires of him the ability to select correct objectives. On
+the basis of classification with respect to the authority making the
+selection, analysis will demonstrate the existence of two types of
+objectives.</p>
+
+<p>These two types of objectives are (see <a href="#Page_30">page 30</a> as to effects and
+further effects), namely, (1) the assigned objective (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>)
+ordinarily indicated by higher authority, exceptionally determined by
+the commander for himself, and (2) the objective typically selected by
+the commander, himself, as the end in view for the integrated effort
+of his subordinates. It will be noted that in the latter category
+there will fall, not only the general objective referred to
+immediately above, but numerous other objectives for whose attainment
+provision may be needed during the actual prosecution of the effort or
+in anticipation thereof.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span>Procedure for Selection of Correct Military Objectives. The
+Fundamental Military Principle (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>), properly applied, is the
+basis for the selection of any or all of such objectives. The
+procedure involves the direct application of the corollary Principle
+of the Correct Military Objective.</p>
+
+<p>According to this principle, the selection of a correct military
+objective depends on due consideration of the salient features noted,
+i.e., correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions,
+proper apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for adequate
+freedom of action. These features, discussed in greater detail
+hereafter (in this chapter), are determined by factors cited in the
+Principle (<a href="#Page_41">pages 41-42</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The first factor being the appropriate effect desired, a correct
+military objective is selected, in the first instance, by reference to
+the requirement of suitability as to this factor. This appropriate
+effect desired may be indicated by the higher command (<a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>), or
+may be determined by the commander himself as hereinafter explained
+(<a href="#Page_52">page 52</a>).</p>
+
+<p>When the appropriate effect desired has been established, the next
+consideration is, "What physical objective (or objectives) can be
+found, action with relation to which will, if successful, attain this
+effect?"</p>
+
+<p>For example, if the appropriate effect desired were the "reduction of
+enemy battleship strength" in a certain area, then an enemy battleship
+appearing therein would manifestly be a correct physical objective. A
+suitable action with relation thereto would be "to destroy the enemy
+battleship", in which case the objective involved in the action would
+be "the destruction of the enemy battleship".</p>
+
+<p>Any lesser accomplishment, such as infliction of damage on the enemy
+battleship, or its repulse, or its diversion elsewhere, would also be
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, though not in the same
+degree. Each such visualized accomplishment, suitable to the
+appropriate effect desired, may properly be considered as a
+tentatively selected objective.</p>
+
+<p>An objective having been tentatively selected on the basis of the
+appropriate effect desired, its final selection will naturally depend,
+as indicated in the Principle, on the feasibility of the effort
+involved in the attainment of each such objective, and on the
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>In investigating such feasibility, account is taken of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>the relative
+fighting strength. With relation to the enemy battleship, for example
+(see above), the commander would consider the means available to him
+and the means opposed (including the enemy battleship and any
+supporting forces), as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater.</p>
+
+<p>This investigation will include, necessarily, a sufficient analysis of
+the salient features of the operation required to attain each
+objective. Such features include the nature of the physical objectives
+(the battleship and any other forces, for instance), the possibilities
+of relative position, the problems involved in apportioning the forces
+on either side, and the proper considerations as to freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>A similar study with respect to the acceptability of the consequences
+to be expected, as to the costs involved in the operation, will
+provide a basis for a conclusion as to that factor.</p>
+
+<p>If the attainment of an objective is found to be infeasible, or
+feasible only at the expense of unacceptable consequences, the
+proposed objective will naturally be rejected, and some other
+objective will be considered (<a href="#Page_33">page 33</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The objective finally adopted as the best will be that which, all
+things considered, is best adapted to the requirements of suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability, as outlined in the Fundamental
+Military Principle.</p>
+
+<p>The Appropriate Effect Desired, as the Basis for the Objective. As
+will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the first factor in
+the selection of a correct objective is the "appropriate effect
+desired". The evaluation of this factor is not always easy, for
+reasons which will be explained.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure (as indicated by the Principle of the Appropriate Effect
+to be Desired&mdash;<a href="#Page_33">page 33</a>) is the same as for the selection of an
+objective. This identity of procedure is natural, because the
+appropriate effect desired, used as a basis for selecting the
+commander's general objective, itself involves the appreciation of an
+objective. The latter is, in fact, one of the "chain of objectives"
+previously mentioned (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Under conventional conditions this objective is selected by higher
+authority, and is assigned to the commander in his instructions from
+the next higher echelon (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>). The objective so indicated will of
+course, under sound procedure, have been selected by higher authority
+on the basis embodied in the Fundamental Military Principle.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>When an established chain of command (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>) is in effective
+operation, the path to the appropriate effect desired will therefore
+normally be indicated through an assigned objective, by the immediate
+superior. This assignment, however, or the failure to receive such an
+indication, does not relieve the commander from the responsibility for
+taking correct action on his own initiative. Such necessity may arise
+should he find, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that his
+instructions need modification or alteration, or even that it is
+necessary for him to depart from his instructions under circumstances
+of great emergency (<a href="#Page_15">pages 15-16</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore, the objective may be adopted by (rather than assigned to)
+the commander concerned, on his own initiative, in order to meet the
+demands of a situation (<a href="#Page_50">page 50</a>) as to which the higher command has
+not yet had time or opportunity to act.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, even when an objective is assigned by higher authority in
+the usual course, it may be expressed in such terms as to require
+examination in order to enable the commander to appreciate it (<a href="#Page_43">page
+43</a>), as to its bearing on his operations. In fact, studious analysis
+may be necessary for this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>For example, if the objective so indicated does not specify a
+clearly-defined goal, the commander will need to make a thorough study
+in order to appreciate the full implications intended. He may find it
+necessary to analyze his immediate superior's instructions pertaining
+to the entire force of which his command is a part, and to consider,
+also, the objectives indicated for other commanders, on his own
+echelon, who also belong to that force.</p>
+
+<p>On occasion, also, higher authority may acquaint the commander with
+the general plan adopted by the superior, and may order action&mdash;such
+as movement in a certain direction or to a certain locality&mdash;without
+assigning a more definite objective. Should it happen in emergency
+that later developments prevent higher authority from making such an
+assignment, the commander may find himself under the necessity of
+selecting, for himself, an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him
+as if it were assigned.</p>
+
+<p>Should the commander find that his instructions do not clearly
+indicate an objective, or should he find that the one indicated is not
+applicable under the circumstances of the case, he will select an
+appropriate objective for his own guidance as if it were assigned by
+higher authority. He will make such selection through use of the same
+procedure <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>already described herein as applicable to the selection of
+an objective of any sort. In such case he puts himself in his
+superior's place, in order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion such as
+the higher commander, if apprised of the circumstances, would desire
+to adopt. Circumstances permitting, the commander will of course
+communicate with higher authority, and will make constructive
+representations. (See <a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>The appropriate effect desired, as the first factor to be applied in
+selecting such an objective, will naturally involve the objective
+indicated in the general plan for the immediate superior's entire
+force. This general plan is normally announced by the superior for the
+guidance of the commander and of other commanders on the same echelon.
+If, however, this further objective is not known to the commander, he
+will endeavor to obtain a proper point of reference. To this end, he
+will use his knowledge of the objective assigned to his immediate
+superior, or of the further intentions of the higher command with
+respect to the conduct of the operations, or of the campaign, or of
+the war.</p>
+
+<p>The provisions for the formulation of plans and orders (Chapters VII
+and VIII) take account of the fact that the commander may require
+definite information as to the objectives of higher echelons. In
+organizations where a state of mutual understanding has been well
+established, the commander will rarely be without some guidance in the
+premises (see also <a href="#Page_33">page 33</a>), by reason of the chain of objectives
+indicated in plans and orders of the higher command (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>).</p>
+
+<p>From the viewpoint of the commander, this relationship among
+objectives presents to him a series, from the present or immediate
+objective to others more distant in time. Thus there may be one or
+more intermediate objectives, leading away from the immediate one to
+the ultimate objective, so far as the concern of the moment is
+involved.</p>
+
+<p>This relationship of immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives
+may also exist in situations where the commander, operating on his own
+initiative and responsibility, determines such a chain of objectives
+for himself.</p>
+
+<p>Such a situation frequently arises in a campaign or a major operation,
+and is normal, also, as to minor operations (see <a href="#Page_56">page 56</a>, as to
+physical objectives).</p>
+
+<p>As already observed, the relationship of objective and further
+objective is the criterion for distinguishing between <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>strategical and
+tactical considerations, from the viewpoint of the commander concerned
+(<a href="#Page_9">pages 9 and 10</a>).</p>
+
+<p>What has been noted in the foregoing as to the objective (singular) is
+also applicable to situations where such an objective involves two or
+more objectives collectively considered.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>III. DETERMINATION OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS</h4>
+
+<p>As noted with respect to the Fundamental Military Principle (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>),
+the effort required for the attainment of a military objective
+involves military operations (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>), whose salient features are
+listed in the Principle. These features, including physical
+objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength,
+and freedom of action, will now be discussed to indicate how they are
+correctly determined by the factors, also cited in the Principle,
+pertaining to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Such
+determination is accomplished through application of the corollary
+Principle of Effective Military Operations (<a href="#Page_42">page 42</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Physical Objectives</h4>
+
+<p>Fundamental Considerations. An operation, however splendidly conceived
+and faultlessly executed, involves waste of effort if directed with
+relation to wrong physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>Since a physical objective constitutes the tangible focus of effort
+(<a href="#Page_47">page 47</a>) toward the attainment of the effect desired, its correct
+determination is of paramount importance both before and during the
+prosecution of operations.</p>
+
+<p>As has been demonstrated (<a href="#Page_51">page 51</a>), the consideration of possible
+physical objectives (in space) is essential to the selection of
+suitable objectives (in mind). Moreover, action with reference to one
+or more physical objectives is the necessary basis for determining the
+feasibility and acceptability of a plan.</p>
+
+<p>Military objectives can be achieved only through the application of
+power, actually or by threat (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>), with reference to physical
+objectives.</p>
+
+<p>The determination of correct physical objectives is followed, if more
+than one such objective is found, by the selection of the one or more
+which are best adapted to the requirements of the situation. The
+procedure for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span>determination and for selection is a matter for
+painstaking mental effort, based on the considerations now to be
+presented.</p>
+
+<p>The term "military objective" is frequently used in military
+literature to distinguish physical objectives which are combatant in
+character from those which are noncombatant. The considerations which
+follow are applicable to physical objectives of all categories.</p>
+
+<p>Procedure for Determination and Selection of Correct Physical
+Objectives. In a particular set of circumstances, the field wherein
+correct physical objectives may be found and the best selected, is
+that of an existent or probable theater of action.</p>
+
+<p>The determination of a physical objective, when correct, initially
+satisfies the requirement of suitability with respect to the nature of
+the objective,&mdash;this being, in such case, the appropriate effect
+desired (<a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>). Physical objectives not suitable, with relation to
+the objective to be attained, are manifestly incorrect physical points
+of orientation with respect to the operations involved in the effort
+to attain such an objective.</p>
+
+<p>It may be found, however, that the selection of a single physical
+objective will not fulfill this requirement. A commander may find it
+necessary to direct his effort simultaneously, or in succession, with
+relation to more than one physical objective.</p>
+
+<p>When a succession of physical objectives has to be dealt with, the
+selection will necessarily include such a series. Such a case might
+occur where a campaign has been found necessary in the form of
+successive stages as essential features. The visualized termination of
+each successive stage may be marked by the successful application of
+effort with respect to one or more physical objectives. Such a series
+of physical objectives may frequently also occur in operations on a
+smaller scale; even in very minor actions such a succession of efforts
+is normal. (See <a href="#Page_54">page 54</a>, as to objectives.)</p>
+
+<p>The choice as to the specific nature of physical objectives will
+extend, for example, from the enemy's organized forces as a whole to
+the physical body of an individual combatant. Within this range will
+be included all manner of physical elements of enemy fighting
+strength, singly and in combination, such as troops, ships,
+geographical points, lines and areas, fortifications, bases, and
+supplies.</p>
+
+<p>The physical objective may take the form of a fixed geographical
+position, the occupation of which, because of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span>its inherent
+advantages, may be, for example, an essential preliminary to further
+progress. The position may, for instance, be merely a point in the
+ocean (<a href="#Page_47">page 47</a>), a rendezvous beyond which, although its occupation
+may be uncontested, it has been deemed unwise to proceed without
+further information or additional strength.</p>
+
+<p>The physical objective, therefore, does not always take the form of
+some element of the enemy fighting strength; not infrequently, the
+occupation of a correct physical objective may be uncontested by the
+enemy. However, intervening armed forces of the enemy may constitute
+the physical objective for application of successful effort before a
+further physical objective may be dealt with. The possibility of enemy
+opposition may, therefore, place the selection of one or more physical
+objectives on an indeterminable basis at the time of the original
+solution of the problem. This may require a commander to defer his
+choice until the situation has become more fully developed.</p>
+
+<p>For example, his objective may be the occupation of a certain harbor,
+preliminary to the establishment of a base. The harbor is then a
+correct physical objective, perhaps the only physical objective which
+need be dealt with, if there are no other obstacles to prevent or
+interrupt the operation. Armed forces of the enemy may, however, stand
+as an obstacle to the undisputed occupation of the harbor and,
+therefore, to the attainment of the objective. In such case they
+become, for the time being, the correct physical objective.</p>
+
+<p>While the armed forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate
+physical objectives, this is not always the case (see above). It is
+true that, in war, the armed forces of the enemy, until they can no
+longer offer effective resistance, prevent the full attainment of the
+objective of the State. Accordingly, from the broad viewpoint, they
+may constitute the legitimate and proper physical objective of the
+opposing armed forces. Armed forces of the enemy which are present in
+opposition to any projected operations are likely to offer proper
+physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>These facts, however, do not restrict a commander, in his choice of a
+physical objective, to the armed forces of the enemy. Nor do these
+considerations require him to search for and destroy the enemy forces
+before directing his effort toward the attainment of an objective
+under circumstances where the enemy is seen to be incapable of
+presenting effective opposition.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span>The correct physical objective may change several times during the
+course of an operation. This is particularly to be expected in a naval
+tactical engagement of considerable scope. While the enemy fleet, as a
+whole, may properly be considered in such a case to be the physical
+objective, the component parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and
+their combinations, may, from time to time, find in their opponents a
+variety of physical objectives, the particular identity of which can
+scarcely be predicted with assurance. It is here that the importance
+of the correct selection of physical objectives stands out in bold
+relief.</p>
+
+<p>Infliction of loss on enemy forces, or support of own forces hard
+pressed, may always seem tempting immediate objectives in war.
+However, there may be occasions when disengagement or refusal to
+engage an enemy force, even though it be of manifestly inferior
+strength, may be appropriate to the attainment of the end in view.
+Necessity for speed or secrecy, or other demands, may make the
+required operations unacceptable. (See <a href="#Page_75">page 75</a> as to the offensive and
+the defensive.)</p>
+
+<p>Land, as the natural habitat of man (<a href="#Page_46">page 46</a>), is always the principal
+store-house of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary
+scene of his activities. Naval operations, therefore, have always in
+view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+situation in critical land areas. From this fundamental viewpoint, the
+eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land
+objective.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The suitability of a physical objective having been determined, the
+next consideration is the feasibility (<a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>) of taking such action,
+with relation thereto, as will, if successful, attain the objective in
+mind. Feasibility is determined by evaluation of the factors of means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater, in order to assess relative fighting strength (see <a href="#Page_52">page 52</a>).
+In connection with the effort involved with relation to any physical
+objective, questions of feasibility may make it desirable or necessary
+to visualize the detailed operations which arise from considerations
+of relative position, of apportionment of fighting strength, and of
+provision for freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>Of particular interest with respect to such operations, it is noted
+that the premature disclosure of a selected physical objective is a
+military error. By appearing, however, to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span>operate against more than
+one physical objective, a commander may lead the enemy to overstrain
+his resources in the effort to protect them all. Thus the commander
+may reduce the resistance to be encountered in dealing with what have
+already, or may finally, become the selected physical objectives.
+Feints in several directions may even divert all of the enemy's
+effective defense from the vital points (see also <a href="#Page_68">page 68</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>After the suitability of a physical objective has been established, as
+well as the feasibility of the contemplated action with relation
+thereto, such action is next considered from the standpoint of
+acceptability with reference to the consequences as to costs. The
+specific factors involved in acceptability as to consequences have
+previously been mentioned (<a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>When the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability
+have been satisfied, the locality, the opposing force, or other
+subject of consideration may be regarded as a correct physical
+objective.</p>
+
+<p>When more than one correct physical objective has been determined and
+a choice is indicated, such selection will also be founded on the
+foregoing requirements.</p>
+
+<p>No doctrine, no advance instructions, can replace the responsible
+judgment of a commander as to his correct physical objectives. On
+occasion, higher authority may request recommendations (see <a href="#Page_42">page 42</a>,
+as to opinions) with respect to such objectives. The duty of a
+commander to depart from his instructions under certain conditions,
+and the grave responsibility which he thereby assumes, have also been
+referred to (<a href="#Page_16">page 16</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Relative Positions</h4>
+
+<p>Fundamental Considerations. The relative positions occupied or
+susceptible of occupancy by armed forces are matters which demand
+constant and intelligent attention before and during hostilities.
+Being fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative
+positions assume primary importance where enemy forces are concerned,
+and are scarcely of less importance from the standpoint of the correct
+apportionment of the subdivisions of one's own forces, and from the
+viewpoint of their freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>During periods of actual tactical contact, the successful delivery of
+the decisive thrust against selected physical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>objectives is greatly
+furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of advantageous relative
+positions.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental significance of relative position lies in the fact
+that position is the basis of movement, for movement is merely a
+change of position. Speed is the rate at which movement takes place.
+The particular factors to be reckoned with are, therefore, time and
+space. In skillful utilization of these elements lies the successful
+employment of relative position in the creation or maintenance of a
+favorable military situation, whether the movement be by land, sea, or
+air (<a href="#Page_46">page 46</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The necessity for movement may be an important consideration in
+determining possible or likely theaters of operations. Where
+transportation between two or more positions within a certain area is
+essential to the successful conduct of a war, the area which includes
+the routes between these positions, or a portion of such routes,
+becomes at once a possible or likely theater. Such an area may be
+normally within the control of one or the other of the belligerents,
+or the control may be in dispute. Certain of the positions themselves
+may belong to neither of the belligerents. The area itself may be a
+land area, or a sea area, or a combination of the two. It may be an
+area which borders upon the sea, or an island area. In any case, the
+air is a common characteristic.</p>
+
+<p>The movement of a force is properly regarded, not as an even flow, but
+as a series of steps from one position to another. The movement may or
+may not be continuous. Pauses are usual, their occurrence and duration
+being a matter dependent upon circumstances and calling for the
+exercise of sound professional judgment. Intermediate positions may be
+utilized, successively, so as to facilitate occupancy of the final
+position which is the goal of that phase of operations (<a href="#Page_56">page 56</a>). This
+procedure often effects an ultimate saving of time. In many cases,
+other advantages also may accrue.</p>
+
+<p>The foregoing considerations are applicable to changes of position
+whether in the direction of the enemy, toward a flank, or to the rear.
+Flanking maneuvers and retrograde movements, both sometimes profitably
+employed to decoy the enemy, may frequently be utilized to gain
+advantageous relative position. The proper objective of each is the
+maintenance of a favorable situation, or the alteration of an
+unfavorable one, either locally or with reference to the larger phases
+of operations, through measures involving <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>apportionment of fighting
+strength, or obtaining advantages of position, or retaining or gaining
+freedom of action. Combinations of forward, flanking, or retrograde
+movements are frequent in war, the skillful combination of the
+offensive and the defensive (see <a href="#Page_75">page 75</a>) being no less applicable to
+the problem of relative position than to the other elements of a
+favorable military operation.</p>
+
+<p>Procedure for Determination and Selection of Advantageous Relative
+Positions. Since the various positions to be occupied become physical
+objectives for the time being, their proper determination and
+selection are governed by the same considerations which apply to
+physical objectives (see <a href="#Page_55">page 55</a> and following).</p>
+
+<p>Thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, as to suitability,
+whether the position, once gained, will permit the attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>Secondly, consideration is required as to feasibility. Are the
+available means adequate to gain or to maintain such position? In
+answering this question, due regard is paid to opposing means and to
+the characteristics of the theater.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, there is to be considered, as to acceptability, whether the
+consequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength, will
+be such, if the position is gained or maintained, as to permit the
+attainment of the objective. The possible effect of these consequences
+on future action, whether the attempt succeeds or fails, may be
+vitally significant.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>With regard to suitability, the factor of the appropriate effect
+desired calls for special consideration of the requirements with a
+view to future action. This is true because of the relationship which
+naturally exists between successive positions (<a href="#Page_60">page 60</a>) if changes of
+location from one to another are to be integrated into movement
+calculated to accomplish the effect desired. Each position, itself for
+the time being a physical objective, offers certain advantages or
+involves certain disadvantages with relation to a further physical
+objective. The position of the latter, in turn, presents possibilities
+(or denies them) with respect to future movement. The influence of
+considerations with respect to time (in addition to those noted above
+with regard to space) is also a factor whose importance increases when
+urgency is a matter of immediate concern.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to feasibility, the technical capabilities and
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span>limitations of the armed forces (<a href="#Page_67">page 67</a>) are, of course, among the
+principal factors. These capabilities and limitations are respectively
+promoted and imposed primarily by considerations peculiar to the
+particular medium of movement involved.</p>
+
+<p>With specific regard to the areas within which military operations may
+suitably be undertaken, the fundamental distinctions created by
+recognized political sovereignty require attention. That part of the
+surface of the earth which comprises its land area is recognized as
+the property or the charge of one or another of the sovereign states,
+although in certain cases the title may be in dispute. The air above a
+nation's territorial domain is generally understood to be part of that
+domain. The point to be observed is that there are no land areas which
+belong equally to all nations. Accordingly; because of the factor of
+neutral sovereignty, both land and air forces of belligerent States
+may be under the necessity of following indirect routes to their
+physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>In the case of the sea, however, all those portions of the earth's
+surface which are covered by water (exclusive only of the recognized
+territorial waters of the several nations), i.e., the high seas, are
+presumably common property. The same applies to the air above the sea.</p>
+
+<p>These considerations, and the fact that the surface of the sea is a
+broad plane, permit open sea areas to be traversed by a variety of
+routes to an extent not applicable in the case of land areas and the
+air above them. In addition, the fact that technological developments
+have been such as to permit movement, not only on the surface of the
+sea and through the air above but also beneath the surface, gives
+distinctive characteristics to the sea when considered as a theater of
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>The surface of the sea has, from the earliest days to the present,
+provided roads over which human beings in greatest numbers and the
+resources of the world in greatest weight and volume can be
+transported in single carriers. From the standpoint of any belligerent
+it is imperative that, during war, these roads be kept open to the
+extent demanded by the needs of the State. It is equally imperative
+that an enemy be deprived of the advantage which their use might
+otherwise afford. In both cases localized (even though temporary)
+control, not only of the surface but of the water beneath and the air
+above, may be essential. It is pertinent, also, to note at this point
+the interest <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>of neutrals, or of unneutral nonbelligerent Powers, in
+keeping open the trade routes via the high seas. Such interest may
+constitute an important factor in the calculations of a belligerent
+State.</p>
+
+<p>Considerations of maximum capacity for speed represent the utmost
+possibilities with respect to movements (i.e., change of positions)
+(<a href="#Page_60">page 60</a>) in a given medium within a given time limit. A knowledge of
+maximum speed potentialities, one's own and those of the enemy, is
+required if changes in position are intelligently to be made. A
+knowledge of the variety of conditions, controllable and otherwise,
+which affect or preclude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise
+a requisite. Poor material condition, inadequate training, and
+incorrect methods of operation are preventable or correctable. The
+limitations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by natural
+obstacles such as the hydrography, the climate, the wind, the weather,
+and the state of the sea, are susceptible of greatest possible
+adjustment to circumstances only by the exercise of foresight and
+judgment. All these conditions indicate the close relationship that
+exists between relative position and freedom of action (<a href="#Page_70">page 70</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The same observations apply to considerations of maximum capacity for
+endurance, the ability to operate without necessity for replenishment
+from an outside source. Radius of action is decreased or increased
+accordingly with resultant restrictions, or otherwise, on freedom of
+action.</p>
+
+<p>With respect to the freedom of action of armed forces, also a
+consideration in relation to feasibility, the logistics of a military
+operation, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins when
+the plan is in process of formulation. This problem ends only when the
+necessity for sustaining the movement, and for retaining the position
+gained, no longer exists.</p>
+
+<p>Ships and other means of conveyance, surface, subsurface, and air, are
+incapable of providing the necessities of life and the implements of
+warfare beyond the capacity built into them. Operations which extend
+beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless replenishment and
+support, possible only from other sources, are provided. The logistics
+problem may be so difficult as to cause rejection of a course of
+action involving distant operations. From the standpoint of supply,
+military movements by land, sea, and air are, therefore, vitally
+associated with positions on land and with their relation to the area
+of operations (see also <a href="#Page_58">page 58</a>).</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span>The same observations apply in larger scope to the State itself,
+which, because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain
+essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support from outside
+sources lest supplies on hand become exhausted. In all cases, great
+importance attaches to the geographical location of sources of supply
+in their relation to a required point of delivery and to the routes
+which lie between.</p>
+
+<p>It follows that enemy sources of supply may be suitable physical
+objectives (see <a href="#Page_56">page 56</a>). Their destruction or capture, or the
+severance of the enemy's lines of communication with them, may
+seriously restrict his freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>From the standpoint of the relative position of its features, and
+apart from their inherent military value, the characteristics of the
+theater of military operations may exert an important influence upon
+the shaping of events. Each characteristic merits consideration as a
+potential means of facilitating or obstructing movement. Some
+localities may have been developed as repair, supply, or air bases.
+Others may be sources of essential raw materials. Certain points may
+be heavily fortified. Island formations may be valuable to either
+opponent, or to both, because of the capacity and security of their
+harbors, the character of their terrain, or their positions relative
+to each other. The inherent military value of the several features of
+the theater may be enhanced or vitiated by the relative position which
+each occupies with respect to other features, and with reference to
+the location of the armed forces involved.</p>
+
+<p>So-called "strategic points", historically significant in connection
+with military operations, derive their importance by reason of their
+relative position with reference to routes of movement.</p>
+
+<p>The possibilities of utilizing or of changing the characteristics of a
+theater of operations, to assist, hamper, or deny movement, are
+governed by considerations previously discussed (see the Principle of
+the Proper Physical Conditions to be established in the Field of
+Action&mdash;<a href="#Page_34">page 34</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In planning the creation or maintenance of a favorable military
+situation from the standpoint of relative position, there may,
+therefore, profitably be included an examination into:</p>
+
+<p>(a) The relation which may exist between the geographical location of
+the subdivisions of one's own forces and</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(1) Those of the enemy,</p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span>
+
+<p class="hang">(2) Geographical areas under one's own control, and
+positions within those areas,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(3) Geographical areas not under one's own control, and
+positions within those areas,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(4) Areas coveted or in dispute,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(5) Fixed actual and potential repair and operating bases
+and sources of supply and replenishment, own and enemy,
+controlled or otherwise.</p></div>
+
+<p>(b) The relation existing among the geographical locations listed
+immediately above, including the effect of possible changes in
+control.</p>
+
+<p>(c) The bearing of the sun and moon, and the direction of the wind and
+sea.</p>
+
+<p>(d) The length and vulnerability of possible lines of communication.</p>
+
+<p>(e) The time and distance, and resulting relative speeds, involved in
+movements necessary to change or to maintain an existing relation.</p>
+
+<p>(f) The measures incident to adequate freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>A more detailed analysis of the factors influencing relative position
+is made in Section I-B of the Estimate Form (Chapter VI).</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>In connection with the factor of consequences as to costs, the
+requirement as to acceptability is a weighing of expected gains and of
+reasonably anticipated losses, a balancing of the one against the
+other, with due attention to the demands of future action, (see <a href="#Page_61">page
+61</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Military movement normally involves an inescapable expenditure of
+military resources. The characteristics of the theater, alone, will
+exact their due toll, even if no enemy be present. In the presence of
+the enemy, such expenditures may increase with great rapidity. The
+fundamental consideration here is whether the resultant losses are
+disproportionate to the gains.</p>
+
+<p>Avoidance of movement is frequently the correct decision, because
+movement, if it offers no advantages, is scarcely justifiable even if
+it entails no material loss. Movement, merely for the sake of moving,
+is not a profitable military operation. However, the conduct of
+military operations without major movement is a concept inherently
+defensive (page <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>75), even apathetic, whose outcome, against an
+energetic enemy, can rarely be other than defeat. In the execution of
+advantageous movement to achieve correct military objectives, the
+competent commander is always ready to accept the losses which are
+inseparable from his gains.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The foregoing considerations as to advantageous relative positions are
+applicable, not only in the realm of the commander's decisions as to
+his own action, but also to his judgments rendered when higher
+authority calls for recommendations (see <a href="#Page_42">page 42</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Apportionment of Fighting Strength</h4>
+
+<p>Fundamental Considerations. The assignment of a task may be expected
+to carry with it availability of fighting strength deemed adequate by
+higher authority for accomplishment of the operation involved.</p>
+
+<p>In appropriate instances, the higher command may call for
+recommendations as to the amount and character of the means deemed
+adequate by the subordinate for performance of the task with which he
+is, or is to be, charged (<a href="#Page_42">page 42</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In any case, means having been made available, it remains for a
+commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion these
+available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite
+strength at points likely to be decisive, without unduly weakening
+other points. In effect, he is charged with a practical adjustment of
+means to ends. This responsibility is discharged by the effective
+utilization of means and prevention of waste nicely balanced through
+full consideration of all essential elements of a favorable military
+operation. The procedure involved has been indicated (see the
+corollary Principle for the determination of the Proper Means to be
+Made Available&mdash;<a href="#Page_34">page 34</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The relation between the strength to be brought to bear in dealing
+with a selected physical objective, the tactical concern of the
+moment, and that necessary to the attainment of the strategical aim
+(see <a href="#Page_9">pages 9 and 10</a>), constitutes a fundamental consideration in
+effecting such a balance.</p>
+
+<p>In making a correct apportionment, there will be involved not only the
+physical elements of fighting strength, but the mental and moral as
+well. With respect to mental and moral factors, the capabilities of
+particular <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span>commanders and organizations may be an important factor in
+apportioning forces to tasks. In the physical field, numbers and types
+occupy a prominent position, each however, requiring consideration
+from the standpoint of the existing situation.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, forces composed of appropriate types and suitably equipped and
+trained may exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not
+so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. On the other
+hand, numerical considerations become predominant under conditions
+otherwise substantially equal.</p>
+
+<p>These considerations, viewed in the light of the relationship of naval
+operations to land areas (<a href="#Page_63">page 63</a>), indicate the importance which may
+attach to immediate availability, with a naval force, in addition to
+its own air strength, of a proper complement of land forces (with
+appropriate air strength) which are organized, equipped, and trained
+for amphibious operations.</p>
+
+<p>The same considerations point also to the vital importance of due
+provision, with respect to the armed forces of a State, for joint
+operations involving concerted action on land, by sea, or in the air.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with the capabilities of particular commanders (<a href="#Page_66">page
+66</a>), it will be appreciated how important it is, more especially in
+amphibious or joint operations, for responsible officers to have a
+correct understanding of the powers and limitations of the several
+types of military forces involved, be their primary medium of movement
+the land, the sea, or the air.</p>
+
+<p>Factors of dispersion and concentration are also involved in
+apportionment of fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>While undue dispersion may result in lack of adequate fighting
+strength where required, a certain degree of dispersion may be
+necessary to meet the demands of movement and of freedom of action.
+Serious errors in this regard, however, may result in inability to
+furnish support where needed, and in consequent punishment or
+isolation of one or more valuable detachments.</p>
+
+<p>In distant operations some dispersion is required to safeguard long
+lines of communication. The requirements for this purpose may
+sometimes be so great that, unless the total available strength is
+adequate, a due apportionment to the guarding of long lines of
+communication may so weaken the main force as to prevent the
+attainment of the objective. (See also <a href="#Page_63">page 63</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Proper dispersion is, therefore, a requirement to be met, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span>while undue
+dispersion is to be avoided. But realization is also necessary, in
+this connection, that there is an equal danger in over-concentration.
+An undue concentration of means at any point may subject such a force
+to unnecessary loss. Another disadvantage may be lack of adequate
+fighting strength elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to divide a total
+force, while containing a sound element of caution, is misleading and
+inadequate, for division is often necessary or desirable. To be
+adequate, a maxim or rule relating to division of force should
+indicate when, and in what measure, such division may or may not be
+necessary or desirable. (See also <a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is the statement
+that the requirements of effective warfare are met by bringing
+superiority to bear at the decisive time and place. Such an injunction
+is of little assistance in solving practical problems as to the
+appropriate degree of superiority, and as to the proper time and
+place.</p>
+
+<p>In like manner, any rule is faulty which advises a commander to seek
+the solution of his problems by always bringing to bear his elements
+of strength against the hostile elements of weakness. It may be found,
+on occasion, that it is necessary or desirable to act with strength
+against strength.</p>
+
+<p>But it is equally faulty to maintain that action, to be effective,
+seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements
+of strength. Even when the strongest opposition cannot be defeated by
+direct action of this nature, success may still be possible by first
+disposing of elements of weakness. When the stronger elements of a
+hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss, yet cannot
+stand without the weaker, consideration may well be given to an
+apportionment of fighting strength on the basis of seeking a decision
+against the latter. The defeat of a relatively small force at a
+distance from the area where the main forces are concentrated in
+opposition, may hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective.</p>
+
+<p>The main effort, where the greater force is employed, may be identical
+with the effort contributing most directly to the final result. This
+identity, however, does not always exist, and the decisive influence
+is frequently exerted by a relatively small force, sometimes at a
+distance from the principal area of action.</p>
+
+<p>Diversions (see also as to feints, <a href="#Page_59">page 59</a>) are not likely <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span>to be
+profitable unless constituting a sufficient threat, or unless offering
+apparent advantages to the enemy which he feels that he cannot forego.
+Success will attend justified diversions if they lead the enemy to
+reapportion his fighting strength to meet the threat, either because
+he expects repetitions (see <a href="#Page_73">page 73</a>, as to raids), or because the area
+involved may become a new theater of action, or for other pertinent
+reasons.</p>
+
+<p>Means which are inadequate for the attainment of an objective if used
+in one effort may sometimes be rendered adequate by utilizing them in
+a series of successive impulses. Similarly, the effect of employing
+means otherwise adequate may be intensified by the delivery of attacks
+in waves.</p>
+
+<p>Procedure for Determining Proper Apportionment. The fundamental
+considerations outlined above as to apportionment of fighting strength
+have application both to the offensive and the defensive (see also
+discussion on <a href="#Page_75">page 75</a>). As to all of these considerations, the
+solution for the particular situation is to be found only through an
+analysis of the factors applying to the particular problem.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, the first consideration relates to suitability, and requires
+that the apportionment of means be suitable both as to type and as to
+amount, in order to produce the appropriate effect desired in view of
+the means opposed and of the influence of the characteristics of the
+theater. The fundamentals involved, applicable in all human activities
+(see the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made Available&mdash;<a href="#Page_34">page 34</a>),
+are the factors cited above. These are also, of course, indicated in
+the Fundamental Military Principle.</p>
+
+<p>The correct apportionment may also be influenced by any military
+changes to be effected in the characteristics of the theater (as
+indicated in the Principle of Proper Physical Conditions to be
+Established&mdash;<a href="#Page_34">page 34</a>). Thus, the establishment of a well defended base
+may operate, properly, to reduce the requirements for apportionment of
+a force for a particular duty in that locality. Similarly, the proper
+use of fortifications, obstacles, demolitions, and routes by land,
+sea, and air, as well as facilities for exchange of information and
+orders, all operate to increase fighting strength relative to that of
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The next consideration, that of feasibility, takes account of the type
+and of the amount of means that can be apportioned in view of the
+means available.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with the foregoing there will be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span>appropriate
+requirements for the operation as a whole and for its component
+operations. All of these requirements may call for analysis of the
+relative positions to be utilized, with reference to the selected
+physical objectives, and of the requirements for adequate freedom of
+action.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the requirement of acceptability as to the factor of
+consequences will call for consideration of the results of the
+allotments of forces to particular tasks. This is necessary in order
+to arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the military costs involved
+either in event of the success of the effort or in event of its
+failure, and with respect, more especially, to the effects on future
+action.</p>
+
+<p>The attainment of the objective, however suitable as to the effect
+desired, may be found, on the basis of due study, to be infeasible or
+to involve unacceptable consequences. The inescapable conclusion is
+then that an increase in relative fighting strength is required or
+that another objective, feasible of attainment and acceptable with
+respect to consequences, is necessarily to be adopted (see <a href="#Page_52">page
+52-53</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Freedom of Action</h4>
+
+<p>Fundamental Considerations. In providing for proper apportionment of
+fighting strength, a commander may attain the end in view by
+increasing the physical, mental, or moral elements of his own
+strength, relative to the enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's
+strength through imposing restrictions on hostile freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>Freedom of action will enable a commander to prosecute his plan in
+spite of restrictive influences. That enemy interference will, to a
+greater or less extent, impose restrictions on freedom of action is to
+be expected. Restrictions may also be imposed by physical conditions
+existing in the theater of operations, and by deficiencies and
+omissions which are within the field of responsibility of the
+commander to correct.</p>
+
+<p>Even with fighting strength adequate to overcome enemy opposition and
+physical handicaps, deficiencies and omissions within a commander's
+own field may become effective checks to further progress unless
+avoided through the exercise of foresight. To this end, it is
+desirable to consider certain possibilities which are likely to
+promote freedom of action if properly exploited, and to restrict it if
+neglected.</p>
+
+<p>To a considerable extent, a commander has within his own control the
+degree of influence which his force will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span>exert in the creation or the
+maintenance of a favorable military situation. The power applied by a
+military force is determined not only by the fighting strength of its
+component commands, but also by the degree of coordination of their
+several efforts in the attainment of the objective (see also <a href="#Page_12">page 12</a>).
+Whatever the inability of the commander to influence the other aspects
+of a situation, the ability of his command to act unitedly is a matter
+largely in his hands.</p>
+
+<p>When time permits, subordinate commanders, apprised of contemplated
+tasks in general terms, may be called upon to submit recommendations
+as to the detailed instructions to be issued them, as well (<a href="#Page_66">page 66</a>)
+as to the means to be allotted for the purpose. By this procedure,
+individual initiative (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>) is fostered and the higher command
+enabled to utilize the first-hand knowledge and experience gained on
+lower echelons without, however, divesting the higher command of any
+of its responsibility.</p>
+
+<p>The command system may provide for unified action through unity of
+command or through cooperation resulting from mutual understanding. On
+the assumption that commanders are competent and that communications
+are adequate, unity of command is the more reliable method. However,
+it cannot be obtained everywhere and at all times, because of the
+necessary decentralization of the command system in areas distant from
+the commander. In such areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured
+by provision for local unity of command. At other times, unity of
+effort may depend entirely on cooperation between adjacent commands
+within the same area. (See <a href="#Page_12">page 12</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Organization (see <a href="#Page_13">page 13</a>), the mechanism of command, is most
+effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate
+with responsibility (<a href="#Page_12">page 12</a>) and through the assignment of tasks to
+commanders with appropriate capabilities (see also <a href="#Page_66">page 66</a>), the
+highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. The command
+organization and mutual understanding are of primary importance as
+methods of ensuring maximum power with available fighting strength,
+and of affording consequent maximum contribution to freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>Deficiencies in technical training are capable of imposing grave
+restrictions upon freedom of action. Material equipment, even though
+it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction,
+will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained.
+Even though <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity
+which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless
+the methods of movement, i.e., of effecting change in relative
+position (<a href="#Page_59">page 59</a>), are intelligently planned and are developed to a
+point which assures facility of operation when in the hands of skilled
+personnel.</p>
+
+<p>Tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations
+(<a href="#Page_67">page 67</a>), is one of the vital factors of fighting strength, with
+respect, more especially, to its contributions to freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>A state of high and stable morale (<a href="#Page_9">page 9</a>), founded upon sound
+discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. An
+understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of
+the science of war.</p>
+
+<p>Discipline, in its basic meaning, is the treatment suitable to a
+disciple. The objective of discipline is therefore the creation and
+maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander
+leads. The exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those
+occasions when the commander can be physically present. The exigencies
+of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from
+being always, personally, in the forefront of action. These
+restrictions as to considerations of space however, impose no
+limitations on leadership in terms of time.</p>
+
+<p>The influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to
+shape the situation according to his will (<a href="#Page_47">page 47</a>), though the
+necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. The
+ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute
+the commander's will wherever he may be (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>) is, accordingly, a
+primary attribute of command.</p>
+
+<p>With this objective in mind, the true disciplinarian runs no risk of
+confusing harshness with the exercise of justice. He understands the
+difference between an overbearing arrogance, arising from unconscious
+ignorance, and the pride which springs from a justified self-respect.
+He appreciates the distinction between mere stubbornness, which would
+alienate his followers, and the necessary firmness which binds the
+bonds between the leader and the led. He realizes that comradeship,
+without presumptuous familiarity, is the firmest foundation for mutual
+loyalty (<a href="#Page_14">page 14</a>). He knows that kindness and consideration, without
+suggestion of pampering, will not be mistaken for weakness by any
+subordinate worthy of the name.</p>
+
+<p>Military subordination, which implies a proud obedience <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span>without trace
+of servility, is the essential basis for the development of the
+qualities of command. It is an old adage that, to know how to command,
+one must know how to obey. In the profession of arms, every man is at
+once a leader and a follower; the uncertainties of war may suddenly
+confront any individual, even on the lowest echelon, with the call to
+exercise command.</p>
+
+<p>The requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for
+all training. By proper training of his command, by instilling in it a
+spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its
+morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may
+increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition.
+When a command is inured to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack
+of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually
+employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with these measures, surprise, when judiciously
+conceived and successfully employed, may be a most potent factor.
+Surprise (see <a href="#Page_26">page 26</a>) is the injection of the unexpected for the
+purpose of creating an unfavorable military situation for the enemy.
+Its effect is particularly telling when it results in disruption of
+enemy plans, and thus promotes the execution of one's own.</p>
+
+<p>The raid, an offensive measure swiftly executed, often by surprise,
+and followed by a withdrawal, may be a valuable operation when
+employed to attain objectives within its capacity. The collection of
+information, the destruction of important enemy equipment or supplies,
+the neutralization of enemy positions, the severing of physical means
+of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable objectives.
+The attritional effect of repeated raids may be very great. Skillfully
+executed raids frequently produce panic among the populace and thus,
+by political pressure, cause a change in the existing apportionment of
+fighting strength to the extent of upsetting military plans in other
+theaters. This is particularly likely to occur when there is fear,
+justified or otherwise, of repetition (see <a href="#Page_69">page 69</a>).</p>
+
+<p>However, because a raid necessarily includes a withdrawal and cannot,
+therefore, accomplish the occupation of territory (see <a href="#Page_46">page 46</a>), it
+can have only indirect bearing, however important, upon the final
+outcome of the hostilities against a strong and competent enemy. Like
+other forms of surprise, the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve
+only to disclose one's presence, and thus to betray more <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span>important
+future plans. If the raid fails to attain its objective, it may even
+strengthen enemy morale.</p>
+
+<p>The form which surprise may take is not confined to the stratagem, the
+ruse, or the sudden appearance. Any unexpected display of novel
+methods or of fighting strength, moral, mental, or physical, the
+last-named sometimes assuming the character of new and especially
+effective weapons or equipment, is included in the category of
+surprise. The potential value of such methods or weapons is, however,
+reduced or even completely vitiated by the leakage of advance
+information concerning them, not only as to their details, but as to
+the fact of their existence.</p>
+
+<p>Other conditions remaining unchanged, an offensive surprise measure is
+therefore more likely to be effective when the opponent has not been
+given time to prepare a defense against it. On the other hand, where
+there is knowledge that an opponent or possible opponent is taking
+steps of a new or unusual nature and no adequate defense is prepared,
+the equivalent of surprise has been granted him.</p>
+
+<p>Security measures are necessary in order to minimize or prevent
+surprise, or to defeat other efforts aimed at disruption of plans.
+Protection brings security; its basic objective is the conservation of
+fighting strength for future employment. Primarily requiring the
+maintenance of secrecy and the exercise of vigilance and foresight,
+security may be furthered by efficient scouting, by appropriate
+dispositions and formations within the command, and by the use of
+protective detachments and of various types of works in the sphere of
+engineering. Previous discussion (<a href="#Page_64">pages 64</a> and <a href="#Page_69">69</a>), with respect to
+relative position and to the apportionment of fighting strength, has
+indicated how, through fortification and related measures, the
+commander may increase relative fighting strength and thereby promote
+his own freedom of action while restricting that of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>A commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at
+its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal,
+adequate logistics support. Because of its intimate relationship to
+mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of
+action. Logistics support requires provision for procurement and
+replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and
+replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance.
+Freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics
+support can be extended. (See <a href="#Page_63">page 63</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span>freedom of
+action. If the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate
+strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. If initiative is
+lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure.</p>
+
+<p>The offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the
+initiative, and of regaining it if lost. Even though there be an
+actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will,
+however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive
+mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable
+opportunity to strike. Completely to abandon the offensive state of
+mind is to forswear victory.</p>
+
+<p>Whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent
+commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will
+of the enemy commander (see <a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>). By effective attack upon the
+hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the
+enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which
+the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect.</p>
+
+<p>It does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable
+under all circumstances. Even with superior strength the most skillful
+commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such
+manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive.
+Without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the
+defensive for considerable periods. If the offensive mental attitude
+is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive
+measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and
+deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time,
+may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. It is of
+the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted
+as a settled procedure (see <a href="#Page_65">page 65</a>) beyond the time necessary to
+prepare for an effective offensive.</p>
+
+<p>Both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation
+whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. In
+operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a
+combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found
+necessary (see also references to distant operations on <a href="#Page_63">pages 63</a> and
+<a href="#Page_74">74</a>). Though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom
+of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive
+action. The enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to
+seize every opportunity to employ the offensive.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has
+been found to be sound procedure (see also <a href="#Page_61">page 61</a>), provided that the
+general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at
+the proper moment, of the offensive. The methods employed during the
+period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of
+action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the
+offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been
+created.</p>
+
+<p>Familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and
+possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the
+strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be
+encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of
+action. Additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a
+continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information
+collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. Of equal
+importance is the denial of information to the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with counter-information measures (see <a href="#Page_127">page 127</a>), the
+scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular
+consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior
+to publication. A resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn
+to his own advantage all available information, including that
+ostensibly innocuous.</p>
+
+<p>As to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional
+knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both,
+and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for
+devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of
+action.</p>
+
+<p>With a given fighting strength, the ensurance of freedom of action,
+within the field of responsibility of a commander, requires
+consideration of such matters as:</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+  <p>(a)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Efficient provisions for exercise of command,</p>
+  <p>(b)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Effective training,</p>
+  <p>(c)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A state of high and stable morale, founded on</p>
+  <p>(d)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; sound discipline,</p>
+  <p>(e)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The offensive spirit,</p>
+  <p>(f)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The initiative,</p>
+  <p>(g)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Surprise,</p>
+  <p>(h)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Security,</p>
+  <p>(i)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Adequate logistics support,</p>
+  <p>(j)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Adequate intelligence and counter-intelligence.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span>A more detailed analysis of such factors is provided hereafter
+(Chapter VI, as to Section I-B of the Estimate Form). With proper
+provision made in these respects, the commander will be better able to
+deal with those restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the enemy
+and by adverse geographical conditions. With respect to restrictions
+that in a particular situation may be due to the latter cause, it will
+at once be appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend on the
+selection of correct physical objectives, on utilization of
+advantageous relative positions, and on an effective apportionment of
+fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>Each measure, or each operation, for freedom of action, if it is to
+meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability,
+will be planned on the basis of the foregoing considerations and will
+take account, also, of the inherent requirements of that measure, or
+operation, for freedom of action for itself.</p>
+
+<p>On occasion, higher authority may request the recommendations of the
+commander (see <a href="#Page_42">page 42</a>, as to opinions) with reference to provision
+for freedom of action. Such recommendations will properly be based on
+the elements considered in the preceding discussion.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>IV. SUMMARY</h4>
+
+<p>All these considerations involve the proper evaluation of the factors
+applicable (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>) to the particular problem. Each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, will
+require examination of its suitability with regard to the appropriate
+effect desired; of its feasibility with respect to the action
+contemplated as to physical objectives, relative positions, the
+concurrent apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action;
+and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to consequences as
+to costs.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span><br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER V<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Chapter V discusses the four steps in the application of
+mental effort to the successful attainment of a military
+objective. Emphasis is placed on such matters as: the Estimate
+of the Situation in basic problems, together with certain
+details as to tasks, the mission, courses of action, and the
+Decision; the formulation of detailed plans, including
+subsidiary plans; directives; the Running Estimate of the
+Situation; and the use of Forms in the solution of problems.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>In Chapter II it has been brought to notice that every problem,
+regardless of its type and scope, has its source in a perplexity
+created by an apparent difficulty inherent in a situation. Where there
+is a sufficient incentive to change or maintain the situation, the
+problem is one which requires solution. (See <a href="#Page_20">page 20</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>A situation may be actual or assumed. In broad outline, an actual
+military situation is always likely to present a picture of opposing
+organizations of human beings, each possessed of fighting strength and
+disposed in a locality or localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other.</p>
+
+<p>This picture may be expected to assume various aspects as action
+progresses (see <a href="#Page_38">page 38</a>). The concern of the commander is to control
+the unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may attain
+the effect he desires (<a href="#Page_72">page 72</a>). (See also Chapter IX.)</p>
+
+<p>The incentive to solve a problem is provided by a realization, on the
+part of the individual concerned, of a need to make provision for the
+attainment of an objective. In the ease of a military problem, such
+incentive may result (1) from a directive issued by higher authority,
+usually in the form of an assigned task, or (2) from the fact that a
+decision already reached by the commander has introduced further
+problems, or (3) from a recognition of the demands of the situation.
+(See <a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>An objective is best attained by the successful application of
+properly directed effort. There is thus an essential and continuing
+relationship between the incentive to solve a problem, and the task
+which assigns the objective (or objectives) and thus motivates the
+procedure necessary for the attainment of the objective(s) so assigned
+(<a href="#Page_50">page 50</a>).</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span>Such a task may, therefore, be referred to as the motivating task.</p>
+
+<p>The natural mental processes which normal human beings employ in
+solving their problems of business, public affairs, or even personal
+matters, have been previously described as the natural processes for
+employment in the solution of military problems (see Chapter II). In
+adapting these natural processes to military requirements (<a href="#Page_43">page 43</a>),
+the only difference imposed is that of studied insistence that the
+factors peculiar to the conduct of war, as recognized in the
+Fundamental Military Principle (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>), receive thorough analytical
+treatment from the professional viewpoint.</p>
+
+<p>The same observations apply when the field of military operations is
+restricted to that which primarily concerns the naval branch of the
+military profession. No fundamental difference in the solution of
+problems is introduced thereby. The only variations in the application
+of the Fundamental Military Principle are those due to the fact that
+the sea provides the theater of naval operations with distinctive
+characteristics (see <a href="#Page_62">page 62</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Approach to the Solution</h4>
+
+<p>Studies of the subject indicate that the successful attainment of an
+assigned military objective involves the application of mental effort
+in four distinct steps (see <a href="#Page_3">page 3</a>), in fixed sequence, as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(1) The selection, by the commander, of a correct objective
+(or objectives) by achieving which he may attain his
+assigned objective(s). Such selection includes the
+determination, in proper detail, of the action required.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(2) The resolution of the required action into detailed
+military operations.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(3) The formulation of a directive, or directives, with the
+intention of immediately inaugurating planned action.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(4) The supervision of the planned action.</p></div>
+
+<p>In the chapters which follow, the fundamental procedure distinctive of
+each of these steps will be treated separately and in the sequence
+shown. The sequence of the steps is fixed because of the consequential
+nature of the relationship among the procedures distinctive of the
+several steps. The complete solution of a problem involves,
+necessarily, all four steps. Each step deals with a distinctive type
+of problem, or problems, pertaining to an aspect of the comprehensive
+problem whose solution requires all four steps. No step <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span>after the
+first can properly be undertaken unless the included problems involved
+in the preceding steps have been solved.</p>
+
+<p>It does not follow that the completion of one step necessarily
+requires that the next step be undertaken immediately. It will be
+seen, for instance, that the first two steps are concerned with
+planning, the latter two more especially with execution. It is not
+always necessary that a plan be executed; it may be drawn up as a
+precautionary measure.</p>
+
+<p>It is possible, therefore, that the first step only may be taken;
+i.e., that the procedure for the attainment of a particular assigned
+objective may be determined for the sole purpose of making provision
+against a contingency, at that particular time merely an obscure
+probability. Or, as may frequently be the case during peace, the
+procedure may terminate, for the time being, with the completion of
+the second step. In such cases, certain of the necessary military
+operations are worked out in the desired detail as a provision against
+future possibilities, are listed, and filed for reference as needed.</p>
+
+<p>Parts II and III, which follow, deal primarily with the solution of
+those problems of the naval commander which require familiarity with
+the entire process, i.e., all of the four steps given above.</p>
+
+<p>For simplicity of presentation, the procedure is described throughout
+from the mental standpoint of the same commander. The arrangement of
+subject matter conforms to this basis. The several types of problems,
+classified according to the source of the incentive (<a href="#Page_79">page 79</a>), are
+discussed in connection with the appropriate step. When a problem
+typical of a previous step arises during the process, the sequence of
+steps is interrupted thereby, but is resumed by a mental return, on
+the part of the commander, to the proper earlier step.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The First Step</h4>
+
+<p>The mental procedure distinctive of the first step (more fully
+discussed in Chapter VI) deals with the usual case where a commander
+becomes acquainted with the nature of his assigned objective through
+receipt of a directive from his immediate superior, ordinarily in the
+form of an assigned task or assigned tasks. In the discussion of the
+first step, this most likely type of problem is chosen for
+description, i.e., the one where the motivating task (see <a href="#Page_80">page 80</a>)
+comes directly from the immediate superior.</p>
+
+<p>For purposes of reference, this problem may conveniently be termed a
+basic problem. In such a case the original <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span>situation which gives
+character to the problem may be similarly referred to as the basic
+situation. The full solution of a basic problem always involves a
+basic estimate of the situation, a basic Decision, a basic plan of
+operations, and one or more basic directives. It may, as will be
+shown, also require certain additional directives.</p>
+
+<p>The military Estimate of the Situation, based on the natural mental
+processes (<a href="#Page_19">pages 19-20</a> and <a href="#Page_19">43</a>), is introduced in the first step. The
+reason for making such an Estimate is to provide a basis for a plan to
+accomplish the assigned task. The Estimate constitutes a systematic
+procedure for selection of a correct objective (or objectives),
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, feasible of attainment,
+and acceptable as to the consequences involved in its achievement. The
+selection of such an objective or objectives involves, incidentally
+(see <a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>), the determination, in the proper detail, of the action
+required.</p>
+
+<p>This estimate procedure is founded on the Fundamental Military
+Principle (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>). The procedure is the same as previously indicated
+for the correct selection of objectives (Section II of Chapter IV).</p>
+
+<p>On the basis of a summary of the situation, a recognition of the
+incentive, and an appreciation of the assigned objective(s) (<a href="#Page_79">page 79</a>),
+the estimate of a basic problem enables the commander to obtain,
+first, an understanding of (<a href="#Page_43">page 43</a>) the appropriate effect desired.
+As a result of this procedure, he can then correctly formulate his
+mission (discussed hereinafter).</p>
+
+<p>For the further understanding of all details pertaining to the
+situation (<a href="#Page_43">page 43</a>), the estimate next determines relative fighting
+strength through a survey of the means available and opposed, as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater.</p>
+
+<p>With the basis for solution of the problem thus established, the
+actual solution (<a href="#Page_44">page 44</a>), conforming to the system indicated in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, starts with consideration of pertinent
+methods of procedure, as tentative solutions of the problem. These
+take the form of military operations, each denominated a course of
+action (discussed in detail hereinafter). Each such course embodies,
+specifically or inferentially, an objective to be achieved for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired. Each course also
+indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken. Every pertinent
+course of action is tested to determine whether it meets the
+requirements of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span>suitability as to the appropriate effect desired, of
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength, and of
+acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>Enemy courses of action are subjected to the same treatment.</p>
+
+<p>Each course of action which passes the tests is compared with each
+retained enemy course, after which those courses of action not
+rejected on this basis are compared with each other. The best is then
+selected and embodied in the Decision.</p>
+
+<p>The Decision, accordingly, expresses a general plan of action (or
+provides a basis therefor), including the commander's general
+objective (<a href="#Page_49">page 49</a>) for the attainment of the assigned objective. The
+Decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken.</p>
+
+<p>The estimate procedure is applicable not only to the problem of the
+first step, viewed as a whole, but also to the numerous included
+problems. These present themselves during the procedure of solution,
+and call for "estimates within the estimate".</p>
+
+<p>For example, the proper nature of the objective embodied in the
+assigned task (discussed hereinafter), if not clear in the directive
+received, may be determined by the use of the natural mental
+processes. This is done through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle, as previously described (<a href="#Page_52">page 52</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Similarly, the solution of the included problems as to the salient
+features of the operations involved (correct physical objectives,
+etc.) can be arrived at through the same processes. The procedure is
+that indicated previously (in Section III of Chapter IV).</p>
+
+<p>The estimate procedure may, however, be somewhat varied, as to
+details, in accordance with the nature of the problem. Such adaptation
+is applicable, for example, as to the special features which
+distinguish certain types of strategical and tactical problems.</p>
+
+<p>Every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects
+(see discussion of strategy and tactics, <a href="#Page_9">pages 9 and 10</a>). The
+character of the effort to be exerted at a particular time, and the
+nature of the objectives to be attained, may be governed chiefly by
+strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations. This fact may
+affect details in the estimate of the situation, e.g., as to the
+weight to be given various factors.</p>
+
+<p>The essential difference between strategy and tactics <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span>has been shown
+to lie in the end in view. It follows, then, that estimates of broad
+strategical situations and of localized tactical situations tend to
+differ from each other. The former lead to decisions as to such
+matters, among others, as whether a battle shall be fought. The latter
+lead to decisions, among others, as to the comprehensive tactical
+methods to be followed in furtherance of strategical aims. Certain
+distinctions of method as to such estimates are noted hereinafter with
+respect to the analysis of fighting strength and with reference to
+courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>Tasks. The assignment of tasks to subordinates is an essential
+function of the chain of command, applicable to all of the echelons of
+command, from the highest to the lowest (<a href="#Page_12">page 12</a>). On the lowest
+echelons, such as that of a gun's crew or a fireroom watch, operations
+thus prescribed involve numerous small specialized tasks, each
+requiring the performance of a simplified routine by a few trained
+men. Although earlier training in the performance of such tasks is
+calculated to remove the necessity of solving the problems of the
+lowest echelons in the four studied steps stated above, it is only
+when the same methods of logical thought have previously been applied
+to the solution of these problems that this state of affairs can be
+brought about.</p>
+
+<p>Properly conceived, each assigned task indicates, either specifically
+or inferentially, an objective (or objectives). The relationships
+existing among the echelons of command, with reference to objectives,
+have previously been noted. (See <a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>.) These relationships,
+because a correctly conceived task specifies or infers an objective,
+are equally applicable as to such tasks.</p>
+
+<p>The manner of expressing tasks calls for special comment (see also
+<a href="#Page_53">page 53</a>, as to expressing objectives).</p>
+
+<p>The commander may find in the expression of his task a statement,
+only, of the action required. For example, the order "Proceed toward
+the enemy battle line" involves movement, indicating merely a change
+in relative position. No provision appears as to a future condition or
+state of affairs.</p>
+
+<p>Again, the task may be expressed as an order to "Attack the enemy
+battle line." In this case, the enemy battle line is the physical
+objective, but no specific future condition to result from the attack
+is indicated. Here the action and the physical objective are given,
+but the objective is left to be inferred.</p>
+
+<p>If the commander can ascertain, from the directives he receives, his
+task expressed in terms of accomplishment, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span>he may be able to
+visualize the action, the physical objective, and the condition to be
+created. The order "Destroy the enemy battleship" (indicating, as the
+objective, "the destruction of the enemy battleship"), results, when
+successfully completed, in a new condition which is the objective of
+the action against the physical objective.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, a task expressed in such terms of accomplishment conveys
+precise information as to the objective; yet such an expression of the
+task does not prevent freedom of action, with opportunity for exercise
+of initiative. The commander who is assigned such a task can clearly
+visualize the results demanded of him, and may feel at liberty to
+employ any one or all of the methods at his disposal.</p>
+
+<p>However, it is not always possible or even desirable to express tasks
+in terms of accomplishment.</p>
+
+<p>For example, where the future situation cannot be adequately
+visualized, either because of the doubtful values of certain factors
+or because of possible changes in circumstances, it may be
+impracticable to assign a definite task in terms of accomplishment.</p>
+
+<p>Under such conditions, and sometimes for other proper reasons, it may
+be desirable to afford a trusted and competent subordinate a
+corresponding measure of freedom of action. In such a case, the
+indication of the commander's general objective for his entire force,
+together with a directive for action along a certain general line,
+without prescription of a definite objective, may be especially
+appropriate to the situation. Such is the frequent usage in the issue,
+for example, of directives of the type known as letters of instruction
+(Chapter VIII).</p>
+
+<p>Again, where immediate response is desired, and where the objective
+may be understood by implication, the task may be better expressed in
+terms of action, rather than of accomplishment. This is frequently the
+case where the task is assigned by word of mouth, by memorandum, or by
+signal. In the last-named instance, the signal, when it constitutes a
+command fully understood by previous usage or experience, may convey a
+practically instantaneous comprehension of the objective. In many such
+instances, however, an inferred objective will require more analysis.</p>
+
+<p>The expression of the task in terms of action is frequently desirable,
+more especially during an engagement, when tactical considerations are
+uppermost. Under such circumstances, two or more objectives may be
+suitable to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span>the appropriate effect desired, but their degree of
+suitability, and the influence of the factors pertaining to
+feasibility and acceptability, may vary rapidly with the course of
+events. In such conditions, an order such as "Attack" without
+indicating a specific physical objective, may be best calculated to
+attain desired results, for the reason, more especially, that it
+affords the subordinate a proper freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>In many cases, the instructions received by a commander will set forth
+more than one task, often of varying importance. The proper bearing of
+such a double or multiple task upon his future action is set forth,
+together with other relevant matters, in the discussion of the
+mission, which follows.</p>
+
+<p>On occasion, a higher commander, in assigning a task, may elect to
+specify, also, the course of action to be pursued by a subordinate for
+the attainment of the assigned objective: for example&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>"Deny enemy bases in area ABCD by capturing X Island".</p></div>
+
+<p>Here the task is to deny the enemy the use of available bases in the
+area described; in addition, the higher commander has specified that
+this be accomplished by the adoption of a predetermined course of
+action (<a href="#Page_88">page 88</a>), expressed in the words "by capturing X Island."
+Higher authority has in this case made the subordinate's estimate of
+the situation for him, and has thus arrived at the decision which the
+subordinate would ordinarily reach for himself.</p>
+
+<p>Such procedure may be deemed advisable under certain circumstances:
+for example, when time is pressing; when a close control of the
+situation is an important factor; when the qualifications of the
+subordinate are unknown, as yet doubtful, or known to be inadequate
+for the operation in hand; or, for various other reasons which may
+suggest themselves according to the nature of the problem.</p>
+
+<p>Occasionally, higher authority, for similar reasons, may also
+prescribe the action to be taken, in considerable detail. Examples
+occur during operations of unusual complexity, or when the personnel
+factors call for special care in coordination of the action.</p>
+
+<p>Sometimes, higher authority, instead of announcing both the task and
+the predetermined course of action, may indicate only the latter; in
+the example given above, the higher commander would then direct,
+"Capture X Island". The directive might also include, in some detail,
+the action to be taken to this end.</p>
+
+<p>Procedure such as noted in the foregoing examples <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span>involves certain
+special considerations from the viewpoint of the subordinate. These
+considerations are discussed hereafter (<a href="#Page_96">page 96</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The Mission. In our naval service an assigned task, coupled with its
+purpose, is known as a mission. As explained previously (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>), the
+purpose indicates the larger aim which is to be served by the
+execution of the task. The task indicates the assigned objective,
+i.e., what is to be accomplished; the purpose, the further objective
+to be served thereby.</p>
+
+<p>The word mission is a derivative of the Latin verb, "to send". Its use
+implies the act of sending someone, or of being sent, as an agent for
+some special duty, a duty imposed by one in authority. Although an
+individual, free to do so, may select his own mission, and thereby
+send himself on a special duty, this is not usually the case where an
+effective military chain of command exists. Normally the sending
+authority is the immediate superior; the agent, the immediate
+subordinate.</p>
+
+<p>The mission, once assigned, does not change until it has been
+accomplished or until it has been modified or revoked by higher
+authority, usually the immediate superior by whom it was assigned.</p>
+
+<p>As previously explained in this connection, the designation of a
+purpose, linked with a task, is an essential element of a mission as
+treated herein. It is essential to unity of effort that the purpose of
+the mission of a commander be common with that of other commanders of
+the same echelon who are to participate in the effort enjoined by
+their superior's directives. Directives expressed in the Order Form
+(<a href="#Page_112">page 112</a> and Chapter VIII) facilitate clear recognition of this
+purpose, which appears in the general plan of action prescribed in the
+second paragraph of that form. The commander may consider the
+relationship thus:</p>
+
+<p>My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out
+my designated part of my immediate superior's general plan.</p>
+
+<p>It is customary to simplify the foregoing to the statement that the
+mission is:</p>
+
+<p>(Task) (statement of the assigned task),</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement
+of the superior's general plan).</p>
+
+<p>The words "assist in", etc., may frequently be understood and
+therefore omitted.</p>
+
+<p>The foregoing expression of a mission affords, as later <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span>explained
+(Chapter VI), a method for clear visualization of the effect desired
+by higher authority. (See also <a href="#Page_84">page 84</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>All of his assigned tasks which materially influence the commander's
+Decision (hereinafter discussed) are properly included in his mission;
+other tasks, naturally, may be omitted in this connection. In the case
+of a double or multiple task (<a href="#Page_86">page 86</a>), all the tasks may be related
+to a single purpose, or the included tasks may each, or in certain
+combinations, be linked separately to appropriate purposes.</p>
+
+<p>Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength. The feasibility and
+acceptability of action for the attainment of an objective are
+dependent (see the Fundamental Military Principle&mdash;<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>) on the
+factors of fighting strength. Fighting strength (<a href="#Page_35">page 35</a>) is derived
+from the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. A survey of these
+factors, in proper detail according to the nature of the problem, is
+therefore a necessary phase in the process of its solution. Such a
+survey completes the basis for the study of courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>Courses of Action. The estimate process naturally takes account (<a href="#Page_80">page
+80</a>) of methods for attaining the objective indicated in the assigned
+task. The military profession has, from time to time, applied a
+variety of terms to designate such methods. Terms so used include,
+among others, "plans open to us" (or "to the enemy"), "lines of
+action", and "courses of action". The last-noted, having been standard
+in our naval service for many years, is the term used in this
+discussion.</p>
+
+<p>Each course of action is thus a plan of military operations for the
+attainment of the assigned objective, and each thus indicates (<a href="#Page_37">page
+37</a>) "an act or a series of acts" which may be undertaken to that end.
+Until a final selection is made for embodiment in the Decision, each
+course of action is a tentative solution of the problem. For the
+reason given below, a course of action, while under consideration as a
+tentative solution of the problem, is also correctly conceived as
+indicating an objective and, in proper detail, the action for its
+attainment.</p>
+
+<p>When embodied in the Decision, the adopted course of action or
+combination of courses becomes the commander's general plan (or the
+basis thereof) for the employment of his force; such a general plan
+will naturally indicate the commander's general objective (<a href="#Page_49">page 49</a>)
+and, in proper detail, the action to be taken for its attainment (<a href="#Page_44">page
+44</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The objective may be specifically stated or may be inferred (see <a href="#Page_82">page
+82</a>; also <a href="#Page_84">page 84</a> for the corresponding <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span>discussion of the expression
+of tasks); but, in any event, clear thinking demands that the
+objective be definitely envisaged. There is a manifest advantage in
+such definite envisaging of the objectives involved in courses of
+action. Suitability as to the appropriate effect desired&mdash;the first
+requirement in the selection of a correct objective (<a href="#Page_51">page 51</a>)&mdash;is much
+more readily tested on this basis. The practical bearing of this fact
+becomes apparent during the early stages (Chapter VI) of the process
+of solving military problems.</p>
+
+<p>Frequent examples of naval courses of action include (see <a href="#Page_92">page 92</a>):</p>
+
+<p>(1)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To destroy the enemy force." Here the objective, "destruction of
+the enemy force", is specifically indicated.</p>
+
+<p>(2)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To divert the enemy force." Here also the objective, in this case
+"diversion of the enemy force", is specifically indicated.</p>
+
+<p>(3)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To evade the enemy." Here again the objective, "evasion of the
+enemy", is specifically indicated.</p>
+
+<p>(4)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To cover friendly and neutral trade." Here the objective,
+"protection of friendly and neutral trade by the utilization of
+advantageous covering positions", is more or less inferred.</p>
+
+<p>(5)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To escort trade." Here the objective, "protection of trade by
+escorting it in convoys", is more or less inferred.</p>
+
+<p>(6)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To patrol the trade routes." Here the objective, e.g.,
+"protection of trade by patrolling the trade routes", is inferred.</p>
+
+<p>(7)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "To raid." Here the objective, e.g., "infliction of loss and
+damage by raiding", is inferred.</p>
+
+<p>In the foregoing instances, the action to be taken is indicated in
+general terms. The extent to which the action may properly be
+indicated depends on the nature of the problem and is necessarily left
+to the judgment of the commander. Two possibilities, between which
+there may be various intermediate cases, are as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(a) To destroy the enemy force by simultaneous attacks on
+the escort and convoy.</p>
+
+<p>(b) To destroy the enemy force by an attack with the main
+force on the escort, following this immediately by an attack
+on the convoy with a flanking force before the convoy can
+scatter so widely as to make ineffective the pursuit of any of
+its units.</p></div>
+
+<p>For a further application, it will be noted that the national policies
+referred to early in this discussion (<a href="#Page_7">page 7</a>) are national courses of
+action, considered and adopted as methods of attaining national
+objectives.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span>The expression "courses of action", in the sense of a plan considered
+or adopted as a solution of the problem, has the defect that it
+appears to emphasize the action, rather than the paramount component,
+i.e., the objective. So long as this fact is borne in mind, the
+limitations of the term "courses of action" need not operate to
+influence, adversely, the solution of the problem.</p>
+
+<p>As noted above, the commander brings to mind courses of action by the
+mental act of "envisaging", i.e., "viewing with the mind's eye or
+conceptionally", "seeing as a mental image", bringing fully and
+distinctively to view. How is this done?</p>
+
+<p>Although the time available for the process depends on the particular
+problem, the process itself is the same for all. During the
+clarification of the problem, the commander will have entertained
+certain ideas,&mdash;ideas as to such matters as the existing situation,
+the desired new situation, the possible physical objectives, the
+relative positions and movements of the forces involved, and related
+matters. His training and experience cause these ideas to evoke
+others, which are associated in his mind with problems of the
+past,&mdash;in particular, with the bearing of such ideas on the outcome of
+those problems.</p>
+
+<p>This process of thinking, if it is to be effective as well as
+reflective, requires mental access to certain sources of ideas. These
+sources may lie in the study of history, or in the wealth of doctrine
+and instructions gathered into official manuals and into other
+professional writings, or in the commander's own practical experience.
+Logicians who have investigated this natural process point out that
+suggested solutions are the resurrection of ideas from past
+experience. Good thinking demands access to a large storehouse of
+ideas connected in various and flexible ways. The best available
+knowledge is the main source from which reflective thinking obtains
+relevant and promising suggestions for a solution.</p>
+
+<p>By such resort to analogy, the commander utilizes the accumulations of
+past experience. Sometimes he finds that the courses of action thus
+suggested are exactly suitable as tentative solutions for his problem.
+In other instances, of course, only parts of the present situation are
+found to be analogous to those previously encountered. Even then,
+however, the similarity of the facts may be helpful in providing
+suggestions. Guidance based on limited or partial similarity has been
+demonstrated to be better than purely intuitive thinking.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span>The commander cannot be content, however, to depend wholly on the
+guidance of the past. Sometimes, moreover, he may not be able to
+obtain suggestions by analogy. New suggestions, ideas not drawn from
+past experience, are very desirable; they are possible, also, in the
+sense that the result of the analysis of past experience may be
+reassembled, in imagination, in novel ways. New courses of action,
+overlooked in the past, may be contrived. Original combinations, not
+previously entertained, may be devised. Readiness to employ the novel
+and the new, as well as to utilize the old, is a prime qualification
+for command.</p>
+
+<p>Reflective thinking of this nature requires adequate knowledge of the
+capabilities of weapons, so that new possibilities may be perceived as
+to coordination in their use. While analogy looks backward to find
+applicable lessons, the search for novelty seeks suggestions from
+potentialities not heretofore utilized.</p>
+
+<p>The development of the full possibilities of new weapons is an
+important source of forward thinking. Such thinking constantly
+integrates the current developments in war. The competent commander
+does not wait for history to be made; he makes it.</p>
+
+<p>Familiarity with experimentation, research, and new performance is
+also a fruitful source of suggestions. When used, this method results
+in advance demands by the armed forces for new weapons not yet
+supplied.</p>
+
+<p>Closely allied to analogy is the application of ordered and classified
+knowledge as to the nature of warfare. Aware of the effects which can
+be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander
+identifies his objective with one or more of these effects.</p>
+
+<p>The application of ordered and classified knowledge of naval warfare
+starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and
+proceeds thereafter to the study of the various classes of operations
+which may be utilized to this end. Naval effort has as its objective
+the keeping open of sea communications (see <a href="#Page_62">page 62</a>). Command of the
+sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the
+ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the
+enemy from doing so.</p>
+
+<p>Naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the
+purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas,
+especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping
+open of sea communications are of vital importance.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>Such operations may be classified under the headings:</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+    <p>(1)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For securing command of sea areas,</p>
+    <p>(2)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In sea areas not under command, and</p>
+    <p>(3)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In sea areas under command.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the basis of this classification, specific operations, broadly
+considered, appear to be limited in number. As to classification (1),
+applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to
+contain them, or to divert them. For (2), applicable operations are:
+to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval
+lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring
+overseas movement. For (3), applicable operations are: to blockade
+trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard
+expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive
+operations against enemy coastal objectives.</p>
+
+<p>Manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in
+an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. Each such course
+of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or
+less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which
+constitute parts of the whole. (See <a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>There can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between
+courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto.
+For example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a
+character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged,
+correlatively with "to destroy", as one of his courses of action. Yet,
+in another problem, a raid may be visualized, properly, as a detailed
+operation pertaining, in a subordinate capacity, to a more
+comprehensive operation envisaged as a course of action "to destroy".</p>
+
+<p>Similarly, what is a broad course of action from the viewpoint of one
+echelon in the chain of command, may be correctly viewed, on a higher
+echelon, as a detailed operation. Operations assigned in tasks imposed
+by higher authority become the basis for the determination of courses
+of action on the next lower echelon, a procedure which continues
+throughout the chain of command until specialized, on the lowest
+echelons, in the form of a simplified routine (see <a href="#Page_84">page 84</a>).</p>
+
+<p>While the list of courses of action given above is made up from the
+viewpoint of broad strategical problems, a similar list can be
+assembled for other problems. For example, the order, "Destroy enemy
+naval forces", if taken as the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>motivating task of a tactical
+estimate, will be the basis for certain courses of action,
+constituting, when complete (see below), a well-recognized general
+plan for a naval battle. This plan will in turn call for various
+detailed operations on the part of the several subdivisions of the
+force under the commander who makes the estimate (see <a href="#Page_95">page 95</a>).</p>
+
+<p>As a tentative solution of the problem a course of action may be
+complete or partial, i.e., it may, if carried out, provide for the
+complete attainment of the objective; or, such complete attainment may
+require a combination of several of the courses of action under study.</p>
+
+<p>The exclusive consideration of courses of action of the complete type
+possesses the advantage of minimizing the total number of solutions
+under study. This simplifies the procedure of analysis and of
+comparing courses of action with each other, because of the relatively
+small number of courses to be tested and to be compared.</p>
+
+<p>However, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
+visualize complete courses of action, especially during the early
+stages of the estimate. Sometimes the initial visualization of partial
+courses and their eventual combination into a complete solution will
+be found necessary.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, either or both of the foregoing systems of formulating
+courses of action may be found appropriate, according to individual
+preference and the nature of the particular problem.</p>
+
+<p>Individuals, comparable with respect to knowledge, appear to vary
+greatly in their ability to produce the appropriate suggestion, as to
+courses of action, at the right time. The reason for this phenomenon
+is not altogether clear, but it is known that thinking seems to be
+limited not merely by the range of knowledge, but by whatever part of
+it becomes available when needed. This point invites attention to
+another procedure which is open to the commander with respect to
+stimulating reflective thinking. This procedure recognizes the fact
+that, when two or more minds attack a problem, together, the combined
+effort often increases the applied mental power. This fact is
+universally recognized, for example, in the utilization of staff
+assistance (<a href="#Page_13">page 13</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Inherent and acquired ability have unquestionably much to do with the
+possibilities of visualizing single courses of action with respect to
+their completeness as to attainment of the objective. One method of
+visualization seems to be the mental picturization of more or less
+detailed operations, followed by their combination, through rapid
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span>synthesis, into complete courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>An example of this method would occur where several rather specific
+operations were visualized, involving seizure of certain localities as
+a defensive measure. If it were then observed that the objective in
+each such case was "denial to the enemy of a particular naval-base
+site in the area ABCD", an appropriate expression of a comprehensive
+course of action would be "to deny the enemy naval-base sites in the
+area ABCD".</p>
+
+<p>Another method of visualizing appropriate courses of action seems to
+involve initial recognition, in the first instance, of such courses as
+broad and comprehensive general plans, without first visualizing and
+combining their details. This method appears to be more usual after
+considerable experience or training. It is therefore possible that
+this second method is merely a practiced development of the first, the
+process of synthesis being so rapidly accomplished that it becomes
+subconscious.</p>
+
+<p>The nature of the particular problem has also an unquestioned bearing
+on this subject. In instances where no single course of action can be
+found which is adequately expressive of complete attainment of the
+objective, the final selection of a method of attaining the objective
+will necessarily be through a combination of the courses of action
+under study (<a href="#Page_93">page 93</a>).</p>
+
+<p>For example, if the assigned task were to "protect trade in sea area
+ABCD", the extent of the area, together with its geographical position
+relative to locations from which enemy attacks could be launched,
+might not be such as to permit the attainment of the objective by a
+single course of action such as "to escort trade in convoys" or "to
+patrol the trade routes". Both of these courses of action might be
+necessary, and, in addition, perhaps, the further course "to cover
+focal points M and N".</p>
+
+<p>Each of these courses of action has, as its objective, the
+establishment of a protected area or areas, stationary or moving, for
+the safe passage of merchant vessels. However, for purposes of
+expressing the course of action involved, the contemplated procedure
+is in this case better indicated by a combination expressed in terms
+of action, the objective being inferred as a matter of mutual
+understanding. The less particularized expression of the course of
+action in terms of the objective would, in this instance, convey a
+less definite idea of the procedure under consideration.</p>
+
+<p>Similar considerations pertain frequently to naval <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span>problems, more
+especially to those involving naval engagements of considerable scope.
+The solution of such a problem takes, typically, the form of an
+operation consisting, not of a single "act", but of "a series of
+acts", i.e., of a number of stages or phases of battle, each being a
+preparation for the one following, until the final stage provides for
+the attainment of the assigned objective.</p>
+
+<p>For example, a first consideration might be "to reduce enemy carrier
+aircraft strength by" certain pertinent operations. A second
+consideration might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed by" certain
+operations in order to force the enemy to accept battle. A third might
+be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed, life, and hitting power by
+gunfire" within certain range bands, in order to exploit own strength
+and enemy weakness at those ranges. A fourth might be "to continue
+reduction of enemy battle-line strength by gunfire, closing to" such a
+range as is suitable to that end. Finally, a fifth consideration might
+be "to inflict conclusive damage on enemy battle-line with torpedoes".
+All of the foregoing partial courses (other possibilities having been
+studied and discarded) might then be combined into one operation as
+the selected course of action "in order to destroy the enemy
+battleship strength",&mdash;such destruction being the assigned objective.</p>
+
+<p>The degree of detail in which a course of action may be visualized for
+purposes of the estimate will vary with the same factors, i.e.,
+personal facility and the nature of the problem. Practice in the
+solution of problems appears to develop such facility that entire
+plans can be visualized as courses of action, each plan reasonably
+complete as to details with reference to physical objectives, relative
+positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for
+freedom of action. However, it is rarely, if ever, necessary to
+visualize courses of action minutely in an estimate of a basic
+problem; the extent to which they are viewed mentally, as detailed
+plans, need only be such as to fulfill the requirements of the
+particular problem (see Section I of Chapter IV).</p>
+
+<p>The statement of a course of action, for purposes of the estimate,
+will naturally be along broad and comprehensive lines, although some
+important matters of detail (relatively speaking) may be added if this
+is found desirable as the estimate proceeds. It is with these
+considerations in mind that the standard practice has been developed
+of formulating courses of action, while under study as tentative
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span>solutions of the problem, in broad terms, appropriate to general plans
+of action.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may find, on occasion, what appears, on first
+examination, to be an exception to the rule, herein treated as valid,
+that a course of action, correctly conceived, always contains the two
+elements (1) objective, specific or inferred, and (2) action for its
+attainment. However, apparent exceptions to this principle are due to
+special conditions which, on proper analysis, reveal no actual
+exceptions. Certain examples, now to be discussed, demonstrate this
+fact.</p>
+
+<p>For instance, when the higher commander deems such procedure advisable
+(<a href="#Page_86">page 86</a>), he may make his subordinate's estimate of the situation, as
+well as his own, and may accordingly indicate both a task and a
+predetermined course of action for the subordinate to pursue: for
+example:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>"Deny enemy base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island."</p></div>
+
+<p>In such a case the higher commander has indicated the predetermined
+course of action in the words "by capturing X Island". This expression
+indicates a specific objective, the capture of X Island. The
+expression also indicates, though not in any detail, the action to be
+taken, i.e., it specifies "capture", rather than "occupation",
+"isolation", or some other form of control (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>). Any further
+development of the action is left for the subordinate to determine.
+The procedure to be followed by the subordinate commander in solving
+such a problem is described hereafter (<a href="#Page_102">page 102</a>) in the discussion of
+the analysis of courses of action. In any event, it is manifest that
+there is here no exception to the rule that a course of action,
+correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action
+for its attainment.</p>
+
+<p>A further example may occur when the higher commander, instead of
+indicating both the task and the predetermined course of action,
+indicates only the latter (<a href="#Page_86">page 86</a>), by directing "Capture X Island".
+Once the subordinate has recognized this directive as containing a
+predetermined course of action, but not a normal task, he realizes
+that the objective so indicated would ordinarily be left for him to
+select. He also realizes that the action to be taken for its
+attainment is left for him to determine, in further detail.</p>
+
+<p>In this case, then, what is really a predetermined course of action
+appears in the guise of a task. When the commander, receiving the
+directive, has recognized this fact, he proceeds in the manner
+hereafter indicated (<a href="#Page_103">page 103</a>) in the discussion of the analysis of
+courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>In any event, it is manifest that here, also, there is no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span>exception
+to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the
+two elements of objective and action for its attainment.</p>
+
+<p>In such a case as the foregoing, how does the commander recognize that
+the apparent task is really a predetermined course of action? He could
+easily go astray because the directive, until analyzed, appears to
+contain a normal task. The directive indicates an objective, thereby
+resembling a task. The directive will usually indicate, at least in
+some degree, the action which the subordinate is to take. Hence, so
+far as superficial appearance is concerned, the subordinate commander
+may easily mistake the predetermined course of action for a normal
+task. However, he discovers the difference when he endeavors to find
+courses of action which are appropriate to this apparent task.</p>
+
+<p>The commander will then discover that, while he can visualize actions
+whose accomplishment will attain the objective indicated in the
+apparent task, he cannot visualize any objective completely suitable
+to the case (<a href="#Page_93">page 93</a>), intermediate between the assigned objective and
+the indicated action. He can state the assigned objective in other
+words and adopt such a statement as an expression of his general
+objective, but the two objectives, the one he selects and the assigned
+one, will really be identical.</p>
+
+<p>This inability to visualize an objective of the commander's own
+selection, suitable to the case, is inevitable, because higher
+authority has already done this for him. He may find it advisable to
+develop further the action needed for the attainment of the indicated
+objective. On occasion this, also, will have been predetermined by the
+higher commander.</p>
+
+<p>The foregoing considerations have been given special emphasis and
+deserve careful study, because an appreciation of these facts is
+necessary to a true understanding of the nature of correctly conceived
+courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>Analysis and Selection of Courses of Action. After one or more courses
+of action have been determined as tentative solutions of his problem,
+the commander will be confronted with the necessity of deciding upon
+that course of action, or combination of courses of action, which will
+best attain the assigned objective, i.e., be the best way out of the
+seeming difficulty. The analysis, in each case, will settle
+suitability on the basis of the appropriate effect desired,
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength as established
+by a survey of means available and opposed, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span>influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater, and acceptability on the basis of
+consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>In connection with these considerations, the detailed operations
+involved in each course will be analyzed so far as may be necessary
+(<a href="#Page_95">page 95</a>) and with respect to correct physical objectives,
+advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting
+strength, and adequate freedom of action (see the Fundamental Military
+Principle&mdash;<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>). A selection shown to be best, from the standpoint
+of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the consequences,
+will be adopted as the decision.</p>
+
+<p>The tests of courses of action to determine whether they fulfill the
+requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability as
+to consequences take account of the usual included determinants as
+listed and explained below. The list is not rigid, and the commander,
+according to the nature of his problem, may desire to omit certain of
+the items or to include any other considerations which may be
+applicable.</p>
+
+<p>With respect to suitability, the commander considers the following:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="noin">(1) General. The test for suitability (see also <a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>)
+calls for conformity as to both the nature and the scope of
+the motivating task. With respect to conformity in nature,
+the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+contribute to the accomplishment of the task. As to scope,
+the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+accomplish the task in full; and, if not in full, to what
+extent. The factor of urgency is also considered here.</p>
+
+<p>It is frequently possible for the commander, merely by
+concentrating his thought on this particular perplexity, to
+conclude at once that the course of action is suitable. In
+other cases, a considerable amount of study may be needed.
+This analytical study consists in breaking down the course of
+action into its component parts, i.e., the detailed operations
+which naturally grow out of it. This procedure is similar to
+that described later (Chapter VII), with respect to
+formulating a plan, but during the basic estimate the
+procedure, when utilized, is for a different reason&mdash;solely
+that of assisting in the analysis.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(2) Details, (a) Conformity as to nature. Will the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span>course of
+action, if successfully carried out, contribute, at least in
+some degree, to the accomplishment of the task? If not, such a
+course is rejected. Courses that do contribute, however, are
+not rejected until the possibilities of combination have been
+examined, later.</p>
+
+<p>(b) Completeness. If the course of action is successfully
+carried out, will it accomplish in full the motivating task?
+If not, how much will it contribute towards such
+accomplishment? With what other courses of action can it be
+combined, to accomplish the motivating task in full? With what
+others can it be combined to accomplish the motivating task in
+part, and in such case how nearly does the combination
+contribute to full accomplishment?</p>
+
+<p>This examination may lead to combinations of certain partial
+solutions.</p>
+
+<p>(c) Desirability as to Urgency. The commander now considers
+the element of time. Complete accomplishment of the motivating
+task within his own theater may come too late to meet the
+requirements of the common effort of the entire force.
+Synchronization with the action of other task-group commanders
+may be so important that timing becomes vital. As to this
+consideration, two courses of action, equally competent, may
+differ greatly in their qualification relating to urgency; one
+may be found highly desirable and the other completely
+unsatisfactory.</p></div>
+
+<p>As to feasibility, the commander considers the following:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="noin">(1) General. The test for feasibility (see <a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>) is
+concerned with whether the course of action is practicable.
+Has it reasonable chances of success under the particular
+circumstances? Are the difficulties surmountable? Is it
+easily practicable, practicable with some difficulty, or very
+difficult?</p>
+
+<p>The commander, if he concludes that the course of action is
+not a practicable one, rejects it from further consideration
+in the estimate of the situation. However, care is taken at
+this point not to dismiss, abruptly, courses of action which
+may later be combined advantageously with one or more others.</p>
+
+<p>Here, again, as noted for the suitability test, the commander
+may sometimes profitably analyze the course of action by
+breaking it down into more detailed operations.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span>As a result of the tests discussed above, the commander is
+able to make a list of courses of action upon which his
+confirmed judgment has bestowed the qualities of suitability
+and feasibility.</p>
+
+<p>He is also able to take stock to see how many of the solutions
+are complete, how many are incomplete, and in the latter case
+to what extent they constitute partial solutions. It is, of
+course, desirable to have as many complete solutions as
+possible, and at this point it may be possible to merge two or
+more incomplete solutions into a single course of action which
+better fulfills the test of suitability. The commander can
+also take stock, similarly, of the degree of feasibility,
+already referred to, as to the retained courses of action.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(2) Details, (a) Prospects of Success. Here the several courses of
+action are considered relatively, with respect to the chance
+of success in each. In the rating of courses on this basis,
+the commander excludes consideration of losses except as they
+may influence success or failure. He notes, however, his
+considered expectations as to losses. Losses may appear to be
+so great that success is doubtful. Certain courses of action
+may be particularly vulnerable to enemy opposition because of
+the types of weapons involved or because of favorable enemy
+positions. Choice of such a course would permit the enemy an
+initial advantage.</p>
+
+<p>(b) Facility of Execution. This subject has to do with the
+relative ease or difficulty of carrying out the several
+courses of action. On the basis of the existing situation,
+each course of action may be compared with all the others to
+determine their relative merits with regard to the facility of
+execution. Consideration is given to the action involved
+against the several physical objectives; to the movements
+needed in making new dispositions; to the relative adequacy of
+the forces as to numbers and types of weapons; and to the
+measures required for freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>A review of the previous discussion of these elements (Chapter
+IV) may be very helpful in connection with this comparison. As
+to freedom of action, for example, the commander may ask
+himself which course is best from the standpoint of using the
+initiative to advantage; and which course of action lends
+itself best to the advantageous use of surprise. As the
+commander reflects on these matters, other similar questions
+may be suggested.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span>(c) Utilization of Own Strength and Exploitation of Enemy
+Weakness. In his original visualization of each course of
+action, the commander has naturally considered how to utilize
+his own strength to best advantage, and how best to exploit
+enemy weakness. In fact, especially in a detailed tactical
+estimate, these considerations may have been predominant in
+envisaging the courses of action. A careful evaluation of the
+merits of each course of action in this respect is accordingly
+necessary before a choice is made.</p></div>
+
+<p>With regard to acceptability of consequences as to costs, the
+commander considers the following:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="noin">(1) General. The process of putting a course of action to
+proof as a tentative solution of the problem remains
+incomplete until the course has been tested to determine its
+consequences as to costs, so far as these can be visualized
+in advance. The process involves an evaluation of the
+diminution in total advantage which will result in the event
+of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the
+event of success. The situation to be expected, if the course
+of action is carried out, is visualized in order to determine
+the future effect on the creation or maintenance of an
+ultimately favorable military situation.</p>
+
+<p>In testing each course of action for acceptability as to its
+consequences (<a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>), the commander considers the cost of
+success, the cost of failure, and the possible gain and loss
+in perspective with the united effort as a whole. Questions
+which he may pose include: If the course of action is
+successful, will the costs be so prohibitive as to adversely
+affect the successful accomplishment of the further effort? If
+a tactical situation is under consideration, will the costs
+prevent the accomplishment of the strategical aim? If the
+course of action fails, what will be its effect? Will it cause
+the entire plan to fail? Will its failure affect, for example,
+the national morale?</p>
+
+<p>If the command&mdash;and ultimately the State&mdash;can afford the
+losses and other disadvantages which will be incurred as a
+result of either the success or the failure of the
+contemplated effort, a course of action may be considered as
+acceptable from the standpoint of consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>As previously noted with respect to suitability, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span>it may be
+desirable to consider, with regard to consequences, the
+detailed operations which may be involved in each course of
+action.</p>
+
+<p>Courses of action involving excessive consequences as to costs
+are rejected. Notation is made of the relative degree of
+acceptability, with respect to consequences as to costs, of
+those courses of action which are retained.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(2) Details. (a) The Results of Success and of Failure. Each
+course of action is examined to visualize the situation which
+would be brought about for the commander and for the enemy in
+case of success or of failure. The relative possibilities of
+recovery toward a more favorable situation are weighed. This
+consideration involves relative risks, for it may be that a
+certain course, otherwise satisfactory, might entail
+intolerable conditions should failure ensue.</p>
+
+<p>The costs are measured in terms of fighting strength. It has
+to be considered whether the sacrifices involved are worth the
+gains which will follow; whether the objectives if attained
+will be sufficiently valuable when the need of fighting
+strength to accomplish further aims is considered.</p>
+
+<p>(b) Comparison of gains and costs. When costs are found to be
+in excess of the over-all gains, this fact may be the basis
+for rejecting any courses of action which are less desirable
+than others. However, retention of a course found to be costly
+may be justified for sound reasons.</p></div>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>When, as in the example given previously (<a href="#Page_96">page 96</a>), the commander
+receives a directive such as "Deny enemy base sites in the area ABCD
+by capturing X Island", he carries through his estimate of the
+situation in the usual manner. He notes, however, that the capture of
+X Island has been indicated as a predetermined course of action. He
+makes a proper survey of the factors of relative fighting strength. He
+considers all pertinent courses of action. He goes through this
+procedure in order to reach an understanding of all the elements of
+his problem. He wishes to understand the necessary background. He
+realizes the importance of a grasp of the considerations which have
+led higher authority to arrive at the predetermined course of action.</p>
+
+<p>By carrying through the usual estimate procedure, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span>including the
+analysis of all pertinent courses of action, he assists himself to
+arrive at a proper concept of the action to be taken to capture X
+island. In this way he establishes a sound basis for formulating a
+detailed plan (in the second step), for inaugurating planned action
+(in the third step), and for supervising this action (in the fourth
+step). He also establishes a basis for any constructive
+representations which he finds it advisable to make to higher
+authority (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In another example previously given (<a href="#Page_96">page 96</a>), the higher commander
+indicates only the predetermined course of action (by a directive
+"Capture X Island") and omits the statement of the true underlying
+task. The subordinate, on discovering this fact, deduces the
+underlying task and carries through the estimate procedure, modified,
+as explained for the previous example. In addition to the merits as
+previously stated, this method has a further advantage. The deduction
+of the underlying task enables the commander to judge whether any
+advisable or necessary deviation or departure from the predetermined
+course of action (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>) involves merely a variation from the letter
+of his instructions or, more important, from their spirit.</p>
+
+<p>For instance, the directive, as in the case previously discussed, may
+have been "Capture X Island". The higher commander when issuing this
+order, may have stated his own general plan to be "This force will
+protect the base at A." The commander, on receipt of this directive,
+then deduces his true task. This is "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD"
+("by capturing X Island"&mdash;a predetermined course of action), the
+purpose of the mission being "in order to protect the base at A".</p>
+
+<p>Now it may be found that the enemy, unconcerned as to X Island, is
+moving to reinforce Y Island and to use it as a base to attack the
+base at A. The commander then properly decides to capture Y Island,
+instead of X Island. By his identification of the predetermined course
+of action as such, and by his correct deduction of the true underlying
+task, the commander has established a sound basis for the solution of
+his problem. He can now, with confidence, defer or abandon the capture
+of X Island, and can devote his efforts to the capture of Y Island.
+His confidence is justified because he knows his decision to be in
+accordance with the spirit of his instructions.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, if the higher commander directed, "This force will protect
+the base at A&mdash;&mdash;", and added, later in his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span>directive, "Deny enemy
+base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island", the subordinate
+commander's deductions would have been made more easily.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The full play of the reasoning power is called for in the process of
+visualizing courses of action and of selecting the best. This process
+is the crux of the first step. Here the knowledge of the relationship
+between cause and effect is applied. Here, also, the commander is
+brought fully to realize that, to reach a sound decision, there is a
+requirement for a studied development of each stage by which the human
+mind passes from recognition of a necessity for action to the ultimate
+conviction as to the best course to pursue.</p>
+
+<p>As essential background for the utilization of his intellectual powers
+in this process, the commander requires knowledge of the capabilities
+and limitations of the technique of his profession and of the weapons
+of his calling. To the necessary knowledge gained through his own
+experience, either in actual warfare or in peacetime exercises
+simulating this experience, he adds the equally essential familiarity
+with the science of war, and with the lessons to be drawn from
+historical instances of success and failure. In effect, it is here
+brought home to him that, on a fundamental basis of earnest thought,
+mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests
+the soundness of decision (see <a href="#Page_219">page 219</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The Decision. The word "decision" has the primary meaning of a
+conclusion. A decision (conclusion) is essential as a starting point
+for further procedure. Sound decision is the essential preliminary to
+wise planning and effective action.</p>
+
+<p>The range within which military decisions may fall extends from the
+instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to the conditional
+intentions of a distant future. Within this range will be found many
+decisions which the commander is necessarily called upon to reach
+during the four steps toward the attainment of an assigned objective.</p>
+
+<p>The course of action, or the combination of courses, as finally
+selected by the commander upon the termination of the first step,
+represents his conclusion as to his outlined plan for the attainment
+of his assigned objective. This conclusion will indicate, specifically
+or inferentially, his general objective, as selected by himself,
+and&mdash;in proper detail&mdash;the action required for its attainment. (See
+<a href="#Page_88">pages 88</a> and <a href="#Page_95">95</a>). The conclusion is thus his Decision, which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span>provides
+the general plan, or the basis therefor, from which he will, in the
+second step, develop a detailed plan of operations for his force.</p>
+
+<p>Illustration of the foregoing process may profitably be initiated with
+respect to the highest echelon involved in the case of a State. The
+primary national objective of organized government (Chapter I, <a href="#Page_7">page 7</a>)
+is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for
+the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community.
+This aim, as embodied in basic policy (see <a href="#Page_8">pages 8 and 9</a>), is the
+objective visualized by the people of the State, or by its
+policy-forming elements, in the capacity of an organized government.</p>
+
+<p>For the maintenance of the condition represented in this policy, or
+for the creation of such a condition not already existing, an
+appropriate task of the State, as the political embodiment of the
+national will, might be to maintain or establish friendly (at least,
+not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of
+the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise.</p>
+
+<p>The national mission (the mission of the State) then becomes:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(Task) To maintain or establish friendly (at least, not
+hostile) governments and social systems In those key
+localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective
+threats may arise,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(Purpose) in order to ensure envisaged prosperity and
+essential security for the social system which is the
+fundamental basis of the community.</p></div>
+
+<p>A national estimate of the situation, by the highest authority of the
+State, to determine the effect to be attained for the accomplishment
+of the foregoing mission, takes account of the possibilities of
+accomplishment through psychological, political, economic, or military
+pressure, or by combinations thereof. As a result of this accounting,
+the State adopts a national Decision which indicates the best way of
+accomplishing its mission.</p>
+
+<p>To carry out this Decision, each of the primary subdivisions of the
+State's organization is assigned a specific task or tasks, whose total
+effect is designed to achieve the result embodied in the national
+Decision. The task of each such primary subdivision is linked to a
+purpose which is the attainment of the objective indicated in the
+national Decision.</p>
+
+<p>In like manner, each organization of the national armed forces is
+governed in its action by a task assigned to it as a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span>result of a
+Decision made by the proper authority on the next higher echelon. Each
+commander is thus provided with a mission which consists of an
+assigned task and of a purpose as indicated by the general objective
+decided upon by his immediate superior.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Second Step</h4>
+
+<p>The second step, that of resolving the required action into detailed
+military operations, may now be undertaken unless the Decision reached
+in the first step is intended for future reference only. During the
+second step the commander, if he carries the procedure through to its
+logical end, visualizes his proposed operations as tasks, in order to
+ensure their proper formulation. He may, if it is his intent to issue
+a directive or directives for the execution of his plan of operation,
+or a part thereof, arrange his procedure so as to facilitate the third
+step.</p>
+
+<p>The common characteristic of problems of the second step is that they
+deal with matters pertaining to the support of the action decided upon
+in the first step, and that they are properly problems for the
+commander who made that Decision, and not for his subordinates, to
+solve. Such problems are appropriately termed subsidiary problems.
+Their full solution involves subsidiary estimates, subsidiary
+decisions, and, not infrequently, distinct subsidiary plans and
+subsidiary directives.</p>
+
+<p>Each detailed operation derived, during the second step, from the
+outlined plan of operations (as embodied in the basic Decision) is
+determined upon the basis of an estimate procedure essentially similar
+to the basic estimate. There is thus a series of subsidiary estimates
+for this purpose. Such estimates tend to be abbreviated and informal,
+since the necessary data, and often much of the consideration as to
+the subsidiary courses of action, may be available from the basic
+estimate.</p>
+
+<p>Unless the detailed operations are of such a character as to require
+development into subsidiary plans as a basis for subsidiary
+directives, such operations are merely embodied, in the form of tasks
+or otherwise as may be appropriate, in the basic plan. In the excepted
+cases, where subsidiary plans, in detailed form, are necessary or
+desirable, such a plan may be the result of a more formal and
+specialized subsidiary estimate.</p>
+
+<p>Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the second step.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span>The problem involved in the first step has been conveniently termed
+the basic problem because it is directly concerned with the attainment
+of the assigned objective (<a href="#Page_81">page 81</a>). The solution of the basic problem
+in the first step, and of its corollary in the second step, completes
+the planning stage.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Third Step</h4>
+
+<p>The third step consists of the formulation, and&mdash;if appropriate&mdash;the
+issue, of the directives which convey to the subordinate the will and
+intent of the commander. From the mental standpoint, the third step
+begins when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating
+his directives for the execution of the planned action. Whether or not
+the third step is partially combined with the second, its problem is a
+separate one. Its complete solution inaugurates the action planned in
+the second step.</p>
+
+<p>The third step is discussed and developed in Chapter VIII.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Fourth Step</h4>
+
+<p>The fourth step, which calls for mental effort in the solution of the
+problem of supervising the action, requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation. The procedure
+employed is customarily termed The Running Estimate of the Situation.
+Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the
+directives of the third step. In effect, the commander, after action
+is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the
+problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation.
+With the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to
+detect whether variations from the original situation are in
+accordance with his design or whether these variations have introduced
+new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or
+its complete abandonment.</p>
+
+<p>The fourth step is discussed and developed in Chapter IX.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Sequence of Events in the Four Steps</h4>
+
+<p>When all of the elements of the entire procedure of the four steps are
+present, they take, from the viewpoint of the same commander
+throughout, the following form:</p>
+
+<p>(1) First step: The commander, confronted with a strategical situation
+(<a href="#Page_83">page 83</a>), makes a strategical estimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>and comes to a strategical
+Decision. The problem, the estimate, and the Decision are basic.</p>
+
+<p>(2) Second step: The commander now is confronted with a particular
+problem, one proceeding from his basic problem and involving the
+details of a plan of execution to carry out the Decision reached in
+the first step; this problem consists, itself, of numerous other
+problems of detail, which require solution by the commander himself.
+The basic Decision has embodied an outlined plan, strategical in
+nature, for an operation to accomplish the motivating task of the
+first step. This plan requires resolution into the detailed operations
+necessary for its full accomplishment.</p>
+
+<p>Each such detailed operation, as part of the outlined plan embodied in
+the strategical Decision, calls for a proper estimate. Though usually
+not formal in nature, more especially if the necessary data can be
+found in the basic estimate, such estimates are fundamentally the same
+as for the basic problem. The assembly of such detailed operations
+results in the formulation of a basic plan.</p>
+
+<p>At this point, additional problems may present themselves, these being
+frequently tactical in nature. Such, for example, may be sortie plans,
+approach plans, and Battle Plans. Other specialized plans (training,
+intelligence, logistics, etc.) may be needed. The data essential for
+the solution of such problems are more detailed than for the usual
+strategical basic problem. In some instances, such subsidiary plans
+may be developed directly from the basic Decision by procedures
+distinctive of the second step. In other instances, solution may
+require an additional subsidiary estimate, along the lines typical of
+the first step. These subsidiary estimates lead to subsidiary
+decisions, which in turn require to be resolved into the necessary
+detailed operations.</p>
+
+<p>(3) Third step: In the third step, the directives, if the basic
+problem was strategical in nature, will be of a strategical character.
+However, if subsidiary tactical problems were also involved, tactical
+directives will frequently be included. Logistics directives and other
+specialized instructions may also be a feature.</p>
+
+<p>(4) Fourth step: The supervision of the planned action, in the fourth
+step, may involve a new strategical problem, perhaps several. In such
+event each new basic problem will initiate a new series of problems,
+with corresponding directives, as described above. Changes in
+strategical plans may be called for. If no strategical changes are
+involved, there may nevertheless be introduced one or more new
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span>tactical or logistics problems, with corresponding changes in the
+subsequent procedure. The fourth step may, however, merely involve
+changes in supporting plans (tactical, logistics, etc.), with
+resultant changes in the directives involved. Finally, the fourth step
+may involve changes, for clarification, in the directives formulated
+in the third step.</p>
+
+<p>Variations in the foregoing procedure are frequent. The most usual is
+perhaps the case where the commander, receiving a tactical (instead of
+a strategical) mission, solves such a tactical problem as a basic
+problem in the first step; resolves his Decision into detailed
+tactical operations in the second step; issues a tactical directive or
+directives in the third step; and supervises his planned tactical
+action in the fourth step.</p>
+
+<p>Phraseology as to "Course of Action", "Operation", and "Task". It is
+important to avoid the possibility of becoming confused because each
+of the terms "a course of action", "an operation", and "a task", is
+correctly visualized as "an act or a series of acts". In the first
+step, the selected course of action (see <a href="#Page_104">page 104</a>) indicates the "act
+or series of acts" decided upon as representing, in general terms, an
+effort for attainment of a specified objective and is therefore stated
+as a comprehensive method of attaining that objective. The Decision
+thus adopts this course of action as a general plan of operations, or
+as a basis therefor.</p>
+
+<p>In the second step, the required action is developed to place it upon
+a practical, workable basis as a detailed plan to be executed. The
+"act or series of acts" represented by the selected "course of action"
+has now become a detailed "act or series of acts". As such, it is now
+susceptible of being assigned, in whole or in part, to subordinate
+commanders as "tasks". The cycle within that particular echelon is
+completed when the tasks are thus assigned. The commander has thereby
+charged his immediate subordinates with the commission of specific
+"acts or series of acts".</p>
+
+<p>Each such subordinate commander necessarily decides on the best method
+of accomplishing his assigned task, i.e., on the course of action (act
+or series of acts) which will best accomplish the effort required of
+him. The procedure (for each commander on that echelon) thus begins
+anew until an echelon is reached where the character of the required
+action has already been determined as a matter of routine (see <a href="#Page_84">page
+84</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span>The Use of a Form in the Solution of Problems</h4>
+
+<p>The natural mental processes (see <a href="#Page_19">page 19</a>) are employed in all of the
+four steps. The processes, in each step, require modification to an
+extent dependent upon the factors to be evaluated.</p>
+
+<p>A form has been adopted for the application of the mental processes in
+the first step. This form, long known to the military profession as
+The outline of The Estimate of The Situation (see Appendix), sets
+forth in a logical manner and order the several considerations likely
+to influence the selection of correct military objectives in problems
+of wide, as well as of lesser, scope. The use of this form is
+conducive to uniformity of reasoning. It centers the attention upon
+essentials, in order to ensure that no material factor bearing on the
+solution of the problem is overlooked. It guides thought along a
+specific path and, through the influence of suggestion, deliberately
+increases the expenditure of mental effort.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure indicated in the form contributes to the Decision
+reached as a result of an Estimate of the Situation, only to the
+extent that it provides an outline for, and encouragement of,
+systematic analysis and reasoning.</p>
+
+<p>To prove successful in stimulating rather than stifling creative
+thought, flexibility is a characteristic of any form capable of
+application in such dissimilar circumstances as may be presented by
+the varying scope of military problems. The Estimate Form is such a
+flexible guide. If a commander, in solving a problem, feels the need
+of greater flexibility, he may, of course, modify or adapt the form to
+his particular needs. In so doing, however, he bears in mind that
+departure from orderly processes of reasoning, on which the form is
+based, tends, through possible neglect of fundamental considerations,
+to lead to the omission of essential features of the analysis.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, a rigid following of the form may frequently cause
+much repetition. This may be avoided, unless desired for emphasis or
+other appropriate reasons, by reference back to preceding portions of
+the estimate. It is also to be noted, however, that the Estimate Form
+is adapted to a progressive procedure. Very frequently the earlier
+consideration of some aspect of the problem can later be expanded both
+in scope and in proper detail by reason of additional information
+which has become available during the intervening stages of the
+procedure.</p>
+
+<p>The distinction between certain strategical and tactical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span>problems
+(<a href="#Page_83">page 83</a>) may introduce variations in the handling of the Estimate
+Form, and may affect the weight to be given the various factors. The
+use of the Estimate Form, as described in Chapter VI, applies in full
+to problems which embrace the complete scope of broad strategical
+concepts. It is suitable also for problems of limited scope, for which
+certain modifications or abbreviations are required. When applied to
+problems of a detailed tactical nature, the emphasis on the factors of
+fighting strength is somewhat different from that for strategical
+problems. For certain subsidiary problems (<a href="#Page_106">page 106</a>), the Form may be
+closely applicable or may require considerable adaptation. In no case
+is it difficult to modify the Form to suit the requirements of the
+problem.</p>
+
+<p>An estimate of a relatively broad strategical situation may normally
+be reduced to writing, because time is usually available. On the other
+hand, an estimate of a localized tactical situation frequently
+requires almost instantaneous decision. Except in the preparation of
+plans to meet contingencies, such an estimate can rarely be given the
+elaborate form frequent in estimates of situations which are broadly
+strategical in nature. When such tactical plans are prepared well in
+advance of the event, the commander bases the estimate upon various
+assumptions as to the circumstances of a probable situation.</p>
+
+<p>The written solution of tactical situations under various assumptions
+is a valuable feature of training to this end.</p>
+
+<p>During the second step, i.e., the resolution of the action, as
+embodied in the Decision, into the detailed operations required, the
+method considered most helpful is to arrange the procedure on the
+basis of the salient features of a military operation (<a href="#Page_39">page 39</a> and
+Section III of Chapter IV). This procedure facilitates not only the
+determination of the necessary operations, but also the later
+formulation of directives.</p>
+
+<p>The second step, like the first, makes use of the estimate procedure.
+This is inevitable, in view of the fact that the mental processes are
+identical (<a href="#Page_106">page 106</a>) for the solution of the problem of both steps.</p>
+
+<p>The application of the estimate procedure to the second step may be
+tested, aside from the logic of the theory involved, by careful
+analysis of examples. For instance, if the basic Decision was to
+determine the location of enemy forces in the area ABCD, this becomes
+the basis for a plan embodying the best method of determining the
+location of such enemy forces (an operation, or a series of
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span>operations). One method of procedure (course of action) to achieve
+this objective may be to search the area by aircraft; another may
+involve a search by cruisers; another by destroyers; another by
+submarines; etc. The operation or operations finally determined upon
+may be any one of these, or a combination of two or more of them,
+perhaps of all of them. The fundamental procedure leading to this
+conclusion is identical with that of the basic estimate.</p>
+
+<p>There are a number of possible variations of the fundamental mental
+processes applicable to the second step, according to the facility and
+the preference of the commander. Practice seems to develop such
+facility (see also <a href="#Page_94">page 94</a>) that entire plans, each properly
+integrated with respect to physical objectives, relative positions,
+apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, may be
+visualized separately from each other.</p>
+
+<p>At the other extreme, the elementary procedure is to utilize these
+salient features of such a plan, successively, to suggest detailed
+operations. The features after the first are then used either to adapt
+or to complete the operations suggested by preceding features, or to
+suggest new operations. This elementary procedure, being the simpler
+and more methodical of the two, is the one explained hereafter
+(Chapter VII).</p>
+
+<p>However, there are various possibilities as to procedures intermediate
+between these extremes. One such procedure would visualize operations
+primarily on the basis of correct physical objectives, adapting and
+completing such operations by reference to the other features; the
+procedure would then utilize relative positions, etc., to suggest
+additional operations, which in turn may be similarly adapted or
+completed. The commander is of course at liberty to use the procedure
+best suited to his own working methods and to the particular
+situation; naturally, he bears full responsibility for any errors due
+to a faulty choice of procedure.</p>
+
+<p>From the standpoint of the exercise of mental power in the solution of
+military problems, the second step may be taken to include the
+assembly of the commander's conclusions in the form of directives. The
+third step begins, however (<a href="#Page_107">page 107</a>), when the commander forms the
+intent of immediately promulgating such directives.</p>
+
+<p>The third step makes use of the Order Form. In our naval service, this
+form is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written
+directives pertaining to operations other than routine. The subject
+matter is presented in a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span>logical sequence which experience has shown
+to be effective. The Order Form assists in the solution of the problem
+by providing a comprehensive vehicle with which all echelons are
+familiar.</p>
+
+<p>In the fourth step, i.e., the supervision of the planned action, the
+prime essential is the maintenance by the commander of a Running
+Estimate (<a href="#Page_107">page 107</a>). For this purpose there is a definite technique of
+which the Estimate Form provides the basis, and by means of which the
+solution of this important problem is aided.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Conclusion As To the Approach to the Solution of Military Problems</h4>
+
+<p>The foregoing considerations indicate that planned attainment of a
+military objective requires the application of mental effort in four
+distinct steps.</p>
+
+<p>The sequence of the four steps necessarily is fixed because of the
+consequential relationship among the problems typical of the several
+steps. The mission, in the first step, furnishes the nature of the
+appropriate effect desired. Until modified or revoked by higher
+authority, it clearly remains the governing influence throughout the
+entire range of mental effort which, in conjunction with the moral and
+physical effort, is calculated to result finally in the attainment of
+the assigned objective.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure involved, being natural and universal, is fundamentally
+the same even in those tactical situations where the commander
+performs all of the steps in almost instantaneous succession. The
+Estimate Form, as presented herein, is adaptable to military problems
+of any nature. The systematic approach represented in the Form is
+subject to adaptation by the competent commander&mdash;provided that the
+essentials are preserved&mdash;in any manner appropriate to his personal
+preference and to the nature of his particular problem.</p>
+
+<p>The essentials of the military Estimate of the Situation, as a
+specialized use of the natural mental processes, are inherent in the
+proper application of the Fundamental Military Principle (see <a href="#Page_82">page
+82</a>). The Estimate Form merely provides a more detailed guide for the
+use of the Principle. Facility in the use of the Principle will enable
+the competent commander, once he has formed a proper understanding of
+the basis for solution of a problem, to solve the problem correctly
+without reference to the Estimate Form. Reference to the Form may be
+necessary in problems of broad scope, in order to ensure a complete
+survey of factors of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span>fighting strength. Time, in such cases, is
+usually available for purposes of a detailed study. Subject to this
+exception, the Principle, alone, may be used effectively as a basis
+for sound military decision,&mdash;a fact of particular significance where
+time (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>) is an element of immediate concern.</p>
+
+<p>That this procedure may be successfully and repeatedly applied in the
+fast-moving events of the decisive tactical engagement is, more
+particularly, the goal of mental preparation for the exercise of
+command.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h3>PART II<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT<br />
+IN PLANNING</h3>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span><br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER VI<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE SELECTION OF A CORRECT OBJECTIVE</h4>
+
+<h4>(Including the Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+for its Attainment)</h4>
+
+<h4>The First Step&mdash;The Solution of a Basic Problem (The Estimate of the
+Situation)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The type of problem distinctive of the first step, now to be
+discussed, is a basic problem. It is the most likely type when
+an organized chain of command is in effective operation, the
+incentive for solution being derived from a directive issued
+by higher authority (Chapter V).</p>
+
+<p>The problem of the first step is described by the question,
+"What objective should I select, and what action (in outline)
+should I take for its attainment, in order to achieve the
+objective assigned to me by higher authority?"</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>The procedure for solution of the type of problem distinctive of the
+first step is that already indicated as applicable to all military
+problems, i.e., a specialized employment of the natural mental
+processes (Chapter II) through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. The studied application of the Principle is
+assisted through the Estimate Form which provides a more detailed
+guide.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamentals of the Estimate Form have already been discussed
+(Chapter V). Except for emphasis, or to afford a basis for further
+detailed discussion, the basic matters previously dealt with are not
+repeated in the present chapter. It is therefore advisable, before
+studying the details applicable to the first step, to make an adequate
+review of the pertinent portions of the preceding chapter. With the
+necessary background thus provided, the Estimate Form can be followed
+with a minimum of distraction caused by reference to related subjects.</p>
+
+<p>For special emphasis, it is repeated here (see also <a href="#Page_110">page 110</a>) that the
+Estimate Form is a flexible guide. The commander is of course at
+liberty to vary the procedure according to his particular needs and
+the nature of his problem; however, he will bear in mind that errors
+of commission or of omission arising by reason of departure from the
+essential features of the procedure may disrupt orderly reasoning.</p>
+
+<p>The Estimate Form is divided into sections and sub-sections, each of
+which presents a subject for consideration. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span>The Form follows,
+sequentially, the salient features of the natural mental process
+described in Chapter II. It will be seen, from an examination of the
+section headings listed below, that Section I has to do with
+establishing the basis for solution of the problem; Sections II, III,
+and IV relate to the actual process of solution through consideration
+of various courses of action; while Section V states the conclusion
+reached.</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">II. Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and Acceptable
+Courses of Action.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">III. Examination into the Capabilities of the Enemy.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">IV. Selection of the Best Course of Action.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">V. The Decision.</p></div>
+
+<p>A tabular form inserted in the Appendix lists the foregoing headings
+and their principal subdivisions within the Estimate Form. For
+convenience, the appended Form also includes page references to the
+discussion in this chapter.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SECTION I</h4>
+
+<h4>ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM</h4>
+
+<p>As noted in the Fundamental Military Principle, each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, requires
+examination from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability. Suitability involves the factor of the appropriate
+effect desired; feasibility involves the factors of the means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater; and acceptability involves the factor of the consequences as
+to costs.</p>
+
+<p>In order to establish a sound basis for the solution of a military
+problem, one which will permit the tests for suitability, feasibility,
+and acceptability (see <a href="#Page_98">pages 98-102</a>) to be intelligently applied, it
+is necessary that the factors involved be studied.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.</h4>
+
+<p>The appropriate effect desired, the first factor listed, is the goal
+toward which the commander is working. He is enabled to form an
+understanding of this essential aspect of his problem through (1) a
+grasp of the salient features of the situation, (2) a recognition of
+the incentive to solution, and (3) an appreciation of the assigned
+objective. He <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span>expresses this understanding by (4) formulating the
+mission.</p>
+
+<p>The sequence in which the commander takes up these considerations is a
+matter for his own choice. Usually, directives from higher authority
+(see Chapter VIII as to the Order Form) give him, first, information
+as to the situation; thereafter, such directives assign him a task (or
+tasks) involving one or more assigned objectives. For this reason, the
+sequence so indicated is the one utilized here.</p>
+
+<p>(1) Summary of the Situation. Before the commander can decide whether
+he wishes to maintain the existing situation or to change it, he
+requires a mental picture of its salient features. On beginning the
+Estimate, the available information is therefore briefly summarized.
+The picture presented here will show in broad outline (<a href="#Page_79">page 79</a>) the
+opposing forces as disposed in localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other. Details are reserved for
+Section I-B of the Estimate.</p>
+
+<p>The appropriate data are noted on the chart, and study of the chart
+goes hand in hand with the development of the Estimate.</p>
+
+<p>The summary of the situation may include statements as to present
+activities of own and enemy forces. It may recite significant
+occurrences. It does not attempt to compare or to deduce; such
+processes are deferred until Section I-B. The commander extracts, from
+the information furnished by higher authority, such data as are
+pertinent to his own problem. He includes these data in his own
+summary, supplementing them by information from other sources, to the
+extent deemed advisable. In the exercise of judgment as to the content
+of his summary, the commander is influenced by the fact that the
+summary is the point of departure for visualizing the appropriate
+effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>(2) Recognition of the Incentive. In basic problems (the type now
+under discussion, see <a href="#Page_117">page 117</a>), the commander finds his incentive in
+directives received from higher authority. Under the procedure of the
+Estimate, a notation of that fact, with a citation of the
+directive(s), is all that is required to indicate that the commander
+has formed a proper recognition of his incentive.</p>
+
+<p>(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective. A correct understanding of
+the nature and of the involvements of the assigned objective is,
+naturally, an essential to the establishment of the basis for the
+solution of a problem of the first step.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span>At this stage of the Estimate the commander cannot, however, expect
+always to reach a final conclusion as to this matter. He will have
+opportunity for further consideration, later, in Section II. It will
+be realized that, after intervening portions of the Estimate have been
+worked out, the commander will be in a position to examine the
+assigned objective again, and to make a more thorough analysis.</p>
+
+<p>In a basic problem, the commander is assigned his objective by higher
+authority, usually in the form of an assigned task. Although, as
+stated on <a href="#Page_84">page 84</a>, such task may be expressed by one of various
+methods, a properly conceived task always indicates, either
+specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives).</p>
+
+<p>Whatever method of expression may have been employed by higher
+authority, the commander will facilitate his appreciation of the
+assigned objective if he now sets down his assigned task, scrutinizes
+it carefully, and then makes note of the objective which is either
+specifically or inferentially indicated by that task. (See <a href="#Page_52">pages
+52-54</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The commander's basis for solving the problem is not complete,
+however, with merely a statement of his own objective. Full
+visualization of the effect desired is not obtained until the
+commander appreciates not only the result which he, himself, is
+required to accomplish, but also the next further result which is
+expected to eventuate as, at least in part, an effect of his
+accomplishment. His goal, as an "effect desired", includes not only
+the effect desired of him by higher authority, but also the effect
+which his immediate superior desires to be accomplished by that
+superior's entire force.</p>
+
+<p>Occasionally, full appreciation of the commander's objective will
+require, also, consideration of the further effects desired by yet
+higher successive echelons.</p>
+
+<p>The natural requirement is that the goal be so clearly defined as to
+obviate any material doubt as to the implications involved in the
+commander's assigned objective. When the goal has been thus defined,
+there results a linking of effect and further effect, of objective and
+further objective,&mdash;in short, of task and purpose,&mdash;the importance of
+which has previously been emphasized (<a href="#Page_48">page 48</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In making notation of this further objective for the solution of
+problems typical of the first step, the commander normally sets down
+the general plan of his immediate superior for the employment of the
+latter's entire force. When the linking of objective to objective,
+echelon by echelon, has involved no complication, the immediate
+superior's <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span>general plan will be a sufficient indication of the
+purpose for which the commander is to carry out his task.</p>
+
+<p>(4) Formulation of the Mission.</p>
+
+<p>The linking of the commander's assigned task to the general plan of
+his immediate superior permits the commander to formulate his mission
+(<a href="#Page_87">page 87</a>). His assigned task becomes the task of his mission; his
+superior's general plan becomes the purpose of his mission. In this
+manner he crystallizes into a clear statement the part of the common
+effort which he is to carry out, indicating the assigned objective he
+is himself to attain, as well as the further objective to whose
+attainment his effort is to contribute.</p>
+
+<p>In establishing the basis for solution of his problem with respect to
+suitability, the commander may have considered his assigned objective
+before studying his situation. If so, he may now desire to modify his
+earlier statement of that objective, before incorporating it in the
+formulation of his mission, to the end that a more clear-cut and
+concise expression may be obtained.</p>
+
+<p>The relationship (restated from <a href="#Page_87">page 87</a> for emphasis) is expressed in
+the following;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of
+carrying out my designated part of my superior's general plan.</p></div>
+
+<p>This formula is customarily simplified to the following:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) (statement of the assigned task),</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of
+(statement of the superior's general plan).</p></div>
+
+<p>The words "assist in the successful execution of" may frequently be
+understood and therefore omitted.</p>
+
+<p>The mission, thus formulated, clearly indicates the appropriate effect
+desired, i.e., the factor which establishes the basis for the solution
+of the problem from the standpoint of suitability.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>B. Relative Fighting Strength.</h4>
+
+<p>As indicated in the Fundamental Military Principle, the second and
+third requirements for a sound solution of the problem are feasibility
+of accomplishment and acceptability of the consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>Both requirements have to do with the factors of relative fighting
+strength. Fighting strength is derived from the means available as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting
+strength is determined by a weighing of these factors against the
+means opposed, as influenced also by the characteristics of the
+theater.</p>
+
+<p>These are the factors, then, which are next studied in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span>the Estimate.
+They are studied in order to complete the establishment of the basis
+for the solution of the problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The factor of consequences, as listed in the Fundamental Military
+Principle, is related to the factors pertinent to feasibility. This is
+true because consequences are assessed, in the Estimate, on the basis
+of the envisaged results of proposed actions. These results are
+necessarily predicated on the grounds established by consideration of
+the factors of relative fighting strength. The study of relative
+fighting strength thus provides not only a sound basis for the
+determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action, but
+also of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>Particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion as to relative fighting
+strength, to the end that specific advantages may be ascertained. Such a
+study is primarily concerned with information:&mdash;its collection, its
+analysis, its evaluation, and its interpretation so as to convert it
+into military (naval) intelligence (<a href="#Page_76">page 76</a>), with a view to its use by
+the commander in the solution of his problem. Information as to forces
+present and as to their positions is of course prerequisite to a clear
+comprehension of the possibilities as to physical objectives, as to
+relative positions, as to apportionment of fighting strength, and as to
+freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may choose whether he shall, in his estimate, first
+consider the means available and opposed, or reverse the order and
+give priority to the characteristics of the theater. In a particular
+situation, the significance of these characteristics is frequently
+determined by the capabilities and limitations of the means available
+and opposed. For this reason, these means are first discussed in this
+treatment, which thereafter includes the analysis of the
+characteristics of the theater.</p>
+
+<p>The capabilities and limitations of the means, and the significance of
+the characteristics of the theater, may be expressed in terms of
+certain specific factors (<a href="#Page_25">page 25</a>). Each of these factors may
+influence, or be influenced by, any or all of the others. Situations
+occur in which certain factors exert little or no influence. Yet, in
+other situations, these same factors have a paramount effect.</p>
+
+<p>The classification of factors utilized in the following treatment is
+applicable to most military problems.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>A list of pertinent factors, to be of real use in the solution of
+problems, is required, first, to be complete, so that no factor will
+be overlooked, and, second, to be simple, so that, as far as
+practicable, all similar data may be discussed under one heading.</p>
+
+<p>With respect to the factors set forth in succeeding pages, the
+solution of a particular problem may call for a different listing.</p>
+
+<p>Such listing may involve, in some cases, the contraction or the
+omission of certain of the headings.</p>
+
+<p>In other cases, an expansion will be necessary or desirable under
+certain headings, in considerably greater detail than shown here. For
+example, Section I-B of a National Estimate may involve reference to
+several volumes of printed books or of similar data, while, even in
+ordinary strategical situations, numerous charts, books of sailing
+directions, and other compilations may require study. Where such
+references are not standard and generally available, they may be
+appended, preferably in condensed form.</p>
+
+<p>The proper listing of pertinent factors will depend on the nature of
+the problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>(1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed.</h4>
+
+<p>The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the
+ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to
+develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>).
+These components, as ranged on one side or the other, constitute the
+means available and opposed. (See <a href="#Page_31">page 31</a>). Analysis of these means
+requires a classification of the various factors which influence the
+situation.</p>
+
+<p>For a broad strategical estimate made by the State, economic and
+political factors require intensive study; physical objectives,
+relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of
+action are all involved in such a survey.</p>
+
+<p>For a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these
+factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. Such a commander is
+concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the
+operations projected for the particular theater involved in his
+problem. From his point of view, the economic and political factors
+often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military
+situation. In such a case, the commander concentrates in this section
+on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his
+important considerations deal with such matters as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>numerical
+strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of
+action.</p>
+
+<p>For strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further
+restricts his study accordingly.</p>
+
+<p>In detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive
+comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy
+armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use
+of relative position are affected by such considerations. This is
+manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet
+contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its
+bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. At that
+time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly
+changing conditions. (Chapter IX.)</p>
+
+<p>In the Form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to
+broad estimates are included under "general factors". These are
+followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(a) General Factors. (i) Political Factors. The prosecution of the war
+is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of
+the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the
+moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war
+aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to
+which the government can make available necessary resources, both
+domestic and foreign.</p>
+
+<p>External relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad
+estimates of the employment of national forces. The wartime factors
+which influence these relations include the effect of the clash
+between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of
+interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and
+the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each
+belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the
+ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine
+the manner in which neutrality will be enforced.</p>
+
+<p>Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret,
+directly influence an estimate. When a war of any importance breaks
+out in any part of the world, all States are affected to some degree.
+One may have an alliance which, though not requiring active
+participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts
+of a belligerent. Another alliance may require active participation,
+while still another State may attempt to maintain strict neutrality.
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span>Every State remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from
+that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the
+contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. The estimate of the
+international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the
+war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each State
+concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct
+of war.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(ii) Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of
+industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is
+prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the
+civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses
+of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing
+upon the industrial capacity of that State.</p>
+
+<p>The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes
+the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign
+credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national
+capability for war.</p>
+
+<p>The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade,
+including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of
+supply, affects its strength. No State yet has complete autarchy.
+Thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain
+of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. As
+each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the
+other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade
+protection.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(iii) Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a stable morale (<a href="#Page_72">page
+72</a>) at a high level is a primary concern. Such stability inures the
+nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear,
+disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences,
+while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which
+strengthen the moral fiber of a people.</p>
+
+<p>Training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to
+overestimate. They provide a basis for evaluating discipline. A study
+of the history of the State may prove valuable in estimating the
+present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be
+classed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of
+war.</p>
+
+<p>Another important factor relates to the existence of the skills
+necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. The
+control of skilled personnel is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span>a psychological consideration of
+great importance.</p>
+
+<p>Unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and
+labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate.</p>
+
+<p>Special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and
+versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in
+development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war
+effort.</p>
+
+<p>Racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale
+and training. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions
+of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past
+performance, to prove of some value. Service traditions may furnish
+clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors.</p>
+
+<p>While only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible
+of quantitative comparison, failure to take account of mental and
+moral factors may involve serious error. Nevertheless, in many
+situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until
+subjected to test. Inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a
+basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. In these,
+racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. History,
+however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and
+military nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than
+that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has
+demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or
+unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably
+warrant otherwise.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(iv) Information and counter-information measures. Operations of war
+are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent
+possesses of the others. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh
+the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of
+obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.</p>
+
+<p>There may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible
+use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured
+documents, and material; reports from other friendly units;
+interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped
+or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of
+cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and
+mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of
+communications systems, ashore and afloat, which include all means of
+interchange of thought. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span>In this connection it will be recalled that
+information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot
+be conveyed in time.</p>
+
+<p>The direct methods of obtaining information are military operations
+intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance,
+scouting, trailing.</p>
+
+<p>Counter-information measures are no less important than those
+pertaining to collection of information. Such measures include all
+provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage,
+cryptography, control of own communications, security of documents,
+camouflage, and applicable tactical operations.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to Armed Forces, (i) Vessels,
+including aircraft. The numbers and characteristics, of the ships and
+aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and
+less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. The
+information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under
+the specific headings of the factors of the Estimate Form as later
+enumerated.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(ii) Land forces, including land-based aviation. Important facts
+concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based
+aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case
+of the naval forces. The value of a comparison&mdash;naval, land, or
+air&mdash;may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the
+accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected
+accurate additional information.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(iii) Personnel. The status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency
+of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale,
+skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can
+seldom be accurately known. Unless there is positive information to
+the contrary, the wise commander will assume in this respect that the
+status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to
+that of his own command. Full consideration will be given to all known
+facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any
+proposed situation may be properly evaluated.</p>
+
+<p>The basic discussion of the psychological factors (<a href="#Page_125">page 125</a>) is
+applicable here as to the respective armed forces. Personal
+characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study,
+since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength.
+The military value of the various units and forces is a similar
+consideration. The present <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span>attitude and past actions of enemy
+commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national,
+and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation
+in this connection.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(iv) Material. The material characteristics of the commander's own
+implements of war are generally known to him. The characteristics of
+enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become
+available, but are not to be underestimated.</p>
+
+<p>Material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility.</p>
+
+<p>Armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other
+weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with
+their own weapons). It also includes chemical agents and other
+instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to
+range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate
+use and as replacements. Ammunition supply is a factor here. In the
+evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available
+to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to
+underestimate.</p>
+
+<p>Life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms
+of standards which can be clearly visualized. For a vessel, life is
+the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its assigned task. In
+the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of
+foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. Here, again, an
+underestimate is dangerous.</p>
+
+<p>Mobility is capability of movement. It is compounded of the elements
+of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions
+of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to
+certain and free movement. Mobility is one of the most important
+factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of
+fighting strength, and to freedom of action. Closely related factors
+are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the
+enemy, and of own forces. Accurate knowledge of these factors, before
+an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing
+effectively with the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the
+efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater
+compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance.
+The last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and
+involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations,
+whether due <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span>to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other
+causes. Here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have
+only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect.
+His experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own
+condition. Definitely, unless he has positive information to the
+contrary, he assumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or
+better than his own. (See also the psychological factors, <a href="#Page_125">page 125</a> and
+the personnel factor, <a href="#Page_127">page 127</a>).</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(v) Logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. In the
+naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate.
+While the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate,
+logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval
+battle, to affect the outcome. This support exercises a dominant
+influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. It is concerned
+with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:</p>
+
+<div class="block4"><p class="hang2">Material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft,
+food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals,
+and general supplies.</p>
+
+<p class="hang2">Personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of
+replacements.</p>
+
+<p class="hang2">Facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair
+facilities, afloat and ashore; shelter; sanitation;
+hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education;
+counter-espionage; counter-propaganda.</p></div>
+
+<p>The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the
+final limit of a commander's plan of action.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.</h4>
+
+<p>The characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence,
+always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of
+attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical
+operations that may be employed.</p>
+
+<p>At this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts,
+intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual
+study of the theater. This study is not for the purpose, at this time,
+of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to
+furnish data which will assist in consideration of later sections of
+the estimate. The study may be made under several important headings,
+as follows:</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(a) Hydrography. A study of the hydrography will <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span>determine the depth
+of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents,
+the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and
+other pertinent features. These are recorded for later use.</p>
+
+<p>Shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of
+submarines. On the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water
+may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the
+tide. Again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the
+range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the
+entrance to a port or base. In a tactical action, advantage may be
+taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without,
+however, interfering with that of one's own forces.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(b) Topography. The topography of the area is also frequently of
+interest to the naval commander. In actions close to the shore, the
+character of the coast may play an important role. A high bluff,
+combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite
+advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation.</p>
+
+<p>Topography may be a most important consideration in determining what
+bases are to be used. The commander makes note of the topography of
+the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural
+features lending assistance to the defense of the various sites may
+play an important part in the selection of bases.</p>
+
+<p>The use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering
+land. Questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held,
+or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to
+the channel.</p>
+
+<p>In any landing operation, the topography of the area to be occupied
+may be the controlling factor.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(c) Weather. The seasonal weather in the theater will have a direct
+bearing upon operations. The use of aircraft, the employment of light
+forces, the habitability of ships over long periods, the use of smoke,
+the range at which a gun action may be fought, the effect of spray and
+gases,&mdash;these considerations are but some of the matters which will be
+affected by weather.</p>
+
+<p>The possession of, and the position of, meteorological stations within
+the theater are of growing importance in the successful planning of
+coordinated air, submarine, and surface operations.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(d) Daylight and Dark Periods. It may be well under this heading to
+put in tabular form the times of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset,
+the phases of the moon, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span>duration of morning and evening
+twilight. When, for example, the commander is considering night
+destroyer attacks, the operation of submarines, or the type of
+protective screens he desires to use, he may profitably refer to these
+tabulations.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(e) Relative Location and Distance. No part of the study of the
+characteristics of the theater is of greater importance than that
+pertaining to relative location and distance. At this point it may be
+found advantageous to place in tabular form the distances between the
+important positions within the geographical area of the theater. This
+study furnishes knowledge as to the availability of certain localities
+for use in support of, or in cooperation with, forces at other
+localities, and as to distances in relation to steaming capabilities
+of the various units which make up the commander's force.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(f) Lines of Transportation and Supply. The usual sea routes which
+pass through the theater are an important subject of study; also,
+particular focal points, defiles, and restricted waters which are, or
+may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces.
+Other items are the significant routes from home or enemy territory,
+i.e., the lines of communication, the terminal points, and the
+flanking positions along these lines.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(g) Facilities and Fortifications. The facilities for the support,
+upkeep, and repair of the units of the commander's forces and of the
+opposing force, as well as the fortifications existing within the
+area, may require consideration. Other features which may render a
+port or base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of
+denying it to the enemy, also merit attention.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(h) Communications. In strategical estimates, more particularly in
+broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves
+not only those means under the commander's control, but also his
+relation to the system of regional and national communications
+operated by his government. Examination is made into the established
+physical stations; such examination includes radio, cables, and
+perhaps land wires.</p>
+
+<p>In tactical estimates the means of communication which affect the
+engagement are more directly those under the control of the commander.
+An examination into the organization of the means to meet conditions
+prevailing in the theater is appropriate here.</p>
+
+<p>Another aspect of communications is that of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span>maintaining all forms
+against enemy interference. The importance of this feature in planning
+may not safely be overlooked, and careful study is indicated to
+provide for guaranteeing communications during action. The
+characteristics of the theater, as they relate to this feature, are
+considered here.</p>
+
+<p>For the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy
+communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them
+with respect to the theater of operations.</p>
+
+<p>This portion of the Estimate Form varies greatly with the type of
+problem under consideration. However, in all estimates, this is the
+place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting
+communications for the particular problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>With the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander
+has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he
+expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.</h4>
+
+<p>Having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the
+characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find
+it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order
+that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily
+visualized and compared. Thus the existing advantages and
+disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to
+relative fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>A satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in
+parallel columns for own and enemy forces. From careful consideration
+of the facts so far determined in Section I-B, there are extracted and
+expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors.</p>
+
+<p>It is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness
+factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical
+estimates.</p>
+
+<p>The former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite
+comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and
+caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of
+torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for
+comparison.</p>
+
+<p>In broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g.,
+as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and
+the like. But other factors may not be so definite, especially as
+regards enemy forces. For example, it will often be difficult for the
+commander to say that the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span>enemy's logistics problem is easier or more
+difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of
+fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time
+limits involved. The evaluation of training, spirit, health, and
+courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to
+determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard
+to the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The value of the entries in the parallel columns at this point of the
+estimate will depend upon the skill of the commander in judging the
+factual data contained in all of the known factors of strength and
+weakness. The proper entries to be made will depend upon
+circumstances. In one estimate, for example, the anti-aircraft
+armament available to a carrier group will be of vital importance. In
+another estimate of the same carrier group, anti-aircraft defense will
+be of no importance because no enemy aircraft can be employed in the
+situation being estimated. Again, in a local tactical situation, if
+the ships involved have just been fueled, the economical steaming
+radius may be of no immediate importance. And while the total amount
+of high-test gasoline which can be produced in a State in the coming
+year may be vital to a broad strategical estimate involving war
+against trade, that information may be of little use in a tactical
+estimate of a localized, fleeting situation.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, in determining what factors to evaluate, and in assessing their
+relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly
+affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration. The
+summary of strength and weakness factors is, then, a summary of those
+factors which the commander considers will affect the character of his
+effort. This summary indicates the relative importance of such
+factors.</p>
+
+<p>A mere list of facts will not serve the purpose. What is needed here
+is a series of evaluations and conclusions which may result from a
+study of the pertinent details.</p>
+
+<p>With the circumstances attending his particular problem clearly in
+mind, the commander carefully reviews each of the factors of fighting
+strength in the theater; he classes each as either a strength or
+weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enters it in the
+proper column. A strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as
+a weakness factor for the opponent:&mdash;what is required is a
+well-digested summary of the factors which give to either side an
+advantage or a disadvantage as compared to the other.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span>NOTE</h4>
+
+<p>The Estimate procedure has, to this point, established the basis for
+the solution of the problem through evaluation of the factors
+pertaining to the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>On this basis, the commander is ready to consider such courses of
+action as may be pertinent. To this end, he has a choice of
+procedures. He may first consider courses of action for himself. He
+may prefer, however, to consider first those which are applicable to
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>If the commander considers his own courses of action first, this
+procedure has an advantage in that it narrows, later, the scope of
+enemy courses which are pertinent to his situation. This is true
+because consideration of enemy courses may in such a case be
+restricted to those which give promise of countering, effectively, his
+own courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>This procedure may also have a certain psychological advantage, in
+that the commander may thereby avoid becoming unduly impressed by the
+potentialities of enemy action. Occasionally, prior consideration of
+enemy courses may tend to put the commander, unnecessarily, on the
+mental defensive.</p>
+
+<p>First consideration of his own courses of action is especially
+appropriate for a commander whose mission requires him to assume the
+initiative, particularly when the relative fighting strength indicates
+that he can compel enemy action to conform to his. This is frequently
+the case when enemy action will chiefly affect details rather than the
+general trend of the operations.</p>
+
+<p>These reflections indicate that first consideration of his own courses
+of action will very frequently be advantageous to the commander. Such
+a sequence is therefore indicated preferentially in the Estimate Form,
+and next discussed. However occasions may arise when consideration in
+the reverse order is preferable. Sometimes the prior consideration of
+enemy potentialities has the advantage of making the commander's
+estimate more complete with respect to the obstacles which he is to
+overcome. Furthermore, when the effectiveness of his future action is
+seen to depend chiefly upon what the enemy can do, or when the
+initiative lies manifestly with the enemy, and when the commander's
+mission requires him to frustrate enemy action, rather than to assume
+the initiative himself, the prior <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span>consideration of enemy courses of
+action may be indicated.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may therefore consider the subject matter of Sections II
+and III in the order hereinafter followed, or he may reverse that
+order.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SECTION II</h4>
+
+<h4>DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION</h4>
+
+<h4>A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective.</h4>
+
+<p>In order further to clarify the problem, consideration of the
+commander's courses of action may profitably commence with an analysis
+(<a href="#Page_53">page 53</a>) of the assigned objective. Section I-A contained an
+appreciation of this objective on the basis of the salient features of
+the situation. A close examination is now possible in the light of the
+additional information furnished by the full details (Section I-B) as
+to the means available and opposed, and as to the characteristics of
+the theater (<a href="#Page_121">page 121</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, the mission (<a href="#Page_121">page 121</a>), is now again stated, and is
+restudied. The task is thoughtfully examined anew, in view of the
+forces and positions now known. The purpose is scrutinized with equal
+care, because it indicates the further end in view for the common
+effort. Now, obstacles to success which, in Section I-A, could not
+fully be appreciated can be examined against the background afforded
+by visualization of the enemy's ability to oppose the attainment of
+the assigned objective.</p>
+
+<p>This analysis calls for such discussion by the commander as is
+essential to better understanding of his assigned objective. Some
+restatement and repetition may be desirable as to the subjects already
+discussed under the appreciation of the assigned objective. In solving
+certain types of problems, where simple estimates, only, are required,
+there may be no necessity for further treatment. Even in these cases,
+however, the commander restates his mission in this subsection, in
+order to ensure a clear comprehension of its task and purpose, as a
+sound basis for his further solution of the problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>B. Survey of Courses of Action.</h4>
+
+<p>The Fundamental Military Principle (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>) represents an equation
+(<a href="#Page_23">page 23</a>) based on five factors: the appropriate effect desired, the
+means available, the means opposed, the characteristics of the
+theater, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span>consequences as to costs. Of these five factors, all
+but the last (the consequences as to costs) have by this time, in the
+course of the estimate, been assigned values as definite as the
+commander's information and his study permit.</p>
+
+<p>From this point on, the problem is to evolve tentative solutions
+(courses of action) and to test them (<a href="#Page_98">page 98</a>), severally, by
+reference to the factors. The tests as to suitability and feasibility
+can now be made with reference to the known factors. The test as to
+acceptability of the consequences involves an unknown factor. However,
+for each tentative solution of the problem, a value can be assigned
+for this factor, because all five factors are interdependent (<a href="#Page_32">page 32</a>
+and following), so that the value of any of them can be set by a study
+of the others. It is through this procedure that evaluation of the
+consequences factor is accomplished (an application of the corollary
+Principle of the Acceptable Consequences as to Costs, <a href="#Page_35">page 35</a>).</p>
+
+<p>By means of the standard tests, the several tentative solutions are
+also compared to each other in the light of envisaged enemy action, so
+as to enable the commander to select the best solution.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The commander now, as a result of his reflective thinking as to
+courses of action, makes a list of those which he has visualized for
+himself. There may be one course of action, or many; ordinarily there
+are several.</p>
+
+<p>Examples of courses of action have been given in the basic discussion
+of the subject (<a href="#Page_89">pages 89</a> and <a href="#Page_92">92</a>). In listing his courses, the
+commander can add to clarity of thought and of expression by
+visualizing the objective embodied in each course and by envisaging
+also, the action, expressed in proper detail, for its attainment. This
+process is naturally the more important when the objective is inferred
+rather than specifically expressed, and when the action involved calls
+for more description than can be obtained merely by stating the
+objective.</p>
+
+<p>For example, the commander may include a course of action such as "to
+raid enemy trade in the area EFGH". The objective is here inferred; it
+is not clearly stated. The commander may therefore be well advised to
+add a notation of what the objective is; indeed, more than one
+objective may be involved. Objectives thus inferred might include,
+when specifically stated, the infliction of damage on enemy trade, the
+infliction of damage on enemy combatant forces protecting such trade,
+the disruption of enemy supply <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span>arrangements, or such others as may be
+applicable.</p>
+
+<p>This clear visualization is essential to the establishment of the
+relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inherent
+in the course of action (<a href="#Page_89">page 89</a>). If, for instance, the motivating
+task is to "divert enemy forces to the area EFGH", the commander may
+consider the course of action "to raid enemy trade in area EFGH". By
+infliction of damage to, and by disruption of, enemy supply
+(objectives of his raiding), he expects to accomplish the diversion of
+enemy forces to the area EFGH, because the enemy will wish to protect
+his trade against such raids. The relationship between the assigned
+objective and the objective inferred in the course of action is thus
+made clear.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to expression of the action to be taken, the commander may
+properly desire to be more explicit than by merely saying, for
+example, "to destroy the enemy". Here the objective is clear (it is
+"the destruction of the enemy"), but the expression of the action is
+so general that additional description may be needed. Examples of more
+explicit statement have been given previously (<a href="#Page_89">page 89</a>).</p>
+
+<p>On occasion the higher commander may predetermine the commander's
+course of action for the attainment of the objective assigned to the
+latter. Circumstances under which such procedure may be properly
+applicable, and the effect which it has on the commander's estimate,
+have been previously discussed (<a href="#Page_86">page 86</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.</h4>
+
+<p>The courses of action which the commander has envisaged are now
+subjected to test (<a href="#Page_98">page 98</a>). This essential stage in thought is
+intended to put the courses of action to proof as tentative solutions
+of the problems. The principle here recognized is that suggestion has
+no logical nor rightful claim upon action or belief until it has
+received adequate confirmation. Such confirmation is, in part,
+provided by these tests.</p>
+
+<p>The tests applied are for suitability, for feasibility, and for
+acceptability as to consequences. Each of these tests is a separate
+one. Each course of action is formally subjected to test. When the
+tests are completed, the courses of action stand classified in these
+respects. During these tests, some courses of action may be rejected;
+such are then omitted in the final classification.</p>
+
+<p>These formal tests are not to be confused with the preliminary tests
+already given by the commander to each <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span>course of action as it occurs
+to mind. Necessarily, there is such a preliminary test, because the
+commander does not wish to entertain inappropriate courses of action.
+For a competent commander, the mental power to envisage solutions of a
+military problem is so much grounded in experience that appropriate
+suggestions are most likely to occur; in fact, discriminating thought
+with respect to military problems is natural for such a commander.
+This immediate discrimination is, however, merely the preliminary
+test. It prevents setting up wooden soldiers only to knock them down,
+but it does not necessarily subject each suggested solution to a
+thorough analysis.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may apply the tests to each course of action as it
+occurs to his mind. This procedure, however, may be rendered
+impossible by the fertility of suggestion; perhaps the commander has
+thought of several courses of action practically simultaneously. It
+is, therefore, often better to apply the tests to all of the courses
+of action, in turn, during a separate stage of the process of
+thinking. This is the procedure indicated herein, as standard, by the
+sequence of steps in this section of the Estimate. The process of
+testing, itself, may bring to mind those combinations of courses of
+action previously referred to (<a href="#Page_93">page 93</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The degree of formality characteristic of the tests varies with the
+nature of the problem. In a broad strategical estimate, these tests
+may be searching and extensive; they may then consume much time. Yet,
+if the commander, in making a quick decision of great urgency in
+actual battle, does not apply the tests, he may adopt a course of
+action leading to tragic results. In such circumstances, the competent
+commander, under pressure of danger, grasps the whole complex
+situation without loss of time. He is not carried away by any chance
+impressions. He does not overlook what is significant in the
+unexpected event. Because he is mentally prepared for the exercise of
+command (<a href="#Page_114">page 114</a>) he sees things in their true proportions (<a href="#Page_4">page 4</a>).
+In immediate response, he coolly chooses the same course of action
+which he would adopt if he had time for careful deliberation.</p>
+
+<p>In making the tests, the commander rejects courses of action found
+unsuitable in that they will not, if successfully prosecuted,
+contribute to the attainment of the objective. He does not, as yet,
+reject courses of action found to be promising of only partial
+accomplishment of the task, because there may be later possibilities
+of effecting combinations to this end.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span>The commander also rejects, at this point, courses of action found to
+be infeasible of accomplishment. He is careful, however, not to
+reject, abruptly, any which may later be found to be feasible in
+combination with other courses.</p>
+
+<p>Similarly, the commander now rejects courses of action found to
+involve excessive consequences as to costs. Here, again, however, he
+bears in mind the possibilities of later combinations.</p>
+
+<p>The commander does not, as yet, make a selection of one course of
+action in preference to another. He merely desires to restrict further
+thought, toward his Decision, to those which are found, on the basis
+of the estimate so far, to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. He
+may, however, make a selection to the extent of effecting proper
+combinations whose applicability has already been demonstrated.</p>
+
+<p>The commander also takes stock, at this stage of the estimate, of the
+relative degree of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of
+retained courses, so far as can be substantiated.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>D. Listing Retained Courses of Action.</h4>
+
+<p>The foregoing process indicates to the commander the courses of action
+which may properly be retained as suitable, as feasible, and as
+acceptable. He therefore draws up a list of retained courses and
+classifies them according to the degree of their suitability, of their
+feasibility, and of their acceptability with respect to consequences.</p>
+
+<p>This list does not necessarily represent the final combinations of
+courses of action; the incomplete solutions may yet become part of the
+course of action finally selected. Also it is not impossible that
+combinations already made will subsequently be recombined as a result
+of further analysis.</p>
+
+<p>It may be apparent to the commander at this time that he does not
+have, as yet, any course of action which fulfills the test of
+suitability as to scope, either originally or by combination. A later
+conclusion is made (Section V) as to final combinations to achieve
+full scope. This conclusion, however, may point the way, as later
+observed, to a Decision adopting an objective short of that which
+would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SECTION III</h4>
+
+<h4>EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY</h4>
+
+<p>While the commander realizes that the Fundamental Military Principle
+(<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>) governs the enemy's problem <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span>no less than his own, he has to
+accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called "fog of war")
+in applying the principle to the enemy's situation. The method of
+reflective thinking utilized (Section II) for the commander's own
+problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the
+enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known
+to the commander as are his own.</p>
+
+<p>Capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which
+the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such
+actions, has the capacity to carry out. Such potentialities of the
+enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in
+estimating the situation. In his estimate, however, the commander's
+interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do;
+probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the
+whole field of capabilities. The commander is not exclusively
+interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the
+enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are
+also subject to change. The commander is interested in everything that
+the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander's own
+courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>In reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes
+an estimate from the enemy's viewpoint and considers that the enemy
+commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is
+endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission.
+Each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable
+military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the
+same intent. The physical objectives for each may be the other's armed
+forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also
+be likely physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>In such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the
+opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual
+conflict. More especially in the initial stages, the respective plans
+may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. Again, the
+geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss contact.
+Moreover, unless one commander definitely makes provision to seek out
+and engage, the two forces, each on the defensive, may find themselves
+"shaking fists" at each other across an ocean area.</p>
+
+<p>Notwithstanding this possibility, however, a conclusion, on an
+insufficient basis, that the enemy will or will not seek him out and
+engage him, or that the enemy will or will not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span>do anything else, may
+be fraught with the most serious consequences for the commander.
+Accordingly, in estimating the enemy's situation, he puts himself in
+the enemy's position, while subordinating his own hopes and desires.
+He credits the enemy with the possession of good judgment and of the
+resolution and ability to apply with skill the fundamentals of
+effective warfare, subject, naturally, to the justified conclusions
+which the commander has drawn (Section I-B) on the basis of the
+available factual data as to relative fighting strength.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem.</h4>
+
+<p>This portion of the commander's estimate pertains, of course, to the
+existing situation as viewed by the enemy. This fact, alone, may
+inject into the problem certain factors which differ from those
+applicable with respect to the commander's view of his own problem, as
+determined to this point.</p>
+
+<h4>(1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation.</h4>
+
+<p>Frequently it may happen that the enemy does not have certain
+significant information. The fact of such lack of information may have
+been established by the conclusions drawn as to relative fighting
+strength (Section I-B). If this be the case, notation of the fact is
+made at this point in the commander's estimate of the enemy's
+situation. If doubt exists as to the extent and accuracy of the
+enemy's information, it will be desirable to credit the enemy with any
+knowledge which it would be dangerous for the commander to conclude
+was not available to his opponent.</p>
+
+<p>In summarizing the enemy's situation, the commander may brief the
+procedure by indicating those significant features of his own
+situation, as summarized in Section I-A and as particularized in
+Section I-B, which he does not consider are known to the enemy. The
+commander will also indicate here any items of important information
+as to which he has only a suggestion or an inkling, but which he
+considers may be known in greater detail to the enemy.</p>
+
+<h4>(2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy.</h4>
+
+<p>It may appear on first thought that the best basis for determining the
+pertinent enemy courses of action is to make a deduction of the
+enemy's mission. Sometimes, undoubtedly, this is the case. However, it
+is not always possible to deduce the enemy's mission correctly. If the
+deduction is incorrect the remainder of the estimate will be on an
+unsound basis. If, as may happen, the enemy's plan has been captured,
+or if, by some other method, conclusive <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>information has been
+obtained, it may be possible to state the enemy's mission. Even then,
+however, the enemy's mission may sometimes be changed. It is thus
+evident that the commander, by restricting his thought, may frequently
+fail to consider all of the enemy capabilities which may materially
+influence his own course of action.</p>
+
+<p>With this precaution in mind, the commander, at this point in his
+Estimate, proceeds to analyze the effect desired by the enemy. The
+commander intends to use his deductions, if such use appears to be
+sound, to narrow the field of consideration as to enemy courses of
+action. However, he reminds himself that such restriction will be
+dangerous unless it is established on sound grounds.</p>
+
+<p>The first mental act toward determining the effect desired by the
+enemy is to form a reasoned opinion as to the situation which the
+enemy wishes to maintain or to create. The maintenance or creation of
+this situation, existent or to be brought about, is an enemy
+objective.</p>
+
+<p>From earlier association with the enemy, from intelligence of his
+peacetime preparations, and from a knowledge of his political and
+military history, his broad current policies are generally matters of
+common report. The motives impelling the enemy to action may thus be
+evident. Past or present tendencies of the enemy, along certain
+specific lines of endeavor, may be known. These may be corroborated by
+the enemy action which has recently occurred.</p>
+
+<p>In military undertakings of major scope the objectives of the enemy
+are often difficult of concealment. A survey of the objectives which
+the enemy has been pursuing may allow a reasoned opinion to be formed
+as to the enemy's immediate objectives,&mdash;whether, at least, his future
+action will be offensive or defensive. The importance to be attached
+by the enemy to certain physical objectives may be indicated by the
+broad aims known to exist. Present composition and disposition of the
+enemy's forces may betray the effort which he intends. Circumstances,
+clearly disadvantageous to the commander's forces, may disclose what
+his enemy's aim may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy)
+military situation.</p>
+
+<p>However scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others,
+the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of
+workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy's
+future action.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span>purpose of the
+enemy's mission. The situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad
+in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. This, in
+turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information
+available.</p>
+
+<p>It may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when
+accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. However, as
+previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. The
+commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out
+will attain the purpose. By being inclusive instead of restrictive in
+this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities.
+Moreover, the information available will not always justify the
+derivation of a specific task.</p>
+
+<p>By this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied
+opinion as to the enemy's appropriate effect desired. The commander's
+safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. He
+expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy's
+objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail
+to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the
+situation.</p>
+
+<p>Situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in
+Section II-B (<a href="#Page_135">page 135</a>), no value can be assigned the factor of the
+appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis
+for deducing enemy courses of action. Such situations are not unusual,
+especially in problems of lesser scope. In such cases, the commander
+is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which
+can materially influence his own plan. Therefore, in instances of this
+nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first
+consideration to the commander's own courses of action affords the
+advantage of (see <a href="#Page_134">page 134</a>) narrowing the field as to the enemy
+capabilities.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities.</h4>
+
+<p>If, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the
+commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a
+sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now
+proceeds, by the mental process described in Section II, to list the
+enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. If there be
+no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all
+enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort.</p>
+
+<p>The survey of fighting strength (Section I-B) has established, through
+consideration of the "means available <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span>and opposed", and of the
+"characteristics of the theater", the limitations of enemy
+capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. Because, however, so
+much of the enemy's situation is usually conjectural, it is important
+to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in
+Section I-B,&mdash;in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and
+strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. Such a study will
+disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. The
+commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which
+can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the
+commander's courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities
+of obtaining information concerning the enemy's moves.</p>
+
+<p>Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations
+which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list
+the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of
+action, for purposes of further analysis. Naturally, he lists courses
+which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to
+consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of
+the estimate.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.</h4>
+
+<p>Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above,
+the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and
+for acceptability as to their consequences.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (Section
+II). However, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if
+deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for
+suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's
+own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy's fighting
+strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis,
+the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the
+commander's own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts
+as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly
+retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the
+same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the
+consequences.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action.</h4>
+
+<p>All enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for
+further study are now listed by the commander.</p>
+
+<p>While it is manifestly of advantage to the commander <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span>if the number of
+enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one,
+it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because
+of undue restriction of the field.</p>
+
+<p>The previous analysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases,
+the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the
+commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the
+enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs.</p>
+
+<p>In many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained
+enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed
+before the less likely. In case of doubt, the higher priority is
+awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous
+from his (the commander's) point of view.</p>
+
+<p>In other instances, no priority can properly be indicated.</p>
+
+<p>As a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine
+certain enemy courses. In any case, he closes this portion of the
+estimate with a list of them, classified so far as he finds
+justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the
+estimate.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SECTION IV</h4>
+
+<h4>SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION</h4>
+
+<p>The extent to which detail is desirable in Section IV of the Estimate
+will vary with the nature of the problem (<a href="#Page_95">page 95</a>). Experience usually
+demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail
+escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog
+the main issues. As the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will
+recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will
+conduct such examination accordingly.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of Action.</h4>
+
+<p>The next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the
+commander's retained courses of action with those of the enemy which
+have been retained for further study. This process consists of
+executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the
+commander's courses of action, against that in each of the enemy's.
+One method is for the Commander to take the initiative with each of
+his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. By this
+procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced,
+on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the
+enemy, on the modification in the enemy's <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span>effort which will be
+caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will
+create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome
+the obstacles.</p>
+
+<p>It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate
+the enemy situation during this analysis. Such necessity arises
+because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy
+situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as
+to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the
+planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the
+situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are
+familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will
+have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments
+may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of
+this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after
+reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy
+estimate (Section III). The particular procedure adopted is
+unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a
+re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to
+this portion of the Estimate.</p>
+
+<p>The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination
+into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself
+in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original
+situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander
+examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed
+situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has
+superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. Thus only can the
+commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his
+own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later
+be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course
+of action, or combination of courses, is the best.</p>
+
+<p>The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to
+the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his
+own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy
+as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against
+each of the commander's courses. This method is applicable, for
+instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which,
+by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander's
+courses. The choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of
+the commander.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span>It is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving
+each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises.
+However, this analysis is confined, as previously explained (see <a href="#Page_145">page
+145</a>), to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of
+a sound comparison. In some cases there may be need for study in the
+greatest detail. Generally, however, the requirement can be met by
+considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of
+weapons, and the physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>During the progress of these analyses of the impact of operations upon
+each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert
+and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these
+operations may also suggest itself.</p>
+
+<p>The use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here
+frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing
+possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges,
+relative strength in types and weapons are useful.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>Through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded
+further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability. He can, once more, view each of his
+courses from the standpoint of its suitability. The visualized enemy
+action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to
+whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate
+effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the
+possible opposition. As to feasibility, the analysis permits him to
+make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to
+obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander's)
+courses of action. In addition, by visualizing the pertinent
+operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be
+expected.</p>
+
+<p>Should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further
+consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not
+justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine
+further analysis within narrower limits.</p>
+
+<p>Should he find, during his analysis, that further combinations should
+be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and
+uses them in his comparison.</p>
+
+<p>However, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the
+course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can
+justifiably be adopted. The process of comparison is confined to
+deduction, rearrangement, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span>justified rejection, preliminary to
+weighing and selecting in the next subsection.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>B. Determination of the Best Course of Action.</h4>
+
+<p>The commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of
+action as further analyzed in the light of enemy opposition. All of
+these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying
+extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. He will now examine
+and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion
+as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. The
+analysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course
+has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander's
+retained courses with each other.</p>
+
+<p>At this point, therefore, the commander again assembles his retained
+courses of action.</p>
+
+<p>He includes the combinations which the preceding analysis has
+indicated belong properly together. He then considers the final
+tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted.</p>
+
+<p>The conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility,
+and for acceptability as to consequences. Because of the importance of
+this terminal analysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise
+as possible.</p>
+
+<p>The commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses
+of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the
+several pertinent headings. He next examines this all-inclusive
+summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action.</p>
+
+<p>It may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best.
+Again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of
+action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage
+toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.</p>
+
+<p>If the result of the analysis has demonstrated that there is no
+satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a
+notation as to the reasons for such opinion. In this case the
+commander faces a dilemma.</p>
+
+<p>Usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a
+carefully considered assignment of part of the superior's planned
+effort. The commander may expect normally to find that his own
+estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if
+successfully carried out, will accomplish the task assigned. The
+reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>Nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to
+meet the possible dilemma:&mdash;When he cannot envisage a course of action
+for accomplishing the assigned task, or when, of the several courses
+of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he
+to do? (See <a href="#Page_70">page 70</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Under these circumstances the commander reviews his estimate in all
+its aspects. By minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of
+accomplishing his assigned task. If he cannot accomplish the task, he
+seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is
+reasonably feasible. If unable, in any degree, to further the
+accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he
+feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of
+his mission.</p>
+
+<p>It is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his
+assigned task, the commander will make constructive representations
+(<a href="#Page_103">page 103</a>) to higher authority. The latter may then assign additional
+forces or may otherwise alter the problem,&mdash;for example, by assigning
+a new task. However, a situation such as described may occur when the
+commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he
+finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority.</p>
+
+<p>In such a situation the commander is under the necessity of
+determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and
+acceptable under the circumstances (<a href="#Page_52">page 52</a>).</p>
+
+<p>It is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the
+commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic
+problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. He has
+not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because
+he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. However, the
+solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new
+phase, or step.</p>
+
+<p>The new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the
+solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the
+abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation,
+which has not changed. The new problem is, however, differentiated
+from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive.
+The incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out
+of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that
+no sound solution for the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span>basic problem can be found. The new problem
+is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be
+delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is
+necessary as a basis for the commander's detailed plan. For these
+reasons the new problem is, by definition (<a href="#Page_106">page 106</a>), a subsidiary
+problem, of the type distinctive of the second step.</p>
+
+<p>At what point in the solution of the original problem does the
+commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of
+the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? There are
+various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this
+question.</p>
+
+<p>From the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that
+the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its
+motivating task cannot be accomplished. It might also be said that the
+basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the
+commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the
+motivating task.</p>
+
+<p>Practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can
+profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no
+contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. At this point
+a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins.
+This view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point
+in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the
+appropriate effect desired. In such circumstances, the commander
+concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the
+accomplishment of his immediate superior's general plan.</p>
+
+<p>The incentive for the solution of the subsidiary problem will
+therefore arise, on the basis thus adopted, when the commander has
+concluded that he cannot contribute to the accomplishment of his basic
+mission, and that he is under the necessity of evolving a new mission
+for himself. His basic Decision (see discussion, hereafter, of Section
+V of the Estimate Form) will reflect this conclusion and will thereby
+afford him a basis for the solution of his subsidiary problem.</p>
+
+<p>Problems of the foregoing nature, where the commander justifiably
+departs from his instructions, are not unusual during the first step.
+However, they are scarcely typical of that step so long as an
+organized chain of command is in effective operation. In the more
+usual case, the commander, at this point in his estimate, makes note
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span>of his selected course of action. Whether he selects a single course
+or a combination, the selection is thereafter known as the best course
+of action (singular).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>SECTION V</h4>
+
+<h4>THE DECISION</h4>
+
+<p>In the final section of the Estimate the commander is concerned with a
+decision as to the selection of an objective or objectives determined
+by himself, for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. This
+decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken for
+the attainment of the commander's selected objective. The decision
+reached at this point becomes the commander's general plan of action
+or provides the basis therefor. It is accordingly so important that
+when it has been formally stated in a basic problem it is thenceforth
+known as the Decision.</p>
+
+<p>The Statement of the Decision. Frequently the statement of the
+Decision may be merely a restatement of the best course of action.
+Such phraseology is often adequate, provided, naturally, that the
+selected course of action has been, itself, correctly expressed (<a href="#Page_95">page
+95</a>). Sometimes, however, the commander may desire, at this point in
+his estimate, to develop such expression more fully. He may at this
+point develop his selected course into a general plan, or he may defer
+this development to the second step.</p>
+
+<p>In any event the commander now scrutinizes his selected course of
+action to ensure that its expression conveys exactly the meaning which
+he has in mind.</p>
+
+<p>He bears in mind, also, that his Decision will settle the pattern of
+his future action. If the selected objective is inferred, rather than
+specifically stated, the commander will then ensure that the
+inference, with all its vital implications, is plain.</p>
+
+<p>As to the statement of the action required to achieve this objective,
+the commander realizes that the pattern laid down by the Decision is
+merely a shape or general outline. The details will be introduced
+later. The Decision covers the general outline of the action
+contemplated for the entire force.</p>
+
+<p>If, for example, only a part of the commander's force is to act, while
+the remainder is to remain inactive, the Decision will cover not only
+the kind of activity but also the extent of the inactivity. However,
+for convenience in stating the Decision, such inactivity may be
+inferred, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span>rather than expressly stated, so long as the meaning is
+made clear. Thus, if the force, except for a raiding task group, is to
+remain inactive for the time being, the Decision may properly be "to
+raid enemy communications in the area &mdash;&mdash; with a task group
+consisting of &mdash;&mdash;", so long as the commander is satisfied that the
+implication is clear, under the circumstances, that the remainder of
+his force is to remain inactive.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may properly include brief summarizing remarks as to the
+methods, broadly viewed, whereby he intends to take action. However,
+he introduces such detail only to the extent that he feels
+amplification is needed, either for his own benefit or for the
+assistance of others who may use his estimate.</p>
+
+<p>Deductions or inferences which the commander wishes to note may, at
+this point, be included with the Decision as corollaries (see next
+page).</p>
+
+<p>Where combinations of courses of action have been made in selecting
+the best course, the meaning can sometimes be improved at this point
+by modification of the previous wording.</p>
+
+<p>When, as previously discussed (<a href="#Page_151">page 151</a>), the commander has concluded
+that he cannot feasibly or acceptably adopt any course of action which
+will accomplish his task, contribute in any measure to its
+accomplishment, or even contribute in any degree to the accomplishment
+of the purpose of his mission, he records that fact in his Decision.
+His study of the problem will by this time, however, have given him
+the necessary data for a conclusion as to what his new mission should
+be. He therefore closes his basic estimate with a Decision, coupled
+with a purpose therefor, (see below), which will serve as a new
+mission, i.e., as an appropriate effect desired. This provides a basis
+for his solution of a subsidiary problem whose incentive is derived
+from this Decision.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, if the commander has had time and opportunity to represent
+his situation on this basis to higher authority, and has received a
+new task therefrom, the new task, coupled with the purpose also
+indicated by higher authority, will provide the mission for the
+solution of a new basic problem.</p>
+
+<p>The Purpose of the Decision. The purpose of the Decision is identical
+with the motivating task,&mdash;provided, of course, that the Decision, if
+carried out, will accomplish that task in full. When stated, the
+purpose is usually <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span>connected with the Decision by the words "in order
+to".</p>
+
+<p>If the commander has concluded that he will take action by stages, the
+Decision may cover only the first stage. In all cases where the
+Decision will only partially accomplish the motivating task,
+appropriate words to link the Decision to its purpose may be such as
+"to assist in" or "preparatory to".</p>
+
+<p>The statement of this purpose, in connection with the Decision, is
+frequently helpful and is sometimes necessary in making clear the
+exact relationship between the Decision and the motivating task. In
+the next planning step, where the detailed operations are determined,
+this purpose is an important guide because each detailed operation is
+expected to contribute to the accomplishment, not only of the
+Decision, but also of the motivating task.</p>
+
+<p>Corollaries to the Decision. The Decision may involve certain
+deductions or inferences, either delimiting or amplifying its nature.
+The commander may find it desirable to make note of these matters in
+connection with his Decision. He may later wish to use these notes
+when formulating his plan. Since these matters relate to deductions or
+inferences which naturally follow as results of the Decision they are
+properly referred to as "corollaries" to the Decision.</p>
+
+<p>The nature of such corollaries may best be shown by an example. It is
+supposed, for instance, that the commander has made the Decision "to
+guard the Eastern Caribbean barrier against enemy penetration". During
+the course of his estimate of the situation, he has come to the
+conclusion that his operations to carry out this Decision will extend
+into the area limited by Port X on the north, and Port Y on the south.
+This conclusion is a deduction, which immediately assumes importance
+when the Decision is made. The commander states this deduced
+conclusion here, in connection with the Decision, for future guidance
+in resolving the Decision into detailed operations, as well as for
+later use in his directives to limit the action of his subordinates.</p>
+
+<p>No particular form is specified for such corollaries. It is
+satisfactory to list them as Corollary I, Corollary II, etc. They do
+not constitute a part of the Decision.</p>
+
+<p>Relation of the Decision to the Detailed Plan and Directives. The
+Decision is the basis for the commander's plan of action for his
+entire force. This plan is promulgated in one or more directives. The
+Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not yet the concern of
+subordinate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span>commanders. It does not become their concern until it is
+used in directives. As incorporated in the commander's detailed plan
+and in his directives, the Decision, whether further developed or not,
+constitutes the commander's general plan and is referred to in those
+terms.</p>
+
+<p>The Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not bound by any rigid
+specifications as to form. Later (Chapter VII), when the commander
+prepares for the inauguration of planned action by the formulation and
+issue of directives, he assumes the obligation of conveying the
+substance of his Decision to his subordinates in clear language. At
+that time he will again have to subject its expression to scrutiny,
+and may find that he has to make modifications solely for
+clarification.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER VII<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED OPERATIONS</h4>
+
+<h4>(The Second Step&mdash;The Solution of Subsidiary Problems)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The problem of the second step may be stated in question form
+as follows: "What action should I take for the attainment of
+my objective as selected in the first step?"</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<div class="sidenote">For convenience a tabular form, inserted in the appendix,
+<a href="#Page_224">page 224</a>, gives page references to the principal subdivisions of this
+Chapter.</div>
+
+<p>Having arrived at his basic Decision, the commander, if he wishes to
+put it into effect, will proceed to formulate a plan of action which
+can be cast into the forms of directives for execution. In making such
+a plan, he provides for operations in the detail proper for his
+situation. He thereby expands the general plan, indicated in or
+developed from his basic Decision, into a complete plan which can
+readily be placed in the Order Form (Chapter VIII) as a directive or
+directives for the guidance of his subordinates.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure involved in formulating such a detailed plan of action
+has been described previously in general terms (Chapter V). The method
+of determining the salient features of the operations required has
+also been discussed (in Section III of Chapter IV). Therefore, these
+matters are not repeated at this point.</p>
+
+<p>The problems distinctive of this procedure (the second step, as
+described in Chapter V) are subsidiary problems, in the sense that the
+incentive for their solution arises by reason of a decision already
+made by the commander, i.e., the basic Decision, and because they are
+problems which the commander recognizes are to be solved by himself
+and not by his subordinates.</p>
+
+<p>Assumptions. The commander's plan has been derived from an estimate of
+the situation based on the best information available to him. Complete
+and accurate information is frequently lacking; hence, many military
+plans consider contingencies which, to make a plan possible, have been
+accepted in the estimate as assumptions.</p>
+
+<p>The word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies
+"the taking of something for granted". It does not mean a conjecture,
+guess, or probability. The proposed action, resulting from a decision
+made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the
+disclosure of the truth of the assumption. The fact that the
+assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span>the
+advisability of developing several plans based upon various sets of
+assumptions.</p>
+
+<p>It would be erroneous to believe that all contingencies can be
+foreseen, and to be content with a particular set of plans, all of
+which may prove to be wrong. It is not to be expected that a plan
+based upon assumptions will, in all respects, be suitable for use in
+an actual situation. For example, it will seldom occur that an
+elaborate Battle Plan, based upon assumptions as to the various types,
+dispositions, and strengths of forces present, the weather conditions,
+and the intent of the enemy, can be used without changes.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a harbor
+under assumptions that high visibility exists, that airplanes can
+operate, and that hostile submarines will be the only force in
+opposition, may frequently be found entirely applicable to the actual
+situation, or so nearly so as to require only slight modification. It
+is possible so to standardize such plans that only minor variables
+need be indicated when the plan is to be used.</p>
+
+<p>The visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the
+most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment.</p>
+
+<p>Alternative Plans. The word "alternative" is generally applied to
+contingent plans intended to accomplish a common task, but developed
+from varying sets of assumptions. "A choice between several" is the
+meaning of the word as here used. When such choice becomes necessary
+in a situation not yet clarified, that plan will be selected which has
+been derived from the set of assumptions considered by the commander
+as most likely to be correct. The selected plan is usually called the
+plan or the "accepted plan", and the other plans, coming from other
+less likely but still possible sets of assumptions, are called
+Alternative Plan No. 1, Alternative Plan No. 2, etc.</p>
+
+<p>Naval tactical situations particularly lend themselves to the drawing
+up of alternative plans in advance. There are numerous general
+categories of such tactical plans. Among these the Battle Plan is of
+paramount concern. Others include plans for sortie, entrance, defense
+while cruising, etc. In each category, alternative plans may be
+developed, based on various sets of assumptions.</p>
+
+<p>Alternative plans evolved in advance of detailed information may be
+found useful as a general basis for action. Circumstances may prove to
+be different from <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span>those previously visualized. The correct procedure
+is to keep the plans up to date, testing them, by the latest
+information, in a Running Estimate (Chapter IX). The commander will
+thus have a foundation for sound decision in the circumstances which
+actually arise.</p>
+
+<p>Still another use of alternative plans merits consideration. Early
+coordinated action during actual operations may be demanded although
+neither time nor the information available has permitted a detailed
+estimate. If the commander has drawn up, in advance, plans based on
+assumptions as to conditions that conceivably might exist, he will be
+better able to appreciate the situations which actually arise. He can
+thus direct the necessary action with more rapidity and understanding
+than if completely unprepared because of lack of planning. If he
+informs his subordinates of his proposed action under certain assumed
+conditions, he will facilitate cooperation, because better mutual
+understanding will exist. The advance alternative plans here discussed
+are not necessarily confined to problems confronting a commander
+during actual war operations. They may profitably be drawn up in
+peace, and may be the basis of training exercises.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Application of the Essential Elements of a Favorable Military
+Operation</h4>
+
+<p>In the solution of the problems distinctive of the second step, the
+commander starts with a consideration of the salient features of a
+favorably progressing military operation. This procedure is
+appropriate because any series of these problems, considered as a
+whole, pertains to the single problem of determining the most
+effective operation, or series of operations, for carrying his basic
+Decision into effect. If the action contemplated in the basic Decision
+is of such a nature as to call for successive included efforts in more
+than one stage, the commander limits his consideration, should he find
+such restriction advisable on sound grounds, to the operation or
+operations included in the first stage.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>On this basis, the commander considers, first, the feature of correct
+physical objectives. He has first to determine what his correct
+physical objectives will be.</p>
+
+<p>This determination may or may not present a perplexity. Frequently,
+the procedure of the first step (Chapter VI) will have plainly
+indicated one or more, perhaps all, of the physical objectives
+involved. In some cases, also, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span>the basic Decision will have plainly
+pointed out the action to be taken, and with respect to what physical
+objectives. In these instances, the commander may, with little further
+analysis or none, set down the operations which he considers necessary
+or desirable with respect to these physical objectives.</p>
+
+<p>In other cases, however, the action indicated in the Decision, though
+plainly indicating the commander's intent&mdash;that is, his calculated
+line of endeavor&mdash;may not have designated the numerous physical
+objectives as to which his effort is to be exerted. For example, the
+Decision "to interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes" is
+quite clear, but what are the numerous exertions of force required,
+and with relation to what physical objectives? Immediately there is a
+perplexity. Guided by the analysis made in his previous estimate of
+the situation, the commander now determines what the physical
+objectives are, action as to which will contribute to the
+accomplishment of the effort. The sum total of the actions taken
+against these physical objectives is properly equivalent to the
+accomplishment of the action indicated in his Decision. He may not be
+able at this time to determine all of the correct physical objectives,
+but he can determine certain correct ones (for the method, see Section
+III of Chapter IV).</p>
+
+<p>The correct physical objectives having been determined, so far as can
+be done at this time, the commander studies each thoroughly,
+developing the possibilities of certain effective actions (operations)
+with reference thereto. For instance, in the case of a commander who
+has been ordered to "interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime
+routes", he might develop one operation "to bomb enemy facilities at
+Port X", and another "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade
+routes" (with an indication of the routes involved).</p>
+
+<p>The operations thus developed are now listed in a definite sequence,
+in order to provide a proper basis for the further procedure. The
+commander may find it desirable to state them in their order of
+importance. Sometimes, however, it may be found advantageous to list
+the operations in chronological sequence, i.e., in the order of their
+execution. This point is further discussed hereafter (<a href="#Page_166">pages 166</a> and
+<a href="#Page_192">192</a>). The commander is at liberty, of course, to use either method
+according to its helpfulness in enabling him to visualize the elements
+of his problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>The commander now considers the second feature: advantageous relative
+positions. He may already occupy an advantageous geographical location
+or locations (see <a href="#Page_64">pages 64</a> (bottom) and <a href="#Page_65">65</a> (top)), or he may desire to
+improve his positions in certain respects. An advantageous position
+might be between the enemy and his base, in order to deny it to him.
+Another advantageous position might be to windward of the enemy, for
+the purpose of making a destroyer attack under the protection of a
+smoke screen.</p>
+
+<p>The commander now reconsiders, from the viewpoint of "advantageous
+relative positions", the operations deduced with respect to "correct
+physical objectives". As a result of this reconsideration, he may find
+that certain of these operations may be retained without change,
+whereas others may require modification.</p>
+
+<p>Suppose, for example, that two of the operations listed are those
+noted above, viz:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>"To bomb enemy facilities at Port X", and</p>
+
+<p>"To capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes
+between the &mdash;&mdash; parallels of north latitude and the
+&mdash;&mdash; meridians of west longitude."</p></div>
+
+<p>From the viewpoint of relative position, it may appear that the first
+operation is not affected seriously, if at all. Therefore, this
+operation may be left unchanged. However, the second operation may be
+definitely affected by relative position, because the best method of
+interrupting enemy trade may be to employ raiding forces in focal
+areas. Therefore this operation might be altered to the form, "to
+capture or destroy enemy trade by raiding focal areas" (with a
+designation of the areas).</p>
+
+<p>The commander's study is now likely to suggest operations which were
+not apparent when the analysis was confined to the correct physical
+objectives, alone. New physical objectives may appear to require
+attention. If so, all such new operations are added to the list
+compiled.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The commander may now study his list of operations, compiled to this
+point, from the standpoint of the third feature, proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. However, if the commander considers such apportionment
+now, his subsequent study of the fourth element&mdash;"adequate freedom of
+action"&mdash;may develop a need for further operations which will in turn
+call for a re-analysis as to his apportionment of fighting strength.
+Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the
+commander now <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span>defers consideration of such apportionment, and that
+he proceeds at this point to study measures for ensuring adequate
+freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>This study requires consideration of such matters as training, morale,
+surprise, secrecy, cooperation, intelligence, logistics, and
+provisions (communications, location of the commander, and the like)
+for effective exercise of command. (See <a href="#Page_76">page 76</a>). The commander
+exercises his judgment as to the degree of detail in which such
+matters should be treated, according to the nature of his problems.</p>
+
+<p>If any such subject&mdash;for example, communications&mdash;involves the
+development of a subsidiary plan (<a href="#Page_168">page 168</a>), the measures noted in
+connection with the formulation of the basic plan may be stated along
+broad lines, such as: "To provide for effective communications." Any
+specific matters of considerable importance may also be included,&mdash;for
+example, as to secrecy with respect to the use of communications.
+Other details may then be deferred until the commander takes up the
+necessary subsidiary plan. Otherwise, all pertinent operations in
+connection with these measures are naturally noted at this point.</p>
+
+<p>Certain of these measures for freedom of action are now to be
+discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on basic
+plans.</p>
+
+<p>In certain operations contemplated by the commander, there may be a
+requirement for additional training, sometimes of a special nature.
+This may be true, for instance, if an operation involves the landing
+of an expeditionary force. Conditions permitting, the commander will
+naturally desire to make provision for training exercises. If time or
+other conditions do not permit necessary training, he may find it
+desirable to modify his plans accordingly. The salient features of a
+subsidiary training problem are discussed hereafter (<a href="#Page_176">page 176</a>), and
+may well be considered at this point in developing the basic plan.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may already have noted, in considering operations
+suggested by his previous study of the situation, a need for certain
+action as to security, secrecy, and intelligence. Any additional
+operations of this nature, not previously noted, may well be
+incorporated at this point.</p>
+
+<p>Security of his own plan, and secrecy therefor, are important
+considerations with reference to intelligence activities. The
+requirements as to intelligence and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span>counter-intelligence features are
+primary considerations as to any plan. Such considerations involve the
+collection of information and its conversion into intelligence. The
+hampering of enemy intelligence activities is a related consideration.</p>
+
+<p>The collection of useful information, and its denial to the enemy,
+call for a definite plan. When information has been collected, it is
+subjected to the processes (<a href="#Page_122">page 122</a>) of analysis, evaluation,
+interpretation, and dissemination. Collection, to be consistently
+effective, calls for specific directives to, or requests on, the
+appropriate collecting agencies. Analysis determines the source of the
+information and the circumstances under which it was obtained.
+Evaluation determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation
+consists of drawing conclusions; when information thus takes the form
+of facts (so far as they can be ascertained) and of sound conclusions
+drawn therefrom, it becomes military (naval) intelligence. It is then
+disseminated to those concerned and is used in the solution of the
+commander's own problems.</p>
+
+<p>The basis for collection of such data is the determination of the
+essential elements of information desired by the commander. The
+notation of these essential elements, for later incorporation in his
+directive(s), naturally constitutes a primary feature of his basic
+plan. The essential elements of information are frequently formulated
+as questions&mdash;e.g., Will the enemy do this? Is the enemy doing that?
+What are the principal topographic features of Y Island, with respect
+to so and so?</p>
+
+<p>These questions cover the essential matters of perplexity as to enemy
+courses of action and as to the characteristics of the theater. Each
+enemy course of action, for example, may provide the basis for a
+question; or, if the scope of the problem has narrowed sufficiently,
+such question may deal with one of the enemy's possible operations,
+related to a course of action which he may be pursuing or is known to
+be pursuing.</p>
+
+<p>On the basis of the essential elements of information, the commander
+provides for proper reconnaissance activities by the several
+collecting agencies under his command, or for appropriate requests to
+be made by him on other collecting agencies. A sound plan will always
+make adequate provision for such measures.</p>
+
+<p>These subjects are treated in more detail in the later discussion
+(<a href="#Page_177">page 177</a>) of intelligence problems.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>In connection with freedom of action, the commander will also make
+adequate provision for logistics support. In its unrestricted sense,
+the term "logistics" relates to the supply and movement of a military
+force, and to such related matters as the disposition and replacement
+of ineffective personnel. Logistics measures, as comprehended in the
+development of the basic plan, exclude movement primarily of a
+strategical or tactical nature, but include movement related primarily
+to supply and similar matters. This requirement gives rise to the
+necessity for logistics measures which may further call for operations
+such as to provide fuel oil and supplies at rendezvous X and Y, and
+tender facilities at port D. An incidental requirement will relate to
+movements of train ships. Hence, the commander formulates these, also,
+and includes them in his list of operations for later assignment as
+logistics tasks. (<a href="#Page_166">Page 166</a>). Fuel oil may likewise be required at Port
+D, but if the commander knows that ample fuel oil is in store there,
+no operation to cover this feature is required of him.</p>
+
+<p>The solution of logistics problems is further discussed hereafter
+(<a href="#Page_179">page 179</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>The commander has now, it may be presumed, evolved all of the
+operations that his analysis tells him are appropriate with respect to
+correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, and
+freedom of action. Therefore, he now studies all of these operations
+from the viewpoint of the remaining element&mdash;proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. This consideration involves, initially, a
+determination of what forces will be necessary to carry out the
+operations listed. The commander thereby determines the requirements,
+as to forces, for each such operation.</p>
+
+<p>For example, the operation "to locate an enemy force" may require the
+use of several types of naval vessels and aircraft. The commander
+determines what method of search is best for the purposes of this
+specific operation; thereafter, he determines what forces are
+necessary to conduct the search. The procedure has previously been
+indicated (in the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made
+Available&mdash;<a href="#Page_34">page 34</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In this study the commander will often find it necessary to divide
+some of the more extensive operations into component parts, suitable
+for later assignment as tasks for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span>subordinates. Fundamentally, there
+is no difference between an operation and a task, except that the
+latter includes also the idea of imposing on another person, or
+assigning to him, a definite amount of work or duty (<a href="#Page_84">page 84</a>). At this
+stage, then, the commander deals with components suitable for
+performance by available weapons, in the usual units, or combinations
+of units, in which they are effective. Of course, when an operation
+meets this requirement without subdivision into components, it need
+not be subdivided.</p>
+
+<p>These component parts are not yet actually tasks, because the
+commander does not plan to assign them at this time to any one for
+execution. However, the components are visualized as clearly, and are
+formulated as definitely, as is possible at this point. The
+requirement is that they be acts that available forces can perform.</p>
+
+<p>The method of breaking down an operation into component parts is one
+of analysis and deduction. Having visualized the manner whereby the
+operation can contribute to the accomplishment of the effort, the
+commander has now to determine the means to be employed to this end.
+Experience and knowledge tell him what numbers and types of ships,
+aircraft, and other weapons, if properly employed, will attain the
+effect desired.</p>
+
+<p>Each component part will indicate both the action and the physical
+objectives of the action. For each component, the commander estimates
+what forces are required. He knows the extent of the armed forces
+available, and he can, if his total force is adequate, adjust matters
+to allow each component a force capable of carrying it out.</p>
+
+<p>For example, a component operation might call for a search by
+destroyers, but the commander might find that his destroyers were in
+such poor relative position as to prevent them from reaching the point
+of origin in time. Therefore he would be unable to conduct the search
+by using destroyers alone. He might now consider a search by aircraft.
+A study of this proposal might indicate that it could be carried out
+in part by aircraft, but that available aircraft were inadequate to
+carry it out in its entirety. In such event, consideration would be in
+order of the possibility of conducting this search by use of other
+forces also, e.g., submarines and cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>In case the commander believes an indicated operation to be
+infeasible, he first restudies that operation to see whether he can
+modify it, without adversely affecting the accomplishment of the
+effort. He may even find that he can <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span>eliminate it by including its
+essential features in some other operation.</p>
+
+<p>If the commander finds that his forces are inadequate for the
+accomplishment of an effort in one stage, but that they are adequate
+for its accomplishment in successive stages, he may draw a conclusion
+as to which of the operations he can carry out first. On this basis,
+he may proceed with the formulation of tasks to include these
+operations, leaving the remainder to a future time (see <a href="#Page_56">page 56</a>).</p>
+
+<p>It may be that all operations set down cannot be accomplished by the
+forces available, but that they will be possible of accomplishment if
+other forces are provided. This knowledge, of the sum total of forces
+required for the action indicated in the Decision, is an essential. It
+is only by such a searching inquiry that the commander ensures that
+the operations resolved from the Decision will result in a full
+solution of his problem. Usually the forces available will be found
+adequate, because the superior who provided them gave consideration,
+on his part, to the requirements. However, if the forces available are
+not deemed adequate, the commander either modifies the operations, or
+restricts them, or subdivides them into parts for performance in
+succession by stages. In any such case, conditions permitting, he
+makes constructive representations, together with a report of the
+facts, to his superior (see <a href="#Page_103">page 103</a>).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.</h4>
+
+<p>Each of the operations finally deemed necessary or desirable is now
+tested as to its suitability, its feasibility, and its acceptability
+as to consequences. The considerations involved have been explained
+previously (Section III of Chapter IV) and are therefore not repeated
+here.</p>
+
+<p>The testing process will eliminate those operations found not
+suitable, feasible, or acceptable.</p>
+
+<p>In addition, the tests may lead to the elimination of operations
+which, while both suitable and feasible, do not contribute enough
+toward the accomplishment of the effort to warrant their retention.
+For example, among the operations listed might be one to capture X
+island and one to capture Y island, both suitable and feasible. The
+commander, having analyzed these proposals, might conclude that the
+capture of Y island would not constitute a sufficient contribution to
+warrant its adoption as an operation at this time. Therefore, he might
+omit this operation, or he might defer it to a later stage.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span>A feasible operation may similarly be rejected or deferred out of
+preference for another which can more readily be accomplished.</p>
+
+<p>The tests may also reveal important facts as to the relative
+consequences with respect to costs. For example, two operations might
+both be acceptable as to this factor, but one might be less acceptable
+than the other. Accordingly, the less acceptable operation might be
+omitted, or might be deferred for the time being.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the completion of the tests, all operations retained are listed
+for further development.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Formulation of Tasks</h4>
+
+<p>The correct resolution of the Decision into the detailed operations
+required is further ensured by the visualization of these operations
+as tasks. Tasks so formulated (<a href="#Page_162">page 162</a>), become a basis for the
+preparation of directives.</p>
+
+<p>To prepare a plan as a basis for directives, or for use as such, the
+commander first finds it desirable to formulate and assemble the
+various tasks. The tasks are formulated as a result of his study of
+(1) those operations which do not require to be broken down, and which
+may now be rewritten as tasks, and of (2) the component parts of the
+more extensive operations (See <a href="#Page_162">page 162</a>, bottom).</p>
+
+<p>Each of the tasks, as now listed, is tested for suitability, for
+feasibility, and for acceptability with respect to the consequences as
+to costs. In view of the fact that the operations have all been
+thoroughly tested, this process now becomes not a formal analysis but
+merely a check.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups</h4>
+
+<p>The commander now classifies the tasks on the basis of their
+suitability for accomplishment by appropriate task forces or
+subdivisions thereof, i.e., task groups. In so doing he endeavors to
+avoid forming any more classifications than are necessary for the
+accomplishment of the full effort.</p>
+
+<p>Note: In the remainder of this work, the term Task Group, except as
+may otherwise be indicated, will be understood in the inclusive sense
+of either "task force" or "task group".</p>
+
+<p>Tasks are assigned to task groups on the basis of such factors as the
+nature and geographical location of physical objectives, the existing
+disposition of the several units, their capabilities, and their
+freedom of action. The last-named <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>may be the determinant, and,
+because of the importance of such considerations, tasks which would
+otherwise fall to one group might be assigned to another. Features
+influencing a change might include lack of training of the personnel
+available in the first group, or the special qualifications of a
+particular commander, or a justified desire to adhere to a previously
+determined permanent task organization.</p>
+
+<p>Logistics tasks, i.e., those requiring operations for placing
+logistics measures in effect, require the same careful consideration
+as do combat tasks. (See <a href="#Page_162">page 162</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Certain tasks apply to all of the task groups, or pertain to the
+general conduct of the common effort. Among such may be provision for
+security, for unity among the subdivisions, and for intelligence
+activities (<a href="#Page_160">page 160</a>). In order to avoid repetition, these tasks are
+assembled in one group.</p>
+
+<p>The commander analyzes the requirements of fighting strength for each
+task group. He then, from the means available to him, assigns the
+necessary strength to each group, making adjustment between the
+theoretical requirements and the actual strength available.</p>
+
+<p>He is familiar with the types of vessels and aircraft constituting his
+command, and with their military characteristics; with the
+capabilities and cooperative qualities of his commanders; with the
+degree of training of his various units; and with the geographical
+location of physical objectives. He recognizes that each task requires
+adequate strength for its accomplishment. Because these requirements
+have been thoroughly considered during the study of the effective
+apportionment of fighting strength, he is able to make adjustments as
+necessary.</p>
+
+<p>The commander now fully organizes each classification of tasks and its
+corresponding task group by naming the task group (or task force), by
+making notation of its composition and of the rank and name of its
+commander, and then by listing the tasks of each group. The principal
+task (or tasks) may be listed first, the other tasks following in the
+order of their importance. If preferred, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological. Also, either major or minor tasks may be listed
+chronologically. (See <a href="#Page_158">pages 158</a> and <a href="#Page_192">192</a>).</p>
+
+<p>If the chronological sequence of tasks is utilized, that fact, in
+order to avoid confusion, is clearly indicated.</p>
+
+<p>Thus organized, the whole plan can be transferred almost bodily into
+the Order Form (Chapter VIII).</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span>Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the Determination
+of Objectives Embodied in Tasks</h4>
+
+<p>In formulating tasks for the several task groups, the commander has
+now visualized, for each such group, an objective (or objectives) for
+the subordinate to attain. In selecting these objectives, the
+commander has placed himself, mentally, in the subordinate's
+situation, visualizing the problem which the subordinate is to solve.
+On this basis the commander has apportioned the strength needed for
+the attainment of the objectives assigned to his subordinates. This
+procedure, of evident importance, is frequently one of considerable
+difficulty, because a higher commander, lacking detailed information
+of the situation which may confront a subordinate cannot always
+anticipate all the obstacles to the latter's success.</p>
+
+<p>In formulating tasks, and in apportioning strength, by the procedure
+already described, the commander has applied the Fundamental Military
+Principle. Now, to ensure the practical adjustment of means to ends
+(<a href="#Page_66">page 66</a>), the commander reviews the process in the light of that
+Principle, so that he may be assured that he has selected a correct
+objective (or objectives) for each subordinate. By using the tests
+indicated in the Principle, the commander confirms the suitability of
+each objective so selected, satisfies himself of its feasibility of
+attainment, and assures himself that the costs involved will be
+acceptable. If these requirements cannot be so satisfied, necessary
+adjustments are in order.</p>
+
+<p>These tests may frequently be of a routine nature, by reason of the
+previous painstaking tests of the several operations involved.
+However, such final tests cannot be omitted without incurring the
+danger of selecting incorrect objectives for subordinates to attain.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action</h4>
+
+<p>Having completed the classification of his tasks, the commander next
+assembles the measures determined upon as necessary for ensuring
+adequate freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>When the subject matter is not too bulky, these measures are
+incorporated in their proper place in the basic plan. Otherwise,
+instructions as to these matters will be issued as annexes.</p>
+
+<p>The various measures are assembled under the classification shown
+below:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) Measures required for security, for cooperation, and for
+intelligence activities.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) Measures for logistics support. These cover <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span>provision for
+procurement and replenishment of supplies, disposition and
+replacement of ineffective personnel, satisfactory
+material maintenance, sanitation, battle casualties, and
+the like.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(c) Measures for the exercise of command. These include
+provision for communications, location of rendezvous, zone
+time to be used, and the location of the commander.</p></div>
+
+<p>This classification corresponds to that used in the Order Form (<a href="#Page_193">page
+193</a>). Experience has indicated that such a classification facilitates
+the transmission of instructions to subordinate commanders.</p>
+
+<p>If desired, the material which will be required to be incorporated in
+paragraph (1) of the Order Form (see <a href="#Page_190">pages 190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a> and <a href="#Page_221">221</a>) may
+be also assembled at this point.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans</h4>
+
+<p>As previously noted (<a href="#Page_106">page 106</a>), certain subsidiary problems require
+the preparation of subsidiary plans to be included with the directive
+as annexes. In broad strategical estimates, the solution of such
+subsidiary problems involves a vast amount of mental effort; even in
+restricted estimates, these problems may require most intensive
+thought. It is therefore appropriate at this point to discuss, in some
+detail, the nature of these subsidiary problems.</p>
+
+<p>During the solution of his basic problem and later, during the process
+of evolving his basic plan, the commander may become aware of the need
+for further action of a supporting nature with respect to his basic
+mission, distinct from that which he intends to assign as tasks to
+subordinate commanders. If the nature of this action involves
+perplexity, he will be confronted with new problems to be solved. When
+he recognizes that such problems exist and are to be solved by
+himself, this awareness is a recognition of the incentive.</p>
+
+<p>For example, one of these problems may involve a battle in which the
+entire force will participate, or perhaps a sortie requiring
+coordination of the several subdivisions of his force. Others will be
+concerned with measures recognized as necessary for ensuring freedom
+of action.</p>
+
+<p>These problems give rise to the subsidiary plans previously referred
+to (<a href="#Page_106">page 106</a>). They are not necessarily subsidiary in importance; even
+the Battle Plan, the basis for the culmination of tactical effort, may
+result from the solution of a subsidiary problem. The word
+"subsidiary", as here used, merely indicates that the problem has its
+origin in the commander's own Decision.</p>
+
+<p>When the incentive is thus recognized during the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span>solution of the
+basic problem or during the second step, the commander solves these
+new problems, and includes their solutions as a part of the directives
+prepared for the carrying out of the basic plan. As will be seen later
+(Chapter VIII), there is a prescribed place for such solutions in the
+usual form in which directives are issued. Often, however, because of
+extent and bulk, these solutions are included with the directives as
+annexes.</p>
+
+<p>The commander will desire to provide for all contingencies, but he can
+rarely, during the planning stage, see completely into the future, so
+as to foretell all pertinent events which may befall. During the
+unfolding of events, therefore, unforeseen subsidiary problems will
+probably arise. Whether visualized during planning, or encountered
+during the execution of the plan, these problems have the same
+relationship with the basic problem. Reference is later made (Chapter
+IX) to subsidiary problems which arise during the action.</p>
+
+<p>Subsidiary problems, according to their nature in each case, may be
+solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step or by that
+distinctive of the second. In many instances either may be applicable,
+the choice being a matter of convenience.</p>
+
+<p>Battle Plans, for example, can demonstrably be formulated by the use
+of either procedure. Thus, a Decision "to destroy the enemy in a
+daylight fleet engagement" may be used as the basis for an Estimate of
+the Situation, by the procedure distinctive of the first step, in
+order to reach a decision as to the plan, in outline, for the
+contemplated engagement. However, the same result can also be attained
+through the procedure distinctive of the second step, with the basic
+Decision as the point of departure.</p>
+
+<p>A solution also can be reached by a method which is, in effect,
+intermediate between the procedures of the first and second steps. For
+example, the basic (broad strategical) Decision noted above can be
+taken, in a detailed tactical Estimate, as the only suitable,
+feasible, and acceptable course of action. Then, in Section IV of the
+Estimate, a study of the more detailed operations involved can be
+developed into an outlined plan for the battle. Thus, a single course
+of action, expanded to include the outlined plan so developed, can
+then be adopted as the decision and can in turn be expanded by
+second-step methods into a detailed tactical plan.</p>
+
+<p>On the grounds of simplicity, the procedure distinctive of the second
+step is preferable, when it is applicable to the particular problem.
+Therefore, when a subsidiary plan is to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span>be developed directly from a
+basic Decision, this is frequently the better procedure. This comment
+is applicable not only to battle plans but also to other subsidiary
+plans such as sortie plans, entrance plans, and logistics plans. The
+commander may find it necessary, however, to expand the study of
+fighting strength made in Section I-B of the basic estimate, in order
+to obtain the detailed data needed for formulating the subsidiary
+plan.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the relative simplicity of the second-step method, cases
+occur where the procedure of the first step is nevertheless
+preferable. For example, a basic Decision making provision for a major
+campaign, divided into stages of some scope, may involve, as part of
+one of these stages, an operation to capture an island. Such an
+operation may itself require a considerable effort on the part of the
+whole force; yet the operation may be so specialized or localized, or
+both, with reference to the entire effort contemplated in the basic
+Decision, that the solution of this subsidiary problem can best be
+accomplished through the procedure distinctive of the first step.</p>
+
+<p>The commander will therefore necessarily be the judge, in each case,
+as to the particular procedure to be adopted.</p>
+
+<p>There are wide variations in the requirements of the Estimate Form,
+when used for the solution of subsidiary problems. This is natural
+because these problems vary widely in nature. They include, on the one
+hand, problems dealing directly with the conflict of armed forces, for
+which the Form is especially designed. On the other hand, these
+problems include those dealing with the factors related to freedom of
+action. To be suitable for this purpose, the Form requires
+modification in varying degrees. Certain examples are included in the
+latter part of this chapter (<a href="#Page_176">page 176</a> and following).</p>
+
+<p>The application of the procedure of the first step to the solution of
+such subsidiary problems requires provision for deriving, in each
+case, a (subsidiary) mission appropriate to the problem. Of the two
+elements of the mission, the (subsidiary) purpose is first determined,
+because the (subsidiary) task will necessarily be suitable to the
+(subsidiary) purpose. These elements of the (subsidiary) mission may
+be obtained from one or more of the operations into which the basic
+Decision has been resolved. They may also be obtained from a preceding
+subsidiary problem, already solved.</p>
+
+<p>In illustration of the preceding, discussion is first centered on a
+strategical problem of usual type, involving a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span>subsidiary tactical
+problem calling for the detailed employment of weapons in a naval
+engagement. Other illustrations will deal with subsidiary problems
+relating to particular aspects of freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>In the first example it is supposed that the commander has already
+solved a basic problem of broad strategical scope, and has arrived at
+a Decision which contemplates an engagement. A further logical act of
+planning is now to develop a Battle Plan. Such development involves
+the solution of a subsidiary problem. In this case the commander is
+supposed to have found it desirable to solve this subsidiary problem
+by the procedure distinctive of the first step.</p>
+
+<p>In this problem, the situation summarized is an imaginary one. It may
+eventuate either through the natural future developments of the
+situation existing at the time of the solution of the basic problem,
+or it may confront the commander during the execution of the plans
+derived from the Decision of that (basic) problem. The Battle Plan
+finally to be formulated will be for use under the conditions assumed
+in this situation.</p>
+
+<p>The commander will desire to draw up a Battle Plan as a provision for
+the situation which he believes most likely to eventuate. However, as
+he cannot be certain that this situation will occur, he may also
+desire to assume other situations, i.e., prepare in advance for other
+contingencies. It is then necessary for him to solve several problems,
+each differing from the others in the assumptions (<a href="#Page_155">page 155</a>) as to the
+form the situation may take. The summary of the situation therefore
+requires a brief statement of the conditions which are assumed. In
+addition, such parts of the basic problem may be included as are
+deemed pertinent to the new problem in hand.</p>
+
+<p>In his new problem the purpose of the (subsidiary) mission may readily
+be obtained from the basic problem. Suppose the assigned task,
+motivating the estimate of the basic problem, to have been to "prevent
+enemy convoy from reaching destination". This, the motivating task of
+the basic problem, then becomes a suitable (subsidiary) purpose for
+the mission of the subsidiary problem.</p>
+
+<p>For the mission of the subsidiary problem, a motivating task, suitable
+to the purpose thus determined, will be found in the Decision of the
+basic problem. Suppose the Decision in this case to have been "to
+destroy the enemy convoy". The task thus determined for the subsidiary
+problem becomes an assigned task in the sense that it is assigned <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span>by
+the commander to himself, instead of to a subordinate; however, it is
+also an assigned task in the sense that it has been indirectly
+assigned by the immediate superior, because it has been derived, in
+the basic estimate, from the motivating task which was directly
+assigned by the superior.</p>
+
+<p>The two elements, of task and purpose, when linked together, enable
+the commander to visualize the appropriate effect desired, as the
+basis for his subsidiary estimate,&mdash;a procedure identical with that
+followed in a basic estimate. As in the latter, the commander can now
+formulate his subsidiary mission, as:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To destroy the enemy convoy,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to prevent it from reaching its
+destination.</p></div>
+
+<p>The mission of the subsidiary problem is thus seen to be identical
+with the basic Decision linked to the purpose of that Decision.</p>
+
+<p>However, this is not always the case. A subsidiary problem may merely
+involve the execution by the commander, i.e., under his own immediate
+direction, of a designated part of his general plan. Or, such a
+problem may involve execution, by the commander, of one or more of the
+detailed operations for the accomplishment of his general plan or of a
+part thereof. The commander may also find it necessary to solve
+numerous subsidiary problems of relatively restricted scope pertaining
+either to his general plan or to a part thereof or to the detailed
+operations involved.</p>
+
+<p>In some of these cases the purpose of the subsidiary mission may be
+readily apparent. In others, its nature may become clear only after
+the application of considerable mental effort. In every case the
+determination of a proper (subsidiary) purpose involves visualization
+of a situation which the commander desires to bring about or to
+maintain. The (subsidiary) task, appropriate to the (subsidiary)
+purpose, will always necessarily be suitable to the latter. This task
+is then the motivating task for the solution of the particular
+subsidiary problem in hand. This will be the case whether the
+commander makes a simple mental solution or produces a more complex
+one in which the formal written estimate of the situation is employed.
+In the former instance, the brevity of the mental process tends to
+obscure this fact.</p>
+
+<p>An example might occur in a situation where the commander has received
+an order to "Protect the base at A". It is then supposed that, after
+estimating the situation, he has reached the Decision "to deny the
+enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of A", the
+purpose of the Decision being, of course, "in order to protect the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span>base at A". The action required might then be undertaken in two
+stages. The first stage might be confined to the area ABCD. If, then,
+all available base sites in this area, except Y island, were already
+securely in friendly hands, the commander would find it necessary to
+make provision for an operation to deny the use of this island to the
+enemy. If this operation is of such a nature that the commander
+desires to execute it under his own direct control, instead of
+assigning it to a subordinate, it presents a subsidiary problem which
+the commander, himself, has to solve.</p>
+
+<p>The commander has now determined the necessity of solving a subsidiary
+problem relating to the accomplishment of a designated part of his
+general plan. He has also determined the necessity of solving another
+subsidiary problem presented by an operation pertaining to the first
+stage of the accomplishment of his general plan.</p>
+
+<p>Each subsidiary problem requires an estimate of the situation although
+"the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact" (<a href="#Page_172">page
+172</a>).</p>
+
+<p>In making his basic estimate, the commander may have discovered the
+need for these subsidiary estimates. In this case, he may have
+included them in his estimate, as "estimates within the estimate"
+(<a href="#Page_83">page 83</a>), in his analysis of the operations involved in the various
+courses of action which he considered. For instance, his basic
+Decision may have included the capture of Y island, and he may have
+covered this feature by a corollary to that Decision, as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Corollary: As a first stage, to deny the enemy the use of
+available base sites in the area ABCD, by capturing Y island.</p></div>
+
+<p>However, the commander may not discover the desirability or need of
+solving these subsidiary problems until the second step, when
+resolving the basic Decision into the detailed operations required. In
+this case, he might make due provision at that time for the operations
+involved in the subsidiary problems. The mental procedure would be the
+same in either event.</p>
+
+<p>The commander may find, however, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate with respect to the determination of the stages of
+his operation, including the details as to the performance of the
+first stage. In this case he finds a proper mission for his subsidiary
+estimate in the basic Decision, linked to its purpose. This mission
+would be as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+effective bombing range of A,</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span>(Purpose) in order to protect the base at A.</p></div>
+
+<p>During the subsidiary estimate the commander may discover, in his
+study of the area ABCD, the necessity for an operation to deny Y
+island to the enemy, and may even go so far, in this study, as to
+decide on the capture of this island. The decision, settling on this
+area as the scene of the first stage of his effort, may then include
+provision for the capture of the island, as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Decision: To deny the enemy the use of base sites in the area
+ABCD as a first stage toward denying him the use of all base
+sites within effective bombing range of the base at A.</p>
+
+<p>Corollary: To capture Y island.</p></div>
+
+<p>However, the commander may not take up the matter of denying Y island,
+specifically, to enemy use until he studies the detailed operations
+required for the accomplishment of the action involved in his first
+stage. In such event, he may make provision for the capture of the
+island in his subsidiary plan for the execution of the first stage. He
+may find, on the other hand, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate as to this feature. If so, the mission for this
+subsidiary estimate would be identical with the decision (less the
+corollary, but plus the purpose of the estimate), i.e.,&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+effective bombing range of the area ABCD as a first stage</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) toward denying him the use of all base sites within
+effective bombing range of the base at A.</p></div>
+
+<p>During this estimate the commander considers the various courses of
+action whereby he can deny to the enemy all bases in the area of the
+first stage. Concluding that Y island is the only base site not
+securely in friendly hands, and that the best method of denying it to
+the enemy is to capture it himself, he reaches a decision as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Decision: To capture Y island, in order to deny to the enemy
+the use of the only available base site in the area ABCD.</p></div>
+
+<p>In each of the foregoing cases, the commander is said to have
+"deduced" the mission for his subsidiary problem. As has been
+demonstrated, the process of deduction is merely the application of
+the natural mental processes through the use of the estimate of the
+situation. Whether the estimate is formal or informal, detailed or
+brief, written or mental, is immaterial; in any case, the estimate
+results in a decision which provides, with its purpose, a proper
+mission for the succeeding problem which has been presented by
+solution of its predecessors.</p>
+
+<p>In logical sequence, from problem to problem, the procedure outlined
+in the preceding discussion enables the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span>commander to derive a correct
+mission for the problem involving the capture of Y Island. Clear
+visualization of such a subsidiary mission is frequently of great
+importance, and may be difficult unless the procedure has been
+carefully traced from each problem to the next. In this particular
+example, if the commander finds that the capture of Y Island is of
+such a specialized and localized nature (<a href="#Page_170">page 170</a>) as to call for a
+formal estimate (as may frequently be the case in capturing a
+well-defended island base), he will be especially desirious of
+deriving a correct (subsidiary) mission as a basis for this estimate.
+In this instance a correct mission would be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To capture Y Island,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only
+available base site in the area ABCD.</p></div>
+
+<p>This mission is identical with the decision, linked to its
+purpose, of the preceding subsidiary problem.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>Subsidiary problems relating to training (<a href="#Page_160">page 160</a>), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, involve estimates of the
+situation very similar to those explained previously (Chapter VI).</p>
+
+<p>Section I-A of such a training estimate will include a summary of the
+salient features of the existing situation, from the strategical or
+tactical viewpoint, together with a statement of the salient features
+of the operations to be carried out for which the projected training
+is designed. The incentive will be found in a previous decision
+calling for the operations which require the training to be given. The
+assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for
+training appropriate to the projected operations. The (subsidiary)
+mission will be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) to provide appropriate training,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action during
+the operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+phraseology in the mission or by reference to the preceding
+summary of the situation.)</p></div>
+
+<p>Section I-B of a training estimate will take account of the training
+factors cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic problem,
+but will specify details with respect to both own and enemy forces.
+This section will also cover existing facilities for training, as well
+as the characteristics of the theater which have now or may have a
+bearing on the training to be given.</p>
+
+<p>Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+the appropriate training.</p>
+
+<p>Section III will deal with any measures which may be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span>adopted by the
+enemy (through actual attack, through propaganda, or any other
+methods) to hinder or prevent the desired training.</p>
+
+<p>Section IV will be devoted to the selection of the best training
+procedure.</p>
+
+<p>Section V will state the decision as to the essentials of the training
+to be given and as to the method of giving the training. The decision
+will be in such detail as to constitute a general plan, or a proper
+basis therefor, from which a detailed plan may be developed.</p>
+
+<p>A detailed training plan, developed from the foregoing decision, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions, will state the
+general plan for training, and will prescribe the appropriate training
+tasks. It will also include any proper coordinating measures, make
+provision for the logistics of the training plan, and finally provide
+for the exercise of command and for supervision over the training.</p>
+
+<p>A training plan may be briefed by annexing appropriate
+documents,&mdash;e.g., a program and a schedule. The commander will
+ordinarily issue a schedule for training to be given under his own
+supervision; he will usually issue a program for training to be given
+by his subordinates, who will in turn prepare their own schedules.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>Subsidiary problems involving intelligence (<a href="#Page_160">page 160</a>), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, call for an intelligence
+estimate along the lines indicated, in general, in Chapter VI.</p>
+
+<p>Section I-A of the Estimate will include a summary of the salient
+features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical
+and tactical operations. The incentive, to be found in a previous
+decision of the commander, will be noted. The assigned objective will
+be the making of provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and
+of the theater of operations. The mission will be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To make provision for adequate intelligence of the
+enemy and of the theater of operations,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+operations contemplated.</p></div>
+
+<p>Section I-B of the intelligence estimate will take account of the
+factors as to intelligence and as to related matters which are noted
+in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate.</p>
+
+<p>Section II will consider the possible procedures for obtaining
+information, i.e., for its collection, including reports from
+collecting agencies.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span>Section III will consider the capabilities of the enemy as to
+counter-intelligence measures.</p>
+
+<p>Section IV will compare the various procedures open for the collection
+of information and for reports thereof.</p>
+
+<p>Section V will include a decision as to the essential elements of
+information desired. The decision will be in sufficient detail to
+serve as a general plan (or a basis therefor), to be developed into a
+detailed plan for obtaining information and for converting it into
+intelligence.</p>
+
+<p>A detailed intelligence plan will include appropriate information and
+assumptions. It will state the general plan for obtaining
+intelligence. This statement will include the essential elements of
+information desired. The plan will include appropriate tasks for
+information-collecting agencies, with times and destinations for
+reports of information. The task for each collecting agency will be
+based on the general plan (above); such task will also be
+synchronized with the projected operations prescribed for such agency
+in current Operation Orders (Chapter VIII). The agency's inherent
+capabilities&mdash;its limitations as well as its powers&mdash;will be given
+due consideration. Requests to be made on collecting agencies not
+under the commander's control will be noted in the information (as to
+own forces) given in the plan (see above).</p>
+
+<p>Logistics arrangements will include, for example, provisions for
+handling prisoners of war, the disposition of captured documents and
+other materials, and the supply of maps, charts, and photographs.
+Counter intelligence measures will be specified where applicable.
+These include such matters as censorship, press relations, camouflage,
+and propaganda. Finally, the plan will include provision for the
+rendition of routine and special reports, for special charts (or maps)
+accompanying or pertinent to such reports, and for any intelligence
+conferences.</p>
+
+<p>The essential elements of information desired are frequently stated in
+question form. Each question deals with an enemy course of action or
+with one or more of the enemy operations pertaining to such a course
+(<a href="#Page_161">page 161</a>).</p>
+
+<p>The tasks assigned to collecting agencies, or the requests made on
+collecting agencies not under the commander's control, will call for
+information (negative, if desired, as well as positive) as to specific
+indications of the enemy's action&mdash;past, present, or intended&mdash;and of
+the characteristics of the theater as related thereto. The indications
+to be sought for and reported are carefully <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span>determined by the
+commander in expectation that information obtained as to such matters
+will enable him to draw conclusions which will answer the questions
+posed by the essential elements of information.</p>
+
+<p>For example, essential elements of information, with corresponding
+indications, may be as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="essential elements of information">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">Essential Elements</td>
+  <td class="tdl3">Indications</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td width="40%" class="tdl3"><p class="hang">1. Will the enemy patrol the
+   trade route from A to B?</p></td>
+  <td width="60%" class="tdl3"><p class="hang">a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   forces (number and types of vessels) between meridians&mdash;and&mdash;,
+   as far north as&mdash;and as far south as&mdash;.</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">b. Times enemy forces observed in area noted.</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">c. Apparent activity of enemy forces so noted.</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">2. Will the enemy cover focal points M and N?</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   forces (numbers and types of vessels) in (a specified area or areas).</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">b. Times enemy forces observed in areas noted in a, above.</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">c. Apparent activity of enemy so noted.</p></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl3">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl3"><p class="hang">d. Has M or N been prepared as a naval base; an air base for seaplanes, for land planes?
+ Is M or N readily accessible to enemy battleships? What are the characteristics of the
+ available entrances to sheltered anchorages? (Etc.)</p></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<p>Another type of subsidiary problem which may call for a separate
+subsidiary plan relates to logistics (<a href="#Page_162">page 162</a>). This problem is
+particularly applicable to the planning stage, because the
+contingencies which it involves can, to a considerable degree, be
+foreseen. In this case the situation which the commander usually
+desires to bring about is adequate freedom of action with respect to
+supply and related matters. He wishes to solve this problem so
+completely during the present step that a logistics plan, concurrently
+executed with his basic plan, will require minimum subsequent
+attention.</p>
+
+<p>A logistics estimate by the procedure distinctive of the first step
+will include in Section I-A a summary of the pertinent features of the
+existing strategical and tactical situation, and of contemplated
+strategical and tactical operations. It will also include a statement
+of the salient <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>features of the existing logistics situation. The
+incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will
+be noted. The assigned objective will be the making of adequate
+provision for logistics support. The mission will be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) to make provision for adequate logistics support,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+phraseology in the mission or by reference to the summary of
+the situation).</p></div>
+
+<p>Section I-B of the estimate will take account of the logistics factors
+cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate, but will
+specify details to the further extent necessary.</p>
+
+<p>Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+appropriate logistics support of the various categories.</p>
+
+<p>Section III will discuss enemy actions to hamper or prevent adequate
+logistics support.</p>
+
+<p>Section IV will deal with selection of the best logistics procedure.</p>
+
+<p>Section V will state the decision as to the essential elements of the
+logistics support to be afforded, in such detail as will constitute a
+general plan (or a proper basis therefor) from which a detailed plan
+can be developed.</p>
+
+<p>A detailed logistics plan, developed from the foregoing estimate, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions. It will state the
+general plan for logistics support. It will then provide for
+appropriate action as to each type of logistics support, or will state
+proper tasks for the several subdivisions of the force concerned
+therewith. It will include, also, any coordinating measures. It will,
+finally, make provision for exercise of command with reference to
+logistics support, as well as for any necessary or desirable time
+elements and similar considerations.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<p>From all of the foregoing discussions it is apparent that the numerous
+possible subsidiary problems are all related to the basic problem
+either directly or through an intervening subsidiary problem. The
+nature of this relationship is seen through the (subsidiary) purpose,
+determined for the particular (subsidiary) task; therefore, the
+understanding of the problem involves a statement or visualization of
+the (subsidiary) purpose in each case.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h3>PART III<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT<br />
+IN THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN</h3>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span><br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER VIII<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE INAUGURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTION</h4>
+
+<h4>(The Third Step&mdash;The Formulation and Issue of Directives)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>In the discussion which now follows, it is demonstrated that,
+if the second step (Chapter VII) has been carried through
+completely, the formulation of directives requires only the
+completion of details of the Order Form, which is explained.
+The various types of naval plans and directives are also
+described.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>Scope of the Third Step. As previously stated (in Chapter V, on page
+107), the inauguration of the planned action (the third step) begins
+when the commander forms the intention of immediately promulgating, as
+one or more directives, his solution of the problem represented by the
+second step. The third step ends at the moment when the problem
+becomes one of supervising the planned action in the course of its
+execution.</p>
+
+<p>Military Plans and Military Directives. A plan is a proposed scheme,
+procedure, or method of action for the attainment of an objective. It
+is one of the essential links between decision and action.</p>
+
+<p>A directive, in the general sense, initiates or governs conduct or
+procedure. It is the means by which one's will or intent is made known
+to others. Sometimes the word is employed as a synonym for "order"; at
+others, it carries the significance of various instructions ranging
+from the simple to the complex; at still others, it denotes a plan
+formulated to be placed in effect in a particular contingency or when
+so directed. In all cases, a directive, to be suitable as a guide for
+others, has as its origin a plan.</p>
+
+<p>The words plan and directive are used herein as follows:&mdash;A plan may
+exist only in the mind. Even if formulated and set down in writing, it
+may receive no distribution. A plan continues to be exclusively a plan
+so long as it concerns the originating commander alone, and it never
+loses its identity as a proposed procedure or method of action. When,
+however, the commander forms the intent of promulgating the plan
+immediately, the plan becomes also a directive. At this point, as
+noted in the preceding paragraph ("Scope of the Third Step"), the
+execution phase begins, from the standpoint of the exercise of mental
+power, with the inauguration of the planned action.</p>
+
+<p>A directive may therefore be (1) an order effective upon receipt, in
+which case it may be an order placing in effect a plan already issued;
+or a directive may be (2) a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span>formulated plan which the commander
+intends to issue immediately to his subordinates.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, certain written instruments prepared under the
+designation of plans are also included under the classification of
+directives. In the use of these terms hereinafter, the distinction
+between a plan viewed as a basis for a directive, and a plan intended
+to be promulgated as a directive, will be indicated in the context.</p>
+
+<p>Whether written or mental, the complete plan will cover the scope of
+the Decision, and will be the commander's method of procedure for his
+future conduct of operations. A commander may, or may not, formulate
+his complete plan in writing, or embody it in a formal directive which
+will provide for the execution, in full, of the Decision of his
+estimate. He may find that his plan divides into several parts, and he
+may make separate provision for the execution of each of these parts.
+While the integrity of a plan depends upon the soundness of its
+essential details, the plan is properly formulated as a directive or
+directives projected in detail, only so far into the future as the
+commander's estimate of the situation assures him of reasonable
+freedom of action (see <a href="#Page_57">page 57</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Where the commander divides his plan into parts for separate
+accomplishment, he will naturally exercise care that each part is, in
+itself, the suitable basis for a complete and homogeneous plan.
+Successful execution of all these plans results in the complete
+accomplishment of his Decision.</p>
+
+<p>Directives required to further the success of a particular operation
+may be issued without awaiting formulation of the entire plan. Parts
+of the plan may be transmitted as fragmentary directives to guide the
+action of subordinates in instantaneous or early execution. Such cases
+are far more frequent than are those in which a formal written plan,
+to guide either the operations in their entirety or a part thereof, is
+prepared and distributed as a directive. Effective action by the
+subordinate is thus not delayed by the absence of complete written
+directives.</p>
+
+<p>The commander, more especially during war, may be the only individual
+who is conversant with the entire plan. He may consider that the
+necessity for secrecy is paramount, or that there are features to
+whose details he is unwilling to commit himself until the situation is
+clearer. However, he may usually expect to disclose its scope and
+general features to his immediate superior, and the plan in its
+entirety to his next junior; or, in the interests of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span>mutual
+understanding, to all his subordinates of the next lower echelon or
+even to his entire command. The scope of the plan also may be a
+determining factor. If the plan covers an entire campaign or an
+extended series of operations, its dissemination is less likely and
+less general than if it is concerned with only a minor operation.</p>
+
+<p>During peace, in exercises simulating war, the complete plan is
+frequently given circulation for purposes of training.</p>
+
+<p>Subsidiary Plans. Subsidiary plans, discussed in Chapter VII (<a href="#Page_168">page
+168</a>), are frequently issued as annexes to the Operation Plan (<a href="#Page_196">page
+196</a>) which carries into effect the basic Decision. The commander will
+be the judge as to whether alternative subsidiary plans are necessary
+or desirable under the circumstances.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Essentials of Military Directives.</h4>
+
+<p>General. By the issue of directives, a commander communicates to his
+subordinates his plans or such parts of them as he desires. Directives
+may be oral or written, or may be transmitted by despatch.</p>
+
+<p>Whether a directive is to be effective upon receipt, or under
+specified conditions, or at a specific time, or upon further
+instructions from the commander, will be evident from its nature, or
+will be prescribed in the body of the directive itself.</p>
+
+<p>The manner of determining the details of a plan has been discussed in
+Chapter VII. The matter contained therein is pertinent to the
+preparation of a plan that is not to be issued as a directive as well
+as to one that is to be so issued.</p>
+
+<p>The various categories of directives customarily employed in our naval
+service, and standard forms for these, are described hereinafter.</p>
+
+<p>The essentials of a military directive which is designed to govern the
+execution of a plan are:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) That it indicate the general plan for the common effort
+of the entire force.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) That it organize the force with a view to the effective
+accomplishment of this plan.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(c) That it assign tasks to the subdivisions of the force,
+such that the accomplishment of these tasks will result in
+the accomplishment of the plan adopted for the entire
+force.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(d) That it make appropriate provision for coordination among
+subdivisions, for logistics <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span>support, and for the
+collection of information and the dissemination of
+intelligence, that it state the conditions under which the
+plan is to become effective; and that it indicate the
+location of the commander during the period of execution.</p></div>
+
+<p>Some of these essentials may have found their expression in previous
+instructions, or may be unnecessary because of the state of mutual
+understanding. On the other hand, the directive may include annexes in
+the form of alternative and subsidiary plans, letters of instructions
+(<a href="#Page_188">page 188</a>), and other material designed to be of assistance in the
+intelligent accomplishment of the assigned task.</p>
+
+<p>In issuing a directive, whether written or oral, except such a
+fragmentary order as has previously been described (<a href="#Page_184">page 184</a>), a
+commander has the following definite responsibilities:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) To ensure that subordinates understand the
+situation,&mdash;therefore, to give them pertinent available
+information.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) To set forth clearly the general plan to be carried out by
+his entire force, as well as the tasks to be accomplished
+by each subdivision of his force.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(c) To provide each of these subdivisions with adequate means
+to accomplish its assigned task.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(d) To allow subordinate commanders appropriate discretion
+within the limits of their assigned tasks, without,
+however, sacrifice of the necessary coordination.</p></div>
+
+<p>He will also bear in mind that a directive will best convey his will
+and intent and will be most easily understood by his subordinates if
+it is clear, brief, and positive.</p>
+
+<p>Clarity demands the use of precise expressions susceptible of only the
+desired interpretation. Normally, the affirmative form is preferable
+to the negative. The importance of clarity has been summed up in the
+saying, "An order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood".
+If misunderstandings arise on the part of trained subordinates the
+chief fault often lies with the person who issued the directive.</p>
+
+<p>Brevity calls for the omission of superfluous words and of unnecessary
+details. Short sentences are ordinarily more easily and rapidly
+understood than longer ones. Brevity, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span>however, is never to be sought
+at the expense of clarity. The attainment of brevity often requires
+considerable expenditure of effort and of time. But time is not to be
+sacrificed in the interests of obtaining brevity in directives, when
+the proper emphasis should rather be on initiating early action.</p>
+
+<p>Positiveness of expression suggests the superior's fixity of purpose,
+with consequent inspiration to subordinates to prosecute their tasks
+with determination. The use of indefinite and weakening expressions
+leads to suspicion of vacillation and indecision. Such expressions
+tend to impose upon subordinates the responsibilities which belong to
+and are fully accepted by a resolute superior.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Restatement of the Decision for Use in the Directive</h4>
+
+<p>Except where special considerations exist to the contrary, it will be
+found that the expression of the Decision for use in a directive will
+most clearly indicate the intent of the commander if stated in terms
+of the objective to be attained by his force (i.e., of the situation
+to be created or maintained) and of the outlined action for its
+attainment (<a href="#Page_104">page 104</a>). Such expression is usually possible in problems
+of broad strategical scope (<a href="#Page_88">page 88</a>). In other cases difficulty may be
+encountered. For instance, in tactical problems dealing with the
+detailed employment of weapons, the action may necessarily be couched
+in the terms of a series of acts (see <a href="#Page_95">page 95</a>).</p>
+
+<p>No precise form is prescribed; thoughts clearly expressed are more
+important than form. It is customary to begin with "This force (or
+group) will", and then state with brevity the Decision as (and if)
+modified, adding the motivating task which is the purpose of the
+Decision. The motivating task is connected with the preceding
+statement by words such as "in order to", "to assist in", or
+"preparatory to", as the case may be.</p>
+
+<p>Since his original expression of the Decision in the first step
+(Chapter VI), the commander has studied the operations required to
+carry it out. He therefore has gained a knowledge, which he did not
+then have, of how his action is to be carried out. He may now be able
+to compile a brief of these operations, applicable to all of them and
+therefore informative to all subordinate commanders. He may be able to
+say how, or even where and when, the effort of his force will be
+exerted.</p>
+
+<p>As an illustration, if his Decision is "to destroy enemy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span>battle-line
+strength", his operations might be described "by gun action at long
+range during high visibility". Should the commander, solely for the
+purpose of making his intent clearer to his subordinate commanders,
+now decide to include the latter phrase in the re-wording of his
+Decision, he may do so at this point.</p>
+
+<p>It may sometimes be necessary to restate the Decision for another
+reason. It will be recalled that the commander is frequently obliged
+to recognize that he cannot carry out all of these operations, and
+that he therefore decides to issue a directive to carry out certain
+ones selected for the first stage (<a href="#Page_164">page 164</a>). In such a case, he may
+not now be able to use the full Decision as originally determined. In
+that event he couches the Decision in terms of the partial
+accomplishment inherent in the operations to be undertaken.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Standard Forms for Plans and Directives</h4>
+
+<p>Form. Experience has shown that military directives usually give best
+results if cast in a standard form well known alike to originator and
+recipient. Such a form tends to prevent the omission of relevant
+features, and to minimize error and misunderstanding. However, a
+commander may find that lack of opportunity to facilitate mutual
+understanding by personal conference requires that one or more
+subordinates receive instructions in greater detail than a standard
+form seems to permit. A letter of instructions may then be
+appropriate. The commander himself is the best judge as to the
+application of a form to his needs of the moment, and as to the
+necessity for adherence to form in whatever particular.</p>
+
+<p>Useful as form is, it is important to keep in mind that it is the
+servant and not the master.</p>
+
+<p>The standard form in use in our naval service, long known as the Order
+Form, is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written plans
+and directives.</p>
+
+<p>The Order Form will now be described in detail from the standpoint of
+its general application to all classes of directives, including the
+commander's written plan, whether or not promulgated as a directive.</p>
+
+<p>The Order Form. Because of established usage, and for other reasons
+noted hereinafter, it is desirable that certain clerical details be
+handled as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) To minimize errors, all numerals are spelled out, except
+paragraph numbers and those in the heading.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) For emphasis, and to minimize errors, all <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>geographical
+names and names of vessels are spelled entirely with
+capitals.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(c) To standardize arrangement and facilitate reading, a
+narrow left-hand margin is left abreast the heading and
+the task organization, and a wider margin is left abreast
+the paragraphs.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(d) For the same reasons, the main paragraph numbers are
+indented in the wider margin.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(e) For emphasis, the task-force or task-group titles of the
+task organization, wherever occurring, are underlined.</p></div>
+
+<p>The sequence in which the subject matter is presented is a logical
+arrangement which experience has shown to be effective. Since every
+item has a definite place in the form, formulation is simplified, and
+ready reference is facilitated.</p>
+
+<p>In a written directive, the prescribed paragraph numbering is always
+followed, even if no text is inserted after a number. This practice
+serves as a check against accidental omission, and as confirmatory
+evidence that omissions are intentional. For example, if there is no
+new information to be disseminated, the paragraph number "1" is
+written in its proper place, followed by the words "No further
+information".</p>
+
+<p>When the subject matter to be presented under any one paragraph is
+voluminous, it may be broken up into a number of subparagraphs. Except
+in paragraph 3, these subparagraphs are unlettered.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">The Heading contains:</p>
+
+<p>In the upper right-hand corner in the following sequence:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) The title of the issuing officer's command, such as
+NORTHERN SCOUTS, or ADVANCED FORCE, etc., preceded by the
+titles, in proper order within the chain of command, of
+all superior echelons or of such higher echelons as will
+ensure adequate identification.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) The name of the flagship, as U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(c) The place of issue: for example, NEWPORT, R.I., or, At
+Sea, Lat. 34&deg;-40' N., Long. 162&deg;-20' W.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(d) The time of issue: that is, the month, day, year, and
+hour; for example, July 12, 1935; 1100.</p></div>
+
+<p>In the upper left-hand corner in the following sequence:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(e) The file notations and classification: SECRET or
+CONFIDENTIAL, the classification being <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>underlined and
+spelled with capitals. This classification is repeated on
+succeeding pages,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(f) The type and serial number of the directive, such as
+Operation Plan No. 5, the words Operation Plan being
+underlined. This is repeated on succeeding pages.</p></div>
+
+<p>The Body. The task organization, which consists of a tabular
+enumeration of task forces or task groups, the composition of each,
+and the rank and name of its commander, is the beginning of the body
+of the directive. It is customary to omit the name of the issuing
+officer from any task force or task group commanded by him. Any unit
+included in a force named in the task organization is, by virtue of
+that fact, directed to act under the command of the commander of the
+specified force.</p>
+
+<p>When so desired for additional ready identification, task forces and
+their subdivisions may be numbered. In our naval service, systematic
+methods for such numerical designation are indicated from time to time
+by proper authority. Numerals for this purpose are entered in the task
+organization to the left of the title of each appropriate task force
+or subdivision thereof. The numerals may be placed in parentheses.</p>
+
+<p>The directive is addressed for action solely to the commanders of the
+task forces or task groups listed in the task organization.</p>
+
+<p>Train vessels assigned exclusively to particular combatant task forces
+are listed among the units of those forces in the task organization.
+If the directive is to be used for assigning tasks involving
+strategical or tactical movement directly to the Train, or to any
+Train units, such units are grouped together to form a separate task
+force. If instructions to the Train are to be issued in another
+directive, the Train need not appear as a separate force in the task
+organization. As a matter of general custom, the Train is usually not
+included as a task force unless it is to accompany, or act in tactical
+concert with, some one or more of the combatant task forces listed.</p>
+
+<p>Each task force named in this table, together with its numerical
+designation, is preceded by a separate letter, (a), (b), (c), etc.,
+and its assigned task is set forth in a similarly lettered
+subparagraph in paragraph 3.</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 1 is the information paragraph. It contains such available
+information of enemy and own forces as is necessary for subordinates
+to understand the situation and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span>to cooperate efficiently. Paragraph 1
+contains no part of the tasks assigned by the commander. Information
+of the enemy and that of own forces, and assumptions where pertinent,
+are usually set forth in separate unlettered subparagraphs.</p>
+
+<p>When deemed advisable, unless secrecy or other considerations forbid,
+paragraph 1 may include statements of the general plans of various
+higher echelons in the chain of command. A statement of the general
+plan of the next higher commander will frequently be included. For the
+same reasons, the commander will often include in this paragraph a
+statement of his own assigned task, unless, of course, this point is
+adequately covered in the statement of his general plan in paragraph
+2. Inclusion of such matters may enable subordinates to gain a clearer
+visualization of the relationships existing among the several
+objectives envisaged by the higher command.</p>
+
+<p>To promote cooperation, paragraph 1 may also state the principal tasks
+of coordinate forces of the commander's own echelon; for like reasons,
+the principal tasks of other task forces of the command not listed in
+the task organization may be included. Where the immediate superior
+has prescribed particular methods to other forces for cooperation and
+security, these may also be set forth as a matter of information. (See
+<a href="#Page_167">page 167</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>In this paragraph, distinction is drawn between information which is
+based upon established facts, and that of merely probable accuracy.
+The latter is not to be confused with assumptions which, in Operation
+Plans, are accepted as a basis. (See <a href="#Page_155">page 155</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>When writing their own information paragraphs, subordinate commanders
+do not necessarily copy verbatim the information contained in the
+order of their superior. Good procedure calls for them to digest that
+information, select what is essential, and present it with any
+additional information considered necessary. Care is taken to include
+necessary information of coordinate task forces.</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 2 states the general plan of the complete force under the
+command of the officer who issued the directive. If several directives
+are issued for carrying out a single, complete plan (see, for example,
+discussion of fragmentary orders, <a href="#Page_184">page 184</a>), then paragraph 2 is
+usually the same in all of them. The amount of detail given in this
+paragraph is sufficient to ensure a clear comprehension by the
+subordinates as to what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole.
+It is customary to begin with the words, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span>"This force will", followed
+by a statement of the general plan and, unless secrecy or other
+considerations forbid, by the purpose of the effort embodied therein.
+(See Restatement of the Decision, <a href="#Page_187">page 187</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 3 assigns individual tasks to all of the task forces listed
+in the task organization. This paragraph is divided into as many
+subparagraphs, (a), (b), (c), etc., as there are task forces
+enumerated in the task organization. Each subparagraph commences with
+the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the title of the
+task force, underlined.</p>
+
+<p>Normally the tasks for each task force are stated in order of their
+importance. If preferred, however, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological, i.e., in the order of their execution. Each method has
+certain advantages, according to the nature of the situation. Where
+the chronological sequence is utilized, that fact is clearly
+indicated, in order to avoid confusion. (See also <a href="#Page_166">page 166</a>). After the
+statement of the tasks, these subparagraphs conclude with such
+detailed instructions as are necessary.</p>
+
+<p>In cases where the entire force is listed in the task organization,
+the proper formulation of tasks requires that the accomplishment of
+all the tasks of paragraph 3 result in the accomplishment of the
+general plan set forth for the entire force in paragraph 2. On the
+other hand, where several directives are issued, each to a different
+part of the force, with a paragraph 2 common to all, then the
+accomplishment of the tasks of all of the paragraphs 3, of the several
+directives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the general
+plan prescribed in the common paragraph 2.</p>
+
+<p>Where two or more task forces have identical task assignments, only
+the common subparagraph need be written after the title of the task
+forces concerned, thus:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p class="hang">(a) Submarine Detachment,</p>
+
+<p class="hang">(b) Air Patrol, (assignment of the common task or tasks).</p></div>
+
+<p>If the Train has been included as a separate force of the task
+organization, it will be given its tasks as to tactical and
+strategical movement in a separate subparagraph of paragraph 3.</p>
+
+<p>In order to avoid repetition, task assignments and instructions which
+apply to all task forces, or which pertain <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span>to the general conduct of
+the operation, are embodied in a final subparagraph, designated as
+3(x). It is particularly necessary that there be included in this
+subparagraph the measures (e.g., as to cooperation, security,
+intelligence, and the like) pertaining to freedom of action and
+applicable to the force as a whole. Any tasks or instructions
+applicable to individual task forces, only, will have been included in
+the appropriate earlier subparagraph(s) (i.e., 3 (a), (b), (c), etc.).
+To avoid repetition in these subparagraphs, coordinating instructions
+applying to more than one task force may also be included, when
+convenient to do so, in paragraph 3 (x).</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 3 (x) of Operation Plans and Battle Plans prescribes, in
+addition to other applicable matters, the time and/or manner of
+placing the plan in effect.</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 4 is the logistics paragraph. It sets forth the availability
+of services and supplies, and describes and gives effect to the
+general plan for the logistics support of the operation. If the
+information and instructions as to logistics are long and detailed,
+they may be embodied in a separate logistics plan, which is referred
+to in paragraph 4, and is attached as an annex.</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 4 is not used for assigning tasks as to movement, either for
+the Train or for any other subdivision of the force.</p>
+
+<p>Paragraph 5 is the command paragraph. It contains instructions
+considered necessary for the control of the command during the
+operation, such as the plan of communications, zone time to be used,
+rendezvous, and location of the commander. Paragraph 5 completes the
+body.</p>
+
+<p>The Ending consists of the signature, the list of annexes, the
+distribution, and the authentication, as noted below:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p>The Signature of the commander issuing the directive, with his
+rank and command title, is placed at the end, for example:
+John Doe, Vice Admiral, Commander Northern Scouts.</p>
+
+<p>Annexes consist of amplifying instructions which are so
+extensive as to make them undesirable for inclusion in the
+directive itself. They contain detailed instructions, in
+written form or in the form of charts or sketches. Separate
+Communications, Logistics, Sortie, Movement, Cruising,
+Intelligence, Scouting, Screening, Approach and Deployment
+Plans may be, and frequently are, disseminated as annexes to a
+directive. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span>Alternative Plans may also be annexed.</p>
+
+<p>Annexes are referred to in the appropriate paragraph of the
+body of the directive, and are listed and serially lettered in
+capitals at the end near the left-hand margin, immediately
+below the body and the signature, and above the distribution.</p>
+
+<p>The Distribution indicates to whom the directive will be
+transmitted and the medium of transmission. The recording of
+this distribution in the directive is essential for the
+information of all concerned.</p>
+
+<p>Standard distribution may be indicated, as Distribution I, II,
+etc.</p>
+
+<p>Authentication. Unless signed by the issuing officer, each
+copy of the directive distributed is authenticated by the
+signature, rank, and designation of the Flag Secretary, with
+the addition of the seal whenever possible.</p></div>
+
+<p>Campaign Plans. Campaign Plans (see <a href="#Page_196">page 196</a>), when communicated to
+officers on the highest echelons, are usually, in the Order Form,
+modified as follows:</p>
+
+<p>Heading. No change.</p>
+
+<p>Task Organization. Not usually used.</p>
+
+<div class="block4"><p class="hang">Paragraph 1. In addition to the information to be furnished,
+a statement is given of the assumptions (<a href="#Page_155">page 155</a>)
+forming the basis of the plan.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Paragraph 2. No change.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Paragraph 3. This shows the stages into which the campaign has
+been divided; the several operations which will be
+undertaken in each stage, and the order of their
+accomplishment; and usually the forces to be made
+available for the first stage.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Paragraph 4. No change.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Paragraph 5. No change.</p></div>
+
+<p>If it be found desirable, however, to employ a letter of instructions
+instead of a formal directive, this may be done. In this case the
+letter sets forth the essential features of the subject matter as
+above described for the Order Form.</p>
+
+<p>Sample Outline Form. For convenient reference, the outline form of an
+Operation Plan is appended (see <a href="#Page_219">page 219</a>). The Operation Order follows
+the same form, the essential difference being that the Operation Order
+makes no provision for assumptions, and is effective upon receipt
+unless otherwise provided in the body of the Order.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span>Types of Naval Directives</h4>
+
+<p>Naval directives in common use are: War Plans, Campaign Plans,
+Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Battle Plans, and Battle Orders.</p>
+
+<p>Basic War Plans designate operating forces, assign broad strategical
+tasks to these forces, and, where required, delimit theaters of
+operations. These plans also assign duties to the supporting services
+such as naval communications, etc. Requirements as to logistics plans
+are also included. Accepted usage designates, as Contributory Plans,
+the subsidiary plans which are prepared in support of Basic War Plans.</p>
+
+<p>Campaign Plans. A campaign, as initially visualized, is a clearly
+defined major stage of a war. A campaign, after it has passed into
+history, sometimes bears the name of a leader, or a seasonal or
+geographical designation. It may consist of a single operation, or of
+successive or concurrent operations. The operations of a campaign have
+properly a definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which
+marks the end of the campaign. (See also <a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>, as to operations.)</p>
+
+<p>A Campaign Plan indicates what might be called the "schedule of
+strategy" which the commander intends to employ to attain his ultimate
+objective for the campaign. Such a plan usually sets forth the stages
+into which he proposes to divide the campaign, shows their sequence,
+and outlines:</p>
+
+<p>(a) The general plan for the entire campaign.</p>
+
+<p>(b) The general plan involved in each stage and the order of
+accomplishment, so far as the commander has been able to project his
+action into the future, and usually,</p>
+
+<p>(c) The forces to be made available for the first stage. The Campaign
+Plan is primarily for the guidance of the commander himself. When
+necessary for information or approval, it is forwarded to higher
+authority. To provide the necessary background, it may sometimes be
+furnished to the principal subordinates. In any case, the interests of
+secrecy demand that its distribution be extremely limited.</p>
+
+<p>Operation Plans. An Operation Plan may cover projected operations, or
+may be contingent upon the occurrence of a particular event, or
+combination of events. It may be issued in advance of the event. It is
+placed in effect at a specified time or by special order, as
+prescribed in the body of the plan itself. It provides for either a
+single operation, or for a connected series of operations to be
+carried out simultaneously or in successive steps. It is prepared for
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span>dissemination to task-force commanders.</p>
+
+<p>Usually, an Operation Plan covers more complex operations than does an
+Operation Order, and projects operations over a greater time and
+space. It allows more latitude to subordinate commanders, and provides
+for less direct supervision by the issuing officer. It has typically
+the distinguishing feature of including, in paragraph 1, the
+assumptions upon which the plan is based.</p>
+
+<p>To provide for eventualities under varying sets of assumptions, the
+commander may formulate several alternative Operation Plans (see <a href="#Page_155">pages
+155</a> and <a href="#Page_156">156</a>).</p>
+
+<p>Operation Orders. An Operation Order deals with an actual situation,
+usually of limited scope, in which the commander considers that he
+possesses sufficient reliable information to warrant an expectation
+that certain specific operations can be initiated and carried through
+to completion as ordered. The Operation Order does not include
+assumptions and, unless it contains a proviso to the contrary, is
+effective upon receipt.</p>
+
+<p>Under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, there are few
+occasions where the Operation Plan will not accomplish the full
+purpose of the Operation Order. The use of the Operation Plan removes
+the undesirable feature of imposing possible restriction on the
+latitude allowed the subordinate without, in any degree, lessening the
+authority of the commander.</p>
+
+<p>Battle Plans. A Battle Plan sets forth methods for the coordinated
+employment of forces during battle. If prepared in advance, it usually
+is based on certain assumptions which are clearly stated in the plan.</p>
+
+<p>Battle Plans may merely include provisions for a particular combat, or
+they may include provisions for a connected series of separate or
+coordinate engagements, possibly culminating in a general action, and
+all directed toward the early attainment of a specified tactical
+objective. Such combats may range in scope from engagements between
+small forces to engagements between entire fleets.</p>
+
+<p>Battle Orders are generally limited to the despatches required to
+place a Battle Plan in effect, and to direct such changes in plan, or
+to initiate such detailed operations, as may be necessary during the
+progress of battle.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CHAPTER IX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<h4>THE SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION</h4>
+
+<h4>(The Fourth Step)</h4>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The discussion in Chapter IX invites attention to the special
+considerations which influence the supervision of the planned
+action. The Running Estimate, which employs the procedure
+typical of the fourth step, is described in detail.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>Nature of Discussion. As explained previously (Foreword, <a href="#Page_4">page 4</a>), the
+vast and important subject of the execution of the plan is treated
+herein, as to details, chiefly from the standpoint of the mental
+effort.</p>
+
+<p>After the commander has issued a directive placing a plan in effect,
+it is his responsibility to supervise the execution of the planned
+action. Through the collection, analysis, evaluation, and
+interpretation of new information (<a href="#Page_161">page 161</a>), he will be able to
+maintain a grasp of present progress and of future possibilities. He
+will correct deficiencies and errors in the plan and in its execution.
+He will guide the direction of effort toward the attainment of the
+objective. He will ensure that his forces conform their movement in
+correct relation to the physical objectives and to each other. He will
+reapportion strength to meet new conditions, through comparison of his
+accrued losses with respect to those he has anticipated. He will take
+appropriate measures for freedom of action.</p>
+
+<p>If a new plan is needed, the commander will evolve one and adopt it.
+If the old plan requires changes as to its larger aspects, he will
+make such changes. Otherwise, he will modify details of his plan as
+the situation may demand, always, however, endeavoring to retain the
+integrity of the larger aspects. He will issue additional directives
+as may be required from time to time.</p>
+
+<p>Goal of Planning. The function of planning (Part II, preceding) is to
+afford a proper basis for effective execution. Effective action,
+therefore, is the goal of planning.</p>
+
+<p>Otherwise, planning is aimless, except as a mental exercise. Such
+mental exercise, though it be with no thought of specific application
+in the realm of action, has nevertheless the same fundamental aim as
+if the planning were so intended. The aim of such mental exercise is
+the inculcation of habits of thought which will provide a sound basis
+for effective action.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span>Importance of Execution. Sound planning is, as explained in previous
+chapters, the best basis for consistently effective action. Yet,
+important as planning is, the effective outcome of plans depends upon
+their execution.</p>
+
+<p>While an unsound plan affords no firm basis for successful action,
+recognition has long been accorded to the companion fact that a
+perfect plan, poorly executed, may not provide as firm a foundation
+for success as a reasonably good plan, carried out with resolution.</p>
+
+<p>No plan, moreover, can be confidently expected to anticipate all
+eventualities. Notwithstanding every effort to foresee all
+possibilities, unexpected changes are to be regarded as normal. This
+fact emphasizes the importance of effective supervision of the planned
+action.</p>
+
+<p>The importance of such supervision reaches its maximum during actual
+hostilities; then (<a href="#Page_4">page 4</a>) the necessity for alert supervision creates
+an accentuated demand for the intelligent application of mental power
+to the solution of military problems. Professional judgment then
+assumes supreme importance because vital issues may hinge upon the
+decisions reached during the development of the action.</p>
+
+<p>Conditions in War. Standards of performance in peacetime exercises
+cannot be a conclusive guide as to what may be expected under the
+conditions of war. In the conduct of hostilities against a strong and
+determined enemy, men and materiel do not always function at their
+best. Commanders undergo extreme strains. Orders are often
+misinterpreted or go astray. Men, and the machines which they operate,
+frequently give less effective service than under the conditions of
+peace.</p>
+
+<p>In war, mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom
+complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won,
+not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of
+an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock
+of battle. The objective is attained, in war, under conditions which
+often impose extreme disadvantages. It is in the light of these facts
+that the commander expects to shape his course during the supervision
+of the planned action.</p>
+
+<p>The Incentive. During the supervision of the action, problems calling
+for decision may derive their incentive, as already noted (<a href="#Page_79">page 79</a>)
+either from a directive issued by superior authority, or by reason of
+a Decision which the commander himself has already made, or because of
+a recognition, by the commander concerned, of an incentive
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span>originating from the demands of the situation.</p>
+
+<p>In the event that the incentive appears in the form of a new task
+assigned by a higher echelon, the commander's problem may become,
+relatively, simple. In such a case he is relieved of the necessity of
+recognizing for himself that the time is ripe for a new decision. This
+fact, however, in no wise alters his fundamental responsibility for
+taking action, or for abstaining therefrom, in accordance with the
+actual demands of the situation (<a href="#Page_15">page 15</a>) in the event that the
+assigned task requires modification or alteration, or, further, in the
+event that circumstances even call for a departure from his
+instructions. Should modification, alteration, or departure be in
+order, the commander is responsible for recognition of the fact that
+the demands of the situation have introduced further problems.</p>
+
+<p>Such recognition, therefore, irrespective of whether higher authority
+has issued instructions covering the new situation, constitutes an
+incentive to take action. No commander is justified in taking wrong
+action, or in taking none, merely because no instructions have been
+received. The ability to recognize the fact that the situation
+presents a new problem is therefore a primary qualification for
+command.</p>
+
+<p>Recognition of New Problems. The supervision of the planned action, as
+the fourth step (see Chapter V) of the exercise of mental effort in
+the solution of military problems, therefore constitutes in itself a
+problem, in that it involves fundamentally the ability to recognize
+the existence of new situations which present new problems for
+solution. To recognize such new problems requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation.</p>
+
+<p>Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines which he desires and as promulgated in
+the directives formulated in the third step (see Chapter V and Chapter
+VIII). In effect, the commander, after action has begun, considers the
+changing situation as a variable in the problem presented by the
+original situation. With the march of events he is, therefore,
+constantly critical to detect whether variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design or whether these
+variations demand a departure from his plan.</p>
+
+<p>Nature of Readjustments Required. If variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design, the commander has the
+assurance that all goes well, and that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span>the unfolding of the situation
+is following his intent. However, if this is not the case, changed
+circumstances may demand recognition of the fact that a new problem
+has presented itself. In this event a new incentive, arising from the
+demands of the situation, calls for the solution of the new problem by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step (Chapter VI).</p>
+
+<p>Should directives of higher authority introduce a new incentive, the
+commander solves such a new problem, also, by employing the procedure
+distinctive of the first step.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the commander may find that the changed situation
+motivates merely a modification of his previously determined
+operations and of his directives already in force. In other words,
+while his basic problem (Chapters V and VI) may remain the same, need
+may arise for certain deviations from the decisions arrived at in the
+first and second steps of its solution. Should this be the case, each
+such problem will require solution by a return to the procedures
+described (Chapter VII) with reference to the second step.</p>
+
+<p>In the event of a demonstrated need, not for any change of plan, but
+for a clarification of directives, the procedure involved is that
+distinctive of the third step (Chapter VIII).</p>
+
+<p>The commander may not safely view the succession of events with
+complacency, even though the situation appears to be unfolding
+according to plan. Perhaps the enemy may be purposely lessening his
+opposition, in order to prepare for the launching of an offensive
+elsewhere. As the situation unfolds, everything is viewed with
+intelligent suspicion.</p>
+
+<p>It is also possible that, during the progress of an operation, an
+unforeseen opportunity may present itself to take advantage of a new
+situation and to strike the enemy a more serious blow than that
+originally intended.</p>
+
+<p>Unwise caution is to be avoided no less than undue temerity. Where a
+change appears, after proper consideration, to be indicated, no
+hesitancy is justified in abandoning the original plan. Blind
+adherence to plan is to be condemned no less than unwarranted
+departures from predetermined procedure. Obstinate insistence on the
+use of a certain method, to the exclusion of others calculated to
+attain the same effect, may jeopardize the success of the effort.
+Undue emphasis on the particular means to be used, and on the manner
+of their employment, may exact a penalty by obscuring the objective.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span>On the other hand, undesirable departures from plan involve a
+corresponding penalty, because changes, unless duly justified by the
+situation, increase the possibility of failure. Frequency of such
+changes, to the point of vacillation, is a sure indication of a lack
+of aptitude for the exercise of command.</p>
+
+<p>Importance of the Will of the Commander. It is accordingly clear that
+qualification for the exercise of command requires the mental capacity
+to recognize the need for changes in plan, or for no change. No less
+essential, however, are the moral qualities required to carry
+justified changes into effect, or to resist the pressure of events in
+favor of changes not justified by the situation. (See also <a href="#Page_8">pages 8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>,
+and <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Hence the universal importance accorded, by the profession of arms, to
+the will of the commander. This is the quality which, together with
+the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander
+to bend events in conformity with his plan (<a href="#Page_47">page 47</a>), or, where such
+shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command
+every possible advantage which can be obtained.</p>
+
+<p>A recognized defect of certain forms of theoretical problems lies in
+the fact that they indicate, themselves, the time when a Decision is
+needed. In other words, they fail to vest the commander with
+responsibility for the decision that the time has come for a Decision
+to be made. Hence the great importance, from the viewpoint of timing,
+of those problems and exercises which partake more fully of the
+reality of war. The successful conduct of war, notwithstanding its
+demand for utmost mental power, is founded predominantly on those
+moral qualities (see <a href="#Page_9">pages 9</a> and <a href="#Page_72">72</a>) which spring less from the
+intellect than from the will.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>Problems Involving Modifications of the Basic Plan</h4>
+
+<p>Relatively minor deviations from decisions reached during the first
+and second steps of the solution of a military problem are frequently
+required during the action phase, because of incentives arising from
+the demands of the situation. Such requirements will not occasion
+serious dislocation in the predetermined effort of the competent
+commander.</p>
+
+<p>However, more momentous situations are also to be expected. These will
+present new problems for the commander to solve. Such new problems, so
+long as they do not challenge the integrity of the basic plan, will
+not prevent the competent commander from proceeding with his
+predetermined <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span>effort if he takes appropriate action in due time to
+control the unfolding situation. To maintain such control may call for
+the exercise of outstanding qualities of the mind and of the will.</p>
+
+<p>For example, it is assumed that the commander's basic Decision was to
+destroy an enemy convoy, the purpose of the Decision being to prevent
+the convoy from reaching its destination. Now, it is supposed that,
+during the supervision of the action planned for the destruction of
+the enemy convoy, the commander receives information of a hostile
+reinforcement. It is further supposed that this reinforcement, if it
+joins the enemy convoy's escort, can jeopardize the success of the
+basic plan.</p>
+
+<p>The commander is now confronted with a serious situation which, if not
+controlled by action of the right kind, at the right time, and at the
+right place, may result in shattering his basic plan. However, if the
+commander takes action along correct lines in due time, he can still
+preserve the integrity of his basic plan and so continue to control
+the shaping of the situation.</p>
+
+<p>Having re-examined his solution of his basic problem and found it
+sound, the commander finds himself under the necessity of resolving a
+perplexity as to what to do about the enemy reinforcement. In this
+case, he concludes that his proper action is to prevent the enemy
+reinforcement from protecting the convoy. This task, self-assigned
+because of the demands of the situation, becomes the basis for the
+mission of his new problem, the mission being:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>(Task) To prevent the enemy reinforcements from protecting the
+convoy,</p>
+
+<p>(Purpose) in order to contribute to the eventual destruction
+of the convoy.</p></div>
+
+<p>The commander now considers the various courses of action open to him
+for the accomplishment of this mission. He also considers the enemy
+courses of action. He then considers each of the former in relation to
+each of the latter. He compares, on this basis, each of his retained
+courses of action with the others and so selects the best course of
+action. Finally, he arrives, in this manner, by the same process as in
+a basic problem (Chapter VI), at a decision as to the best course of
+action. Should this decision be to sink the enemy reinforcement, its
+statement linked to its purpose, would be:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>To destroy the enemy reinforcement, in order to prevent it
+from protecting the convoy.</p></div>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span>Problems Challenging the Integrity of the Basic Plan</h4>
+
+<p>During the planned action, a change in the situation may have the
+effect of challenging the integrity of the basic plan. The commander
+is then faced by a problem calling for the exercise of the highest
+order of ability. While problems of this type probably occur with
+least frequency, they are the most important of those which may be
+encountered during the fourth step.</p>
+
+<p>Because such a problem, arising from the demands of a new situation,
+requires a re-estimate of the basic situation, the essential procedure
+is the same as for a basic problem (Chapter VI), but certain
+modifications necessarily appear.</p>
+
+<p>Summary of the Situation. While a commander will rarely find himself
+operating without instructions, the importance of problems arising
+when no directive applies is not lessened by the fact that such
+problems may infrequently occur. When the commander is faced with a
+situation not covered in orders of his superior, action may be
+necessary before he can inform higher authority and receive
+instructions. Usually this situation will be an emergency. Often it
+will not allow time for a written estimate. The fact that such a
+situation has arisen, and the reasons causing the commander to
+conclude that it has arisen, are appropriately included in Section I-A
+of the Estimate, under the "Summary of the Situation".</p>
+
+<p>Recognition of the Incentive. The conclusion on the part of the
+commander that the situation requires him to make provision for its
+maintenance, or for a change, which in either case calls for a
+departure from his basic Decision, constitutes a recognition of his
+new incentive.</p>
+
+<p>Appreciation of the Objective. Frequently the new incentive will
+indicate that the objective embodied in the commander's present task
+is no longer suitable, but that the purpose of his mission still
+applies. By modifying the objective indicated in his assigned task,
+but adhering to that in the purpose of his mission, he may be able to
+visualize a new objective which will be appropriate to the new
+circumstances. In this case the retained purpose assists the commander
+to select a new objective which he can confidently adopt as the basis
+for a new task which he assigns to himself.</p>
+
+<p>If neither the commander's task nor the purpose of his mission apply
+in the new situation, the evolution of a proper new objective may be
+much more difficult. Under <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span>such circumstances the commander, by the
+use of such information as may be in his possession, will first
+endeavor to deduce an objective whose attainment constitutes a
+suitable purpose. Such a deduction will be made on the basis of the
+larger circumstances of the war, the campaign, or the operation.
+Having made this determination, the commander will then deduce a task
+appropriate to the new situation and in furtherance of the adopted
+purpose. (See Chapter IV, <a href="#Page_52">page 52</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>Formulation of the New Mission. An appropriate new task having been
+determined, as well as a proper purpose, the commander is now in a
+position to formulate his mission. The procedure to this end is the
+same as described (Chapter VI) with respect to the estimate of a basic
+problem.</p>
+
+<p>Other Items of the Estimate. For such problems of the fourth step,
+other items of the Estimate Form require no essential modification of
+the procedures described (Chapter VI) as applicable for the first
+step.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Further Procedure Applicable to Such Problems of The Fourth Step</h4>
+
+<p>After the commander has reached his new decision, the further course
+of events may call for the resolution of the required new action into
+detailed operations and for the inauguration of a new planned effort.
+In such case, these procedures are accomplished through processes
+essentially similar to, and fortified by the experience gained in,
+those distinctive of the second and third steps. (Chapters VII and
+VIII, respectively).</p>
+
+<p>The new planned effort having been inaugurated, its supervision
+continues, in turn, through the critical observation and the
+appropriate action described herein as distinctive of the fourth step.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>The Running Estimate of the Situation</h4>
+
+<p>The procedure employed in the constant, close observation of the
+unfolding of the situation&mdash;to the end that justified changes of plan
+may be initiated, while those uncalled-for may be avoided&mdash;is known as
+the "Running Estimate of the Situation". Such an estimate, as
+indicated by its name, is intended to keep pace with the flow of
+events, so that the commander may be assured, at any time, that his
+concurrent action will be based on sound decision. To this end, there
+is a definite technique for which the standard Estimate Form provides
+the basis. This technique is an aid for solution of the problem
+involved in the supervision of the planned action.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span>Aim of the Technique Involved. Any procedure adopted to this end is
+properly intended to assist in the supervision of the planned action,
+but not to restrict the commander to particular methods. Flexibility
+is a prime consideration. The ultimate aim of the technique is (see
+also <a href="#Page_114">page 114</a>) the rapid and successful exercise of mental effort in
+the fast-moving events of the tactical engagement. It is under such
+conditions, more especially, that effective supervision of the planned
+action becomes a problem calling for every facility that can be
+afforded the commander.</p>
+
+<p>Nature of the Technique. The solution of this problem requires
+mentally or in writing according to the particular case, (a) the
+assembly of information as to events bearing on the situation, and (b)
+the organization of this knowledge in a manner permitting its ready
+use. Accordingly, it will be found helpful, where circumstances permit
+written records to be kept, to provide for (a) a journal (a form of
+diary) of events, with a file to support it, and (b) a work sheet to
+organize applicable information in proper form for use. The journal
+affords a basis for the work sheet. The latter in turn facilitates the
+procedure, continuous while the action lasts, of estimating the
+situation so that a Decision maybe rendered at any time desired.</p>
+
+<p>Where written records are unnecessary or impracticable, the same
+fundamental process is nevertheless employed. The fact that the
+process is then wholly mental, without extraneous aids, involves no
+change in the basic character of the essential procedure.</p>
+
+<p>Journal. The journal, to serve the purpose indicated above, is kept in
+a form permitting entry of essential data as to information needed for
+the Running Estimate. Such data may include (see the suggested Form,
+next page) the appropriate heading of the journal, the entries
+applicable to each item of pertinent information, and the
+authentication with which the journal, for any chosen period, is
+closed.</p>
+
+<br />
+<hr style='width: 15%;' />
+<br />
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span>JOURNAL</h4>
+
+<br />
+
+<p class="cen">(Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">From: .................................................<br />
+(date and hour)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">To: ...................................................<br />
+(date and hour)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">Place: ................................................</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="80%" summary="Journal" style="border: solid 1pt black;">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">TOR</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">TOD</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">Time Dated</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">Serial No.</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">From</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">To (Action)</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="23%">Incidents, Messages, Orders, etc.</td>
+  <td class="tdcb" width="11%">Action Taken</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbtlr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdbblr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<p>The heading of the journal is completed by inserting the designation
+of the organization and, where appropriate, the staff subdivision
+concerned, as well as the date and hour of beginning and closing the
+journal, and the place (or general area) where the commander is
+located.</p>
+
+<p>Each entry includes, where appropriate, a time notation: for example,
+as to the occurrence of an incident; the receipt (TOR) or despatch
+(TOD) of a message; the receipt or issue of an order. The serial
+number assigned to the entry is recorded. The "time dated" is the date
+and hour of the incident, or, in the case of the message or order, the
+date and hour appearing thereon.</p>
+
+<p>Entry of the nature of incidents or of the content of messages and
+orders, etc., is made under the heading "Incidents, Messages, Orders,
+etc."; for example:</p>
+
+<div class="block3"><p>As to an incident:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>Enemy bombed light forces in screen from northward.</p></div>
+
+<p>As to a message:</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>Our troops held up on Beach A since 0500 this date.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the case of a message or order, the source and the action
+addressee(s) are recorded in the columns marked "From" and "To
+(action)" respectively. The content of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span>the despatch or order then
+follows. The amount of detail to be included depends upon the needs of
+the work sheet (see below) in its capacity as a basis for the running
+estimate of the situation. Further details can be ascertained, if
+needed, by reference to the journal file.</p>
+
+<p>The action taken ("None" entered, if none is taken) is indicated
+briefly under that heading. In the case of the above entry as to the
+enemy bombing light forces, the "action taken" might, for example
+read:</p>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>Prepared for torpedo attack.</p></div>
+
+<p>A single journal may be maintained for the commander concerned; or, if
+so desired, separate journals may be kept, for their respective
+purposes, by the several principal officers of his staff.</p>
+
+<p>The journal itself and its use are readily adaptable to informal
+methods of preparation and maintenance. The Journal Form may be
+prepared hastily, as needed or desired. Where appropriate, the Journal
+Form may be made up in quantity by printing, multigraphing, or other
+practicable methods.</p>
+
+<p>Journal File. The file to support the journal is merely an assembly of
+the records (messages, records of oral orders, and the like) from
+which the journal is compiled. Each item of the file bears a serial
+number corresponding to that of its entry in the journal. An ordinary
+spike-file is frequently adequate for safe-keeping of these records
+while in use. When the journal is closed, the corresponding
+journal-file is filed with the journal, in accordance with standing
+instructions or in compliance with any particular disposition directed
+by the commander concerned or by higher authority.</p>
+
+<p>Work Sheet. The usual form of the work sheet follows the form of the
+estimate of the situation. A single work sheet may be kept for the
+commander concerned, or, if so desired, separate work sheets may be
+maintained, for their respective purposes, by the several principal
+subdivisions of his staff. If a single work sheet is maintained,
+entries by the several staff subdivisions may be facilitated by
+dividing the work sheet among them, provided that the entire document
+can always be promptly assembled for use as needed.</p>
+
+<p>The work sheet, while an important official document, is ordinarily
+informal in nature. The various headings, items, or titles (other than
+the main heading) are merely copied, ordinarily, from the usual
+Estimate Form. An example of a work sheet is as follows (see next
+page):</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span>WORK SHEET</h4>
+
+<h4>(For Running Estimate of the Situation)</h4>
+
+<p class="cen">..............................................................<br />
+    (Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">From: ........................................................<br />
+               (Date and hour)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">To: ..........................................................<br />
+           (Date and hour, if pertinent)</p>
+
+<p class="cen">Place: .......................................................</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="block3">
+<p class="noin">I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">(1) Summary of the Situation.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">(Note: No other heading would be entered on the first page.)</p></div>
+
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*<br />
+
+<p class="noin">(2) Recognition of the Incentive.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">(Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (second) page.)</p></div>
+
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*<br />
+
+<p class="noin">(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">(Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (third) page.)</p></div>
+
+<p class="noin">(4) Formulation of the Mission.</p>
+
+<div class="block">
+<p class="noin">(Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (fourth) page.)</p></div>
+
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;*<br />
+</div>
+
+<p class="noin">B. (Note: This and subsequent headings are entered in the manner
+     indicated as to Section I-A, above.)</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The remaining necessary headings and subheadings of the Estimate Form
+would be entered similarly, in due order, on succeeding pages.</p>
+
+<p>The use of a voluminous work-sheet is facilitated by entering item
+headings in a narrow column at the left, and by cutting away unused
+space below the several headings in such column, so that all the
+headings (or the more important ones) can be seen at a glance. A
+person using the work-sheet can then readily find any page desired.</p>
+
+<p>The main heading (top, first page) is filled out in the same manner as
+for the journal.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>The other headings, for subdivisions of the work sheet, are ordinarily
+transcribed from the usual Estimate Form, according to the needs for
+the purpose of the particular work sheet. Such needs will vary with
+circumstances. As has also been noted, the Estimate Form, itself
+(Chapter VI), varies with the situation. For these reasons, the
+work-sheet form is necessarily flexible, and will rarely be prescribed
+in detail. Reproduction by printing, etc., will not be so frequent as
+in the case of more rigid forms. The work sheet is authenticated only
+if it is filed (see below), or if authentication is desired for other
+reasons. The work sheet is, in fact, as indicated by its name, merely
+a vehicle to facilitate the performance of important mental work.</p>
+
+<p>When the work sheet has served its purpose, it is usually destroyed.
+It is not, ordinarily, a permanent record, since such purpose is
+served by the journal and its file. When a formal Estimate is made up
+from the work sheet, such Estimate may serve the purpose of an
+additional record. If no formal Estimate is made up for a given period
+and the commander desires the corresponding work sheet to be preserved
+for record, he may so direct.</p>
+
+<p>Ordinarily, the work sheet is not destroyed or filed (and a new one
+started) at any specified time. The work sheet is kept current by
+marking out old entries no longer applicable; by inserting new
+entries; and by inserting fresh pages when old ones have been filled.
+The old pages, unless otherwise desired, may be destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>A separate page of the work sheet is ordinarily used for each item
+under which entries are to be made. This procedure applies not only to
+principal headings, but also to subordinate titles, according to the
+convenience of the user.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure of devoting a separate page, initially, to each item of
+the form enables additional pages to be inserted, where needed.
+Manifestly, the amount of space needed for particular items of the
+form cannot always be foreseen. The entries, for example, under the
+"Summary of the Situation", in Section I-A of the Estimate Form, may
+require little space or a great deal, depending upon the occurrence of
+events and upon the period of time covered by the particular work
+sheet. The same considerations are applicable as to other items.</p>
+
+<p>When a work sheet is used as the basis for rendering special reports
+(e.g., as to intelligence or operations), its form follows that used
+for such reports. It is, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>therefore, in essence, merely an
+outline-form, for entry of applicable data.</p>
+
+<p>Procedure as to Entries. When a report, a plan, a dispatch, or other
+pertinent item is received, its applicable content may first be
+entered on the chart (or charts) maintained by the commander (or by
+his staff). Thereafter the usual procedure would be an entry in the
+journal, followed by a corresponding entry in the work sheet. The
+document so received and recorded would then be placed in the journal
+file. This procedure is subject to proper variation, as desired.
+Immediate entry of data on the chart enables the commander and staff
+to study the implications of the item, without waiting for completion
+of routine clerical work.</p>
+
+<p>Outgoing messages, instructions, etc., after approval or signature by
+the commander, are handled by a similar routine. Where applicable,
+such routine involves appropriate entry on the chart, in the journal,
+and in the work sheet. The routine of entry is preferably based on a
+copy (or copies), in order to avoid delay in dispatch.</p>
+
+<p>Staff Organization and Functioning. The commander may desire important
+documents to be handed to him at once, on receipt. He may, of course,
+call for them at any time. He naturally will not, however, permit any
+unnecessary delay to occur in the usual routine disposition of such
+items. The routine exists to assist him, and its arbitrary disruption,
+if he has properly defined the essential routine in the first
+instance, cannot but work to his disadvantage.</p>
+
+<p>Few things are more disturbing to the functioning of a staff than
+undue eccentricity on the part of the commander or of senior members
+of the staff. For instance, a personal habit to be rigorously
+suppressed&mdash;a habit not infrequently in evidence, especially under
+strain of active operations&mdash;is that of absent-mindedly pocketing
+documents needed in the work under way. This subject might, but for
+limitations of space, be illustrated by numerous other examples whose
+homely character may not safely be permitted to detract from their
+considered importance to unity of effort.</p>
+
+<p>Where circumstances permit, it is desirable that incoming and outgoing
+items be reproduced in quantity sufficient to supply separate copies
+for the commander and for the several interested members of his staff.</p>
+
+<p>A competent staff brings to the commander's attention all the items
+necessary&mdash;but only those necessary&mdash;for his proper performance of his
+duties. Inordinate attention by the commander to unnecessary detail
+cannot but tend to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span>distract his attention from his proper duties.</p>
+
+<p>The importance of smooth and effective functioning of a staff
+emphasizes the need for an established, though flexible, procedure.
+Such procedure, if reasonably standardized, facilitates unity of
+action, not only within staffs, but also among the several commanders,
+and their staffs, throughout the chain of command.</p>
+
+<p>The same fundamentals apply as to staff organization. If proper
+functioning of staffs is generally understood, and if staffs are
+correctly organized to perform their functions, the basis for their
+sound organization will become a matter of general understanding. Such
+organization, so understood, becomes a powerful influence in behalf of
+unity of effort.</p>
+
+<p>Staff functions&mdash;i.e., characteristic activities of staffs&mdash;divide
+fundamentally into two classifications. These may be referred to, for
+convenience of terminology, as "general" and "special".</p>
+
+<p>The latter have to do with the characteristic operations of the
+command, rather than of the commander; they therefore relate to such
+matters as routine administration and to the technical aspects of
+movement, of the use of weapons, and of supply, sanitation, and
+hospitalization. The administrative, technical, and supply staff, thus
+broadly considered, may be said to be concerned with special functions
+relating to the operations of the command.</p>
+
+<p>By contrast, the functions of the commander, as such, have to do with
+the necessary supervision of these special functions and, more
+especially, with the important duty of planning for the future
+employment of the command. The supervisory and planning activities
+may, for purposes of differentiation from the specialties noted above,
+be properly described as general functions. They relate more
+particularly to the duties performed personally by the commander or,
+where such duties become too onerous for performance by one person, by
+specifically designated members of his staff.</p>
+
+<p>In our naval service, the higher commanders are provided, where
+appropriate, with a chief of staff, who coordinates and supervises the
+work of the entire staff. Provision is also made, where the nature and
+amount of the work to be done calls for such assignment, for the
+detail of additional staff officers to perform the important general
+functions mentioned above. Appropriate provision is also made for
+staff officers to care for the special functions inherent in the
+character of the particular command.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span>The important general functions referred to are those relating to
+intelligence duties, and to operations. Intelligence duties have to do
+with the collection of information as to the enemy and the theater of
+operations, the analysis of this information, its evaluation, its
+conversion into intelligence by the process of drawing conclusions,
+i.e., by interpretation, and, finally, its dissemination to the
+command or to other appropriate destinations (<a href="#Page_161">page 161</a>). Intelligence
+estimates and plans have been discussed previously (Chapters VII and
+VIII).</p>
+
+<p>Operations, in the sense in which the term is employed in this
+connection, relate to the strategical or tactical activities of the
+command, as distinguished from routine functions pertaining to such
+matters as administration and supply. Operations, therefore, as a term
+employed in contradistinction to intelligence activities, refer more
+especially to the performance of the commander's own force, while
+intelligence functions are oriented more particularly with respect to
+the activities of the enemy. Operation plans, which may include
+subsidiary intelligence plans, have been discussed previously
+(Chapters VII and VIII).</p>
+
+<p>Further details in this connection are touched on hereafter with
+respect to rendition of reports and estimates.</p>
+
+<p>Reports. The work-sheet facilitates the rendition, at any time, of
+such special reports as may be required by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff. The appropriate staff officer is prepared at
+all times to render a report, oral or written, informal or formal,
+brief or detailed, of the situation of the command and of other
+friendly forces, or of the situation with reference to the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>No less important than rendition of reports to the commander and to
+higher authority is the duty of the staff, or of the commander if he
+lacks such staff assistance, to insure that subordinate commands
+receive pertinent information at the proper time. Cooperating friendly
+forces will also require such information. This need is sometimes met
+by the issue of periodical reports or bulletins. However, during the
+intervals between such reports, and at all times when such reports are
+lacking, it is a primary duty of the commander and staff to ensure
+that all concerned are informed as to the situation. The work sheet is
+a valuable aid for the performance of this duty.</p>
+
+<p>Oral Estimates. When called for by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff, oral estimates of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span>situation can be
+rendered promptly and effectively by reference to the work sheet.
+Estimates called for by the commander are presented by the appropriate
+staff officers. Presentation is made to the commander or, if so
+directed, to the chief of staff, the latter being prepared to render,
+in turn, an estimate to the commander. Oral estimates desired by
+higher authority are made by the commander, or by the staff officer
+concerned, at the direction of his commander.</p>
+
+<p>Partial estimates may be called for from time to time as to particular
+aspects of the situation.</p>
+
+<p>In the larger staffs, the work is facilitated if each principal staff
+officer is prepared to present his appropriate portion of the
+estimate. In such case the intelligence officer deals with matters
+relating to the enemy; the operations officer deals with those
+relating to own forces, etc. The entire staff acts as a team in the
+presentation of a well-rounded estimate which will bring all pertinent
+matters to the attention of the commander so that he may arrive at a
+sound decision.</p>
+
+<p>Should the commander call also for recommendations as to the decision
+or decisions to be made, the appropriate members of the staff will be
+prepared to submit their views. They will be prepared, as well, to
+answer at any time the calls of higher authority for information, for
+the conclusions of the commander, or for his recommendations. Should
+the commander have no staff for the performance of the foregoing
+functions, such detailed duties devolve upon him personally.</p>
+
+<p>Certain further aspects of estimates of the situation, with reference
+to the circumstances obtaining during the supervision of the planned
+action, are noted under the discussion of written estimates, which
+follows.</p>
+
+<p>Written Estimates. The foregoing remarks as to oral estimates are no
+less applicable to those submitted in written form, whether formal or
+informal, partial or full, brief or detailed. The nature of an
+estimate, as to these characteristics, will largely depend on the time
+element. A long and detailed estimate, often desirable when time is
+available, may be wholly impracticable when the press of events
+requires rapid decision. The written estimate, even if informal,
+partial, or brief, would frequently be out of place in situations
+where an oral estimate would be adequate or, if not adequate, would be
+all that could be accomplished under the circumstances of the case.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span>Special Remarks as to Entries</h4>
+
+<p>Entries on Charts. Entries on charts are made by the usual
+conventional signs and symbols. Colors are employed where appropriate.
+Information not yet confirmed is indicated as doubtful; e.g., by a
+question mark. Special remarks, comments, or other notations may also
+be entered, but in such a manner as not to obscure other data on the
+chart.</p>
+
+<p>Where operations of land forces are involved, maps are prepared by the
+methods prescribed for own land forces. The higher naval staffs, or
+those of forces specially designated for such operations, may include
+army officers who will look after these matters; marine officers may
+also be assigned such duties.</p>
+
+<p>Special charts or maps are those prepared for special purposes. A
+chart (or map) maintained to show the existing situation is known as a
+"situation chart" (or map). Charts (or maps) prepared for particular
+operations are known as "operations charts" (or maps).</p>
+
+<p>Entries in Journals. Entries in journals, already referred to, are
+purely factual. Such entries may be complete copies of the content of
+incoming or outgoing orders or messages. Again, as already indicated
+(<a href="#Page_209">page 209</a>), entries may consist of condensations of such matters. The
+oral instructions of the commander are also appropriate items for
+entry, when the matter is of sufficient importance. The journal may
+also make note of the movements of the commander, his staff officers,
+and other persons. Other pertinent happenings may also be made the
+subject of entry.</p>
+
+<p>Entries in Work Sheets. Entries in the work sheet, since it is the
+basis for estimates of the situation, are both factual and otherwise.
+All matters entered in the journal are normally appropriate for
+notation in the work sheet. Information not yet confirmed is indicated
+as doubtful. The work sheet is also the proper place for notation of
+matters of conjecture (noted as such) and for other like items related
+to estimates of the situation. The various considerations influencing
+the commander and staff, with respect to current operations, are
+proper entries in the work sheet. Its informal character affords wide
+latitude as to entries which may be considered worthy of record in
+this manner. The underlying consideration is that anything may and
+should be entered which will be of value in preparing estimates or
+rendering the special reports for which the work sheet is to provide
+the basis.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span>A succinct running account of the situation is kept posted to date
+under the appropriate heading of the work sheet.</p>
+
+<p>Entry is also made of the incentive which motivates the solution of
+the problem presented by the situation. Notation is made as to whether
+the incentive arises from a task imposed by higher authority or is
+derived by the commander from other sources (see <a href="#Page_200">page 200</a>). In either
+case, the work sheet is the proper place for the entry of such facts
+and of the reasons which have led the commander to regard this
+incentive as motivating his actions in the situation existing at the
+time.</p>
+
+<p>Information of the enemy, after receipt from the various collecting
+agencies (radio, observers, subordinate forces, etc.), is subject to
+the usual procedures of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and
+dissemination (<a href="#Page_214">page 214</a>). Analysis determines the source and the
+circumstances which led to the dispatch of the message. Evaluation
+determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation calls for drawing
+conclusions. The resulting intelligence is then disseminated to those
+concerned, either within the command or elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>Since information of the enemy does not become intelligence until
+converted thereinto by the process of drawing conclusions, this
+important procedure is recorded briefly in the work sheet. Such record
+makes available, for inclusion in estimates or in reports, the reasons
+which have formed the basis for such conclusions.</p>
+
+<p>Information of friendly forces, with any deductions drawn therefrom,
+is similarly entered in the appropriate portions of the work sheet.</p>
+
+<p>The facts and conclusions as to fighting strength of own and enemy
+forces are important entries. The summary of fighting strength
+includes proper conclusions as to the relative fighting strength of
+the opposing forces, own and enemy's.</p>
+
+<p>The work sheet is also the proper document for other entries pertinent
+to estimates of the situation: e.g., the determination of own courses
+of action, the examination into enemy capabilities, and the selection
+of own best course of action. The commander's decisions, as rendered
+from time to time, are also entered for purposes of temporary record.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span>Summary</h4>
+
+<p>The work sheet, therefore, if properly utilized, contains the Running
+Estimate of the Situation, and is supported by the journal and the
+journal file. By the use of the Running Estimate and its supporting
+documents, the commander is enabled to keep himself apprised of the
+developments of the situation. On this basis he is able to detect the
+necessity for any changes in his plan and to arrive promptly at
+decisions in accordance with such needs. These decisions become the
+basis for new or modified plans and directives, to cause the action of
+his command to conform to changes in the situation.</p>
+
+<p>Where the full procedure described in this Chapter is unnecessary or
+impracticable, a suitable modification without fundamental change will
+be found applicable. The mental process, even if no records are kept
+in writing, applies to the supervision of the planned action in every
+situation.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>CONCLUSION<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<div class="block2"><p>The discussion of "Sound Military Decision" now closes with a
+brief review of the application of mental power to the
+solution of military problems.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<p>Mental power, which includes the ability to arrive at sound solutions
+of military problems, is a recognized essential component of fighting
+strength because (<a href="#Page_18">page 18</a>) it is the source of professional judgment.</p>
+
+<p>The procedure most likely to ensure sound solutions is the studied
+employment of a natural mental process, differing in no fundamental
+respect from that effectively utilized in all other human activities.
+The basic mental procedure remains unchanged, irrespective of the
+nature of the problem,&mdash;be it simple or complex, its solution
+instantaneous or slow. The procedure is especially adapted to the
+needs of the profession of arms through the use of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. By outlining the essential elements involved, this
+Principle, a valid guide for the solution of military problems, covers
+the full scope of the application of mental power as a recognized
+component of fighting strength.</p>
+
+<p>It is more especially during the swift-moving action of the tactical
+engagement that moral capacity to command, and mental ability to solve
+military problems, experience the maximum pressure of events. It is
+then, also, that the responsibility of the commander creates an added
+demand for intelligent application of mental power because of the
+vital issues which may hinge upon his decisions. That this pressure be
+successfully sustained, and this responsibility effectively
+discharged, is the goal of any system of mental training in the
+profession of arms (<a href="#Page_114">page 114</a>).</p>
+
+<p>On a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character,
+knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision.</p>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<a name="APPENDIX_1" id="APPENDIX_1"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span><br />
+
+
+<h4>OUTLINE FORM OF AN OPERATION PLAN</h4>
+
+<p class="cen"><a href="images/outline.png">Image of form</a></p>
+
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="OUTLINE FORM">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" width="55%" style="vertical-align: bottom;">File Notations<br />
+    <span class="line">SECRET</span> (or <span class="line">CONFIDENTIAL</span>)</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="45%">TITLES OF THE<br />
+    SUPERIOR ECHELONS,<br />
+    TITLE OF THE FORCE,<br />
+    NAME OF SHIP, Flagship.</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="line">Operation Plan</span><br />
+    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;No. &mdash;&mdash;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">PLACE OF ISSUE,<br />
+    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Date and hour of issue.</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<p class="line">TASK ORGANIZATION.</p>
+
+<div class="block"><p>(a) Task Force Title, Rank and name of its commander. Composition
+of Task Force.</p>
+
+<p>(b) (Similarly enumerate other Task Forces after appropriate
+letter (b), (c), etc.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="block4"><p class="hang">1.&nbsp;&nbsp; Information. Information of enemy and own forces affecting
+the Plan and needed by subordinate commanders. If no
+further information is available, the statement "No
+further information" is inserted. Distinction is made
+between matters of conjecture and of fact. If desired,
+indicate the tasks and general objectives of higher
+echelons and of coordinate forces of the commander's
+echelon, and of other forces of the command, not listed in
+the Task Organization. If desired, include general
+measures prescribed by the immediate superior for
+cooperation and security.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">Assumptions. Statement of the assumptions upon which the
+Plan is based. Assumptions are things taken for granted as
+the basis for action.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">2.&nbsp;&nbsp; The general plan for the whole force actually under the
+command of the officer issuing the Plan, and, if desired,
+the methods of executing it, and its purpose. If
+additional matter is needed to convey clearly the will and
+intent of the commander, such matter may be added.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">3. &nbsp;&nbsp;(a) Title of Task Force (a), followed by a statement of the
+principal task, other tasks, and detailed instructions for
+the particular Task Force. Tasks may be stated, if
+preferred, in chronological order. Include directions as to
+cooperation, security, and intelligence activities.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(b) Title of Task Force (b), followed by a subparagraph of
+similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above.</p>
+
+<p class="noin">(x) Instructions that apply to all Task Forces or that
+pertain to the general conduct of the operation, including,
+if desired, coordinating instructions applying to more than
+one task force. Include, particularly, measures for
+cooperation, security, and intelligence activities. Include
+statement of the time and/or manner in which the Operation
+Plan is to be placed in effect.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">4.&nbsp;&nbsp; Broad instructions concerning logistics measures necessary
+to the operation, or reference to Logistics Annex, if one
+has been prepared in connection with the operation.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">5.&nbsp;&nbsp; Measures necessary to the exercise of command, such as plan
+of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous, and
+location of Commander during operation.</p></div>
+
+<p class="noin" style="margin-left: 55%;">(Signature)<br />
+Rank,<br />
+Title of Command.</p>
+
+<p class="line">ANNEXES.</p>
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="Annexes">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" width="20%">A. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(Name)<br />B. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;do<br /><br />DISTRIBUTION</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="80%" style="vertical-align: middle;">NOTE&mdash;The Operation Order
+    (see <a href="#Page_196">page 196</a>) follows this Form except that it makes no provision for assumptions, and is effective
+    on receipt unless otherwise provided in the body of the Order.</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">(Authentication)</td>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdc2">(Seal)</td>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span><br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h3>TABULAR FORMS<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="APPENDIX_2" id="APPENDIX_2"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span><br />
+
+<h4>TABULAR FORM OF <br />THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION</h4>
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="80%" summary="The Estimate of the Situation">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" width="10%">Section</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="80%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="10%">Page</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 110%; padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">I.&nbsp;&nbsp; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">A. The Appropriate Effect Desired</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_118">118</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(1) Summary of the Situation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(2) Recognition of the Incentive</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(4) Formulation of the Mission</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_121">121</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">B. Relative Fighting Strength</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_121">121</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">(To include only such of the following factors as appear
+    to be necessary background for the later reasoning in Sections II to IV.)</td>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">(1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">*(a) General Factors</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(i) Political Factors</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(ii) Economics Factors</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(iii) Psychological Factors</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(iv) Information and Counter-Information Measures</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_126">126</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(i) Vessels, including Aircraft</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(ii) Land Forces, including land-based aviation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(iii) Personnel</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(iv) Material</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(v) Logistics</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(a) Hydrography</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(b) Topography</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(c) Weather</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(d) Daylight and Dark Periods</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(e) Relative Location and Distance</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(f) Lines of Transportation and Supply</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(g) Facilities and Fortifications</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(h) Communications</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 110%; padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">II.&nbsp;&nbsp; DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span></td>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_135">135</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">B. Survey of Courses of Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_135">135</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility,
+     and Acceptability</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">D. Listing Retained Courses of Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 110%; padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">III.&nbsp;&nbsp; EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 110%; padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">IV.&nbsp;&nbsp; SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION.</td>
+  <td class="tdr">&nbsp;</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of
+     Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl">B. Determination of the Best Course of Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_148">148</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 110%; padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">V.&nbsp;&nbsp; THE DECISION.</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2" style="padding-top: .5em; padding-bottom: .5em;">* Usually included only in an estimate of broad scope.</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="block3"><p>On the reverse side, <a href="#Page_224">page 224</a>, will be found a Tabular Form of the
+Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed Operations.</p>
+
+<p>CAUTION. This folder is merely a guide, provided in order to
+facilitate reference to the subject matter of Chapters VI and VII. It
+is not possible to arrive at sound military decision by its use
+alone.</p></div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span><hr />
+<br />
+
+<h4>TABULAR FORM OF<br /> THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION<br /> INTO DETAILED
+OPERATIONS</h4>
+
+<div class="centered">
+<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="70%" summary="The Resolution of the Required Action">
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr" width="10%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" width="70%">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdr" width="20%">Page</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">1.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Assumptions</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_155">155-156</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">2.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Alternative Plans</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_156">156-157</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">3.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Application of the Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_157">157-164</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(a) Correct physical objectives</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_157">157-158</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 3em;">(1) Effective action with relation to</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_158">158</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(b) Advantageous relative positions</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(c) Freedom of action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_159">159-162</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(d) Proper apportionment of fighting strength</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_162">162-164</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">4.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Testing of Operations for Suitability, Feasibility and Acceptability</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_164">164-165</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(a) Listing of retained operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">5.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">The Formulation of Tasks</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(a) Testing of tasks for suitability, feasibility
+       and acceptability</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">6.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165-166</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(a) Grouping of tasks</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165-166</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(b) Assignment of necessary strength</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdl">&nbsp;</td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="padding-left: 1.5em;">(c) Completion of the organization</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">7.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+   to the Determination of Objectives Embodied in Tasks</td>
+  <td class="tdr2"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">8.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_167">167-168</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">9.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">The Assembly of Information</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_168">168</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+  <td class="tdr">10.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_168">168-179</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a><hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+
+<h2>INDEX</h2>
+
+<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span><br />
+<hr />
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span><br />
+
+<h3>INDEX<span class="totoc"><a href="#toc">ToC</a></span></h3>
+<br />
+
+
+<ul><li>A</li>
+
+<li>Acceptable consequences as to costs, principle for determination of <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li>Acceptability, application of test for <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li>Action,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>effective, against correct physical objectives <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+  <li>freedom of (See Freedom of Action)</li>
+  <li>physical conditions prevailing in field of <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+  <li>supervision of the <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Action, courses of, (See Courses of Action)</li>
+
+<li>Annexes to Order Form <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+
+<li>Application of
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>essential elements of favorable military operations <a  href="#Page_157">157-164</a></li>
+  <li>tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability <a  href="#Page_99">99-102</a>, <a  href="#Page_137">137-139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>the Fundamental Military Principle <a  href="#Page_43">43-77</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Apportionment of fighting strength,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>during amphibious operations <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  <li>discussion of <a  href="#Page_66">66-70</a></li>
+  <li>dispersion and concentration involved in <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+  <li>diversion, bearing of, on <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+  <li>feasibility and acceptability of <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+  <li>joint operations <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  <li>numerical considerations <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  <li>procedure for determining proper <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
+  <li>a salient feature of a military situation (operation) <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+  <li>types, training and equipment of forces <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Appropriate effect desired,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>assigned objective becomes <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+  <li>as the basis for the objective <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
+  <li>definition of <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>enemy's <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  <li>operations studied from viewpoint of <a  href="#Page_162">162-164</a></li>
+  <li>forms part of basis for solution of problem <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  <li>principle for determination of <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
+  <li>requirements for an understanding of <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li>
+  <li>suitability as to <a  href="#Page_118">118-120</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Areas,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>coveted or in dispute <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  <li>geographical not under one's own control <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  <li>geographical under one's own control <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  <li>no land, belong equally to all nations <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+  <li>sea, not under command <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  <li>sea, securing command of <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  <li>sea, under command <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Armament, material factor of <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li>Armed forces,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>command of <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>factors more directly applicable to <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+  <li>function and character of <a href="#Page_8">8</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span></li>
+  <li>fundamental objective of <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+  <li>initial requisite to effective use of <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Art of War,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a true concept of, requirement of <a  href="#Page_9">9-10</a></li>
+  <li>foundation of <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Assumptions,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>defined and discussed <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+  <li>may form basis of Estimate <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Authentication, order form <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />B</li>
+
+<li>Basic,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>decision <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>estimate of the situation <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>problem <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+  <li>problems challenging integrity of, plan(s) <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>problems involving modification of, plan(s) <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+  <li>situation <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>war plans <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Basis,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of science of war <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+  <li>for solution of problem <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Battle Plans <a  href="#Page_168">168-171</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li>
+
+<li>Blind adherence to plan condemned <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+<li>Body of order form <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+
+<li>Brevity, required in directives <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />C</li>
+
+<li>Campaign Plans,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>defined <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+  <li>form of <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Campaigns of Twentieth Century reflect intensity of mental training <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li>Capabilities of enemy,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>examination into <a  href="#Page_139">139-145</a></li>
+  <li>examination not complete under certain conditions <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+  <li>survey of <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Cause and effect <a href="#Page_3">3</a>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>correct relation between, established by principles <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>natural forces and resultant conditions <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+  <li>principles as valid statements of <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Challenge to integrity of basic plan <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+
+<li>Characteristics,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>commander's personal <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+  <li>influence of, on fighting strength <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li>
+  <li>of (field) theater of (action) operations <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a  href="#Page_129">129-132</a></li>
+  <li>racial or national <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Clarity,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>required in directives <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Command,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>adherence to chain of, essential to mutual understanding <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+  <li>chain of <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
+  <li>echelons of <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+  <li>mental preparation for <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+  <li>paragraph, in order form <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+  <li>responsibility and authority inherent in <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+  <li>the ideal of <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>training for <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>unity of <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Commander,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>may depart from his instructions <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  <li>may modify or alter assigned task <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to subordinates <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+  <li>staff of a <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+  <li>the personification of command <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Communication(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>lines of <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
+  <li>plans, as an annex <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+  <li>provision for <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
+  <li>study of in strategical and tactical estimates <a  href="#Page_131">131-182</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Component(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>human and material, of fighting strength <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+  <li>major, of military problems <a  href="#Page_43">43-47</a></li>
+  <li>mental power, recognized essential, of fighting strength <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+  <li>parts of an operation assigned as tasks <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Condition(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>influence of, on resources <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>of armed forces <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+  <li>of material <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+  <li>in war, peacetime exercises not a conclusive guide to <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Consequences as to costs, principle for determination of acceptable <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li>Constructive representations, establishing basis for <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li>Corollaries to the Decision <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li>Corollary principle,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of the Correct Military Objective <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>of Effective Military Operations <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Correct military objective(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>corollary principle of the <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>selection of <a  href="#Page_47">47-51</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Correct physical objectives, effective action against <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li>Course(s) of action,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>analysis and selection of <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
+  <li>analysis of, settles suitability, feasibility and acceptability <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li>
+  <li>as tentative solutions, complete or partial <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span></li>
+  <li>classified as to suitability, feasibility and acceptability <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+  <li>combination of enemy's <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+  <li>combination of, into complete solution <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+  <li>comparison of, summarized <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>consideration of operations involved in <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li>
+  <li>defined <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+  <li>degree of detail in which, may be visualized varies <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li>
+  <li>determination and selection of the best <a  href="#Page_145">145-161</a></li>
+  <li>each, embodies an objective <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>examples of <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+  <li>how phrased <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+  <li>listing of <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+  <li>listing of retained <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>listing of retained enemy's <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+  <li>no rigid line of demarcation between, and operations pertaining thereto <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  <li>predetermined <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li>
+  <li>rejection of <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+  <li>resolving into operations <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+  <li>retained, analyses and comparison of <a  href="#Page_145">145-147</a></li>
+  <li>selection of the best <a  href="#Page_145">145-151</a></li>
+  <li>survey of <a  href="#Page_135">135-137</a></li>
+  <li>test for suitability, feasibility and acceptability of <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a  href="#Page_98">98-102</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>visualization of <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+  <li>when embodied in decision <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />D</li>
+
+<li>Daylight and dark periods <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li>
+
+<li>Decision <a  href="#Page_161">161-154</a>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>corollaries to the <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+  <li>embodies best solution of the problem <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>expresses a general plan of action <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+  <li>indicates general objective <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
+  <li>purpose of the <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to detailed plan and directives <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to mission <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+  <li>restatement of, for use in directive <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+  <li>statement of <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Detailed Plan <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li>Dilemma,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>definition of <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  <li>procedure in case of <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Directive(s)
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>defined <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li>
+  <li>formulation and issue of <a href="#Page_183">183</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span></li>
+  <li>fragmentary <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+  <li>military, essentials of <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+  <li>military plans and military <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li>
+  <li>requirements of a <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary, and plans <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+  <li>types of naval <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Distance,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>involved in movements <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  <li>relative location and <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Distribution of Order Form <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li>
+
+<li>Diversions <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li>Doctrine,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>derivation of meaning of <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  <li>military <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />E</li>
+
+<li>Echelon of command, definition of <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li>Economic factors <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li>Effect desired,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>appropriate, defined <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>by enemy, analysis of <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+  <li>character distinctly military, in war <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+  <li>enemy's <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  <li>factor of the <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a></li>
+  <li>further <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li>
+  <li>produced by action of natural causes <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+  <li>source of <a  href="#Page_20">20-21</a></li>
+  <li>suitable to further effect, if appropriate <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>End in view,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a result to be produced, an effect desired <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  <li>requirements for attainment of an <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Ending of Order Form <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+
+<li>Enemy, information of <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
+
+<li>Enemy('s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>capabilities, examination into <a  href="#Page_139">139-146</a></li>
+  <li>capabilities, survey of <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+  <li>information of the <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
+  <li>problem, survey of <a  href="#Page_141">141-143</a></li>
+  <li>situation, summary of <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+  <li>situation, re-estimate of <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Entries in journals and work-sheets <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
+
+<li>Essential elements,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of a favorable military operation <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+  <li>of a favorable military situation <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+  <li>relationship existing among <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Establishment of the basis for solution of the problem <a  href="#Page_118">118-136</a></li>
+
+<li>Estimate form,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a flexible guide <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+  <li>variation in requirements of <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Estimate(s) of the Situation,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>provides basis for plan <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>estimate within an <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+  <li>form, a detailed guide for use of Fundamental Military Principle <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+  <li>founded on Fundamental Military Principle, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>oral <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li>
+  <li>running <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a  href="#Page_204">204-205</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+  <li>tabular form of <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Examination into capabilities of enemy <a  href="#Page_139">139-145</a></li>
+
+<li>Execution of plans, importance of <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />F</li>
+
+<li>Facilities and fortifications <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li>Factor(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>defined <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+  <li>directly applicable to armed forces <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+  <li>each to be weighed in connection with others <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+  <li>general, applicable to broad estimates <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+  <li>in relation to a situation <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+  <li>interdependency of <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a></li>
+  <li>pertinent, relation of, to effects to be produced <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+  <li>strength and weakness <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Favorable military situation,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>essential elements of a, unchanged through the years <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+  <li>salient features of a <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Favorably progressing military operation, salient features of a <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li>Feasibility <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>application of test of <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>consideration of, calls for survey of comparative resources <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+  <li>facility of execution as test for <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li>
+  <li>prospects of success as test for <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to correct end in view <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Features,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>salient, of favorable military situation <a  href="#Page_38">38-41</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Feints <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+
+<li>Fighting strength,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>apportionment of <a  href="#Page_66">66-70</a>, <a  href="#Page_162">162-164</a></li>
+  <li>conclusions as to <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+  <li>derivation of <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+  <li>human and material components of <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+  <li>mental power, a recognized essential component of <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+  <li>relative <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+  <li>survey of factors of <a href="#Page_88">88</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>File, journal, description of <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+
+<li>Force(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>armed, function and character of <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+  <li>requirements of, for task groups <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+  <li>task, organization of <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Form,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>estimate, a flexible guide <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+  <li>order, detailed description of <a  href="#Page_188">188-195</a></li>
+  <li>order, discussion of <a  href="#Page_183">183-196</a></li>
+  <li>standard, for plans and directives <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+  <li>use of, in solution of problem <a  href="#Page_110">110-113</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Formulation,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of mission <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+  <li>of tasks <a  href="#Page_84">84-86</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Freedom of action,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a salient feature of a military situation (operation) <a  href="#Page_38">38-41</a></li>
+  <li>adequate, measures for ensuring <a  href="#Page_160">160-162</a></li>
+  <li>assembly of measures for <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>best basis for devising measures for <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
+  <li>discussion of <a  href="#Page_70">70-77</a></li>
+  <li>initiative, of paramount importance to <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>list of matters requiring consideration for ensurance of <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  <li>logistics support essential to <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>morale founded upon sound discipline, an essential to <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+  <li>organization, of primary importance in contributing to <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+  <li>relation of offensive to <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
+  <li>security measures necessary to <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Fundamental considerations,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>factors become, in particular circumstances <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+  <li>the basis for the successful conduct of war <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Fundamental military philosophy <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li>Fundamental Military Principle <a  href="#Page_39">39-42</a></li>
+
+<li>Fundamental principle for attainment of an end <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+
+<li>Fundamentals common to all campaigns of history <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+
+<li>Further effect(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>consideration of <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+  <li>indicated by higher authority <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to effect desired <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />G</li>
+
+<li>General factors applicable to broad estimates <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+
+<li>General plan,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a comprehensive method of attaining the assigned objective <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+  <li>the Decision available as a <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span></li>
+  <li>indicated in or developed from the Decision <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Genius, fallacy of relying on availability of <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li>Goal of planning <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li>Groups, Task, organization of <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li>Guide,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>the Estimate Form a flexible <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+  <li>the Fundamental Military Principle a valid and practical <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />H</li>
+
+<li>Heading of Order Form <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li>
+
+<li>Hydrography in theater of operations <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />I</li>
+
+<li>Incentive,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>during supervision of the action <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+  <li>recognition of the <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>relationship of, with motivating task <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Indoctrination, meaning and application of <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li>Information,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>and counter-information measures <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+  <li>its collection, analysis, evaluation and interpretation <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+  <li>of enemy and of friendly forces <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
+  <li>paragraph of Order Form <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Initiative,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>offensive is a method of seizing <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to freedom of action <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Instructions,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>action may be necessary before receipt of <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>commander may depart from <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+  <li>letter of, in lieu of directive cast in standard form <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+  <li>the letter and spirit of, variation from <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Intelligence,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>accurate, related to freedom of action <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
+  <li>and counter-intelligence, measures for <a  href="#Page_160">160-161</a></li>
+  <li>derived from information <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+  <li>plan <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary problem involving <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Intelligent suspicion, everything to be viewed with <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+<li>Inventiveness and versatility, special attention to desirable <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />J</li>
+
+<li>Journal file, description of <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+
+<li>Journal for entry of data in running estimate,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>description of <a  href="#Page_205">205-207</a></li>
+  <li>entries in, purely factual <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Judgment, professional,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>essential to good leadership <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+  <li>exercise of, in planning <a  href="#Page_117">117-179</a></li>
+  <li>exercise of, in the execution of the plan <a  href="#Page_183">183-217</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span></li>
+  <li>has its source in mental power <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+  <li>relation of to successful conduct of war <a  href="#Page_40">40-114</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />L</li>
+
+<li>Letters of instruction, use of <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Life, the ability to withstand punishment <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Listing,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of courses of action <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li>
+  <li>of operations in definite sequence <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+  <li>of retained courses of action <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Logical thought,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>necessity for <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>principles in their relation to <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>separates the rational from the irrational <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Logistics,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>factor of direct concern to armed forces <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+  <li>paragraph of Order Form <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+  <li>plan <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
+  <li>support, commander hampered without <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+  <li>support, measures for <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Loyalty,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a military necessity <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+  <li>more than a moral virtue <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+  <li>mutual, born of mutual confidence <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />M</li>
+
+<li>Material, a factor applicable to armed forces <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li>Means,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>available, and opposed <a  href="#Page_31">31-36</a>, <a  href="#Page_38">38-41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
+  <li>survey of <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
+  <li>to be made available, principle for determination of <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Measures,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>for adequate freedom of action <a  href="#Page_160">160-162</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>for exercise of command <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
+  <li>for information and counter-information <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+  <li>for intelligence and counter-intelligence <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+  <li>for logistics support <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>for security, cooperation and intelligence <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>for training <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Mental elements of fighting strength enumerated <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li>Mental power,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>essential component of fighting strength <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+  <li>vital, as basis for professional counsel to State <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Mental process(es) (See Natural mental process(es))</li>
+
+<li>Military plans and directives (See Directive(s))</li>
+
+<li>Military effort, no easy road to goal of <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li>
+
+<li>Military operation(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>application of essential elements of a favorable <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+  <li>as tentative solutions of problems, denominated as course(s) of action <a href="#Page_82">82</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span></li>
+  <li>attainment of military objective depends on effective <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+  <li>determination of effective <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
+  <li>possible confusion because of phraseology as to <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+  <li>principle of effective <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Military principles, procedure for developing <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+
+<li>Military problem(s), (See also Problem(s))
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>conclusion as to approach to solution of <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+  <li>approach to solution of, involves four distinct steps <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>effect to be produced and action required to produce it, major considerations in solving <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+  <li>use of a form in solution of <a  href="#Page_110">110-118</a></li>
+  <li>four steps in solution of <a  href="#Page_79">79-114</a></li>
+  <li>involvements of full solution of <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>major components of <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+  <li>solution of <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a  href="#Page_79">79-114</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;first step, in <a  href="#Page_81">81-106</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;second step, in <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a  href="#Page_117">117-164</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;third step, in <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a  href="#Page_155">155-179</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;fourth step, in <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a  href="#Page_183">183-216</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;sequence of the four steps in <a  href="#Page_107">107-109</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+  <li>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;sound basis for, establishment of <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Military situation, every, has both strategical State in military matters <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li>Military situation, every, has both strategical and tactical aspects <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li>Mission,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>an assigned task coupled with purpose <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
+  <li>clearly indicates the appropriate effect desired <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+  <li>double or multiple tasks in <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+  <li>formulation of, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a> 204</li>
+  <li>manner of expressing <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
+  <li>restated <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a  href="#Page_174">174-176</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Mobility, as a material factor <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li>Modification of basic plan, problems involving <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+
+<li>Morale, discussion of <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+
+<li>Motivating task <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+
+<li>Mutual understanding essential to unity of effort <a href="#Page_14">14</a>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>final aim of <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />N</li>
+
+<li>National and racial characteristics, factors of <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li>Natural law,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>human activities governed by <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+  <li>relation of cause, effect and further effect to <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span></li>
+  <li>relation of, to human activity <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Natural mental process(es),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>adapted to military requirements <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+  <li>application of, to problems of war <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>employed by normal mature human beings <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+  <li>studied employment of, ii, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Naval directives, types of <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />O</li>
+
+<li>Objective(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>appreciation of (assigned) <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>assigned <a  href="#Page_48">48-50</a>, <a  href="#Page_119">119-121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+  <li>attainment of, by chain of command <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+  <li>best attained by properly directed effort <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+  <li>chain of <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+  <li>correct military, principle of <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>selection of <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a  href="#Page_117">117-184</a></li>
+  <li>correct military, relation of, to favorable military situation <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+  <li>correct physical, determination of (See also physical objective(s)) <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+  <li>determination of, embodied in tasks <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>general <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+  <li>immediate <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+  <li>inferred in assigned tasks <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
+  <li>in mind <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+  <li>in space, physical <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+  <li>intermediate <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+  <li>in war is an effect to be produced <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+  <li>national <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+  <li>physical (See also physical objective(s))</li>
+  <li>purpose of attainment usually given to subordinates, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+  <li>selection of correct military <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a  href="#Page_117">117-134</a></li>
+  <li>specified in tasks <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+  <li>tentatively selected <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+  <li>typically selected by commander himself <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
+  <li>ultimate <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Offensive, relation of, to freedom of action <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
+
+<li>Operation plans <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+
+<li>Operation(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>planning detailed <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+  <li>developed from measures for freedom of action <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+  <li>effective military, principle of <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>enemy's, envisaged by commander <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+  <li>favorable military situation dependent upon effective <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span></li>
+  <li>in relation to required action <a  href="#Page_106">106-107</a></li>
+  <li>listing of <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+  <li>military <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+  <li>naval, classification of <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  <li>order (plan), outline form of <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+  <li>reconsideration of <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+  <li>resolution of required action into <a  href="#Page_155">155-179</a></li>
+  <li>resolving courses of action into <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+  <li>theater of, characteristics of <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Oral estimate <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li>
+
+<li>Order form,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>annexes to <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+  <li>authentication of <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li>
+  <li>body of <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+  <li>detailed description of <a  href="#Page_188">188-194</a></li>
+  <li>distribution of <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li>
+  <li>purpose of <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Organization of task forces and tasks groups <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li>Organization, staff, and functioning <a  href="#Page_210">210-212</a></li>
+
+<li>Outline form of Operation Plan <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />P</li>
+
+<li>Perplexity, source of every problem <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+
+<li>Personnel factor applicable to armed forces <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li>Philosophy, fundamental military <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li>Physical conditions in field of action <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+
+<li>Physical objective(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>defined <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+  <li>determination of correct <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+  <li>discussion of <a  href="#Page_55">55-59</a></li>
+  <li>effective action against <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+  <li>eventual, a land objective <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
+  <li>fundamental considerations in determination of <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to (mental) objective <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+  <li>a salient feature of a military situation (operation) <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+  <li>series of, to be dealt with in successive stages <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
+  <li>suitability, feasibility and acceptability of <a  href="#Page_56">56-59</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Pithy statements, danger of <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+<li>Planned action,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>inauguration of <a  href="#Page_183">183-196</a></li>
+  <li>supervision of <a  href="#Page_197">197-217</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Planning, goal of <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li>Plan(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>alternative <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+  <li>as proposed methods of procedure <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+  <li>basic, problems challenging integrity of <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>basic, problems involving modification of <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+  <li>battle, described <a  href="#Page_168">168-171</a></li>
+  <li>best, incorporated in Decision <a href="#Page_22">22</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span></li>
+  <li>blind adherence to, condemned <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+  <li>campaign <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+  <li>comparison of <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
+  <li>detailed <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+  <li>general <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li>
+  <li>intelligence <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
+  <li>logistics <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
+  <li>military directives and military <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li>
+  <li>of execution <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  <li>operation, outline form of <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+  <li>outlined, plan embodied in basic decision <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Policy,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>coordination of national <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+  <li>implementation of national <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+  <li>relation of, to military strategy <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Political factors <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+
+<li>Position(s) (See relative position(s))</li>
+
+<li>Positiveness, required in directives <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+
+<li>Power, mental, moral and physical <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li>Predetermined course(s) of action <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li>
+
+<li>Principle(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a natural law <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>cannot replace logical thought <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+  <li>corollary for determination of the appropriate effect to be desired <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
+  <li>corollary or subordinate <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+  <li>establish (es) relations between cause and effect <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>false, why man adopts them; their danger <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+  <li>for determination of acceptable consequences as to cost <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+  <li>for determination of the proper means to be made available <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+  <li>for determination of the proper physical conditions to be established in the field of action <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+  <li>for determining salient features of favorable military situation <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+  <li>formulation and use of <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+  <li>fundamental, if basic in its field <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>fundamental, for the attainment of an end <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+  <li>in relation to logical thought <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+  <li>military, procedure for development of <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+  <li>of effective military operations <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>of the correct military objective <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+  <li>review of conclusions as to <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+  <li>the Fundamental Military <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Principles of War (so-called) value and limitations of <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+
+<li>Problem(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>appearance of perplexity in situation results in <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li>
+  <li>basic, the solution of <a href="#Page_117">117</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span></li>
+  <li>basis for solution of <a  href="#Page_20">20-21</a></li>
+  <li>challenging integrity of basic plan <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>courses, of action as tentative solutions of <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+  <li>enemy's, survey of <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+  <li>establishment of basis for solution of <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li>
+  <li>involving modification of basic plan <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+  <li>recognition of new <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+  <li>solution of <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+  <li>arising because of no sound solution for basic <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+  <li>how solved <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li>
+  <li>involving intelligence <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+  <li>involving preparation of battle plans <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+  <li>relating to logistics <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+  <li>relating to training <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li>
+  <li>tactical <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Psychological factors <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li>Purpose,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>of Decision <a  href="#Page_152">152-153</a></li>
+  <li>of Mission <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+  <li>re-examined <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />R</li>
+
+<li>Racial characteristics as psychological factor <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li>Raid may be a valuable operation <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+
+<li>Readjustments required during supervision of planned action <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+
+<li>Recognition of the incentive <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+
+<li>Reestimate of the situation <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li>Rejection of courses of action <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+
+<li>Relations, external <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
+
+<li>Relative fighting strength <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>conclusions as to <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+  <li>feasibility and acceptability as to <a  href="#Page_121">121-133</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Relative location and distance <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li>Relative position(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>advantageous <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+  <li>characteristics of theatre, important from standpoint of <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+  <li>discussion of <a  href="#Page_59">59-66</a></li>
+  <li>fundamental considerations as to <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+  <li>procedure for determination and selection of advantageous <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+  <li>salient feature of a military situation (operation) <a  href="#Page_38">38-41</a></li>
+  <li>suitability, feasibility and acceptability of <a  href="#Page_61">61-66</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Resources,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>as part of basis for solution of problem <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  <li>feasibility requires survey of <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Restatement of the decision for use in the directive <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+
+<li>Rule(s) of action,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>circumstances alter cases, a reliable <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+  <li>faulty, unfortunate consequences of <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span></li>
+  <li>pithy statements as <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+  <li>search for reliable, by human mind <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Running estimate <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />S</li>
+
+<li>Salient features,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>considered in selecting objective <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+  <li>of a situation <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+  <li>of military operations <a  href="#Page_38">38-41</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Science of war, basis for <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+
+<li>Scientific analysis <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+
+<li>Scientific approach to solution of military problems <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li>Scientific investigation <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+
+<li>Sea(s),  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>areas, operations for securing command of <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+  <li>high, and air above, presumably common property <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+  <li>movement by land, and air <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+  <li>provides theatre of operations with distinctive characteristics <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+  <li>routes, an important subject of study <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+  <li>surface of, provides roads <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Security measures <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+
+<li>Selection of the best course of action <a  href="#Page_145">145-151</a></li>
+
+<li>Sequence of operations, visualized <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li>Sequence of tasks, chronological or in order of importance <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li>Signature in Order Form <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+
+<li>Situation,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a combination of circumstances <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+  <li>actual or assumed <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+  <li>basic <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+  <li>enemy, summary of <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+  <li>produced by effects of certain causes <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+  <li>summary of <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+  <li>to be maintained or created <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Solution(s) of problem(s),
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>establishment of basis for <a  href="#Page_118">118-135</a></li>
+  <li>process of <a  href="#Page_135">135-151</a></li>
+  <li>tentative <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Sound decision, approach presented for reaching <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li>Staff,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>assistance, utilization of <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+  <li>of commander <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+  <li>organization and functioning <a  href="#Page_210">210-212</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Stages, successive, for accomplishment of effort <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li>Standard form for plans and directives <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li>Strategy,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>and tactics inseparable <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>differentiated from tactics by end in view <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+  <li>distinguished by objectives <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+  <li>in relation to policy <a href="#Page_9">9</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span></li>
+  <li>in relation to tactics <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Strength and weakness factors <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li>Strength, relative fighting (see also fighting strength) <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li>Subordinates, proper relationship of, to commander <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li>Subsidiary mission <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+
+<li>Subsidiary plans,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>as annexes <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+  <li>preparation of <a  href="#Page_168">168-179</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Subsidiary problem(s) (See also Problem(s))
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>arising because of no sound solution for basic problem <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+  <li>how solved <a href="#Page_106">106</a>,169</li>
+  <li>involving intelligence <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+  <li>involving preparation of battle plan <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+  <li>relative to logistics <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+  <li>relative to training <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Suitability,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>application of test for <a  href="#Page_98">98-102</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+  <li>requirement of <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a  href="#Page_39">39-41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Summarized comparison of courses of action <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li>Supervision of planned action <a  href="#Page_197">197-216</a></li>
+
+<li>Suspicion, intelligent, everything to be viewed with <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />T</li>
+
+<li>Tactics,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>and strategy inseparable <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+  <li>differentiated from strategy by end in view <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Task(s)
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>as a predetermined course of action <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+  <li>assignment of, to subordinates <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+  <li>expressed in terms of accomplishment <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+  <li>forces and task groups <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+  <li>formulation of <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+  <li>logistics <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+  <li>manner of expressing <a  href="#Page_84">84-86</a></li>
+  <li>modification of, may be required by changing situation <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+  <li>motivating <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+  <li>of the mission <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+  <li>organization <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+  <li>properly conceived, indicate an objective <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+  <li>re-examination of <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+  <li>underlying <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Technique, nature of, in solution of problems <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li>Tentative solution(s) of problem(s) <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li>Tests for suitability, feasibility and acceptability <a  href="#Page_137">137-139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
+
+<li>Theater of operations, survey of characteristics of <a  href="#Page_129">129-132</a></li>
+
+<li>Training,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span>
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>measures for <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+  <li>peacetime <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+  <li>subsidiary problem relating to <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li>
+  <li>tactical <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Transportation and supply, lines of <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li>Types of naval directives <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+
+
+<li>U</li>
+
+<li>Undesirable departures from plan involve penalty <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+
+<li>Unforeseen opportunity to strike enemy may be presented <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+<li>Unity of effort,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>adherence to chain of command, essential to <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+  <li>between management and labor <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+  <li>most important single factor <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+  <li>mutual understanding requisite to <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />V</li>
+
+<li>Versatility, as a psychological factor <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li>Vessels, including aircraft, as a factor applicable to armed forces <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+
+<li><br /><br />W</li>
+
+<li>War,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>a human activity and subject to natural law <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+  <li>as understood herein <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+  <li>conditions in, peacetime exercises not conclusive guide to <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+  <li>effective conduct of, requirements and demands of <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+  <li>specialized nature of, as a human activity <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+
+<li>Warfare, naval, discussion of <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+
+<li>Weather <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li>
+
+<li>Will of the commander, importance of <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+
+<li>Work Sheet,
+  <ul class="nest">
+  <li>description of <a  href="#Page_207">207-210</a></li>
+  <li>entries in <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
+  <li>facilitates oral estimates <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li>
+  <li>facilitates special reports <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li>
+  <li>facilitates written estimates <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
+  <li>summary of <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
+  </ul></li>
+</ul>
+
+<br />
+<hr />
+<br />
+
+<div class="tr">
+<p class="cen"><a name="TN" id="TN"></a>Typographical errors corrected in text:</p>
+<br />
+Page &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;8: &nbsp;circumtances replaced with circumstances<br />
+Page &nbsp;&nbsp;61: &nbsp;skillfull replaced with skillful<br />
+Page 172: &nbsp;therof replaced with thereof<br />
+Page 175: &nbsp;caried replaced with carried<br />
+</div>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOUND MILITARY DECISION***</p>
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@@ -0,0 +1,11529 @@
+The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sound Military Decision, by U.s. Naval War
+College
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Sound Military Decision
+
+
+Author: U.s. Naval War College
+
+
+
+Release Date: February 24, 2009  [eBook #28178]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOUND MILITARY DECISION***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Jeannie Howse, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net)
+
+
+
+Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
+      file which includes the original illustrations.
+      See 28178-h.htm or 28178-h.zip:
+      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/8/1/7/28178/28178-h/28178-h.htm)
+      or
+      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/8/1/7/28178/28178-h.zip)
+
+
+      +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+      | Transcriber's Note:                                       |
+      |                                                           |
+      | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has     |
+      | been preserved.                                           |
+      |                                                           |
+      | The original book used bold face as a means to find the   |
+      | index entries. This has not been reproduced in this       |
+      | e-book.                                                   |
+      |                                                           |
+      | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For     |
+      | a complete list, please see the end of this document.     |
+      |                                                           |
+      +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+
+
+
+SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+
+U.S. Naval War College
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Naval Institute Press                   Annapolis, Maryland
+
+This book is the 1942 edition of a book originally published in 1936
+by the U.S. Naval War College.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+   _Sound Military Decision_                                 1
+
+   Index                                                   227
+
+
+
+
+Sound Military Decision
+
+
+
+
+U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island
+
+                                                November 30, 1941
+
+
+SOUND MILITARY DECISION was first published at the Naval War College
+in 1936. It included the essential features of THE ESTIMATE OF THE
+SITUATION which, since 1910, had been issued at intervals in a series
+of revised editions. The new material that was added in 1936 was
+intended to assist in enlarging the viewpoint and in broadening the
+basis of professional judgment.
+
+Primarily intended for the purposes of the Naval War College, this
+work is the cumulative result of years of untiring and loyal effort on
+the part of the College staff and student body. Equally important have
+been the advice and assistance contributed by other officers of wide
+professional experience and attainment.
+
+The objective has been a brief but inclusive treatment of the
+fundamentals of the military profession, i.e., the profession of arms.
+The emphasis, naturally, is on the exercise of mental effort in the
+solution of military problems, more especially in our Navy. An
+enormous literature has been consulted, and research has included all
+available and pertinent military writings. Care has also been taken to
+include, from civil sources, the findings of those authoritative works
+which deal with related matters and with the applicable underlying
+truths.
+
+In a work of this type and scope, it is manifestly not possible to
+illustrate the abstract text by historical examples and analogies.
+These are complementary features of the War College resident and
+correspondence courses; provision for the necessary historical
+background is otherwise the concern of the individual student.
+
+In this edition of SOUND MILITARY DECISION no radical changes have
+been made; the revision has been confined to rearrangement and
+amplification of the subject matter.
+
+                                               E.C. KALBFUS,
+                                        Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
+                                                  President.
+
+    [Illustration: SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+    THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS
+
+    Through the studied employment of the Natural Mental Processes
+
+    (Foreword) The Scientific Approach to the Solution of Military
+      Problems
+
+    PART I
+
+    PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+    in its relation to the successful Conduct of War
+
+    (Chapter I) Command and its Problems
+
+    (Chapter II) Mental Processes and Human Tendencies
+
+    THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+
+    (Ch. III) leading to SOUND MILITARY DECISION
+
+    (Ch. IV) THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+    The Two Major Applications, i.e.,--
+      THE SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES
+      THE DETERMINATION OF OPERATIONS
+
+    (Ch. V) THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
+
+
+    Part II--PLANNING
+
+    (Ch. VI) THE FIRST STEP The Estimate of the Situation The Decision
+
+    (Ch. VII) THE SECOND STEP The Detailed Plan
+
+
+    Part III--EXECUTION
+
+    (Ch. VIII) THE THIRD STEP The Directives
+
+    (Ch. IX) THE FOURTH STEP The Supervision of the Planned Action]
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+(See Chart on page XXXX)
+
+
+                                                                  Page
+
+FOREWORD                                                             1
+
+    Science of War--Scientific Investigation--Fundamental
+    Considerations--Art of War--Scientific Method--Leadership
+    and Training--Sound Decision--Judgment--The Approach to
+    the Solution of Military Problems--Fundamental
+    Philosophy--Technique of Solution--Process of
+    Education--Outline of the Discussion.
+
+
+PART I. PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE SUCCESSFUL
+        CONDUCT OF WAR.
+
+Chapter
+
+   I Command and its Problems                                        7
+
+    The Implementation of National Policy--The Primary Function
+    of the Armed Forces--Military Strategy and Tactics--Command
+    of the Armed Forces--Unity of Effort--The Chain of
+    Command--Mutual Understanding--Indoctrination.
+
+  II Mental Processes and Human Tendencies                          19
+
+    Natural Mental Processes--The Necessity for Logical
+    Thought--Principles in their Relation to Logical
+    Thought--Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles
+    of War--Formulation and Use of Principles--Summary of
+    Fundamental Considerations.
+
+ III Basic Principles Applicable to Military Problems (The
+     Fundamental Military Principle)                                29
+
+    Review of Conclusions--Procedure--Suitability,
+    Feasibility, and Acceptability--Fundamental Principle for
+    Attainment of an End--Interdependency of Factors--Special
+    Nature of War--Factors in War--The Objective in
+    War--Military Operations--Salient Features--The Fundamental
+    Military Principle--Corollaries.
+
+  IV The Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+     (Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment)                   43
+
+    The Basis for Solution of a Military Problem--The Major
+    Components of a Military Problem--Essential
+    Elements--Selection of Correct Military Objectives--
+    Determination of Effective Military Operations--Physical
+    Objectives--Relative Positions--Apportionment of Fighting
+    Strength--Freedom of Action--Summary.
+
+
+   V The Four Steps in the Solution of a Military Problem           79
+
+    A Situation--The Incentive--The Assigned Objective--The
+    Motivating Task--The Natural Mental Processes--The Approach
+    to the Solution--The First Step--The Basic Problem--Tasks--
+    The Mission--Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength--Courses
+    of Action--Reflective Thinking--Naval Operations--Analysis
+    and Selection of Courses of Action--The Decision--The Second
+    Step--The Third Step--The Fourth Step--Sequence of Events in
+    the Four Steps--The Use of a Form in the Solution of
+    Problems--Conclusion.
+
+
+*PART II. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN PLANNING.
+
+  VI The Selection of a Correct Objective (Including the
+     Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+     for its Attainment) The First Step--The Solution of a
+     Basic Problem (The Estimate of the Situation)                 117
+
+    Process of solving a Problem--Sections of the Estimate
+    Form--Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the
+    Problem--Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and
+    Acceptable Courses of Action--Examination into the
+    Capabilities of the Enemy--Selection of the Best Course
+    of Action--The Decision.
+
+ VII The Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed
+     Operations (The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary
+     Problems)                                                     155
+
+    Assumptions--Alternative Plans--Application of the
+    Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation--
+    Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability--
+    Formulation of Tasks--Organization of Task Groups--
+    Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the
+    Determination of Objectives embodied in Tasks--Assembly
+    of Measures for Freedom of Action--Preparation of
+    Subsidiary Plans.
+
+
+*PART III. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN THE
+EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
+
+VIII The Inauguration of the Planned Action (The Third
+     Step--The Formulation and Issue of Directives)                183
+
+    Scope of the Third Step--Military Plans and Military
+    Directives--Essentials of Military Directives--
+    Restatement of the Decision--Standard Forms for Plans
+    and Directives--The Order Form--Types of Naval
+    Directives.
+
+ IX The Supervision of the Planned Action (The Fourth Step)        197
+
+    Nature of the Discussion--Goal of Planning--Importance
+    of Execution--The Incentive--Conditions in War--
+    Recognition of New Problems--Nature of Readjustments
+    Required--Importance of the Will of the Commander--
+    Problems Involving Modification of the Basic Plan--
+    Problems Challenging Integrity of Basic Plan--Further
+    Procedure Applicable to such Problems of the Fourth
+    Step--The Running Estimate of the Situation--Journal
+    and Work Sheet--Special Remarks as to Entries--Summary.
+
+*CONCLUSION                                                        217
+
+*APPENDIX
+
+    Outline Form of an Operation Plan                              219
+    Tabular Form of the Estimate of the Situation                  222
+
+*INDEX                                                             227
+
+* Not included in the limited issue for use in Part I of the
+  Correspondence Course.
+
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+
+From the earliest days of recorded history, the facts associated with
+military operations of the past have been constantly studied. The
+result has been the accumulation of a mass of information from which
+conclusions have been drawn as to the causes of success and failure.
+Although scattered through countless volumes, and nowhere completely
+systematized and classified, this accepted body of knowledge
+constitutes the basis for the science of war.
+
+Scientific investigation--that is, the collection, verification, and
+classification of facts--follows the recurrent procedure of successive
+analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test. The application of this
+process to the campaigns of history reveals fundamentals common to
+all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea,
+or air. In the ceaseless struggle for supremacy between the offense
+and the defense, great technological changes have taken place. The
+successful conduct of war, however, has always depended on effective
+operations for the creation or maintenance of favorable military
+situations, whose essential elements have remained unchanged
+throughout the years (see page 46).
+
+These fundamental considerations (see page 28), whatever the detailed
+form of their presentation, are the basis for the successful conduct
+of war. The need of such a basis has been felt from very early times.
+It was not, however, until the early part of the Nineteenth Century
+that students of warfare appear to have recorded the view that the
+conduct of war is susceptible of reduction to scientific analysis, and
+that only through a reasoned theory can the true causes of success and
+failure be explained.
+
+Such a scientific analysis of any subject has for its chief practical
+aim the improvement of the art, or practice, of that subject. Forming
+an important part of the science of war are those new developments in
+weapons and in other technological fields which, with the passage of
+time, have brought about great changes in methods of waging war. It is
+only through founding the art of war--the application of the science
+of war to actual military situations--on the fundamental truths
+discovered through the science of war, that changes in method, due to
+technological evolution, can be made most effective.
+
+In preparing for war, the only practicable peacetime tests are usually
+restricted to those afforded by examples of the past, by problems such
+as chart (map) and board maneuvers, and by fleet and field exercises.
+While the military profession can afford to neglect none of them,
+such tests can never be conclusive. This fact, however, far from
+justifying resort to any other procedure, emphasizes the necessity for
+utilization of the scientific method in order to arrive at conclusions
+which are as exact as possible.
+
+An exact result is, of course, the aim of all scientific research, but
+exactitude necessarily depends on the establishment of correct
+relationships among facts which have so far come to light.
+Consequently, there is great variation in the degree of accuracy which
+actually characterizes the several sciences. If it be maintained that
+only those studies which have resulted in exact conclusions may
+properly be regarded as sciences, then it can hardly be said that many
+sciences, now regarded as such, exist; for the findings of medicine,
+biology, chemistry, and even physics are continually being revised in
+the light of new data.
+
+The science of war necessarily includes knowledge gained in other
+fields. In war, as in medicine or any other practical activity, the
+more inclusive and dependable the body of knowledge available as a
+basis for action, the more probable it is that the application of this
+knowledge, the art (page 1), will be effective.
+
+Realization of these facts has led to renewed emphasis on the
+scientific approach to the solution of military problems. The fallacy
+of staking the future upon the possible availability of a military
+genius in time of need became clear when it was appreciated that more
+than one nation, hitherto victorious in arms, had been defeated and
+humiliated when genius no longer led its forces.
+
+There followed in the military profession a conviction that, although
+extraordinary inherent capacity can be recognized and utilized when
+known to exist, it is safer and wiser to develop by training the
+highest average of ability in leadership than to trust to untrained
+"common sense" or to the possible advent of a genius. History has
+abundantly proved the folly of attempting, on any other basis, to cope
+with the unpredictable occurrence of genius in the hostile leadership.
+With the actual exercise of leadership in war restricted to the
+reality of war, there is emphasized the need of peacetime
+training--training of subordinates in efficient performance, and, more
+important, training of those who will be placed by the State in
+positions of responsibility and command.
+
+Campaigns of the Twentieth Century reflect the intensity of mental
+training among the armed forces of the greater powers; the planning
+and conduct of war have acquired a precision, a swiftness, and a
+thoroughness before unknown. The study and analysis of past campaigns,
+the sifting of technical details from fundamental truths, and the
+shrewd combination of the theoretical and the practical form the basis
+of this training.
+
+The proper solution of military problems requires the reaching of
+sound decision as to what is to be done. Upon the soundness of the
+decision depends, in great part, the effectiveness of the resulting
+action. Both are dependent on the possession of a high order of
+professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on
+experience. Theoretical knowledge supplements experience, and is the
+best substitute in its absence. Judgment, the ability to understand
+the correct relationship between cause and effect, and to apply that
+knowledge under varying circumstances, is essential to good
+leadership. Professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental
+exercise in the application of logical processes to the solution of
+military problems.
+
+The approach, presented herein, to the solution of military problems
+is intended to assist the military profession in reaching sound
+decisions as to (1) the selection of its correct objectives, the ends
+toward which its action is to be directed under varying circumstances;
+(2) planning the detailed operations required; (3) transmitting the
+intent so clearly as to ensure inauguration of well-coordinated
+action; and (4) the effective supervision of such action.
+
+The student of war will find in these pages a fundamental military
+philosophy whose roots go down to very ancient times. In the technique
+described for the solution of military problems, experienced officers
+will recognize a system with which they are already familiar. This
+system, constantly under study to improve its details, has been in use
+in our military Services for many years.
+
+The foundation of this philosophy and of the system for its practical
+utilization rests on the concept of relative or proportional values.
+In the military environment, change, rather than stability, is
+especially to be expected, and the relationships existing among the
+essential elements of a military situation are, in fact, the
+significant values. Such values, themselves, vary with the viewpoint
+of the person concerned. Accordingly, because of the difference in
+objectives (defined above), what is strategy as viewed by a commander
+on a higher echelon may have more of a tactical aspect to those on a
+lower (page 10). Immediate objectives and ultimate objectives (page
+54) can scarcely be understood in their true proportions unless the
+point of reference is clear. The point of view of the commander, as
+established by the position he occupies in the chain of command, is,
+therefore, to be taken into consideration in every phase of the
+solution of a problem,--in the determination of the appropriate effect
+desired (page 43), of relative fighting strength (page 35), and of
+courses of action and the detailed operations pertaining thereto (page
+88).
+
+On the basis of these facts, instantaneous and easy understanding of
+all the elements involved is not to be expected. Were such
+understanding possible, the expert conduct of war would be one of the
+easiest, instead of one of the most difficult, of human activities. It
+is only through a gradual assimilation of its fundamentals that the
+profession of arms is to be mastered. A process of true education is
+involved,--that of enlarging the viewpoint and broadening the basis of
+professional judgment (see page i),--and its essentials are the proper
+foundation for any system of self-improvement in the exercise of
+mental power. There is no easy road to the goal of military effort.
+
+Part I, hereafter, discusses professional judgment in its basic
+relation to the successful conduct of war. This treatment examines the
+responsibilities of the armed forces, discusses the role of the
+commander, indicates the natural mental processes employed in the
+solution of military problems, formulates and explains the Fundamental
+Military Principle, and concludes with an outline of the procedure for
+its further application in Parts II and III.
+
+Part II is concerned with the solution of the problems encountered
+during the planning stage.
+
+Part III discusses the execution of the plan,--the directives and the
+supervision of the action,--but the treatment as to details is chiefly
+from the standpoint of the mental effort. During hostilities the vital
+issues which hinge on alert supervision create an accentuated demand
+for the intelligent exercise of professional judgment. Its possession
+to a highly developed degree and its exercise on a foundation of
+knowledge and experience, are prerequisite to attainment of the
+highest standards in the conduct of war.
+
+The following pages are intended, therefore, to provide a fundamental
+basis upon which the commander, by thoughtful study and reflection,
+may develop his professional judgment to the end that its exercise
+result in sound military decision, essential alike to wise planning
+and to consistently effective action.
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO
+THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF WAR
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+COMMAND AND ITS PROBLEMS
+
+    The Foreword, preceding, has explained the scientific
+    approach to the solution of military problems. It has been
+    brought to notice that the science of war can be utilized to
+    further sound military decision and, so, to improve the
+    practice of war, i.e., the art of war, whether under assumed
+    or actual conditions. The Foreword has also stressed the
+    importance of education for the development of judgment in
+    the application of mental power to the solution of military
+    problems.
+
+    Chapter I, which now follows, deals with the armed forces in
+    their relation to national policy, and discusses,
+    specifically, the role of the commander with respect to the
+    use of mental power as a recognized component of fighting
+    strength. Emphasis is placed on the important subjects of
+    military strategy and tactics, unity of effort, the chain of
+    command, authority and responsibility, organization, mutual
+    understanding, loyalty, and indoctrination.
+
+
+The Implementation of National Policy. Organized government exists for
+the purpose of bringing into systematic union the individuals of a
+State for the attainment of common ends. The primary national
+objective (page 3) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of
+essential security for the social system which is the fundamental
+basis of the community. Whatever the form of government, the power and
+authority of the State are vested in an individual, or in a grouping
+of individuals, whose voice is the voice of the State. In the
+prosecution of the chief aim of organized government, the State
+crystallizes the many conflicting desires and views of its people into
+policies, internal and external. Each policy is a method of procedure
+for attaining one or more national objectives.
+
+Internal policies are rendered effective by enforcement of the laws of
+the State.
+
+External policies, to become effective, require recognition by other
+States, tacitly or by agreement. When there is conflict between the
+policies of one State and those of another, peaceful means of
+settlement are usually sought.
+
+If peaceful (diplomatic) means fail to settle the point at issue, the
+State abandons the policy in question, defers action to enforce it, or
+adopts stronger measures. Such measures may take the form of
+psychological, political, or economic pressure. They may even include
+the threat to employ armed force before actually resorting to the
+imposition of physical violence. During actual hostilities, also,
+every means of pressure known to man, in addition to physical
+violence, may be employed.
+
+Whether the use of armed force to impose or to resist the imposition
+of policy constitutes a legal state of war is a political question
+which does not affect the tasks the armed forces may be called on to
+perform. War, therefore, is to be understood herein as any condition
+in which one State employs physical violence against another, or
+against an organized part of itself which may be in rebellion.
+
+By agreement among nations, effort has been made to discountenance
+aggressive warfare. The distinction between aggression and
+self-defense is, however, not a matter of agreement. War is still
+employed as an instrument of national policy. No nation has, as yet,
+manifested willingness to relinquish the right to employ armed force
+in resisting aggression, nor the right to decide what constitutes
+self-defense. States still maintain and employ armed forces as a means
+of promoting and expanding, as well as of defending, their welfare and
+interests.
+
+The Primary Function of the Armed Forces. Whether war is an ethical
+institution is not a matter within the purview of the armed forces.
+Their primary function is, when called upon to do so, to support and,
+within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policy of the
+State. The performance of this function constitutes the chief reason
+for their existence.
+
+The fundamental objective of the armed forces is, therefore, the
+reduction of the opposing will to resist. It is attained through the
+use of actual physical violence or the threat thereof (page 7). This
+fact constitutes the underlying motive of every military plan, whether
+for the conduct of a minor or contributory operation, or for the
+prosecution of a major campaign. The final outcome is dependent on
+ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the
+enemy, for land is the natural habitat of man (page 46). Since
+opposition is to be expected, the military problem is primarily
+concerned with the application of power--mental, moral, and
+physical--in overcoming resistance, or in exerting effort to resist.
+
+The application of power implies effort, i.e., the exertion of
+strength. The mental, moral, and physical power at the disposal of the
+armed forces depends on the effort which can be exerted by the human
+and material components of their fighting strength.
+
+The skillful employment of fighting strength, as a weapon more
+effective than the enemy's under a given set of circumstances, is the
+goal toward which the armed forces direct their effort. The elements
+of the material component--arms, ammunition, and other equipment--are
+indispensable. They are impotent, however, without the direction and
+energy supplied by the human component, its moral and mental elements
+nicely balanced and judiciously compounded with physical fitness. A
+true concept of the art of war will insist that the necessity for the
+achievement of a high standard of technical and administrative skill
+not be permitted to outweigh the need for maximum development of other
+mental attainments, and of the moral components of fighting strength.
+
+The moral elements include all the essential attributes of personal
+character, and more especially those qualities of courage, loyalty,
+decisiveness, modesty, patience, tolerance of the opinions of others,
+and fearlessness of responsibility which are characteristics of true
+military leadership. The maintenance of a high ethical standard is
+essential to the establishment and continuance of mutual confidence.
+
+The qualifications essential to the proper application of the mental
+elements include a creative imagination and the ability to think and
+to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a
+knowledge of the science of war. An unmistakable mark of mental
+maturity is the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and
+fundamental knowledge. Intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the
+influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion, is the essential basis
+for the effective employment of mental power.
+
+The numerical size of the armed forces, in their correct perspective
+as an instrument of the State, as well as the extent to which they are
+supplied with material components of fighting strength, are matters to
+be determined by the State after consultation with the responsible
+military authorities. The development of the essential military
+qualities of the instrument is the special charge of the armed forces.
+It is their task to weld the assemblage of men, armed and maintained
+by the State, into an harmonious whole, skilled in technique and
+imbued with a psychological and mental attitude which will not admit
+that any obstacle is insuperable.
+
+The Advisory Function. Understanding between the civil representatives
+of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly
+essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to
+enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of
+ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise
+professional counsel be available to the State. While military
+strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of
+attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or
+failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only
+that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of
+strategy be allotted adequate means, and be undertaken under the most
+favorable conditions.
+
+These considerations require that the military profession be
+qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and
+capacity for expression, to advise the State in military matters.
+There is thus accentuated the need for mental training, as set forth
+previously in the Foreword.
+
+Military Strategy and Tactics. Military strategy as distinguished by
+objectives (page 3) representing a larger, further, or more
+fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is
+concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn
+permit strategy to accomplish its further objective.
+
+Consequently, every military situation has both strategical and
+tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a
+particular time, and the action to be taken to that end, may be
+governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical,
+considerations. Whether an operation is distinctively strategical or
+tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned,
+on the end which he has in view.
+
+To attain its objective, strategy uses force (or threatens such use)
+(see page 8) as applied by tactics; tactics employed for a purpose
+other than that of contributing to the aims of strategy is unsound.
+Proper tactics, therefore, has a strategic background. Definition of
+tactics as the art of handling troops or ships in battle, or in the
+immediate presence of the enemy, is not all-inclusive. Such a view
+infers that the field of battle is the only province of tactics, or
+that strategy abdicates when tactics comes to the fore.
+
+Actually, while tactical considerations may predominate during battle,
+their influence is not confined to the immediate presence of the
+enemy. Tactical dispositions are frequently adopted for convenience,
+for time saving, or for other reasons, long before entry into the
+immediate presence of the enemy. Nor do strategical considerations end
+when battle is joined. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly
+make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But
+strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord
+with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics are inseparable.
+
+It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are
+appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at
+the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.
+The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that
+the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can
+be made available.
+
+Consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy, generally
+depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially
+responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the
+province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical
+objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that
+the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the
+attainment of the designated objectives.
+
+Command of the Armed Forces. The initial requisite to the effective
+use of the armed forces is an agency authorized to direct them.
+
+Command directs the armed forces. It is vitalized and personified in
+the commander, the human directing head, both of the whole and of
+organized groupings in descending scale of importance. Its
+responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the armed forces to
+the point of readiness for war and, during the conflict, their
+effective employment.
+
+Training for command, to be effective, is necessarily dependent upon
+an understanding of the position occupied by the commander, and of the
+role which he plays. Accordingly, this understanding is an essential
+in the study of that aspect of command training which has as its
+purpose the development of ability to reach sound decision.
+
+The ideal of military command combines the best of human qualities
+with sound knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the armed
+forces. It recognizes in war a form of human activity whose conduct,
+like that of all other human activities, is subject to natural law. It
+applies to the mastery of the problems of war, therefore, the natural
+mental processes of human thought (see Chapter II); it adapts these
+natural processes to a specific purpose, and consciously develops
+their use to the maximum degree for the attainment of this end. As
+command ascends the scale, its viewpoint broadens. Experience and
+added knowledge, with increasing authority and responsibility, lead to
+a concept of war more and more comprehensive, with the resultant
+growth in ability to evolve and put into effect a general plan for
+the effective control of collective effort.
+
+Unity of Effort. An objective is best attained by effective
+application of properly directed effort, exerted by a single
+individual or by groups of individuals. Where individuals are
+collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single
+factor contributory to the common success. The basic condition to be
+sought by the armed forces is an harmonious whole, capable of putting
+forth combined effort, intensified in strength because of the
+collective feature, and rendered effective by its unity.
+
+The Chain of Command. Within the limits of human capacity, an
+organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the
+more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single
+competent commander. To divide the supreme command in any locality, or
+to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to
+diffuse responsibility. In that degree there is then incurred the
+danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and
+of creating corresponding diffusion of effort.
+
+Realization of this danger has led the military profession to entrust
+command, subject to justifiable exceptions (see page 71), to a single
+head, while ensuring, by careful selection and training of personnel,
+that competent individuals are available for this duty. Although this
+method is in seeming conflict with the restriction imposed by
+recognized limitations of human capacity, the difficulty is
+effectively met through the chain of command, whereby responsibility
+is assigned and authority is transmitted without lessening of ultimate
+responsibility. Responsibility and authority, the latter properly
+apportioned to the former, are inseparably inherent in command, and
+may not justifiably be severed from one another.
+
+In the abstract, the chain of command consists of a series of links,
+through which responsibility and authority are transmitted. The
+supreme commander is thus linked with his successively subordinate
+commanders, and all are disposed on, so to speak, a vertical series of
+levels, each constituting an echelon of command.
+
+By means of the chain of command, a commander is enabled to require of
+his immediate subordinates an expenditure of effort which, in the
+aggregate, will ensure the attainment of his own objective (page 3).
+He thus assigns tasks to his immediate subordinates, whom he holds
+directly responsible for their execution without, however, divesting
+himself of any part of his initial responsibility. The accomplishment
+of each of these assigned tasks will involve the attainment of an
+objective, necessarily less in scope than that of the immediate
+superior but a contribution to the attainment of the latter.
+
+The character and magnitude of the objective of the highest echelon
+involved will have considerable bearing upon the number of echelons
+required for its attainment. Whatever the number, a commander on a
+particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate subordinate
+to a commander on the next higher echelon, and that of an immediate
+superior with relation to a commander on the next lower echelon.
+Within these confines, authority is exercised and accomplishment
+exacted, both to the extent calculated to ensure unity of effort.
+
+There may frequently be found two or more commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon, all with the same immediate
+superior, and all charged with loyalty to him and to each other in the
+attainment of a common objective. In no case, however, will a
+commander be directly answerable to more than one immediate superior
+for the performance of the same duty. Thus is fulfilled the
+requirement that the command, although relatively narrower in scope as
+the scale is descended, be reposed in a single head.
+
+The experience gained and the knowledge acquired during early service
+on the lower echelons provide a basis for later expansion of
+viewpoint, a better understanding of the position occupied by the
+subordinate and of the obligations of higher command, including its
+dependence on subordinates. As the echelons of command are ascended,
+the details involved become more and more numerous, because of the
+increased scope of the problems. On the higher echelons, therefore,
+staff assistance is provided so that the commander may be left free to
+consider matters in their major aspects. The staff of a commander is
+not, however, a part of the chain of command; its members, as such,
+exercise no independent authority.
+
+A chain of command is not created by the subdivision of the officer
+corps into grades on a basis of relative rank. Such subdivision is for
+the purpose of classification from the standpoint of potential
+competency and capacity for responsibility, and carries no authority
+to command by virtue of rank alone. Organization, systematized
+connection for a specific purpose, is first necessary.
+
+The armed forces, during peace, are usually subdivided into permanent
+major organizations for the purpose of attaining and maintaining
+readiness for action. From the several grades of the officer corps, a
+permanent chain of command is instituted by the process of organization,
+the supreme command being reposed in a commander-in-chief. The basis of
+the permanent organization is that chosen as best suited to attain and
+maintain readiness. Its choice requires consideration of many factors,
+such as the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses, and their
+capabilities, severally and in combination. Further specific demands are
+met by temporary arrangements effected through "task organization".
+Whether the organization be permanent or temporary, its establishment
+places in effect a chain of command applicable to that organization
+throughout its continuance.
+
+Habitual and studied adherence to the chain of command in
+administrative matters, in consultation, in the exchange of
+information, and in the issue of directives is essential to mutual
+understanding, and therefore to unity of effort. The right of a
+commander, however, because of the responsibility he shoulders, to
+deal directly with subordinates more than one echelon removed is not
+relinquished because of the existence of the chain of command.
+Circumstances may arise which require him to issue orders directly to
+any person under his command. Fully aware, however, of the value of
+unity of effort, and recognizing that failure to deal through his
+immediate subordinate, no matter what the exigency, cannot but tend to
+weaken the chain of command, he will, as soon as the state of the
+emergency permits, inform intervening commanders of the action he has
+been compelled to take.
+
+Mutual Understanding. The chain of command, though providing the
+necessary linkage, does not of itself ensure that the command
+organization will be adequate, nor can it ensure that unity of effort
+will result. To meet the requirement of adequacy, there is needed in
+the person of each commander not only the ability to arrive at sound
+military decision, to plan, and to direct the operations of his
+command, but also an appreciation of the position which he occupies in
+his relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand, and to
+his own immediate subordinates on the other. To meet the requirement
+of unity of effort, it is also essential that there exist a state of
+mutual understanding throughout the chain of command.
+
+Loyalty is not merely a moral virtue; it is a great military
+necessity. To establish and to cultivate a state of mutual
+understanding from which will flow mutual loyalty born of mutual
+confidence (page 9) are prime obligations of command. Within the
+limits of responsibility and resultant authority, individual
+initiative will follow. On a foundation of intelligent cooperation and
+resolute determination, the acts of the lowest commander will be in
+accordance with the desires of the highest. This, in effect, will
+constitute unity of effort, accomplished through the vesting of
+command in a single head.
+
+The final aim of mutual understanding is attained when, in the absence
+of specific instructions, each subordinate commander in the chain acts
+instinctively as his immediate superior, if present, would have him
+act, and also cooperates intelligently with commanders occupying
+coordinate positions on the same echelon. For this reason there is
+need, on all echelons, of a complete grasp of the significance of the
+relationship between immediate superior and immediate subordinate, and
+of the obligations of each to the other.
+
+The proper relationship is such that a subordinate, even though
+separated from his commander, can confidently take action as if the
+latter were present. To this end, the competent commander will earlier
+have cultivated the personal relationship between his immediate
+superior and himself, and between himself and his subordinates. It is
+through such close relationship that mutual understanding is best
+developed and harmony promoted, so that intelligent and cordial unity
+of effort may exist among the personnel of a command.
+
+The commander, however competent, necessarily relies on his
+subordinates. Recognizing the psychological factors involved, he will
+therefore manifest confidence in their abilities, display sympathetic
+interest in their efforts, and evince pride in their achievements. He
+will also exercise patience with the mistakes which will inevitably
+occur, without condonement, however, of disaffection, neglect, or
+carelessness. The commander may reasonably expect, by the same token,
+that this attitude will characterize his immediate superior.
+
+In the absence of his superior, and faced with a changing situation, a
+commander may be forced to the conclusion that his assigned task
+requires modification or alteration. Conditions permitting, he will of
+course communicate with proper authority, and will make constructive
+representations. If he is without adequate communications facilities,
+or if circumstances have imposed restrictions on communications
+facilities otherwise available, he takes action according to the
+dictates of his own judgment, guided by the known views of his
+superior. On occasions when he believes that the immediate situation
+so requires, he may even depart from his instructions. He realizes
+that in so doing he accepts the gravest of military responsibilities.
+At the same time, however, he recognizes that to fail to take the
+indicated action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of
+courage, judgment, initiative, and loyalty (page 9). He will, of
+course inform his superior of his action at the first available
+opportunity. In the meantime, he has been enabled to act intelligently
+and fearlessly because of the existence of a state of mutual
+understanding.
+
+Indoctrination. Both the necessary process and the final result of
+establishing a state of mutual understanding are sometimes known as
+indoctrination.
+
+The word carries the dual meaning of "the act of indoctrinating" and
+"the state of being indoctrinated". In common with the word doctrine,
+it has its root in the Latin verb which means "to teach". A doctrine,
+in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for
+acceptance or belief.
+
+It does not follow that every doctrine is necessarily sound, nor that
+it is founded on conviction reached as the result of intelligent
+thought. Nor is the encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread
+of a doctrine, necessarily inspired by good motives. The preaching of
+doctrine known to be false is frequently encountered in many human
+activities. The deliberate spread of false propaganda is an example.
+But, whatever the motive and whether the doctrine be sound or false,
+the act of indoctrination is intended to shape opinion and thus
+influence action.
+
+Manifestly, to be along permanently useful lines, indoctrination flows
+from sound philosophy, i.e., is rooted in truth. All teachings, all
+opinions that may be advanced, all expressions of viewpoint, i.e., all
+doctrine, is therefore to be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of
+validity, and then from that of usefulness of application. It is the
+responsibility of command to ensure that these conditions are met
+before doctrine is pronounced.
+
+Military doctrine, in its broad sense, is a digest of the accepted
+beliefs of the military profession. In a narrower sense a military
+doctrine may be confined to the views of a single commander on a
+specific subject. The object of military doctrine, however, is always
+to furnish a basis for mutual understanding to the end that prompt and
+harmonious action by subordinate commanders may ensue without the
+necessity for referring every problem to superior authority before
+taking action (page 15). Doctrine thus provides a basis for action in
+possible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions
+have not been issued.
+
+The term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content
+of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a
+particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under
+circumstances of the moment. The precise instructions thus issued,
+though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves
+constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the
+nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative
+opinion.
+
+In the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified
+demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is
+an essential to unity of effort. If the members of the military
+profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to
+the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected
+more nearly to approach unanimity. The attainment of unity of effort
+therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic
+indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all
+commanders of the chain of command.
+
+Wars come and go. Their effects are painful, but when their wounds are
+healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that
+peace will henceforth be unbroken. Psychological and economic forces
+then not infrequently impel the State to subordinate the national
+defense in favor of other interests. During such periods the burdens
+of command are enlarged. Its responsibility is not lessened, but the
+means for effective discharge thereof are withheld.
+
+The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist
+(see pages 9 and 10) between the civil representatives of the State
+and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with
+the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of
+the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war
+demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with
+intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities
+and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the
+practical details into the general plan in their true relation
+thereto.
+
+The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour
+of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is
+wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its
+adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment
+until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are
+essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite
+intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied
+effort during peace.
+
+It follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is
+directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific,
+rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary
+components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the
+readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the
+application of power more likely to be successful. History records, as
+facts, that certain States have given their armed forces great
+stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases,
+failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof.
+Military problems are not confined to those presented after war is
+begun.
+
+Mental power (see pages 8 and 9), which includes the ability to solve
+military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound
+decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength
+because it is the source of professional judgment. The development of
+such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct
+of war (page 4) may not safely be postponed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+MENTAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN TENDENCIES
+
+    The discussion in Chapter II deals, first, with the natural
+    mental processes employed by the normal mature human being
+    before taking deliberate action.
+
+    With the necessity for logical thought thus established, there
+    arises a need for valid statements of cause and effect, i.e.,
+    of relationships resulting from the operation of natural laws,
+    for use as reliable rules of action. The discussion of this
+    subject explains the dangers inherent in the use of faulty
+    rules, emphasizes the role played by the various factors
+    applicable in particular cases, and describes the method of
+    formulating reliable rules, i.e., principles.
+
+
+All living beings and their surroundings are understood, on the basis
+of informed authority, to be governed in their characteristic
+activities by natural law (page 11). The natural forces inherent in
+living things and in their environment are continually reacting upon
+each other, either maintaining the existing condition or creating a
+new one, each of which is a situation or state of affairs. There is
+thus always a relationship (page 3) existing between such natural
+forces and the resultant condition which they produce. The natural
+forces are causes; the resultant conditions are effects.
+
+It is a recognized natural phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of a certain cause, or of a combination of causes, and that each
+effect is itself, in turn, the cause of additional effects. Action and
+reaction are the basis of natural law. Cause and effect, the latter
+being the cause of further effects, follow each other in ceaseless
+succession in the world of human affairs.
+
+Except by putting proper natural causes into action, it is impossible
+to produce the effect desired. It follows that specific knowledge of
+causes is necessary for the planned production of specific effects.
+Toward the accumulation of such knowledge the methods of science
+(pages 1 and 2) are constantly directed.
+
+The uncertainties of war are largely the outgrowth of the fact that
+the minds of men are pitted against one other. Because of this, a
+knowledge of the manner in which the human mind seeks its way out of
+difficulties is a great military asset. Consideration is next given,
+therefore, to the natural mental processes employed (page 11) and to
+certain human tendencies which have been known to militate against
+their successful employment.
+
+The mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before
+taking deliberate action, or in making studied provision for possible
+future action, are natural procedures, in that they employ the
+intellectual powers bestowed by nature, without artificial
+modification or embellishment.
+
+When the individual concerned has a background of adequate knowledge
+and experience, his ability to solve problems is limited only by his
+native intellectual endowment. That he falls short does not
+necessarily indicate, however, that the limit of native endowment has
+been reached. It happens frequently that latent powers have not been
+cultivated, or have not been utilized.
+
+A problem is, by definition, a perplexing question. In any human
+activity, a problem appears when a perplexity arises as to a way out
+of a difficulty inherent in a situation. The question involved then
+is, what is a way, more especially the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty?
+
+To determine the best way out of the difficulty, i.e., the best
+solution of the problem, involves:
+
+        (1) The establishment of the proper basis for the
+    solution of the problem,
+
+        (2) The actual solution of the problem through the
+    employment of the reasoning power in the consideration of
+    various possible solutions and the selection of the best
+    solution, and
+
+        (3) The conclusion, i.e., the decision, embodying the best
+    solution.
+
+Considered in greater detail, the process has its inception in a
+combination of circumstances, existent or assumed, which, constitutes
+a situation. No problem will result however, unless the situation
+involves an apparent difficulty. Even in such a case, a problem will
+result only if such involvement exists and gives rise to a perplexity
+as to a way, more especially as to the best way, out of the seeming
+difficulty.
+
+The problem will require solution only when accompanied by an
+incentive which demands a changed situation or resistance against a
+threatened change. A recognition of the incentive thus necessarily
+involves realization of a desire or need to maintain the existing
+situation or to change it into a new one.
+
+Such realization may come on the initiative of the person confronted
+with the situation, or because he has received instructions from
+someone in authority. In either case, the effect so indicated is the
+outcome of a desire for change or for resisting change, and may
+therefore be regarded properly as an effect desired (page 19).
+
+As so far outlined, therefore, the establishment of the correct basis
+for the solution of the problem involves (1) a grasp of the salient
+features of the situation, (2) a recognition of the incentive, and (3)
+an appreciation of the effect desired.
+
+The "appropriate" effect desired will necessarily be suitable to the
+further effects (page 19) which are inherent in the situation. An
+effect to be attained is accepted as appropriate when, after due
+examination, its relationship with the further effects involved, in
+all their pertinent implications, has been found to be in accordance
+with the dictates of sound judgment.
+
+The establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem will
+also require an understanding of the resources involved, as influenced
+by the conditions obtaining, for the maintenance of the existing
+situation or for the creation of a new one.
+
+The resources available, as influenced by the conditions obtaining,
+are correctly considered on a relative basis as compared to those of
+any persons who may oppose the effort.
+
+With the basis for the solution of the problem established in this
+manner, the actual solution involves the consideration of one or more
+plans, i.e., proposed methods of procedure, and the selection of the
+one considered to be the best.
+
+The person concerned, taking cognizance of the present condition,
+i.e., the existing situation, first considers whether this situation,
+if maintained, will be suitable to the appropriate effect desired.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates one or
+more images of future conditions, i.e., mental pictures of new
+situations, which will also be suitable to this end. The maintenance
+of the existing situation, or the creation of a new one, will in each
+case involve a plan.
+
+Necessarily, each such plan includes provision for (1) an effect to be
+produced by the person solving the problem, which effect will be the
+maintenance of the existing situation or the creation of a new one as
+visualized by himself, and (2) the action required to produce this
+effect and so to attain the appropriate effect desired, already
+established as an essential part of the basis of his problem.
+
+After systematic examination of such plans, those retained for further
+consideration can be subjected to a comparison as to their relative
+merits.
+
+The best plan, selected accordingly, is then incorporated into a
+decision as to the procedure to be adopted.
+
+This decision is then available as a general plan, or may be developed
+into one, to serve as a basis if necessary for a more detailed plan
+for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired.
+
+Later development, herein, of the details of this procedure will
+disclose many ramifications. The treatment, so far, points to the fact
+that the best method of reaching sound decision is through systematic
+thought which employs logic, i.e., sound reasoning, as its machinery.
+
+The Necessity for Logical Thought. Logical thought separates the
+rational from the irrational. Its use avoids the wastefulness of the
+trial-and-error method. By its insistent employment, dormant powers of
+reasoning are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive,
+spontaneous, impulsive, or emotional acceptance of conclusions (page
+9) is lessened. The evil effects of an inclination to dodge the issue
+or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. The
+fallacy of employing the reasoning power to justify conclusions
+already reached, whether on the basis of tradition or habit, or
+because of the bias or bent of a school of thought, or because of the
+tendency of human nature to accept plausible suggestions, is also made
+apparent. Through the deliberate practice of testing and weighing, the
+faculty of arriving swiftly at accurate decisions is strengthened and
+is brought more quickly into play when time is a matter of immediate
+concern.
+
+Principles in their Relation to Logical Thought. Because of the
+necessity for the exercise of judgment (page 3) in the systematic
+arrangement of thought, the relationship between cause and effect, as
+expressed in principles, is of great assistance in applying logical
+processes to the problems of human life.
+
+A principle establishes a correct relation between cause and effect.
+The word, derived from the Latin "principium", meaning a foundation,
+beginning, source, origin, or cause, has, because a cause implies an
+effect, acquired in correct usage the significance of a true statement
+of relationship between cause and effect. A principle, so formulated,
+is a natural law (page 19) because it expresses a fact of nature; it
+thus becomes a reliable rule of action and may be confidently adopted
+as a governing law of conduct. If basic in its field, such a rule or
+law becomes a general or fundamental principle with respect thereto;
+each such basic truth may be the basis for the determination of many
+corollary or subordinate principles dealing with the details of the
+particular subject.
+
+The formulation of a principle, therefore, requires the determination
+of the causes that generate a particular effect (or effects), and the
+accurate expression of the resultant relationship. Such expression
+frequently takes the form of a proportion. In the mathematical
+sciences the proportion may represent a precise balance; its statement
+may be an exact formula. In other sciences, a definite relationship
+between cause and effect has likewise been established in many cases,
+though not always with mathematical precision. Comparable exactitude
+has not been attained, in some cases, because the field has not been
+so thoroughly explored; moreover, greater difficulty is experienced,
+at times, in isolating the cause, or causes. The balance represented
+by such equations, therefore, is based on quantities whose weights
+vary within wide ranges. (See page 3.)
+
+Human conduct does not lend itself to analysis as readily as do
+mathematical and physical phenomena. The advance in the psychological
+and sociological sciences is not so marked as in the physical, and the
+actions and reactions of the mind of man have not yet proved to be
+susceptible of reduction to exact formulae. Nevertheless, man, in his
+intuitive search for valid guides for his own action, has been able,
+with the advance of time, greatly to improve his own lot through the
+medium of the scientific approach to human problems.
+
+The insistent search of the human mind for reliable rules of action is
+a recognized natural phenomenon. As understood on the basis of expert
+investigation of the subject, this trait results from the recognition,
+conscious or otherwise, by countless generations of mankind, of the
+relationships between cause and effect as evidenced in the workings of
+the laws of nature (page 22). A logical outcome, therefore, of
+experience, this instinctive demand of the mind constitutes a force
+which defies opposition. Properly utilized, this force affords a
+powerful and natural aid in the solution of problems.
+
+Inasmuch as a valid rule, or principle, is of great assistance in
+arriving at sound decisions and in formulating effective plans (see
+page 22), this demand for reliable guides is logical, as well as
+natural. In any event, the demand for such guidance, if not met by
+provision for reliable rules of action, may result in the adoption of
+faulty rules, with frequent unfortunate consequences.
+
+The formulation of principles, already referred to in this connection,
+constitutes in itself a recognized problem (see also page 27) of great
+difficulty; for it is a human failing to avoid the mental effort
+involved in thinking through such a problem, and to rely on rules
+whose plausibility and seeming simplicity are frequently a measure of
+their incompleteness and inaccuracy.
+
+Since the earliest days, man has attempted to formulate the
+relationships between causes and effects without, however, always
+possessing the specific knowledge essential to accuracy. Pithy
+statements have always had great appeal to man, as evidenced by the
+existence of proverbs, maxims, and adages preserved from times of
+great antiquity. Frequently, however, such statements are not
+expressive of the truth. Sometimes, again, they state facts, without,
+nevertheless, expressing the whole truth.
+
+Only when the relationship between cause and effect has been
+demonstrated to be always true can the trained, inquiring mind receive
+its statement as a valid guide, acceptable as a principle in the light
+of the knowledge of the day.
+
+To rely upon rules of action which do not express the whole truth is
+to court the danger of encountering exceptions which may entail
+serious consequences. The value of those rules known to be
+inexpressive of the whole truth lies in the fact that they may invite
+attention to circumstances which are sometimes encountered, or may
+suggest methods of action which are sometimes appropriate. Danger lies
+in the fact that such rules may fail to give proper emphasis to other
+circumstances or other methods which are encountered or are more
+appropriate in other cases.
+
+Such a rule may fail to consider the entire problem. Its use,
+therefore, implies the necessity of recognizing cases to which it is
+not applicable. This may frequently be difficult in the active
+operations of war, when nervous strain and the urgency of events are
+handicaps to quick and accurate thinking (see page 22).
+
+To express the whole truth, a rule of action calls to attention all
+circumstances, or causes, which may ever influence the result. The
+saying that "the exception proves the rule" is properly interpreted
+only in the older sense that an exception "tests" the rule, indicating
+by the mere fact of exception that the rule is to such extent
+incomplete.
+
+Subject to variations of phraseology, the old adage "circumstances
+alter cases" is the sole reliable and fundamental rule of action. A
+corresponding maxim of the military profession, "It depends on the
+situation", has its root in recognition of the same fact, i.e., that
+the action taken in any situation depends, properly, on the
+circumstances of the case, and that the relationship between cause and
+effect (page 22) is always the governing consideration. The principles
+deduced hereafter (Chapter III) have these irrefutable findings as
+their foundation.
+
+Factors. A situation is by definition (page 20) a combination of
+circumstances, which are the effects of certain causes. To these
+causes, the term "factors", long in use in the military profession, is
+customarily applied in many other activities. Through their influence
+as causes, these factors operate to produce, as their effects, the
+circumstances which, in combination, constitute the situation. A
+combination of factors, therefore, gives to each situation its
+distinctive character, differentiating it from other situations.
+
+To maintain an existing situation, it is necessary to preserve, in
+total effect, the influence of factors already present, or to
+introduce new factors to offset the influence of any which tend to
+cause a change. To change the situation, it is necessary to introduce
+factors which will exert the desired influence; or, change may be
+effected by altering the influence of factors already present. To say,
+therefore, that "It depends on the situation", as in the maxim cited
+(above), is to state that under all circumstances, the proper action
+depends on, or is determined by, the influence of the factors
+involved. Any valid rule, or principle, will accordingly take into
+account the factors applicable to the case.
+
+The application of any rule will similarly take into account the
+influence of the particular factors involved. The danger of the
+application of such factors to all circumstances, without due
+circumspection as to their value in the existing situation, lies in
+the fact that, in any particular combination of circumstances, they do
+not necessarily carry equal weight.
+
+If this view be accepted, it follows that in many situations certain
+factors may, after mature deliberation, be rejected, or relegated to a
+relatively inferior status, without detracting from their potential
+value as fundamental considerations (page 1) in all situations.
+
+Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles of War. The human
+preference for catchwords has, by many writers on the science and art
+of war, been extended to the attempted condensation of a principle or
+of several principles into a single all-inclusive word or phrase. As
+a result, varying lists of abstract nouns and phrases have been
+advanced to constitute epitomes of the principles of war. Subject to
+minor differences in number and in designation, the list most
+frequently encountered comprises The Objective, Superiority, The
+Offensive, Economy of Force, Movement, Cooperation, Surprise,
+Security, and Simplicity.
+
+To rely on a list of this nature, as a condensation of the
+fundamentals of war, has been known to cause confusion and to result
+in failure to recognize the principles which are intended to be
+brought to mind.
+
+For example, misunderstanding has resulted from the designation of the
+single word, surprise, as a "principle of war". On the one hand, it
+has been denied that surprise embodies a principle, the reason being
+advanced that it is neither always necessary, nor feasible, nor even
+desirable to attempt to obtain surprise. On the other hand, the
+acceptance of the word surprise (see page 73), as itself expressing a
+universal truth (which it of course does not except by inference), has
+been known to result in the incorrect belief that surprise is always
+essential to success. Action based on such a viewpoint is the
+equivalent of applying general treatment to specific cases, regardless
+of circumstances.
+
+Thus there have resulted distortions of the simple fact that a
+relationship exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the
+creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent. The correct
+formulation of a principle, or of several principles, governing the
+employment of surprise, will result in a definite statement that its
+appropriate employment is dependent upon the various factors (page 25)
+that make up the situation, the influence of each of which requires
+evaluation in each separate situation.
+
+Analysis, in like manner, of the so-called "principle of the
+objective" as a "principle of war" will show that the objective of a
+military force is, in itself, no more a principle of war than the
+direction of a physical force is, in itself, a principle of mechanics.
+Both concepts, however, involve certain matters of fact which can best
+be explained by principles. Such principles take note of the factors
+pertaining to the subjects, and indicate the underlying relationships
+in a manner to be later shown herein.
+
+Certainly the preceding list (above) of isolated expressions includes
+no item which, in the abstract, may not properly be considered as
+possibly vital from the strategical and tactical standpoints. But
+that these expressions are always vital, and that there are no other
+considerations, can scarcely be accepted as final. Even if this
+objection could be removed by the inclusion of all factors well known
+to be vital, the fact would still remain that these expressions,
+standing alone, fail to satisfy the real need; i.e., they fail to
+indicate any practical application of the concepts which they are
+intended to imply. They do no more than provide a useful point of
+origin for further inquiry. When understood on this basis, they
+possess a certain value.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The concept underlying the application of principles is correct with
+respect to military problems, as well as for all others (page 22).
+This purpose, however, cannot be served by a mere collection of nouns
+or noun-phrases. Such expressions make no statements of cause and
+effect. Their meaning is therefore left to inference and to the
+idiosyncrasy of individual interpretation. The formulation, moreover,
+of useful principles cannot be satisfactorily established by the
+more-or-less random selection of matters, however important,
+pertaining to the subject at hand. What is required is a systematic
+analysis of the essentials of the subject, with resultant emphasis on
+the fundamental causes and effects whose relationships are to be
+expressed.
+
+Formulation and Use of Principles. The formulation of a principle,
+referred to previously (page 24) as itself a difficult problem,
+requires a citation of the factors pertaining to the subject. On the
+basis of these factors as causes, the principles, when properly
+formulated, also state the effects which may properly be expected.
+(See page 22.)
+
+The relationship between causes and effects, or between effects and
+their causes, may be expressed in various ways. The requirement is
+that the expression be one of fact and that, if the principle purport
+to cover the entire subject, all of the pertinent facts (page 24) be
+stated, though not necessarily all the details involved.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In addition to the principles of general application (Chapter III),
+the later discussion herein includes numerous other principles, with
+reference to matters of detail (pages 22-23). To some of these
+principles the treatment invites special attention. All principles
+included have been phrased with due care, to ensure conformity with
+the requirements above stated. The preferred form, herein, for the
+usual statement of cause and effect is through the use of phraseology
+such as that certain effects "depend on" or are "dependent on" certain
+causes, or that certain causes "determine" certain effects, or that
+the latter "are determined by" certain causes.
+
+From the standpoint of the exercise of judgment, it is a principle
+that the due determination of effects to be produced depends on the
+proper consideration of pertinent factors. Once the principles
+applicable to any subject have been formulated in necessary detail,
+the evaluation of the cited factors with respect to a particular
+situation becomes the vital procedure as to any problem where that
+subject is involved. In the course of this evaluation, corollary or
+subordinate principles may be of assistance (page 22). In military
+problems, however, the evaluation usually involves many factors not
+susceptible of reasonably exact determination by the use of formulae
+(see page 23). In such cases, experience, education, and training
+afford the only secure basis for judgment which will produce reliable
+conclusions. The principles, therefore, provide reliable guides by
+citing the factors to be evaluated in order to arrive at desired
+results, but the principles cannot replace logical thought in the
+evaluation of the factors.
+
+In formulating principles (see also page 23) as practical guides for
+action, as well as in using them when formulated, failure to give
+consideration to all pertinent factors may result in vitiating the
+effort based on their application. Danger also lies in the fact that
+any particular factor will infrequently have the same value--the same
+influence on the situation--in any two problems (page 25). Therefore,
+in each situation, each factor requires to be weighed in connection
+with the others. The soundness of the resulting conclusion will depend
+on the extent of the knowledge available (page 2) and on its useful
+employment.
+
+Summary of Fundamental Considerations. The factors (page 25) involved
+in determining the nature of an effect and of the action to attain it
+become fundamental considerations (page 25) when it is desired to
+arrive at such a result under a particular set of circumstances.
+
+The relationships obtaining between the desired effect and the action
+to attain it, on the one hand, and the factors involved, on the other,
+are best expressed in the form of principles. The next chapter is
+therefore devoted to the development of basic principles applicable to
+military problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+BASIC PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PROBLEMS
+
+(The Fundamental Military Principle)
+
+    On the basis of the previous discussion as to the natural
+    mental processes and as to principles useful in their
+    employment, Chapter III discusses the requirements for the
+    attainment of an end in human affairs.
+
+    The fundamental principle thus derived is then applied to the
+    needs of the military profession, so as to develop the
+    Fundamental Military Principle. This Principle indicates the
+    requirements of a correct military objective and of the action
+    for its attainment.
+
+
+Review of Conclusions as to Principles. On the premise that all human
+activities and their environment are governed by natural laws (page
+22), the preceding chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the
+natural mental processes employed in meeting the problems of human
+life. This analysis has stressed four fundamental truths:
+
+    (1) That a valid rule, or principle, when complete, embraces
+        all known phenomena pertinent to the relationship
+        established.
+
+    (2) That the logical application of principles to particular
+        incidents will take account of all the factors of the
+        principles, and of all known conditions of the incidents.
+
+    (3) That such principles afford great assistance in arriving
+        at sound conclusions, and that the human mind, if without
+        access to such valid guides, tends to adopt faulty rules
+        in the effort to serve the same purpose.
+
+    (4) That rules of action, however, even though they be valid,
+        cannot be depended upon to replace the employment of
+        logical thought.
+
+Procedure for Developing Military Principles. Logically, the next
+stage in the treatment of this subject is to develop certain basic
+principles applicable, more especially, to the solution of military
+problems.
+
+The development of such principles starts, on the basis already
+established in this discussion, with a reference to the natural mental
+processes used by the normal mature human being before taking
+deliberate action (page 19). Under such circumstances, the person who
+is to solve the problem has first to establish a basis for his
+solution.
+
+To arrive at this basis, which involves an understanding of the
+appropriate effect desired, the person concerned requires a grasp of
+the salient features of the situation, a recognition of the incentive,
+and an appreciation of the effect which he has been directed to
+produce or has adopted on his own initiative. To complete the basis
+for his solution, he also requires an understanding of comparative
+resources as influenced by the conditions obtaining at the time.
+
+During the actual solution of the problem, the person concerned takes
+cognizance first, of the existing situation, picturing it in his mind.
+Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates for
+himself mental images of future situations. The pictured condition
+decided upon after consideration of the pertinent factors involved, be
+it the situation to be maintained or a new situation to be created,
+constitutes an effect he may produce for the further attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part
+of the basis of his problem. (See page 25.)
+
+With the existing situation and a new situation now clear, what action
+is he to take to change the one into the other? Or, if no change is
+desired, what action is he to take to maintain the existing situation?
+What acts or series of acts should he decide upon, plan in detail,
+inaugurate, and supervise (page 3), to attain the effect which he has
+envisaged for the further attainment of the appropriate effect
+desired?
+
+The correct solution of problems therefore hinges on the requirements
+involved in the effects to be produced and in the action to produce
+them. If these requirements are ascertained, a principle can be
+formulated as a valid guide for the solution of human problems.
+
+Requirements for the Attainment of an End. The discussion to this
+point has established the fact that an end in view, a result to be
+produced, an effect desired, is very closely connected with a further
+effect which the attainment of the former is intended to produce.
+Human motives spring from deep-seated incentives often derived from
+distant sources, so that, even when the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative, he will rarely, if ever, be uninfluenced
+by some further effect desired, inherent in his situation (see page
+19).
+
+An end in view, therefore, from the viewpoint of the person who is
+endeavoring to visualize its accomplishment as a method for attainment
+of a further aim, will necessarily achieve such further aim, or at
+least contribute to its achievement. The first requirement,
+accordingly, of such an end in view is that it be suitable to any
+further aim, whatever that aim may be. It may be said, therefore, that
+a correct end in view satisfies the requirement of suitability as to
+the appropriate effect desired, whatever this further effect may be.
+
+Important as suitability is, however, a reasonably responsible person
+will recognize that this consideration, alone, does not satisfy all
+requirements. An end in view remains a mere desire, without
+possibility of attainment, unless such a result is practicable of
+accomplishment. A correct end in view, therefore, satisfies also the
+requirements of feasibility.
+
+Consideration of feasibility calls for a survey of comparative
+resources (page 30). Such a survey will cover the extent of the
+resources (means available) of those making the effort, as compared to
+the resources (means opposed) of those who may oppose it. Full account
+is also to be taken, as to feasibility, of the natural and artificial
+conditions which the effort will encounter before it can produce the
+contemplated result. The responsible person will ask himself where the
+effort is most likely to be successful, and what obstacles, in
+addition to those represented by opponents, he will be required to
+surmount. The effects of such conditions may alter the ratio otherwise
+presented by comparative resources.
+
+Consideration of the characteristics of the field of action may thus
+disclose features which will greatly influence the possibility of
+accomplishment, as well as the character of the effort to be made,
+from the standpoint of feasibility. The second requirement, therefore,
+is that of feasibility with respect to comparative resources, i.e.,
+the means available and opposed, as influenced by the physical
+conditions prevailing in the field of action.
+
+Although believed to be both suitable and feasible, the requirements
+for the attainment of an end are not yet completely established. There
+is still required a reckoning of a profit-and-loss account of the
+whole undertaking, to estimate whether it will be advantageous. What
+will be the cost, and what will be the gain? Is the effort worth
+while? Or should one be content with venturing less and gaining less?
+What is the bearing on possible future action? The consequences as to
+costs, always important considerations in dealing with human problems,
+are frequently the paramount determinant. The third requirement,
+therefore, is acceptability with respect to the consequences as to
+costs.
+
+These requirements invite attention to the factors, already
+discussed, whose influence (see page 25 as to factors) determines the
+character of the effort required to attain an end.
+
+The Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End. Here, then,
+are the broad fundamental considerations which affect the solution of
+every human problem. In a narrower field, the considerations may fall
+within more specific limits, but a principle sufficiently broad to be
+applicable to all cases appears to comprehend those inclusive factors
+mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
+
+A review of these paragraphs will disclose that the factors pertaining
+to the several requirements may be so grouped as to constitute a
+single fundamental principle governing the attainment of an end in
+human affairs,--as follows:
+
+In any human activity, the attainment of a correct end in view depends
+on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+        of the appropriate effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility of the effort required, on the basis of
+        comparative resources, as determined by the means
+        available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+        physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs,
+
+    which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
+
+The Interdependency of the Factors. As previously observed (page 28),
+the factors cited in the foregoing principle are themselves
+interdependent. This fact results from working of natural law (page
+22), for it is a recognized phenomenon that every effect is the result
+of certain causes, and that every effect is itself, in turn, the cause
+of further effects (page 19).
+
+Accordingly, when the evaluation of any factor is under consideration,
+its value as an unknown quantity can be determined to the extent that
+the values of the other pertinent factors are known. (See page 23, as
+to the discussion of the quantities in an equation.) The significance
+of each, in any situation, is therefore determined by the influence of
+the other factors. The relationships existing among them can best be
+expressed in the terms of four corollary principles (page 27), next to
+be discussed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+For example, questions frequently arise as to what is the appropriate
+effect to be desired in a particular situation. Whether a desired
+effect is feasible of attainment, and whether certain consequences,
+though undesirable, will be acceptable, in view of the gains, can be
+determined by evaluation of the means available and opposed,
+influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of
+action, and of the consequences as to costs. If a desired effect is
+thereby found to be not feasible of attainment, or to be unacceptable
+as to consequences, deferment of such effort is indicated. A proper
+solution in such case would adopt some lesser effect, in conformity
+with the further aim, feasible of accomplishment, and acceptable as to
+its consequences.
+
+If (with respect to the further aim, mentioned above) the person
+concerned is acting under the instructions of another, there will
+frequently be injected into the equation, in addition to the factors
+already noted, a further effect desired, indicated by higher
+authority. Such an indication will often operate to narrow the limits
+of the problem. This is true even if the person concerned is acting
+wholly on his own initiative and responsibility (pages 29-30).
+
+These considerations lead to the formulation of what may be called the
+corollary principle for determination of the appropriate effect to be
+desired in human affairs,--as follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the appropriate effect to be desired
+  (i.e., an end in view, a result to be accomplished) depends on
+  fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of
+        the further effect desired (if such further effect is
+        indicated),
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+        field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+If, to take a further example, the known factors include the
+appropriate effect desired, the means opposed, the physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action, and the consequences as to costs,
+the only unknown remains the means available. The question then is,
+what means need be made available for the accomplishment of the
+contemplated effort? The answer to this question may be found in the
+application of what may be called the principle for the determination
+of the proper means to be made available in human affairs,--as
+follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the proper means to be made available
+  depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the means (in kind and amount) to accomplish
+        the end in view, as determined by the factor of the
+        appropriate effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to make such means available on the
+        basis of comparative resources as determined by the factor
+        of the means opposed, influenced by the factor of the
+        physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The influence of physical conditions in the field of action may be
+illustrated by any case where ends otherwise feasible of attainment
+cannot be achieved without effecting changes in such conditions. The
+resolution of the uncertainty then requires study to determine what
+suitable changes can be made. Changes for such a purpose may take
+various forms, such as the construction of physical features in the
+area involved, or the destruction of such features already existing;
+or, again, both methods may be employed. Examples of such changes have
+existed and still exist in profusion, some of them, military and
+non-military, being on such a scale as radically to alter the previous
+status with respect to entire nations. The question as to what changes
+ought to be effected in the prevailing physical conditions, in order
+to attain a certain objective, can be answered by the application of
+what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper
+physical conditions to be established in the field of action,--as
+follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the proper physical conditions to be
+  established in the field of action depend on fulfillment of the
+  requirements of
+
+    Suitability of such conditions to the end in view, as
+        determined by the factor of the appropriate effect
+        desired,
+
+    Feasibility of effort to establish such conditions, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions existing in the
+        field of action, and
+
+    Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
+        determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The factor of consequences as to costs also calls for special notice.
+The influence of this factor frequently justifies abandonment of
+suitable ends in view, even though their attainment has been
+determined to be feasible, because the loss involved would out-weigh
+the gain. Immediate success may be attained at such cost as to prevent
+the attainment of larger ends (see the discussion, pages 9 and 10, of
+the relationship of strategy and tactics).
+
+On the other hand, the circumstances of the case may well justify
+loss, however great, because the alternative is unacceptable, even
+though the consequences involve complete destruction. Moreover, the
+need for swift and aggressive action in many activities (notably in
+war), for resolute prosecution of the plan, for timely seizure of
+opportunity, and for acceptance of justified risks, requires that
+consideration of consequences as to costs never be emphasized beyond
+its proper weight. To determine such proper weight calls, frequently,
+for judgment of the highest order, and is, in the military profession,
+a direct responsibility of command. This responsibility can be
+discharged by the application of what may be called the corollary
+principle for the determination of acceptable consequences as to
+costs,--as follows:
+
+  In any human activity, the acceptable consequences as to costs
+    depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
+
+    Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
+        of the appropriate effect desired, and
+
+    Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
+        basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
+        factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
+        the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
+        field of action.
+
+Special Nature of War as a Human Activity. A principle found, by
+careful analysis, to be governing as to human activities of any
+nature, is also applicable to the problems of war. This is true
+because war is a human activity, differing from other human activities
+only in the specialized character of the factors that enter.
+
+The effect desired in war has a character distinctly military and,
+ultimately, through the reestablishment of a favorable peace, a
+political character (see pages 7-9).
+
+The means available (or opposed) in war are the human and material
+components of fighting strength (page 8). The physical conditions
+prevailing in the field of action are, in war, the characteristics of
+the theater of operations. Fighting strength is thus derived from the
+means available (or opposed) in war, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting strength
+(comparative resources in war) involves a comparison of means
+available with means opposed, due account being taken of the influence
+exerted on both by the characteristics of the theater. In war,
+relatively large masses of human beings oppose each other with hostile
+intent, while the means available and opposed, and the physical
+conditions established by the operations of war in the theater of
+action, tend more and more to acquire a highly specialized character.
+
+The consequences as to costs, in war, also assume a special
+significance, inasmuch as they may materially influence the
+development of entire nations or of the world situation.
+
+Factors as Universal Determinants in War. Tabulated for convenient
+reference and expressed in terms in general use in the military
+profession, the factors governing the attainment of an end in war are
+therefore:
+
+  (a) The Nature of the appropriate Effect Desired,
+  (b) The Means Available and Opposed,
+  (c) The Characteristics of the Theater of Operations,
+      and
+  (d) The Consequences as to Costs.
+
+These factors, thus expressed in abstract form, are the universal
+determinants of the nature of the objective and of the character of
+the action to attain it. Their further resolution into factors of more
+concrete form is indicated hereinafter (see Chapter VI, in the
+discussion of Section II of the Estimate Form).
+
+The Objective in War. The objective (page 3), a term long in use in
+the military profession in connection with the "objective point", has
+acquired by extension the significance of something more than the
+physical object of action. The latter, as explained later (page 37),
+is properly denominated the "physical objective".
+
+In the abstract, an "objective", in present general usage as well as
+in the military vocabulary, is an end toward which action is being
+directed, or is to be directed; in brief, an end in view, a result to
+be attained, an effect desired (pages 19 and 30). An objective is an
+effect to be produced for the attainment of a further objective,
+itself a further effect. As already demonstrated (page 30 and
+following), the attainment of an end, in any human activity, requires
+action to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one.
+Therefore, in war, a special form of human activity, the attainment of
+an objective requires that action be actual imposition of an outside
+agency. The attainment of a correct military objective (discussed in
+detail in Chapter IV) requires, accordingly, the creation or
+maintenance of a favorable military situation.
+
+An objective, in the sense of an end in view, a result to be
+accomplished, is manifestly an objective in mind. As already indicated
+(page 36), however, military usage also assigns to the term
+"objective" an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete.
+Results in war are attained through the actual or threatened use of
+physical force (pages 8 and 9) directed with relation to something
+tangible, such as, for example, some physical element of the enemy's
+strength.
+
+Action as to this tangible feature (e.g., if it is destroyed,
+occupied, neutralized, or otherwise dealt with) will result in, or
+further the attainment of, an effect desired. Thus the physical
+objective occupies a sharply defined position in warfare, in that it
+establishes the physical basis of the objective and indicates the
+geographical direction of the effort. Since the physical objective is
+always an object--be it only a geographical point--, it is more than a
+mental concept; it is an objective in space.
+
+For example, the objective being "the destruction of the enemy
+battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship.
+
+As used herein the expression "the objective" or "the military
+objective" (page 55), when unqualified, ordinarily indicates the
+mental objective. The term is properly applicable to a physical
+objective when the context makes the meaning clear. Ordinarily, and
+always when clarity demands, a tangible focus of effort is herein
+denoted a "physical objective".
+
+Military Operations. Appropriate action to create or maintain a
+situation will take the form of a military operation. An operation, in
+the basic sense, is merely an act, or a series of acts. The word is
+derived from the Latin opus, meaning "work". A military operation is
+therefore an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a
+military character. A military operation may consist of an entire
+campaign, or even of several such, constituting a clearly defined
+major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions
+thereof. The term is also applied, properly, to entire series of acts
+on the part of successive commands, from the higher to the lower
+echelons, to and including distinctive military actions which relate
+to the merest routine.
+
+A plan of action to attain a military objective is, therefore, a plan
+of military operations, including supporting measures (see page 167),
+considered or adopted as a method of procedure for the achievement of
+that end (see page 21). Such a plan or method of procedure requires
+action with relation to correct physical objectives in such a manner
+as to attain the objective, i.e., to maintain the existing situation
+or to create a new one, conformably to the appropriate effect desired.
+
+A plan of military operations may be regarded as reasonably effective
+if the direction or geographical trend of the effort provides for
+proper action with relation to the correct physical objectives; if the
+force concerned utilizes positions advantageous in relation to those
+of the opponent; if the fighting strength is so apportioned as to
+provide for requisite power at points likely to be decisive, without
+undue weakening at other points; and if future actions, in seeking the
+effect desired, will be unhampered by obstacles with which the force
+cannot cope. These essentials apply to all of the various combinations
+of circumstances, i.e., situations (page 20), which may materialize as
+action progresses and the original situation unfolds.
+
+A properly conceived plan of military operations therefore makes
+provision, necessarily, for certain salient features of such
+operations, as follows:
+
+  The physical objectives involved,
+  The relative positions utilized,
+  The apportionment of fighting strength, and
+  The provisions for freedom of action.
+
+As will later be observed (Chapters VII and VIII), the content of
+plans for naval operations may be classified under the headings listed
+above. In such plans the salient features noted will be observed,
+also, to occur, subject to certain exceptions, in the sequence above
+indicated. Similar observations are applicable as to plans
+systematically prepared for direction of forces operating on land and
+in the air.
+
+A military operation which is progressing favorably, whatever the
+medium of action, may therefore be justifiably stated to include
+provision for the following salient features:
+
+      Effective action with relation to correct physical
+  objectives,
+
+      Projection of military action from advantageous relative
+  positions,
+
+      Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
+
+      Ensurance of adequate freedom of action.
+
+Since, at any moment of its successful prosecution, a military
+operation presents, inherently (page 38), a favorable military
+situation, the salient features of such an operation constitute, also,
+the salient features of a favorable military situation. Manifestly,
+any deficiencies in these respects will indicate that in certain
+particulars the situation is not entirely favorable, if not actually
+unfavorable.
+
+Determination of the Salient Features. Because the form which a
+military operation takes, in the effort to attain a military
+objective, depends upon the factors which are the universal
+determinants (page 36) of the character of the effort, the salient
+features of such an operation are determined by the same factors. A
+valid guide as to determination of the salient features of a favorably
+progressing military operation, seen (above) to be identical with
+those of a favorable military situation, may therefore be formulated
+as a principle for determining these salient features, as follows:
+
+The determination of
+
+                             }         { Suitability, as determined by
+                             }         { the factor of the appropriate
+Correct physical objectives, }         { effect desired.
+                             }         {
+Advantageous relative        }         { Feasibility, by reason of
+ positions,                  }         { relative fighting strength,
+                             } depends { as determined by the factors
+Proper apportionment of      } on      { of the means available and
+fighting strength, and       } their   { opposed, influenced by the
+                             }         { factor of the characteristics
+Provision for adequate       }         { of the theater of operations,
+freedom of action            }         { and
+                             }         {
+                             }         { Acceptability, as determined
+                             }         { by the factor of the
+                             }         { consequences as to costs.
+
+Since the particular character of each salient feature of a situation,
+or of an operation, is determined by the influence, exerted by the
+identical factors (as noted), there is a resulting interdependency,
+important though indirect, among the several features. This
+interdependency is explained hereafter. (Chapter IV).
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle. The Fundamental Principle for the
+Attainment of an End in human affairs (page 32) has invited
+attention to the factors, pertinent to suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability, seen to be applicable, as well, to any military effort
+(page 35). As also noted, a military effort will necessarily consist
+of military operations, whose salient features depend upon the same
+factors. The factors, in turn, have been observed (page 32 and
+following) to be interdependent.
+
+[Illustration: THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE (diagram)]
+
+These considerations lead to the formulation of a derivative of the
+Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End in human affairs,
+in the form of
+
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle
+
+The attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance of
+a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations
+involving the salient features of
+
+    Effective action with relation to correct physical
+        objectives,
+
+    Projection of action from advantageous relative positions,
+
+    Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
+
+    Ensurance of adequate freedom of action,
+
+    each fulfilling the requirements of
+
+    Suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate
+        effect desired,
+
+    Feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength as
+        determined by the factors of the means available and
+        opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics
+        of the theater of operations, and
+
+    Acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences
+        as to costs,
+
+    which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle, as a valid guide, encounters no
+exception in the field it purports to cover. As a practical guide, it
+brings to attention, in broad outline, all the causes and effects
+which are involved. The principle affords a proper basis for the
+formulation of corollary principles for the determination, in any
+particular situation, of any element noted therein whose value may be
+unknown but may be ascertained by reference to other pertinent
+elements which constitute known quantities. (See pages 21-27.)
+
+As later explained (Chapter IV), the two major applications of the
+Principle relate to the selection of a correct military objective and
+to the determination of effective military operations to attain an
+objective (see page 28).
+
+A corollary Principle of the Correct Military Objective will
+accordingly state that the selection of a correct military objective
+depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the
+factors cited in the Fundamental Military Principle. The application
+of this corollary is discussed in Section II of Chapter IV.
+
+A corollary Principle of Effective Military Operations will similarly
+state that the determination of effective operations for the
+attainment of a military objective depends on the due consideration of
+the salient features and the factors cited in the Fundamental Military
+Principle. The application of this corollary is explained in Section
+III of Chapter IV.
+
+These principles can be used as a basis for formulating the plans of
+the commander concerned, and, accordingly, for determining his own
+action. They can also be used as a basis for rendering sound opinions,
+when requested of the commander, as to plans and actions contemplated
+by higher authority. The principles are in like manner applicable for
+purposes of historical study involving analysis of operations of the
+past.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
+
+(Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment)
+
+    Section I of Chapter IV discusses the major components of all
+    military problems.
+
+    Section II deals with the fundamental considerations having to
+    do, generally, with the first of these components, i.e., the
+    selection of correct military objectives; the application,
+    more specifically, is reserved for Chapter VI.
+
+    Section III deals with the fundamental considerations having
+    to do, generally, with the second of the two major components,
+    i.e., the determination of effective military operations for
+    the attainment of such objectives; the application, more
+    specifically, is reserved for Chapter VII.
+
+    The selection of objectives has a secondary application, also,
+    to the discussion in Chapter VII, while the determination of
+    operations has a similar application to that in Chapter VI.
+    Both subjects, i.e., as to objectives and as to operations,
+    have application also to Chapter IX.
+
+    The chart on page ii shows these relationships.
+
+
+I. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PROBLEMS.
+
+In the two preceding chapters, the study of the natural mental
+processes has brought to notice that, to meet the requirements of
+suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as to consequences in the
+proper solution of a military problem, it is first necessary to
+establish a sound basis for that solution. Such a basis involves an
+understanding of the appropriate effect desired and of relative
+fighting strength (see pages 29 and 30).
+
+In each situation an understanding of the appropriate effect desired,
+from the standpoint of suitability, requires:
+
+        (1) A grasp of the salient features of the situation,
+    favorable and unfavorable, including the perplexity inherent
+    therein,
+
+        (2) A recognition of the incentive to solution of the
+    problem, i.e., a realization of the desire or need for
+    attaining a certain effect, an objective (page 36) which will
+    be the maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+    situation, and
+
+        (3) An appreciation of this objective in its relationship
+    to the next further result to be accomplished by its
+    attainment.
+
+An understanding of relative fighting strength involves consideration
+of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. With this understanding
+there is provided a sound basis for the determination, later, of the
+feasibility of courses of action and of their acceptability with
+respect to consequences as to costs.
+
+In the premises, the ability to understand the nature of a military
+problem is dependent on the knowledge, experience, character, and
+professional judgment of the commander. These qualities enable him to
+grasp the significance of the salient features of the situation. The
+same personal characteristics are instrumental in the recognition of
+the incentive. Analysis indicates that an incentive may arise (1) by
+reason of a directive issued by higher authority, or (2) from the fact
+that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced
+further problems, or (3) because of the demands of the situation.
+However, the primary consideration in understanding the nature of the
+problem is the appreciation of the objective from which the problem
+originates, i.e., the just estimation or accurate evaluation of this
+objective. Such consideration is primary because appreciation of this
+objective involves, as necessary concomitants, a grasp of the salient
+features of the existing situation (to be maintained or changed) and a
+recognition of the incentive.
+
+Correct appreciation of this objective, in its relationship to the
+further effect to be produced, is thus the principal consideration in
+reaching an understanding of the appropriate effect desired. It is, to
+repeat, through an understanding of this factor and of the factors of
+relative fighting strength that the commander establishes the basis
+for the solution of his problem. (See Section I of Chapter VI, page
+118).
+
+The Solution of a Military Problem. When the commander has thus
+obtained an understanding of the basis of his problem, the actual
+procedure of solution is undertaken through the consideration of the
+factors involved in their influence on the various plans for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired, as thus established. The
+best plan, selected and embodied in outline in the decision, can then
+be further developed, if necessary, into a general plan for the
+commander's force and, finally, into a detailed plan, as the solution
+of the problem. (See page 22.)
+
+The Major Components of a Military Problem. Each plan considered by
+the commander will involve (page 21) two major considerations:
+namely--an effect to be produced and the action required to produce
+it; or, in military terms, a correct military objective (or
+objectives) and effective operations for its attainment. The selection
+of correct military objectives and the determination of effective
+operations for their attainment are therefore the two major components
+of a military problem, because they are the principal considerations
+on which depends the soundness of military decision. To meet these
+requirements is a prime function of command, one which demands
+professional judgment of the highest order.
+
+The major components of a military problem are of course intimately
+connected, because a purposeful action, accomplished, is equivalent to
+an objective, attained. Furthermore, the attainment of an objective
+involves the accomplishment of effective operations.
+
+Because of the importance of the subject, the relationship between
+these two major components deserves very careful analysis. As has been
+observed (page 30), the action to be taken depends, in the first
+instance, on the effect to be produced. Therefore, the objective is,
+as compared to the action to attain it, the paramount matter.
+Moreover, there is necessarily included, in the procedure of selecting
+a correct objective, a consideration as to whether the action to that
+end will be feasible and as to whether the consequences involved will
+be acceptable on the basis of the costs which will be exacted. If,
+then, the objective has been correctly selected in any situation, this
+procedure will have included, as a necessary incidental, the
+determination also, in the proper detail, of the operations required
+for its attainment.
+
+Of the two major components involved in the selection of the best
+plan, the primary relates, therefore, to correct objectives.
+Accordingly, this consideration is most aptly expressed in terms of
+the "selection" of objectives. The "determination" of necessary
+operations is a proper expression of the procedure therein involved,
+because this procedure, though also involving a major component of the
+problem is dependent on the primary consideration of objectives.
+
+A valid guide for practical use during the process of solving military
+problems will therefore provide a basis, primarily, for the selection
+of correct objectives. However, the procedure for such selection,
+though requiring consideration of the action involved in attaining
+objectives, will seldom call for a complete analysis of such
+operations. Therefore, it is also desirable, for the solution of
+military problems, to provide a valid guide for the determination of
+effective operations, in detail. This guide may be used on occasions
+when, the correct objective having been selected, the only remaining
+problem is to work out the detailed operations involved.
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle, developed in the preceding
+chapter, has been formulated to fulfill the requirements described in
+the preceding paragraph. Through the exhaustive analysis of the
+elements involved, there has been provided, in the form of a single
+fundamental principle, a valid guide for the selection of correct
+military objectives and for the due determination of effective
+operations for their attainment.
+
+In the present chapter, the abstract application of the Principle is
+discussed in terms of fundamental considerations. Section II of the
+chapter deals with the selection of objectives; this subject, in more
+specific terms, is later expanded in Chapter VI. Section III of the
+present chapter deals with the determination of operations; this
+subject, in more specific terms, is expanded in Chapter VII. The
+present chapter affords a treatment applicable to military problems of
+any nature. Later expansion is applicable, more especially, to naval
+problems.
+
+This arrangement of the subject matter has been adopted for two
+reasons. First, discussion of fundamental considerations, thus taken
+up at the present point, immediately follows the formulation of the
+principle (in Chapter III). Furthermore, a fundamental treatment,
+prior to Chapters VI and VII, permits maximum brevity in the
+discussion, therein. The commander, having mastered the fundamentals
+dealt with here, can later follow the detailed procedure with minimum
+distraction due to reference to the preceding discussion.
+
+Essential Elements Involved. As previously stated, the problems of war
+differ from those of other human activities with respect, only (page
+35), to the specialized character of the factors that enter.
+
+The final outcome is dependent (page 8) on ability to isolate, occupy,
+or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it
+supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many
+essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the
+secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of
+man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The
+air affords routes of communication over both land and sea.
+
+These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar
+to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air (page 60). There
+are also involved the specialized demands of a technique for the
+imposition of and the resistance to physical violence. In addition
+there appear those factors related to the psychology of human
+reactions to armed conflict.
+
+In any situation involving opposing armed forces, the problem, as in
+any human activity (page 30), is, from the standpoint of each
+opponent, a matter of maintaining existing conditions or of bringing
+about a change. The method employed, if the action is to be effective,
+will follow lines calculated to shape the ensuing progressive changes
+in circumstances toward the attainment of the end in view. The action
+to be taken will be ineffective if it does not support the calculated
+line of endeavor, i.e., if it is not suitable or adequate forcibly to
+shape the course of events either toward the creation of a desired new
+and more favorable situation, or the maintenance of the original
+conditions.
+
+The analysis of the principal components of a military problem--i.e.,
+the military objectives and the military operations appropriate to the
+effort for their attainment--therefore requires a study of such
+objectives and operations in terms, respectively, of a favorable
+military situation (page 37) and of a favorably progressing military
+operation (page 38). As has been observed, the salient features of
+such a situation or operation are, from the abstract viewpoint,
+identical, as are also the factors which determine the character of
+such features (page 39). As a covering word for such features and
+factors, alike, the term "elements" appears especially suitable,
+inasmuch as it properly comprises the constituent parts of any
+subject, as well as the factors which may pertain thereto.
+
+Accordingly, the analysis, following, of the procedure for selection
+of correct military objectives is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorable military situation. For like reasons, the
+analysis of the procedure for determining the character of the
+detailed operations required is made in terms of the essential
+elements of a favorably progressing military operation. (For these
+elements, see the salient features and the factors cited in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, page 41.)
+
+
+II. SELECTION OF CORRECT MILITARY OBJECTIVES
+
+Nature of Military Objectives. In the previous discussion (page 36),
+the military objective has been defined as the end toward which action
+is being, or is to be, directed. As such it has been noted as an
+objective in mind. The tangible focus of effort, the physical
+objective toward which the action is directed, has been observed to be
+an objective in space. The physical objective is always an object, be
+it only a geographical point, while the objective, being a mental
+concept, is a situation to be created or maintained.
+
+The term "objective" requires circumspection, not only in the manner
+of its expression (see page 53), but in its use. The latter is true
+because the purport of the objective under consideration will vary
+with the viewpoint of the echelon concerned. For instance, the proper
+visualization of an objective, as an "effect desired" (page 19), calls
+for a correct answer to the question, "Who desires this effect to be
+produced?" (See page 4).
+
+A variety of viewpoints is thus a natural characteristic of the chain
+of command (pages 11-13), whose functioning creates what may be called
+a "chain of objectives".
+
+Necessary exceptions aside, the commander expects to receive, from his
+immediate superior, an assigned objective, which that superior thus
+enjoins the commander to attain. The commander, in turn, through the
+use of the natural mental processes already explained, decides on an
+objective, for the general effort of his own force, to attain the
+objective assigned by his immediate superior.
+
+As a subordinate, a commander to whom an objective has been assigned
+is responsible to his immediate superior for its attainment. The
+commander may, however, also occupy the position of an immediate
+superior to one or more commanders on the next lower echelon. In such
+capacity, he may assign objectives to these immediate subordinates. By
+attaining such an assigned objective, each of these subordinates thus
+contributes to the success of the complete effort planned by his
+immediate superior, to the extent represented by his own assigned
+share of the effort.
+
+A commander can scarcely expect to receive in full the intelligent
+support of his subordinate commanders, unless he makes clear to them
+the character of his own planned effort. It is customary, therefore,
+when assigning an objective to a subordinate, also to inform him of
+the purpose which its attainment is intended to further. Stated
+differently, a commander, when imposing upon an immediate subordinate
+an effect which he is to produce, informs him, at the same time, of
+the nature of the military result which he, the immediate superior,
+has determined to bring about.
+
+This is the part of wisdom, not merely of choice. It acquaints the
+immediate subordinate with the objective of the immediate superior and
+thus enables the former to comprehend wherein the attainment of his
+own assigned objective is expected to contribute to the attainment of
+the effect desired by his superior.
+
+Since the attainment of the assigned objectives will represent the
+consummation of the general plan of the immediate superior, the
+purpose of each of these assignments is to assist in the attainment of
+the objective announced, for his entire force, by the immediate
+superior (see also page 12).
+
+From the viewpoint of the subordinate, the objective thus assigned by
+the immediate superior becomes the appropriate effect desired,
+essential to the determination of the accomplishment which the former
+is to effect by his own effort. On occasion, also, the full scope of
+the appropriate effect desired may require consideration of the
+objectives of higher echelons in the chain of command, so far as such
+objectives may be known or deduced.
+
+The responsibility of the immediate superior, in the matter of
+ensuring that his immediate subordinates understand the purpose of
+their assigned objectives, is in no respect less than that which falls
+upon these subordinates in the execution of their own assignments. By
+failing to provide subordinate commanders, through whatever methods,
+with a knowledge not only of the details of his plan but of the
+general objective which their integrated effort is calculated to
+attain, the superior may actually subject his undertaking to the risk
+of failure.
+
+The decision as to the general plan (page 44) for the attainment of
+his assigned objective provides the commander with an objective which
+he himself has originated. With the plan for the attainment of his
+general objective clearly fixed in mind, the commander may now proceed
+to the selection of one or more objectives of a specific nature, the
+integrated attainment of which will ensure the attainment of his
+assigned objective. The instructions which he may then give,
+severally, to his immediate subordinates in a detailed plan of
+operations, thus indicate to the latter their assigned objectives.
+(See also page 22.)
+
+The source of the incentive (page 44) has an intimate connection with
+the assigned objective. Furthermore, whatever the origin of the
+incentive, the ability to select correct objectives is an essential
+element in the mental equipment of the commander.
+
+For example, if the incentive arises by reason of a directive received
+from higher authority, such directive will presumably assign an
+objective, specific or inferred. The commander to whom such an
+objective is assigned is responsible for a correct understanding of
+all the implications involved, including the relationship between the
+assigned objective and the general objective of the next higher
+commander, which represents the purpose of the assigned objective. On
+occasion it will also be necessary for the commander to consider the
+relationships involved with the further objectives of the higher
+command (page 49). Again, without any suggestion of cavilling at
+orders received, the commander may also find occasion to examine, with
+care, the implications of his assigned objective, because of his
+responsibility for taking correct action in the premises (page 15).
+
+If the incentive arises from a decision previously made by the
+commander, it follows that such decision will have embodied an
+objective, selected by the commander himself.
+
+If the incentive arises because of the demands of the situation, the
+commander is responsible for recognition of the necessity for action
+and for the correct selection of an appropriate objective, to be
+adopted by him as a basis for his own action as if it were assigned by
+higher authority.
+
+An assigned objective having been established with respect to the
+basis for his problem, the commander is always responsible for the
+correct selection of an objective to serve as the end in view for the
+general, integrated action of his subordinate commanders.
+
+Once such an objective has been selected, the commander is further
+responsible for selecting, on the basis provided thereby, correct
+objectives to be assigned to his subordinate commanders.
+
+For various practical reasons, therefore, the responsibility of the
+commander requires of him the ability to select correct objectives. On
+the basis of classification with respect to the authority making the
+selection, analysis will demonstrate the existence of two types of
+objectives.
+
+These two types of objectives are (see page 30 as to effects and
+further effects), namely, (1) the assigned objective (page 48)
+ordinarily indicated by higher authority, exceptionally determined by
+the commander for himself, and (2) the objective typically selected by
+the commander, himself, as the end in view for the integrated effort
+of his subordinates. It will be noted that in the latter category
+there will fall, not only the general objective referred to
+immediately above, but numerous other objectives for whose attainment
+provision may be needed during the actual prosecution of the effort or
+in anticipation thereof.
+
+Procedure for Selection of Correct Military Objectives. The
+Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), properly applied, is the
+basis for the selection of any or all of such objectives. The
+procedure involves the direct application of the corollary Principle
+of the Correct Military Objective.
+
+According to this principle, the selection of a correct military
+objective depends on due consideration of the salient features noted,
+i.e., correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions,
+proper apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for adequate
+freedom of action. These features, discussed in greater detail
+hereafter (in this chapter), are determined by factors cited in the
+Principle (pages 41-42).
+
+The first factor being the appropriate effect desired, a correct
+military objective is selected, in the first instance, by reference to
+the requirement of suitability as to this factor. This appropriate
+effect desired may be indicated by the higher command (page 44), or
+may be determined by the commander himself as hereinafter explained
+(page 52).
+
+When the appropriate effect desired has been established, the next
+consideration is, "What physical objective (or objectives) can be
+found, action with relation to which will, if successful, attain this
+effect?"
+
+For example, if the appropriate effect desired were the "reduction of
+enemy battleship strength" in a certain area, then an enemy battleship
+appearing therein would manifestly be a correct physical objective. A
+suitable action with relation thereto would be "to destroy the enemy
+battleship", in which case the objective involved in the action would
+be "the destruction of the enemy battleship".
+
+Any lesser accomplishment, such as infliction of damage on the enemy
+battleship, or its repulse, or its diversion elsewhere, would also be
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, though not in the same
+degree. Each such visualized accomplishment, suitable to the
+appropriate effect desired, may properly be considered as a
+tentatively selected objective.
+
+An objective having been tentatively selected on the basis of the
+appropriate effect desired, its final selection will naturally depend,
+as indicated in the Principle, on the feasibility of the effort
+involved in the attainment of each such objective, and on the
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+In investigating such feasibility, account is taken of the relative
+fighting strength. With relation to the enemy battleship, for example
+(see above), the commander would consider the means available to him
+and the means opposed (including the enemy battleship and any
+supporting forces), as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater.
+
+This investigation will include, necessarily, a sufficient analysis of
+the salient features of the operation required to attain each
+objective. Such features include the nature of the physical objectives
+(the battleship and any other forces, for instance), the possibilities
+of relative position, the problems involved in apportioning the forces
+on either side, and the proper considerations as to freedom of action.
+
+A similar study with respect to the acceptability of the consequences
+to be expected, as to the costs involved in the operation, will
+provide a basis for a conclusion as to that factor.
+
+If the attainment of an objective is found to be infeasible, or
+feasible only at the expense of unacceptable consequences, the
+proposed objective will naturally be rejected, and some other
+objective will be considered (page 33).
+
+The objective finally adopted as the best will be that which, all
+things considered, is best adapted to the requirements of suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability, as outlined in the Fundamental
+Military Principle.
+
+The Appropriate Effect Desired, as the Basis for the Objective. As
+will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the first factor in
+the selection of a correct objective is the "appropriate effect
+desired". The evaluation of this factor is not always easy, for
+reasons which will be explained.
+
+The procedure (as indicated by the Principle of the Appropriate Effect
+to be Desired--page 33) is the same as for the selection of an
+objective. This identity of procedure is natural, because the
+appropriate effect desired, used as a basis for selecting the
+commander's general objective, itself involves the appreciation of an
+objective. The latter is, in fact, one of the "chain of objectives"
+previously mentioned (page 48).
+
+Under conventional conditions this objective is selected by higher
+authority, and is assigned to the commander in his instructions from
+the next higher echelon (page 48). The objective so indicated will of
+course, under sound procedure, have been selected by higher authority
+on the basis embodied in the Fundamental Military Principle.
+
+When an established chain of command (page 11) is in effective
+operation, the path to the appropriate effect desired will therefore
+normally be indicated through an assigned objective, by the immediate
+superior. This assignment, however, or the failure to receive such an
+indication, does not relieve the commander from the responsibility for
+taking correct action on his own initiative. Such necessity may arise
+should he find, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that his
+instructions need modification or alteration, or even that it is
+necessary for him to depart from his instructions under circumstances
+of great emergency (page 15-16).
+
+Furthermore, the objective may be adopted by (rather than assigned to)
+the commander concerned, on his own initiative, in order to meet the
+demands of a situation (page 50) as to which the higher command has
+not yet had time or opportunity to act.
+
+Moreover, even when an objective is assigned by higher authority in
+the usual course, it may be expressed in such terms as to require
+examination in order to enable the commander to appreciate it (page
+43), as to its bearing on his operations. In fact, studious analysis
+may be necessary for this purpose.
+
+For example, if the objective so indicated does not specify a
+clearly-defined goal, the commander will need to make a thorough study
+in order to appreciate the full implications intended. He may find it
+necessary to analyze his immediate superior's instructions pertaining
+to the entire force of which his command is a part, and to consider,
+also, the objectives indicated for other commanders, on his own
+echelon, who also belong to that force.
+
+On occasion, also, higher authority may acquaint the commander with
+the general plan adopted by the superior, and may order action--such
+as movement in a certain direction or to a certain locality--without
+assigning a more definite objective. Should it happen in emergency
+that later developments prevent higher authority from making such an
+assignment, the commander may find himself under the necessity of
+selecting, for himself, an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him
+as if it were assigned.
+
+Should the commander find that his instructions do not clearly
+indicate an objective, or should he find that the one indicated is not
+applicable under the circumstances of the case, he will select an
+appropriate objective for his own guidance as if it were assigned by
+higher authority. He will make such selection through use of the same
+procedure already described herein as applicable to the selection of
+an objective of any sort. In such case he puts himself in his
+superior's place, in order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion such as
+the higher commander, if apprised of the circumstances, would desire
+to adopt. Circumstances permitting, the commander will of course
+communicate with higher authority, and will make constructive
+representations. (See page 15.)
+
+The appropriate effect desired, as the first factor to be applied in
+selecting such an objective, will naturally involve the objective
+indicated in the general plan for the immediate superior's entire
+force. This general plan is normally announced by the superior for the
+guidance of the commander and of other commanders on the same echelon.
+If, however, this further objective is not known to the commander, he
+will endeavor to obtain a proper point of reference. To this end, he
+will use his knowledge of the objective assigned to his immediate
+superior, or of the further intentions of the higher command with
+respect to the conduct of the operations, or of the campaign, or of
+the war.
+
+The provisions for the formulation of plans and orders (Chapters VII
+and VIII) take account of the fact that the commander may require
+definite information as to the objectives of higher echelons. In
+organizations where a state of mutual understanding has been well
+established, the commander will rarely be without some guidance in the
+premises (see also page 33), by reason of the chain of objectives
+indicated in plans and orders of the higher command (page 48).
+
+From the viewpoint of the commander, this relationship among
+objectives presents to him a series, from the present or immediate
+objective to others more distant in time. Thus there may be one or
+more intermediate objectives, leading away from the immediate one to
+the ultimate objective, so far as the concern of the moment is
+involved.
+
+This relationship of immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives
+may also exist in situations where the commander, operating on his own
+initiative and responsibility, determines such a chain of objectives
+for himself.
+
+Such a situation frequently arises in a campaign or a major operation,
+and is normal, also, as to minor operations (see page 56, as to
+physical objectives).
+
+As already observed, the relationship of objective and further
+objective is the criterion for distinguishing between strategical and
+tactical considerations, from the viewpoint of the commander concerned
+(pages 9 and 10).
+
+What has been noted in the foregoing as to the objective (singular) is
+also applicable to situations where such an objective involves two or
+more objectives collectively considered.
+
+
+III. DETERMINATION OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
+
+As noted with respect to the Fundamental Military Principle (page 41),
+the effort required for the attainment of a military objective
+involves military operations (page 37), whose salient features are
+listed in the Principle. These features, including physical
+objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength,
+and freedom of action, will now be discussed to indicate how they are
+correctly determined by the factors, also cited in the Principle,
+pertaining to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Such
+determination is accomplished through application of the corollary
+Principle of Effective Military Operations (page 42).
+
+
+Physical Objectives
+
+Fundamental Considerations. An operation, however splendidly conceived
+and faultlessly executed, involves waste of effort if directed with
+relation to wrong physical objectives.
+
+Since a physical objective constitutes the tangible focus of effort
+(page 47) toward the attainment of the effect desired, its correct
+determination is of paramount importance both before and during the
+prosecution of operations.
+
+As has been demonstrated (page 51), the consideration of possible
+physical objectives (in space) is essential to the selection of
+suitable objectives (in mind). Moreover, action with reference to one
+or more physical objectives is the necessary basis for determining the
+feasibility and acceptability of a plan.
+
+Military objectives can be achieved only through the application of
+power, actually or by threat (page 8), with reference to physical
+objectives.
+
+The determination of correct physical objectives is followed, if more
+than one such objective is found, by the selection of the one or more
+which are best adapted to the requirements of the situation. The
+procedure for determination and for selection is a matter for
+painstaking mental effort, based on the considerations now to be
+presented.
+
+The term "military objective" is frequently used in military
+literature to distinguish physical objectives which are combatant in
+character from those which are noncombatant. The considerations which
+follow are applicable to physical objectives of all categories.
+
+Procedure for Determination and Selection of Correct Physical
+Objectives. In a particular set of circumstances, the field wherein
+correct physical objectives may be found and the best selected, is
+that of an existent or probable theater of action.
+
+The determination of a physical objective, when correct, initially
+satisfies the requirement of suitability with respect to the nature of
+the objective,--this being, in such case, the appropriate effect
+desired (page 31). Physical objectives not suitable, with relation to
+the objective to be attained, are manifestly incorrect physical points
+of orientation with respect to the operations involved in the effort
+to attain such an objective.
+
+It may be found, however, that the selection of a single physical
+objective will not fulfill this requirement. A commander may find it
+necessary to direct his effort simultaneously, or in succession, with
+relation to more than one physical objective.
+
+When a succession of physical objectives has to be dealt with, the
+selection will necessarily include such a series. Such a case might
+occur where a campaign has been found necessary in the form of
+successive stages as essential features. The visualized termination of
+each successive stage may be marked by the successful application of
+effort with respect to one or more physical objectives. Such a series
+of physical objectives may frequently also occur in operations on a
+smaller scale; even in very minor actions such a succession of efforts
+is normal. (See page 54, as to objectives.)
+
+The choice as to the specific nature of physical objectives will
+extend, for example, from the enemy's organized forces as a whole to
+the physical body of an individual combatant. Within this range will
+be included all manner of physical elements of enemy fighting
+strength, singly and in combination, such as troops, ships,
+geographical points, lines and areas, fortifications, bases, and
+supplies.
+
+The physical objective may take the form of a fixed geographical
+position, the occupation of which, because of its inherent
+advantages, may be, for example, an essential preliminary to further
+progress. The position may, for instance, be merely a point in the
+ocean (page 47), a rendezvous beyond which, although its occupation
+may be uncontested, it has been deemed unwise to proceed without
+further information or additional strength.
+
+The physical objective, therefore, does not always take the form of
+some element of the enemy fighting strength; not infrequently, the
+occupation of a correct physical objective may be uncontested by the
+enemy. However, intervening armed forces of the enemy may constitute
+the physical objective for application of successful effort before a
+further physical objective may be dealt with. The possibility of enemy
+opposition may, therefore, place the selection of one or more physical
+objectives on an indeterminable basis at the time of the original
+solution of the problem. This may require a commander to defer his
+choice until the situation has become more fully developed.
+
+For example, his objective may be the occupation of a certain harbor,
+preliminary to the establishment of a base. The harbor is then a
+correct physical objective, perhaps the only physical objective which
+need be dealt with, if there are no other obstacles to prevent or
+interrupt the operation. Armed forces of the enemy may, however, stand
+as an obstacle to the undisputed occupation of the harbor and,
+therefore, to the attainment of the objective. In such case they
+become, for the time being, the correct physical objective.
+
+While the armed forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate
+physical objectives, this is not always the case (see above). It is
+true that, in war, the armed forces of the enemy, until they can no
+longer offer effective resistance, prevent the full attainment of the
+objective of the State. Accordingly, from the broad viewpoint, they
+may constitute the legitimate and proper physical objective of the
+opposing armed forces. Armed forces of the enemy which are present in
+opposition to any projected operations are likely to offer proper
+physical objectives.
+
+These facts, however, do not restrict a commander, in his choice of a
+physical objective, to the armed forces of the enemy. Nor do these
+considerations require him to search for and destroy the enemy forces
+before directing his effort toward the attainment of an objective
+under circumstances where the enemy is seen to be incapable of
+presenting effective opposition.
+
+The correct physical objective may change several times during the
+course of an operation. This is particularly to be expected in a naval
+tactical engagement of considerable scope. While the enemy fleet, as a
+whole, may properly be considered in such a case to be the physical
+objective, the component parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and
+their combinations, may, from time to time, find in their opponents a
+variety of physical objectives, the particular identity of which can
+scarcely be predicted with assurance. It is here that the importance
+of the correct selection of physical objectives stands out in bold
+relief.
+
+Infliction of loss on enemy forces, or support of own forces hard
+pressed, may always seem tempting immediate objectives in war.
+However, there may be occasions when disengagement or refusal to
+engage an enemy force, even though it be of manifestly inferior
+strength, may be appropriate to the attainment of the end in view.
+Necessity for speed or secrecy, or other demands, may make the
+required operations unacceptable. (See page 75 as to the offensive and
+the defensive.)
+
+Land, as the natural habitat of man (page 46), is always the principal
+store-house of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary
+scene of his activities. Naval operations, therefore, have always in
+view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military
+situation in critical land areas. From this fundamental viewpoint, the
+eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land
+objective.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The suitability of a physical objective having been determined, the
+next consideration is the feasibility (page 31) of taking such action,
+with relation thereto, as will, if successful, attain the objective in
+mind. Feasibility is determined by evaluation of the factors of means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater, in order to assess relative fighting strength (see page 52).
+In connection with the effort involved with relation to any physical
+objective, questions of feasibility may make it desirable or necessary
+to visualize the detailed operations which arise from considerations
+of relative position, of apportionment of fighting strength, and of
+provision for freedom of action.
+
+Of particular interest with respect to such operations, it is noted
+that the premature disclosure of a selected physical objective is a
+military error. By appearing, however, to operate against more than
+one physical objective, a commander may lead the enemy to overstrain
+his resources in the effort to protect them all. Thus the commander
+may reduce the resistance to be encountered in dealing with what have
+already, or may finally, become the selected physical objectives.
+Feints in several directions may even divert all of the enemy's
+effective defense from the vital points (see also page 68).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+After the suitability of a physical objective has been established, as
+well as the feasibility of the contemplated action with relation
+thereto, such action is next considered from the standpoint of
+acceptability with reference to the consequences as to costs. The
+specific factors involved in acceptability as to consequences have
+previously been mentioned (page 31).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+When the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability
+have been satisfied, the locality, the opposing force, or other
+subject of consideration may be regarded as a correct physical
+objective.
+
+When more than one correct physical objective has been determined and
+a choice is indicated, such selection will also be founded on the
+foregoing requirements.
+
+No doctrine, no advance instructions, can replace the responsible
+judgment of a commander as to his correct physical objectives. On
+occasion, higher authority may request recommendations (see page 42,
+as to opinions) with respect to such objectives. The duty of a
+commander to depart from his instructions under certain conditions,
+and the grave responsibility which he thereby assumes, have also been
+referred to (page 16).
+
+
+Relative Positions
+
+Fundamental Considerations. The relative positions occupied or
+susceptible of occupancy by armed forces are matters which demand
+constant and intelligent attention before and during hostilities.
+Being fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative
+positions assume primary importance where enemy forces are concerned,
+and are scarcely of less importance from the standpoint of the correct
+apportionment of the subdivisions of one's own forces, and from the
+viewpoint of their freedom of action.
+
+During periods of actual tactical contact, the successful delivery of
+the decisive thrust against selected physical objectives is greatly
+furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of advantageous relative
+positions.
+
+The fundamental significance of relative position lies in the fact
+that position is the basis of movement, for movement is merely a
+change of position. Speed is the rate at which movement takes place.
+The particular factors to be reckoned with are, therefore, time and
+space. In skillful utilization of these elements lies the successful
+employment of relative position in the creation or maintenance of a
+favorable military situation, whether the movement be by land, sea, or
+air (page 46).
+
+The necessity for movement may be an important consideration in
+determining possible or likely theaters of operations. Where
+transportation between two or more positions within a certain area is
+essential to the successful conduct of a war, the area which includes
+the routes between these positions, or a portion of such routes,
+becomes at once a possible or likely theater. Such an area may be
+normally within the control of one or the other of the belligerents,
+or the control may be in dispute. Certain of the positions themselves
+may belong to neither of the belligerents. The area itself may be a
+land area, or a sea area, or a combination of the two. It may be an
+area which borders upon the sea, or an island area. In any case, the
+air is a common characteristic.
+
+The movement of a force is properly regarded, not as an even flow, but
+as a series of steps from one position to another. The movement may or
+may not be continuous. Pauses are usual, their occurrence and duration
+being a matter dependent upon circumstances and calling for the
+exercise of sound professional judgment. Intermediate positions may be
+utilized, successively, so as to facilitate occupancy of the final
+position which is the goal of that phase of operations (page 56). This
+procedure often effects an ultimate saving of time. In many cases,
+other advantages also may accrue.
+
+The foregoing considerations are applicable to changes of position
+whether in the direction of the enemy, toward a flank, or to the rear.
+Flanking maneuvers and retrograde movements, both sometimes profitably
+employed to decoy the enemy, may frequently be utilized to gain
+advantageous relative position. The proper objective of each is the
+maintenance of a favorable situation, or the alteration of an
+unfavorable one, either locally or with reference to the larger phases
+of operations, through measures involving apportionment of fighting
+strength, or obtaining advantages of position, or retaining or gaining
+freedom of action. Combinations of forward, flanking, or retrograde
+movements are frequent in war, the skillful combination of the
+offensive and the defensive (see page 75) being no less applicable to
+the problem of relative position than to the other elements of a
+favorable military operation.
+
+Procedure for Determination and Selection of Advantageous Relative
+Positions. Since the various positions to be occupied become physical
+objectives for the time being, their proper determination and
+selection are governed by the same considerations which apply to
+physical objectives (see page 55 and following).
+
+Thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, as to suitability,
+whether the position, once gained, will permit the attainment of the
+appropriate effect desired.
+
+Secondly, consideration is required as to feasibility. Are the
+available means adequate to gain or to maintain such position? In
+answering this question, due regard is paid to opposing means and to
+the characteristics of the theater.
+
+Finally, there is to be considered, as to acceptability, whether the
+consequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength, will
+be such, if the position is gained or maintained, as to permit the
+attainment of the objective. The possible effect of these consequences
+on future action, whether the attempt succeeds or fails, may be
+vitally significant.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With regard to suitability, the factor of the appropriate effect
+desired calls for special consideration of the requirements with a
+view to future action. This is true because of the relationship which
+naturally exists between successive positions (page 60) if changes of
+location from one to another are to be integrated into movement
+calculated to accomplish the effect desired. Each position, itself for
+the time being a physical objective, offers certain advantages or
+involves certain disadvantages with relation to a further physical
+objective. The position of the latter, in turn, presents possibilities
+(or denies them) with respect to future movement. The influence of
+considerations with respect to time (in addition to those noted above
+with regard to space) is also a factor whose importance increases when
+urgency is a matter of immediate concern.
+
+With regard to feasibility, the technical capabilities and
+limitations of the armed forces (page 67) are, of course, among the
+principal factors. These capabilities and limitations are respectively
+promoted and imposed primarily by considerations peculiar to the
+particular medium of movement involved.
+
+With specific regard to the areas within which military operations may
+suitably be undertaken, the fundamental distinctions created by
+recognized political sovereignty require attention. That part of the
+surface of the earth which comprises its land area is recognized as
+the property or the charge of one or another of the sovereign states,
+although in certain cases the title may be in dispute. The air above a
+nation's territorial domain is generally understood to be part of that
+domain. The point to be observed is that there are no land areas which
+belong equally to all nations. Accordingly; because of the factor of
+neutral sovereignty, both land and air forces of belligerent States
+may be under the necessity of following indirect routes to their
+physical objectives.
+
+In the case of the sea, however, all those portions of the earth's
+surface which are covered by water (exclusive only of the recognized
+territorial waters of the several nations), i.e., the high seas, are
+presumably common property. The same applies to the air above the sea.
+
+These considerations, and the fact that the surface of the sea is a
+broad plane, permit open sea areas to be traversed by a variety of
+routes to an extent not applicable in the case of land areas and the
+air above them. In addition, the fact that technological developments
+have been such as to permit movement, not only on the surface of the
+sea and through the air above but also beneath the surface, gives
+distinctive characteristics to the sea when considered as a theater of
+operations.
+
+The surface of the sea has, from the earliest days to the present,
+provided roads over which human beings in greatest numbers and the
+resources of the world in greatest weight and volume can be
+transported in single carriers. From the standpoint of any belligerent
+it is imperative that, during war, these roads be kept open to the
+extent demanded by the needs of the State. It is equally imperative
+that an enemy be deprived of the advantage which their use might
+otherwise afford. In both cases localized (even though temporary)
+control, not only of the surface but of the water beneath and the air
+above, may be essential. It is pertinent, also, to note at this point
+the interest of neutrals, or of unneutral nonbelligerent Powers, in
+keeping open the trade routes via the high seas. Such interest may
+constitute an important factor in the calculations of a belligerent
+State.
+
+Considerations of maximum capacity for speed represent the utmost
+possibilities with respect to movements (i.e., change of positions)
+(page 60) in a given medium within a given time limit. A knowledge of
+maximum speed potentialities, one's own and those of the enemy, is
+required if changes in position are intelligently to be made. A
+knowledge of the variety of conditions, controllable and otherwise,
+which affect or preclude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise
+a requisite. Poor material condition, inadequate training, and
+incorrect methods of operation are preventable or correctable. The
+limitations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by natural
+obstacles such as the hydrography, the climate, the wind, the weather,
+and the state of the sea, are susceptible of greatest possible
+adjustment to circumstances only by the exercise of foresight and
+judgment. All these conditions indicate the close relationship that
+exists between relative position and freedom of action (page 70).
+
+The same observations apply to considerations of maximum capacity for
+endurance, the ability to operate without necessity for replenishment
+from an outside source. Radius of action is decreased or increased
+accordingly with resultant restrictions, or otherwise, on freedom of
+action.
+
+With respect to the freedom of action of armed forces, also a
+consideration in relation to feasibility, the logistics of a military
+operation, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins when
+the plan is in process of formulation. This problem ends only when the
+necessity for sustaining the movement, and for retaining the position
+gained, no longer exists.
+
+Ships and other means of conveyance, surface, subsurface, and air, are
+incapable of providing the necessities of life and the implements of
+warfare beyond the capacity built into them. Operations which extend
+beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless replenishment and
+support, possible only from other sources, are provided. The logistics
+problem may be so difficult as to cause rejection of a course of
+action involving distant operations. From the standpoint of supply,
+military movements by land, sea, and air are, therefore, vitally
+associated with positions on land and with their relation to the area
+of operations (see also page 58).
+
+The same observations apply in larger scope to the State itself,
+which, because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain
+essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support from outside
+sources lest supplies on hand become exhausted. In all cases, great
+importance attaches to the geographical location of sources of supply
+in their relation to a required point of delivery and to the routes
+which lie between.
+
+It follows that enemy sources of supply may be suitable physical
+objectives (see page 56). Their destruction or capture, or the
+severance of the enemy's lines of communication with them, may
+seriously restrict his freedom of action.
+
+From the standpoint of the relative position of its features, and
+apart from their inherent military value, the characteristics of the
+theater of military operations may exert an important influence upon
+the shaping of events. Each characteristic merits consideration as a
+potential means of facilitating or obstructing movement. Some
+localities may have been developed as repair, supply, or air bases.
+Others may be sources of essential raw materials. Certain points may
+be heavily fortified. Island formations may be valuable to either
+opponent, or to both, because of the capacity and security of their
+harbors, the character of their terrain, or their positions relative
+to each other. The inherent military value of the several features of
+the theater may be enhanced or vitiated by the relative position which
+each occupies with respect to other features, and with reference to
+the location of the armed forces involved.
+
+So-called "strategic points", historically significant in connection
+with military operations, derive their importance by reason of their
+relative position with reference to routes of movement.
+
+The possibilities of utilizing or of changing the characteristics of a
+theater of operations, to assist, hamper, or deny movement, are
+governed by considerations previously discussed (see the Principle of
+the Proper Physical Conditions to be established in the Field of
+Action--page 34).
+
+In planning the creation or maintenance of a favorable military
+situation from the standpoint of relative position, there may,
+therefore, profitably be included an examination into:
+
+(a) The relation which may exist between the geographical location of
+the subdivisions of one's own forces and
+
+      (1) Those of the enemy,
+
+      (2) Geographical areas under one's own control, and
+          positions within those areas,
+
+      (3) Geographical areas not under one's own control, and
+          positions within those areas,
+
+      (4) Areas coveted or in dispute,
+
+      (5) Fixed actual and potential repair and operating bases
+          and sources of supply and replenishment, own and enemy,
+          controlled or otherwise.
+
+(b) The relation existing among the geographical locations listed
+immediately above, including the effect of possible changes in
+control.
+
+(c) The bearing of the sun and moon, and the direction of the wind and
+sea.
+
+(d) The length and vulnerability of possible lines of communication.
+
+(e) The time and distance, and resulting relative speeds, involved in
+movements necessary to change or to maintain an existing relation.
+
+(f) The measures incident to adequate freedom of action.
+
+A more detailed analysis of the factors influencing relative position
+is made in Section I-B of the Estimate Form (Chapter VI).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In connection with the factor of consequences as to costs, the
+requirement as to acceptability is a weighing of expected gains and of
+reasonably anticipated losses, a balancing of the one against the
+other, with due attention to the demands of future action, (see page
+61).
+
+Military movement normally involves an inescapable expenditure of
+military resources. The characteristics of the theater, alone, will
+exact their due toll, even if no enemy be present. In the presence of
+the enemy, such expenditures may increase with great rapidity. The
+fundamental consideration here is whether the resultant losses are
+disproportionate to the gains.
+
+Avoidance of movement is frequently the correct decision, because
+movement, if it offers no advantages, is scarcely justifiable even if
+it entails no material loss. Movement, merely for the sake of moving,
+is not a profitable military operation. However, the conduct of
+military operations without major movement is a concept inherently
+defensive (page 75), even apathetic, whose outcome, against an
+energetic enemy, can rarely be other than defeat. In the execution of
+advantageous movement to achieve correct military objectives, the
+competent commander is always ready to accept the losses which are
+inseparable from his gains.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The foregoing considerations as to advantageous relative positions are
+applicable, not only in the realm of the commander's decisions as to
+his own action, but also to his judgments rendered when higher
+authority calls for recommendations (see page 42).
+
+
+Apportionment of Fighting Strength
+
+Fundamental Considerations. The assignment of a task may be expected
+to carry with it availability of fighting strength deemed adequate by
+higher authority for accomplishment of the operation involved.
+
+In appropriate instances, the higher command may call for
+recommendations as to the amount and character of the means deemed
+adequate by the subordinate for performance of the task with which he
+is, or is to be, charged (page 42).
+
+In any case, means having been made available, it remains for a
+commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion these
+available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite
+strength at points likely to be decisive, without unduly weakening
+other points. In effect, he is charged with a practical adjustment of
+means to ends. This responsibility is discharged by the effective
+utilization of means and prevention of waste nicely balanced through
+full consideration of all essential elements of a favorable military
+operation. The procedure involved has been indicated (see the
+corollary Principle for the determination of the Proper Means to be
+Made Available--page 34).
+
+The relation between the strength to be brought to bear in dealing
+with a selected physical objective, the tactical concern of the
+moment, and that necessary to the attainment of the strategical aim
+(see pages 9 and 10), constitutes a fundamental consideration in
+effecting such a balance.
+
+In making a correct apportionment, there will be involved not only the
+physical elements of fighting strength, but the mental and moral as
+well. With respect to mental and moral factors, the capabilities of
+particular commanders and organizations may be an important factor in
+apportioning forces to tasks. In the physical field, numbers and types
+occupy a prominent position, each however, requiring consideration
+from the standpoint of the existing situation.
+
+Thus, forces composed of appropriate types and suitably equipped and
+trained may exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not
+so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. On the other
+hand, numerical considerations become predominant under conditions
+otherwise substantially equal.
+
+These considerations, viewed in the light of the relationship of naval
+operations to land areas (page 63), indicate the importance which may
+attach to immediate availability, with a naval force, in addition to
+its own air strength, of a proper complement of land forces (with
+appropriate air strength) which are organized, equipped, and trained
+for amphibious operations.
+
+The same considerations point also to the vital importance of due
+provision, with respect to the armed forces of a State, for joint
+operations involving concerted action on land, by sea, or in the air.
+
+In connection with the capabilities of particular commanders (page
+66), it will be appreciated how important it is, more especially in
+amphibious or joint operations, for responsible officers to have a
+correct understanding of the powers and limitations of the several
+types of military forces involved, be their primary medium of movement
+the land, the sea, or the air.
+
+Factors of dispersion and concentration are also involved in
+apportionment of fighting strength.
+
+While undue dispersion may result in lack of adequate fighting
+strength where required, a certain degree of dispersion may be
+necessary to meet the demands of movement and of freedom of action.
+Serious errors in this regard, however, may result in inability to
+furnish support where needed, and in consequent punishment or
+isolation of one or more valuable detachments.
+
+In distant operations some dispersion is required to safeguard long
+lines of communication. The requirements for this purpose may
+sometimes be so great that, unless the total available strength is
+adequate, a due apportionment to the guarding of long lines of
+communication may so weaken the main force as to prevent the
+attainment of the objective. (See also page 63.)
+
+Proper dispersion is, therefore, a requirement to be met, while undue
+dispersion is to be avoided. But realization is also necessary, in
+this connection, that there is an equal danger in over-concentration.
+An undue concentration of means at any point may subject such a force
+to unnecessary loss. Another disadvantage may be lack of adequate
+fighting strength elsewhere.
+
+Accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to divide a total
+force, while containing a sound element of caution, is misleading and
+inadequate, for division is often necessary or desirable. To be
+adequate, a maxim or rule relating to division of force should
+indicate when, and in what measure, such division may or may not be
+necessary or desirable. (See also page 25.)
+
+Similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is the statement
+that the requirements of effective warfare are met by bringing
+superiority to bear at the decisive time and place. Such an injunction
+is of little assistance in solving practical problems as to the
+appropriate degree of superiority, and as to the proper time and
+place.
+
+In like manner, any rule is faulty which advises a commander to seek
+the solution of his problems by always bringing to bear his elements
+of strength against the hostile elements of weakness. It may be found,
+on occasion, that it is necessary or desirable to act with strength
+against strength.
+
+But it is equally faulty to maintain that action, to be effective,
+seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements
+of strength. Even when the strongest opposition cannot be defeated by
+direct action of this nature, success may still be possible by first
+disposing of elements of weakness. When the stronger elements of a
+hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss, yet cannot
+stand without the weaker, consideration may well be given to an
+apportionment of fighting strength on the basis of seeking a decision
+against the latter. The defeat of a relatively small force at a
+distance from the area where the main forces are concentrated in
+opposition, may hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective.
+
+The main effort, where the greater force is employed, may be identical
+with the effort contributing most directly to the final result. This
+identity, however, does not always exist, and the decisive influence
+is frequently exerted by a relatively small force, sometimes at a
+distance from the principal area of action.
+
+Diversions (see also as to feints, page 59) are not likely to be
+profitable unless constituting a sufficient threat, or unless offering
+apparent advantages to the enemy which he feels that he cannot forego.
+Success will attend justified diversions if they lead the enemy to
+reapportion his fighting strength to meet the threat, either because
+he expects repetitions (see page 73, as to raids), or because the area
+involved may become a new theater of action, or for other pertinent
+reasons.
+
+Means which are inadequate for the attainment of an objective if used
+in one effort may sometimes be rendered adequate by utilizing them in
+a series of successive impulses. Similarly, the effect of employing
+means otherwise adequate may be intensified by the delivery of attacks
+in waves.
+
+Procedure for Determining Proper Apportionment. The fundamental
+considerations outlined above as to apportionment of fighting strength
+have application both to the offensive and the defensive (see also
+discussion on page 75). As to all of these considerations, the
+solution for the particular situation is to be found only through an
+analysis of the factors applying to the particular problem.
+
+Thus, the first consideration relates to suitability, and requires
+that the apportionment of means be suitable both as to type and as to
+amount, in order to produce the appropriate effect desired in view of
+the means opposed and of the influence of the characteristics of the
+theater. The fundamentals involved, applicable in all human activities
+(see the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made Available--page 34),
+are the factors cited above. These are also, of course, indicated in
+the Fundamental Military Principle.
+
+The correct apportionment may also be influenced by any military
+changes to be effected in the characteristics of the theater (as
+indicated in the Principle of Proper Physical Conditions to be
+Established--page 34). Thus, the establishment of a well defended base
+may operate, properly, to reduce the requirements for apportionment of
+a force for a particular duty in that locality. Similarly, the proper
+use of fortifications, obstacles, demolitions, and routes by land,
+sea, and air, as well as facilities for exchange of information and
+orders, all operate to increase fighting strength relative to that of
+the enemy.
+
+The next consideration, that of feasibility, takes account of the type
+and of the amount of means that can be apportioned in view of the
+means available.
+
+In connection with the foregoing there will be appropriate
+requirements for the operation as a whole and for its component
+operations. All of these requirements may call for analysis of the
+relative positions to be utilized, with reference to the selected
+physical objectives, and of the requirements for adequate freedom of
+action.
+
+Finally, the requirement of acceptability as to the factor of
+consequences will call for consideration of the results of the
+allotments of forces to particular tasks. This is necessary in order
+to arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the military costs involved
+either in event of the success of the effort or in event of its
+failure, and with respect, more especially, to the effects on future
+action.
+
+The attainment of the objective, however suitable as to the effect
+desired, may be found, on the basis of due study, to be infeasible or
+to involve unacceptable consequences. The inescapable conclusion is
+then that an increase in relative fighting strength is required or
+that another objective, feasible of attainment and acceptable with
+respect to consequences, is necessarily to be adopted (see page
+52-53).
+
+
+Freedom of Action
+
+Fundamental Considerations. In providing for proper apportionment of
+fighting strength, a commander may attain the end in view by
+increasing the physical, mental, or moral elements of his own
+strength, relative to the enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's
+strength through imposing restrictions on hostile freedom of action.
+
+Freedom of action will enable a commander to prosecute his plan in
+spite of restrictive influences. That enemy interference will, to a
+greater or less extent, impose restrictions on freedom of action is to
+be expected. Restrictions may also be imposed by physical conditions
+existing in the theater of operations, and by deficiencies and
+omissions which are within the field of responsibility of the
+commander to correct.
+
+Even with fighting strength adequate to overcome enemy opposition and
+physical handicaps, deficiencies and omissions within a commander's
+own field may become effective checks to further progress unless
+avoided through the exercise of foresight. To this end, it is
+desirable to consider certain possibilities which are likely to
+promote freedom of action if properly exploited, and to restrict it if
+neglected.
+
+To a considerable extent, a commander has within his own control the
+degree of influence which his force will exert in the creation or the
+maintenance of a favorable military situation. The power applied by a
+military force is determined not only by the fighting strength of its
+component commands, but also by the degree of coordination of their
+several efforts in the attainment of the objective (see also page 12).
+Whatever the inability of the commander to influence the other aspects
+of a situation, the ability of his command to act unitedly is a matter
+largely in his hands.
+
+When time permits, subordinate commanders, apprised of contemplated
+tasks in general terms, may be called upon to submit recommendations
+as to the detailed instructions to be issued them, as well (page 66)
+as to the means to be allotted for the purpose. By this procedure,
+individual initiative (page 15) is fostered and the higher command
+enabled to utilize the first-hand knowledge and experience gained on
+lower echelons without, however, divesting the higher command of any
+of its responsibility.
+
+The command system may provide for unified action through unity of
+command or through cooperation resulting from mutual understanding. On
+the assumption that commanders are competent and that communications
+are adequate, unity of command is the more reliable method. However,
+it cannot be obtained everywhere and at all times, because of the
+necessary decentralization of the command system in areas distant from
+the commander. In such areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured
+by provision for local unity of command. At other times, unity of
+effort may depend entirely on cooperation between adjacent commands
+within the same area. (See page 12.)
+
+Organization (see page 13), the mechanism of command, is most
+effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate
+with responsibility (page 12) and through the assignment of tasks to
+commanders with appropriate capabilities (see also page 66), the
+highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. The command
+organization and mutual understanding are of primary importance as
+methods of ensuring maximum power with available fighting strength,
+and of affording consequent maximum contribution to freedom of action.
+
+Deficiencies in technical training are capable of imposing grave
+restrictions upon freedom of action. Material equipment, even though
+it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction,
+will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained.
+Even though mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity
+which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless
+the methods of movement, i.e., of effecting change in relative
+position (page 59), are intelligently planned and are developed to a
+point which assures facility of operation when in the hands of skilled
+personnel.
+
+Tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations
+(page 67), is one of the vital factors of fighting strength, with
+respect, more especially, to its contributions to freedom of action.
+
+A state of high and stable morale (page 9), founded upon sound
+discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. An
+understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of
+the science of war.
+
+Discipline, in its basic meaning, is the treatment suitable to a
+disciple. The objective of discipline is therefore the creation and
+maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander
+leads. The exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those
+occasions when the commander can be physically present. The exigencies
+of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from
+being always, personally, in the forefront of action. These
+restrictions as to considerations of space however, impose no
+limitations on leadership in terms of time.
+
+The influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to
+shape the situation according to his will (page 47), though the
+necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. The
+ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute
+the commander's will wherever he may be (page 15) is, accordingly, a
+primary attribute of command.
+
+With this objective in mind, the true disciplinarian runs no risk of
+confusing harshness with the exercise of justice. He understands the
+difference between an overbearing arrogance, arising from unconscious
+ignorance, and the pride which springs from a justified self-respect.
+He appreciates the distinction between mere stubbornness, which would
+alienate his followers, and the necessary firmness which binds the
+bonds between the leader and the led. He realizes that comradeship,
+without presumptuous familiarity, is the firmest foundation for mutual
+loyalty (page 14). He knows that kindness and consideration, without
+suggestion of pampering, will not be mistaken for weakness by any
+subordinate worthy of the name.
+
+Military subordination, which implies a proud obedience without trace
+of servility, is the essential basis for the development of the
+qualities of command. It is an old adage that, to know how to command,
+one must know how to obey. In the profession of arms, every man is at
+once a leader and a follower; the uncertainties of war may suddenly
+confront any individual, even on the lowest echelon, with the call to
+exercise command.
+
+The requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for
+all training. By proper training of his command, by instilling in it a
+spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its
+morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may
+increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition.
+When a command is inured to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack
+of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually
+employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy.
+
+In connection with these measures, surprise, when judiciously
+conceived and successfully employed, may be a most potent factor.
+Surprise (see page 26) is the injection of the unexpected for the
+purpose of creating an unfavorable military situation for the enemy.
+Its effect is particularly telling when it results in disruption of
+enemy plans, and thus promotes the execution of one's own.
+
+The raid, an offensive measure swiftly executed, often by surprise,
+and followed by a withdrawal, may be a valuable operation when
+employed to attain objectives within its capacity. The collection of
+information, the destruction of important enemy equipment or supplies,
+the neutralization of enemy positions, the severing of physical means
+of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable objectives.
+The attritional effect of repeated raids may be very great. Skillfully
+executed raids frequently produce panic among the populace and thus,
+by political pressure, cause a change in the existing apportionment of
+fighting strength to the extent of upsetting military plans in other
+theaters. This is particularly likely to occur when there is fear,
+justified or otherwise, of repetition (see page 69).
+
+However, because a raid necessarily includes a withdrawal and cannot,
+therefore, accomplish the occupation of territory (see page 46), it
+can have only indirect bearing, however important, upon the final
+outcome of the hostilities against a strong and competent enemy. Like
+other forms of surprise, the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve
+only to disclose one's presence, and thus to betray more important
+future plans. If the raid fails to attain its objective, it may even
+strengthen enemy morale.
+
+The form which surprise may take is not confined to the stratagem, the
+ruse, or the sudden appearance. Any unexpected display of novel
+methods or of fighting strength, moral, mental, or physical, the
+last-named sometimes assuming the character of new and especially
+effective weapons or equipment, is included in the category of
+surprise. The potential value of such methods or weapons is, however,
+reduced or even completely vitiated by the leakage of advance
+information concerning them, not only as to their details, but as to
+the fact of their existence.
+
+Other conditions remaining unchanged, an offensive surprise measure is
+therefore more likely to be effective when the opponent has not been
+given time to prepare a defense against it. On the other hand, where
+there is knowledge that an opponent or possible opponent is taking
+steps of a new or unusual nature and no adequate defense is prepared,
+the equivalent of surprise has been granted him.
+
+Security measures are necessary in order to minimize or prevent
+surprise, or to defeat other efforts aimed at disruption of plans.
+Protection brings security; its basic objective is the conservation of
+fighting strength for future employment. Primarily requiring the
+maintenance of secrecy and the exercise of vigilance and foresight,
+security may be furthered by efficient scouting, by appropriate
+dispositions and formations within the command, and by the use of
+protective detachments and of various types of works in the sphere of
+engineering. Previous discussion (pages 64 and 69), with respect to
+relative position and to the apportionment of fighting strength, has
+indicated how, through fortification and related measures, the
+commander may increase relative fighting strength and thereby promote
+his own freedom of action while restricting that of the enemy.
+
+A commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at
+its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal,
+adequate logistics support. Because of its intimate relationship to
+mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of
+action. Logistics support requires provision for procurement and
+replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and
+replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance.
+Freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics
+support can be extended. (See page 63.)
+
+The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring freedom of
+action. If the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate
+strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. If initiative is
+lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure.
+
+The offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the
+initiative, and of regaining it if lost. Even though there be an
+actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will,
+however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive
+mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable
+opportunity to strike. Completely to abandon the offensive state of
+mind is to forswear victory.
+
+Whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent
+commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will
+of the enemy commander (see page 8). By effective attack upon the
+hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the
+enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which
+the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect.
+
+It does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable
+under all circumstances. Even with superior strength the most skillful
+commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such
+manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive.
+Without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the
+defensive for considerable periods. If the offensive mental attitude
+is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive
+measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and
+deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time,
+may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. It is of
+the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted
+as a settled procedure (see page 65) beyond the time necessary to
+prepare for an effective offensive.
+
+Both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation
+whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. In
+operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a
+combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found
+necessary (see also references to distant operations on pages 63 and
+74). Though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom
+of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive
+action. The enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to
+seize every opportunity to employ the offensive.
+
+Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has
+been found to be sound procedure (see also page 61), provided that the
+general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at
+the proper moment, of the offensive. The methods employed during the
+period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of
+action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the
+offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been
+created.
+
+Familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and
+possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the
+strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be
+encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of
+action. Additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a
+continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information
+collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. Of equal
+importance is the denial of information to the enemy.
+
+In connection with counter-information measures (see page 127), the
+scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular
+consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior
+to publication. A resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn
+to his own advantage all available information, including that
+ostensibly innocuous.
+
+As to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional
+knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both,
+and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for
+devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of
+action.
+
+With a given fighting strength, the ensurance of freedom of action,
+within the field of responsibility of a commander, requires
+consideration of such matters as:
+
+  (a) Efficient provisions for exercise of command,
+  (b) Effective training,
+  (c) A state of high and stable morale, founded on
+  (d) sound discipline,
+  (e) The offensive spirit,
+  (f) The initiative,
+  (g) Surprise,
+  (h) Security,
+  (i) Adequate logistics support,
+  (j) Adequate intelligence and counter-intelligence.
+
+A more detailed analysis of such factors is provided hereafter
+(Chapter VI, as to Section I-B of the Estimate Form). With proper
+provision made in these respects, the commander will be better able to
+deal with those restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the enemy
+and by adverse geographical conditions. With respect to restrictions
+that in a particular situation may be due to the latter cause, it will
+at once be appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend on the
+selection of correct physical objectives, on utilization of
+advantageous relative positions, and on an effective apportionment of
+fighting strength.
+
+Each measure, or each operation, for freedom of action, if it is to
+meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability,
+will be planned on the basis of the foregoing considerations and will
+take account, also, of the inherent requirements of that measure, or
+operation, for freedom of action for itself.
+
+On occasion, higher authority may request the recommendations of the
+commander (see page 42, as to opinions) with reference to provision
+for freedom of action. Such recommendations will properly be based on
+the elements considered in the preceding discussion.
+
+
+IV. SUMMARY
+
+All these considerations involve the proper evaluation of the factors
+applicable (page 25) to the particular problem. Each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, will
+require examination of its suitability with regard to the appropriate
+effect desired; of its feasibility with respect to the action
+contemplated as to physical objectives, relative positions, the
+concurrent apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action;
+and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to consequences as
+to costs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
+
+    Chapter V discusses the four steps in the application of
+    mental effort to the successful attainment of a military
+    objective. Emphasis is placed on such matters as: the Estimate
+    of the Situation in basic problems, together with certain
+    details as to tasks, the mission, courses of action, and the
+    Decision; the formulation of detailed plans, including
+    subsidiary plans; directives; the Running Estimate of the
+    Situation; and the use of Forms in the solution of problems.
+
+
+In Chapter II it has been brought to notice that every problem,
+regardless of its type and scope, has its source in a perplexity
+created by an apparent difficulty inherent in a situation. Where there
+is a sufficient incentive to change or maintain the situation, the
+problem is one which requires solution. (See page 20.)
+
+A situation may be actual or assumed. In broad outline, an actual
+military situation is always likely to present a picture of opposing
+organizations of human beings, each possessed of fighting strength and
+disposed in a locality or localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other.
+
+This picture may be expected to assume various aspects as action
+progresses (see page 38). The concern of the commander is to control
+the unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may attain
+the effect he desires (page 72). (See also Chapter IX.)
+
+The incentive to solve a problem is provided by a realization, on the
+part of the individual concerned, of a need to make provision for the
+attainment of an objective. In the ease of a military problem, such
+incentive may result (1) from a directive issued by higher authority,
+usually in the form of an assigned task, or (2) from the fact that a
+decision already reached by the commander has introduced further
+problems, or (3) from a recognition of the demands of the situation.
+(See page 44.)
+
+An objective is best attained by the successful application of
+properly directed effort. There is thus an essential and continuing
+relationship between the incentive to solve a problem, and the task
+which assigns the objective (or objectives) and thus motivates the
+procedure necessary for the attainment of the objective(s) so assigned
+(page 50).
+
+Such a task may, therefore, be referred to as the motivating task.
+
+The natural mental processes which normal human beings employ in
+solving their problems of business, public affairs, or even personal
+matters, have been previously described as the natural processes for
+employment in the solution of military problems (see Chapter II). In
+adapting these natural processes to military requirements (page 43),
+the only difference imposed is that of studied insistence that the
+factors peculiar to the conduct of war, as recognized in the
+Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), receive thorough analytical
+treatment from the professional viewpoint.
+
+The same observations apply when the field of military operations is
+restricted to that which primarily concerns the naval branch of the
+military profession. No fundamental difference in the solution of
+problems is introduced thereby. The only variations in the application
+of the Fundamental Military Principle are those due to the fact that
+the sea provides the theater of naval operations with distinctive
+characteristics (see page 62).
+
+
+The Approach to the Solution
+
+Studies of the subject indicate that the successful attainment of an
+assigned military objective involves the application of mental effort
+in four distinct steps (see page 3), in fixed sequence, as follows:
+
+    (1) The selection, by the commander, of a correct objective
+        (or objectives) by achieving which he may attain his
+        assigned objective(s). Such selection includes the
+        determination, in proper detail, of the action required.
+
+    (2) The resolution of the required action into detailed
+        military operations.
+
+    (3) The formulation of a directive, or directives, with the
+        intention of immediately inaugurating planned action.
+
+    (4) The supervision of the planned action.
+
+In the chapters which follow, the fundamental procedure distinctive of
+each of these steps will be treated separately and in the sequence
+shown. The sequence of the steps is fixed because of the consequential
+nature of the relationship among the procedures distinctive of the
+several steps. The complete solution of a problem involves,
+necessarily, all four steps. Each step deals with a distinctive type
+of problem, or problems, pertaining to an aspect of the comprehensive
+problem whose solution requires all four steps. No step after the
+first can properly be undertaken unless the included problems involved
+in the preceding steps have been solved.
+
+It does not follow that the completion of one step necessarily
+requires that the next step be undertaken immediately. It will be
+seen, for instance, that the first two steps are concerned with
+planning, the latter two more especially with execution. It is not
+always necessary that a plan be executed; it may be drawn up as a
+precautionary measure.
+
+It is possible, therefore, that the first step only may be taken;
+i.e., that the procedure for the attainment of a particular assigned
+objective may be determined for the sole purpose of making provision
+against a contingency, at that particular time merely an obscure
+probability. Or, as may frequently be the case during peace, the
+procedure may terminate, for the time being, with the completion of
+the second step. In such cases, certain of the necessary military
+operations are worked out in the desired detail as a provision against
+future possibilities, are listed, and filed for reference as needed.
+
+Parts II and III, which follow, deal primarily with the solution of
+those problems of the naval commander which require familiarity with
+the entire process, i.e., all of the four steps given above.
+
+For simplicity of presentation, the procedure is described throughout
+from the mental standpoint of the same commander. The arrangement of
+subject matter conforms to this basis. The several types of problems,
+classified according to the source of the incentive (page 79), are
+discussed in connection with the appropriate step. When a problem
+typical of a previous step arises during the process, the sequence of
+steps is interrupted thereby, but is resumed by a mental return, on
+the part of the commander, to the proper earlier step.
+
+
+The First Step
+
+The mental procedure distinctive of the first step (more fully
+discussed in Chapter VI) deals with the usual case where a commander
+becomes acquainted with the nature of his assigned objective through
+receipt of a directive from his immediate superior, ordinarily in the
+form of an assigned task or assigned tasks. In the discussion of the
+first step, this most likely type of problem is chosen for
+description, i.e., the one where the motivating task (see page 80)
+comes directly from the immediate superior.
+
+For purposes of reference, this problem may conveniently be termed a
+basic problem. In such a case the original situation which gives
+character to the problem may be similarly referred to as the basic
+situation. The full solution of a basic problem always involves a
+basic estimate of the situation, a basic Decision, a basic plan of
+operations, and one or more basic directives. It may, as will be
+shown, also require certain additional directives.
+
+The military Estimate of the Situation, based on the natural mental
+processes (pages 19-20 and 43), is introduced in the first step. The
+reason for making such an Estimate is to provide a basis for a plan to
+accomplish the assigned task. The Estimate constitutes a systematic
+procedure for selection of a correct objective (or objectives),
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, feasible of attainment,
+and acceptable as to the consequences involved in its achievement. The
+selection of such an objective or objectives involves, incidentally
+(see page 44), the determination, in the proper detail, of the action
+required.
+
+This estimate procedure is founded on the Fundamental Military
+Principle (page 41). The procedure is the same as previously indicated
+for the correct selection of objectives (Section II of Chapter IV).
+
+On the basis of a summary of the situation, a recognition of the
+incentive, and an appreciation of the assigned objective(s) (page 79),
+the estimate of a basic problem enables the commander to obtain,
+first, an understanding of (page 43) the appropriate effect desired.
+As a result of this procedure, he can then correctly formulate his
+mission (discussed hereinafter).
+
+For the further understanding of all details pertaining to the
+situation (page 43), the estimate next determines relative fighting
+strength through a survey of the means available and opposed, as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater.
+
+With the basis for solution of the problem thus established, the
+actual solution (page 44), conforming to the system indicated in the
+Fundamental Military Principle, starts with consideration of pertinent
+methods of procedure, as tentative solutions of the problem. These
+take the form of military operations, each denominated a course of
+action (discussed in detail hereinafter). Each such course embodies,
+specifically or inferentially, an objective to be achieved for the
+attainment of the appropriate effect desired. Each course also
+indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken. Every pertinent
+course of action is tested to determine whether it meets the
+requirements of suitability as to the appropriate effect desired, of
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength, and of
+acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs.
+
+Enemy courses of action are subjected to the same treatment.
+
+Each course of action which passes the tests is compared with each
+retained enemy course, after which those courses of action not
+rejected on this basis are compared with each other. The best is then
+selected and embodied in the Decision.
+
+The Decision, accordingly, expresses a general plan of action (or
+provides a basis therefor), including the commander's general
+objective (page 49) for the attainment of the assigned objective. The
+Decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken.
+
+The estimate procedure is applicable not only to the problem of the
+first step, viewed as a whole, but also to the numerous included
+problems. These present themselves during the procedure of solution,
+and call for "estimates within the estimate".
+
+For example, the proper nature of the objective embodied in the
+assigned task (discussed hereinafter), if not clear in the directive
+received, may be determined by the use of the natural mental
+processes. This is done through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle, as previously described (page 52).
+
+Similarly, the solution of the included problems as to the salient
+features of the operations involved (correct physical objectives,
+etc.) can be arrived at through the same processes. The procedure is
+that indicated previously (in Section III of Chapter IV).
+
+The estimate procedure may, however, be somewhat varied, as to
+details, in accordance with the nature of the problem. Such adaptation
+is applicable, for example, as to the special features which
+distinguish certain types of strategical and tactical problems.
+
+Every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects
+(see discussion of strategy and tactics, pages 9 and 10). The
+character of the effort to be exerted at a particular time, and the
+nature of the objectives to be attained, may be governed chiefly by
+strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations. This fact may
+affect details in the estimate of the situation, e.g., as to the
+weight to be given various factors.
+
+The essential difference between strategy and tactics has been shown
+to lie in the end in view. It follows, then, that estimates of broad
+strategical situations and of localized tactical situations tend to
+differ from each other. The former lead to decisions as to such
+matters, among others, as whether a battle shall be fought. The latter
+lead to decisions, among others, as to the comprehensive tactical
+methods to be followed in furtherance of strategical aims. Certain
+distinctions of method as to such estimates are noted hereinafter with
+respect to the analysis of fighting strength and with reference to
+courses of action.
+
+Tasks. The assignment of tasks to subordinates is an essential
+function of the chain of command, applicable to all of the echelons of
+command, from the highest to the lowest (page 12). On the lowest
+echelons, such as that of a gun's crew or a fireroom watch, operations
+thus prescribed involve numerous small specialized tasks, each
+requiring the performance of a simplified routine by a few trained
+men. Although earlier training in the performance of such tasks is
+calculated to remove the necessity of solving the problems of the
+lowest echelons in the four studied steps stated above, it is only
+when the same methods of logical thought have previously been applied
+to the solution of these problems that this state of affairs can be
+brought about.
+
+Properly conceived, each assigned task indicates, either specifically
+or inferentially, an objective (or objectives). The relationships
+existing among the echelons of command, with reference to objectives,
+have previously been noted. (See page 48.) These relationships,
+because a correctly conceived task specifies or infers an objective,
+are equally applicable as to such tasks.
+
+The manner of expressing tasks calls for special comment (see also
+page 53, as to expressing objectives).
+
+The commander may find in the expression of his task a statement,
+only, of the action required. For example, the order "Proceed toward
+the enemy battle line" involves movement, indicating merely a change
+in relative position. No provision appears as to a future condition or
+state of affairs.
+
+Again, the task may be expressed as an order to "Attack the enemy
+battle line." In this case, the enemy battle line is the physical
+objective, but no specific future condition to result from the attack
+is indicated. Here the action and the physical objective are given,
+but the objective is left to be inferred.
+
+If the commander can ascertain, from the directives he receives, his
+task expressed in terms of accomplishment, he may be able to
+visualize the action, the physical objective, and the condition to be
+created. The order "Destroy the enemy battleship" (indicating, as the
+objective, "the destruction of the enemy battleship"), results, when
+successfully completed, in a new condition which is the objective of
+the action against the physical objective.
+
+Accordingly, a task expressed in such terms of accomplishment conveys
+precise information as to the objective; yet such an expression of the
+task does not prevent freedom of action, with opportunity for exercise
+of initiative. The commander who is assigned such a task can clearly
+visualize the results demanded of him, and may feel at liberty to
+employ any one or all of the methods at his disposal.
+
+However, it is not always possible or even desirable to express tasks
+in terms of accomplishment.
+
+For example, where the future situation cannot be adequately
+visualized, either because of the doubtful values of certain factors
+or because of possible changes in circumstances, it may be
+impracticable to assign a definite task in terms of accomplishment.
+
+Under such conditions, and sometimes for other proper reasons, it may
+be desirable to afford a trusted and competent subordinate a
+corresponding measure of freedom of action. In such a case, the
+indication of the commander's general objective for his entire force,
+together with a directive for action along a certain general line,
+without prescription of a definite objective, may be especially
+appropriate to the situation. Such is the frequent usage in the issue,
+for example, of directives of the type known as letters of instruction
+(Chapter VIII).
+
+Again, where immediate response is desired, and where the objective
+may be understood by implication, the task may be better expressed in
+terms of action, rather than of accomplishment. This is frequently the
+case where the task is assigned by word of mouth, by memorandum, or by
+signal. In the last-named instance, the signal, when it constitutes a
+command fully understood by previous usage or experience, may convey a
+practically instantaneous comprehension of the objective. In many such
+instances, however, an inferred objective will require more analysis.
+
+The expression of the task in terms of action is frequently desirable,
+more especially during an engagement, when tactical considerations are
+uppermost. Under such circumstances, two or more objectives may be
+suitable to the appropriate effect desired, but their degree of
+suitability, and the influence of the factors pertaining to
+feasibility and acceptability, may vary rapidly with the course of
+events. In such conditions, an order such as "Attack" without
+indicating a specific physical objective, may be best calculated to
+attain desired results, for the reason, more especially, that it
+affords the subordinate a proper freedom of action.
+
+In many cases, the instructions received by a commander will set forth
+more than one task, often of varying importance. The proper bearing of
+such a double or multiple task upon his future action is set forth,
+together with other relevant matters, in the discussion of the
+mission, which follows.
+
+On occasion, a higher commander, in assigning a task, may elect to
+specify, also, the course of action to be pursued by a subordinate for
+the attainment of the assigned objective: for example--
+
+    "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD by capturing X Island".
+
+Here the task is to deny the enemy the use of available bases in the
+area described; in addition, the higher commander has specified that
+this be accomplished by the adoption of a predetermined course of
+action (page 88), expressed in the words "by capturing X Island."
+Higher authority has in this case made the subordinate's estimate of
+the situation for him, and has thus arrived at the decision which the
+subordinate would ordinarily reach for himself.
+
+Such procedure may be deemed advisable under certain circumstances:
+for example, when time is pressing; when a close control of the
+situation is an important factor; when the qualifications of the
+subordinate are unknown, as yet doubtful, or known to be inadequate
+for the operation in hand; or, for various other reasons which may
+suggest themselves according to the nature of the problem.
+
+Occasionally, higher authority, for similar reasons, may also
+prescribe the action to be taken, in considerable detail. Examples
+occur during operations of unusual complexity, or when the personnel
+factors call for special care in coordination of the action.
+
+Sometimes, higher authority, instead of announcing both the task and
+the predetermined course of action, may indicate only the latter; in
+the example given above, the higher commander would then direct,
+"Capture X Island". The directive might also include, in some detail,
+the action to be taken to this end.
+
+Procedure such as noted in the foregoing examples involves certain
+special considerations from the viewpoint of the subordinate. These
+considerations are discussed hereafter (page 96).
+
+The Mission. In our naval service an assigned task, coupled with its
+purpose, is known as a mission. As explained previously (page 48), the
+purpose indicates the larger aim which is to be served by the
+execution of the task. The task indicates the assigned objective,
+i.e., what is to be accomplished; the purpose, the further objective
+to be served thereby.
+
+The word mission is a derivative of the Latin verb, "to send". Its use
+implies the act of sending someone, or of being sent, as an agent for
+some special duty, a duty imposed by one in authority. Although an
+individual, free to do so, may select his own mission, and thereby
+send himself on a special duty, this is not usually the case where an
+effective military chain of command exists. Normally the sending
+authority is the immediate superior; the agent, the immediate
+subordinate.
+
+The mission, once assigned, does not change until it has been
+accomplished or until it has been modified or revoked by higher
+authority, usually the immediate superior by whom it was assigned.
+
+As previously explained in this connection, the designation of a
+purpose, linked with a task, is an essential element of a mission as
+treated herein. It is essential to unity of effort that the purpose of
+the mission of a commander be common with that of other commanders of
+the same echelon who are to participate in the effort enjoined by
+their superior's directives. Directives expressed in the Order Form
+(page 112 and Chapter VIII) facilitate clear recognition of this
+purpose, which appears in the general plan of action prescribed in the
+second paragraph of that form. The commander may consider the
+relationship thus:
+
+My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out
+my designated part of my immediate superior's general plan.
+
+It is customary to simplify the foregoing to the statement that the
+mission is:
+
+(Task) (statement of the assigned task),
+
+(Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement
+of the superior's general plan).
+
+The words "assist in", etc., may frequently be understood and
+therefore omitted.
+
+The foregoing expression of a mission affords, as later explained
+(Chapter VI), a method for clear visualization of the effect desired
+by higher authority. (See also page 84.)
+
+All of his assigned tasks which materially influence the commander's
+Decision (hereinafter discussed) are properly included in his mission;
+other tasks, naturally, may be omitted in this connection. In the case
+of a double or multiple task (page 86), all the tasks may be related
+to a single purpose, or the included tasks may each, or in certain
+combinations, be linked separately to appropriate purposes.
+
+Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength. The feasibility and
+acceptability of action for the attainment of an objective are
+dependent (see the Fundamental Military Principle--page 41) on the
+factors of fighting strength. Fighting strength (page 35) is derived
+from the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater of operations. A survey of these
+factors, in proper detail according to the nature of the problem, is
+therefore a necessary phase in the process of its solution. Such a
+survey completes the basis for the study of courses of action.
+
+Courses of Action. The estimate process naturally takes account (page
+80) of methods for attaining the objective indicated in the assigned
+task. The military profession has, from time to time, applied a
+variety of terms to designate such methods. Terms so used include,
+among others, "plans open to us" (or "to the enemy"), "lines of
+action", and "courses of action". The last-noted, having been standard
+in our naval service for many years, is the term used in this
+discussion.
+
+Each course of action is thus a plan of military operations for the
+attainment of the assigned objective, and each thus indicates (page
+37) "an act or a series of acts" which may be undertaken to that end.
+Until a final selection is made for embodiment in the Decision, each
+course of action is a tentative solution of the problem. For the
+reason given below, a course of action, while under consideration as a
+tentative solution of the problem, is also correctly conceived as
+indicating an objective and, in proper detail, the action for its
+attainment.
+
+When embodied in the Decision, the adopted course of action or
+combination of courses becomes the commander's general plan (or the
+basis thereof) for the employment of his force; such a general plan
+will naturally indicate the commander's general objective (page 49)
+and, in proper detail, the action to be taken for its attainment (page
+44).
+
+The objective may be specifically stated or may be inferred (see page
+82; also page 84 for the corresponding discussion of the expression
+of tasks); but, in any event, clear thinking demands that the
+objective be definitely envisaged. There is a manifest advantage in
+such definite envisaging of the objectives involved in courses of
+action. Suitability as to the appropriate effect desired--the first
+requirement in the selection of a correct objective (page 51)--is much
+more readily tested on this basis. The practical bearing of this fact
+becomes apparent during the early stages (Chapter VI) of the process
+of solving military problems.
+
+Frequent examples of naval courses of action include (see page 92):
+
+(1) "To destroy the enemy force." Here the objective, "destruction of
+the enemy force", is specifically indicated.
+
+(2) "To divert the enemy force." Here also the objective, in this case
+"diversion of the enemy force", is specifically indicated.
+
+(3) "To evade the enemy." Here again the objective, "evasion of the
+enemy", is specifically indicated.
+
+(4) "To cover friendly and neutral trade." Here the objective,
+"protection of friendly and neutral trade by the utilization of
+advantageous covering positions", is more or less inferred.
+
+(5) "To escort trade." Here the objective, "protection of trade by
+escorting it in convoys", is more or less inferred.
+
+(6) "To patrol the trade routes." Here the objective, e.g.,
+"protection of trade by patrolling the trade routes", is inferred.
+
+(7) "To raid." Here the objective, e.g., "infliction of loss and
+damage by raiding", is inferred.
+
+In the foregoing instances, the action to be taken is indicated in
+general terms. The extent to which the action may properly be
+indicated depends on the nature of the problem and is necessarily left
+to the judgment of the commander. Two possibilities, between which
+there may be various intermediate cases, are as follows:
+
+        (a) To destroy the enemy force by simultaneous attacks on
+    the escort and convoy.
+
+        (b) To destroy the enemy force by an attack with the main
+    force on the escort, following this immediately by an attack
+    on the convoy with a flanking force before the convoy can
+    scatter so widely as to make ineffective the pursuit of any of
+    its units.
+
+For a further application, it will be noted that the national policies
+referred to early in this discussion (page 7) are national courses of
+action, considered and adopted as methods of attaining national
+objectives.
+
+The expression "courses of action", in the sense of a plan considered
+or adopted as a solution of the problem, has the defect that it
+appears to emphasize the action, rather than the paramount component,
+i.e., the objective. So long as this fact is borne in mind, the
+limitations of the term "courses of action" need not operate to
+influence, adversely, the solution of the problem.
+
+As noted above, the commander brings to mind courses of action by the
+mental act of "envisaging", i.e., "viewing with the mind's eye or
+conceptionally", "seeing as a mental image", bringing fully and
+distinctively to view. How is this done?
+
+Although the time available for the process depends on the particular
+problem, the process itself is the same for all. During the
+clarification of the problem, the commander will have entertained
+certain ideas,--ideas as to such matters as the existing situation,
+the desired new situation, the possible physical objectives, the
+relative positions and movements of the forces involved, and related
+matters. His training and experience cause these ideas to evoke
+others, which are associated in his mind with problems of the
+past,--in particular, with the bearing of such ideas on the outcome of
+those problems.
+
+This process of thinking, if it is to be effective as well as
+reflective, requires mental access to certain sources of ideas. These
+sources may lie in the study of history, or in the wealth of doctrine
+and instructions gathered into official manuals and into other
+professional writings, or in the commander's own practical experience.
+Logicians who have investigated this natural process point out that
+suggested solutions are the resurrection of ideas from past
+experience. Good thinking demands access to a large storehouse of
+ideas connected in various and flexible ways. The best available
+knowledge is the main source from which reflective thinking obtains
+relevant and promising suggestions for a solution.
+
+By such resort to analogy, the commander utilizes the accumulations of
+past experience. Sometimes he finds that the courses of action thus
+suggested are exactly suitable as tentative solutions for his problem.
+In other instances, of course, only parts of the present situation are
+found to be analogous to those previously encountered. Even then,
+however, the similarity of the facts may be helpful in providing
+suggestions. Guidance based on limited or partial similarity has been
+demonstrated to be better than purely intuitive thinking.
+
+The commander cannot be content, however, to depend wholly on the
+guidance of the past. Sometimes, moreover, he may not be able to
+obtain suggestions by analogy. New suggestions, ideas not drawn from
+past experience, are very desirable; they are possible, also, in the
+sense that the result of the analysis of past experience may be
+reassembled, in imagination, in novel ways. New courses of action,
+overlooked in the past, may be contrived. Original combinations, not
+previously entertained, may be devised. Readiness to employ the novel
+and the new, as well as to utilize the old, is a prime qualification
+for command.
+
+Reflective thinking of this nature requires adequate knowledge of the
+capabilities of weapons, so that new possibilities may be perceived as
+to coordination in their use. While analogy looks backward to find
+applicable lessons, the search for novelty seeks suggestions from
+potentialities not heretofore utilized.
+
+The development of the full possibilities of new weapons is an
+important source of forward thinking. Such thinking constantly
+integrates the current developments in war. The competent commander
+does not wait for history to be made; he makes it.
+
+Familiarity with experimentation, research, and new performance is
+also a fruitful source of suggestions. When used, this method results
+in advance demands by the armed forces for new weapons not yet
+supplied.
+
+Closely allied to analogy is the application of ordered and classified
+knowledge as to the nature of warfare. Aware of the effects which can
+be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander
+identifies his objective with one or more of these effects.
+
+The application of ordered and classified knowledge of naval warfare
+starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and
+proceeds thereafter to the study of the various classes of operations
+which may be utilized to this end. Naval effort has as its objective
+the keeping open of sea communications (see page 62). Command of the
+sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the
+ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the
+enemy from doing so.
+
+Naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the
+purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas,
+especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping
+open of sea communications are of vital importance.
+
+Such operations may be classified under the headings:
+
+    (1) For securing command of sea areas,
+    (2) In sea areas not under command, and
+    (3) In sea areas under command.
+
+On the basis of this classification, specific operations, broadly
+considered, appear to be limited in number. As to classification (1),
+applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to
+contain them, or to divert them. For (2), applicable operations are:
+to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval
+lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring
+overseas movement. For (3), applicable operations are: to blockade
+trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard
+expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive
+operations against enemy coastal objectives.
+
+Manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in
+an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. Each such course
+of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or
+less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which
+constitute parts of the whole. (See page 37.)
+
+There can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between
+courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto.
+For example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a
+character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged,
+correlatively with "to destroy", as one of his courses of action. Yet,
+in another problem, a raid may be visualized, properly, as a detailed
+operation pertaining, in a subordinate capacity, to a more
+comprehensive operation envisaged as a course of action "to destroy".
+
+Similarly, what is a broad course of action from the viewpoint of one
+echelon in the chain of command, may be correctly viewed, on a higher
+echelon, as a detailed operation. Operations assigned in tasks imposed
+by higher authority become the basis for the determination of courses
+of action on the next lower echelon, a procedure which continues
+throughout the chain of command until specialized, on the lowest
+echelons, in the form of a simplified routine (see page 84).
+
+While the list of courses of action given above is made up from the
+viewpoint of broad strategical problems, a similar list can be
+assembled for other problems. For example, the order, "Destroy enemy
+naval forces", if taken as the motivating task of a tactical
+estimate, will be the basis for certain courses of action,
+constituting, when complete (see below), a well-recognized general
+plan for a naval battle. This plan will in turn call for various
+detailed operations on the part of the several subdivisions of the
+force under the commander who makes the estimate (see page 95).
+
+As a tentative solution of the problem a course of action may be
+complete or partial, i.e., it may, if carried out, provide for the
+complete attainment of the objective; or, such complete attainment may
+require a combination of several of the courses of action under study.
+
+The exclusive consideration of courses of action of the complete type
+possesses the advantage of minimizing the total number of solutions
+under study. This simplifies the procedure of analysis and of
+comparing courses of action with each other, because of the relatively
+small number of courses to be tested and to be compared.
+
+However, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
+visualize complete courses of action, especially during the early
+stages of the estimate. Sometimes the initial visualization of partial
+courses and their eventual combination into a complete solution will
+be found necessary.
+
+Therefore, either or both of the foregoing systems of formulating
+courses of action may be found appropriate, according to individual
+preference and the nature of the particular problem.
+
+Individuals, comparable with respect to knowledge, appear to vary
+greatly in their ability to produce the appropriate suggestion, as to
+courses of action, at the right time. The reason for this phenomenon
+is not altogether clear, but it is known that thinking seems to be
+limited not merely by the range of knowledge, but by whatever part of
+it becomes available when needed. This point invites attention to
+another procedure which is open to the commander with respect to
+stimulating reflective thinking. This procedure recognizes the fact
+that, when two or more minds attack a problem, together, the combined
+effort often increases the applied mental power. This fact is
+universally recognized, for example, in the utilization of staff
+assistance (page 13).
+
+Inherent and acquired ability have unquestionably much to do with the
+possibilities of visualizing single courses of action with respect to
+their completeness as to attainment of the objective. One method of
+visualization seems to be the mental picturization of more or less
+detailed operations, followed by their combination, through rapid
+synthesis, into complete courses of action.
+
+An example of this method would occur where several rather specific
+operations were visualized, involving seizure of certain localities as
+a defensive measure. If it were then observed that the objective in
+each such case was "denial to the enemy of a particular naval-base
+site in the area ABCD", an appropriate expression of a comprehensive
+course of action would be "to deny the enemy naval-base sites in the
+area ABCD".
+
+Another method of visualizing appropriate courses of action seems to
+involve initial recognition, in the first instance, of such courses as
+broad and comprehensive general plans, without first visualizing and
+combining their details. This method appears to be more usual after
+considerable experience or training. It is therefore possible that
+this second method is merely a practiced development of the first, the
+process of synthesis being so rapidly accomplished that it becomes
+subconscious.
+
+The nature of the particular problem has also an unquestioned bearing
+on this subject. In instances where no single course of action can be
+found which is adequately expressive of complete attainment of the
+objective, the final selection of a method of attaining the objective
+will necessarily be through a combination of the courses of action
+under study (page 93).
+
+For example, if the assigned task were to "protect trade in sea area
+ABCD", the extent of the area, together with its geographical position
+relative to locations from which enemy attacks could be launched,
+might not be such as to permit the attainment of the objective by a
+single course of action such as "to escort trade in convoys" or "to
+patrol the trade routes". Both of these courses of action might be
+necessary, and, in addition, perhaps, the further course "to cover
+focal points M and N".
+
+Each of these courses of action has, as its objective, the
+establishment of a protected area or areas, stationary or moving, for
+the safe passage of merchant vessels. However, for purposes of
+expressing the course of action involved, the contemplated procedure
+is in this case better indicated by a combination expressed in terms
+of action, the objective being inferred as a matter of mutual
+understanding. The less particularized expression of the course of
+action in terms of the objective would, in this instance, convey a
+less definite idea of the procedure under consideration.
+
+Similar considerations pertain frequently to naval problems, more
+especially to those involving naval engagements of considerable scope.
+The solution of such a problem takes, typically, the form of an
+operation consisting, not of a single "act", but of "a series of
+acts", i.e., of a number of stages or phases of battle, each being a
+preparation for the one following, until the final stage provides for
+the attainment of the assigned objective.
+
+For example, a first consideration might be "to reduce enemy carrier
+aircraft strength by" certain pertinent operations. A second
+consideration might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed by" certain
+operations in order to force the enemy to accept battle. A third might
+be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed, life, and hitting power by
+gunfire" within certain range bands, in order to exploit own strength
+and enemy weakness at those ranges. A fourth might be "to continue
+reduction of enemy battle-line strength by gunfire, closing to" such a
+range as is suitable to that end. Finally, a fifth consideration might
+be "to inflict conclusive damage on enemy battle-line with torpedoes".
+All of the foregoing partial courses (other possibilities having been
+studied and discarded) might then be combined into one operation as
+the selected course of action "in order to destroy the enemy
+battleship strength",--such destruction being the assigned objective.
+
+The degree of detail in which a course of action may be visualized for
+purposes of the estimate will vary with the same factors, i.e.,
+personal facility and the nature of the problem. Practice in the
+solution of problems appears to develop such facility that entire
+plans can be visualized as courses of action, each plan reasonably
+complete as to details with reference to physical objectives, relative
+positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for
+freedom of action. However, it is rarely, if ever, necessary to
+visualize courses of action minutely in an estimate of a basic
+problem; the extent to which they are viewed mentally, as detailed
+plans, need only be such as to fulfill the requirements of the
+particular problem (see Section I of Chapter IV).
+
+The statement of a course of action, for purposes of the estimate,
+will naturally be along broad and comprehensive lines, although some
+important matters of detail (relatively speaking) may be added if this
+is found desirable as the estimate proceeds. It is with these
+considerations in mind that the standard practice has been developed
+of formulating courses of action, while under study as tentative
+solutions of the problem, in broad terms, appropriate to general plans
+of action.
+
+The commander may find, on occasion, what appears, on first
+examination, to be an exception to the rule, herein treated as valid,
+that a course of action, correctly conceived, always contains the two
+elements (1) objective, specific or inferred, and (2) action for its
+attainment. However, apparent exceptions to this principle are due to
+special conditions which, on proper analysis, reveal no actual
+exceptions. Certain examples, now to be discussed, demonstrate this
+fact.
+
+For instance, when the higher commander deems such procedure advisable
+(page 86), he may make his subordinate's estimate of the situation, as
+well as his own, and may accordingly indicate both a task and a
+predetermined course of action for the subordinate to pursue: for
+example:
+
+    "Deny enemy base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island."
+
+In such a case the higher commander has indicated the predetermined
+course of action in the words "by capturing X Island". This expression
+indicates a specific objective, the capture of X Island. The
+expression also indicates, though not in any detail, the action to be
+taken, i.e., it specifies "capture", rather than "occupation",
+"isolation", or some other form of control (page 8). Any further
+development of the action is left for the subordinate to determine.
+The procedure to be followed by the subordinate commander in solving
+such a problem is described hereafter (page 102) in the discussion of
+the analysis of courses of action. In any event, it is manifest that
+there is here no exception to the rule that a course of action,
+correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action
+for its attainment.
+
+A further example may occur when the higher commander, instead of
+indicating both the task and the predetermined course of action,
+indicates only the latter (page 86), by directing "Capture X Island".
+Once the subordinate has recognized this directive as containing a
+predetermined course of action, but not a normal task, he realizes
+that the objective so indicated would ordinarily be left for him to
+select. He also realizes that the action to be taken for its
+attainment is left for him to determine, in further detail.
+
+In this case, then, what is really a predetermined course of action
+appears in the guise of a task. When the commander, receiving the
+directive, has recognized this fact, he proceeds in the manner
+hereafter indicated (page 103) in the discussion of the analysis of
+courses of action.
+
+In any event, it is manifest that here, also, there is no exception
+to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the
+two elements of objective and action for its attainment.
+
+In such a case as the foregoing, how does the commander recognize that
+the apparent task is really a predetermined course of action? He could
+easily go astray because the directive, until analyzed, appears to
+contain a normal task. The directive indicates an objective, thereby
+resembling a task. The directive will usually indicate, at least in
+some degree, the action which the subordinate is to take. Hence, so
+far as superficial appearance is concerned, the subordinate commander
+may easily mistake the predetermined course of action for a normal
+task. However, he discovers the difference when he endeavors to find
+courses of action which are appropriate to this apparent task.
+
+The commander will then discover that, while he can visualize actions
+whose accomplishment will attain the objective indicated in the
+apparent task, he cannot visualize any objective completely suitable
+to the case (page 93), intermediate between the assigned objective and
+the indicated action. He can state the assigned objective in other
+words and adopt such a statement as an expression of his general
+objective, but the two objectives, the one he selects and the assigned
+one, will really be identical.
+
+This inability to visualize an objective of the commander's own
+selection, suitable to the case, is inevitable, because higher
+authority has already done this for him. He may find it advisable to
+develop further the action needed for the attainment of the indicated
+objective. On occasion this, also, will have been predetermined by the
+higher commander.
+
+The foregoing considerations have been given special emphasis and
+deserve careful study, because an appreciation of these facts is
+necessary to a true understanding of the nature of correctly conceived
+courses of action.
+
+Analysis and Selection of Courses of Action. After one or more courses
+of action have been determined as tentative solutions of his problem,
+the commander will be confronted with the necessity of deciding upon
+that course of action, or combination of courses of action, which will
+best attain the assigned objective, i.e., be the best way out of the
+seeming difficulty. The analysis, in each case, will settle
+suitability on the basis of the appropriate effect desired,
+feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength as established
+by a survey of means available and opposed, influenced by the
+characteristics of the theater, and acceptability on the basis of
+consequences as to costs.
+
+In connection with these considerations, the detailed operations
+involved in each course will be analyzed so far as may be necessary
+(page 95) and with respect to correct physical objectives,
+advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting
+strength, and adequate freedom of action (see the Fundamental Military
+Principle--page 41). A selection shown to be best, from the standpoint
+of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the consequences,
+will be adopted as the decision.
+
+The tests of courses of action to determine whether they fulfill the
+requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability as
+to consequences take account of the usual included determinants as
+listed and explained below. The list is not rigid, and the commander,
+according to the nature of his problem, may desire to omit certain of
+the items or to include any other considerations which may be
+applicable.
+
+With respect to suitability, the commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The test for suitability (see also page 31)
+    calls for conformity as to both the nature and the scope of
+    the motivating task. With respect to conformity in nature,
+    the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+    action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+    contribute to the accomplishment of the task. As to scope,
+    the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of
+    action, if carried out successfully, will or will not
+    accomplish the task in full; and, if not in full, to what
+    extent. The factor of urgency is also considered here.
+
+    It is frequently possible for the commander, merely by
+    concentrating his thought on this particular perplexity, to
+    conclude at once that the course of action is suitable. In
+    other cases, a considerable amount of study may be needed.
+    This analytical study consists in breaking down the course of
+    action into its component parts, i.e., the detailed operations
+    which naturally grow out of it. This procedure is similar to
+    that described later (Chapter VII), with respect to
+    formulating a plan, but during the basic estimate the
+    procedure, when utilized, is for a different reason--solely
+    that of assisting in the analysis.
+
+    (2) Details, (a) Conformity as to nature. Will the course of
+    action, if successfully carried out, contribute, at least in
+    some degree, to the accomplishment of the task? If not, such a
+    course is rejected. Courses that do contribute, however, are
+    not rejected until the possibilities of combination have been
+    examined, later.
+
+    (b) Completeness. If the course of action is successfully
+    carried out, will it accomplish in full the motivating task?
+    If not, how much will it contribute towards such
+    accomplishment? With what other courses of action can it be
+    combined, to accomplish the motivating task in full? With what
+    others can it be combined to accomplish the motivating task in
+    part, and in such case how nearly does the combination
+    contribute to full accomplishment?
+
+    This examination may lead to combinations of certain partial
+    solutions.
+
+    (c) Desirability as to Urgency. The commander now considers
+    the element of time. Complete accomplishment of the motivating
+    task within his own theater may come too late to meet the
+    requirements of the common effort of the entire force.
+    Synchronization with the action of other task-group commanders
+    may be so important that timing becomes vital. As to this
+    consideration, two courses of action, equally competent, may
+    differ greatly in their qualification relating to urgency; one
+    may be found highly desirable and the other completely
+    unsatisfactory.
+
+As to feasibility, the commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The test for feasibility (see page 31) is
+    concerned with whether the course of action is practicable.
+    Has it reasonable chances of success under the particular
+    circumstances? Are the difficulties surmountable? Is it
+    easily practicable, practicable with some difficulty, or very
+    difficult?
+
+    The commander, if he concludes that the course of action is
+    not a practicable one, rejects it from further consideration
+    in the estimate of the situation. However, care is taken at
+    this point not to dismiss, abruptly, courses of action which
+    may later be combined advantageously with one or more others.
+
+    Here, again, as noted for the suitability test, the commander
+    may sometimes profitably analyze the course of action by
+    breaking it down into more detailed operations.
+
+    As a result of the tests discussed above, the commander is
+    able to make a list of courses of action upon which his
+    confirmed judgment has bestowed the qualities of suitability
+    and feasibility.
+
+    He is also able to take stock to see how many of the solutions
+    are complete, how many are incomplete, and in the latter case
+    to what extent they constitute partial solutions. It is, of
+    course, desirable to have as many complete solutions as
+    possible, and at this point it may be possible to merge two or
+    more incomplete solutions into a single course of action which
+    better fulfills the test of suitability. The commander can
+    also take stock, similarly, of the degree of feasibility,
+    already referred to, as to the retained courses of action.
+
+    (2) Details, (a) Prospects of Success. Here the several courses
+    of action are considered relatively, with respect to the chance
+    of success in each. In the rating of courses on this basis,
+    the commander excludes consideration of losses except as they
+    may influence success or failure. He notes, however, his
+    considered expectations as to losses. Losses may appear to be
+    so great that success is doubtful. Certain courses of action
+    may be particularly vulnerable to enemy opposition because of
+    the types of weapons involved or because of favorable enemy
+    positions. Choice of such a course would permit the enemy an
+    initial advantage.
+
+    (b) Facility of Execution. This subject has to do with the
+    relative ease or difficulty of carrying out the several
+    courses of action. On the basis of the existing situation,
+    each course of action may be compared with all the others to
+    determine their relative merits with regard to the facility of
+    execution. Consideration is given to the action involved
+    against the several physical objectives; to the movements
+    needed in making new dispositions; to the relative adequacy of
+    the forces as to numbers and types of weapons; and to the
+    measures required for freedom of action.
+
+    A review of the previous discussion of these elements (Chapter
+    IV) may be very helpful in connection with this comparison. As
+    to freedom of action, for example, the commander may ask
+    himself which course is best from the standpoint of using the
+    initiative to advantage; and which course of action lends
+    itself best to the advantageous use of surprise. As the
+    commander reflects on these matters, other similar questions
+    may be suggested.
+
+    (c) Utilization of Own Strength and Exploitation of Enemy
+    Weakness. In his original visualization of each course of
+    action, the commander has naturally considered how to utilize
+    his own strength to best advantage, and how best to exploit
+    enemy weakness. In fact, especially in a detailed tactical
+    estimate, these considerations may have been predominant in
+    envisaging the courses of action. A careful evaluation of the
+    merits of each course of action in this respect is accordingly
+    necessary before a choice is made.
+
+With regard to acceptability of consequences as to costs, the
+commander considers the following:
+
+    (1) General. The process of putting a course of action to
+    proof as a tentative solution of the problem remains
+    incomplete until the course has been tested to determine its
+    consequences as to costs, so far as these can be visualized
+    in advance. The process involves an evaluation of the
+    diminution in total advantage which will result in the event
+    of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the
+    event of success. The situation to be expected, if the course
+    of action is carried out, is visualized in order to determine
+    the future effect on the creation or maintenance of an
+    ultimately favorable military situation.
+
+    In testing each course of action for acceptability as to its
+    consequences (page 31), the commander considers the cost of
+    success, the cost of failure, and the possible gain and loss
+    in perspective with the united effort as a whole. Questions
+    which he may pose include: If the course of action is
+    successful, will the costs be so prohibitive as to adversely
+    affect the successful accomplishment of the further effort? If
+    a tactical situation is under consideration, will the costs
+    prevent the accomplishment of the strategical aim? If the
+    course of action fails, what will be its effect? Will it cause
+    the entire plan to fail? Will its failure affect, for example,
+    the national morale?
+
+    If the command--and ultimately the State--can afford the
+    losses and other disadvantages which will be incurred as a
+    result of either the success or the failure of the
+    contemplated effort, a course of action may be considered as
+    acceptable from the standpoint of consequences as to costs.
+
+    As previously noted with respect to suitability, it may be
+    desirable to consider, with regard to consequences, the
+    detailed operations which may be involved in each course of
+    action.
+
+    Courses of action involving excessive consequences as to costs
+    are rejected. Notation is made of the relative degree of
+    acceptability, with respect to consequences as to costs, of
+    those courses of action which are retained.
+
+    (2) Details. (a) The Results of Success and of Failure. Each
+    course of action is examined to visualize the situation which
+    would be brought about for the commander and for the enemy in
+    case of success or of failure. The relative possibilities of
+    recovery toward a more favorable situation are weighed. This
+    consideration involves relative risks, for it may be that a
+    certain course, otherwise satisfactory, might entail
+    intolerable conditions should failure ensue.
+
+    The costs are measured in terms of fighting strength. It has
+    to be considered whether the sacrifices involved are worth the
+    gains which will follow; whether the objectives if attained
+    will be sufficiently valuable when the need of fighting
+    strength to accomplish further aims is considered.
+
+    (b) Comparison of gains and costs. When costs are found to be
+    in excess of the over-all gains, this fact may be the basis
+    for rejecting any courses of action which are less desirable
+    than others. However, retention of a course found to be costly
+    may be justified for sound reasons.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+When, as in the example given previously (page 96), the commander
+receives a directive such as "Deny enemy base sites in the area ABCD
+by capturing X Island", he carries through his estimate of the
+situation in the usual manner. He notes, however, that the capture of
+X Island has been indicated as a predetermined course of action. He
+makes a proper survey of the factors of relative fighting strength. He
+considers all pertinent courses of action. He goes through this
+procedure in order to reach an understanding of all the elements of
+his problem. He wishes to understand the necessary background. He
+realizes the importance of a grasp of the considerations which have
+led higher authority to arrive at the predetermined course of action.
+
+By carrying through the usual estimate procedure, including the
+analysis of all pertinent courses of action, he assists himself to
+arrive at a proper concept of the action to be taken to capture X
+island. In this way he establishes a sound basis for formulating a
+detailed plan (in the second step), for inaugurating planned action
+(in the third step), and for supervising this action (in the fourth
+step). He also establishes a basis for any constructive
+representations which he finds it advisable to make to higher
+authority (page 15).
+
+In another example previously given (page 96), the higher commander
+indicates only the predetermined course of action (by a directive
+"Capture X Island") and omits the statement of the true underlying
+task. The subordinate, on discovering this fact, deduces the
+underlying task and carries through the estimate procedure, modified,
+as explained for the previous example. In addition to the merits as
+previously stated, this method has a further advantage. The deduction
+of the underlying task enables the commander to judge whether any
+advisable or necessary deviation or departure from the predetermined
+course of action (page 15) involves merely a variation from the letter
+of his instructions or, more important, from their spirit.
+
+For instance, the directive, as in the case previously discussed, may
+have been "Capture X Island". The higher commander when issuing this
+order, may have stated his own general plan to be "This force will
+protect the base at A." The commander, on receipt of this directive,
+then deduces his true task. This is "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD"
+("by capturing X Island"--a predetermined course of action), the
+purpose of the mission being "in order to protect the base at A".
+
+Now it may be found that the enemy, unconcerned as to X Island, is
+moving to reinforce Y Island and to use it as a base to attack the
+base at A. The commander then properly decides to capture Y Island,
+instead of X Island. By his identification of the predetermined course
+of action as such, and by his correct deduction of the true underlying
+task, the commander has established a sound basis for the solution of
+his problem. He can now, with confidence, defer or abandon the capture
+of X Island, and can devote his efforts to the capture of Y Island.
+His confidence is justified because he knows his decision to be in
+accordance with the spirit of his instructions.
+
+Naturally, if the higher commander directed, "This force will protect
+the base at A----", and added, later in his directive, "Deny enemy
+base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island", the subordinate
+commander's deductions would have been made more easily.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The full play of the reasoning power is called for in the process of
+visualizing courses of action and of selecting the best. This process
+is the crux of the first step. Here the knowledge of the relationship
+between cause and effect is applied. Here, also, the commander is
+brought fully to realize that, to reach a sound decision, there is a
+requirement for a studied development of each stage by which the human
+mind passes from recognition of a necessity for action to the ultimate
+conviction as to the best course to pursue.
+
+As essential background for the utilization of his intellectual powers
+in this process, the commander requires knowledge of the capabilities
+and limitations of the technique of his profession and of the weapons
+of his calling. To the necessary knowledge gained through his own
+experience, either in actual warfare or in peacetime exercises
+simulating this experience, he adds the equally essential familiarity
+with the science of war, and with the lessons to be drawn from
+historical instances of success and failure. In effect, it is here
+brought home to him that, on a fundamental basis of earnest thought,
+mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests
+the soundness of decision (see page 219).
+
+The Decision. The word "decision" has the primary meaning of a
+conclusion. A decision (conclusion) is essential as a starting point
+for further procedure. Sound decision is the essential preliminary to
+wise planning and effective action.
+
+The range within which military decisions may fall extends from the
+instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to the conditional
+intentions of a distant future. Within this range will be found many
+decisions which the commander is necessarily called upon to reach
+during the four steps toward the attainment of an assigned objective.
+
+The course of action, or the combination of courses, as finally
+selected by the commander upon the termination of the first step,
+represents his conclusion as to his outlined plan for the attainment
+of his assigned objective. This conclusion will indicate, specifically
+or inferentially, his general objective, as selected by himself,
+and--in proper detail--the action required for its attainment. (See
+pages 88 and 95). The conclusion is thus his Decision, which provides
+the general plan, or the basis therefor, from which he will, in the
+second step, develop a detailed plan of operations for his force.
+
+Illustration of the foregoing process may profitably be initiated with
+respect to the highest echelon involved in the case of a State. The
+primary national objective of organized government (Chapter I, page 7)
+is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for
+the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community.
+This aim, as embodied in basic policy (see pages 8 and 9), is the
+objective visualized by the people of the State, or by its
+policy-forming elements, in the capacity of an organized government.
+
+For the maintenance of the condition represented in this policy, or
+for the creation of such a condition not already existing, an
+appropriate task of the State, as the political embodiment of the
+national will, might be to maintain or establish friendly (at least,
+not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of
+the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise.
+
+The national mission (the mission of the State) then becomes:--
+
+    (Task) To maintain or establish friendly (at least, not
+        hostile) governments and social systems In those key
+        localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective
+        threats may arise,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to ensure envisaged prosperity and
+        essential security for the social system which is the
+        fundamental basis of the community.
+
+A national estimate of the situation, by the highest authority of the
+State, to determine the effect to be attained for the accomplishment
+of the foregoing mission, takes account of the possibilities of
+accomplishment through psychological, political, economic, or military
+pressure, or by combinations thereof. As a result of this accounting,
+the State adopts a national Decision which indicates the best way of
+accomplishing its mission.
+
+To carry out this Decision, each of the primary subdivisions of the
+State's organization is assigned a specific task or tasks, whose total
+effect is designed to achieve the result embodied in the national
+Decision. The task of each such primary subdivision is linked to a
+purpose which is the attainment of the objective indicated in the
+national Decision.
+
+In like manner, each organization of the national armed forces is
+governed in its action by a task assigned to it as a result of a
+Decision made by the proper authority on the next higher echelon. Each
+commander is thus provided with a mission which consists of an
+assigned task and of a purpose as indicated by the general objective
+decided upon by his immediate superior.
+
+
+The Second Step
+
+The second step, that of resolving the required action into detailed
+military operations, may now be undertaken unless the Decision reached
+in the first step is intended for future reference only. During the
+second step the commander, if he carries the procedure through to its
+logical end, visualizes his proposed operations as tasks, in order to
+ensure their proper formulation. He may, if it is his intent to issue
+a directive or directives for the execution of his plan of operation,
+or a part thereof, arrange his procedure so as to facilitate the third
+step.
+
+The common characteristic of problems of the second step is that they
+deal with matters pertaining to the support of the action decided upon
+in the first step, and that they are properly problems for the
+commander who made that Decision, and not for his subordinates, to
+solve. Such problems are appropriately termed subsidiary problems.
+Their full solution involves subsidiary estimates, subsidiary
+decisions, and, not infrequently, distinct subsidiary plans and
+subsidiary directives.
+
+Each detailed operation derived, during the second step, from the
+outlined plan of operations (as embodied in the basic Decision) is
+determined upon the basis of an estimate procedure essentially similar
+to the basic estimate. There is thus a series of subsidiary estimates
+for this purpose. Such estimates tend to be abbreviated and informal,
+since the necessary data, and often much of the consideration as to
+the subsidiary courses of action, may be available from the basic
+estimate.
+
+Unless the detailed operations are of such a character as to require
+development into subsidiary plans as a basis for subsidiary
+directives, such operations are merely embodied, in the form of tasks
+or otherwise as may be appropriate, in the basic plan. In the excepted
+cases, where subsidiary plans, in detailed form, are necessary or
+desirable, such a plan may be the result of a more formal and
+specialized subsidiary estimate.
+
+Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the second step.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The problem involved in the first step has been conveniently termed
+the basic problem because it is directly concerned with the attainment
+of the assigned objective (page 81). The solution of the basic problem
+in the first step, and of its corollary in the second step, completes
+the planning stage.
+
+
+The Third Step
+
+The third step consists of the formulation, and--if appropriate--the
+issue, of the directives which convey to the subordinate the will and
+intent of the commander. From the mental standpoint, the third step
+begins when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating
+his directives for the execution of the planned action. Whether or not
+the third step is partially combined with the second, its problem is a
+separate one. Its complete solution inaugurates the action planned in
+the second step.
+
+The third step is discussed and developed in Chapter VIII.
+
+
+The Fourth Step
+
+The fourth step, which calls for mental effort in the solution of the
+problem of supervising the action, requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation. The procedure
+employed is customarily termed The Running Estimate of the Situation.
+Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the
+directives of the third step. In effect, the commander, after action
+is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the
+problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation.
+With the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to
+detect whether variations from the original situation are in
+accordance with his design or whether these variations have introduced
+new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or
+its complete abandonment.
+
+The fourth step is discussed and developed in Chapter IX.
+
+
+Sequence of Events in the Four Steps
+
+When all of the elements of the entire procedure of the four steps are
+present, they take, from the viewpoint of the same commander
+throughout, the following form:
+
+(1) First step: The commander, confronted with a strategical situation
+(page 83), makes a strategical estimate and comes to a strategical
+Decision. The problem, the estimate, and the Decision are basic.
+
+(2) Second step: The commander now is confronted with a particular
+problem, one proceeding from his basic problem and involving the
+details of a plan of execution to carry out the Decision reached in
+the first step; this problem consists, itself, of numerous other
+problems of detail, which require solution by the commander himself.
+The basic Decision has embodied an outlined plan, strategical in
+nature, for an operation to accomplish the motivating task of the
+first step. This plan requires resolution into the detailed operations
+necessary for its full accomplishment.
+
+Each such detailed operation, as part of the outlined plan embodied in
+the strategical Decision, calls for a proper estimate. Though usually
+not formal in nature, more especially if the necessary data can be
+found in the basic estimate, such estimates are fundamentally the same
+as for the basic problem. The assembly of such detailed operations
+results in the formulation of a basic plan.
+
+At this point, additional problems may present themselves, these being
+frequently tactical in nature. Such, for example, may be sortie plans,
+approach plans, and Battle Plans. Other specialized plans (training,
+intelligence, logistics, etc.) may be needed. The data essential for
+the solution of such problems are more detailed than for the usual
+strategical basic problem. In some instances, such subsidiary plans
+may be developed directly from the basic Decision by procedures
+distinctive of the second step. In other instances, solution may
+require an additional subsidiary estimate, along the lines typical of
+the first step. These subsidiary estimates lead to subsidiary
+decisions, which in turn require to be resolved into the necessary
+detailed operations.
+
+(3) Third step: In the third step, the directives, if the basic
+problem was strategical in nature, will be of a strategical character.
+However, if subsidiary tactical problems were also involved, tactical
+directives will frequently be included. Logistics directives and other
+specialized instructions may also be a feature.
+
+(4) Fourth step: The supervision of the planned action, in the fourth
+step, may involve a new strategical problem, perhaps several. In such
+event each new basic problem will initiate a new series of problems,
+with corresponding directives, as described above. Changes in
+strategical plans may be called for. If no strategical changes are
+involved, there may nevertheless be introduced one or more new
+tactical or logistics problems, with corresponding changes in the
+subsequent procedure. The fourth step may, however, merely involve
+changes in supporting plans (tactical, logistics, etc.), with
+resultant changes in the directives involved. Finally, the fourth step
+may involve changes, for clarification, in the directives formulated
+in the third step.
+
+Variations in the foregoing procedure are frequent. The most usual is
+perhaps the case where the commander, receiving a tactical (instead of
+a strategical) mission, solves such a tactical problem as a basic
+problem in the first step; resolves his Decision into detailed
+tactical operations in the second step; issues a tactical directive or
+directives in the third step; and supervises his planned tactical
+action in the fourth step.
+
+Phraseology as to "Course of Action", "Operation", and "Task". It is
+important to avoid the possibility of becoming confused because each
+of the terms "a course of action", "an operation", and "a task", is
+correctly visualized as "an act or a series of acts". In the first
+step, the selected course of action (see page 104) indicates the "act
+or series of acts" decided upon as representing, in general terms, an
+effort for attainment of a specified objective and is therefore stated
+as a comprehensive method of attaining that objective. The Decision
+thus adopts this course of action as a general plan of operations, or
+as a basis therefor.
+
+In the second step, the required action is developed to place it upon
+a practical, workable basis as a detailed plan to be executed. The
+"act or series of acts" represented by the selected "course of action"
+has now become a detailed "act or series of acts". As such, it is now
+susceptible of being assigned, in whole or in part, to subordinate
+commanders as "tasks". The cycle within that particular echelon is
+completed when the tasks are thus assigned. The commander has thereby
+charged his immediate subordinates with the commission of specific
+"acts or series of acts".
+
+Each such subordinate commander necessarily decides on the best method
+of accomplishing his assigned task, i.e., on the course of action (act
+or series of acts) which will best accomplish the effort required of
+him. The procedure (for each commander on that echelon) thus begins
+anew until an echelon is reached where the character of the required
+action has already been determined as a matter of routine (see page
+84).
+
+
+The Use of a Form in the Solution of Problems
+
+The natural mental processes (see page 19) are employed in all of the
+four steps. The processes, in each step, require modification to an
+extent dependent upon the factors to be evaluated.
+
+A form has been adopted for the application of the mental processes in
+the first step. This form, long known to the military profession as
+The outline of The Estimate of The Situation (see Appendix), sets
+forth in a logical manner and order the several considerations likely
+to influence the selection of correct military objectives in problems
+of wide, as well as of lesser, scope. The use of this form is
+conducive to uniformity of reasoning. It centers the attention upon
+essentials, in order to ensure that no material factor bearing on the
+solution of the problem is overlooked. It guides thought along a
+specific path and, through the influence of suggestion, deliberately
+increases the expenditure of mental effort.
+
+The procedure indicated in the form contributes to the Decision
+reached as a result of an Estimate of the Situation, only to the
+extent that it provides an outline for, and encouragement of,
+systematic analysis and reasoning.
+
+To prove successful in stimulating rather than stifling creative
+thought, flexibility is a characteristic of any form capable of
+application in such dissimilar circumstances as may be presented by
+the varying scope of military problems. The Estimate Form is such a
+flexible guide. If a commander, in solving a problem, feels the need
+of greater flexibility, he may, of course, modify or adapt the form to
+his particular needs. In so doing, however, he bears in mind that
+departure from orderly processes of reasoning, on which the form is
+based, tends, through possible neglect of fundamental considerations,
+to lead to the omission of essential features of the analysis.
+
+On the other hand, a rigid following of the form may frequently cause
+much repetition. This may be avoided, unless desired for emphasis or
+other appropriate reasons, by reference back to preceding portions of
+the estimate. It is also to be noted, however, that the Estimate Form
+is adapted to a progressive procedure. Very frequently the earlier
+consideration of some aspect of the problem can later be expanded both
+in scope and in proper detail by reason of additional information
+which has become available during the intervening stages of the
+procedure.
+
+The distinction between certain strategical and tactical problems
+(page 83) may introduce variations in the handling of the Estimate
+Form, and may affect the weight to be given the various factors. The
+use of the Estimate Form, as described in Chapter VI, applies in full
+to problems which embrace the complete scope of broad strategical
+concepts. It is suitable also for problems of limited scope, for which
+certain modifications or abbreviations are required. When applied to
+problems of a detailed tactical nature, the emphasis on the factors of
+fighting strength is somewhat different from that for strategical
+problems. For certain subsidiary problems (page 106), the Form may be
+closely applicable or may require considerable adaptation. In no case
+is it difficult to modify the Form to suit the requirements of the
+problem.
+
+An estimate of a relatively broad strategical situation may normally
+be reduced to writing, because time is usually available. On the other
+hand, an estimate of a localized tactical situation frequently
+requires almost instantaneous decision. Except in the preparation of
+plans to meet contingencies, such an estimate can rarely be given the
+elaborate form frequent in estimates of situations which are broadly
+strategical in nature. When such tactical plans are prepared well in
+advance of the event, the commander bases the estimate upon various
+assumptions as to the circumstances of a probable situation.
+
+The written solution of tactical situations under various assumptions
+is a valuable feature of training to this end.
+
+During the second step, i.e., the resolution of the action, as
+embodied in the Decision, into the detailed operations required, the
+method considered most helpful is to arrange the procedure on the
+basis of the salient features of a military operation (page 39 and
+Section III of Chapter IV). This procedure facilitates not only the
+determination of the necessary operations, but also the later
+formulation of directives.
+
+The second step, like the first, makes use of the estimate procedure.
+This is inevitable, in view of the fact that the mental processes are
+identical (page 106) for the solution of the problem of both steps.
+
+The application of the estimate procedure to the second step may be
+tested, aside from the logic of the theory involved, by careful
+analysis of examples. For instance, if the basic Decision was to
+determine the location of enemy forces in the area ABCD, this becomes
+the basis for a plan embodying the best method of determining the
+location of such enemy forces (an operation, or a series of
+operations). One method of procedure (course of action) to achieve
+this objective may be to search the area by aircraft; another may
+involve a search by cruisers; another by destroyers; another by
+submarines; etc. The operation or operations finally determined upon
+may be any one of these, or a combination of two or more of them,
+perhaps of all of them. The fundamental procedure leading to this
+conclusion is identical with that of the basic estimate.
+
+There are a number of possible variations of the fundamental mental
+processes applicable to the second step, according to the facility and
+the preference of the commander. Practice seems to develop such
+facility (see also page 94) that entire plans, each properly
+integrated with respect to physical objectives, relative positions,
+apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, may be
+visualized separately from each other.
+
+At the other extreme, the elementary procedure is to utilize these
+salient features of such a plan, successively, to suggest detailed
+operations. The features after the first are then used either to adapt
+or to complete the operations suggested by preceding features, or to
+suggest new operations. This elementary procedure, being the simpler
+and more methodical of the two, is the one explained hereafter
+(Chapter VII).
+
+However, there are various possibilities as to procedures intermediate
+between these extremes. One such procedure would visualize operations
+primarily on the basis of correct physical objectives, adapting and
+completing such operations by reference to the other features; the
+procedure would then utilize relative positions, etc., to suggest
+additional operations, which in turn may be similarly adapted or
+completed. The commander is of course at liberty to use the procedure
+best suited to his own working methods and to the particular
+situation; naturally, he bears full responsibility for any errors due
+to a faulty choice of procedure.
+
+From the standpoint of the exercise of mental power in the solution of
+military problems, the second step may be taken to include the
+assembly of the commander's conclusions in the form of directives. The
+third step begins, however (page 107), when the commander forms the
+intent of immediately promulgating such directives.
+
+The third step makes use of the Order Form. In our naval service, this
+form is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written
+directives pertaining to operations other than routine. The subject
+matter is presented in a logical sequence which experience has shown
+to be effective. The Order Form assists in the solution of the problem
+by providing a comprehensive vehicle with which all echelons are
+familiar.
+
+In the fourth step, i.e., the supervision of the planned action, the
+prime essential is the maintenance by the commander of a Running
+Estimate (page 107). For this purpose there is a definite technique of
+which the Estimate Form provides the basis, and by means of which the
+solution of this important problem is aided.
+
+
+Conclusion As To the Approach to the Solution of Military Problems
+
+The foregoing considerations indicate that planned attainment of a
+military objective requires the application of mental effort in four
+distinct steps.
+
+The sequence of the four steps necessarily is fixed because of the
+consequential relationship among the problems typical of the several
+steps. The mission, in the first step, furnishes the nature of the
+appropriate effect desired. Until modified or revoked by higher
+authority, it clearly remains the governing influence throughout the
+entire range of mental effort which, in conjunction with the moral and
+physical effort, is calculated to result finally in the attainment of
+the assigned objective.
+
+The procedure involved, being natural and universal, is fundamentally
+the same even in those tactical situations where the commander
+performs all of the steps in almost instantaneous succession. The
+Estimate Form, as presented herein, is adaptable to military problems
+of any nature. The systematic approach represented in the Form is
+subject to adaptation by the competent commander--provided that the
+essentials are preserved--in any manner appropriate to his personal
+preference and to the nature of his particular problem.
+
+The essentials of the military Estimate of the Situation, as a
+specialized use of the natural mental processes, are inherent in the
+proper application of the Fundamental Military Principle (see page
+82). The Estimate Form merely provides a more detailed guide for the
+use of the Principle. Facility in the use of the Principle will enable
+the competent commander, once he has formed a proper understanding of
+the basis for solution of a problem, to solve the problem correctly
+without reference to the Estimate Form. Reference to the Form may be
+necessary in problems of broad scope, in order to ensure a complete
+survey of factors of fighting strength. Time, in such cases, is
+usually available for purposes of a detailed study. Subject to this
+exception, the Principle, alone, may be used effectively as a basis
+for sound military decision,--a fact of particular significance where
+time (page 22) is an element of immediate concern.
+
+That this procedure may be successfully and repeatedly applied in the
+fast-moving events of the decisive tactical engagement is, more
+particularly, the goal of mental preparation for the exercise of
+command.
+
+
+
+
+PART II
+
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+IN PLANNING
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE SELECTION OF A CORRECT OBJECTIVE
+
+(Including the Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
+for its Attainment)
+
+The First Step--The Solution of a Basic Problem (The Estimate of the
+Situation)
+
+    The type of problem distinctive of the first step, now to be
+    discussed, is a basic problem. It is the most likely type when
+    an organized chain of command is in effective operation, the
+    incentive for solution being derived from a directive issued
+    by higher authority (Chapter V).
+
+    The problem of the first step is described by the question,
+    "What objective should I select, and what action (in outline)
+    should I take for its attainment, in order to achieve the
+    objective assigned to me by higher authority?"
+
+
+The procedure for solution of the type of problem distinctive of the
+first step is that already indicated as applicable to all military
+problems, i.e., a specialized employment of the natural mental
+processes (Chapter II) through the application of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. The studied application of the Principle is
+assisted through the Estimate Form which provides a more detailed
+guide.
+
+The fundamentals of the Estimate Form have already been discussed
+(Chapter V). Except for emphasis, or to afford a basis for further
+detailed discussion, the basic matters previously dealt with are not
+repeated in the present chapter. It is therefore advisable, before
+studying the details applicable to the first step, to make an adequate
+review of the pertinent portions of the preceding chapter. With the
+necessary background thus provided, the Estimate Form can be followed
+with a minimum of distraction caused by reference to related subjects.
+
+For special emphasis, it is repeated here (see also page 110) that the
+Estimate Form is a flexible guide. The commander is of course at
+liberty to vary the procedure according to his particular needs and
+the nature of his problem; however, he will bear in mind that errors
+of commission or of omission arising by reason of departure from the
+essential features of the procedure may disrupt orderly reasoning.
+
+The Estimate Form is divided into sections and sub-sections, each of
+which presents a subject for consideration. The Form follows,
+sequentially, the salient features of the natural mental process
+described in Chapter II. It will be seen, from an examination of the
+section headings listed below, that Section I has to do with
+establishing the basis for solution of the problem; Sections II, III,
+and IV relate to the actual process of solution through consideration
+of various courses of action; while Section V states the conclusion
+reached.
+
+    I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.
+
+    II. Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and Acceptable
+        Courses of Action.
+
+    III. Examination into the Capabilities of the Enemy.
+
+    IV. Selection of the Best Course of Action.
+
+    V. The Decision.
+
+A tabular form inserted in the Appendix lists the foregoing headings
+and their principal subdivisions within the Estimate Form. For
+convenience, the appended Form also includes page references to the
+discussion in this chapter.
+
+
+SECTION I
+
+ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
+
+As noted in the Fundamental Military Principle, each objective, prior
+to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, requires
+examination from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and
+acceptability. Suitability involves the factor of the appropriate
+effect desired; feasibility involves the factors of the means
+available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
+theater; and acceptability involves the factor of the consequences as
+to costs.
+
+In order to establish a sound basis for the solution of a military
+problem, one which will permit the tests for suitability, feasibility,
+and acceptability (see pages 98-102) to be intelligently applied, it
+is necessary that the factors involved be studied.
+
+
+A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.
+
+The appropriate effect desired, the first factor listed, is the goal
+toward which the commander is working. He is enabled to form an
+understanding of this essential aspect of his problem through (1) a
+grasp of the salient features of the situation, (2) a recognition of
+the incentive to solution, and (3) an appreciation of the assigned
+objective. He expresses this understanding by (4) formulating the
+mission.
+
+The sequence in which the commander takes up these considerations is a
+matter for his own choice. Usually, directives from higher authority
+(see Chapter VIII as to the Order Form) give him, first, information
+as to the situation; thereafter, such directives assign him a task (or
+tasks) involving one or more assigned objectives. For this reason, the
+sequence so indicated is the one utilized here.
+
+(1) Summary of the Situation. Before the commander can decide whether
+he wishes to maintain the existing situation or to change it, he
+requires a mental picture of its salient features. On beginning the
+Estimate, the available information is therefore briefly summarized.
+The picture presented here will show in broad outline (page 79) the
+opposing forces as disposed in localities which constitute relative
+positions with reference to each other. Details are reserved for
+Section I-B of the Estimate.
+
+The appropriate data are noted on the chart, and study of the chart
+goes hand in hand with the development of the Estimate.
+
+The summary of the situation may include statements as to present
+activities of own and enemy forces. It may recite significant
+occurrences. It does not attempt to compare or to deduce; such
+processes are deferred until Section I-B. The commander extracts, from
+the information furnished by higher authority, such data as are
+pertinent to his own problem. He includes these data in his own
+summary, supplementing them by information from other sources, to the
+extent deemed advisable. In the exercise of judgment as to the content
+of his summary, the commander is influenced by the fact that the
+summary is the point of departure for visualizing the appropriate
+effect desired.
+
+(2) Recognition of the Incentive. In basic problems (the type now
+under discussion, see page 117), the commander finds his incentive in
+directives received from higher authority. Under the procedure of the
+Estimate, a notation of that fact, with a citation of the
+directive(s), is all that is required to indicate that the commander
+has formed a proper recognition of his incentive.
+
+(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective. A correct understanding of
+the nature and of the involvements of the assigned objective is,
+naturally, an essential to the establishment of the basis for the
+solution of a problem of the first step.
+
+At this stage of the Estimate the commander cannot, however, expect
+always to reach a final conclusion as to this matter. He will have
+opportunity for further consideration, later, in Section II. It will
+be realized that, after intervening portions of the Estimate have been
+worked out, the commander will be in a position to examine the
+assigned objective again, and to make a more thorough analysis.
+
+In a basic problem, the commander is assigned his objective by higher
+authority, usually in the form of an assigned task. Although, as
+stated on page 84, such task may be expressed by one of various
+methods, a properly conceived task always indicates, either
+specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives).
+
+Whatever method of expression may have been employed by higher
+authority, the commander will facilitate his appreciation of the
+assigned objective if he now sets down his assigned task, scrutinizes
+it carefully, and then makes note of the objective which is either
+specifically or inferentially indicated by that task. (See pages
+52-54).
+
+The commander's basis for solving the problem is not complete,
+however, with merely a statement of his own objective. Full
+visualization of the effect desired is not obtained until the
+commander appreciates not only the result which he, himself, is
+required to accomplish, but also the next further result which is
+expected to eventuate as, at least in part, an effect of his
+accomplishment. His goal, as an "effect desired", includes not only
+the effect desired of him by higher authority, but also the effect
+which his immediate superior desires to be accomplished by that
+superior's entire force.
+
+Occasionally, full appreciation of the commander's objective will
+require, also, consideration of the further effects desired by yet
+higher successive echelons.
+
+The natural requirement is that the goal be so clearly defined as to
+obviate any material doubt as to the implications involved in the
+commander's assigned objective. When the goal has been thus defined,
+there results a linking of effect and further effect, of objective and
+further objective,--in short, of task and purpose,--the importance of
+which has previously been emphasized (page 48).
+
+In making notation of this further objective for the solution of
+problems typical of the first step, the commander normally sets down
+the general plan of his immediate superior for the employment of the
+latter's entire force. When the linking of objective to objective,
+echelon by echelon, has involved no complication, the immediate
+superior's general plan will be a sufficient indication of the
+purpose for which the commander is to carry out his task.
+
+(4) Formulation of the Mission.
+
+The linking of the commander's assigned task to the general plan of
+his immediate superior permits the commander to formulate his mission
+(page 87). His assigned task becomes the task of his mission; his
+superior's general plan becomes the purpose of his mission. In this
+manner he crystallizes into a clear statement the part of the common
+effort which he is to carry out, indicating the assigned objective he
+is himself to attain, as well as the further objective to whose
+attainment his effort is to contribute.
+
+In establishing the basis for solution of his problem with respect to
+suitability, the commander may have considered his assigned objective
+before studying his situation. If so, he may now desire to modify his
+earlier statement of that objective, before incorporating it in the
+formulation of his mission, to the end that a more clear-cut and
+concise expression may be obtained.
+
+The relationship (restated from page 87 for emphasis) is expressed in
+the following;
+
+    My assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of
+    carrying out my designated part of my superior's general plan.
+
+This formula is customarily simplified to the following:
+
+    (Task) (statement of the assigned task),
+
+    (Purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of
+    (statement of the superior's general plan).
+
+The words "assist in the successful execution of" may frequently be
+understood and therefore omitted.
+
+The mission, thus formulated, clearly indicates the appropriate effect
+desired, i.e., the factor which establishes the basis for the solution
+of the problem from the standpoint of suitability.
+
+
+B. Relative Fighting Strength.
+
+As indicated in the Fundamental Military Principle, the second and
+third requirements for a sound solution of the problem are feasibility
+of accomplishment and acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+Both requirements have to do with the factors of relative fighting
+strength. Fighting strength is derived from the means available as
+influenced by the characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting
+strength is determined by a weighing of these factors against the
+means opposed, as influenced also by the characteristics of the
+theater.
+
+These are the factors, then, which are next studied in the Estimate.
+They are studied in order to complete the establishment of the basis
+for the solution of the problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The factor of consequences, as listed in the Fundamental Military
+Principle, is related to the factors pertinent to feasibility. This is
+true because consequences are assessed, in the Estimate, on the basis
+of the envisaged results of proposed actions. These results are
+necessarily predicated on the grounds established by consideration of
+the factors of relative fighting strength. The study of relative
+fighting strength thus provides not only a sound basis for the
+determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action, but
+also of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs.
+
+Particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion as to relative fighting
+strength, to the end that specific advantages may be ascertained. Such a
+study is primarily concerned with information:--its collection, its
+analysis, its evaluation, and its interpretation so as to convert it
+into military (naval) intelligence (page 76), with a view to its use by
+the commander in the solution of his problem. Information as to forces
+present and as to their positions is of course prerequisite to a clear
+comprehension of the possibilities as to physical objectives, as to
+relative positions, as to apportionment of fighting strength, and as to
+freedom of action.
+
+The commander may choose whether he shall, in his estimate, first
+consider the means available and opposed, or reverse the order and
+give priority to the characteristics of the theater. In a particular
+situation, the significance of these characteristics is frequently
+determined by the capabilities and limitations of the means available
+and opposed. For this reason, these means are first discussed in this
+treatment, which thereafter includes the analysis of the
+characteristics of the theater.
+
+The capabilities and limitations of the means, and the significance of
+the characteristics of the theater, may be expressed in terms of
+certain specific factors (page 25). Each of these factors may
+influence, or be influenced by, any or all of the others. Situations
+occur in which certain factors exert little or no influence. Yet, in
+other situations, these same factors have a paramount effect.
+
+The classification of factors utilized in the following treatment is
+applicable to most military problems.
+
+A list of pertinent factors, to be of real use in the solution of
+problems, is required, first, to be complete, so that no factor will
+be overlooked, and, second, to be simple, so that, as far as
+practicable, all similar data may be discussed under one heading.
+
+With respect to the factors set forth in succeeding pages, the
+solution of a particular problem may call for a different listing.
+
+Such listing may involve, in some cases, the contraction or the
+omission of certain of the headings.
+
+In other cases, an expansion will be necessary or desirable under
+certain headings, in considerably greater detail than shown here. For
+example, Section I-B of a National Estimate may involve reference to
+several volumes of printed books or of similar data, while, even in
+ordinary strategical situations, numerous charts, books of sailing
+directions, and other compilations may require study. Where such
+references are not standard and generally available, they may be
+appended, preferably in condensed form.
+
+The proper listing of pertinent factors will depend on the nature of
+the problem.
+
+
+(1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed.
+
+The application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the
+ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to
+develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat (page 8).
+These components, as ranged on one side or the other, constitute the
+means available and opposed. (See page 31). Analysis of these means
+requires a classification of the various factors which influence the
+situation.
+
+For a broad strategical estimate made by the State, economic and
+political factors require intensive study; physical objectives,
+relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of
+action are all involved in such a survey.
+
+For a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these
+factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. Such a commander is
+concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the
+operations projected for the particular theater involved in his
+problem. From his point of view, the economic and political factors
+often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military
+situation. In such a case, the commander concentrates in this section
+on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his
+important considerations deal with such matters as numerical
+strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of
+action.
+
+For strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further
+restricts his study accordingly.
+
+In detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive
+comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy
+armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use
+of relative position are affected by such considerations. This is
+manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet
+contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its
+bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. At that
+time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly
+changing conditions. (Chapter IX.)
+
+In the Form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to
+broad estimates are included under "general factors". These are
+followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces.
+
+(a) General Factors. (i) Political Factors. The prosecution of the war
+is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of
+the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the
+moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war
+aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to
+which the government can make available necessary resources, both
+domestic and foreign.
+
+External relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad
+estimates of the employment of national forces. The wartime factors
+which influence these relations include the effect of the clash
+between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of
+interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and
+the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each
+belligerent. The diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the
+ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine
+the manner in which neutrality will be enforced.
+
+Alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret,
+directly influence an estimate. When a war of any importance breaks
+out in any part of the world, all States are affected to some degree.
+One may have an alliance which, though not requiring active
+participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts
+of a belligerent. Another alliance may require active participation,
+while still another State may attempt to maintain strict neutrality.
+Every State remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from
+that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the
+contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. The estimate of the
+international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the
+war increases. A correct appreciation of the status of each State
+concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct
+of war.
+
+(ii) Economic Factors. The capacity, organization, and mobilization of
+industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is
+prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. The acceptance by the
+civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses
+of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing
+upon the industrial capacity of that State.
+
+The ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes
+the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign
+credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national
+capability for war.
+
+The dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade,
+including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of
+supply, affects its strength. No State yet has complete autarchy.
+Thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain
+of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. As
+each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the
+other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade
+protection.
+
+(iii) Psychological Factors. The maintenance of a stable morale (page
+72) at a high level is a primary concern. Such stability inures the
+nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear,
+disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences,
+while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which
+strengthen the moral fiber of a people.
+
+Training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to
+overestimate. They provide a basis for evaluating discipline. A study
+of the history of the State may prove valuable in estimating the
+present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be
+classed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of
+war.
+
+Another important factor relates to the existence of the skills
+necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. The
+control of skilled personnel is a psychological consideration of
+great importance.
+
+Unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and
+labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate.
+
+Special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and
+versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in
+development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war
+effort.
+
+Racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale
+and training. Reactions of various races or groups to the conditions
+of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past
+performance, to prove of some value. Service traditions may furnish
+clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors.
+
+While only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible
+of quantitative comparison, failure to take account of mental and
+moral factors may involve serious error. Nevertheless, in many
+situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until
+subjected to test. Inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a
+basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. In these,
+racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. History,
+however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and
+military nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than
+that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has
+demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or
+unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably
+warrant otherwise.
+
+(iv) Information and counter-information measures. Operations of war
+are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent
+possesses of the others. It is therefore of vital importance to weigh
+the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of
+obtaining, denying, and utilizing information.
+
+There may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible
+use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured
+documents, and material; reports from other friendly units;
+interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped
+or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of
+cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and
+mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of
+communications systems, ashore and afloat, which include all means of
+interchange of thought. In this connection it will be recalled that
+information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot
+be conveyed in time.
+
+The direct methods of obtaining information are military operations
+intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance,
+scouting, trailing.
+
+Counter-information measures are no less important than those
+pertaining to collection of information. Such measures include all
+provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage,
+cryptography, control of own communications, security of documents,
+camouflage, and applicable tactical operations.
+
+(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to Armed Forces, (i) Vessels,
+including aircraft. The numbers and characteristics, of the ships and
+aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and
+less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. The
+information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under
+the specific headings of the factors of the Estimate Form as later
+enumerated.
+
+(ii) Land forces, including land-based aviation. Important facts
+concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based
+aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case
+of the naval forces. The value of a comparison--naval, land, or
+air--may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the
+accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected
+accurate additional information.
+
+(iii) Personnel. The status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency
+of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale,
+skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can
+seldom be accurately known. Unless there is positive information to
+the contrary, the wise commander will assume in this respect that the
+status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to
+that of his own command. Full consideration will be given to all known
+facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any
+proposed situation may be properly evaluated.
+
+The basic discussion of the psychological factors (page 125) is
+applicable here as to the respective armed forces. Personal
+characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study,
+since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength.
+The military value of the various units and forces is a similar
+consideration. The present attitude and past actions of enemy
+commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national,
+and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation
+in this connection.
+
+(iv) Material. The material characteristics of the commander's own
+implements of war are generally known to him. The characteristics of
+enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become
+available, but are not to be underestimated.
+
+Material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility.
+
+Armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other
+weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with
+their own weapons). It also includes chemical agents and other
+instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to
+range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate
+use and as replacements. Ammunition supply is a factor here. In the
+evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available
+to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to
+underestimate.
+
+Life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms
+of standards which can be clearly visualized. For a vessel, life is
+the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its assigned task. In
+the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of
+foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. Here, again, an
+underestimate is dangerous.
+
+Mobility is capability of movement. It is compounded of the elements
+of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions
+of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to
+certain and free movement. Mobility is one of the most important
+factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of
+fighting strength, and to freedom of action. Closely related factors
+are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the
+enemy, and of own forces. Accurate knowledge of these factors, before
+an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing
+effectively with the enemy.
+
+The condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the
+efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater
+compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance.
+The last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and
+involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations,
+whether due to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other
+causes. Here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have
+only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect.
+His experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own
+condition. Definitely, unless he has positive information to the
+contrary, he assumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or
+better than his own. (See also the psychological factors, page 125 and
+the personnel factor, page 127).
+
+(v) Logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. In the
+naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate.
+While the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate,
+logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval
+battle, to affect the outcome. This support exercises a dominant
+influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. It is concerned
+with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following:
+
+    Material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft,
+        food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals,
+        and general supplies.
+
+    Personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of
+        replacements.
+
+    Facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair
+        facilities, afloat and ashore; shelter; sanitation;
+        hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education;
+        counter-espionage; counter-propaganda.
+
+The limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the
+final limit of a commander's plan of action.
+
+
+(2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.
+
+The characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence,
+always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of
+attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical
+operations that may be employed.
+
+At this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts,
+intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual
+study of the theater. This study is not for the purpose, at this time,
+of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to
+furnish data which will assist in consideration of later sections of
+the estimate. The study may be made under several important headings,
+as follows:
+
+(a) Hydrography. A study of the hydrography will determine the depth
+of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents,
+the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and
+other pertinent features. These are recorded for later use.
+
+Shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of
+submarines. On the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water
+may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the
+tide. Again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the
+range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the
+entrance to a port or base. In a tactical action, advantage may be
+taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without,
+however, interfering with that of one's own forces.
+
+(b) Topography. The topography of the area is also frequently of
+interest to the naval commander. In actions close to the shore, the
+character of the coast may play an important role. A high bluff,
+combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite
+advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation.
+
+Topography may be a most important consideration in determining what
+bases are to be used. The commander makes note of the topography of
+the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural
+features lending assistance to the defense of the various sites may
+play an important part in the selection of bases.
+
+The use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering
+land. Questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held,
+or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to
+the channel.
+
+In any landing operation, the topography of the area to be occupied
+may be the controlling factor.
+
+(c) Weather. The seasonal weather in the theater will have a direct
+bearing upon operations. The use of aircraft, the employment of light
+forces, the habitability of ships over long periods, the use of smoke,
+the range at which a gun action may be fought, the effect of spray and
+gases,--these considerations are but some of the matters which will be
+affected by weather.
+
+The possession of, and the position of, meteorological stations within
+the theater are of growing importance in the successful planning of
+coordinated air, submarine, and surface operations.
+
+(d) Daylight and Dark Periods. It may be well under this heading to
+put in tabular form the times of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset,
+the phases of the moon, and the duration of morning and evening
+twilight. When, for example, the commander is considering night
+destroyer attacks, the operation of submarines, or the type of
+protective screens he desires to use, he may profitably refer to these
+tabulations.
+
+(e) Relative Location and Distance. No part of the study of the
+characteristics of the theater is of greater importance than that
+pertaining to relative location and distance. At this point it may be
+found advantageous to place in tabular form the distances between the
+important positions within the geographical area of the theater. This
+study furnishes knowledge as to the availability of certain localities
+for use in support of, or in cooperation with, forces at other
+localities, and as to distances in relation to steaming capabilities
+of the various units which make up the commander's force.
+
+(f) Lines of Transportation and Supply. The usual sea routes which
+pass through the theater are an important subject of study; also,
+particular focal points, defiles, and restricted waters which are, or
+may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces.
+Other items are the significant routes from home or enemy territory,
+i.e., the lines of communication, the terminal points, and the
+flanking positions along these lines.
+
+(g) Facilities and Fortifications. The facilities for the support,
+upkeep, and repair of the units of the commander's forces and of the
+opposing force, as well as the fortifications existing within the
+area, may require consideration. Other features which may render a
+port or base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of
+denying it to the enemy, also merit attention.
+
+(h) Communications. In strategical estimates, more particularly in
+broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves
+not only those means under the commander's control, but also his
+relation to the system of regional and national communications
+operated by his government. Examination is made into the established
+physical stations; such examination includes radio, cables, and
+perhaps land wires.
+
+In tactical estimates the means of communication which affect the
+engagement are more directly those under the control of the commander.
+An examination into the organization of the means to meet conditions
+prevailing in the theater is appropriate here.
+
+Another aspect of communications is that of maintaining all forms
+against enemy interference. The importance of this feature in planning
+may not safely be overlooked, and careful study is indicated to
+provide for guaranteeing communications during action. The
+characteristics of the theater, as they relate to this feature, are
+considered here.
+
+For the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy
+communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them
+with respect to the theater of operations.
+
+This portion of the Estimate Form varies greatly with the type of
+problem under consideration. However, in all estimates, this is the
+place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting
+communications for the particular problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander
+has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he
+expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate.
+
+
+(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.
+
+Having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the
+characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find
+it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order
+that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily
+visualized and compared. Thus the existing advantages and
+disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to
+relative fighting strength.
+
+A satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in
+parallel columns for own and enemy forces. From careful consideration
+of the facts so far determined in Section I-B, there are extracted and
+expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors.
+
+It is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness
+factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical
+estimates.
+
+The former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite
+comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and
+caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of
+torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for
+comparison.
+
+In broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g.,
+as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and
+the like. But other factors may not be so definite, especially as
+regards enemy forces. For example, it will often be difficult for the
+commander to say that the enemy's logistics problem is easier or more
+difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of
+fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time
+limits involved. The evaluation of training, spirit, health, and
+courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to
+determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard
+to the enemy.
+
+The value of the entries in the parallel columns at this point of the
+estimate will depend upon the skill of the commander in judging the
+factual data contained in all of the known factors of strength and
+weakness. The proper entries to be made will depend upon
+circumstances. In one estimate, for example, the anti-aircraft
+armament available to a carrier group will be of vital importance. In
+another estimate of the same carrier group, anti-aircraft defense will
+be of no importance because no enemy aircraft can be employed in the
+situation being estimated. Again, in a local tactical situation, if
+the ships involved have just been fueled, the economical steaming
+radius may be of no immediate importance. And while the total amount
+of high-test gasoline which can be produced in a State in the coming
+year may be vital to a broad strategical estimate involving war
+against trade, that information may be of little use in a tactical
+estimate of a localized, fleeting situation.
+
+Thus, in determining what factors to evaluate, and in assessing their
+relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly
+affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration. The
+summary of strength and weakness factors is, then, a summary of those
+factors which the commander considers will affect the character of his
+effort. This summary indicates the relative importance of such
+factors.
+
+A mere list of facts will not serve the purpose. What is needed here
+is a series of evaluations and conclusions which may result from a
+study of the pertinent details.
+
+With the circumstances attending his particular problem clearly in
+mind, the commander carefully reviews each of the factors of fighting
+strength in the theater; he classes each as either a strength or
+weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enters it in the
+proper column. A strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as
+a weakness factor for the opponent:--what is required is a
+well-digested summary of the factors which give to either side an
+advantage or a disadvantage as compared to the other.
+
+
+NOTE
+
+The Estimate procedure has, to this point, established the basis for
+the solution of the problem through evaluation of the factors
+pertaining to the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of
+acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
+
+On this basis, the commander is ready to consider such courses of
+action as may be pertinent. To this end, he has a choice of
+procedures. He may first consider courses of action for himself. He
+may prefer, however, to consider first those which are applicable to
+the enemy.
+
+If the commander considers his own courses of action first, this
+procedure has an advantage in that it narrows, later, the scope of
+enemy courses which are pertinent to his situation. This is true
+because consideration of enemy courses may in such a case be
+restricted to those which give promise of countering, effectively, his
+own courses of action.
+
+This procedure may also have a certain psychological advantage, in
+that the commander may thereby avoid becoming unduly impressed by the
+potentialities of enemy action. Occasionally, prior consideration of
+enemy courses may tend to put the commander, unnecessarily, on the
+mental defensive.
+
+First consideration of his own courses of action is especially
+appropriate for a commander whose mission requires him to assume the
+initiative, particularly when the relative fighting strength indicates
+that he can compel enemy action to conform to his. This is frequently
+the case when enemy action will chiefly affect details rather than the
+general trend of the operations.
+
+These reflections indicate that first consideration of his own courses
+of action will very frequently be advantageous to the commander. Such
+a sequence is therefore indicated preferentially in the Estimate Form,
+and next discussed. However occasions may arise when consideration in
+the reverse order is preferable. Sometimes the prior consideration of
+enemy potentialities has the advantage of making the commander's
+estimate more complete with respect to the obstacles which he is to
+overcome. Furthermore, when the effectiveness of his future action is
+seen to depend chiefly upon what the enemy can do, or when the
+initiative lies manifestly with the enemy, and when the commander's
+mission requires him to frustrate enemy action, rather than to assume
+the initiative himself, the prior consideration of enemy courses of
+action may be indicated.
+
+The commander may therefore consider the subject matter of Sections II
+and III in the order hereinafter followed, or he may reverse that
+order.
+
+
+SECTION II
+
+DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION
+
+A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective.
+
+In order further to clarify the problem, consideration of the
+commander's courses of action may profitably commence with an analysis
+(page 53) of the assigned objective. Section I-A contained an
+appreciation of this objective on the basis of the salient features of
+the situation. A close examination is now possible in the light of the
+additional information furnished by the full details (Section I-B) as
+to the means available and opposed, and as to the characteristics of
+the theater (page 121).
+
+Accordingly, the mission (page 121), is now again stated, and is
+restudied. The task is thoughtfully examined anew, in view of the
+forces and positions now known. The purpose is scrutinized with equal
+care, because it indicates the further end in view for the common
+effort. Now, obstacles to success which, in Section I-A, could not
+fully be appreciated can be examined against the background afforded
+by visualization of the enemy's ability to oppose the attainment of
+the assigned objective.
+
+This analysis calls for such discussion by the commander as is
+essential to better understanding of his assigned objective. Some
+restatement and repetition may be desirable as to the subjects already
+discussed under the appreciation of the assigned objective. In solving
+certain types of problems, where simple estimates, only, are required,
+there may be no necessity for further treatment. Even in these cases,
+however, the commander restates his mission in this subsection, in
+order to ensure a clear comprehension of its task and purpose, as a
+sound basis for his further solution of the problem.
+
+
+B. Survey of Courses of Action.
+
+The Fundamental Military Principle (page 41) represents an equation
+(page 23) based on five factors: the appropriate effect desired, the
+means available, the means opposed, the characteristics of the
+theater, and the consequences as to costs. Of these five factors, all
+but the last (the consequences as to costs) have by this time, in the
+course of the estimate, been assigned values as definite as the
+commander's information and his study permit.
+
+From this point on, the problem is to evolve tentative solutions
+(courses of action) and to test them (page 98), severally, by
+reference to the factors. The tests as to suitability and feasibility
+can now be made with reference to the known factors. The test as to
+acceptability of the consequences involves an unknown factor. However,
+for each tentative solution of the problem, a value can be assigned
+for this factor, because all five factors are interdependent (pages 32
+and following), so that the value of any of them can be set by a study
+of the others. It is through this procedure that evaluation of the
+consequences factor is accomplished (an application of the corollary
+Principle of the Acceptable Consequences as to Costs, page 35).
+
+By means of the standard tests, the several tentative solutions are
+also compared to each other in the light of envisaged enemy action, so
+as to enable the commander to select the best solution.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander now, as a result of his reflective thinking as to
+courses of action, makes a list of those which he has visualized for
+himself. There may be one course of action, or many; ordinarily there
+are several.
+
+Examples of courses of action have been given in the basic discussion
+of the subject (pages 89 and 92). In listing his courses, the
+commander can add to clarity of thought and of expression by
+visualizing the objective embodied in each course and by envisaging
+also, the action, expressed in proper detail, for its attainment. This
+process is naturally the more important when the objective is inferred
+rather than specifically expressed, and when the action involved calls
+for more description than can be obtained merely by stating the
+objective.
+
+For example, the commander may include a course of action such as "to
+raid enemy trade in the area EFGH". The objective is here inferred; it
+is not clearly stated. The commander may therefore be well advised to
+add a notation of what the objective is; indeed, more than one
+objective may be involved. Objectives thus inferred might include,
+when specifically stated, the infliction of damage on enemy trade, the
+infliction of damage on enemy combatant forces protecting such trade,
+the disruption of enemy supply arrangements, or such others as may be
+applicable.
+
+This clear visualization is essential to the establishment of the
+relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inherent
+in the course of action (page 89). If, for instance, the motivating
+task is to "divert enemy forces to the area EFGH", the commander may
+consider the course of action "to raid enemy trade in area EFGH". By
+infliction of damage to, and by disruption of, enemy supply
+(objectives of his raiding), he expects to accomplish the diversion of
+enemy forces to the area EFGH, because the enemy will wish to protect
+his trade against such raids. The relationship between the assigned
+objective and the objective inferred in the course of action is thus
+made clear.
+
+With regard to expression of the action to be taken, the commander may
+properly desire to be more explicit than by merely saying, for
+example, "to destroy the enemy". Here the objective is clear (it is
+"the destruction of the enemy"), but the expression of the action is
+so general that additional description may be needed. Examples of more
+explicit statement have been given previously (page 89).
+
+On occasion the higher commander may predetermine the commander's
+course of action for the attainment of the objective assigned to the
+latter. Circumstances under which such procedure may be properly
+applicable, and the effect which it has on the commander's estimate,
+have been previously discussed (page 86).
+
+
+C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.
+
+The courses of action which the commander has envisaged are now
+subjected to test (page 98). This essential stage in thought is
+intended to put the courses of action to proof as tentative solutions
+of the problems. The principle here recognized is that suggestion has
+no logical nor rightful claim upon action or belief until it has
+received adequate confirmation. Such confirmation is, in part,
+provided by these tests.
+
+The tests applied are for suitability, for feasibility, and for
+acceptability as to consequences. Each of these tests is a separate
+one. Each course of action is formally subjected to test. When the
+tests are completed, the courses of action stand classified in these
+respects. During these tests, some courses of action may be rejected;
+such are then omitted in the final classification.
+
+These formal tests are not to be confused with the preliminary tests
+already given by the commander to each course of action as it occurs
+to mind. Necessarily, there is such a preliminary test, because the
+commander does not wish to entertain inappropriate courses of action.
+For a competent commander, the mental power to envisage solutions of a
+military problem is so much grounded in experience that appropriate
+suggestions are most likely to occur; in fact, discriminating thought
+with respect to military problems is natural for such a commander.
+This immediate discrimination is, however, merely the preliminary
+test. It prevents setting up wooden soldiers only to knock them down,
+but it does not necessarily subject each suggested solution to a
+thorough analysis.
+
+The commander may apply the tests to each course of action as it
+occurs to his mind. This procedure, however, may be rendered
+impossible by the fertility of suggestion; perhaps the commander has
+thought of several courses of action practically simultaneously. It
+is, therefore, often better to apply the tests to all of the courses
+of action, in turn, during a separate stage of the process of
+thinking. This is the procedure indicated herein, as standard, by the
+sequence of steps in this section of the Estimate. The process of
+testing, itself, may bring to mind those combinations of courses of
+action previously referred to (page 93).
+
+The degree of formality characteristic of the tests varies with the
+nature of the problem. In a broad strategical estimate, these tests
+may be searching and extensive; they may then consume much time. Yet,
+if the commander, in making a quick decision of great urgency in
+actual battle, does not apply the tests, he may adopt a course of
+action leading to tragic results. In such circumstances, the competent
+commander, under pressure of danger, grasps the whole complex
+situation without loss of time. He is not carried away by any chance
+impressions. He does not overlook what is significant in the
+unexpected event. Because he is mentally prepared for the exercise of
+command (page 114) he sees things in their true proportions (page 4).
+In immediate response, he coolly chooses the same course of action
+which he would adopt if he had time for careful deliberation.
+
+In making the tests, the commander rejects courses of action found
+unsuitable in that they will not, if successfully prosecuted,
+contribute to the attainment of the objective. He does not, as yet,
+reject courses of action found to be promising of only partial
+accomplishment of the task, because there may be later possibilities
+of effecting combinations to this end.
+
+The commander also rejects, at this point, courses of action found to
+be infeasible of accomplishment. He is careful, however, not to
+reject, abruptly, any which may later be found to be feasible in
+combination with other courses.
+
+Similarly, the commander now rejects courses of action found to
+involve excessive consequences as to costs. Here, again, however, he
+bears in mind the possibilities of later combinations.
+
+The commander does not, as yet, make a selection of one course of
+action in preference to another. He merely desires to restrict further
+thought, toward his Decision, to those which are found, on the basis
+of the estimate so far, to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. He
+may, however, make a selection to the extent of effecting proper
+combinations whose applicability has already been demonstrated.
+
+The commander also takes stock, at this stage of the estimate, of the
+relative degree of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of
+retained courses, so far as can be substantiated.
+
+
+D. Listing Retained Courses of Action.
+
+The foregoing process indicates to the commander the courses of action
+which may properly be retained as suitable, as feasible, and as
+acceptable. He therefore draws up a list of retained courses and
+classifies them according to the degree of their suitability, of their
+feasibility, and of their acceptability with respect to consequences.
+
+This list does not necessarily represent the final combinations of
+courses of action; the incomplete solutions may yet become part of the
+course of action finally selected. Also it is not impossible that
+combinations already made will subsequently be recombined as a result
+of further analysis.
+
+It may be apparent to the commander at this time that he does not
+have, as yet, any course of action which fulfills the test of
+suitability as to scope, either originally or by combination. A later
+conclusion is made (Section V) as to final combinations to achieve
+full scope. This conclusion, however, may point the way, as later
+observed, to a Decision adopting an objective short of that which
+would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task.
+
+
+SECTION III
+
+EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY
+
+While the commander realizes that the Fundamental Military Principle
+(page 41) governs the enemy's problem no less than his own, he has to
+accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called "fog of war")
+in applying the principle to the enemy's situation. The method of
+reflective thinking utilized (Section II) for the commander's own
+problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the
+enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known
+to the commander as are his own.
+
+Capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which
+the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such
+actions, has the capacity to carry out. Such potentialities of the
+enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in
+estimating the situation. In his estimate, however, the commander's
+interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do;
+probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the
+whole field of capabilities. The commander is not exclusively
+interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the
+enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are
+also subject to change. The commander is interested in everything that
+the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander's own
+courses of action.
+
+In reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes
+an estimate from the enemy's viewpoint and considers that the enemy
+commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is
+endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission.
+Each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable
+military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the
+same intent. The physical objectives for each may be the other's armed
+forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also
+be likely physical objectives.
+
+In such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the
+opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual
+conflict. More especially in the initial stages, the respective plans
+may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. Again, the
+geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss contact.
+Moreover, unless one commander definitely makes provision to seek out
+and engage, the two forces, each on the defensive, may find themselves
+"shaking fists" at each other across an ocean area.
+
+Notwithstanding this possibility, however, a conclusion, on an
+insufficient basis, that the enemy will or will not seek him out and
+engage him, or that the enemy will or will not do anything else, may
+be fraught with the most serious consequences for the commander.
+Accordingly, in estimating the enemy's situation, he puts himself in
+the enemy's position, while subordinating his own hopes and desires.
+He credits the enemy with the possession of good judgment and of the
+resolution and ability to apply with skill the fundamentals of
+effective warfare, subject, naturally, to the justified conclusions
+which the commander has drawn (Section I-B) on the basis of the
+available factual data as to relative fighting strength.
+
+
+A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem.
+
+This portion of the commander's estimate pertains, of course, to the
+existing situation as viewed by the enemy. This fact, alone, may
+inject into the problem certain factors which differ from those
+applicable with respect to the commander's view of his own problem, as
+determined to this point.
+
+(1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation.
+
+Frequently it may happen that the enemy does not have certain
+significant information. The fact of such lack of information may have
+been established by the conclusions drawn as to relative fighting
+strength (Section I-B). If this be the case, notation of the fact is
+made at this point in the commander's estimate of the enemy's
+situation. If doubt exists as to the extent and accuracy of the
+enemy's information, it will be desirable to credit the enemy with any
+knowledge which it would be dangerous for the commander to conclude
+was not available to his opponent.
+
+In summarizing the enemy's situation, the commander may brief the
+procedure by indicating those significant features of his own
+situation, as summarized in Section I-A and as particularized in
+Section I-B, which he does not consider are known to the enemy. The
+commander will also indicate here any items of important information
+as to which he has only a suggestion or an inkling, but which he
+considers may be known in greater detail to the enemy.
+
+(2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy.
+
+It may appear on first thought that the best basis for determining the
+pertinent enemy courses of action is to make a deduction of the
+enemy's mission. Sometimes, undoubtedly, this is the case. However, it
+is not always possible to deduce the enemy's mission correctly. If the
+deduction is incorrect the remainder of the estimate will be on an
+unsound basis. If, as may happen, the enemy's plan has been captured,
+or if, by some other method, conclusive information has been
+obtained, it may be possible to state the enemy's mission. Even then,
+however, the enemy's mission may sometimes be changed. It is thus
+evident that the commander, by restricting his thought, may frequently
+fail to consider all of the enemy capabilities which may materially
+influence his own course of action.
+
+With this precaution in mind, the commander, at this point in his
+Estimate, proceeds to analyze the effect desired by the enemy. The
+commander intends to use his deductions, if such use appears to be
+sound, to narrow the field of consideration as to enemy courses of
+action. However, he reminds himself that such restriction will be
+dangerous unless it is established on sound grounds.
+
+The first mental act toward determining the effect desired by the
+enemy is to form a reasoned opinion as to the situation which the
+enemy wishes to maintain or to create. The maintenance or creation of
+this situation, existent or to be brought about, is an enemy
+objective.
+
+From earlier association with the enemy, from intelligence of his
+peacetime preparations, and from a knowledge of his political and
+military history, his broad current policies are generally matters of
+common report. The motives impelling the enemy to action may thus be
+evident. Past or present tendencies of the enemy, along certain
+specific lines of endeavor, may be known. These may be corroborated by
+the enemy action which has recently occurred.
+
+In military undertakings of major scope the objectives of the enemy
+are often difficult of concealment. A survey of the objectives which
+the enemy has been pursuing may allow a reasoned opinion to be formed
+as to the enemy's immediate objectives,--whether, at least, his future
+action will be offensive or defensive. The importance to be attached
+by the enemy to certain physical objectives may be indicated by the
+broad aims known to exist. Present composition and disposition of the
+enemy's forces may betray the effort which he intends. Circumstances,
+clearly disadvantageous to the commander's forces, may disclose what
+his enemy's aim may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy)
+military situation.
+
+However scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others,
+the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of
+workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy's
+future action.
+
+The enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the purpose of the
+enemy's mission. The situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad
+in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. This, in
+turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information
+available.
+
+It may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when
+accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. However, as
+previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. The
+commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out
+will attain the purpose. By being inclusive instead of restrictive in
+this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities.
+Moreover, the information available will not always justify the
+derivation of a specific task.
+
+By this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied
+opinion as to the enemy's appropriate effect desired. The commander's
+safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. He
+expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy's
+objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail
+to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the
+situation.
+
+Situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in
+Section II-B (page 135), no value can be assigned the factor of the
+appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis
+for deducing enemy courses of action. Such situations are not unusual,
+especially in problems of lesser scope. In such cases, the commander
+is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which
+can materially influence his own plan. Therefore, in instances of this
+nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first
+consideration to the commander's own courses of action affords the
+advantage of (see page 134) narrowing the field as to the enemy
+capabilities.
+
+
+B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities.
+
+If, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the
+commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a
+sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now
+proceeds, by the mental process described in Section II, to list the
+enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. If there be
+no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all
+enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort.
+
+The survey of fighting strength (Section I-B) has established, through
+consideration of the "means available and opposed", and of the
+"characteristics of the theater", the limitations of enemy
+capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. Because, however, so
+much of the enemy's situation is usually conjectural, it is important
+to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in
+Section I-B,--in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and
+strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. Such a study will
+disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. The
+commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which
+can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the
+commander's courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities
+of obtaining information concerning the enemy's moves.
+
+Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations
+which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list
+the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of
+action, for purposes of further analysis. Naturally, he lists courses
+which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to
+consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of
+the estimate.
+
+
+C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
+Acceptability.
+
+Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above,
+the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and
+for acceptability as to their consequences.
+
+The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (Section
+II). However, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if
+deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for
+suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's
+own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy's fighting
+strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis,
+the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the
+commander's own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts
+as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly
+retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the
+same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the
+consequences.
+
+
+D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action.
+
+All enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for
+further study are now listed by the commander.
+
+While it is manifestly of advantage to the commander if the number of
+enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one,
+it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because
+of undue restriction of the field.
+
+The previous analysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases,
+the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the
+commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the
+enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs.
+
+In many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained
+enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed
+before the less likely. In case of doubt, the higher priority is
+awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous
+from his (the commander's) point of view.
+
+In other instances, no priority can properly be indicated.
+
+As a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine
+certain enemy courses. In any case, he closes this portion of the
+estimate with a list of them, classified so far as he finds
+justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the
+estimate.
+
+
+SECTION IV
+
+SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION
+
+The extent to which detail is desirable in Section IV of the Estimate
+will vary with the nature of the problem (page 95). Experience usually
+demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail
+escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog
+the main issues. As the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will
+recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will
+conduct such examination accordingly.
+
+
+A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of Action.
+
+The next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the
+commander's retained courses of action with those of the enemy which
+have been retained for further study. This process consists of
+executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the
+commander's courses of action, against that in each of the enemy's.
+One method is for the Commander to take the initiative with each of
+his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. By this
+procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced,
+on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the
+enemy, on the modification in the enemy's effort which will be
+caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will
+create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome
+the obstacles.
+
+It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate
+the enemy situation during this analysis. Such necessity arises
+because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy
+situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as
+to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the
+planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the
+situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are
+familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will
+have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments
+may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of
+this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after
+reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy
+estimate (Section III). The particular procedure adopted is
+unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a
+re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to
+this portion of the Estimate.
+
+The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination
+into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself
+in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original
+situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander
+examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed
+situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has
+superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. Thus only can the
+commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his
+own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later
+be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course
+of action, or combination of courses, is the best.
+
+The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to
+the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his
+own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy
+as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against
+each of the commander's courses. This method is applicable, for
+instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which,
+by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander's
+courses. The choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of
+the commander.
+
+It is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving
+each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises.
+However, this analysis is confined, as previously explained (see page
+145), to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of
+a sound comparison. In some cases there may be need for study in the
+greatest detail. Generally, however, the requirement can be met by
+considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of
+weapons, and the physical objectives.
+
+During the progress of these analyses of the impact of operations upon
+each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert
+and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these
+operations may also suggest itself.
+
+The use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here
+frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing
+possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges,
+relative strength in types and weapons are useful.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded
+further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability,
+feasibility, and acceptability. He can, once more, view each of his
+courses from the standpoint of its suitability. The visualized enemy
+action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to
+whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate
+effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the
+possible opposition. As to feasibility, the analysis permits him to
+make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to
+obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander's)
+courses of action. In addition, by visualizing the pertinent
+operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be
+expected.
+
+Should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further
+consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not
+justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine
+further analysis within narrower limits.
+
+Should he find, during his analysis, that further combinations should
+be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and
+uses them in his comparison.
+
+However, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the
+course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can
+justifiably be adopted. The process of comparison is confined to
+deduction, rearrangement, and justified rejection, preliminary to
+weighing and selecting in the next subsection.
+
+
+B. Determination of the Best Course of Action.
+
+The commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of
+action as further analyzed in the light of enemy opposition. All of
+these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying
+extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. He will now examine
+and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion
+as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. The
+analysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course
+has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander's
+retained courses with each other.
+
+At this point, therefore, the commander again assembles his retained
+courses of action.
+
+He includes the combinations which the preceding analysis has
+indicated belong properly together. He then considers the final
+tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted.
+
+The conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility,
+and for acceptability as to consequences. Because of the importance of
+this terminal analysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise
+as possible.
+
+The commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses
+of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the
+several pertinent headings. He next examines this all-inclusive
+summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action.
+
+It may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best.
+Again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of
+action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage
+toward the accomplishment of the motivating task.
+
+If the result of the analysis has demonstrated that there is no
+satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a
+notation as to the reasons for such opinion. In this case the
+commander faces a dilemma.
+
+Usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a
+carefully considered assignment of part of the superior's planned
+effort. The commander may expect normally to find that his own
+estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if
+successfully carried out, will accomplish the task assigned. The
+reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect.
+
+Nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to
+meet the possible dilemma:--When he cannot envisage a course of action
+for accomplishing the assigned task, or when, of the several courses
+of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he
+to do? (See page 70).
+
+Under these circumstances the commander reviews his estimate in all
+its aspects. By minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of
+accomplishing his assigned task. If he cannot accomplish the task, he
+seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is
+reasonably feasible. If unable, in any degree, to further the
+accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he
+feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of
+his mission.
+
+It is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his
+assigned task, the commander will make constructive representations
+(page 103) to higher authority. The latter may then assign additional
+forces or may otherwise alter the problem,--for example, by assigning
+a new task. However, a situation such as described may occur when the
+commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he
+finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority.
+
+In such a situation the commander is under the necessity of
+determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and
+acceptable under the circumstances (page 52).
+
+It is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the
+commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic
+problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. He has
+not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because
+he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. However, the
+solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new
+phase, or step.
+
+The new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the
+solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the
+abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation,
+which has not changed. The new problem is, however, differentiated
+from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive.
+The incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out
+of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that
+no sound solution for the basic problem can be found. The new problem
+is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be
+delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is
+necessary as a basis for the commander's detailed plan. For these
+reasons the new problem is, by definition (page 106), a subsidiary
+problem, of the type distinctive of the second step.
+
+At what point in the solution of the original problem does the
+commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of
+the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? There are
+various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this
+question.
+
+From the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that
+the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its
+motivating task cannot be accomplished. It might also be said that the
+basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the
+commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the
+motivating task.
+
+Practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can
+profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no
+contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. At this point
+a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins.
+This view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point
+in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the
+appropriate effect desired. In such circumstances, the commander
+concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the
+accomplishment of his immediate superior's general plan.
+
+The incentive for the solution of the subsidiary problem will
+therefore arise, on the basis thus adopted, when the commander has
+concluded that he cannot contribute to the accomplishment of his basic
+mission, and that he is under the necessity of evolving a new mission
+for himself. His basic Decision (see discussion, hereafter, of Section
+V of the Estimate Form) will reflect this conclusion and will thereby
+afford him a basis for the solution of his subsidiary problem.
+
+Problems of the foregoing nature, where the commander justifiably
+departs from his instructions, are not unusual during the first step.
+However, they are scarcely typical of that step so long as an
+organized chain of command is in effective operation. In the more
+usual case, the commander, at this point in his estimate, makes note
+of his selected course of action. Whether he selects a single course
+or a combination, the selection is thereafter known as the best course
+of action (singular).
+
+
+SECTION V
+
+THE DECISION
+
+In the final section of the Estimate the commander is concerned with a
+decision as to the selection of an objective or objectives determined
+by himself, for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. This
+decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken for
+the attainment of the commander's selected objective. The decision
+reached at this point becomes the commander's general plan of action
+or provides the basis therefor. It is accordingly so important that
+when it has been formally stated in a basic problem it is thenceforth
+known as the Decision.
+
+The Statement of the Decision. Frequently the statement of the
+Decision may be merely a restatement of the best course of action.
+Such phraseology is often adequate, provided, naturally, that the
+selected course of action has been, itself, correctly expressed (page
+95). Sometimes, however, the commander may desire, at this point in
+his estimate, to develop such expression more fully. He may at this
+point develop his selected course into a general plan, or he may defer
+this development to the second step.
+
+In any event the commander now scrutinizes his selected course of
+action to ensure that its expression conveys exactly the meaning which
+he has in mind.
+
+He bears in mind, also, that his Decision will settle the pattern of
+his future action. If the selected objective is inferred, rather than
+specifically stated, the commander will then ensure that the
+inference, with all its vital implications, is plain.
+
+As to the statement of the action required to achieve this objective,
+the commander realizes that the pattern laid down by the Decision is
+merely a shape or general outline. The details will be introduced
+later. The Decision covers the general outline of the action
+contemplated for the entire force.
+
+If, for example, only a part of the commander's force is to act, while
+the remainder is to remain inactive, the Decision will cover not only
+the kind of activity but also the extent of the inactivity. However,
+for convenience in stating the Decision, such inactivity may be
+inferred, rather than expressly stated, so long as the meaning is
+made clear. Thus, if the force, except for a raiding task group, is to
+remain inactive for the time being, the Decision may properly be "to
+raid enemy communications in the area ---- with a task group
+consisting of ----", so long as the commander is satisfied that the
+implication is clear, under the circumstances, that the remainder of
+his force is to remain inactive.
+
+The commander may properly include brief summarizing remarks as to the
+methods, broadly viewed, whereby he intends to take action. However,
+he introduces such detail only to the extent that he feels
+amplification is needed, either for his own benefit or for the
+assistance of others who may use his estimate.
+
+Deductions or inferences which the commander wishes to note may, at
+this point, be included with the Decision as corollaries (see next
+page).
+
+Where combinations of courses of action have been made in selecting
+the best course, the meaning can sometimes be improved at this point
+by modification of the previous wording.
+
+When, as previously discussed (page 151), the commander has concluded
+that he cannot feasibly or acceptably adopt any course of action which
+will accomplish his task, contribute in any measure to its
+accomplishment, or even contribute in any degree to the accomplishment
+of the purpose of his mission, he records that fact in his Decision.
+His study of the problem will by this time, however, have given him
+the necessary data for a conclusion as to what his new mission should
+be. He therefore closes his basic estimate with a Decision, coupled
+with a purpose therefor, (see below), which will serve as a new
+mission, i.e., as an appropriate effect desired. This provides a basis
+for his solution of a subsidiary problem whose incentive is derived
+from this Decision.
+
+Of course, if the commander has had time and opportunity to represent
+his situation on this basis to higher authority, and has received a
+new task therefrom, the new task, coupled with the purpose also
+indicated by higher authority, will provide the mission for the
+solution of a new basic problem.
+
+The Purpose of the Decision. The purpose of the Decision is identical
+with the motivating task,--provided, of course, that the Decision, if
+carried out, will accomplish that task in full. When stated, the
+purpose is usually connected with the Decision by the words "in order
+to".
+
+If the commander has concluded that he will take action by stages, the
+Decision may cover only the first stage. In all cases where the
+Decision will only partially accomplish the motivating task,
+appropriate words to link the Decision to its purpose may be such as
+"to assist in" or "preparatory to".
+
+The statement of this purpose, in connection with the Decision, is
+frequently helpful and is sometimes necessary in making clear the
+exact relationship between the Decision and the motivating task. In
+the next planning step, where the detailed operations are determined,
+this purpose is an important guide because each detailed operation is
+expected to contribute to the accomplishment, not only of the
+Decision, but also of the motivating task.
+
+Corollaries to the Decision. The Decision may involve certain
+deductions or inferences, either delimiting or amplifying its nature.
+The commander may find it desirable to make note of these matters in
+connection with his Decision. He may later wish to use these notes
+when formulating his plan. Since these matters relate to deductions or
+inferences which naturally follow as results of the Decision they are
+properly referred to as "corollaries" to the Decision.
+
+The nature of such corollaries may best be shown by an example. It is
+supposed, for instance, that the commander has made the Decision "to
+guard the Eastern Caribbean barrier against enemy penetration". During
+the course of his estimate of the situation, he has come to the
+conclusion that his operations to carry out this Decision will extend
+into the area limited by Port X on the north, and Port Y on the south.
+This conclusion is a deduction, which immediately assumes importance
+when the Decision is made. The commander states this deduced
+conclusion here, in connection with the Decision, for future guidance
+in resolving the Decision into detailed operations, as well as for
+later use in his directives to limit the action of his subordinates.
+
+No particular form is specified for such corollaries. It is
+satisfactory to list them as Corollary I, Corollary II, etc. They do
+not constitute a part of the Decision.
+
+Relation of the Decision to the Detailed Plan and Directives. The
+Decision is the basis for the commander's plan of action for his
+entire force. This plan is promulgated in one or more directives. The
+Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not yet the concern of
+subordinate commanders. It does not become their concern until it is
+used in directives. As incorporated in the commander's detailed plan
+and in his directives, the Decision, whether further developed or not,
+constitutes the commander's general plan and is referred to in those
+terms.
+
+The Decision, as it appears in the Estimate, is not bound by any rigid
+specifications as to form. Later (Chapter VII), when the commander
+prepares for the inauguration of planned action by the formulation and
+issue of directives, he assumes the obligation of conveying the
+substance of his Decision to his subordinates in clear language. At
+that time he will again have to subject its expression to scrutiny,
+and may find that he has to make modifications solely for
+clarification.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED OPERATIONS
+
+(The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary Problems)
+
+    The problem of the second step may be stated in question form
+    as follows: "What action should I take for the attainment of
+    my objective as selected in the first step?"
+
+
+[Sidenote: For convenience a tabular form, inserted in the appendix,
+page 224, gives page references to the principal subdivisions of this
+Chapter.]
+
+Having arrived at his basic Decision, the commander, if he wishes to
+put it into effect, will proceed to formulate a plan of action which
+can be cast into the forms of directives for execution. In making such
+a plan, he provides for operations in the detail proper for his
+situation. He thereby expands the general plan, indicated in or
+developed from his basic Decision, into a complete plan which can
+readily be placed in the Order Form (Chapter VIII) as a directive or
+directives for the guidance of his subordinates.
+
+The procedure involved in formulating such a detailed plan of action
+has been described previously in general terms (Chapter V). The method
+of determining the salient features of the operations required has
+also been discussed (in Section III of Chapter IV). Therefore, these
+matters are not repeated at this point.
+
+The problems distinctive of this procedure (the second step, as
+described in Chapter V) are subsidiary problems, in the sense that the
+incentive for their solution arises by reason of a decision already
+made by the commander, i.e., the basic Decision, and because they are
+problems which the commander recognizes are to be solved by himself
+and not by his subordinates.
+
+Assumptions. The commander's plan has been derived from an estimate of
+the situation based on the best information available to him. Complete
+and accurate information is frequently lacking; hence, many military
+plans consider contingencies which, to make a plan possible, have been
+accepted in the estimate as assumptions.
+
+The word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies
+"the taking of something for granted". It does not mean a conjecture,
+guess, or probability. The proposed action, resulting from a decision
+made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the
+disclosure of the truth of the assumption. The fact that the
+assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates the
+advisability of developing several plans based upon various sets of
+assumptions.
+
+It would be erroneous to believe that all contingencies can be
+foreseen, and to be content with a particular set of plans, all of
+which may prove to be wrong. It is not to be expected that a plan
+based upon assumptions will, in all respects, be suitable for use in
+an actual situation. For example, it will seldom occur that an
+elaborate Battle Plan, based upon assumptions as to the various types,
+dispositions, and strengths of forces present, the weather conditions,
+and the intent of the enemy, can be used without changes.
+
+On the other hand, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a harbor
+under assumptions that high visibility exists, that airplanes can
+operate, and that hostile submarines will be the only force in
+opposition, may frequently be found entirely applicable to the actual
+situation, or so nearly so as to require only slight modification. It
+is possible so to standardize such plans that only minor variables
+need be indicated when the plan is to be used.
+
+The visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the
+most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment.
+
+Alternative Plans. The word "alternative" is generally applied to
+contingent plans intended to accomplish a common task, but developed
+from varying sets of assumptions. "A choice between several" is the
+meaning of the word as here used. When such choice becomes necessary
+in a situation not yet clarified, that plan will be selected which has
+been derived from the set of assumptions considered by the commander
+as most likely to be correct. The selected plan is usually called the
+plan or the "accepted plan", and the other plans, coming from other
+less likely but still possible sets of assumptions, are called
+Alternative Plan No. 1, Alternative Plan No. 2, etc.
+
+Naval tactical situations particularly lend themselves to the drawing
+up of alternative plans in advance. There are numerous general
+categories of such tactical plans. Among these the Battle Plan is of
+paramount concern. Others include plans for sortie, entrance, defense
+while cruising, etc. In each category, alternative plans may be
+developed, based on various sets of assumptions.
+
+Alternative plans evolved in advance of detailed information may be
+found useful as a general basis for action. Circumstances may prove to
+be different from those previously visualized. The correct procedure
+is to keep the plans up to date, testing them, by the latest
+information, in a Running Estimate (Chapter IX). The commander will
+thus have a foundation for sound decision in the circumstances which
+actually arise.
+
+Still another use of alternative plans merits consideration. Early
+coordinated action during actual operations may be demanded although
+neither time nor the information available has permitted a detailed
+estimate. If the commander has drawn up, in advance, plans based on
+assumptions as to conditions that conceivably might exist, he will be
+better able to appreciate the situations which actually arise. He can
+thus direct the necessary action with more rapidity and understanding
+than if completely unprepared because of lack of planning. If he
+informs his subordinates of his proposed action under certain assumed
+conditions, he will facilitate cooperation, because better mutual
+understanding will exist. The advance alternative plans here discussed
+are not necessarily confined to problems confronting a commander
+during actual war operations. They may profitably be drawn up in
+peace, and may be the basis of training exercises.
+
+
+Application of the Essential Elements of a Favorable Military
+Operation
+
+In the solution of the problems distinctive of the second step, the
+commander starts with a consideration of the salient features of a
+favorably progressing military operation. This procedure is
+appropriate because any series of these problems, considered as a
+whole, pertains to the single problem of determining the most
+effective operation, or series of operations, for carrying his basic
+Decision into effect. If the action contemplated in the basic Decision
+is of such a nature as to call for successive included efforts in more
+than one stage, the commander limits his consideration, should he find
+such restriction advisable on sound grounds, to the operation or
+operations included in the first stage.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+On this basis, the commander considers, first, the feature of correct
+physical objectives. He has first to determine what his correct
+physical objectives will be.
+
+This determination may or may not present a perplexity. Frequently,
+the procedure of the first step (Chapter VI) will have plainly
+indicated one or more, perhaps all, of the physical objectives
+involved. In some cases, also, the basic Decision will have plainly
+pointed out the action to be taken, and with respect to what physical
+objectives. In these instances, the commander may, with little further
+analysis or none, set down the operations which he considers necessary
+or desirable with respect to these physical objectives.
+
+In other cases, however, the action indicated in the Decision, though
+plainly indicating the commander's intent--that is, his calculated
+line of endeavor--may not have designated the numerous physical
+objectives as to which his effort is to be exerted. For example, the
+Decision "to interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes" is
+quite clear, but what are the numerous exertions of force required,
+and with relation to what physical objectives? Immediately there is a
+perplexity. Guided by the analysis made in his previous estimate of
+the situation, the commander now determines what the physical
+objectives are, action as to which will contribute to the
+accomplishment of the effort. The sum total of the actions taken
+against these physical objectives is properly equivalent to the
+accomplishment of the action indicated in his Decision. He may not be
+able at this time to determine all of the correct physical objectives,
+but he can determine certain correct ones (for the method, see Section
+III of Chapter IV).
+
+The correct physical objectives having been determined, so far as can
+be done at this time, the commander studies each thoroughly,
+developing the possibilities of certain effective actions (operations)
+with reference thereto. For instance, in the case of a commander who
+has been ordered to "interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime
+routes", he might develop one operation "to bomb enemy facilities at
+Port X", and another "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade
+routes" (with an indication of the routes involved).
+
+The operations thus developed are now listed in a definite sequence,
+in order to provide a proper basis for the further procedure. The
+commander may find it desirable to state them in their order of
+importance. Sometimes, however, it may be found advantageous to list
+the operations in chronological sequence, i.e., in the order of their
+execution. This point is further discussed hereafter (pages 166 and
+192). The commander is at liberty, of course, to use either method
+according to its helpfulness in enabling him to visualize the elements
+of his problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander now considers the second feature: advantageous relative
+positions. He may already occupy an advantageous geographical location
+or locations (see pages 64 (bottom) and 65 (top)), or he may desire to
+improve his positions in certain respects. An advantageous position
+might be between the enemy and his base, in order to deny it to him.
+Another advantageous position might be to windward of the enemy, for
+the purpose of making a destroyer attack under the protection of a
+smoke screen.
+
+The commander now reconsiders, from the viewpoint of "advantageous
+relative positions", the operations deduced with respect to "correct
+physical objectives". As a result of this reconsideration, he may find
+that certain of these operations may be retained without change,
+whereas others may require modification.
+
+Suppose, for example, that two of the operations listed are those
+noted above, viz:
+
+    "To bomb enemy facilities at Port X", and
+
+    "To capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes
+    between the ---- parallels of north latitude and the
+    ---- meridians of west longitude."
+
+From the viewpoint of relative position, it may appear that the first
+operation is not affected seriously, if at all. Therefore, this
+operation may be left unchanged. However, the second operation may be
+definitely affected by relative position, because the best method of
+interrupting enemy trade may be to employ raiding forces in focal
+areas. Therefore this operation might be altered to the form, "to
+capture or destroy enemy trade by raiding focal areas" (with a
+designation of the areas).
+
+The commander's study is now likely to suggest operations which were
+not apparent when the analysis was confined to the correct physical
+objectives, alone. New physical objectives may appear to require
+attention. If so, all such new operations are added to the list
+compiled.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander may now study his list of operations, compiled to this
+point, from the standpoint of the third feature, proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. However, if the commander considers such apportionment
+now, his subsequent study of the fourth element--"adequate freedom of
+action"--may develop a need for further operations which will in turn
+call for a re-analysis as to his apportionment of fighting strength.
+Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the
+commander now defers consideration of such apportionment, and that
+he proceeds at this point to study measures for ensuring adequate
+freedom of action.
+
+This study requires consideration of such matters as training, morale,
+surprise, secrecy, cooperation, intelligence, logistics, and
+provisions (communications, location of the commander, and the like)
+for effective exercise of command. (See page 76). The commander
+exercises his judgment as to the degree of detail in which such
+matters should be treated, according to the nature of his problems.
+
+If any such subject--for example, communications--involves the
+development of a subsidiary plan (page 168), the measures noted in
+connection with the formulation of the basic plan may be stated along
+broad lines, such as: "To provide for effective communications." Any
+specific matters of considerable importance may also be included,--for
+example, as to secrecy with respect to the use of communications.
+Other details may then be deferred until the commander takes up the
+necessary subsidiary plan. Otherwise, all pertinent operations in
+connection with these measures are naturally noted at this point.
+
+Certain of these measures for freedom of action are now to be
+discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on basic
+plans.
+
+In certain operations contemplated by the commander, there may be a
+requirement for additional training, sometimes of a special nature.
+This may be true, for instance, if an operation involves the landing
+of an expeditionary force. Conditions permitting, the commander will
+naturally desire to make provision for training exercises. If time or
+other conditions do not permit necessary training, he may find it
+desirable to modify his plans accordingly. The salient features of a
+subsidiary training problem are discussed hereafter (page 176), and
+may well be considered at this point in developing the basic plan.
+
+The commander may already have noted, in considering operations
+suggested by his previous study of the situation, a need for certain
+action as to security, secrecy, and intelligence. Any additional
+operations of this nature, not previously noted, may well be
+incorporated at this point.
+
+Security of his own plan, and secrecy therefor, are important
+considerations with reference to intelligence activities. The
+requirements as to intelligence and counter-intelligence features are
+primary considerations as to any plan. Such considerations involve the
+collection of information and its conversion into intelligence. The
+hampering of enemy intelligence activities is a related consideration.
+
+The collection of useful information, and its denial to the enemy,
+call for a definite plan. When information has been collected, it is
+subjected to the processes (page 122) of analysis, evaluation,
+interpretation, and dissemination. Collection, to be consistently
+effective, calls for specific directives to, or requests on, the
+appropriate collecting agencies. Analysis determines the source of the
+information and the circumstances under which it was obtained.
+Evaluation determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation
+consists of drawing conclusions; when information thus takes the form
+of facts (so far as they can be ascertained) and of sound conclusions
+drawn therefrom, it becomes military (naval) intelligence. It is then
+disseminated to those concerned and is used in the solution of the
+commander's own problems.
+
+The basis for collection of such data is the determination of the
+essential elements of information desired by the commander. The
+notation of these essential elements, for later incorporation in his
+directive(s), naturally constitutes a primary feature of his basic
+plan. The essential elements of information are frequently formulated
+as questions--e.g., Will the enemy do this? Is the enemy doing that?
+What are the principal topographic features of Y Island, with respect
+to so and so?
+
+These questions cover the essential matters of perplexity as to enemy
+courses of action and as to the characteristics of the theater. Each
+enemy course of action, for example, may provide the basis for a
+question; or, if the scope of the problem has narrowed sufficiently,
+such question may deal with one of the enemy's possible operations,
+related to a course of action which he may be pursuing or is known to
+be pursuing.
+
+On the basis of the essential elements of information, the commander
+provides for proper reconnaissance activities by the several
+collecting agencies under his command, or for appropriate requests to
+be made by him on other collecting agencies. A sound plan will always
+make adequate provision for such measures.
+
+These subjects are treated in more detail in the later discussion
+(page 177) of intelligence problems.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In connection with freedom of action, the commander will also make
+adequate provision for logistics support. In its unrestricted sense,
+the term "logistics" relates to the supply and movement of a military
+force, and to such related matters as the disposition and replacement
+of ineffective personnel. Logistics measures, as comprehended in the
+development of the basic plan, exclude movement primarily of a
+strategical or tactical nature, but include movement related primarily
+to supply and similar matters. This requirement gives rise to the
+necessity for logistics measures which may further call for operations
+such as to provide fuel oil and supplies at rendezvous X and Y, and
+tender facilities at port D. An incidental requirement will relate to
+movements of train ships. Hence, the commander formulates these, also,
+and includes them in his list of operations for later assignment as
+logistics tasks. (Page 166). Fuel oil may likewise be required at Port
+D, but if the commander knows that ample fuel oil is in store there,
+no operation to cover this feature is required of him.
+
+The solution of logistics problems is further discussed hereafter
+(page 179).
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The commander has now, it may be presumed, evolved all of the
+operations that his analysis tells him are appropriate with respect to
+correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, and
+freedom of action. Therefore, he now studies all of these operations
+from the viewpoint of the remaining element--proper apportionment of
+fighting strength. This consideration involves, initially, a
+determination of what forces will be necessary to carry out the
+operations listed. The commander thereby determines the requirements,
+as to forces, for each such operation.
+
+For example, the operation "to locate an enemy force" may require the
+use of several types of naval vessels and aircraft. The commander
+determines what method of search is best for the purposes of this
+specific operation; thereafter, he determines what forces are
+necessary to conduct the search. The procedure has previously been
+indicated (in the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made
+Available--page 34).
+
+In this study the commander will often find it necessary to divide
+some of the more extensive operations into component parts, suitable
+for later assignment as tasks for subordinates. Fundamentally, there
+is no difference between an operation and a task, except that the
+latter includes also the idea of imposing on another person, or
+assigning to him, a definite amount of work or duty (page 84). At this
+stage, then, the commander deals with components suitable for
+performance by available weapons, in the usual units, or combinations
+of units, in which they are effective. Of course, when an operation
+meets this requirement without subdivision into components, it need
+not be subdivided.
+
+These component parts are not yet actually tasks, because the
+commander does not plan to assign them at this time to any one for
+execution. However, the components are visualized as clearly, and are
+formulated as definitely, as is possible at this point. The
+requirement is that they be acts that available forces can perform.
+
+The method of breaking down an operation into component parts is one
+of analysis and deduction. Having visualized the manner whereby the
+operation can contribute to the accomplishment of the effort, the
+commander has now to determine the means to be employed to this end.
+Experience and knowledge tell him what numbers and types of ships,
+aircraft, and other weapons, if properly employed, will attain the
+effect desired.
+
+Each component part will indicate both the action and the physical
+objectives of the action. For each component, the commander estimates
+what forces are required. He knows the extent of the armed forces
+available, and he can, if his total force is adequate, adjust matters
+to allow each component a force capable of carrying it out.
+
+For example, a component operation might call for a search by
+destroyers, but the commander might find that his destroyers were in
+such poor relative position as to prevent them from reaching the point
+of origin in time. Therefore he would be unable to conduct the search
+by using destroyers alone. He might now consider a search by aircraft.
+A study of this proposal might indicate that it could be carried out
+in part by aircraft, but that available aircraft were inadequate to
+carry it out in its entirety. In such event, consideration would be in
+order of the possibility of conducting this search by use of other
+forces also, e.g., submarines and cruisers.
+
+In case the commander believes an indicated operation to be
+infeasible, he first restudies that operation to see whether he can
+modify it, without adversely affecting the accomplishment of the
+effort. He may even find that he can eliminate it by including its
+essential features in some other operation.
+
+If the commander finds that his forces are inadequate for the
+accomplishment of an effort in one stage, but that they are adequate
+for its accomplishment in successive stages, he may draw a conclusion
+as to which of the operations he can carry out first. On this basis,
+he may proceed with the formulation of tasks to include these
+operations, leaving the remainder to a future time (see page 56).
+
+It may be that all operations set down cannot be accomplished by the
+forces available, but that they will be possible of accomplishment if
+other forces are provided. This knowledge, of the sum total of forces
+required for the action indicated in the Decision, is an essential. It
+is only by such a searching inquiry that the commander ensures that
+the operations resolved from the Decision will result in a full
+solution of his problem. Usually the forces available will be found
+adequate, because the superior who provided them gave consideration,
+on his part, to the requirements. However, if the forces available are
+not deemed adequate, the commander either modifies the operations, or
+restricts them, or subdivides them into parts for performance in
+succession by stages. In any such case, conditions permitting, he
+makes constructive representations, together with a report of the
+facts, to his superior (see page 103).
+
+
+Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.
+
+Each of the operations finally deemed necessary or desirable is now
+tested as to its suitability, its feasibility, and its acceptability
+as to consequences. The considerations involved have been explained
+previously (Section III of Chapter IV) and are therefore not repeated
+here.
+
+The testing process will eliminate those operations found not
+suitable, feasible, or acceptable.
+
+In addition, the tests may lead to the elimination of operations
+which, while both suitable and feasible, do not contribute enough
+toward the accomplishment of the effort to warrant their retention.
+For example, among the operations listed might be one to capture X
+island and one to capture Y island, both suitable and feasible. The
+commander, having analyzed these proposals, might conclude that the
+capture of Y island would not constitute a sufficient contribution to
+warrant its adoption as an operation at this time. Therefore, he might
+omit this operation, or he might defer it to a later stage.
+
+A feasible operation may similarly be rejected or deferred out of
+preference for another which can more readily be accomplished.
+
+The tests may also reveal important facts as to the relative
+consequences with respect to costs. For example, two operations might
+both be acceptable as to this factor, but one might be less acceptable
+than the other. Accordingly, the less acceptable operation might be
+omitted, or might be deferred for the time being.
+
+Upon the completion of the tests, all operations retained are listed
+for further development.
+
+
+The Formulation of Tasks
+
+The correct resolution of the Decision into the detailed operations
+required is further ensured by the visualization of these operations
+as tasks. Tasks so formulated (page 162), become a basis for the
+preparation of directives.
+
+To prepare a plan as a basis for directives, or for use as such, the
+commander first finds it desirable to formulate and assemble the
+various tasks. The tasks are formulated as a result of his study of
+(1) those operations which do not require to be broken down, and which
+may now be rewritten as tasks, and of (2) the component parts of the
+more extensive operations (See page 162, bottom).
+
+Each of the tasks, as now listed, is tested for suitability, for
+feasibility, and for acceptability with respect to the consequences as
+to costs. In view of the fact that the operations have all been
+thoroughly tested, this process now becomes not a formal analysis but
+merely a check.
+
+
+The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups
+
+The commander now classifies the tasks on the basis of their
+suitability for accomplishment by appropriate task forces or
+subdivisions thereof, i.e., task groups. In so doing he endeavors to
+avoid forming any more classifications than are necessary for the
+accomplishment of the full effort.
+
+Note: In the remainder of this work, the term Task Group, except as
+may otherwise be indicated, will be understood in the inclusive sense
+of either "task force" or "task group".
+
+Tasks are assigned to task groups on the basis of such factors as the
+nature and geographical location of physical objectives, the existing
+disposition of the several units, their capabilities, and their
+freedom of action. The last-named may be the determinant, and,
+because of the importance of such considerations, tasks which would
+otherwise fall to one group might be assigned to another. Features
+influencing a change might include lack of training of the personnel
+available in the first group, or the special qualifications of a
+particular commander, or a justified desire to adhere to a previously
+determined permanent task organization.
+
+Logistics tasks, i.e., those requiring operations for placing
+logistics measures in effect, require the same careful consideration
+as do combat tasks. (See page 162).
+
+Certain tasks apply to all of the task groups, or pertain to the
+general conduct of the common effort. Among such may be provision for
+security, for unity among the subdivisions, and for intelligence
+activities (page 160). In order to avoid repetition, these tasks are
+assembled in one group.
+
+The commander analyzes the requirements of fighting strength for each
+task group. He then, from the means available to him, assigns the
+necessary strength to each group, making adjustment between the
+theoretical requirements and the actual strength available.
+
+He is familiar with the types of vessels and aircraft constituting his
+command, and with their military characteristics; with the
+capabilities and cooperative qualities of his commanders; with the
+degree of training of his various units; and with the geographical
+location of physical objectives. He recognizes that each task requires
+adequate strength for its accomplishment. Because these requirements
+have been thoroughly considered during the study of the effective
+apportionment of fighting strength, he is able to make adjustments as
+necessary.
+
+The commander now fully organizes each classification of tasks and its
+corresponding task group by naming the task group (or task force), by
+making notation of its composition and of the rank and name of its
+commander, and then by listing the tasks of each group. The principal
+task (or tasks) may be listed first, the other tasks following in the
+order of their importance. If preferred, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological. Also, either major or minor tasks may be listed
+chronologically. (See pages 158 and 192).
+
+If the chronological sequence of tasks is utilized, that fact, in
+order to avoid confusion, is clearly indicated.
+
+Thus organized, the whole plan can be transferred almost bodily into
+the Order Form (Chapter VIII).
+
+
+Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the Determination
+of Objectives Embodied in Tasks
+
+In formulating tasks for the several task groups, the commander has
+now visualized, for each such group, an objective (or objectives) for
+the subordinate to attain. In selecting these objectives, the
+commander has placed himself, mentally, in the subordinate's
+situation, visualizing the problem which the subordinate is to solve.
+On this basis the commander has apportioned the strength needed for
+the attainment of the objectives assigned to his subordinates. This
+procedure, of evident importance, is frequently one of considerable
+difficulty, because a higher commander, lacking detailed information
+of the situation which may confront a subordinate cannot always
+anticipate all the obstacles to the latter's success.
+
+In formulating tasks, and in apportioning strength, by the procedure
+already described, the commander has applied the Fundamental Military
+Principle. Now, to ensure the practical adjustment of means to ends
+(page 66), the commander reviews the process in the light of that
+Principle, so that he may be assured that he has selected a correct
+objective (or objectives) for each subordinate. By using the tests
+indicated in the Principle, the commander confirms the suitability of
+each objective so selected, satisfies himself of its feasibility of
+attainment, and assures himself that the costs involved will be
+acceptable. If these requirements cannot be so satisfied, necessary
+adjustments are in order.
+
+These tests may frequently be of a routine nature, by reason of the
+previous painstaking tests of the several operations involved.
+However, such final tests cannot be omitted without incurring the
+danger of selecting incorrect objectives for subordinates to attain.
+
+
+The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action
+
+Having completed the classification of his tasks, the commander next
+assembles the measures determined upon as necessary for ensuring
+adequate freedom of action.
+
+When the subject matter is not too bulky, these measures are
+incorporated in their proper place in the basic plan. Otherwise,
+instructions as to these matters will be issued as annexes.
+
+The various measures are assembled under the classification shown
+below:
+
+    (a) Measures required for security, for cooperation, and for
+        intelligence activities.
+
+    (b) Measures for logistics support. These cover provision for
+        procurement and replenishment of supplies, disposition and
+        replacement of ineffective personnel, satisfactory
+        material maintenance, sanitation, battle casualties, and
+        the like.
+
+    (c) Measures for the exercise of command. These include
+        provision for communications, location of rendezvous, zone
+        time to be used, and the location of the commander.
+
+This classification corresponds to that used in the Order Form (page
+193). Experience has indicated that such a classification facilitates
+the transmission of instructions to subordinate commanders.
+
+If desired, the material which will be required to be incorporated in
+paragraph (1) of the Order Form (see pages 190, 191, 219 and 221) may
+be also assembled at this point.
+
+
+The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans
+
+As previously noted (page 106), certain subsidiary problems require
+the preparation of subsidiary plans to be included with the directive
+as annexes. In broad strategical estimates, the solution of such
+subsidiary problems involves a vast amount of mental effort; even in
+restricted estimates, these problems may require most intensive
+thought. It is therefore appropriate at this point to discuss, in some
+detail, the nature of these subsidiary problems.
+
+During the solution of his basic problem and later, during the process
+of evolving his basic plan, the commander may become aware of the need
+for further action of a supporting nature with respect to his basic
+mission, distinct from that which he intends to assign as tasks to
+subordinate commanders. If the nature of this action involves
+perplexity, he will be confronted with new problems to be solved. When
+he recognizes that such problems exist and are to be solved by
+himself, this awareness is a recognition of the incentive.
+
+For example, one of these problems may involve a battle in which the
+entire force will participate, or perhaps a sortie requiring
+coordination of the several subdivisions of his force. Others will be
+concerned with measures recognized as necessary for ensuring freedom
+of action.
+
+These problems give rise to the subsidiary plans previously referred
+to (page 106). They are not necessarily subsidiary in importance; even
+the Battle Plan, the basis for the culmination of tactical effort, may
+result from the solution of a subsidiary problem. The word
+"subsidiary", as here used, merely indicates that the problem has its
+origin in the commander's own Decision.
+
+When the incentive is thus recognized during the solution of the
+basic problem or during the second step, the commander solves these
+new problems, and includes their solutions as a part of the directives
+prepared for the carrying out of the basic plan. As will be seen later
+(Chapter VIII), there is a prescribed place for such solutions in the
+usual form in which directives are issued. Often, however, because of
+extent and bulk, these solutions are included with the directives as
+annexes.
+
+The commander will desire to provide for all contingencies, but he can
+rarely, during the planning stage, see completely into the future, so
+as to foretell all pertinent events which may befall. During the
+unfolding of events, therefore, unforeseen subsidiary problems will
+probably arise. Whether visualized during planning, or encountered
+during the execution of the plan, these problems have the same
+relationship with the basic problem. Reference is later made (Chapter
+IX) to subsidiary problems which arise during the action.
+
+Subsidiary problems, according to their nature in each case, may be
+solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step or by that
+distinctive of the second. In many instances either may be applicable,
+the choice being a matter of convenience.
+
+Battle Plans, for example, can demonstrably be formulated by the use
+of either procedure. Thus, a Decision "to destroy the enemy in a
+daylight fleet engagement" may be used as the basis for an Estimate of
+the Situation, by the procedure distinctive of the first step, in
+order to reach a decision as to the plan, in outline, for the
+contemplated engagement. However, the same result can also be attained
+through the procedure distinctive of the second step, with the basic
+Decision as the point of departure.
+
+A solution also can be reached by a method which is, in effect,
+intermediate between the procedures of the first and second steps. For
+example, the basic (broad strategical) Decision noted above can be
+taken, in a detailed tactical Estimate, as the only suitable,
+feasible, and acceptable course of action. Then, in Section IV of the
+Estimate, a study of the more detailed operations involved can be
+developed into an outlined plan for the battle. Thus, a single course
+of action, expanded to include the outlined plan so developed, can
+then be adopted as the decision and can in turn be expanded by
+second-step methods into a detailed tactical plan.
+
+On the grounds of simplicity, the procedure distinctive of the second
+step is preferable, when it is applicable to the particular problem.
+Therefore, when a subsidiary plan is to be developed directly from a
+basic Decision, this is frequently the better procedure. This comment
+is applicable not only to battle plans but also to other subsidiary
+plans such as sortie plans, entrance plans, and logistics plans. The
+commander may find it necessary, however, to expand the study of
+fighting strength made in Section I-B of the basic estimate, in order
+to obtain the detailed data needed for formulating the subsidiary
+plan.
+
+In spite of the relative simplicity of the second-step method, cases
+occur where the procedure of the first step is nevertheless
+preferable. For example, a basic Decision making provision for a major
+campaign, divided into stages of some scope, may involve, as part of
+one of these stages, an operation to capture an island. Such an
+operation may itself require a considerable effort on the part of the
+whole force; yet the operation may be so specialized or localized, or
+both, with reference to the entire effort contemplated in the basic
+Decision, that the solution of this subsidiary problem can best be
+accomplished through the procedure distinctive of the first step.
+
+The commander will therefore necessarily be the judge, in each case,
+as to the particular procedure to be adopted.
+
+There are wide variations in the requirements of the Estimate Form,
+when used for the solution of subsidiary problems. This is natural
+because these problems vary widely in nature. They include, on the one
+hand, problems dealing directly with the conflict of armed forces, for
+which the Form is especially designed. On the other hand, these
+problems include those dealing with the factors related to freedom of
+action. To be suitable for this purpose, the Form requires
+modification in varying degrees. Certain examples are included in the
+latter part of this chapter (page 176 and following).
+
+The application of the procedure of the first step to the solution of
+such subsidiary problems requires provision for deriving, in each
+case, a (subsidiary) mission appropriate to the problem. Of the two
+elements of the mission, the (subsidiary) purpose is first determined,
+because the (subsidiary) task will necessarily be suitable to the
+(subsidiary) purpose. These elements of the (subsidiary) mission may
+be obtained from one or more of the operations into which the basic
+Decision has been resolved. They may also be obtained from a preceding
+subsidiary problem, already solved.
+
+In illustration of the preceding, discussion is first centered on a
+strategical problem of usual type, involving a subsidiary tactical
+problem calling for the detailed employment of weapons in a naval
+engagement. Other illustrations will deal with subsidiary problems
+relating to particular aspects of freedom of action.
+
+In the first example it is supposed that the commander has already
+solved a basic problem of broad strategical scope, and has arrived at
+a Decision which contemplates an engagement. A further logical act of
+planning is now to develop a Battle Plan. Such development involves
+the solution of a subsidiary problem. In this case the commander is
+supposed to have found it desirable to solve this subsidiary problem
+by the procedure distinctive of the first step.
+
+In this problem, the situation summarized is an imaginary one. It may
+eventuate either through the natural future developments of the
+situation existing at the time of the solution of the basic problem,
+or it may confront the commander during the execution of the plans
+derived from the Decision of that (basic) problem. The Battle Plan
+finally to be formulated will be for use under the conditions assumed
+in this situation.
+
+The commander will desire to draw up a Battle Plan as a provision for
+the situation which he believes most likely to eventuate. However, as
+he cannot be certain that this situation will occur, he may also
+desire to assume other situations, i.e., prepare in advance for other
+contingencies. It is then necessary for him to solve several problems,
+each differing from the others in the assumptions (page 155) as to the
+form the situation may take. The summary of the situation therefore
+requires a brief statement of the conditions which are assumed. In
+addition, such parts of the basic problem may be included as are
+deemed pertinent to the new problem in hand.
+
+In his new problem the purpose of the (subsidiary) mission may readily
+be obtained from the basic problem. Suppose the assigned task,
+motivating the estimate of the basic problem, to have been to "prevent
+enemy convoy from reaching destination". This, the motivating task of
+the basic problem, then becomes a suitable (subsidiary) purpose for
+the mission of the subsidiary problem.
+
+For the mission of the subsidiary problem, a motivating task, suitable
+to the purpose thus determined, will be found in the Decision of the
+basic problem. Suppose the Decision in this case to have been "to
+destroy the enemy convoy". The task thus determined for the subsidiary
+problem becomes an assigned task in the sense that it is assigned by
+the commander to himself, instead of to a subordinate; however, it is
+also an assigned task in the sense that it has been indirectly
+assigned by the immediate superior, because it has been derived, in
+the basic estimate, from the motivating task which was directly
+assigned by the superior.
+
+The two elements, of task and purpose, when linked together, enable
+the commander to visualize the appropriate effect desired, as the
+basis for his subsidiary estimate,--a procedure identical with that
+followed in a basic estimate. As in the latter, the commander can now
+formulate his subsidiary mission, as:--
+
+    (Task) To destroy the enemy convoy,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to prevent it from reaching its
+    destination.
+
+The mission of the subsidiary problem is thus seen to be identical
+with the basic Decision linked to the purpose of that Decision.
+
+However, this is not always the case. A subsidiary problem may merely
+involve the execution by the commander, i.e., under his own immediate
+direction, of a designated part of his general plan. Or, such a
+problem may involve execution, by the commander, of one or more of the
+detailed operations for the accomplishment of his general plan or of a
+part thereof. The commander may also find it necessary to solve
+numerous subsidiary problems of relatively restricted scope pertaining
+either to his general plan or to a part thereof or to the detailed
+operations involved.
+
+In some of these cases the purpose of the subsidiary mission may be
+readily apparent. In others, its nature may become clear only after
+the application of considerable mental effort. In every case the
+determination of a proper (subsidiary) purpose involves visualization
+of a situation which the commander desires to bring about or to
+maintain. The (subsidiary) task, appropriate to the (subsidiary)
+purpose, will always necessarily be suitable to the latter. This task
+is then the motivating task for the solution of the particular
+subsidiary problem in hand. This will be the case whether the
+commander makes a simple mental solution or produces a more complex
+one in which the formal written estimate of the situation is employed.
+In the former instance, the brevity of the mental process tends to
+obscure this fact.
+
+An example might occur in a situation where the commander has received
+an order to "Protect the base at A". It is then supposed that, after
+estimating the situation, he has reached the Decision "to deny the
+enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of A", the
+purpose of the Decision being, of course, "in order to protect the
+base at A". The action required might then be undertaken in two
+stages. The first stage might be confined to the area ABCD. If, then,
+all available base sites in this area, except Y island, were already
+securely in friendly hands, the commander would find it necessary to
+make provision for an operation to deny the use of this island to the
+enemy. If this operation is of such a nature that the commander
+desires to execute it under his own direct control, instead of
+assigning it to a subordinate, it presents a subsidiary problem which
+the commander, himself, has to solve.
+
+The commander has now determined the necessity of solving a subsidiary
+problem relating to the accomplishment of a designated part of his
+general plan. He has also determined the necessity of solving another
+subsidiary problem presented by an operation pertaining to the first
+stage of the accomplishment of his general plan.
+
+Each subsidiary problem requires an estimate of the situation although
+"the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact" (page
+172).
+
+In making his basic estimate, the commander may have discovered the
+need for these subsidiary estimates. In this case, he may have
+included them in his estimate, as "estimates within the estimate"
+(page 83), in his analysis of the operations involved in the various
+courses of action which he considered. For instance, his basic
+Decision may have included the capture of Y island, and he may have
+covered this feature by a corollary to that Decision, as follows:
+
+    Corollary: As a first stage, to deny the enemy the use of
+    available base sites in the area ABCD, by capturing Y island.
+
+However, the commander may not discover the desirability or need of
+solving these subsidiary problems until the second step, when
+resolving the basic Decision into the detailed operations required. In
+this case, he might make due provision at that time for the operations
+involved in the subsidiary problems. The mental procedure would be the
+same in either event.
+
+The commander may find, however, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate with respect to the determination of the stages of
+his operation, including the details as to the performance of the
+first stage. In this case he finds a proper mission for his subsidiary
+estimate in the basic Decision, linked to its purpose. This mission
+would be as follows:--
+
+    (Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+    effective bombing range of A,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to protect the base at A.
+
+During the subsidiary estimate the commander may discover, in his
+study of the area ABCD, the necessity for an operation to deny Y
+island to the enemy, and may even go so far, in this study, as to
+decide on the capture of this island. The decision, settling on this
+area as the scene of the first stage of his effort, may then include
+provision for the capture of the island, as follows:
+
+    Decision: To deny the enemy the use of base sites in the area
+    ABCD as a first stage toward denying him the use of all base
+    sites within effective bombing range of the base at A.
+
+    Corollary: To capture Y island.
+
+However, the commander may not take up the matter of denying Y island,
+specifically, to enemy use until he studies the detailed operations
+required for the accomplishment of the action involved in his first
+stage. In such event, he may make provision for the capture of the
+island in his subsidiary plan for the execution of the first stage. He
+may find, on the other hand, that he prefers to make a separate,
+subsidiary estimate as to this feature. If so, the mission for this
+subsidiary estimate would be identical with the decision (less the
+corollary, but plus the purpose of the estimate), i.e.,--
+
+    (Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within
+    effective bombing range of the area ABCD as a first stage
+
+    (Purpose) toward denying him the use of all base sites within
+    effective bombing range of the base at A.
+
+During this estimate the commander considers the various courses of
+action whereby he can deny to the enemy all bases in the area of the
+first stage. Concluding that Y island is the only base site not
+securely in friendly hands, and that the best method of denying it to
+the enemy is to capture it himself, he reaches a decision as follows:
+
+    Decision: To capture Y island, in order to deny to the enemy
+    the use of the only available base site in the area ABCD.
+
+In each of the foregoing cases, the commander is said to have
+"deduced" the mission for his subsidiary problem. As has been
+demonstrated, the process of deduction is merely the application of
+the natural mental processes through the use of the estimate of the
+situation. Whether the estimate is formal or informal, detailed or
+brief, written or mental, is immaterial; in any case, the estimate
+results in a decision which provides, with its purpose, a proper
+mission for the succeeding problem which has been presented by
+solution of its predecessors.
+
+In logical sequence, from problem to problem, the procedure outlined
+in the preceding discussion enables the commander to derive a correct
+mission for the problem involving the capture of Y Island. Clear
+visualization of such a subsidiary mission is frequently of great
+importance, and may be difficult unless the procedure has been
+carefully traced from each problem to the next. In this particular
+example, if the commander finds that the capture of Y Island is of
+such a specialized and localized nature (page 170) as to call for a
+formal estimate (as may frequently be the case in capturing a
+well-defended island base), he will be especially desirious of
+deriving a correct (subsidiary) mission as a basis for this estimate.
+In this instance a correct mission would be:--
+
+    (Task) To capture Y Island,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only
+    available base site in the area ABCD.
+
+This mission is identical with the decision, linked to its purpose, of
+the preceding subsidiary problem.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Subsidiary problems relating to training (page 160), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, involve estimates of the
+situation very similar to those explained previously (Chapter VI).
+
+Section I-A of such a training estimate will include a summary of the
+salient features of the existing situation, from the strategical or
+tactical viewpoint, together with a statement of the salient features
+of the operations to be carried out for which the projected training
+is designed. The incentive will be found in a previous decision
+calling for the operations which require the training to be given. The
+assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for
+training appropriate to the projected operations. The (subsidiary)
+mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) to provide appropriate training,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action during
+    the operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+    operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+    phraseology in the mission or by reference to the preceding
+    summary of the situation.)
+
+Section I-B of a training estimate will take account of the training
+factors cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic problem,
+but will specify details with respect to both own and enemy forces.
+This section will also cover existing facilities for training, as well
+as the characteristics of the theater which have now or may have a
+bearing on the training to be given.
+
+Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+the appropriate training.
+
+Section III will deal with any measures which may be adopted by the
+enemy (through actual attack, through propaganda, or any other
+methods) to hinder or prevent the desired training.
+
+Section IV will be devoted to the selection of the best training
+procedure.
+
+Section V will state the decision as to the essentials of the training
+to be given and as to the method of giving the training. The decision
+will be in such detail as to constitute a general plan, or a proper
+basis therefor, from which a detailed plan may be developed.
+
+A detailed training plan, developed from the foregoing decision, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions, will state the
+general plan for training, and will prescribe the appropriate training
+tasks. It will also include any proper coordinating measures, make
+provision for the logistics of the training plan, and finally provide
+for the exercise of command and for supervision over the training.
+
+A training plan may be briefed by annexing appropriate
+documents,--e.g., a program and a schedule. The commander will
+ordinarily issue a schedule for training to be given under his own
+supervision; he will usually issue a program for training to be given
+by his subordinates, who will in turn prepare their own schedules.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Subsidiary problems involving intelligence (page 160), when solved by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step, call for an intelligence
+estimate along the lines indicated, in general, in Chapter VI.
+
+Section I-A of the Estimate will include a summary of the salient
+features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical
+and tactical operations. The incentive, to be found in a previous
+decision of the commander, will be noted. The assigned objective will
+be the making of provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and
+of the theater of operations. The mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) To make provision for adequate intelligence of the
+    enemy and of the theater of operations,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+    operations contemplated.
+
+Section I-B of the intelligence estimate will take account of the
+factors as to intelligence and as to related matters which are noted
+in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate.
+
+Section II will consider the possible procedures for obtaining
+information, i.e., for its collection, including reports from
+collecting agencies.
+
+Section III will consider the capabilities of the enemy as to
+counter-intelligence measures.
+
+Section IV will compare the various procedures open for the collection
+of information and for reports thereof.
+
+Section V will include a decision as to the essential elements of
+information desired. The decision will be in sufficient detail to
+serve as a general plan (or a basis therefor), to be developed into a
+detailed plan for obtaining information and for converting it into
+intelligence.
+
+A detailed intelligence plan will include appropriate information and
+assumptions. It will state the general plan for obtaining
+intelligence. This statement will include the essential elements of
+information desired. The plan will include appropriate tasks for
+information-collecting agencies, with times and destinations for
+reports of information. The task for each collecting agency will be
+based on the general plan (above); such task will also be
+synchronized with the projected operations prescribed for such agency
+in current Operation Orders (Chapter VIII). The agency's inherent
+capabilities--its limitations as well as its powers--will be given
+due consideration. Requests to be made on collecting agencies not
+under the commander's control will be noted in the information (as to
+own forces) given in the plan (see above).
+
+Logistics arrangements will include, for example, provisions for
+handling prisoners of war, the disposition of captured documents and
+other materials, and the supply of maps, charts, and photographs.
+Counter intelligence measures will be specified where applicable.
+These include such matters as censorship, press relations, camouflage,
+and propaganda. Finally, the plan will include provision for the
+rendition of routine and special reports, for special charts (or maps)
+accompanying or pertinent to such reports, and for any intelligence
+conferences.
+
+The essential elements of information desired are frequently stated in
+question form. Each question deals with an enemy course of action or
+with one or more of the enemy operations pertaining to such a course
+(page 161).
+
+The tasks assigned to collecting agencies, or the requests made on
+collecting agencies not under the commander's control, will call for
+information (negative, if desired, as well as positive) as to specific
+indications of the enemy's action--past, present, or intended--and of
+the characteristics of the theater as related thereto. The indications
+to be sought for and reported are carefully determined by the
+commander in expectation that information obtained as to such matters
+will enable him to draw conclusions which will answer the questions
+posed by the essential elements of information.
+
+For example, essential elements of information, with corresponding
+indications, may be as follows:
+
+Essential Elements               Indications
+
+1. Will the enemy patrol the     a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   trade route from A to B?         forces (number and types of
+                                    vessels) between meridians--and--,
+                                    as far north as--and as far
+                                    south as--.
+
+                                 b. Times enemy forces observed
+                                    in area noted.
+
+                                 c. Apparent activity of enemy
+                                    forces so noted.
+
+2. Will the enemy cover focal    a. Presence or absence of enemy
+   points M and N?                  forces (numbers and types of
+                                    vessels) in (a specified area
+                                    or areas).
+
+                                 b. Times enemy forces observed
+                                    in areas noted in a, above.
+
+                                 c. Apparent activity of enemy so
+                                    noted.
+
+                                 d. Has M or N been prepared
+                                    as a naval base; an air base
+                                    for seaplanes, for land planes?
+                                    Is M or N readily accessible to
+                                    enemy battleships? What are
+                                    the characteristics of the
+                                    available entrances to sheltered
+                                    anchorages? (Etc.)
+
+Another type of subsidiary problem which may call for a separate
+subsidiary plan relates to logistics (page 162). This problem is
+particularly applicable to the planning stage, because the
+contingencies which it involves can, to a considerable degree, be
+foreseen. In this case the situation which the commander usually
+desires to bring about is adequate freedom of action with respect to
+supply and related matters. He wishes to solve this problem so
+completely during the present step that a logistics plan, concurrently
+executed with his basic plan, will require minimum subsequent
+attention.
+
+A logistics estimate by the procedure distinctive of the first step
+will include in Section I-A a summary of the pertinent features of the
+existing strategical and tactical situation, and of contemplated
+strategical and tactical operations. It will also include a statement
+of the salient features of the existing logistics situation. The
+incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will
+be noted. The assigned objective will be the making of adequate
+provision for logistics support. The mission will be:--
+
+    (Task) to make provision for adequate logistics support,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the
+    operations contemplated. (In each particular case the
+    operations contemplated will be indicated by proper
+    phraseology in the mission or by reference to the summary of
+    the situation).
+
+Section I-B of the estimate will take account of the logistics factors
+cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate, but will
+specify details to the further extent necessary.
+
+Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording
+appropriate logistics support of the various categories.
+
+Section III will discuss enemy actions to hamper or prevent adequate
+logistics support.
+
+Section IV will deal with selection of the best logistics procedure.
+
+Section V will state the decision as to the essential elements of the
+logistics support to be afforded, in such detail as will constitute a
+general plan (or a proper basis therefor) from which a detailed plan
+can be developed.
+
+A detailed logistics plan, developed from the foregoing estimate, will
+assemble the necessary information and assumptions. It will state the
+general plan for logistics support. It will then provide for
+appropriate action as to each type of logistics support, or will state
+proper tasks for the several subdivisions of the force concerned
+therewith. It will include, also, any coordinating measures. It will,
+finally, make provision for exercise of command with reference to
+logistics support, as well as for any necessary or desirable time
+elements and similar considerations.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+From all of the foregoing discussions it is apparent that the numerous
+possible subsidiary problems are all related to the basic problem
+either directly or through an intervening subsidiary problem. The
+nature of this relationship is seen through the (subsidiary) purpose,
+determined for the particular (subsidiary) task; therefore, the
+understanding of the problem involves a statement or visualization of
+the (subsidiary) purpose in each case.
+
+
+
+
+PART III
+
+
+THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
+IN THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE INAUGURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTION
+
+(The Third Step--The Formulation and Issue of Directives)
+
+    In the discussion which now follows, it is demonstrated that,
+    if the second step (Chapter VII) has been carried through
+    completely, the formulation of directives requires only the
+    completion of details of the Order Form, which is explained.
+    The various types of naval plans and directives are also
+    described.
+
+
+Scope of the Third Step. As previously stated (in Chapter V, on page
+107), the inauguration of the planned action (the third step) begins
+when the commander forms the intention of immediately promulgating, as
+one or more directives, his solution of the problem represented by the
+second step. The third step ends at the moment when the problem
+becomes one of supervising the planned action in the course of its
+execution.
+
+Military Plans and Military Directives. A plan is a proposed scheme,
+procedure, or method of action for the attainment of an objective. It
+is one of the essential links between decision and action.
+
+A directive, in the general sense, initiates or governs conduct or
+procedure. It is the means by which one's will or intent is made known
+to others. Sometimes the word is employed as a synonym for "order"; at
+others, it carries the significance of various instructions ranging
+from the simple to the complex; at still others, it denotes a plan
+formulated to be placed in effect in a particular contingency or when
+so directed. In all cases, a directive, to be suitable as a guide for
+others, has as its origin a plan.
+
+The words plan and directive are used herein as follows:--A plan may
+exist only in the mind. Even if formulated and set down in writing, it
+may receive no distribution. A plan continues to be exclusively a plan
+so long as it concerns the originating commander alone, and it never
+loses its identity as a proposed procedure or method of action. When,
+however, the commander forms the intent of promulgating the plan
+immediately, the plan becomes also a directive. At this point, as
+noted in the preceding paragraph ("Scope of the Third Step"), the
+execution phase begins, from the standpoint of the exercise of mental
+power, with the inauguration of the planned action.
+
+A directive may therefore be (1) an order effective upon receipt, in
+which case it may be an order placing in effect a plan already issued;
+or a directive may be (2) a formulated plan which the commander
+intends to issue immediately to his subordinates.
+
+Accordingly, certain written instruments prepared under the
+designation of plans are also included under the classification of
+directives. In the use of these terms hereinafter, the distinction
+between a plan viewed as a basis for a directive, and a plan intended
+to be promulgated as a directive, will be indicated in the context.
+
+Whether written or mental, the complete plan will cover the scope of
+the Decision, and will be the commander's method of procedure for his
+future conduct of operations. A commander may, or may not, formulate
+his complete plan in writing, or embody it in a formal directive which
+will provide for the execution, in full, of the Decision of his
+estimate. He may find that his plan divides into several parts, and he
+may make separate provision for the execution of each of these parts.
+While the integrity of a plan depends upon the soundness of its
+essential details, the plan is properly formulated as a directive or
+directives projected in detail, only so far into the future as the
+commander's estimate of the situation assures him of reasonable
+freedom of action (see page 57).
+
+Where the commander divides his plan into parts for separate
+accomplishment, he will naturally exercise care that each part is, in
+itself, the suitable basis for a complete and homogeneous plan.
+Successful execution of all these plans results in the complete
+accomplishment of his Decision.
+
+Directives required to further the success of a particular operation
+may be issued without awaiting formulation of the entire plan. Parts
+of the plan may be transmitted as fragmentary directives to guide the
+action of subordinates in instantaneous or early execution. Such cases
+are far more frequent than are those in which a formal written plan,
+to guide either the operations in their entirety or a part thereof, is
+prepared and distributed as a directive. Effective action by the
+subordinate is thus not delayed by the absence of complete written
+directives.
+
+The commander, more especially during war, may be the only individual
+who is conversant with the entire plan. He may consider that the
+necessity for secrecy is paramount, or that there are features to
+whose details he is unwilling to commit himself until the situation is
+clearer. However, he may usually expect to disclose its scope and
+general features to his immediate superior, and the plan in its
+entirety to his next junior; or, in the interests of mutual
+understanding, to all his subordinates of the next lower echelon or
+even to his entire command. The scope of the plan also may be a
+determining factor. If the plan covers an entire campaign or an
+extended series of operations, its dissemination is less likely and
+less general than if it is concerned with only a minor operation.
+
+During peace, in exercises simulating war, the complete plan is
+frequently given circulation for purposes of training.
+
+Subsidiary Plans. Subsidiary plans, discussed in Chapter VII (page
+168), are frequently issued as annexes to the Operation Plan (page
+196) which carries into effect the basic Decision. The commander will
+be the judge as to whether alternative subsidiary plans are necessary
+or desirable under the circumstances.
+
+
+Essentials of Military Directives.
+
+General. By the issue of directives, a commander communicates to his
+subordinates his plans or such parts of them as he desires. Directives
+may be oral or written, or may be transmitted by despatch.
+
+Whether a directive is to be effective upon receipt, or under
+specified conditions, or at a specific time, or upon further
+instructions from the commander, will be evident from its nature, or
+will be prescribed in the body of the directive itself.
+
+The manner of determining the details of a plan has been discussed in
+Chapter VII. The matter contained therein is pertinent to the
+preparation of a plan that is not to be issued as a directive as well
+as to one that is to be so issued.
+
+The various categories of directives customarily employed in our naval
+service, and standard forms for these, are described hereinafter.
+
+The essentials of a military directive which is designed to govern the
+execution of a plan are:
+
+    (a) That it indicate the general plan for the common effort
+        of the entire force.
+
+    (b) That it organize the force with a view to the effective
+        accomplishment of this plan.
+
+    (c) That it assign tasks to the subdivisions of the force,
+        such that the accomplishment of these tasks will result in
+        the accomplishment of the plan adopted for the entire
+        force.
+
+    (d) That it make appropriate provision for coordination among
+        subdivisions, for logistics support, and for the
+        collection of information and the dissemination of
+        intelligence, that it state the conditions under which the
+        plan is to become effective; and that it indicate the
+        location of the commander during the period of execution.
+
+Some of these essentials may have found their expression in previous
+instructions, or may be unnecessary because of the state of mutual
+understanding. On the other hand, the directive may include annexes in
+the form of alternative and subsidiary plans, letters of instructions
+(page 188), and other material designed to be of assistance in the
+intelligent accomplishment of the assigned task.
+
+In issuing a directive, whether written or oral, except such a
+fragmentary order as has previously been described (page 184), a
+commander has the following definite responsibilities:
+
+    (a) To ensure that subordinates understand the
+        situation,--therefore, to give them pertinent available
+        information.
+
+    (b) To set forth clearly the general plan to be carried out by
+        his entire force, as well as the tasks to be accomplished
+        by each subdivision of his force.
+
+    (c) To provide each of these subdivisions with adequate means
+        to accomplish its assigned task.
+
+    (d) To allow subordinate commanders appropriate discretion
+        within the limits of their assigned tasks, without,
+        however, sacrifice of the necessary coordination.
+
+He will also bear in mind that a directive will best convey his will
+and intent and will be most easily understood by his subordinates if
+it is clear, brief, and positive.
+
+Clarity demands the use of precise expressions susceptible of only the
+desired interpretation. Normally, the affirmative form is preferable
+to the negative. The importance of clarity has been summed up in the
+saying, "An order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood".
+If misunderstandings arise on the part of trained subordinates the
+chief fault often lies with the person who issued the directive.
+
+Brevity calls for the omission of superfluous words and of unnecessary
+details. Short sentences are ordinarily more easily and rapidly
+understood than longer ones. Brevity, however, is never to be sought
+at the expense of clarity. The attainment of brevity often requires
+considerable expenditure of effort and of time. But time is not to be
+sacrificed in the interests of obtaining brevity in directives, when
+the proper emphasis should rather be on initiating early action.
+
+Positiveness of expression suggests the superior's fixity of purpose,
+with consequent inspiration to subordinates to prosecute their tasks
+with determination. The use of indefinite and weakening expressions
+leads to suspicion of vacillation and indecision. Such expressions
+tend to impose upon subordinates the responsibilities which belong to
+and are fully accepted by a resolute superior.
+
+
+Restatement of the Decision for Use in the Directive
+
+Except where special considerations exist to the contrary, it will be
+found that the expression of the Decision for use in a directive will
+most clearly indicate the intent of the commander if stated in terms
+of the objective to be attained by his force (i.e., of the situation
+to be created or maintained) and of the outlined action for its
+attainment (page 104). Such expression is usually possible in problems
+of broad strategical scope (page 88). In other cases difficulty may be
+encountered. For instance, in tactical problems dealing with the
+detailed employment of weapons, the action may necessarily be couched
+in the terms of a series of acts (see page 95).
+
+No precise form is prescribed; thoughts clearly expressed are more
+important than form. It is customary to begin with "This force (or
+group) will", and then state with brevity the Decision as (and if)
+modified, adding the motivating task which is the purpose of the
+Decision. The motivating task is connected with the preceding
+statement by words such as "in order to", "to assist in", or
+"preparatory to", as the case may be.
+
+Since his original expression of the Decision in the first step
+(Chapter VI), the commander has studied the operations required to
+carry it out. He therefore has gained a knowledge, which he did not
+then have, of how his action is to be carried out. He may now be able
+to compile a brief of these operations, applicable to all of them and
+therefore informative to all subordinate commanders. He may be able to
+say how, or even where and when, the effort of his force will be
+exerted.
+
+As an illustration, if his Decision is "to destroy enemy battle-line
+strength", his operations might be described "by gun action at long
+range during high visibility". Should the commander, solely for the
+purpose of making his intent clearer to his subordinate commanders,
+now decide to include the latter phrase in the re-wording of his
+Decision, he may do so at this point.
+
+It may sometimes be necessary to restate the Decision for another
+reason. It will be recalled that the commander is frequently obliged
+to recognize that he cannot carry out all of these operations, and
+that he therefore decides to issue a directive to carry out certain
+ones selected for the first stage (page 164). In such a case, he may
+not now be able to use the full Decision as originally determined. In
+that event he couches the Decision in terms of the partial
+accomplishment inherent in the operations to be undertaken.
+
+
+Standard Forms for Plans and Directives
+
+Form. Experience has shown that military directives usually give best
+results if cast in a standard form well known alike to originator and
+recipient. Such a form tends to prevent the omission of relevant
+features, and to minimize error and misunderstanding. However, a
+commander may find that lack of opportunity to facilitate mutual
+understanding by personal conference requires that one or more
+subordinates receive instructions in greater detail than a standard
+form seems to permit. A letter of instructions may then be
+appropriate. The commander himself is the best judge as to the
+application of a form to his needs of the moment, and as to the
+necessity for adherence to form in whatever particular.
+
+Useful as form is, it is important to keep in mind that it is the
+servant and not the master.
+
+The standard form in use in our naval service, long known as the Order
+Form, is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written plans
+and directives.
+
+The Order Form will now be described in detail from the standpoint of
+its general application to all classes of directives, including the
+commander's written plan, whether or not promulgated as a directive.
+
+The Order Form. Because of established usage, and for other reasons
+noted hereinafter, it is desirable that certain clerical details be
+handled as follows:
+
+    (a) To minimize errors, all numerals are spelled out, except
+        paragraph numbers and those in the heading.
+
+    (b) For emphasis, and to minimize errors, all geographical
+        names and names of vessels are spelled entirely with
+        capitals.
+
+    (c) To standardize arrangement and facilitate reading, a
+        narrow left-hand margin is left abreast the heading and
+        the task organization, and a wider margin is left abreast
+        the paragraphs.
+
+    (d) For the same reasons, the main paragraph numbers are
+        indented in the wider margin.
+
+    (e) For emphasis, the task-force or task-group titles of the
+        task organization, wherever occurring, are underlined.
+
+The sequence in which the subject matter is presented is a logical
+arrangement which experience has shown to be effective. Since every
+item has a definite place in the form, formulation is simplified, and
+ready reference is facilitated.
+
+In a written directive, the prescribed paragraph numbering is always
+followed, even if no text is inserted after a number. This practice
+serves as a check against accidental omission, and as confirmatory
+evidence that omissions are intentional. For example, if there is no
+new information to be disseminated, the paragraph number "1" is
+written in its proper place, followed by the words "No further
+information".
+
+When the subject matter to be presented under any one paragraph is
+voluminous, it may be broken up into a number of subparagraphs. Except
+in paragraph 3, these subparagraphs are unlettered.
+
+The Heading contains:
+
+In the upper right-hand corner in the following sequence:
+
+    (a) The title of the issuing officer's command, such as
+        NORTHERN SCOUTS, or ADVANCED FORCE, etc., preceded by the
+        titles, in proper order within the chain of command, of
+        all superior echelons or of such higher echelons as will
+        ensure adequate identification.
+
+    (b) The name of the flagship, as U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship.
+
+    (c) The place of issue: for example, NEWPORT, R.I., or, At
+        Sea, Lat. 34 deg.-40' N., Long. 162 deg.-20' W.
+
+    (d) The time of issue: that is, the month, day, year, and
+        hour; for example, July 12, 1935; 1100.
+
+In the upper left-hand corner in the following sequence:
+
+    (e) The file notations and classification: SECRET or
+        CONFIDENTIAL, the classification being underlined and
+        spelled with capitals. This classification is repeated on
+        succeeding pages,
+
+    (f) The type and serial number of the directive, such as
+        Operation Plan No. 5, the words Operation Plan being
+        underlined. This is repeated on succeeding pages.
+
+The Body. The task organization, which consists of a tabular
+enumeration of task forces or task groups, the composition of each,
+and the rank and name of its commander, is the beginning of the body
+of the directive. It is customary to omit the name of the issuing
+officer from any task force or task group commanded by him. Any unit
+included in a force named in the task organization is, by virtue of
+that fact, directed to act under the command of the commander of the
+specified force.
+
+When so desired for additional ready identification, task forces and
+their subdivisions may be numbered. In our naval service, systematic
+methods for such numerical designation are indicated from time to time
+by proper authority. Numerals for this purpose are entered in the task
+organization to the left of the title of each appropriate task force
+or subdivision thereof. The numerals may be placed in parentheses.
+
+The directive is addressed for action solely to the commanders of the
+task forces or task groups listed in the task organization.
+
+Train vessels assigned exclusively to particular combatant task forces
+are listed among the units of those forces in the task organization.
+If the directive is to be used for assigning tasks involving
+strategical or tactical movement directly to the Train, or to any
+Train units, such units are grouped together to form a separate task
+force. If instructions to the Train are to be issued in another
+directive, the Train need not appear as a separate force in the task
+organization. As a matter of general custom, the Train is usually not
+included as a task force unless it is to accompany, or act in tactical
+concert with, some one or more of the combatant task forces listed.
+
+Each task force named in this table, together with its numerical
+designation, is preceded by a separate letter, (a), (b), (c), etc.,
+and its assigned task is set forth in a similarly lettered
+subparagraph in paragraph 3.
+
+Paragraph 1 is the information paragraph. It contains such available
+information of enemy and own forces as is necessary for subordinates
+to understand the situation and to cooperate efficiently. Paragraph 1
+contains no part of the tasks assigned by the commander. Information
+of the enemy and that of own forces, and assumptions where pertinent,
+are usually set forth in separate unlettered subparagraphs.
+
+When deemed advisable, unless secrecy or other considerations forbid,
+paragraph 1 may include statements of the general plans of various
+higher echelons in the chain of command. A statement of the general
+plan of the next higher commander will frequently be included. For the
+same reasons, the commander will often include in this paragraph a
+statement of his own assigned task, unless, of course, this point is
+adequately covered in the statement of his general plan in paragraph
+2. Inclusion of such matters may enable subordinates to gain a clearer
+visualization of the relationships existing among the several
+objectives envisaged by the higher command.
+
+To promote cooperation, paragraph 1 may also state the principal tasks
+of coordinate forces of the commander's own echelon; for like reasons,
+the principal tasks of other task forces of the command not listed in
+the task organization may be included. Where the immediate superior
+has prescribed particular methods to other forces for cooperation and
+security, these may also be set forth as a matter of information. (See
+page 167.)
+
+In this paragraph, distinction is drawn between information which is
+based upon established facts, and that of merely probable accuracy.
+The latter is not to be confused with assumptions which, in Operation
+Plans, are accepted as a basis. (See page 155.)
+
+When writing their own information paragraphs, subordinate commanders
+do not necessarily copy verbatim the information contained in the
+order of their superior. Good procedure calls for them to digest that
+information, select what is essential, and present it with any
+additional information considered necessary. Care is taken to include
+necessary information of coordinate task forces.
+
+Paragraph 2 states the general plan of the complete force under the
+command of the officer who issued the directive. If several directives
+are issued for carrying out a single, complete plan (see, for example,
+discussion of fragmentary orders, page 184), then paragraph 2 is
+usually the same in all of them. The amount of detail given in this
+paragraph is sufficient to ensure a clear comprehension by the
+subordinates as to what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole.
+It is customary to begin with the words, "This force will", followed
+by a statement of the general plan and, unless secrecy or other
+considerations forbid, by the purpose of the effort embodied therein.
+(See Restatement of the Decision, page 187).
+
+Paragraph 3 assigns individual tasks to all of the task forces listed
+in the task organization. This paragraph is divided into as many
+subparagraphs, (a), (b), (c), etc., as there are task forces
+enumerated in the task organization. Each subparagraph commences with
+the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the title of the
+task force, underlined.
+
+Normally the tasks for each task force are stated in order of their
+importance. If preferred, however, the sequence of tasks may be
+chronological, i.e., in the order of their execution. Each method has
+certain advantages, according to the nature of the situation. Where
+the chronological sequence is utilized, that fact is clearly
+indicated, in order to avoid confusion. (See also page 166). After the
+statement of the tasks, these subparagraphs conclude with such
+detailed instructions as are necessary.
+
+In cases where the entire force is listed in the task organization,
+the proper formulation of tasks requires that the accomplishment of
+all the tasks of paragraph 3 result in the accomplishment of the
+general plan set forth for the entire force in paragraph 2. On the
+other hand, where several directives are issued, each to a different
+part of the force, with a paragraph 2 common to all, then the
+accomplishment of the tasks of all of the paragraphs 3, of the several
+directives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the general
+plan prescribed in the common paragraph 2.
+
+Where two or more task forces have identical task assignments, only
+the common subparagraph need be written after the title of the task
+forces concerned, thus:
+
+    (a) Submarine Detachment,
+
+    (b) Air Patrol, (assignment of the common task or tasks).
+
+If the Train has been included as a separate force of the task
+organization, it will be given its tasks as to tactical and
+strategical movement in a separate subparagraph of paragraph 3.
+
+In order to avoid repetition, task assignments and instructions which
+apply to all task forces, or which pertain to the general conduct of
+the operation, are embodied in a final subparagraph, designated as
+3(x). It is particularly necessary that there be included in this
+subparagraph the measures (e.g., as to cooperation, security,
+intelligence, and the like) pertaining to freedom of action and
+applicable to the force as a whole. Any tasks or instructions
+applicable to individual task forces, only, will have been included in
+the appropriate earlier subparagraph(s) (i.e., 3 (a), (b), (c), etc.).
+To avoid repetition in these subparagraphs, coordinating instructions
+applying to more than one task force may also be included, when
+convenient to do so, in paragraph 3 (x).
+
+Paragraph 3 (x) of Operation Plans and Battle Plans prescribes, in
+addition to other applicable matters, the time and/or manner of
+placing the plan in effect.
+
+Paragraph 4 is the logistics paragraph. It sets forth the availability
+of services and supplies, and describes and gives effect to the
+general plan for the logistics support of the operation. If the
+information and instructions as to logistics are long and detailed,
+they may be embodied in a separate logistics plan, which is referred
+to in paragraph 4, and is attached as an annex.
+
+Paragraph 4 is not used for assigning tasks as to movement, either for
+the Train or for any other subdivision of the force.
+
+Paragraph 5 is the command paragraph. It contains instructions
+considered necessary for the control of the command during the
+operation, such as the plan of communications, zone time to be used,
+rendezvous, and location of the commander. Paragraph 5 completes the
+body.
+
+The Ending consists of the signature, the list of annexes, the
+distribution, and the authentication, as noted below:
+
+    The Signature of the commander issuing the directive, with his
+    rank and command title, is placed at the end, for example:
+    John Doe, Vice Admiral, Commander Northern Scouts.
+
+    Annexes consist of amplifying instructions which are so
+    extensive as to make them undesirable for inclusion in the
+    directive itself. They contain detailed instructions, in
+    written form or in the form of charts or sketches. Separate
+    Communications, Logistics, Sortie, Movement, Cruising,
+    Intelligence, Scouting, Screening, Approach and Deployment
+    Plans may be, and frequently are, disseminated as annexes to a
+    directive. Alternative Plans may also be annexed.
+
+    Annexes are referred to in the appropriate paragraph of the
+    body of the directive, and are listed and serially lettered in
+    capitals at the end near the left-hand margin, immediately
+    below the body and the signature, and above the distribution.
+
+    The Distribution indicates to whom the directive will be
+    transmitted and the medium of transmission. The recording of
+    this distribution in the directive is essential for the
+    information of all concerned.
+
+    Standard distribution may be indicated, as Distribution I, II,
+    etc.
+
+    Authentication. Unless signed by the issuing officer, each
+    copy of the directive distributed is authenticated by the
+    signature, rank, and designation of the Flag Secretary, with
+    the addition of the seal whenever possible.
+
+Campaign Plans. Campaign Plans (see page 196), when communicated to
+officers on the highest echelons, are usually, in the Order Form,
+modified as follows:
+
+Heading. No change.
+
+Task Organization. Not usually used.
+
+    Paragraph 1. In addition to the information to be furnished,
+        a statement is given of the assumptions (page 155)
+        forming the basis of the plan.
+
+    Paragraph 2. No change.
+
+    Paragraph 3. This shows the stages into which the campaign has
+        been divided; the several operations which will be
+        undertaken in each stage, and the order of their
+        accomplishment; and usually the forces to be made
+        available for the first stage.
+
+    Paragraph 4. No change.
+
+    Paragraph 5. No change.
+
+If it be found desirable, however, to employ a letter of instructions
+instead of a formal directive, this may be done. In this case the
+letter sets forth the essential features of the subject matter as
+above described for the Order Form.
+
+Sample Outline Form. For convenient reference, the outline form of an
+Operation Plan is appended (see page 219). The Operation Order follows
+the same form, the essential difference being that the Operation Order
+makes no provision for assumptions, and is effective upon receipt
+unless otherwise provided in the body of the Order.
+
+
+Types of Naval Directives
+
+Naval directives in common use are: War Plans, Campaign Plans,
+Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Battle Plans, and Battle Orders.
+
+Basic War Plans designate operating forces, assign broad strategical
+tasks to these forces, and, where required, delimit theaters of
+operations. These plans also assign duties to the supporting services
+such as naval communications, etc. Requirements as to logistics plans
+are also included. Accepted usage designates, as Contributory Plans,
+the subsidiary plans which are prepared in support of Basic War Plans.
+
+Campaign Plans. A campaign, as initially visualized, is a clearly
+defined major stage of a war. A campaign, after it has passed into
+history, sometimes bears the name of a leader, or a seasonal or
+geographical designation. It may consist of a single operation, or of
+successive or concurrent operations. The operations of a campaign have
+properly a definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which
+marks the end of the campaign. (See also page 37, as to operations.)
+
+A Campaign Plan indicates what might be called the "schedule of
+strategy" which the commander intends to employ to attain his ultimate
+objective for the campaign. Such a plan usually sets forth the stages
+into which he proposes to divide the campaign, shows their sequence,
+and outlines:
+
+(a) The general plan for the entire campaign.
+
+(b) The general plan involved in each stage and the order of
+accomplishment, so far as the commander has been able to project his
+action into the future, and usually,
+
+(c) The forces to be made available for the first stage. The Campaign
+Plan is primarily for the guidance of the commander himself. When
+necessary for information or approval, it is forwarded to higher
+authority. To provide the necessary background, it may sometimes be
+furnished to the principal subordinates. In any case, the interests of
+secrecy demand that its distribution be extremely limited.
+
+Operation Plans. An Operation Plan may cover projected operations, or
+may be contingent upon the occurrence of a particular event, or
+combination of events. It may be issued in advance of the event. It is
+placed in effect at a specified time or by special order, as
+prescribed in the body of the plan itself. It provides for either a
+single operation, or for a connected series of operations to be
+carried out simultaneously or in successive steps. It is prepared for
+dissemination to task-force commanders.
+
+Usually, an Operation Plan covers more complex operations than does an
+Operation Order, and projects operations over a greater time and
+space. It allows more latitude to subordinate commanders, and provides
+for less direct supervision by the issuing officer. It has typically
+the distinguishing feature of including, in paragraph 1, the
+assumptions upon which the plan is based.
+
+To provide for eventualities under varying sets of assumptions, the
+commander may formulate several alternative Operation Plans (see pages
+155 and 156).
+
+Operation Orders. An Operation Order deals with an actual situation,
+usually of limited scope, in which the commander considers that he
+possesses sufficient reliable information to warrant an expectation
+that certain specific operations can be initiated and carried through
+to completion as ordered. The Operation Order does not include
+assumptions and, unless it contains a proviso to the contrary, is
+effective upon receipt.
+
+Under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, there are few
+occasions where the Operation Plan will not accomplish the full
+purpose of the Operation Order. The use of the Operation Plan removes
+the undesirable feature of imposing possible restriction on the
+latitude allowed the subordinate without, in any degree, lessening the
+authority of the commander.
+
+Battle Plans. A Battle Plan sets forth methods for the coordinated
+employment of forces during battle. If prepared in advance, it usually
+is based on certain assumptions which are clearly stated in the plan.
+
+Battle Plans may merely include provisions for a particular combat, or
+they may include provisions for a connected series of separate or
+coordinate engagements, possibly culminating in a general action, and
+all directed toward the early attainment of a specified tactical
+objective. Such combats may range in scope from engagements between
+small forces to engagements between entire fleets.
+
+Battle Orders are generally limited to the despatches required to
+place a Battle Plan in effect, and to direct such changes in plan, or
+to initiate such detailed operations, as may be necessary during the
+progress of battle.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION
+
+(The Fourth Step)
+
+    The discussion in Chapter IX invites attention to the special
+    considerations which influence the supervision of the planned
+    action. The Running Estimate, which employs the procedure
+    typical of the fourth step, is described in detail.
+
+
+Nature of Discussion. As explained previously (Foreword, page 4), the
+vast and important subject of the execution of the plan is treated
+herein, as to details, chiefly from the standpoint of the mental
+effort.
+
+After the commander has issued a directive placing a plan in effect,
+it is his responsibility to supervise the execution of the planned
+action. Through the collection, analysis, evaluation, and
+interpretation of new information (page 161), he will be able to
+maintain a grasp of present progress and of future possibilities. He
+will correct deficiencies and errors in the plan and in its execution.
+He will guide the direction of effort toward the attainment of the
+objective. He will ensure that his forces conform their movement in
+correct relation to the physical objectives and to each other. He will
+reapportion strength to meet new conditions, through comparison of his
+accrued losses with respect to those he has anticipated. He will take
+appropriate measures for freedom of action.
+
+If a new plan is needed, the commander will evolve one and adopt it.
+If the old plan requires changes as to its larger aspects, he will
+make such changes. Otherwise, he will modify details of his plan as
+the situation may demand, always, however, endeavoring to retain the
+integrity of the larger aspects. He will issue additional directives
+as may be required from time to time.
+
+Goal of Planning. The function of planning (Part II, preceding) is to
+afford a proper basis for effective execution. Effective action,
+therefore, is the goal of planning.
+
+Otherwise, planning is aimless, except as a mental exercise. Such
+mental exercise, though it be with no thought of specific application
+in the realm of action, has nevertheless the same fundamental aim as
+if the planning were so intended. The aim of such mental exercise is
+the inculcation of habits of thought which will provide a sound basis
+for effective action.
+
+Importance of Execution. Sound planning is, as explained in previous
+chapters, the best basis for consistently effective action. Yet,
+important as planning is, the effective outcome of plans depends upon
+their execution.
+
+While an unsound plan affords no firm basis for successful action,
+recognition has long been accorded to the companion fact that a
+perfect plan, poorly executed, may not provide as firm a foundation
+for success as a reasonably good plan, carried out with resolution.
+
+No plan, moreover, can be confidently expected to anticipate all
+eventualities. Notwithstanding every effort to foresee all
+possibilities, unexpected changes are to be regarded as normal. This
+fact emphasizes the importance of effective supervision of the planned
+action.
+
+The importance of such supervision reaches its maximum during actual
+hostilities; then (page 4) the necessity for alert supervision creates
+an accentuated demand for the intelligent application of mental power
+to the solution of military problems. Professional judgment then
+assumes supreme importance because vital issues may hinge upon the
+decisions reached during the development of the action.
+
+Conditions in War. Standards of performance in peacetime exercises
+cannot be a conclusive guide as to what may be expected under the
+conditions of war. In the conduct of hostilities against a strong and
+determined enemy, men and materiel do not always function at their
+best. Commanders undergo extreme strains. Orders are often
+misinterpreted or go astray. Men, and the machines which they operate,
+frequently give less effective service than under the conditions of
+peace.
+
+In war, mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom
+complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won,
+not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of
+an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock
+of battle. The objective is attained, in war, under conditions which
+often impose extreme disadvantages. It is in the light of these facts
+that the commander expects to shape his course during the supervision
+of the planned action.
+
+The Incentive. During the supervision of the action, problems calling
+for decision may derive their incentive, as already noted (page 79)
+either from a directive issued by superior authority, or by reason of
+a Decision which the commander himself has already made, or because of
+a recognition, by the commander concerned, of an incentive
+originating from the demands of the situation.
+
+In the event that the incentive appears in the form of a new task
+assigned by a higher echelon, the commander's problem may become,
+relatively, simple. In such a case he is relieved of the necessity of
+recognizing for himself that the time is ripe for a new decision. This
+fact, however, in no wise alters his fundamental responsibility for
+taking action, or for abstaining therefrom, in accordance with the
+actual demands of the situation (page 15) in the event that the
+assigned task requires modification or alteration, or, further, in the
+event that circumstances even call for a departure from his
+instructions. Should modification, alteration, or departure be in
+order, the commander is responsible for recognition of the fact that
+the demands of the situation have introduced further problems.
+
+Such recognition, therefore, irrespective of whether higher authority
+has issued instructions covering the new situation, constitutes an
+incentive to take action. No commander is justified in taking wrong
+action, or in taking none, merely because no instructions have been
+received. The ability to recognize the fact that the situation
+presents a new problem is therefore a primary qualification for
+command.
+
+Recognition of New Problems. The supervision of the planned action, as
+the fourth step (see Chapter V) of the exercise of mental effort in
+the solution of military problems, therefore constitutes in itself a
+problem, in that it involves fundamentally the ability to recognize
+the existence of new situations which present new problems for
+solution. To recognize such new problems requires a constant, close
+observation of the unfolding of the original situation.
+
+Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation
+is unfolding along the lines which he desires and as promulgated in
+the directives formulated in the third step (see Chapter V and Chapter
+VIII). In effect, the commander, after action has begun, considers the
+changing situation as a variable in the problem presented by the
+original situation. With the march of events he is, therefore,
+constantly critical to detect whether variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design or whether these
+variations demand a departure from his plan.
+
+Nature of Readjustments Required. If variations in the original
+situation are in accordance with his design, the commander has the
+assurance that all goes well, and that the unfolding of the situation
+is following his intent. However, if this is not the case, changed
+circumstances may demand recognition of the fact that a new problem
+has presented itself. In this event a new incentive, arising from the
+demands of the situation, calls for the solution of the new problem by
+the procedure distinctive of the first step (Chapter VI).
+
+Should directives of higher authority introduce a new incentive, the
+commander solves such a new problem, also, by employing the procedure
+distinctive of the first step.
+
+On the other hand, the commander may find that the changed situation
+motivates merely a modification of his previously determined
+operations and of his directives already in force. In other words,
+while his basic problem (Chapters V and VI) may remain the same, need
+may arise for certain deviations from the decisions arrived at in the
+first and second steps of its solution. Should this be the case, each
+such problem will require solution by a return to the procedures
+described (Chapter VII) with reference to the second step.
+
+In the event of a demonstrated need, not for any change of plan, but
+for a clarification of directives, the procedure involved is that
+distinctive of the third step (Chapter VIII).
+
+The commander may not safely view the succession of events with
+complacency, even though the situation appears to be unfolding
+according to plan. Perhaps the enemy may be purposely lessening his
+opposition, in order to prepare for the launching of an offensive
+elsewhere. As the situation unfolds, everything is viewed with
+intelligent suspicion.
+
+It is also possible that, during the progress of an operation, an
+unforeseen opportunity may present itself to take advantage of a new
+situation and to strike the enemy a more serious blow than that
+originally intended.
+
+Unwise caution is to be avoided no less than undue temerity. Where a
+change appears, after proper consideration, to be indicated, no
+hesitancy is justified in abandoning the original plan. Blind
+adherence to plan is to be condemned no less than unwarranted
+departures from predetermined procedure. Obstinate insistence on the
+use of a certain method, to the exclusion of others calculated to
+attain the same effect, may jeopardize the success of the effort.
+Undue emphasis on the particular means to be used, and on the manner
+of their employment, may exact a penalty by obscuring the objective.
+
+On the other hand, undesirable departures from plan involve a
+corresponding penalty, because changes, unless duly justified by the
+situation, increase the possibility of failure. Frequency of such
+changes, to the point of vacillation, is a sure indication of a lack
+of aptitude for the exercise of command.
+
+Importance of the Will of the Commander. It is accordingly clear that
+qualification for the exercise of command requires the mental capacity
+to recognize the need for changes in plan, or for no change. No less
+essential, however, are the moral qualities required to carry
+justified changes into effect, or to resist the pressure of events in
+favor of changes not justified by the situation. (See also pages 8, 9,
+and 72.)
+
+Hence the universal importance accorded, by the profession of arms, to
+the will of the commander. This is the quality which, together with
+the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander
+to bend events in conformity with his plan (page 47), or, where such
+shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command
+every possible advantage which can be obtained.
+
+A recognized defect of certain forms of theoretical problems lies in
+the fact that they indicate, themselves, the time when a Decision is
+needed. In other words, they fail to vest the commander with
+responsibility for the decision that the time has come for a Decision
+to be made. Hence the great importance, from the viewpoint of timing,
+of those problems and exercises which partake more fully of the
+reality of war. The successful conduct of war, notwithstanding its
+demand for utmost mental power, is founded predominantly on those
+moral qualities (see pages 9 and 72) which spring less from the
+intellect than from the will.
+
+
+Problems Involving Modifications of the Basic Plan
+
+Relatively minor deviations from decisions reached during the first
+and second steps of the solution of a military problem are frequently
+required during the action phase, because of incentives arising from
+the demands of the situation. Such requirements will not occasion
+serious dislocation in the predetermined effort of the competent
+commander.
+
+However, more momentous situations are also to be expected. These will
+present new problems for the commander to solve. Such new problems, so
+long as they do not challenge the integrity of the basic plan, will
+not prevent the competent commander from proceeding with his
+predetermined effort if he takes appropriate action in due time to
+control the unfolding situation. To maintain such control may call for
+the exercise of outstanding qualities of the mind and of the will.
+
+For example, it is assumed that the commander's basic Decision was to
+destroy an enemy convoy, the purpose of the Decision being to prevent
+the convoy from reaching its destination. Now, it is supposed that,
+during the supervision of the action planned for the destruction of
+the enemy convoy, the commander receives information of a hostile
+reinforcement. It is further supposed that this reinforcement, if it
+joins the enemy convoy's escort, can jeopardize the success of the
+basic plan.
+
+The commander is now confronted with a serious situation which, if not
+controlled by action of the right kind, at the right time, and at the
+right place, may result in shattering his basic plan. However, if the
+commander takes action along correct lines in due time, he can still
+preserve the integrity of his basic plan and so continue to control
+the shaping of the situation.
+
+Having re-examined his solution of his basic problem and found it
+sound, the commander finds himself under the necessity of resolving a
+perplexity as to what to do about the enemy reinforcement. In this
+case, he concludes that his proper action is to prevent the enemy
+reinforcement from protecting the convoy. This task, self-assigned
+because of the demands of the situation, becomes the basis for the
+mission of his new problem, the mission being:--
+
+    (Task) To prevent the enemy reinforcements from protecting the
+    convoy,
+
+    (Purpose) in order to contribute to the eventual destruction
+    of the convoy.
+
+The commander now considers the various courses of action open to him
+for the accomplishment of this mission. He also considers the enemy
+courses of action. He then considers each of the former in relation to
+each of the latter. He compares, on this basis, each of his retained
+courses of action with the others and so selects the best course of
+action. Finally, he arrives, in this manner, by the same process as in
+a basic problem (Chapter VI), at a decision as to the best course of
+action. Should this decision be to sink the enemy reinforcement, its
+statement linked to its purpose, would be:--
+
+    To destroy the enemy reinforcement, in order to prevent it
+    from protecting the convoy.
+
+
+Problems Challenging the Integrity of the Basic Plan
+
+During the planned action, a change in the situation may have the
+effect of challenging the integrity of the basic plan. The commander
+is then faced by a problem calling for the exercise of the highest
+order of ability. While problems of this type probably occur with
+least frequency, they are the most important of those which may be
+encountered during the fourth step.
+
+Because such a problem, arising from the demands of a new situation,
+requires a re-estimate of the basic situation, the essential procedure
+is the same as for a basic problem (Chapter VI), but certain
+modifications necessarily appear.
+
+Summary of the Situation. While a commander will rarely find himself
+operating without instructions, the importance of problems arising
+when no directive applies is not lessened by the fact that such
+problems may infrequently occur. When the commander is faced with a
+situation not covered in orders of his superior, action may be
+necessary before he can inform higher authority and receive
+instructions. Usually this situation will be an emergency. Often it
+will not allow time for a written estimate. The fact that such a
+situation has arisen, and the reasons causing the commander to
+conclude that it has arisen, are appropriately included in Section I-A
+of the Estimate, under the "Summary of the Situation".
+
+Recognition of the Incentive. The conclusion on the part of the
+commander that the situation requires him to make provision for its
+maintenance, or for a change, which in either case calls for a
+departure from his basic Decision, constitutes a recognition of his
+new incentive.
+
+Appreciation of the Objective. Frequently the new incentive will
+indicate that the objective embodied in the commander's present task
+is no longer suitable, but that the purpose of his mission still
+applies. By modifying the objective indicated in his assigned task,
+but adhering to that in the purpose of his mission, he may be able to
+visualize a new objective which will be appropriate to the new
+circumstances. In this case the retained purpose assists the commander
+to select a new objective which he can confidently adopt as the basis
+for a new task which he assigns to himself.
+
+If neither the commander's task nor the purpose of his mission apply
+in the new situation, the evolution of a proper new objective may be
+much more difficult. Under such circumstances the commander, by the
+use of such information as may be in his possession, will first
+endeavor to deduce an objective whose attainment constitutes a
+suitable purpose. Such a deduction will be made on the basis of the
+larger circumstances of the war, the campaign, or the operation.
+Having made this determination, the commander will then deduce a task
+appropriate to the new situation and in furtherance of the adopted
+purpose. (See Chapter IV, page 52.)
+
+Formulation of the New Mission. An appropriate new task having been
+determined, as well as a proper purpose, the commander is now in a
+position to formulate his mission. The procedure to this end is the
+same as described (Chapter VI) with respect to the estimate of a basic
+problem.
+
+Other Items of the Estimate. For such problems of the fourth step,
+other items of the Estimate Form require no essential modification of
+the procedures described (Chapter VI) as applicable for the first
+step.
+
+
+The Further Procedure Applicable to Such Problems of The Fourth Step
+
+After the commander has reached his new decision, the further course
+of events may call for the resolution of the required new action into
+detailed operations and for the inauguration of a new planned effort.
+In such case, these procedures are accomplished through processes
+essentially similar to, and fortified by the experience gained in,
+those distinctive of the second and third steps. (Chapters VII and
+VIII, respectively).
+
+The new planned effort having been inaugurated, its supervision
+continues, in turn, through the critical observation and the
+appropriate action described herein as distinctive of the fourth step.
+
+
+The Running Estimate of the Situation
+
+The procedure employed in the constant, close observation of the
+unfolding of the situation--to the end that justified changes of plan
+may be initiated, while those uncalled-for may be avoided--is known as
+the "Running Estimate of the Situation". Such an estimate, as
+indicated by its name, is intended to keep pace with the flow of
+events, so that the commander may be assured, at any time, that his
+concurrent action will be based on sound decision. To this end, there
+is a definite technique for which the standard Estimate Form provides
+the basis. This technique is an aid for solution of the problem
+involved in the supervision of the planned action.
+
+Aim of the Technique Involved. Any procedure adopted to this end is
+properly intended to assist in the supervision of the planned action,
+but not to restrict the commander to particular methods. Flexibility
+is a prime consideration. The ultimate aim of the technique is (see
+also page 114) the rapid and successful exercise of mental effort in
+the fast-moving events of the tactical engagement. It is under such
+conditions, more especially, that effective supervision of the planned
+action becomes a problem calling for every facility that can be
+afforded the commander.
+
+Nature of the Technique. The solution of this problem requires
+mentally or in writing according to the particular case, (a) the
+assembly of information as to events bearing on the situation, and (b)
+the organization of this knowledge in a manner permitting its ready
+use. Accordingly, it will be found helpful, where circumstances permit
+written records to be kept, to provide for (a) a journal (a form of
+diary) of events, with a file to support it, and (b) a work sheet to
+organize applicable information in proper form for use. The journal
+affords a basis for the work sheet. The latter in turn facilitates the
+procedure, continuous while the action lasts, of estimating the
+situation so that a Decision maybe rendered at any time desired.
+
+Where written records are unnecessary or impracticable, the same
+fundamental process is nevertheless employed. The fact that the
+process is then wholly mental, without extraneous aids, involves no
+change in the basic character of the essential procedure.
+
+Journal. The journal, to serve the purpose indicated above, is kept in
+a form permitting entry of essential data as to information needed for
+the Running Estimate. Such data may include (see the suggested Form,
+next page) the appropriate heading of the journal, the entries
+applicable to each item of pertinent information, and the
+authentication with which the journal, for any chosen period, is
+closed.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+JOURNAL
+
+(Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)
+
+From: .................................................
+                          (date and hour)
+
+To: ...................................................
+                          (date and hour)
+
+Place: ................................................
+
+
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+TOR | TOD | Time | Serial| From |  To    |Incidents, Messages,|Action
+    |     | Dated|  No.  |      |(Action)|   Orders, etc.     |Taken
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+    |     |      |       |      |        |                    |
+----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+-------
+
+The heading of the journal is completed by inserting the designation
+of the organization and, where appropriate, the staff subdivision
+concerned, as well as the date and hour of beginning and closing the
+journal, and the place (or general area) where the commander is
+located.
+
+Each entry includes, where appropriate, a time notation: for example,
+as to the occurrence of an incident; the receipt (TOR) or despatch
+(TOD) of a message; the receipt or issue of an order. The serial
+number assigned to the entry is recorded. The "time dated" is the date
+and hour of the incident, or, in the case of the message or order, the
+date and hour appearing thereon.
+
+Entry of the nature of incidents or of the content of messages and
+orders, etc., is made under the heading "Incidents, Messages, Orders,
+etc."; for example:
+
+    As to an incident:
+
+      Enemy bombed light forces in screen from northward.
+
+As to a message:
+
+      Our troops held up on Beach A since 0500 this date.
+
+In the case of a message or order, the source and the action
+addressee(s) are recorded in the columns marked "From" and "To
+(action)" respectively. The content of the despatch or order then
+follows. The amount of detail to be included depends upon the needs of
+the work sheet (see below) in its capacity as a basis for the running
+estimate of the situation. Further details can be ascertained, if
+needed, by reference to the journal file.
+
+The action taken ("None" entered, if none is taken) is indicated
+briefly under that heading. In the case of the above entry as to the
+enemy bombing light forces, the "action taken" might, for example
+read:
+
+    Prepared for torpedo attack.
+
+A single journal may be maintained for the commander concerned; or, if
+so desired, separate journals may be kept, for their respective
+purposes, by the several principal officers of his staff.
+
+The journal itself and its use are readily adaptable to informal
+methods of preparation and maintenance. The Journal Form may be
+prepared hastily, as needed or desired. Where appropriate, the Journal
+Form may be made up in quantity by printing, multigraphing, or other
+practicable methods.
+
+Journal File. The file to support the journal is merely an assembly of
+the records (messages, records of oral orders, and the like) from
+which the journal is compiled. Each item of the file bears a serial
+number corresponding to that of its entry in the journal. An ordinary
+spike-file is frequently adequate for safe-keeping of these records
+while in use. When the journal is closed, the corresponding
+journal-file is filed with the journal, in accordance with standing
+instructions or in compliance with any particular disposition directed
+by the commander concerned or by higher authority.
+
+Work Sheet. The usual form of the work sheet follows the form of the
+estimate of the situation. A single work sheet may be kept for the
+commander concerned, or, if so desired, separate work sheets may be
+maintained, for their respective purposes, by the several principal
+subdivisions of his staff. If a single work sheet is maintained,
+entries by the several staff subdivisions may be facilitated by
+dividing the work sheet among them, provided that the entire document
+can always be promptly assembled for use as needed.
+
+The work sheet, while an important official document, is ordinarily
+informal in nature. The various headings, items, or titles (other than
+the main heading) are merely copied, ordinarily, from the usual
+Estimate Form. An example of a work sheet is as follows (see next
+page):
+
+
+WORK SHEET
+(For Running Estimate of the Situation)
+
+    ........................................
+    (Organization, staff subdivision, etc.)
+
+    From: ..................................
+               (Date and hour)
+
+    To: ....................................
+           (Date and hour, if pertinent)
+
+    Place: .................................
+
+I. Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the Problem.
+
+  A. The Appropriate Effect Desired.
+
+    (1) Summary of the Situation.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the first page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+    (2) Recognition of the Incentive.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (second) page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+    (3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (third) page.)
+
+    (4) Formulation of the Mission.
+        (Note: No other heading would be entered on the (initial)
+        (fourth) page.)
+
+               *     *     *
+
+  B. (Note: This and subsequent headings are entered in the manner
+     indicated as to Section I-A, above.)
+
+The remaining necessary headings and subheadings of the Estimate Form
+would be entered similarly, in due order, on succeeding pages.
+
+The use of a voluminous work-sheet is facilitated by entering item
+headings in a narrow column at the left, and by cutting away unused
+space below the several headings in such column, so that all the
+headings (or the more important ones) can be seen at a glance. A
+person using the work-sheet can then readily find any page desired.
+
+The main heading (top, first page) is filled out in the same manner as
+for the journal.
+
+The other headings, for subdivisions of the work sheet, are ordinarily
+transcribed from the usual Estimate Form, according to the needs for
+the purpose of the particular work sheet. Such needs will vary with
+circumstances. As has also been noted, the Estimate Form, itself
+(Chapter VI), varies with the situation. For these reasons, the
+work-sheet form is necessarily flexible, and will rarely be prescribed
+in detail. Reproduction by printing, etc., will not be so frequent as
+in the case of more rigid forms. The work sheet is authenticated only
+if it is filed (see below), or if authentication is desired for other
+reasons. The work sheet is, in fact, as indicated by its name, merely
+a vehicle to facilitate the performance of important mental work.
+
+When the work sheet has served its purpose, it is usually destroyed.
+It is not, ordinarily, a permanent record, since such purpose is
+served by the journal and its file. When a formal Estimate is made up
+from the work sheet, such Estimate may serve the purpose of an
+additional record. If no formal Estimate is made up for a given period
+and the commander desires the corresponding work sheet to be preserved
+for record, he may so direct.
+
+Ordinarily, the work sheet is not destroyed or filed (and a new one
+started) at any specified time. The work sheet is kept current by
+marking out old entries no longer applicable; by inserting new
+entries; and by inserting fresh pages when old ones have been filled.
+The old pages, unless otherwise desired, may be destroyed.
+
+A separate page of the work sheet is ordinarily used for each item
+under which entries are to be made. This procedure applies not only to
+principal headings, but also to subordinate titles, according to the
+convenience of the user.
+
+The procedure of devoting a separate page, initially, to each item of
+the form enables additional pages to be inserted, where needed.
+Manifestly, the amount of space needed for particular items of the
+form cannot always be foreseen. The entries, for example, under the
+"Summary of the Situation", in Section I-A of the Estimate Form, may
+require little space or a great deal, depending upon the occurrence of
+events and upon the period of time covered by the particular work
+sheet. The same considerations are applicable as to other items.
+
+When a work sheet is used as the basis for rendering special reports
+(e.g., as to intelligence or operations), its form follows that used
+for such reports. It is, therefore, in essence, merely an
+outline-form, for entry of applicable data.
+
+Procedure as to Entries. When a report, a plan, a dispatch, or other
+pertinent item is received, its applicable content may first be
+entered on the chart (or charts) maintained by the commander (or by
+his staff). Thereafter the usual procedure would be an entry in the
+journal, followed by a corresponding entry in the work sheet. The
+document so received and recorded would then be placed in the journal
+file. This procedure is subject to proper variation, as desired.
+Immediate entry of data on the chart enables the commander and staff
+to study the implications of the item, without waiting for completion
+of routine clerical work.
+
+Outgoing messages, instructions, etc., after approval or signature by
+the commander, are handled by a similar routine. Where applicable,
+such routine involves appropriate entry on the chart, in the journal,
+and in the work sheet. The routine of entry is preferably based on a
+copy (or copies), in order to avoid delay in dispatch.
+
+Staff Organization and Functioning. The commander may desire important
+documents to be handed to him at once, on receipt. He may, of course,
+call for them at any time. He naturally will not, however, permit any
+unnecessary delay to occur in the usual routine disposition of such
+items. The routine exists to assist him, and its arbitrary disruption,
+if he has properly defined the essential routine in the first
+instance, cannot but work to his disadvantage.
+
+Few things are more disturbing to the functioning of a staff than
+undue eccentricity on the part of the commander or of senior members
+of the staff. For instance, a personal habit to be rigorously
+suppressed--a habit not infrequently in evidence, especially under
+strain of active operations--is that of absent-mindedly pocketing
+documents needed in the work under way. This subject might, but for
+limitations of space, be illustrated by numerous other examples whose
+homely character may not safely be permitted to detract from their
+considered importance to unity of effort.
+
+Where circumstances permit, it is desirable that incoming and outgoing
+items be reproduced in quantity sufficient to supply separate copies
+for the commander and for the several interested members of his staff.
+
+A competent staff brings to the commander's attention all the items
+necessary--but only those necessary--for his proper performance of his
+duties. Inordinate attention by the commander to unnecessary detail
+cannot but tend to distract his attention from his proper duties.
+
+The importance of smooth and effective functioning of a staff
+emphasizes the need for an established, though flexible, procedure.
+Such procedure, if reasonably standardized, facilitates unity of
+action, not only within staffs, but also among the several commanders,
+and their staffs, throughout the chain of command.
+
+The same fundamentals apply as to staff organization. If proper
+functioning of staffs is generally understood, and if staffs are
+correctly organized to perform their functions, the basis for their
+sound organization will become a matter of general understanding. Such
+organization, so understood, becomes a powerful influence in behalf of
+unity of effort.
+
+Staff functions--i.e., characteristic activities of staffs--divide
+fundamentally into two classifications. These may be referred to, for
+convenience of terminology, as "general" and "special".
+
+The latter have to do with the characteristic operations of the
+command, rather than of the commander; they therefore relate to such
+matters as routine administration and to the technical aspects of
+movement, of the use of weapons, and of supply, sanitation, and
+hospitalization. The administrative, technical, and supply staff, thus
+broadly considered, may be said to be concerned with special functions
+relating to the operations of the command.
+
+By contrast, the functions of the commander, as such, have to do with
+the necessary supervision of these special functions and, more
+especially, with the important duty of planning for the future
+employment of the command. The supervisory and planning activities
+may, for purposes of differentiation from the specialties noted above,
+be properly described as general functions. They relate more
+particularly to the duties performed personally by the commander or,
+where such duties become too onerous for performance by one person, by
+specifically designated members of his staff.
+
+In our naval service, the higher commanders are provided, where
+appropriate, with a chief of staff, who coordinates and supervises the
+work of the entire staff. Provision is also made, where the nature and
+amount of the work to be done calls for such assignment, for the
+detail of additional staff officers to perform the important general
+functions mentioned above. Appropriate provision is also made for
+staff officers to care for the special functions inherent in the
+character of the particular command.
+
+The important general functions referred to are those relating to
+intelligence duties, and to operations. Intelligence duties have to do
+with the collection of information as to the enemy and the theater of
+operations, the analysis of this information, its evaluation, its
+conversion into intelligence by the process of drawing conclusions,
+i.e., by interpretation, and, finally, its dissemination to the
+command or to other appropriate destinations (page 161). Intelligence
+estimates and plans have been discussed previously (Chapters VII and
+VIII).
+
+Operations, in the sense in which the term is employed in this
+connection, relate to the strategical or tactical activities of the
+command, as distinguished from routine functions pertaining to such
+matters as administration and supply. Operations, therefore, as a term
+employed in contradistinction to intelligence activities, refer more
+especially to the performance of the commander's own force, while
+intelligence functions are oriented more particularly with respect to
+the activities of the enemy. Operation plans, which may include
+subsidiary intelligence plans, have been discussed previously
+(Chapters VII and VIII).
+
+Further details in this connection are touched on hereafter with
+respect to rendition of reports and estimates.
+
+Reports. The work-sheet facilitates the rendition, at any time, of
+such special reports as may be required by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff. The appropriate staff officer is prepared at
+all times to render a report, oral or written, informal or formal,
+brief or detailed, of the situation of the command and of other
+friendly forces, or of the situation with reference to the enemy.
+
+No less important than rendition of reports to the commander and to
+higher authority is the duty of the staff, or of the commander if he
+lacks such staff assistance, to insure that subordinate commands
+receive pertinent information at the proper time. Cooperating friendly
+forces will also require such information. This need is sometimes met
+by the issue of periodical reports or bulletins. However, during the
+intervals between such reports, and at all times when such reports are
+lacking, it is a primary duty of the commander and staff to ensure
+that all concerned are informed as to the situation. The work sheet is
+a valuable aid for the performance of this duty.
+
+Oral Estimates. When called for by higher authority, or by the
+commander from his staff, oral estimates of the situation can be
+rendered promptly and effectively by reference to the work sheet.
+Estimates called for by the commander are presented by the appropriate
+staff officers. Presentation is made to the commander or, if so
+directed, to the chief of staff, the latter being prepared to render,
+in turn, an estimate to the commander. Oral estimates desired by
+higher authority are made by the commander, or by the staff officer
+concerned, at the direction of his commander.
+
+Partial estimates may be called for from time to time as to particular
+aspects of the situation.
+
+In the larger staffs, the work is facilitated if each principal staff
+officer is prepared to present his appropriate portion of the
+estimate. In such case the intelligence officer deals with matters
+relating to the enemy; the operations officer deals with those
+relating to own forces, etc. The entire staff acts as a team in the
+presentation of a well-rounded estimate which will bring all pertinent
+matters to the attention of the commander so that he may arrive at a
+sound decision.
+
+Should the commander call also for recommendations as to the decision
+or decisions to be made, the appropriate members of the staff will be
+prepared to submit their views. They will be prepared, as well, to
+answer at any time the calls of higher authority for information, for
+the conclusions of the commander, or for his recommendations. Should
+the commander have no staff for the performance of the foregoing
+functions, such detailed duties devolve upon him personally.
+
+Certain further aspects of estimates of the situation, with reference
+to the circumstances obtaining during the supervision of the planned
+action, are noted under the discussion of written estimates, which
+follows.
+
+Written Estimates. The foregoing remarks as to oral estimates are no
+less applicable to those submitted in written form, whether formal or
+informal, partial or full, brief or detailed. The nature of an
+estimate, as to these characteristics, will largely depend on the time
+element. A long and detailed estimate, often desirable when time is
+available, may be wholly impracticable when the press of events
+requires rapid decision. The written estimate, even if informal,
+partial, or brief, would frequently be out of place in situations
+where an oral estimate would be adequate or, if not adequate, would be
+all that could be accomplished under the circumstances of the case.
+
+
+Special Remarks as to Entries
+
+Entries on Charts. Entries on charts are made by the usual
+conventional signs and symbols. Colors are employed where appropriate.
+Information not yet confirmed is indicated as doubtful; e.g., by a
+question mark. Special remarks, comments, or other notations may also
+be entered, but in such a manner as not to obscure other data on the
+chart.
+
+Where operations of land forces are involved, maps are prepared by the
+methods prescribed for own land forces. The higher naval staffs, or
+those of forces specially designated for such operations, may include
+army officers who will look after these matters; marine officers may
+also be assigned such duties.
+
+Special charts or maps are those prepared for special purposes. A
+chart (or map) maintained to show the existing situation is known as a
+"situation chart" (or map). Charts (or maps) prepared for particular
+operations are known as "operations charts" (or maps).
+
+Entries in Journals. Entries in journals, already referred to, are
+purely factual. Such entries may be complete copies of the content of
+incoming or outgoing orders or messages. Again, as already indicated
+(page 209), entries may consist of condensations of such matters. The
+oral instructions of the commander are also appropriate items for
+entry, when the matter is of sufficient importance. The journal may
+also make note of the movements of the commander, his staff officers,
+and other persons. Other pertinent happenings may also be made the
+subject of entry.
+
+Entries in Work Sheets. Entries in the work sheet, since it is the
+basis for estimates of the situation, are both factual and otherwise.
+All matters entered in the journal are normally appropriate for
+notation in the work sheet. Information not yet confirmed is indicated
+as doubtful. The work sheet is also the proper place for notation of
+matters of conjecture (noted as such) and for other like items related
+to estimates of the situation. The various considerations influencing
+the commander and staff, with respect to current operations, are
+proper entries in the work sheet. Its informal character affords wide
+latitude as to entries which may be considered worthy of record in
+this manner. The underlying consideration is that anything may and
+should be entered which will be of value in preparing estimates or
+rendering the special reports for which the work sheet is to provide
+the basis.
+
+A succinct running account of the situation is kept posted to date
+under the appropriate heading of the work sheet.
+
+Entry is also made of the incentive which motivates the solution of
+the problem presented by the situation. Notation is made as to whether
+the incentive arises from a task imposed by higher authority or is
+derived by the commander from other sources (see page 200). In either
+case, the work sheet is the proper place for the entry of such facts
+and of the reasons which have led the commander to regard this
+incentive as motivating his actions in the situation existing at the
+time.
+
+Information of the enemy, after receipt from the various collecting
+agencies (radio, observers, subordinate forces, etc.), is subject to
+the usual procedures of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and
+dissemination (page 214). Analysis determines the source and the
+circumstances which led to the dispatch of the message. Evaluation
+determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation calls for drawing
+conclusions. The resulting intelligence is then disseminated to those
+concerned, either within the command or elsewhere.
+
+Since information of the enemy does not become intelligence until
+converted thereinto by the process of drawing conclusions, this
+important procedure is recorded briefly in the work sheet. Such record
+makes available, for inclusion in estimates or in reports, the reasons
+which have formed the basis for such conclusions.
+
+Information of friendly forces, with any deductions drawn therefrom,
+is similarly entered in the appropriate portions of the work sheet.
+
+The facts and conclusions as to fighting strength of own and enemy
+forces are important entries. The summary of fighting strength
+includes proper conclusions as to the relative fighting strength of
+the opposing forces, own and enemy's.
+
+The work sheet is also the proper document for other entries pertinent
+to estimates of the situation: e.g., the determination of own courses
+of action, the examination into enemy capabilities, and the selection
+of own best course of action. The commander's decisions, as rendered
+from time to time, are also entered for purposes of temporary record.
+
+
+Summary
+
+The work sheet, therefore, if properly utilized, contains the Running
+Estimate of the Situation, and is supported by the journal and the
+journal file. By the use of the Running Estimate and its supporting
+documents, the commander is enabled to keep himself apprised of the
+developments of the situation. On this basis he is able to detect the
+necessity for any changes in his plan and to arrive promptly at
+decisions in accordance with such needs. These decisions become the
+basis for new or modified plans and directives, to cause the action of
+his command to conform to changes in the situation.
+
+Where the full procedure described in this Chapter is unnecessary or
+impracticable, a suitable modification without fundamental change will
+be found applicable. The mental process, even if no records are kept
+in writing, applies to the supervision of the planned action in every
+situation.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+    The discussion of "Sound Military Decision" now closes with a
+    brief review of the application of mental power to the
+    solution of military problems.
+
+
+Mental power, which includes the ability to arrive at sound solutions
+of military problems, is a recognized essential component of fighting
+strength because (page 18) it is the source of professional judgment.
+
+The procedure most likely to ensure sound solutions is the studied
+employment of a natural mental process, differing in no fundamental
+respect from that effectively utilized in all other human activities.
+The basic mental procedure remains unchanged, irrespective of the
+nature of the problem,--be it simple or complex, its solution
+instantaneous or slow. The procedure is especially adapted to the
+needs of the profession of arms through the use of the Fundamental
+Military Principle. By outlining the essential elements involved, this
+Principle, a valid guide for the solution of military problems, covers
+the full scope of the application of mental power as a recognized
+component of fighting strength.
+
+It is more especially during the swift-moving action of the tactical
+engagement that moral capacity to command, and mental ability to solve
+military problems, experience the maximum pressure of events. It is
+then, also, that the responsibility of the commander creates an added
+demand for intelligent application of mental power because of the
+vital issues which may hinge upon his decisions. That this pressure be
+successfully sustained, and this responsibility effectively
+discharged, is the goal of any system of mental training in the
+profession of arms (page 114).
+
+On a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character,
+knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision.
+
+
+OUTLINE FORM OF AN OPERATION PLAN
+
+                                      TITLES OF THE
+                                      SUPERIOR ECHELONS,
+File Notations                        TITLE OF THE FORCE,
+SECRET (or CONFIDENTIAL)              NAME OF SHIP, Flagship.
+
+Operation Plan                        PLACE OF ISSUE,
+         No. ----                     Date and hour of issue.
+
+TASK ORGANIZATION.
+
+  (a) Task Force Title, Rank and name of its commander. Composition
+      of Task Force.
+
+  (b) (Similarly enumerate other Task Forces after appropriate
+      letter (b), (c), etc.)
+
+      1. Information. Information of enemy and own forces affecting
+         the Plan and needed by subordinate commanders. If no
+         further information is available, the statement "No
+         further information" is inserted. Distinction is made
+         between matters of conjecture and of fact. If desired,
+         indicate the tasks and general objectives of higher
+         echelons and of coordinate forces of the commander's
+         echelon, and of other forces of the command, not listed in
+         the Task Organization. If desired, include general
+         measures prescribed by the immediate superior for
+         cooperation and security.
+
+         Assumptions. Statement of the assumptions upon which the
+         Plan is based. Assumptions are things taken for granted as
+         the basis for action.
+
+      2. The general plan for the whole force actually under the
+         command of the officer issuing the Plan, and, if desired,
+         the methods of executing it, and its purpose. If
+         additional matter is needed to convey clearly the will and
+         intent of the commander, such matter may be added.
+
+      3. (a) Title of Task Force (a), followed by a statement of the
+         principal task, other tasks, and detailed instructions for
+         the particular Task Force. Tasks may be stated, if
+         preferred, in chronological order. Include directions as to
+         cooperation, security, and intelligence activities.
+
+         (b) Title of Task Force (b), followed by a subparagraph of
+         similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above.
+
+         (x) Instructions that apply to all Task Forces or that
+         pertain to the general conduct of the operation, including,
+         if desired, coordinating instructions applying to more than
+         one task force. Include, particularly, measures for
+         cooperation, security, and intelligence activities. Include
+         statement of the time and/or manner in which the Operation
+         Plan is to be placed in effect.
+
+      4. Broad instructions concerning logistics measures necessary
+         to the operation, or reference to Logistics Annex, if one
+         has been prepared in connection with the operation.
+
+      5. Measures necessary to the exercise of command, such as plan
+         of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous, and
+         location of Commander during operation.
+
+                                       (Signature)
+                                        Rank,
+                                        Title of Command.
+
+ANNEXES.
+
+A. (Name)
+B. do          NOTE--The Operation Order (see page 196) follows this
+               Form except that it makes no provision for assumptions,
+DISTRIBUTION   and is effective on receipt unless otherwise provided in
+               the body of the Order.
+
+(Authentication)
+
+(Seal)
+
+
+
+
+TABULAR FORMS
+
+
+TABULAR FORM OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
+
+
+Section                                                      Page
+
+I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.
+
+  A. The Appropriate Effect Desired                           118
+     (1) Summary of the Situation                             119
+     (2) Recognition of the Incentive                         119
+     (3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective               119
+     (4) Formulation of the Mission                           121
+
+  B. Relative Fighting Strength                               121
+
+   (To include only such of the following factors as appear
+   to be necessary background for the later reasoning in
+   Sections II to IV.)
+
+  (1) Survey of the Means Available and Opposed               123
+     *(a) General Factors                                     124
+            (i) Political Factors                             124
+           (ii) Economics Factors                             125
+          (iii) Psychological Factors                         125
+           (iv) Information and Counter-Information
+                Measures                                      126
+      (b) Factors More Directly Applicable to the
+          Armed Forces                                        127
+            (i) Vessels, including Aircraft                   127
+           (ii) Land Forces, including land-based
+                aviation                                      127
+          (iii) Personnel                                     127
+           (iv) Material                                      128
+            (v) Logistics                                     128
+
+  (2) Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater
+      of Operations                                           129
+      (a) Hydrography                                         129
+      (b) Topography                                          130
+      (c) Weather                                             130
+      (d) Daylight and Dark Periods                           130
+      (e) Relative Location and Distance                      131
+      (f) Lines of Transportation and Supply                  131
+      (g) Facilities and Fortifications                       131
+      (h) Communications                                      131
+
+  (3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength            132
+
+
+II. DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE
+    COURSES OF ACTION.
+
+  A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective                       135
+
+  B. Survey of Courses of Action                              135
+
+  C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility,
+     and Acceptability                                        137
+
+  D. Listing Retained Courses of Action                       139
+
+
+III. EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF
+THE ENEMY                                                     139
+
+  A. Survey of the Enemy's Problem                            141
+     (1) Summary of the Enemy's Situation                     141
+     (2) Analysis of the Effect Desired by the Enemy          141
+
+  B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities                             143
+
+  C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility,
+     and Acceptability                                        144
+
+  D. Listing Retained Enemy Courses of Action                 144
+
+
+IV. SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION.
+
+  A. Analysis and Comparison of Retained Courses of
+     Action                                                   145
+
+  B. Determination of the Best Course of Action               148
+
+
+V. THE DECISION                                               151
+
+* Usually included only in an estimate of broad scope.
+
+On the reverse side, page 224, will be found a Tabular Form of the
+Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed Operations.
+
+CAUTION. This folder is merely a guide, provided in order to
+facilitate reference to the subject matter of Chapters VI and VII. It
+is not possible to arrive at sound military decision by its use
+alone.
+
+
+TABULAR FORM OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED
+OPERATIONS
+
+                                                             Page
+
+1. Assumptions                                            155-156
+
+2. Alternative Plans                                      156-157
+
+3. Application of the Essential Elements of a
+Favorable Military Operation                              157-164
+  (a) Correct physical objectives                         157-158
+      (1) Effective action with relation to                   158
+  (b) Advantageous relative positions                         159
+  (c) Freedom of action                                   159-162
+  (d) Proper apportionment of fighting strength           162-164
+
+4. Testing of Operations for Suitability, Feasibility
+   and Acceptability                                      164-165
+   (a) Listing of retained operations                         165
+
+5. The Formulation of Tasks                                   165
+   (a) Testing of tasks for suitability, feasibility
+       and acceptability                                      165
+
+6. The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups        165-166
+   (a) Grouping of tasks                                  165-166
+   (b) Assignment of necessary strength                       166
+   (c) Completion of the organization                         166
+
+7. Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
+   to the Determination of Objectives Embodied in Tasks       167
+
+8. The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action         167-168
+
+9. The Assembly of Information                                168
+
+10. The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans                   168-179
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+A
+
+Acceptable consequences as to costs, principle for determination
+  of 34, 35
+
+Acceptability, application of test for 101, 102, 137, 144, 147, 164,
+  165, 167
+
+Action,
+  effective, against correct physical objectives 157
+  freedom of (See Freedom of Action)
+  physical conditions prevailing in field of 31
+  supervision of the 4, 197
+
+Action, courses of, (See Courses of Action)
+
+Annexes to Order Form 193
+
+Application of
+  essential elements of favorable military operations 157-164
+  tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability 99-102,
+    137-139, 144, 147, 164, 165, 167
+  the Fundamental Military Principle 43-77
+
+Apportionment of fighting strength,
+  during amphibious operations 67
+  discussion of 66-70
+  dispersion and concentration involved in 67, 68
+  diversion, bearing of, on 68
+  feasibility and acceptability of 69, 70
+  joint operations 67
+  numerical considerations 67
+  procedure for determining proper 69
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38, 39, 40, 41
+  types, training and equipment of forces 67
+
+Appropriate effect desired,
+  assigned objective becomes 49
+  as the basis for the objective 52
+  definition of 21
+  enemy's 143
+  operations studied from viewpoint of 162-164
+  forms part of basis for solution of problem 30
+  principle for determination of 33
+  requirements for an understanding of 43
+  suitability as to 118-120
+
+Areas,
+  coveted or in dispute 65
+  geographical not under one's own control 65
+  geographical under one's own control 65
+  no land, belong equally to all nations 62
+  sea, not under command 92
+  sea, securing command of 92
+  sea, under command 92
+
+Armament, material factor of 128
+
+Armed forces,
+  command of 11
+  factors more directly applicable to 127
+  function and character of 8
+  fundamental objective of 8
+  initial requisite to effective use of 11
+
+Art of War,
+  a true concept of, requirement of 9-10
+  foundation of 1
+
+Assumptions,
+  defined and discussed 155, 171
+  may form basis of Estimate 111
+
+Authentication, order form 194
+
+
+B
+
+Basic,
+  decision 82
+  estimate of the situation 82
+  problem 81
+  problems challenging integrity of, plan(s) 203
+  problems involving modification of, plan(s) 201
+  situation 82
+  war plans 195
+
+Basis,
+  of science of war 1
+  for solution of problem 20, 21, 29, 30, 43, 118, 134
+
+Battle Plans 168-171, 196
+
+Blind adherence to plan condemned 200
+
+Body of order form 190
+
+Brevity, required in directives 186
+
+
+C
+
+Campaign Plans,
+  defined 195
+  form of 194
+
+Campaigns of Twentieth Century reflect intensity of mental training 2
+
+Capabilities of enemy,
+  examination into 139-145
+  examination not complete under certain conditions 146
+  survey of 143
+
+Cause and effect 3
+  correct relation between, established by principles 22
+  natural forces and resultant conditions 19
+  principles as valid statements of 19
+
+Challenge to integrity of basic plan 203
+
+Characteristics,
+  commander's personal 127
+  influence of, on fighting strength 31, 34, 43
+  of (field) theater of (action) operations 31, 35, 39-41, 43, 52, 64,
+    65, 129-132
+  racial or national 126
+
+Clarity,
+  required in directives 186
+
+Command,
+  adherence to chain of, essential to mutual understanding 14
+  chain of 12, 53
+  echelons of 12
+  mental preparation for 114
+  paragraph, in order form 193
+  responsibility and authority inherent in 12
+  the ideal of 11
+  training for 11
+  unity of 71
+
+Commander,
+  may depart from his instructions 16
+  may modify or alter assigned task 15
+  relation of, to subordinates 15
+  staff of a 13
+  the personification of command 11
+
+Communication(s),
+  lines of 67, 91
+  plans, as an annex 193
+  provision for 168
+  study of in strategical and tactical estimates 131-182
+
+Component(s),
+  human and material, of fighting strength 8, 9
+  major, of military problems 43-47
+  mental power, recognized essential, of fighting strength 18, 217
+  parts of an operation assigned as tasks 162
+
+Condition(s),
+  influence of, on resources 21
+  of armed forces 128, 129
+  of material 128
+  in war, peacetime exercises not a conclusive guide to 198
+
+Consequences as to costs, principle for determination of acceptable 35
+
+Constructive representations, establishing basis for 103
+
+Corollaries to the Decision 153
+
+Corollary principle,
+  of the Correct Military Objective 42
+  of Effective Military Operations 42
+
+Correct military objective(s),
+  corollary principle of the 42
+  selection of 47-51
+
+Correct physical objectives, effective action against 157, 158
+
+Course(s) of action,
+  analysis and selection of 97, 104
+  analysis of, settles suitability, feasibility and acceptability 97
+  as tentative solutions, complete or partial 88, 93, 136
+  classified as to suitability, feasibility and acceptability 139
+  combination of enemy's 146
+  combination of, into complete solution 93, 138
+  comparison of, summarized 148
+  consideration of operations involved in 98
+  defined 88
+  degree of detail in which, may be visualized varies 96
+  determination and selection of the best 145-161
+  each, embodies an objective 82
+  examples of 89
+  how phrased 109
+  listing of 136, 139
+  listing of retained 139, 148
+  listing of retained enemy's 144
+  no rigid line of demarcation between, and operations pertaining
+    thereto 92
+  predetermined 86, 96, 102
+  rejection of 138, 139, 147
+  resolving into operations 147
+  retained, analyses and comparison of 145-147
+  selection of the best 145-151
+  survey of 135-137
+  test for suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 82, 98-102,
+    187, 144, 147, 164, 166, 167
+  visualization of 93
+  when embodied in decision 88
+
+
+D
+
+Daylight and dark periods 130
+
+Decision 161-154
+  basic 82
+  corollaries to the 153
+  embodies best solution of the problem 22
+  expresses a general plan of action 83
+  indicates general objective 104
+  purpose of the 152
+  relation of, to detailed plan and directives 153
+  relation of, to mission 105
+  restatement of, for use in directive 187
+  statement of 151
+  subsidiary 106, 108
+
+Detailed Plan 44, 49
+
+Dilemma,
+  definition of 148
+  procedure in case of 149
+
+Directive(s)
+  basic 82
+  defined 183
+  formulation and issue of 183
+  fragmentary 184
+  military, essentials of 185
+  military plans and military 183
+  requirements of a 186
+  subsidiary, and plans 106
+  types of naval 195
+
+Distance,
+  involved in movements 65
+  relative location and 131
+
+Distribution of Order Form 194
+
+Diversions 68
+
+Doctrine,
+  derivation of meaning of 16
+  military 16
+
+
+E
+
+Echelon of command, definition of 12
+
+Economic factors 125
+
+Effect desired,
+  appropriate, defined 21
+  by enemy, analysis of 141
+  character distinctly military, in war 35
+  enemy's 143
+  factor of the 39-41
+  further 20
+  produced by action of natural causes 19
+  source of 20-21
+  suitable to further effect, if appropriate 21, 30
+
+End in view,
+  a result to be produced, an effect desired 30
+  requirements for attainment of an 30, 31
+
+Ending of Order Form 193
+
+Enemy, information of 215
+
+Enemy('s),
+  capabilities, examination into 139-146
+  capabilities, survey of 143
+  information of the 190, 216
+  problem, survey of 141-143
+  situation, summary of 141
+  situation, re-estimate of 146
+
+Entries in journals and work-sheets 214
+
+Essential elements,
+  of a favorable military operation 47, 157
+  of a favorable military situation 47
+  relationship existing among 3
+
+Establishment of the basis for solution of the problem 118-136
+
+Estimate form,
+  a flexible guide 117
+  variation in requirements of 170
+
+Estimate(s) of the Situation,
+  basic 82
+  provides basis for plan 82
+  estimate within an 83
+  form, a detailed guide for use of Fundamental Military Principle 113
+  founded on Fundamental Military Principle, 82
+  oral 212
+  running 107, 118, 204-205
+  subsidiary 106
+  tabular form of 222
+
+Examination into capabilities of enemy 139-145
+
+Execution of plans, importance of 198
+
+
+F
+
+Facilities and fortifications 131
+
+Factor(s),
+  defined 25
+  directly applicable to armed forces 127
+  each to be weighed in connection with others 28
+  general, applicable to broad estimates 124
+  in relation to a situation 25
+  interdependency of 32, 39-41
+  pertinent, relation of, to effects to be produced 28
+  strength and weakness 132, 133
+
+Favorable military situation,
+  essential elements of a, unchanged through the years 1
+  salient features of a 39
+
+Favorably progressing military operation, salient features of a 38, 39
+
+Feasibility 39-41, 61, 99
+  application of test of 187, 144, 147, 164, 165, 167
+  consideration of, calls for survey of comparative resources 31
+  facility of execution as test for 100
+  prospects of success as test for 100
+  relation of, to correct end in view 31, 32
+
+Features,
+  salient, of favorable military situation 38-41
+
+Feints 59
+
+Fighting strength,
+  apportionment of 66-70, 162-164
+  conclusions as to 132
+  derivation of 35
+  human and material components of 8
+  mental power, a recognized essential component of 18, 217
+  relative 4, 35, 43, 52, 121, 122, 132
+  survey of factors of 88
+
+File, journal, description of 207
+
+Force(s),
+  armed, function and character of 8
+  requirements of, for task groups 166
+  task, organization of 165
+
+Form,
+  estimate, a flexible guide 117
+  order, detailed description of 188-195
+  order, discussion of 183-196
+  standard, for plans and directives 188
+  use of, in solution of problem 110-113
+
+Formulation,
+  of mission 82, 87, 121, 204
+  of tasks 84-86, 165, 192
+
+Freedom of action,
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38-41
+  adequate, measures for ensuring 160-162
+  assembly of measures for 167
+  best basis for devising measures for 76
+  discussion of 70-77
+  initiative, of paramount importance to 74
+  list of matters requiring consideration for ensurance of 16
+  logistics support essential to 74
+  morale founded upon sound discipline, an essential to 72
+  organization, of primary importance in contributing to 71
+  relation of offensive to 75
+  security measures necessary to 74
+
+Fundamental considerations,
+  factors become, in particular circumstances 28
+  the basis for the successful conduct of war 1
+
+Fundamental military philosophy 3
+
+Fundamental Military Principle 39-42
+
+Fundamental principle for attainment of an end 32
+
+Fundamentals common to all campaigns of history 1
+
+Further effect(s),
+  consideration of 120
+  indicated by higher authority 33
+  relation of, to effect desired 30
+
+
+G
+
+General factors applicable to broad estimates 124
+
+General plan,
+  a comprehensive method of attaining the assigned objective 49, 109
+  the Decision available as a 22, 44, 88
+  indicated in or developed from the Decision 155
+
+Genius, fallacy of relying on availability of 2
+
+Goal of planning 197
+
+Groups, Task, organization of 165
+
+Guide,
+  the Estimate Form a flexible 117
+  the Fundamental Military Principle a valid and practical 41
+
+
+H
+
+Heading of Order Form 189
+
+Hydrography in theater of operations 129
+
+
+I
+
+Incentive,
+  during supervision of the action 198
+  recognition of the 20, 43, 44, 50, 79, 82, 119, 203
+  relationship of, with motivating task 79
+
+Indoctrination, meaning and application of 16
+
+Information,
+  and counter-information measures 126
+  its collection, analysis, evaluation and interpretation 122
+  of enemy and of friendly forces 190, 216
+  paragraph of Order Form 190
+
+Initiative,
+  offensive is a method of seizing 75
+  relation of, to freedom of action 74
+
+Instructions,
+  action may be necessary before receipt of 203
+  commander may depart from 16
+  letter of, in lieu of directive cast in standard form 188
+  the letter and spirit of, variation from 103
+
+Intelligence,
+  accurate, related to freedom of action 76
+  and counter-intelligence, measures for 160-161
+  derived from information 122
+  plan 177
+  subsidiary problem involving 176
+
+Intelligent suspicion, everything to be viewed with 200
+
+Inventiveness and versatility, special attention to desirable 126
+
+
+J
+
+Journal file, description of 207
+
+Journal for entry of data in running estimate,
+  description of 205-207
+  entries in, purely factual 214
+
+Judgment, professional,
+  essential to good leadership 3
+  exercise of, in planning 117-179
+  exercise of, in the execution of the plan 183-217
+  has its source in mental power 217
+  relation of to successful conduct of war 40-114
+
+
+L
+
+Letters of instruction, use of 85, 188
+
+Life, the ability to withstand punishment 188
+
+Listing,
+  of courses of action 186, 189
+  of operations in definite sequence 158
+  of retained courses of action 139, 148
+
+Logical thought,
+  necessity for 22
+  principles in their relation to 22
+  separates the rational from the irrational 22
+
+Logistics,
+  factor of direct concern to armed forces 129
+  paragraph of Order Form 198
+  plan 179
+  support, commander hampered without 74
+  support, measures for 162
+
+Loyalty,
+  a military necessity 15
+  more than a moral virtue 14
+  mutual, born of mutual confidence 9
+
+
+M
+
+Material, a factor applicable to armed forces 128
+
+Means,
+  available, and opposed 31-36, 38-41, 43, 52
+  survey of 123
+  to be made available, principle for determination of 34
+
+Measures,
+  for adequate freedom of action 160-162, 167
+  for exercise of command 160, 168
+  for information and counter-information 126
+  for intelligence and counter-intelligence 160
+  for logistics support 162, 167
+  for security, cooperation and intelligence 167
+  for training 160
+
+Mental elements of fighting strength enumerated 9
+
+Mental power,
+  essential component of fighting strength 18, 217
+  vital, as basis for professional counsel to State 10
+
+Mental process(es) (See Natural mental process(es))
+
+Military plans and directives (See Directive(s))
+
+Military effort, no easy road to goal of 4
+
+Military operation(s),
+  application of essential elements of a favorable 157
+  as tentative solutions of problems, denominated as course(s) of
+    action 82
+  attainment of military objective depends on effective 40, 47
+  determination of effective 55
+  possible confusion because of phraseology as to 109
+  principle of effective 42
+
+Military principles, procedure for developing 29
+
+Military problem(s), (See also Problem(s))
+  conclusion as to approach to solution of 113
+  approach to solution of, involves four distinct steps 80
+  basic 81, 82
+  effect to be produced and action required to produce it, major
+    considerations in solving 44
+  use of a form in solution of 110-118
+  four steps in solution of 79-114
+  involvements of full solution of 82
+  major components of 43, 44
+  solution of 44, 79-114
+    first step, in 81-106
+    second step, in 106, 117-164
+    third step, in 107, 155-179
+    fourth step, in 107, 183-216
+    sequence of the four steps in 107-109, 113
+    sound basis for, establishment of 20, 43
+
+Military situation, every, has both strategical State in military
+    matters 10
+
+Military situation, every, has both strategical and tactical aspects 83
+
+Mission,
+  an assigned task coupled with purpose 87
+  clearly indicates the appropriate effect desired 121
+  double or multiple tasks in 88
+  formulation of, 82, 87, 121 204
+  manner of expressing 87
+  restated 135
+  subsidiary 170, 172, 174-176
+
+Mobility, as a material factor 128
+
+Modification of basic plan, problems involving 201
+
+Morale, discussion of 72, 73
+
+Motivating task 80
+
+Mutual understanding essential to unity of effort 14
+  final aim of 15
+
+
+N
+
+National and racial characteristics, factors of 126
+
+Natural law,
+  human activities governed by 29
+  relation of cause, effect and further effect to 19, 32
+  relation of, to human activity 11
+
+Natural mental process(es),
+  adapted to military requirements 80
+  application of, to problems of war 11
+  employed by normal mature human beings 19
+  studied employment of, ii, 217
+
+Naval directives, types of 195
+
+
+O
+
+Objective(s),
+  appreciation of (assigned) 44, 82, 119, 203
+  assigned 48-50, 119-121, 135
+  attainment of, by chain of command 12
+  best attained by properly directed effort 45, 79
+  chain of 48, 62, 54
+  correct military, principle of 42
+  selection of 43, 46, 47, 51, 117-184
+  correct military, relation of, to favorable military situation 37
+  correct physical, determination of (See also physical
+    objective(s)) 157, 158
+  determination of, embodied in tasks 167
+  general 49, 60
+  immediate 3, 64
+  inferred in assigned tasks 49, 84, 88, 104
+  in mind 37, 47
+  in space, physical 37, 47
+  intermediate 54
+  in war is an effect to be produced 36
+  national 7
+  physical (See also physical objective(s))
+  purpose of attainment usually given to subordinates, 48
+  selection of correct military 43, 45, 47, 51, 117-134
+  specified in tasks 84, 104, 49, 88
+  tentatively selected 51
+  typically selected by commander himself 50
+  ultimate 3, 54
+
+Offensive, relation of, to freedom of action 75
+
+Operation plans 195
+
+Operation(s),
+  planning detailed 3
+  developed from measures for freedom of action 160
+  effective military, principle of 42
+  enemy's, envisaged by commander 144
+  favorable military situation dependent upon effective 1, 41
+  in relation to required action 106-107
+  listing of 158
+  military 37, 109
+  naval, classification of 92
+  order (plan), outline form of 219
+  reconsideration of 159
+  resolution of required action into 155-179
+  resolving courses of action into 147
+  theater of, characteristics of 129
+
+Oral estimate 212
+
+Order form,
+  annexes to 193
+  authentication of 194
+  body of 190
+  detailed description of 188-194
+  distribution of 194
+  purpose of 112, 188
+
+Organization of task forces and tasks groups 165
+
+Organization, staff, and functioning 210-212
+
+Outline form of Operation Plan 219
+
+
+P
+
+Perplexity, source of every problem 20, 79
+
+Personnel factor applicable to armed forces 127
+
+Philosophy, fundamental military 3
+
+Physical conditions in field of action 34
+
+Physical objective(s),
+  defined 37, 47, 167
+  determination of correct 65
+  discussion of 55-59
+  effective action against 157, 158
+  eventual, a land objective 58
+  fundamental considerations in determination of 55
+  relation of, to (mental) objective 38
+  a salient feature of a military situation (operation) 47
+  series of, to be dealt with in successive stages 56
+  suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 56-59
+
+Pithy statements, danger of 24
+
+Planned action,
+  inauguration of 183-196
+  supervision of 197-217
+
+Planning, goal of 197
+
+Plan(s),
+  alternative 156
+  as proposed methods of procedure 21
+  basic 82, 108, 195
+  basic, problems challenging integrity of 203
+  basic, problems involving modification of 201
+  battle, described 168-171
+  best, incorporated in Decision 22
+  blind adherence to, condemned 200
+  campaign 194, 195
+  comparison of 21
+  detailed 22, 49, 105
+  general 2, 22, 88, 105, 155, 183
+  intelligence 177
+  logistics 179
+  military directives and military 183
+  of execution 108
+  operation, outline form of 219
+  outlined, plan embodied in basic decision 108
+  subsidiary 106, 168, 186, 201
+
+Policy,
+  coordination of national 9
+  implementation of national 7
+  relation of, to military strategy 9
+
+Political factors 124
+
+Position(s) (See relative position(s))
+
+Positiveness, required in directives 187
+
+Power, mental, moral and physical 8, 217
+
+Predetermined course(s) of action 86, 96, 102
+
+Principle(s),
+  a natural law 22
+  cannot replace logical thought 28
+  corollary for determination of the appropriate effect to be desired 33
+  corollary or subordinate 22, 23, 28
+  establish (es) relations between cause and effect 22
+  false, why man adopts them; their danger 24
+  for determination of acceptable consequences as to cost 35
+  for determination of the proper means to be made available 34
+  for determination of the proper physical conditions to be
+    established in the field of action 34
+  for determining salient features of favorable military situation 39
+  formulation and use of 23, 27
+  fundamental, if basic in its field 22
+  fundamental, for the attainment of an end 32
+  in relation to logical thought 22
+  military, procedure for development of 29
+  of effective military operations 42
+  of the correct military objective 42
+  review of conclusions as to 29
+  the Fundamental Military 39-41
+
+Principles of War (so-called) value and limitations of 25
+
+Problem(s),
+  appearance of perplexity in situation results in 20
+  basic, the solution of 117
+  basis for solution of 20-21
+  challenging integrity of basic plan 203
+  courses, of action as tentative solutions of 136
+  enemy's, survey of 141
+  establishment of basis for solution of 118
+  involving modification of basic plan 201
+  recognition of new 199
+  solution of 20, 44
+  subsidiary 106
+  arising because of no sound solution for basic 149
+  how solved 106, 169
+  involving intelligence 176
+  involving preparation of battle plans 171
+  relating to logistics 178
+  relating to training 175
+  tactical 108
+
+Psychological factors 125
+
+Purpose,
+  of Decision 152-153
+  of Mission 87, 121
+  re-examined 135
+
+
+R
+
+Racial characteristics as psychological factor 126
+
+Raid may be a valuable operation 73
+
+Readjustments required during supervision of planned action 199
+
+Recognition of the incentive 119, 203
+
+Reestimate of the situation 146
+
+Rejection of courses of action 138, 139, 147
+
+Relations, external 124
+
+Relative fighting strength 4, 35, 43, 52, 121, 122
+  conclusions as to 132
+  feasibility and acceptability as to 121-133
+
+Relative location and distance 131
+
+Relative position(s),
+  advantageous 159
+  characteristics of theatre, important from standpoint of 64
+  discussion of 59-66
+  fundamental considerations as to 59
+  procedure for determination and selection of advantageous 61, 159
+  salient feature of a military situation (operation) 38-41
+  suitability, feasibility and acceptability of 61-66
+
+Resources,
+  as part of basis for solution of problem 21, 30
+  feasibility requires survey of 31
+
+Restatement of the decision for use in the directive 187
+
+Rule(s) of action,
+  circumstances alter cases, a reliable 24
+  faulty, unfortunate consequences of 23, 24
+  pithy statements as 24
+  search for reliable, by human mind 23
+
+Running estimate 107, 113, 204
+
+
+S
+
+Salient features,
+  considered in selecting objective 51
+  of a situation 39
+  of military operations 38-41, 111
+
+Science of war, basis for 1
+
+Scientific analysis 1
+
+Scientific approach to solution of military problems 2
+
+Scientific investigation 1
+
+Sea(s),
+  areas, operations for securing command of 92
+  high, and air above, presumably common property 62
+  movement by land, and air 60
+  provides theatre of operations with distinctive characteristics 80
+  routes, an important subject of study 62, 131
+  surface of, provides roads 62
+
+Security measures 74
+
+Selection of the best course of action 145-151
+
+Sequence of operations, visualized 158
+
+Sequence of tasks, chronological or in order of importance 166
+
+Signature in Order Form 193
+
+Situation,
+  a combination of circumstances 20, 25
+  actual or assumed 79
+  basic 82
+  enemy, summary of 141
+  produced by effects of certain causes 25
+  summary of 82, 119, 203
+  to be maintained or created 21, 30
+
+Solution(s) of problem(s),
+  establishment of basis for 118-135
+  process of 135-151
+  tentative 88, 93, 97, 136
+
+Sound decision, approach presented for reaching 3
+
+Staff,
+  assistance, utilization of 93
+  of commander 13
+  organization and functioning 210-212
+
+Stages, successive, for accomplishment of effort 164
+
+Standard form for plans and directives 188
+
+Strategy,
+  and tactics inseparable 10, 11
+  differentiated from tactics by end in view 83
+  distinguished by objectives 3, 10
+  in relation to policy 9
+  in relation to tactics 10
+
+Strength and weakness factors 132
+
+Strength, relative fighting (see also fighting strength) 4, 33, 43,
+    52, 121, 122, 132
+
+Subordinates, proper relationship of, to commander 15
+
+Subsidiary mission 170, 172, 174, 175, 176
+
+Subsidiary plans,
+  as annexes 185
+  preparation of 168-179
+
+Subsidiary problem(s) (See also Problem(s))
+  arising because of no sound solution for basic problem 149
+  how solved 106,169
+  involving intelligence 176
+  involving preparation of battle plan 171
+  relative to logistics 178
+  relative to training 175
+
+Suitability,
+  application of test for 98-102, 137, 144, 147, 164
+  requirement of 31, 32, 39-41, 43, 51, 56
+
+Summarized comparison of courses of action 148
+
+Supervision of planned action 197-216
+
+Suspicion, intelligent, everything to be viewed with 200
+
+
+T
+
+Tactics,
+  and strategy inseparable 10
+  differentiated from strategy by end in view 83
+
+Task(s)
+  as a predetermined course of action 86
+  assignment of, to subordinates 84, 192, 193
+  expressed in terms of accomplishment 84
+  forces and task groups 165, 166, 190
+  formulation of 165
+  logistics 166
+  manner of expressing 84-86
+  modification of, may be required by changing situation 15
+  motivating 80, 153
+  of the mission 87, 121, 136
+  organization 14, 165, 166, 190
+  properly conceived, indicate an objective 84
+  re-examination of 135
+  underlying 103
+
+Technique, nature of, in solution of problems 205
+
+Tentative solution(s) of problem(s) 88, 93, 97, 136
+
+Tests for suitability, feasibility and acceptability 137-139, 144,
+    147, 164, 168
+
+Theater of operations, survey of characteristics of 129-132
+
+Training,
+  measures for 160
+  peacetime 2
+  subsidiary problem relating to 175
+  tactical 72
+
+Transportation and supply, lines of 131
+
+Types of naval directives 195
+
+
+U
+
+Undesirable departures from plan involve penalty 201
+
+Unforeseen opportunity to strike enemy may be presented 200
+
+Unity of effort,
+  adherence to chain of command, essential to 12
+  between management and labor 126
+  most important single factor 12, 13
+  mutual understanding requisite to 14
+
+
+V
+
+Versatility, as a psychological factor 126
+
+Vessels, including aircraft, as a factor applicable to armed forces 127
+
+
+W
+
+War,
+  a human activity and subject to natural law 11
+  as understood herein 8
+  conditions in, peacetime exercises not conclusive guide to 198
+  effective conduct of, requirements and demands of 17
+  specialized nature of, as a human activity 35
+
+Warfare, naval, discussion of 91, 92
+
+Weather 130
+
+Will of the commander, importance of 201
+
+Work Sheet,
+  description of 207-210
+  entries in 214
+  facilitates oral estimates 212
+  facilitates special reports 212
+  facilitates written estimates 213
+  summary of 216
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+    +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+    | Typographical errors corrected in text:                   |
+    |                                                           |
+    | Page   8: circumtances replaced with circumstances        |
+    | Page  61: skillfull replaced with skillful                |
+    | Page 172: therof replaced with thereof                    |
+    | Page 175: caried replaced with carried                    |
+    |                                                           |
+    +-----------------------------------------------------------+
+
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